No.

L-18008. October 30, 1962.

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

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358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Laperal vs. Republic

Change of Name; Legal separation alone not ground for wife’s change of name; Mandatory language
of Article 372, New Civil Code.—A woman’s married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation,
there being no severance of the  vinculum,  and under Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she must
continue using the name and surname employed by her before the separation.

Same; Applicability of Rule 103, Rules of Court; Doubtful.—It is doubtful whether Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of
Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regard to married women legally separated from their husbands.
Even, however, applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone is not sufficient ground to justify a
change of name, because to hold otherwise, would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provisions of said Article 372.

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City. De Veyra, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Martin B. Laurea & Associates for petitioner.
     Solicitor General for oppositor.

BARRERA, J.:

On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp. Proc. No.
433) a petition which reads:

“1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three
years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;
“2. That petitioner’s maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she
married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this
Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled
‘Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria’, Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given
a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final;
“3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her
maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from
Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now;
“4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable
that

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VOL. 6, OCTOBER 30, 1962 359

Laperal vs. Republic
she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit:
ELISEA LAPERAL.
“WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be
allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.”

The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates
the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court.
In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article
372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her
husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation.
Upon petitioner’s motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name,
reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who
is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her
married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.
The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
“ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife  shall continue  using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation”. (Italics supplied)

Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal
separation has been decreed shall continue using her name and surname employed before the
legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there
being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should
continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of her name
from Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal,
her maiden name, giving as reason or
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Laperal vs. Republic

cause therefor her being legally separated from the husband Enrique R. Santamaria, and the
fact that they have ceased to live together for many years.
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure
prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from
the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the
change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in
fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103
which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article
372 of the New Civil Code with regard to married women legally separated from their
husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone—
which is the only basis for the petition at bar—is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to
justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an
easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of the said Article 372-
It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as
petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued use of her husband’s surname may
cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This
finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the
petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly,
with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958 the conjugal partnership between
petitioner and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2],
Civil Code). Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is
hereby set aside and the petition dismissed. Without costs. So ordered.

          Bengzon, C.J.,  Padilla,  Bautista Angelo,  Labrador,Concepcion,  Reyes,

J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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VOL. 6, OCTOBER 30, 1962 361

Naira vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission

Order set aside; petition dismissed.

Note.—For a discussion on marriage and divorce, see annotation in 17 SCRA 686-688.

On change of name, see  Manuel v. Republic,  1 SCRA 836;  Ng Yao Siong v. Republic,  16
SCRA 483 and the annotations on “Change of Name”, 1 SCRA 839-844 and “Other Rulings in
Change of Names,” 16 SCRA 489-490.