Brockman Hawe Final PDF
Brockman Hawe Final PDF
Brockman Hawe Final PDF
∗ Benjamin Brockman-Hawe graduated Boston University School of Law with Honors in the
Concentration of International Law in 2008. He currently works in the Hague at Trial Chamber II of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
1. Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Romulo, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888,
G.R. No. 17605 and G.R. No. 17622, (S.C. February 11, 2009),available at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/feb2009/175888.htm. (Phil.)
2. Evangeline De Vera, SC Rules Against Smith Transfer to Embassy but Status Quo Stays,
MALAYA NEWS, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.malaya.com.ph/feb12/news4.htm (explaining that Justice
Antonio Eduardo Nachura, solicitor general when the suit reached the Supreme Court, and the newly
appointed Justice Diosdado Peralta recused themselves).
3. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (finding the International Court of
Justice’s Avena decision was not directly enforceable federal law and the President’s memorandum
saying that state courts would give effect to the decision did not require states to reconsider and review
claims without regard to state procedural default rules). See generally Margaret E. McGuinness,
Medellín v. Texas: Supreme Court Holds ICJ Decisions under the Consular Convention Not Binding
Federal Law, Rejects Presidential Enforcement of ICJ Judgments over State Proceedings, ASIL
INSIGHTS, April 18, 2008, http://www.asil.org/insights080418.cfm (providing a general overview and
analysis of Medellín v. Texas).
4. See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, International Agreements and U.S. Law, ASIL INSIGHTS,
May 1997, http://www.asil.org/insigh10.cfm (providing a thorough discussion of the President’s
authority to conclude sole executive agreements before Medellín v. Texas)
351
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and the relationship between the two countries was characterized by slow transfer
of sovereignty from the latter to the former.5 Having achieved full independence
in 1946, the Republic of the Philippines became a treaty ally of the United States
under the1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).6 United States military personnel
were stationed on twenty-three sites in the Philippines until 1991, when the
Military Bases Agreement governing the bases expired and was not replaced.7
However, in response to a 1995 territorial dispute with China in the South China
Sea, President Ramos invited the U.S. to negotiate the new Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) with the Philippines.8 In 1998 consultations for the VFA
concluded, and the resulting document, in which both countries reaffirmed their
commitment to the MDT, entered into force on June 1, 1999.9
B. The Visiting Forces Agreement
The VFA has been ratified by the Phillipine Senate and, as an agreement
concluded solely by the U.S. President, was reported to the U.S. Congress in
compliance with the Case-Zablocki Act.10 The primary purpose of the VFA is to
establish rules governing the relationship between U.S. service members visiting
the Phillipines and Philippine law. Regarding criminal jurisdiction, Article V
establishes the sole jurisdiction of Filipino authorities over US personnel who
violate any Philippine laws, but U.S. military authorities have exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes against American property, security or personnel, and
retain the right to exercise sole jurisdiction over any personnel accused of
committing a crime during the performance of their official duties.11 The VFA
also establishes various procedural safeguards for U.S. service members detained,
taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, including the right to a
prompt and speedy trial, to be informed of the charges against them and to be
granted access to appropriate U.S. authorities.12
5. See TEODORO C. AGONCILLO & MILAGROS C. GUERRERO, HISTORY OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
241-497 (8th ed. 1990) (providing a general historical overview of the Filipino people).
6. Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the
Philippines, U.S.-Phil., Aug. 30, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3947.
7. DONALD E. WEATHERBEE, RALF EMMERS, MARI PANGESTU, & LEONARD C. SEBASTIAN,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY 84 (1st ed. 2005);
RENATO CONSTANTINO & LETIZIA R. CONSTANTINO, THE PHILIPPINES: THE CONTINUING PAST 205
(1978).
8. BERNARD D. COLE, THE GREAT WALL AT SEA: CHINA’S NAVY ENTERS THE TWENTY-FIRST
43 (2001).
9. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the United States of America Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the
Philippines, U.S.-Phil., Feb. 10, 1998,T.I.A.S. No. 12931 [hereinafter Visiting Forces Agreement],
available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/us/doc/vfa.html.
10. The Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. 112b (1972). See also Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon, Judgment
in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888, G.R. No. 17605 and G.R. No. 17622, para. 28.
11. Visiting Forces Agreement, supra note 9, at Arts. 5(1) - 5(3).
12. Id. at Art. V(9).
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13. Groups Vow to Continue Anti-VFA Campaign Despite Nicole’s Recantation, BULATLAT, Mar.
18, 2009, http://www.bulatlat.com/main/2009/03/18/groups-vow-to-continue-anti-vfa-campaign-
despite-nicole%e2%80%99s-recantation/.
14. Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888, G.R. No.
17605 and G.R. No. 17622 para 6.
15. Id. at para. 7.
16. Puno C.J., dissenting at para. 6 available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ jurisprudence/2009
/feb2009/ 175888_176051_176222_puno.htm.
17. Id. at para 7.
18. Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888, G.R. No.
17605 and G.R. No. 17622 at para. 8.
19. Id. at para 9.
20. Id. at para 11.
21. Id. at para. 13.
22. Id. at para. 20.
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for two reasons. First, as held by the Court in the prior case Bayan v. Zamora
nearly one decade ago,23 despite not having been submitted to the U.S. Senate for
advice and consent the VFA nevertheless imposes a binding legal obligation on the
United States. To that effect “[n]otice can be taken of the internationally known
practice of the United States . . . “ of concluding sole-executive agreements and
notifying Congress of such under the Case-Zablocki Act.24 Second, the Court
concluded that the purpose of the VFA was to implement the Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1951, which was approved after the advice and with the consent of the
U.S. Senate.25 The Court reasoned that, as an implementation agreement, only
notification of the VFA’s conclusion to the U.S. Congress under Case-Zablocki
Act was required for compliance with Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution.26
The Court also addressed the claim that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Medellín had altered the constitutionality of the VFA. In Medellín, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that, absent language within a treaty to the effect that it was
self-executing or Congressional legislation implementing the accord, international
agreements entered into by the United States could not be enforced as part of its
domestic law.27 Petitioners argued that because the VFA was part of the domestic
law of the Philippines, Medellín had rendered the VFA unequally binding on the
two Contracting States and violated Section 25.28
The majority rejected the argument, holding that the VFA was both self-
executing (since “the parties intend[ed] its provision to be enforceable, precisely
because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty”)29 and was subject to implementing legislation
(vis-à-vis notification to the U.S. Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act,
“inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive
agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be
immediately implemented.”).30 Moreover, although the Court had previously
recognized that the purpose of Section 25 was to ensure that a bilateral agreement
with the U.S. covering military matters was ‘equally binding’, the majority held
that absolute ‘alignment and parity’ regarding the enforceability of international
obligations was not required by the Constitution.31 Instead, formulaic mutual
acknowledgement of an agreement’s ‘treaty’ status could suffice.32 Noting that the
U.S. Supreme Court in Weinberger concluded that executive agreements are
23. Bayan v. Zamora, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 138570 , G.R. No. 138572, G.R.
No. 138587, G.R. No. 138680, and G.R. No. 138698, (S.C. October 10, 2000), available at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/oct2000/138570.htm.
24. Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888, G.R. No.
17605 and G.R. No. 17622 at para. 24.
25. Nicolas v. Romulo, at para. 42.
26. Id. at paras. 26-31. See Case-Zablocki Act of August 12, 1972, 1 U.S.C. §112B (2009).
27. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008).
28. Nicolas v. Romulo, at para. 39.
29. Id. at para. 42.
30. Id. at para. 43.
31. Id. at para. 48.
32. Id.
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‘treaties’ within the meaning of that word, the majority was satisfied that the
obligations imposed by Section 25 had been met.33
The opinion then briefly addressed the claims that the provision of the VFA
partially immunizing U.S. personnel from the jurisdiction of local courts violated
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which establishes the exclusive
authority of the Supreme Court in adopting rules of procedure for all courts in the
Philippines, and that the transfer of Smith to U.S. custody contravenes the
Constitution’s Article III, Section 1 equal protection guarantees.34 With respect to
both the Court noted that constitutional protections are not without limit, and that
in the present case general principles of international law, incorporated into the
Constitution at Article 2 Section 2, constituted “a substantial basis for a different
treatment of a member of a foreign military.”35 Because international law provides
that “the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply –
except to the extent agreed upon – to subjects of another State,”36 the Constitution
can accommodate Article V of the VFA and the transfer of Smith to U.S. custody.
Having acknowledged the constitutionality of the VFA, of its own volition the
majority weighed in on the legality of the Romulo-Kenney Agreements. Recalling
that Article V of the Agreement calls for “[t]he confinement or detention by
Philippine authorities [. . .]” the Court concluded that detention by U.S. authorities
was not in accord with the VFA.37 It was therefore ordered that the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs “negotiate with the United States representatives for [an]
appropriate agreement on detention facilities” consistent with Article V.38
III. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Chief Justice Puno and Associate Justice Carpio, joined by Associate Justices
Alicia Austria-Martinez and Conchita Carpio-Morales, drafted separate dissents in
which they strongly condemned the majority’s analysis of Medellín ‘s impact on
the VFA.39 Justice Carpio’s impassioned dissent begins by describing what is at
stake in Nicolas:
In short, the Philippine Constitution bars the efficacy of such a treaty
that is enforceable as domestic law only in the Philippines but
unenforceable as domestic law in the other contracting State. The
Philippines is a sovereign and independent State. It is no longer a colony
of the United States. This Court should not countenance an unequal
treaty that is not only contrary to the express mandate of the Philippine
wrongly decided and reflects the strict interpretation he would have applied to
Article XVIII Section 25,48 his dissatisfaction with the “asymmetry in the legal
treatment” the VFA embodied in 2000 and continues to perpetuate post-Medellín,49
and his belief that the VFA fulfilled neither requirement for domestic enforcement
imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court.50 His opinion is noteworthy for its specific
examination of Medellín’s impact on the U.S. President’s power to conclude
domestically enforceable sole-executive agreements. Justice Puno concluded that:
In fine, the U.S. President’s authority to enter into treaties that are
enforceable within its domestic sphere was severely limited by Medellín
In Medellín [. . .], the Supreme Court held that “the president’s
authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, must
stem from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”51
Upon comparison of the Presidential Memorandum at issue in Medellín and
the VFA, Justice Puno reasoned that:
[i]n sum, the non-self-executing character of the [VFA and MPT] not
only refutes the notion that the ratifying parties vest the President with
authority to unilaterally make treaty obligations binding on domestic
courts, but also prohibits him from doing so. The responsibility to
transform an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing
treaty into domestic law falls on Congress, not the Executive.52
IV. CONCLUSION
Several aspects of the majority and dissenting opinions are striking and
worthy of comment. First, it is surprising that the majority decided to sidestep the
issue of the domestic legal effects of a U.S. Presidential executive agreement and
declare that the Filipino Constitution requires equality but not parity in the
enforceability of international obligations in light of Medellín’s recognition of a
limited Presidential authority to conclude sole-executive agreements with domestic
legal effect. In his majority opinion in Medellín, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
Roberts acknowledged that the President has a “narrow and strictly limited
authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive
agreement.”53 This power is based on “a history of congressional acquiescence
[that] can be treated as a “gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President by §1
of Art. II.”54 Justice Puno ignores this language completely, and the majority in
Nicolas could have used it to distinguish Medellín on the grounds that the
Presidential Memorandum at issue in the U.S. case represented a unique attempt by
the Executive branch to convert an international obligation approved by the U.S.
Congress into domestically binding law absent congressional authorization to do
55. Id. at 1372, citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petioners, Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2005), (Nos. 05–51 and 04–10566), at 29–30 (noting that the
Presidential Memorandum at issue was described by the Executive Branch itself as an “unprecedented
action”).
56. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND RELATED ISSUES
CONCERNING THE PROSPECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ 28 &
n.89 (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34362_20080528.pdf (noting that “[t]he only
SOFA agreement to which the United States is a party that was concluded as a treaty is the North
Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA), 4 U.S.T. 1792, entered into force August
23, 1953.”).
57. Medellín , 128 S. Ct. at 1370.
58. Visiting Forces Agreement, supra note 9, at art. V(6).
59. See e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Treaties and the Separation of Powers in the United States: A
Reassessment after Medellín v. Texas, 47 DUQUESNE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319818, (“What it does take for a
treaty provision to be self-executing is now less clear than prior to the Medellín decision, with some of
the language of the majority opinion squarely requiring explicit language of self-implementation in a
treaty, and other language providing a contrary statement that a treaty provision may be self-executing
without specific statement to that effect.”). See also Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law in the
American Courts – The United States Supreme Court Declines to Enforce the I.C.J.’s Avena Judgment
Relating to a U.S. Obligation under the Convention on Consular Relations, 9 GERMAN L. J. 619, 623-
629 (2008) available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/print.php?id=958; Luke A. McLaurin,
Medellín v. Texas and the Doctrine of Non-Self-Executing Treaties 20 MICH. INT’L LAW. 1, 4 (2008).
60. Incidentally, this means that Chief Justice Puno’s analysis of Medellín is also incorrect
inasmuch as he asserts that the “[U.S. Supreme] Court adopted a textual approach in determining
whether the relevant treaty sources are self-executory.” In fact, “[t]he Medellín opinion states in several
places that courts should look to the intentions of the U.S. treaty-makers to determine whether a treaty
is self-executing.” Ingrid Weurth, Medellín : The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1,
14 (2009) citing inter alia Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1366 (“Our cases simply require courts to decide
whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that
confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.”); Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1366 (“Nothing . . . suggests
that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international
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fail to examine either element, but it (along with Justice’s Puno and Carpio)
ignored language in Medellín that would have abrogated its need to do so; the U.S.
Supreme Court at one point suggests that, with respect to sole-executive
agreements that self-execution may not be relevant in terms of determining the
domestic effect of an agreement, since there was leeway for the Supreme Court to
find that “congressional acquiescence [alone] could support the President’s
asserted authority to create domestic law pursuant to a non-self executing treaty.”
61
Till now, scholars have discussed Medellín in terms of its implications for the
development of domestic treaty law while paying comparatively little attention to
its practical effects on U.S. relations with its allies. Nicolas is the first challenge to
a bilateral agreement with the U.S. brought under Medellín and heard by a foreign
court, and though the arrangement at issue emerged intact this time, the serious
shortcomings of the majority and dissenting opinions hint at a future of sole-
executive agreements with dubious enforceability abroad, even when those
agreements can reasonably be construed as consistent with Medellín. As a potent
reminder that the effects of Medellín on U.S. relations have only just begun to
manifest, Nicolas has already incited Executive action,62 and may finally inspire
Congressional action clarifying the domestic obligations of the U.S. vis-à-vis its
international obligations as embodied in thousands of bilateral agreements as well.
tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by ‘many of our most fundamental constitutional
protections.’” id. at 1367 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006)); id. at 1358
(“Article 94 . . . [does not] indicate that the Senate that ratified the U.N. charter intended to vest ICJ
decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts.”); id. at 1358 (“the Executive Branch has
unfailingly adhered to its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal
law.”). Id. at 1351. See also McLaurin, supra note 59, at 4.
61. Medellín , 128 S. Ct. at 1372.
62. On March 13, 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama called Filipino President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to reaffirm his commitment to the VFA. Obama calls Arroyo on VFA, PHILLIPINE DAILY
ENQUIRER, March 15, 2008, available at http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?sec=1&id=4530.