CCPR General Comment No.

27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement)

Adopted at the Sixty-seventh session of the Human Rights Committee,

on 2 November 1999
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, General Comment No. 27. (General Comments)
(Contained in document CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9)

1. Liberty of movement is an indispensable condition for the free development of

a person. It interacts with several other rights enshrined in the Covenant, as is often
shown in the Committee’s practice in considering reports from States parties and
communications from individuals. Moreover, the Committee in its general comment
No. 15 (“The position of aliens under the Covenant”, 1986) referred to the special link
between articles 12 and 13. 1

2. The permissible limitations which may be imposed on the rights protected

under article 12 must not nullify the principle of liberty of movement, and are
governed by the requirement of necessity provided for in article 12, paragraph 3, and
by the need for consistency with the other rights recognized in the Covenant.

3. States parties should provide the Committee in their reports with the relevant
domestic legal rules and administrative and judicial practices relating to the rights
protected by article 12, taking into account the issues discussed in the present general
comment. They must also include information on remedies available if these rights
are restricted.

Liberty of movement and freedom to choose residence (para. 1)

4. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State enjoys, within that territory,
the right to move freely and to choose his or her place of residence. In principle,
citizens of a State are always lawfully within the territory of that State. The question
whether an alien is “lawfully” within the territory of a State is a matter governed by
domestic law, which may subject the entry of an alien to the territory of a State to
restrictions, provided they are in compliance with the State’s international obligations.
In that connection, the Committee has held that an alien who entered the State
illegally, but whose status has been regularized, must be considered to be lawfully
within the territory for the purposes of article 12. 2 Once a person is lawfully within a
State, any restrictions on his or her rights guaranteed by article 12, paragraphs 1 and
2, as well as any treatment different from that accorded to nationals, have to be
justified under the rules provided for by article 12, paragraph 3. 3 It is, therefore,
important that States parties indicate in their reports the circumstances in which they
treat aliens differently from their nationals in this regard and how they justify this
difference in treatment.

1
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, 15 August 1997, p. 20 (para. 8).
2
Communication No. 456/1991, Celepli v. Sweden, paragraph 9.2.
3
General comment No. 15, paragraph 8, in HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, 15 August 1997, p. 20.
5. The right to move freely relates to the whole territory of a State, including all
parts of federal States. According to article 12, paragraph 1, persons are entitled to
move from one place to another and to establish themselves in a place of their choice.
The enjoyment of this right must not be made dependent on any particular purpose or
reason for the person wanting to move or to stay in a place. Any restrictions must be
in conformity with paragraph 3.

6. The State party must ensure that the rights guaranteed in article 12 are
protected not only from public but also from private interference. In the case of
women, this obligation to protect is particularly pertinent. For example, it is
incompatible with article 12, paragraph 1, that the right of a woman to move freely
and to choose her residence be made subject, by law or practice, to the decision of
another person, including a relative.

7. Subject to the provisions of article 12, paragraph 3, the right to reside in a

place of one’s choice within the territory includes protection against all forms of
forced internal displacement. It also precludes preventing the entry or stay of persons
in a defined part of the territory. Lawful detention, however, affects more specifically
the right to personal liberty and is covered by article 9 of the Covenant. In some
circumstances, articles 12 and 9 may come into play together.4

Freedom to leave any country, including one’s own (para. 2)

8. Freedom to leave the territory of a State may not be made dependent on any
specific purpose or on the period of time the individual chooses to stay outside the
country. Thus travelling abroad is covered, as well as departure for permanent
emigration. Likewise, the right of the individual to determine the State of destination
is part of the legal guarantee. As the scope of article 12, paragraph 2, is not restricted
to persons lawfully within the territory of a State, an alien being legally expelled from
the country is likewise entitled to elect the State of destination, subject to the
agreement of that State. 5

9. In order to enable the individual to enjoy the rights guaranteed by article 12,
paragraph 2, obligations are imposed both on the State of residence and on the State
of nationality. 6 Since international travel usually requires appropriate documents, in
particular a passport, the right to leave a country must include the right to obtain the
necessary travel documents. The issuing of passports is normally incumbent on the
State of nationality of the individual. The refusal by a State to issue a passport or
prolong its validity for a national residing abroad may deprive this person of the right
to leave the country of residence and to travel elsewhere. 7 It is no justification for the

4
See, for example, communication No. 138/1983, Mpandajila v. Zaire, paragraph 10; communication
No. 157/1983, Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire, paragraph 10; communication Nos. 241/1987 and 242/1987,
Birhashwirwa/Tshisekedi v. Zaire, paragraph 13.
5
See general comment No. 15, paragraph 9, in HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, 15 August 1997, p. 21.
6
See communication No. 106/1981, Montero v. Uruguay, paragraph 9.4; communication No. 57/1979,
Vidal Martins v. Uruguay, paragraph 7; communication No. 77/1980, Lichtensztejn v. Uruguay,
paragraph 6.1.
7
See communication No. 57/1979, Vidal Martins v. Uruguay, paragraph 9.
State to claim that its national would be able to return to its territory without a
passport.

10. The practice of States often shows that legal rules and administrative measures
adversely affect the right to leave, in particular, a person’s own country. It is
therefore of the utmost importance that States parties report on all legal and practical
restrictions on the right to leave which they apply both to nationals and to foreigners,
in order to enable the Committee to assess the conformity of these rules and practices
with article 12, paragraph 3. States parties should also include information in their
reports on measures that impose sanctions on international carriers which bring to
their territory persons without required documents, where those measures affect the
right to leave another country.

Restrictions (para. 3)

11. Article 12, paragraph 3, provides for exceptional circumstances in which

rights under paragraphs 1 and 2 may be restricted. This provision authorizes the State
to restrict these rights only to protect national security, public order (ordre public),
public health or morals and the rights and freedoms of others. To be permissible,
restrictions must be provided by law, must be necessary in a democratic society for
the protection of these purposes and must be consistent with all other rights
recognized in the Covenant (see paragraph 18 below).

12. The law itself has to establish the conditions under which the rights may be
limited. State reports should therefore specify the legal norms upon which restrictions
are founded. Restrictions which are not provided for in the law or are not in
conformity with the requirements of article 12, paragraph 3, would violate the rights
guaranteed by paragraphs 1 and 2.

13. In adopting laws providing for restrictions permitted by article 12,

paragraph 3, States should always be guided by the principle that the restrictions must
not impair the essence of the right (cf. article 5, paragraph 1); the relation between
right and restriction, between norm and exception, must not be reversed. The laws
authorizing the application of restrictions should use precise criteria and may not
confer unfettered discretion on those charged with their execution.

14. Article 12, paragraph 3, clearly indicates that it is not sufficient that the
restrictions serve the permissible purposes; they must also be necessary to protect
them. Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they
must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they
must be proportionate to the interest to be protected.

15. The principle of proportionality has to be respected not only in the law that
frames the restrictions, but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in
applying the law. States should ensure that any proceedings relating to the exercise or
restriction of these rights are expeditious and that reasons for the application of
restrictive measures are provided.
16. States have often failed to show that the application of their laws restricting
the rights enshrined in article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, are in conformity with all
requirements referred to in article 12, paragraph 3. The application of restrictions in
any individual case must be based on clear legal grounds and meet the test of
necessity and the requirements of proportionality. These conditions would not be
met, for example, if an individual were prevented from leaving a country merely on
the ground that he or she is the holder of “State secrets”, or if an individual were
prevented from travelling internally without a specific permit. On the other hand, the
conditions could be met by restrictions on access to military zones on national
security grounds, or limitations on the freedom to settle in areas inhabited by
indigenous or minorities communities. 8

17. A major source of concern is the manifold legal and bureaucratic barriers
unnecessarily affecting the full enjoyment of the rights of the individuals to move
freely, to leave a country, including their own, and to take up residence. Regarding
the right to movement within a country, the Committee has criticized provisions
requiring individuals to apply for permission to change their residence or to seek the
approval of the local authorities of the place of destination, as well as delays in
processing such written applications. States’ practice presents an even richer array of
obstacles making it more difficult to leave the country, in particular for their own
nationals. These rules and practices include, inter alia, lack of access for applicants to
the competent authorities and lack of information regarding requirements; the
requirement to apply for special forms through which the proper application
documents for the issuance of a passport can be obtained; the need for supportive
statements from employers or family members; exact description of the travel route;
issuance of passports only on payment of high fees substantially exceeding the cost of
the service rendered by the administration; unreasonable delays in the issuance of
travel documents; restrictions on family members travelling together; requirement of a
repatriation deposit or a return ticket; requirement of an invitation from the State of
destination or from people living there; harassment of applicants, for example by
physical intimidation, arrest, loss of employment or expulsion of their children from
school or university; refusal to issue a passport because the applicant is said to harm
the good name of the country. In the light of these practices, States parties should
make sure that all restrictions imposed by them are in full compliance with article 12,
paragraph 3.

18. The application of the restrictions permissible under article 12, paragraph 3,
needs to be consistent with the other rights guaranteed in the Covenant and with the
fundamental principles of equality and non-discrimination. Thus, it would be a clear
violation of the Covenant if the rights enshrined in article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2,
were restricted by making distinctions of any kind, such as on the basis of race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. In examining State reports, the Committee has on
several occasions found that measures preventing women from moving freely or from

8
See general comment No. 23, paragraph 7, in HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3, 15 August 1997, p. 41.
leaving the country by requiring them to have the consent or the escort of a male
person constitute a violation of article 12.

The right to enter one’s own country (para. 4)

19. The right of a person to enter his or her own country recognizes the special
relationship of a person to that country. The right has various facets. It implies the
right to remain in one’s own country. It includes not only the right to return after
having left one’s own country; it may also entitle a person to come to the country for
the first time if he or she was born outside the country (for example, if that country is
the person’s State of nationality). The right to return is of the utmost importance for
refugees seeking voluntary repatriation. It also implies prohibition of enforced
population transfers or mass expulsions to other countries.

20. The wording of article 12, paragraph 4, does not distinguish between nationals
and aliens (“no one”). Thus, the persons entitled to exercise this right can be
identified only by interpreting the meaning of the phrase “his own country”. 9 The
scope of “his own country” is broader than the concept “country of his nationality”. It
is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at birth or
by conferral; it embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his or her
special ties to or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered to be a
mere alien. This would be the case, for example, of nationals of a country who have
there been stripped of their nationality in violation of international law, and of
individuals whose country of nationality has been incorporated in or transferred to
another national entity, whose nationality is being denied them. The language of
article 12, paragraph 4, moreover, permits a broader interpretation that might embrace
other categories of long-term residents, including but not limited to stateless persons
arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such
residence. Since other factors may in certain circumstances result in the establishment
of close and enduring connections between a person and a country, States parties
should include in their reports information on the rights of permanent residents to
return to their country of residence.

21. In no case may a person be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his or her
own country. The reference to the concept of arbitrariness in this context is intended
to emphasize that it applies to all State action, legislative, administrative and judicial;
it guarantees that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with
the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event,
reasonable in the particular circumstances. The Committee considers that there are
few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own
country could be reasonable. A State party must not, by stripping a person of
nationality or by expelling an individual to a third country, arbitrarily prevent this
person from returning to his or her own country.

9
See communication No. 538/1993, Stewart v. Canada.