Filoil Refinery Corporation v. Filoil Supervisory and Confidential Employees Association

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 2

67 Filoil Refinery Corporation v.

Filoil Supervisory and AUTHOR: Castro (copied Pat’s digest, edited the issue/ratio)
Confidential Employees Association and Court of NOTES: Art. 232. Prohibition on certification election. The
Industrial Relations Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification election or
[G.R. No. L-26736, August 18, 1972] any other action which may disturb the administration of duly
TOPIC: Determining Agency registered existing collective bargaining agreements affecting the
PONENTE: Teehankee, J. parties except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The industrial court "enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary to insure the fair and free choice
of bargaining representations by employees," and that its action "in deciding upon an appropriate unit for collective
bargaining purposes is discretionary, and its judgment in this respect is entitled to almost complete finality, unless its
action is arbitrary or capricious", and that absent any grave abuse of discretion as to justify the Court's intervention, "this
Court has repeatedly upheld the exercise of the Court of Industrial Relations in matters concerning the representation of
employee groups”.

The United States National Labor Relations Board, in deciding whether to include or exclude a group of employees from
a bargaining unit, has always allowed itself to be guided by the determination as to whether its action "will insure to the
employees of the Company the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining and otherwise
effectuate the policies of the Act”. – same principle used here
Emergency Recit
FSCEA, a separate labor association composed of Filoil’s supervisory and confidential employees, filed a petition for
certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent. Filoil opposed, stating that supervisors are not
employees but part of management, thus they do not have the right to bargain collectively. The Court of Industrial
Relations upheld the right of the supervisors and confidential employees to organize FSCEA and to bargain collectively.
The SC agreed that the industrial court has discretionary powers determining matters regarding the appropriate unit for
collective bargaining purposes.
FACTS:
 Respondent FSCEA is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor, composed exclusively
of the supervisory and confidential employees of petitioner corporation. There exists another entirely distinct labor
association composed of the corporation's rank-and-file employees, the Filoil Employees & Workers Association
(FEWA) with which petitioner executed a collective bargaining agreement. This collective bargaining agreement
expressly excluded from its coverage petitioner's supervisory and confidential employees, who in turn organized
their own labor association, respondent FSCEA.
 February 18, 1965: FSCEA filed with the CIR its petition for certification as the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining agent of all of petitioner's supervisory and confidential employees working at its refinery in Rosario,
Cavite.
 Petitioner filed a MTD on the grounds of lack of cause of action and of respondent court's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter, under its claim that supervisors are not employees within the meaning of Republic Act 875, the
Industrial Peace Act, and that since they are part of management, they do not have the right to bargain collectively
although they may organize an organization of their own.
 CIR: Denied MTD. Rejected petitioner's objection against the composition of respondent association in that it
included as members technical men and confidential employees: supervisors as a general rule should form an
association of their own and should exclude all other types of personnel unless a special consideration exists,
like example, that they are so few in number and that there are other technical men or confidential men
equally few in number. In the latter case, they may all constitute one unit.
 CIR after hearing: Since the confidential employees are very few and are, by practice and tradition, identified
with management, the NLRB, because of such "identity of interest", has allowed their inclusion in the bargaining
unit of supervisors who are likewise identified with management. And because the CIR is the equivalent of the
NLRB, the inclusion of the confidential employees in the bargaining unit of supervisor should be allowed.
o Creating fragmentary units would not serve the interest of industrial peace… “The Court is
likewise aware of the ineffectiveness of a small union with a scanty members as bargaining
unit. The breaking up of bargaining agents into tiny units will greatly impair their
organizational value.”
ISSUE:
Whether the CIR gravely abused its discretion ruling in favor of the association
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
 No arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against respondent court's allowing the inclusion
of the confidential employees in the supervisors' association for as admitted by petitioner itself, supra, the
supervisors and confidential employees enjoy its trust and confidence. This identity of interest logically calls for
their inclusion in the same bargaining unit and at the same time fulfills the law's objective of insuring to them the
full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, which could hardly be accomplished
if the respondent association's membership were to be broken up into 5 separate ineffective tiny units, as urged
by petitioner.

 Respondent court's action not being vulnerable to challenge as being arbitrary or capricious is therefore sustained,
in line with the Court's consistent rulings that the industrial court "enjoys a wide discretion in determining
the procedure necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representations by employees,"
and that its action "in deciding upon an appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes is
discretionary ... and (that) its judgment in this respect is entitled to almost complete finality, unless its
action is arbitrary or capricious" and that absent any grave abuse of discretion as to justify the Court's
intervention, "this Court has repeatedly upheld the exercise of the Court of Industrial Relations in matters
concerning the representation of employee groups."

You might also like