N at i o n a l S t r at e g y f o r

pa n de m ic
influenza

homeland security council

november 2005
 N at i o n a l S t r at e g y f o r

pandem ic

influenza

homeland security COUNCIL

november 2005
My fellow Americans,

Once again, nature has presented us with a daunting challenge: the possibility of an influenza
pandemic.

Most of us are accustomed to seasonal influenza, or “the flu,” a viral infection that continues to
be a significant public health challenge. From time to time, changes in the influenza virus result
in a new strain to which people have never been exposed. These new strains have the potential
to sweep the globe, causing millions of illnesses, in what is called a pandemic.

A new strain of influenza virus has been found in birds in Asia, and has shown that it can infect
humans. If this virus undergoes further change, it could very well result in the next human
pandemic.

We have an opportunity to prepare ourselves, our Nation, and our world to fight this potentially
devastating outbreak of infectious disease.

The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza presents our approach to address the threat of
pandemic influenza, whether it results from the strain currently in birds in Asia or another
influenza virus. It outlines how we intend to prepare, detect, and respond to a pandemic. It also
outlines the important roles to be played not only by the Federal government, but also by State
and local governments, private industry, our international partners, and most importantly
individual citizens, including you and your families.

While your government will do much to prepare for a pandemic, individual action and individual
responsibility are necessary for the success of any measures. Not only should you take action to
protect yourself and your families, you should also take action to prevent the spread of influenza
if you or anyone in your family becomes ill.

Together we will confront this emerging threat and together, as Americans, we will be prepared
to protect our families, our communities, this great Nation, and our world.

GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE
November 1, 2005
 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1

THE PANDEMIC THREAT .................................................................................................... 1

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA ..................................................... 2

PILLARS OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY .............................................................................. 3

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY .............................................................. 3

PILLAR ONE: PREPAREDNESS AND COMMUNICATION...................................................... 4

PILLAR TWO: SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION ............................................................... 7

PILLAR THREE: RESPONSE AND CONTAINMENT............................................................... 8

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................................ 10

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

INTRODUCTION
Although remarkable advances have been a role in the last three influenza pandemics.
made in science and medicine during the Two of these pandemic-causing viruses
past century, we are constantly reminded remain in circulation and are responsible for
that we live in a universe of microbes - the majority of influenza cases each year.
viruses, bacteria, protozoa and fungi that are
Pandemics have occurred intermittently over
forever changing and adapting themselves to
centuries. The last three pandemics, in
the human host and the defenses that
1918, 1957 and 1968, killed approximately
humans create.
40 million, 2 million and 1 million people
Influenza viruses are notable for their worldwide, respectively. Although the
resilience and adaptability. While science timing cannot be predicted, history and
has been able to develop highly effective science suggest that we will face one or
vaccines and treatments for many infectious more pandemics in this century.
diseases that threaten public health,
The current pandemic threat stems from an
acquiring these tools is an ongoing challenge
unprecedented outbreak of avian influenza
with the influenza virus. Changes in the
in Asia and Europe, caused by the H5N1
genetic makeup of the virus require us to
strain of the Influenza A virus. To date, the
develop new vaccines on an annual basis
virus has infected birds in 16 countries and
and forecast which strains are likely to
has resulted in the deaths, through illness
predominate.
and culling, of approximately 200 million
As a result, and despite annual vaccinations, birds across Asia. While traditional control
the U.S. faces a burden of influenza that measures have been attempted, the virus is
results in approximately 36,000 deaths and now endemic in Southeast Asia, present in
more than 200,000 hospitalizations each long-range migratory birds, and unlikely to
year. In addition to this human toll, be eradicated soon.
influenza is annually responsible for a total
A notable and worrisome feature of the
cost of over $10 billion in the U.S.
H5N1 virus is its ability to infect a wide
A pandemic, or worldwide outbreak of a range of hosts, including birds and humans.
new influenza virus, could dwarf this impact As of the date of this document, the virus is
by overwhelming our health and medical known to have infected 121 people in four
capabilities, potentially resulting in countries, resulting in 62 deaths over the
hundreds of thousands of deaths, millions of past two years. Although the virus has not
hospitalizations, and hundreds of billions of yet shown an ability to transmit efficiently
dollars in direct and indirect costs. This between humans, as is seen with the annual
Strategy will guide our preparedness and influenza virus, there is concern that it will
response activities to mitigate that impact. acquire this capability through genetic
mutation or exchange of genetic material
with a human influenza virus.
THE PANDEMIC THREAT
It is impossible to know whether the
Pandemics happen when a novel influenza currently circulating H5N1 virus will cause
virus emerges that infects and can be a human pandemic. The widespread nature
efficiently transmitted between humans. of H5N1 in birds and the likelihood of
Animals are the most likely reservoir for mutations over time raise our concerns that
these emerging viruses; avian viruses played

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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the virus will become transmissible between The National Strategy for Pandemic
humans, with potentially catastrophic Influenza guides our preparedness and
consequences. If this does not happen with response to an influenza pandemic, with
the current H5N1 strain, history suggests the intent of (1) stopping, slowing or
that a different influenza virus will emerge otherwise limiting the spread of a
and result in the next pandemic. pandemic to the United States;
(2) limiting the domestic spread of a
pandemic, and mitigating disease,
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC suffering and death; and (3) sustaining
INFLUENZA infrastructure and mitigating impact to
Preparing for a pandemic requires the the economy and the functioning of
leveraging of all instruments of national society.
power, and coordinated action by all
segments of government and society. The Strategy will provide a framework for
Influenza viruses do not respect the future U.S. Government planning efforts
distinctions of race, sex, age, profession or that is consistent with The National Security
nationality, and are not constrained by Strategy and the National Strategy for
geographic boundaries. The next pandemic Homeland Security. It recognizes that
is likely to come in waves, each lasting preparing for and responding to a pandemic
months, and pass through communities of all cannot be viewed as a purely federal
size across the nation and world. While a responsibility, and that the nation must have
pandemic will not damage power lines, a system of plans at all levels of government
banks or computer networks, it will and in all sectors outside of government that
ultimately threaten all critical infrastructure can be integrated to address the pandemic
by removing essential personnel from the threat. It is guided by the following
workplace for weeks or months. principles:

This makes a pandemic a unique • The federal government will use all
circumstance necessitating a strategy that instruments of national power to address
extends well beyond health and medical the pandemic threat.
boundaries, to include the sustainment of • States and communities should have
critical infrastructure, private-sector credible pandemic preparedness plans to
activities, the movement of goods and respond to an outbreak within their
services across the nation and the globe, and jurisdictions.
economic and security considerations. The
uncertainties associated with influenza • The private sector should play an
viruses require that our Strategy be versatile, integral role in preparedness before a
to ensure that we are prepared for any virus pandemic begins, and should be part of
with pandemic potential, as well as the the national response.
annual burden of influenza that we know we • Individual citizens should be prepared
will face. for an influenza pandemic, and be
educated about individual responsibility
to limit the spread of infection if they or
their family members become ill.
• Global partnerships will be leveraged to
address the pandemic threat.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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PILLARS OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL
STRATEGY
Our Strategy addresses the full spectrum of
events that link a farmyard overseas to a This Strategy reflects the federal
living room in America. While the government’s approach to the pandemic
circumstances that connect these threat. While it provides strategic direction
environments are very different, our for the Departments and Agencies of the
strategic principles remain relevant. The U.S. Government, it does not attempt to
pillars of our Strategy are: catalogue and assign all federal
responsibilities. The implementation of this
• Preparedness and Communication:
Strategy and specific responsibilities will be
Activities that should be undertaken
described separately.
before a pandemic to ensure
preparedness, and the communication of
roles and responsibilities to all levels of
government, segments of society and
individuals.
• Surveillance and Detection: Domestic
and international systems that provide
continuous “situational awareness,” to
ensure the earliest warning possible to
protect the population.
• Response and Containment: Actions
to limit the spread of the outbreak and to
mitigate the health, social and economic
impacts of a pandemic.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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PILLAR ONE: PREPAREDNESS AND COMMUNICATION

Preparedness is the underpinning of the • Continue to work with states and

entire spectrum of activities, including localities to:
surveillance, detection, containment and
o Establish and exercise pandemic
response efforts. We will support pandemic
response plans;
planning efforts, and clearly communicate
expectations to individuals, communities o Develop medical and veterinary
and governments, whether overseas or in the surge capacity plans; and
United States, recognizing that all share the
o Integrate non-health sectors,
responsibility to limit the spread of infection
including the private sector and
in order to protect populations beyond their
critical infrastructure entities, in
borders.
these planning efforts.
• Build upon existing domestic
Planning for a Pandemic mechanisms to rapidly recruit and
To enhance preparedness, we will: deploy large numbers of health, medical
and veterinary providers within or
• Develop federal implementation plans to across jurisdictions to match medical
support this Strategy, to include all requirements with capabilities.
components of the U.S. government and
to address the full range of
consequences of a pandemic, including Communicating Expectations and
human and animal health, security, Responsibilities
transportation, economic, trade and
A critical element of pandemic planning is
infrastructure considerations.
ensuring that people and entities not
• Work through multilateral health accustomed to responding to health crises
organizations such as the World Health understand the actions and priorities
Organization (WHO), Food and required to prepare for and respond to a
Agriculture Organization (FAO), World pandemic. Those groups include political
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) leadership at all levels of government, non-
and regional organizations such as the health components of government and
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation members of the private sector. Essential
(APEC) forum, as well as through planning also includes the coordination of
bilateral and multilateral contacts to: efforts between human and animal health
authorities. In order to accomplish this, we
o Support the development and
will:
exercising of avian and
pandemic response plans; • Work to ensure clear, effective and
coordinated risk communication,
o Expand in-country medical,
domestically and internationally, before
veterinary and scientific
and during a pandemic. This includes
capacity to respond to an
identifying credible spokespersons at all
outbreak; and
levels of government to effectively
o Educate populations at home coordinate and communicate helpful,
and abroad about high-risk informative messages in a timely
practices that increase the manner.
likelihood of virus transmission
between species. • Provide guidance to the private sector
and critical infrastructure entities on
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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 their role in the pandemic response, and including personal protective
considerations necessary to maintain equipment, antibiotics and general
essential services and operations despite supplies.
significant and sustained worker
• Establish domestic production capacity
absenteeism.
and stockpiles of countermeasures to
• Provide guidance to individuals on ensure:
infection control behaviors they should
o Sufficient vaccine to vaccinate
adopt pre-pandemic, and the specific
front-line personnel and at-risk
actions they will need to take during a
populations, including military
severe influenza season or pandemic,
personnel;
such as self-isolation and protection of
others if they themselves contract o Sufficient vaccine to vaccinate
influenza. the entire U.S. population
within six months of the
• Provide guidance and support to poultry, emergence of a virus with
swine and related industries on their role pandemic potential; and
in responding to an outbreak of avian
influenza, including ensuring the o Antiviral treatment for those
protection of animal workers and who contract a pandemic strain
initiating or strengthening public of influenza.
education campaigns to minimize the • Facilitate appropriate coordination of
risks of infection from animal products. efforts across the vaccine manufacturing
sector.
Producing and Stockpiling Vaccines, • Address regulatory and other legal
Antivirals and Medical Material barriers to the expansion of our
domestic vaccine production capacity.
In combination with traditional public health
measures, vaccines and antiviral drugs form • Expand the public health
the foundation of our infection control recommendations for domestic seasonal
strategy. Vaccination is the most important influenza vaccination and encourage the
element of this strategy, but we same practice internationally.
acknowledge that a two-pronged strategy
incorporating both vaccines and antivirals is • Expand the domestic supply of avian
essential. To establish production capacity influenza vaccine to control a domestic
and stockpiles in support of our containment outbreak of avian influenza in bird
and response strategies, we will: populations.

• Encourage nations to develop

production capacity and stockpiles to Establishing Distribution Plans for
support their response needs, to include Vaccines and Antivirals
pooling of efforts to create regional
It is essential that we prioritize the allocation
capacity.
of countermeasures (vaccines and antivirals)
• Encourage and subsidize the that are in limited supply and define
development of state-based antiviral effective distribution modalities during a
stockpiles to support response activities. pandemic. We will:
• Ensure that our national stockpile and • Develop credible countermeasure
stockpiles based in states and distribution mechanisms for vaccine and
communities are properly configured to antiviral agents prior to and during a
respond to the diversity of medical pandemic.
requirements presented by a pandemic,

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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• Prioritize countermeasure allocation • Work with our international partners to
before an outbreak, and update this ensure that we are all leveraging the
prioritization immediately after the most advanced technological approaches
outbreak begins based on the at-risk available for vaccine production.
populations, available supplies and the
• Accelerate the development of cell
characteristics of the virus.
culture technology for influenza vaccine
production and establish a domestic
Advancing Scientific Knowledge and production base to support vaccination
Accelerating Development demands.

Research and development of vaccines, • Use novel investment strategies to

antivirals, adjuvants and diagnostics advance the development of next-
represents our best defense against a generation influenza diagnostics and
pandemic. To realize our goal of next- countermeasures, including new
generation countermeasures against antivirals, vaccines, adjuvant
influenza, we must make significant and technologies, and countermeasures that
targeted investments in promising provide protection across multiple
technologies. We will: strains and seasons of the influenza
virus.
• Ensure that there is maximal sharing of
scientific information about influenza
viruses between governments, scientific
entities and the private sector.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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PILLAR TWO: SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION

Early warning of a pandemic and our ability illness in communities, and leverage all
to closely track the spread of avian influenza federal medical capabilities, both
outbreak is critical to being able to rapidly domestic and international, in support of
employ resources to contain the spread of this objective.
the virus. An effective surveillance and
• Develop and deploy rapid diagnostics
detection system will save lives by allowing
with greater sensitivity and
us to activate our response plans before the
reproducibility to allow onsite diagnosis
arrival of a pandemic virus to the U.S.,
of pandemic strains of influenza at home
activate additional surveillance systems and
and abroad, in animals and humans, to
initiate vaccine production and
facilitate early warning, outbreak control
administration.
and targeting of antiviral therapy.

Ensuring Rapid Reporting of Outbreaks • Expand our domestic livestock and

wildlife surveillance activities to ensure
To support our need for “situational early warning of the spread of an
awareness,” both domestically and outbreak to our shores.
internationally, we will:
• Work through the International Using Surveillance to Limit Spread
Partnership on Avian and Pandemic
Although influenza does not respect
Influenza, as well as through other
geographic or political borders, entry to and
political and diplomatic channels such
egress from affected areas represent
as the United Nations and the Asia-
opportunities to control or at the very least
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, to
slow the spread of infection. In parallel to
ensure transparency, scientific
our containment measures, we will:
cooperation and rapid reporting of avian
and human influenza cases. • Develop mechanisms to rapidly share
information on travelers who may be
• Support the development of the proper
carrying or may have been exposed to a
scientific and epidemiologic expertise in
pandemic strain of influenza, for the
affected regions to ensure early
purposes of contact tracing and outbreak
recognition of changes in the pattern of
investigation.
avian or human outbreaks.
• Develop and exercise mechanisms to
• Support the development and
provide active and passive surveillance
sustainment of sufficient U.S. and host
during an outbreak, both within and
nation laboratory capacity and
beyond our borders.
diagnostic reagents in affected regions
and domestically, to provide rapid • Expand and enhance mechanisms for
confirmation of cases in animals or screening and monitoring animals that
humans. may harbor viruses with pandemic
potential.
• Advance mechanisms for “real-time”
clinical surveillance in domestic acute • Develop screening and monitoring
care settings such as emergency mechanisms and agreements to
departments, intensive care units and appropriately control travel and shipping
laboratories to provide local, state and of potentially infected products to and
federal public health officials with from affected regions if necessary, and
continuous awareness of the profile of to protect unaffected populations.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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PILLAR THREE: RESPONSE AND CONTAINMENT

We recognize that a virus with pandemic infection-control and containment,

potential anywhere represents a risk to including those circumstances where
populations everywhere. Once health social distancing measures, limitations
authorities have signaled sustained and on gatherings, or quarantine authority
efficient human-to-human spread of the may be an appropriate public health
virus has occurred, a cascade of response intervention.
mechanisms will be initiated, from the site
• Emphasize the roles and responsibilities
of the documented transmission to locations
of the individual in preventing the
around the globe.
spread of an outbreak, and the risk to
others if infection-control practices are
Containing Outbreaks not followed.

The most effective way to protect the • Provide guidance for states, localities
American population is to contain an and industry on best practices to prevent
outbreak beyond the borders of the U.S. the spread of avian influenza in
While we work to prevent a pandemic from commercial, domestic and wild birds,
reaching our shores, we recognize that and other animals.
slowing or limiting the spread of the
outbreak is a more realistic outcome and can
save many lives. In support of our Leveraging National Medical and Public
containment strategy, we will: Health Surge Capacity
Rather than generating a focal point of
• Work through the International
casualties, the medical burden of a pandemic
Partnership to develop a coalition of
is likely to be distributed in communities
strong partners to coordinate actions to
across the nation for an extended period of
limit the spread of a virus with
time. In order to save lives and limit
pandemic potential beyond the location
suffering, we will:
where it is first recognized in order to
protect U.S. interests abroad. • Implement state and local public health
and medical surge plans, and leverage
• Where appropriate, offer and coordinate
all federal medical facilities, personnel
assistance from the United States and
and response capabilities to support the
other members of the International
national surge requirement.
Partnership.
• Activate plans to distribute medical
• Encourage all levels of government,
countermeasures, including non-medical
domestically and globally, to take
equipment and other material, from the
appropriate and lawful action to contain
Strategic National Stockpile and other
an outbreak within the borders of their
distribution centers to federal, state and
community, province, state or nation.
local authorities.
• Where appropriate, use governmental
• Address barriers to the flow of public
authorities to limit non-essential
health, medical and veterinary personnel
movement of people, goods and services
across state and local jurisdictions to
into and out of areas where an outbreak
meet local shortfalls in public health,
occurs.
medical and veterinary capacity.
• Provide guidance to all levels of
• Determine the spectrum of public
government on the range of options for
health, medical and veterinary surge

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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 capacity activities that the U.S. military functional despite significant and
and other government entities may be sustained worker absenteeism.
able to support during a pandemic,
• Determine the spectrum of
contingent upon primary mission
infrastructure-sustainment activities that
requirements, and develop mechanisms
the U.S. military and other government
to activate them.
entities may be able to support during a
pandemic, contingent upon primary
Sustaining Infrastructure, Essential mission requirements, and develop
Services and the Economy mechanisms to activate them.

Movement of essential personnel, goods and

services, and maintenance of critical Ensuring Effective Risk Communication
infrastructure are necessary during an event
Effective risk communication is essential to
that spans months in any given community.
inform the public and mitigate panic. We
The private sector and critical infrastructure
will:
entities must respond in a manner that
allows them to maintain the essential • Ensure that timely, clear, coordinated
elements of their operations for a prolonged messages are delivered to the American
period of time, in order to prevent severe public from trained spokespersons at all
disruption of life in our communities. To levels of government and assist the
ensure this, we will: governments of affected nations to do
the same.
• Encourage the development of
coordination mechanisms across • Work with state and local governments
American industries to support the to develop guidelines to assure the
above activities during a pandemic. public of the safety of the food supply
and mitigate the risk of exposure from
• Provide guidance to activate
wildlife.
contingency plans to ensure that
personnel are protected, that the delivery
of essential goods and services is
maintained, and that sectors remain

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Because of its unique nature, responsibility a pandemic on the federal workforce,
for preparedness and response to a pandemic and are configured to support state, local
extends across all levels of government and and private sector efforts as appropriate.
all segments of society. No single entity
• Facilitating state and local planning
alone can prevent or mitigate the impact of a
through funding and guidance.
pandemic.
• Providing guidance to the private sector
and public on preparedness and response
The Federal Government planning, in conjunction with states and
While the Federal government plays a communities.
critical role in elements of preparedness and Lead departments have been identified for
response to a pandemic, the success of these the medical response (Department of Health
measures is predicated on actions taken at and Human Services), veterinary response
the individual level and in states and (Department of Agriculture), international
communities. Federal responsibilities activities (Department of State) and the
include the following: overall domestic incident management and
• Advancing international preparedness, Federal coordination (Department of
surveillance, response and containment Homeland Security). Each department is
activities. responsible for coordination of all efforts
within its authorized mission, and
• Supporting the establishment of departments are responsible for developing
countermeasure stockpiles and plans to implement this Strategy.
production capacity by:
o Facilitating the development of
States and Localities
sufficient domestic production
capacity for vaccines, antivirals, Our communities are on the front lines of a
diagnostics and personal pandemic and will face many challenges in
protective equipment to support maintaining continuity of society in the face
domestic needs, and of widespread illness and increased demand
encouraging the development of on most essential government services. State
production capacity around the and local responsibilities include the
world; following:
o Advancing the science • Ensuring that all reasonable measures
necessary to produce effective are taken to limit the spread of an
vaccines, therapeutics and outbreak within and beyond the
diagnostics; and community’s borders.
o Stockpiling and coordinating the • Establishing comprehensive and
distribution of necessary credible preparedness and response
countermeasures, in concert plans that are exercised on a regular
with states and other entities. basis.
• Ensuring that federal departments and • Integrating non-health entities in the
agencies, including federal health care planning for a pandemic, including law
systems, have developed and exercised enforcement, utilities, city services and
preparedness and response plans that political leadership.
take into account the potential impact of

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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• Establishing state and community-based • Where possible, establishing
stockpiles and distribution systems to mechanisms to allow workers to provide
support a comprehensive pandemic services from home if public health
response. officials advise against non-essential
travel outside the home.
• Identifying key spokespersons for the
community, ensuring that they are • Establishing partnerships with other
educated in risk communication, and members of the sector to provide mutual
have coordinated crisis communications support and maintenance of essential
plans. services during a pandemic.
• Providing public education campaigns
on pandemic influenza and public and Individuals and Families
private interventions.
The critical role of individuals and families
in controlling a pandemic cannot be
The Private Sector and Critical overstated. Modeling of the transmission of
Infrastructure Entities influenza vividly illustrates the impact of
one individual’s behavior on the spread of
The private sector represents an essential
disease, by showing that an infection carried
pillar of our society because of the essential
by one person can be transmitted to tens or
goods and services that it provides.
hundreds of others. For this reason,
Moreover, it touches the majority of our
individual action is perhaps the most
population on a daily basis, through an
important element of pandemic preparedness
employer-employee or vendor-customer
and response.
relationship. For these reasons, it is
essential that the U.S. private sector be Education on pandemic preparedness for the
engaged in all preparedness and response population should begin before a pandemic,
activities for a pandemic. should be provided by all levels of
government and the private sector, and
Critical infrastructure entities also must be
should occur in the context of preventing the
engaged in planning for a pandemic because
transmission of any infection, such as the
of our society’s dependence upon their
annual influenza or the common cold.
services. Both the private sector and critical
Responsibilities of the individual and
infrastructure entities represent essential
families include:
underpinnings for the functioning of
American society. Responsibilities of the • Taking precautions to prevent the spread
U.S. private sector and critical infrastructure of infection to others if an individual or
entities include the following: a family member has symptoms of
influenza.
• Establishing an ethic of infection control
in the workplace that is reinforced • Being prepared to follow public health
during the annual influenza season, to guidance that may include limitation of
include, if possible, options for working attendance at public gatherings and non-
offsite while ill, systems to reduce essential travel for several days or
infection transmission, and worker weeks.
education.
• Keeping supplies of materials at home,
• Establishing contingency systems to as recommended by authorities, to
maintain delivery of essential goods and support essential needs of the household
services during times of significant and for several days if necessary.
sustained worker absenteeism.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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International Partners 5. Rapid reaction to address the first signs
of accelerated transmission of H5N1 and
We rely upon our international partnerships,
other highly pathogenic influenza strains
with the United Nations, international
so that appropriate international and
organizations and private non-profit
national resources can be brought to
organizations, to amplify our efforts, and
bear;
will engage them on a multilateral and
bilateral basis. Our international effort to 6. Prevent and contain an incipient
contain and mitigate the effects of an epidemic through capacity building and
outbreak of pandemic influenza is a central in-country collaboration with
component of our overall strategy. In many international partners;
ways, the character and quality of the U.S.
7. Work in a manner complementary to
response and that of our international
and supportive of expanded cooperation
partners may play a determining role in the
with and appropriate support of key
severity of a pandemic.
multilateral organizations (including the
The International Partnership on Avian and WHO, Food and Agriculture
Pandemic Influenza stands in support of Organization and World Organization
multinational organizations. Members of for Animal Health);
the Partnership have agreed that the
8. Timely coordination of bilateral and
following 10 principles will guide their
multilateral resource allocations;
efforts:
dedication of domestic resources
1. International cooperation to protect the (human and financial); improvements in
lives and health of our people; public awareness; and development of
economic and trade contingency plans;
2. Timely and sustained high-level global
political leadership to combat avian and 9. Increased coordination and
pandemic influenza; harmonization of preparedness,
prevention, response and containment
3. Transparency in reporting of influenza
activities among nations,
cases in humans and in animals caused
complementing domestic and regional
by virus strains that have pandemic
preparedness initiatives, and
potential, to increase understanding and
encouraging where appropriate the
preparedness and especially to ensure
development of strategic regional
rapid and timely response to potential
initiatives; and
outbreaks;
10. Actions based on the best available
4. Immediate sharing of epidemiological
science.
data and samples with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Through the Partnership and other bilateral
international community to detect and and multilateral initiatives, we will promote
characterize the nature and evolution of these principles and support the
any outbreaks as quickly as possible, by development of an international capacity to
utilizing, where appropriate, existing prepare, detect and respond to an influenza
networks and mechanisms; pandemic.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

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 N at i o n a l S t r at e g y f o r

pa n de m ic
influenza

homeland security council

november 2005