Recent Cases: First Sunday

Political Law

1. Persida approached the police and tipped them that Polong was engaged in illegal
drug trade and in cultivating marijuana plants. Thus, in one buy-bust incident,
several sachets of cocaine were seized from Polong. While the police were reading
him his Miranda rights, the eyewitness, Persida, pointed out a marijuana plant
hidden beneath the gabi plants found in Polong’s room. Thus, the police checked the
gabi plants and found the marijuana plant. The marijuana plant was presented in
evidence by the police, arguing that it was seized in plain view. Is the marijuana
plant admissible in evidence? Explain.
No.
The plain view doctrine applies when in the course of a lawful intrusion, the law enforcement
officer came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must
be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.
In this case, the discovery cannot be considered inadvertent because the police officers already
knew that there could be marijuana plants in the area. Moreover, the seized marijuana plant was
not open to the eye as it was hidden by gabi leaves. In fact, it was not discovered immediately by
the police officers and it took instructions from Persida that a marijuana plant was hidden
beneath the gabi plants.
Hence, the marijuana plant is not admissible in evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Acosta,
G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019, Second Division)

2. Cardema was elected and served as mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for three
consecutive terms: 2007-2010, 2010-2013, and 2013-2016. During the 2016 elections,
he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga. He argued
that during his second term as mayor of the municipality, Mabalacat was converted
into a component city. Such conversion therefore interrupted his term as mayor. He
further insisted that Mabalacat City is an entirely different political unit from the
municipality of Mabalacat, having an increased territory, income and population.
Emilio Maranon filed a petition for cancellation of Cardema’s certificate of
candidacy. Decide.
Cardema’s certificate of candidacy should be cancelled because of the three-term limit rule.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it was ruled that the conversion of a municipality into a
city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service.
In this case, despite the conversion of municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga into a component
city, Cardema never ceased from acting and discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor.
As such, he is deemed to have served three terms as mayor already for the period 2007 to 2016.
(Halili v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019, En Banc [per J.
Carpio])

Labor Law

3. Distinguish task basis engagement or pakyaw from straight-hour wage payment.

The difference lies in the non-consideration of the time spent in working. In a payment by
pakyaw basis, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that payment is reckoned in terms of
completion of the work, not in terms of the number of hours spent in the completion of the work.
(Ramiro Lim & Sons Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Guilaran, G.R. No. 221967, February 6, 2019,
Second Division [per J. Carpio])

4. Bartolome and Yamat applied as carpenter and tile setter with AICI, an
employment agency providing manpower to foreign corporations. They were
eventually engaged by Golden Arrow Company, which had its office in Sudan.
Thereafter, they signed their respective employment contracts that they would
render services for a period of not less than 24 months. Upon their arrival in Sudan,
Golden Arrow transferred their employment to its sister company, Al Mamoun. A
year later, Al Mamoun served Notices of Termination of Service to Bartolome and
Yamat, causing them to return to the Philippines.
a. Does the Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction over this case? Explain.
b. Article 14 of the contract of Bartolome and Yamat with Golden Arrow provides:
“Settlement of disputes. All claims and complaints relative to the employment
contract of the employee shall be settled in accordance with Company policies,
rules and regulations. In case the employee contests the decision of the employer,
the matter shall be settled amicably with the participation of the Labor Attache
or any authorized representative of the Philippine embassy nearest the site of
employment.” Will your answer in (a) change in view of the stipulation? Does
the provision point out to a Voluntary Arbitrator? Explain.
c. Is AICI liable? If it is liable, what are the remedies of AICI? Explain.

a.
Yes. Under the law, labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising out
of employer-employee relations or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment, as in this case. Thus, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over this case.
(Augustin International Center, Inc. v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 226578, January 28, 2019, Second
Division)

b.
No, because Article 14 of the contract refers to an amicable settlement. In similar case decided
by the Supreme Court, it was ruled that such mechanism presupposes that the parties can
negotiate with each other and thus cannot oust from the Labor Arbiter his or her jurisdiction to
decide the case.
Furthermore, the designated person in the dispute settlement provision does not refer to a
Voluntary Arbitrator under the auspices of the Labor Code. In a similar case decided by the
Court, it was ruled that, in instances such as in this case, a person designated in the dispute
settlement provision is not considered as a Voluntary Arbitrator. (Augustin International Center,
Inc. v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 226578, January 28, 2019, Second Division)

c.
Yes, because the law expressly provides that a recruitment agency, such as AICI, is solidarily
liable with the foreign employer for money claims arising out of the employee-employer
relationship between the latter and the overseas Filipino worker. Being liable therefore, AICI is
not precluded from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of any payment it has
made to Bartolome and Yamat to answer for the money claims against the foreign employer.
(Augustin International Center, Inc. v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 226578, January 28, 2019, Second
Division)

5. Boninay was employed on September 9, 2008 as a clerk by Camilla Sardines, a

domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and processing of
sardines and other canned goods. Her employment was covered by a collective
bargaining agreement and Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa – Katipunan, the
company’s sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular rank-and-file
employees. Among its provisions was a union security clause, which reads:
Section 3. Dismissal. – Any new employee covered by the bargaining unit
who attains regular status in the Company but fails to join the Union, and
any union member who is expelled from the Union or fails to maintain their
membership in the Union shall be dismissed, such as organizing or joining
another labor Union or any other labor group, upon a written demand by the
Union to the employer.
Camilla Sardines claimed that sometime in December 2013, Boninay asked several
employees to affix their signatures on a blank sheet of yellow paper for the purpose
of forming a new union, prompting the president of NLM – Katipunan to file
expulsion proceedings against her for disloyalty. Subsequently, on February 9, 2014,
Boninay organized a new union named Bantay Manggagawa sa Camila (BMC)
which she registered with the DOLE on February 20, 2014. After an investigation
which Boninay failed to appear and participate, NLM-Katipunan resolved, with the
ratification of its members, to expel Boninay on the ground of disloyalty. NLM-
Katipunan requested for the enforcement of the union security clause by demanding
the dismissal of Boninay from employment through a letter. Immediately upon
receipt of the letter, Camilla Sardines, through its HR Manager, called for Boninay.
After notifying Boninya of the union’s decision to expel her and showing her all the
documents attached to the union’s dismissal, her employment was terminated.
a. Define and distinguish the following union security clauses: union shop,
maintenance of membership, and closed shop. Identify the kind of union security
clause prevailing between Camilla Sardines and NLM-Katipunan.
b. Was Boninay’s employment validly terminated? Explain.

a.
There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a
certain period for their continued employment.
There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the
effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union
membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out
of the bargaining unit, or the agreement is terminated.
A closed shop, on the other hand, is an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer
and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed
departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and for the duration of the agreement,
remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees
in interest are a part.
The union security clause partakes of a closed shop agreement because it stipulates that Camilla
Sardines’ employees must join NLM-Katipunan and remain to be a member in good standing.
(Slord Development Corporation v. Noya, G.R. No. 232687, February 4, 2019, Second Division)

b.
Yes, Boninay was validly terminated; however, she is entitled to payment of nominal damages
because her right to procedural due process was violated.
Case law recognizes that dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the union
security clause in the collective bargaining agreement is another just cause for termination of
employment. To validly terminate the employment through the enforcement of the union security
clause, the following requisites must concur: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the
union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the collective
bargaining agreement; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to
expel the employee from the union.
There is the confluence of the foregoing requisites in this case. Firstly, the collective bargaining
agreement contained a closed shop agreement stipulating that Camilla Sardines’ employees must
join the NLM-Katipunan and remain to be a member in good standing; otherwise, through a
written demand, NLM-Katipunan can insist the dismissal of the employee. Secondly, it was
shown that NLM-Katipunan, through a letter, requested the enforcement of the union security
clause by demanding the dismissal of Boninay from employment. Finally, it was shown that
Boninay was asking several employees to affix their signatures in a yellow paper for the purpose
of forming another union and a registration of BMC showing that Boninay formed and organized
the union.
However, while there is a just cause to dismiss her from employment, Boninay was not afforded
her right to procedural due process because she was not given ample opportunity to defend
herself through the twin requirements of notice and hearing which are required in dismissals for
a just cause. (Slord Development Corporation v. Noya, G.R. No. 232687, February 4, 2019,
Second Division)

6. Enumerate the contents of a valid and enforceable quitclaim.

Under the law, these are:
1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;
2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the
employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount;
3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino,
or in the dialect known to the employees – that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they
are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive the benefits which are due them under
the law; and
4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily and had
fully understood the contents of the document and that their consent was freely given
without any threat, violence, duress, intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their
person. (Carolina;s Lace Shoppe v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 219419, April 10, 2019, Second
Division [per J. Reyes])
 Recent Cases: Second Sunday

Civil Law

1. Mayor Clemente, Dr. Clemente, Judge Clemente, and Atty. Clemente were the
owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT T-50896. During their lifetime, they
executed a Deed of Donation dated March 16, 1963 over a one-hectare portion of
their property in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The Deed of Donation
provided:
“The herein DONORS hereby voluntarily and freely give, transfer, and
convey, by way of unconditional donation, unto said DONEE, his executors
and administrators, all of the rights, title, and interest which the aforesaid
DONORS have or which pertain to them and which they owned exclusively
in the above-described real property over a one-hectare portion of the same,
solely for hospital site only and for no other else, where a Government
Hospital shall be constructed, free from all liens and encumbrances
whatsoever, which portion of the land had been segregated in the attached
subdivision plan.”
In accordance with the Deed of Donation, the construction of a building hospital
was started in the following year. However, for reasons unknown, the construction
was never completed and only its foundation remains today. In 2003, Socorro wrote
the DPWH and asked for updates for the construction of the government hospital.
However, the DPWH informed her that there were no plans to build any hospital on
the subject property. Thus, in 2004, almost 41 years after the Deed of Donation was
executed, Socorro, as heir and successor-in-interest of Mayor Clemente filed a
complaint for revocation of donation, reconveyance and recovery of possession. She
prayed that the Deed of Donation be revoked, the TCT issued in the name of the
Republic be cancelled, a new TCT in the names of the heirs of the Clemente siblings,
pro-indiviso, be issued, and the Republic of the Philippines to surrender or reconvey
to the heirs of the Clemente siblings.
a. What is the nature of the donation? Explain.
b. The Solicitor General argued that all the heirs of Mayor Clemente, Dr.
Clemente, Judge Clemente, and Atty. Clemente must be impleaded as petitioners
being co-owners of the property. Moreover, assuming arguendo that only one
heir must file a case for rescission, the estate of the Clemente siblings must be
settled first. However, Socorro argues that there is no need for a settlement of
the estate because the action for revocation of donation is filed by an heir of a co-
owner. Whose argument is correct? Explain.
c. Has the cause of action prescribed? Is the complaint barred by laches? Explain.
d. Decide on the complaint.
e. Will your answer in (e) change if the government argues that the government’s
obligation to construct a hospital was fulfilled when it started to construct a
hospital? Explain.

a.
The donation made by the Clemente siblings is a donation subject to a condition – the condition
being the construction of a government hospital and the use of the Subject Property solely for
hospital purposes. (Clemente v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220008, February 20,
2019, Second Division [per J. Carpio])

b.
Socorro is correct.
It is settled that a co-heir or a co-owner may bring suit without impleading all the other co-
owners if the suit is for the benefit of all.
In this case, it is undisputed that Socorro is an heir of one of the donors. Moreover, her prayer
was to revoke the Deed of Donation, cancel the TCT issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, issue a new certificate in the names of the heirs of the heirs of the Clemente siblings,
pro-indiviso, and direct the Republic to surrender or reconvey possession over the property to the
heirs of the Clemente siblings. It is clear, therefore, that there is no need to implead the other co-
heirs for the action to proceed as it is for the benefit of the co-ownership. (Clemente v. Republic
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220008, February 20, 2019, Second Division [per J. Carpio])

c.
Prescription has not set in because it was only in 2003 that the Republic, through the DPWH,
manifested its lack of intention of fulfilling its obligation under the Deed of Donation. It thus
became indubitable that the construction of the hospital will not take place and as a consequence,
the obligation of the donor to honor the donation is extinguished. As the action was brought a
year after, it was filed well within the four-year prescriptive period to revoke a donation based on
non-compliance of the condition.
Moreover, laches has not set in because the Deed of Donation did not specify the period within
which to comply with the condition and thus there can be no delay in asserting the right against
the Republic of the Philippines. (Clemente v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220008,
February 20, 2019, Second Division [per J. Carpio])

d.
The complaint must be granted.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that upon the non-fulfillment of the condition, the donation
may be revoked and all the rights already acquired by the done shall be deemed lost and
extinguished. The non-fulfillment of the condition gives the donor the right to revoke the
donation.
In this case, upon the execution of the Deed of Donation and the acceptance of such donation,
ownership was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines. However, for the donation to be
valid, the done must comply with its obligation to construct a government hospital and use the
subject property as a hospital site. The failure to do so gives the donor to revoke the donation.
(Clemente v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220008, February 20, 2019, Second Division
[per J. Carpio])

e.
No, because the Deed of Donation explicitly provides that the donee should construct and
complete a functioning hospital on the subject property. This can be evidenced by the words
“solely for hospital site only and for no other else, where a government hospital shall be
constructed.” (Clemente v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220008, February 20, 2019,
Second Division [per J. Carpio])

Taxation Law

2. The University of the Philippines owns a parcel of land. In its effort to raise
revenues, it leased said parcel of land to Ayala Land, Inc., a private corporation.
The Lease Contract between UP and ALI shows that it is for educational purpose
 and a support to an educational purpose. The Treasurer’s Office of Quezon City
assessed the University of the Philippines for the lot it leased to Ayala Land.
According to the City Treasurer, Sections 205 and 234 of the Local Government
Code states that when beneficial use of a real property owned by a government
instrumentality is granted to a taxable person, then the taxable person is not
exempted from paying real property tax on such property. Should UP pay for the
taxes? Explain.
No, because R.A. No. 9500 provides that all of UP’s revenues and assets used for educational
purposes or in support thereof are exempt from all taxes and duties. Thus, there is no longer any
need to ascertain or determine the tax status of the possessor or of the beneficial user to further
ascertain whether UP’s revenue or asset is exempt from tax. (University of the Philippines v.
City Treasurer of Quezon City, G.R. No. 214044, June 19, 2019, Second Division [per J.
Carpio])

3. Manny was assessed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for his tax liabilities.
Pending the final resolution by the Court of Tax Appeal of their appeal disputing
the validity of the FDDA, he sought the suspension of the issuance of warrants of
distraint and/or levy and warrants of garnishment. However, they were too late
because the CIR informed him that they have denied the request to defer the
collection enforcement action for lack of legal basis. Thus, Manny looked for
another lawyer and paid a sizeable chunk of attorney’s fees. He then filed an Urgent
Motion for the Court of Tax Appeals to lift the warrants of distraint, levy and
garnishment issued by the CIR against their assets and to enjoin the CIR from
collecting the assessed deficiency taxes pending the resolution of their appeal. The
CTA enjoined the collection but required that Manny pays a deposit no less than the
disputed amount of P3 billion or post a bond in the amount of P4 billion in
accordance with Section 11 of the CTA law. His expensive lawyer then moved for
reconsideration and argued that the appeal suspends the collection of tax.
a. Decide on the motion for reconsideration.
b. When is the bond requirement dispensed with?
c. What factors should the Court of Tax Appeals consider in ordering whether
posting of security bond under Section 11 of the Court of Tax Appeals law is
required?

a.
The motion should be dismissed because, as a rule, appeal does not suspend the collection of tax.
According to the law, an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals from the decision of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue will not suspend the payment, levy, distraint and/or sale of
any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as provided by law. By way of
exception, however, when in the view of the Court of Tax Appeals, the collection may jeopardize
the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer, it may suspend the said collection and require
the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond.
In this case, there is no showing that the collection of the taxes would jeopardize the interest of
the Government and/or Manny, the taxpayer. (Spouses Pacquiao v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R.
No. 213394, April 6, 2016, Second Division [per J. Mendoza])

b.
According to a line of decisions of the Supreme Court, the bond requirement to enjoin the
collection of taxes pending appeal of the disputed assessment is dispensed with whenever it is
determined by the courts that the method employed by the Collector of Internal Revenue in the
collection of tax is not sanctioned by law. (Privatization and Management Office v. City
Government of Tacloban, G.R. No. 211839, March 18, 2019, Second Division [per J. Reyes])

c.
These factors are as follows:
1. Whether the requirement of a notice of informal conference was complied with;
2. Whether the Commissioner’s investigation is within the prescriptive period of three
years, or 10 years in cases of false, fraudulent, or non-filing of a tax return, and if the
investigation is arbitrary and excessive;
3. Whether fraud was duly established;
4. Whether the final letter of demand issued against the taxpayer was irregular; and
5. Whether the final decision of disputed assessment and the warrants of distraint and/or
levy were validly issued. (Spouses Pacquiao v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 213394,
April 6, 2016, Second Division [per J. Mendoza])
 Recent Cases: Third Sunday

Mercantile Law

1. Is the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance available in banking transactions? Explain.

Yes. In a case decided by the Court, it was held that the doctrine of last clear chance applies in
banking transactions in such instances when the bank’s failure to exercise such ordinary care,
having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, is the proximate cause of the occurrence of
such loss or injury. (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Quiaoit, G.R. No. 199562,
January 16, 2019, Second Division [per J. Carpio])

2. Due to the closure of his bank, Cooperative Rural Bank, depositor Carlito filed a
claim for payment of deposit insurance for his account which had a balance of
P400,000.00 at the time of the bank’s closure. Upon investigation, PDIC found that
Carlito’s account originated from the account of Cornelio or Ligaya with an
opening balance of P1.5 million. On December 13, 2012, the account of Cornelio or
Ligaya was closed and its balance was transferred and distributed to four accounts.
PDIC then conducted a tracing of relationship for the purpose of determining
beneficial ownership of accounts and it discovered that Carlito is not a qualified
relative of Cornelio and Ligaya. Consequently, Carlito’s account was consolidated
with the other legitimate deposits of Cornelio and Ligaya for purposes of computing
the insurable deposit. PDIC considered the source account holders Cornelio and
Ligaya as the real owners of the four resulting accounts. Thus, they were only
entitled to a maximum deposit insurance of P500,000.00. Carlito’s claim was denied
by the PDIC on the ground that it is covered by the maximum deposit insurance
coverage for the account of Cornelio and Ligaya. It further added that there are no
records of transfer documents whatsoever at the time of closure.
a. What are the elements of deposit splitting?
b. Carlito argued that the transfer of funds to his account is not deposit splitting
because the transfer took place more than 120 days prior to the closure of the
bank. He further argued that Cornelio donated the amount contained in his
savings account. Thus, he is entitled to his claim of P400,000.00. Is Carlito
correct? Explain.
c. The PDIC found that Cooperative Rural Bank aided Carlito in deposit splitting.
Are the bank officers liable? Explain.

a.
Under the law, these are:
1. Existence of source account/s in a bank with a balance or aggregate balance of more than
the maximum deposit insurance coverage;
2. There is a break up and transfer of said account/s into two or more existing or new
accounts in the name of another person/s or entity/entities;
3. The transferee/s have no beneficial ownership over the transferred funds; and
4. Transfer occurred within 120 days immediately preceding or during a bank-declared bank
holiday, or immediately preceding bank closure. (Linsangan v. Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 228807, February 11, 2019, Second Division [per J.
Reyes])

b.
No.
According to a decision of the Supreme Court, in cases wherein the transfer into two or more
accounts occurred before the 120 days immediately preceding bank closure, the presumption
arises that the source account remained with the transferor in the absence of transfer documents
found in the records of the bank at the time of closure.
In this case, there are no documents evidencing the alleged donation in the custody or possession
of the bank upon takeover by PDIC. From the facts, there are no records of transfer documents at
the time of closure. (Linsangan v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 228807,
February 11, 2019, Second Division [per J. Reyes])

c.
Yes. The law states that the bank, its directors, officers, employees, or agents are prohibited from
and shall not in any way participate or aide in, or other abet deposit splitting activities nor shall
they promote or encourage the commission of deposit splitting among the bank’s depositors.
Moreover, the approval by a bank officer or employee of a transaction resulting to deposit
splitting is prima facie evidence of participation in deposit splitting activities. (Linsangan v.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 228807, February 11, 2019, Second
Division [per J. Reyes])

Criminal Law

3. A new law was passed by Congress which provided for the crediting of preventive
imprisonment and good conduct time allowance for offenders and/or accused from
their service of sentence. The law specifically states that offenders who have
undergone preventive imprisonment enjoy the crediting of the full time during
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment. Pursuant to the law, the
Bureau of Corrections was tasked to create the implementing rules of the law. Six
months later, the Bureau of Corrections issued the IRR which stated that the
provisions of the law will have a prospective effect. The inmates of the New Bilibid
Prison led by Rody, Imee, Bong, and Bato filed a petition for certiorari challenging
the prospective application of the law. Rule on their petition.
The petition must be granted.
In criminal law, the principle that penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect is well entrenched.
In this case, the law in question is a penal law as it addresses the rehabilitation component of the
country’s correctional system and has the purpose of reducing the length of the penalty of
imprisonment. It is beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike such as Rody, Imee,
Bong, and Bato.
Hence, the petition must be granted. (Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City v. De
Lima, G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019, En Banc [per J. Peralta])

4. Rody falsified his voter’s registration with the COMELEC by making it appear that
he is a citizen of the Philippines, when in truth, he is a Chinese citizen who has yet to
acquire Filipino citizen. Thus, after prosecution and trial, he was adjudged guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for falsification. Instead of filing an appeal, Rody filed an
Application for Probation, manifesting that he is not among those disqualified
offenders under the Probation Law. However, in its Post-Sentence Investigation
Report, the Parole and Probation Office ascertained that he poses a great risk to the
 members of his community as shown by his several derogatory records. The office’s
recommendation is that his application for probation be denied. Thus, the MTC of
Davao City, relying purely on the recommendations of the PPO, ordered the
issuance of warrant of arrest against Rody for the enforcement of the judgment of
conviction. However, Rody disputes the findings of the Parole and Probation Officer
by filing a motion for reconsideration.
a. What is probation?
b. Can Rody dispute the denial of his application for probation? Explain.

a.
Under the law, probation refers to a special privilege granted by the State to penitent qualified
offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. (Ching v.
Ching, G.R. No. 240843, June 3, 2019, Second Division)

b.
Yes, because the findings of the Parole and Probation Officer are merely recommendatory.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it was ruled that the grant of probation is discretionary
upon the court and that the court should not limit the basis of its decision to the report or
recommendation of the probation officer, which is at best only persuasive. In exercising its
discretion, it must conduct its own investigation on the matter.
In this case, the MTC of Davao City solely relied on the recommendations of the PPO and did
not conduct its own investigation.
Hence, Rody may question the denial of his application for probation. (Ching v. Ching, G.R. No.
240843, June 3, 2019, Second Division)

5. Alcantara, the head of the Bids and Awards Committee of the Bureau of
Communications Services (BCS) – Office of the President, submitted a Purchase
Request to Varona, the Director of the BCS for the procurement of a Heidelberg
single color offset printing machine. On even date, Josue, the OIC of the Accounting
Section, and Villarosa, the Chief of Publications and Productions Chief, issued BCS
Disposition Form No. 39 informing Varona that the BCS had no approved capital
outlay to support the purchase and suggested a lease-to-own arrangement to obtain
the equipment, chargeable against its Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
(MOOE). However, they cautioned that this kind of transaction may be deemed
irregular by the Commission on Audit. Despite knowing that its procurement was
not supported by a corresponding appropriation, Varona approved the request.
This was concurred to by Josue and Villarosa. Josue then awarded the project to
Ernest Printing. During the audit by the COA, it was discovered that Varona,
Alcantara, Josue, and Villarosa failed to comply with the proper rules and
procedures laid down under the Government Procurement Act.
a. Can a private individual be held liable for Section 3(e) of RA 3019? Explain.
b. What crime was or crimes were committed, if any?

a.
Yes, if the private individual acts in conspiracy with a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions who has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence which resulted to undue injury to any party or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits. (Josue v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 240947, June 3, 2019,
Second Division)
 b.
They violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
The elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions, or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officers; (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
In this case, the elements are present: first, Varona, Alcantara, Josue and Villarosa are all public
officers; second, they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence in the procurement of the printing machine despite the absence of capital outlay and
lapses in procurement procedures; and lastly, they gave Ernest Printing unwarranted advantage
and preference by failing to conduct a public bidding and thus resulted in undue injury to the
government. (Josue v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 240947, June 3, 2019, Second
Division)
 Recent Cases: Fourth Sunday

Remedial Law

1. Ramon filed a petition for correction of entries before the RTC of Manila. He
alleged that he had been using his real name “Ramon Corpuz Tan” during his
lifetime and that when he later secured a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, he
discovered that his name was entered as “Ramon Corpus Tan Ko,” instead of his
true and correct name which is “Ramon Corpuz Tan.” However, in one of his
annexes, the surname of his parents is “Tan Ko.”
a. The OSG prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Rule 108 is
not the proper remedy since the change is merely clerical. Is the OSG correct in
its arguments? Explain.
b. Who should Ramon implead as respondents? Explain.

a.
No.
First, under the law, a petition for correction of entry under Rule 108 covers not only clerical
errors, but also substantial changes. The difference lies only on the procedure which would
govern the correction sought as clerical corrections adopt a summary procedure while substantial
changes require adversary procedure. Thus, in either type of change or correction, Rule 108 may
apply.
Second, the change is substantial. In this case, the change is substantial as any alteration on his
surname would affect his filiation with his parents. (Tan v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the City of Manila, G.R. No. 211435, April 10, 2019, Second Divison [per J. Reyes, Jr.])

b.
Ramon must implead the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register in accordance
with Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. (Tan v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
City of Manila, G.R. No. 211435, April 10, 2019, Second Divison [per J. Reyes, Jr.])

2. Omaha’s mother gave birth to her in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Due to financial
difficulties, Omaha’s birth was not registered. 10 years later, her birth was
registered in the Consular Office in Kuala Lumpur. However, the date of birth was
erroneously recorded. Thus, Omaha filed a petition for correction of entries before
the RTC of Davao City where she is a resident now. The RTC granted the petition
without any objection from the OSG. During appeal however, the OSG prayed for
the reversal of the RTC’s decision on the ground of improper venue under Section
1. It argued that the proper venue should have been in Kuala Lumpur. Decide on
the argument of the OSG.
The argument deserves scant consideration.
Under the Rules, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, in civil cases. It may be waived; thus, a
party’s objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity.
In this case, the OSG failed to raise improper venue during the proceedings before the RTC of
Davao City. It only raised the issue of improper venue during the appellate proceedings. Thus, it
is deemed to have waived the same. (Cabrera v. The Philippine Statistics Authority, G.R. No.
241369, June 3, 2019, Second Division)

Legal Ethics

3. Mr. Lee passed the 2016 Bar Examinations. However, he was not allowed to take the
Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys on the ground that there is a pending
collection of sum of money case filed against him. Undeterred, Mr. Lee filed a
petition to allow him to take the Lawyer’s Oath. Rule on the petition.
The petition must be granted because in a case of similar import, the Court ruled that the mere
pendency of civil cases does not mean that an applicant to the Philippine Bar committed acts
tainted with moral turpitude. However, he must be reminded not to renege on his obligations in
order to take the oath and sign the Rolls. Thus, upon a satisfactory showing that he would not
renege on his monetary obligations, Mr. Lee should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and
sign the Roll of Attorneys. (So v. Lee, B.M. No. 3288, April 10, 2019, En Banc [per J. Reyes,
Jr.])