Alice Ackermann

OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures Related to Early

Warning, Conflict Prevention, and Crisis Management

Introduction

Early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management have always been
at the core of the OSCE, and the mechanisms and procedures available to the
Organization to ensure the implementation of these key tasks date back to the
early 1990s, and in some cases even earlier. Having been itself an instrument
for conflict prevention during the Cold War, when it still had the form of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the OSCE has
always been at the forefront of new thinking on preventing armed conflicts,
early warning, and the peaceful settlement of crisis and conflict situations,
turning such new thinking into concrete tools and actions.

The Origins of Recent Discussions on OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures

The origins of recent discussions on OSCE mechanisms and procedures re-

lated to early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management can be
traced to the aftermath of the 6 August 2007 missile incident in Georgia, and
the subsequent address to the Permanent Council (PC) on 6 September by the
Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office, Miomir Žužul, who pro-
posed that the OSCE adopt a more forward-looking approach towards future
efforts in crisis prevention. In the context of this recommended forward-
looking approach, the Spanish OSCE Chairmanship presented a food-for-
thought paper to the participating States in the Permanent Council on 25
September 2007, in which it elaborated on two concrete sets of measures: one
that aimed at preventing similar incidents from happening; the second at
strengthening confidence-building measures.
In particular, renewed attention was paid to the question of whether the
OSCE could have done more to prevent crisis situations that had occurred in
the past. Among the organizational measures the Chairmanship suggested
were the appointment of a Personal Representative, who could “immediately
intervene in case of an incident” – much in the spirit of preventive diplomacy
or preventive mediation – and the compilation by the Secretariat of a list of
experts with experience in crisis management who could be dispatched on

Note: The author writes in her personal capacity. She would like to acknowledge the indispens-
able support of her colleagues from Planning and Analysis, CPC/OS, John Crosby, Joop
de Haan, and Erik Falkehed, the Deputy Director of the CPC/OS Jaroslaw Pietrusiewicz,
and the Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat.

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short notice to perform fact-finding missions. The Chairmanship, in its con-
clusions, also emphasized that the OSCE already had, in its conflict preven-
tion and crisis management toolbox, a series of mechanisms and procedures
that could be applied and activated when incidents threatened peace and sta-
bility in the OSCE area.1
As a follow-up measure, the OSCE Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention
Centre (CPC) assumed the task of preparing a survey of existing OSCE
mechanisms and procedures related to early warning, conflict prevention, and
crisis management, as contained in various OSCE documents. On 14 No-
vember 2007, the Director of the CPC, Ambassador Herbert Salber, pre-
sented the survey, which had been compiled by the CPC’s Operation Service,
to the 30th Joint Meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and
the Permanent Council. He posed two critical questions for consideration to
the participating States: First, does the OSCE still need these existing mech-
anisms and procedures, or are other frameworks, including the Permanent
Council, FSC, and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Special Representatives,
sufficient or even more effective in addressing and managing crisis situ-
ations? Second, if the participating States continue to view existing mechan-
isms and procedures as useful and necessary, how can they be made to cor-
respond more closely to the Organization’s current needs and to become
more effective? Ambassador Salber’s forward-looking proposals included the
suggestion that the participating States consider a systematic review of exist-
ing mechanisms and procedures and the creation of a reference guide that
would simplify the implementation of appropriate early warning, conflict
prevention, and crisis management mechanisms.
Discussions of existing OSCE mechanisms and procedures were also
carried into the 2008 Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC), where
one of the three working sessions was devoted to the topic. One of the panel-
lists noted in his presentation that “after having been almost ‘forgotten’ over
a long period of time, OSCE’s mechanisms in the security domain have re-
cently been rediscovered and applied”.2 Since then, a number of participating
States have continued to keep alive the debate over whether OSCE mechan-
isms and procedures should be used more concertedly, or whether even a new
mechanism should be constructed that can be used to deal more effectively
with current demands for crisis prevention.

1 See OSCE Chairmanship, Food for Thought Paper, The 6 August 2007 Missile Incident –
The Way Forward, CIO/GAL/146/07, 25 September 2007.
2 Speaking Notes for Dr. Arie Bloed for ASRC 2 July 2008, PC.DEL/544/08, 30 June 2008.

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A Brief Summary of OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures3

There are four categories of mechanisms and procedures available to the

OSCE that are related to early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis man-
agement. These pertain to the human dimension, risk reduction, early warn-
ing and preventive action, and the peaceful settlement of disputes based on
conciliation and/or arbitration.
The OSCE mechanisms and procedures introduced here have three
commonalities: They are co-operative in nature, which means they have been
developed within the context of the OSCE’s concept of comprehensive and
co-operative security. They were agreed by all participating States. And they
require commitment and political will to be implemented in times of crisis
and conflict situations.
The Human Dimension: Two important mechanisms fall into the human
dimension category – the Vienna and the Moscow Mechanisms. These can be
invoked by any participating State or group of States to mobilize rapid and
concerted action when it comes to monitoring the implementation of com-
mitments in the human dimension. Mechanisms pertaining to the human di-
mension developed gradually from the provisions foreseen in the Concluding
Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting adopted in 1989 – known as the
Vienna Mechanism. Changes were introduced during the Human Dimension
Conferences in Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991), which led to the so-
called Moscow Mechanism.
The Vienna Mechanism can be invoked by any OSCE participating
State, and may include the following actions: the exchange of information
and response to requests for information; the convening of bilateral meetings
with other participating States to review and examine questions related to the
human dimension, including specific situations and cases; the bringing to at-
tention of situations and cases in the human dimension by any participating
State; and the providing of information regarding the above-mentioned ac-
tions at the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (formerly, the Con-
ference on the Human Dimension and the CSCE Follow-up Meetings).
Adopted at the third Human Dimension Conference in Moscow on
4 October 1991, the Moscow Mechanism was an expanded and strengthened
version of the Vienna Mechanism. It was intended to further improve the im-
plementation of human dimension commitments by the participating States.
Accordingly, it provides for the possibility of establishing ad hoc missions of

3 For references, see OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre/Operations Service,

Compendium of OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures, SEC.GAL/121/08, 20 June 2008,
and OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre/Operations Service, Summary of OSCE
Mechanisms and Procedures, SEC.GAL/120/08, 20 June 2008. For a summary of pertin-
ent documents, see also OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre/Operations Service,
The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security: An Overview of Major
Milestones, SEC.GAL/100/09, 17 June 2009. The documents are available on the OSCE
Conflict Prevention Centre website.

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independent experts to explore specific cases and situations related to issues
in the human dimension. A list of six experts appointed by each participating
State for a period of three to six years was established. This list of experts
continues to be managed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR), which functions as the designated institution.
The Moscow Mechanism, amended at the 1993 Rome CSCE Council
Meeting, may be activated through five different procedures. A participating
State may voluntarily invite an ad hoc mission of experts, or it may be asked
to invite a mission of experts. The other three procedures of activation cover
those cases where the participating State in question refuses a mission or
where a particularly serious threat to the human dimension has occurred. In
such a case, participating States themselves can proceed without the consent
of the requested state by establishing a mission of rapporteurs, or the Per-
manent Council may also decide to establish a mission of experts or rappor-
teurs upon the request of any participating State.
Since September 1991, there have between several documented activa-
tions, such as in 1992, when the United Kingdom, in a note verbale, re-
quested an activation of the mechanism towards Croatia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, resulting in the dispatch of a mission of rapporteurs to investigate
reported attacks on civilians. The latest activation was in 2002 in relation to a
request for a rapporteur mission to Turkmenistan.4
Risk Reduction: After 1989, a series of specific mechanisms and proced-
ures for reducing the risk of conflict arising or escalating were adopted,
which reflected a greater willingness to co-operate on the part of the partici-
pating States. The OSCE’s capabilities for early warning and conflict pre-
vention were also strengthened via the creation of new decision-making
structures, such as the Permanent Committee (renamed the Permanent Coun-
cil in 1994) and the Forum for Security Co-operation. These risk reduction
mechanisms built on those developed earlier in the course of the negotiations
within the framework of the 1984-86 Stockholm Conference on Confidence-
and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), and on
the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) contained in the
1986 Document of the Stockholm Conference. They were first set forth in the
Vienna Document 1990, and their present text can be found in the Vienna
Document 1999, chapter III on “Risk Reduction”. They include provisions on
the “Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual
Military Activities”, “Co-operation as Regards Hazardous Incidents of a
Military Nature”, and “Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concern About
Military Activities”. Risk reduction measures such as the “Stabilizing Meas-
ures for Localized Crisis Situations” also provide for a series of measures in
support of the political process during crisis situations. Another measure for

4 Further cases and details are provided in the Summary of OSCE Mechanisms and Proced-
ures, ibid.

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risk reduction is the 2001 Ministerial Council Decision No. 3 on “Fostering
the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue”.
Of particular importance is the “Mechanism for Consultation and Co-
operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities” as it can provide for crisis
prevention in the event of a threat that is posed by the deployment of armed
forces. It is also one of the few mechanisms that have been used more re-
cently – in 2008 – as will be explored in a subsequent section. By activating
this mechanism, a participating State can request information from another
regarding unusual and unscheduled activities of military forces outside their
normal peacetime locations. The activation process features a series of steps
beyond the request for clarification, including a meeting between the con-
flicting parties chaired by the Chairman-in-Office (or his or her representa-
tive) as well as a joint meeting of the Permanent Council and the Forum for
Security Co-operation (FSC), where participating States can recommend ap-
propriate measures for the stabilization of the crisis situation.
“Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations” were adopted in
November 1993 by the then Special Committee of the FSC as one of the
documents of the Programme for Immediate Action.5 The document provides
for a catalogue of stabilizing measures that may be applied individually or in
various combinations, depending on the circumstances. The measures to be
applied must be decided on by the appropriate OSCE body, and prior consent
and active support of the parties involved in a particular crisis situation is re-
quired. Another risk reduction mechanism is Ministerial Council Decision
No. 3, “Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue”,
adopted at the Ministerial Council in Bucharest in 2001, which allows for the
FSC, upon the request of the Permanent Council, to make available its expert
advice on issues of a politico-military nature.
There have only been a few incidents where risk reduction measures
were activated, mostly between 1991 and 1999 – the earliest activations oc-
curred in the context of the wars in Yugoslavia. As mentioned earlier, the
most recent activation occurred in late May 2008.
Early Warning and Preventive Action: The third category of existing
OSCE mechanisms and procedures refer to provisions related to early warn-
ing and preventive action. They date back to the 1992 Helsinki Document
“The Challenges of Change”, which includes decisions on developing new
structures and instruments related to the strengthening of early warning, con-
flict prevention, and crisis management. The Document featured not only the
creation of a High Commissioner on National Minorities, with an explicit
early warning mandate, but also mechanisms that can be used in a more ad
hoc fashion. For example, participating States may draw the attention of the
Permanent Council to a given crisis situation.

5 See FSC/Journal No. 49, Annex 2, adopted on 25 November 1993.

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 This category of mechanisms and procedures also includes those meas-
ures contained in the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons
and the Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with Regard to Emer-
gency Situations, the so-called Berlin Mechanism, adopted in June 1991 at
the Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers. This mechanism is
particularly crucial, as it allows participating States to react to serious emer-
gency situations, especially those endangering peace, security, and stability,
and allows for any participating State to request clarification from another
participating State or States in the context of such emergency situations.
Activation of the Berlin Mechanism has occurred on several occasions,
primarily within the context of the Yugoslav wars. For example, on 28 June
1991, Luxemburg requested clarification from the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia in response to the conflict in that country. Several participating
States seconded the request for an emergency meeting, which took place on 3
and 4 July 1991 and resulted in the offer of a CSCE good offices mission to
Yugoslavia.
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Based on Conciliation and/or Arbitra-
tion constitutes the fourth category of mechanisms and procedures. The 1975
Helsinki Final Act already specifically called for existing methods for the
peaceful settlement of disputes to be complemented and mentioned the need
to work further on the “Draft Convention on a European System for the
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” submitted by Switzerland.
While the commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes is en-
shrined in many OSCE documents, including, in particular, the Helsinki Final
Act, the 1989 Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting, the
1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and the 1992 Helsinki Document, it
should be noted that more formalized dispute settlement mechanisms were
also created, based on conciliation and arbitration. These include the “Val-
letta Mechanism”, which was the first formal procedure for peaceful dispute
settlement, entailing a fully fledged conciliation procedure that designated the
Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) as the focal point for the es-
tablishment of the mechanism.
In 1992, the participating States also adopted “Provisions for a CSCE
Conciliation Commission” and “Provisions for Directed Conciliation” as well
as the “Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE”, which
also established the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. Unfortunately, to
date, none of the adopted mechanisms and procedures for the peaceful
settlement of disputes has been put into practice. As to the convention, so far
only 33 participating States have signed and ratified it. It came into force in
1994, but so far has never been used.
Exploring the patterns of activation of OSCE mechanisms and proced-
ures over the years, the following conclusions can be drawn: Most of the ac-
tivations occurred in the first part of the 1990s; some were activated sporad-

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ically; and others have never been activated at all, as demonstrated, for ex-
ample, by those mechanisms referring to the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Several possible reasons may be identified that could explain this phe-
nomenon: In the early 1990s, the then CSCE still had a limited institutional
framework, and these mechanisms and procedures allowed for a structured
dialogue on security and human dimension issues at a time when more per-
manent decision-making bodies, such as the Permanent Council, did not
exist. Second, participating States may also have viewed these existing mech-
anisms and procedures as too cumbersome and complicated to use. More-
over, there is reason to believe that knowledge of these existing mechanisms
and procedures is no longer as widespread as it was in the early 1990s.

OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures Revisited: The 2008 Activation of the

“Bucharest Mechanism” and the Mechanism Regarding “Consultation and
Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities”

The two most recent activations of OSCE mechanisms and procedures oc-
curred in 2008 in the context of the incident involving an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) shot down over Abkhazia, Georgia, on 20 April. The incident
resulted first in the activation of the so-called “Bucharest Mechanism”, offi-
cially referred to as the Bucharest Ministerial Council Decision No. 3, “Fos-
tering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue”. This
mechanism provides for the FSC to make available its expert advice on issues
of a politico-military nature at the request of the Permanent Council.
On 24 April, the Finnish Chairmanship tabled a draft decision on the
Permanent Council’s request to the FSC for its expert advice with regard to
the UAV incident, although no consensus was reached on what further steps
should be taken. On 29 April, at the request of the Georgian OSCE Delega-
tion, and on 30 April, at the request of the Permanent Council Chair, the FSC
was again asked to provide its expert advice on the same incident. The result
was that the UAV incident was discussed at various FSC meetings and joint
meetings of the Permanent Council and the FSC.
It was in the later part of May that Georgia decided to also activate the
Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military
Activities, contained in the 1999 Vienna Document. In a note verbale of 28
May 2008, Georgia requested information from the Russian Federation re-
garding the UAV incident, in accordance with paragraph 16.1. Chapter III of
the 1999 Vienna Document. The Russian Federation sent a response to Geor-
gia’s request on 30 May, within the time frame stipulated by the provisions of
the mechanism. Furthermore, the Russian Federation requested clarification
under said mechanism on two issues: 1) Georgia’s use of UAV flights; and 2)
Georgia’s multiple violations of the Moscow Agreement of 1994, which had
established the ceasefire and separation of forces in Abkhazia. Georgia sub-

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mitted responses to the Russian Federation on both requests for clarification
on 1 June. Three back-to-back Chairmanship-held meetings under paragraph
16.2.1.4 of Chapter III convened on 4 June, with a Chairmanship Report on
the meetings issued to delegations on 9 June. Then on 11 June, three joint
meetings of the FSC and the Permanent Council were held on the issues
raised by Georgia and the Russian Federation.
While the confidential details of the discussions are contained in a re-
stricted report by the Chairperson of the FSC to the Permanent Council Chair
of 26 June 2008, what can be noted here is that a constructive and structured
debate took place, with a majority of OSCE ambassadors taking the floor to
support the findings of the UN’s report of 26 May. During the course of dis-
cussions, the participating States also strongly encouraged the sides to con-
tinue with their dialogue and prevent the reoccurrence of such incidents. It
was significant that the participating States commended the Russian Feder-
ation and Georgia for their use of OSCE mechanisms, allowing them to en-
gage constructively and collectively in preventing further crisis escalation.
What the use of OSCE mechanisms in this particular incident also dem-
onstrates is that not only the two sides, but also all of the participating States
were able to engage in a structured and in-depth debate, allowing for specific
recommendations to be made that would enable Georgia and the Russian
Federation to move forward. Even though armed hostilities broke out in Au-
gust 2008, this particular incident of crisis management shows that prevent-
ive action, as taken between April and June 2008, was indeed effective, at
least at that time. In hindsight, more specific follow-up preventive measures
would have been advisable, particularly with regard to increasing confidence-
building measures or enhancing the number of military monitors – recom-
mendations that were already contained in the food-for-thought paper of the
2007 Spanish Chairmanship.

Concluding Thoughts

Discussions on whether to make more use of existing OSCE mechanisms and

procedures or to develop new mechanisms are likely to continue in the
OSCE. One indication of this is that at the meetings known as the Corfu
Process – a dialogue on European security anchored in the OSCE – issues of
conflict resolution in the OSCE area are being discussed. During the second
Corfu Process meeting, at least two delegations stressed the need to reinvig-
orate and perhaps even introduce a new mechanism that could provide for
preventive action when crisis situations occur.
There are a number of ways in which the OSCE could move forward in
the future on early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management. One
would be to enhance the OSCE’s conflict prevention and crisis management
abilities. This can be done by exploring ways of strengthening our existing

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mechanisms, and, if there is a need, coming up with new mechanisms that
can easily be used in response to a given security situation. More consider-
ation should also be given to facilitating preventive diplomacy and medi-
ation, underlining how important it is that mediation should not set in pri-
marily after the outbreak of a crisis or an episode of violent conflict but that
more concerted action needs to be taken when there are signs that a crisis is
imminent. Other preventive action measures could include sending an ob-
server mission in a preventive capacity and on a short-term basis to address
security-related issues on the ground, while preventive diplomacy could ad-
dress conflict-related issues at the political level.

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