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material consistent with the Society’s mission: to provide a professional
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Volume 25, Numb e r 4 2011
Editorial
635 Editorial STEPHEN E. BRAUDE
Research Articles
639 Revisiting the Ganzfeld ESP Debate:
A Basic Review and Assessment BRYAN J. WILLIAMS
663 The Global Consciousness Project: EDWIN C. MAY
Identifying the Source of Psi S. JAMES P. SPOTTISWOODE
683 Reply to May and Spottiswoode on Experi-
menter Effect as the Explanation for GCP Results ROGER NELSON
690 Reply to May and Spottiswoode’s “The GCP:
Identifying the Source of Psi” PETER BANCEL
695 The Global Consciousness Project, Identifying the EDWIN C. MAY
Source of the Psi: A Response to Nelson and Bancel S. JAMES P. SPOTTISWOODE
699 Alien Visitation, Extra-Terrestrial Life, NEIL DAGNALL
and Paranormal Beliefs KENNETH DRINKWATER
ANDREW PARKER
721 Anomalous Switching of the Bi-Stable Percept
of a Necker Cube: A Preliminary Study DICK J. BIERMAN
735 Color Distribution of Light Balls in Hessdalen GERSON S. PAIVA
Lights Pheomenon CARLTON A. TAFT
Commentary
747 On Elephants and Matters Epistemological:
Reply to Etzel Cardeña’s Guest Editorial “On
Wolverines and Epistemological Totalitarianism” NEAL GROSSMAN
754 Response to Neal Grossman’s Reply
“On Elephants and Matters Epistemological” ETZEL CARDEÑA
Historical Perspective
755 Ernesto Bozzano: An Italian Spiritualist
and Psychical Researcher LUCA GASPERINI
Obituary
775 In Memory of William Corliss PATRICK HUYGHE
Letter to the Editor

779 Pipefish or Pipe Dream? ED L. BOUSFIELD
PAUL H. LEBLOND
Book Reviews
781 Essay Review: Miracles and Modern Spiritualism:
A Re-Review. On Miracles and Modern Spiritualism.
Three Essays by Alfred Russel Wallace LESLIE PRICE
789 Essay Review: Ian Stevenson’s Twenty Cases Suggestive
of Reincarnation: An Historical Review and Assessment.
Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation by Ian Stevenson JAMES G. MATLOCK
821 Consciousness and the Source of Realilty: The PEAR
Odyssey by Robert G. Jahn and Brenda J. Dunne WILLIAM F. BENGSTON
825 Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the
Misrepresentation of Humanity by Raymond Tallis STAN V. MCDANIEL
836 Consciousness Explained Better: Towards an Integral
Understanding of the Multifaceted Nature of
Consciousness by Allan Combs IMANTS BARUŠS
838 The End of Discovery: Are We Approaching the
Boundaries of the Knowable? by Russell Stannard GABRIEL FINKELSTEIN
839 The Kensington Runestone: Approaching a
Research Question Holistically by Alice Beck Kehoe STEPHEN C. JETT
841 Born on a Blue Day by Daniel Tammet;
Embracing the Wide Sky by Daniel Tammet ADRIAN PARKER
848 The Psychedelic Explorer’s Guide: Safe, Therapeutic,
and Sacred Journeys by James Fadiman S TANLEY KRIPPNER
851 Wonders in the Sky: Unexplained Aerial Objects
from Antiquity to Modern Times and Their Impact
on Human Culture, History, and Beliefs
by Jacques Vallee and Chris Aubeck THOMAS E. BULLARD
857 Dizionario Enciclopedico delle Classificazioni
Analitiche della Biblioteca Bozzano–De Boni
[Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Analytical
Classification of the Bozzano–De Boni Library]
edited by Silvio Ravaldini and Giulio Caratelli MASSIMO BIONDI
859 War and Shadows: The Haunting of Vietnam
by Mai Lan Gustafsson MICHAEL GROSSO
Further Book of Note
863 They Knew the Unknown by Martin Ebon MICHAEL SCHMICKER
Articles of Interest
865 The Alchemical Revolution by Sara Reardon, Science, 332 HENRY H. BAUER
866 Is “Alien Abduction” Extraterrestrial Visitation? by Mark
Hensher, Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, 63 MARK RODEGHIER
SSE News
867 SSE 31st Annual Conference; SSE 9th Biennial European Meeting; SSE Masthead
869 Thank You to Submission Reviewers and Book Review Authors for 2010 & 2011
871 Index of Previous Articles in JSE
885 Order forms for JSE Issues, JSE Subscriptions, and Society Membership
88938 Instructions for JSE Authors
Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 635–637, 2011 0892-3310/11
EDITORIAL
A s subscribers to the hard copy version of the JSE have already noticed, this
is a particularly hefty issue. I’m pleased that we’ve been able to wrap up
2011 with a gratifyingly substantive and larger than usual array of papers on a
variety of interesting and important topics. This issue contains too many papers
for me to comment on them individually. But I do want to direct your attention
to the detailed exchange over the data from the Global Consciousness Project
(GCP). This series of papers addresses not only the specific questions of how to
interpret the GCP data and what it is that the GCP is actually tracking, but also
the long-standing and more general debate among parapsychologists over the
merits of Decision Augmentation Theory (DAT), hailed by some as a more vi-
able ESP (or cognition)-based alternative to physicalistic explanations of much
of the apparent evidence for psychokinesis. Ed May and James Spottiswoode
argue first for the DAT point of view. They contend that the statistical devia-
tions reported in the GCP reflect a cognitive form of experimenter psi rather
than a force-like physical effect. Then Roger Nelson and Peter Bancel reply
separately, and from quite different perspectives. May and Spottiswoode get
the last word in this exchange. I’m personally pleased to see the details of the
debate presented so thoroughly, and I hope readers will agree that the exchange
significantly advances our understanding of the issues.
I also hope to feature additional dialogues on topics of interest to SSE
members in future issues, and I encourage readers to let me know what key
topics they would like to see debated. Of course, I can’t promise to satisfy all
(or any) suggestions. Already in my brief tenure as JSE Editor-in-Chief, I’ve
learned that I can’t always extract submissions of target articles (or replies)
from relevant researchers, no matter how pathetically or aggressively I frame
my requests. But I’ll do what I can, and I’m genuinely interested in knowing
which topics are of particular interest to our subscribers.
Since this is the holiday season and an appropriate time for reflecting on the
year that’s coming to a close, I’d like once again to acknowledge and thank my
dedicated and hardworking—in fact, overworked—team of Associate Editors
and the many reviewers on whom we all rely in vetting papers for inclusion
in the JSE. As I’ve noted before, producing this Journal poses a distinctive
challenge. Because the JSE deals with topics either shunned altogether or dealt
with shabbily by more mainstream publications, the community of qualified
readers for high-level peer review is quite small. Ideally, I’d prefer to have
a larger team of Associate Editors, in order to lighten the editorial load for
those who—perhaps inscrutably—continue to volunteer large chunks of time to
635
636 Editorial
shepherding submissions through our system. However, adding members to that

team inevitably subtracts members from the small pool of qualified referees. So
I’m deeply grateful to my Associate Editors, who realize the need to maintain
the high standard of scientific and scholarly excellence that’s characterized
the JSE since its inception, who recognize that there are only so many people
on whom the JSE can rely, and who accordingly and generously donate their
valuable time. I’m equally grateful to our many referees, many of whom we call
upon over and over, simply because they have expertise in the relevant areas of
research, and because the number of people who have both that expertise and
the relevant degree of open-mindedness about new ideas remains too small for
us to look elsewhere.
I must also express my deep appreciation for the breathtaking efficiency,
technical panache, and thorough understanding of the publishing business of
our Managing Editor, Kathleen Erickson. Kathleen does it all, and she does
it brilliantly. I’m sure JSE’s Associate Editors and readers agree with me on
this. We benefit, time and again, from Kathleen’s assistance, patience, and good
nature. In fact, I’ve never met anyone who can issue a reminder with such a
winning combination of grace and coercion.
On a quite different matter, I’ve learned recently that some found my
previous Editorial disturbingly pessimistic. That Editorial dealt with the problem
of finding reliable and stable repositories for the book and journal collections,
and other scholarly research materials, of those working on the frontiers of
science. I commented on the financial struggles of some parapsychological
institutions, and I ended my Editorial with what I thought were some appropriate
and justifiable concerns about the long-term reliability of current benefactors.
But I don’t believe there was any more doom and gloom behind those remarks
than I’d attribute to the average purchaser of an insurance policy, who doesn’t
expect the worst but who certainly wants to be protected in case it occurs.
Let’s face it, shit happens, and unfortunately the world suffers its share
of rogues and scoundrels. The story I told in my Editorial about finding a
good home for the Eisenbud/Serios collection was, I thought, a cautionary
tale about protecting what members of this diverse community have worked
so hard and lovingly to build. But by no means do I feel that the problems are
insurmountable. It’s just that we need to be smart and careful about protecting
our scholarly and research legacies, like any investment.
One reason the SSE is such a valuable community is that its members
are united, not so much by shared specific research interests, but rather by a
resistance to scientific complacency and a readiness to challenge various
forms of received wisdom. It’s a sensible empirical stance buttressed by a
clear and extensive historical record of scientific development. I’d argue that
my cautionary comments are likewise supported by a wealth of historical
Editorial 637
examples, which can guide us as we look for ways to preserve our scholarly
and research legacies. Fortunately, the SSE abounds in smart and resourceful
members who, either individually or collectively, should be able to address this
recurring problem. I’d hoped that my previous Editorial would have provoked
some discussion and scheming on the matter, and I’m sorry if—for at least
some—it elicited more discouragement than enthusiasm for the challenge.
And I’m sorry too if I managed to obscure the positive message that, for the
Eisenbud/Serios material at least, we were able to find a respectable, respectful,
and indeed grateful repository, whose director very actively and energetically
promotes the collection. While it’s true (as I noted) that we must remain wary
of possible changes in attitude along with changes in personnel, I hope that this
story encourages JSE readers to explore their own mainstream connections for
protecting other research archives.
STEPHEN E. BRAUDE
638 Editorial
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Revisiting the Ganzfeld ESP Debate:

A Basic Review and Assessment
BRYAN J. WILLIAMS
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87102
[email protected]
Submitted: 1/3/2011; Accepted 6/1/2011
Abstract—This paper presents a brief review of the debate between parapsy-

chologists and skeptics regarding the issue of replication in experimental tests
of extrasensory perception (ESP) using a sensory reduction technique known
as ganzfeld. The review is followed by a basic assessment of 59 ganzfeld
ESP studies reported in the period following the publication of a stringent
set of methodological guidelines and recommendations by R. Hyman and C.
Honorton in 1986. The assessment indicates that these 59 studies have a com-
bined hit rate of approximately 30%, which is significantly above the chance
expected hit rate of 25%. A comparison of the hit rates across four ganzfeld
meta-analyses, as well as across fifteen laboratories, seems to further indicate
replication of the ganzfeld ESP effect by a broad group of independent re-
searchers.
Keywords: extrasensory perception (ESP)—ganzfeld—meta-analysis—psi—
parapsychology
Introduction
In attempting to make a case for the existence of ostensible psychic (psi)
phenomena such as extrasensory perception (ESP), parapsychologists have
been regularly faced with the challenge from skeptics of providing a body of
notable evidence that can be reproduced under laboratory conditions. In rising
to this challenge, many parapsychologists have focused in recent years on the
data from a particular type of experiment often used to test for telepathy, and
which makes use of a sensory reduction technique known as ganzfeld.
Within the context of parapsychology, the ganzfeld (German for “total
field”) is a technique intended to help improve the reception of ESP by briefly
exposing a person to a static and uniform sensory field.1 This is done by covering
the person’s eyes with translucent eye shields (usually halved ping-pong balls
externally illuminated by a red light) and filling the person’s ears with soft static
noise played through headphones. While in this homogeneous ganzfeld “state,”
639
640 Bryan J. Williams
the person may report a dimming of the visual field and experience a diffuse
background that has been described as a “cloudy fog” (Wackermann, Pütz, &
Allefeld, 2008:1366). After several minutes, the person may begin to experience
hallucinatory-like images and/or sounds, similar to those experienced during
the hypnagogic state between wakefulness and sleep.2 Presumably, if the ESP
assumption is valid, some of the images and sounds may correspond to the ESP
target.
A typical experimental test session for telepathy using the ganzfeld
proceeds in the following manner: Two participants, one acting as the “sender”
and the other as the “receiver,”3 are isolated in separate, soundproofed rooms.
In one room, the receiver is placed in the ganzfeld state and asked to describe
any images, sounds, or impressions that come to mind while in that state. In the
other room, the sender is shown a randomly selected visual target, such as a
photograph or a video clip, and asked to concentrate on its details. After about
thirty minutes, the receiver is taken out of the ganzfeld and shown a collection
of four photos or video clips, one of which was the target that the sender was
concentrating on (the other three are decoys). The receiver is then asked to rank
the four photos/videos according to their degree of correspondence with the
images, sounds, and impressions received while in the ganzfeld. If the photo/
video that the sender was viewing is ranked as having the highest degree of
correspondence, the test session is considered a success, or a “hit.” With the
probability of a hit being 1 in 4, the hit rate expected by chance is 25% (for
further discussion of the ganzfeld and its use in ESP experiments, see, for
example, Bem & Honorton, 1994, Honorton, Berger,Varvoglis, Quant, Derr, et
al., 1990, Wackermann, Pütz, & Allefeld, 2008).4
For a period of approximately 28 years, there has been an ongoing debate
between parapsychologists and skeptics over the issue of whether or not
the ganzfeld experiment can provide the independently replicable evidence
necessary to support the empirical case for psi. This paper seeks to address
the issue in two ways. First, it provides a brief review of the substance of the
debate as it has persisted from 1982 to the present. Second, it presents a basic
assessment of a collection of 59 ganzfeld ESP studies reported in the years
following the publication of a stringent set of methodological guidelines and
recommendations for ganzfeld research developed by Ray Hyman, a cognitive
psychologist and long-time critic of parapsychology, and the late Charles
Honorton, a parapsychologist and contributor to the ganzfeld database (Hyman
& Honorton, 1986).
The Ganzfeld Debate

ESP research using the ganzfeld was initiated in the early 1970s largely through
the efforts of three independent researchers: Charles Honorton, William Braud,
Revisiting the Ganzfeld Debate 641
and Adrian Parker (Braud, Wood, & Braud, 1975, Honorton & Harper, 1974,
Parker, 1975). Between 1974 and 1981, a total of 42 ganzfeld studies had been
reported by ten different laboratories. Of these early studies, 23 (55%) produced
results that were statistically significant at the .05 level.
The debate commenced at the 25th Annual Convention of the
Parapsychological Association (PA) in August of 1982, where two preliminary
meta-analyses of the early ganzfeld database were presented.5 On the basis of
his analysis, Ray Hyman argued that the initial rate of successful replication
may have been overestimated. Noting that some of the experiments contained
slight variations on the standard ganzfeld procedure, Hyman suggested that
each variation should be counted as a separate study. By his count, there were
80 ganzfeld studies in all, 25 of which (31%) were successful. Although this
was still considered notable, Hyman further argued that the significance of the
database could be further discounted through the effects of selective reporting.
In his review of the database, Hyman found a significant tendency for
studies with a small number of test sessions to have a higher proportion of
significant positive results, suggesting to him the possibility that some studies
may have been stopped and reported early on because of their promising results
(i.e. optional stopping on a hit). In addition, Hyman claimed that there was
circumstantial evidence suggesting that some pilot or exploratory studies in
the database were being retrospectively counted as formal ones solely on the
basis of their significant outcomes. He further suggested that, in contrast to
the significant ones, studies with nonsignificant results might not have been
reported, contributing to a possible “file-drawer” effect. According to Hyman’s
argument, when the effects of selective reporting are taken into account, the
success rate of the database comes much closer to chance. Lastly, Hyman cited a
number of potential study flaws in the database relating to target randomization,
adequate security, sensory cuing, statistical errors, and the use of multiple
analyses.
Honorton responded to Hyman’s critique with his own meta-analysis
of the early ganzfeld database. To address the issue of varying conditions,
Honorton proposed that researchers should examine each study and decide for
themselves whether or not each varying ganzfeld condition should be classified
as a separate study. To adjust the results for the effects of multiple analyses,
Honorton applied a Bonferroni correction and showed that the initial success
rate would only be reduced to 45%. To further counter the multiple-analysis
argument, Honorton focused on the 28 studies that reported a hit rate, the most
common analysis measure used in the database. Of these, 12 studies (43%)
were significant at the .05 level. When combined, these 28 studies were shown
to have a Stouffer’s Z of 6.60 (p = 2.1 × 10−9). In addition to citing the PA’s
policy against selective reporting, Honorton used Rosenthal’s (1979) “file
drawer” estimation statistic to show that approximately 423 studies would be

needed to nullify the significance of the 28 studies, amounting to 15 unreported
studies for every one that was reported. Lastly, to address the issue of flaws,
Honorton’s analysis showed that there was no significant correlation between
rated study quality and experimental outcomes.
The two opposing meta-analyses were refined and published together in
the Journal of Parapsychology three years later (Honorton, 1985, Hyman,
1985). Instead of remaining in opposing camps, Hyman and Honorton (1986)
came together soon afterward to develop a “joint communiqué” that highlighted
the issues on which they agreed. In summarizing their agreements, they wrote:
We agree that there is an overall significant effect in this data base that cannot
be reasonably explained by selective reporting or multiple analysis. We con-
tinue to differ over the degree to which the effect constitutes evidence for psi,
but we agree that the final verdict awaits the outcome of future experiments
conducted by a broader range of investigators and according to more stringent
standards. (p. 351)
To supplement their agreement regarding future experimentation, Hyman

and Honorton (1986) also provided in their communiqué the jointly developed
set of methodological guidelines and recommendations.
At the same time, Honorton and his colleagues at Psychophysical Research
Laboratories (PRL) in New Jersey had designed a series of automated ganzfeld
studies in which target selection, presentation, and data recording were handled
by computer (Honorton et al., 1990). These eleven “autoganzfeld” studies were
conducted from 1983 to 1989, and were made to be compliant with the guidelines
and recommendations of the joint communiqué. In a meta-analysis published
in the prominent mainstream journal Psychological Bulletin, Daryl Bem and
Charles Honorton (1994) evaluated ten of the PRL autoganzfeld studies and
found that they had collectively produced 106 hits in 329 test sessions for a
significant hit rate of 32.2% (z = 2.89, p = .002). A graphical summary of Bem
and Honorton’s results is shown in Figure 1.
In addition to PRL, seven other laboratories had made efforts to design
and conduct ganzfeld studies that complied with the joint communiqué
guidelines and recommendations. Five years after the analysis by Bem and
Honorton, Julie Milton and Richard Wiseman (1999) published a meta-analysis
in Psychological Bulletin of the 30 ganzfeld studies conducted by these other
laboratories between 1987 and 1997. Their analysis seemed to indicate that this
independent database had produced an overall result consistent with chance
(Stouffer’s Z = 0.70, p = .242). A graphical summary of Milton and Wiseman’s
results is shown in Figure 2.
Two years later, Lance Storm and Suitbert Ertel (2001) published a
Figure 1. Results summary of the PRL autoganzfeld meta-analysis reported

by Bem and Honorton (1994), in terms of hit rate and 95%
confidence intervals.
The horizontal line at 25% indicates the hit rate expected by chance.
The far right hit rate marked “All” represents the combined data of
Studies 1–10.
Figure 2. Results summary for the 30 ganzfeld ESP studies analyzed by Milton
and Wiseman (1999), in terms of hit rate and 95% confidence intervals.
commentary in Psychological Bulletin that raised several methodological issues

with Milton and Wiseman’s analysis, and that presented a meta-analysis of a
larger database. They reasoned that, in order to reach a general conclusion on
ganzfeld research, it was necessary to consider the results of all studies reported
from 1974 to 1997. On this basis, they compiled a unified database of 79 studies
that included the early ganzfeld and PRL studies, along with those contained
in the Milton–Wiseman database. Their subsequent analysis found a significant
overall effect (Stouffer’s Z = 5.66, p = 7.78 × 10−9). In their reply, Milton and
Wiseman (2001) claimed that Storm and Ertel’s result was ambiguous because
they had included the early ganzfeld database, which contained numerous flaws
according to Hyman’s (1985) analysis. Milton and Wiseman argued that this
would make it impossible to determine what proportion of the significant effect
was due to flaws.
Shortly after this exchange, Daryl Bem, John Palmer, and Richard
Broughton (2001a) published a meta-analysis that seemed to shed light on a
possible reason why Milton and Wiseman’s results were null. They noticed
that the database used by Milton and Wiseman comprised two types of study,
labeled “standard” and “non-standard.”
Standard studies were intended to be direct replications of the PRL
autoganzfeld, and had therefore used methods and procedures very similar
to (if not the same as) those used by PRL. In contrast, non-standard studies
used methods and procedures that had been purposely modified from those
commonly used in previous ganzfeld experiments in order to search for other
psi-conducive conditions and begin exploring the processes involved in ESP.
Some of the modifications made in non-standard studies include using auditory
targets instead of visual ones (Willin, 1996a, 1996b), using more than one
target during a session (Serial Ganzfeld section in Parker & Westerlund, 1998),
exploring the effects of psychedelic drugs on receiver impressions (Series V
& VI in Wezelman & Bierman, 1997), and exclusively using a clairvoyance
design throughout the course of the study (Kanthamani & Broughton, 1996,
Kanthamani & Khilji, 1990, Kanthamani, Khilji, & Rustomji-Kerns, 1989).
Several of the non-standard studies were noted by Bem et al. (2001a) to
have shown negative or null results, consistent with their cautionary statement
that “. . . such deviations from exact replication are at increased risk for failure”
(p. 208). They hypothesized that, when combined with the standard studies, the
results of the non-standard studies could have the effect of reducing the overall
hit rate. To test this, Bem et al. separately grouped the two types of study based
on ratings of how closely they adhered to the PRL autoganzfeld methods and
procedures. The 29 standard studies were found to have a significant above-
chance hit rate of 31.2% (Stouffer’s Z = 3.49, p = .0002), whereas the nine
non-standard studies had a nonsignificant below-chance hit rate of 24%
(Stouffer’s Z = −1.30, p = .903). The difference between the two study types
was significant (U = 190.5, p = .020). In addition, Bem, Palmer, & Broughton
(2001a) found ten other ganzfeld studies that had been reported after Milton
and Wiseman’s analysis. When these studies were combined with the 30 studies
in the Milton–Wiseman database, a significant hit rate of 30.1% was obtained
(Stouffer’s Z = 2.59, p = .0048). Graphical summaries of Bem et al.’s results are
presented in Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5.
Figure 3. Results summary for the set of 29 “standard” ganzfeld studies

contained in the database analyzed by Bem et al. (2001b), in terms of
hit rate and 95% confidence intervals.
Two other recent meta-analyses have reported overall hit rates that are
significantly above the 25% expected by chance. In the first, Marilyn Schlitz
and Dean Radin (2003) found that a unified database of all ganzfeld studies
published between 1974 and 2001 had a hit rate of 32% (929 hits in 2,878
sessions, z = 8.75, p << 10−15).6
Another unified database comprising 16 early ganzfeld studies, the eleven
PRL autoganzfeld studies, and Bem et al.’s 29 “standard” ganzfeld studies was
analyzed by Jessica Utts, Michelle Norris, Eric Suess, and Wesley Johnson
(2010) in the second study. Their results indicated 709 hits in 2,124 sessions
for a hit rate of 33.4% (z = 8.92, p = 2.26 × 10−18). In addition to this frequentist
Figure 4. Results summary for the set of nine “non-standard” ganzfeld studies
contained in the database analyzed by Bem, Palmer, & Broughton
(2001b), in terms of hit rate and 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5. Results summary for the entire set of 40 “standard” & “non-standard”
ganzfeld studies contained in the database analyzed by Bem, Palmer,
& Broughton (2001b), in terms of hit rate and 95% confidence intervals.
The far right point interval represents the overall hit rate for all 40 studies
combined. The horizontal line at 25% indicates the hit rate expected by
chance.
analysis, Utts, Norris, Suess, & Johnson (2010) performed a Bayesian analysis
on this database to illustrate how the differing levels of a priori belief regarding
the probability for ganzfeld success (modeled in terms of a beta distribution)
for three separate personal points of view (believer, skeptic, and open-minded)
were each influenced by the experimental results of the database. While the
probability distribution for the open-minded view was shifted more toward
higher probabilities of success, the distribution for the skeptic view was not
shifted much from probabilities close to chance level. The distribution for the
believer view remained within the range of higher probabilities, but was found
to have less variability.
Most recently, an analysis by Lance Storm, Patrizio Tressoldi, and Lorenzo
Di Risio (2010a) of 30 ganzfeld studies reported from 1997 to 2008 found a
hit rate of 32.2% (483 hits in 1,498 sessions, z = 6.44, p < .001).7 A graphical
summary of Storm et al.’s (2010a) results is shown in Figure 6.
More in-depth discussion of the ganzfeld debate and additional summaries
of the meta-analyses reviewed here can be found in other published reviews
by Dalkvist (2001), Palmer (2003), Radin (1997, Ch. 5, 2006, Ch. 6), Storm
(2006), and Utts (1991, 1999b).
A Basic Assessment
An issue central to the ganzfeld debate as it appeared in Psychological Bulletin
was the status of independent replication in the years following the publication
of Hyman and Honorton’s (1986) joint communiqué. At the end of their article
on the PRL autoganzfeld meta-analysis, Bem and Honorton (1994) stated
that, although they had produced significant overall results under stringent
conditions,
. . . the autoganzfeld studies by themselves cannot satisfy the requirement [in

the joint communiqué] that replications be conducted by a “broader range of
investigators.” Accordingly, we hope the findings reported here will be suf-
ficiently provocative to prompt others to try replicating the psi ganzfeld effect.
(p. 13)
The analysis by Milton and Wiseman (1999) represented an initial attempt to

determine whether this requirement had been met in the decade following the
joint communiqué, and their null result suggested that the outlook for replication
by others was not promising. In contrast, several subsequent analyses using a
unified database of all ganzfeld studies seemed to suggest that a more positive
outlook was warranted (Radin, 2006:120–121, Schlitz & Radin, 2003, Storm
& Ertel, 2001, Storm et al., 2010a:477, Utts, Norris, Suess, & Johnson, 2010).
Despite this, it might be argued that these analyses may be somewhat limited in
their ability to address the issue because of their inclusion of the early ganzfeld
database. Assuming for the moment that the early database does indeed contain
serious flaws, as argued by Hyman (1985), the argument can be made that
inclusion of this database could potentially inflate or otherwise confound the
overall results.8 Meta-analyses that used a non-unified database also offer a
positive outlook on the issue (e.g., Bem, Palmer, & Broughton, 2001a, Storm et
al., 2010a:475), although assessing the broader, long-term trend in replication
may be partially limited in these analyses by their confined periods of coverage.
For these reasons, an attempt was made to basically assess the post-communiqué
replication status of the current ganzfeld database, as well as to update and
confirm some of the results of previous meta-analyses. However, it should be
made clear that the assessment presented here was not meant to represent any
kind of formal meta-analysis, and thus that may perhaps limit interpretation of
its findings (addressed in the Discussion).
Method
To examine the current status of replication, a collection of ganzfeld studies was
compiled from the databases listed in three previously published meta-analyses
that addressed post-communiqué research (Bem, Palmer, & Broughton, 2001a,
Milton & Wiseman, 1999, Storm et al., 2010a). This resulted in 59 studies
reported in the period between 1987 and 2008 (see Appendix 1).
Formal meta-analyses of ganzfeld research have tended to use effect size
as their primary measure of effect magnitude. However, to make the assessment
results more accessible to a general interdisciplinary audience, the decision was
made here to focus on hit rate, as this is a concept that is intuitively easier
to grasp. Following the approach taken by Radin (1997), the hit rate was
obtained by determining the proportion of hits achieved over the total number
of test sessions in each study, and an associated 95% confidence interval was
calculated based on the proportion of hits and its associated standard deviation
(SD), derived from the equation (from Utts, 1999a:341):
SD = √(h)(1 – h)/N
where h is the proportion of hits and N is the number of sessions. To cover

95% of the values that fall within approximately two standard deviations of h,
SD is multiplied by 1.96. Thus, the confidence interval is obtained using the
equation CI = h ± 1.96(SD) (Howell, 1995:95–96, Utts, 1999a:341). To confirm
and compare previously obtained results, the published data from four meta-
analyses (Bem & Honorton, 1994, Bem et al., 2001a, Milton & Wiseman, 1999,
Storm et al., 2010a) were reanalyzed in the same manner.
To test the statistical significance of the collection and the four databases,
the method of hypothesis testing described by Utts (1999a, Ch. 21) was used.
In this basic four-step method, a test statistic is used to decide between two
competing hypotheses: a null hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis. Under
the null hypothesis of no ESP, the mean hit rate in ganzfeld experiments is
expected to be around the chance rate of 25%. Under the alternative hypothesis
of ostensible ESP, the mean ganzfeld hit rate will be significantly different from
the expected chance rate of 25%. Here, the test statistic was a z-score of the form
z = (x – μ)/SD, where x is the proportion of hits observed in a given database
of ganzfeld experiments, μ is the mean proportion of hits expected under the
null hypothesis (.25), and SD is the expected standard deviation (determined
by the SD equation above, using the chance-expected proportion of hits for h).
Based on the resulting z-score, an associated probability value was obtained to
determine the degree of significance. Because the prediction in many ESP tests
(including the ganzfeld) is for an above-chance hit rate, the same prediction was
maintained here and thus all reported probability values are one-tailed.
Results
Figure 1 shows a results summary of the PRL autoganzfeld meta-analysis by
Bem and Honorton (1994), expressed in terms of hit rate and 95% confidence
intervals. As in the Bem and Honorton analysis, Study 11 (No. 302–Experienced)
was excluded from the overall hit rate because of its possible response bias. As
noted in the previous section, Bem and Honorton found a total of 106 hits in 329
sessions, for a significant overall hit rate of 32.2%. Based on Utts’ method of
hypothesis testing, this results in a z-score of 3.02 (p = .001), which is slightly
higher than, but still consistent with, the original reported finding.9
Figure 2 shows the results summary for the 30 post-communiqué ganzfeld
studies analyzed by Milton and Wiseman (1999), expressed in terms of hit
rate and 95% confidence intervals. It was noted in the previous section that
Milton and Wiseman’s analysis, as originally published, had produced a result
consistent with chance. However, a few researchers (Radin, 2006:118, Schlitz
& Radin, 2003:79, Utts cited in Storm et al., 2010a, Footnote 1) have pointed
out that if their 30-study database is analyzed in terms of hit rate, a significant
finding is obtained. An attempt was made to verify this by calculating the
proportion of hits for each study in the database and then examining the
combined hit rate.10 This resulted in 331 hits in 1,198 sessions for a hit rate of
27.6% (z = 2.08, p = .019), consistent with the estimates made by these other
researchers. It can be seen at the far right of Figure 2 that the lower bound
of the confidence interval for the combined hit rate seems to include chance
(by calculation, the lower bound is 25.07%, just marginally above chance
expectation). This suggests that, even though the result is postive, caution is
warranted in interpreting the combined result.
Results summaries for the meta-analysis by Bem, Palmer, & Broughton

(2001a) are shown in Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5. These summaries are
based on data contained in a corrected table that was later published by the
authors (Bem, Palmer, & Broughton, 2001b). Figure 3 shows the results for the
set of 29 “standard” ganzfeld studies contained within their 40-study database.
There were 402 hits out of 1,278 sessions in this set of standard studies, for an
overall hit rate of 31.5%. By the Utts method, this is associated with a z-score
of 5.37 (p = 3.95 × 10–8).
The results for the set of nine “non-standard” ganzfeld studies in the Bem
et al. database is shown in Figure 4. As in the Bem et al. (2001a) analysis, the
two studies in the database that fell on the boundary between standard and
non-standard were excluded. Consistent with the point made by Bem, Palmer,
& Broughton (2001a) that studies that deviate from standard ganzfeld methods
and procedures are at greater risk for failure, the confidence intervals for all nine
studies shown in Figure 4 include chance expectation, even when combined.
This is further indicated by a nonsignificant hit rate of 24.3% for this set (73 hits
in 300 sessions,11 z = −0.28, p = .610).
When combined, the 40 standard and non-standard studies contained in the
Bem, Palmer, & Broughton (2001b) database have an above-chance hit rate of
30.1% (503 hits in 1,661 sessions, z = 4.80, p = 7.94 × 10–7). However, there
has been some debate about the effect of including a large and highly significant
study by Kathy Dalton (1997), which apparently began over the considerable
influence it had in affecting the overall significance of the ganzfeld database
as it stood in March of 1999 (see Milton, 1999, Schmeidler & Edge, 1999,
Storm, 2000). When this Dalton study is excluded from the Bem, Palmer, &
Broughton (2001a) database, the overall hit rate decreases to 28.9%, which
remains significant (443 hits in 1,533 sessions, z = 3.53, p = .0002). The results
for all 40 studies are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 6 shows the results summary for 29 of the 30 ganzfeld studies
analyzed by Storm et al. (2010a).12 Ten studies contained within their database
were also included in the database of Bem et al. (2001b). Here a small update
is provided to the Storm et al. database by replacing the preliminary data from
one conference-presented study (Ganzfeld Study 7 in Storm et al.’s Appendix
A) with its more complete published data (Parker, 2010), and adjusting one
study (Ganzfeld Study 11 in their Appendix A) for an extra hit that was later
found and reported elsewhere (Parker, 2000). As noted in the previous section,
Storm et al. reported a significant overall hit rate of 32.2% for their database, a
finding that does not include the Dalton (1997) study. Recalculating based on
the updated database gives 486 hits in 1,506 sessions for an overall hit rate of
32.3% (z = 6.54, p = 3.09 × 10–11), consistent with their finding.
A summary of the combined results for the collection of 59 post-
Figure 6. Results summary for 29 of the 30 ganzfeld studies included in the

meta-analysis by Storm et al. (2010a), in terms of hit rate and 95%
confidence intervals.
communiqué studies compiled from the databases of Bem et al. (2001b), Milton
and Wiseman (1999), and Storm et al. (2010a) is shown in Figure 7 in terms of a
cumulative hit rate over time and associated 95% confidence intervals (modeled
after the approach taken by Radin, 2006:120). It should be made clear that this
does not include the PRL autoganzfeld results; it is based only on ganzfeld
replication efforts independent of PRL. The graph indicates that the hit rate
begins to average out over time at about 30%, significantly above the 25%
expected by chance. Overall, there are 878 hits in 2,832 sessions for a hit rate
of 31%, which has z = 7.37, p = 8.59 × 10–14 by the Utts method. If the Dalton
(1997) study is excluded, there are 818 hits in 2,704 sessions for a hit rate of
30.3% (z = 6.36, p = 1.01 × 10–10). This suggests that, even if the early ganzfeld
and PRL autoganzfeld databases are not considered, attempts to replicate the
ganzfeld ESP effect by independent researchers are still collectively above what
would be expected by chance, with the correct target being identified about one-
third of the time on average.
The Issue of Replication: A Comparative Approach

Statistician Jessica Utts (1999b) suggests that, rather than being defined in terms
of statistical significance, “[a] more appropriate definition of repeatability of an
effect is that the estimated magnitude of the effect (odds ratio, hit rate, and so on)
Figure 7. Results summary for the collection of 59 post-communiqué

ganzfeld ESP studies reported from 1987 to 2008, in terms of
cumulative hit rate over time and 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 8. Comparison of the overall hit rates and 95% confidence intervals
from four ganzfeld ESP meta-analyses.
BH 94: Bem & Honorton, 1994; MW 99: Milton & Wiseman, 1999; BPB 01-A: combined result
from all studies in the Bem et al. (2001b) database; BPB 01-S & BPB 01-NS: results from the
“standard” and “non-standard” studies in Bem et al., 2001b, respectively; STDR-10: Storm et al.,
2010a; PCGANZ-ALL: combination of MW 99, BPB 01-A, and STDR-10, representing all post-
communiqué ganzfeld studies, excluding PRL.
Figure 9. Comparison of the hit rates and 95% confidence intervals for 15
laboratories that have contributed to the ganzfeld ESP database.
Above each lab is the total number of sessions contributed by that lab
to the database.
falls within the same range from one repetition of an experiment to the next”
(p. 631). This is something that can be assessed by looking at the confidence
intervals. Figure 8 shows a comparison of the hit rate confidence interval from
the Bem and Honorton (1994) PRL autoganzfeld database with the confidence
intervals of the three meta-analyses used to compile the 59-study collection
(Bem et al., 2001b, Milton & Wiseman, 1999, Storm et al., 2010a).
It can be seen that, when compared to the PRL autoganzfeld (BH 94 in
Figure 8), the three other meta-analyses each have a mean hit rate that lies
within the PRL 95% confidence interval. The same finding is evident when the
results of the three analyses are combined. When split into standard and non-
standard ganzfeld, the Bem et al. (2001b) database indicates that, as one might
predict, the mean hit rate for standard studies replicates the PRL autoganzfeld
finding, while the non-standard hit rate mean does not (although the confidence
intervals do overlap).
Looking at replication from another perspective, Figure 9 compares the
mean hit rates and confidence intervals across each of the fifteen laboratories
that have contributed to the ganzfeld database.13 While the intervals for most
of the laboratories include chance, they also have mean hit rates above what is
expected by chance. Most importantly, ten of the fifteen laboratories (66.7%)

produced mean hit rates that fall at or within the bounds of the 95% confidence
interval for PRL, indicating a fair degree of replication of the obtained PRL hit
rate.
Discussion
The results of the basic assessment presented here are consistent with those
reported in previous meta-analyses of the ganzfeld ESP database, and seem to
indicate three main things: First, there remains a significant overall hit rate in
the series of ganzfeld studies conducted after Hyman and Honorton’s (1986)
joint communiqué.
Second, this significant finding remains apart from the results of the early
ganzfeld and PRL databases. As noted, this goes toward addressing a criticism
that could be leveled against meta-analyses that include the latter two databases
as part of a larger unified database. In addition to his finding of flaws in the
early ganzfeld database, Hyman (1994) claimed to have found subtle hints of
artifacts present in the PRL autoganzfeld database that he argues may constrain
interpretation of its results. Assuming his claims have merit, it can be argued that
inclusion of the two databases in a unified database could potentially confound
interpretation of any subsequent meta-analysis. However, in not being reliant
on either of the databases, the collection of post-communiqué studies used in
the present assessment circumvents this confound.
Third, this series of post-communiqué studies was contributed by fifteen
different laboratories, more than half of which produced a hit rate statistically
within the range of the hit rate obtained in the PRL autoganzfeld. Similarly,
the combined series shows a comparable hit rate to PRL. If the replication
issue is addressed in these terms, it would seem that, in answer to Hyman and
Honorton’s (1986:351) communiqué statement, the psi ganzfeld effect has
indeed been replicated by “a broader range of investigators” under stringent
standards.
Some consideration should be made of the potential limitations of the
present assessment. Because it was not defined in advance to be a formal meta-
analysis, the assessment had no well-defined criteria for studies to be included in
the collection used here, and no formal check of the heterogeneity of the dataset
was performed. However, it should be recognized that the studies included in the
collection came from meta-analytic databases that did have defined inclusion
criteria, and that the issue of how to properly handle a heterogeneity problem
within the ganzfeld database is still under debate (e.g., see Schmeidler & Edge,
1999:340–349, Storm, 2000). Even so, at least one formal meta-analysis that
included a test for heterogeneity has found a significant result with a trimmed,
homogeneous database (Storm et al., 2010a:475).
As mentioned previously, the ganzfeld debate has persisted for nearly 30

years without adequate resolution. If the results of the present assessment and
those of previous meta-analyses are carefully considered, they seem to stress
the issue that there is a statistical anomaly within the ganzfeld database that
is in need of a more sufficient explanation, if not ESP. Regardless of their
interpretation, the results seem to offer reason that serious consideration should
perhaps be put toward bringing final closure to the replication issue at the heart
of the debate, rather than lingering endlessly on the proof-oriented questions of
whether an anomaly exists and whether it is replicable.
Notes
1
The idea of how the ganzfeld might improve ESP reception is based on the assumption
that ESP is regularly overwhelmed or “drowned out” by incoming signals from the
prime sensory channels of vision and hearing. However, if these sensory channels
are reduced via the ganzfeld, then this might give the subtle ESP information a better
chance of seeping into conscious awareness.
2
The similarity between the ganzfeld state and the hypnagogic state has previously
led some researchers to suspect that the two might be related. However, the findings
reviewed by Wackermann et al. (2008) suggest that, rather than being a state of
reduced awareness like the hypnagogic state, the ganzfeld may actually be a mildly
active state, characterized in part by brain waves in the alpha range (8–12 Hz, usually
associated with a state of relaxed awareness). Some studies offer evidence to suggest
that ESP may be associated with alpha activity (see the reviews in Krippner &
Friedman, 2010), perhaps suggesting a possible connection.
3
Although the concept of telepathy traditionally assumes that the sender is
“transferring” information about the ESP target to the receiver, there is currently little
(if any) evidence to indicate that that is what is occurring. Thus, these terms are being
used here for the convenience of distinguishing between the two participants, and
should not be taken to imply that one necessarily transferred or “sent” something to
the other.
4
In addition to telepathy, a ganzfeld experiment may also be used to test for
clairvoyance; this can be done by having no sender present to view the ESP target.
Although a small number of the individual experiments in the ganzfeld database have
tested clairvoyance, the majority of them have used a telepathy design.
5
For simplicity, meta-analysis can be defined here as the statistical method of
combining the data from many separate experiments in order to examine and weigh
the evidence for a combined overall effect, rather than looking at the individual results
of each experiment alone. This type of analysis is particularly useful when evaluating
the experimental evidence for phenomena that are inherently weak or that tend to
vary across conditions, such as psi and other forms of human behavior. For useful
discussions on meta-analysis and its use in parapsychology, see Radin (1997, Chapter
4), Storm (2006), and Utts (1991, 1999b).
6
See also two books by Radin (1997:86–89, 2006:120–121) for the results of two other
unified ganzfeld meta-analyses.
7
The ganzfeld was one of the three types of ESP experiment examined in Storm et
al.’s (2010a) meta-analysis. The other two, noise reduction induced through alleged
psi-enhancing techniques (dreams, meditation, relaxation, and hypnosis) and standard
waking free response, had also shown significant overall results.
8
The issue of whether or not the early ganzfeld database does indeed contain serious
flaws remains to be one of serious controversy; it was a major point of contention in
the exchange between Milton and Wiseman (2001, 2002) and Storm and Ertel (2001,
2002) with regard to interpreting the latter’s meta-analysis, and Hyman (2010:488)
still apparently stands behind his argument of flaws (see Storm et al., 2010b:493, for a
brief counterargument and supporting references). Although some analyses have found
no significant correlation between rated study quality and effect size, one wonders
whether this would satisfy the skeptics, given the persistent controversy. Rather than
having to address it, the controversy was circumvented here by considering only the
ganzfeld studies conducted after the joint communiqué (since the focus of this paper
is on post-communiqué replication).
9
The discrepancy between the z-score obtained by the Utts method and that reported
by Bem and Honorton (1994) can be explained by the fact that the latter is associated
with the exact binomial probability for the observed number of hits compared to
chance expectation (p. 10). The same holds for the results of all the other meta-
analyses reanalyzed here.
10
In calculating the number of hits for two studies contained in the Milton–Wiseman
database, it was necessary to make approximations. For Stanford and Frank (1991),
Bem et al. (2001b:428) note that the hit rate was not reported and had to be estimated
from a z-score. The number of hits was approximated based on this hit rate and the
total number of sessions. For McDonough, Don, & Warren (1994), the approximated
number of hits was based on a composite of the hit rates obtained both by receiver
judging and by independent judging. The approximations for the two studies are noted
in the table in Appendix 1.
11
For the serial study by Parker and Westerlund (1998) and four studies summarized
by Kanthamani and Broughton (1994), Bem et al. (2001b:428) note that the hit rate
was not reported and had to be estimated from a z-score. The number of hits for these
studies was again approximated based on the estimated hit rate and the total number
of sessions. These approximations are noted in Appendix 1.
12
One of the studies (Roe & Flint, 2007) in the Storm et al. (2010a) database was
excluded because it had a hit probability of 12.5% (i.e. 1 in 8) rather than the usual
25% (1 in 4) of most other ganzfeld studies.
13
To identify these contributing laboratories, the methods sections of the individually
published studies cited in Appendix 1 were consulted in order to determine where
the ganzfeld test sessions for each study had been conducted. In some cases, this
information was also given in the study title (e.g., the Utrecht and Amsterdam series),
and/or was available in the extended Parapsychological Association Convention
abstracts for certain studies that were originally published in the annual anthology
Research in Parapsychology and later in the Journal of Parapsychology. The
numbers of sessions reported in the studies were tabulated and grouped according to
the laboratory where each study was conducted. The session numbers for all studies
conducted at a given laboratory were then summed to produce the totals for each
laboratory listed in Figure 9.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Dr. Lance Storm for kindly providing a reprint of an earlier
article, and for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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APPENDIX 1
The 59-Study Post-Communiqué Ganzfeld Collection
Study Study Description N Sessions Hits Hit Rate SD*

1 Kanthamani et al. (1989)—FRNM Manual Series 5a 4 2 0.500 0.250
2 Kanthamani et al. (1989)—FRNM Manual Series 5b 10 1 0.100 0.095
3 Kanthamani & Khilji (1990)—FRNM Manual Series 6b 40 12 0.300 0.072
4 Stanford & Frank (1991)—Psych Verbal Indicators 58 11 0.190 0.052
5 Kanthamani & Broughton (1996)—FRNM Manual Series 6a 20 5 0.250 0.097
6 Bierman et al. (1993)—Utrecht Novice Series 1 50 13 0.260 0.062
7 Bierman et al. (1993)—Utrecht Novice Series 2 50 12 0.240 0.060
8 Kanthamani & Palmer (1993)—Subliminal Sending 22 2 0.091 0.061
9 Morris et al. (1993)—Cunningham Study 32 13 0.406 0.087
10 Morris et al. (1993)—McAlpine Study 32 8 0.250 0.077
11 Dalton (1994)—Sender–Receiver Sex Pairing 29 12 0.414 0.091
12 Kanthamani & Broughton (1994)—FRNM Manual Series 3 40 8 0.200 0.063
16 McDonough et al. (1994)—EEG Ganzfeld 20 8 0.300 0.102
17 Williams et al. (1994)—Senders/Geomagnetism 42 5 0.119 0.050
18 Bierman (1995)—Amsterdam Series III: Emotional Targets 40 16 0.400 0.077
19 Bierman (1995)—Amsterdam Series IV: Emotional Targets 36 13 0.361 0.080
20 Morris et al. (1995)—Sender/No Sender 97 32 0.330 0.048
21 Willin (1996a)—Musical Targets 100 24 0.240 0.043
22 Willin (1996b)—Musical Targets High Scorers 16 4 0.250 0.108
23 Broughton & Alexander (1997)—AG II: First Timers Series 1 50 12 0.240 0.060
24 Broughton & Alexander (1997)—AG II: First Timers Series 2 50 9 0.180 0.054
25 Broughton & Alexander (1997)—AG II: Emotionally Close 51 19 0.373 0.068
26 Broughton & Alexander (1997)—AG II: Clairvoyance Series 50 11 0.220 0.059
27 Broughton & Alexander (1997)—AG II: General Series 8 3 0.375 0.171
28 Dalton (1997)—Creativity and Psi 128 60 0.469 0.044
29 Parker et al. (1997)—Gothenburg Study 1 30 6 0.200 0.073
32 Symmons & Morris (1997)—7 Hz Drumming 51 23 0.451 0.070
33 Wezelman & Bierman (1997)—Amsterdam Series IVB: Emotional 32 5 0.156 0.064
34 Wezelman & Bierman (1997)—Amsterdam Series V: Altered States 40 8 0.200 0.063
35 Wezelman & Bierman (1997)—Amsterdam Series VI: Altered States 40 10 0.250 0.068
36 Wezelman et al. (1997)—Eigensender 32 14 0.438 0.088
37 Parker & Westerlund (1998)—Gothenburg Serial Study 30 7 0.230 0.077
38 Parker & Westerlund (1998)—Gothenburg Study 4 30 14 0.467 0.091
39 Parker & Westerlund (1998)—Gothenburg Study 5 30 12 0.400 0.089
40 Alexander & Broughton (1999)—CL1 Ganzfeld 50 18 0.360 0.068
41 Roe et al. (2001)—Sender–Receiver Creativity Scores 24 5 0.208 0.083
42 da Silva et al. (2003)—Ganzfeld vs. No-Ganzfeld 54 18 0.333 0.064
43 Morris et al. (2003)—Creative Population 40 15 0.375 0.077
44 Roe et al. (2003)—Sender as PK Agent 1 40 14 0.350 0.075
45 Wright & Parker (2003)—Real-Time Digital Ganzfeld 74 24 0.324 0.054
46 Goulding et al. (2004)—First Real-Time Digital Ganzfeld Judging 128 30 0.234 0.037
47 Lau (2004)—Bayesian Ganzfeld Approach 120 36 0.300 0.042
48 Parra & Villanueva (2004)—Picture Targets 54 25 0.463 0.068
49 Parra & Villanueva (2004)—Musical Targets 54 19 0.352 0.065
50 Roe et al. (2004)—Sender Role: No Sender 17 4 0.235 0.103
51 Roe et al. (2004)—Sender Role: Sender 23 6 0.261 0.092
52 Stevens (2004)—Feedback Reinforcement 50 12 0.240 0.060
53 Sherwood et al. (2005)—Experimenter Interpersonal Psi 38 8 0.211 0.066
54 Parker (2006/2010)—Identical Twins 28 10 0.357 0.091
55 Parra & Villanueva (2006)—Ganzfeld vs. Relaxation 138 57 0.413 0.042
56 Pütz et al. (2007)—Covert Ganzfeld Telepathy 120 39 0.325 0.043
57 Simmonds-Moore & Holt (2007)—Schizotypy Trait & State 26 6 0.231 0.083
58 Parker & Sjödén (2008)—Subliminal Priming 29 8 0.276 0.083
59 Smith & Savva (2008)—Ganzfeld Experimenter Effects 114 39 0.342 0.044
All 2832 878 0.310 0.009
* Based on the equation given by Utts (1999a:341); see Method subsection in text. FRNM: Foundation for Research on the Nature
of Man. AG: autoganzfeld. Bold indicates hits and sessions adjusted or approximated (see text; Notes 10 & 11). Studies 1, 2, 3, & 5
are summarized in Kanthamani & Broughton (1994).
RESEARCH
The Global Consciousness Project:

Identifying the Source of Psi
EDWIN C. MAY
Laboratories for Fundamental Research, 330 Cowper Street, Palo Alto, CA 94301 USA
[email protected]
S. JAMES P. SPOTTISWOODE
9824 Charleville Blvd., Beverly Hills, CA 90212 USA
Submitted 10/18/10; Accepted 3/29/11
Abstract—Analysis of the formal events listed on the Global Consciousness

Project (GCP) website as of 9 November 2009 showed that the total Stouffer’s
Z computed across all events was 5.81—a strong statistical effect. The over-
whelming evidence from laboratory-based random number generator studies
demonstrates that there are no forces involved in creating the significant ef-
fects. Similarly with the GCP formal events, we found that the best fit line
through the Z2 versus number-of-RNGs scatter plot had a slope of (−5.37 ±
340) × 10−5 (p = 0.506) indicating there is no evidence of an asymmetric force
to explain the deviant GCP statistic; rather, we show that it is likely that ex-
perimenter psi can account for the effect. Dr. Nelson brought 234 events to
the attention of the GCP for a Stouffer’s Z for his contribution, alone, of 5.91,
whereas the 66 other events yielded a Stouffer’s Z of 1.26, and the Z of the
difference was 3.29 (p = 4.97 × 10−4). This suggests that Dr. Nelson’s psi-
mediated decision capacity drives the GCP result, and it is unlikely that their
primary hypothesis of a putative global consciousness connection to the RNG
devices can account for the results.
Keywords: EGG—random number generator (RNG)—Global Consciousness
Project (GCP)—Decision Augmentation Theory (DAT)
Introduction
The Global Consciousness Project was launched in 1998 in part in anticipation
of the then upcoming Y2K (i.e. date transition from the 20th to the 21st century).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the historical development of
this intriguing project. Much of it can be found on the website for the project,
http://noosphere.princeton.edu; however, we will provide some of the funda-
mentals here.
663
664 Edwin C. May and S. James P. Spottiswoode
The basic idea sprang from the random number generator (RNG)1 research
which may have had its beginning with Helmut Schmidt’s seminal publica-
tion entitled “Precognition of a Quantum Process” (Schmidt, 1969). The RNG
used by Schmidt in both studies that were reported had its base in the radioac-
tive decay of the isotope Strontium-90 (i.e. often written in nuclear physics as
Sr90), which is an electron emitter mediated by the weak nuclear force. When
an electron was detected by a Geiger-Müller tube, a repeating clock that cycled
the integers 1, 2, 3, 4, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . ., etc., at one microsecond per integer was
interrupted and the resulting integer between one and four, inclusive, energized
an appropriate light on a display panel.
The participants in this study were asked to guess which of four lamps
would light after they registered their choice with a button press. After the guess
was recorded, the RNG chose which of the four lamps to light. Schmidt report-
ed significant results in both studies: Study 1: n = 63,066, z = 6.36, p =1.01 ×
10−10, effect size = 0.0253. Study 2: n = 20,000, z = 6.55, p = 1.91 × 10−11, effect
size = 0.0463.2 We note that the z-scores are relatively constant with respect to
the number of trials and the effect size scales as the square root of the ratio of
the trials. We will return to this point in the discussion section below.
The RNGs associated with the Global Consciousness Project accumulate
200 binary bits each second and report back to a central server the number of
binary ones accumulated within that second. Over time, the number of such
RNGs has grown, and as reported on the website above as of August 2009 there
are 65 of them located worldwide.
The RNG Network

May and Spottiswoode (2001) conducted a detailed analysis of the data pro-
duced by the network of RNGs. A downloadable PDF version can be found at
http://www.lfr.org/LFR/csl/library/Sep1101.pdf
They used all of the 31 days in August and all of the 30 days in September
2001. Each day consists of 86,400 seconds with the number of binary ones (i.e.
hits) associated with each RNG for each second. For each second, they only
included RNGs that were active (i.e. non-zero hits) and whose hits were in the
range [50,150]. That is, if the number of hits were less than 50 or greater than
150, which correspond to a z-score of ±7, they assumed that the RNG in ques-
tion was faulty. For each second, they computed a Z and Z2 for each RNG, a
Stouffer’s Z across the valid RNGs and χ2 as:
n
 2   Z i2 , df  n.
i 1
where n is the valid number of RNGs.3

Identifying the Source of Psi in the GCP 665
For completeness, they examined the Stouffer’s Z data for all 86,400 sec-
onds of 11 September 2001 in Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). For each Z, there
is an associated p-value, which is the integral of the normal distribution from Z
to infinity. They computed the theoretical expectation for the p-values resulting
from Zs in the range [−5.0, 5.0], and the observed values from the data of the
p-value for each Z as:
# of Zs  Z g
P  Value 
Total # of Zs
where Zg is the given value of Z.

The results of their extensive analysis confirms that the network of RNGs
at that time and presumably now, satisfy the accepted criteria for randomness
and show that:
 The distribution of p-values for Stouffer’s Z meet mean chance expec-

tation even in the rare event tails of that distribution.
 The number of high-value z-scores of 4.0, 4.5, and 5.0 for the months
of August and September, 2001, individually meet mean chance ex-
pectation and do so for the combined months as well.
Finally, in spite of the terrible events of 11 September 2001, we conclude

from these analyses, that the network of RNGs function as an excellent source
of random numbers both individually and collectively.4
The Global Consciousness Project Hypothesis

The overall hypothesis of the Global Consciousness Project has been difficult
to understand in that the project, until recently, appeared to have been in a con-
tinuing state of exploration—something which more psi researchers should do.
We do not put as much attention in hypothesis formulation as we think we need.
The most succinct statement of the hypothesis to date can be found in Ban-
cel & Nelson (2008):
Periods of collective emotional or attentional behavior in widely

distributed populations will correlate with deviations from expecta-
tion in a global network of RNGs.
Even in this paper, it remains ambiguous as to what is meant by this

hypothesis: Who and more importantly when are people emotionally or
attentionally engaged and to what strength and for how long? Is it at the time of
some large tragedy/joyful event? Or when most people become aware of said
event? Are the correlative deviations of the RNGs constrained to be in real time
with the events. If not, what time window is acceptable?
It is not the intent of this paper to provide an in-depth critique of the GCP
in general nor specifically upon the details of the analytical approach; rather, it
is to demonstrate a potential source of the psi in the project.
Assumptions
In order to develop the arguments presented in this paper, the following
statements will be assumed to be true:
 The network of RNGs (a.k.a. EGGs) are sound and unbiased random
number generators.
 The various methods of analyses to produce z-scores are sound.
 The hypothesis can change with regard to starting time and duration of
the events that are counted as part of the formal set of trials.
 The summary results posted on the GCP website accurately represent
a significant effect.
Source of the Psi

Before we can identify the source of the psi that results in the GCP’s signifi-
cant effect, we must examine the limited number of possibilities. Although the
title of Schmidt’s original paper (1969) referred to precognition, from that time
onward the name accepted for the observation of deviations from mean chance
expectation of the data stream from RNGs was micro-PK (μPK) or just PK.
For example, Schmidt almost immediately began using the PK term (Schmidt,
1970). This, of course, implies, by definition, that these devices physically
change in some way, as a result of some PK effort, so as to affect their outputs.
Some of our colleagues have criticized May by saying that most people at the
time never thought of μPK in terms of a force/bit in the device. In our opinion,
this is an Orwellian-like attempt to rewrite history.
Dean Robert Jahn, head of the former Princeton Engineering Anomalies
Laboratory, illustrates the point:
Over this large a data base [PEAR’s RNG data], there arises some
quantitative statistical regularity in the PK process, epitomized by
the mean slopes of the cumulative deviations in Figs. 14 and 15 and
by the terminal values of the average deviations in Fig. 16. Traced
back to the elemental binary samples, these values imply directed
inversions from chance behavior of about one or one and a half bits
in every one thousand or, alternatively, of 0.2 or 0.3 bits per trial.
(Jahn, 1982, emphasis added)
Taking Jahn’s estimated hit rate of 1.5 bit/thousand or 0.5015, we compute

an effect size of 0.003, a value which is typical in the RNG literature. That is,
this effect size is the estimate of the degree to which RNG hardware yields to
human-mediated μPK. This supposition is testable using Decision Augmenta-
tion Theory (May, Utts, & Spottiswoode, 1995a). In a typical laboratory RNG
study, a participant (or experimenter) presses a button that samples n bits from
the generator. A z-score statistic is usually computed from the total number of
binary ones in the observed sequence.
Decision Augmentation Review

May, Utts, and Spottiswoode (1995b) analyzed 128 RNG studies which consti-
tuted the published results up to 1989. In accordance with the DAT formalism,
they constructed a scatter plot of n versus z2, where n is the number of bits per
button press and z2 is the square of the z-scores that resulted. A simple weighted
least squares regression was used to compute the intercept and slope of the best
fit straight line through these data. DAT predicts zero for the slope and if εPK is
the putative PK effect size, then the best fit line under the PK hypothesis will
have a slope of:  PK2
. See May, Utts, & Spottiswoode (1995b) for the derivation
of these results.
Figure 1 shows the results of the DAT analysis of that historical RNG da-
tabase.
For readability, Figure 1 displays only a portion of the problem space in
that the minimums/maximums are [0.862, 3.86] and [16, 10000] for z2 and n,
respectively. The thick horizontal line at z2 = 1 is the mean chance expectation
under the null hypothesis of no psi at all, and the solid black line at z2 = 1.036
is the best fit line through all the data:
y  1.036  0.05  (1.73  10.01) 106 (n  1750).
The dashed lines surrounding this line display the one standard error of the
slope. The sloping dot-dashed lines represent what the best fit line would be
under two values of the PK effect size of 0.003 for the lower one and 0.01 for
the upper one.
The elevated best fit line is significantly above the mean chance expecta-
tion for Z2 of one (z = 6.4, p = 7.77 × 10−11), and the one standard error for the
slope encompasses zero and is not significantly different from zero (t(126) =
0.173, p = 0.432).
Clearly, any asymmetric force/bit model must be rejected in that the stan-
dard error of the slope surrounds zero, the DAT prediction, and the lines repre-
senting values of the best fit under the PK hypothesis lie mostly outside the one
standard error for the fitted slope.
Figure 1. DAT Analysis of the Historical RNG Database.
It appears, then, that participants in these kinds of studies use their psi
ability to select out locally deviant subsequences from otherwise unperturbed
output sequences from the devices. There is a caveat to this assertion. If it turns
out that participants’ PK ability (i.e. effect size) across time and across partici-
pants dropped off as , then this DAT analysis could not distinguish between a
force-like and informational mechanism. Similarly, as we point out above, this
analysis would not be able to detect interactions that leave the mean of the par-
ent distribution exactly the same as under the null hypothesis of no psi.
Returning to Schmidt’s original study (1969), we find that the effect sizes
reported in that paper scale as , just as DAT predicts.
With regard to the results from RNGs in the Global Consciousness Project
network, there are a very limited number of possible explanations.
GCP Potential Explanations

The first, most obvious, and easiest to reject is the mean chance expectation
(MCE) null hypothesis. The analysis shown on the GCP website clearly demon-
strates a sizeable effect and we have assumed their result to be correct.

The second and the most popular supposition is that the network of RNGs
somehow responds to human and natural events. That is, the RNGs exhibit
significant deviations from MCE during or temporally near these events. This
supposition divides cleanly into two hypotheses:
1. Human and/or natural events exert PK-like forces upon the devices,
which account for their significant deviations from MCE.
2. There is no PK-like force/bit; rather, somehow these devices are sim-
ply correlated with the human/natural events.
We might have to reject the first hypothesis for a number of reasons. First
of all, a large portion of the laboratory-based RNG studies clearly show no
force per bit. Second, many private communications from the GCP community
also reject the force per bit hypothesis and even go so far as to criticize May for
even suggesting it. So we are left with hypothesis two. The GCP data will be the
final arbiter with regard to this point.
As we all have learned in our statistics courses, correlation does not neces-
sarily imply a causal relationship between the variables. Hypothesis 2 above
also bifurcates. Either human/natural events magically happen on average only
during times of locally deviant, but expected, excursions of the RNGs, or vice
versa. Even though there does not have to be a causal relation for this correla-
tion to arise, we are obligated to search for a third (or more) variable(s) that
gives rise to the correlation. In many cases, an external (to the primary correla-
tive variables) variable is difficult or impossible to identify.
In the case of the GCP correlations, a third variable to consider is experi-
menter psi operating by means of Decision Augmentation Theory or DAT.
Decision Augmentation Theory and the GCP

There are two aspects to identify a possible third experimenter psi variable.
The first is to determine if there is evidence for a force/bit in the GCP dataset.
If there is no evidence, then the next step is to determine the degree to which
the known experimenters may have contributed to the result. Thanks to the ex-
tensive, and quite laudable, reporting of the results on the GCP website, we can
test both of these suppositions.
The Dataset. The table in Appendix 1, which has been taken directly from
the GCP website and added here, shows the formal events that contribute to the
stated results. In accordance with the preamble to this table on the website, there
were a few events, indicated by a leading red asterisk, that we have removed
from all analyses. These 13 events number 2, 10, 18, 19, 20, 30, 33, 34, 38,
44, 66, 81, and 116. For completeness, we have included all other events in the
analyses that follow.
We computed the Stouffer’s Z-score for the 300 remaining events to be

5.81 which is consistent with the value 5.78 that appears on the site. As was
stated in the Assumptions section above, we accept these numbers to be robust
and evidential of some non-chance phenomenon.
Formal DAT Analysis. To determine whether there is a force/bit effect in
these data, we created a scatter plot of the stated Z-score squared against the
number of RNGs that were used to compute the Z-score. Most of the number
of RNGs (i.e. column number 3 in the table in Appendix 1) were integers. One
(row number 25) however was listed as “Var” and was removed from the DAT
analysis. A few others scattered about the dataset showed small ranges of the
number of RNGs used. In these cases, we used the mean of the range for the
single number for that individual event. Figure 2 shows the DAT analysis for
the remaining 299 events.
The axes in Figure 2 have been expanded for clarity. The Z2 range
was [3.5 × 10−5, 10.3], and the range of the number of RNGs was [3, 72].
Figure 2. DAT Analysis of the Global Consciousness Project.

The horizontal black line at Z2 = 1 is mean chance expectation, and the error
bar at 48 RNGs is one standard error for the intercept at 48 RNGs for the best
fit line through the data, which is shown as a nearly horizontal line at Z2 = 1.200
± 0.058. The slope of this line is (−5.37 ± 340) × 10−5. One standard error in
the slope is shown in Figure 2 as sloping dotted lines. The one standard error
bars for the intercept are shown as the weighted mean of the number of RNGs.
An asymmetric force/bit mechanism requires a non-zero slope and the ob-
served slope is first of all negative and the slope’s one standard error easily
encompasses zero, which is required for a DAT interpretation.
A more general interpretation requires a deeper discussion. Rejecting the
force argument on the basis of a zero slope of the regression line is valid only
for forces that distort the parent distribution in asymmetrical ways; that is, all
force-like interactions that leave the mean of the parent distribution exactly
equal to zero will give rise to a zero slope in this analysis. Since it was common
in the literature and in the psi research “culture” of the 1970s and for the next
20 years or more that RNG micro-PK involved a force per bit (Jahn, 1982), our
analysis was focused on this point.
Thus we conclude that the effect from the current formal dataset for the
Global Consciousness Project appears not to include a force/bit or other kind of
asymmetric influence. That is, the network of RNGs associated with the GCP
are not physically changed asymmetrically as a result of human and or natural
events.
The original DAT formalism accounted only for direct linear forces. That
is under the PK hypothesis, the parent distribution mean shifted proportionally
to the PK effect size. This approach was reasonable in that the RNG community
collectively thought in terms of micro-PK, or a force per bit interaction. A linear
shift in the mean predicts a non-zero slope to the best-fit regression line in a
number of studies with Z2 versus number of bits resulting from a single button
push. We have come to realize that a zero slope through such data is insufficient
to reject more complex PK interactions. For example, any interaction that does
not shift the mean but changes other moments of the parent distribution would
not be detected with this analysis.
The putative interaction claimed by the GCP community arises only in
the variance of the parent distributions and thus would not lend itself to a DAT
analysis. But the RNGs in the GCP are conceptually similar to the ones used
in RNG studies (including those conducted by PEAR) in the vast literature in
which the interaction arose as a linear mean shift of the parent distribution. Why
would the GCP data be any different? Thus we call into question the GCP’s un-
derlying assumption of variance interaction. In addition, for the DAT analysis
to be invalid requires the mean shift to be nearly identically equal to zero—un-
likely to be sure.
Our earlier work showed that in the non-GCP studies, there was no mean
shift of the parent distribution; rather, the sampling was biased by the operators’
precognitive ability. So we think that the DAT analysis stands for the GCP data.
Stouffer’s Z Analysis. As indicated above, the Stouffer’s Z-score for the
total dataset was 5.81. The GCP website should be further commended for in-
dicating which individual(s) brought the formal event to the GCP for analysis.
This allows for an unprecedented opportunity to determine the degree to which
any differences can be observed.
Of the 300 formal events, we found that Dr. Nelson, the founder and argu-
ably the driving force of the GCP, either singularly or among others brought
234 events to the project; whereas, all others totaled 66. The Stouffers’s Z for
the “Nelson” events was 5.91 and for the others the Stouffers’s Z was 1.26. The
Z-score for the difference is 3.29 (p = 4.97 × 10−4). Thus, there appears to be
something “special” about the events that were brought to the attention of the
GCP.
Conclusion and Discussion

The Global Consciousness Project’s array of RNGs is an impressive engineer-
ing feat. It is clear from the GCP’s own analyses and ours that the “control” out-
put of these devices, individually and collectively, meet the current standards
for producing random bit streams. Furthermore, the raw data and the analyses
are available to the public.
The DAT analysis of the formal events (n = 300), shows no evidence of any
asymmetric interaction with the physical devices. Under the DAT hypothesis,
the expected slope for a regression line through the scatter plot of Z2 versus
number-of-RNGs is zero. The observed slope was zero to three significant fig-
ures and the one-standard error of the slope surrounded zero (slope = [−5.37
± 340] × 10−5). Tested against a zero slope, the p-value is 0.506. Thus, these
physical devices are not responding asymmetrically in any way to human or
natural events. Even though the formal DAT analysis is insensitive to symmet-
ric influences such as affecting the variance of the parent distribution, we think
it is unlikely that such an interaction would leave the mean unchanged given
that most all of the published RNG PK data suggest otherwise.
Yet, there is a strongly significant effect. As we indicated above, we must
now rely on some correlation to account for these effects. It seems most unlike-
ly since the RNG devices do not “know” about human or natural events, that
these events somehow line up in such a way as to correlate with the unperturbed
random fluctuations of the RNGs.
A possible third variable that may link the RNGs to the events is the experi-
menters. And among the experimenters (i.e. source), Nelson is nearly singularly
responsible for the effect. In private communication with Dr. Nelson, he sug-
gested that the reason this is true is that he knows, by means other than psi, what
events are best suited for the analysis. We find this argument to be spurious. To
realize that, say earthquakes would be an effective event while sporting events
would not, would require an independently supported model which predicted,
and hopefully explained, why these classes of event would show differing GCP
effects. No such model has been offered.
We are left then to conclude that Dr. Nelson’s DAT-like decision capacity
drives the GCP result, and it is unlikely that their statistically robust result is
due to a variation of their primary hypothesis of some global consciousness
connections to the RNG devices.
Unfortunately, this kind of psi-mediated experimenter effect is not limited
to Nelson alone. May, Paulinyi, and Vassy (2005) demonstrated in their skin
conductance study that the primary, and presumably cherished, hypothesis that
their participants’ skin conductance was reacting, in advance, to a future ran-
domly chosen startle acoustic stimulus was not supported by the data. Instead,
the results strongly suggested that the results arose because of a psi-mediated
experimenter effect enabled by DAT. Spottiswoode and May (2003) published
the protocol and pilot results of their pre-stimulus response study with acoustic
stimuli. Their still-unpublished formal results of over 5σ can be attributed di-
rectly to DAT by the experimenters.
Clearly we are not the first to notice the potential of experimenter psi in
studies. DAT just added a formal mathematical and testable method to allow
for the possibility of determining whether force-like or informational processes
better describe the observable. This kind of statistically robust experimenter
effect represents a major challenge to researchers in parapsychology. If psi-en-
abled experimenters, such as Dr. Nelson and ourselves, can achieve significant
results for their favored hypotheses by the DAT process, then discovering the
mechanism of psi through classical hypothesis testing is problematic indeed.
Notes
1
We will use this acronym for the devices rather than the popular term random event
generator which seems to us to be contrived.
2
We have recomputed the statistics and added the effect sizes based upon the reported
raw results. The z-scores agree with those reported by Schmidt as Critical Ratios.
3
It is important to emphasize that the GCP analysis uses the χ2 approach derived from
the summed Z2 scores.
4
We do not use these results to refute the significant data posted on the GCP website;
rather, we use it to show that at least in 2001 the network of RNGs appeared to func-
tion according to mean chance expectation in the aggregate.
References
Bancel, P., & Nelson, R. (2008). The GCP event experiment: Design, analytical methods, results.
Journal of Scientific Exploration, 22(3), 27.
Jahn, R. G. (1982). The persistent paradox of psychic phenomena: An engineering perspective.
Proceedings of the IEEE, 70(2), 35.
May, E. C., Paulinyi, T., & Vassy, Z. (2005). Anomalous anticipatory skin conductance response to
acoustic stimuli: Experimental results and speculation upon a mechanism. The Journal of
Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 11(4), 695–702.
May, E. C., & Spottiswoode, S. P. J. (2001). Global Consciousness Project: An Independent
Analysis of the 11 September 2001 Events. Laboratories for Fundamental Research.
May, E. C., Utts, J. M., & Spottiswoode, S. J. P. (1995a). Decision augmentation theory:
Applications to the random number generator database. Journal of Scientific Exploration,
9(4), 453–488.
May, E. C., Utts, J. M., & Spottiswoode, S. J. P. (1995b). Decision augmentation theory: Toward a
model for anomalous mental phenomena. Journal of Parapsychology, 59, 195–220.
Schmidt, H. (1969). Precognition of a quantum process. Journal of Parapsychology, 33(2), 10.
Schmidt, H. (1970). PK test with electronic equipment. Journal of Parapsychology, 34(3), 7.
Spottiswoode, S. J. P., & May, E. C. (2003). Skin conductance prestimulus response: Analyses,
artifacts and a pilot study. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 17(4), 617–641.
APPENDIX 1
This table was taken direct from the Global Consciousness Project website
(http://noosphere.princeton.edu) on November 9, 2009. The preamble to this
table from the site is:
Statistical evaluations use a “normalized” database, with

normalization based on an empirical estimate of variance
for each egg, calculated from its full database of trials. In
addition we exclude all “bad data” identified by standardized
rules (e.g., trial scores outside the range 55 to 145 are almost
certainly errors). The formal database also excludes 13
poorly defined or partially redundant events marked in the
results table with a red asterisk. Cases with no normalized
calculation are marked with a double asterisk. Statistics for
very recent events (marked with ~) will change slightly when
normalized calculations are done.
red = significant; light red = predicted direction;
green = opposite and significant
In the hardcopy print version of this issue of the Journal:
bold = significant; gray = predicted direction;
bold italics = opposite and significant
The online Journal version retains the original red, light red, and green colors.
REPLY
Reply to May and Spottiswoode on

Experimenter Effect as the Explanation for GCP Results
ROGER NELSON
Global Consciousness Project
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Helmut H. W. Schmidt
I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the article by May and Spottiswoode

(hereafter M&S) in which they attempt to identify the source of the anomalous
correlations reported by the Global Consciousness Project (GCP). Their aim is
to show that the GCP data, like laboratory micro-PK data, can be explained in
terms of Decision Augmentation Theory (DAT), and in particular as an experi-
menter effect. The experimenter they have in mind is Roger Nelson, and while
I suppose it is some sort of honor to be perceived as a powerful psi source, I
consider it unlikely that the highly significant composite findings in the GCP
experiment are attributable to me. In this paper, I will discuss why, and in the
process show logical and factual errors that undermine and largely if not com-
pletely destroy the case for DAT and the experimenter effect. Before proceed-
ing, however, I want to say that I appreciate the civility of expression and argu-
ment M&S bring to bear. I hope the discussion in their paper and mine will be
helpful to readers who are interested in the GCP experiment, in the important
questions of interpretation it raises, and in the substantial implications it may
have for psi research.
Let’s begin with some simple mistakes. In their Abstract the authors imply
that we propose an asymmetric force or force per bit to explain the deviant
GCP statistic. We do not posit or speak of forces at all, so in terms of what the
GCP does, this can be seen as a straw man. Of course this is the language M&S
are accustomed to using, so we will accept that and deal with the actual issues
ab initio. To begin, our primary measure as well as the independent measures
we have developed all are correlations or correlation-based. We simply do not
make claims about forces. That said, we have found better fits to the empirical
data with field-like models than the classic selection models (DAT) that M&S
believe should apply (Nelson & Bancel, 2009).
M&S say the “basic idea” of the GCP sprang from Helmut Schmidt’s
research with RNGs whose behavior was the target of participant guesses or
683
684 Roger Nelson
influence, though they don’t explain how this leads to the GCP. Schmidt’s test
trials were typically decisions based on 1 bit (one binary decision) and typically
the trials took a few seconds. Crucially, there was a participant with an intention
to influence that bit. There is no such participant in the GCP, and to construe
the experimenter in that role demands a convoluted argument. Nevertheless, we
encourage data-based modeling to test such notions empirically.
We also do not claim, as they assert, that global consciousness is the source
of the anomalous effects, rather, we use an operational definition of the object
of study. The hypothesis we test simply says that we expect deviations in the
data from our global network of RNGs during major world events. Formally:
Periods of collective attention or emotion in widely distributed

populations will correlate with data deviations in a global network
of physical random number generators.
This general hypothesis is tested via a replication series of completely

specified simple hypotheses of the form: The GCP network variance statistic
(or other specified measure) will be greater than expectation from time 1 to time
2 on a given date. That is, we conduct a series of replications in which the exact
data segment is identified along with the statistical test that will be applied.
The composite across these replications constitutes a formal test of the general
hypothesis (Bancel & Nelson, 2008, Nelson & Bancel, 2011). Over time, we
expect to be able to discriminate between models, including one that is physical
and might be given a name like “global consciousness” because of the link to
collective human attention postulated in the general hypothesis. In the first in-
stance, however, we seek evidence for a correlation, not for a theoretical entity.
It is a surprise to see M&S describe the inception of the GCP as “launched
in 1998 in part in anticipation of the then up-coming Y2K.” That, I am afraid,
is made up. The project as conceived in 1997 was an evolution of FieldREG
studies (Nelson, Bradish, Dobyns, Dunne, & Jahn, 1996, Nelson, Jahn, Dunne,
Dobyns, & Bradish, 1998), and was concretely modeled on two prototype ef-
forts to expand that concept to a larger scale by combining data from a dozen
or more RNGs in Europe and the U.S. (Nelson, 1997, Nelson, Boesch, Boller,
Dobyns, Houtkooper, et al., 1998). New Year’s was an obvious candidate for
a “global event” from the beginning, and the Y2K moment was of course in-
cluded, but it was not a motivator for the project.
M&S say they have trouble understanding the GCP hypothesis, and know-
ing what the process is for selecting the events. The latter is a reasonable ques-
tion, which we have addressed in some detail (Nelson & Bancel, 2011), but
valid statistics are not dependent on these issues. It is sufficient that each event
is selected and the hypothesis registered prior to examining the data, and that
Reply to May and Spottiswoode on GCP 685
the results are all reported. Whether we are looking at the time of the event or
the time when people become aware of the event isn’t relevant to the validity
of the simple hypothesis tests in the replication series. Fortunately, that ques-
tion can be empirically explored in the large GCP database, because the event
definitions typically cover a time span that includes both aspects. Similarly,
many other questions can in principle be asked of the data because we employ a
two-stage hypothesis, with a general statement that is flexible to allow explora-
tions, and formal testing via a series of rigorously defined simple hypotheses.
In practice, the event definitions are standardized based on experience, with
events in each of several categories specified using the same relative starting
point and duration.
M&S make a point of disputing an “Orwellian rewrite of history” with
regard to the use of PK or a force per bit model, but they are arguing with
someone else. The GCP does not use this language; instead, we speak in terms
of correlations. Indeed, the primary measure (the only one M&S address) is
equivalent to an average pair-wise correlation in the RNG data. As the general
hypothesis states, we are asking whether there is a deviation of this inter-node
correlation that occurs during (is correlated with) the formally selected events.
M&S wonder if the prediction is “constrained to be in real time with the events”
and of course it is. To imagine otherwise is to confuse the defined event with the
putative effect—an important distinction which, again, can be assessed in the
GCP database. For more detail on the point, see Bancel and Nelson (2008) and
Nelson and Bancel (2009).
An issue that is never discussed by M&S is the fact that all their calcula-
tions and theorizing about the sources of effects derive from a model that was
designed to address intention experiments, that is experiments where someone
is attempting to change the behavior of an RNG. However, while the GCP ex-
periment uses RNG technology, it is not about intentions to affect the behavior
of the devices. Its design is better regarded as an environmental monitor, where
the environment of interest is variations in the coherence of consciousness and
emotion across large populations. M&S might argue that the experimenter has
an intention, but it would be of a categorically different sort. As the experi-
menter of interest, I would characterize my intention in the GCP as a desire to
learn something—I’m not much interested in getting more ones or zeros. (Good
thing, too. As a participant in the PEAR REG experiments, I produced a very
small, non-significant positive effect over several years and thousands of trials.)
Moreover, the primary metric for evaluating the GCP hypothesis is not
an increase or decrease of ones and zeros, but excess correlation among the
RNGs. We predict and test for an increase in the composite spatially distributed
network variance, which is equivalent to predicting an increase (from zero)
in the average correlation between hundreds or thousands of RNG pairs. The
686 Roger Nelson
M&S model requires that the experimenter intuit or precognize the outcome
of these tests. Of course the experimenter might guess well when looking for
events that will be correlated with changes in the GCP network, but that seems
an obvious, mundane talent, assuming there are correlated changes. It can most
likely be learned, as well, with no experimenter psi required. This is a testable
proposition, and is the subject of a program we are developing to define and
teach consistent criteria for event selection which can be applied by indepen-
dent observer/analysts, including skeptics.
In the “Formal DAT Analysis” section, the authors define their procedure:
“To determine whether there is a force/bit effect in these data, we created a
scatter plot of the stated Z-score squared against the number of RNGs that were
used to compute the Z-score.” This states that the N of RNGs is used, not the
number of bits, as is usual in the DAT literature. It would have been useful for
M&S to explain the switch and show its equivalence. The quoted statement also
says they use GCP’s stated Z-scores for individual events. Thus, their proposi-
tion appears to be that the Z-score, which represents a spatially distributed vari-
ance measure (or increased pairwise correlation), is dependent on the number
of RNGs in the force per bit model, but independent of N for the DAT model.
They do not further discuss the models or their assumptions, but let’s accept
that for the moment. Taking the alternative formulation for the GCP effect since
it is easier to visualize, we can ask whether the significance of the correlation
should depend on the number of RNGs. Since increasing the number of pairs
should grow the number of correlations, leading to smaller error bars on the av-
erage correlation, the significance represented by the calculated Z-scores would
be expected to increase. Thus, the discovery of a null relationship of Z-scores
(representing the correlations) to the N of RNGs would be surprising, and in-
consistent with a physical model. We believe the data do not support the M&S
claim that the regression has zero slope.
Putting it explicitly, the bottom line drawn by M&S is premature at best:
“We are left then to conclude that Dr. Nelson’s DAT-like decision capacity
drives the GCP result, and it is unlikely that their statistically robust result is
due to a variation of their primary hypothesis of some global consciousness
connections to the RNG devices.” In a personal communication responding
to an earlier version of this paper, Peter Bancel stated that “simulations show
that it is not possible to distinguish between the models—there’s not enough
statistical power in the data.” He goes on to say that while the data may be
consistent with DAT, they are also consistent with a reasonable “force” model.
York Dobyns has tested the DAT model against data from RNG experiments
and finds it inadequate. He too points out the problem of small effects: “The
selection model assumes that the operator somehow becomes aware of the ac-
tual run outcomes and assigns intentions to suit, but I also present an argument
showing that given the small overall effect size, a standard DAT model
would produce the same statistics in the output data as the intention-
selecting model . . . ” (Dobyns, 1993, 1996, Dobyns & Nelson, 1997).
A little later in their paper, M&S recognize that their analysis doesn’t really
discriminate alternative models for the GCP data very well, but then say that
after all since the GCP does use RNGs the analysis of laboratory intention ex-
periments should still apply: “Why would the GCP data be any different? Thus
we call into question the GCP’s underlying assumption of variance interaction.”
This is a very weak argument. Perhaps M&S are confused by differing uses of
the term “variance” and perhaps their comments are directed, inappropriately,
to the variance of the individual RNGs. In any case they miss the point that,
far from being an assumption, we define the network variance as our primary
measure.
Moving to a different perspective, M&S attempt to compare the success of
Nelson vs. other predictors. They state that Nelson “brought 234 events to the
attention of the GCP,” but their count is based on the assumption that whenever
Nelson is included in the “source” column of the formal results table, he is
the source. In fact, whenever names other than Nelson are included, they can
legitimately be considered the source(s). When others suggest an event, there
is frequently a need for collaboration to establish the analysis parameters. For
example, an event will be suggested, but not the start and end times required
for a formal event specification. Because of their faulty assumption, the counts
made by M&S are wrong. In a recent categorization, May 28, 2011, I found that
a little more than half of the events had been suggested by one or more others,
sometimes including me (N = 188) and that Nelson alone had been the source
for the rest of the predictions (N = 177). Looking at the two subsets separately,
we see that Nelson’s composite Z is 5.188, agreeing pretty well with that cal-
culated by M&S on the smaller database they used, but the composite Z for the
other predictors is 3.706, not even close to the M&S calculation. The differ-
ence in composite effect size attributable to Nelson vs. others is substantial, but
not significant; the difference Z-score is 1.143. What is more important is an
obvious logical flaw in the reasoning behind this comparison of outcomes for
Nelson vs. others. Since Nelson is involved in registering, analysis, and writeup
for every event, and would presumably always have a similar interest, it is clear
ex hypothesi that this attempted comparison is artificial and invalid. It cannot
tell us whether the GCP effect is due to experimenter psi.
Beyond that, the question whether Nelson is the primary source of the ef-
fects is far more complex than M&S apparently recognize. Even if the Nelson
vs. other comparison were legitimate and the difference in composite Z were
significant, such a comparison selectively ignores other factors. In particular,
because the predictions for the GCP formal series are made a priori, they are
688 Roger Nelson
guesses. They are explicit attempts to specify, without any prior knowledge, a
period of time when the data will be found to deviate from expectation in a cer-
tain statistic. There is a history of predictions and outcomes, that is a feedback
loop that can be expected to educate the predictor as to what factors or features
of events are associated with confirmations of the predictions. Does it not seem
reasonable that Nelson, who pays more attention than anyone else to the se-
quence of successful and failed predictions, might learn something along the
way about which are the “good bets” to make? That’s pretty mundane compared
with DAT or the psychic experimenter effect postulated by M&S, but it seems
very likely to account for some considerable part of the (non-significant) advan-
tage Nelson has over other predictors. When the details are considered, there
are still other reasons why non-Nelson predictions may fail. They are often
about local and relatively small items, and many of the ones accepted for reg-
istration and analysis are about meditations, peace prayers, earth days, and the
like. I’m attuned to the ideas and ideals, and in order to learn about these events
I accept many such suggestions, but our categorization studies have shown that
they tend to have small effects.
In their discussion, M&S argue that the difference in success rate for
Nelson compared with other predictors cannot be attributed to practice and ex-
perience. “To realize that, say earthquakes would be an effective event while
sporting events would not, would require an independently supported model
which predicted, and hopefully explained, why these classes of event would
show differing GCP effects. No such model has been offered.” In fact, though it
doesn’t have the status of a formal model, categorical analysis reveals charac-
teristics which do help identify types of events that produce larger and smaller
effects (Nelson, 2008). While these are general and descriptive findings, they
are adequate to provide the sort of advantage Nelson’s predictions show, simply
as a matter of experiential learning.
I am pleased that May and Spottiswoode took the time to attempt an ex-
planation of the GCP data deviations, though it seems to me they should have
thought more deeply about various issues. They confuse or conflate various lev-
els of description, and they make unexamined assumptions. I don’t have a fun-
damental problem with an “experimenter effect” as a contributor to deviations
from expectation in psi experiments, even in the GCP data. But there are no
good reasons to think it is all or even most of the source. May and Spottiswoode
make two separate attempts to persuade us otherwise. Their DAT explanation,
even if applicable, fails because it is unable to discriminate between appropriate
models. Their attribution to Nelson as experimenter fails because their assump-
tions about who is the source of predictions is faulty. It is, however, useful to
think through these issues. They help us understand the experiment, and stimu-
late efforts to make it a better research vehicle.
References
Bancel, P., & Nelson, R. (2008). The GCP Event Experiment: Design, analytical methods, results.
Journal of Scientific Exploration, 22(3), 27.
Dobyns, Y. (1993). Selection versus influence in remote REG anomalies. Journal of Scientific
Exploration, 7(3), 259–269. Comment, RetroPsychoKinesis Project, http://www.
fourmilab.ch/rpkp/dobyns.html
Dobyns, Y. (1996). Selection versus influence revisited: New method and conclusions. Journal of
Scientific Exploration, 10(2), 253–267.
Dobyns, Y., & Nelson, R. (1997). Empirical Evidence against Decision Augmentation Theory.
Technical Note PEAR 97005, Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research, Princeton
University, School of Engineering/Applied Science.
Nelson, R. (1997). Multiple Field REG/RNG Recordings During a Global Event, Parts I & II.
http://noosphere.princeton.edu/ejap/gaiamind/1997_2a.html [Originally published in The
Electronic Journal of Parapsychology, eJAP]
Nelson, R. (2008). The Emotional Nature of Global Consciousness. Proceedings of the Bial
Foundation 7th Symposium, Behind and Beyond the Brain; Porto, Portugal; 26–29 March
2008.
Nelson, R., & Bancel, P. (2009). Response to a letter from Helmut Schmidt. Journal of Scientific
Exploration, 23(4), 510–516.
Nelson, R. & Bancel, P. (2011). Effects of mass consciousness: Changes in random data during
global events. Explore: The Journal of Science & Healing, 7(6), 373–383.
Nelson, R., Boesch, H., Boller, E., Dobyns, Y., Houtkooper, J., Lettieri, A., Radin, D., Russek, L.,
Schwartz, G., & Wesch, J. (1998). Global Resonance of Consciousness: Princess Diana
and Mother Teresa. http://noosphere.princeton.edu/ejap/diana/1998_1.html [Originally
published in The Electronic Journal of Parapsychology, eJAP]
Nelson, R., Bradish, G., Dobyns, Y., Dunne, B., & Jahn, R. (1996). FieldREG anomalies in group
situations. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 10(1), 111–141.
Nelson, R., Jahn, R., Dunne, B., Dobyns, Y., & Bradish, G. (1998). FieldREG II: Consciousness
field effects: Replications and explorations. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 12(3), 425–
454.
REPLY
Reply to May and Spottiswoode’s “The Global Consciousness

Project: Identifying the Source of Psi”
PETER BANCEL
Institut Métapsychique International, Paris, France
I am pleased that May and Spottiswoode have initiated a discussion about

the Global Consciousness Project (GCP), and I would like to thank the JSE
editors for this opportunity to respond to their paper. May and Spottiswoode
(M&S) suggest that the source of the statistical deviations reported by the GCP
can be attributed to an experimenter effect and that Decision Augmentation
Theory (DAT) can adequately model the GCP results. While I disagree with
the analysis, their contribution is particularly welcome since they address
an essential question that needs to be resolved by any model: Does the GCP
measure a real, physical effect?
It is easy to see why the question is pertinent if we recall the experimental
methodology. The GCP hypothesizes that data from a network of random
number generators (RNGs) will deviate during events of global significance.
Testing the hypothesis is a two-step procedure: 1) From time to time, data from
the continuously accumulating RNG database are selected according to a blind
procedure in which an event is identified from news or other sources and a data
segment corresponding to the event is specified. A pre-designated test statistic
is then calculated for the selected data. 2) The test statistic is converted to a
standard normal Z-score and added to a table of Z-scores for all events. The
formal experimental result is the mean of these Z-scores. As of late 2011, the
GCP obtains a mean Z-score that exceeds zero by 6 standard deviations. This is
the hugely significant result that M&S seek to explain.
The explanation proposed by the GCP is that, given the blind selection
procedure, the change in the network statistics during events is due to a change
in the physical behavior of the RNG devices themselves. This proposal can
be tested by developing suitable models of the data. The GCP maintains that
models which posit a physical mechanism that acts on the RNGs represent,
at the least, a plausible avenue of investigation. What M&S correctly point
out is that one cannot exclude, a priori, that a psi-mediated intuition, which
informs the experimenter’s designation of events, might compromise the blind
selection procedure. In such a case, one cannot rely on the formal result to
make inferences about the RNG behavior. According to M&S, the freedom of
choice in selecting the events and their start/end times, in conjunction with psi-
mediated information about the resulting test statistics, sets up a satisfactory
explanation of the experiment. For M&S, the experimental result is merely the
consequence of fortuitous selection of naturally occurring data deviations.
M&S go a step further by using a DAT model to test their idea against
the GCP data. DAT derives from the well-known principle whereby the ratio
of signal-to-noise in a sample (i.e. the Z-score of a measurement) increases as
DF1/2 where DF (“degrees of freedom”) is the sample size. M&S distinguish
between degrees of freedom which are relevant for DAT—those which
designate an elemental instance of decision concerning what data to include in
a measurement—and irrelevant “internal” degrees of freedom which have no
inherent relevance for the decision process. In the GCP event experiment, the
elemental DAT degree of freedom is the selection of a data block representing
an event. In the DAT picture, a constant effect size, ZDAT, is attributed to each
instance of event selection. ZDAT is independent of all internal degrees of
freedom, such as the number of seconds or RNGs in the data block. It is thus
evident that any physical model which does depend on the internal degrees of
freedom can be distinguished from DAT models by testing for an association
between DFInternal and Z. If the DAT model holds, no association will be found,
whereas a physical model will yield a positive association between DFInternal
and measured values of Z. A standard way to test for association is by ordinary
least squares regression (OLS). M&S chose to do an OLS for Z2 versus N, the
number of RNGs in the network during the event. Their OLS yields a regression
slope within a standard error of zero, and they conclude that this supports a
DAT interpretation of the GCP.
This conclusion might have some weight if their regression analysis were
done correctly. Unfortunately, M&S make several errors which are fatal to their
argument. Here, I briefly sketch their errors and show that a proper test leads to
the opposite conclusion from M&S: There is a clear association between Z2 and
DFInternal and reasonably strong grounds for rejecting DAT in favor of a physical
model.
I discuss four separate errors, in order of increasing consequence. The first
two have negligible impact, but the others invalidate M&S’s calculations and
reverse the conclusions one must draw from the DAT analysis.
1. Incorrect values of explanatory and response variables
M&S use values for the explanatory variables, N, that are listed on the GCP
website. The website values are only approximate and should be replaced
692 Peter Bancel
with exact values which account for null data trials. In addition, it would be
preferable to calculate exact Z-scores for events 310–313, rather than use the
estimates M&S list in their table.
2. Incorrect determination of fit parameter standard errors
M&S take the Z2 as response variables. This choice yields non-normal fit
residuals which impact the reliability of the usual OLS estimators for the fit
parameter standard errors. Reliable errors for the regression slope and intercept
parameters need to be determined by simulation. A 20,000-iteration Monte
Carlo calculation (in which I use the correct values of N and Z) yields standard
errors of the slope and intercept of 0.0061 and 0.303, respectively. These are
substantially larger than the M&S values of 0.0034 and 0.058.
3. Failure to control for influence points
M&S neglect to perform regression diagnostics. It is well-known that OLS

regression is sensitive to outlier and leverage points which may unduly influence
the estimation of fit parameters. A common diagnostic is the Cook distance, d,
which measures a point’s relative influence on parameter estimation. Typically,
a cutoff value sets an acceptable level of influence. In the representation I use
here, d has a cutoff of 1 and points with d > ≈3 may be considered substantially
influential. Data points exceeding the cutoff need to be assessed carefully for
experimental errors or other irregularities which might invalidate their inclusion
in the regression dataset. For the GCP regression data, five data points have
d-values greater than 3 and Event 1 has an exceedingly high value of d = 42.3.
A recent paper published in JSE (Bancel & Nelson, 2008) assessed the
GCP Event Experiment in detail (the paper is cited by M&S in their article).
The paper clearly states that, due to network instabilities during the first months
of operation, Z-scores for the first 10 events are not reliable and should be
excluded from analyses (footnote 21 in the paper). With these Z-scores excluded,
a re-calculation of the OLS regression yields a positive slope parameter,
increasing from −0.00064 to 0.0063. Correspondingly, the one-tailed Monte
Carlo P-value for a test of the DAT hypothesis decreases from 0.51 to 0.13,
indicating a much weaker agreement with the DAT model than M&S claim.
More importantly, the re-calculation shows that OLS is an ill-suited choice for
testing association between Z2 and N. M&S would do better to use a modern
technique of robust regression estimation. Robust methods are far less sensitive
to outliers, influential data points, non-normality, and heteroskedasticity, and
they frequently provide a power advantage over OLS. A slope estimate using
one such robust technique, the Theil-Sen estimator (TSe), is discussed below.
4. Incorrect assignment of the regressor variable
The most serious error M&S make is in their choice of regressor. In Bancel
and Nelson (2008), we show in considerable detail that the measured effect can
be traced to correlations between pairs of RNGs. If the RNG output is written
as z(i,t) where i labels the RNGs and t is the time in seconds, then the average
correlation, ξ, is simply
ξ = DF-1 ∑ z(i,t) z(j,t) .
The sum is over all unique RNG pairs for each second so that DFGCP
= T(N2 − N)/2, where T is the number of seconds during the event.
The correlations ξ distribute normally (to high approximation, under the
central limit theorem), and the event Z-scores are given as Z = ξ √ DFGCP. The
appropriate regressor is thus DFGCP and not N as M&S propose. Inappropriately
selecting a DF of N introduces a large dispersion in the regressor variable,
DFGCP. This leads to a partial randomization of the regressor (see Figure 1) and
all but guarantees that the regression test will accept the DAT hypothesis.
Figure 1. Dispersion of N with DFGCP.

The plot shows the correspondence between DF = N and the correct
DFGCP as identified by Bancel & Nelson for the 299 events cited by M&S.
At fixed N, there is a broad dispersion in the values of DFGCP. The dispersion
greatly reduces the power of Z vs. N regressions. The gray curves are lines of
constant event duration (4, 8, and 24 hours, left to right).
694 Peter Bancel
To conclude, I show that the DAT model is rejected when a robust estimator
and the appropriate regressor are used. I employ the Theil-Sen estimator which
has a considerably higher power than OLS for the Z2 vs. DF regression. The
TSe slope estimate is taken as the median slope of all pairs of data points.
Confidence intervals can be determined by bootstrap analysis, but a hypothesis
test of the DAT model requires empirical determination of the TSe distribution
by Monte Carlo simulation. A one-tailed Monte Carlo test of DAT yields a
P-value of 0.024. Using the recommended dataset which excludes early events,
the P-value falls to 0.0053. These correspond to Z-scores of 1.98 and 2.56,
and indicate that the GCP data reject the DAT model with moderately high
confidence. Although it is beyond the scope of this Reply, one can show that
a similar procedure which tests the alternate hypothesis of a physical effect
accepts that hypothesis as being consistent with the data (in preparation by
Bancel).
In summary, M&S highlight a fundamental interpretational issue of the
GCP: whether the measured effect has its source in a physical perturbation of
the network RNGs. The issue can be addressed by testing for such structure
in the event data as would be predicted by a physical effect. The association
of Z and DFGCP is one example of this approach, and the analysis presented
here supports the GCP proposal. However, the issue is sufficiently important
that further, independent tests are needed before a convincing conclusion can
be drawn (Nelson & Bancel, 2011). A number of independent tests have been
identified, and a report is currently in preparation by Bancel.
Acknowledgements
My thanks to Roger Nelson for many useful discussions. This work is supported in part
by a grant from the Parapsychological Association. I would like to dedicate this Reply to
the memory of Helmut Schmidt and his pioneering contributions to psi research.
References
Bancel, P., & Nelson, R. (2008). The GCP Event Experiment: Design, analytical methods, results.
Journal of Scientific Exploration, 22(3), 309–333.
Nelson, R., & Bancel, P. (2011). Effects of mass consciousness: Changes in random data during
global events. Explore: The Journal of Science & Healing, 7(6), 373–383.
RESPONSE
The Global Consciousness Project, Identifying the Source of

the Psi: A Response to Nelson and Bancel
EDWIN C. MAY
Laboratories for Fundamental Research, 330 Cowper Street, Palo Alto, CA 94301 USA
[email protected]
S. JAMES P. SPOTTISWOODE
9824 Charleville Blvd., Beverly Hills, CA 90212 USA
[email protected]
First of all we want to express our thanks to the Journal for allowing us to
have the “last” word. We put last in quotes because the very good news about
this exchange is that the discussion will undoubtedly continue. While it might
be possible to respond point by point to Nelson and Bancel’s remarks, we
prefer to focus on serious points of disagreement. We will comment upon their
responses separately. Before we begin, it is important to recognize that while
our interpretations differ, there are large areas of overlap in our thinking.
Response to Roger Nelson

Nelson has documented that the GCP arose from PEAR’s field-RNG studies;
yet the GCP represents a major conceptual change from the field-RNG studies.
One of the differences is that the dependent variable in field-REG studies is
a mean shift in the sampling distributions and the effect sizes are consistent
with much of the laboratory-based RNG database of that time (Nelson, Bradish,
Dobyns, Dunne, & Jahn, 1996). While it is true that field-RNG studies differ
from laboratory studies because of the lack of volitional involvement, to
generalize that argument to somehow isolate the GCP results as something
fundamentally different from laboratory studies is logically incorrect in that it
makes psychological assumptions of the process which, at best, are premature.
There are examples of studies with “hidden” RNGs (i.e. the participant is
unaware of a second RNG in the equipment) that produced significant changes
in the mean of the hidden RNG (Varvoglis & McCarthy, 1986). Thus, Nelson’s
point that the lack of volition means removing forces from the discussion does
not follow.
695
One lesson we have learned from our exchange is that our early thinking
on Decision Augmentation Theory (DAT) was very limited mainly because of
the RNG zeitgeist of the day of a force per bit model, as we document in our
article in this issue of this Journal. The DAT analysis shown is completely
insensitive to any forces that may be symmetrical about zero or in cases where
there is no force at all. However, the main idea behind DAT is equivalent to
experimenter psi; that is, experimenters (or agents acting like experimenters)
make psi-mediated choices to affect the outcome. Of course, this is not a new
idea (Stanford, Zenhausern, Taylor, & Dwyer, 1975).
We believe Nelson is splitting hairs with regard to their published hypothesis
with regard to the GCP when he claims “We also do not claim, as they [May &
Spottiswoode] assert, that global consciousness is the source of the anomalous
effects, rather, we use an operational definition of the object of study.” In our
rebuttal, we offer two points taken from Bancel and Nelson (2008) and the GCP
website, respectively:
Periods of collective emotional or attentional behavior in widely distributed

populations will correlate with deviations from expectation in a global net-
work of RNGs.
When human consciousness becomes coherent and synchronized, the behav-

ior of random systems may change. Quantum event based random number
generators (RNGs) produce completely unpredictable sequences of zeroes and
ones. But when a great event synchronizes the feelings of millions of people,
our network of RNGs becomes subtly structured. The probability is less than
one in a billion that the effect is due to chance. The evidence suggests an
emerging noosphere, or the unifying field of consciousness described by sages
in all cultures.
To us, the paragraph from the GCP website seems to be the quintessential
definition of global consciousness.
Nelson implies that we fail to understand the GCP hypothesis (to which
we plead guilty) because we are concerned that the “time” of the event is
vague. From our perspective this project has been in a continuing state of
exploration and we think this is the case, at least in part, because addressing
whether the people who are actually involved in, say a natural disaster, or the
people worldwide who later see the disaster on television are somehow related
to the variance of the networks RNGs is the goal of the GCP project. Or even
peaks in the variance that occur before the event which requires a precognitive
description. It seems to us these considerations are not trivial.
This brings us to our major criticism of Nelson’s defense. Claiming that
the GCP is only about correlations does not absolve him of a responsibility to
Response to Nelson and Bancel Replies 697
untangle the pressing correlation issues we raised in our original paper. Without
belaboring the point, we quote from our paper:
As we all have learned in our statistics courses, correlation does not necessar-
ily imply a causal relationship between the variables. Hypothesis two above
[correlation hypothesis] also bifurcates. Either human/natural events magical-
ly happen on the average only during times of locally deviant, but expected,
excursions of the RNGs or vice versa. Even though there does not have to be
a causal relation for this correlation to arise, we are obligated to search for a
third (or more) variable(s) that give rise to the correlation. In many cases, an
external (to the primary correlative variables) variable is difficult or impos-
sible to identify.
Correlations are not magical. Somewhere in the variable chain there is a

causal relationship. We find both of the correlation cases we outlined above
as substantially implausible especially given the often-observed psi-mediated
experimenter effects, which might be sufficient to explain the observables.
Nelson appears to have changed the definition of the “Hypothesis Source”—
the GCP’s words, not ours. Part of his argument against Nelson being the source
of the psi rests upon his self-proclaimed modest abilities in laboratory RNG
studies. We find that argument to be not apropos. Our claim is that Nelson’s psi
is not involved in the RNGs at all; rather it arises in the selection of what events
get counted in the GCP formal database and which do not.
Finally, if Nelson is correct in his redefinition of the column heading (i.e.
Hypothesis Source) used to define the chooser of GCP events, then he opens
the door for further theoretical musing and experimenter-effect analyses. We
arrive at the notion that the GCP has nothing to do with the people on our planet
in general not only because of our analysis of Nelson versus the rest of the
contributors but also because of the questionable correlational arguments we
illustrate above.
Response to Peter Bancel

The vast majority of Bancel’s response is a mathematical and technical
refutation of our DAT analysis. Both in our primary paper and in our comments
above, we stipulate that DAT does not enter into the RNGs at all if the effects,
as claimed by the GCP, are correlational or if the effects arise because of
an exactly symmetric force. Rather, thinking of DAT as equivalent to a psi-
mediated experimenter effect as does Robert Rosenthal1, then as we illustrated
extensively above the psi-mediated experimenter effect may enter into the
system at the event-selection level, which renders arguments with regard to
variables for any z2 versus number of eggs moot. Bancel notes that the events
are selected by a blind procedure and thus, by implication, are not subjected to
DAT. This is simply factually incorrect and flies in the face of most all of the psi
literature in which psi happens under double blind and sometimes even more
layers of blindness. The event selector could be a major psi contributor to the
successful outcome of the GCP.
Conclusion
If Nelson is accurate in his description of the meaning of the “Hypothesis
Source,” then clearly there is more work to be done to definitively identify the
source of the psi in the GCP. However, it is clear to us that global consciousness
however defined is not a contributor to the observables. We look forward to
working with Bancel with regard to extending our DAT analysis by incorporating
his correlational variable insight.
There is, however, one simple thing that can be done from this point forward
that would go a long way to answer the questions raised in our debate. Rather
than posting the GCP data for every second, post only, say, the even-numbered
seconds. Then data snoopers and data-mining programs can be unleashed with
impunity to isolate events that show significant correlations. Among the things
we have stipulated is the excellence of the RNG hardware, which means the
autocorrelation of non-zero lags is statistically zero. In simple language this
means that the data from second to second are independent of each other under
the null hypothesis of no effects. When the data mining produces a significant
effect on the even-numbered seconds, it must also be seen nearly exactly on the
odd-numbered seconds which now act as a formal “within session” control.2
Any causal or correlational effects should replicate on a second-by-second
basis.
Notes
1
Private communication.
2
We thank Professor Richard Broughton for first suggesting this to us.
References
Bancel, P., & Nelson, R. D. (2008). The GCP Event Experiment: Design, analytical methods,
results. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 22(3), 259–269.
Nelson, R. D., Bradish, G. J., Dobyns, Y. H., Dunne, B. J., & Jahn, R. G. (1996). FieldREG
anomalies in group situations. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 10(1), 111–141.
Stanford, R. G., Zenhausern, R., Taylor, A., & Dwyer, M. A. (1975). Psychokinesis as psi-mediated
instrumental response. Journal of American Society for Psychical Research, 69, 127–133.
Varvoglis, M. P., & McCarthy, D. (1986). Conscious-purposive focus and PK: RNG activity in
relation to awareness, task-orientation, and feedback. Journal of the American Society for
RESEARCH
Alien Visitation, Extra-Terrestrial Life,

and Paranormal Beliefs
NEIL DAGNALL
Department of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University,
Elizabeth Gaskell Campus, Hathersage Road, Manchester, M13 0JA UK
[email protected]
KENNETH DRINKWATER
Manchester Metropolitan University
ANDREW PARKER
Manchester Metropolitan University
Abstract—The present paper investigated the nature and structure of extra-

terrestrial beliefs. Respondents completed a booklet containing items meas-
uring belief in extra-terrestrial life, alien visitation, and paranormal belief
(Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, R-PBS; and the Australian Sheep Goat
Scale, ASGS). Responses were analyzed using principal component analysis
(PCA), and a three-factor structure emerged: alien visitation, belief in extra-
terrestrial life, and the search for extra-terrestrials. Further analysis revealed
that males scored higher than females on belief in extra-terrestrial life and
the search for extra-terrestrial life. No difference was observed for alien visi-
tation. Correlational analysis found significant positive associations between
each of the extra-terrestrial life factors and alien visitation. In addition to this,
the extra-terrestrial life factors and alien visitation were found to correlate
with overall paranormal belief (ASGS), and the two factors of the R-PBS
(Traditional Paranormal Belief and New Age Philosophy). Alien Visitation
was more strongly correlated with the paranormal belief measures than the
extra-terrestrial belief factors; these were found to be negatively correlated
with the paranormal belief measures when Alien Visitation was controlled for.
These findings indicate that only more extreme Alien Visitation beliefs were
associated with belief in the paranormal.
Keywords: alien visitation—belief in extra-terrestrial life—search for extra-
terrestrial life—paranormal belief
Introduction
The origin, nature, and prevalence of extra-terrestrial beliefs have been relatively
under-researched within psychology (Swami, Furnham, Haubner, Stieger, &
Voracek, 2009, Swami, Pietschnig, Stieger, & Voracek, 2010b). This is surprising
because such beliefs have been recorded throughout human history (Crowe,
699
700 Neil Dagnall, Kenneth Drinkwater, & Andrew Parker
1986) and continue to prevail within modern society (Clarke, 1991, Zullino,
Verdu, Khazaal, & Borgeat, 2006). Indeed, recent work indicates that a significant
proportion of the population believe that extra-terrestrial life exists and that UFOs
are evidence of alien life (Biasco & Nunn, 2000, Chequers, Joseph, & Diduca,
1997, Gallup, 1997, Patry & Pelletier, 2001, Swami et al., 2009).
Pertinently, since the 1960s, the development of contemporary alien research
has coincided with an observed growth in extra-terrestrial beliefs (Gallup &
Newport, 1991, Genta, 2007), which has been accompanied by an increase in
reported accounts of UFO and alien-related experiences (cf., French, 2001,
French, Santomauro, Hamilton, Fox, & Thalbourne, 2008, Swami et al., 2009).
French et al. (2008) estimate that worldwide, the number of people claiming to
have conscious memories of alien abduction is likely to run into at least several
thousands. Further studies have suggested this figure may be higher, between
2% (Appelle, 1995/1996, Hopkins, Jacobs, & Westrum, 1992) and 5%–6% of
the population (Jacobs, 1992). While these figures seem unusually high, even
more conservative measures, such as consideration of reported cases, have
identified significant numbers of incidents. Notably, Bullard’s (1994) survey
of 13 investigators yielded 1,700 reports (Appelle, 1995/1996). Collectively,
these findings indicate that extra-terrestrial beliefs and experiences represent
important phenomena, which merit further study and clarification.
Historically, the study of extra-terrestrial beliefs has been hindered by the
fact that such beliefs have been frequently subsumed within measures of general
paranormal belief (e.g., the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale [R-PBS], Tobacyk,
1988). Swami et al. (2009) contend that this has occurred because extra-
terrestrial beliefs are premised upon notions and theories, which transcend the
explanatory power of mainstream science (Gray, 1991). Certainly, the scientific
community has yet to accept evidence of extra-terrestrial life as authentic and
has failed to agree on a definitive position on the existence of other life forms.
It is worth noting that the merits of including extra-terrestrial beliefs within
paranormal measures is much debated, and hence not all paranormal scales
make reference to extra-terrestrial beliefs (e.g., Australian Sheep Goat Scale,
Thalbourne, 1995a, Thalbourne & Delin, 1993).
Where extra-terrestrial beliefs have been incorporated into paranormal
belief measures, they have received a partial, limited treatment. For instance,
the R-PBS (Tobacyk, 1988) contains a three-item Extraordinary Life Form
subscale, which assesses the existence of extra-terrestrial life alongside other
extraordinary life forms (i.e. the abominable snowman of Tibet and the Loch
Ness Monster). The use of a single item to measure extra-terrestrial beliefs is
problematic because there is evidence to suggest that extra-terrestrial beliefs
are multidimensional (Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010a, Dagnall,
Parker, Munley, & Drinkwater, 2010, Swami et al., 2009).
Alien Visitation, Extra-Terrestrial Life, & Paranormal Beliefs 701
This issue is exemplified by the R-PBS item, “There is life on other

planets.” The item is a general statement, which is difficult to refute because life
could take many shapes and forms (e.g., bacteria) (Lawrence, 1995a). Hence,
the question of interest should not be whether life exists on other planets but
whether life from other planets is visiting the Earth. The latter UFO-related
belief(s) are contentious, and there is evidence to suggest that only these
radical notions (visitation, abduction, medical examination, etc.) are related
to paranormal belief (Dagnall, Parker, Munley, & Drinkwater, 2010, Dagnall,
Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010a).
Limited consideration of extra-terrestrial and alien-related beliefs is not
peculiar to the R-PBS, but is typical of several paranormal belief measures: The
Belief in the Paranormal Scale (Jones, Russell, & Nickel, 1977) assesses UFO
sightings via a single item; the Supernaturalism Scale (Randall & Desrosiers,
1980) assesses belief in extra-terrestrial life and UFOs via three items; the
Anomalous/Paranormal Belief Subscale (Kumar, Pekala, & Gallagher, 1994,
Kumar & Pekala, 2001) assesses belief in intelligent life on other planets;
the Paranormal Short Inventory (Randall, 1997) assesses belief in UFOs via
one item; and the Exeter Superstitions Questionnaire (Preece & Baxter, 2000)
assesses belief in alien visitation via one item. Examining these measures, it is
clear that they fail to provide an adequate measure of extra-terrestrial–related
beliefs because they are unable to discriminate between extra-terrestrial life
and UFO-related beliefs and contain insufficient items to measure the alien
constructs (Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010a).
The distinction between belief in extra-terrestrial life and UFO-related
beliefs has previously been found to be important (Chequers at al., 1997).
Notably, Chequers at al. (1997) designed eight items to measure extra-terrestrial
life/alien beliefs alongside schizotypy. Following a review of their paper, they
subdivided their items into two measures dealing with extra-terrestrial life and
UFO related-beliefs. Endorsement rates were lower for items related to UFO-
related beliefs (e.g., 1% agreed that they had been taken on board a spaceship
and 32% agreed that the government refuses to tell the truth about flying
saucers) than items related to belief in extra-terrestrial life (e.g., 85% agreed
that there is good evidence that life exists on other planets). These findings
suggest that the subscales measure different constructs.
Despite these differences, Chequers et al. (1997) observed some overlap
between UFO-related beliefs and extra-terrestrial life; 96% of respondents
disagreed that people who say they have been abducted by aliens are mentally ill.
Interestingly, Chequers et al. (1997) found that the two subscale measures were
differently related to scores on the schizotypal traits questionnaire (Rawlings &
MacFarlane, 1994); only UFO-related beliefs were found to positively correlate
with level of schizotypy. Chequers et al. (1997) hypothesize that this is because
extra-terrestrial life beliefs are more plausible than UFO-related beliefs. Clearly,
their distinction between belief in extra-terrestrial life and UFO-related beliefs
is a useful theoretical dichotomy that requires further explanation.
Noting this, Dagnall, Munley, Parker, and Drinkwater (2010a) explored
whether alien-related beliefs (life on other planets and alien visitations) were
related to extraordinary life forms, as suggested by the R-PBS, and if such beliefs
could be considered to represent facets of paranormal belief per se (Diaz-Vilela
& Alvarez-Gonzalez, 2004). This was achieved by identifying commonly used
measures of paranormal belief (R-PBS, Paranormal Short Inventory, etc.) and
related phenomena (e.g., scales assessing belief in extra-terrestrial life and UFO-
related beliefs, Chequers et al., 1997; and Poltergeists and Hauntings, Kumar &
Pekala, 2001). The latter scales provided only a limited range of related beliefs
and consequently the authors generated additional items by exploring reports of
alien-related and haunting experiences.
The new and original scale items were combined to produce a 124-item
composite measure. This was completed by 1,481 respondents and the data
were then analyzed using exploratory factor analysis (principal components
analysis), and a nine-factor structure emerged: Hauntings, Other Life,
Superstition, Religious Belief, Alien Visitation, Extrasensory Perception (ESP),
Psychokinesis (PK), Astrology, and Witchcraft. Consistent with Chequers et
al. (1997), other life (extra-terrestrial life) and Alien Visitation (UFO-related
beliefs) were identified as separate factors; both were coherent, possessed face
validity, and demonstrated excellent internal reliability.
Dagnall, Munley, Parker, and Drinkwater (2010a) in a followup study further
explored the relationships among extra-terrestrial life, UFO-related beliefs, and
paranormal belief. They found that despite being positively correlated with
each other UFO-related beliefs were more highly correlated with paranormal
belief, as measured by the R-PBS and ASGS, than belief in extra-terrestrial life;
partial correlation, controlling for the overlap between belief in extra-terrestrial
life and UFO-related beliefs, found only the more extreme UFO-related beliefs
to be associated with paranormal belief. These findings suggest that belief in
extra-terrestrial life is multifactorial and that further research is required to
identify the structure of such beliefs.
Swami et al. (2009) conducted a study examining the structure of beliefs
about extra-terrestrial life. In order to do this they recruited 577 respondents (320
participants from Austria and 257 participants from Britain) and asked them to
complete their Extra-terrestrial Beliefs Scale (EBS). The EBS is a 37-item scale
measuring belief in evidence of extra-terrestrial life, governmental knowledge
of the existence of extra-terrestrial life, scientific search for extra-terrestrial life,
and the existence of UFOs. In addition to this, participants provided information
on sex, age, ethnicity, religion, marital status, highest educational qualification,
religious belief, and political orientation. Exploratory factor analysis suggested

three primary factors: belief that extra-terrestrial life has visited Earth and that
governmental agencies have knowledge of this fact (Factor 1), scientific search
for extra-terrestrial life (Factor 2), and general beliefs about the existence of
extra-terrestrial life (Factor 3). Separate factor analysis for the Austrian and
British participants revealed similar factor structures.
Examination of responses to the three factors indicated that respondents
made a clear distinction between paranormal-related beliefs (Factor 1) and more
science-based beliefs (Factor 3) (Swami et al., 2009). Typically, respondents
endorsed the notion that other life exists elsewhere in the universe but were
skeptical of the idea that extra-terrestrial life has visited Earth. Thus only Factor
1 was found to be meaningfully related to the categorization of extra-terrestrial
beliefs as paranormal. On this basis, Swami et al. (2009) made a distinction
between UFO-related beliefs (paranormal-related beliefs) and general belief
in the possibility that extra-terrestrial life exists. Interestingly, although
participants believed that extra-terrestrial life may exist, they expressed only
moderate support for exploration of such life. With regard to demographic
variables, Swami et al. (2009) found that: stronger general extra-terrestrial
beliefs were associated with higher levels of education; higher religiosity and
more right-wing political orientation were associated with decreased belief in
extra-terrestrial life; and there were no gender differences across factor scores.
Looking at the previous research makes it evident that further work in the
area of extra-terrestrial–related beliefs is required for a number of reasons. First,
while the dichotomy between extra-terrestrial life and UFO-related beliefs has
been established, the factorial structure of extra-terrestrial beliefs has yet to be
fully assessed; Chequers et al. (1997) simply subdivided their items on the basis
of content, while Dagnall, Parker, Munley, and Drinkwater (2010), Dagnall,
Munley, Parker, and Drinkwater (2010a), and Swami et al. (2009) employed
exploratory factor analysis. Hence the present study was designed to extract
common factors from the two existing measurement scales.
Dagnall, Parker, Munley, and Drinkwater (2010) and Dagnall, Munley,
Parker, & Drinkwater (2010a) identified two factors (life on other planets,
Factor 1; and alien visitations, Factor 2), while Swami et al. (2009) outline
three factors: belief that extra-terrestrial life has visited Earth and that
governmental agencies have knowledge of this fact (Factor 1); scientific search
for extra-terrestrial life (Factor 2); and general beliefs about the existence
of extra-terrestrial life (Factor 3). In order to do this, the two-item sets from
the respective studies were combined to form a composite measure of extra-
terrestrial–related beliefs. Second, it was hoped that this approach would lead
to an enhanced, psychometrically validated measure of the facets of extra-
terrestrial belief, which would be of use within the current area of research
as well as to related areas such as false memory (Clancy, McNally, Schacter,

Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002, French et al., 2008).
Methods
Materials and Procedure
Participants were asked to complete: items assessing belief in extra-terrestrial
life and alien visitation (Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010a, Swami
et al., 2009), the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS, Tobacyk, 1988,
Tobacyk, 2004, Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), and the Australian Sheep–Goat Scale
(ASGS, Thalbourne, 1995a, Thalbourne & Delin, 1993). Presentation order
across questionnaires was counterbalanced to prevent order effects. The current
questionnaire measures have been previously psychometrically validated:
Belief in extra-terrestrial life and alien visitation (Dagnall, Parker,
Munley, & Drinkwater, 2010, Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010a,
Swami et al., 2009). Belief in extra-terrestrial life and alien visitation was
assessed via a 37-composite-item measure; 23 items from Swami et al. (2009)
and 14 items from Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater (2010a). The Swami
et al. (2009) items represented three factors: alien visitation and coverup (e.g.,
“The government of this country is covering up the existence of extra-terrestrial
life”), 11 questions; scientific search (e.g., “The search for extra-terrestrial life
is a serious and important scientific endeavour”), 6 questions; and general
beliefs (e.g., “Just because we have no evidence of extra-terrestrial life does not
mean that such life does not exist”), 6 questions. The Dagnall, Munley, Parker,
& Drinkwater (2010a) items represent two factors: extra-terrestrial life (e.g.,
“Somewhere in the universe there are other forms of life”), 6 questions; and
UFO-related beliefs (e.g., “Aliens are abducting human beings)”, 8 questions.
In order to facilitate direct comparison with Swami et al. (2009), all questions
employed a 7-point Likert-type scale (where 1 was disagree, 4 was neither agree
nor disagree, and 7 was agree). Previously, both item sets have been found
to be conceptually coherent and possess good to excellent internal reliability
(Cronbach’s alpha, α). Swami et al. (2009): alien visitation and coverup, α =
.90; scientific search, α = .82; and general beliefs, α = .75. Dagnall, Munley,
Parker, & Drinkwater (2010a): belief in extra-terrestrial-life, α = .91; and UFO-
related beliefs, α = .95.
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS) (Tobacyk, 1988, Tobacyk,
2004, Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). The R-PBS is an amended form of the
Paranormal Belief Scale developed by Tobacyk and Milford (1983) and is the
most frequently used self-report measure of paranormal belief (Irwin, 2004).
It contains 26 items assessing seven facets of paranormal belief: traditional
religious belief, psi, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, extraordinary life
forms, and precognition. The R-PBS can be totalled to produce overall scores,
or subscores can be calculated for each of the facets. However, recent attempts
to refine/purify the scale to eliminate differential item functioning (arising from
age and gender bias) and subsequent factor analysis has identified an alternative
two-factor solution (Lange, Irwin, & Houran, 2000). This is composed of factors
assessing New Age Philosophy (NAP) and Traditional Paranormal Belief
(TPB): NAP measures belief in psi, reincarnation, altered states, and astrology
(11 items), while TPB assesses belief in concepts such as the devil, witchcraft,
and heaven and hell (5 items) (Irwin, 2004). R-PBS items are presented as
statements (e.g., “I believe in God”), and respondents record answers on a
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher
scores on the scale/sub-scale indicate higher paranormal belief.
The current paper, in line with Irwin (2004) and recent convention will
employ the two-factor solution suggested by Lange, Irwin, & Houran (2000).
This is achieved by recoding the scores; 1–7 is converted to 0–6, and the rasch
scaling procedure is used (Andrich, 1988). Rasch scaling produces scores
ranging from 6.85 to 47.72 on NAP and 11.16 to 43.24 on TPB. While the
factorial structure of the R-PBS has frequently been debated (Lawrence, 1995a,
1995b, Lawrence, Roe, & Williams, 1997, Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b, Tobacyk
& Thomas, 1997), the scale overall has been found to be a conceptually and
psychometrically satisfactory measure (Tobacyk, 2004). Particularly, the
R-PBS has been found to possess adequate validity (Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b,
2004) and good test–retest reliability (Tobayck, 2004).
Australian Sheep–Goat Scale (Thalbourne, 1995b, Thalbourne & Delin,
1993). The ASGS measures belief in, and alleged experience of, three core
concepts of parapsychology (life after death, psychokinesis, and extrasensory
perception). These concepts, while independent, have been found to be highly
correlated. Hence, the ASGS is generally considered to measure belief in psychic
ability (Thalbourne, 1995a, 1995b, Thalbourne & Delin, 1993, Thalbourne,
Dunbar, & Delin, 1995, Wiseman & Watt, 2006). The ASGS is composed of
18 items, and the response options are False (scored as zero), “?” (Don’t know:
scored as 1 point), and True (scored as 2 points). The scale has a range from 0
to 36, higher scores indicating higher levels of belief and experience. Recent
attempts to rasch scale the ASGS (Lange & Thalbourne, 2002) suggest that
scoring should be limited to 16 rather than 18 items. Across a range of studies
the ASGS has demonstrated good reliability and validity (Thalbourne, 1995a,
Thalbourne & Delin, 1993).
Respondents
527 respondents completed the questionnaire. Ages ranged 16–75 years, with
a mean of 25.27, a standard deviation of 10.96, and a median of 20 (lower
quartile 19 and upper quartile 27); 73% female and 27% male. Respondents
were recruited through a range of sources: via undergraduate and postgraduate

psychology and healthcare courses, through contacts at local colleges, via
emails to staff and students across the University, and to external contacts.
An opportunistic snowball-sampling technique was employed. Participation
was voluntary and respondents could terminate participation at any point. All
surveys were completed under anonymous and confidential conditions.
Procedure
All participants were informed that the questionnaire measure was concerned
with the measurement of belief. They were told that their responses would
be anonymous and that they should ensure that all items were completed.
Participants were instructed that there was no time limit and that they should
work through the questions at their own pace.
Results
Exploration of the Empirical Structure of the Questionnaire
In line with Swami et al. (2009) participants’ questionnaire responses were
subjected to principal components analysis (PCA) with orthogonal (varimax)
rotation. Prior to conducting PCA, the correctness of the data for factor
analysis was assessed. The data was found to be suitable for PCA: The Kaiser–
Mayer–Oklin value (.956) exceeded the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser,
1970, 1974); Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) was significant (χ2
= 12797.746, df = 561, p < .001), and the correlation matrix contained many
coefficients of .3 or above. An item-loading cut-off value of .45 was selected;
Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest that item loadings above this value provide a
good measure of a factor.
The initial PCA resulted in a solution comprising six factors with
eigenvalues of greater than 1, accounting for 64% of the total variance. Parallel
analysis was conducted using the MonteCarlo PCA (Watkins, 2000). This
indicated that Factors 4, 5, and 6 should not be retained in the final analysis.
Reliability analysis, in the form of Cronbach’s alpha (α), revealed that Factor
1 (α = .95) and Factor 2 (α = .92) possessed excellent internal reliability and
Factor 3 (α = .80) good internal reliability.
Following the initial PCA and the subsequent reliability analysis, a second
PCA was undertaken. This included the three factors which produced an
acceptable internal reliability coefficient (α ≥ .7) and used a reduced set of 25
items (see Table 1).1
TABLE 1
Scale Items with Mean Scores and
Standard Deviations (SD) for UK Participants
GENDER COMBINED
WOMEN MEN TOTAL
Item Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1 Given the size and age of the universe, it is very 4.80 1.64 5.50 1.60 4.99 1.66
likely that extra-terrestrial life must exist.
6 If Earth-like planets exist in the universe, then 4.82 1.41 4.94 1.71 4.85 1.50
it is likely that Earth-like organisms will have
evolved on those planets.
8 Intelligent extra-terrestrial life has visited 3.16 1.58 3.26 1.73 3.19 1.62
Earth.
11 The search for extra-terrestrial life is a serious 4.41 1.55 4.81 1.75 4.52 1.61
and important endeavour.
15 Just because we have no evidence of 5.51 1.55 5.70 1.58 5.56 1.56
extraterrestrial life does not mean that such life
does not exist.
18 Governments should direct more funding to the 2.98 1.66 3.36 1.69 3.08 1.67
scientific search for extra-terrestrial life.
21R The search for extra-terrestrial life is a waste of 4.18 1.77 4.61 1.83 4.30 1.79
time and money.
23R Earth is the only planet in the universe that 4.84 1.62 5.36 1.63 4.98 1.64
harbours life.
26R The search for extra-terrestrial life is a 4.38 1.58 4.52 1.80 4.42 1.64
pseudoscience (not proper science).
28 Extra-terrestrial creatures visited Earth in the 3.38 1.39 3.21 1.66 3.33 1.47
distant past or at the dawn of civilization.
38 Somewhere in the universe there are other 4.88 1.55 5.30 1.68 4.99 1.60
forms of life.
39 People have been taken on board alien 2.65 1.50 2.72 1.64 2.67 1.54
spaceships.
40R The Earth is the only planet in the universe that 4.78 1.67 5.21 1.67 4.90 1.68
supports life.
41 Aliens are abducting human beings. 2.35 1.42 2.36 1.48 2.35 1.44
42R The only intelligent life exists on earth. 4.46 1.67 4.80 1.73 4.55 1.69
43 Aliens have implanted objects into people. 2.28 1.38 2.31 1.41 2.29 1.39
44 There is life on other planets. 4.79 1.49 5.31 1.58 4.93 1.53
45 Alien spaceships regularly visit Earth. 2.57 1.52 2.57 1.56 2.57 1.53
46R There is no such thing as extra-terrestrial life. 4.68 1.74 5.22 1.75 4.83 1.76
47 Alien spaceships have crash-landed on Earth. 2.64 1.53 2.86 1.71 2.70 1.58
48 Intelligent life exists beyond our universe. 4.49 1.57 4.87 1.66 4.59 1.60
49 Alien intelligence is responsible for some UFO 3.20 1.59 3.14 1.68 3.18 1.62
sightings.
50 Extra-terrestrials have visited Earth throughout 3.25 1.69 3.22 1.75 3.24 1.71
history.
51 Unidentified Flying Objects suggest that 3.28 1.63 3.18 1.67 3.25 1.64
some kind of extra-terrestrial life form has
approached the surface of the Earth.
TABLE 2
Principal Component Loadings for Scale Items
Factor Item/Number Communalities Component

1 2 3
Alien Visitation (Factor 1)
45 Alien spaceships regularly visit Earth. .76 .85 .09 .15
39 People have been taken on board alien spaceships. .75 .85 .11 .10
41 Aliens are abducting human beings. .70 .83 .03 .10
47 Alien spaceships have crash-landed on earth.. .74 .83 .27 .19
50 Extra-terrestrials have visited Earth throughout .79 .83 .19 .12
history.
43 Aliens have injected objects into people. .68 .81 .01 .10
49 Alien intelligence is responsible for some UFO .73 .79 .24 .18
sightings.
51 Unidentified Flying Objects suggest that some kind .71 .79 .25 .17
of extra-terrestrial life form has approached the
surface of the Earth.
8 Intelligent extra-terrestrial life has visited Earth. .64 .74 .27 .12
28 Extra-terrestrial creatures visited Earth in the .58 .71 .20 .20
distant past or at the dawn of human civilization.
Existence of Extra-Terrestrial (Factor 2)
40R The Earth is the only planet in the universe that .71 .05 .83 .14
supports life.
38 Somewhere in the universe there are other forms .71 .14 .80 .19
of life.
23R Earth is the only planet in the universe that .64 .07 .77 .23
harbours life.
1 Given the size and age of the universe, it is very .63 .16 .76 .14
likely that extra-terrestrial life must exist.
44 There is life on other planets. .62 .08 .76 .18
48 Intelligent life exists beyond our universe. .65 .27 .75 .06
46R There is no such thing as extra-terrestrial life. .64 .14 .73 .31
42R The only intelligent life exists on Earth. .57 .18 .72 .12
15 Just because we have no evidence of extra- .43 .12 .61 .22
terrestrial life does not mean that such life does
not exist.
6 If Earth-like planets exist in the universe, then it is .40 .22 .74 .01
likely that Earth-like organisms will have evolved
on those planets.
Search for Extra-Terrestrial Life (Factor 3)
21R The search for extra-terrestrial life is a waste of .70 .08 .33 .73
time and money.
26R The search for extra-terrestrial life is a .67 .29 .25 .72
pseudoscience (not proper science).
18 Governments should direct more funding to the .64 .45 .15 .67
scientific search for extra-terrestrial life.
11 The search for extraterrestrial life is a serious and .57 .24 .37 .61
important scientific endeavor.
Bolded numbers represent values loaded on to particular factors.
The second PCA, also using varimax rotation, provided a solution

comprising three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, accounting for 64%
of the total variance. Inspection of the pattern matrix revealed that all emergent
factors demonstrated good levels of internal consistency, and were conceptually
distinct. One of the 25 items was omitted because it failed to meet the loading
cut-off value of .45:
Factor 1 (Alien Visitation), eigenvalue of 10.59, accounted for 42.38%
of the variance. This factor demonstrated excellent internal reliability (α = .95)
and comprised ten items.
Factor 2 (Belief in the Existence of Extra-Terrestrial Life), eigenvalue of
4.00, accounted for 15.99% of the variance. This factor demonstrated excellent
internal reliability (α = .92) and comprised ten items.
Factor 3 (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Life), eigenvalue of 1.30,
accounted for 5.20% of the variance. This factor demonstrated good internal
reliability (α =.80) and comprised four items (see Table 2).
Gender Differences
In order to allow comparisons between the three factor scores, the mean was
calculated for each factor. In order to test for gender differences on factor
scores, a multivariate analysis of covariance was conducted (MANCOVA). A
significant main effect was found for gender, F(3, 523) = 5.53, p = .001, Wilk’s
Lambda =.97, partial eta-squared = .031.2 Analysis of each alien/extra-terrestrial
belief factor revealed that: males (M = 5.22, SD = 1.18) scored higher than
females (M = 4.80, SD = 1.24) on Belief in the Existence of Extra-Terrestrial
Life, F(1, 525) = 12.08, p = .001, partial eta-squared = .022; and males (M =
4.33, SD = 1.39) scored higher than females (M = 3.99, SD = 1.30) on Search
for Extra-Terrestrial Life, F(1, 525) = 6.89, p = .009, partial eta-squared = .013.
No difference was found between males and females on Alien Visitation, F(1,
525) = .005, p > .05, partial eta-squared = .00 (see Table 3).
TABLE 3
Means, Standard Deviations, & Reliability Statistics for Factor Scores
GENDER COMBINED TOTAL

WOMEN MEN
Factor M SD α M SD α M SD α
1 Alien Visitation 2.87 1.27 .95 2.88 1.38 .96 2.88 1.30 .95
2 Existence of Extra- 4.80 1.24 .93 5.22 1.18 .90 4.92 1.24 .92
Terrestrial Life
3 Search for Extra- 3.99 1.30 .80 4.33 1.39 .79 4.08 1.33 .80
Terrestrial Life
Relationship between Extra-Terrestrial and Paranormal Beliefs

Prior to conducting correlation analysis, the reliability of the paranormal
measures was assessed. This revealed that the Revised Paranormal Belief
Scale (R-PBS) (Tobacyk, 1988, Tobacyk, 2004, Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) and
the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS) (Thalbourne, 1995a, Thalbourne &
Delin, 1993) possessed good interval reliability. In addition to this, the two-
factor solution for the R-PBS (Lange, Irwin, & Houran, 2000), which comprised
factors assessing New Age Philosophy (NAP) and Traditional Paranormal
Belief (TPB), demonstrated good internal reliability (see Table 4).
TABLE 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability Statistics
for Paranormal Belief Measures
Paranormal Belief Measures M SD α
R-PBS 57.01 27.75 .88

TPB 22.16 4.70 .89
NAP 22.84 5.07 .79
ASGS 9.60 7.05 .93
A series of Pearson’s Product-Moment correlations were conducted between

the three alien/extra-terrestrial belief factors and the measures of paranormal
belief (NAP, TPB, and ASGS). Significant positive correlations were found
between the alien/extra-terrestrial belief factors. Positive correlations were
also found between: NAP and the alien/extra-terrestrial belief factors; TPB and
Alien Visitation and Search for Extra-Terrestrial Life; and ASGS and the alien/
extra-terrestrial belief factors (see Table 5).
TABLE 5
Correlations: Alien Visitation, Extra-Terrestrial, and Paranormal Belief
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Alien Visitation
2 Belief in ET .41**
3 Search for ET .54** .58**
4 NAP .56** .15** .25**
5 TPB .48** .07 .15** .68**
6 ASGS .49** .24** .25** .65** .53**
* p < .05; ** p < .01 (all probabilities one-tailed).
Looking at the pattern of correlations, it is clear that there is a stronger

relationship between Alien Visitation and the measures of paranormal belief
than there is between the two extra-terrestrial-belief–related factors (Belief in
the Existence of Extra-Terrestrial Life and the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Life)
(see Table 6).
TABLE 6
Differences in Correlation Magnitude between Belief in Alien/Extra-
Terrestrial Life Factors and Measures of Paranormal Belief
Alien/Extra-Terrestrial Belief Factors Z Sig
Alien Visitation Belief in ET

NAP .56 .15 9.72 £.001
TPB .48 .07 9.48 £.001
ASGS .49 .24 6.03 £.001
Alien Visitation Search for ET
NAP .56 .25 8.57 £.001
TPB .48 .15 8.55 £.001
ASGS .49 .25 6.32 £.001
Belief in ET Search for ET
NAP .15 .25 2.33 £.001
TPB .07 .15 2.11 £.001
ASGS .24 .25 0.47 £.05
A series of first-order partial correlations was conducted to determine the

degree to which the significant positive correlations between the alien/extra-
terrestrial belief factors and paranormal belief were explained by belief in Alien
Visitation. Controlling for Alien Visitation beliefs revealed weak negative
correlations between Belief in the Existence of Extra-Terrestrial Life, Search
for Extra-Terrestrial Life, and the two factors of the R-PBS (NAP and TPB)
(see Table 7). Contrastingly, controlling for Belief in the Existence of Extra-
Terrestrial Life revealed positive correlations between Alien Visitation, Search
for ET, and the two factors of the R-PBS (NAP and TPB) (see Table 8). Finally,
controlling for Search for ET produced positive correlations between Alien
Visitation and the two factors of the R-PBS (NAP and TPB), and no correlation
was found between Belief in ET and the R-PBS (see Table 9). These findings
indicate that the relationship between the alien/extra-terrestrial belief factors
and paranormal belief is best explained by belief in Alien Visitation.
TABLE 7
Partial Correlations: Belief in the Existence of ET,
Search for ET, and Paranormal Belief Controlling for Alien Visitation
1 2 3 4
1 Belief in ET
2 Search for ET .47**
3 NAP −.10* −.08*
4 TPB −.16** −.15** .56**
* p < .05; **; p < 0.1 (all probabilities one-tailed).
TABLE 8
Partial Correlations: Alien Visitation, Search for ET,
and Paranormal Belief Controlling for Belief in the Existence of ET
1 2 3 4
1 Alien Visitation
2 Search for ET .40**
3 NAP .55** .19**
4 TPB .50** .14** .68**
* p < .05; ** p < 0.1 (all probabilities one-tailed).
TABLE 9
Partial Correlations: Alien Visitation, Belief in the Existence of ET,
and Paranormal Belief Controlling for Search for ET
1 2 3 4
1 Alien Visitation
2 Belief in ET .15**
3 NAP .52** .02
4 TPB .48** −.03 .67**
* p < .05; ** p < 0.1 (all probabilities one-tailed).
Discussion
The nature and structure of alien/extra-terrestrial beliefs has been relatively
under-researched within psychology (Swami et al., 2009, Swami, Pietschnig,
Stieger, & Voracek, 2010b). Hence, the current paper was designed to extend
research by examining and reconciling theoretical differences between important
recent work (cf., Dagnall, Parker, Munley, & Drinkwater, 2010, Dagnall,
Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010a, and Swami et al., 2009). Particularly,
debate has arisen around the nature and number of alien/extra-terrestrial belief
factors: Dagnall, Parker, Munley, and Drinkwater (2010) and Dagnall, Munley,
Parker, and Drinkwater (2010a) forwarded two factors (Factor 1, belief in extra-
terrestrial life; and Factor 2, UFO-related beliefs), while Swami et al. (2009)
outlined three factors (Factor 1, belief that extra-terrestrial life has visited Earth
and that governmental agencies have knowledge of this fact; Factor 2; scientific
search for extra-terrestrial life; and Factor 3, general beliefs about the existence
of extra-terrestrial life). Although these studies successfully proposed alien/
extra-terrestrial factors and produced valid and reliable measures, the lack of
agreement over the number and nature of factors suggests that there is currently
no theoretical consensus, and that greater conceptual clarity is required. In this
context the current study’s intention was to disambiguate these differences and
in so doing further elucidate understanding of alien/extra-terrestrial beliefs.
To achieve this, items from the Dagnall, Parker, Munley, & Drinkwater
(2010) and Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater (2010a) and Swami et al.
(2009) papers were combined to produce a composite measure of alien/extra-
terrestrial belief(s). Using Principal Components Analysis (PCA), this measure
was found to be reducible to three related, but conceptually different factors:
Factor 1, Alien Visitation (e.g., “Alien spaceships regularly visit Earth”); Factor
2, Belief in the Existence of Extra-Terrestrial Life (e.g., “Somewhere in the
universe there are other forms of life”); and Factor 3, the Search for Extra-
Terrestrial Life (e.g., “Governments should direct more funding to the scientific
search for extra-terrestrial life”). The existence of three factors supports the
notion that alien/extra-terrestrial life beliefs are multifactorial (Chequers et al.,
1997, Dagnall, Parker, Munley, & Drinkwater, 2010, Dagnall, Munley, Parker,
& Drinkwater, 2010a, Swami et al., 2009) and implies that simple measures,
such as those contained within general measures of paranormal belief (e.g.,
R-PBS) are insufficient and unable to account for the complex nature of alien/
extra-terrestrial beliefs.
Importantly, support is provided for the dichotomy between alien visitation/
UFO-related beliefs and extra-terrestrial belief (Dagnall, Parker, Munley, &
Drinkwater, 2010, Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010a, Swami et
al., 2009, Chequers et al., 1997). Differences, however, were observed between
the factors identified in the present study and those proposed by Dagnall,
Parker, Munley, & Drinkwater (2010), Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater
(2010a), and Swami et al. (2009). Particularly, the Dagnall, Parker, Munley, &
Drinkwater (2010) measure was extended by the identification of an additional
factor (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Life), while the government component of
the Swami et al.’s measure (2009) (Factor 1) was found to be redundant.
Within the present study, males scored higher than females on Belief in the
Existence of Extra-Terrestrial Life (Factor 2) and Search for Extra-Terrestrial
Life (Factor 3), and no difference was found for Alien Visitation. While these
findings contradict Swami et al. (2009, 2010b), who found no sex difference,
they are consistent with previous studies, which found men more likely to
believe in extra-terrestrial life (Goode, 2000, Patry & Pelletier, 2001, Rice,
2003). Although gender differences were observed, the accompanying effect
sizes were small (Cohen, 1988), and this may explain the previously reported
inconsistent findings.
The present paper was also designed to examine the relationship between
alien/extra-terrestrial belief and paranormal belief. Previous work reports that
participants endorse the existence of life elsewhere in the universe but are
skeptical that such life has visited Earth (Dagnall, Parker, Munley, & Drinkwater,
2010, Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010a, Swami et al., 2009).
Noting this distinction, Swami et al. (2009) proposed a dichotomy between
paranormal-related alien/extra-terrestrial beliefs (Factor 1, belief that extra
terrestrial life has visited Earth and that government agencies have knowledge
of this fact) and more science-based beliefs (Factor 3, general beliefs about
the existence of extra terrestrial life). Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater
(2010a) found only the more radical UFO-related beliefs to be positively
associated with paranormal belief; alien visitation was found to correlate more
strongly with paranormal belief than the extra-terrestrial belief factors. Partial
correlations controlling for alien visitation revealed no association between the
extra-terrestrial belief factors and paranormal belief. These findings suggest
that belief in alien visitation can be viewed alongside facets of paranormal
belief, while belief in extra-terrestrial life cannot. Perhaps one interpretation of
this is that both sets of belief are dependent upon impaired/faulty reasoning and
critical evaluation (e.g., Blackmore, 1997, Bressan, 2002, Dagnall, Parker, &
Munley, 2007, Rogers, Fisk, & Wiltshire, 2010). However, in spite of this, it is
clear that belief in alien visitation or an alien presence is not always considered
to be unfounded and without evidential base (e.g., Carlotto, 1995, 1997, 2002,
DiPietro, Molenaar, & Brandenburg, 1988, Friedman, 2008, Greer, 2006, Leir,
2005, Maccabee, 2000, Sitchin, 1976, 2004, 2010).
Indeed, many researchers hold particular ideas concerning extraterrestrials
predicated upon reasoned argument and the evaluation of evidence.
Consequently, what remains for further study is how the nature of alien visitation
beliefs might differ between groups of individuals depending upon how those
beliefs are derived. In some instances at least, beliefs in alien visitation or
an alien presence is the result of analytical processes that form the basis of
empirical and critical evaluation. Thus, the relationship between paranormal
beliefs and alien visitation beliefs may not be found when the latter beliefs are
based upon reasoned argument. This requires further study.
In this context one variable of particular interest is reality testing (Irwin,
2003). Reality testing has been defined as the inclination to test critically the
logical plausibility of beliefs. The importance of reality testing is derived from
the notion that pathological beliefs and delusions arise in part from the failure
to subject hypothetical explanations of sensory experience to critical testing
(Irwin, 2004, Langdon & Coltheart, 2000); problems arise because experiences
require interpretation (casual attributions) and are subject to bias (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1972, Weiner, 1986). Thus, pathological belief generation is
characterized by the failure to test the plausibility of generated explanations/
hypotheses.
Reality testing deficits have been used to explain the development
and maintenance of paranormal beliefs (Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, &
Munley, 2010, Irwin, 2004, 2003, Zusne & Jones, 1982). The acceptance and
maintenance of paranormal explanations over conventional alternatives arises
from the intuitive–experiential interpretation of stimuli and an absence of
analytical–rational processing (reality testing) (Irwin, 2009). Irwin and Young
(2002) argue that people with an intuitive–experiential processing style will be
predisposed toward accepting paranormal explanations because they find them
appealing and therefore do not subject them to reality testing. This notion could
be extended to include alien visitation/UFO-related beliefs.
Recent research has found that scores on cognitive–perceptual measures
(schizotypy and transliminality) affect level of paranormal belief (Dagnall,
Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010b). Particularly, participants scoring above
the median have demonstrated higher levels of endorsement across a range
of paranormal belief subscales (Hauntings, Aliens, Superstition, Other Life,
Religion, PK, ESP, Astrology, and Witchcraft) than those below the median.
In line with Swami et al. (2010b), this suggests that the individual-differences
approach may be usefully employed to clarify the underlying processes that
give rise to extra-terrestrial and alien-related beliefs.
Indeed, extra-terrestrial and alien-related beliefs have been found to be
predicted by different variables. Swami et al. (2010b) reported that extra-
terrestrial beliefs were predicted by paranormal beliefs, the unusual factor of
schizotypy, openness to experience, and education. While Swami, Chamorro-
Premuzic, and Shafi (2010a) noted that Agreeableness, Neuroticism, and
Extraversion were positively correlated with beliefs in alien visitation and

government coverups, when additional variables were controlled for (e.g.,
conformity and sensation-seeking) only Conscientiousness significantly
predicted such beliefs. Extending this work, it would be interesting to see
which individual cognitive–perceptual factors (reality testing, schizoptypy,
dissociation, etc.) best predict belief in extra-terrestrial and alien-related beliefs
(Swami et al., 2010b), and whether, as is the case with paranormal beliefs,
this relationship may be largely explained by reality-testing deficits (Dagnall,
Drinkwater, Parker, & Munley, 2010, Irwin, 2004, 2009). Again, more work is
required in this area.
In conclusion, this paper provides further support for the dichotomy
between extra-terrestrial–related beliefs and alien visitation/UFO-related
beliefs. The former are likely to be considered more conventional by members
of the mainstream scientific community, especially those involved or affiliated
with SETI (e.g., Shostak, 2009, Vakoch, 2011). The latter views could be
construed as somewhat less conventional by these same researchers. However,
it is perhaps more likely that the endorsement of belief in alien visitation and its
relationship to paranormal belief is not fixed but variable, depending upon how
such beliefs are derived and the manner in which such beliefs are woven into
the individual’s scientific worldview.
Notes
1
Within Table 1 and Table 2, reversed (item numbers with an R) denotes items that are
reversed-scored.
2
A partial eta-squared between .01 and .06 reflects a small effect size, within the .06–
.13 range a medium effect size, and .14 or higher a large effect (Cohen, 1988).
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RESEARCH
Anomalous Switching of the Bi-Stable Percept

of a Necker Cube: A Preliminary Study
DICK J. BIERMAN
University of Amsterdam
Abstract—Psychophysiological research has shown anomalous correlations

between unconscious states reflected by physiological fluctuations and ran-
dom future conditions. Where the future conditions concerned emotional and
neutral events, this anomalous effect has been called presentiment. In the pres-
ent research, the domain of interest regarding apparent retrocausal effects is
further extended to the visual experience of a so-called “transparent” Necker
cube. When a picture of this cube is presented to subjects, their experience
switches spontaneously between two viewpoints. In one perspective the cube
is experienced as observed from “above,” in the other it is experienced as ob-
served from “below.” We measured switching times from “the above” to “the
below” experience. Once the subject had indicated by pressing a button that
this shift had taken place, the picture of the transparent cube changed into
an opaque presentation of one of the two possible viewpoints. The choice of
which perspective was presented, “from above” or “from below”, was random.
When the opaque view was “from above” this corresponded to the view for
which the duration was measured (congruent), the opaque view “from below”
was the incongruent condition. Arguing that in the incongruent condition the
opaque view would “retrocausally” interfere with the “top view” for which the
duration was measured, we predicted that in that condition the duration would
be shorter. The switching-time effects found in the pilot and two confirma-
tory studies were in the same predicted direction. The pooled results showed a
mean difference in switching time of 126 msec. These results seem to fit into
a growing database of anomalous correlations between conscious and uncon-
scious behavior and random future conditions. It extends the domain of these
anomalous correlations to other non-emotional events. Alternative possibili-
ties, such as procedural errors, are discussed.
Keywords: time symmetry—retroactive interference—anomaly—retroactive
priming—Necker cube
Introduction
Theory
Psi phenomena can be formally defined as correlations that seem to transcend
space or time or both. For instance, there may be correlations between what
subjects choose from a set of four potential targets and the actual target about
which the subject has no information. This information may be distant in space
721
722 Dick J. Bierman
so that access by normal sensory channels is prohibited, or the information may

be distant in time. When the target is known only in the future, the anomaly is
quite obvious because any correlation in that case seems to contradict causality.
One of the general issues in this field of anomalous correlations is the role
of emotions. Do these anomalous correlations arise especially when the events
are very emotional (Broughton, 2006)? That idea originates from case studies
such as crisis telepathy. The vast majority of reported cases from the field deal
with highly emotional events such as the passing away of relatives. However,
one could argue that this is not an intrinsic aspect of the anomalous correlations
but rather an intrinsic aspect of the reporting bias (or that emotion tends to focus
attention, or provide a motivational factor that non-emotional targets cannot).
One cannot exclude that trivial cases just aren’t reported but happen nonethe-
less. In presentiment studies the role of emotions is quite explicit (Radin, 2004).
But are correlations between physiological behavior and a random future stimu-
lus restricted to paradigms where we compare neutral and emotional events?
In a recent theoretical approach, it has been argued that these correlations
should occur in non-emotional events as well. According to this approach, these
anomalous correlations arise from time-symmetry restoration (Bierman, 2010).
Time symmetry is quite basic in most physical formalisms. For instance, elec-
tromagnetic systems theory predicts that there are two consequences of a spe-
cific initial state. These two solutions are called the retarded solution (with time
running forward) and the time-symmetric advanced solution (where time can
be interpreted as running backward). The advanced solution is generally con-
sidered a meaningless oddity due to the mathematics used, because in physical
systems this symmetry hasn’t been observed empirically. However, an alterna-
tive view is that the boundary conditions in most simple physical systems are
such that the advanced solutions are prohibited. Introducing the brain, while it
is sustaining consciousness, into the otherwise material system is assumed to
restore time symmetry to some degree. The restoration is assumed to be more
complete when the brain system is in a more coherent state. This theoretical ap-
proach does not rely on emotions and would predict “retroactive” effects for all
events that interact with consciousness, not only emotional ones.
Another issue relates to the idea that it is easier to find anomalous correla-
tions when measuring non-conscious dependent variables such as physiological
variables rather than when measuring consciously produced variables (such as
explicit oral predictions). In several studies, anomalous correlations were estab-
lished between non-conscious physiological states and random external (actual
or future) conditions while the subjects appeared to be unable to “use” this infor-
mation in order to improve conscious guessing of the external random condition
(i.e. Lobach, 2010). The dependent variable in the current study (switching) can
be interpreted as somewhere between conscious and non-conscious behavior.
Necker Cube Switching Time Anomaly 723
Finally there is a theoretical issue related to the stability of the system

under consideration. It has been proposed that it is easier to find anomalous
correlations in unstable or labile systems (Stanford, 1990).
These three issues together suggest the use of the experience of a bi-stable
percept as a dependent variable. There is an ongoing discussion in the field
of bi-stable conscious states about where in the brain bi-stability is handled.
Globally there are two points of view. Either there is a top-down (attentional)
process originating in higher parts of the brain that is the origin of the switching
between the two experiences, or the bi-stability is processed and resolved in the
very early stages of information processing by the brain (Tong, Meng, & Blake,
2006, Blake & Logothetis, 2002).
Earlier Experiments
The roots of the current research can probably be traced back to the middle
of the last century, when instruments to measure physiological processes be-
came more commonly available. A. J. Good reportedly suggested measuring
brain potentials on the surface of someone’s skull (EEG) while he sits in a
dark room and a light is flashed at random moments, to discover whether “the
EEG shows any tendency to forecast the flashes of light” (Good, 1961, cited in
Radin, 2006:163). In the 1970s, there was in fact a study conducted to explore
whether the EEG showed any tendency to forecast, not flashes of light, but the
gender of faces in pictures (Hartwell, 1978). The results showed no significant
differences in EEG for different genders, however, despite laborious (especially
at the time) and extensive analyses. At about the same time, Vassy (1978) did
report highly significant results in an experiment that was set up to measure te-
lepathy. That study is worth mentioning because its design was rather similar to
that of later presentiment studies. Vassy measured the electrical activity of the
skin (EDA) preceding an electrical shock for which the participant either was or
wasn’t warned telepathically by someone in another room. As with Hartwell’s
EEG study (Hartwell, 1978), judging and analyzing physiological measures
was cumbersome and prone to error in those days. This is perhaps why it took
a rather long time before more studies were undertaken in this direction. By the
end of the last century, Radin picked up the trail and used modern, automated
equipment in the first of a series of presentiment studies (Radin, 1997). Radin
got interesting, statistically significant, results corroborating his hypothesis.
These results were soon replicated by Bierman, and together they published a
summary of five different presentiment studies in a “mainstream” psychologi-
cal journal (Bierman & Radin, 1997). As in Vassy’s study, these early experi-
ments used mainly EDA as the dependent physiological measure of presenti-
ment; this measure seemed to produce the most reliable results.
724 Dick J. Bierman
Figure 1. Illustration of a trial in a presentiment experiment (from Radin, 2004).
In a typical presentiment study as reported by Bierman and Radin (1997),

a participant is hooked up to an instrument to measure EDA. Changes in the
electrical activity of the skin are measured continuously during the whole ses-
sion. The participant is seated in a comfortable chair in front of a computer
screen and remains passive, except when a signal indicates that he or she can
start the next trial by pressing a button. The number of trials may vary, but is
typically about 30. After the button press, there is a delay of a few seconds
until a stimulus is presented, after which there is a cool-down period until the
next signal (Figure 1). Stimuli are drawn randomly from two picture pools.
One pool contains calm pictures, such as photos of landscapes. The other pool
contains arousing pictures with violent (e.g., a bloody car crash) or erotic con-
tent. Experiments in mainstream psychology have shown clear EDA responses
after arousing stimuli. In presentiment studies the focus is on the time interval
directly preceding the stimulus, from the button press until the picture is pre-
sented on the screen.
EDA measures can be analyzed in a number of different ways. The studies
conducted by Radin and Bierman looked at the average skin conductance level
response (SCL). The statistical analysis compares the SCL averaged across all
emotional trials with the SCL averaged across all neutral trials. Although in
most studies the future condition was either emotional or non-emotional us-
ing pictures from the International Affective Picture system (Lang, Bradley,
& Cuthbert, 1999), there have been a few studies that used a pleasant or an
unpleasant tone (Spottiswoode & May, 2003, May, Paulinyi, & Vassy, 2005).
These studies yielded comparable results.
Since then, several other physiological measures have been used as depen-
dent variables with a similar design as in Figure 1 or with a design where the
stimuli are unexpected loud sounds or light flashes to induce strong responses
like in the study by May and Spottiswoode. Variables that have been used in-
clude Evoked Potentials (Radin & Lobach, 2007), CNV (Bierman, 2006), Bold
(Bierman & Scholte, 2002, Bierman, 2007), Eye Movement (Radin & Borges,
2009), Pupil Dilation (Radin & Borges, 2009), Blinking (Radin & Borges,
2009), and HR (heart rate) (Tressoldi, Martinelli, Massaccesi, & Sartori, 2005,
McCraty, Atkinson, & Bradley, 2004a, 2004b). The results of all these stud-
ies suggest anomalous correlations, though the interpretation is far from clear
and the results are not very robust. Also a number of experiments have used
behavioral measures such as preference scores in a mere-exposure experiment
where the preference score was given before the mere exposure (Bem, 2011).
Preferences that increase as in mere exposure or decrease as in habituation can
still be seen in the framework of emotion research. Apparent retrocausal ef-
fects were also observed in a priming task where the prime was presented after
the response was given (de Boer & Bierman, 2006). This retroactive priming
study showed a clear effect of a faster response in a gender-discrimination task
when the target was followed by a congruent “prime” (which actually should be
called “post”). In this case, “emotions” apparently were not involved explicitly
or implicitly.
Research Question
In the present research, the domain of interest regarding apparent retrocausal
effects is further extended to the visual experience of a so-called “transparent”
Necker cube. When a picture of this cube is presented to subjects, their experi-
ence switches spontaneously between two viewpoints. In one perspective the
cube is experienced as observed from above, in the other it is experienced as
observed from below. We measured switching times from the “above” to the
“below” experience. Once the subject had indicated by pressing a button that
this shift had taken place, the picture of the transparent cube changed into an
opaque presentation of one of the two possible viewpoints. The choice of which
perspective was presented, “from above” or “from below”, was random. This
created two conditions. When the opaque view was “from above”, this cor-
responded to the view for which the duration was measured (congruent), the
opaque view “from below” was the incongruent condition. Arguing that in the
incongruent condition the opaque view would “retrocausally” interfere with
the “top view” for which the duration was measured, we predicted that in that
incongruent condition the duration would be shorter. Alternatively one could
argue that presenting a future congruent opaque view would stabilize retroac-
tively the experienced “top view”, thereby enhancing the switching time. The
726 Dick J. Bierman
direction of the differential effect between congruent and incongruent condition

would be the same for both arguments. Deciding between the two “models” is
possible only when a baseline condition with no future opaque view of the cube
is presented. We have considered using a balanced design where the duration of
the bottom view would also be measured in a congruent and incongruent condi-
tion. However, most subjects find it easier to experience the “top view” and also
have difficulty performing the task. For this preliminary study, we therefore
opted to keep the task as simple as possible (see also in the Discussion section
the recommendations for future research).
Method
Subjects
Subjects for the pilot and confirmatory studies were recruited from the Dutch
University of Groningen student population. The second confirmatory study
used voluntary subjects from the Amsterdam area. About half of those sub-
jects in the Amsterdam study practiced yoga while the other half consisted of
matched control subjects. See Table 1 for gender counts and age information.
TABLE 1
Mean Age and Standard Deviations Split for Study and Gender
FEMALE MALE
Study N Mean sd N Mean sd
Pilot 3* 3*
Amsterdam 13 41 17.13 16 36.25 13.4
Groningen 41 22.88 3.84 93 21.62 1.42
TOTALS 57 26.91 11.41 112 23.75 7.30
* Data from the pilot study were unavailable.
Procedure
The experimental software was developed at the University of Amsterdam,
and then the same program was mailed to the University of Groningen where
the experiment was conducted by a Ph.D. student unaware of the hypotheses.
Parallel to that study, a Master's student in Amsterdam ran the same experiment
in Amsterdam, also blind to the hypotheses.
Subjects were exposed to a picture of a Necker cube with a fixation point
embedded “inside” the cube (see Figure 2).
They were asked to gaze at the fixation point and wait until they expe-
Figure 2. Transparent view of Necker cube.
rienced the cube with a “bottom view” perspective and then press the space-
bar (response 1) at the moment that this subjective experience spontaneously
changed to a “top view.” As soon as the “top view” returned to the bottom view
they pressed the spacebar again (response 2). The trial then ended by the soft-
ware changing the picture into an opaque view of the cube randomly in either
“top view” or “bottom view” (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Example of opaque "top view" of Necker cube used for feedback.
728 Dick J. Bierman
This opaque-cube feedback remained for one second on the screen. The
time between the two responses was the duration that the “top view” was ex-
perienced. The subjects were unaware of the psi hypothesis. In the Groningen
study also the experimenter was unaware of the psi hypothesis. The experiment
was framed as a study in the category of consciousness research.
From the pilot experiment we learned that this task is not an easy one and
that subjects sometimes missed a switch or did not follow the gaze instruction.
We therefore adjusted the subject’s instructions and also added instructions for
naïve experimenters. Further, in the confirmatory studies, the subjects were
asked to indicate if they succeeded in giving the response according to instruc-
tions, otherwise the trial was not included in the analyses. For each subject, a
session consisted of 32 valid trials and lasted about six minutes.
Analysis
Data from the Groningen confirmatory experiment were mailed to the University
of Amsterdam to be analyzed. The Amsterdam experiment was analyzed sepa-
rately and later all data were pooled. Outlier trials with a perspective switch
time value larger than three standard deviations or with a switch time smaller
than 800 msec were removed. This procedure, based upon trying out several
outlier removal algorithms on the pilot data, was repeated until no further outli-
ers were present. Then the mean durations of the “top view” percept were cal-
culated for each subject and for each of the two (future) conditions. The means
were compared using SPSS 16 (Mac-version) with a two-sample t-test.
Results
Pilot
Six subjects were tested. Outliers were removed as described above. The mean
difference of 58 msec between the two (future) conditions was in the theoreti-
cally expected direction but not significant. Inspection of the preprocessed data
showed that one subject had more than nine outliers. When this subject was
removed from the analysis, the two conditions differed by 384 msec and the
t-test was marginally significant (t = 2.5, df = 4, p = 0.065 two-tailed). Two-
tailed tests were used here because we decided that in spite of the theoretical
argument that gave us an expectation for the direction of the effect, we would
use the pilot data to specify a direction to be used in the confirmatory phase
of the study. Although the p-values of the pilot study are marginal, the fact
that the effect was in the predicted direction gave us confidence to also predict
the same direction for the confirmatory studies and thereby justified the use of
one-tailed testing in those studies. It can be argued that two-tailed testing is al-
ways required when effects on both directions are of interest, and we certainly
feel that this might be the case for the study of anomalous phenomena. On the
other hand, we feel that this field is in need of theory-driven research generally
predicting a direction of an effect, rather than that any anomaly be published.
It should be noted that the preprocessing procedures dealing with outli-
ers introduce some extra degrees of freedom. A subject was removed from the
study if he or she produced nine or more outliers. This value is rather arbitrary
and was chosen on the basis of optimization of the end result of the pilot study
outcome. Once these parameters were set, they were not changed again when
analyzing the confirmatory experiments.
Removal of the pilot study’s one subject who obtained a large number of
outliers also considerably improved the correlation between the two conditions.
The correlation between conditions for all six subjects was 0.77, while after
removal of the suspect subject the correlation became 0.96, adding to the im-
pression that this removed subject really was an outlier.
The results of the pilot experiment were used as a predictor for the con-
firmatory experiment. This allowed us to predict a direction for the effect. The
predicted direction was in line with the idea that the duration of the “top view”
perspective was disturbed by showing an opaque bottom view afterward. We
called this retroactive interference. We also expected on the basis of the pilot
experiment that subjects in the confirmatory experiments with nine or more
outliers would not contribute to a switching time effect.
Confirmatory Studies
The overall difference between the two conditions pooled for all 169 subjects
from the three studies was in the same direction and of the same magnitude (88
msec) as in the pilot study, but as in the pilot this effect was non-significant
(t = 1.41, df = 168, p = 0.08 one-tailed). After removal of the 16 subjects (9.5%)
who had nine or more outliers, the mean differential effect was 129 msec
(t = 1.97, df = 152, p = 0.026 one-tailed). In Table 2 the results are given for
each of the three studies separately.
The mean number of outliers per subject over all studies (including the pi-
lot) was 3.00 from the 32 trials (sd = 1.78). The mean time that each participant
spent was 12:20 (sd = 11:53).
Discussion and Conclusion

The statistical strength of the differential effect does not allow for a strong con-
clusion, rather it suggests further experimentation along these lines. The estab-
lished scientific worldview appears to conflict with the effects reported here be-
cause these effects would imply a violation of traditional causality where cause
precedes effect. And extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence, which
730 Dick J. Bierman
TABLE 2
Review of Results for the Two Conditions, Top View Feedback and
Bottom View Feedback, of the Opaque Final Picture
Study N Top View Bottom View Diff. effect st error t P*
PILOT 5 3669 3306 +363 142.7 2.5 0.065 2-t

AMS 26 4959 4765 +184 104.6 1.76 0.045
GRONINGEN 122 5027 4959 +103 78.2 1.36 0.090
TOTAL 153 5004 4875 +129 78.2 1.97 0.026
* One-tailed p-values in confirmatory experiment.
in the current experimental results is lacking. The results, therefore, should be

considered only as suggestive and should be replicated widely before drawing
stronger conclusions.
Recommendations for further studies are:
1. a balanced design with regard to measurement of top-view duration and
bottom-view duration, but between subjects because mixing of these two condi-
tions is too confusing for the subject.
2. An extra baseline condition without an opaque view after measurement
of the top- or bottom-view duration. This would allow for discrimination be-
tween retroactive interference and retroactive facilitation.
It should be emphasized that the study outcome is sensitive for the choice
of parameters that determine how to handle outliers and individual subjects
who generate many outliers. Other parameters often result in smaller effect
sizes although the direction of the effect is unaffected by change of any of these
parameters. For example, the effect becomes statistically non-significant if the
16 subjects who had many outliers are included in the overall analysis. One
could argue that many outliers might be an indication of subjects not perform-
ing according to task instruction, but this was not explicitly assessed in the exit
interview.
Furthermore, one can object to using parametric testing on response-time
differences because the data are in principle non-normally distributed. We there-
fore repeated the analysis using a random permutation test. This test yielded a
p-value of 0.023, slightly smaller than the p-value obtained by the analytical
approach.
If we assume the effects to be real, it can be concluded that future random
feedback correlates with the earlier response times, a controversial effect that
hitherto was mostly associated with emotional events. However, the Necker
cube switching is a non-emotional phenomenon and the one-second feedback
is hardly noticed by the subjects, and above all there is no reason to assume that
this feedback induces any emotional response in the subject. Therefore it might
be concluded that this finding supports the idea that apparent retrocausal ef-
fects do occur in all events, neutral or emotional. Also, the percepts from above
and from below are conscious percepts rather than non-conscious physiological
states. Thus we might conclude that these anomalous effects might also induce
correlations between future conditions and a conscious state.
We did not formally compare stable with unstable systems, because the
Necker cube switch is by definition a phenomenon due to instability. One could
argue that when the mean switching time is small the (brain) system is even
more labile than when the mean switching times are larger. We therefore cor-
related the relative effect size for each subject with the mean switching time of
that subject. This correlation was very small and far from significant. Thus this
study does not lend support to, nor contradict, the idea that more labile systems
are more sensitive for these apparent retrocausal effects.
An alternative paranormal explanation is that the study results are an ex-
ample of an analyzer psi effect: Choosing the analysis criteria precisely in such
a way that a significant outcome arises; although a counterargument is that this
freedom of choice was constrained by adhering to the parameters that gave the
best result for the pilot series in the confirmatory studies. The analyzer effect
“explanation” has been put forward in a number of anomaly research studies.
The idea is that the analysis is also a future condition, although it is further in
the future than the feedback per trial, and a more complex task.
Another explanation that does not resort to an anomaly is that the code that
was executed for time measurement is in some way different for the two future
pictures. We tested this by simulating key-presses using an independent timer.
The mean response times for the two future pictures thus obtained did differ
by 2.4 msec (not significant). This difference is a factor of 50, smaller than the
differences obtained in this experiment.
Finally there could be a problem with data integrity. However, a copy of
the raw data stayed at Groningen University and can be compared by indepen-
dent researchers to the data that finally entered into the formal analysis.
The studies reported here are generally classified as parapsychological.
That is a misnomer. There is nothing in Psychology that prohibits these anoma-
lous effects from occurring. The term anomaly solely refers to the accepted
interpretation of physics. If anything, these studies should be classified as para-
physical. However, as was argued in the Introduction, current physical frame-
works do not really prohibit advanced phenomena. The nature and the arrow of
time is still a very open issue in physics. Therefore, the anomaly refers to the
fact that in physics advanced phenomena haven’t been observed (yet).
It is important to develop the time-symmetry model further in order to
732 Dick J. Bierman
produce testable hypotheses. Most notably, future work might focus on indi-
vidual differences and correlate these with the coherence aspect of states of
consciousness.
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank Ninja Kattenbeck and Lara Knuwer for their help as experimenters and
Jacob Joly for providing laboratory space at the University of Groningen. Eva Lobach
contributed by supervising the Master's student in Amsterdam and by commenting on
several versions of this manuscript. This work was an extension of work funded by Bial
Grant 34-04.
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RESEARCH
Color Distribution of Light Balls in Hessdalen Lights Phenomenon
GERSON S. PAIVA
[email protected]
CARLTON A. TAFT
[email protected]
Centro Brasileiro de pesquisas Físicas, Rua Dr. Xavier Sigaud, 150

22290-180, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Abstract—Hessdalen lights (HL) are unexplained light balls usually seen in

the valley of Hessdalen, Norway. In this work, we present a model to explain
the spatial color distribution of luminous balls commonly observed in HL
phenomenon. According to our model, these light balls are produced by elec-
trons accelerated by electric fields during rapid fracture of piezoelectric rocks
under the ground. Semi-relativistic light balls in the HL phenomenon are pro-
duced by ionic acoustic waves (IAW) interacting with a central white-colored
light ball of HL phenomenon.
Keywords: Hessdalen Lights—Rock piezoelectricity—electron avalanche—

Fractoemission
Introduction
Several rare and unexplained light phenomena can be seen in the atmosphere.
For example, ball lightning (Paiva, Pavão, Vasconcelos, Mendes, & Silva,
2007), blue jets (Pasko & George, 2002), red sprites (Pasko, Inan, & Bell,
2000), and terrestrial gamma ray flashes (TGFs) (Paiva, Pavão, & Bastos, 2009,
Paiva, 2009). Hessdalen Lights (HL) are unexplained lights usually seen in the
valley of Hessdalen, Norway (Teodorani, 2004). They have the appearance of
a free-floating light ball with dimensions ranging from decimeters up to 30 m.
HL often show strong pulsating magnetic perturbation of about 5 Hz. They are
often accompanied by small, short-duration pulsating “spikes” in the HF and
735
736 Gerson S. Paiva and Carlton A. Taft
VLF radio ranges, sometimes showing Doppler features. HL explicitly shows

visually some kind of “satellite spheres” around a central luminous core. The
absolute luminosity of this cluster of light balls has been estimated to be about
19 kW. The empirical evidence is that the small balls which can be ejected to a
large distance (on the order of 50–100 m) from the large white-colored nucleus
tend to be green-colored, while the small balls that appear to be very close
(distance on the order of 2–5 m) to a cluster nucleus tend to be white- (high
intensity) or red- (high intensity) and blue- (low-intensity) colored.
The reason for the different colors, which are apparently related to distance
from the nuclear region, remains unknown (Teodorani, 2004). According to
Teodorani (2004), the production of balls of distinctly different color, recorded
at Hessdalen, differs from standard ball lightning behavior. If so, then the color
of the light balls might be produced by quantum dots from mold spores on just
one side of the plasma or by natural aerosols whose nature varies with locality.
Quantum dots are nanoparticles made from a semiconducting material and range
in diameter from 2–10 nm. Spontaneous production of almost mono-disperse
quantum dots might come from mold spores, as the main semi-conducting
elements, decomposed by the central plasma of the light ball. However, this
theory does not explain the color intensity of satellite light balls.
No existing theory or model can account for all (and sometimes
contradictory) observations of HL. One explanation attributes the phenomenon
to an incompletely understood combustion process in air involving clouds of
dust from the valley floor containing scandium (Bjorn, 2007). Some sightings,
though, have been identified as misperceptions of astronomical bodies, aircraft,
car headlights, and mirages (Leone, 2003).
A theory that has attracted great attention was proposed by Takaki and
Ikeya (1998). It involves piezoelectricity generated under a rock strain. Change
in seismic stress releases piezo-compensating, bound charges due to changes in
the piezoelectric polarization of quartz grains in granitic rocks, which produces
an intense electric field at the fault zone. In the specific Hessdalen area, where
light phenomena are seen very often some meters over the ground, an electric
triggering mechanism above might be produced by the existing high abundance
of quartz, copper, and iron underground. When quartz is subjected to tectonic
stress, it generates piezoelectricity (Lockner, Johnston, & Byerlee, 1983), while
copper is an ideal electricity conductor and consequently might be an electrical
amplifier of the HL phenomenon.
One recent hypothesis suggests that the lights are formed by a cluster of
macroscopic Coulomb crystals in a plasma produced by the ionization of air
and dust by alpha particles during radon decay in the dusty atmosphere (Paiva
Colored Light Balls in Hessdalen Lights 737
& Taft, 2010). Coulomb crystal is a regular structure (cubic, triangular, etc.)
formed by microparticles (dust) in the plasma of electrons and ions under certain
conditions. Several physical properties (oscillation, geometric structure, and
light spectrum) observed in Hessdalen Lights phenomenon can be explained
through the dust plasma model.
Enomoto and Hashimoto (1990) have detected the emission of charged
particles from indentation fracture of rocks. The charge generated by
hornblende andesite indentation fracture is about 1.2 × 10−11 C/s. The volume
of the fractured zone, estimated from the size of the indent, was 0.02 × 10−9 m3.
Thus, the net production rate would be ~0.6 C/m3/s. If a massive fracture occurs
during one second at ground level, over an area extending some meters, the
charge generated may be compared to the total electric charge produced by one
bolt of lightning (1 Coulomb). Charge separation on fractured surfaces produces
high electric fields on the order of 106−107 V cm−1, causing the field emission of
electrons in the atmosphere. The energy of emitted electrons may be in the keV
range. This may be sufficient to cause geoelectromagnetic disturbances.
Ogawa, Oike, and Miura (1985) showed in laboratory experiments that
rocks radiated wide-band EM waves (10 Hz–100 kHz) when they were struck
by a hammer and fractured. Very low frequency EM emission (0.01–10 Hz) was
also observed from earth rocks before and during earthquakes according to Park,
Johnson, Madden, Morgan, and Morrison (1993). Satellites showed intense EM
radiation at frequencies below 450 Hz (Serebryakova, Bilichenko, Chmyrev,
Parrot, Rauch, Lefeuvre, & Pokhotelov, 1992). These data are in accord with
the EM signals recorded by the spectrum analyzer and the magnetometer at
Hessdalen covering the band of 0.5–80 MHz (Strand, 1990). So it appears that
EM waves could have been emitted by rocks in the region where strange lights
were observed.
In this work, we present a model to explain the spatial color distribution of
luminous balls commonly observed in HL phenomenon. According to our model,
different colors of light balls in HL phenomenon are produced by accelerated
electrons due to electric fields formed by rapid fractures of piezoelectric rocks
under the ground during water freezing (i.e. during the winter). Semi-relativistic
green light balls in the HL phenomenon are produced by the light emission of
ionic oxygen transported by ionic acoustic waves (IAW) interacting with a large
white-colored light ball of HL phenomenon.
The Model
Let us consider the model of the HL cluster shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Light balls in HL cluster: Rock fractures under the hill ground (a),
charge separation (b), high electric fields (c), acceleration of these
electrons in the atmosphere (d), electron-avalanche (e), low-intensity
blue-colored light ball (f), high-intensity red-colored light ball (g),
central white-colored light ball (h), small green light ball (i), very low
frequency electromagnetic waves (j), ion-acoustic waves (k). Rotation
(l) of the central white ball (m) ejecting its hot and cold edges, form-
ing, respectively, blue (f) and red light balls (g).
According to Figure 1, the abrupt rock fractures under the hill ground (a)
(probably produced by water expansion during freezing in the lithosphere)
results, temporarily, in charge separation (b). One possibility is that charge
separation on fractured surfaces produces high electric fields on the order of
106–107 V cm−1 (c). Free electrons with the density of 4 × 106 to 1 × 107
electrons m−3 s−1 are generated by cosmic rays and natural radiation due to
atmospheric radioactivity. The electric field generated induces charges on the
ground causing the acceleration of these electrons in the atmosphere (d). When
these electrons collide with atmospheric atoms, knocking off electrons, they
will form an electron-avalanche (e). Low-flux of high-energy (temperature)
electrons will produce a low-intensity, blue-colored light ball (f), and high-flux of
low-energy (temperature) electrons will produce a high-luminosity, red-colored
light ball (g) in the opposite direction of the central white ball (h). Ejection of a
small green light ball (i) from a white ball is due to radiation pressure produced
by the interaction between very low frequency electromagnetic waves (j) and
atmospheric ions in the central white-colored ball through ion-acoustic waves
(IAW) (k). Centrifugal forces (l) caused by the rotation of the central white ball
(m) can eject its hot and cold poles, forming, respectively, blue and red light
balls.
IAW is a longitudinal oscillation of the ions (and the electrons) much like
acoustic waves traveling in neutral gas. The IAW velocity will be (Alexeff &
Neidigh, 1961):
 e Z i k BTe   i k BTi
VIAW  (1)
mi
where kB is Boltzmann’s constant, ‹mi› is the mean mass of the ion, Zi is its
charge, Te is the temperature of the electrons, and Ti is the temperature of the ions.
Normally γe is taken to be unity, on the grounds that the thermal conductivity
of electrons is large enough to keep them isothermal on the time scale of ionic
acoustic waves, and γi is taken to be 3, corresponding to one-dimensional motion.
In the plasma the electrons are often much hotter than the ions, in which case the
second term in the numerator can be ignored. Thus, we have:
 e Z i k BTe
VIAW ~
mi (2)
According to Teodorani (2004), the HL spectrum gives a gas (ion)

temperature of about Ti = 5,000 K. Generally, the radiant species present in
atmospheric plasma are N2, N2+, O2, and O2+, NO+ (in dry air) and OH (in humid
air). At higher temperatures, atomic emission lines of N and O, and (in the
presence of water) H, are present (Laux, Spence, Kruger, & Zare, 2003). Thus,
considering Te = 10 × Ti = 50,000 K, and mean ion mass as being:
mi (O  )  mi ( N  )
mi 
2 (3)
where mi(O+) = 2.3 × 10−16 kg is the ionic oxygen mass, and mi(N+) = 2.6 ×
10−16 kg is the ionic nitrogen mass, we have VIAW ~ 104 ms−1. This is the velocity
of the energetic wave packet of an ion acoustic wave in a dusty plasma. This
value is close to the observed velocity of some ejected light balls from HL,
which is estimated as being 2 × 104 ms−1 (Teodorani, 2004).
Night vision systems revealed that the HL phenomenon produces a very
strong infrared signature even when it is very faint or invisible in the optical
range (Teodorani & Nobili, 2002). The dissociative recombination of N2+ in
excited neutral atoms can explain the infrared emission by HL phenomenon
even when it is very faint or invisible in the optical range. When VLF eject
ions in high velocity from a white ball by IAW, dissociative recombination of
N2+ [i.e. destroying molecular ions to produce excited neutral atomic species]
can occur through the reaction N2+ + e− → N + N + kinetic energy (Kasner,
1967). Dissociative recombination (DR) exhibits a high exothermicity, which
makes DR the only source of kinetically energetic atoms (>1eV) (Peterson,
Le Padellec, Danared, Dunn, Larsson, et al., 1998). These species (i.e. excited
nitrogen atoms) are disconnected by IAW because they have zero charge. Few
experimental studies of recombination have been carried out under conditions
where dissociative recombination is the predominant process (Fowler &
Atkinson, 1959). It will be the predominant electron loss process in the plasma
only in regions where the concentration ratio of atomic to molecular ions is >l04
(Biondi, 1969).
Why is the ejected ball always green-colored? Ejection of a small green
light ball from HL is due to radiation pressure produced by the interaction
between very low frequency electromagnetic waves (VLF) and atmospheric
ions (present in the central white-colored ball) through ion-acoustic
waves (IAW) (See Figure 1). Probably only O2+ ions (electronic transition
(b4Σg– → a4Πu)), with green emission lines, are predominantly transported
by IAW. Electronic bands of O2+ ions occur in auroral spectra (Chamberlain,
1961, Nicolet & Dogniaux, 1950). Electron–molecular-ion dissociative
recombination coefficient rate α as functions of electron temperature Te and
cross sections σ as a function of electron energy E have been measured by
Mehr and Biondi (1969) for N2+ and O2+ over the electron temperature interval
0.007 to 10 eV. The estimated temperature of HL is about 5,000 K (Teodorani,
2004). At this temperature, the rate coefficient of dissociative recombination
will be, respectively, α(Te)O2+ ~ 10−8 cm3 s−1, and α(Te)N2+ ~ 10−7 cm3 s−1. Thus,
the nitrogen ions will be decomposed in N2+ + e− → N + N* more rapidly than
oxygen ions in the HL plasma. Only ionic-species are transported by IAW.
Therefore, only oxygen ions will be predominantly ejected by IAW from a
central white ball in HL phenomenon forming high-velocity green-light balls
presenting a negative band of O2+ with electronic transition b4Σg− → a4Πu.
Additionally, the first positive bands of N2(1PN2, electronic transition B3Πg →
A3Σu+) make a distinct contribution to the source spectrum of red balls, while
the second positive band of N2(2PN2, electronic transition C3Πu → B3Πg) and
the first negative band of N2+ (1NN2+, electronic transition B2Σu+ → X2Σg+) play
a minor role since they are caused by high-energy electrons—both bands are
responsible for blue-colored balls around the central white ball in HL (Wescott,
Sentman, Heavner, Hallinan, Hampton, & Osborne, 1996).
Relativistic runaway electron avalanche (RREA) is an avalanche growth of
a population of relativistic electrons driven through a material (typically air) by
an electric field. RREA has been hypothesized to be related to lightning initiation
(Gurevich & Zybin, 2005), terrestrial gamma-ray flashes (Dwyer & Smith, 2005),
and red sprites (Lehtinen, Bell, & Inan, 1999), and it is unique that it can occur
at electric fields an order of magnitude lower than the dielectric strength of the
material. When an electric field is applied to a material, free electrons will drift
slowly through the material as described by electron mobility. For low-energy
electrons, faster drift implies higher friction, so the drift speed tends to stabilize.
For electrons with energy above about 1 keV, however, higher speeds imply lower
friction. An electron with a sufficiently high energy, therefore, may be accelerated
by an electric field to even higher and higher energies, encountering less and
less friction as it accelerates. Such an electron is described as a “runaway.” Free
electrons with the density of 4 × 106 to 1 × 107 electrons m−3 s−1 are generated by
cosmic rays and natural radiation due to atmospheric radioactivity (Paiva & Taft,
2011). The electric field generated by the rock fracture or stress induces charges
on the ground that accelerate these electrons which ionize or excite N2 and
O2 molecules in the air, forming the electron avalanche by RREA. Indentation
fracture of moist andesite (under wet conditions) can produce a net negative
charge density of about 0.6 C m−3 s−1. Typical occurrence altitude of the HL
phenomenon is generally very low (a few tens of meters over the treetops), and
the vast majority of the lights were reported to be below the tops of mountains
(Bjorn, 2007). Mountainous soil has a mean dielectric constant (permittivity)
εs ~ 5 (Saveskie, 2000). Thus, the electric potential in the air on the failure will
be ΔV = q/4π εsε0 = 2.2 GV. Let us calculate the electron number produced
by the runaway electron avalanche (RREA) mechanism in HL phenomenon.
The runaway electron avalanche multiplication factor is given by Dwyer (2003,
2007):
 V  2.13 106 I 
N RE  exp   (4)
 7.3 106 
where ΔV is the potential difference of the avalanche region in volts and I is

the column depth of the avalanche region in g/cm2. In the case of HL altitude
occurrence, atmospheric depth will be I = 103 g/cm2 (Bacioiu, 2011). The number
of electrons in the final path of the RREA avalanche will be NRE = exp (9.5) =
104 electrons. This value is 1012 times lower than that responsible for terrestrial
gamma ray flashes in high altitudes on thunderclouds (Paiva, Pavão, & Bastos,
2009). Finally, high luminosity white balls around a central white ball are formed
by a fragmentation process of Hessdalen lights–like dusty plasmas (Paiva &
Taft, 2011). According to Teodorani (2004), sudden appearance of satellite
light balls around a common nucleus can be related to the re-minimization of
the effective surface energy (with the formation of new condensation nuclei)
predicted by Turner’s ball lightning model (Turner, 2003). However, several
chemical species from rocks, such as scandium and silicon ions, were detected
in the HL spectrum, suggesting dust from the valley (Bjorn, 2007). Thus, HL
can sometimes assume the dusty plasma structure (Paiva & Taft, 2010). In this
case, fragmentation of HL in a cluster of light balls can be produced by the
interaction of low-frequency electromagnetic waves through the dust-acoustic
waves. It is known that laboratory dusty plasmas are longitudinally fragmented
by dust-acoustic waves (Barkan, Merlino, & D’Angelo, 1995). Similarly, video
images show linear fragmentation of atmospheric light balls (UFO Hessdalen
Norway, 2010, Amazing REAL looking UFO Sightings in INDIA, 2008). Dusty
acoustic waves (DAW) is a complete analog to the common ionic-acoustic
wave, where the dust particles take the role of the ions and ions and electrons
take the role of the electrons (Thompson, Barkan, D’Angelo, & Merlino, 1997),
and is an extremely low-velocity normal mode of a three-component dusty
plasma comprising electrons, ions, and massive micrometer-size charged dust
grains.
Conclusion
The appearance of “satellite spheres,” presenting different colors and intensities,
composing a cluster around a main nuclear region, is produced by the interaction
between high-energy electrons and very low frequency electromagnetic waves
and atmospheric steady plasmas. A very strong infrared signature even when
HL is very faint or invisible in the optical range is produced by the dissociative
recombination of N2+ in excited neutral atoms (i.e. with high kinetic energy)
in regions where the concentration ratio of atomic to molecular ions in the
plasma is >l04 (Biondi, 1969). Probably other related characteristics of HL
can be explained by the high-energy electrons (accelerated by the RREA
avalanche mechanism) accelerated in the atmosphere by electric fields from
fractured rocks, or by the interaction between very low frequencies (from
ground) and ions or charged dust particles in the atmospheric plasmas. Several
chemical species from rocks, such as scandium and silicon ions, were detected
in the HL spectrum (Bjorn, 2007) suggesting dust from the valley. Thus, HL
can sometimes assume the dusty plasma structure (Paiva & Taft, 2010). The
spectrum of the Hessdalen light phenomenon appears to be a continuum with
no resolved lines (Teodorani, 2004). In the three-dimensional analysis of the

intensity distribution of the lights, it appeared that the radiant power is due to a
heated substance. Nevertheless, the light phenomenon, in both a photometric and
spectroscopic sense, does not have the characteristics typical of a classic plasma
of free electrons and ions (Teodorani & Nobili, 2002). When the atmospheric
transparency was low, which was most of the time, and when the orbs were
low over the horizon, the intensity distribution (ID) profile was very similar
to that of an image of a heated, glowing plasma, i.e. a Gaussian shape with
exponential wings. When the atmosphere was clear, with no fog, the ID profile
of the image was nearly flat on top with steep sides such as when luminous
point-like objects (e.g., stars) are observed through thick atmospheric layers.
Probably this is due to the effect of optical thickness on the bremsstrahlung
spectrum which is produced by electrons. At low frequencies, self-absorption
modifies the spectrum to follow the Raleigh-Jeans part of the blackbody curve.
This spectrum is typical of dense ionized gas. Additionally, the spectrum
produced in the thermal bremsstrahlung process is flat up to a cutoff frequency,
and falls off exponentially at higher frequencies. This sequence of events forms
the typical spectrum of HL phenomenon when the atmosphere is clear, with no
fog. One other possibility is that this typical spectrum is an effect due to solid
particles (dust grains) immersed in a hot plasma. Unfortunately, the spectrum of
laboratory dusty plasma still has not been obtained.
Finally, two stationary particles of the same electrical charge will repel
each other, but two particles of the same electrical charge moving in parallel
will develop a force of attraction. This can be the key to plasma confinement
in nuclear fusion reactors. If atomic nuclei can be squeezed together by the
positive charged mass flow, without the need for random collisions in superhot
plasmas, then fusion engines could be designed to produce electricity directly
by pulsing the fuel into the mass flow that compresses itself until fusion is
reached. The extra energy from fusion will cause the mass flow to accelerate,
and bind itself even tighter, releasing its energy as electromagnetic fields or
energetic electrons until the fuel pulse is exhausted. In this way, the fusion
ignition temperature could possibly be attained. Furthermore, helium lines have
been detected in the HL spectrum (Bjorn, 2007). This can be strong evidence for
cold nuclear fusion in these atmospheric plasmas since this chemical element
is a product of nuclear fusion between deuterium atoms in nuclear fusion
reactors. The currently accepted theory of special relativity (SRT) doesn’t
suggest that atomic nuclei can be squeezed together by positive charged mass
flow. In SRT, mass velocities do not exceed light speed, so magnetic forces
bringing nuclei together do not exceed Coulomb forces keeping them apart.
If it nevertheless happens, that is exciting evidence that SRT is not entirely
right. A number of other mechanisms can be suggested, without violating the
SRT principle. For example, quantum tunneling between deuterium nuclei can
occur in HL phenomenon. In this process a particle passes through a potential
barrier that it classically could not surmount. Winter is the season of Hessdalen
Lights, when water is abundant. About one in every 6,000 water molecules
contains deuterium atoms. On the other side, experiments on board the MIR
orbital station (1991), the ISS (International Space Station) (2002), and the
Kolibri-2000 satellite (2002) at an altitude of 400 km detected neutron bursts
(one signature of nuclear fusion) in the equator regions connected with lightning
discharges (Paiva, 2009). Whether these neutrons are thermonuclear in origin
or are generated by photonuclear processes, this remains to be experimentally
determined. In the case of HL, the mechanism responsible for helium emissions
needs to be elucidated. Another possibility is that the helium comes from inside
rocks. Fractured rocks can liberate helium ions which emit light when they
recapture electrons in the atmosphere. In fact, there are rocks (for example,
uraninite) that release helium from the natural decay of uranium.
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge financial support from CNPq and Faperj (Brazil).
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COMMENTARY
On Elephants and Matters Epistemological:

Reply to Etzel Cardeña’s Guest Editorial
“On Wolverines and Epistemological Totalitarianism”
NEAL GROSSMAN
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago
The Guest Editorial On Wolverines and Epistemological Totalitarianism by

Etzel Cardeña (JSE 24(3), Fall 2011) is little more than a rant, in which invective,
ridicule, and mockery take the place of reasoned argumentation. Mind you,
there’s nothing wrong with a good rant, especially when one agrees with the
overall perspective, and I actually found myself in agreement with much of what
the author had to say. Most of Cardeña’s anger is directed at those Materialist
philosophers and psychologists who happily pontificate against the possibility
of psi while remaining studiously ignorant of the data that parapsychological
research has uncovered. I think everyone who comes to parapsychology with
an open mind at some point experiences the same frustration that Cardeña
expresses toward Materialist idealogues, whose conclusions and opinions have
been formed a priori and appear to be impervious to empirical data. But he
seems equally upset with those who are “pro-psi,” lamenting
the epistemological absolutism that pervades both the strident anti-psi and
pro-psi proponents from what I consider a healthy abeyance from fully com-
mitting to a closed position in science or in other aspects of life. (Cardeña,
p. 539)
Cardeña singles me out as a pro-psi proponent (a charge which I proudly

acknowledge), then proceeds to misrepresent my views, quote me out of
context, and hold up what he has quoted for ridicule and contempt. In thinking
about whether and how I should respond, I believe I have come across, not
a wolverine, but rather an elephant, an epistemological elephant, in our
parapsychological living room. The main purpose of this Reply is to bring
attention to this elephant, in the hope that it will lead to fruitful discussion
across differing epistemic perspectives.
747
748 Neal Grossman
In what follows, I shall use the expression “the data” to refer to empirical
data collected by parapsychologists and survival researchers over the past 130
years. The term “evidence” is a relational term, and is used in conjunction
with a specific hypothesis for which the data are alleged to be evidence. The
specific hypothesis for which the data are taken to be evidence in this case can
be and has been formulated in many different ways: (i) Materialism is false, (ii)
consciousness is not produced by the brain, (iii) the mind can acquire information
that is not mediated by the body’s sensory channels, (iv) the consciousness
that constitutes our self continues after the death of the body. Although we
may quibble over this, I take these to be roughly equivalent formulations of
the same underlying hypothesis. Perhaps we can agree to use William James’
formulation: The brain is a transmitter, not a producer, of consciousness.
The epistemological question here is how strong is the data as evidence
for our hypothesis, or, to shorten it, how good is the evidence? From a logical
perspective, there are three possible points of view, corresponding to the logical
quantifiers: (1) no, (2) some, and (3) all.
(1) The data does not constitute any evidence (against Materialism) at
all. This is the perspective of Materialist ideologues, who usually reach this
conclusion without examining the data, then project their conclusion onto
whatever data, if any, they examine. This is what frustrates Cardeña the most,
and I agree.
(2) The collective data constitute some evidence against Materialism, but
it is hardly conclusive, and much more research is needed. I believe that this is
the epistemological perspective of most practicing parapsychologists, including
Cardeña.
But some scientists and philosophers, who have studied the data, have
concluded that (3) the data as they now stands is sufficiently strong to conclude
that James’ hypothesis is correct. More data are of course always welcome,
but the data already obtained is evidentially sufficiently strong to assert that
Materialism is false.
Now for decades our efforts have been rightly directed against the deniers
(1) . . . those who deny that the data constitute any evidence against Materialism.
That is, those who belong to the (2)nd and (3)rd epistemological perspectives
have been so united in our efforts against the Materialist ideologues, that we
have perhaps failed to notice the major epistemological differences among
ourselves. This is the elephant in our living room.
Cardeña’s off-the-wall ridicule of me began to make some sense to me
when I tried to see how things look to someone who is committed to the (2)nd
epistemological perspective. In the next two paragraphs I will try to examine
how each perspective looks from the vantage point of the other perspective.
So let us suppose, as Cardeña does, that we believe the (2)nd perspective
On Elephants and Matters Epistemological 749
to be the correct one. We believe that the evidence is sufficiently strong to

justify further research, but not sufficiently strong to assert that Materialism has
already been falsified by science. What must we now say about someone who
belongs to the (3)rd perspective, who believes that the evidence as it now stands
is sufficiently strong to declare, as a finding of science, that James is correct in
his belief that consciousness is not produced by the brain. Well, according to
this epistemological position the data are only “suggestive,” but by no means
conclusive. So anyone who has concluded that Materialism is false, that the
brain does not produce consciousness, etc., cannot have reached this conclusion
on the basis of scientific data and reasoning alone. Something must be added
to the data to reach this conclusion. What is this something? What else but
the usual suspects: wishful thinking, sloppy reasoning, dogmatic suppression
of alternative theories, and so forth. Cardeña compares those who believe
that the evidence is conclusive with the “person in a New Age fair trading in
everything from magical rocks to mysterious odors” (p. 539). And this is how
it must seem from within this epistemological perspective. Cardeña cannot
even acknowledge that this (3)rd perspective exists, and lumps those of us who
have concluded that the evidence warrants our strong conclusion together with
starry-eyed crystal gazers. Speaking of epistemological totalitarianism. Wow!
Now, fair is fair, and it is about time someone tried to describe how the
(2)nd epistemological perspective looks from the vantage point of the (3)rd
perspective. We have perhaps a psychological advantage, in that most of us . . .
those of us in the (3)rd perspective . . . have come to that perspective by way of
the (2)nd perspective, so we know what that perspective feels like. But from the
point of view of this (3)rd perspective, it seems that those in the (2)nd perspective
are just sitting on the fence, are excessively fond of hair-splitting, can’t see the
forest for the trees, are not familiar with all the relevant data, or have emotional
issues (such as fear of ridicule from dogmatists in the first two epistemological
perspectives).
In referring to Cardeña as a dogmatist, I am in a way accusing him of
espousing the very epistemological totalitarianism that he rails against. For
he takes the (2)nd epistemological perspective, his own, to be absolute. In the
passage quoted above he advocates “a healthy abeyance from fully committing
to a closed position in science.” This appears to be an open-minded statement
about always being open to alternative hypotheses and new ideas in science.
But this, as an epistemological rule, precludes that science could ever reach a
conclusion about anything. Science has, as a matter of fact, arrived at a “closed
position” about many things that at one time were open questions: Does Cardeña
recommend a “healthy abeyance” from “fully committing” to such things as (i)
global warming, (ii) cigarette smoke causing cancer, (iii) the heliocentric theory,
and (iv) the age of the Earth. I can readily imagine a fundamentalist agreeing with
750 Neal Grossman
Cardeña, that we should maintain a “healthy abeyance from fully committing

to a closed position in science,” and that Creationist theories should be taught
in our schools along with geology. The truth of the matter is that sometimes
science does reach a conclusion, in which case it is unscientific to keep sitting
on the fence, always demanding more and more evidence, and then, just like our
Materialist friends, moving the goalpost whenever such evidence seems to be
forthcoming.
I would now like to examine a specific passage in which Cardeña quotes
me out of context, then seriously distorts and misrepresents my actual views.
Here is the passage:
On the other side, we have the milder contempt of Grossman stating that who-
ever holds a Materialist perspective is not “a responsible investigator” and is
dogmatic and “irrational.” He also stated that those who succeed academically
do so not on the grounds of “talent, but mostly on competition, self-promotion,
and so forth.” He also implies that anyone disagreeing with his conclusion has
not accepted the primacy of love. (Cardeña, p. 544)
Cardeña’s last sentence here is so outrageous that I will not dignify it with a
reply. But let’s take a look at the first sentence. All of Cardeña’s quotes from my
work are taken from a Foreword I wrote to Chris Carter’s book, Science and the
Near-Death Experience. In the Foreword, I had quoted the following passage
from Kelly, Kelly, Crabtree, Gauld, Grosso, & Greyson (2007:421):
. . . the central challenge of NDEs (Near-Death Experiences) lies in asking how

these complex states of consciousness, including vivid mentation, sensory per-
ception, and memory, can occur under conditions in which current neurophysi-
ologic models of the production of mind by brain deem such states impossible.
This conflict between current neuroscientific orthodoxy and the occurrence of
NDEs under conditions of general anesthesia and/or cardiac arrest is head-on,
profound, and inescapable. In our opinion, no future scientific or philosophic
discussion of the mind–brain problem can be fully responsible, intellectually,
without taking these challenging data into account. (Grossman, 2010)
The relevant word in this quote is “responsible.” In my Foreword, I

expressed agreement with Kelly et al. that it is not responsible for a philosopher
or psychologist to discuss the mind/brain problem while being studiously
ignorant of the data from parapsychology, especially the near-death experience.
Here is what I wrote:
Given that there is a large body of empirical data that (i) is highly relevant to
this question and (ii) has convinced virtually everyone that has taken the time
to examine it that Materialism cannot explain it, I find myself agreeing with
Kelly, Grosso, and Greyson that it is intellectually irresponsible for a philoso-

pher or psychologist to be ignorant of this data. (Grossman, 2010:xii)
Those who have read Cardeña’s Guest Editorial will know that this sentence
is in complete agreement with everything Cardeña has to say regarding our
Materialist colleagues who refuse to look at the data. Yet when I say it, I am
expressing “contempt.”
Perhaps I crossed a line here by using the word love, and perhaps it was
the use of this word that, in Cardeña’s mind, triggered an association with New
Age Fluff. But my Foreword was to a book on the near-death experience, and
the concept of unconditional love plays an indispensable role to everyone who
has had an NDE. It is well-documented that one of the main difficulties, perhaps
“the” main difficulty that NDErs have, is in returning to a world that is not
organized around the principles of unconditional love that they experience in
their NDE. This “unconditional love” business is something that those of us
in the (3)rd epistemological category are obliged to take very seriously. If we
are convinced that the NDE is real (this does not apply to the inhabitants
of the (2)nd epistemological category), and if we are concerned to understand
the nature of this consciousness that we now know is a fundamental existent,
and if we wish to remain empirical in our undertakings, then it is incumbent
upon us to seriously examine the testimony of those who have experienced
consciousness in itself, independent of the body: mystics and NDErs. They all
speak to the issue of Love, and validate Ken Ring’s suggestion that the Golden
Rule is how we are supposed to live our lives.
This forces one to think about the meaning of the Golden Rule in an entirely
new way. Most of us are accustomed to regard it mainly as a precept for moral
action. . . . But in the light of these life review commentaries, the Golden Rule
is much more than that—it is actually the way it works. Familiar exhortations,
such as “Love your Brother as Yourself” from this point of view are under-
stood to mean that in the life review, you are your brother you have been urged
to love. And this is no mere intellectual conviction or even a religious credo—
it is an undeniable fact of your lived experience. (Ring, 1998:161–162)
And in a passage cited approvingly by two famous parapsychologists

writing 110 years apart, psychiatrist Richard Bucke, describing his mystical
experience, states
I did not merely come to believe, but I saw that the universe is not composed
of dead matter, but is, on the contrary, a living Presence; I became conscious in
myself of eternal life. . . . I saw that all men are immortal; that the cosmic order
is such that without any peradventure all things work together for the good of
each and all; that the foundation principle of the world, of all the worlds, is
what we call love. . . . (James, 1994:435; also Tart, 2010:330)
752 Neal Grossman
So I think it is incumbent on those of us who are in what I called the (3)rd

epistemological category to follow the argument where it leads, to take Love
seriously, and to apply these “Lessons from the Light” to both our personal lives
and the institutions of our culture. If, as Bucke states, Love is the foundation
principle of the world, then there can be no theoretical understanding of the
nature of consciousness that does not involve the concept of love. My suggestion
here is that the social and cultural forces that make it difficult for an NDEr to
return are the same cultural forces that make it difficult to do this research in a
university setting. I understand that it is not proper form to use the four-letter
word love in an academic context. But in times of major paradigm change, and
this is such a time, everything should be open for question. Why is it the case
that talking about love in an academic context is taboo? What might be the
vested interests that are threatened by such talk? This is a conversation that we
must have, at some point.
Let me close with a little story. Perhaps the most egregious example of
what Cardeña calls “epistemological totalitarianism” was committed by
philosopher Robert Almeder. In the first chapter of his book Death and Personal
Survival, he spends sixty pages or so examining some of the stronger cases of
the reincarnational type (CORT), including every alternative hypothesis that
has been put forth to explain the data. He concludes by saying that, given the
evidence, “it is unreasonable to reject belief in reincarnation.” This is very blunt
language. Almeder is saying that anyone who examines the evidence and denies
that reincarnation is the case is behaving unreasonably. Even I thought that
this was a bit over the top when I first read it. And it must be very offensive to
those in the (2)nd epistemological perspective, and perhaps even to those
in the (3)rd perspective who do not believe that reincarnation is the case. But
instead of ranting about “epistemological totalitarianism,” one could do what
some of my bright undergraduates did in a seminar I taught recently. They took
Almeder’s statement not as criticism but as a challenge. They went deeply into
the cases, read books and articles by Tucker and Stevenson, and went over
Almeder’s argumentation in detail. In the end, they could find no fault with
Almeder’s argumentation. And when one cannot find anything wrong with an
argument . . . the premises are true and the reasoning is sound . . . then it is not
reasonable to reject the conclusion. My students saw this. And they also saw
that when one has an argument that one cannot refute, but one is still not able
or willing to accept the conclusion, this is the point where nonrational factors
(such as ridicule, intimidation, name-calling, denial) enter the discussion.
Thus, to consider a few more examples and mention a few more names,
the scientists van Lommel (Consciousness beyond Life), Tart (The End of
Materialism), Kelly (Irreducible Mind), Radin (The Conscious Universe), and
Tucker (Life before Life) announce the conclusions they have come to through
the titles of their books. Their conclusions are, respectively, that consciousness
continues after the death of the body, that Materialism has been falsified by
science, that the human mind is not reducible to the brain, that the Universe is
conscious, and that consciousness exists prior to birth. These scientists did not
arrive at their conclusions by attending “New Age Fairs” or overdosing on “The
Secret type of New Age theories” (Cardeña, p. 548). No. Their conclusions
were arrived at only after a meticulous and exhaustive examination of all the
relevant empirical data, together with a detailed analysis and refutation of all
alternative hypotheses. If Cardeña does not like their conclusions, then I invite
him, and others who feel as he does, to accept the challenge, as my students did,
to go deeply into the subject matter, and to examine their arguments, and tell us
where they are mistaken in their reasoning. And if you cannot find any errors in
their argumentation, as I could not, then is it not incumbent on you, as a scientist
and rational human being, to embrace their conclusion that “consciousness can
exist independent of the brain and that Materialism is therefore empirically
false” (Grossman, cited disapprovingly in Cardeña, p. 541)?
References
Cardeña, E. (2011). On Wolverines and Epistemological Totalitarianism. Journal of Scientific
Exploration, 25(3), 539–551.
Grossman, N. (2010). Foreword to Science and the Near-Death Experience: How Consciousness
Survives Death by Chris Carter. Inner Traditions.
James, W. (1994). The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. Modern
Library.
Kelly, E. F., Kelly, E. W., Crabtree, A., Gauld, A., Grosso, M., & Greyson, B. (2007). Irreducible
Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 421.
Radin, D. (1997). The Conscious Universe: The Scientific Truth of Psychic Phenomena.
HarperCollins.
Ring, K. (1998). Lessons from the Light: What We Can Learn from the Near-Death Experience.
Moment Point Press.
Tart, C. (2010). The End of Materialism: How Evidence of the Paranormal Is Bringing Science and
Spirit Together. New Harbinger Publications.
Tucker, J. (2005). Life Before Life: Children’s Memories of Previous Lives. St. Martin’s Press.
van Lommel, P. (2010). Consciousness beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death Experience.
HarperOne.
Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 754, 2011 0892-3310/11
RESPONSE
Response to Neal Grossman’s Reply

“On Elephants and Matters Epistemological”
ETZEL CARDEÑA
Department of Psychology, Center for Research on Consciousness and Anomalous
Psychology (CERCAP), Lund University, P.O. Box 213 SE-221 00, Lund, Sweden
In his long Reply, Professor Grossman opines that my Guest Editorial is “little
more than a rant.” Although rant can be interpreted as a “wild revel,” even
without telepathic means I strongly doubt that that is what he had in mind.
Contrary to what the reader might conclude from his statements, my essay was
not at all an attack against the probable reality of psi phenomena, something that
I have supported repeatedly, nor a defense of Materialism. Instead, it criticized
epistemological totalitarianisms that endorse absolute and simplistic certainties
regarding psi or other issues and consider any disagreement with their positions
or interpretations, no matter how large or small, as lacking in reasonableness,
love, or whatever. As to the charge that I misrepresented Professor Grossman,
I provided quotations along with their source, so the reader can judge whether
I was fair or not. But more telling, I believe, is that Professor Grossman’s letter
exemplifies the problem I was describing better than I could in a limited space.
Therefore I will cede the last word to, in my view, the brightest mind we have
had in parapsychology, William James. He held that psi phenomena were real,
but instead of assuming that he completely or finally understood this issue (or
any other topic), he challenged us to develop “the habit of always seeing an
alternative” (James, 1896:4).
Reference
James, W. (1896/1978). The Teaching of Philosophy in Our Colleges. In Essays in Philosophy,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 3–6. [Original work published 1876]
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Ernesto Bozzano:
An Italian Spiritualist and Psychical Researcher
LUCA GASPERINI
[email protected]
Submitted: 2/17/2011; Accepted: 4/11/2011
Abstract—Ernesto Bozzano (1862–1943) was a luminary in psychical and

spiritualistic studies in Italy, to which he contributed numerous publications
that were also distributed abroad, and for more than forty years he tirelessly
defended “human survival after death” against its critics. This article, after a
brief look at the studies dedicated to him, furnishes a profile of the life and
thinking of Bozzano, paying particular attention to the events that brought
him to the eyes of the international community of psychical researchers.
Keywords: Ernesto Bozzano—Italian psychical research—spiritualism—
survival research
Introduction
Ernesto Bozzano (1862–1943) was probably the most important Italian
representative of psychical and spiritualistic studies before the 1940s, as
well as one of the few to emerge on the international scene, thanks to his
numerous publications which gained him the esteem of scientists, philosophers,
and psychical researchers. He was at the center of an intense network of
correspondence with Italian, European, and American intellectuals, receiving
an average of 200 letters a month, and was furthermore one of the few Italian
scholars to have been named an honorary member of the Society for Psychical
Research (SPR), the American Society for Psychical Research (ASPR), and the
Institut Métapsychique International (IMI). Despite the fact that the academic
historian Bruno Di Porto (1933) wrote a description of him for the Dizionario
Biografico degli Italiani (Di Porto),1 an element which testifies to his relevance,
Bozzano is completely unknown in Italy to those who do not deal with the
history of psychical research. However, this did not prevent Italian scholars
from continuing to remember him (e.g., Biondi, 1988, Inardi & Ianuzzo, 1981,
Macaluso, 1972, Orlandi, 1971) or his works from continuing to be reprinted,
even recently, in journals or by specialized publishers (e.g., Bozzano, 1948a,
755
756 Luca Gasperini
1957a, 1967a, 1972, 1975, 1982, 1998a, 2001, 2008). Still cited in France (e.g.,
Clauzure, 1983, Dumas, 1973), Bozzano does not appear in some important
historical accounts of Anglo-Saxon psychical research (e.g., Beloff, 1993,
Inglis, 1977) but does appear in the bibliographies of various authors of the
same linguistic group (e.g., Stevenson, 1977, Van de Castle, 1977). Only
beginning in 1982–1983, coinciding with the fortieth anniversary of his death,
did some historians of psychical research begin to study him in more depth
(Biondi, 1984, Iannuzzo, 1982, 1983a, 1983b, Ravaldini, 1983). From this
renewed interest, there were only two critical volumes regarding Bozzano
taken as a whole (Iannuzzo, 1983b, Ravaldini, 1993a), and some more recent
articles that examine specific aspects of his biography or works (Alvarado,
1986, 1989, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, Biondi, 2010, Caratelli, 1998, Cellina,
1993, Cugnaschi, 2002).
In addition, there are the first biographical articles written by his disciple
Gastone De Boni (1908–1986) (the main ones being De Boni, 1941, 1946,
1947). There are also some autobiographical articles written by Bozzano
in his old age, which are usable with reservations (Bozzano, 1924c, 1930a,
1938a, 1939). For a more in-depth study, it is however indispensable to refer
to unpublished primary sources, among which the correspondence between
Bozzano and De Boni is indispensable for reconstructing his life.2
The present article has, as its objective, a brief presentation of the life,
works, and thinking of Ernesto Bozzano.
Biographical Profile
Ernesto Bozzano was born in Genoa on January 9, 1862, the fourth son of a
lower-middle-class Genoese family, but we know very little of his childhood,
in reality of his entire life up to 1928; by his own admission, that part of his life
was without relevant biographical events, so much so that the only information
conserved regards his intellectual life. He had an early vocation for study for
which he received no support since, when he was fourteen years old, he was
taken out of school in order to begin a commercial career. Other than this brief
experience of work in his youth and a similar brief journalistic collaboration
with the Genoese daily newspaper Il Secolo XIX around 1893, of which there
is no trace, he never needed to work. Since he lived with his brother Vittorio
(1860–?), and was in part economically supported by his well-to-do brother
Adolfo (1859–?) and probably had a small income sufficient to maintain a
secluded lifestyle, Bozzano was able to dedicate all his time to studying and
writing. In fact, he managed to study by himself, dedicating himself first to
poetry and literature, then to the sciences, and finally to philosophy, his great
passion. He became a supporter of positivism and a fervent follower of the
British philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) who, in the 1880s, was
Ernesto Bozzano: Italian Spiritualist Researcher 757
his habitual correspondent together with William James (1842–1910), Alfred

Russel Wallace (1823–1913), Théodule Ribot (1839–1916), Jean-Marie Guyau
(1854–1888), and Henri Bergson (1859–1941) (Letter from Savona, 7 May
1941, unpublished, in Bozzano & De Boni, 1930–1943).
The biographical and autobiographical articles present Bozzano’s interest
in spiritualism and psychical research as a philosophical and rational conversion
from materialism (a total negation of phenomena) to demolition of his misoneism
and, finally, to spiritualism (e.g., De Boni, 1941:14 and on), but numerous
other data do not correspond to these facts. On the basis of Iannuzzo’s studies
(1983b) and mine, it is much more probable that Bozzano was already inclined
toward spiritualism in 1890 and that his presumed conversion, completed in
1893, was, in reality, reached after three years of psychical and spiritualistic
readings, but, above all, after three years of going to a mediumistic Genoese
club whose culminating event had been the apparition of his dead mother in a
seance in July 1893.
Independently of the problem of this conversion, what is certain is that,
until 1943, Bozzano never stopped dedicating himself to psychical research,
or metapsichica (métapsychique or metapsychical research) as it was called in
continental Europe, understood as a single science capable of demonstrating the
existence of the spirit and its survival after bodily death as opposed to religion,
which was too dogmatic, and official science, which was too materialistic.
Bozzano’s methodological approach was specific and comparable to that of
an eighteenth-century naturalist; he did not carry out experiments or directly
gather testimony because he did not feel the necessity of proving the existence
of the psychic, but he summarized the accounts of the phenomena present in the
literature (which he patiently classified during his entire life) as immediately
valid natural phenomena, and he inserted them into an inductive process based
on comparative analysis and convergence of proofs; in other words, he pointed
out all the likenesses of a certain class of phenomena and reached specific
conclusions. Therefore, his monographs were created in order to
collect an adequate number of events . . ., carefully selected from the point of

view of their authenticity as facts, in order to then classify, analyze and com-
pare them, and deduce the laws which govern them.” (Bozzano, 1972:228)
The monograph Dei Fenomeni di “Bilocazione” (The Phenomena of

“Bilocation”) (Bozzano, 1934) can furnish a concrete cross-section of his
procedural method. In this monograph, Bozzano held that the phenomena of
bilocation “assume decisive importance for the experimental demonstration
of the existence and survival of the human spirit” (Bozzano, 1934:7) since
it would prove that, in the somatic body, an etheric body exists, capable of
making oneself autonomous, often carrying along with itself consciousness,
758 Luca Gasperini
memory, identity, and its own other supernormal faculties, thus ending up
with independence of the spirit from the body and subordination of the brain
to the mind. He reached this conclusion after having analyzed four categories
of phenomena. The first included the cases of sensitivity in amputees and
hemiplegics; discarding the neurological explanations, Bozzano believed he
was dealing with the initial levels of bilocation. In the second, we find the cases
in which a subject would see his own double; although accepting the possible
pathological explanation with reserve, for Bozzano these cases represented, as
a general rule, the second level of incipient bilocation, the transition between
being both inside and outside one’s own body. In the third group, he placed all
the cases in which consciousness would be completely transferred to the etheric
double which verified the sensation of seeing reality from a position external to
one’s own physical body. Finally, in the fourth group, there were the cases in
which the etheric double was seen by one or more people. Considering all the
categories cumulatively and taking the cases of this last group as crucial proof
of their intersubjectivity, Bozzano thought he had scientifically deduced some
conclusions from some facts that were evident for him but which were often
not “self-evident facts” but rather an “interpretation of the cases he considered”
(Alvarado, 2005:228). In any case, in order to understand his methods, a
quotation from his work can be useful:
As soon as the processes of comparative analysis are applied to hundreds

of similar episodes in which all the gradations which employ this phenom-
enology are represented, [there can no longer exist any doubts regarding the]
objectivity of the phenomenon itself; in the sense that the “dreamlike” and
“hallucinatory” hypotheses must be excluded and they are also the only ones
which are opposed to the phenomena. (Bozzano, 1934:124)
If, for Bozzano, the phenomena of bilocation represented the passage from
animism to spiritism, the phenomena of transcendental music dealt with in the
monograph Musica Trascendentale (Transcendental Music) (Bozzano, 1982)
were instead of clear spiritual genesis. In this monograph, he subdivided the
phenomena into six classes, even if, dealing with animistic phenomena, he
dedicated less space to the first two (musical mediumship and transcendental
music with telepathic externalization). The classes of transcendental music of
haunting origin, of music perceived without a relationship to events dealing
with death, music at the deathbed, and music which is manifested after an event
dealing with death would instead be, cumulatively taken, reliable testimony of
spiritual intervention. In fact, from the moment that musical phenomenology was
often externalized together with apparitions of the dead person at the deathbed, in
such a way as to prove the spiritual identification of a dear deceased person who
comes to assist the dying person, because of the numerous cases in which music
was heard by everyone present and,

sometimes, by all of them except
the dying person, and as a result of
the cases in which the music was
heard on fixed dates after the death
of someone, Bozzano was certain
that, thanks to his demonstrative
process, the hallucinatory and
psychometric explanations as well
as suggestion and telepathy among
the living could be discarded in
favor of the spiritual explanation of
the phenomenon. Also in the case of
transcendental music, the gradual
exposition of the phenomenology
permitted Bozzano to exclude the
antagonistic hypotheses step by Ernesto Bozzano, at about forty years old.
step and to guide the reader, by
means of the convergence of the proofs, to understand how “the numerous
branches of metaphysics (. . .) all converge as a center toward the experimental
demonstration of the existence and survival of the human spirit” (Bozzano,
1982:156–157).
Bozzano, therefore, understood science as a process of researching
truth, carried out rigorously starting from the facts, and capable of rationally
demonstrating conclusions using comparative analysis and the convergence of
proofs. It is understood that, on the basis of this assumption, metapsichica also,
at least as he saw it, was to all effects a science, and that Bozzano the spiritualist
and Bozzano the psychical researcher were one and the same.
In 1899, in Genoa, Bozzano and the writer Luigi Arnaldo Vassallo (1852–
1906) founded the Circolo Scientifico Minerva (Minerva Science Club), which
had as its aim the scientific study of mediumistic phenomena and the promotion
of debates and publications regarding them (Minerva, 1899). Many people of
the Genoese middle class joined, including without a doubt Francesco Porro
(1861–1937) the astronomer and Enrico Morselli (1852–1929), the celebrated
psychiatrist who, for his honest and impartial attitude regarding research,
compared this Club to a small SPR (Morselli, 1908:vol. I, 174). The principal
activity of this Club in 1901–1902 was to study the medium Eusapia Palladino
(1854–1918), which led to various publications by its members (the most
important were Bozzano, 1903, 1904, Morselli, 1908, Vassallo, 1992). In 1904,
the Club was dissolved as a result of disagreement among the members.
Since, from 1890 on, Bozzano followed the developments of his discipline
760 Luca Gasperini
with attention (he dedicated notable energy to constant reading, writing,

analysis, and critiques of numerous publications), many of his writings took
the form of critical reviews of his colleagues’ texts, many of whom were also
friends, thus generating small disputes, always carried out with logical strictness
and politeness. Their common characteristic was that of wanting to nip in the
bud the theories contrary to the hypothesis of human survival. Among the most
relevant debates, we recall that which took place with Morselli and went on
from 1899 to 1917; since Morselli denied the spiritual hypothesis, Bozzano
opposed Morselli regarding the phenomena of the etheric body, of apport, of
identification of spiritual personalities and reincarnation, challenging him many
times to deny that, from these facts, the existence of a soul surviving a body
and the intervention of the deceased was able to be deduced (Gasperini, 2010).
Nobel Prize winner and psychical researcher Charles Richet (1850–1935),
who, by upholding the hypothesis of the cryptesthésie (cryptesthesia), a faculty
of superior cognition but at the human level, was not, according to Bozzano,
able to explain many undoubtedly spiritual facts, such as the phenomena of
telekinesis at the deathbed, those of haunting, those of transcendental music
or the cases of identification of deceased people unknown to the medium and
those present at the seances (Bozzano, 1922a, 1922b, 1922c, Richet, 1922a,
1922b, 1922c)3. There was also biologist and psychical researcher William
Mackenzie (1877–1970), advocate of the polypsychical hypothesis used to
explain the mediumistic personalities without resorting to spiritualism; for
Bozzano, the fact that, notwithstanding the constant changing of participants
at the seances, the mediumistic personalities maintained their own identity was
more than sufficient to hold that the opposing thesis was destroyed (Bozzano,
1923a, 1923b, Mackenzie, 1923a, 1923b). And psychical researcher René
Sudre (1880–1968) explained the phenomena of intelligent mediumship with
the prosopopèse-métagnomie, that is attributing them to the latent subconscious
personality in the mind of the medium, capable of producing anomalous facts.
Elaborating on the theories of Richet, Bozzano disproved the hypothesis of
the prosopopèse using the same reasoning advanced against cryptesthésie
(Bozzano, 1926, Sudre, 1926).
The majority of the debates were carried out in the journal Luce e
Ombra (Lo), which from 1900 on became the principal publication of Italian
spiritualism (Alvarado, Biondi, & Kramer, 2006). From 1906 to 1939 when Lo
was made to close by the fascist regime, Bozzano was the principal contributor
to the journal with his contribution of almost 4,000 pages, thanks to which
he acquired considerable notoriety, above all abroad; starting in 1920, he also
regularly published articles in the most important English, French, American,
and South American spiritualistic and psychical journals. In Italy, he published
approximately 90 volumes that, starting from 1920, were translated into nine
different languages, such as English, French, German, and Turkish (Alvarado,

1986, De Boni, 1941, Ravaldini, 2000) and reviewed critically in the most
important psychical and spiritualistic journals. Although agreeing that Bozzano
was one of the greatest scholars in the field of psychical research, the reviewers
often criticized his methodology, e.g., Troubridge (1919) accused him of
accepting too quickly the reality of the phenomenon whose existence he had
to demonstrate; Wilson (1933) repeated the same argument, while Saltmarsh
(1938) judged his reasoning with regard to the biological evolution and the
independence of the spirit from the body to be completely erroneous. Collins
(1939) criticized him for assuming as proven some facts that could be defined as
arbitrary, and, in Nature, the spiritistic hypothesis of Bozzano was defined to be
of scarce interest for the skeptics but merited in-depth study for the enthusiasts
of psychical studies (Review of Discarnate Influence in Human Life, 1938).
In France, Quartier (1927a, 1927b) described Bozzano as a sage of the pre-
scientific era because of his non-use of the experimental method, and even
Count Cesar Baudi de Vesme (1862–1938) criticized his esteemed colleague,
so certain of the reality of psychical phenomena and the explanatory value of
the spiritistic hypothesis that he never doubted it, for omitting, among other
things, in an unfair manner, topics that were contrary (de Vesme, 1934, 1936).
From 1927 to 1929, Bozzano was called on to cover the role of expert in
noted mediumistic experiences, such as the seances of Millesimo; these were
a series of seances held in the ancient castle of Millesimo, a picturesque town
not far from Savona (Italy), and presided over by Marquis Carlo Centurione
Scotto (1862–1937), Senator and medium, during which numerous direct voice
and apport phenomena were supposedly verified, culminating in the presumed
dematerialization and successive materialization of the Marquis himself,
occurring on July 29, 1928 (Ferraro, 1989). Thanks to accounts published in Lo
by Bozzano (Bozzano, 1927b, 1927c, 1928a, 1928b, 1928c, 1928d), which were
then collected into one volume (Bozzano, 1929b) and disseminated abroad also
thanks to his collaborators (e.g., Bozzano, 1928e, 1929d, 1929e, 1930e, Hack,
1930), the seances obtained vast visibility, throwing the international research
community into turmoil. Officially, he upheld the veracity of the happenings
and the unquestionable intervention of the disembodied entities,4 drawing upon
himself first the criticism of psychical researcher Rudolph Lambert (1866–
1964) (Bozzano, 1929a, 1929c, 1930b, 1930d, Lambert, 1929, 1930) and then
that of the exponent of the SPR, Theodore Besterman (1904–1976) (Besterman,
1930). The answer to the English scholar was given for him by an indignant Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930), who dismayed by the attacks that his Italian
friend was undergoing resigned from his role as honorary member of the SPR
(Doyle, 1930), taking with him 77 members (Mauskopf & McVaugh, 1980:28).
The seances at Millesimo, together with those with Palladino at the Circolo
762 Luca Gasperini
Scientifico Minerva about thirty years earlier (Bozzano, 1903), were the only
two experiments worth noting in the course of his research, which was otherwise
carried out almost exclusively in written analyses of books and articles. Space
does not permit the chronicling of the eloquent and detailed accounts of the
seances that Bozzano published; however, according to those who have written
about it, it seems that the scholar went to the seances, on both occasions,
already profoundly convinced of the reality of the facts to which he would have
attested, and of the authenticity of the mediums. This can be deduced by his
lack of doubts and from his critical tone against the skeptics (e.g., Bozzano,
1903:362–363) as well as from the clearly demonstrative presentation of the
events narrated, not simple events to explain to readers and to assess critically,
but compelling results of experimentation demonstrating the intervention
of disincarnate intelligence. Our affirmation is also supported by the weight
Bozzano gave to the evidence of the facts and, in particular, to psychological
control: To whoever contested the lack of verification of the mediums at the
seances of Millesimo, he responded that their psychological profile, namely
being aristocrats, cultured, and rich, meant therefore automatically that they
were not interested in committing fraud, as well as the clear evidence for
paranormal phenomenology could not but render clearly truthful all his
accounts and exempt him from subjecting the mediums to humiliating anti-
fraud verification (e.g., Bozzano, 1929a). Let us be clear, we do not want to
insinuate anything nefarious regarding the Genoese psychical researcher and
his honesty, but simply to demonstrate how his behavior could seem suspect, or
at least naïve, to many of his contemporaries.
Thanks to the wide dissemination of his writings, Bozzano managed to
begin a correspondence and friendship not only with Conan Doyle but also
with many other psychical researchers, scientists, and philosophers of that era,
such as William Crookes (1832–1919), Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), Oliver
Lodge (1851–1940), Camille Flammarion (1842–1925), and James Hyslop
(1854–1920), with the Italian philosopher and psychologist Angelo Brofferio
(1846–1894), with Italian psychiatrists Enrico Morselli and Cesare Lombroso
(1835–1909), and also with many others (Letter from Genoa, 6 October 1942,
unpublished, in Bozzano & De Boni, 1930–1943). But he also received a lot of
letters from non-scholars who were greatly consoled by him and the doctrines
he proposed. Unfortunately, almost all his correspondence has been lost
(Ravaldini, 1993a:73–76).
But, as the Gospel says: nemo propheta in patria [never a prophet in his
own country]. In fact, in Italy, the works of Bozzano were not very well-known
outside the circle of readers of Lo or its staff; of these, positive comments on
his works came, other than from De Boni (e.g., De Boni, 1946, 1947), from
two important Italian psychical researchers, Emilio Servadio (1904–1995), who
extolled the argumentative force of Bozzano (Servadio 1931, 1934), and from
Antonio Bruers (1880–1954), who was certainly more cautious regarding the
Genoese scholar in accepting the evidence of some alleged spiritualistic facts
(Bruers, 1929, 1930). The situation greatly improved when De Boni made an
agreement with the publisher L’Albero of Verona (Italy) and began publishing
the opera omnia of Bozzano5; the first volume Popoli Primitivi e Manifestazioni
Supernormali (Primitive Cultures and Supernormal Manifestations) in 1941
(Bozzano, 1941)6 was a big success and attracted the attention of a goodly
number of Italian intellectuals, above all anthropologists and religious and
oriental historians such as Giuseppe Tucci (1894–1984), Raffaele Pettazzoni
(1883–1959), and Ernesto de Martino (1908–1965), who critiqued it in
newpapers and specialized journals (e.g., de Martino, 1941, Gasperini, 2011)
and began a brief correspondence with Bozzano (unpublished correspondence).
Outside of Italy, an enthusiastic reader of Popoli Primitivi was Carl Gustav
Jung (1875–1961) (De Boni, 1949).
Bozzano died on June 24, 1943, from circulatory complications, and his
death was mentioned in Italian and French spiritualistic and psychical journals
(De Boni, 1947, Necrologie, 1946, Weissenbach, 1949).
Outline of the Metapsychical Philosophy

Between 1922 and 1943, Bozzano produced and updated his most important
monographs which, together with his articles, permitted the reconstruction
of the central points of his thinking and the ordering of them into a scheme,
something which he had never formally done.7 As Iannuzzo (1982) also noted,
that which seemed to emerge when studying Bozzano’s works, was the attempt
that he made, probably based on the body of Spencerian philosophy, to create a
“metapsychical philosophy” capable of interpreting and coherently connecting
paranormal phenomena, above all considering the demonstration of human
survival, the topic which interested him primarily, but also secondarily deriving
some notions of metaphysical and cosmological order of the general guiding
hypotheses with which to return and compare the psychic phenomena in order
to justify and organize them in a wider perspective, namely that of the spiritual
evolution of the universe (Cugnaschi, 2002). Indeed, the latter subject rarely
emerges from his writings and certainly does not distinguish itself for originality
from a conceptual point of view, but it is equally an unpublished mixture of
Spencerian philosophical tenets and paranormal phenomena assumed to be
empirical data.
At the root of his metapsychical philosophy, Bozzano posed his “Spiritistic
hypothesis” which was not immediately synonomous with spiritualism, but
rather a criterium of the interpretation of paranormal phenomena which only later
on pointed to the veracity of spiritualism. With this hypothesis, he maintained
764 Luca Gasperini
that paranormal, physical, and intellectual phenomena were products and

proof of the existence of a spirit as well as an active and immaterial principle
independent of the body, and which due to these characteristics cannot help but
survive them inasmuch as the spirit is incarnate by life to certain phenomena
(telepathy, clairvoyance, telekinesis, etc.) which Bozzano called “Animistic”
(or psychobiodynamic) and since the spirit is disembodied from life in the
other categories of phenomena (communication with the dead, apparitions
at the deathbed, transcendental music, etc.) which he called “Spiritistic” (or
transcendental). As Bozzano wrote in a work expressly dedicated to this subject,
supernormal phenomena (. . .) are the effects of a single cause and it is the

human spirit which, when it is manifested fleetingly during the incarnate ex-
istence, determines Animistic phenomena, and when manifested under con-
ditions of disembodiment in the world of the living it determines Spiritistic
phenomena. (Bozzano, 1967a:295)8
All in all, the spiritic hypothesis is quite simple; the vast amount of the
writings and subjects that he produced to support it is, if anything, magnificent
and is Bozzano’s real contribution to psychical research. Above all, the
discourse on the autonomy of “subconscious supernormal faculties,” namely
the faculties of the incarnate spirit which is positioned in the subconscious,
is, to all effects, the reservoir for psychic phenomena. For example, the fact
that telepathy and clairvoyance emerged on rare occasions of severe physical
and psychical weakening, as the mediums and people in the state of mesmeric
sleep demonstrated, for Bozzano meant that they were completely useless in
this life since the potential senses of the incarnate spirit would become real
only when this spirit would have passed through the crisis of death (Bozzano,
1899, 1924d). For Bozzano, another strong proof in favor of the autonomy of
the bodily spirit was the evident independence of supernormal faculties from
the laws of natural selection, based on their uselessness in the struggle for life
(Bozzano, 1923c). Bozzano resolved the mind–body problem utilizing the
concept of the etheric body which envelops the incarnate spirit linking it to
the body but is also capable of breaking off, bringing with it the individual
consciousness and the integral subconscious memory contained in the etheric
brain, the true seat of thinking for which the somatic brain only serves as an
interpreter of physical sensations (Bozzano, 1930c, 1931).9
From the preceding considerations, together with the conviction that the
spirit is also present in animals, with them having the same subconscious
faculties as man (Bozzano, 1975), and the belief in the faculty of thought and
willingness to mould the subject which, according to Bozzano, appeared to
emerge from the phenomena of ideoplasty and ectoplasmy (Bozzano, 1967b,
1967c), Bozzano deduced a cosmological theory reconstructable from some
writings that went beyond pure psychical research. In summary, he believed

that the universe was in continuous evolution and that the true evolutive
motor was the spirit which had to pass through all the inferior animal forms
until reaching man in order to finally reach a perfect state of existence in the
spiritual sphere (Bozzano, 1967b); the evolution of the individual spirits falls
within the end of the evolution of the great universal spirit, God or Absolute
or Unknowable, which is both intelligence tinged with material reality and
the material itself, constructed and supported, thanks to its most fundamental
material expressions: Force, Motion, Energy, and Ether (Bozzano, 1924b). For
Bozzano, this form of idealistic and evolutionist pantheism was not only, as was
said, a working hypothesis used as a theoretical framework but also, together
with all that happened after the birth of spiritualism, a new form of rational
religious revelation not antagonistic to Christian thinking (Bozzano, 1927a).
Although implied in all his writings, the theme of survival after bodily
death is the specific object of the controversial monograph La Crisi della Morte
(The Crisis of Death) in which Bozzano attempted to demonstrate human
survival, speaking about the environment and the conditions of spiritual life
using transcendental communications, namely all that copious information
received directly from the dead by direct writing or mediumistic dictation right
from the beginning of the spiritualistic movement (Bozzano, 1998b). Bozzano
believed that communication is an instrument indispensible for proving the
reality of disembodied entities since these can furnish information regarding
their own identity and, vice versa, information regarding their identity proves
that communication was taking place with a dead person. We are dealing with
very slippery ground and even Bozzano (1996) understood this; exactly for
this reason, he stated a list of proofs in favor of the spiritualistic hypothesis
he held to be unattackable by countertheories: the existence of subconscious
supernormal faculties free of biological evolution, time, and space; bilocation;
apparition of the dead at the deathbed; premonitions of accidental death; cross-
correspondence between mediumistic communications received by mediums
who are not together and cannot communicate; apparitions of the dead.
Implicitly, this list was an invitation to globally consider paranormal
phenomena since only globally would they have furnished an incontestable
demonstration of the spiritualistic hypothesis. Bozzano was loyal to his
own intention since, with his monographs, he collected all paranormal
phenomenology, thus constructing the empiric base and the construction of
indirect proof (psychic phenomena) and direct proof (spiritualistic phenomena)
he required. For example, among the most important monographs dedicated
to psychic phenomena, we find the one dealing with the phenomena of
bilocation (Bozzano, 1934),10 that dealing with clairvoyance (Bozzano,
1947a), that dealing with telepathy (Bozzano, 1946a), and the triptych dealing
766 Luca Gasperini
with premonition in which he also espoused his solution to the ancient

determinism–free will dilemma (Bozzano, 1947b, 1947c, 1948a). Regarding
the spiritualistic phenomena, he dealt with telekinesis phenomena in relation to
the crisis of death which he attributed to the participation of the dead (Bozzano,
1948b),11 experiences of an auditory nature at the deathbed as well as cases of
trancendental music (Bozzano, 1982), the apparition of the dead at the deathbed
(Bozzano, 1947b), haunting (Bozzano, 1936), and also polyglot mediumistic
phenomena (Bozzano, 1946b). At the end of each monograph, he stated with
certainty that had reached logical and necessary conclusions regarding the
existence of supernormal faculties independent of the strict dictates of time,
space, and natural selection with regard to the existence of disembodied spirits
capable of interfering in the daily events of the living.
The thirst for proof brought Bozzano to also devote himself to phenomena
which took place at other times and places; he wrote to reaffirm the veracity of
the events of some precursors of the spiritualistic movement (Bozzano, 1957a,
1957b, 2001), to demonstrate the hand of the spirits in the composition of the
supposed works dictated psychographically or produced by direct writing
(Bozzano, 1998a), and he concluded with the grandiose attempt of complete
recognition of the paranormal on the part of primitive cultures (Bozzano, 1941).
Conclusion
Bozzano was deeply convinced of his Spiritistic hypothesis and therefore
spent 50 years of his life collecting his immense paranormal record of cases in
order to demonstrate them scientifically, so that no one could any longer voice
doubts about them. He built a solid reputation as a psychical researcher, but
it is evident that the image which has survived is that of a spiritualist (Fodor,
1933:36). If we keep this in mind, together with the fact that, since the 1930s,
parapsychology has moved on different tracks from those of Bozzano and
has, above all, become a discipline conducted in the English language (e.g.,
Mauskopf & McVaugh, 1980), and that in Italy this area of study is languishing,
we can form a rough idea of why the conclusions of Bozzano have not recently
been taken into consideration.
In effect, the methods of Bozzano, which Iannuzzo (1983a) defined as
observational and naturalistic and which we can also call bibliographic, must
have seemed rather simplistic to the parapsychologists of the experimental
school. In fact, he not only made exclusive use of qualitative sources but
refused to adopt the experimental method, believing that it was not worthwhile
(Ravaldini, 1993b:129), and, as was contested so many times (e.g., Di Porto,
no year, Inardi & Iannuzzo, 1981), by taking the facts reported in the literature
as immediately valid, he ended up assuming an uncritical attitude toward his
own sources.
Nevertheless, from a historical point of view, he symbolically epitomized

the interest of his time and place for spiritualism and psychical phenomena,
and to study him permits, if nothing else, a more in-depth reconstruction of
the Italian situation, in general suffering from a historiographic void on this
subject. From a more straightforward parapsychological point of view, some
attempts have been made to recover the case records and conclusions set forth
by Bozzano in his monographs, which could still be rich in suggestions and
ideas for research (e.g., Alvarado, 2005, 2008, Biondi, 2010).
Notes
1
The Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani (acronym: DBI) is a work of highly respected
scientific value edited by the Institute of the Italian Encyclopedia, begun in 1925
and still not completed; its aim is to gather approximately 40,000 biographies having
rich bibliographies and edited by scholars, of as many illustrious Italians. Paper
publication has been interrupted, and it is now possible to consult it online at http://
www.treccani.it/Portale/ricerche/searchBiografie.html
2
His collection of letters is conserved at the Bozzano–De Boni Library Foundation in
Bologna (Italy) and includes 450 letters, of which 275 are unpublished. Those from
1928 to 1936 have been published (De Boni, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978), and while
those from 1930 to 1936 have been published, with, however, some letters missing,
the bulk of the unpublished correspondence is from 1937 to 1943. In addition to the
published writings of Bozzano, approximately 150 binders of additional unpublished
material are conserved at the Foundation among which much other correspondence
and various collections of notes, citations, drafts of articles, and monographs never
published and even manuscripts of some of his most important publications are found.
The Foundation, which also publishes the journal Luce e Ombra and is one of the
most important Italian libraries of the history of spiritualism and psychical research,
is the only association which is involved in keeping the memory of Bozzano alive. For
further information, see http://www.bibliotecabozzanodeboni.it
3
Richet and Bozzano shared a professional friendship as is seen by their letters
which have been conserved. Thanks to these letters, we know that the French
scholar frequently sent his own publications dedicated to Bozzano, and many
times he proposed publishing a collection of all Bozzano’s works at his own
expense; furthermore, initially antispiritualistic, Richet attributed his attraction to
the spiritualistic hypothesis to reading Bozzano’s works. See Bozzano (1924a) and
unpublished letters: Richet–Bozzano, Paris, 14 May 1935, Paris, 31 May 1935, Paris,
28 June 1935.
4
Utilizing the unpublished material of the Bozzano–De Boni collection of letters,
Biondi (2009) strongly questioned the honesty of Bozzano and De Boni regarding
the events at Millesimo, quoting, in particular, their involvement in keeping secret the
Centurione Scotto fraud in the seance on July 29, 1928, and that of George Valiantine
in successive seances with the group of Millesimo, whose accounts have never been
published.
5
Although De Boni (1941), with regard to the complete edition of Bozzano’s writings,
indicated 15,000 pages in more than 50 volumes, in the end he chose 17 writings,
768 Luca Gasperini
those more theoretically important which had been updated with new material by
Bozzano between 1939 and 1943 (De Boni, 1946). Until the 1970s, De Boni did his
best to enable everybody to see the light, relying on various Italian publishing houses,
also including Editrice Luce e Ombra which was refounded by him in 1967.
6
The majority of Bozzano’s books are monographs, specific studies on a category
of metapsychical phenomena, but Popoli Primitivi is one of the few writings to
veer away from his usual theme; with this, he attempted to shed light on the entire
paranormal phenomena of the cultures which the anthropology of that era defined as
primitive, principally African peoples, but also including Indians, Aborigines, and
Maori, in order to find the occidental case records (generated not by mediums but by
yogin, shamans, and medicine men) and the solution to the question of the origin of
religions (the observation of spiritualistic facts).
7
The only vaguely systematic work, written in 1938 (the definitive and quite different
edition was published in 1967), and for this reason definable as the clear synthesis of
his 50 years of work, is Animismo o Spiritismo? Quale dei Due Spiega il Complesso
dei Fatti? (Bozzano, 1967a). The 1938 work was also translated into English as
Discarnate Influence in Human Life (Bozzano, 1938b).
8
For the formulation of this hypothesis, Bozzano was greatly inspired by the work of
Aksakof (1890) which he read in French in 1895 (Aksakof, 1895). There, in fact, we
find (I consulted the Italian translation: Aksakof, 1912) the complete formulation of
many of the points of Bozzano’s metapsychical philosophy, such as the distinction
between animistic and spiritistic phenomena, the theory according to which animistic
phenomena reside in the subconscious and are proof of the existence of an immortal
spirit free of the body, and also the importance of spiritualistic communication with
cases of identification of the deceased as the main proof in favor of survival.
9
For a more in-depth study of Bozzano (1931), also in relation to the most recent
reports of a life review in parapsychology events, see Biondi, 2010.
10
In the category of the phenomena of bilocation, Bozzano inserted a class of facts
corresponding to today’s out-of-body experiences, which, although not being
classified as such and explanations of which resorted to hypotheses of the ethereal
body and survival, had been studied for a long time. For a close examination of this
history which also deals with Bozzano from the nineteenth century until the 1980s,
see Alvarado, 1989. For a specific study of Bozzano and the phenomena of bilocation,
see Alvarado, 2005.
11
For a historical summary of these and other phenomena linked to near-death
experiences, see Alvarado, 2006. For a specific study of this monograph of Bozzano,
see Alvarado, 2008.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Carlos Alvarado for his suggestions.
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Unpublished.
Bruers, A. (1929). Review of “E. Bozzano: La crisi della morte nelle descrizioni dei defunti
comunicanti.” Luce e Ombra, 29, 566–570.
Bruers, A. (1930). Review of “E. Bozzano: Letteratura d’Oltretomba.” Luce e Ombra, 30, 294–295.
Caratelli, G. (1998). De Martino e Bozzano. Luce e Ombra, 98, 65–76.
Cellina, F. (1993). La “crisi della morte” di Ernesto Bozzano e le attuali esperienze di pre-morte
(NDE). Luce e Ombra, 93, 171–176.
Clauzure, G. (1983). Le secret de Psi: “l’effet Bozzano.” Renâitre 2000, 34, 196–201.
Collins, A. (1939). Discarnate Influence in Human Life. Professor Bozzano’s great work for
Spiritualism. Light, 59, 241–242.
Cugnaschi, S. (2002). Angelo Marzorati–Ernesto Bozzano: Prove “scientifiche” di una cosmologia
“sperimentale.” Luce e Ombra, 102, 83–97.
De Boni, G. (1941). Vita ed opera di Ernesto Bozzano nel cinquantenario della sua attività
metapsichica. Preface to Bozzano (1941). pp. 11–37.
De Boni, G. (1946). Prefazione. Preface to Bozzano (1946a). pp. 11–16.
De Boni, G. (1947). Prefazione. Preface to E. Bozzano (1947a). Verona: L’Albero Editions. pp.
11–15.
De Boni, G. (1949). Una visita a Carl Gustav Jung. [Reprinted in La realtà dell’Anima. Scelta di
brani della rivista Luce e Ombra 1926–1950, edited by M. Biondi and S. Ravaldini, Rome:
GSE, 1999, pp. 179–186]
De Boni, G. (1974). Carteggio E. Bozzano–G. De Boni 1928–1931. Luce e Ombra, 74, 44–112.
De Boni, G. (1975). Carteggio E. Bozzano–G. De Boni 1932–1933. Luce e Ombra, 75, 3–50.
De Boni, G. (1976). Carteggio E. Bozzano–G. De Boni 1934. Luce e Ombra, 76, 51–84.
772 Luca Gasperini
de Martino, E. (1941). Recensione a E. Bozzano, “Popoli primitivi e manifestazioni supernormali,”

Edizioni L’Albero, Verona. Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni, 17, 82–83.
de Vesme, C. B. (1934). Review of La Médiumnité Polyglotte (Xénoglossie). Revue Métapsychique,
4, 265–270.
de Vesme, C. B. (1936). Réplique de M. de Vesme a M. E. Bozzano. Revue Métapsychique, 3,
178–185.
Di Porto, B. (no year). Ernesto Bozzano. In Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Rome: Treccani,
Volume 13, pp. 578–580.
Doyle, A. C. (1930). Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Resignation. Reprinted by Psypioneer, V, 2009,
263–266.
Dumas A. (1973). La Science de l’Ame. Paris: Dervy-Livres.
Ferraro, A. (1989). Le Sedute di Millesimo. Un’Impossibile Storia Vera. Gardolo di Trento: Luigi
Reverdito.
Fodor, N. (1933). Encyclopædia of Psychic Science. London: Arthurs Press Limited.
Gasperini, L. (2010). L’annosa disputa Bozzano–Morselli. Luce e Ombra, 110, 290–306.
Gasperini, L. (2011). Ernesto Bozzano, i “popoli primitivi” ed Ernesto de Martino. Luce e Ombra,
111, 17–25.
Hack, G. K. (1930). Modern Psychic Mysteries: Millesimo Castle, Italy. London: Rider.
Iannuzzo, G. (1982). Il pensiero di Ernesto Bozzano tra “Spiritismo scientifico” e parapsicologia:
Una rivalutazione. Luce e Ombra, 82, 113–141.
Iannuzzo, G. (1983a). Ernesto Bozzano e il problema della sopravvivenza. Luce e Ombra, 83,
288–302.
Iannuzzo, G. (1983b). Ernesto Bozzano. La vita e l’Oopera. Verona: Luce e Ombra Editors.
Inardi, M., & Iannuzzo, G. (1981). Parapsicologia Realtà Contestata. Milan: SugarCo.
Inglis, B. (1977). Natural and Supernatural. A History of the Paranormal from Earliest Times to
1914. Bridport, UK: Unity Press. [Italian translation: Naturale e Soprannaturale, Storia
del paranormale, Rome: Astrolabio, 1979]
Lambert, R. (1929). Eine kritische Betrachtung der Experimente Bozzanos in Millesimo. Zeitschrift
für Parapsychologie, 8, 465–482.
Lambert, R. (1930). Bozzanos Einwände gegen meine Kritik der Millesimo-Experimente und
gegen mich selbst. Zeitschrift für Parapsychologie, 1, 60–64.
Macaluso, G. (1972). Ernesto Bozzano precursore-maestro di scienze spiritiche e metapsichiche.
In Lo Spiritismo e la Metapsichica, edited by Giuseppe Macaluso, Rome: Edizioni
Associazione Mazziniana “Pensiero e Azione”.
Mackenzie, W. (1923a). A proposito di “polipsichismo.” Luce e Ombra, 23, 129–142.
Mackenzie, W. (1923b). Metapsychica moderna. Journal, 21, 126–128. [New edition: Genoa:
Fratelli Melita, 1988]
Mauskopf, S., & McVaugh, M. (1980). The Elusive Science. Origins of Experimental Psychical
Research. Baltimore/London: John Hopkins University Press.
Minerva, Circolo Scientifico (1899). Statuto del Circolo Scientifico “Minerva.” Unpublished.
Morselli, E. (1908). Psicologia e Spiritismo. Impressioni e Note Critiche sui Fenomeni Medianici
di Eusapia Paladino (2 volumes). Milan/Rome: Fratelli Bocca.
Necrologie—Ernesto Bozzano 1862–1943 (1946). Metapsichica, 342–434.
Orlandi, D. (1971). Ernesto Bozzano. Il padre della metapsichica in Italia. Giornale dei Misteri,
1, 31–36.
Quartier, C. (1927a). Review of “A Propos de l’Introduction à la Métapsychique Humaine”. Revue
Quartier, C. (1927b). Review of “Les Enigmes de la Psychométrie et les Phénomènes de la
Télesthésie”. Revue Métapsychique, 6, 381–384.
Ravaldini, S. (1983). Ernesto Bozzano. Luce e Ombra, 83, 266–287.
Ravaldini, S. (1993a). Ernesto Bozzano e la Ricerca Psichica. Vita e Opere di un Pioniere della
Parapsicologia. Rome: Mediterranean Editions.
Ravaldini, S. (1993b). Un Grande Pioniere: Ernesto Bozzano. Luce e Ombra, 93, 121–139.
Ravaldini, S. (2000). Catalogo Generale della Biblioteca Bozzano–De Boni (2 volumes). Bologna:
Bozzano–De Boni Library.
Review of Discarnate Influence in Human Life (1938). Nature, 142, 376.
Richet, C. (1922a). Traité de Métapsychique. Paris: Félix Alcan.
Richet, C. (1922b). De la Théorie Spirite—Réponse a M. Bozzano. Revue Métapsychique, 6, 366–
371.
Richet, C. (1922c). Un dernier mot sur la Cryptesthésie–Réponse a M. E. Bozzano. Revue
Saltmarsh, H. F. (1938). Review of Discarnate Influence in Human Life. Journal of the Society for
Servadio, E. (1931). Review of “E. Bozzano: Indagini sulle manifestazioni supernormali.” Luce e
Ombra, 31, 338.
Servadio, E. (1934). In difesa dei casi d’identificazione spiritica. Luce e Ombra, 34, 56–58.
Stevenson, I. (1977). Children Who Remember Previous Lives. Charlottesville: University Press
of Virginia.
Sudre, R. (1926). Introduction a la Métapsychique Humaine. Paris: Payot.
Troubridge, U. V. (1919). Review of Dei Fenomeni d’Infestazione. Journal of the Society for
Vassallo, L. A. (1992). Gli Invisibili. Genoa: ECIG. [Original publication date 1902]
Van de Castle, R. L. (1977). Anthropology and Psychic Research. Phoenix. New Directions in the
Study of Man, 1, 27–35.
Weissenbach, R. (1949). A la Mémoire du Grand Spirite Italien: Ernest Bozzano. La Revue Spirite,
69–78.
Wilson, S. R. W. (1933). Review of Polyglot Mediumship (Xenoglossy). Journal of the Society for
OBITUARY
In Memory of William Corliss
William R. Corliss, regarded by many as the world’s greatest contemporary

anomalist, passed away at his home in Glen Arm, Maryland, on July 8, 2011,
at the age of 84. During a span of some 40 years, the physicist turned stalker
of paradoxical data brought to light a mind-boggling collection of unexplained
observations, embarrassing deviations, and paradigm-shattering discoveries
that orthodox science had largely swept under the carpet of consensus. In
recognition of these contributions, he received, in 1994, the Tim Dinsdale
Award presented by the Society for Scientific Exploration.
Corliss was born on August 28, 1926, in Stamford, Connecticut, and
served in the Navy during World War II. After receiving degrees in physics
from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (BS) and the University of Colorado
(MS), he worked for more than a decade as a physicist in industry, first with
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft, then with General Electric Company, and finally
with the Martin Company where he was Director of Advanced Programs in
their Nuclear Division. In 1963 he began another career, in technical writing,
and produced works for NASA and the National Science Foundation on such
topics as electric power generation, computers, space radiation, robotics, and
telecommunications.
With an interest in “outlaw science” that had been sparked by the reading
of a controversial book on geology in 1951, Corliss turned to writing about
scientific anomalies in 1974, an endeavor he christened The Sourcebook Project.
In the decades that followed, he conducted a massive amount of library research,
poring through many thousands of scientific journals and gleaning from them a
wide assortment of neglected data in the fields of geology, biology, archeology,
astronomy, psychology, and geophysics. He first reprinted the accounts he
found in a series of six ring-bound volumes, followed by six massive hardback
volumes he called “handbooks.” But by 1982 he had switched to a hardback
catalog format that not only presented examples of various anomalies and their
sources, but also gave an evaluation of the quality of data—and an evaluation
of an anomaly’s possible impact on science, from being a mere curiosity to
being “revolutionary,” by which he meant that the anomaly could not even be
explained by a modification of present scientific laws.
The evaluations were necessarily subjective. He admitted that it was
difficult to categorize and organize the unknown, and always pointed out that
775
776 Patrick Huyghe
the material he chose to include in his anomaly catalogs reflected what—in

his opinion—was not well-explained, as “anomalousness is often in the eyes
of the beholder.” Not all the anomalies he highlighted presented a threat to
mainstream science. Some are mere blemishes. Others are leaks, cracks, and
fissures in the foundations and facades of the various sciences. But there are
potholes as well, the potential game changers. “Instead of simply accepting nice,
slick theories like evolution, relativity, and continental drift,” he said in 1980, “I
think we should occasionally reexamine them to be sure they are not accepted
just because they are so slick. And based upon the material I’ve collected, what
I’m saying is: I’m not so sure.” Among the major paradigms widely considered
to be fact that his catalogs of anomalies put at risk are: the expanding universe;
the Big Bang origin of the universe; Neo-Darwinism, specifically evolution
via random mutation and natural selection; plate tectonics and continental
drift; Special and General Relativity; and the assumption that genomes are the
complete blueprint for life forms.
Corliss made no claims of completeness. Indeed he would constantly point
out that he had covered just a fraction of the literature on a subject. In 2005,
he wrote that his 40 published volumes detailing more than 2,000 scientific
anomalies and “provocative” phenomena represented just 50% of his database.
And even after decades of work, only a handful of English-language journals
had received his serious attention. “The journals in other languages, government
reports, conference papers, publications of research facilities, proceedings of
state academies of science, and an immense reservoir of pertinent books,”
he noted, “remain almost untapped.” The task he faced was daunting: “The
anomalies residing in the world’s literature seem infinite in number.”
But he never lost his enthusiasm, and one has to admire his courage in
single-handedly attempting a project of such enormous scope. His catalogs are
unique in the annals of science, in that he cataloged not what is known but what
is not known. “It seems to me that any organized activity like science would
have done this a long time ago,” he said. “It is at least as important to realize
what is not known as it is to recognize the well-explained.”
Though Corliss has often been compared to a modern-day Charles Fort,
their differences are considerable. Unlike Fort, he avoided using newspapers
as the source of his data whenever possible, preferring instead to depend on
academically accredited journals that described anomalies that were the product
of scientific observation, research, and exploration. Furthermore, Corliss, unlike
Fort, was not anti-science and he did not editorialize. He thought the data were
damning enough on their own. “In the Catalog of Anomalies,” he wrote, “the
data rule; all theories and hypotheses are held to be tentative. The history of
science proves that this is a wise policy.” Corliss saw anomalies as a way to
renew, to reinvigorate, science.
In Memory of William Corliss 777
Though his first volume of anomalies, entitled Strange Phenomena, was

actually recommended by both Nature and Science, quite often the publication
of his catalogs met with disbelief, even disdain. The critics claimed that the data
must be in error, that the data is anecdotal, that it was too old, that a supposed
anomaly was explained long ago. His reply? “The baseline of well-established
theories, against which anomalousness is measured, is always shifting and some
data, indeed, are bad. But for every anomaly or example that can be legitimately
demolished, ten more take its place. Nature is very anomalous or, equivalently,
Nature is not yet well-understood by science.” Such words did not endear him
to the scientific mainstream, which largely ignored much of his later work.
Corliss did not have any illusions about the impact The Sourcebook Project
would have on science. Would it revolutionize science? “Probably not—at least
not immediately,” he wrote. The late sociologist Marcello Truzzi called Corliss
“an unsung hero of science.”
I was introduced to The Sourcebook Project in the late 1970s, when I
received my very first published volume of anomalies from the mail-order
service he operated with his wife, Virginia. (Most volumes are still available
from The Sourcebook Project, P.O. Box 107, Glen Arm MD 21057. See also:
http://www.science-frontiers.com.) Shortly afterward, I met and interviewed
him for an article I was writing on his work for Science Digest. We kept in
touch over the years, and I would occasionally send him a newsclipping for
the newsletter he published called Science Frontiers. After being involved in
producing a couple of science exhibits for museums, I began to think that his
work should have a wider audience, that there should be a William Corliss
Museum of Anomalies or at least an exhibit for museums based on his work,
called What Science Doesn’t Know. I can’t imagine anything more stimulating
to the minds of young people than to discover areas of science that are up for
grabs, puzzling topics they could explore, wide open fields of research where
they could make a difference, instead of being presented with science as a closed
book of knowledge, as at most science museums. The work of William Corliss
is an inspiration, a wonder-filled refutation that we have not come to the end of
science. Quite the contrary. As he would often say, “Much remains to be done.”
PATRICK HUYGHE
Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 779–780, 2011 0892-3310/11
LETTER TO THE EDITOR
Pipefish or Pipe Dream?
This Letter is a reply to the research article “A Baby Sea-Serpent No More:

Reinterpreting Hagelund’s Juvenile ‘Cadborosaur’ Report,” in JSE 25:3, Fall
2011 (Woodley, Naish, & McCormick, 2011). Naish and colleagues indulge
in the common home-quarterbacking habit of insisting that anything described
as different must be an erroneous description of something found in a book
that vaguely looks like it. A comparison of Hagelund’s “baby-Caddy” with a
pipefish (Figure 1) shows significant differences in the latter:
Figure 1. A comparison of the pipefish (Syngnathus griseolineatus) (A) with

Hagelund’s “baby Caddy” (B). (Hagelund, 1987; Leblond & Bousfield, 1995)
1 – no neck;
2 – nearly fused jaws;
3 – no posterior paired appendages (pelvic fins);
4 – pronounced dorsal fin;
5 – very elongate post-vent tail region (> 1/2 body length);
6 – lateral plates encircling the body and tail region (vs. only dorso
laterally on trunk region in Hagelund’s creature);
7 – presence of a small and vertically oriented fin.
779
780 Letter to the Editor
Observed behavioral differences are equally great. The pipefish doesn’t

swim with its head continuously out of the water for more than a few seconds,
not the estimated 5–10 minutes observed originally by Hagelund, and the
pipefish cannot open its tiny jaws (Syn-gnathus!), whereas the baby Caddy
opened its large jaws and displayed a mouthful of conspicuous teeth.
So much for the pipefish idea. As to whether Caddy eyewitness accounts
relate to one or more unknown creatures: “entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter
necessitatem” to quote William of Occam; and while there may be a remote
chance that more than one single unconfirmed animal species may be hiding
under the appellation Cadborosaurus, there is not enough evidence to introduce
specific distinctions at this time.
We appreciate the interest expressed in Cadborosaurus and encourage
commentators to look closely at the published evidence before jumping to
conclusions.
ED L. BOUSFIELD
[email protected]
PAUL H. LEBLOND
[email protected]
References
Hagelund, W. (1987). Whalers No More. Madeira Park, B.C.: Harbour Publishing.
LeBlond, P. H., & Bousfield, E. L. (1995). Cadborosaurus. Victoria, B.C.: Horsdal & Schubart.
Woodley, M. A., Naish, D., & McCormick, C. A. (2011). A baby sea-serpent no more: Reinterpreting
Hagelund’s juvenile “Cadborosaur” report. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 25, 497–514.
ESSAY REVIEW
Miracles and Modern Spiritualism: A Re-Review
On Miracles and Modern Spiritualism. Three Essays by Alfred

Russel Wallace. London: James Burns, 1875. 236 pp. Free PDF at http://
books.google.com/books?id=7ZU0AAAAMAAJ&pg=PR1#v=onep
age&q=&f=false [Reprinted by General Books, 2010, $21.09, ISBN
9780217265287]
About 1875, Modern Spiritualism in Britain attained a peak of cultural influence.

In January 1874 William Crookes published “Notes of an Enquiry into the
Phenomena called Spiritual during the Years 1870–1873” in his Quarterly
Journal of Science, reaching positive conclusions and postulating the existence
of a psychic force.
Another scientist was also reporting on his investigations. Alfred Russel
Wallace, co-discoverer of evolution with Darwin, contributed “A Defence of
Modern Spiritualism” to The Fortnightly Review in May 1874.
James Burns, a Spiritualist editor, publisher, and bookseller, gathered
together Crookes’s writings on Spiritualism, to form a volume Research into the
Phenomena of Spiritualism (1874) which was to be very influential. In March
1875, Burns enjoyed another coup when he issued On Miracles and Modern
Spiritualism. Three Essays by Alfred Russel Wallace (OMMS). Although this
was a much more comprehensive work than Crookes’, it has had less impact,
perhaps because it did not include the kind of laboratory experiments which
Crookes reported with the medium D. D. Home.
Nevertheless, OMMS was often reprinted, and has merits which still
commend it to us today, which outweigh its disjointed origin. Wallace wrote
clearly, and had a command of the literature, a background in science, and
personal experience of the phenomena.
The first essay, “An Answer to the Arguments of Hume, Lecky and others
against Miracles” (28 pages), had been read before the Dialectical Society in
1871. This London organization has largely vanished from history, except for
its resolution on January 26, 1869, “to investigate the phenomena alleged to be
Spiritual Manifestations, and to report thereon.”1
The second essay, “The Scientific Aspect of the Supernatural” (102 pages),
had a much longer history. It had first appeared serially in a journal, The Leader,
781
782 Book Reviews
in 1866, and then promptly became as now a scarce pamphlet. Sections had been
reused in The Spiritualist newspaper in 1871. It is worth noting that Wallace not
only habitually reissued material, he also revised it. To the 1875 version of the
essay, Wallace added “Notes of Personal Evidence.” The 1866 essay may be
seen as an argument for taking Spiritualism seriously.
Finally the paper “A Defence of Modern Spiritualism” (92 pages, including
an appendix of the author’s replies) had appeared in The Fortnightly Review
in 1874 and been reprinted as far afield as Boston (USA) and Dunedin (New
Zealand) before being revised for this book.
The content of the essays varied. The first essay was mainly philosophical
and logical. The second was the nearest to a general survey of Spiritualism,
including a section on its teaching. The third was chiefly a literature review.
In the first essay, Wallace discusses the philosopher David Hume whose
definitions of Miracles had been very influential, and might be said to rule
out the study of paranormal phenomena in advance.2 Hume had argued that
a uniform experience amounted to a proof that miracles did not happen,
but Wallace gives many examples of testimony to miraculous events, by no
means limited to Modern Spiritualism. Wallace also exposes the limitations
to scientific rejection a priori, without investigation, of psychic evidence, with
many examples of scientific error (e.g., “Sir Humphry Davy laughed at the idea
of London ever being lighted with gas”).
Wallace also takes issue with his contemporary, the historian William
Lecky, who had attacked the belief in miracles, and had suggested that belief in
the supernatural existed only when men were destitute of the critical spirit and
when the notion of uniform law was as yet unborn. Wallace pointed to Joseph
Glanvil as a critical mind who defended the supernatural.3
A third thinker whom Wallace challenges is the anthropologist Edward
Tylor who had asserted that psychic beliefs were an example of the survival
of savage thought.4 Many modern people, Wallace noted, can testify to the
phenomena which cause such beliefs.
Wallace concludes this first essay by repeating that he seeks only to clear
the ground of arguments supposed to disprove miracles and Spiritualism
without examination. This he has done effectively, and in a clear way that the
general reader can follow.
In the second essay, “The Scientific Aspect of the Supernatural,” Wallace
again makes some general points in defense of the miraculous, such as our
limited knowledge of the laws of nature, and the possibility of ethereal
intelligences of whose existence we are generally unaware. He calls attention to
the good quality of the witnesses who testify to modern miraculous phenomena,
and he claims:
Book Reviews 783
during the eighteen years which have passed since the revival of a belief in the
supernatural in America, not one single individual has carefully investigated
the subject without accepting the reality of the phenomena, and while thou-
sands have been converted to the belief not one adherent has been converted
back from it. (p. 49)
This may be doubted, although uncertainty about how much investigation

would be called “careful” offers a loophole. Certainly Dr. Carpenter, with
whom Wallace had a long combat, was less than careful in his investigations, as
Wallace was able to show in a number of rejoinders.5
This may be a suitable moment to recommend to all students of Wallace and
of the history of psychical investigation the website conducted by Dr. Charles
Smith known as the Alfred Russel Wallace page, which contains a vast amount
of information about Wallace, including original writings: http://people.wku.
edu/charles.smith/index1.htm
Others would question how much care Wallace himself took in his seance
work. Moreover, it was one thing to accept the reality of the phenomena and
another to be convinced of human spirit return, as Spiritualists believed. Pre-
eminently, William Crookes was not so convinced at that time.
Wallace devotes a number of sections in the essay to citing eminent
witnesses to various phenomena, including od-force, animal magnetism,
clairvoyance, apparitions, and poltergeists, making particular use of Robert
Dale Owen’s Footfalls.6
He calls attention to the Cideville, France, disturbances of 1850–1851,7
and to “the remarkable resemblance of the phenomena to those which had
occurred a short time previously in America [i.e. Hydesville rappings], but had
not in 1850 become much known in Europe.” He also compares them with the
Epworth Parsonage case in the Wesley family, which was often recalled in the
early days of Modern Spiritualism.
Wallace then moves on to quote witnesses to Spiritualist phenomena,
choosing Augustus De Morgan, Robert Hare, and Judge Edmonds from science,
though the first was primarily a mathematician and the last was a lawyer.
For literary and professional men, he selects T. Adophus Trollope, James
Gully, M.D., Col. Wilbraham, S. C. Hall, Nassau William Senior, Rev. William
Kerr, Thackeray, Lord Lyndhurst, Archbishop Whateley, Dr. Elliotson, Captain
Burton, and Professor Challis, who as an astronomer ought really to be in the
previous chapter. But it may be said of nearly all these witnesses that neither
their powers of observation nor their recordkeeping would meet the standards
which would soon be sought by the Society for Psychical Research, founded
in 1882.
784 Book Reviews
Wallace then turns to a general discussion of the theory of Spiritualism,

and the hypothesis of the existence of spirits. He discusses the possibility of
continuity after death, and “the agency of beings of a like mental nature to
ourselves—who are, in fact, ourselves—but one step advanced on the long
journey through eternity” (p. 103). This continuity was a central theme in
Wallace’s outlook for the rest of his life.
In the next section, “The Moral Teachings of Spiritualism,” he summarizes
in a sympathetic manner the philosophy of Spiritualism: “There are no bad
spirits but the spirits of bad men, and even the worst are surely if slowly
progressing,” he notes (p. 109). Wallace over four pages quotes from an address
by the medium Mrs. Emma Hardinge [who had actually married and added the
surname “Britten” in 1870] who warns of “The effects of vice and ungoverned
passions” (p. 112). It seems possible that Wallace had been significantly affected
by Emma’s lectures; they may even have been a trigger for his 1866 essay, and
caused him to consider the relationship between Evolution and Spiritualism.8
After some remarks on the nature of God, Wallace defends Spiritualism as
having inspired thousands to devote their lives to good works.
In the 1875 edition of this essay, Wallace added “Notes of Personal
Evidence.” These include his early experiences in mesmerism, his participation
in a home circle, his sittings with a professional medium, Mrs. Marshall,
and further experiments in the home circle, at some of which Miss Nichol
(later a professional medium, better known as Mrs. Guppy) was the focus of
phenomena. These personal experiences had now caused him to accept both the
phenomena and the philosophy.
Whatever criticism we may make of Wallace as either witness or recorder
of these events, his practical experience was much in excess of some of his
critics.9
In the third essay, “A Defence of Modern Spiritualism,” Wallace first
criticizes some recent treatments of the subject by popular and scientific writers,
who have strong negative feelings but limited practical experience. He then
gives a historical sketch of the origins of Spiritualism centered on the Misses
Fox in Hydesville, New York, in 1848. Wallace here used such books as Robert
Dale Owen’s Footfalls and Emma Hardinge’s Modern American Spiritualism.
We have only recently realized that these accounts, like some other sacred
narratives, had evolved away from the actual historical record.10
It has now been noted, for example, that the connection of the Fox sisters
with the first phenomena was more limited than later reported, that the age of the
sisters was uncertain, that the name of a supposed peddler who communicated
was not in the original narrative, and so on. We may criticize Wallace for
accepting the story as it had come down to him (Owen and Hardinge had both
known the Fox sisters), but must recognize that although there were many in his
Book Reviews 785
lifetime who accused the sisters of fraud,

no one properly analyzed the history of the
Fox story. The Spiritualists themselves did
not enquire too closely.11
In support of the facts of Spiritualism,
Wallace then gives summary accounts
of several mediums and researchers.
Most of these remain neither exposed
nor vindicated. Even Kate Fox (p. 156
ff.) who lived in England for a time,
produced some phenomena that are hard
to explain. One might assume that her
materializations for Livermore, the New
ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE
York banker (p. 157), were exploded
long ago, but they have simply been forgotten. In contrast, the literature on the
medium D. D. Home continues to expand steadily without a definitive blow to
either medium or critics.12
On the investigator side, Wallace was able to cite William Crookes’ lately
published work mentioned above. Here, too, a voluminous literature has left
uncertainty. William Brock, in a magisterial biography, acquitted Crookes of
fraud, but suggested he might have suffered from an eyesight problem.13
Another witness to phenomena, George Sexton, once a rationalist orator
then a Spiritualist, was to become a Christian preacher for the rest of his life,
though he does not appear to have repudiated his belief in mediumship.14
Wallace devotes a section to “Spirit-Photographs” (his use of a hyphen
has not generally found favor), the supposed appearance of human spirits on
photographs. Because of its physical nature, he was impressed by the evidential
value of photographs, but, in retrospect, it was perhaps the most vulnerable part
of his case. The most famous European photographer, Buguet, was arrested in
Paris and convicted of fraud just after Wallace’s book appeared.15
Fortunately, Wallace had used British photographic cases to make his case.
But Mrs. Sidgwick exposed the limitations of these in 1891.16
Since then, although photographic images, most recently orbs, have
continued to cause occasional puzzlement, the value of spirit photographs as
survival evidence has been accepted by few.
In a section on “Historical Teachings of Spiritualism,” Wallace briefly
identifies mediumship in ancient Greece, the Bible, the lives of saints, and
the witchcraft trails. He offers an explanation of the testimony to intercessory
prayer given in A Narrative of Some of the Lord’s Dealings with George Müller,
Written by Himself (1860):
786 Book Reviews
The perfect simplicity, faith, boundless charity, and goodness of George

Müller, have enlisted in his cause beings of a like nature; and his mediumistic
powers have enabled them to work for him by influencing others to send him
money, food, clothes, &c., all arriving, as we should say, just in the nick of
time. The numerous letters he received with these gifts, describing the sudden
and uncontrollable impulse the donors felt to send him a certain definite sum
at a certain fixed time, such being the exact sum he was in want of, and had
prayed for, strikingly illustrates the nature of the power at work. (pp. 210–211)
As in the second essay, Wallace gives a sympathetic account of the “Moral

Teachings of Spiritualism.” He draws attention to the consistencies of spirit
teachings received in many places which are radically different from those of
orthodox religion held by the medium or by the supposed communicators in
life.
Finally in an appendix, Wallace crosses swords with Carpenter once more,
adds a little more evidence, and responds to critics of his third paper. This
ongoing discussion was characteristic of Wallace. In the OMMS third edition
of 1901, he included, for example, chapters on apparitions and phantasms, and
a new preface.
…………………………..
This book was one of Wallace’s most durable. But its main readership has
been Spiritualists, rather than psychical researchers or scientists. He wrote at
a time when the psychic field was still, to a large extent, organizationally and
ideologically undivided, except between those who accepted the phenomena
and those who did not. Within months of the book appearing, The Theosophical
Society had been formed in New York, which would develop a more critical
view of Spiritualism in the light of a revived occult tradition. The rise of
psychical research gradually emphasized the importance of the laboratory
approach, championed by Crookes, rather than the natural history of Wallace.
Notes
1
The ensuing Report on Spiritualism appeared as a book—London: Longmans,
Green, Reader & Dyer, 1871; reprinted (slightly shortened) London: J. Burns, 1873;
reprinted, London: Arno Press, 1976.
2
“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature” and also “A miracle is a transgression
of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity, or by the interposition of some
invisible agent.” Wallace shows that both definitions are defective.
3
Henry Sidgwick, first president of the Society for Psychical Research, read Lecky, but
was then led to take more seriously the evidence for medieval marvels. Interestingly,
Lecky seems to have facilitated the inclusion of a dream case in an early SPR survey
Phantasms of the Living (1886), being acquainted with the dreamer.
4
It is now known that Tylor was privately investigating the subject: Stocking, J., &
Book Reviews 787
George, W. (1971), Animism in theory and practice: E. B. Tylor’s unpublished Notes

on ‘Spiritualism’, Man, New Series 6(1), 88–104.
5
For example, Dr. Carpenter and Psychic Force, The Spiritualist, 15 February 1872.
http://www.wku.edu/~smithch/wallace/S206.htm
6
Robert Dale Owen, Footfalls on the Boundary of Another World, London: Trubner,
1860.
7
A. Lang, The poltergeist at Cideville, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
Research, 41(xviii), 454–463. Cideville and Epworth remain in the case files of
psychical research, still discussed but not generally accepted outside the research
community.
8
Personal communication, Charles Smith.
9
Charles Smith comments in a personal communication to me: “I don’t think it is true
that Wallace was an observer only, as on some occasions he added constraints to
the séance settings that were designed to eliminate fraud. This included both careful
investigation of the physical layout of the settings, and adding slips of paper and such
to detect forms of fraud-initiated movements of furniture, etc.”
10
The re-evaluation is first apparent in Barbara Weisberg’s Talking to the Dead, Kate
and Maggie Fox and the Rise of Spiritualism, San Francisco: Harper, 2004, and in
many articles in the online journal Psypioneer (archived at http://www.woodlandway.
org) founded in 2004.
11
Podmore (Modern Spiritualism, 1902) was aware of an 1848 report by E. E. Lewis
(Mysterious Noises), who had interviewed witnesses at Hydesville, but did not obtain
it himself. The Lewis report was reprinted by Psypioneer in April 2005.
12
A good entry point is Peter Lamont’s The First Psychic (2005). Dr. Lamont suggests
that Home’s phenomena are not yet fully understood, though he is confident that they
were not paranormal.
13
William Crookes (1832–1919) and the Commercialization of Science, Aldershot,
Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2008.
14
See Timothy Larsen’s Crisis of Doubt. Honest Faith in Nineteenth-Century England,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapter 8, George Sexton.
15
In his recent study Laboratories of Faith, Mesmerism, Spiritism, and Occultism in
Modern France (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2008) John Warne Monroe
gives a detailed account of the Buguet case, using police records.
16
On spirit photographs: A reply to Mr. A. R. Wallace, Proceedings of the Society for
Psychical Research, 1891, 268–289. After the First World War, it looked for a time as
if spirit photography might make a comeback, but one of its main enthusiasts, Fred
Barlow, lost faith. See Fred Barlow and W. Rampling Rose, Report on an investigation
into spirit-photography, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 1933,
121–138.
LESLIE PRICE
[email protected]
ESSAY REVIEW
Ian Stevenson’s Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation:

An Historical Review and Assessment
Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation by Ian Stevenson.

University Press of Virginia, 1980 (second edition). 396 pp. $25.93,
ISBN 9780813908724.
Introduction
Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation (first published in 1966) is a classic
of 20th-century parapsychology that can still be read with profit.1 Along with
Children Who Remember Previous Lives (2001),2 it is an ideal introduction to
Stevenson. The latter work, intended for the educated general reader, provides
an overview of 40 years of research and includes capsule summaries of several
cases, but Twenty Cases contains detailed reports that illustrate reincarnation-
type cases much more fully.
The cases reported in Twenty Cases come from India, Ceylon (now Sri
Lanka), Lebanon, Brazil, and the United States (the Tlingit Indians of Alaska).
They were selected from about 200 personally investigated by Stevenson in
order to show the variety of features this type of case presents. The subjects
of all were young children at the time they claimed to have lived before.
Collectively these twenty cases help define “cases of the reincarnation type,” as
Stevenson came to call them, though they vary substantially in detail.
The book includes both evidentially strong and weak cases, cases among
strangers and in the same family, cases with strong behavioral features, cases
with birthmarks and congenital deformities related to the previous person,3 a
case with a change of sex between the previous person and the subject, and a
case in which the previous person died after the birth of the subject. The last
type is extremely rare. Stevenson worked for years on a volume that was to
include “anomalous date” cases, but it remained incomplete at his death in 2007
and has not been published. He also did not live to complete a planned volume
on non-tribal American cases, although he analyzed a series of 79 of them in
an article published in the Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease in 1983
(Stevenson, 1983b).
The Canadian-born Stevenson was already a tenured professor and
Chair of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Virginia Medical
Center when he turned his attention to reincarnation-type cases. From 1960
789
790 Book Reviews
on, he enjoyed the financial support of Chester Carlson, inventor of the Xerox
process. Carlson endowed a Chair and Stevenson became Carlson Professor
of Psychiatry in 1964. In 1967, he resigned as chairman of the Department of
Psychiatry and established a Division of Parapsychology (later renamed the
Division of Personality Studies)4 within it. From then on, he devoted all of his
efforts to psychical research. Carlson continued to give annual donations, and
on his death in 1968 left a $1,000,000 bequest to the University of Virginia in
support of the work (Stevenson, 2006).
Twenty Cases was first published in 1966 in the Proceedings of the
American Society for Psychical Research, and reprinted with additional material
that included followup information on the subjects by the University Press
of Virginia in 1974 (Stevenson, 1974b). In this historical review, I describe
reincarnation studies in Anglo–American psychical research before Twenty
Cases appeared, the reception that book received, and the influence it has had. I
also assess it from the vantage of current research. If nothing else, Twenty Cases
brought a new type of spontaneous case5 to the attention of parapsychologists
and the world, although some scholars, like Almeder (1996), believe that it
(together with the works that succeeded it) accomplished much more and that it
would now be “irrational” to deny that reincarnation occurs.
Reincarnation in Psychical Research Before 1960

Phenomena related to survival of death were a core subject matter of
parapsychology from the outset. Indeed, the Society for Psychical Research
(SPR) was founded in 1882 partly to look into the claims of Spiritualism (Gauld,
1968). The earliest work centered on mediumship, apparitions, and other
spontaneous cases. Investigations in these areas furnished the main empirical
support for and against survival, and were debated back and forth for decades,
stalemated by questions about the limits of ESP and the possibility that some
form of “super-ESP”6 could dispose of the evidence (Gauld, 1961, Hart, 1959).
In his landmark Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, F.
W. H. Myers carefully considered two cases often discussed in the context of
reincarnation. One was that of Lurancy Vennum (Stevens, 1887), who took on
the personality of a dead girl, Mary Roff, for about four months, during which
time she recognized people from Mary’s life, but not her own (Myers, 1903,
Vol. 1:360–368). Lurancy returned to herself, however, and this case is better
regarded as one of possession than of reincarnation. The other case was that of
Hélène Smith, the pseudonym of a trance medium who claimed to have had
several previous lives, among other places in India and on Mars (Flournoy,
1900). This case was persuasive to many in French spiritualist circles, but
psychologist Theodore Flournoy demonstrated how the “past-life” personas
were produced by the medium’s subconscious (Myers, 1903, Vol. 2:130–144).
Book Reviews 791
Myers agreed and understandably concluded that “for reincarnation there is as

yet no valid evidence” (1903, Vol. 2:134).7
Reincarnation was not a tenet of Anglo–American Spiritualism,8 but
Theosophy embraced it and promoted it heavily (Besant, 1897, Cooper, 1920,
Walker, 1888).9 Psychical research took little interest in it,10 though a few
workers did comment on it. Sir Oliver Lodge believed that individual spirits
emanated from a common “larger self” and accepted pre-existence but not
reincarnation in the ordinary sense (1907:85–87). James Hyslop of the American
Society for Psychical Research (ASPR) was skeptical, in the absence of good
evidence that previous lives could be recalled (1906, 1919). Sir William Barrett,
who was not troubled by the memory problem, found the prospect attractive
(1917:287–291). Hereward Carrington thought that its plausibility rested on
survival of death in general being proved (1930:57).
The official Spiritualist position notwithstanding, mediumistic communi-
cators not infrequently spoke about reincarnation, and at times asserted links
to the mediums in past lives they said they had shared. Frederick Bligh Bond
(1924) employed an automatist (an automatic writer) in his psychic archaeology
at Glastonbury Abbey and she transmitted communications from a monk who
claimed to have known both Bond and her in previous lives there. J. Arthur
Hill (1929) reported on a series of automatic scripts in which communicators
claimed to be successive reincarnations of a man in love with a previous
incarnation of the automatist. Lady Nona, the communicator in the Rosemary
case of apparent Egyptian xenoglossy11 (Hulme & Wood, 1936, Wood, 1935),
claimed to have known Rosemary, the medium, in an earlier life three thousand
years before.
These cases and others like them are more properly ones of mediumship
than of reincarnation, in that the mediums do not themselves claim to remember
previous lives (unless we want to take the position that the communicators,
rather than being independent entities, are parts of the mediums’ personalities).
The story of Nyria (Soul of Nyria, Praed,12 1931) is different. It was initiated in
an hypnotic session with the hypnotist suggesting a return to a life in ancient
Rome and continued in trances of which the subject, a young English woman,
had no conscious awareness. Nyria purported to be a slave-girl and gave an
account full of verified names and other period detail well beyond the normal
knowledge of the subject, although the existence of Nyria herself was never
confirmed.
Soul of Nyria is not the only example of supposed past-life memory cast as
fiction. Beginning in 1937 with the best-selling Winged Pharaoh, Joan Grant
published a series of historical novels told in the first person which in 1956
she said were based on memories of previous lives. From an early age, Grant
experienced dreams with what she believed were fragmentary memories. In
792 Book Reviews
her 20s, she trained herself to access this “far memory” and began dictating,
in trance, her seven novels, set in ancient Egypt, classical Greece, and
contemporary Rome, Renaissance Italy, and among American Indians in pre-
contact times (Grant, 1956, Kelsey & Grant, 1967).
Some have credited the impressive output of Pearl Curran writing as
Patience Worth to past-life memory, although Patience herself repeatedly
denied reincarnation. She identified herself as a 17th-century English woman
who had emigrated to the American colonies and been killed by Indians there.
She dictated through a Ouija board and then through automatic writing six
long novels and an array of other literary works. Most of the novels are set in
17th-century England, but one is set in Victorian England (two hundred years
after Patience is supposed to have lived) and another in Biblical-era Palestine.
Like Soul of Nyria and the far-memory novels of Joan Grant, these works are
replete with recondite period detail and language that Curran did not know or
use normally (Prince, 1927, Yost, 1916), and their source remains a mystery
(Braude, 2003).
Thanks to the Spiritism of Alan Kardec (1875), which like Theosophy
endorsed the idea, reincarnation was taken more seriously in continental Europe
than in Great Britain and the United States, and European psychical researchers
took more interest in it than did their American and British counterparts.
Albert de Rochas (1911) is well-known for his pioneering exploration of
hypnotic age regression to previous lives, but perhaps because his book has
not been translated into English it is not generally realized that the regressions
compose only a small part of the presentation. It is a wide-ranging discussion of
reincarnation that includes a review of spontaneous cases culled from a variety
of sources, including Fielding (1898). Even less well-known is a book by de
Rochas’s countryman and colleague Charles Lancelin (1922), who described
the important Italian child case of Alessandrina (Alexandrina) Samona, one of
the earliest European cases on record. This case has the interesting feature that
the rebirth was heralded in multiple ways (in dreams, séance communications,
and poltergeist raps). There are striking physical and behavioral similarities
with the previous person, and Alessandrina apparently recalled an incident from
that person’s previous life.
In 1924, R. B. S. Sunderlal reported four Indian cases in the Revue
Métapsychique.13 That same year, Gabriel Delanne (1924), a follower of Allan
Kardec, released another general study of reincarnation. In addition to survey-
ing spontaneous child cases, child prodigies, and déjà vu experiences, Delanne
examined cases of retrocognition and reviewed cases in which rebirths had
been announced in mediumistic communications. Again, because his book has
not been translated into English, it has had little influence on Anglo–American
psychical research. Other French Spiritists, such as Geléy (1920, 1930) and
Book Reviews 793
Flammarion (1923), whose works have been translat-

ed, are better-known, but unfortunately, although they
endorse reincarnation, they do not mention the many
spontaneous cases documented by Rochas, Lancelin,
and Delanne.
The publisher Ralph Shirley (1936) produced
the first well-rounded analysis of the evidence for
reincarnation in English. He discussed the strengths
and weaknesses of automatic writing, hypnotic age
regression, and spontaneous memories, including
many of those assembled by the French writers. He
briefly mentioned Shanti Devi, based on an Indian newspaper story.14 Yeats-
Brown (1936) summarized many of the same cases. The following year, Arthur
Osborn (1937) treated reincarnation as an aspect of the human experience in
The Superphysical. This book contains descriptions of several British cases,
gathered in response to Osborn’s own surveys. Osborn’s cases are less evidential
than those of Shirley and Yeats-Brown, but they give a sense of the quotidian
ground from which the better cases spring.
Age regression to previous lives under hypnosis was largely a parlor game
of mesmerists and amateur hypnotists before the researches of de Rochas (1911),
and after him there are no significant reports until Bernstein’s The Search for
Bridey Murphy exploded into public awareness as a newspaper serial in 1954
and a best-selling book in 1956 (Bernstein, 1956). Bridey Murphy purported to
be a 19th-century Irish woman, and Bernstein’s book convinced many people
that reincarnation had occurred. Although her account of herself included
obscure details that were verified, the case was attacked on various grounds,
and the public lost faith in Bridey as quickly as it had fallen for her (Ducasse,
1960). Another veridical hypnotic regression case, that of Naomi Henry (Blythe,
1956), passed almost unnoticed in the wake of the Bridey Murphy controversy,
and after Zolik (1958) showed how easy it was to construct fantasies under
hypnosis, psychical research all but abandoned age regression as a reliable
doorway to previous lives.
The “life readings” of the psychic Edgar Cayce began as an inadvertent
offshoot of his health or “physical readings” (Cerminara, 1950, Sugrue, 1942),
but quickly became part of a post–world-war cult craze that continues to this
day. Many of Cayce’s physical readings and prescriptions were uncannily
accurate, so there was a presumption of authenticity for the life readings as
well. He attributed not one but a series of lives to each petitioner, with links
between lives explained through various types of karma. Many readings had
the same sequence of settings for the lives, such as “Atlantis, Egypt, Rome,
the Crusades period, and the Early [American] Colonial period,” explained
794 Book Reviews
on the theory that period-cohorts tended to reincarnate together (Cerminara,

1950:43). The entranced Cayce said that he drew information partly from the
subconscious of petitioners and partly from the “Akashic Records” (Cerminara,
1950:45). Although it was possible to verify information given for the more
recent lives in a few instances, earlier lives were not amenable to checking, and
psychical researchers discounted Cayce’s readings further by pointing out that
they came from a sensitive rather than from the subjects themselves.
In a well-received book published in 1953, the Australian physicist Raynor
Johnson tied together psi, survival, and mystical experience in a grand portrait
of human nature reminiscent of Myers. He argued for reincarnation and karma,
which like other authors he considered to go hand in hand, and pointed to child
prodigies, déjà vu experiences, and occasional memory claims (citing Shirley,
1936) as evidence of pre-existence and reincarnation.
Among philosophers, J. M. E. McTaggart (1906) advanced a reasoned
argument for what he called the “plurality of lives,” avoiding the word
reincarnation, perhaps because of its occult associations. He found support in
love at first sight (the lovers had known each other in earlier lives) and innate
character traits, arguing at length that the self might persist through a series of
lives while having memories only of the present one. James Ward (1911), in
his Gifford Lectures of 1907–1910, considered reincarnation to be consonant
with the economy of nature and superior to the Christian concept of bodily
resurrection as a theory of immortality.
C. J. Ducasse (1948, 1951), who was well-acquainted with psychical
research and served for years on the ASPR Board of Trustees, wrote at length
on reincarnation or, as he termed it, transmigration. Ducasse (1951) cited the
Japanese case of Katsugoro (Hearn, 1897), in which a seven-year-old boy made
verified statements about a child who had died in another place several years
before, as an example of a memory claim, and considered various objections
to the idea of reincarnation. C. D. Broad (1958), who like Ducasse was well-
acquainted with psychical research, conceptualized reincarnation in terms of
his theory of Ψ-components. He regarded reincarnation as the most likely form
survival might take, but offered no evidence of it.
Paul Siwek (1953) contributed what appears to be the first thoroughgoing
skeptical treatment of reincarnation,15 although it was directed not to psychical
research but to Theosophy, which continued to be the most prominent promoter
of the idea in England and America. Siwek addressed déjà vu and apparent
memories arising in dreams and under hypnosis, as well as the claims of
children. He was skeptical of the last because of children’s tendency to fantasize
and suggested that Indian cases might be prompted by cultural expectations.
Book Reviews 795
Enter Ian Stevenson

In 1960, Stevenson published a literature review that ushered in a new chapter
in the study of reincarnation. He reported having found 44 apparently credible
accounts of persons who claimed to remember having lived before. In 28 of
these cases, the subjects had made at least six statements relating to the previous
life and the two families were unknown to each other before the previous
person was identified and the statements were confirmed. The majority of
the subjects were young children, like Katsugoro, Alessandrina Samona, and
Shanti Devi. The cases came from 13 countries, including India, Burma, Italy,
England, Belgium, Greece, Cuba, Mauritius, Japan, France, Syria, Canada, and
the United States (Stevenson, 1960).
The previous lives in these cases all occurred close by the subjects and not
long in the past, very different from what Western occult traditions, cases like
Rosemary and Nyria, the far-memory novels of Joan Grant, and the life readings
of Edgar Cayce, had led one to expect.16 Moreover, the memories were veridical,
long the gold standard of spontaneous cases in parapsychology. No one since
Shirley (1936), Yeats-Brown (1936), and Osborn (1937) had brought cases
like these together and they were little-known. Most writers on reincarnation
appealed to logical argument and quoted cultural luminaries who believed in
it. Their evidence consisted largely of child prodigies and déjà vu experiences,
and many took pains to explain why previous lives were not normally recalled
(e.g., Johnson, 1953:385–388). No one seems to have realized there were so
many spontaneous cases on record, or that they shared such a class similarity.
In their last major works, Ducasse (1961) and Broad (1962) referenced
Stevenson’s paper, although it appeared too late for them to consider at
length. Ducasse, who had been in contact with Stevenson and received from
him complete reports of several cases, analyzed some of the more impressive
(1961:241–247) and concluded that they provided “the best conceivable kind of
evidence” for reincarnation (1961:306). Broad concurred that the best of them
were “strongly suggestive” of reincarnation (1962:411). A. J. Ayer also may
have had Stevenson’s paper in mind when he wrote: “I think it would be open
to us to admit the logical possibility of reincarnation merely by laying down
the rule that if a person who is physically identified as living at a later time
does have the ostensible memories and character of a person who is physically
identified as living at an earlier time, they are to be counted as one person and
not two” (1963:127).17
A dissonant note was sounded by C. T. K. Chari, a professor at the
Madras Christian College in South India. He pointed to similarities among
mediumship, possession, reincarnation, and multiple personality, arguing that
what seem to be past-life memories are fantasies produced in altered states of
796 Book Reviews
consciousness (Chari, 1961–1962a, 1961–1962b, cf. Stevenson, 1961–1962).

These papers were quickly followed by others that offered explanations in
terms of cryptomnesia (Chari, 1962a), paramnesia (Chari, 1962b), and
psychometry allied with GESP (general extra-sensory perception) (Chari,
1962c).
Stevenson’s paper caught the attention of two other people who were to have
a profound influence on his life. One was Chester Carlson, whose importance
has already been noted. The other was Eileen Garrett of the Parapsychology
Foundation. At the beginning of 1961, she told Stevenson that she had heard of
a child case in India and offered him funds to investigate it. By the time he left
for India and Ceylon later that year, he knew of a few other cases, but he went
expecting to find children who only spoke about having lived before. He should
have been prepared by the accounts he had reviewed for behaviors, physical
traits, and birthmarks related to the previous persons as well, but these latter
features of the cases caught him by surprise, and he was slow to appreciate their
significance. He was surprised also by the large number of additional cases he
learned about. Later, with Carlson’s support, he went to Lebanon, Brazil, and
Alaska. He returned to several of these places more than once. The result was
Twenty Cases (Stevenson, 2006).
Twenty Cases and the Cultural Conformance Theory

Twenty Cases introduced terminology that has been adopted by other researchers,
and it set the standard for investigating and reporting reincarnation-type cases.
Stevenson’s methods were modeled on the investigations of spontaneous cases
by the early SPR and emphasized the careful recording and consideration of
facts, aimed at establishing paranormality. The great majority of cases were
some years old and the two families had met by the time Stevenson arrived,
so his research centered on interviews with first-hand witnesses and the
scrutiny of what written documents were available. Only rarely did he reach
a case before it was “solved,” allowing him to make a record of the subject’s
statements and behaviors before attempting to verify them, and to observe the
initial meeting of the subject and the family of the previous person, if the latter
could be identified. Solved cases with records made before verification are ideal
because the investigator can reduce the chance of informants misremembering
or forgetting key details, but they are rare (Keil & Tucker, 2005).
The twenty case studies are grouped by country or culture with each
section prefaced by a resume of the reincarnation beliefs of that region or
people. Most reports include tabulations of statements and behaviors along with
brief comments that are expanded upon as appropriate in the general discussion.
Each report describes how the case was investigated and assesses possibilities
such as fraud, malobservation, tricks of memory, and so forth, as well as sundry
Book Reviews 797
paranormal explanations, before deciding that the case is best interpreted as one
of reincarnation. The arguments are summarized and reconsidered in a chapter
at the end of the volume.
Neither in that chapter nor elsewhere does Stevenson assert that the
cases prove that reincarnation occurs—only that the best of them are highly
suggestive of it. Of the book’s reviewers, Beloff (1966) and McHarg (1969)
accepted this conclusion, with McHarg pointing out that what reincarnated
appeared to be something less than a full personality. Chari (1967) proposed
various alternative explanations, including ESP. Louisa Rhine (1966) suggested
that the cases might be the result of parents unconsciously shaping the behavior
of their children to conform to cultural expectations about reincarnation, a
position anticipated by Siwek (1953) and assumed by many later critics.
The fullest and most oft-cited expression of the psycho-cultural (or socio-
psychological) theory was made by Brody (1979) in a review of a later book by
Stevenson. Pasricha (1992), however, found that parental guidance could not
account for cases in North India, and Schouten and Stevenson (1998) tested the
possibility by comparing cases with and without written records made before
verification. On the psycho-cultural theory, cases with written records would be
expected to have many fewer verified statements than cases without them. The
test did not support this theory. Children in the group with written records made
more statements, an average of 25.5 as against an average of 18.5, a statistically
significant difference (p < 0.01), while the percentage of correct statements was
roughly the same in both groups—76.7% in the cases with written records and
78.4% in the cases without them.
Mills (1990a, 1990b) studied several Indian cases with differences of religion
(Hinduism and Buddhism) between the previous person and the subject and
wondered why religious parents would choose to impose another religious
identity on their children. We could ask a similar question about the large num-
ber of Indian cases with differences of caste. Also, many parents attempt to stop
their children from talking about their memories, believing that they will suffer
from them in some way.18 Suppression attempts are seldom successful (Steven-
son & Chadha, 1990), but if the parents are responsible for the cases, why do
they seek to quash them once they have brought them into being? Is it because
they have taken on lives of their own, so to speak? Many children insist they
have other families and demand to be taken to their previous homes, and this
must not be pleasant for their parents to hear.
The psychological and interpersonal conflicts necessary to produce
reincarnation-type cases in the psycho-cultural theory led Rhine (1966) and
Brody (1979) to call for explorations of the children’s psychologies. This has
now been done by Haraldsson and his colleagues in Sri Lanka (Haraldsson,
1995, 1997, Haraldsson, Fowler, & Periyannanpillai, 2000) and Lebanon
798 Book Reviews
(Haraldsson, 2003) and Mills (2003) in India. Children with past-life memories
are viewed by their parents as being more highly strung, more tense, more
argumentative, and more anxious and fearful than children in matched control
groups (though teachers do not report behavioral problems, and in fact the
children perform better in school than their peers). They score higher on
dissociation scales but are no more suggestible than their peers. In Lebanon,
where 80% recalled violent deaths, they seemed to suffer from a mild PTSD.
On the whole, differences between the groups appear to be attributable to
effects of the memories and do not explain them. Braude (2003), however,
wants more information on what psychological needs the memories fulfill in a
particular case. He regards the statements of Stevenson and others on this point
as superficial (as they often are), but it is not at all clear that further probing
would turn up anything of consequence.
Cultural conformance theories (of which psycho-cultural theories are a
variety) are challenged by the veridical aspects of the cases, the birthmarks
and other physical features of many, and the strong emotions and personations
exhibited by the children, forcing critics to include super-psi (as super-ESP is
now called) in their explanatory paradigms. Braude (1989, 1992, 2003) believes
that super-psi has not been properly appreciated and suggests that the children
may be accessing it in psi-conducive dissociated states (2003:24). There is little
doubt that, given sufficient ingenuity, super-psi can be stretched to cover any
eventuality, and therefore in a strict sense it cannot be ruled out, no matter how
crippling its complexity becomes. However, not everyone finds it as plausible
as Braude does. Griffin (1997) introduces what he calls retroprehensive
inclusion, essentially a new type of psi, to account for survival cases in general,
but regards even that as failing to explain the better reincarnation-type cases.
In any event, super-psi would operate within cultural confines and be
dependent upon the cultural conformance theory, so any evidence against the
latter would count also against the former.19 With this in mind, let us examine
some of the cases in the book.
Seven Cases
A Lebanese Druse boy, Imad Elawar, expressed over and over again his joy at
being able to walk. He gave many names and other details that pertained to a
man from another town who had been bedridden, probably with tuberculosis
of the spine, for two months before he died. Imad also had a pronounced fear
of large motor vehicles. The man whose life he recalled had been involved in
a bus accident and had had a cousin who had died following a truck accident.20
He had spoken French well and Imad learned that language quickly, although
no one else in his family could speak or understand it. This case was unsolved
when Stevenson reached it and he was able to record much of what Imad said
Book Reviews 799
and how he behaved before searching for and identifying the previous person,
and thus it cannot easily be attributed to cultural construction (which may be
why Angel, 1994a, 1994b, attacks Stevenson’s research methods instead, cf.
Stevenson, 1995).
An Indian boy named Ravi Shankar was born with a long, linear mark,
closely resembling the scar of a knife wound, across his neck. He spoke about
having been murdered, named the killers, and gave other details of the crime,
in which the head had been severed from the body. Ravi’s birthmark is typical
of birthmarks in reincarnation-type cases. Few are of the common types but
rather are congenital marks matching wounds and other marks on the bodies of
the deceased persons whose lives the children recall (Stevenson, 1997a). The
men Ravi named as the murderers lived in his town, and he was afraid of them
whenever he saw them. His fear remained with him as he grew older, even as
his imaged memories faded.
The case of Mallika, an Indian girl, is strikingly different. Imad was
between one and a half and two and Ravi between two and three years old
when they made their first statements, apparently spontaneously. Mallika was
four when her family moved to a new city, where they rented the ground floor
of a house. The first time she visited her landlord’s apartment, upstairs from her
own, she noticed some embroidered cushions, and said that she had made them.
She later commented on several other things in the apartment that identified
her with the landlord’s wife’s deceased sister. She exhibited some striking
behavioral similarities to this woman, but she made no statements that were not
recognitions.
Younger children, many of whom make their first statements as soon as
they begin to speak, are more likely to make them spontaneously, while subjects
of Mallika’s age or older are more likely to make them in response to something
they have seen (Matlock, 1988, 1989). It is as if the images have increasing
difficulty breaking into consciousness as the children age.21 Pratomwan Inthanu,
a Thai woman, was 20 when veridical memories of two different lives came to
her while meditating (Stevenson, 1983b). Uttara Huddar was 32 when she met
a man she believed to be the reincarnation of her past-life husband and began to
enter periodic fugue states, in which she behaved and spoke like an early 19th-
century Bangali woman called Sharada (Akolkar, 1992, Stevenson, 1984).22
Not only was Mallika relatively old (for a child subject) when she made
her recognitions, her case is a rare South Indian case, the only one among seven
Indian cases in Twenty Cases. The population of South India is largely Dravidian
or descended from Dravidian tribes, the most prominent of India’s indigenous
peoples. The Indo-European speaking Aryans arrived in North India around
1500 BC and their religion, Hinduism, adopted the belief in reincarnation from
the peoples they encountered there (Fürer-Haimendorf, 1953, Obeyesekere,
800 Book Reviews
1980). Belief in reincarnation is as strong today in South India as it is in the

rest of the country. If beliefs sufficed to produce the cases, we would expect to
find as many in the south as in the north, yet there are few cases in South India
(Chari, 1967, Pasricha, 2001).
The comparative lack of cases in South India again shows the cultural
conformance theory to be too facile, issues of veridicality aside. Moreover,
reincarnation is not a single monolithic belief but a general term that designates
a set of kindred beliefs and sub-beliefs. The exact beliefs and sub-beliefs vary
from tradition to tradition (Neufeld, 1986, O’Flaherty, 1980). If the cultural
conformance theory were correct, cases should reflect not only the general
belief in reincarnation, but the local beliefs also (or in particular). However, at
least in North India, this is not so. People unacquainted with actual cases expect
them to develop in ways they do not (Pasricha, 1990).
Still, we can find traces of cultural influences on reincarnation-type cases,
if we step back a little. Let us take the example of intermission length, the
duration of the interval between lives. Intermission length varies across cultures
more or less in line with cultural expectations, though it does not match them
closely (Matlock, 1990b:225–226). For instance, the Druse expect the deceased
to reincarnate in a newborn immediately upon death. The median intermission
length for 79 of Stevenson’s Druse cases was eight months, the second shortest
of all the cultures in which he had studied cases (Stevenson, 1986:212),23 but
longer than the expectation.
If the cases are produced in conformance with cultural demands, it is hard to
understand why the Druse would create this awkward situation for themselves.
They hypothesize brief intermediate lives to make up the extra time (Stevenson,
2001:176), thereby bringing their belief into conformance with the cases, but
would it not be easier to imagine fully culturally compliant cases from the start?
From a reincarnation perspective, the tendency for intermission length to vary
by culture can be explained if a person’s beliefs can influence the circumstances
of his or her rebirth (Matlock, 1990b:238). This may seem improbable, but I
will give other examples of its possible occurrence later.24
The North Indian case of Swarnlata is instructive for very different reasons.
Swarnlata was three and a half when she drove with her family through a town
unknown to her and said they were near her old house. Thereafter she described
what were evidently spontaneous memories of an earlier life. Her father and
an outside investigator made notes of her statements, which the investigator
then matched to a woman from the designated town who had died several years
before Swarnlata’s birth. When Swarnlata was taken to meet this woman’s
family, she recognized numerous people and places from her life, even passing
tests intended to mislead her.
Swarnlata also performed dances and songs she said were from another
Book Reviews 801
life, intermediate between the life she recalled best and her own. She sang
the songs in Bengali, the language of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). This
intermediate life was never confirmed, but in the 1974 second edition of Twenty
Cases, Stevenson reported that the songs had been identified as traditional
ones from the Bengal region. Although Swarnlata was unable to converse in
Bengali, as Uttara Huddar did, her singing is a form of recitative xenoglossy.
If the intermediate life was real, Swarnlata’s main memories may have been
stimulated by her environment, even though the life to which they related was
not the most recent one.
Another noteworthy Indian case in the collection is that of Jasbir, who at
the age of five suffered a serious illness and seemed to die, but revived and after
he had recuperated claimed to be a different person, named Sobha Ram. This
case is similar to the case of Lurancy Vennum, except that Lurancy’s possession
by Mary Roff lasted less than four months, whereas Sobha Ram came to
occupy Jasbir’s body permanently. In this respect, it is like the Sumitra case
(Stevenson, Pasricha, & McLean-Rice, 1989), also one of permanent possession
or “replacement reincarnation,” to coin a term.25 It is different from the Uttara
Huddar case in that Sharada was not an invading entity but was connected to
Uttara as a past-life personality whose initial emergence was triggered by a
highly emotional encounter. The revitalized Jasbir gradually came to accept his
new circumstances and developed normally in them, even accepting the name
Jasbir, which he at first resisted.
The Ceylonese case of Wijeratne is the only case in Twenty Cases to feature
a birth defect related to the previous person. Wijeratne claimed to recall the
life of a man who had killed his arranged bride when she refused to move
from her parents’ house after their civil wedding but before this was publicly
celebrated in a marriage feast. He had been tried for the crime, convicted, and
hung. Wijeratne was born with a shrunken left arm, the same arm the previous
person had used to wield the murder weapon.
Wijeratne attributed his deformity to karma, but reincarnation-type cases
provide scant evidence of karma as a moral system of rewards and punishments,
much less as conceived in this coercive, cause-and-effect way. Although
there are many Asian cases in which the social and economic situation of the
subject varies greatly from that of the previous person, there is no discernable
correlation with what is known about the previous person. Because the karmic
reason for the shifts in social status is not apparent, the assumption is that there
must be something that is not known, perhaps something from an anterior or
intermediate life, that has resulted in the present circumstances (Stevenson,
2001). Again, beliefs are adjusted to fit the cases, not the other way around, as
advocates of the cultural conformance theory would have it.
Karma is considered moral because it is derived from one’s actions (and
802 Book Reviews
sometimes one’s thoughts, intentions, etc.), good and bad. It has been taken
by many writers as a corollary of reincarnation and advanced as an ethically
appealing aspect of the belief (e.g., by Osborn, 1937, and by Johnson, 1953). But
there is nothing about reincarnation that logically entails karma, and in small-
scale or tribal societies like the Dravidian and Tlingit, reincarnation beliefs
do not include it (Matlock, 1993, Obeyesekere, 2002).26 Karma is a Sanskrit
word that originally denoted ritual action but came to be linked to reincarnation
and took on its moral coloring in Hinduism and Buddhism after they had
acquired the belief in rebirth from Indian tribal peoples (Fürer-Haimendorf,
1953, Obeyesekere, 1980, 2002). I return to this issue in my discussion of
Stevenson’s Tlingit cases, below. If not evidence of karma, Wijeratne’s case
can be explained as due to the previous person’s belief that his conduct would
have this result, and thus is another example of a person’s beliefs influencing
the reincarnation process.27
The case of Paulo Lorenz, one of two Brazilian cases28 in the book, has
several interesting features, not least of which is that Paulo recalled the life of
his deceased sister, Emilia, who had poisoned and killed herself, saying that
she wished to be reborn a boy. Paulo did not start speaking until he was three
and a half. The first thing he said was to tell another child, who was about to
put something in his mouth, that it was dangerous to do that. He identified with
Emilia, and until he was four or five refused to wear boy’s clothes. He only
accepted trousers when an old skirt of Emilia’s was used to make him a pair.
Neither Paulo nor Emilia showed any interest in cooking and both disliked
milk and had the habit of breaking corners off bread. Most importantly, both
were skilled at sewing, the only members of a family of fifteen who showed
any aptitude for it. Paulo recognized and demonstrated how to thread and use
Emilia’s sewing machine when he was younger than four years old.
Sex change is one of the features of reincarnation-type cases that varies
according to cultural expectation, being found most often in places with
traditions that allow for it, and seldom or not at all where it is believed not to
happen (Matlock, 1990b:226–227). This sometimes is held to be a telling point
in favor of the cases as cultural constructions, but it could just as well be that in
places that sex change is thought impossible, people do not consider it an option
for themselves, and so return as members of the same sex.
In the majority of sex-change cases, the subjects adjust to their new
anatomical sex, but in some cases, gender confusion persists for years (Mills,
2004, Stevenson, 1977b, Tucker & Keil, 2001). Paulo began to lose his intense
feminine traits when he was about six but was effeminate even in adulthood.
He never married and, Stevenson tells us in the second edition of Twenty
Cases, he killed himself when he was 43. Most of the other subjects in Twenty
Cases moved beyond their childhood memories and developed normally, but
Book Reviews 803
Wijeratne also experienced difficulties. He suffered a series of psychotic breaks

triggered by imagined rejections by women he liked and was several years late
in qualifying for university studies. Such severe adjustment problems are rare,
but less extreme ones have been reported on occasion. Mills (2006) describes
memories that impeded arranged marriages in two Indian cases because the
subjects, then in their twenties, still had strong attachments to the persons they
considered their past-life spouses. Shanti Devi provides another example of the
same (Lönnerstrand, 1998:84–85).
Animistic Reincarnation
We turn now to the Tlingit cases. These are divergent from the other cases in
some respects, although they share many features with them. The Tlingit are an
Alaskan Indian tribe whose reincarnation beliefs are rooted in a long Amerindian
(Jefferson, 2009, Mills & Slobodin, 1994) and global (Matlock, 1993) tradition
that includes the Dravidians and others. This is the tradition called animism, a
collection of beliefs about souls and spirits and their operation in the natural and
supernatural worlds (Tylor, 1871).29 Belief in postmortem survival is universal
in animistic societies and reincarnation beliefs are more common than might be
thought. Half of the world’s tribal peoples in cross-cultural samples have or at
one time had them (Matlock, 1993, 1995).30
In discussions of reincarnation beliefs, a contrast is often made between
Hindu and Buddhist ideas. This is an important distinction, because Buddhists
do not recognize an eternal soul but imagine rebirth propelled by attachments
to the material world (with karma playing a central role), whereas Hindus
conceive of a personal soul that continues to evolve through a succession of
lives (O’Flaherty, 1980). However, there is another contrast to be made, and
that is between reincarnation beliefs that incorporate karma and those that do
not. I believe this latter distinction to be the more basic and so group Hindu
and Buddhist beliefs together in opposition to animistic ones (Matlock, 1996).
Because reincarnation-type cases provide little evidence of karma, regardless of
the culture from which they are reported (Stevenson, 2001:251–253), they fall
under the heading of Animistic reincarnation.
Without the concept of karma,31 the Tlingit and other tribal peoples are
free to believe that they may exercise some control over the reincarnation
process, and in two of the Tlingit cases in Twenty Cases (Corliss Chortkin,
Jr., and William George, Jr.), the previous persons stated their intentions to be
reborn to the mothers of the subjects. Planned returns were expressed in the two
Brazilian cases in Twenty Cases, but they are unusual under Indic belief systems
(including Jainism and Sikhism along with Hinduism and Buddhism),32 where
karma is thought to govern the rebirth process.33 Planned returns are distinctly
animistic in implying a discarnate agency, and Stevenson (2001:39) regarded
804 Book Reviews
them as the only variety of reincarnation belief for which there is empirical
evidence.
However, the Tlingit cases are weaker evidentially than those of Southeast
Asia, and Stevenson evinced relatively little interest in them. He published
papers on the Tlingit (1966a) and neighboring Haida (1975a), but never
produced a volume of case reports about them, as he did for other cultures
(1975b, 1977a, 1980, 1983b). The weaknesses stem in part from the planned
returns, which set up the expectation of the rebirth, thereby opening the cases
to charges of parental and societal shaping in accordance to the expectation.
Another reason is that in most Tlingit cases (including all seven in Twenty Cases),
the previous person and the subject are related, so that the subject in theory
could have learned about the previous person normally or paranormally from
relatives. These cases are also often less well-developed, with fewer statements
and recognitions attributed to the subjects, than are the better Southeast Asian
cases (though rich cases may occur also among tribal peoples; see Mills, 2010).
A striking feature of the Tlingit cases in Twenty Cases is the birthmarks.
Six of the seven have birthmarks, but elsewhere in the collection they appear
only in the case of Ravi Shankar (Wijeratne’s birth defect is of a different
order). Along with planned returns, announcing dreams,34 and physical and
behavioral similarities, birthmarks are signs that allow the Tlingit to identify
a child with a particular deceased person even before he or she begins to talk
(de Laguna, 1972, Matlock, 1990a). These signs, which have become well-
known as recurrent features of reincarnation-type cases, have been reported
by ethnographers and other observers in relation to animistic reincarnation
beliefs for many years. They were noted by Tylor (1871:3–5), who assumed
that they had occurred from time immemorial and suggested that they were the
foundation of the belief in reincarnation, as seems very possible.
In small-scale tribal societies, a premium typically is placed on returning
in the same lineage or kin grouping, allowing for an almost literal “social
reproduction.” When signs suggest a child is a returning relative, he or she
may be given that person’s name and grow up to take on or to qualify to take
on that person’s rights and responsibilities and even to inherit his tangible and
intangible property (Matlock, 1990a, 1993, Mills, 1988). However, when signs
suggest that the child is the reincarnation of someone outside the kin grouping,
this also is accepted, and reincarnation thereby promotes social cohesion (Mills
& Champion, 1996). In the much more populous Indic societies, the pattern
is reversed, with the majority of cases occurring between non-relatives, often
strangers. This is because, as Obeyesekere puts it, “karma theory produces
dislocation and the dispersal of kin” in rebirth (2002:344). It does so by de-
emphasizing personal relationships and ascribing rebirth to an impersonal
moral force.
Book Reviews 805
I suggest that personal agency always plays a role, but different sets of
expectations (on the part of the previous persons), generated by different
cultural ideals (discarnate agency vs. karma), produce the different outcomes
(same-family cases in animistic societies vs. non-relative and stranger cases
in Indic societies). Beliefs about the reincarnation process influence the cases
from the inside, as it were, carried by dying persons into their postmortem state.
Discarnate actors are involved in selecting their new births, unconsciously if not
consciously.35 This accords with animistic thinking and is what I call Animistic
reincarnation.
Keil (1996) called cases in which the child makes no or very few
statements “silent” and “near-silent” cases. His data suggest that these account
for a relatively small percentage of cases among the Turkish Alevi, whereas
the impression one receives from the ethnographic literature is that silent and
near-silent cases are in the majority in tribal societies. The less well-developed
tribal cases are like cases from Europe and non-tribal North America (Harrison
& Harrison, 1991, Jacobson, 1974, Osborn, 1937, Rivas, 2003, 2004, Stemman,
2005, Stevenson, 1960, 2003, Tucker, 2005) in being notably underdeveloped
and often unsolved. Moreover, solved cases similar to those from other places,
have been reported from Europe and non-tribal North America (Cockell, 1994,
Leininger & Leininger, 2009, Stevenson, 1960, 1983a, 1983b, 2003, Tucker,
2005). There is no correlation between the strength of reincarnation beliefs and
the strength or even the appearance of cases. Both strong and weak cases may
occur where the belief is weak or absent as well as where it is strongly present,
and cases where the belief is strongly present are not always strong as we saw in
the instance of South India36 and see again with the cases from tribal societies.
We must therefore seek explanations for these cases in terms of something other
than the belief in reincarnation.37
The same year the revised edition of Twenty Cases appeared, Stevenson
introduced the idea of a psychophore to explain how reincarnation might operate.
He described the psychophore as an “intermediate ‘non-physical’ body which
acts as the carrier of . . . attributes between one life and another” (1974a:406).
He returned to this idea in Children Who Remember Previous Lives, where he
speculated at greater length about processes (2001:233–254). The psychophore
would not simply convey characteristics, but would have will and intention at
its disposal. It might exercise some initiative, such as waiting for a body of the
desired sex to be available, if it did not operate on the developing zygote directly.
The psychophore sounds very much like an astral body—perhaps a “minded”
astral body, to borrow a term from Wheatley (1979)—and it harmonizes well
with my concept of Animistic reincarnation.38
If reincarnation happens for some, does it happen for all? Griffin assumes
that the only people who have reincarnated are those who remember having
806 Book Reviews
lived before (1997:186), but silent cases suggest that reincarnation may occur
without imaged memories, and it is possible that a person might reincarnate
without having any indication of it whatsoever. And if we all reincarnate, we
may all have past-life memories accessible to us. They may enter consciousness
on occasion, and perhaps be retrievable under hypnosis, trance, and other
dissociative states, as we find with adults such as Pratomwan Inthanu and
Uttara Huddar. They may also lie in the background of fictional productions
such as those of Pearl Curran and Joan Grant. I believe the assumption that we
all reincarnate handles the data better than the assumption that only some of
us do, but as Stevenson observed (2001:216), we may never be certain on this
point.
Stevenson’s Legacy
Twenty Cases depicted reincarnation very differently than had been imagined
before Stevenson’s 1960 paper, and it more than confirmed the findings
and fulfilled the promise of that paper. All the major recurrent features of
reincarnation-type cases appear in the book.39 Indeed, it is remarkable how
well it lays out the parameters of this type of case. Subsequent work has
added details but has not changed our understanding in any substantial way.
Moreover, as I have shown, the twenty cases collectively provide the basis of a
theoretical conception of reincarnation in terms of an Animistic as opposed to
an Indic model, a way of thinking about reincarnation radically different from
that assumed before 1960.
Twenty Cases did much to pull reincarnation studies out of the realm of
speculation and to provide it a scientific footing. However, Stevenson’s fellow
parapsychologists were slow to recognize its significance, and the larger world
of science, to which Stevenson appealed constantly, has yet to come to grips
with it (Edelstein, 2008). Attitudes may be changing, however. Astronomer and
science writer Carl Sagan, a skeptic about most things parapsychological, wrote
in his last book that he regarded reincarnation-type cases to be one of the few
promising areas of research in the field (Sagan, 1997:302).
One reason for Stevenson’s early difficulty in parapsychology was
his adherence to the old SPR style of field investigation at a time when the
gravitational center of the discipline had moved from spontaneous cases and
survival questions to laboratory studies of ESP under the influence of J. B. Rhine
(Alvarado & Zingrone, 2008). Stevenson was out of step with the majority of
his colleagues, especially in the United States. It was widely believed that he
was the only researcher turning up reincarnation-type cases, something easily
disproved (Matlock, 1990b). Similar cases had been reported by many people
over many years, and other investigators, such as Brazilian parapsychologist
Hernani Andrade, were finding them also. However, because Andrade published
Book Reviews 807
in Portuguese (e.g., 1988), he was and still is not as well-known in the English-
speaking world as he should be (but see Playfair, 1975, 2006, and Andrade,
Rossi, Playfair, & Lima, 2010, for English-language summaries of his cases.)
Of those Stevenson trained to assist him in the field, Satwant Pasricha
has made the most significant contributions, but she is not the only one. K.
S. Rawat has recently co-authored an article and a book with newcomer Titus
Rivas (Rawat & Rivas, 2005, 2007). Stevenson’s research has attracted others
as well. Anthropologist Antonia Mills was acquainted with the reincarnation
beliefs of the Indians of British Columbia when she met Stevenson in 1984
and became interested in cases (Mills, 1994). Stevenson underwrote her work
with the Gitksan and Beaver, reported in 1988, as well as her first field trips to
India, in 1987 and 1988, in an attempt to “replicate” his findings (Mills, 1989).
Later, she joined Erlendur Haraldsson and Jürgen Keil in a larger replication of
Stevenson’s research (Mills, Haraldsson, & Keil, 1994).40
As readers of this Journal know, Pasricha, Mills, Haraldsson, and Keil
have continued to report reincarnation-type cases and have carried the research
in new directions. Haraldsson (1995, 2000, 2003) has studied the psychology
of the child subjects, Mills (2001, 2006, 2010) is demonstrating the power of
combining anthropological and parapsychological approaches, and Keil (1996,
2010) is drawing attention to unusual and problematical cases. Meanwhile,
Tucker (2005) has been working with non-tribal American cases, Rivas (2000,
2003, 2004) has reported cases from The Netherlands, and an increasing
number of original accounts are appearing in popular publications (Bowman,
1997, 2001, Cockell, 1994, Harrison & Harrison, 1991, Leininger & Leininger,
2009). Important new voices are also emerging on the side of commentary
and critique (Edelman & Bernet, 2007, Moura Visoni, 2010, Nahm & Hassler,
2011). Stevenson’s passing has not brought an end to serious reincarnation
studies, as some may have expected.
I have focused on the professional reception of Twenty Cases because
that is where Stevenson placed his emphasis, but I cannot altogether ignore
the popular sphere, for it is there that the book has had its greatest impact. By
1990, Twenty Cases had been translated into seven languages and sold some
50,000 copies (Stevenson, 1990), astonishing for a university press offering.
It is difficult to find a book on reincarnation published after 1966 that does not
refer to it. Many popular books summarize its cases and conclusions, making
them more accessible to a wide audience. Angel identifies it as “one of the most
influential sources of empirical evidence for reincarnation” (1994a:481) and
says that his students in the philosophy of religion routinely cite authors who
have been persuaded by it.
As of 1990, Stevenson’s research had received little attention from
academia (see Matlock, 1990b). Since that date, it has been addressed by several
808 Book Reviews
philosophers, who have raised the level of discourse on the subject considerably.
Angel (1994b) limits himself to the case of Imad Elawar, but Almeder (1992),
Becker (1993), Paterson (1995), Edwards (1996), Griffin (1997), Braude
(2003), Grosso (2004), and Lund (2009) treat Stevenson’s work generally.
Edwards, a humanist, ridicules much of the data. Almeder, as already noted, is
convinced. The others fall somewhere in between. Most contrast reincarnation
with super-psi and psycho-cultural explanations. Griffin, Becker, Lund, Paterson,
and Grosso lean toward reincarnation, but Braude favors super-psi.
Stevenson had high hopes for Reincarnation and Biology, his massive
two-volume examination of birthmarks and birth defects (1997a, 1997b).
This “medical monograph” includes detailed reports of 225 cases, together
with supporting photographs and citations from autopsy reports, and he was
very disheartened when it was met with silence. Edelstein (2008) suggests
that this non-reaction was due in part to Stevenson having done little to show
how reincarnation could be integrated with biology. His psychophore concept
was not well-enough articulated to serve the purpose. I agree with this, but I
think there may be other large obstacles also. One is Stevenson’s steadfastly
parapsychological presentation. He was very much a psychical researcher of
the old school and was not good at communicating with scientists of other
disciplines, despite his many publications in mainstream journals. Another part
of the problem may lie with the word reincarnation.
Do the cases Stevenson studied suggest or support reincarnation? Not if we
define it in the Indic sense, as involving karma. If we want to say that these cases
suggest reincarnation, we must be clear that we mean Animistic reincarnation,
and we would do well to point out that the evidence we have suggests that it
occurs most often in the same community or region and that there typically are
very few years between lives.41 There is no hint in the spontaneous cases of
past lives centuries before in distant foreign lands, as was commonly envisaged
before 1960. Nor is there much evidence of past lives spent as animals, as is
allowed under Hinduism and Buddhism (and in some societies with animistic
beliefs). In other words, we must distinguish an empirically based, scientific
understanding of reincarnation from a religious or occult one. We may also
want to follow McTaggart’s lead and come up with a new name for the process.
Stevenson’s most important legacy arguably lies in making reincarnation
a problem for science, not merely religion and philosophy, but we must now
take the next steps. It is good to show that reincarnation is logically coherent
and that it makes better sense of the data than other theories do, but until we
can demonstrate its relation to established concepts in biology and psychology,
we will not have advanced much beyond where we were in 1960, as far as
the majority of scientists are concerned.42 Moreover, although I think that
current data point in the direction of reincarnation, we must be cautious in our
Book Reviews 809
conclusions, since it may turn out that our present ideas are not quite right and
that another solution, which we cannot yet see, is the correct one. Regardless,
reincarnation-type cases without a doubt present a problem for science, one that
we will always be indebted to Stevenson and Twenty Cases for having brought
to our attention.
Acknowledgments
I owe many thanks to Antonia Mills for email discussions of the theoretical issues
addressed in this paper, which helped me to clarify both my ideas and their expression.
I would like to thank her also for reading the paper in draft and making many useful
editorial suggestions. Carlos Alvarado read it at a late stage and also made useful
suggestions. Finally, I want to thank Nivedita Nadkarni, M.D., a Resident in Psychiatry at
the University of Virginia, for helping me to understand Hindu concepts of reincarnation
and karma.
Notes
1
Twenty Cases remains in press in its 1980 paperback edition.
2
The 2001 publication is a updated edition of the book of the same title published in
1987.
3
Stevenson referred to the person of the previous life as the “previous personality,” but
persons and personalities are not at all the same thing. The individuals concerned were
more than personalities, and I prefer the term “previous person” (Matlock, 1990b).
4
The current name is Division of Perceptual Studies.
5
I use the term “spontaneous case” as it used in parapsychology, to denote paranormal
experiences. Spontaneous past-life memories resemble what psychologists call in-
voluntary memories and flashbulb memories, except that many have behavioral and
physical components.
6
Super-ESP is ESP of a nature and range not otherwise observed.
7
There was, however, more evidence than Myers realized. The earliest recorded rein-
carnation-type cases presently known are Chinese cases dating from the 3rd to the 10th
centuries AD (De Groot, 1901:143–145, and Paton, 1921:26–27, per Gauld, 2008:33,
Note 7). Nineteenth-century cases are described by Wortabet (1860:308–309n; retold
by Oliphant, 1880:322–323), Hearn (1897:267–290), and Fielding (1898:335–353).
Signs of the sort now recognized to be recurrent features of cases appear in the reports
of travelers, missionaries, and government functionaries from the 17th through the
19th centuries (Tylor, 1871:3–5). Besterman (1930) cites 19th-century examples from
sub-Saharan Africa, and Matlock and Mills (1994) have several 19th-century refer-
ences for North American native societies.
8
Many Spiritualists were opposed to reincarnation because they thought that it was
contradicted by mediumistic communication and because mediums were said not to
hear about it from deceased communicators. This was not the case in continental
Europe, where Kardec’s Spiritism and, later, Steiner’s Anthroposophy were popular
(see Note 9), leading to tensions between adherents of the different spiritualist schools
(see Alvarado, 2003:83–84, for examples of the Victorian Spiritualist attitude toward
Spiritism).
810 Book Reviews
9
Other occult systems, including Spiritism (Kardec, 1875), Anthroposophy (Steiner,
1914), and Rosicrucianism (Heindel, 1909), also taught reincarnation, but Theosophy
was by far the most prominent in the earlier part of the 20th century in the United
States and Great Britain. On reincarnation and 19th-century Spiritism in France, see a
recent book by Sharp (2006).
10
Rogo (1985:17–18) suggested that the SPR’s lack of interest in reincarnation may
have stemmed from their dislike of the Theosophist Helena Blavatsky, whom they had
investigated and found a fraud (Hodgson, Netherclift, & Sidgwick, 1885). Another
factor may have been doubts raised by the different positions taken by Spiritualism
and Spiritism (Sudre, 1930).
11
Xenoglossy is the correct use of an unlearned language. It may be either recitative
(use of words or expressions only without the ability to converse) or responsive (use
of language in an interactive way, showing the ability to understand as well as speak).
12
This author has generally been cited in psychical research as Campbell-Praed (e.g.,
by Rogo, 1985, and Stevenson, 1960), probably because Shirley (1936) hyphenated
the name. However, the name is not hyphenated on the title pages of her books and
appears as Praed in the catalog of the Library of Congress, the authority followed by
most libraries.
13
Sunderlal submitted this paper first to the ASPR Journal, but the editors thought it
possibly a hoax because similar cases were unknown to them (documents in the ASPR
archives).
14
The case of Shanti Devi began to develop in the early 1930s and led to a formal
investigation in the middle of that decade (Gupta, Sharma, & Mathur, 1936). Shanti
retained her memories into adulthood, which permitted other investigators to interview
her as well (Bose, 1952, Lönnerstrand, 1998, Rawat, 1997). Today it is one of the
best-known Indian child cases but this was not so in the period before 1960. Ducasse
(1961) appears to have been the first after Shirley (1936) to comment on it in English.
Tenhaeff (1958) dealt with it, but in Dutch, and an English translation of his book was
not published until 1972.
15
Objections were raised earlier by Pringle-Pattison (1922), whose concept of reincar-
nation was informed mainly by Hindu and Buddhist teachings. Siwek’s treatment is,
so far as I know, the first skeptical one to deal extensively with memory claims.
16
Indeed, Ducasse doubted the regressions of de Rochas (1911) not only because they
were not veridical but because the lives ostensibly recalled were located in France
rather than in distant locales (Ducasse, 1961:274).
17
However, Ayer made the same point a few years earlier (1956:193–194), so this pas-
sage may be no more than a coincidence of timing.
18
Stevenson has found this idea in various parts of the world, among the Alaskan Tlingit
and Nigerian Igbo as well as throughout South Asia (2001:96).
19
I do not have space to consider other ESP models, such as Murphy’s application
of Carington’s psychon theory (Murphy, 1973), Roll’s long body (1982), or Keil’s
thought bundles (2010), but as none transcend culture, the same general consider-
ations apply to them also. See Matlock (1990b) on the earlier theories and Nahm and
Hassler (2011) on Keil.
20
Stevenson learned about another man who as a child claimed to remember the life of
the cousin who had been killed in the truck accident. Because both he and Imad spoke
about the same accident, albeit from different points of view, this case has been por-
Book Reviews 811
trayed as one of “merged and divided” rebirth by Roll (1977, 1982) and Rogo (1985).
There would seem little basis for this reading (Matlock, 1992). Apart from the truck
accident, the memories of the two subjects were entirely distinct.
21
Adult spontaneous past-life memory cases have received relatively little attention.
In adults, apparent memories (much less-developed and less often veridical than in
young children) tend to arise in dreams, trances, and other altered states (Jacobson,
1974, Lenz, 1979, Osborn, 1937, Pasricha, 1990:109–112, Rogo, 1985, 1991).
22
This case is commonly known by the name of the previous person, Sharada. It has
been analyzed as one of possession rather than reincarnation by Griffin (1997) and
Braude (2003), but both Stevenson (1984) and Akolkar (1992), who investigated it,
treat it as one of reincarnation. The key is appreciating that Uttara was relatively old
at case onset. She was practiced in meditation and this may have played an important
role in the way her memories presented (Matlock, 1988).
23
The median intermission was four months among the Haida of Alaska. The longest
median intermission of ten societies compared was 141 months in a series of 25 non-
tribal U.S. cases (Stevenson, 1986:212).
24
I am suggesting something more than the idea that thoughts at the point of death have
an influence on the new birth, as one finds in Tibetan and other forms of Buddhism. I
mean long-held, firmly established beliefs that may be largely unconscious and may
persist after death in the “mind” of a discarnate actor who brings about his or her own
reincarnation.
25
Only a few other cases of this sort have been reported (Barrington, Mulacz, & Rivas,
2005, Pasricha, 1990:104–109, Stevenson, 1983b:171–190). However, although rare,
the phenomenon is common enough in India to be recognized by a special name in
Hindu religious thought—parakaya pravesh, which refers to the entry of a wandering
soul into a physical body, replacing the soul with which the body was born (Nivedita
Nadkarni, personal communication). Parakaya pravesh generally is glossed as “pos-
session” in English, though this obscures the fact that it covers both temporary and
permanent forms of possession.
26
Karma is also missing from ancient Greek and other reincarnation concepts, as
Obeyesekere (2002) shows in some detail. It is found only in the Indic religions and
occult systems such as Theosophy that are derived from them.
27
It is interesting that Wijeratne did not have a birthmark related to the hanging. I
suggest that he did not because the previous person was more concerned (perhaps
preoccupied) with the murder he had committed. I do not think that birthmarks are
automatically produced but rather that they are conditioned by the previous person’s
focus of attention and emotional attachments. This hypothesis allows us to explain
why not all death wounds produce birthmarks and why some represent marks made to
the body after death, as well as why some represent wounds or marks from earlier in
life (Stevenson, 1997a, 2001).
28
Despite opposition from the Catholic Church, reincarnation is widely accepted in Bra-
zil, with beliefs derived from the West African culture of former slaves, reinforced by
the Spiritism of Allan Kardec.
29
The animistic worldview is fundamentally empirical. Tylor (1871), who introduced
animism, argued that concepts of the soul and its survival of death were suggested by
observations and experiences such as paranormal dreams, apparitions, and what we
now call out-of-body and near-death experiences. Tylor believed that the soul was
812 Book Reviews
then generalized to lower animals and in some situations to plants and to natural force
and even to words and names, although these last are by no means universal features
of animism as it appears in the ethnographic record (Matlock, 1993, 1995).
30
Animistic peoples do not necessarily see a conflict between ancestral spirits and rein-
carnation. In a cross-cultural study (Matlock, 1995), I found a statistically significant
relationship (p =.003) between beliefs in reincarnation and active ancestral spirits,
those thought to interact with the living in some way. In another study, I found a sig-
nificant relationship (p =.035) between beliefs in reincarnation and the fragmentation
of the soul upon death (Matlock, 1993:128–129). Typically, the soul is thought to split
three ways upon death, one part staying with the corpse, another part going on to the
land of the dead, and a third part reincarnating.
31
In the introduction to the Tlingit cases in Twenty Cases, Stevenson described what he
thought were indications of karma in Tlingit beliefs and speculated that these were
influenced by contact with Buddhism. However, the examples he gives of karma are
of no more than a belief in the continuity of identity from one life to another and have
no reference to the moral qualities of actions with which karma is concerned. He does
not repeat this assertion on other occasions.
32
This classification of Hindu with Buddhist, Jain, and Sikh beliefs as Indic is problem-
atical because in Hinduism, unlike in the other religions, there has long been debate
about whether karma is the result of individual action alone or whether it is imple-
mented or adjusted by God (O’Flaherty, 1980). In modern Hinduism, God is involved
in the mediation of karma to such an extent that modern Hinduism is better assigned
to a Theistic category (Nivedita Nadkarni, personal communication). In Theistic re-
incarnation, God determines how a new birth is assigned. Other examples of Theistic
reincarnation beliefs are the Druse and Alevi (see Stevenson, 2001:38).
33
Obeyesekere (2002) compares planned returns in animistic societies to the “rebirth
wishes” that often are a part of Buddhist merit-making rituals. The latter may
include desires to be reborn to certain people, especially in the same family, but
Obeyesekere—I think correctly—reads these as survivals of earlier animistic beliefs
because they are fundamentally at odds with karma (2002:344).
34
Announcing dreams are dreams in which a deceased person appears and “announces”
his or her intention to be reborn, usually to a certain woman.
35
This brings us to the “selection problem” (the problem of how the new parents are
selected), but I do not have space here to go further into the issue. For a longer dis-
cussion, see Stevenson (2001:236–244), and see also the literature on intermission
memories (Rawat & Rivas, 2005, Sharma & Tucker, 2005, Story, 1975:191–199).
36
Chari (1967) observed that there are few cases not only in South India, but in most
of North India also. It appears that reincarnation-type cases occur more frequently in
some places than others. The reasons for this variation would seem to have little to do
with belief but are not yet understood.
37
This conclusion would be stronger if it were more than impressionistic. Tucker’s
(2000) Strength of Case Scale could be used to rate the strength of cases, which could
then be compared to the strength of reincarnation beliefs in different cultures, if this
could be assessed in some way.
38
Many religious traditions and occult systems have similar concepts, but Stevenson
introduced his neologism, which means “soul bearing,” to avoid their connotations
(2001:309). Elsewhere he suggested that the psychophore might be composed of mor-
Book Reviews 813
phogenetic fields (1997b:2086–2088). However, he left the idea undeveloped, and as

Gauld points out, it “seems to be simply a dummy concept filling (pending further
information) a vital gap in an explanatory system” (2008:31).
39
This includes intermission memories (see Note 35). The second Jasbir said that after
his death as Sobha Ram he met a holy man who told him to take refuge in the first
Jasbir’s body. This is an example of what we may call “assisted reincarnation,” an
exception to the rule that discarnate actors take the initiative in Animistic reincarna-
tion.
40
These replication studies were aimed at seeing if different persons, working with
the same methods, would find similar cases and come to similar conclusions regard-
ing them. All three found it easy to discover similar cases. Mills and Haraldsson
agreed with Stevenson’s conclusions, but Keil preferred an ESP interpretation (Mills,
Haraldsson, & Keil, 1994).
41
According to Stevenson, all but a few cases have intermissions of less than three years
(2001:120). There are solved spontaneous cases with longer intermissions, but not
on the order of centuries, and long-distance or international cases are also rare. Even
when these do occur, we cannot be sure that there have not been intervening lives in-
termediate in distance as well as time. This issue relates to the selection problem and
a fuller discussion will have to await another occasion.
42
One way would be to link the psychophore or minded astral body concepts to Shel-
drake’s (1981, 2009) morphogenetic fields and morphic resonance (Matlock, 1988,
1990b). Stevenson (1977b:2086–2088) saw this, but, as Edelstein (2008:98) points
out, Sheldrake has had little success in getting his own ideas accepted.
JAMES G. MATLOCK
[email protected]
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Matlock, J. G. (1996). Reincarnation. In D. Levinson & M. Ember (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Cultural
Anthropology, Volume 3, New York: Henry Holt, pp. 1086–1089.
Matlock, J. G., & Mills, A. (1994). A trait index to North American Indian and Inuit reincarnation
beliefs. In A. Mills & R. Sobodin (Eds.), Amerindian Rebirth, Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, pp. 299–356.
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Mills, A. (1988). A comparison of Witsuwit’en cases of the reincarnation type with Gitksan and
Book Reviews 817
Beaver. Journal of Anthropological Research, 44, 385–415.

Mills, A. (1989). A replication study: Three cases of children in northern India who are said to
remember a previous life. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 3, 133–184.
Mills, A. (1990a). Moslem cases of the reincarnation type in Northern India: A test of the hypothesis
of imposed identification. Part I. Analysis of 26 cases. Journal of Scientific Exploration,
4, 171–188.
Mills, A. (1990b). Moslem cases of the reincarnation type in Northern India: A test of the hypothesis
of imposed identification. Part II. Detailed reports of six cases. Journal of Scientific
Mills, A. (1994). Making a scientific investigation of ethnographic cases suggestive of reincarnation.
In D. Young & J.-G. A. Goulet (Eds.), Being Changed by Cross-Cultural Encounters: The
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237–269.
Mills, A. (2001). Sacred land and coming back: How Gitxsan and Witsuwit’en reincarnation
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Mills, A. (2003). Are children with imaginary playmates and children said to remember previous
lives cross-culturally comparable categories? Transcultural Psychiatry, 40, 63–91.
Mills, A. (2004, August). Body/gender and spirit fits and misfits in three cases: A preliminary
exploration of the role of reincarnation in two-spirit people. Paper presented at 24th Annual
Conference of the Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness; 24–28 March, 2004;
University of California at Berkeley.
Mills, A. (2006). Back from death: Young adults in northern India who as children were said to
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Mills, A. (2010). Understanding the conundrum of rebirth experience of the Beaver, Gitxsan, and
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Mills, A., Haraldsson, E., & Keil, H. H. J. (1994). Replication studies of cases suggestive of
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108.
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818 Book Reviews
O’Flaherty, W. D. (Ed.) (1980). Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions. Berkeley:
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of Scientific Exploration, 15, 211–221.
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Book Reviews 819
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hypnotic “previous existence” fantasy. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 14, 178–183.
BOOK REVIEWS
Consciousness and the Source of Reality: The PEAR Odyssey by

Robert G. Jahn and Brenda J. Dunne. Princeton: ICRL Press, 2011.
398 pp. $19.95. ISBN 9781936033034. Hardcover deluxe limited color
edition, $59.95, [email protected].
A few years ago I attended a lecture by a well-known Ivy-League physicist who

is quite skilled at presenting basic scientific principles to a lay audience. At the
end of his talk, which was intended to communicate the essentials of the way
that modern physical theory conceptualizes the world, he was asked a simple
and direct question: Have you any opinion of experiments that suggest that
consciousness can influence random physical processes?
I was impressed by his reaction to the question. Without being dismissive at
all, he leaned on the podium for what seemed an extended time before carefully
crafting his answer. It was obvious that he took the question seriously. Speaking
quite slowly and deliberately, he unequivocally said that if consciousness could
influence random physical events, then everything that he thinks he knows is
wrong. Everything. After another long pause, he continued by recalling that
one of his respected colleagues told him that “someone” had worked on this
problem at he thought perhaps Princeton, but that nothing significant ever came
of it.
I walked over to the line at the microphone to make a suggestion, but
before it was my turn the allotted time was up and the speaker left the stage.
What I wanted to suggest was this: If, in your own words, everything you think
you know would be wrong if consciousness could influence random physical
events, then I think it might be worth a few hours of your time poring over
some of the PEAR data. But be careful, I also wanted to say, once you look at
the data closely there’s no academically safe place to hide. The PEAR data are
game changers.
Most readers of this Journal will be familiar with at least the outline of
the PEAR lab work, as its accomplishments and output have reached almost
mythical status. In the late 1970s, Robert Jahn, then Dean of the School of
Engineering and Applied Science at Princeton, hired Brenda Dunne to be his
laboratory manager, and the rest, as they say, is history. So began an ambitious
collaborative program to investigate 1) whether human operators could
consciously or unconsciously influence the output of random physical systems
of various stripes; 2) whether human operators could consciously extract
821
822 Book Reviews
information from the physical environment in ways which would be considered

anomalous; and 3) how to construct useful theoretical models which make
sense of the experimental data.
These three areas of inquiry roughly translate into the five sections of the
book. Section I, Venues, Vistas, and Vectors, contains six short chapters which
serve as an introduction to the major themes and questions that are discussed
at greater length in later sections. There is some history, sociology, and
philosophy of science about some grand questions usually discussed only in
rarified specialty texts. How does the mind/body problem illustrate the Western
science traditional division between the “objective” physical world and the
softer “subjective” experience of people? Isn’t all “objective” knowledge
“subjectively” experienced? In Jahn and Dunne’s words, “Mind without matter
leaves us with a world of ephemeral abstraction; matter without mind eliminates
the essence of life itself.”
Section II, Human/Machine Connections: Thinking Inside the Box, is the
longest section of the book, comprising fifteen chapters, the last of which is
entitled “Inconclusive Conclusions.” I highlight this last chapter title as an
indicator of how careful, thorough, and humble Jahn and Dunne are with their
presentation. There is never any overreaching, and when speculative thoughts
arise, they are identified as such. These are careful researchers indeed. This
section almost overwhelms the reader in its recounting of the scope and depth
of inquiry by the PEAR lab. By the end of the section I was intellectually
exhausted by exposure to so much data, even as I was titillated and exhilarated
by them. The early work with random event generators looked for statistical
shifts in the output based on the pre-stated intentions of the operators. Later,
so-called field-REGs (portable machines) were taken into a wide variety of
locations that were thought to be emotionally “coherent,” such as sporting
events or musical concerts. Jahn and Dunne give us a statistical primer on
interpreting deviations from expected chance that should be comprehensible to
the intelligent layperson, so that when they intersperse a selected few graphs
and tables it really augments the discussion. Did the results depend on whether
the operator was male or female? Do multiple operators add to the effect size?
If one operator intends “high” deviations and another “low,” do they cancel
each other out? Does immediate feedback enhance performance? Does practice
improve performance? Does it matter whether the generated random events
are “true” or “pseudo”? Does it matter whether the randomness is generated
electronically, mechanically, through fluid dynamics? Does distance matter?
Time? You get the idea. I don’t want to give away the story line, but I do
guarantee that you will be swept along with their intellectual playfulness, and
you really will care about the results, even as nature keeps hurling surprises at
our fledgling attempts to make sense of the world.
Book Reviews 823
Section III, Remote Perception: Information

and Uncertainty, contains seven chapters on the
PEAR “remote perception” work. As in all of
their work, Jahn and Dunne decided early on to
use “ordinary” volunteers in their experiments
rather than specially trained people who claimed
a history of producing extraordinary phenomena.
Their “operators” were instructed to use whatever
subjective techniques that they wanted to either
affect the REGs or to gather information from
volunteer percipients who were elsewhere, and
often not time-synchronized. Some meditated,
some closed their eyes, some left them open,
some performed a ritual, but all gave the task their
own personal stamp. As in the previous section, think of all of the interesting
questions that can be addressed: Does distance matter? Does time matter? Does
practice improve performance? When the target is correctly perceived, what is
the nature of the signal? Again, I don’t want to give away the empirical results,
because this work reads like a mystery, which in fact it is. To titillate: When
their analytical techniques became more sophisticated, the effects weakened.
Whew. Most researchers would ignore this as an annoyance or possibly an
artifact. Jahn and Dunne unabashedly throw this in the pile of surprises to be
thought about.
Section IV, Thinking Outside the Box, deals with the mother lode scientific
question: How do we make sense of these daunting data? Once again, they
face the problem head on. Any scientific model, they write, must deal with
a hierarchy of extraordinary features: tiny informational increments riding on
random statistical backgrounds; correlations of objective physical evidence
with subjective psychological parameters, most notably intention, attitude,
meaning, resonance, and uncertainty; time and space independence; oscillatory
sequential patterns of anomalous performance; data distribution structures
consistent with alterations in the prevailing elemental probabilities; complex
and irregular replicability. Whew, again. Their “out of the box” response is to
begin with what they call a “Science of the Subjective.” In their words:
. . . any neo-subjective science, while retaining the logical rigor, empirical/

theoretical dialogue, and cultural purpose of its rigidly objective predecessor,
would have the following requirement: acknowledgment of a proactive role
for human consciousness; more explicit and profound use of interdisciplinary
metaphors; more generous interpretations of measurability, replicability, and
resonance; a reduction of ontological aspirations; and an overarching teleo-
logical causality. More importantly, the subjective and objective aspects of
824 Book Reviews
this holistic science would have to stand in mutually respectful and construc-
tive complementarity to one another if the composite discipline were to fulfill
itself and its role in society.
Dare I give one more “whew”? In this section they explore whether quantum
metaphors have sufficient power to help us understand their data; whether it is
more productive to think of the apparent correlations between the conscious
mind and tangible output in a more circuitous route involving unconscious
processes (their M5 model); the place of filters in the communication between
consciousness and its Source. Finally, they anticipate the intellectual pushback
in the reader reacting to their paradigm-busting presentation. Are the data
wrong? Are they real but not important? Should we consider this outside of
scientific inquiry? Should we keep working to get back to our safe deterministic
models? Should we change the rules of science? Jahn and Dunne, in a masterly
essay, recommend the latter. Let’s “Change the Rules!”
The final section, Consolidation and Closure, is as promised, and presents
itself as the most speculative of the sections. As they pose the question of how
to distill both their empirical data and theoretical propositions, Jahn and Dunne
really let out all of the stops. Again, in their own words:
. . . these efforts must struggle through the entangling undergrowth of philo-

sophical and functional dogma that has accumulated over eons of endemic
human greed, self-serving rationalization, and malicious and inadvertent at-
tentional neglect, to constrain, and often to enslave, our minds, hearts, and
souls, and that has brought our species to a precipice of spiritual stagnation
that cannot much longer support its survival. Our contributions here cannot
be more than puny on the grand scale of such an impending catastrophe . . .
Again, not to give away the punch line, they suggest that traditional science
has been focused on the famous equivalence of matter and energy, but they
have left information out of their equations. To them, the most facile conceptual
language to describe their results is information: in the case of REGs, insertion
into the random binary strings; in the case of remote perception, extraction from
a global array of possible targets. And returning to the science of the subjective,
they implore us to somehow balance the more objective measurements of
information quantification with the more subjective sense of personal meaning.
Indeed, more attention to such subjective states as “intention,” “resonance,”
“unconscious processing,” and more are called for. Imagine “a functionally
proactive subjective consciousness . . . added to the arsenal of scientific concepts
and tools . . .” Game changer.
This is a beautiful book. I recommend reading it slowly, thoroughly, and
reflectively. The prose is rich and is actually aesthetically pleasing. I found
Book Reviews 825
myself reading a chapter, putting it down, reflecting, and then re-reading to

find even more nuance. Even consistent readers of the PEAR Lab’s more
than 150 articles and technical reports (many of which are to be found in the
Journal of Scientific Exploration) will gain a new perspective as you take in
the entire “odyssey” of their work in one publication. The book can also serve
as a model of humble, yet relentless, scientific thinking. To dream: Imagine
the next generation of scientists reading works like this to balance out the stale
textbooks that present knowledge as “finished.” Imagine a book that fills you
with awe and wonder as it relentlessly presents an incredible challenge to our
way of making sense of the world. Imagine the experience of actually having a
skeptical, open mind, and coming upon this book. What a gift.
WILLIAM F. BENGSTON
St. Joseph’s College
President, Society for Scientific Exploration
Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresen-

tation of Humanity by Raymond Tallis. Acumen, 2011. 416 pp. $29.95
(hardcover). ISBN 9781844652723.
What might physician and professor of geriatric medicine Raymond Tallis and
actor John Rhys-Davies have in common? In Peter Jackson’s epic film The
Lord of the Rings, Rhys-Davies (as Gimli the dwarf) wields an axe with such
consummate skill as to challenge, intimidate, and lend a hand in the defeat
of the evil orcs of Mordor; while in Aping Mankind Tallis (as philosopher
and scientist) with a finely-honed axe of logic takes on perhaps equally
formidable foes: those Cognitive Scientists possessed by Neuromania (p. 26)
and Evolutionary Biologists obsessed by Darwinitis (p. 40) (called respectively
Neuromaniacs and Darwinitics).
An inapt comparison? Orcs are degenerate mutations from a once-benign
race, who would destroy or enslave all humankind, while Evolutionary Biologists
and Cognitive Scientists are, certainly, benign professionals enriching the store
of knowledge for the benefit of all. Yet as Tallis makes abundantly clear, many
Cognitive Scientists believe that the mind is the brain, the brain is a computer,
and since a computer has no self and does not exist in a world of intentionality,
human beings have no selves and do not exist in a world of intentionality
(p. 101).1 Some biologists and psychologists, influenced by the twin premises
that the brain is a product of evolution and that the mind is a computer–brain,
826 Book Reviews
reduce mind to a single-purpose biological mechanism programmed only to

ensure the survival of the gene pool. The wedding of the mind–brain–computer
theory to the Darwinian impulse produces a “grand synthesis of Darwinitis
and Neuromania” against which Tallis mounts his argument (p. 145). He is
convinced that these views, riddled as he believes they are with faulty logic and
bad science, are in fact dangerous.
The distinctive features of human beings—self-hood, free will, that col-

lective space called the human world, the sense that we lead our lives rather
than simply live them as organisms do—are being discarded as illusions by
many, even by philosophers. . . . Such views may have consequences that are
not merely intellectually derelict but dangerous. (p. 8)
In this densely packed, well-researched, and carefully argued volume

of more than 400 pages, Tallis offers penetrating critiques of assumptions
prominent in Neuroscience and Evolutionary Biology and lays out what he
considers to be their potential negative consequences. The book moves on to
a “Defense of the Humanities” and a stimulating though inconclusive effort to
provide a solution to the chief problem raised by his analysis of the mind–body
relation.
What Is the Danger?

Tallis argues that the conclusions of Neuromaniacs (NMs) and Darwinitics
(DTs)2 have added weight to traditional determinism with its corollary that
there is no such thing as personal responsibility (pp. 49–50). Although it is
not new to debate the existence of free will, Tallis holds that the incursion of
neuroscience into our sense of ourselves as conscious agents is “more up close
and personal . . . [and] the personal gives way before the impersonal” (p. 51).
Thus he cites the view of neurophysiologist Colin Blakemore:
The human brain is a machine which alone accounts for all our actions, our
most private thoughts, our beliefs. . . . All our actions are products of the activ-
ity of our brains. (p. 50)
In referring to private thoughts and beliefs, this does not go far enough;
a significant theme in neuroscientific circles is eliminative materialism, which
argues that thoughts are merely the flow of physical energies within the
computer–brain, and beliefs are illusions of a “folk psychology” eventually to
be replaced by a new conceptual framework provided by neuroscience.3 And
since the self is an illusion, the idea of any thought being private is also in error,
since there is nothing for a thought to be private to. The brain is a machine which
has no thoughts and no beliefs. And “you” are “your” brain (but there is no you).
Book Reviews 827
Surely, though, the vast majority of humanity will just go right on

“thinking” that “they” have “beliefs” (even NMs and DTs seem unable to avoid
this illusion), so why worry? Tallis’s first concern is a perceived potential for
fostering human self-hatred. His book begins with a keynote citation from Straw
Dogs by John Gray, Professor of European Thought at the London School of
Economics, in which Gray is reported as saying that the lives of humans, who are
rapacious, destructive, predatory animals, are obviously not worth preserving,
and have no more meaning than that of a slime mould (p. 1). Thus, Tallis’s first
concern has to do with psychological consequences: encouragement of despair
and inactivity (p. 64).
A second “even more frightening” concern rests on a proposed NM solution
to the destructive aspect of the human animal–machine: Legal and governmental
decision-making should be determined by neuroscientific understanding of the
brain’s “system of justice” and of how the brain reacts to conflicts. Although
this may appear extreme and even irrational (if the brain is that of a rapacious
predatory animal, why should anyone trust its system of justice?), such ideas
are in fact being considered (p. 65, citing Zeki & Goodenough, 2006.)
A third concern, characterized by Tallis as sinister, is what may follow
from the notion that there is more of the animal in some people than in others.
Tallis here cites views from which it would follow that we should treat mentally
handicapped human beings as we would animals (p. 68). Tallis does not go so
far here as to suggest whether the determination of who, or of what group or
population, is handicapped, should be placed in the hands of NMs and DTs, but
it is a reasonable question to ask.4
One might think such views are of little consequence because they are
supported only within relatively small areas of scientific study and academic
commentary. Not so: Tallis notes that the idea of neuroscience having dominion
over territory that once belonged to the human sciences is fostered not only
incessantly in the popular press but in the burgeoning growth of disciplines
such as neuro- or evolutionary- jurisprudence, economics, aesthetics, theology,
architecture, archaeology, and ethics (p. 58).
Of particular interest to this reader is Tallis’s commentary on the incursion
of NM/DT assumptions in aesthetics. It would seem reasonable to hold that the
existence of the arts testifies most strongly against the notion that human beings
are computers driven by neuro-biological programming. What has a machine
after all to do with ballet, opera, string quartets, or the Night Café? But Tallis
reports a different view.
The aficionados of neuroaesthetics explain the impact of different kinds of art

by referring to what is seen on fMRI scans. . . . The creation of art itself is a
neurally mediated activity by which the artist, unknown to himself, behaves in
such a way as to promote the replication of his genetic material. (p. 58)
828 Book Reviews
If Vincent van Gogh had understood this explanation of his artistic

endeavors, one could readily understand why he sliced off his ear: His entire
life’s work had no more value than the satisfaction of lusts in copulating
animals. (But since he had no knowledge of neuroaesthetics, there must have
been something else wrong with his brain.)
A key term here is value. In the purposeless world of material science (and
of eliminative materialism), there can be no values, since value rests on beliefs,
purposes, goals, satisfactions, and disappointments. Divesting the world
of intentionality is divesting it of meaning, and the psychological condition
of living in a meaningless world is Nihilism (p. 66). Over a hundred years
ago, Nietzsche came to the following conclusion upon considering the rise of
science, the desire for supernaturally sanctioned truth, and the relation between
value and purpose:
What I am now going to relate is the history of the next two centuries. I shall
describe what will happen, what must necessarily happen: the triumph of Ni-
hilism. . . . What does Nihilism mean? That the highest values are losing their
value. There is no bourne. There is no answer to the question: To what pur-
pose? . . . Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd. (Nietzsche,
1910, Preface and p. 8)
Seen from the perspective provided by Tallis, one may wonder whether this
prediction is well on its way toward fulfillment. Surely it is cavalier, with the
presumed authority of science, to divest the world of meaning by intentionally
denying the existence of intentionality. But whether the dire result feared by
Tallis is avoidable or inevitable would seem to depend on the question of
whether the identification of humanity with animality and of the mind with a
computer–brain is founded on truth or scientistic confusion.5
The Two Towers of Scientism

Of course Tallis is speaking not of Neuroscience or Evolutionary Biology in
general, but only of the allied edifices of NM and DT. Tallis devotes Chapters
3 and 4 to a scathing critique of each in turn. There are four primary lines
of argument which he raises against NM: argument from methodology
and technology, from causality, from the phenomenological description of
consciousness, and from logic.
Regarding the first, Tallis describes limitations of fMRI brain scans (p. 74),
oversimplified experimental designs (pp. 74–77), evidence for non-modular
distribution of brain activity such as memory (p. 80), and other technical
and procedural limitations. However, since it can always be argued that such
limitations may, with better technology, be overcome, Tallis must take into
account other dimensions of the problem.
Book Reviews 829
The first of these is the attribution of the

causes of conscious states to specific areas of
the brain. Giving a causal status to putative
functional modules in the brain raises an
acute problem of conceptual confusion
among three quite different relations:
correlation, causation, and identity. Mere
correlation of a particular area of brain
activity with some specific mental activity
cannot serve as proof that a specific locus
of brain activity is the sole cause, or even
identical with, the associated mental activity
(p. 83). Against the assumption of discrete
modules, Tallis points out that when a
particular area of the brain becomes active in
the presence of some stimulus, much more
of the brain is already active (p. 75). Tallis
shares this point with other critics who hold that the brain is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for consciousness, and that one cannot separate the brain
from the nervous system as a whole (e.g., Rockwell 2007, Chemero 2009).
What Tallis adds, however, is a depth of detail and a broadened perspective
not usually encountered in similar critiques. Tallis opens up the greater sphere
of experience that he posits is systematically neglected in the discussion: the
human world. “Even those who locate the roots of consciousness in the brain
should still recognize that brains together create a space that cannot be stuffed
back into the brain” (p. 235). For example, speaking of studies claiming to have
found the location of unconditional love in the brain by recording brain activity
while the experimental subjects look at photographs of those with whom they
are deeply in love, he says “anyone who is not a Martian” knows that
Love is not like a response to a simple stimulus such as a picture. It is not even a
single enduring state, like being cold. It encompasses many things, including: not
feeling in love at that moment; hunger; indifference; delight, wanting to be kind;
wanting to impress; worrying over the logistics of meetings; lust; awe; surprise;
joy; guilt; anger; jealousy; imagining conversations or events; speculating what
the loved one is doing when one is not there; and so on. . . . The more you think
about the idea that human life can be parcelled out into discrete functions that
are allocated to their own bits of the brain, the more absurd it seems. (pp. 75–80)
In many ways, Tallis’s book is an extended, impassioned evocation of

this greater world. This is his third argument, that from the phenomenological
description of human experience, the explanation of which he says is not even
830 Book Reviews
remotely approached by NMs or DTs. By limiting the concept of experience

to an artificially narrow range, simplistic experimental designs and broadly
brushed conclusions are made to seem reasonable. Tallis, we might say, is
inviting NMs and DTs, like the denizens of Plato’s Cave, to come out into
the vastly wider realm of truth, fact, belief, error, beauty, love, community,
and, in short, intentionality; putting into proper perspective the endeavors and
findings of science as these may enrich, rather than impoverish, that world (p.
91 passim).6
Logic and Language: A Failed Attempt at Conceptual Judo

Here however we are brought to the fourth of the criticisms mentioned above:
logic. The claim that intentionality is an illusion, and that such things as beliefs
do not exist, appears to plunge NMs into a morass of self-contradiction: They
believe that their beliefs do not exist; that they themselves do not exist. But as
Tallis puts it, it is not possible to deny viewpoint (pp. 112, 336–338). Against
this, neuroscientists have argued that such seeming contradictions emerge only
because we (temporarily) must use the defective language of folk psychology;
but just as soon as the neuroscientists provide a linguistic framework reflecting
the true reality, such contradictions will simply go away (cf. Churchland, 1986).
This defense is like a move in martial arts: Use your opponent’s strength
against him. But that move can easily be reversed. The language the NM calls
for in fact already exists. It is the language of the physical sciences. Only the
purely physical description of the universe is real, and whatever does not fit
that framework is an illusion.7 And that is an example of what philosopher
John Dewey long ago termed the philosophical fallacy: taking objects of
selective preference and converting them into antecedent existence, i.e. into the
fundament of reality (Dewey, 1958:25–30). The NM is not asserting a scientific
truth but is instead promulgating a metaphysical doctrine.
Although Tallis never cites Dewey (he is not even listed in the 16 small-type
pages of references), Tallis’s argument from the quality of human experience is
strongly reminiscent of Dewey’s views. Advocating substitution of the language
of the Physical Sciences for the language of intentionality creates a schism
between the specialized sciences, with their plethora of abstract theoretical
entities, and the world of experience and common sense out of which those
sciences grew and to which they are irretrievably related. The allegedly stable,
certain, and unchanging law-like character of the physical sciences, in contrast
to the unwieldy face of the experienced world, promotes the refined objects of
science to a level of selective preference as the pure reality. Then
The stable ideal meanings which are the fruit of nature are forbidden . . . from
dropping seeds in nature to its further fructification. (Dewey, 1958:58)
Book Reviews 831
As I read him, this is the central point of Tallis’s deeply felt concern:
Instead of running away from the world of common sense and calling it
pejorative names such as folk psychology, science should always, no matter
how abstract its theory becomes, return to that world and give back with interest
what it has taken. The startling degree to which the neuro- and evolutionary-
pseudosciences manage to impoverish the world is starkly highlighted in a
summary Tallis gives in Chapter 9 (p. 337).
Misplaced Anti-Animality
Tallis to this point has presented a richly detailed and convincingly argued
position, and he does this in a highly readable style. But now we come to a less
satisfactory discussion. Tallis still must put Evolutionary Biology in its place.
Here he commits a large-scale blunder. In order to reject the idea that all human
behavior is explained by reference to animal instinct driven exclusively by the
mechanism of natural selection, he finds himself having to advocate a yawning
gulf between animal life and human experience. The form his argument takes
is to mount a wholesale denigration of animal existence. Human behavior is
fundamentally different (p. 233). He comes close to concatenating animals with
insentient matter (p. 232). Animal vision is “programmed response” while that
of humans is “the gaze which looks out and sees” (p. 171). Animal life, in
contrast to the human shared world, is rather a world of “bumped-into objects
and forces,” seeming to suggest that animals are little different from billiard
balls. Animal emotions are exhausted by the “rapid heart rate and increased
respiratory rate of a beast being prepared for fighting, fleeing, feeding, or
copulating” (p. 233). It is, he says, bad biology to assimilate animal emotions
to human feelings. He does not appear to realize that it is also bad biology to
assimilate animal behavior to that of billiard balls.
Animals as he sees them also do not live in any dimension of time. While
human experience has temporal depth (p. 250), the behavior of animals such as
crows caching food for future use does not indicate any sense of future need
but is rather a mechanical hard-wired activity with no relation to a felt need
or the existence of a future (p. 134). In such a view, an animal chasing a prey,
for example, is not pursuing a goal within a temporal dimension, but is merely
reacting mechanically from one instant to the next, with all the composite
instances being separate billiard-ball reactions to separate stimuli. There is
no telic quality (possibly rudimentary intentionality) to animal behavior, this
despite the testimony of biologists such as Edmund Sinnott, who speaks of the
“persistent directiveness or goal-seeking that is the essential feature of behavior
and thus finally the basis of all mental activity” (Sinnott, 1955:52).
Sinnott is not a DT. He does not reduce human behavior to that of animals.
But he posits a continuity in the development of consciousness from animal to
832 Book Reviews
human life. Such continuity works both ways: There is something of the animal
in the human, but there is also something of the human in the animal. Tallis is
exaggeratedly wary of admitting continuity as it might apply to consciousness
because he mistakenly feels that to admit any incremental or significant
developmental flow from animal to human is to give in to the DTs. We shall
see however that although Tallis repeatedly gives the (sometimes excessively
brutal) impression that nonhuman animals have nothing like a conscious
existence, he cannot hold firmly to this position, and it causes him trouble when
he arrives at his concluding attempts at a remedial theory.
The Wrap-Up: A Stimulating Theory That Stumbles

His first step is to highlight the difficulty which his own argument has created:
the acute difference between the human world and its biological and material
predecessors. He has concluded that natural selection is a “mindless, pointless
process” that has no goal and is thereby in stark contrast to the human world.
He believes this, he says, because he is an atheist humanist. In other words,
in his view, to believe that evolution has a goal is to believe in a supernatural
designing deity (p. 209). It is here that Tallis’s penetration begins to weaken. For
one thing, the possibility that there might be some degree of directionality, i.e.
a telic property within the sweep of evolution but not necessitating a designing
deity, does not seem to occur to him (or perhaps he does not think it worthy
of consideration). He does not distinguish between the having of goals and
the having of one overall Goal (my capitalization). Evolution has no Goal but
humans are able to consciously aim at stated goals, which, he concludes, means
that “humans are not a part of nature or not entirely so” (p. 210).
The rather peculiar syllogistic reasoning appears to be this: Evolution is part
of nature; evolution has no Goal; humans have goals; therefore humans are not
part of nature (or not entirely so). The caveat “not entirely so” renders this less
fallacious; but in any case the difference between Goal and goal is overlooked.
The argument might be recovered by the following: Animals have no goals (sans
capitalization); humans have goals; therefore humans are not animals (or not
entirely so?). In order to make this work, however, he must deny that a hawk
in search of prey, a titmouse building a nest, or a beaver chewing a branch off
a tree for use in constructing a dam, have goals; or if we must say they have
goals, we must distinguish between animal goals and human goals. Human goals
are conscious, anticipated, explicit. Animal “goals” are so only by misplaced
analogy. The animal is without consciousness. It has no existence in time, no
past or future, no anticipation. For the animal, nothing is or can be “explicit.”
This appears to me to be what Tallis wishes to say when he is attacking
Darwinitics. But now a different story arises. If, as he has argued, humans are
not a part of nature or not entirely so, the absolutely necessary requirement for
Book Reviews 833
a coherent view is to answer, without appealing to supernatural intervention or

alien devices hidden in monoliths, the question: How did humans get to be so
different? (p. 210). This Tallis attempts, although tentatively, to answer.
Let us review once again the immensity of the difference as understood by
Tallis. It is not the difference between, for example, ordinary chimpanzees and
exceptionally gifted chimpanzees (p. 212). It is not a minute incremental step
on a ladder of progress responding to some teleological impulse inherent in the
processes of life. It is not simply the advent of a larger frontal cortex (p. 213).
No. It is a shock, a jolt, the advent of something stunning. And that something,
Tallis has it, is the human hand with its opposable thumb, its ability to be used
for grasping and pointing, and in particular its placement upon an upright
bipedal body that allows it to be seen at a distance from the head but at the same
time to be felt as a part of the whole: “The thumb . . . taken in conjunction with
the upright position, transformed the primate hand into a proto-tool” (p. 213).
Yet the question remains: What has a better paw got to do with bridging
his carefully, painstakingly constructed, immense gulf between unconscious
animal life and the world of consciousness inhabited by humans? Tallis engages
in an elaborate account of what he considers the reasons that “something so
small as the hand . . . should have had such momentous, indeed massive,
consequences.” It is a clever, stimulating, and interesting demonstration of the
functional relationship between the hand, upright posture, the opposable thumb,
the extending of the arm, and the visibility to the eye of the hand’s actions. And
it has a convincing ring to it. But none of it answers the fundamental question
as to how something totally unconscious and without any sense of self or
existence in time, can come to experience temporal depth, become conscious,
and become conscious of itself as a self. It is here, at the crucial moment, where
Tallis’s scenario collapses.
The hand . . . made the human animal, our hominid ancestor, uniquely aware
of its own actively engaged body. This awoke the dim intuition that I am this
body. (p. 212)
So the key, the turning point, is the “awakening” of a dim intuition. But
how can an intuitionless being have an intuition? “Intuition” belongs to the
language of mind; an intuition can occur only to a self—even if it is “dim” and
is occurring to a limited kind of self. Otherwise “dim intuition” is just a couple
of words explaining nothing. And calling this intuition dim admits of degrees.
Something was there, some kind of self-consciousness, as a necessary condition
for the having of any intuition whatsoever. And if we grant the possibility of a
“dim intuition” there is no way to avoid the possibility of a dim anticipation or
a dim sense of having a goal: a dim, but nevertheless extant, temporal depth.
834 Book Reviews
What he has stumbled upon, driven by the force of his own reasoning,
is a theoretical position similar to that of thinkers such as Pierre Teilhard (de
Chardin), another profoundly relevant and much-neglected philosopher who is
also not within the sphere of Tallis’s references.
Properly observed, even if only in one spot, a phenomenon necessarily has an

omnipresent value and roots by reason of the fundamental unity of the world.
. . . Consciousness is completely evident only in man we are tempted to say,
therefore it is an isolated instance of no interest to science. . . . Consciousness
is evident in man, we must continue, correcting ourselves, therefore, half-seen
in this one flash of light, it . . . is surrounded by an aura of indefinite spatial and
temporal extension. In the world, nothing could ever burst forth as final across
the different thresholds successively traversed by evolution . . . which has not
already existed in an obscure and primordial way. (Teilhard 1961, my italics)
My point here is not to argue for the validity of Teilhard’s view, which
is nonetheless vastly more accommodating than Tallis’s attempt to slip
consciousness in where he has previously fought to deny it. The point is that
Tallis cannot get out of his dilemma without admitting a prior development of
degrees of consciousness within the evolutionary process, thereby arriving at a
position close to that of Teilhard.
The real contrast, then, seems to me to be between the closed world empty
of consciousness and deprived of selfhood as envisioned by the NMs and DTs
sitting huddled with the others in Plato’s cave, or an open world of continuity
within which human consciousness is a part of nature simply because in
one degree or another, the spawning of consciousness is an entirely natural
phenomenon and extends somehow to the roots of matter.8 If the latter is one’s
choice, and if that choice means a revolution in our understanding of matter
and of a healthier relation between science and humanity, so be it. It should be
a conclusion with which, however reluctantly, Tallis must agree.
Notes
1
Intentionality refers essentially to the sphere of meaning, as evidenced in what are
called propositional attitudes such as hopes, desires, fears, and, more broadly, beliefs,
which are directed at objects . . . or clusters of possibilities that are felt to be other than
the subject (p. 101).
2
These capitalized abbreviations are my own. Since the terms in full have a rhetorical
purpose but nevertheless do refer to specific theoretical attitudes, the more or less
neutral abbreviations are preferable.
3
For a description and criticism of these views, see Will Wilkenson, Churchland
Debunked, Commonsense Psychology Vindicated. http://enlightenment.supersaturated.
com/essays/text/willwilkinson/churchlanddebunked.html
4
Tallis gives a more incisive discussion of this concern in his small volume Why the
Book Reviews 835
Mind Is Not a Computer, pointing out how scientistic ideas contributed to oppression
of the Jews in Germany and the Kulaks in Soviet Russia (Tallis, 2004:26).
5
Scientism is “the mistaken belief that the natural sciences . . . can or will give a
complete description and explanation of everything” (p. 13).
6
Tallis’ view of a World here is reminiscent of John Dewey’s concept of “Experience”
as a fundamental category of being and the obligation of science to enrich, rather
than diminish, it. Dewey’s philosophical work has emerged from undeserved
obscurity recently as a major influence in critiques of the mind–brain identity theory
(Noë, 2009, Chemero, 2009, Rockwell, 2007).
7
An example of this fallacy outside the realm of neuroscience: “From a quantum world
view, we and the things around us are mostly empty space. The way we experience
ourselves . . . is really just a ‘figment of our imaginations shaped by our senses.’”
This from ASU Regents’ Professor David Ferry reported at http://www.physorg.com/
news197266420.html, July 2, 2010.
8
Considering matter as an expression of energy, Teilhard proposed a revision of the
concept of energy. This involved his hypothesis of the existence of a radial energy,
which is the energy leading to organization, specifically the functional organization
of matter around a center which he called the within of things (Teilhard, 1961:63ff.).
The question of the relation of this concept to standard physics has been discussed at
length in O’Manique (1969).
STAN V. MCDANIEL
Professor of Philosophy Emeritus
Sonoma State University
References
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, A Bradford
Book.
Churchland, P. S.(1986). Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dewey, J. (1958). Experience and Nature. New York: Dover Publications. [Reprint of the 1929
edition]
Nietzsche, F. (1910). The Will to Power (Volume I of The Complete Works, edited by Oscar Levy).
Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis.
Noë, A. (2009). Out of Our Heads. Hill & Wang.
O’Manique, J. (1969). Energy in Evolution. New York: Humanities Press.
Rockwell, W. T. (2007). Neither Brain Nor Ghost: A Non-Dualist Alternative to the Mind–Brain
Identity Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, A Bradford Book. [Paperback edition of the
2005 publication]
Sinnott, E. J. (1955). Biology of the Spirit. Compass Books C 17.
Tallis, R. (2004). Why the Mind Is Not a Computer. Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic.
Teilhard de Chardin, P. (1961). The Phenomenon of Man. Harper Torchbooks TB383. [Original
publication in French, 1955]
Zeki, S., & Goodenough, O. (2006). Law and the Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
836 Book Reviews
Consciousness Explained Better: Towards an Integral Understand-

ing of the Multifaceted Nature of Consciousness by Allan Combs.
Paragon House, 2009. 196 pp. $19.95 (paperback). ISBN 9781557788832.
In this accessible book, Allan Combs takes on the daunting task of addressing
the subject matter of consciousness. The title, Consciousness Explained Better,
alludes to the title of Daniel Dennett’s book Consciousness Explained, in which
Dennett gives a reductionist account of consciousness. But the title of Combs’s
book is misleading in that his book consists of a description of the structures
of experience and not an explanation of consciousness, nor of experience or
its structures. However, for those who are unfamiliar with a developmental
approach to the structures of experience, this book is a good introduction.
Combs starts by taking the reader back to William James’s “world of pure
experience,” conceptually prior to the splitting of experience into subjective
and objective distinctions. His main thesis is that the actual events that occur
for us depend upon the structures through which our experience is lived. These
structures form a developmental sequence from Jean Piaget’s sensorimotor
period through his formal operational thinking and then, linking with Ken
Wilber’s cosmology, to various levels of transpersonal mentation culminating
in “nondual awareness” (p. 84), which Combs characterizes as the “Ever-
present ordinary mind; the direct experience of the nondual ground” (p. 100).
For Combs, these stages not only take place within the individual development
of people, but can also be seen as giving rise to historical time periods in which
they were first expressed. For this, Combs brings in the work of Jean Gebser
and provides examples from science and art to illustrate that contention. With
reference to the writing of Sri Aurobindo, Combs pays particular attention to
the first developmental stage after formal operational thinking, that of “Integral
or Vision Logic” (p. 100), where “multiple perspectives” (p. 144) can be
held simultaneously. Combs wants this to be more than just “a laundry list
of characteristics” and considers the relationship of integral consciousness to
“enlightenment” (p. 144).
The main strength of this book, to my mind, is the adoption of such a broad
approach to its subject matter that it forces us to reconsider the usual framework
within which consciousness is discussed. In particular, according to Combs,
the distinction we commonly make between our “inner” perspective of

thoughts . . . and our “outer” perspective of the external world . . . has not
always been with us. (p. 111)
Combs identifies the cleaving of experience into subjective and objective

aspects with the cogitations of René Decartes. But such splitting might not
Book Reviews 837
actually tell us anything about the nature of

experience, just about the way it manifests for
us. I think it is clear that we usually tend to
choose some variation on these two aspects
for taking an ontological stand, so that we
end up with mental monism, materialism,
or some form of dualism. In particular, we
sometimes try to explain away mental events
using neuroscience. Initially, Combs refrains
from taking any metaphysical step. He goes
on to make distinctions, including distinctions
between the inner and the outer, but these are
simply reflections of the heuristics humanity
has used for parsing experience. It is not until
the second half of the book, when he has laid
out a multiplicity of ways that experience can
be structured, that he revisits metaphysical questions by asking whether
we create these realms of experience . . . through our own modes of thinking

[or whether they are] already part of the Kosmos waiting for us to refine our
mental instrument sufficiently to detect and experience them. (p. 91)
Combs leans toward a “perennialist view,” and, in the end, asserts that there
are “universal dimensions of consciousness that mark us as human beings” (p.
144).
Although Combs’s account is largely descriptive, I think that he has
discerned the crux of the solution to the problem with consciousness when he
elucidates the nature of experience before its evolutionary split into subjective
and objective aspects and after its recombination into the nondual state of
being for those for whom such transcendent events have occurred. In doing
so, Combs’s work can reset the course of consciousness studies onto a more
productive track. And I would very much like to see him, along with other
researchers, develop these ideas in such a way as to explicate the nature of
experience and the reasons for its manifestations.
IMANTS BARUŠS
Department of Psychology
King’s University College at The University of Western Ontario
[email protected]
838 Book Reviews
The End of Discovery: Are We Approaching the Boundaries of the

Knowable? by Russell Stannard. Oxford/New York: Oxford University
Press, 2010. 228 pp. $24.95. ISBN 978-0199585243.
In 1872 the physiologist Emil du Bois-Reymond surveyed “The Limits of

Science” in a keynote address to an annual meeting of his colleagues. Eight
years later he returned to the subject in a lecture to the Prussian Academy of
Sciences that discussed “Seven Shortcomings” in our understanding of the
world. Reprints of both speeches did well: “The Limits of Science” went
through eleven editions in German, not counting sales
in English, French, Italian, Romanian, Serbian, and
Russian. As du Bois-Reymond admitted, he was far
from the first to delimit the boundaries of knowledge:
Philosophers from Locke to Kant had referred to
unanswerable questions, and scientists such as John
Tyndall and Thomas Henry Huxley had indicated the
failures in their mechanical models of nature. But
du Bois-Reymond had a knack for rhetoric, and his
audience had expected him to defend the efficacy
of reason in overcoming ignorance and superstition.
Contemporaries reported that his speech hit them “like
the unexpected explosion of a mine,” coming as it did
from “the center of the center of science,” his chair at the University of Berlin,
the leading university in the world at the time.
Since then authorities on science have imitated du Bois-Reymond’s example.
Some, such as John Horgan or John Barrow, have developed the argument of his
first lecture, pointing to the essence of matter, the nature of consciousness, and
other riddles impervious to the investigations of cosmology and neuroscience.
Others, like Roger Penrose and Stephen Hawking, have taken up the theme of
his second lecture in reviewing the outstanding problems of their field. Russell
Stannard belongs to this second category of scientific popularizers. After a nod
to the philosophy of mind, he devotes eleven chapters to the current state of
astronomy and physics. His book has the merit of clear exposition and easy
style. In terms of originality, however, it is no match for the theses of Penrose
and Hawking, and in terms of insight, it pales beside the analyses of Horgan and
Barrow. Anyone with any abiding interest in whether science has limits would
do better to look at the work of Stannard’s peers, if not his predecessors.
GABRIEL FINKELSTEIN
Associate Professor of History, University of Colorado Denver
[email protected]
Book Reviews 839
The Kensington Runestone: Approaching a Research Question

Holistically by Alice Beck Kehoe. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press,
2005. 102 pp. (figures, bibliography, index). $14.50 (paperback). ISBN
9781577663713.
Veteran anthropologist Alice Kehoe has written a small volume using the
Kensington Runestone controversy as a cautionary case study illustrating the
need for a multidisciplinary approach in assessing antiquities, their contexts,
and their implications. In the process, she reveals her own positive conclusions
regarding one particular object, which inadequately informed professionals
have routinely relegated to the official dustbin for infamous fakes and hoaxes.
The Kensington stone is a yard-long, shaped slab of greywacke on whose
surface appears an incised inscription in Scandinavian runic characters and
language. The inscription includes a declared carving date of 1362. In her first
chapter, Kehoe discusses the initial reports of the finding of the stone, clasped
in the roots of a modest-sized aspen tree that was being winched out of the
ground on the farm of one Olof Ohman, near Kensington, Minnesota, in 1898.
The stone and copies of its text came to be circulated to regional universities as
well as in Scandinavia, with inconclusive results. In 1907, avocational historian
Hjalmar Holand examined the object, became convinced of its authenticity, and
promoted its study, involving, among others, the Minnesota Historical Society.
The Historical Society submitted the text to Scandinavian linguists, all of
whom pronounced the inscription to be a modern fake. This conclusion was
based partly on the perceived improbability of fourteenth-century Scandinavians
being in Minnesota, partly on the flimsily based suspicion that Ohman had
faked the stone to promote Swedish pride, and partly on the linguistic and
paleographic bases of words, runes, and usages seeming to be anachronistic,
without attestation in other fourteenth-century documents.
In 1909, Minnesota’s most eminent geologist examined the stone, noted
significant patination in the runic incisions, and declared that in his opinion the
object was genuinely old. However, in view of the linguistic objections, the
Historical Society declined to conclude for or against authenticity.
Over the decades, the debate went on. Various Scandinavian-language
specialists—notably UCLA’s Erik Wahlgren in 1958—studied the text and the
runes rather cursorily and affirmed fakery, and this conclusion became mainline
belief. A pro-Runestone book by Romance-languages philologist Robert A.
Hall, Jr., published in 1982, was rather technical, and it impressed some linguists
but few, if, any, professional archaeologists or historians. The same may be
said for the work of American avocational runologist Richard Nielsen, who
speaks Danish as well as English. He has demonstrated that essentially all of the
840 Book Reviews
perceived anachronisms and other anomalies in

the stone’s text are now attested by examples
from fourteenth-century Scandinavia—most
recognized by scholars only after the discovery
of the runestone—and that the language could
be specifically assigned to the spoken Bohuslän
dialect; a nineteenth-century forger could not
have known of forms not yet attested.
In 2000, a Minnesota professional
petrographer, Scott Wolter, began an
examination of the Kensington stone, and in
2004 issued his report. There were, indeed,
root marks on the back that corresponded to
Ohman’s and others’ declarations and drawings.
Those runes that had not been subsequently
retouched had the same patination as the worked side of the stone, including
minute pits where pyrite had weathered away over time. Comparing the degree
of weathering of the pyrite in the characters on a runestone known to have been
faked in 1985 and which had remained fully exposed to the elements, Wolter
concluded that the Kensington stone must have been buried in the ground long
before Ohman came on the scene. This view was reinforced by examination
of three tombstones in Maine dating from 1805–1815, which showed less
weathering than did the Kensington object.
Kehoe notes that although tuberculosis, a disease of Old World origin, is
recognized as also having existed here and there in the Americas since quite
early times, an epidemic appears to have occurred in the Midwest around
A.D. 1000—centuries earlier than the stated date of the Kensington stone but
compatible with a Greenlander Norse introduction in or near Newfoundland,
with Indians spreading it inland via trade routes (pp. 54–55). She doubts,
however, that the Mandan of the Great Plains carried pre-trader Norse or
Welsh genes as some have proposed on the basis of historic accounts of some
Mandans’ manifesting light skin and reddish-to-blond hair (pp. 55–58).
The author makes the point that within Europe, for centuries medieval
Scandinavians traveled the rivers as traders, into Russia and to as far from
Norden as Turkey. She asks, if this is so why couldn’t Norsemen have managed
to do likewise once they reached North America, which they are known to have
done (in Newfoundland, where the Norse l’Anse aux Meadows site of around
A.D. 1000 was discovered in 1960). In fact, might not North America have
attracted peripatetic Scandinavians after the Hanse cut off their fur-trade access
to Russia around A.D. 1360 (pp. 67–68)?
Concludes Kehoe, the question of the authenticity of the stone is less
Book Reviews 841
important as testimony of a particular historical event than it is in terms of its

possible implications for larger questions such as the late-fourteenth-century
changes visible in Midwestern archaeology and the fifteenth-century expansion
of European voyages of exploration. There is, especially among Americans,
psychological resistance to the idea of overseas-originating activity in America
before 1492, owing to the myth that America remained in edenic isolation
until Columbus discovered that “new world,” a discovery that sparked a
migrationary response that rapidly led to European settlement and development
of this newfound paradise, a paradise that would already have been conquered
and populated by Europeans had people of the Old World possessed access to it
previously. Thus, “It is a real paradigm shift to believe that the Americas have
never been isolated” (p. 83).
STEPHEN C. JETT
Professor Emeritus of Geography and of Texitles and Clothing
University of California Davis
[email protected]
Born on a Blue Day by Daniel Tammet. London: Holder & Stoughton,

2007. 284 pp. £6.99. ISBN 9780340899755.
Embracing the Wide Sky by Daniel Tammet. London: Holder &

Stoughton, 2007. 392 pp. £7.99. ISBN 9780340961339.
Readers will be familiar with Asperger’s syndrome and autism spectrum

disorders due to the success of the film Rain Man giving a picture of a so-
called autistic savant based mostly on the real life of Kim Peek. It should be
emphasized that only about 10 percent of autistic individuals show marked
savant talents. Daniel Tammet, the author of the reviewed books, eventually
gained a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome, which is the part of the autism
spectrum disorders characterized by usually high functioning individuals with
poor motor ability. Daniel Tammet became something of a celebrity when he
appeared in a BBC documentary and on the CBS News program 60 Minutes
because of his extraordinary mathematical and linguistic abilities.
Daniel is quite extraordinary and unique. He is not only highly intelligent
(with an estimated IQ of 150) but also socially gifted. What is almost unique
among savants is Tammet’s ability to introspect and share whatever important
information he can glean about the nature of his abilities. Allan Snyder, a
leading researcher in this area, writes:
842 Book Reviews
Savants cannot normally give insight into how they perform their skill and
are uncontaminated by learned algorithms. It just comes to them. They just
see it. With maturity, the occasionally offered insights are suspect, possibly
contaminated by the acquisition of concepts concerning their particular skill.
Yet, I have labelled one savant, Daniel Tammet, a Rosetta stone. (Snyder,
2011:3400)
The Introduction to Born on Blue Day is written appropriately by Darold

Treffert, probably the world’s leading authority on Savant syndrome and the
advisor for Rain Man. He has described Daniel Tammet as “articulate, soft-
spoken, pleasant, gentle, and modest.” I would also add benevolent and caring.
Given that Introduction, Daniel can indeed ask “How could I—an otherwise
healthy young man with a partner, job, and friends—be considered a ‘rain
man’?” Simplistic psychiatric diagnoses are at best describing a final common
pathway and at worst a means of hiding ignorance and which can become a
dangerous means of creating negative expectancies.
Undoubtedly, Daniel did fulfill many of the diagnostic criteria for
Asperger’s syndrome, and therefore it becomes enlightening and inspiring
to follow his biography in this book describing his road toward becoming a
socially skilled individual and his achievement in turning his predispositions
into positive effects rather than being handicapped by them. Nevertheless, it
should be emphasized that Daniel’s biological potential may have made him
more amenable to the influence of psychological and family factors than would
be the case for children with a lower potential. All this is detailed in his first
book: Born on a Blue Day, which I recommend reading before continuing with
the subsequent followup, Embracing the Sky.
The latter book is an insightful review of the functioning of Daniel’s abilities
against the background of what is known as the psychology of cognition and
intelligence, and it asks what might savants teach us all about our own minds.
But first the book tries to answer the question which we all might want to ask
about savants: How do they do it?
What is first evident from Daniel’s childhood as related in Born on a Blue
Day, is that he is not just a case of misdiagnosis or that he merely suffered
from a very mild form of Asperger’s syndrome. His difficulties appear to
have been rather pervasive and typical of Asperger’s, including as they did,
not only perceptual–motor obsessions, asocial behavior, difficulties in spatial
relationships, but also temporal lobe epilepsy. Much of this is a success story,
and if we give credit to his story, and I think we should, the above difficulties
were ameliorated by the warmth, guidance, and unconditional love of his
parents. The parents wanted to avoid the stigma of diagnosis and its self-
fulfilling prophecies. His epilepsy clearly did require medication, but this was
phased out as soon as possible. Apparently Daniel’s seizures originated in the
Book Reviews 843
left hemispheres which fits the known

finding of damage to the left hemisphere
being a common occurrence in savants.
One theory is that since the mathematical
and language skills of savants are often
associated with the right hemisphere (rather
than the left as in normal individuals), then
a transfer of function from the left to the
right hemisphere may have involved some
form of overcompensation (Treffert, 2000).
Rather than as we might expect,
excelling as a child in literacy skills,
Daniel records how he was actually late in
acquiring reading and writing proficiency.
His synesthetic ability seems to have
first come into being primarily as a basis
for his numeracy but later it may also
have facilitated his imagery associations
concerning words. Eventually this capacity and his own particular drive and
interest in words gave fruit so that his language skills became his forte. The
access to fantasy meant that in leading a solitary childhood, numbers and
letters became his substitute friends. Although some authorities might dispute
the generality of this, Daniel writes of this isolation (p. 98): “People with
Asperger’s syndrome do want to make friends but find it difficult to do so.”
During his childhood, Daniel was a loner often teased by his peers, and like
many such individuals he developed an imaginary playmate. In Daniel’s case,
the playmate seems to have gained a greater degree of independence and served
to give him support and reassurance. Being the first in a line of what were
eventually nine children—with parents who were neither rich nor Catholic but
simply liked children—actually in Daniel’s case became an advantage since his
siblings provided him with models and opportunities for finally developing his
own social skills. Nevertheless, his parents seem to have treated his peculiar
obsessions with the optimal combination of both tolerance and the gentle
setting of limits. One obsession even reached a physical limit when his fixation
on collecting piles of horse chestnuts finally threatened to cave in the floor of
the house and damage the ceiling of those living below.
Born on a Blue Day gives a very insightful account of the demands on
childhood development which most of us easily overcome but which for many
children with Asperger’s become persistent and dire problems—such as learning
to ride a bicycle, understanding the importance of personal space, distinguishing
left from right, developing a sense of direction, understanding metaphors, and
844 Book Reviews
following complex instructions. Yet with the crucial help of friends, Daniel was
even able to master what even ordinary people can find daunting: traveling on
the London underground. Also vital seems to have been the support of parents
and others in enabling him to spend a year doing voluntary service in Lithuania.
This experience was evidently crucial to the building of his self-confidence
and to the furthering of his fascination for languages. Shortly afterward, the
advent of computers and the Internet enabled his world of social relationship to
be greatly extended and eventually led to a lasting love relationship. The final
confirmation of the consistent parental support given to Daniel, came with his
parents’ acceptance of his declaration of being gay (which he had realized from
the age of eleven).
The book gives some insight into the feat which first brought Daniel
to the attention of the mass media: his success at winning the British and
European record for reciting pi. Daniel recited 22,514 digits in the course of
more than five hours. This was not as spontaneous as might appear from the
videorecording but required three months of practice. What is most distinctive
in his various numerical performances is the recall of digits in the form of
touchable landscapes. It is this aspect of synesthetic experience which is the
truly remarkable. The synesthetic ability is augmented by his extraordinary
memory span which has been established at 10–12 digits (compared to the
normal range of 5–7 digits).
The attention given to his success at winning this record led to the BBC
film, a documentary that included a journey to meet the real “rain man,” the
recently deceased Kim Peek. As part of the program, Daniel was willing to
take part in research to which he clearly has a positive attitude. While not all
researchers might prove worthy of this confidence, BBC’s choice of Vilayanur
Ramachandran and his assistants at the Center for Brain and Cognition proved
to be an appropriate one. It was with interest concerning the fruits of this
cooperation that I turned to the sequel book.
The title of this, Embracing the Wide Sky, is inspired from an Emily
Dickinson poem and serves to emphasize one of Daniel’s personal insights in
life. Despite his intellectual prowess, he is able to reach a state of consciousness
transcending this, and this transcendence means for him that he has a Christian
religious belief. The book begins as a primer of contemporary findings in
cognitive and neuropsychology before focusing on what Daniel Tammet has
learned from his own experience and from his now considerable knowledge of
the neuroscience literature.
One of the ready explanations for savant ability is what he calls “the
drudge theory,” by which he means that the spectacular performances are
due to repetitious and even obsessional hard work in the use of rote memory.
Clearly in most cases hard work is a prerequisite. Daniel Tammet succeeded
Book Reviews 845
at speaking Icelandic after less than a week’s

effort but it was a week of intensive learning.
Obviously this explanation is not enough.
What is revealing is how Daniel makes use of
his extraordinary gifts of seeing connections
between words in different languages and
between sounds and words. The account of
Daniel’s meeting with Kim Peeks reinforces
this conclusion. He writes: “Kim remembers
his vast repository of factual information by
weaving the facts he learns together with
a mental network of many thousands of
different associations and interconnections”
(p. 79). Daniel thereby agrees with what most
psychologists conclude: that photographic
memory is also a myth as an explanation
and savants learn mainly what they have a
biological predilection for and what they have the motivation to develop. In the
case of Daniel, a study of him by Simon Baron-Cohen of the Cambridge Autism
Research Center suggested the ability concerning numbers and his fascination
with them might be due to the area for facial recognition having been taken over
by digit recognition.
But there is much more to Daniel Tammet’s abilities. The truly defining
feature giving insight into his ability may be Daniel’s synesthesia. In chapter
5, The Number Instinct, Daniel describes how synesthesia enables him to
see numbers as meaningful relationships with recognizable visual and tactile
shapes. But this is still no worthy explanation since why do we not all do
this? His own theory, and it is one supported by Snyder and Ramachandran,
concerns disinhibition. Disinhibition is the principle in neurophysiology
that the functioning of the more primitive areas are held in check by areas
expressing the higher cortical functions. When the latter areas are disinhibited,
automatisms beyond normal consciousness awareness come in to play. Well-
known examples of this are alien hand syndrome, but somnambulism and
partial complex epilepsy, and even the mediumistic automatisms, may also be
due to forms of disinhibition.
In the case of his numerical ability, Daniel notes that normally it is the
left temporal lobe which inhibits the expression of synesthesia located as it
usually is in the right temporal lobe. In his own case, the left hemisphere may
have been damaged and this damage led to the disinhibition or activation of
the right temporal lobe. That Kim Peek lacked a corpus callosum to coordinate
hemispherical functions, he sees as consistent with this hypothesis. The
846 Book Reviews
hypothesis is developed even further by maintaining that this disinhibition can

occur even in schizophrenia and is a source of creativity in savants. Whereas
certainly argument can be made for a link between psychotic states and
creativity, it is nevertheless disputed whether most high-functioning Asperger
savants are more creative than other individuals (Treffert, 2000:300–301).
Regrettably, in the final analysis, not even Daniel Tammet can give much
deeper insight into the nature of his own calculating abilities. A rather similar
limit is reached with the insight given into his language abilities (Chapter 4, A
World of Words). He shares with the reader his many tips and suggestions for
the learning of foreign languages, and it obvious that he is fascinated by words
and enjoys playing with them. However, even applying these tips, it is still
clearly beyond the ability of nearly every non-Scandinavian to learn Icelandic
in a week in order to give a television interview in the language.
Because of this lack of insight, research on savants has rather reached an
impasse. What it has shown is that sometimes they use memory and sometimes
even elaborate numerical or language rules but most often without any form
of awareness of them and without import into other areas of functioning.
Yet there are some experimental findings that may give some support for the
above theory. Neuropsychiatrist Darold Treffert describes in his book (Treffert,
2000:77–78) how a graduate student, Benj Langdon, tried day and night to
practice the calendar-calculating skills of two savant brothers. After spending
an enormous length of time at it, he still failed to match their performance.
Then when apparently he had given up, it suddenly came, and he no longer
consciously had to go through the operations. Like for many savants, the
answers came intuitively and non-consciously.
But what does this actually mean? Allen Snyder, director of the Centre for
the Mind in Australia, argued that “savants have privileged access to lower-
level, less-processed information, before it is packaged into holistic concepts
and labels—savants tap into or read off information that exists in all our brains,
but this information is normally beyond conscious awareness owing to top-
down inhibition” (Snyder, 2009:1399). Accordingly, Snyder and his co-workers
have developed an experimental means of disinhibiting the left temporal lobe
(Snyder, 2009, 2011). The method involves giving repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation to the lateral anterior temporal lobe of right-handed
normal individuals. Having done this, it was found compared to those receiving
a sham stimulation, there appeared to occur changes in drawing, in accuracy of
proofreading skills, and in numerosity—and also a reduction in false memories.
Snyder believes that some cortical areas may be responsible for the top-down
processes that create our holistic and meaningful interpretations. To do so
may require an inhibition of those areas, presumably in the right hemisphere,
concerned with perceiving details.
Book Reviews 847
Furthermore, this theory is promising because it will work as a general

theory of autism since an autistic person, being stuck in the perception of
details, thereby lacks the ability to build whole concepts such as a “theory of
mind” and a workable theory of how to form relationships.
The explanation is simple and yet elegant. Treffert and Snyder along with
Daniel Tammet see it as having important implications for the existence of an
enormous reserve of untapped human potential in so-called normal individuals.
Even so there are some incongruities. Daniel Tammet’s major message is
actually contrary to the above, since he explains that the key to his abilities is
seeking meaningful and contextual relationships, and it is this ability to see the
whole myriad of relationships that he believes enables his success at languages
and calculating. Moreover, there is as yet no firm evidence that individuals with
synesthetic ability are poorer at personal relationships and are more creative.
But what surely remains enigmatic concerns the acquisition of complex savant
skills of speaking languages or playing music. These would seem to be more
than access to mechanical rote learning or associations, but some form of
integrative ability for understanding the rules governing what goes together.
Indeed the leading authority in the area, Darold Treffert, after reviewing the
35 years of research, doubts that brain damage or practice alone could account
for the access to the rules of music, mathematics, and art that is innate in these
individuals. He argues that we may be born with this “soft ware” already
encoded as genetic transmission (Treffert, 2000).
Yet if we critically analyze the reason for proposing such a nearly all-
encompassing mechanism, then the real enigma of some savants becomes
undeniably apparent. As Keith Chandler (2004) pointed out in his provocative
paper, while we might explain the performances of Daniel Tammet and
Kim Peeks as a mixture of motivation, mindless learning, and synesthetic
associations, the explanation is just not all-encompassing enough. He asks how
does this explain the cases of prodigy savants (Treffert & Wallace, 2002) where
complex skills are required and there is no apparent possibility of acquiring
these skills? If the information we are told about their backgrounds is correct,
then neither chromosomes nor software could not contain the necessary specific
cultural information for these skills to suddenly appear. For instance, in the
case of Leslie Lemke (Chandler, 2004) the prodigious talent for playing music
appeared in its completeness literally in the middle of the night after hearing
on television Tchaikovsky’s Piano Concerto No 1. Chandler writes: “It is
something he clearly remembers how to do but it is a remembered skill that
he was never taught and being blind one that he could never have seen anyone
else perform.”
There is now an extensive literature on savants, and it should be of interest
to make a critical research review of what actual opportunities prodigy savants
848 Book Reviews
have had for learning such complex skills. The above books are now a very
important contribution to this literature. Given that Daniel Tammet has access
to this reservoir of semantic relationships that we are not normally conscious
of and seldom use, it is just possible that he is far more unique than we have
realized. We can be thankful that he has such a positive and generous attitude
to research.
There is only one quip which I am almost reluctant to mention given
Daniel’s confessed obsessive attention to detail. The books show how well read
he is, but Born on a Blue Day lacks references and Embracing the Wide Sky
lacks many of those quoted in the text.
ADRIAN PARKER
Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg
References
Chandler, K. (2004). People who remember things they never have learned. Australian Journal of
Parapsychology, 4(1), 2–31.
Snyder, A. (2009). Explaining and inducing savant skills: Privileged access lower-level, less-
processed information. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London,
Biological Sciences, 364, 1399–1405.
Snyder, A. (2011). Accepting information normally beyond conscious awareness by non-invasive
brain stimulation: Opening the doors to perception and memory. Proceedings of Towards a
Science of Consciousness; 3–11 May 2011; Stockholm.
Treffert, D. (2000). Extraordinary People: Understanding Savant Syndrome. Lincoln, NE:
iUniverse.com.
Treffert, D., & Wallace, G. (2002). Islands of Genius. Scientific American, June, 68–75.
The Psychedelic Explorer’s Guide: Safe, Therapeutic, and Sacred

Journeys by James Fadiman. Rochester, VT: Park Street Press, 2011.
352 pp. $18.95. ISBN 978-1594774027.
Drawing upon more than four decades of professional and personal experience
in the arena, James Fadiman has written a practical, informed, and entertaining
handbook for people who desire to embark on an encounter with LSD, mescaline,
peyote, psilocybin mushrooms, or the dozens of other natural and synthetic
substances that fall under the psychedelic umbrella. Similar guidebooks have
been written over the years, but none of them approach the authority, credibility,
or utility of The Psychedelic Explorer’s Guide.
Fadiman is a faculty member of the Institute of Transpersonal Psychology,
a graduate school that he helped to found in 1975. He possesses considerable
gravitas on this topic, having conducted research with psychedelics when
Book Reviews 849
the substances were still legal. His book is

extremely timely now that investigations are
undergoing a Renaissance, and that several
articles have been published in high-level
psychological, psychiatric, and medical
journals. These investigators need to read
this book because it will provide important
considerations with regard to the six factors
that are described by Fadiman: set, setting,
substance, sitter, session, and situation.
However, there are other potential readers
who are conducting what is euphemistically
referred to as “self-experimentation.”
These are seekers for what Fadiman calls
their “birthright” to become “more aware.”
Fadiman presents data indicating that these
intrepid explorers refer to their session as “the greatest experience of my
life.” The book’s first two chapters provide guidelines for one’s “trip.” The
next two chapters review the contributions of several major figures in this field
who review what they have learned from their sessions, ranging from Albert
Hofmann and Aldous Huxley to Alan Watts and Stanislav Grof. Letters to and
from Humphry Osmond, Timothy Leary, and others are cited, as are passages
from books by such icons as Alexander Shulgin, Ralph Metzner, Huston Smith,
Rabbi Zalman Schachter-Shalomi, Richard Alpert (Ram Dass), and Frances
Vaughan (the lone female in this collection of white males).
The next four chapters focus on self-exploration; one of them was
written by Neal Goldsmith, a psychologist and psychotherapist, and is aptly
titled, “Things Can Go Wrong.” Neither Fadiman nor Goldsmith guarantee
their readers a risk-free psychedelic journey, and Goldsmith offers 18 helpful
suggestions ranging from regulated breathing to having a warm blanket on
hand for emergencies. The next chapter brings up the topic of adulterants such
as methamphetamine. However, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s
1991 claim that strychnine is a common adulterant is examined and found
wanting. The case can be made that adulterants have become less problematic
in recent years, certainly since I published a short research article on this topic
in the journal Science in 1970. Nonetheless, Fadiman merely tells his readers to
obtain their supplies “from a trusted source” (p. 262). Perhaps this is all he can
say without running afoul of the law, but an expansion of this guideline would
have been useful.
The following six chapters provide a detailed description of Fadiman’s
pioneering investigations at San Francisco State University’s Institute for
850 Book Reviews
Psychedelic Research, a project abruptly terminated in 1966 by the U.S. Food

and Drug Administration, along with similar projects across the country.
Improvement of cognitive enhancement, especially creativity, was observed
among these two dozen participants, and Fadiman provides both test data and
subjective reports that illustrate these results. A few extensive case studies
provide valuable accounts of how the psychedelic experience was put into
practice once the session was over.
These accounts lead to four chapters outlining “new horizons” for
psychedelic research; including the use of: “micro-doses” for specific purposes,
much as indigenous shamans have used small amounts of mind-altering
morning glory seeds, mushrooms, and the like to assist their service to their
communities. Future medical and psychotherapeutic uses include expanding
the pilot studies indicating psychedelics’ value in treating cluster headaches
and PTSD and for spiritual enhancement. This latter direction has led to what I
consider the overuse of the term “entheogen” as a synonym for “psychedelic”;
not every session is designed to find “the God within,” and the term “potential
entheogen” would be a more appropriate descriptor. “Psychedelic or “mind-
manifesting” is far better than the negatively toned “psychotomimetic” and
“hallucinogenic” descriptors. I have long favored the term “phantasticant,” but
it never caught on.
The final four chapters bring the reader up to date on the Amazonian brew
ayahuasca. They consist of three well-written first person reports, but omit
the research studies conducted by the psychiatrist Charles Grob and his team
whose data found several long-lasting beneficial effects of ayahuasca imbibed
in a religious setting, and no long-term negative effects. However, Fadiman
provides an excellent account of the behavior changes that followed LSD and
mescaline sessions with 67 participants at the International Foundation for
Advanced Study in Menlo Park, California, in 1962 and 1963. The effects upon
marriage, sexual performance, job satisfaction, and nighttime dreams have
never been presented in such detail. Questionnaire data from 113 participants
at the same institute are also included. It is a tribute to Fadiman’s writing skills
that these data do not bog down the book or drain the reader’s attention, but add
texture and richness to what could have been a superficial cookbook on how to
run an LSD session.
Fadiman’s autobiographical material is an important part of this book; he
calls himself an “inadvertent pioneer” and describes how he fell into his role due
to serendipitous meetings with Willis Harman, Myron Stolaroff, Charles Savage,
and—of course—Timothy Leary and Richard Alpert, the future Ram Dass.
When Harvard University terminated the services of Leary and Alpert, Fadiman
knew that his own career was at risk. As he put it, “I really stepped back at that
point,” and his segue into the new field of transpersonal psychology was a wise
Book Reviews 851
career move. He helped develop the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology and

the Association for Transpersonal Psychology, which Fadiman misnames the
“Transpersonal Psychology Association” (p. 235). He also employs the “genie
out of the bottle” metaphor too often; that genie should be content to emerge
from the proverbial bottle once and be on his way. Some seminal books remain
unmentioned, most notably The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience (Masters
& Houston, 1966), which I consider the best phenomenological account of
these internal voyages.
But these are minor flaws in a magnificent tapestry. Fadiman does not
proselytize, he simply provides useful information. He concludes by stating, “If
you’re going to use psychedelics, do it with someone you love, and hopefully
someone who has been there before you, and be aware that the world is better
than you have ever thought” (p. 238). I would rephrase the beginning of this
advice to “. . . do it with someone who has been there before you, and hopefully
someone you love.” But the last phrase makes sense not only for those who
want to embark on a psychedelic excursion but to those who prefer meditation,
prayer, Nature walks, falling in love, or any of countless other ways to secure
their birthright of becoming more aware.
STANLEY KRIPPNER
Saybrook University, San Franciso, CA
References
Krippner, S. (1970). Letter. Drug deceptions. Science, 168, 654–655.
Masters, R. E. L., & Houston, J. (1966). The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston.
Wonders in the Sky: Unexplained Aerial Objects from Antiquity

to Modern Times and Their Impact on Human Culture, History,
and Beliefs by Jacques Vallee and Chris Aubeck. New York: Jeremy P.
Tarcher/Penguin, 2009. 508 pp. $22.95. ISBN 978-1585428205.
Ufology is a historical enterprise deep down in its heart. For all their scientific
aspirations, ufologists spend most of their time collecting and collating cases,
looking for connections over time, searching for patterns of meaning amid a
welter of details—in short, the very sort of thing historians do to chronicle
the lives of Roman emperors or events of the Civil War. One key date is June
24, 1947, and anyone familiar with UFOs recognizes it as the day when the
852 Book Reviews
“first” flying saucers appeared; but no sooner had Kenneth Arnold reported his
sighting than reports of antecedents called the uniqueness of this event into
question. The Arnold incident holds benchmark importance, a beginning of the
modern era when saucers began to fly thick and fast as they quickly established
themselves as a cultural fixture and a mystery to reckon with, but historical
awareness sets this event in a wider perspective: Arnold did not see the first
UFO, just one more in an unbroken line that stretches back to the 19th century
in some opinions; in others, to antiquity or even remote prehistory.
Early cases entered into UFO discourse almost from the start. In a sense this
prior history was ready and waiting for the flying saucers to arrive through the
writings of American author Charles Fort, who spent much of his life combing
newspapers and scientific publications of the 19th and early 20th centuries for
reports of strange phenomena damned to exclusion by official science. His four
books and the still-active Fortean Society provided the new phenomenon with
a robust lineage of suggestive observations. A segment on old sightings became
standard in most UFO books of the 1950s. Ufologists have embraced old reports
as stout supports for the extraterrestrial hypothesis, since skeptics’ arguments
that airplanes or satellites are responsible for many UFO reports hardly apply
in ages when no man-made flying machine had yet left the ground. Proponents
took a vested interest in finding modern UFOs flying over Roman legions and
crusader castles, because if such reports existed, they had to describe alien
vehicles. By simple elimination, no other explanation would work.
If ufologists have good reason to value history, they have not necessarily
shown a very discriminating knowledge of it. The examples in the 1950s
literature were haphazard and, when derived from sources other than Fort, often
inaccurate, distorted, even rewritten to confirm a proponent’s wishes. By the
1960s and 1970s historical research divided between two contrasting pathways:
One led to systematic explorations of the phantom airship waves of the 1890s
and early 1900s, and to Jacques Vallee’s seminal Passport to Magonia (1969),
which related UFO experiences to fairy and demonic lore with the suggestion
that some broader mystery might underlie a multitude of anomalous phenomena.
Along the other path, “ancient astronauts” theories ran rampant as every ancient
myth and monument became evidence for alien visitation and intervention in
human history. Hoaxes and wild speculations multiplied to the discredit of
ufology and to the confusion of whatever message the historic reports carried
for the UFO mystery as a whole.
Now at last a book has come along that intends to set the study of historical
UFOs on a sound footing. Wonders in the Sky is authored by Jacques Vallee, one
of the most respected names in UFO research, and Chris Aubeck, who has made
a distinguished name for himself among serious historical researchers over the
past eight years. In 2003 Aubeck organized the Magoniax project to link a
Book Reviews 853
select few active UFO historians through

the Internet, for the purpose of exchanging
and compiling reliable accounts of
anomalous phenomena prior to 1947. This
book represents the first study to grow out
of the Magoniax project.
The heart of the book, more than 300
pages long, consists of a chronological
collection of 500 cases of “wonders”
starting in 1460 B.C. and ending in 1879
A.D. Most of the accounts describe aerial
lights or objects; some treat UFO-related
phenomena like abductions, entities, and
mysterious communications. Each entry
provides a substantial summary of events,
along with date, place, and source, and
sometimes concludes with a brief commentary. The authors have screened an
extensive body of records to eliminate the obvious comets, meteors, sundogs,
hoaxes, and other identifiable causes, leaving readers with a genuinely
puzzling residuum of aerial events from across the centuries. A decision to
close this chronicle with 1879 was both practical and theoretical. The running
understanding of aerial wonders from earliest times through the 17th century
assumed a supernatural source, such as gods, angels, demons, or witches. Most
educated writers from the 18th century onward favored naturalistic origins for
strange sights in the sky, like meteors or weather phenomena. By the latter
quarter of the 19th century expectations of man-made aircraft spilled over into
the observational record as people began to describe phantom balloons and
airships, with the reports becoming epidemic by the 1890s. Faced with this
shift of concept and escalating numbers, the authors wisely chose to call a halt
just before technological wonders began to dominate.
Among the more interesting cases is a Roman account from 91 B.C. of
a fireball that descended to earth, then rose from the ground and was large
enough to blot out the sun. A Chinese record from about 1059 tells of an object
like a giant pearl that frequented a lake for some ten years. The object emitted
such intense light that the shadows of trees miles away became visible. Solitary
English travelers sometimes had to contend with a fiery wheel- or barrel-shaped
object that would follow them at nights during the winter of 1394. In 1520 a
beam of fire descended from the sky and burned many things on the ground
before it ascended again and changed its shape into a circle of fire. A report to
a London newspaper in 1794 describes a meteor over India that made frequent
pauses before it descended behind some hills. Two minutes later the light
854 Book Reviews
rose above the hills, illuminating them before it sank again and repeating this
behavior twice more before vanishing. My favorite case is the Robozero Marvel
of 1663, when residents of a Russian village watched a ball of fire with the
diameter of a 14-story building pass back and forth overhead three times before
hovering close over the surface of a lake for 45 minutes then finally flying away.
If the nature of the objects in this chapter remains open to contention, their
puzzling and uncharacteristic qualities are undeniable.
A second extensive section, titled Myths, Legends, and Chariots of the
Gods, provides the authors with an opportunity to discuss some questionable
stories taken as evidence for extraterrestrial visitation in the UFO literature. The
entries include hoaxes like the “Dropa Stones,” supposedly artifacts left by a
group of aliens marooned on earth thousands of years ago, or the “silver shields”
that flew over Alexander the Great’s army though only in the imagination of
some modern writer. Other instances exemplify an abundance of speculation
applied to texts, so that the vimanas of ancient Indian epics become spaceships
or the Star of Bethlehem acquires an extraterrestrial identity. Meteors, auroras,
halos, and other conventional phenomena clearly explain some appearances
that amazed witnesses in the past. Common folk beliefs contribute to stories of
ships in the sky and to accounts that associate lights and entities with fairies,
though traditional beliefs do not necessarily exhaust the strangeness of some
reports. By treating these reports in a separate section, the authors can satisfy
readers’ curiosity about claims often associated with UFOs and at the same time
distinguish the doubtful evidence from the sound.
The book consists mainly of cases, but it also provides orientation,
connecting material, and some basic analysis. Considerable care goes into
explaining the sources used and the criteria for selecting cases. A preference
for the most original sources available—the medieval chronicles or scientific
journals or the literature of prodigies and wonders like the 1557 Prodigiorum ac
Ostentorum Chronicon of Conrad Lycosthenes—sets this collection apart from
the usual derivative materials found in the UFO literature and on the Internet.
The inherent strangeness of the case rather than interpretations imposed on it or
suggested by current agendas qualifies an account for inclusion, so that even as
tempting a report as a flying shield does not automatically mean a flying saucer,
but only that an ancient historian drew a conventional comparison to describe a
meteor. Scattered through the extensive chronicle of cases are pauses to update
readers on the historical context of the reports, such as changes in religious
beliefs, social conditions, and technological developments that contributed to
the shape, dissemination, and interest in prodigious occurrences at a given time.
Issues of interpretation do not arise in this book. The authors are satisfied
to establish the existence of unknown aerial appearances and not jump to the
conclusion that alien visitation or any other particular cause was responsible. At
Book Reviews 855
the same time they do not leave readers entirely adrift. In a Foreword by David
Hufford, this noted scholar of anomalies reminds readers that beliefs often
originate in experience, and a study of claims about strange phenomena stands
to profit from an experience-centered approach. The authors’ Introduction cites
four conclusions—that unknown phenomena have appeared throughout history,
that interpretations change from epoch to epoch, that these phenomena have
had an influence on human civilization, and that historical cases teach lessons
applicable to modern aerial manifestations. A final chapter returns to these
conclusions and summarizes the case files to argue that similar phenomena
have recurred down the centuries all over the world, while the phenomenology
of past events anticipates the reported experiences of UFO witnesses today.
Human interests and explanations vary according to time and place but the
underlying appearances show a consistency worthy of further study. These
measured and cautious proposals grow out of the historical materials as fully
justified and free of the jarring leaps of faith so common in relating UFOs to
their supposed antecedents.
This admirable study fulfills its goals and leaves little cause for complaint.
Some of the case summaries would benefit from more complete information.
Historical records of aerial anomalies are often frustrating in their brevity,
while equally frustrating copyright restrictions hinder direct quotations and
raise barriers that are especially onerous for such a wide-ranging project as
this one. Still, a case like no. 473 appears almost devoid of details to indicate
why it was included at all, even though it is familiar from Charles Fort and
intriguing only because of the omitted descriptions. Other cases almost
certainly have conventional explanations, like no. 482, wherein an astronomer
watched the slow progression of a red “bolide” over Marseille in 1871. While
the object certainly was not meteoric in its actions, its characteristics well suit
the behavior of a fire balloon. While high standards govern the selection of
cases and secondary sources are usually reputable, the authors draw on the UFO
literature now and then. These lapses allow inclusion of Japanese and Chinese
reports not otherwise available, but in rare instances the sources are doubtful, at
least in details, yet included anyway (e.g., case no. 49 and case no. 188).
The authors are well aware that the written record tells a cultural truth
that is not always the same thing as historical truth. Prodigies became tools of
propaganda in the Reformation era, with some entries in the Mirabilis Annus
collection so slanted toward the Puritan cause in 1660s England that royalist
authorities sought to apprehend the author. Newspapers in the 19th century
shamelessly resorted to bogus stories of extraordinary events to provide a form of
journalistic entertainment known as “nature faking.” These pitfalls are familiar
enough, but the literature of signs and wonders twists and turns in a labyrinth of
motives and customs wherein no amount of caution is ever quite enough. The
856 Book Reviews
garrulous monk William of Newburgh seems never to have met a strange story
he didn’t like, but he simply represents one of the most visible examples of a
credulous medieval writer. Others have idiosyncrasies of their own and even
the most disciplined sometimes waive their sound judgment where anomalies
are concerned. The written accounts cannot be taken entirely at face value and
as a result cases cited in Wonders in the Sky provide an “enriched” sample of
unknowns rather than a “pure” sample.
Another possible source of error is the stereotypical elements of some
accounts. A “saints’ lives” literature stands by itself but also infiltrates many
mainstream medieval chronicles with recurrent motifs of luminous phenomena
accompanying the birth, death, and miraculous activities of saints. These
obligatory elements serve more to validate the sanctity of a historical personage
in a biographical genre than to record literal history. Folkloric motifs intrude
in some accounts, one example perhaps being the fiery object that followed
travelers in 1394. This account bears similarities to the will-o’the-wisp or the
fairy lantern that leads wayfarers astray, and even if the experience was real the
description may have taken its shape from popular belief.
The brevity of the book’s forays into the historical and intellectual contexts
of its subject matter calls for expansion, as does the database itself and analysis
of the findings. But these jobs are work for another day. What we have in
hand is a book worthy of celebration in itself. The authors replace the faith
and phonies too often characteristic of historical UFO research with a solid
basis, both an extensive collection of genuinely interesting anomalies from
original or creditable international sources, and the provision of a framework
for understanding these reports and for building on this foundation in the future.
Whatever opinion the reader may hold about the nature of these accounts, the
factual matter of the case, the fundamental cause for wonder, stands out with
unprecedented clarity and sets bounds on the speculative impulse. We can thank
the authors for this important step toward the truth, whatever form it ultimately
takes, and look forward to further scholarship at the same high standards.
THOMAS E. BULLARD
[email protected]
Book Reviews 857
Dizionario Enciclopedico delle Classificazioni Analitiche della Biblio-

teca Bozzano–De Boni [Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Analytical
Classification of the Bozzano–De Boni Library] edited by Silvio
Ravaldini and Giulio Caratelli. Bologna, Italy, 2011. Eight volumes.
More than 2,200 entries––excluding those referring to terms and expressions––

most of them containing bibliographic references, 2,800 pages in eight volumes.
In the last volume, there are more than 50 pages of Contents, describing which
entries and themes are present and where they are dealt with. These are the main
features of a new “tool” of the Bozzano–De Boni Library, a Cumulative Index
published at the very beginning of 2011 as the result of a work started a long
time ago.
Ernesto Bozzano was the first one who had the idea of creating a reference
list, an Index of publications concerning mediumship and spiritism. At the
beginning of the 20th century he was committed to reading extensively about
spiritism and psychical research, becoming a “supporter and promoter” of
spiritism. He was a tireless reader of everything that was published––and
everything he could obtain––on metapsychics, mediumship, spiritism, and
related issues. While thoroughly examining the texts, he would annotate what
he found interesting, from the most general and evident elements (i.e. theories,
argumentations, original experience reports) to minor details that a superficial
reader may fail to notice, such as private stories, referrals to persons and experts
in the field, anecdotes, observations, and so on. Perhaps without him being
aware of it, Bozzano’s work led to the creation of analysis sheets for each book
and review he read, containing detailed references on various themes (page
numbers and referrals to other publications), which allow the reader to easily
get to the materials. Those sheets were essential to him, since his monographs
were composed of the systematic and logical combination of examples leading
the reader to his own “inescapable” conclusions. Each example was specifically
discussed, and the more numerous the cases reported, the more his thesis was
strengthened and supported (Biondi, 1984, Ravaldini, 2011). This is the reason
why he considered working with indexes extremely useful, and perseveringly
continued his task for more than forty years.
After Bozzano’s death, all his papers and documents were inherited by
Gastone De Boni, who added other book analyses by following the same criteria.
Some decades after, the entire work reached the hands of Silvio Ravaldini, who
also gathered publications, personal documents, and materials of Bozzano,
De Boni, and other prominent scholars of spiritism and psychical research.
Once books, reviews, and other materials were ordered in a purpose-specific
Library, he had to decide how to use the hundreds of analysis sheets that had
858 Book Reviews
been collected, some of them dating back

to the previous century but which still
had remarkable information potential.
Ravaldini continued that analysis work,
at first on his own and then supported by
Silvana Pagnotta. While he was ordering,
verifying, and computer typing the old
classifications of Bozzano and De Boni, a
small work team, composed of Claudia and
Cecilia Magnanensi, and Giulio Caratelli,
carried on other parts of the work (Caratelli,
2011). Their commitment turned into a
project aimed at indexing by 2000 all the
most prominent journals and books kept in
the Bozzano–De Boni Library at Bologna.
The Index was concluded by the deadline,
but it took another ten years to organize and structure the written texts, which
have today the above-described characteristics.
The Index is essential for anyone who looks for solid documentary bases
for supporting historical, experimental, or theoretical works. Publications
on spiritism and parapsychology constitute a minor and marginal part of the
contemporary culture, but are extremely numerous and it is difficult to find
direction through them. Furthermore, the modern approach often ignores
the historical perspective, and the wide variety of texts on the Web makes
it impossible to have adequate control of the countless available “rough”
materials. This is why a guide indicating if and where references can be found,
not to mention discussions of specific issues, and the way an author dealt with
a theme, is a very valuable tool for all who want to study this field, fill in some
knowledge gaps, or simply satisfy their curiosity.
MASSIMO BIONDI
Gestioni e Servizi Editoriali
Via Corridoni 14, 00046 Grottaferrata, Rome, Italy
[email protected]
References
Biondi, M. (1984). Pagine d’appunti di Ernesto Bozzano. Luce e Ombra, 84, 156–164.
Caratelli, G. (2011). Preface. Dizionario Enciclopedico delle Classificazioni Analitiche. Bologna.
Volume 1, VII–VIII.
Ravaldini, S. (2011). Preface. Dizionario Enciclopedico delle Classificazioni Analitiche. Bologna.
Volume 1, III–V.
Book Reviews 859
War and Shadows: The Haunting of Vietnam by Mai Lan Gustafsson.

Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009. 206 pp. $19.95,
ISBN 9780801475016.
This book is an anthropological study of spirit possession in postwar Vietnam.

The author knows that the notion of spirit possession is widely rejected by most
modern scholars. She has, however, chosen to record her observations from the
viewpoint of her informants, trying not to impose any reductive assumptions
on her narrative. Her object is to describe a complex human experience, not
“explain” away any part of it that seems dubious according to mainstream
bias. The big idea behind this book forces us to think about new dimensions
of suffering caused by war, especially by modern war in which the physical
obliteration of victims is more likely, thanks to more destructive technologies.
Dr. Gustafsson has collected 190 case histories of people mainly from
Hanoi and nearby: individuals who have been possessed, assaulted, and
haunted by “angry ghosts” (con ma). These are victims still living in the
vast psychic wake of a war that officially ended in 1975 and began with the
French colonialists returning to Saigon in 1946 after the Second World War.
The encounter with these angry ghosts runs to epidemic proportions; so much
so that the Communist (spirit-disbelieving) government a) has been forced to
acknowledge the devastating economic reality of the problem, pronouncing it
a “public health menace,” and b) permits, despite ideological reluctance, the
practice of spiritistic folk medicine; for it is the local mediums, sensitives, and
diviners who seem to know what’s going on and, often at great financial cost to
the victim, can perform salutary rites and provide useful counsel for palliating
the rage of the spirits. This may consist of something as simple as putting a
nice frame around a dead uncle’s photo. Something strange is undoubtedly
happening in the Vietnam that America tried famously “to bomb back to the
stone age.” To understand what this is, at least two premises from the author’s
narrative must be underscored.
The first has to do with the all-important Confucian element in Vietnamese
burial practices, and their significance for the psychic integrity of the entire
community. The picture one gets from Gustafsson’s account of these practices,
which are taken very seriously, points to something probably pretty strange for
most Western individualists. According to the Confucian li—the rites, duties,
performances—proper burial is absolutely essential to the well-being of the
deceased. The rites are offerings, acts of respect, love, honor, and recognition
directed toward the dead; when done properly, the departed become guardian
spirits (lo tien), sources of guidance and well-being for the living family. The
Confucian roots of this points to the fact that the family is the basic religious
860 Book Reviews
institution (Smith, 1994). The stability of society seems here to depend on ritual
rapport with the dead. Anything that prevents that ritual rapport must corrode
basic social bonds.
This leads to the second premise essential for understanding. What in fact
was deeply antithetical to traditional Vietnam burial customs? Answer: The
Vietnam War. For proper ritual burial you have to have a body. Without an intact
body—a head or a limb won’t do—the li cannot be performed. The Vietnamese
believe that rite-deprived souls cannot handle their fate on their own in the next
world. Facing what is perceived as insurmountable frustration of their support,
they become angry ghosts. But before we sketch a picture of the angry ghost
and the kind of havoc it is alleged to inflict on Gustafsson’s informants, we
need to comprehend the enormity of the war’s cost, part of which seems to have
involved denizens of the “other world” as well as living survivors. On page 125
we find that the American losers of this war still managed to inflict the following
on the Vietnamese people: more than 5 million dead; 300,000 missing; 300,000
orphans; 64,000 injured, and 40,000 killed by landmines and unexploded
ordnance, since the end of the war in 1975; nor should we omit the 250,000
boat people who died during attempts to escape nor the 10 million refugees,
said to be a conservative number. The number of key importance to the angry
ghost question is the 300,000 missing but no-doubt-dead bodies. According to
the belief system, that means 300,000 angry ghosts are out there wandering
about looking for ways to vent their fury. Suppose the invisible afterworld
corridors do indeed swarm with such agents of ill will—truly horrifying is the
belief that there is no hope of relief for them, no prospect of ever escaping from
this anarchic psychic inferno. The author keeps hammering home this picture
of hopelessness; it’s a hellishly narrow place to be trapped in, dependent on
the kindness and remembrance of the living, forever trying to be noticed, if
necessary by means of cruel and spiteful actions.
The author provides an Appendix (I), titled “Table of Suffering” (pp.
147–167), summarizing what she learned from her 190 victims of otherworldly
aggression. They cover all types, genders, ages. Besides basic facts about the
informants, we learn of their symptoms, their diagnoses, and their treatments. The
book also covers individual cases in greater detail. The possession experience
presents a roster of symptoms. The drift of them suggest the displacement of
the normal personality and something else forcing its way in, and in no gentle
or kindly manner. Some symptoms are mainly physical and may indicate the
resistance and discomfort in being displaced; for example, pains, tremors,
shaking, convulsions, skin disorders, listlessness, and unexplained illnesses.
(The author repeatedly underscores the failure of physicians to account for
most of these symptoms.) Other symptoms show the outline of the invading
personality itself: voices, obsessive thoughts, inability to concentrate, amnesia,
Book Reviews 861
nightmares, violent behavior, sleepwalking, and the

often-mentioned out-of-character behaviors.
The third item is diagnosis. What to make of the
these unexplained symptoms and who provides the
diagnosis? First of all, the diagnoses are intuitive,
not definitive or rigorous in a quantitative way. The
responses show a handful of popular sources of
diagnosis, beginning with the victim’s own self-
diagnosis. Besides oneself, mediums, fortunetellers,
and family members may confirm that one is
possessed and by whom: often family members (from
greatgrandmothers to sons), friends, strangers, and
lots of ghouls. (The only kind of ghoul that fits the role
here is the Arabian desert ghoul said to prey on travelers.)
Finally, we are given information about the treatment in each case and its
success or failure. For example, in one case, “Symptoms stop after installing
dead comrade’s memory in pagoda, becomes ‘no problem’ after funeral service in
Cambodia (per medium’s advice)” (p. 149). But then in another case, “Symptoms
persist, even after victim confesses to family that he stole offerings of food and
money meant for these spirits” (p. 151). Generally, the symptoms stop or lessen
when the possessed person follows the recommendations of the medium or other
advisors. In the cases where the symptoms persist, despite the victim following
instructions, the failure is attributed to lack of sincerity or responsibility. And
then there are cases like the man diagnosed as possessed by his dead wife. Effects
of the treatment were unclear: “Victim must renounce sex with prostitutes, per
medium’s instructions: status of symptoms unknown” (p. 159).
Often partly or with great difficulty, the angry ghosts can be laid to rest, or at
least pacified. What does it take? These wretched spirits need to be recognized,
remembered, memorialized, celebrated, and honored. In this thought-world,
when the living adopt the right attitude and behavior toward the dead, the dead
become gods, guides, guardians to the living. This is the basis of Confucian
ancestor worship. When the living ungenerously isolate themselves from the
dead, and fail for whatever reason to pay their respects, there is war between
the living and the dead. By creating 300,000 possible angry ghosts, modern
body-annihilating military technology vastly multiplies pain and suffering for
possible afterlife survivors, and certainly for the haunted victims. The war has
made Hell Day a popular holiday in Vietnam when people go out of their festive
way to honor and make offerings and hope to placate the swarms of angry
ghosts out there.
Are we afforded any evidence that there really are such conscious angry
ghosts? Dr. Gustafsson abstains from making any explicit claims, and was not
862 Book Reviews
aiming to produce proof in the manner of a parapsychologist, but I felt she was
quietly persuaded that the touted ghosts were objectively real. I first heard her
on public radio describe the case of an American who upon returning to Vietnam
for a visit had symptoms of possession; the American, normally very even-
tempered, began to have nightmares and shouted in his sleep furious outbursts in
perfectly grammatical Vietnamese. His girlfriend was witness to these displays,
and vouched for their grammatic excellence. This story would pack a wallop if
the American knew no Vietnamese; but he had moved to Vietnam and did have
a working knowledge of the language. What was impressive to witnesses was
the fluency and idiomatic style of his execrations.
There is a broad argument meant to support, or at least suggest, the
hypothesis that ghostly survival is the best explanation of the symptoms
experienced by the author’s informants. If the ritual recognition of the angry
ghosts is effective, the symptoms do ease off or completely vanish; in short,
it looks as if the ghosts are responding to the ritual treatment. The trouble is
that the links in the chain of the argument are too fuzzy. We have at best a very
sketchy medical knowledge of the symptoms. There is another crucial question.
How did the angry ghost get identified as the culprit? Here again we’re in what
looks like a cloudy realm to the outside observer. And finally, the doubter might
think: Couldn’t all the beneficial effects from the treatments be explained by a
powerful placebo effect and a highly active and culturally primed imagination?
Perhaps the angry ghosts are really the guilty unconscious of the survivors
punishing themselves and trying to make amends. In short, counterexplanations
could be advanced to explain the angry ghost phenomenon; but they’re not
likely to persuade victims.
In my opinion, this very well-written and courageous book merits our
attention for at least two reasons. First, it points to an area of research that
may be of interest to investigators of postmortem survival. As it turns out,
much survival evidence is found to relate to violent situations and mortal crisis:
most obviously, near-death experiences; also many reincarnation memories,
behaviors, and bodily marks; and many hauntings that involve violent death
and violent emotion. The hauntings and possessions of angry, aggressive
ghosts reported by Dr. Gustafsson may be included here, exacerbated by body-
vaporizing warfare, and the special problems that result from lack of proper
burial. If there is a transition to a next world, the how of the transition must
make a difference. The ideal Vietnamese death is peaceful and harmonious with
the surviving family. The purpose of this harmonious death is to establish a link
with the invisible world and be led by the wisdom and virtual godlikeness of
benevolent ancestors. On the other hand, being instantly blown to smithereens
by a bomb might indeed, as the Vietnamese believe, transform a human soul
into a permanent agent of festering ill will.
Book Reviews 863
The second valuable point is that War and Shadows enlarges our
understanding of the scope of human suffering. On any interpretation of the
material recounted, war is costly in ways most of us can barely conceive. In
the undoubtedly profitable business of war, the profound hell of hatred and
misery that we create, not just for survivors but for possible afterdeath victims,
is something we need to reckon with as part of the collateral damage.
MICHAEL GROSSO
Division of Perceptual Studies, University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22902
[email protected]
Reference
Smith, H. (1994). The Illustrated Guide to the World’s Religions. Harper SanFrancisco. p. 120.
Further Book of Note
They Knew The Unknown by Martin Ebon. The World Publishing

Company, 1972. 253 pp. $2.41 (used). ASIN: B00371827C.
Thanks to Amazon and Google, old books don’t die. They’re available online
in near perpetuity. Some end up like those lonely paperbacks left behind on the
bookshelf of a summer beach rental—worth but a bored afternoon when it’s
raining outside. Others are worth saving and savoring.
Martin Ebon’s book, written in 1972, is the latter. It’s a keeper. A professional
writer, Ebon served as managing editor of Eileen Garrett’s International Journal
of Parapsychology and as a consultant to ESP studies pioneer Dr. J. B. Rhine,
deeply exposing him to their body of work. But he honed his wordsmithing as
a book editor with the New American Library and Playboy Press. Ebon deploys
erudite writing: intelligent, sophisticated, with historical references, and
touches of humor to drive home his key point—biographers of famous persons
routinely sanitize their subjects’ lives, glossing over or removing entirely any
references to their psychic experiences or beliefs.
Ebon’s richly woven tapestry of illustrious scientists, authors, politicians,
and philosophers who wrestled with the unknown is extensive and delicious:
864 Book Reviews
Socrates, Swedenborg, Kant, Schopenhauer,

and America’s own intellectual explorer of
the survival of consciousness C. J. Ducasse;
Shakespeare, Shelley, Hugo, Twain, Doyle,
Browning, Dickens, Yeats, Thomas Mann,
Aldous Huxley, and Upton Sinclair; President
Lincoln and his publicly known participation in
Spiritualist séances contrasted with Canadian
Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King (1874–
1950) and his concealed lifetime of consulting
mediums; Strindberg’s telepathic delusions;
Thomas Edison’s musings on how to contact the
dead; Alfred Russel Wallace, co-founder with
Darwin of the theory of evolution, sharing with
a San Francisco audience in 1887 the séance
experience which confirmed for Wallace the existence of an afterlife.
And then there’s that iconic trinity of psychiatrists: James, Jung, and
Freud. Ebon recounts the struggle between Freud and Jung over the nature,
meaning, and interpretation of psychic experiences which sealed the fate of
these quirky phenomena in psychology’s infancy. Had Jung and his intellectual
ally William James won, parapsychology today would simply be psychology.
Unfortunately, a timid, intellectually dishonest Freud punted; consequently,
a class of experiences persistently recorded throughout human history were
stigmatized and marginalized to the ultimate detriment of humanity.
You can pick up a used paperback copy of Ebon’s hidden history of these
psychic explorers for 75 cents. In terms of education and entertainment, that’s
one heck of a bargain.
MICHAEL SCHMICKER
Honolulu, Hawaii
http://www.redroom.com/author/Michael-L-Schmicker
Book Reviews 865
Articles of Interest
The Alchemical Revolution by Sara Reardon, Science, 332 (20 May

2011), 914–915.
Some historians of science are trying to replicate experiments done by

alchemists, and they are finding clues to why the alchemists might have
reasonably concluded, for example from color changes, that it might indeed be
feasible to transmute less noble metals into gold. This article exemplifies how
culturally ingrained is the view of alchemy as magic, superstition, religion, in
contrast to science, pragmatism, objectivity.
Thirty years ago I had been taken aback to hear Isaac Newton’s biographer,
the well-known historian Richard Westfall (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Richard_S._Westfall), say that his problem had been to reconcile the Newton
of scientific genius with the Newton who spent more time on biblical exegesis
and alchemical experiments than on his mathematics and science. Westfall was
committing a fallacy that some other historians have long recognized, taking
what they call a Whiggish view: presuming that there has been steady progress
from ignorance to knowledge, and judging the past by the standards of later
understanding. Surely Newton was, like other humans, an individual who will
have felt no puzzling clash between his various interests, in Newton’s case no
incongruity in his pursuit of understanding by looking into alchemical claims,
biblical claims, observational data, and better ways to calculate. Whigs of
future centuries will find plenty of reasons to wonder how they could reconcile
various aspects of some of the most prominent achievers of our times, say those
present-day religious believers who are also scientists. Journalist Reardon
doesn’t fully understand this when she reports that “alchemy is certainly a thorn
in the side of historians: an unwelcome reminder of science’s foray into magic.”
A few years ago, my Sydney Alumni Magazine (University of Sydney) had a
piece about an historian studying the doings of alchemists, and several later
Letters to the Editor expressed dismay that people would spend time delving
into superstition.
Mistaken views and approaches can take a long time to die off, among the
media and the general public even more than among academics.
cr. Henry H. Bauer

[email protected]
866 Book Reviews
Is “Alien Abduction” Extraterrestrial Visitation? Developing Pro-

spective Study Designs to Gather Physical Evidence of Alleged “Alien
Abduction” by Martin Hensher. Journal of the British Interplanetary
Society, 63 (2010), 307–315.
The alien abduction phenomenon remains a mystery, one primarily investigated

either by UFO researchers or, in the academy, by psychologists. The former
group has mainly recorded witness testimony, often with hypnosis; the latter
crowd has proposed various mechanisms that might cause a person to report
abduction experiences although no such thing had really occurred. Very few
investigators have attempted to penetrate to the heart of the mystery and gather
physical evidence that might conclusively demonstrate that something unusual
is occurring, or alternatively reveal that nothing out-of-the-ordinary happens
during a purported abduction.
Such a study is at least conceivable, if barely feasible, because abductions
are said to happen routinely to some individuals, often in their homes or in
other familiar settings. In this paper, Hensher brings to bear his expertise in
epidemiological methods to investigate the key design and statistical issues of
a potential cohort study that would use physical instrumentation for continual
monitoring of abductees. He lays out the various factors, including abductees
with and without memories of their experience, various event frequencies, study
periods, drop-out rates, and so forth, and then conducts simulation studies to
calculate sample sizes at various levels of statistical power. What soon becomes
evident is that, if some, but not all, abductions are real, hundreds of abductees
would need to be included in a study to obtain reasonable power (and thereby
avoid a Type II error of concluding there is no physical evidence).
These calculations illustrate the difficulty faced by any concerted attempt
to study abductees systematically and obtain objective evidence, especially
given the lack of current funding in ufology for anything but small-scale efforts.
MARK RODEGHIER
Center for UFO Studies
SSE News 867
31ST ANNUAL SSE CONFERENCE

JUNE 21–23, 2012 BOULDER, COLORADO
Millennium Hotel
Bonfire of the Paradigms

Challenging Paradigms in the Health Sciences Keynote: Richard Olree
Challenging Paradigms in the Physical Sciences Keynote: David Dilley
Challenging Paradigms in the Biological Sciences Keynote: Thomas Dykstra
CALL FOR PAPERS WILL GO OUT IN JANUARY
The Dinsdale Prize will be awarded at the conference.
Two night-time panels will be presented.
9TH BIENNIAL SSE EUROPEAN MEETING

18TH – 21ST OCTOBER 2012
An Grianán Adult Education College,
Termonfechin, Drogheda, IRELAND
Mapping Time, Mind, and Space

CALL FOR PAPERS — SEND TO:
Peter Wadhams, Chair, Program Committee
[email protected]
868 SSE News
Society for Scientific Exploration

Executive Committee
Dr. Bill Bengston Dr. John Reed
SSE President SSE Treasurer
St. Joseph’s College Johns Hopkins University
Patchogue, New York 4401 Roland Avenue, Suite 405
Baltimore, Maryland 21210
Professor Robert G. Jahn
Ms. Brenda Dunne
SSE Vice-President
SSE Education Officer
School of Engineering and Applied Science
International Consciousness Research
Princeton University
Laboratories
Princeton, New Jersey
Princeton, New Jersey
Dr. Mark Urban-Lurain Professor Garret Moddel
SSE Secretary SSE Past President
College of Natural Science Department of Electrical and Computer
Michigan State University Engineering
111 N. Kedzie Lab University of Colorado at Boulder
East Lansing, Michigan 48824 Boulder, Colorado
Council
Dr. Julie Beischel Dr. Bernard Haisch
The Windbridge Institute California Institute for Physics & Astrophysics
Tucson, Arizona Redwood Shores, California
Dr. Richard Blasband Dr. Roger Nelson
Center for Functional Research Global Consciousness Project
Sausalito, California Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
Dr. Courtney Brown Dr. Glen Rein
Emory University Ridgway, Colorado
Atlanta, Georgia
Dr. Dominique Surel
Dr. York Dobyns Evergreen, Colorado
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
Dr. Chantal Toporow
Northrup Grumman, Redondo Beach, California
Appointed Officers
Professor Peter A. Sturrock P. David Moncrief
SSE President Emeritus and Founder JSE Book Review Editor
Stanford University Memphis, Tennessee
Stanford, California L. David Leiter
Associate Members’ Representative
Professor Charles Tolbert
Willow Grove, Pennsylvania
SSE President Emeritus
Department of Astronomy Erling P. Strand
University of Virginia European Members’ Representative
Charlottesville, Virginia Østfold College
Halden, Norway
Professor Lawrence Fredrick Professor Henry Bauer
SSE Secretary Emeritus JSE Editor Emeritus
University of Virginia Dean Emeritus, Virginia Tech
Charlottesville, Virginia Blacksburg, Virginia
SSE News 869
THANK YOU TO THE JOURNAL SUBMISSION

REVIEWERS IN 2010 AND 2011
The following individuals participated in the peer review process for the
Journal of Scientific Exploration, and the Editors thank them for their
diligence, dedication, time, and commitment to the Journal.
Mikel Aickin Larry Dossey John Palmer

Carlos S. Alvarado Jeremy Drake Charles Paxton
Stuart Appelle Brenda J. Dunne Guy Lyon Playfair
James Kenneth Arnette Eric Eisenbud Thomas Rabeyron
Loyd Auerbach Suitbert Ertel Dean Radin
Peter Bancel Renaud Evrard Adam Rock
Eberhard Bauer Michael Franklin Mark Rodeghier
Julie Beischel Alan Gauld David Rousseau
Daryl Bem Stephan Joseph Gift Elizabeth Roxburgh
William Bengston Dale E. Graff Alfonso Rueda
Qiao Bi Bruce Greyson Kunitomo Sakurai
Dick Bierman Neal Grossman Mohammed Sanduk
Massimo Biondi Bernard Haisch Stefan Schmidt
Robert Bobrow Andrianto Handojo Richard Shoup
Richard Broughton Erlendur Haraldsson Christine Simmonds
Courtney Brown Arthur Hastings Paul Smith
Eddie Bullard Wolfgang Helfrich William Spillman
Jean Burns Gerd Hoevelmann Mahadeva Srinivasan
Claudio Cardella Michael Ibison Peter A. Sturrock
Etzel Cardeña John Ives Michael Sudduth
James Carpenter Robert G. Jahn Charles Tart
Bernard Carr Hannah Jenkins Devin Terhune
Jerome Clark James Rea Johnston Patrizio E. Tressoldi
Loren Coleman Brian Josephson Jim Tucker
Barrie George Colvin Robert Klauber Claus Wilhelm Turtur
Alan Combs Dietrich Kuhlke Jessica Utts
Wendy Cousins Marissa Little Mario Varvoglis
Donald DeGracia Scott Little Harald Walach
David Deming Edwin C. May Steve Weinstein
Maaneli Derakhshani Garret Moddel Don West
John Derr Peter Mulacz Cynthia Whitney
York Dobyns Michael Nahm Bryan J. Williams
Don Donderi Roger D. Nelson Nancy Zingrone
870 SSE News
THANK YOU TO THE JOURNAL

BOOK REVIEWERS IN 2010 AND 2011
The Editors would also like to thank the following authors of the
Reviews section of the Journal of Scientific Exploration.
Carlos S. Alvarado Alton Higgins

Stuart Appelle Hannah Jenkins
Imants BaruŠS Stephen C. Jett
Alan H. Batten Edward F. Kelly
Henry H. Bauer Stanley Krippner
William F. Bengston Michael Levin
John Bindernagel Bruce Maccabee
Massimo Biondi Fatima Regina Machado
Courtney Brown James G. Matlock
Hale Brownlee Stan V. McDaniel
Lyn Buchanan Randy Moore
Thomas E. Bullard Michael Nahm
Etzel Cardeña Stephen R. Palmquist
Billy Cox F. David Peat
Constantin Adrian Parker
Cranganu Frank Pasciuti
Horace Crater Guy Lyon Playfair
Hugh Cunningham Leslie Price
Michael Davidson Thomas Rabeyron
Steven J. Dick Mark Rodeghier
Tana Dineen Michael Schmicker
Greg Ealick Daniel Sheehan
Renaud Evrard Karl P. N. Shuker
Sally Rhine Feather Djohar Si Ahmed
Gabriel Finkelstein Andreas Sommer
Ephraim Fischbach Claude Swanson
Stephan Ray Flora Carlos Adrian Hernandez Tavares
Ryan D. Foster Yervant Terzian
Patric Giesler Jim B. Tucker
Barry Greenwood John L. Turner
Neal Grossman Michael E. Tymn
Michael Grosso Bryan J. Williams
David Schaffer Hafiz Wellington Zangari
Index of Previous Articles in the Journal of Scientific Exploration
Vol: No Article Author(s)
1:1 A Brief History of the Society for Scientific Exploration P. Sturrock

Aterations in Recollection of Unusual and Unexpected Events D. Hall et al.
Toward a Quantitative Theory of Intellectual Discovery (Esp. in Phys.) R. Fowler
Engineering Anomalies Research R. Jahn et al.
Common Knowledge about the Loch Ness Monster H. Bauer
An Analysis of the Condon Report on the Colorado UFO Project P. Sturrock
1:2 The Strange Properties of Psychokinesis H. Schmidt
What Do We Mean by ‘‘Scientific?’’ H. Bauer
Analysis of a UFO Photograph R. Haines
Periodically Flashing Lights Filmed off the Coast of New Zealand B. Maccabee
2:1 Commonalities in Arguments over Anomalies H. Bauer
Remote Viewing and Computer Communications—An Experiment J. Vallee
Is There a Mars Effect? M. Gauquelin
Raising the Hurdle for the Athletes’ Mars Effect S. Ertel
2:2 UFOs and NASA R. Henry
The Nature of Time Y. Terzian
Operator-Related Anomalies in a Random Mechanical Cascade B. Dunne et al.
Evidence for a Short-Period Internal Clock in Humans T. Slanger
Three New Cases of Reincarnation Types in Sri Lanka with Written Records I. Stevenson et al.
3:1 Arguments Over Anomalies: H. \?Polemics H. Bauer
Anomalies: Analysis and Aesthetics R. Jahn
Trends in the Study of Out-of-Body Experiences C. Alvarado
A Methodology for the Objective Study of Transpersonal Imagery W. Braud/
M. Schlitz
The Influence of Intention on Random and Pseudorandom Events D. Radin/J. Utts
Case of Possession Type in India with Evidence of Paranormal Knowledge I. Stevenson et al.
3:2 New Ideas in Science T. Gold
Photo Analysis of an Aerial Disc Over Costa Rica R. Haines/J. Vallee
Three Cases of Children in Northern India Who Remember a Previous Life A. Mills
‘‘Signatures’’ in Anomalous Human–Machine Interaction Data D. Radin
A Case of Severe Birth Defects Possibly Due to Cursing I. Stevenson
4:1 Biochemical Traumatology/Plant Metabolic Disorders in a UFO Landing M. Bounias
Return to Trans-en-Provence J. Vallee
Analysis of Anomalous Physical Traces: 1981 Trans-en-Provence UFO Case J. Velasco
Physical Interpretation of Very Small Concentrations H. Bauer
Luminous Phenomena and Seismic Energy in the Central United States J. Derr/
M. Persinger
Photo Analysis of an Aerial Disc Over Costa Rica: New Evidence R. Haines/J. Vallee
A Scientific Inquiry into the Validity of Astrology J. McGrew/
R. McFall
Planetary Influences on Human Behavior: Absurd for a Scientific Explanation? A. Müller
Five Arguments against Extraterrestrial Origin of Unidentified Flying Objects J. Vallee
4:2 Using the Study of Anomalies To Enhance Critical Thinking in the Classroom M. Swords
Observations of Electromagnetic Signals Prior to California Earthquakes M. Adams
Bayesian Analysis of Random Event Generator Data W. Jefferys
Moslem Case of Reincarnation Type in Northern India: Analysis of 26 Cases A. Mills
Electromagnetic Disturbances Associated with Earthquakes M. Parrot
Extrasensory Interactions between Homo Sapiens and Microbes C. Pleass/N. Dey
Correlation between Mental Processes and External Random Events H. Schmidt
Phobias in Children Who Claim To Remember Previous Lives I. Stevenson
A Gas Discharge Device for Investigating Focused Human Attention W. Tiller
871
Radio Emissions from an Earthquake J. Warwick

5:1 The Cydonian Hypothesis J. Brandenburg et al.
Cases in Burma, Thailand, and Turkey: Aspects of I. Stevenson’s Research J. Keil
Effects of Consciousness on the Fall of Dice: A Meta-Analysis D. Radin/D. Ferrari
The Wasgo or Sisiutl: A Cryptozoological Sea-Animal M. Swords
The Extraterrestrial Hypothesis Is Not That Bad R. Wood
Toward a Second-Degree Extraterrestrial Theory of UFOs J. Vallee
Low-Frequency Emissions: Earthquakes and Volcanic Eruptions in Japan T. Yoshino
5:2 Eccles’s Model of Mind–Brain Interaction and Psychokinesis W. Giroldini
Ball Lightning and St. Elmo’s Fire as Forms of Thunderstorm Activity A. Grigor’ev et al.
Social Scientific Paradigms for Investigating Anomalous Experience J. McClenon
Count Population Profiles in Engineering Anomalies Experiments R. Jahn et al.
Children Claiming Past-Life Memories: Four Cases in Sri Lanka E. Haraldsson
6:1 Can the UFO Extraterrestrial Hypothesis and Vallee Hypotheses Be Reconciled? W. Bramley
Learning for Discovery: Establishing the Foundations R. Domaingue
On the Bayesian Analysis of REG Data (Response from W. Jefferys) Y. Dobyns
Electrodynamic Activities and Their Role in the Organization of Body Pattern M. W. Ho et al.
6:2 Review of Approaches to the Study of Spontaneous Psi Experiences R. White
Survival or Super-Psi?: Interchange Responses I. Stevenson/S.
Braude
The Psychokinesis Effect: Geomagnetic Influence, Age and Sex Differences L. Gissurarson
Are Reincarnation Type Cases Shaped by Parental Guidance? S. Pasricha
6:3 Heim’s Theory of Elementary Particle Structures T. Auerbach
Better Blood through Chemistry: A Laboratory Replication of a Miracle M. Epstein
The Gauquelin Effect Explained? Comments on Müller’s Planetary Correlations S. Ertel
The Gauquelin Effect Explained? A Rejoinder to Ertel’s Critique A. Müller
Ball Lightning Penetration into Closed Rooms: 43 Eyewitness Accounts A. Grivor’ev et al.
A Series of Possibly Paranormal Recurrent Dreams I. Stevenson
6:4 Experiments in Remote Human/Machine Interaction B. Dunne et al.
A Low Light Level Diffraction Experiment for Anomalies Research S. Jeffers et al.
A New Look at Maternal Impressions: An Analysis of 50 Published Cases I. Stevenson
Alternative Healing Therapy on Regeneration Rate of Salamander Forelimbs D. Wirth et al.
7:1 Accultured Topographical Effects of Shamanic Trance Consciousness P. Devereux
Mainstream Sciences vs. Parasciences: Toward an Old Dualism? G. L. Eberlein
Existence of Life and Homeostasis in an Atmospheric Environment S. Moriyama
A Guide to UFO Research M. D. Swords
7:2 Non-Causality as the Earmark of Psi H. Schmidt
Adequate Epistemology for Scientific Exploration of Consciousness W. W. Harman
Puzzling Eminence Effects Might Make Good Sense S. Ertel
Comments on Puzzling Eminence Effects J. W. Nienhuys
A Systematic Survey of Near-Death Experiences in South India S. Pasricha
The Willamette Pass Oregon UFO Photo Revisited: An Explanation I. Wieder
7:3 Near Death Experiences: Evidence for Life After Death? M. Schröter-
Kunhardt
Analysis of the May 18, 1992, UFO Sighting in Gulf Breeze, Florida B. Maccabee
Selection Versus Influence in Remote REG Anomalies Y. Dobyns
Dutch Investigation of the Gauquelin Mars Effect J. Nienhuys
Comments on Dutch Investigations of the Gauquelin Mars Effect S. Ertel
What Are Subtle Energies? W. Tiller
7:4 Explaining the Mysterious Sounds Produced by Very Large Meteor Fireballs C. S. L. Keay
Neural Network Analyses of Consciousness-Related Patterns D. I. Radin
Applied Parapsychology: Studies of Psychics and Healers S. A. Schouten
Birthmarks and Birth Defects Corresponding to Wounds on Deceased Persons I. Stevenson
Index of Previous Articles in JSE 873
The ‘‘Enemies’’ of Parapsychology R. McConnell

8:1 Survey of the American Astronomical Society Concerning UFOs: Part 1 P. Sturrock
Anatomy of a Hoax: The Philadelphia Experiment Fifty Years Later J. Vallee
Healing and the Mind: Is There a Dark Side? L. Dossey
Alleged Experiences Inside UFOs: An Analysis of Abduction Reports V. Ballester Olmos
What I See When I Close My Eyes R. Targ
Series Position Effects in Random Event Generator Experiments B. Dunne et al.
Re-Examination of the Law of Conservation of Mass in Chemical Reactions K. Volkamer et al.
The ‘Genius Hypothesis’: Exploratory Concepts for Creativity E. Laszlo
Strong Magnetic Field Detected Following a Sighting of an UFO B. Maccabee
Complementary Healing Therapy for Patients with Type I Diabetes Mellitus D. P. Wirth
Report of an Indian Swami Claiming to Materialize Objects E. Haraldsson
8:4 Scientific Analysis of Four Photos of a Flying Disk Near Lac Chauvet, France Pierre Guérin
A Linear Pendulum Experiment: Operator Intention on Damping Rate R. D. Nelson
Applied Scientific Inference P. A. Sturrock
The Mind-Brain Problem J. Beloff
9:1 Unconventional Water Detection: Field Test of Dowsing in Dry Zones: Part 1 H. Betz
Digital Video Analysis of Anomalous Space Objects M. Carlotto
The Critical Role of Analytical Science in the Study of Anomalies M. Epstein
Near-Death Experiences in South India: A Systematic Survey S. Pasricha
Human Consciousness Influence on Water Structure L. Pyatnitsky/
V. Fonkin
9:2 Unconventional Water Detection: Field Test of Dowsing in Dry Zones: Part 2 H. Betz
Semi-molten Meteoric Iron Associated with a Crop Formation W. Levengood/MJ.
Burke
Experiments on a Possible g-Ray Emission Caused by a Chemical Process V. Noninski et al.
The Effect of Paranormal Healing on Tumor Growth F. Snel/
P. van der Sijde
Psychokinetic Action of Young Chicks on the Path of an Illuminated Source R. Peoc’h
Eddington’s Thinking on the Relation between Science and Religion A. Batten
Two Kinds of Knowledge: Maps and Stories H. Bauer
9:3 Experiments on Claimed Beta Particle Emission Decay V. Noninski et al.
Assessing Commonalities in Randomly Paired Individuals T. Rowe et al.
Anomalously Large Body Voltage Surges on Exceptional Subjects W. Tiller et al.
Six Modern Apparitional Experiences I. Stevenson
Viewing the Future: A Pilot Study with an Error-Detecting Protocol R. Targ et al.
Could Extraterrestrial Intelligences Be Expected to Breathe Our Air? M. Swords
9:4 Decision Augmentation Theory: Applications to Random Number Generators E. May
Extrasensory Perception of Subatomic Particles & Referee Interchange (Dobyns) S. Phillips
North American Indian Effigy Mounds A. Apostol
A Holistic Aesthetic for Science B. Kirchoff
10:1 An Assessment of the Evidence for Psychic Functioning J. Utts
Evaluation of a Program on Anomalous Mental Phenomena R. Hyman
CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing Program at Stanford Research Institute H. Puthoff
Remote Viewing at Stanford Research Institute in the 1970s: A Memoir R. Targ
American Institutes for Research Review of the STAR GATE Program E. May
FieldREG Anomalies in Group Situations R. Nelson et al.
Anomalous Organization of Random Events by Group Consciousness D. Radin et al.
10:2 Critical Review of the ‘‘Cold Fusion’’ Effect E. Storms
Do Nuclear Reactions Take Place Under Chemical Stimulation? J. Bockris et al.
Claimed Transmutation of Elements Caused by a Chemical Process V. Noninski et al.
Selection versus Influence Revisited: New Methods and Conclusions Y. Dobyns

Illegitimate Science? A Personal Story B. Maccabee
Anomalous Phenomena Observed in the Presence of a Brazilian ‘‘Sensitive’’ S. Krippner et al.
10:3 Mass Modification Experiment Definition Study R. Forward
Atmospheric Mass Loss on Mars and the Consequences H. Lammer
Exploring Correlations between Local Emotional and Global Emotional Events D. Bierman
Archetypes, Neurognosis and the Quantum Sea C. Laughlin
10:4 Distance Healing of Patients with Major Depression B. Greyson
Cases of the Reincarnation Type: Evaluation of Some Indirect Evidence J. Keil
Enhanced Congruence between Dreams and Distant Target Material S. Krippner et al.
Recent Responses to Survival Research (Responses by Braude & Wheatley) R. Almeder
Toward a Philosophy of Science in Women’s Health Research A. Lettieri
11:1 Biased Data Selection in Mars Effect Research S. Ertel/K. Irving
Is the ‘‘Mars Effect’’ Genuine? P. Kurtz et al.
Fortean Phenomena on Film: Evidence or Artifact? R. Lange/J. Houran
Wishing for Good Weather: A Natural Experiment in Group Consciousness R. Nelson
Empirical Evidence for a Non-Classical Experimenter Effect H. Walach/
S. Schmidt
Consciousness, Causality, and Quantum Physics D. Pratt
11:2 Anomalous Cognition Experiments and Local Sidereal Time S. J. P. Spottiswoode
Evidence that Objects on Mars are Artificial in Origin M. Carlotto
The Astrology of Time Twins: A Re-Analysis & Referee Interchange (Roberts) C. French et al.
Unconscious Perception of Future Emotions: An Experiment in Presentiment D. Radin
A Bayesian Maximum-Entropy Approach to Hypothesis Testing P. Sturrock
Planetary Diameters in the Surya-Siddhanta R. Thompson
Science of the Subjective R. Jahn/B. Dunne
11:3 Accessing Anomalous States of Consciousness with Binaural Beat Technology F. Holmes Atwater
The ‘‘Mars Effect’’ As Seen by the Committee PARA J. Dommanget
Astrology and Sociability: A Comparative Psychological Analysis S. Fuzeau-Braesch
Comparison between Children with and without Previous-Life Memories E. Haraldsson
Did Life Originate in Space? Discussion of Implications of Recent Research A. Mugan
Correlations of Random Binary Sequences with Pre-Stated Operator Intention R. Jahn et al.
The Hidden Side of Wolfgange Pauli: An Encounter with Depth Psychology Atmanspacher/
Primas
11:4 Topographic Brain Mapping of UFO Experiencers N. Don/G. Moura
Toward a Model Relating Empathy, Charisma, and Telepathy J. Donovan
The Zero-Point Field and the NASA Challenge of Create the Space Drive B. Haisch/A. Rueda
Motivation and Meaningful Coincidence: Further Examination of Synchronicity T. Rowe et al.
A Critique of Arguments Offered against Reincarnation R. Almeder
The Archaeology of Consciousness P. Devereux
12:1 Gender Differences in Human/Machine Anomalies B. Dunne
Statement Validity Analysis of ‘‘Jim Ragsdale Story’’: Roswell Implications J. Houran/S. Porter
Experiment Effects in Scientifi c Research: How Widely Are They Neglected? R. Sheldrake
Roswell—Anatomy of a Myth K. Jeffery
A Different View of ‘‘Roswell—Anatomy of a Myth’’ M. Swords
Critique of ‘‘Roswell—Anatomy of a Myth’’ R. Woods
12:2 Physical Evidence Related to UFO Reports P. A. Sturrock et al.
Empirical Evidence Against Decision Augmentation Theory Y. Dobyns/R. Nelson
Cases of Reincarnation in Northern India with Birthmarks and Birth Defects S. Pasricha
Can the Vacuum Be Engineered for Spaceflight Applications? Overview. H. E. Puthoff
Four Paradoxes Involving the Second Law of Thermodynamics D. Sheehan
The Paranormal Is Not Excluded from Physics O. Costa de
Beauregard
12:3 Estimates of Optical Power Output in Six Cases of Unexplained Aerial Objects J. Vallee
Analyses in Ten Cases of Unexplained Aerial Objects with Material Samples J. Vallee
Do Near-Death Experiences Provide Evidence for Survival of Human Personality E. Cook et al.
Anomalous Statistical Influence Depends on Details of Random Process M. Ibison
FieldREG II: Consciousness Field Effects: Replications and Explorations R. D. Nelson et al.
Biological Effects of Very Low Frequency (VLF) Atmospherics in Humans A. Schienle et al.
12:4 The Timing of Conscious Experience: Causality-Violating F. A. Wolf
Double-Slit Diffraction Experiment of Investigate Consciousness Anomalies M. Ibison/S. Jeffers
Techno-Dowsing: A Physiological Response System to Improve Psi Training P. Stevens
Physical Measurement of Episodes of Focused Group Energy W. Rowe
Experimental Studies of Telepathic Group Communication of Emotions J. Dalkvist/
Westerlund
Strategies for Dissenting Scientists B. Martin
13:1 Significance Levels for the Assessment of Anomalous Phenomena R. A. J. Matthews
Retrotransposons as Engines of Human Bodily Transformation C. A. Kelleher
A Rescaled Range Analysis of Random Events F. Pallikari/E. Boller
Subtle Domain Connections to the Physical Domain Aspect of Reality W. A. Tiller
Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions K. A. Kress
Dreaming Consciousness: More Than a Bit Player in the Mind/Body Problem M. Ullman
13:2 The Effect of ‘‘Healing with Intent’’ on Pepsin Enzyme Activity T. Bunnell
Electronic Device-Mediated pH Changes in Water W. Dibble/W. Tiller
Variations on the Foundations of Dirac’s Quantum Physics J. Edmonds
Do Cases of the Reincarnation Type Show Similar Features over Many Years? J. Keil/I. Stevenson
Optical Power Output of an Unidentifi ed High Altitude Light Source B. Maccabee
Registration of Actual and Intended Eye Gaze: Correlation with Spiritual Beliefs G. Schwartz/
L. Russek
Real Communication? Report on a SORRAT Letter-Writing Experiment I. Grattan-Guinness
What are the Irreducible Components of the Scientific Enterprise? I. Stevenson
Anomalies in the History of Relativity I. McCausland
Magic of Signs: A Nonlocal Interpretation of Homeopathy H. Walach
13:3 Second Sight and Family History: Pedigree and Segregation Analyses S. Cohn
Mound Configurations on the Martian Cydonia Plain H. Crater/
S. McDaniel
Geomorphology of Selected Massifs on the Plains of Cydonia, Mars D. Pieri
Atmosphere or UFO? A Response to the 1997 SSE Review Panel Report B. Maccabee
An Unusual Case of Stigmatization M. Margnelli
Methuselah: Oldest Myth. or Oldest Man? L. McKague
Analysis of Technically Inventive Dream-Like Mental Imagery B. Towe/
Randall-May
Exploring the Limits of Direct Mental Influence: Two Studies C. Watt et al.
13:4 Experimental Systems in Mind–Matter Research R. Morris
Basic Elements and Problems of Probability Theory H. Primas
The Significance of Statistics in Mind–Matter Research R. Utts
Introductory Remarks on Large Deviations Statistics Amann/
Atmanspacher
p-adic Information Spaces. Small Probabilities and Anomalous Phenomena A. Khrennikov
Towards an Understanding of the Nature of Racial Prejudice Hoyle/
Wickramasinghe
Clyde Tombaugh, Mars and UFOs M. Swords
14:1 Investigating Deviations from Dynamical Randomness with Scaling Indices Atmanspacher et al.
Valentich Disappearence: New Evidence and New Conclusion R. Haines/P.
Norman
Protection of Mice from Tularemia with Ultra-Low Agitated Dilutions W. Jonas/D. Dillner
The Correlation of the Gradient of Shannon Entropy and Anomalous Cognition Spottiswoode/Faith
Contributions to Variance in REG Experiments: ANOVA Models R. Nelson et al.
Publication Bias: The ‘‘File-Drawer’’ Problem in Scientific Inference J. Scargle
Remote Viewing in a Group Setting R. Targ/J. Katra
14:2 Overview of Several Theoretical Models on PEAR Data Y. Dobyns
The Ordering of Random Events by Emotional Expression R. Blasband
Energy, Fitness and Information-Augmented EMFs in Drosophila melanogaster M. Kohane/
W. Tiller
A Dog That Seems To Know When His Owner Is Coming Home R. Sheldrake/
P. Smart
What Can Elementary Particles Tell Us about the World in Which We Live? R. Bryan
Modern Physics and Subtle Realms: Not Mutually Exclusive R. Klauber
14:3 Plate Tectonics: A Paradigm Under Threat D. Pratt
The Effect of the ‘‘Laying On of Hands’’ on Transplanted Breast Cancer in Mice Bengston/Krinsley
Stability of Assessments of Paranormal Connections in Reincarnation Type Cases I. Stevenson/J. Keil
ArtREG: A Random Event Experiment Utilizing Picture-Preference Feedback R. G. Jahn et al.
Can Population Growth Rule Out Reincarnation? D. Bishai
The Mars Effect Is Genuine S. Ertel/K. Irving
Bulky Mars Effect Hard To Hide S. Ertel
What Has Science Come to? H. Arp
14:4 Mind/Machine Interaction Consortium: PortREG Replication Experiments Jahn/Mischo/
Vaitl et al.
Unusual Play in Young Children Who Claim to Remember Previous Lives I. Stevenson
A Scale to Measure the Strength of Children’s Claims of Previous Lives J. B. Tucker
Reanalysis of the 1965 Hefl in UFO Photos Druffel/Wood/
Kelson
Should You Take Aspirin To Prevent Heart Attack? J. M. Kauffman
15:1 The Biomedical Significance of Homocysteine K. McCully
20th and 21st Century Science: Reflections and Projections R. G. Jahn
To Be Or Not To Be! A ‘Paraphysics’ for the New Millennium J. E. Beichler
Science of the Future in Light of Alterations of Consciousness I. Barušs
Composition Analysis of the Brazil Magnesium P. A. Sturrock
Does Recurrent ISP Involve More Than Congnitive Neuroscience? J.-C. Terrillon/
S. Marques
Bonham
15:2 The Scole Investigation: Critical Analysis of Paranormal Physical Phenomena M. Keen
Bio-photons and Bio-communication R. VanWijk
Scalar Waves: Theory and Experiments K. Meyl
Commentary: On Existence of K. Meyl’s Scalar Waves G. W. Bruhn
Cases of the Reincarnation Type in South India: Why So Few Reports? S. K. Pasricha
Mind, Matter, and Diversity of Stable Isotopes J. P. Pui/A. A.
Berezin
Are the Apparitions of Medjugorge Real? J. P. Pandarakalam
Where Do We File ‘Flying Saucers’? Archivist and Uncertainty Principle H. Evans
The Bakken: A Library and Museum of Electricity in Life D. Stillings
15:3 A Modular Model of Mind/Matter Manifestations (M5) R. G. Jahn/B. J.
Dunne
The Speed of Thought: Complex Space–Time Metric and Psychic Phenomenon E. A. Rauscher/
R. Targ
Failure to Replicate Electronic Voice Phenomenon I. Barušs
Experimental Study on Precognition Vasilescu/Vasilescu
Unexplained Temporal Coincidence of Crystallization Constain/Davies
15:4 The Challenge of Consciousness R. G. Jahn
Anomalies and Surprises H. H. Bauer

Earth Geodynamic Hypotheses Updated N. C. Smoot
Unexplained Weight Gain Transients at the Moment of Death L. E. Hollander, Jr.
Physico-Chemical Properties of Water Following Exposure to Resonant Circuits C. Cardella et al.
16:1 Can Physics Accommodate Clairvoyance, Precognition, and Psychokinesis? R. Shoup
The Pineal Gland and the Ancient Art of Iatromathematica F. McGillion
Confounds in Deciphering the Ramey Memo from the Roswell UFO Case J. Houran/
K. D. Randle
The Pathology of Organized Skepticism L. D. Leiter
Aspects of the Wave Mechanics of Two Particles in a Many Body Quantum System Y. S. Jain
Microscopic Theory of a System of Interacting Bosons: A Unifying New Approach Y. S. Jain
Unification of the Physics of Interacting Bosons and Fermions Y. S. Jain
The Pathology of Organized Skepticism L. D. Leiter
16:2 Arguing for an Observational Theory of Paranormal Phenomena J. M. Houtkooper
Differential Event-Related Potentials to Targets and Decoys in Guessing Task McDonough/Don/
Warren
Stigmatic Phenomena: An Alleged Case in Brazil S. Krippner
The Case for the Loch Ness ‘‘Monster’’: The Scientific Evidence H. H. Bauer
What’s an Editor To Do? H. H. Bauer
16:3 M*: Vector Representation of the Subliminal Seed Regime of M5 R. G. Jahn
Can Longitudinal Electromagnetic Waves Exist? G. W. Bruhn
Development of Certainty about the Deceased in Reincarnation Case in Lebanon Haraldsson/
Izzeddin
Manifestation and Effects of External Qi of Yan Xin Life Science Technology Yan et al.
Face-Like Feature at West Candor Chasma, Mars MGS Image AB 108403 Crater/Levasseur
A Search for Anomalies W. R. Corliss
Common Knowledge about the Loch Ness Monster: Television, Videos, and Film H. H. Bauer
16:4 Relationships Between Random Physical Events and Mass Human Attention D. Radin
Coherent Consciousness and Reduced Randomness: Correlations on 9/11/2001 R. D. Nelson
Was There Evidence of Global Consciousness on September 11, 2001? J. Scargle
A Dog That Seems To Know When His Owner Is Coming Home D. Radin
An Investigation on the Activity Pattern of Alchemical Transmutations J. Pérez-Pariente
Anomalies in Relativistic Rotation R. D. Klauber
The Vardøgr, Perhaps Another Indicator of the Non-Locality of Consciousness L. D. Leiter
Review of the Perrott-Warrick Conference Held at Cambridge 3–5 April 2000 B. Carr
Wavelike Coherence and CPT Invariance: Sesames of the Paranormal O. Costa de
Beauregard
Why Only 4 Dimensions Will Not Explain Relationships in Precognition Rauscher/Targ
17:1 Problems Reporting Anomalous Observations in Anthropology C. Richards
The Fringe of American Archaeology A. B. Kehoe
Rocks That Crackle and Sparkle and Glow: Strange Pre-Earthquake Phenomena F. T. Freund
Poltergeists, Electromagnetism and Consciousness W. G. Roll
AIDS: Scientific or Viral Catastrophe? N. Hodgkinson
17:2 Information and Uncertainty in Remote Perception Research B. J. Dunne/R. G.
Jahn
Problems of Reproducibility in Complex Mind–Matter Systems H. Atmanspacher
Parapsychology: Science or Pseudo-Science? M.-C. Mousseau
The Similarity of Features of Reincarnation Type Cases Over Many Years: I. Stevenson/
A Third Study E. Haraldsson
Communicating with the Dead: The Evidence Ignored. Why Paul Kurtz is Wrong M. Keen
Purported Anomalous Perception in a Highly Skilled Individual: G. E. Schwartz/
Observations, Interpretations, Compassion L. A. Nelson/L. G
Russek
Proof Positive—Loch Ness Was an Ancient Arm of the Sea F. M. Dougherty

17:3 Radiation Hormesis: Demonstrated, Deconstructed, Denied, J. M. Kauffman
Dismissed, and Some Implications for Public Policy
Video Analysis of an Anomalous Image Filmed during Apollo 16 H. Nakamura
The Missing Science of Ball Lightning D. J. Turner
Pattern Count Statistics for the Analysis of Time Series in Mind–Matter Studies W. Ehm
Replication Attempt: No Development of pH or Temperature Oscillations L. I. Mason/
in Water Using Intention Imprinted Electronic Devices R. P. Patterson
Three Cases of the Reincarnation Type in the Netherlands T. Rivas
17:4 Testing a Language-Using Parrot for Telepathy R. Sheldrake/A.
Morgana
Skin Conductance Prestimulus Response: Analyses, Artifacts and a S. J. P. Spottiswode
Pilot Study /E. C. May
Effects of Frontal Lobe Lesions on Intentionality and Random M. Freedman/S.
Physical Phenomena Jeffers/K. Saeger/
Physical Phenomena /M. Binns/S. Black
The Use of Music Therapy as a Clinical Intervention for Physiologist D. S. Berger/
Functional Adaptation Media Coverage of Parapsychology D. J. Schneck/
and the Prevalence of Irrational Beliefs M.-C. Mousseau
The Einstein Mystique I. McCausland
18:1 A Retrospective on the Journal of Scientific Exploration B. Haisch/M. Sims
Anomalous Experience of a Family Physician J. H. Armstrong, Sr.
Historical Overview & Basic Facts Involved in the Sasquatch or J. Green
Bigfoot Phenomenon
The Sasquatch: An Unwelcome and Premature Zoological Discovery? J. A. Bindernagel
Midfoot Flexibility, Fossil Footprints, and Sasquatch Steps: D. J. Meldrum
New Perspectives on the Evolution of Bipedalism
Low-Carbohydrate Diets J. M. Kauffman
18:2 Analysis of the Columbia Shuttle Disaster— J. P. MacLean/
Anatomy of a Flawed Investigation in a Pathological Organization G. Campbell/
S. Seals
Long-Term Scientific Survey of the Hessdalen Phenomenon M. Teodorani
Electrodermal Presentiments of Future Emotions D. I. Radin
Intelligent Design: Ready for Prime Time? A. D. Gishlick
On Events Possibly Related to the ‘‘Brazil Magnesium’’ P. Kaufmann/
P. A. Sturrock
Entropy and Subtle Interactions G. Moddel
‘‘Can a Single Bubble Sink a Ship?’’ D. Deming
18:3 The MegaREG Experiment Y. H. Dobyns et al.
Replication and Interpretation Time-Series Analysis of a Catalog of UFO P. A. Sturrock
Events: Evidence of a Local-Sidereal-Time Modulation
Challenging Dominant Physics Paradigms J. M. Campanario/
B. Martin
Ball Lightning and Atmospheric Light Phenomena: A Common Origin? T. Wessel-Berg
18:4 Sensors, Filters, and the Source of Reality R. G. Jahn/
B. J. Dunne
The Hum: An Anomalous Sound Heard Around the World D. Deming
Experimental Test of Possible Psychological Benefits of Past-Life Regression K. Woods/I. Barušs
Inferences from the Case of Ajendra Singh Chauhan: The Effect of Parental A. Mills
Questioning, of Meeting the “Previous Life” Family, an Attempt To
Quantify Probabilities, and the Impact on His Life as a Young Adult
Science in the 21st Century: Knowledge Monopolies and Research Cartels H. H. Bauer
Organized Skepticism Revisited L. D. Leiter
19:1 The Effect of a Change in Pro Attitude on Paranormal Performance: L. Storm/

A Pilot Study Using Naive and Sophisticated Skeptics M. A. Thalbourne
The Paradox of Planetary Metals Y. Almirantis
An Integrated Alternative Conceptual Framework to Heat S. T. Tassos/
Engine Earth, Plate Tectonics, and Elastic Rebound D. J. Ford
Children Who Claim to Remember Previous Lives: Cases with H. H. Jürgen Keil/
Written Records Made before the Previous Personality Was Identified J. B. Tucker
19:2 Balls of Light: The Questionable Science of Crop Circles F. Grassi/C. Cocheo/
P. Russo
Children of Myanmar Who Behave like Japanese Soldiers: A Possible Third I. Stevenson/J. Keil
Element in Personality
Challenging the Paradigm B. Maccabee
The PEAR Proposition R. G. Jahn/B. J.
Dunne
Global Warming, the Politicization of Science, and Michael Crichton’s D. Deming
State of Fear
19:3 A State of Belief Is a State of Being Charles Eisenstein
Anomalous Orbic ‘‘Spirit’’ Photographs? A Conventional Optical Explanation G. E. Schwartz/
K. Creath
Some Bodily Malformations Attributed to Previous Lives S. K. Pasricha et al.
A State of Belief Is a State of Being C. Eisenstein
HIV, As Told by Its Discoverers H. H. Bauer
Kicking the Sacred Cow: Questioning the Unquestionable H. H. Bauer
and Thinking the Impermissible
19:4 Among the Anomalies J. Clark
What Biophoton Images of Plants Can Tell Us about Biofields and Healing K. Creath/
G. E. Schwartz
Demographic Characteristics of HIV: I. How Did HIV Spread? H. H. Bauer
20:1 Half a Career with the Paranormal I. Stevenson
Pure Inference with Credibility Functions M. Aickin
Questioning Answers on the Hessdalen Phenomenon M. Leone
Hessdalen Research: A Few Non-Questioning Answers M. Teodorani
Demographic Characteristics of HIV: II. How Did HIV Spread H. H. Bauer
Organized Opposition to Plate Techtonics: D. Pratt
The New Concepts in Global Tectonics Group
20:2 Time-Normalized Yield: A Natrual Unit for Effect Size in R. D. Nelson
Anomalies Experiments
The Relative Motion of the Earth and the Ether Detected S. J. G. Gift
A Unified Theory of Ball Lightning and Unexplained Atmospheric Lights P. F. Coleman
Experimenter Effects in Laboratory Tests of ESP and PK Using a C. A. Roe/
Common Protocol R. Davey/P. Stevens
Demographic Characteristics of HIV: III. Why Does HIV Discriminate by Race H. H. Bauer
20:3 Assessing the Evidence for Mind–Matter Interaction Effects D. Radin et al.
Experiments Testing Models of Mind–Matter Interaction D. Radin
A Critique of the Parapsychological Random Number Generator M. H. Schub
Meta-Analyses of Radin and Nelson
Comment on: “A Critique of the Parapsychological Random Number J. D. Scargle
Generator Meta-Analyses of Radin and Nelson”
The Two-Edged Sword of Skepticism: Occam’s Razor and Occam’s Lobotomy H. H. Bauer
20:4 Consciousness and the Anomalous Organization of Random Events: L. A. Nelson/
The Role of Absorption G. E.Schwartz
Ufology: What Have We Learned? M. D. Swords
21:1 Linking String and Membrane Theory to Quantum Mechanics & Special M. G. Hocking
Relativity Equations, Avoiding Any Special Relativity Assumptions
Response of an REG-Driven Robot to Operator Intention R. G. Jahn et al.

Time-Series Power Spectrum Analysis of Performance in Free Response P. A. Sturrock/
Anomalous Cognition Experiments S. J. Spottiswoode
A Methodology for Studying Various Interpretations of the M. A. Rodriguez
N,N-dimethyltryptamine-Induced Alternate Reality
An Experimental Test of Instrumental Transcommunication I. Barušs
An Analysis of Contextual Variables and the Incidence of Photographic D. B. Terhune et al.
Anomalies at an Alleged Haunt and a Control Site
The Function of Book Reviews in Anomalistics G. H. Hövelmann
Ockham’s Razor and Its Improper Use D. Gernert
Science: Past, Present, and Future H. H. Bauer
21:2 The Role of Anomalies in Scientific Exploration P. A. Sturrock
The Yantra Experiment Y. H. Dobyns et al.
An Empirical Study of Some Astrological Factors in Relation to Dog Behaviour S. Fuzeau-Braesch/
Differences by Statistical Analysis & Compared with Human Characteristics J.-B. Denis
Exploratory Study: The Random Number Generator and Group Meditation L. I. Mason et al.
Statistical Consequences of Data Selection Y. H. Dobyns
21:3 Dependence of Anomalous REG Performance on Run length R. G. Jahn/
Y. H. Dobyns
Dependence of Anomalous REG Performance on Elemental Binary Probability R. G. Jahn/
J. C. Valentino
Effect of Belief on Psi Performance in a Card Guessing Task K. Walsh/
G. Moddel
An Automated Online Telepathy Test R. Sheldrake/
M. Lambert
Three Logical Proofs: The Five-Dimensional Reality of Space–Time J. E. Beichler
Children Who Claim to Remember Previous Lives: Past, Present, & Future Research J. B. Tucker
Memory and Precognition J. Taylor
AIDS, Cancer and Arthritis: A New Perspective N. Hodgkinson
Online Historical Materials about Psychic Phenomena C. S. Alvarado
21:4 Synthesis of Biologically Important Precursors on Titan Sam H. Abbas/
Is the Psychokinetic Effect as Found with Binary Random Number D. Schulze-
Generators Suitable to Account for Mind–Brain Interaction? Makuch/
Wolfgang Helfrich
Explorations in Precognitive Dreaming Dale E. Graff
Climate Change Reexamined Joel M. Kauffman
Franklin Wolff’s Mathematical Resolution of Existential Issues Imants Barušs
From Healing to Religiosity Kevin W. Chen
22:1 Theme and Variations: The Life and Work of Ian Stevenson Emily Williams
Kelly/
Carlos S. Alvarado
Ian Stevenson: Recollections Kerr L. White
Reflections on the Life and Work of Ian Stevenson Alan Gauld
Ian Stevenson and Cases of the Reincarnation Type Jim B. Tucker
Ian Stevenson and the Modern Study of Spontaneous ESP Experiences Carlos S. Alvarado/
Nancy L. Zingrone
Ian Stevenson’s Contributions to Near-Death Studies Bruce Greyson
Ian Stevenson’s Contributions to the Study of Mediumship Erlendur
Haraldsson
Where Science and Religion Intersect: The Work of Ian Stevenson Edward F. Kelly/
Emily Williams
Kelly
The Gentle American Doctor M.M. Abu-Izzeddin
Professor Ian Stevenson—Some Personal Reminiscences Mary Rose

Barrington
Ian Stevenson: A Recollection and Tribute Stephen E. Braude
Ian Stevenson and His Impact on Foreign Shores Bernard Carr
Ian Stevenson: Gentleman and Scholar Lisette Coly
The Quest for Acceptance Stuart J. Edelstein
Ian Stevenson: Founder of the Scientific Investigation of Human Reincarnation Doris Kuhlmann-
Wilsdorf
Remembering My Teacher L. David Leiter
Comments on Ian Stevenson, M.D., Director of the Division of Personality Antonia Mills
Studies and Pioneer of Reincarnation Research
Ian Stevenson: Reminiscences and Observations John Palmer
Dr. Ian Stevenson: A Multifaceted Personality Satwant K. Pasricha
A Good Question Tom Shroder
The Fight for the Truth John Smythies
Ian Stevenson: A Man from Whom We Should Learn Rex Stanford
Ian Stevenson and the Society for Scientific Exploration Peter A. Sturrock
Ian Stevenson’s Early Years in Charlottesville Ruth B. Weeks
Tribute to a Remarkable Scholar Donald J. West
An Ian Stevenson Remembrance Ray Westphal
22:2 Meditation on Consciousness I. Ivtzan
An Exploration of Degree of Meditation Attainment in Relation to Psychic S. M. Roney-
Awareness with Tibetan Buddhists Dougal/
J. Solfvin/J. Fox
Thematic Analysis of Research Mediums’ Experiences of A. J. Rock/J
Discarnate Communcation Beischel/
G. E. Schwartz
Change the Rules! R. G. Jahn/
B. J. Dunne
Proposed Criteria for the Necessary Conditions for ShamanicJourneying Imagery A. J. Rock/S.
Krippner
‘‘Scalar Wave Effects according to Tesla’’ & ‘‘Far Range Transponder’’by K. Meyl D. Kühlke
How to Reject Any Scientific Manuscript D. Gernert
22:3 Unusual Atmospheric Phenomena Observed Near the Channel Islands, J.-F. Baure/
United Kingdom, 23 April 2007 D. Clarke/
P. Fuller/M. Shough
The GCP Event Experiment: Design, Analytical Methods, Results P. Bancel/R. Nelson
New Insights into the Links between ESP and Geomagnetic Activity Adrian Ryan
Phenomenology of N,N-Dimethyltryptamine Use: A Thematic Analysis C. Cott/A. Rock
Altered Experience Mediates the Relationship between Schizotypy and A. Rock/G. Abbott/
Mood Disturbance during Shamanic-Like Journeying N. Kambouropoulos
Persistence of Past-Life Memories: Study of Adults Who Claimed in Their E. Haraldsson
Childhood To Remember a Past Life
22:4 Energy, Entropy, and the Environment (How to Increase the First D. P. Sheehan
by Decreasing the Second to Save the Third)
Effects of Distant Intention on Water Crystal Formation: D. Radin/N. Lund/
A Triple-Blind Replication M. Emoto/T. Kizu
Changes in Physical Strength During Nutritional Testing C. F. Buhler/
P. R. Burgess/
E. VanWagoner
Investigating Scopesthesia: Attentional Transitions, Controls and Rupert Sheldrake/
Error Rates in Repeated Tests Pamela Smart
Shakespeare: The Authorship Question, A Bayesian Approach P. A. Sturrock
An Anomalous Legal Decision Richard A.

Blasband
23:1 A New Experimental Approach to Weight Change Experiments at the Moment Masayoshi Ishida
of Death with a Review of Lewis E. Hollander’s Experiments on Sheep
An Automated Test for Telepathy in Connection with Emails R. Sheldrake/
L. Avraamides
Brain and Consciousness: The Ghost in the Machines John Smythies
In Defense of Intuition: Exploring the Physical Foundations of Ervin Laszlo
Spontaneous Apprehension
23:2 Appraisal of Shawn Carlson’s Renowned Astrology Tests Suitbert Ertel
A Field-Theoretic View of Consciousness: Reply to Critics D. W. Orne-
Johnson/
Robert M. Oates
Super-Psi and the Survivalist Interpretation of Mediumship Michael Sudduth
Perspectival Awareness and Postmortem Survival Stephen E. Braude
23:3 Exploratory Evidence for Correlations between Entrained Dean Radin/
Mental Coherence and Random Physical Systems F. Holmes Atwater
Scientific Research between Orthodoxy and Anomaly Harald
Atmanspacher
23:4 Cold Fusion: Fact or Fantasy? M. E. Little/S. R.
Little
“Extraordinary Evidence” Replication Effort M. E. Little/S. R.
Little
Survey of the Observed Excess Energy and Emissions in Lattice- Mitchell R. Swartz
Assisted Nuclear Reactions
24:1 Rebuttal to Claimed Refutations of Duncan MacDougall’s Experiment Masayoshi Ishida
on Human Weight Change at the Moment of Death
Unexpected Behavior of Matter in Conjunction with Human Consciousness Dong Shen
Randomized Expectancy-Enhanced Placebo-Controlled Trial of the Impact Adam J. Rock
of Quantum BioEnergetics and Mental Boundaries on Affect Fiona E. Permezel
A Case of the Reincarnation Type in Turkey Suggesting Strong Jürgen Keil
Paranormal Information Involvements
Questions of the Reincarnation Type Jürgen Keil
How To Improve the Study and Documentation of Cases of the Vitor Moura Visoni
Reincarnation Type? A Reappraisal of the Case of Kemal Atasoy
24:2 Importance of a Psychosocial Approach for a Comprehensive E. Maraldi, F. Ma-
Understanding of Mediumship chado, W. Zangari
Investigating Mental Mediums: Research Suggestions from the
Historical Literature Carlos S. Alvarado
Advantages of Being Multiplex Michael Grosso
Some Directions for Mediumship Research Emily W. Kelly
Parapsychology in France after May 1968: A History of GERP Renaud Evrard
Remy Chauvin (1913–2009) Renaud Evrard
24:3 Anomalous Magnetic Field Activity During a Bioenergy Healing Margaret M. Moga
Experiment William F. Bengston
Further Evidence of the Possibility of Exploiting Anticipatory Physiological Patrizio E. Tressoldi
Signals To Assist Implicit Intuition of Random Events M. Martinelli
Laura Scartezzini
Stefano Massaccesi
Fire in Copenhagen and Stockholm. Indridason’s and Swedenborg’s E. Haraldsson
“Remote Viewing” Experiences Johan L. F. Gerding
Soal’s Target Digits: Statistical Links Back to the Source
He Reported After All Roderick Garton
Common Paranormal Belief Dimensions Neil Dagnall

Andrew Parker
Gary Munley
K. Drinkwater
The 1907 Psychokinetic Experiments of Professor Filippo Bottazzi Antonio Giuditta
24:4 Psi in a Skeptic’s Lab: A Successful Replication of Ertel’s Ball Selection Test Suitbert Ertel
Anticipatory Alarm Behavior in Bengalese Finches Fernando Alvarez
The Daniel Experiment: Sitter Group Contributions Mike Wilson
with Field RNG and MESA Recordings Bryan J. Williams
Timothy M. Harte
William J. Roll
Field RNG Data Analysis, Based on Viewing the Japanese Takeshi Shimizu
Movie Departures (Okuribito) Masato Ishikawa
The Healing Connection: EEG Harmonics, Entrainment, Luke Hendricks
and Schumann’s Resonances William F. Bengston
Jay Gunkelman
Laboratory Psi Effects May Be Put to Practical Use James Carpenter
25:1 Are There Stable Mean Values, and Relationships
between Them, in Statistical Parapsychology? Wolfgang Helfrich
Exploring the Relationship between Tibetan Serena Roney-Dougal
Meditation Attainment and Precognition Jerry Solfvin
A Faulty PK Meta-Analysis Wilfried Kugel
Karhunen-Loève Transform for Detecting Ionospheric
Total Electron Content (TEC) Anomalies
Prior to the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake, Taiwan Jyh-Woei Lin
Eusapia Palladino: An Autobiographical Essay Carlos S. Alvarado
Mental Health of Mediums and Differential Diagnosis between Adair Menezes, Jr.
Mediumship and Mental Disorders Alexander Moreira-Almeida
25:2 Objective Analyses of Real-Time and Audio Instrumental Mark Boccuzzi
Transcommunication and Matched Control Sessions: Julie Beischel
A Pilot Study
Measurement Controls in Anomalies Research Walter E. Dibble Jr.
William A. Tiller
Hessdalen Lights and Piezoelectricity from Rock Strain Gerson S. Paiva
C. A. Taft
Retroactive Event Determination and the Interpretation Sky Nelson
of Macroscopic Quantum Superposition States in
Consistent Histories and Relational Quantum Mechanics
Thoughts about Thought Bundles: A Commentary on Jürgen Keil’s Michael Nahm
Paper “Questions of the Reincarnation Type” Dieter Hassler
Reply to the Nahm and Hassler Commentary on Jürgen Keil’s Jürgen Keil
Paper “Questions of the Reincarnation Type”
The Desire for the Development of Flight: A Recurrent Theme B. Reiswig
for Advanced Civilizations? D. Schulze-Makuch
25:3 Reflections on the Context of Near-Death Experiences Michael Nahm
An Important Subject at the Institut Métapsychique International:
Jeanne LaPlace Guilio Caratelli
Maria Luisa Felici
A Baby Sea-Serpent No More: Reinterpreting Hagelund’s M. A. Woodley
Juvenile “Cadborosaur” Report D. Naish
C. A. McCormick
Avian Formation on a South-Facing Slope Along the Northwest Michael A. Dale

Rim of the Argyre Basin George J. Haas
James S. Miller
William R. Saunders
A. J. Cole
Susan Orosz
Joseph M. Friedlander
On Wolverines and Epistemological Totalitarianism Etzel Cardeña
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Alien visitation, extra-terrestrial life, and paranormal beliefs

Article in Journal of Scientific Exploration · January 2011

Neil Dagnall Ken Drinkwater

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Out of Body experience View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Editorial Office: Journal of Scientific Exploration, Society for Scientific Exploration,

AIMS AND SCOPE: The Journal of Scientific Exploration publishes

Volume 25, Numb e r 4 2011

Letter to the Editor

shepherding submissions through our system. However, adding members to that

Revisiting the Ganzfeld ESP Debate:

Submitted: 1/3/2011; Accepted 6/1/2011

Abstract—This paper presents a brief review of the debate between parapsy-

The Ganzfeld Debate

drawer” estimation statistic to show that approximately 423 studies would be

To supplement their agreement regarding future experimentation, Hyman

Figure 1. Results summary of the PRL autoganzfeld meta-analysis reported

commentary in Psychological Bulletin that raised several methodological issues

Figure 3. Results summary for the set of 29 “standard” ganzfeld studies

. . . the autoganzfeld studies by themselves cannot satisfy the requirement [in

The analysis by Milton and Wiseman (1999) represented an initial attempt to

where h is the proportion of hits and N is the number of sessions. To cover

Results summaries for the meta-analysis by Bem, Palmer, & Broughton

Figure 6. Results summary for 29 of the 30 ganzfeld studies included in the

The Issue of Replication: A Comparative Approach

Figure 7. Results summary for the collection of 59 post-communiqué

expected by chance. Most importantly, ten of the fifteen laboratories (66.7%)

As mentioned previously, the ganzfeld debate has persisted for nearly 30

Study Study Description N Sessions Hits Hit Rate SD*

The Global Consciousness Project:

Submitted 10/18/10; Accepted 3/29/11

Abstract—Analysis of the formal events listed on the Global Consciousness

The RNG Network

where n is the valid number of RNGs.3

where Zg is the given value of Z.

 The distribution of p-values for Stouffer’s Z meet mean chance expec-

Finally, in spite of the terrible events of 11 September 2001, we conclude

The Global Consciousness Project Hypothesis

Periods of collective emotional or attentional behavior in widely

Even in this paper, it remains ambiguous as to what is meant by this

Source of the Psi

Taking Jahn’s estimated hit rate of 1.5 bit/thousand or 0.5015, we compute

Decision Augmentation Review

y  1.036  0.05  (1.73  10.01) 106 (n  1750).

Figure 1. DAT Analysis of the Historical RNG Database.

GCP Potential Explanations

strates a sizeable effect and we have assumed their result to be correct.

Decision Augmentation Theory and the GCP

We computed the Stouffer’s Z-score for the 300 remaining events to be

Figure 2. DAT Analysis of the Global Consciousness Project.

Conclusion and Discussion

Statistical evaluations use a “normalized” database, with

Reply to May and Spottiswoode on

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Helmut H. W. Schmidt

I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the article by May and Spottiswoode

Periods of collective attention or emotion in widely distributed

This general hypothesis is tested via a replication series of completely