Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian

Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there
is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains”
and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private
landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired.
Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural
resources – somehow against the regalian doctrine.

CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

MATEO CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been
possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the
petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that
a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine).
Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many
years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the
absolute owner.

Oh Cho vs Director of Lands G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

Oh Cho vs Director of Lands
G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

FACTS:

Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since
1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said
land and also because he was an alien.

ISSUEs:

Whether or not Oh Cho had title

Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:

Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be
any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration
of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This
possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by
prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

CARINO VS INSULAR
FACTS:
 Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because the CFI
and SC dismissed his petition for application

 For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land
as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated
parts and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)

 1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

 1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but process
only established possessory title

 Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No.
926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation

ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.

HELD: YES. Petition Granted.
 Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.

 Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years,
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.

 Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father
ever was made.

 Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

 There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his or
her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.

Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)

Cariño v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands

No. 72

Argued January 13, 1909

Decided February 23, 1909

212 U.S. 449

Syllabus
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to
this Court. The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is
proper to bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming
a judgment of the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration
of land.

Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the
Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles,
one who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act
No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.

While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically
it is a question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to
decide how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former
sovereign and how far it will recognize actual facts.

Page 212 U. S. 450

The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands
occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32
Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the
inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for
failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine
Commission or by Spanish law.

The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.

Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many
years, and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to
comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.

Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the
Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land
in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled
to the continued possession thereof.

7 Phil. 132 reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Page 212 U. S. 455

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Cariño vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935
Land Titles and Deeds – Regalian Doctrine – Statute of Limitations
1)
Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than
50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for
registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands
belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.
Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:
“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land.”
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership
since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

2)
FACTS:
 Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because the CFI and SC
dismissed his petition for application
 For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as
recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and
used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)
 1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail
 1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but process only
established possessory title
 Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of
1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation

ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.

HELD: YES. Petition Granted.
 Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.
 Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show
that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For
uncultivated, 30.
 Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was
made.
 Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
 There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his or her own. It
went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.

3)
Facts: Mateo Cariño, on February 23 , 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration for a title to a parcel of land
consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet. This was heard with a petition for a
title for a portion of the land.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, because they alleged that the whole parcel of land is public
property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresion from the State.
According to Carino, in 1884, he erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property
now in question. They said that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same
to Donaldson Sim. Carino abandoned the house and lived on the land in question.
The court of land registration ruled against their favor. They also ruled that the land was "used for pasture and sowing," and
belongs to the class called public land.
Issue: Is Carino the rightful possessor of the land?
Held: No, petition denied.
Ratio:
Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land being of common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its
sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the
possession of the same pass from the State.
There was no proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government.
The possessory information was not the one authorized in substitution for the one in adjustment of the royal decree of February
13, 1894. This was due to:
1. the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been
possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the
information and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed openly
without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated
Or such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land
had not been cultivated
2. Under Spanish law, there was a period of one year allowable to verify the possessory information. After the expiration of this
period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together
with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or
their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period
of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the
ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law.
In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be certain that he was the true possessor of
the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five
years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other
person, from the record of the case
The right of possession in accordance with civil law remained at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch
as it could only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands even until after February 13, 1894.
3. The advent of American sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and particularly as to the
classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely
called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with the Organic Act of 1902 and
other laws like Act No. 648, herein mentioned by the petitioner.
Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claim the title under
the period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use from time
immemorial. But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands not exceeding more
that 16 hectares in extent." Under Sec. 6 of said act. The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into
consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, therefore it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and
now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked.
And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according to the testimony of Cariño,
belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not
been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared
in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in
granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his children have already exceeded such amount in various
acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration.
4)
FACTS:On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146
hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no
other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled
in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial
use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land
(regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a
grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant
portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of
time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them
his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.

G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907 MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-
appellee. Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee. ARELLANO, C.J.:

Mateo Cariño, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration praying
that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town
of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and
bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cariño, H. Phelps
Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales,
and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west,
in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cariño and Mayengmeng.

By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No.
834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel set out in
the former petition.

The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of land is public property of the
Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresion from the State.

After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its judgment in these terms:

Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said
property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed the house now there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and
Cariño held possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are
dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)

The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the following:

From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the Government it is deduced, that in or
about the year 1884 Cariño erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property
now in question, property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to
Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to
Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H.
Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..

In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the property described in the plan
attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the
center of the property, as is indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the
property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)

1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial extension of the land described
in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch
as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof
consists of a possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year;
and, according to such possessory information, the land therein described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by
"the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in
half, or running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said
road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned.

2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said possessory information, and upon
which is situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in
the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.

3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its
sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the
possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain
of the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4,
The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal
decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present
subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within
any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an
uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without
interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during
the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption
during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the
testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second, because the possessory
information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of
acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at
all times until the publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as
follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in
articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain
gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the
community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of
average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors
not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance
with common law."

5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be certain that he was the true possessor
of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of
five years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any
other person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested
in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to show any right of ownership until after
the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity
with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.

6. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say, civil law — remains at all times subordinate to the
Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which
condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable
lands for the purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time
pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894.

7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and particularly as to the
classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth
merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of
the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine
Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648, 2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in
connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded.

8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for
obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten years established by that
act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such
prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent."
(Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an
extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows
that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.

9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according to the testimony of
Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent
has not been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be
declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of
Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his children have already exceeded such
amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration,
donations or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these
new laws.

By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:

1. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in
question since time immemorial;
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the contrary, it was the property of the
Government. (Allegation 21.)
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of
twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let
the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

U.S. Supreme Court

Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
No. 72
Argued January 13, 1909
Decided February 23, 1909
212 U.S. 449
Syllabus

Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this Court. The latter method is in the main
confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
affirming a judgment of the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land.

Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the Philippine Commission which provides
for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration
under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.

While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a question of strength and of
varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the
former sovereign and how far it will recognize actual facts.

Page 212 U. S. 450

 The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the
Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the
inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies
prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.

The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution,
extends those safeguards to all.

Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against the government which
seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.

Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by
the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is
entitled to the continued possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 212 U. S. 455
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G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

o GR: All lands are acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant.
o EXCEPTION: Lands under private ownership since time immemorial.
o Application for decree of registration is a condition precedent to acquisition of title. Non-
compliance gives rise to mere possessory right.
o An alien cannot acquire title to lands of the public domain by prescription.

FACTS:

Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas,
which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17,
1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the
ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not Oh Cho had title

o Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:

Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should
have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before
the Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot
by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot,
because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration
had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a
condition precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most
they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was
transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never
ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring
title over public land by prescription.

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of
the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a
manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On
17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC
Facts:
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services
to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were
deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for
the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not
appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency.
Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution.
The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it
claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner
asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from
suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

Issues:
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.

Discussions:
Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be “sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should first be brought to the
Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the State’s immunity from suit, subject to
its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered
by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth
Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.

Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations

Commission 227 D 693
FACTS:

In 1989, the Department of Agriculture entered into a contract with Sultan

Security Agency for the latter to provide security services to the petitioner.
In 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, including
damages. The Executive Labor Arbiter found the
petitioner jointly and severally liable and rendered a decision which became
final and executory when both the petitioner and respondent did not file an
appeal. The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of execution and commanded the
City Sheriff to execute the judgment against the property of the petitioner. The
petitioner filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer
for preliminary writ of injunction with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) alleging inter alia that the writ was issued without the Labor Arbiter
having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. This, they reasoned,
makes the decision of the Labor Arbiter null and void such that all actions
pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The
petitioner also pointed out that seizure of its property would hamper and
jeopardize petitioner’s governmental functions to the prejudice of the public
good. The NLRC though upheld the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The petitioner
thus filed a petition for certiorari, charging the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion and asserting that the NLRC disregarded the cardinal rule on the
non-suability of the State. The NLRC argued that the petitioner has impliedly
waived its immunity from suit by entering into a service contract with Sultan
Security Agency.

ISSUE:

Can the Department of Agriculture invoke non-suability of the State as defense

for a moneyed claim involving a service contract?

HELD:

Yes. When the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it limits the claimant’s action “only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution.” The power of the Courts ends
when a judgment is rendered since government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments.
This is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Thus, the Supreme
Court granted the petition and nullified the writ of execution directed against the
property of the Department of Agriculture.