Air Mobility Operations
Air Mobility Operations
Air Mobility Operations
Operations
OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Lt Col Marc Okyen and Maj James Ayers , USAF)
Certified by: HQ AFDC/CC Maj Gen Timothy A. Kinnan, USAF
Pages: 94
Distribution: F
Approved by:MICHAEL E. RYAN, General, USAF
Chief of Staff
FOREWORD
Air power must be more than force because the problems of the
world must increasingly be addressed by the military with more
than force. Many of the crises and conflicts in our shrinking world
are no longer highly susceptible to resolution through the projection
of force, but—as in protection of the Kurds in the wake of Operation
DESERT STORM—will require the projection of infrastructures such
as security, medical care, communications and transportation.
Carl Builder
The Icarus Syndrome
MICHAEL E. RYAN
General, USAF
Chief of Staff
25 June 1999
i
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. vii
CHAPTER ONE—General .................................................................... 1
Overview ............................................................................................ 1
Air mobility Triad ............................................................................... 2
The Mobility Air Forces (MAF) .......................................................... 2
Air Mobility Functions And Associated Missions ............................... 3
Air Mobility And Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) ............................. 3
Summary ............................................................................................ 3
CHAPTER TWO—Air Mobility, an Integral Part of Aerospace
Power ...................................................................................................... 5
General ............................................................................................... 5
Air Mobility And Tenets Of Aerospace Power .................................... 5
Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution ......................... 5
Flexiblity and Versatility ................................................................ 6
Synergistic Effects .......................................................................... 6
Priority ........................................................................................... 7
Air Mobility And Air Force Core Competencies ................................. 8
Rapid Global Mobility ..................................................................... 8
Agile Combat Support .................................................................... 8
Information Superiority ................................................................. 8
Precision Engagement .................................................................... 9
Air and Space Superiority ............................................................ 10
Global Attack ................................................................................. 11
Summary ........................................................................................... 11
CHAPTER THREE—Command and Control .................................. 13
National Direction ............................................................................ 13
Assignment Of Air Mobility Forces .................................................. 13
Intertheater Air Mobility .................................................................. 14
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) .......... 14
Air Mobility Command (AMC) ..................................................... 15
AMC Tanker/Airlift Control Center (TACC) ................................ 16
Intratheater Air Mobility .................................................................. 16
Theater Command and Control Organization ............................. 16
Air Mobility Operations Control Center (AMOCC) ...................... 17
The Transition To Contingency Operations ..................................... 17
Joining Intertheater and Intratheater Air Mobility .......................... 18
iii
Contingency Operations ................................................................... 19
Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) .............................. 20
Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) ................................. 20
Air Mobility Division (AMD) ........................................................ 21
Air Mobility Control Team (AMCT) ............................................. 22
Airlift Control Team (ALCT) ........................................................ 23
Air Refueling Control Team (ARCT) ............................................ 23
Air Mobility Element (AME) ........................................................ 24
Presentation And Integration Of Air Mobility Forces ....................... 25
Summary .......................................................................................... 29
CHAPTER FOUR—Airlift .................................................................. 31
General ............................................................................................. 31
Components Of The Airlift Force ..................................................... 32
Active Duty Component ............................................................... 32
Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Forces........................ 32
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) .................................................... 34
Airlift Operations .............................................................................. 35
Intertheater Airlift ........................................................................ 35
Intratheater Airlift ........................................................................ 37
Operational Support Airlift (OSA) ................................................ 38
Delivery Methods ............................................................................. 39
Airland ......................................................................................... 39
Airdrop ......................................................................................... 40
Airlift Missions ................................................................................. 40
Passenger and Cargo Movement .................................................. 41
Combat Employment and Sustainment ....................................... 42
Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) ...................................................... 44
Special Operations Support .......................................................... 45
Summary .......................................................................................... 46
CHAPTER FIVE—Air Refueling ...................................................... 47
General ............................................................................................. 47
Force Enabler—Force Multiplier .................................................. 48
Force Extension ............................................................................ 48
Components Of The Air Refueling Force ......................................... 49
Active Duty Forces ....................................................................... 49
Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Forces........................ 50
Air Refueling Operations .................................................................. 50
Intertheater Air Refueling ............................................................ 50
Intratheater Air Refueling ............................................................ 50
Air Refueling Missions ...................................................................... 51
iv
Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) Support ........................ 51
Global Attack Support .................................................................. 52
Air Bridge Support ........................................................................ 53
Deployment Support .................................................................... 54
Theater Support to Combat Air Forces ........................................ 54
Special Operations Support .......................................................... 55
Summary .......................................................................................... 55
CHAPTER SIX—Air Mobility Support ............................................ 57
General ............................................................................................. 57
Global Air Mobility Support System (GAMSS) ............................. 57
GAMSS and Rapid Global Mobility ............................................... 58
GAMSS Components ......................................................................... 59
Active Duty Component ............................................................... 59
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command Component ..... 59
Elements Of The GAMSS .................................................................. 60
Tanker/Airlift Control Element (TALCE) ..................................... 60
Mission Support Team (MST) ....................................................... 60
Mission Support Element (MSE) .................................................. 60
Operations ........................................................................................ 61
Peacetime ..................................................................................... 61
Transition to a Contingency ......................................................... 62
Functions .......................................................................................... 64
Command and Control ................................................................. 64
Aircraft Maintenance ................................................................... 65
Aerial Port .................................................................................... 66
Summary .......................................................................................... 67
Suggested Readings ............................................................................ 69
Glossary .............................................................................................. 73
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INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2–6, Air Mobility, has been pre-
pared under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF).
This document establishes doctrinal guidance for the application of air
mobility forces and is consistent with, and complementary to, capstone
doctrine contained in AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, and AFDD 2, Or-
ganization and Employment of Aerospace Power. AFDD 2–6 serves as the
keystone doctrine document for employing airlift, air refueling, and air
mobility support elements as an integrated air mobility system.
APPLICATION
AFDD 2–6 applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve (AFR), Air Na-
tional Guard (ANG), and civilian Air Force personnel. The doctrine in
this document is authoritative but not directive; therefore, commanders
are encouraged to exercise judgement in applying this doctrine to accom-
plish their missions.
SCOPE
vii
viii
CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL
OVERVIEW
1
THE AIR MOBILITY TRIAD
2
AIR MOBILITY FUNCTIONS AND ASSOCIATED
MISSIONS
The US Air Force provides the nation the ability to rapidly project forces
anywhere in the world through AEFs. AEFs are tailorable force packages
that integrate with air mobility forces to accomplish the commander’s
objectives. AEFs can be lethal or nonlethal in nature, thereby providing
the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a full range of force op-
tions. In some cases, an AEF may be comprised principally of MAF assets
when the operational focus is nonlethal in nature and its success hinges
directly on support provided by airlift and air refueling assets. Regardless
of the AEF’s composition, however, air mobility forces provide an essen-
tial capability to project US influence anywhere in the world.
SUMMARY
3
4
CHAPTER TWO
GENERAL
5
air mobility forces. This arrangement ensures a proper focus for global
and regional air mobility.
Synergistic Effects
6
Airlift delivers where
and when needed.
Priority
Air mobility forces are limited and thus must be applied where they
can make the greatest contribution to the most critical requirements. By
releasing US mobility assets to the theaters for theater taskings, the Air
Force enhances theater operations at the possible expense of global power
projection or support to another geographic CINC. Consequently, the NCA,
with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), make allo-
cation decisions designating percentages of air mobility capabilities made avail-
able to theater commanders. NCA involvement ensures global air mobility
forces are employed against the most critical national strategic objectives. Like-
wise, within a theater or joint operations area (JOA), the CINC/JFC must pri-
oritize his requirements to ensure limited air mobility assets are applied in a
manner that effectively fulfills his time-phased force deployment concept. Only
a disciplined system of prioritization enables commanders at all levels to en-
sure the most urgent requirements are serviced by scarce air mobility assets.
7
AIR MOBILITY AND AIR FORCE CORE COMPETENCIES
Go, sir, gallop, and don’t forget that the world was made in six
days. You can ask me for anything you like, except time.
Napolean Bonaparte, 1803,
speaking to an aide.
Information Superiority
8
transportation technologies, providing
responsive mobility support to the Core competencies are at
warfighter. Air mobility’s informa- the heart of the Air Force’s
tion system architecture constitutes strategic perspective and
an integrated, worldwide command thereby at the heart of the
and control capability providing a Service’s contribution to our
stream of timely, up-to-date infor- nation’s total military
mation. This information is vital capabilities. They are not
when air mobility forces must be re- doctrine per se, but are
directed to support developing cri- enablers of our doctrine.
ses or unexpected higher priority re- They are the basic areas of
quirements. While the information expertise that the Air Force
infrastructure that supports the air brings to any activity across
mobility system is indeed capable, the range of military
air mobility’s heavy dependence on operations, whether as a
information systems also creates a single Service or in
significant vulnerability. Therefore, conjunction with the core
protection of information systems competencies of other
through physical security measures Services in joint operations.
and implementation of processes and A particular core competency
procedures that bolster the overall level is not necessarily unique to
of information security are crucial to the Air Force, but for our Air
the success of air mobility operations. Force they are not optional.
What distinguishes the Air
Precision Engagement Force core competencies from
the core competencies of
Precision engagement is the other Services are the speed
ability to command, control, and and the global nature of its
employ forces to cause discrimi- reach and perspective. The
nate and discrete effects. In addi- US Air Force’s fundamental
tion to precision munitions such as service to the nation is its
laser-guided bombs, precision engage- ability to develop, train,
ment includes precise delivery of forces sustain, and integrate the
and materiel to locations around the elements of air and space
world. Whether delivering humani- power to execute its core
tarian relief supplies, airdropping competencies across the
ground combat forces, or air refuel- spectrum of peace and war.
ing over the mid-Atlantic, air mo-
bility forces provide precise deliv- AFDD 1, Air Force Basic
ery options to the warfighter. Preci- Doctrine
sion engagement enables our forces
9
CENTRAZBAT 97
I
n September 1997, over 500 troops
from the 82nd Airborne Division, Ft
Bragg, NC participated with soldiers
from the newly formed Central Asian
Battalion in Uzbekistan. Made up of sol-
diers from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan, this battalion was created in
1996 to increase regional security by fo-
cusing primarily on peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance operations. This
combined exercise, referred to as
CENTRAZBAT 97, was designed to en-
hance regional cooperation and provide
interoperability training between NATO
and these Partnership for Peace nations.
The early success of CENTRAZBAT 97
was tied to an ambitious plan that in-
volved airdropping 82nd Airborne Divi-
sion troops and six vehicles on a drop
zone 8000 nautical miles away in
Kazakhstan. Transported by 8 C–17 aircraft, this operation covered more dis-
tance than any airborne operation in history. It would not have been possible
without extensive air refueling support which consisted of 11 KC–135s and 9
KC–10 aircraft, most of which were prepositioned to Moron, Spain. Eight thou-
sand miles and 20 hours later, the personnel and equipment were delivered
on target and within one second of the planned time over target.
not only to win wars but also drive a crisis to a peaceful and lasting reso-
lution.
10
forces provides a significant contribution towards achieving air superior-
ity. Air refueling permits combat aircraft to reduce their departure fuel
weights in exchange for maximum lethal payloads, remain airborne for
longer periods of time, and operate at greater ranges. In many situations,
air refueling allows high value airborne assets (i.e., combat support air-
craft such as the joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS),
the airborne warning and control system (AWACS), RIVET JOINT, etc.) to
be positioned beyond enemy threat range, thus enhancing force protec-
tion. Air refueling is a force multiplier expanding the reach, power, and
security of air superiority forces.
Global Attack
All military services provide strike capabilities, but only the Air
Force can attack rapidly, persistently, within a wide range of re-
sponses, anywhere on the globe at any time. Forces based in the CO-
NUS have become the primary means for crisis response and power projec-
tion. MAF air refueling assets enable the rapid deployment of fighters,
bombers, and combat support aircraft. This capability decreases reliance
on staging bases, host nation support, and other diplomatic considerations,
while accelerating the deployment and employment of combat forces to
and within a theater of operations.
SUMMARY
11
12
CHAPTER THREE
NATIONAL DIRECTION
The NCA allocate air mobility forces by prioritizing air mobility efforts
to support various theaters or major operations. The NCA, with the ad-
vice of the CJCS and the Joint Transportation Board (JTB), provide this
direction.
13
NATIONAL COMMAND
AUTHORITIES
CJCS JTB
Theater AMC
Assigned/ Air Mobility
Attached Air Forces
Mobility Forces
14
As the single manager of the DTS,
USCINCTRANS provides air, land,
and sea transportation for the
Department of Defense.
AMC is the Air Force major command with the primary respon-
sibility for providing airlift, air refueling, air mobility support,
special air mission, and aeromedical evacuation forces. AMC orga-
nizes, trains, equips, and provides its assigned air mobility forces to meet
worldwide mobility requirements. These forces are made available to ful-
fill intertheater and intratheater air mobility requirements. AMC plans,
coordinates, and manages the CRAF program which provides a pool of
civil airlift capability made available to the DOD in times of crises. When
the CRAF is activated, AMC assumes mission control of these assets
through the AMC TACC. The individual commercial carriers retain op-
erational control.
AMC is the designated lead agent for Air Force air mobility is-
sues. In this capacity, AMC is responsible for developing weapon system
standards and integrated command and control processes for the MAF.
Global standardization of air mobility processes is crucial to ensure mo-
bility forces are effectively and efficiently combined from any source.
AMC’s global presence of fixed operating sites, deployable support, liai-
son teams, and worldwide forces operating continuously are the main-
stay of Air Force global mobility. AMC works closely with Air Force com-
ponents of each combatant command to establish appropriate standards
that enable a smooth transition to contingency operations.
15
AMC Tanker/Airlift Control Center
(TACC)
16
air mobility operations to the commander of the USAFE AMOCC. To as-
sure seamless operations, the standing peacetime command and control struc-
ture in the theater interfaces with the global network managed by AMC.
The COMAFFOR can ensure effective command and control over air
mobility operations during a contingency by:
17
J Identifying when the theater will need augmentation.
18
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
The AMD may be one of the core divisions within the AOC. The AMD,
under the direction of the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR),
plans, coordinates, tasks, and executes air mobility missions operating in
a designated area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operating area (JOA). In
operations primarily involving air mobility, there may be insufficient com-
bat activity to warrant the formation of a full AOC. In this case, the JFACC
could be the senior air mobility commander and could be dual-hatted as
the DIRMOBFOR. In these circumstances, the AOC would consist prima-
rily of an AMD and sufficient other expertise to control all air mobility
operations within the JOA/AOR, to produce an air tasking order (ATO),
and manage the required combat sorties. In every case, however, there
Air Mobility
Element
19
should only be one air commander with one AOC within the JOA/AOR.
Figure 3.2 depicts a notional AOC structure.
20
in intertheater air mobility operations. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced
by the theater Air Force component commander or nominated by the
AMC commander. To ensure close coordination with the overall theater
air effort, the DIRMOBFOR should be collocated with the AOC and
COMAFFOR/JFACC. The COMAFFOR exercises complete ADCON over the
DIRMOBFOR, however, the DIRMOBFOR reports operationally to the JFACC.
Specific authorities and responsibilities of the DIRMOBFOR include:
J Direct the tasking of intratheater air mobility forces (air and ground)
attached (either via OPCON or TACON) to the JFC.
J Coordinate with the AOC director to ensure all air mobility operations
supporting the JFC are fully integrated into the air and space assess-
ment, planning, and execution process and deconflicted with all other
air operations.
J Coordinate with AMC TACC, through the air mobility element (AME),
all intertheater air mobility missions to ensure the most effective use
of these resources in accomplishing the JFC, theater, and USTRANSCOM
missions.
The AMD plans, coordinates, tasks, and executes the air mobil-
ity mission. The AMD is located in the AOC and is directed by the
DIRMOBFOR. The AOC director ensures the AMD works as an effective divi-
sion of the AOC in the air and space planning and execution process. The
AMD coordinates with the JFC’s movement requirements and control
authority, the theater AMOCC, if established, and the AMC TACC as re-
quired to derive apportionment guidance, compute allocation, and col-
lect requirements. The DIRMOBFOR, in conjunction with the AOC direc-
tor and the JFACC, may adjust the AMD’s organizational structure ensur-
ing all the processes of the AMD’s core teams, the air mobility control
team (AMCT), air refueling control team (ARCT), airlift control team
(ALCT), and air mobility element (AME), interface more effectively with
the other air and space planning and execution divisions found in the
21
AOC and to meet the JFACC/COMAFFOR’s requirements. As directed by
the DIRMOBFOR, the AMD will task attached intratheater air mobility
forces through wing and unit command posts when those forces operate
from permanent home bases or through the wing operations centers if
those forces are deployed. Under the direction of the DIRMOBFOR, the Air
Mobility Division normally has the following responsibilities:
J Ensure intratheater air mobility missions are visible in the AMC stan-
dard command and control system and reflected in the ATO/ACO.
22
The C130 Hercules is usually the workhorse for intratheater airlift
operations.
The ALCT is the source of theater airlift expertise within the Air
Mobility Division. The ALCT brings together theater airlift functional
expertise from theater organizations to plan, coordinate, manage, and
execute theater airlift operations in the AOR/JOA in support of JFACC
objectives. AMC may augment the ALCT with theater airlift expertise.
These two sources of airlift expertise integrate into a single ALCT within
the Air Mobility Division.
23
The ARCT ensures tanker assets are best utilized to accomplish JFC
objectives.
ing assets are completely integrated into the joint air and space opera-
tions plan (JASOP) during the employment phase of an operation.
24
PRESENTATION AND INTEGRATION OF AIR
MOBILITY FORCES
Figures 3.3 through 3.6 represent the building blocks for a no-
tional presentation of air mobility assets to the joint force. The
DIRMOBFOR must work closely with the JFACC and MAF forces to tailor
this notional framework according to the specific requirements of the JFC.
Figure 3.3 depicts the peacetime control of air mobility assets. The theater
CINC controls those forces under his combatant command by delegating
OPCON to the Air Component Commander (ACC) who then exercises
OPCON through the Air Mobility Operations Control Center (AMOCC).
USCINCTRANS similarly exercises OPCON through the AMC Commander
(AMC/CC) and the AMC TACC Commander (TACC/CC).
Figure 3.4 depicts the integration of air mobility forces into a joint task force
(JTF). When a JTF is established, a portion of those forces permanently
assigned to the geographic CINC will be allocated and attached to the
joint force commander who in turn will normally delegate OPCON of
these forces to the JFACC.
25
NCA
AMOCC/CC TACC/CC
A T
M A
O C
C C
C
Theater AMC
Assigned/ Air Mobility
Attached Air Forces
Mobility Forces
As shown in Figure 3.6, the AMD is an integral part of the AOC. While the
AMD takes direction from the DIRMOBFOR, the AOC director (who has over-
all responsibility for AOC operations) also provides guidance to the AMD. Each
directs two independent processes and the AMD participates in both. The
26
NCA
JFC
JFACC/COMAFFOR
AMOCC/CC TACC/CC
A
M T
O A
C
C
C C
The Air Mobility Division, like the other divisions of the AOC,
must support and respond to the AOC director in the air and space
planning and execution process. This process revolves around a con-
tinually flowing strategy, planning, ATO production, ATO execution, and
assessment and analysis cycle. Everyone in the AOC, including air mobil-
ity expertise within the AMD, supports the AOC director in this process
and reacts to his orchestration of the battle rhythm.
27
NCA
JFC
JFACC/COMAFFOR
TACC/CC
AMOCC/CC
Theater Assigned/
Air Mobility AMC
Assigned/ Attached
Forces Attached Air Mobility
Attached Air Aerospace
to the JTF Forces
Mobility Forces Power Forces
28
NCA
JFC
JFACC/COMAFFOR
TACC/CC
AMOCC/CC
SUMMARY
29
CHAPTER FOUR
AIRLIFT
GENERAL
31
pend on developing an air bridge, which provides a long-range, continu-
ous air line of communication into the AOR.
CONUS-based active duty airlift forces are assigned to (and under the
combatant command of) USTRANSCOM and under the operational con-
trol of USTRANSCOM’s air component, AMC. Similarly, theater-based ac-
tive duty airlift forces are assigned to (and under the combatant com-
mand of) their regional CINC (e.g., USCINCEUR or Commander in Chief,
US Pacific Command [USCINCPAC]) and under the operational control of
their regional CINC’s respective air component (e.g., USAFE or Pacific
Air Forces [PACAF]). These forces conduct routine airlift missions along
with those missions requiring specialized training and equipment. Com-
manders have full access to their active duty component assets at all times
and airlift forces are continuously ready for immediate worldwide taskings.
The Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and the Air National Guard
(ANG) provide vital airlift capabilities to the Defense Transportation Sys-
32
Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda
S
TOP THE DYING! This quickly became
a primary US objective in the summer
of 1994 when hundreds of thousands of
Rwandan refugees fled to neighboring Afri-
can countries to avoid becoming victims of a
violent inter-tribal war. With over 100,000
dead and nearly a half-million displaced,
President Clinton stated, “The flow of refu-
gees across Rwanda’s borders has now created
what could be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in a generation. A disas-
ter born of brutal violence, it is now claiming one life every minute.” In
response, the US launched Operation SUPPORT HOPE, a massive humanitarian
relief mission to help normalize a situation in sub-Sahara Africa that was
anything but normal.
Refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu swelled overnight and, while sup-
plies of food and medicine were critically short, the lack of clean drinking
water was the biggest problem. Hundreds were dying every day from cholera
and dysentery, which had spread to epidemic levels from consumption of
contaminated water. A C–5 loaded with a Reverse Osmosis Water Purification
Unit (ROWPU) would help provide the solution. Flying 22 hours non-stop
from Travis AFB to Rwanda and conducting 3 air refuelings while en route,
this mission quickly provided an initial source of potable water. In a short
time, more ROWPUs, water pumping equipment, and mobile fabric tanks
were delivered and mortality rates decreased dramatically. By the time relief
efforts ended, over 400 KC–10 and KC–135 missions were flown to refuel C–5
and C–141 aircraft which ferried 23,000 tons of equipment and supplies to
the beleaguered masses.
Operation SUPPORT HOPE is a great example of air mobility being applied in
a non-lethal manner. While it would be difficult to determine the actual num-
ber of lives saved, it is evident air mobility directly achieved a major US
objective: STOP THE DYING!
tem. They are an integral part of the airlift system and conduct airlift
missions in support of national taskings every day. During crises, volun-
teers or activated AFRC/ANG units augment the active duty airlift force,
providing substantial increases in airlift capacity. AFRC/ANG personnel
are experienced operators and train to the same standards as the active
duty airlift force. Peacetime access to AFRC/ANG forces is provided
through a system of volunteerism. In those circumstances where airlift
requirements exceed airlift capability available through AFRC/ANG
volunteerism, formal activation may be required.
33
CRAF in Operation DESERT SHIELD and STORM
T
he CRAF has only been acti-
vated once since its inception
in 1951. During the early
phases of Operation DESERT SHIELD,
it became apparent that the Air
Force would need additional aircraft
to meet the growing airlift require-
ments. On 17 August 1990, General The CRAF was responsible for
Hansford T. Johnson, Commander
in Chief, United States Transporta- delivering 90 percent of US
tion Command, activated stage I of personnel to Southwest Asia for
the CRAF guaranteeing DESERT STORM.
USTRANSCOM the use of 38 addi-
tional aircraft. These assets were primarily used to “marry-up” troops with
prepositioned cargo overseas. Supporting the President’s call for additional
forces just prior to hostilities and to help ensure a steady stream of resupply,
Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, activated CRAF Stage II on 17 Janu-
ary 1991. The Stage II activation yielded a total of 76 passenger and 40 cargo
aircraft. Collectively, the CRAF accounted for one fourth of all the passen-
gers and cargo airlifted during the Gulf War thus proving the value of this
unique civil-military partnership.
The DOD tasks the minimum percentage of assets in each stage necessary to
augment military airlift to meet crisis requirements. During activation, the civil
carriers retain operational control of their aircraft while AMC TACC exercises
mission control.
34
AIRLIFT OPERATIONS
Intertheater Airlift
35
1973 Arab-Israeli War (Yom Kippur War)
D
uring the Arab-Israeli War of
1973, commonly referred to
as the Yom Kippur War, the
survival of Israel hung in a precari-
ous balance. Determined to recapture
territory lost to Israel in the 1967 Six-
Day War, Egypt and Syria launched a
surprise attack that caught Israel off
guard. While both sides sustained
heavy losses in the first few days of
the conflict, Arab forces were quickly Military Airlift Commands C5A
resupplied by the Soviet Union, which
sent large quantities of munitions and
was the only aircraft capable of
equipment. Recognizing that Israel carrying outsized cargo.
was not postured to win a war of at-
trition and needed immediate help to survive the Arab attack, the United States
dedicated its massive airlift assets to support a monumental resupply effort code-
named Operation NICKEL GRASS.
In addition to airlifting munitions and modern weapons that enabled the Israe-
lis to fight on equal terms against Arab forces, airlift served a very important
strategic purpose amidst a politically charged and extremely volatile environment.
The United States demonstrated to the world a willingness to take necessary mea-
sures to support and defend its allies from nations with hostile intent.
The airlift lasted for 32 days before sufficient supplies arrived via sealift. During
those 32 days, Military Airlift Command (MAC) C–5s and C–141s flew over 550
missions and delivered over 22,000 tons of precious equipment and supplies. Sig-
nificant was the ability of MAC aircraft to equal the resupply efforts of the Soviets
and from a substantially greater distance. Operation NICKEL GRASS demonstrated the
enormous military potential of airlift to rapidly sustain forces anywhere in the
world and was instrumental in turning the tide of the Yom Kippur War in favor of
Israel.
From an airlift perspective, Operation NICKEL GRASS produced several important
lessons. First, although the US had the largest military airlift fleet in the world, it
became clear that additional intertheater airlift capability was needed. Second, the
inability to obtain diplomatic clearances for desired en route basing and overflight
rights highlighted the value of air refueling. At the time, only a limited number of
C–5 crews were qualified in air refueling and the C–141 lacked air refueling capabil-
ity altogether. Furthermore, air refueling would have increased aircraft allowable
cabin loads and significantly reduced enroute times. And finally, Operation NICKEL
GRASS proved the value of the C–5 as an outsized airlifter, capable of carrying the
Army’s largest tanks.
The attention given to remedy the airlift lessons of the Yom Kippur War is
evident and clearly reflected in the composition of today’s US air mobility fleet.
Intertheater cargo airlift capacity is greater than ever, the vast majority of aircraft
and aircrews that normally conduct intertheater airlift routinely participate in
air refueling operations, and the capability to transport outsized cargo con-
tinues to increase as more C–17 Globemaster IIIs become operational.
36
Intertheater airlift has the capability to deploy, employ, sustain, and
redeploy forces anywhere in the world. During the deployment phase of
a contingency, intertheater airlift requirements, while significant, are to
a large degree predictable. Such requirements normally are identified in
the TPFDD associated with a particular operation plan (OPLAN) or op-
eration order (OPORD). A TPFDD can be tailored to meet specific re-
quirements when the mission is not aligned with an OPLAN or modified
to meet the requirements associated with a particular course of action.
Under those circumstances where an AEF is a validated component of
the supported CINC’s approved course of action, AEF support require-
ments will be reflected in the applicable TPFDD. The AEF concept relies
significantly on AMC-provided airlift capability to project military power.
Time-definite resupply via airlift from CONUS to the theaters is critical in
maintaining the flow of materiel necessary to sustain operations. This
concept uses both military and commercial aircraft to support the sus-
tainment flow and must begin as soon as deployment operations begin.
Intratheater Airlift
37
Operation DESERT STORM’s Left Hook
F
rom 18–28 January 1991, C–130s
secretly airlifted elements of the
XVIII Airborne Corps from King
Fahd International Airport to Rafha, in
northern Saudi Arabia, near the Iraqi
border. This intense airlift supported
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s flank-
ing maneuver to the west, which he de- Intratheater airlift enables the
scribed as a “Hail Mary Pass.” C–130s JFC to move forces to
flew the mission corridors at 10-minute achieve shock and surprise.
intervals in radio silence. During the
airlift to Rafha, C–130 sortie rates increased from 200 per day to more than
300 daily and peaked at more than 350 sorties during one 24-hour period.
Nearly 14,000 troops and more than 9,300 tons of cargo were transported.
General Schwarzkopf said of this fast-paced demonstration of air mobility: “I
can’t recall any time in the annals of military history when this number of
forces has moved over this distance to put themselves in a position to attack.”
38
signed organization’s organic requirements, OSA assets may be used to
reduce extraordinary workload demands on the airlift system.
USTRANSCOM is responsible for the scheduling and execution of OSA
operations regarding CONUS-based assets while the Services validate OSA
requests.
DELIVERY METHODS
Airland
In most cases,
airlifters offload their
payloads after they have
landed. This highly effec-
tive and efficient delivery
method is usually preferred
because it minimizes the risk
of injury to personnel and
damage to equipment, elimi-
nates payload dispersal,
and offers an increased
availability of resources.
This method requires secure,
suitable, and conveniently Airland is the preferred delivery method.
located airfields.
39
Employment Concepts
APOE
APOD
Hub
APOD APOD
Airdrop
AIRLIFT MISSIONS
The four basic missions of airlift are: passenger and cargo move-
ment; combat employment and resupply; aeromedical evacuation;
and special operations support. Air Force airlift forces perform these
40
The Siege at Khe Sanh
I
n mid-December 1967, North Vietnamese units began encircling two
US Marine infantry battalions and an artillery battalion at Khe Sanh,
South Vietnam, near the Demilitarized Zone. By January 1968, some
15,000 Communist troops had cut off all ground supply. Khe Sanh would
have to rely on an air bridge to survive. Air Force C–130s airlanded another
infantry battalion to reinforce the base, bringing the total number of defend-
ers to 6,000. The Marines had enough food, fuel, and ammunition to last 30
days, a level of sustainment secured by 15 daily C–130 missions.
Soon, North Vietnamese forces began to increase the volume and frequency
of their mortar, rocket, and artillery fire onto the base. On 21 January, the
main ammunition dump was hit, prompting a request for an emergency aerial
resupply. C–123 and C–130 aircraft responded by airlanding over 2,500 tons
of supplies over the following eight days to the besieged Americans. In re-
sponse to the Marines obvious reliance on the air bridge, the well dug in and
hidden North Vietnamese set up automatic weapons and antiaircraft fire to
disrupt the airlift effort.
Due to poor weather conditions and intense ground fire, airlift aircraft
changed their tactics. Relying less on airland as a delivery method, airdrop
allowed delivery of supplies in less favorable weather and reduced the time
aircrews and aircraft were exposed to enemy fire. Utilizing airdrop techniques
like the container delivery system to drop ammunition, food, and construc-
tion materials, airlift enabled the Marines to stay the course.
Between the end of January and early April 1968, intratheater airlift de-
livered 12, 430 tons of cargo to the defenders of Khe Sanh. Despite the loss of
three C–123s and damage to numerous C–130 and C–123 aircraft, the air
bridge enabled the US Marines to withstand the assault. According to one
historian, “Airlift made possible the allied victory . . .The defenders of this
post were exclusively resupplied by air and withstood the attacks of four
Vietnamese regiments.”
Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: An Illustrated History
of the Military Airlift Command, 1941–1991
41
vice organization to
Airlift Missions USTRANSCOM, and executed by
AMC TACC. Depending on user re-
J Passenger and Cargo quirements, requests not support-
Movement able through the channel structure
can be fulfilled through the use of
J Combat Employment other mission categories such as
and Sustainment special air missions (SAM), special
assignment airlift missions (SAAM),
J Aeromedical and exercise and contingency mis-
Evacuation sions. Requests that cannot be sat-
isfied by any of the above missions
J Special Operations
may be referred to other transpor-
Support
tation modes of the Defense Trans-
portation System. The airlift system
has the flexibility to surge and meet
Figure 4.2. Airlift Missions requirements that exceed routine,
peacetime demands for passenger and cargo movement. For example, during
Operation DESERT SHIELD, new channel routes and structures were es-
tablished to support the significantly increased airlift demands.
42
Operation JUST CAUSE
I
n the closing days of 1989, the United States engaged in the largest
American combat operation since Vietnam, Operation JUST CAUSE. At
the center of the controversy was Panamanian dictator, General Manuel
Noriega. After enduring several years of illegal and corrupt activity by Gen-
eral Noriega, a number of trigger events occurred in mid-December 1989 that
forced President Bush to order the US military into action. First, General
Noriega announced on 15 December 1989 that a state of war existed between
the United States and Panama. On the following day, Panamanian Defense
Forces (PDF) killed an off-duty US Marine, First Lieutenant Robert Paz. Wit-
nessing the murder, a Navy lieutenant and his wife were arrested, threatened,
and abused.
The plan for Operation JUST CAUSE rested on five objectives established by
the NCA: (1) safeguard American citizens in Panama, (2) restore a demo-
cratic form of government, (3) ensure the uninterrupted operation of the
Panama Canal, (4) neutralize the PDF and, (5) remove General Noriega from
power. Planners immediately recognized that airlift would play a lead role in
achieving these objectives.
In the early hours of December 19, a massive airborne assault composed
of Army Rangers from Forts Lewis and Stewart as well as airborne troops
from Fort Bragg was directed against key strategic targets in Panama. Spear-
heading the attack, 25 C–130 and 80 C–141 aircraft from Military Airlift Com-
mand (MAC) successfully airdropped these troops and their equipment as
planned. However, the aerial insertion did not come without cost. Security
breaches, due in part to media leaks, tipped off the PDF that an airlift inva-
sion was imminent and robbed US forces of tactical surprise. Fourteen MAC
aircraft sustained battle damage and 23 US
servicemen lost their lives.
In the final analysis, Operation JUST CAUSE
was an enormous success and showcased the
speed, range, flexibility, and versatility of air-
lift and its ability to operate in a forcible en-
try environment. Shortly after the invasion,
General Manuel Noriega surrendered himself
to US authorities and was flown by C–130 to
the United States where he faced charges and
eventual imprisonment for drug trafficking.
43
While this mission provides significant capabilities, it also car-
ries substantial risk. Success in combat employment and sustainment
hinges on air superiority and threat avoidance. This requires accurate
and timely intelligence regarding threats along the ingress and egress
routes and over the target area. Once delivered to the target area, the
inserted force may be totally dependent upon subsequent airlift opera-
tions for sustainment, movement, withdrawal, or redeployment.
44
in the theater. The AECC should
be deployed simultaneously and
independently from the AOC but
requires collocation with the AOC.
J Intertheater AE - Contingency
intertheater AE will normally be
accomplished using dedicated
AE CRAF. Retrograde or dedi- CRAF augments intertheater AE.
cated military AE aircraft may
be used when AE CRAF capability is exceeded or on an urgent/priority
basis. Alternatives to AE CRAF or military aircraft may be pursued
when competing airlift or evacuee requirements reduce airframe avail-
ability. These alternatives could include use of other organic military
airlift, CRAF passenger aircraft,
or authorization for commercial
travel for ambulatory patients
who do not require in-flight sup-
portive medical care.
J Intratheater AE - Intratheater AE
involves movement of patients
within the theater of operations
from the mobile aeromedical The C9 Nightingale is the
evacuation facilities located near workhorse for intratheater AE.
the front lines, to the aeromedical staging facilities in the rear area.
This movement of casualties out of the combat zone during contin-
gency operations is generally accomplished using dedicated or sched-
uled aeromedical aircraft.
45
Special operations forces rely on airlift support.
SUMMARY
46
CHAPTER FIVE
AIR REFUELING
GENERAL
47
Tanker aircraft operating under the dual role concept can transport
passengers and cargo while performing air refueling.
Force Extension
48
Force extension is often used for transoceanic fighter movements.
sion is often used when tankers supporting aircraft deployments are car-
rying cargo as well as refueling other aircraft (dual-role). Since takeoff
fuel is limited by the amount of payload carried, tankers operating in a
dual-role may require force extension. All KC–10 aircraft and a small num-
ber of KC–135 aircraft are equipped to receive air refueling and be force
extended.
The Air Force’s active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National
Guard air refueling force is the largest and most experienced of its
kind in the world. The majority of the Air Force’s air refueling assets are
assigned to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. With both boom
and drogue capability, Air Force air refueling aircraft can refuel most
joint and allied aircraft equipped for air refueling.
49
These forces perform core and specialized air refueling missions and are
readily available for tasking and deployment.
Air refueling forces in the AFRC and ANG are aligned similarly
to that of AFRC and ANG airlift forces. These assets are an integral
part of AMC’s operations, flying air refueling missions in support of na-
tional taskings every day. During crises, volunteers or activated AFRC/ANG
units augment the active duty air refueling force, providing substantial in-
creases in air refueling capacity. AFRC/ANG personnel are experienced
operators and train to the same standards as the active duty air refueling
force. Peacetime access to AFRC/ANG forces is provided through a sys-
tem of volunteerism. Major contingencies, however, normally require
activation or “call up” of AFRC/ANG units.
50
During DESERT STORM, 60 percent of all attack sorties required air
refueling. More than 1,400 aircraft per day were air refueled. Only attack
and airlift missions accounted for more sorties than air refueling.
51
Air refueling support is
critical to the bomber leg
of the Triad.
52
Operation DESERT STRIKE
D
uring August 1996, Iraqi forces violated United Nations resolutions
by entering northern Iraq to intervene in a civil war among Kurdish
factions. The United States retaliated with an attack on Iraqi air de-
fenses. Operating in conjunction with the US Navy, the Air Force portion of
the strike was conducted by two B–52s which flew a 15-hour, non-stop
prepositioning leg to Anderson AB, Guam. In addition, a C–5 aircraft airlifted
100 maintenance and mission support personnel from CONUS to Anderson
AB. From Guam, the bombers flew to the Persian Gulf region, released 13 air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCM), and returned to Guam on a grueling 34-
hour, 14,000-mile mission. Both legs of the bomber mission were dependent
on air refueling provided by active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force
Reserve KC–10s and KC–135s. Overall, 14 tankers supplied close to a million
pounds of fuel for the prepositioning leg to Anderson AB while 17 tankers
deployed to Guam offloaded nearly 1.5 million pounds of fuel for the air
strike.
Operation DESERT STRIKE demonstrated the synergy that results when global
attack assets are properly coupled with air refueling forces. Striking at targets
situated halfway around the world, air refueling allowed the B–52s to accom-
plish this operation with maximum flexibility in minimum time. Without
overflight clearances, mission planners had to rely on the flexibility offered
by air refueling to accommodate for the increased flight distances to ALCM
release points in Southwest Asia. In addition, time requirements were greatly
compressed. The deployment order arrived on 31 August, at which point
tankers began moving into position. The attack launched on 2 September and
was completed by the next day. Air refueling is a tremendous force enabler
and clearly played a significant role in the success of Operation DESERT STRIKE.
53
The limited range of fighter aircraft demands air refueling support for
non-stop deployments.
Deployment Support
54
Special operations often need support from air refueling assets to
satisfy their requirements.
used to help manage, direct, and conduct combat operations. Without in-
flight refueling, they have limited endurance and require extensive re-
generation periods between sorties. Extending endurance reduces the
number of sorties required, decreases ground support requirements at
forward locations, and may reduce the number of aircraft deployed to an
AOR.
SUMMARY
55
trum of military operations. Missions such as SIOP, global attack, air bridge,
deployment and special operations support as well as theater support to
combat air forces are heavily dependent on air refueling forces.
56
CHAPTER SIX
GENERAL
Airlift and air refueling forces rely on a robust global support system
when conducting air mobility operations. Successful employment of the
MAF is contingent upon establishing and maintaining a Global Air Mobil-
ity Support System (GAMSS) that enables the deployment, employment,
sustainment, and redeployment of air mobility forces throughout the spec-
trum of military operations.
57
command and control, aerial port operations, and aircraft maintenance,
GAMSS units strive to coordinate and synchronize intertheater and
intratheater air mobility operations in a manner that appears seamless to
the customer. The GAMSS facilitates such operations as air bridge sup-
port, hub and spoke operations, airfield surveys for pending operations,
and establishing arrangements for host-nation support. Quick response
requirements by the NCA means GAMSS-deployable forces must be able
to deploy rapidly and begin immediate operations.
Not only must GAMSS forces deploy quickly; they must deploy
first—prior to the main flow of forces. This force sequencing enables
supported forces to immediately swing to follow-on missions because es-
sential support infrastructure for the operation is already in place. To
58
work properly, GAMSS forces must preposition themselves at key loca-
tions outside the theater prior to the deployment of forces—usually upon
receipt of the JCS alert order. Consequently, mission planners must pro-
vide adequate lead times for GAMSS forces to organize and take initial
preparatory measures.
GAMSS COMPONENTS
GAMSS forces are drawn from active duty, Air Force Reserve
Command (AFRC), and Air National Guard (ANG) components.
Collectively, these components provide the forces that make up the permanent
CONUS and overseas GAMSS organizations as well as the deployable forces
stationed primarily in CONUS. These components support operations
throughout the spectrum of military operations.
Both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command
provide forces to augment active duty GAMSS units. AFRC/ANG
forces are an important supplement to active duty GAMSS forces. During
peacetime, the AFRC/ANG provide forces on a volunteer basis. When mo-
bilized, AFRC/ANG units are placed on active duty status and may be
used in the same manner as regular active duty units. AFRC/ANG forces
maintain the same mission-ready status as their active duty counterparts.
59
TALCEs are designed to provide air mobility support at austere
locations.
ELEMENTS OF THE GAMSS
60
aerial port services. They may be deployed as an element of a TALCE or
MST, or as a small scale stand alone entity. An MSE has personnel and
equipment deployed to support a specific mission or requirement at mo-
bility airfields or off-line locations.
OPERATIONS
Peacetime
AMSS ✈ AMSS
Elmendorf
Osan
✈✈ AMSS
Yokota
AMSS
✈✈ AMSS
Mildenhall Rhein Main
AMSS ✈ ✈ AMSS/AMSG
Kadena AMSS/AMSG
AMSS
Lajes ✈ Ramstein✈
✈Hickam ✈ Rota
AMSS AMSS
✈ Incirlik
AMSS
Andersen ✈ AMSS
Howard
61
AMSSs are situated at key overseas en route locations to operate air
terminal facilities in support of the Defense Transportation System and
numerous DOD customers. AMSS personnel generate, launch, and recover
air mobility missions and en route support aircraft. Each AMSS operates
an air mobility control center (AMCC), which serves as the command
and control conduit to the TACC for air mobility mission tracking. In ad-
dition, one AMSS under each AMSG contains an air mobility control flight
(AMCF) capable of providing an immediate initial response TALCE or
MST core command, control and communications element.
AMC/CC
Administrative Operational
NAF/CC TACC/CC
AMSG/CC AMSS/CC
Transition to a Contingency
62
deploy and provide the core functions of air mobility support (i.e., com-
mand and control, aerial port operations, and aircraft maintenance),
GAMSS forces are also capable of providing any other support capabilities
necessary to sustain air mobility operations.
AMSS ✈ AMSS
AMSS
Osan
✈✈ AMSS
Elmendorf
✈
Mildenhall AMSS
Yokota AMOG ✈
✈
Rhein Main
Kadena✈
AMSS AMOG AMSS/AMSG
Travis
Hickam ✈
AMSS/AMSG
McGuire
✈ Ramstein
✈ AMSS
AMSS ✈ AMSS
✈
AMSS ✈ AMSS
Lajes Rota Incirlik
Andersen Howard
63
Each AMOG and its subordinate units are administratively aligned
under their respective NAF. Service-related issues are addressed through
administrative lines that pass through each NAF/CC to its respective
AMOG/CC. However, operational authority for planning, scheduling, task-
ing and executing missions passes through the TACC/CC to the AMCU/
CCs. (See Figure 6.2.)
The AMC TACC is the tasking authority for all deployable AMC
GAMSS units. [Note: USAFE and PACAF retain tasking authority
over their deployable GAMSS units.] Personnel in these units must be
capable of deploying rapidly upon notification. Centralized control through
AMC TACC enables AMC/CC to rapidly shift these forces in response to
globally prioritized taskings.
FUNCTIONS
The three core functions provided through the Global Air Mobil-
ity Support System are command and control, maintenance, and
aerial port. All major en route locations will provide these services, how-
ever, other support capabilities that directly impact air mobility opera-
tional missions (force protection, life support, intelligence, etc.) can be
added to these basic functions to complement this system at an en route
location. The level of support can be tailored to match the workload re-
quirements at any particular en route location. Consequently, GAMSS
mobile forces can provide a method for (1) establishing support capabili-
ties at existing or formerly “bare-base” locations; (2) tailoring the level of
support provided at a location; and (3) adding additional support capabili-
ties at a location to complement the three basic functions.
64
ing the location and delivery status of transported personnel and mate-
riel provides the ability to continuously monitor the readiness of forces in
the theater. The use of modern command and control systems to provide in-
transit visibility simplifies operational planning by reducing the element of
uncertainty inherent in deployed operations. The command and control sys-
tems are tied together in a network which is accessible to theater com-
manders.
Aircraft Maintenance
Deployable GAMSS forces are often the first US Air Force per-
sonnel to arrive at a given operating location and they are limited
in what they can bring, to include aircraft maintenance capability.
GAMSS maintenance capability is contained in two deployable organiza-
tions, the TALCE and the maintenance recovery team (MRT). Designed
primarily to support air mobility aircraft conducting deployment opera-
tions, GAMSS maintenance units are not intended to provide sustained main-
tenance.
65
The GAMSS maintenance capability contained in the TALCE is
more robust than that found in an MRT and consists mostly of cross-
functional maintenance specialties designed to provide aircraft marshal-
ing, parking, refueling, limited aircraft troubleshooting, and repair capa-
bility. If specific aircraft repair capability is required at a deployed loca-
tion, an MRT will be deployed with appropriate specialists, equipment,
and parts to accomplish the repair.
Aerial Port
GAMSS units possess a more robust aerial port capability than mainte-
nance capability. TALCEs and other GAMSS units are designed to estab-
lish and operate air mobility airheads and they have the ability to onload
and offload a set number of aircraft based on forecast workload require-
ments. In addition, GAMSS aerial port specialists provide expertise to es-
tablish a marshaling yard and traffic routing for cargo, aircraft servicing,
passenger manifesting, and air terminal operations center services.
The GAMSS aerial port services provided by TALCE units are not
designed for long-term, sustained aerial port operations. For sus-
tained aerial port services in a location not serviced by a contractor or an
66
AMSS, an expeditionary wing/group will normally be established. An ex-
peditionary wing/group will normally bring organic aerial port person-
nel and equipment to the deployed location.
SUMMARY
67
68
Suggested Readings
Bowers, Ray L. Tactical Airlift. Office of Air Force History, Washington,
DC, 1983. (From the series: United States Air Force in Southeast Asia).
Byrd, Vernon B. Passing Gas: The History of Inflight Refueling. Chico, CA,
Byrd Publishing, 1994.
Conrad, Scott W. Conrad. Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond. Na-
tional Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Wash-
ington, DC, US GPO, 1994.
Dyche, David D. Making Operational Support Airlift Ready for War. Max-
well AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1995.
Giangreco, D.M. and Griffin, Robert. Airbridge to Berlin: The Berlin Crisis
of 1948-Origins and Aftermath. Novato, CA, Presido Press, 1988.
Gropman, Alan L. Airpower and the Airlift Evacuation of Kham Duc. Office
of Air Force History, Washington, DC, 1985.
69
Lester, John R. Frontline Airline: Troop Carrier Pilots in World War II. Man-
hattan, KS, Sunflower University Press, 1994.
Miller, Charles E. Airlift Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press,
1988.
Nalty, Bernard C. Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh, USAF Special Study.
Office of Air Force History, Washington DC, 1986.
Spencer, Otha C. Flying the Hump: Memories of an Air War. College Station,
TX, Texas A & M University Press, 1992.
Tunner, William H. Over the Hump. Office of Air Force History, Washing-
ton, DC, 1985.
Wolfe, Martin. Green Light! A Troop Carrier Squadron’s War from Normandy
to the Rhine. Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC, 1993.
70
Young, Charles H. Into the Valley: The Untold Story of USAAF Troop Carrier
in World War II, From North Africa to Europe. Dallas, TX, PrintComm,
1997.
Official Publications
Joint Publication 3-17: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mo-
bility Operations. (under revision).
Joint Publication 4-01: Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.
17 June 1997.
Joint Publication 4-01.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift
Support to Joint Operations. 20 July 1996.
Joint Publication 4-01.3: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Move-
ment Control. 21 June 1996.
71
72
Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms
73
CINC commander in chief
CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces
COMUSAFE Commander, US Air Forces in Europe
CONOPS concept of operations
CONUS continental United States
CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force
DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces
DoD Department of Defense
DTS Defense Transportation System
DZ drop zone
GAMSS Global Air Mobility Support System
GRL global reach laydown
GTN Global Transportation Network
ISR intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
ITV in-transit visibility
JAOC joint air operations center
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JMC joint movement center
JOA joint operations area
JSTARS joint surveillance target attack radar system
JTB Joint Transportation Board
JTF joint task force
LZ landing zone
MAC Military Airlift Command
MAF Mobility Air Force
MAJCOM major command
MOG maximum on ground
MOOTW military operations other than war
MRT maintenance recovery team
MSC Military Sealift Command
MSE mission support element
MSF mission support forces
MST mission support team
74
MTMC Military Traffic Management Command
NAF numbered air force
NCA National Command Authorities
OCONUS outside continental United States
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OSA operational support airlift
PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PDF Panamanian Defense Forces
SAAM special assignment airlift mission
SAM special air mission
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SIOP single integrated operational plan
SOF special operations forces
TACC Tanker/Airlift Control Center
TACON tactical control
TALCE tanker airlift control element
TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL time-phased force and deployment list
US United States
USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe
USCINCEUR Commander in Chief, US European Command
USCINCPAC Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command
USCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command
USEUCOM US European Command
USTRANSCOM US Transportation Command
Definitions
75
aerospace power. The use of lethal and nonlethal means by aerospace
forces to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. (AFDD 2)
air superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force
over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and
its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without pro-
hibitive interference by the opposing force. (Joint Pub 1–02)
air supremacy. That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air
force is incapable of effective interference. (Joint Pub 1–02)
76
attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where
such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to
specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively tem-
porary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty.
See also assign. (Joint Pub 1–02)
77
coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsi-
bility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of
two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same
Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require con-
sultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority
to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be
obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordi-
nating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through
which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more appli-
cable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Joint Pub
1–02)
core competency. The basic areas of expertise or the specialties that the
Air Force brings to any activity across the spectrum of military opera-
tions whether as a single Service or in conjunction with the core compe-
tencies of other services in joint operations. Core competencies repre-
sent both air and space power application theory and physical capability
represented in a well-trained and equipped air force. (AFDD 1)
78
information warfare. Actions taken to achieve information superiority
by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, infor-
mation systems, and computer-based networks while leveraging and de-
fending one’s own information, information-based processes, information
systems, and computer-based networks. Also called IW. (Joint Pub 1–02)
[Information operations conducted to defend one’s own information and infor-
mation systems, or attacking and affecting an adversary’s information and
information systems.] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the
Air Force and is offered for clarity.} (AFDD 2)
in-transit visibility. The ability to track the identity, status, and location
of Department of Defense units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk pe-
troleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; medical patients; and per-
sonal property from origin to consignee or destination across the range of
military operations. See also global transportation network. (Joint Pub
1–02)
79
joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant
elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments,
operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force com-
mander. (Joint Pub 1–02)
joint force air component commander. The joint force air component
commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has
the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coor-
dination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to
ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The
joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air compo-
nent commander. The joint force air component commander’s responsi-
bilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these
would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation,
and tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment deci-
sion). Using the joint force commander’s guidance and authority, and in
coordination with other Service component commanders and other as-
signed or supporting commanders, the joint force air component com-
mander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of
air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC.
See also joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1–02)
joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the
Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander,
or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1–
02)
logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and
maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of
military operations which deal with: (a) design and development, acqui-
sition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and dis-
position of materiel; (b) movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of
personnel; (c) acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and
disposition of facilities; and (d) acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint
Pub 1–02)
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military strategy. The art and science of employing the armed forces of
a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of
force or the threat of force. (Joint Pub 1–02)
national strategy. The art and science of developing and using the po-
litical, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its
armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives. (Joint
Pub 1–02)
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by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.
(Joint Pub 1–02)
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special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained,
and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, politi-
cal, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military
means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations
are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, indepen-
dently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial op-
erations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special
operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques, and
oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional
operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques,
mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and depen-
dence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also
called SO. (Joint Pub 1–02)
strategy. The art and science of developing and using political, economic,
psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to
afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the prob-
abilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances
of defeat. (Joint Pub 1–02)
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plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)
tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements
are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to
tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered
arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other
and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1–02)
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vices, maintenance, security, transportation, weather, intelligence, and
other support functions, as necessary. The Tanker Airlift Control Ele-
ment is composed of mission support elements from various units and
deploys in support of peacetime, contingency, and emergency relief op-
erations on both planned and “no notice” basis. Also called TALCE. A
TALCE is a mobile C2 organization responsible for providing continuous
on-site management of mobility airfield operations. It is a provisional or-
ganization composed of various mission support elements (MSE). They
deploy to provide mission support when command and control, mission
reporting, or required support functions are insufficient. TALCEs provide
command and control, communications, aerial port, logistics, security,
weather and intelligence services, or other MSEs as deemed necessary.
These organizations are sized based upon projected requirements. (Air
Mobility Master Plan [AMMP])
theater. The geographical area outside the continental United States for
which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned respon-
sibility. (Joint Pub 1–02)
war. Open and often prolonged conflict between nations (or organized
groups within nations) to achieve national objectives. (AFDD 1)
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