FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. L-9322-23. January 30, 1956.]

TEODORO TANDA, plaintiff-appellant , vs. NARCISO N. ALDAYA,

defendant-appellee.

Teodoro Tanda, in his own behalf.

San Juan, Africa, Yñiguez & Benedicto for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DECLARATORY RELIEF; COURT

DECISION NOT PROPER SUBJECT OF ACTIONS; REMEDY WHERE DECISION IS
DOUBTFUL OR AMBIGUOUS. — A court decision cannot be the subject of declaratory
relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on
questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial court a motion for reconsideration or
a new trial in order that the defect may be corrected (section 1, Rule 37). The same
remedy may be pursued by a party with regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or
of the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule 54, section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section
1, Rule 53). A party may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court
on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if he avails of that
remedy within the terms prescribed by section 1, Rule 38. In the present case, the
fundamental reason why the decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief is
predicated upon the principle of res judicata which stamps the ,ark of finality in a case
which has been fully and definitely litigated in court.
2. ID.; FINAL JUDGMENT; WITHDRAWAL OF EVIDENCE. — Where the
judgment has become final and executory and no further step need be taken affecting
the equities of the parties, the evidence presented therein may be withdrawn.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J : p

The present appeal concerns a review of an order entered by the Court of First
Instance of Cavite on June 12, 1953 which dismisses the complaint in Civil Case No.
5113 instituted to obtain from the court a declaratory relief on certain matters pleaded
therein while it grants the plea prayed for in Civil Case No. 4606 of the same court for
withdrawal of Original Certificate of Title No. 114 in order that the Register of Deeds
may effect the registration of the document of consolidation of ownership and issuance
of the necessary title in favor of the winning party. Another order appealed from is that
of August 26, 1953, but, being merely corollary, discussion thereof is deemed
unnecessary.
For a clear understanding of the issues raised herein, it is necessary to make a
brief statement of the factual background and the different steps taken by the parties
leading to the issuance of the order subject of the present review.
On April 10, 1948, appellant instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cavite an
action for the annulment of a certain contract of sale with pacto de retro (Civil Case No.
4606). On May 11, 1949, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the contract valid
and absolving appellee of the complaint. After a motion to set aside judgment and a
motion for new trial filed by appellant were denied by the trial court, appellant brought
the case on appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 23, 1951, the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision appealed from particularly with regard to the validity of the contract which
is disputed by appellant. After the two motions for reconsideration filed by appellant
were denied, the decision became final and executory and the record was returned to
the court of origin; but, on November 8, 1951, appellant initiated the present case for
declaratory relief. Considering that this action is purposeless because, while outwardly
its aim is to seek a declaratory relief on certain matters but in effect its purpose is to
nullify the judgment rendered in the previous case (Civil Case No. 4606) which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-3278), * appellee filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the case states no cause of action. In the meantime, appellee moved
to withdraw the original of Title No. 114 which was presented in the case as evidence in
order that his ownership may be consolidated and a new title issued in his name it
appearing that case has been finally terminated (Civil Case No. 4606). The trial court,
acting on the two motions, entered an order on June 12, 1953 granting the motion to
dismiss and allowing the withdrawal of the original title as already adverted to in the
early part of this decision.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals wherein appellant assigned
nine errors as allegedly committed by the trial court but, after a cursory reading of the
errors assigned, that court certified the case to us on the ground that the questions to
be resolved are purely of law.
The purpose of the case which gave rise to the present appeal is avowedly for
declaratory relief instituted under Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which
provides that "Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action
to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or
statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." And, it is claimed, this
case comes under its purview because its purpose is to obtain a clarification of the
decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-3278 which in the opinion of appellant, is vague and
susceptible of double interpretation. Appellant contends that the words "other written
instrument" should be interpreted as including a court decision regardless of whether it
is final in character or otherwise.
We do not subscribe to the foregoing view. Evidently, a court decision cannot be
interpreted as included within the purview of the words "other written instrument", as
contended by appellant, for the simple reason that the Rules of Court already provide for
the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified
without need of resorting to the expedient prescribed by Rule 66. Thus, if a party is not
agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial
court a motion for reconsideration or a new trial in order that the defect may be
corrected (Section 1, Rule 37). The same remedy may be pursued by a party with
regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule
54, section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section 1, Rule 58). A party may even seek
relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence if he avails of that remedy within the terms prescribed
by section 1, Rule 38. Apparently, appellant has already availed of some of these legal
remedies but that he was denied relief because his claim was found unmeritorious.
But the fundamental reason why the decision of this Court in the original case (G.
R. No. L-3278) cannot be the subject of declaratory relief is predicated upon the
principle of res judicata which stamps the mark of finality on a case which has been
fully and definitely litigated in court. This principle is sound. It avoids multiplicity of
actions. It commands that once a case is definitely litigated it should not be reopened.
Thus, it has been held that "The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res
judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment
of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties,
and those in privity with them in law or estate. It is considered that a judgment presents
evidence of the facts of so high a nature that nothing which could be proved by evidence
aliunde would be sufficient to overcome it; and therefore it would be useless for a party
against whom it can be properly applied to adduce any such evidence, and accordingly
he is estopped or precluded by law from doing so. Such is the character of an estoppel
by matter of record, as in case of an issue on a question of fact, judicially tried and
decided." (Oberiano vs. Sobremesana, G. R. No. L-4622, May 30, 1952.)
We may mention in passing that the claim of appellant that the decision of this
Court above referred to suffers from contradiction or inconsistency is rather equivocal
for he mistook a restatement made therein of a portion of the argument of appellant as a
finding of fact made by the Court which is not the case. A more discerning appreciation
of the decision would bear this out. The truth of the matter is that the Court concluded
that the contract in dispute was valid as may be inferred from the portion of the decision
which we quote:
"The second or supplemental motion for a new trial, the denial of which is
the subject of the fourth assignment of error, added a new ground to the first
motion for new trial and assailed the validity of the contract of sale for supposed
lack of valuable consideration or because the consideration was 'false and illicit'.
Here is what we make out of the plaintiff's line of reasoning, which is none too
easy to understand:
"At the start and through the greater part of the Japanese occupation, the
Japanese war notes were at par with the Commonwealth currency and were so
understood and recognized both by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
'Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic.' By the contract in question the parties
reduced the rate of exchange between the two currencies from par to one to ten.
'This reduction is contrary to the law or public policy promulgated by the
Japanese Military authorities, or the Philippine Executive Commission.' Therefore
the consideration was false and illicit and the contract was void ab initio,
according to Articles 1255, 1275, 1276, and 1278 of the Civil Code.
"What the plaintiff would want the court to do as a result of the contract's
alleged nullity is not stated or made clear. However, that may be, the contract
 was not void. It was licit for the parties to agree that the vendor should pay the
purchaser only P2,000 instead of P20,000 as price of repurchase regardless of
the currency received by the vendor. In this case the plaintiff, who is a full-pledged
lawyer and appeared below in his own behalf and filed the brief in this instance,
drew the deed of sale himself, according to the lower court's finding, and the fixing
of the ratio of ten to one between the Japanese war notes and the Commonwealth
money must have been his own idea and certainly was for his own benefit. If the
devaluation of the Japanese money bothered the plaintiff's conscience, there was
no law to prevent him from redeeming the land for P20,000, or P15,000 which he
admitted having received." (Italics supplied)

With regard to the portion of the order which allows the withdrawal of the original
certificate of title in order that the Register of Deeds may effect the consolidation of
ownership and issuance of a new title in favor of appellee as requested, we do not also
find any justification for its reversal, as we are urged, it appearing that the decision in
the original case (Civil Case No. 466) has become final and executory and no further
step need be taken therein affecting the equities of the parties. The case is closed and
no reason is seen why the evidence that has been presented cannot be withdrawn.
Finding no merit in this appeal, we hereby affirm the order appealed from, with
costs against appellant.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

* 89 Phil., 497.