Unified Facilities Criteria (Ufc), Design To Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects

UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Change 1, 1 February 2017
UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)
DESIGN TO RESIST DIRECT FIRE

WEAPONS EFFECTS
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
DESIGN TO RESIST DIRECT FIRE

WEAPONS EFFECTS
Any copyrighted material included in this UFC is identified at its point of use.
Use of the copyrighted material apart from this UFC must have the permission of the
copyright holder.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND (Preparing Activity)
AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT AGENCY
Record of Changes (changes are indicated by \1\ ... /1/)
Change No. Date Location

1 1 February Reformatted to Word Template. Modified paragraphs 1-
2017 4,1-5,1-6,1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 2-2.1, 4-4, 5-3.3.1,5-3.3.2, 5-
4.4.1, B-2. New Fig 1-1. Updated Fig 4-1. Moved
Appendix A to Appendix C
This UFC supersedes UFC 4-023-07, dated Jul 2008.

UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
FOREWORD
The Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) system is prescribed by MIL-STD 3007 and provides
planning, design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization criteria, and applies
to the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities in accordance
with USD (AT&L) Memorandum dated 29 May 2002. UFC will be used for all DoD projects and
work for other customers where appropriate. All construction outside of the United States is
also governed by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Host Nation Funded Construction
Agreements (HNFA), and in some instances, Bilateral Infrastructure Agreements (BIA.)
Therefore, the acquisition team must ensure compliance with the most stringent of the UFC, the
SOFA, the HNFA, and the BIA, as applicable.
UFC are living documents and will be periodically reviewed, updated, and made available to
users as part of the Services’ responsibility for providing technical criteria for military
construction. Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE), Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC), and Air Force \ Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) \ are
responsible for administration of the UFC system. Defense agencies should contact the
preparing service for document interpretation and improvements. Technical content of UFC is
the responsibility of the cognizant DoD working group. Recommended changes with supporting
rationale should be sent to the respective service proponent office by the following electronic
form: Criteria Change Request. The form is also accessible from the Internet sites listed below.
UFC are effective upon issuance and are distributed only in electronic media from the following
source:
• Whole Building Design Guide web site http://dod.wbdg.org/.
\ Refer to UFC 1-200-01, General Building Requirements, for implementation of new issuances
on projects. \
AUTHORIZED BY:
______________________________________ ______________________________________
JAMES C. DALTON, P.E. STEVEN R. ISELIN, P.E.
Chief, Engineering and Construction Chief Engineer
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Naval Facilities Engineering Command
______________________________________ ______________________________________
PAUL A. PARKER Dr. GET W. MOY, P.E.
The Deputy Civil Engineer Director, Installations Requirements and
DCS/Installations & Logistics Management
Department of the Air Force Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment)
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
REVISIONSUMMARY SHEET
Document: UFC 4-023-07, Design to Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects, Change 1
Superseding: UFC 4-023-07, Design to Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects
Description: This change updated the document’s format, incorporated multiple

Criteria Change Requests and updated references.
Reasons for Document:

This UFC presents unified engineering guidance for designing facilities to protect assets
within them from the effects of direct fire weapons, which include small arms and
shoulder fired antitank weapons for the purposes of this UFC. It includes guidance to
be applied to new construction and to apply in developing retrofits to existing buildings.
This UFC is one in a series of security engineering Unified Facilities Criteria that
address minimum standards, planning, preliminary design, and detailed design for
security and antiterrorism. The manuals in this series are designed to be used
sequentially by a diverse audience to facilitate development of projects throughout the
design cycle. The manuals in the security engineering series include the following:
• UFC 4-010-01: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings
• UFC 4-020-01: DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual
• UFC 4-020-02: DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual
• Security Engineering Support Manuals
This UFC is one of the security engineering support manuals, and as such is intended
to be used to refine preliminary designs developed using UFC 4-020-02.
Impact:
The following will result from publication of this UFC:
• The approach to designing to resist direct fire weapons effects will be
standardized among the Services.
• Use of this manual will not result in any adverse impacts on environmental,
sustainability, or constructability policies or practices.
Unification Issues
No unification issues.
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1
1-1 INTRODUCTION. ...................................................................................... 1
1-2 PURPOSE. ................................................................................................ 1
1-3 SCOPE. ..................................................................................................... 1
1-4 APPLICABILITY. ....................................................................................... 2
1-5 VULNERABILITY AND RISK ASSESSMENT. ......................................... 2
1-6 GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS. ................................................ 2
1-7 REFERENCES. ......................................................................................... 2
1-8 GLOSSARY. .............................................................................................. 2
1-9 SECURITY ENGINEERING UFC SERIES. ............................................... 2
1-9.1 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings. ............................ 3
1-9.2 Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual. .................................. 3
1-9.3 DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual. ............................. 3
1-9.4 Security Engineering Support Manuals. ................................................. 3
1-9.5 Security Engineering UFC Application. .................................................. 4
CHAPTER 2 DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS PROPERTIES ................................................. 7
2-1 INTRODUCTION. ...................................................................................... 7
2-2 THREAT LEVELS. .................................................................................... 7
2-2.1 Threat Severity. ..................................................................................... 7
2-3 BALLISTIC THREATS. ............................................................................. 8
2-3.1 U.S Standards. ...................................................................................... 8
2-3.2 Non-U.S. Standards. .............................................................................. 8
2-4 ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS. ............................................. 8
2-4.1 Projectile. ............................................................................................... 8
2-4.2 Warhead. ............................................................................................... 9
2-4.3 Older Warheads................................................................................... 10
CHAPTER 3 DESIGN APPROACH .............................................................................. 11
3-1 INTRODUCTION. .................................................................................... 11
3-2 DESIGN STRATEGIES. .......................................................................... 11
3-2.1 General Design Strategy...................................................................... 11
3-2.2 Specific Design Strategies. .................................................................. 11
3-3 THE PROTECTIVE SYSTEM. ................................................................. 12
i
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
3-3.1 Sitework Elements. .............................................................................. 12
3-3.2 Building Elements. ............................................................................... 12
3-3.3 Building Support Systems. ................................................................... 12
3-3.4 Equipment............................................................................................ 12
3-3.5 Manpower and Procedures. ................................................................. 13
CHAPTER 4 SITE WORK ELEMENTS ........................................................................ 15
4-1 INTRODUCTION. .................................................................................... 15
4-2 FACILITY LOCATION. ............................................................................ 15
4-2.1 Locating Away from Vantage Points. ................................................... 15
4-2.2 Locating on High Points of Land. ......................................................... 15
4-2.3 Locating Near Existing Landforms. ...................................................... 16
4-2.4 Locating Near Other Buildings. ............................................................ 16
4-3 COUNTERMEASURES FOR VERY LOW LEVEL OF PROTECTION. .. 16
4-4 COUNTERMEASURES FOR LOW LEVEL OF PROTECTION. ............. 16
4-4.1 Planting and the Unobstructed Space. ................................................ 16
4-4.2 Hedges. ............................................................................................... 17
4-4.3 Trees for Screening. ............................................................................ 18
4-4.4 Fences and Walls. ............................................................................... 19
4-4.5 Using Landforms to Increase the Height. ............................................. 20
4-4.6 Berms and Landforms. ........................................................................ 21
4-5 COUNTERMEASURES FOR MEDIUM LEVEL OF PROTECTION. ....... 21
4-5.1 Energy Absorption Screen. .................................................................. 21
4-5.2 Predetonation Screen. ......................................................................... 21
4-6 COUNTERMEASURES FOR HIGH LEVEL OF PROTECTION. ............ 24
CHAPTER 5 BUILDING ELEMENTS ........................................................................... 25
5-1 INTRODUCTION. .................................................................................... 25
5-2 BUILDING LAYOUT. ............................................................................... 25
5-2.1 Very Low Level of Protection. .............................................................. 25
5-2.2 Low level of protection. ........................................................................ 25
5-2.3 Medium Level of Protection. ................................................................ 26
5-2.4 High Level of Protection. ...................................................................... 26
5-3 WALLS. ................................................................................................... 27
ii
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
5-3.2 Low Level of Protection........................................................................ 27
5-4 WINDOWS............................................................................................... 41
5-5 DOORS.................................................................................................... 44
5-6 VENT COVERS AND GRILLES. ............................................................. 48
5-7 ROOFS. ................................................................................................... 50
APPENDIX A REFERENCES ....................................................................................... 53
APPENDIX B GLOSSARY ........................................................................................... 55
B-1 ACRONYMS ............................................................................................ 55
B-2 DEFINITION OF TERMS: ........................................................................ 57
APPENDIX C BALLISTIC STANDARDS ..................................................................... 61
C-1 BALLISTIC STNADARDS....................................................................... 61
C-2 UL LEVELS ............................................................................................. 66
iii
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
FIGURES
Figure 1-1 Security Engineering UFC Application ........................................................... 5
Figure 2-1. Representative Anti-tank Round Cross-Section ........................................... 9
Figure 2-2. Shaped Charge Penetration......................................................................... 9
Figure 2-3. Shaped Charge Penetration of Masonry .................................................... 10
Figure 4-1. Trees and the Unobstructed Space ........................................................... 18
Figure 4-2. Overlapping Trees for Obscuration ............................................................ 19
Figure 4-3. Failed Chain Link Fence with Obscuration Material Added ........................ 20
Figure 4-4. Tree Line Elevated on Berm ...................................................................... 20
Figure 4-5. Predetonation Screen ................................................................................ 22
Figure 4-6. Predetonation Screen Location .................................................................. 23
Figure 5-1. Sacrificial Area Layout ............................................................................... 26
Figure 5-2. Anti-tank Weapon Wall Retrofit Using Sand............................................... 30
Figure 5-3. Anti-Tank Weapon Retrofit Using Sand and Spall Plate ............................ 30
Figure 5-4. Narrow Obliquely Recessed Windows ....................................................... 42
Figure 5-6. Entrance Layout to Limit Sight Lines.......................................................... 45
Figure 5-7. Door Shielding ........................................................................................... 46
Figure 5-8. Hardened Foyer Configuration ................................................................... 47
Figure 5-9. Bullet Resistant Fiberglass Door Core ....................................................... 48
Figure 5-10. Raised Parapets ...................................................................................... 51
TABLES
Table 2-1 Threat Parameters................................................................................... 7

Table 5-1 Wall Construction with Energy Absorption Screen 1 .............................. 28
Table 5-2 Wall Construction with Anti-Tank Round Predetonation Screens .......... 29
Table 5-3 Ballistics Resistant Construction ........................................................... 32
Table 5-4 Anti-Tank Weapon Resistant Construction ............................................ 32
Table 5-5 Wood Properties .................................................................................... 34
Table 5-6 Material Multiplication Factors for Antitank Weapon Resistance ........... 40
iv
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1-1 INTRODUCTION.
Attacks against facilities and other assets using direct fire weapons have always been a
threat to U.S. Government operations. A direct fire attack requires an unobstructed line-
of-sight to the asset being attacked within the effective range of the weapon being used.
Aggressors often fire these weapons from vantage points outside the controlled
perimeter of an installation or facility, which makes these threats difficult to prevent or to
detect before they occur. The aggressors’ goals are to damage the facility, to injure or
kill its occupants, or to damage or destroy assets.
1-2 PURPOSE.
The purpose of this UFC is to present engineering guidelines and cost effective
solutions for protecting assets within fixed facilities against direct fire (antitank weapons
and small arms) attacks. Those solutions will vary according to the applicable level of
protection, which must be provided to designers as part of the design criteria. This UFC
is intended to be used to refine preliminary countermeasures designs and protective
strategies developed using UFC 4-020-02.
1-3 SCOPE.
This document provides guidance for design of new buildings and for retrofits of existing
buildings against the effects of direct fire weapons. Direct fire weapons, for the
purposes of this UFC, are limited to small arms and shoulder fired antitank weapons.
Small arms include ballistic weapons such as pistols, rifles, shotguns, and submachine
guns up to 12.7 mm (0.50 caliber). Anti-tank weapons are limited to shoulder fired
rockets such as the Russian RPG-7, RPG-18, and RPG-22 and the U.S. M-72 Light
Antitank Weapon (LAW). For guidance on protecting against weapons outside of this
scope, refer to UFC 3-340-01.
The ballistic weapons in this UFC are described in terms of ballistic standards
developed by Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) for testing the resistance of building
elements or assemblies to the ballistics effects. Those standards indicate the weapon to
be used in the test, the ammunition, the muzzle velocity, the number of rounds to be
fired, and the acceptance criteria for the targets. Coverage of the ballistic threat in this
UFC includes the penetration mechanics of the ammunition, threat mitigation measures,
and the use of ballistic resistant materials that prevent penetration. Countermeasures
vary with level of protection and include blocking sight lines to facilities or assets, facility
siting strategies, obscuration techniques, and facility hardening to resist the weapons
effects. While there are more effective anti-tank weapons and missiles than those listed
above, only weapons of the class described above will be considered in this UFC due to
their wide availability and their frequent use. In addition, constructing conventional
buildings to resist more effective weapons is impractical. The countermeasures
described in this document are based on protecting against single hits, not volleys,
since protecting against multiple hits is also impractical and since the accuracy of these
weapons is such that firing two rounds through the same hole is difficult. Protection
1
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
against multiple stage and delayed fuse warheads is also not addressed in this UFC.
Strategies to mitigate the effects of these antitank weapons include obscuring assets
from lines-of-sight and hardening building components for either pre-detonated rounds
or direct hits depending on the level of protection. \1\
1-4 APPLICABILITY.
This document provides design criteria for DoD components and participating
organizations. This document applies to all construction, renovation, and repair projects
requiring mitigation for direct fire weapons effects.
1-5 VULNERABILITY AND RISK ASSESSMENT.
A vulnerability and risk assessment must be conducted prior to beginning any security
project. Upon identifying facility or asset vulnerabilities to threats, protection measures
such as mitigation for direct fire weapons effects may be deployed to reduce
vulnerabilities. In summary, this document assumes the pre-design phases, including
the risk analysis, are complete prior to beginning design. For information on Security
Engineering Planning and Design process, refer to UFC 4-020-01 and UFC 4-020-02
(described in the section “Security Engineering UFC Series” in this chapter). The
engineering risk analysis conducted as part of UFC 4-020-01 should be consistent with
the terrorism risk analysis conducted by the installation security/antiterrorism (AT) staff.
1-6 GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS.
Comply with UFC 1-200-01, General Building Requirements. UFC 1-200-01 provides
applicability of model building codes and government unique criteria for typical design
disciplines and building systems, as well as for accessibility, antiterrorism, security, high
performance and sustainability requirements, and safety. Use this UFC in addition to
UFC 1-200-01 and the UFCs and government criteria referenced therein.
1-7 REFERENCES.
Appendix A contains a list of references used in this document. The publication date of
the code or standard is not included in this document. In general, the latest available
issuance of the reference is used.
1-8 GLOSSARY.
Appendix C contains acronyms, abbreviations, and terms.
1-9 SECURITY ENGINEERING UFC SERIES.
This UFC is one of a series of security engineering unified facilities criteria documents
that cover minimum standards, planning, preliminary design, and detailed design for
security and antiterrorism. The manuals in this series are designed to be used
sequentially by a diverse audience to facilitate development of projects throughout the
design cycle. The manuals in this series include the following:
2
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
1-9.1 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings.
This UFC 4-010-01 and 4-010-02 establish standards that provide minimum levels of
protection against terrorist attacks for the occupants of all DoD inhabited buildings.
These UFCs are intended to be used by security and antiterrorism personnel and
design teams to identify the minimum requirements that must be incorporated into the
design of all new construction and major renovations of inhabited DoD buildings. They
also include recommendations that should be, but are not required to be incorporated
into all such buildings.
1-9.2 Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual.
UFC 4-020-01 presents processes for developing the design criteria necessary to
incorporate security and antiterrorism into DoD facilities and for identifying the cost
implications of applying those design criteria. Those design criteria may be limited to
the requirements of the minimum standards, or they may include protection of assets
other than those addressed in the minimum standards (people), aggressor tactics that
are not addressed in the minimum standards or levels of protection beyond those
required by the minimum standards. The cost implications for security and antiterrorism
are addressed as cost increases over conventional construction for common
construction types. The changes in construction represented by those cost increases
are tabulated for reference, but they represent only representative construction that will
meet the requirements of the design criteria. The manual also addresses the tradeoffs
between cost and risk. The Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual is intended
to be used by planners as well as security and antiterrorism personnel with support from
planning team members.
1-9.3 DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual.
UFC 4-020-02 provides interdisciplinary design guidance for developing preliminary

systems of protective measures to implement the design criteria established using UFC
4-020-01. Those protective measures include building and site elements, equipment,
and the supporting manpower and procedures necessary to make them all work as a
system. The information in UFC 4-020-02 is in sufficient detail to support concept level
project development, and as such can provide a good basis for a more detailed design.
The manual also provides a process for assessing the impact of protective measures on
risk. The primary audience for the Security Engineering Design Manual is the design
team, but it can also be used by security and antiterrorism personnel.
1-9.4 Security Engineering Support Manuals.
In addition to the standards, planning, and design UFCs mentioned above, there is a
series of additional UFCs that provide detailed design guidance for developing final
designs based on the preliminary designs developed using UFC 4-020-02. These
support manuals provide specialized, discipline specific design guidance. Some
address specific tactics such as direct fire weapons, forced entry, or airborne
contamination. Others address limited aspects of design such as resistance to
progressive collapse or design of portions of buildings such as mail rooms. Still others
3
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
address details of designs for specific protective measures such as vehicle barriers or
fences. The Security Engineering Support Manuals are intended to be used by the
design team during the development of final design packages.
1-9.5 Security Engineering UFC Application.
The application of the security engineering series of UFCs is illustrated in Figure 1-1.
UFC 4-020-01 is intended to be the starting point for any project that is likely to have
security or antiterrorism requirements. By beginning with UFC 4-020-01, the design
criteria will be developed that establishes which of the other UFCs in the series will
need to be applied. The design criteria may indicate that only the minimum standards
need to be incorporated, or it may include additional requirements, resulting in the need
for application of additional UFCs. Even if only the minimum standards are required
other UFCs may need to be applied if sufficient standoff distances are unavailable.
Applying this series of UFCs in the manner illustrated in Figure 1-3 will result in the most
efficient use of resources for protecting assets against security and antiterrorism related
threats.
4
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 1-1 Security Engineering UFC Application
/1/
5
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
6
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
CHAPTER 2 DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS PROPERTIES
2-1 INTRODUCTION.
Direct fire weapons threats involve weapons that require an unobstructed line-of-¬sight
from the weapon to a target, for the shooter to acquire a target, and for the projectile to
arrive at a target. Direct fire threat weapons include both ballistic and rocket propelled
munitions. In a ballistic threat, the aggressor fires small arms such as pistols,
submachine guns, shotguns, or rifles. Anti-tank (AT) weapons are military weapons or
similar improvised weapons originally designed to penetrate the armor on armored
vehicles. They can also be fired at facilities, which are the focus of this UFC.
2-2 THREAT LEVELS.

Table 2-1 shows the four threat severity levels associated with the direct fire weapons
tactic in UFC 4-020-01. These threats provide representative weapons and munitions to
the variety of direct fire weapons that can be expected to be used against people and
facilities in criminal and terrorist attacks. There are more severe threats, but they are
considered at this time to be less likely to be used by criminals and terrorists. The
effective ranges of the weapons at which aggressors could be expected to accurately
target person sized targets are entered for use in identifying relevant vantage points as
described in Chapter 4.
2-2.1 Threat Severity.

Of the ballistic threats in Table 2-1, the weapon associated with the low threat severity
level is a handgun. The weapons for \1\ medium, high and very high threat severity
levels include rifles /1/. Rounds include ball type and armor piercing ammunition. Refer
to \1\ Appendix C /1/ for specific rounds.
The anti-tank weapon \1\ is associated with very high threat severity /1/ and
representative of a range of shoulder fired rocket propelled projectile weapons including
the United States M-72 and the Russian RPG-7, RPG-18, and RPG-22.
Table 2-1 Threat Parameters
Design Basis Weapons / Standards Effective Range

Threat
Very High Anti-tank weapons AT Weapon: 300 meters
ANSI/UL 752 Level 10
(12.7 mm / .50 caliber) .50 Caliber: 2000 meters
High ANSI/UL 752 Level 9 800 meters
(.30 caliber Armor Piercing)
Medium ANSI/UL 752 Level 5 1000 meters
(7.62 mm / .30 caliber)
Low ANSI/UL 752 Level 3 100 meters
(.44 caliber Magnum)
7
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
2-3 BALLISTIC THREATS.
Ballistic threats are described in terms of ballistic standards developed for testing the
resistance of building components to ballistic threats. These standards provide criteria
to evaluate the performance of materials or systems. Test standards specify caliber,
weight, projectile composition, muzzle velocity of the round, number of impacts, and
spacing of impacts. They also define what constitutes failure of the building component.
2-3.1 U.S Standards.
There are several recognized ballistic standards in the United States and other
countries. There are many similarities among the standards, but their differences make
them so they are not interchangeable. The most common commercial standards in the
United States are American National Standards Institute (ANSI) / Underwriters
Laboratories (UL) 752 and National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 0108.01. Additionally, there
is the ASTM International F 1233 standard, although it is limited to security glazing
materials and systems. The three standards are mostly based on the same weapons
and rounds. The ballistic threats referenced in this UFC are from the ANSI/UL 752.
Two additional U.S. standards are by the U.S. Department of State and H.P. White
Laboratories. Those standards are not widely used commercially. \1\ Appendix C /1/
lists all of the major national and international standards and their most common
parameters. For a more detailed listing of the parameters of the standards in Table 2-
1, refer to Table X1.1 in ASTM F 1233.
2-3.2 Non-U.S. Standards.
There are several standards available from other countries. They include Australian,
British, European, and German standards. All are summarized in \1\ Appendix C /1/
and are covered in more detail in Table X1.1 in ASTM F 1233.
2-4 ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS.
The anti-tank weapon threats addressed in this document are shoulder-fired weapons
consisting of two components, the launcher and projectile. The projectile consists of an
explosive warhead affixed to a solid fuel rocket motor. There are several types of
warheads used in these weapons, but this document only addresses the armor
penetrating warheads. They are the most common and represent the greatest challenge
in designing countermeasures to mitigate this threat. This document also will not
address multiple stage or delayed fuse warheads that are available for these weapons
due to their limited availability. While the details of the specific projectiles and weapons
differ, they all have similar operating mechanisms, which are summarized below.
2-4.1 Projectile.
The projectile (rocket motor and warhead) is fired from a light hand-held, shoulder fired
launcher. When fired, the projectile leaves the launch tube and is propelled to the target
by the rocket motor. When the projectile impacts the target, a fuse sends a signal to the
detonator, which detonates the warhead.
8
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
2-4.2 Warhead.
The warhead incorporates a conical metal shaped charge (often copper lined) with high
explosive packed behind it. See figure 2-1. On detonation, the material of the inner
lining of the cone of the shaped charge collapses and forms a molten metallic “slug”.
The explosive gasses and the molten metallic slug together form a high velocity jet (on
the order of 10,000 meters per second or 33,000 feet per second). As the gas and
molten metallic jet begin to penetrate a target material, the pressure exerted by the jet
tip pushes the material away in all directions, eventually driving through the target
material. In addition, the force of the penetration of the jet causes the inside face of the
target to fracture, and it is propelled into the protected space at high velocity. That
effect is called “spall.” The penetration effect of a conical shaped charge is illustrated in
Figure 2-2. The kinetic energy of the warhead will allow it to penetrate 24 to 32 inches
of reinforced concrete, depending on the weapon. Note that anti-tank weapons are
designed to “poke” holes in armor, and they have similar narrowly focused effects on
buildings as shown in Figure 2-3. Once the jet passes through a wall, it maintains its
narrowly focused effects
Figure 2-1. Representative Anti-tank Round Cross-Section
Figure 2-2. Shaped Charge Penetration
9
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 2-3. Shaped Charge Penetration of Masonry
2-4.3 Older Warheads.
Some older warheads for some of the commonly available shoulder fired anti-tank
weapons had design configurations in which the wires extending from the fuses to the
detonators could be severed when the warheads were forced through a wire mesh or a
chain-link fence. That resulted in the warhead being rendered inert, which is often
called “dudding.” Because there are available warheads that do not have that design
vulnerability and because the process described above is not very reliable, the whole
issue of dudding anti-tank rounds will not be addressed in this UFC.
10
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
CHAPTER 3 DESIGN APPROACH
3-1 INTRODUCTION.
This chapter describes the approach to developing systems of countermeasures to

mitigate the effects of direct fire weapons attacks.
3-2 DESIGN STRATEGIES.
In approaching solutions to any security engineering related threat, there are two
applicable strategies, the general design strategy and the specific design strategy. The
general design strategy is the basic approach to developing a protective system to
mitigate the effects a given tactic. It governs the general application of construction,
building support systems, equipment, manpower, and procedures. The specific design
strategy governs how the general design strategy is applied for different levels of
protection. The specific design strategies address the different performances required
by the levels of protection. The general design strategy and the specific design
strategies for direct fire weapons will be described below.
3-2.1 General Design Strategy.
The general design strategy involves identifying vantage points from which direct fire
weapons can be launched and, depending on the level of protection, either blocking
sight lines to assets and building occupants or hardening the building elements to resist
the direct fire weapons effects.
3-2.2 Specific Design Strategies.
Because this tactic includes both small arms and antitank weapons, and because the
effects of those weapons vary significantly, the specific design strategies will not apply
equally to all threat severity levels. Specifically, the medium level of protection applies
only to the high threat severity level, which includes antitank weapons and high caliber
small arms (12.7 mm or .50 caliber). When the medium level of protection applies for
lower threat severity levels, use the design strategy for high level of protection.
3-2.2.1 Very Low Level of Protection.

The very low level of protection is limited to incorporating the standards of UFC 4-010-
01, the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings. Those requirements will
be described in this UFC, but detailed coverage will be left to UFC 4-010-01.
3-2.2.2 Low Level of Protection.

For all threat severity levels (involving both small arms and antitank weapons), the
design strategy for this level of protection is to block sight lines to building occupants or
assets. The assumption behind that strategy is that aggressors will not shoot at what
they cannot see. Blocking sight lines may be accomplished by applying both building
and sitework elements.
11
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
3-2.2.3 Medium Level of Protection.
The medium level of protection may be applied to all threat severity levels, but is only
practical in the case of large caliber small arms (12.5 mm or .50 caliber) and antitank
weapons. It includes the installation of predetonation screens that detonate antitank
rounds at a specific distance from a target and/or energy absorption screens that
reduce the energy of the small arms rounds before they impact the target. In both
cases, the combination of screen material, standoff distance, and building element
construction will prevent the small arms and antitank rounds from breaching the building
envelope.
3-2.2.4 High Level of Protection.

For all threat severity levels (involving both small arms and antitank weapons), the
design strategy for this level of protection is to harden building elements such that they
resist the direct effects of the threat weapon.
3-3 THE PROTECTIVE SYSTEM.
The system of countermeasures that is provided to mitigate the effects of any tactic is
referred to as the protective system. Develop the countermeasures that are parts of
that system based on the general and specific design strategies associated with levels
of protection and then evaluate them to ensure they are integrated so they act as part of
a system. Countermeasures are divided into five major categories. Those categories
are explained below.
3-3.1 Sitework Elements.
These include all countermeasures that are associated with areas surrounding buildings
beyond 1.5 m (5 ft) from the building. They are addressed in Chapter 4.
3-3.2 Building Elements.
These include all countermeasures directly associated with buildings such as walls,
doors, windows, roofs, and building layout. They are addressed in Chapter 5.
3-3.3 Building Support Systems.
Building support systems are systems such as utilities and heating, ventilating, and air
conditioning (HVAC) systems. There are no significant issues relating to such systems
in relation to mitigating the effects of direct fire weapons tactics, so they will not be
addressed in this UFC.
3-3.4 Equipment.
Equipment as a category of countermeasures includes such things as electronic

security systems and explosives detection equipment. Because there are no
opportunities to detect direct fire weapons attacks and because they can be launched
12
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
from a distance, equipment is not considered in protective system development for this
tactic and will not be addressed in this UFC.
3-3.5 Manpower and Procedures.
Because there are no opportunities to detect direct fire weapons attacks prior to shots
being fired and because they can be launched from a distance, manpower and
procedures are only issues associated with response to attacks; therefore, they do not
have facility implications, and they will not be addressed in this UFC. Similarly,
activities such as patrolling areas from which attacks could be launched to deter or
prevent attacks are also not addressed in this UFC.
13
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
14
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
CHAPTER 4 SITE WORK ELEMENTS
4-1 INTRODUCTION.
Sitework elements commonly play a limited role in mitigating direct fire weapons
attacks, including both ballistics and anti-tank weapons. The primary reason for that
limited role is that it is generally less expensive to build protection into buildings than to
shield buildings using sitework elements. That may not be the case, however, for some
existing buildings of lightweight construction, where there are limited areas of buildings
that require protection, or where assets are not located in buildings. Sitework elements
are used either to obscure assets from lines-of-sight to assets or to shield assets from
direct fire weapons. How they are used with respect to those two functions varies by
level of protection, and they are therefore addressed in the contexts of the applicable
specific design strategies. In addition, there are sitework related issues that drive site
selection and facility location, which are covered separately.
4-2 FACILITY LOCATION.
Before determining the location of new facilities, site planners should evaluate the site
to identify vantage points from which aggressors could launch direct fire attacks. Look
for vantage points that will permit an unobstructed line-of-sight to the facility or to areas
within the facility where assets that are potential targets may be located. Consider the
following in site planning to avoid such vantage points:
4-2.1 Locating Away from Vantage Points.
Locate buildings in areas of installations that are beyond the maximum range of the
applicable weapons from identified vantage points where possible. Those vantage
points may be either inside or outside the perimeter of the installation. An example
would be tall buildings outside the secured perimeter from which an aggressor could
establish a direct line-of-sight to facilities within the secured perimeter. That leads to the
general recommendation to locate buildings that require protection closer to the interiors
of installations. The DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings (UFC 4-010-
01) specifically address this issue in a recommendation.
4-2.2 Locating on High Points of Land.
Consider locating buildings on high points of land. If buildings are situated higher than
the surrounding area there will be fewer potential vantage points from which to target
the buildings. Locating the “castle on the hill” will also cause ballistic projectiles fired
from a lower elevation to strike at an oblique angle, reducing their effectiveness slightly.
That advantage is minimal for anti-tank weapons, however. One disadvantage of
locating buildings on high points is that doing so may make the building more noticeable
and easier to target.
15
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
4-2.3 Locating Near Existing Landforms.
Look for landforms that may block sight lines from vantage points. Consider locating
buildings to take advantage of those landforms. Avoid locating near natural features that
can be used as vantage points, however, unless they are within controlled areas. Also
avoid locating buildings adjacent to drainage channels, ditches, ridges, or culverts that
can provide concealment to aggressors and from which they could target buildings.
4-2.4 Locating Near Other Buildings.
Consider locating buildings near parking garages, warehouses, and other structures
that may block sight lines from vantage points. Also take advantage of structures that
house less critical assets and use those structures to block lines-of-sight. This could
also be a strategy for placing multiple new buildings on a site. In that case, less critical
buildings could be sited to block sightlines from vantage points to critical buildings.
4-3 COUNTERMEASURES FOR VERY LOW LEVEL OF PROTECTION.
The design strategy for the very low level of protection is limited to incorporating the
minimum standards of UFC 4-010-01, the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for
Buildings, into the protective system. There are no site work oriented requirements
among those standards that are related to mitigating any effects of direct fire weapons.
4-4 COUNTERMEASURES FOR LOW LEVEL OF PROTECTION.
As stated in Chapter 3, the design strategy for the low level of protection is based on
blocking lines-of-sight between vantage points and potential targets. This strategy
assumes that aggressors will not fire at what they cannot see. Sitework elements that
can be used effectively in implementing this strategy include vegetation, fences, land
forms, and walls placed to interrupt sight lines. \1\Consult a Landscape Architect to
determine the appropriate site elements and plants for use in specific areas. /1/
Recognize that vegetation used to block sight lines may not be effective until it matures,
which may take years, and that plants that do not retain their foliage year-round will
have periods when they are ineffective.
4-4.1 Planting and the Unobstructed Space.
The DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings (UFC 4-010-01) require
inhabited buildings to be surrounded by unobstructed spaces that extend \1\/1/outside
of the buildings. Unobstructed spaces cannot have obstructions within them that would
allow for concealment from observation of explosive devices 150 mm (6 inches) in
height. Any \1\ shrubs or trees /1/ planted to block sight lines, therefore, must either be
planted outside the unobstructed space or should be kept trimmed to a height of 1.2
meters (4 feet) above the ground to preclude concealing explosives under them. Figure
4-1 illustrates the placement of trees in the vicinity of the unobstructed space. \1\
16
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
4-4.2 Hedges.
/1/ Hedges can be effective at blocking sight lines, but their feasibility and the species
available vary by region. \1\/1/ Optimally select plants for hedges that retain their \1\
form and /1/ foliage year-round and that are typically used for hedges. Where plants
that are not evergreen varieties are used, alternative means to block sight lines will
have to be provided during the periods of the year when the plants do not have leaves.
Use caution when selecting shrubs or trees for planting in temperate or colder zones.
Some shrubs or trees that are evergreen in warm climates may not be evergreen in cold
climates. \1\
4-4.2.1 Shrubs for Hedges.

Utilize native and naturalized plants that are adapted to the local regional climate and
natural aesthetic. Select plant species that are hardy, disease resistant, drought-
tolerant, and low maintenance. Select plant species by ultimate size and form to
maintain the natural shape and not require extensive maintenance or pruning. Place
hedges a minimum of two-thirds of the radius of the ultimate growth of the shrub from
hardscape, walls, fences, or buildings. Provide plant materials of sufficient size and
spacing to achieve the desired screening effect. Confirm plant species with the
appropriate Base Exterior Architecture Plan (BEAP), Installation Appearance Plan (IAP),
Public Works Department or the reviewing Government Landscape Architect.
4-4.2.2 Shrubs to Avoid.

Avoid plants that are invasive, poisonous, or have excessive leaf, flower, seed or cone
litter. Avoid plants that are short-lived or that have surface-rooting tendencies. Provide
100% native or naturalized plant materials on projects that are immediately adjacent to
designated open space or sensitive environments. Provide plant materials that are fire-
resistant on projects in regions prone to wild-fire. Refer to the appropriate Base Exterior
Architecture Plan (BEAP), Installation Appearance Plan (IAP), Public Works Department
or the reviewing Government Landscape Architect. /1/ \1\
17
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 4-1. Trees and the Unobstructed Space
/1/ \1\
4-4.3 Trees for Screening.
Select trees that retain their foliage year-round. Utilize native and naturalized trees that
are adapted to the local regional climate and natural aesthetic. Select tree species that
are hardy, disease resistant, drought-tolerant, and low maintenance. Select tree
species by ultimate size and form to maintain the natural shape and not require
extensive maintenance or pruning. In addition, ensure that trees overlap such that there
are no visible gaps between them as shown in Figure 4-2. Note in the elevation view of
Figure 4-2 that only the upper floors would be shielded, so only non-critical areas could
be located on lower floors. Refer to the appropriate Base Exterior Architecture Plan
(BEAP), Installation Appearance Plan (IAP), Public Works Department or the reviewing
Government Landscape Architect. /1/
Some varieties such as Douglas Fir can grow very tall and in areas with heavy snows
will lose most of their lower branches. That may diminish their effectiveness for
obscuration. Blue spruce will retain its branches even in heavy snows, but can be very
slow growing. Magnolia trees will work well for warm climates and some of the new
varieties will stay a nice medium height. Ficus is fast growing and will provide a good
screen, but it can develop a massive root system, so it should be planted at least 3
meters (10 feet) away from paved areas.
18
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 4-2. Overlapping Trees for Obscuration
Plan
Elevation
\1\ Utilize trees species that are “fanlike” (wide but not deep) for narrow areas such as
between unobstructed spaces and paved areas where space for planting trees is
limited. /1/
4-4.4 Fences and Walls.
Perimeter barriers such as fences and walls can be used to block lines-of-sight. Walls,
due to the fact that they are generally opaque and can be built to almost any height are
very effective at blocking sight lines. Fences can be either solid, such as wood slat
fences, or they can be transparent, such as chain-link or expanded metal. The solid
fences are quite effective at blocking sightlines, but transparent fences require some
form of obscuration material to be added to them for them to be effective at blocking
sight lines. There are many such materials available for use with chain-link fencing.
Some of the most common are wood, light gauge steel, or aluminum slats. The slats are
woven in between the chain links. One significant issue in adding obscuration to fences
is that they must be designed to resist the additional wind load that will result from
19
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
adding the obscuration material. Figure 4-3 shows a chain link fence that failed due to
the increased wind loading resulting from the addition of plastic obscuration material.
Figure 4-3. Failed Chain Link Fence with Obscuration Material Added
4-4.5 Using Landforms to Increase the Height.
Landforms can be built to raise fence-lines or to increase the height of newly planted
trees or shrubs. Shrubbery can also be raised using individual or continuous planter
boxes. Raising shrubs or tree lines for new plantings can obstruct lines-of-sight sooner
than if the shrubs or trees are planted at ground level. Figure 4-4 shows a tree line
elevated on a berm. The disadvantage to using landforms in this manner is that such
landforms can create areas for intruder concealment or for the hiding of explosive
devices. Due to such considerations, landforms should not be located within the
\1\/1/unobstructed spaces required by UFC 4-010-01.
Figure 4-4. Tree Line Elevated on Berm
20
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
4-4.6 Berms and Landforms.
Berms and other such landforms can be used by themselves to block sightlines.
Building them tall enough to be effective is generally impractical for all but the lowest of
buildings, however. The berm in Figure 4-4, for example, would only potentially shield
the lower floor of the building behind it. Berms can also provide opportunities for
concealment, so they should be kept outside of unobstructed spaces.
4-5 COUNTERMEASURES FOR MEDIUM LEVEL OF PROTECTION.
The primary design strategy for the medium level of protection is to place a screen in
front of portions of targeted buildings where there are assets identified as requiring
protection against direct fire weapons. The screens intercept incoming direct fire
rounds. In the case of ballistics, the screen will serve to absorb energy from the
incoming round. In the case of anti-tank weapons, the screen will predetonate the
incoming warhead. Both applications will be described below. Note that a screen can
serve the purposes of both an energy absorption screen and a predetonation screen,
but differences in construction will have to be evaluated to determine which controls.
4-5.1 Energy Absorption Screen.
The energy absorption screen serves to reduce the energy of incoming rounds, which
allows for savings in the construction of building components behind them that are
provided to resist penetration of the rounds. This strategy is only practical for the .50
caliber (12.7 mm) threat. For lesser threats it is more cost effective to build the full
bullet resistance into the building construction. To be effective, the screen has to be
solid and must have enough mass to reduce the velocity of the incoming round. That
requires a minimum of 12 mm (1/2 inch) thick wood fence, reinforced concrete, or brick.
The distance from the screen to the target is not a critical design parameter, but such
screens should not be located within the 10 meter (33 feet) unobstructed space. Design
guidance on screen thickness and material is provided in the wall design section of
Chapter 5.
4-5.2 Predetonation Screen.
The effects of anti-tank warheads can be reduced by detonating the warheads at a

distance from their targets. When the charges are detonated farther from the targets
than their optimum standoffs (technically, the distance from the conical shaped charge
to the tip of the warhead), the jets tend to break up and lose energy before striking the
targets. This design strategy is called predetonation. It is accomplished by building a
predetonation screen.
4-5.2.1 Predetonation Screen Location.

Predetonation screens generally will be located in front of portions of buildings that must
provide protection against anti-tank weapons or areas that are vulnerable to an attack.
In some cases a screen could surround an entire building. The standoff distance
between the predetonation screen and the building is governed by the building
construction. Those distances are discussed in the wall design section of Chapter 5.
21
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
For a range of common conventionally constructed walls the standoff distances range
from 2 to 15 meters (7 to 49 feet), but the screens should not be located within the 10
meter (33 feet) unobstructed space. Figures 4-5 and 4-6 illustrate the placement and
function of a predetonation screen.
Figure 4-5. Predetonation Screen
4-5.2.2 Predetonation Screen Height.

Predetonation screens need to be as high as the portions of buildings they are intended
to protect. They may only be practical, therefore, for intercepting anti-tank rounds fired
at the lower stories of buildings. Where building predetonation screens high enough to
protect upper stories of buildings is not practical, design to a different level of protection
for those portions of the building that are not shielded by the predetonation screen.
Either use obscuration (low level protection) or harden the building to resist the direct
impact of the anti-tank round. Note that in the case of designing for the low level of
protection, building users are accepting the additional risk that goes along with that level
of protection; therefore, the design team should not make that decision without
consulting with the user or the planning team.
4-5.2.3 Building Exterior Envelope.

The exterior envelope of the building could be used as a predetonation screen if the
assets that require protection are in interior rooms. In that case, the building exterior
could be used as a predetonation screen and the interior walls would be designed to
resist the predetonated round as described in Chapter 5.
22
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 4-6. Predetonation Screen Location
4-5.2.4 Predetonation Screen Material.

Predetonation screens can be constructed of concrete, masonry, or wood. If wood is
used for the predetonation screen, construct it in sections so that if one section is
damaged, it can easily be replaced. Wood predetonation screens thicknesses vary with
wood species used. The minimum thicknesses required for some common wood
species are listed below. The other requirement for the wood fences is that if wood slat
fencing is used, the slats should be spaced no more than 6.4 mm (1/4 inch) apart.
• Cedar: 9 mm (3/8 inch)

• Douglas Fir or Pine: 25 mm (1 inch)
• Plywood: 18 mm (3/4 inch) (including Oriented Strand Board)
The thickness of concrete or masonry predetonation screens does not need to be
greater than 25 mm (1 inch); therefore, they are limited only by what is required for
structural stability. Another constraint is that a structural wall made of concrete or
masonry could amplify the effects of a pressure wave created by a bomb blast by
reflecting it back to the facility. If that is a concern blast resistance will have to be taken
into account during the design of the predetonation screen. In addition, concrete or
masonry predetonation screens could break up and produce hazardous flying debris in
23
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
the event of an explosive detonation. The blast amplification and debris considerations
are outside the scope of this UFC. See the DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design
Manual (UFC 4-020-02).
4-6 COUNTERMEASURES FOR HIGH LEVEL OF PROTECTION.
The design strategy for the high level of protection depends on the shell of the building
protecting the targeted assets to provide all of the resistance to the direct fire weapons.
Because that strategy relies only on building components, sitework elements do not
enter into the design strategy for this level of protection.
24
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
CHAPTER 5 BUILDING ELEMENTS
5-1 INTRODUCTION.
Building elements are the predominant components of protective systems to mitigate

direct fire weapons effects. The exterior shells of buildings are commonly what provide
the protection for assets within them, whether or not shielding has been provided using
site work elements. This chapter will provide guidance for designing walls, windows,
doors, vent covers, grilles, and roofs to implement the design strategies for the four
applicable levels of protection. It will also address how building layout may be affected
by the design strategies for mitigating direct fire weapons.
5-2 BUILDING LAYOUT.
Building layout can provide significant opportunities for mitigating the effects of direct
fire weapons. How the design strategies for building layout vary for the different levels
of protection is described below. Note, however, that applying the layout principles for
the low and very low levels of protection can simplify protection at the higher levels of
protection; therefore, always apply those principles where possible.
5-2.1 Very Low Level of Protection.
There is a requirement in UFC 4-010-01 that is predicated on consideration of direct fire

weapons threats. Standard 11 requires main entrances to buildings not to face
installation perimeters or other uncontrolled vantage points or to provide some means to
block those lines-of-sight. The latter is addressed later in this chapter where the low
level of protection for doors is discussed. For existing buildings, this requirement may
lead to reorganization of building circulation to accommodate moving the main building
entrance. Note, however, that the standards of UFC 4-010-01 are only triggered for
existing buildings that are undergoing major modifications or conversions of use. Refer
to UFC 4-010-01 for descriptions of those triggers. This main entrance requirement
accounts for the facts that there is little control over what happens off installations and
that building main entrances are especially vulnerable due to the level of traffic into and
out of buildings at those locations.
5-2.2 Low level of protection.
Building layout for the low level of protection is focused on minimizing lines-of-sight to
targeted assets. Consider designing interior layouts of buildings to locate critical assets
as far as possible into the interior of the building to make them easier to protect.
Unoccupied areas or areas in which non-critical functions will be performed can be
located along the exterior of the facility. Any such layout considerations must take into
account whether or not issues such as building occupant operations will constrain
where assets or functions are located. Interior room layout can also limit asset
exposure. In designing room layouts locate furniture and activity areas to minimize
visibility through windows and doors.
Building orientation can also be used to minimize asset exposure. Where possible,
orient buildings so critical areas do not face known vantage points or installation
25
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
perimeters. Storerooms or other uninhabited areas can be located on those sides of
buildings.
5-2.3 Medium Level of Protection.
The design strategy for the medium level of protection includes employment of energy
absorption and/or predetonation screens. Where targeted assets can be located in
interior areas of buildings, the building shell can be used for energy absorption or
predetonation. In those cases lay out interior walls between the building exterior and
the assets and design the interior walls to resist the weapons effects remaining after
energy dissipation and/or predetonation as described in the section in this chapter on
walls. Figure 5-1 illustrates such a building layout. In addition, lay out buildings to
minimize windows and doors leading to targeted assets. Refer to the section in this
chapter on windows for more guidance on window layout.
Figure 5-1. Sacrificial Area Layout
Required
standoff
distance
from
screen
Hardened
wall
Wall for energy

absorption and/or
predetonation
5-2.4 High Level of Protection.
Because the design strategy for the high level of protection is based on building
exteriors resisting the direct impacts of direct fire munitions, there are minimal layout
issues to be considered. The only significant one relates to windows and doors. It is
often not practical to design windows and doors to provide the high level of protection,
especially for the higher threat severity levels, so a more practical approach for those
cases is to avoid exposing targeted assets to windows and doors through effective
building layout. Refer to the sections in this chapter on windows and doors for more
guidance on window and door layout.
26
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
5-3 WALLS.
Because the design strategy for the very low level of protection is limited to
incorporating the minimum standards of UFC 4-010-01, the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism
Standards for Buildings, and since there are no minimum standards related to mitigating
direct fire weapons effects against walls, there are no requirements for walls at this level
of protection.
5-3.2 Low Level of Protection.
Because the design strategy for the low level of protection is limited to blocking lines-of-
sight to targeted assets and because walls are commonly opaque, there are no
additional requirements for walls at this level of protection. If, however, glass block are
used for walls, ensure they are translucent or figured so assets cannot be targeted
through them.
The design strategy for the medium level of protection is predicated on either
predetonating anti-tank rounds and/or reducing the energy of large caliber ballistics.
Design of walls will differ based on whether they are designed for ballistics threats, anti-
tank weapon threats, or both.
5-3.3.1 Ballistics Threats.

Table 5-1 covers wall design where an energy absorption screen is employed to
mitigate the effects of high caliber ballistics (.50 caliber or 12.7 mm). Select a material
and thickness for the energy absorption screen and find the reinforced concrete or
masonry wall necessary to resist the residual velocity of the round after it impacts the
screen. Masonry walls are either fully grouted concrete masonry units or solid clay brick
masonry units. The distances from screens to targets are unimportant, but they cannot
be located within the \1\/1/ unobstructed space required by UFC 4-010-01.
For concrete and masonry materials, the design condition of the wall is for no spalling
from the inside face. Spalling is a phenomenon in which the impact of a projectile
propagates a shock wave through the material. That wave is reflected from the rear
face of the wall as a tensile wave. When that tensile wave exceeds the limited tensile
capacity of the material, the material is ejected from the spalled region, potentially at
hazardous velocities. Spalling is illustrated in Figure 2-3. For more options, use the
equations in the section on the high level of protection. Calculate the residual velocity
of the round after it perforates the energy absorption screen and then design the target
wall to resist that residual velocity.
27
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
5-3.3.2 Anti-tank Weapon Threats.
Table 5-2 covers wall design where a predetonation screen is employed to mitigate the
effects of anti-tank weapons. The table includes 8 different common wall constructions,
their total thicknesses, and the standoff distances from those walls at which
predetonation screens must be located for the target wall to resist the predetonated
round. The values in Table 5-2 were obtained through testing, and they represent walls
that will resist the “family” of anti-tank weapons that were described in Chapter 2. Note
that where Table 5-2 shows a predetonation screen standoff of less than the standoff
associated with the unobstructed space, screens should not be located within the \1\/1/
unobstructed space unobstructed space required by UFC 4-010-01.
Figures 5-2 and 5-3 illustrate techniques for retrofitting existing reinforced concrete
walls to resist predetonated anti-tank rounds. Both techniques employ sand against the
outside of the wall. The configuration in Figure 5-3 also includes the installation of steel
plate on the interior face of the wall to prevent spall. There are many ways that sand in
the thicknesses shown can be placed against walls, such as light retaining walls, sand
bags, or sand grids. Aesthetics and maintainability issues are left up to designers.
Table 5-1 Wall Construction with Energy Absorption Screen 1
Energy Absorption Screen Material and Reinforced Concrete Masonry Wall

Thickness 2, 3 Wall Thickness 2 Thickness 2,3
No screen 22 inch (560mm) 30 inch (760 mm)
½ inch (12 mm) wood 18 inch (460mm) 30 inch (760 mm)

¾ inch (19 mm) wood 18 inch (460mm) 28 inch (710 mm)
1 inch (25 mm) wood 18 inch (460mm) 28 inch (710 mm)
2 inch (50 mm) reinforced concrete 18 inch (460mm) 26 inch (660 mm)
4 inch (100 mm) reinforced concrete 16 inch (400mm) 26 inch (660mm)
6 inch (150 mm) reinforced concrete 15 inch (380 mm) 22 inch (560 mm)
Ungrouted CMU 18 inch (460mm) 28 inch (710 mm)
(1.5 inch or 40 mm total face shell
thickness)
4 inch (100 mm) masonry 16 inch (400mm) 26 inch (660 mm)
6 inch (150 mm) masonry 15 inch (380 mm) 22 inch (560 mm)
1. For .50 caliber (12.7 mm) round
2. All thicknesses are nominal thicknesses.
3. Masonry walls can either be fully grouted CMU or solid clay brick. Reinforcement ratio is not a
significant factor in bullet resistance.
28
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Table 5-2 Wall Construction with Anti-Tank Round Predetonation Screens
Standoff Distance to
Material Total Wall Thickness 1
Predetonation Screen
4 inch (100 mm ) brick / 2 14 inches (356 mm) 49 feet (15 meters)
inch (50 mm) air gap / 8
inch (200 mm) hollow CMU
8 inch (200 mm) grout filled 8 inches (200 mm) 36 feet (11 meters)
CMU
8 inch (200 mm) solid brick 8 inches (200 mm) 36 feet (11 meters)
4 inch (100 mm ) brick / 2 10 inches (254 mm) 36 feet (11 meters)
inch (100 mm) brick
4 inch (100 mm ) brick / 4 11.5 inches (292 mm) 36 feet (11 meters)
inch (100 mm) brick
6 inch (150 mm) reinforced 6 inch (150 mm) 25 feet (7.6 meters) 2
concrete
8 inch (200 mm) reinforced 8 inch (200 mm) 11 feet (3.4 meters) 2
concrete
12 inch (300 mm) 12 inch (300 mm) 7 feet (2.1 meters) 2
reinforced concrete
1. Nominal thicknesses.
2. Do not locate closer than the edge of the unobstructed space where unobstructed
space is required in accordance with UFC 4-010-01.
29
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 5-2. Anti-tank Weapon Wall Retrofit Using Sand
Figure 5-3. Anti-Tank Weapon Retrofit Using Sand and Spall Plate
30
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
5-3.3.3 Ballistic and Anti-tank Weapon Threats.
The very high threat severity level is shown in Table 2-1 to include both high caliber
ballistics and anti-tank weapons. In designing against both of those threats, apply both
Tables 5-1 and 5-2 and use whichever construction is heaviest.
The design strategy for the high level of protection is predicated on resisting the full
effects of the ballistic or anti-tank rounds without any energy reduction or predetonation.
That strategy results in hardened construction for all building components to which there
are lines-of-sight and behind or under which there are assets that require protection. It
can result in an entire building envelope or portions thereof being hardened depending
on building layout and asset location. Walls constructed to resist ballistics or antitank
weapons will commonly need to be constructed of reinforced concrete or masonry.
Steel plate can also be added to existing wall construction as a retrofit.
5-3.4.1 Design Using Tables.

5-3.4.1.1 Ballistics Threat.
Table 5-3 provides construction that will resist the effects of direct hits by ballistics for all
four threat severity levels. Some of the entries are from tests; others are from
calculations. It includes reinforced concrete and concrete and clay brick masonry. Note
that where concrete masonry unit construction is used, all cells must be grouted full.
Table 5-3 also includes steel plate and bullet resisting fiberglass, both of which can be
used to retrofit existing walls that do not provide the necessary ballistic resistance. The
steel plate includes both mild steel, which is common structural steel plate, and rolled
homogeneous armor. The Brinnell Hardness Numbers for the two steel plate types are
specified in the notes to Table 5-3. The bullet resistant fiberglass thicknesses are
commercially available thicknesses that are based on tests. To design for other threats
or to explore other options use the computational procedures later in this section.
5-3.4.1.2 Anti-tank Weapon Threat.

Table 5-4 provides the necessary thicknesses for a variety of potential construction
materials to resist direct hits by anti-tank warheads. While the practicality of some of
them is questionable, the results tabulated are provided for reference and to allow
designers as much flexibility as possible.
31
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Table 5-3 Ballistics Resistant Construction
Steel Plate 1 Bullet

Threat Reinforced CMU 2 or
Resistant
Level Concrete 1 Brick 1 Mild 3 Armor 4
Fiberglass 1
Low 2-1/2 inches 4 inches 5/16 inches 1/4 inches 7/16 inches
(64 mm) (100 mm) (8mm) (6mm) (14mm)
Medium 4 inches 8 inches 9/16 inches 7/16 inches 1-1/8 inches
(100 mm) (200 mm) (14 mm) (11 mm) (28.4mm)
High 6-1/2 inches 8 inches 13/16 inches 11/16 inches
Note 5
(165 mm) (200 mm) (21 mm) (18 mm)
22 inches6
30 inches 1-1/4 inches 1 in.
Very High (560 mm)
(760 mm) (32 mm) (25 mm) Note 5
12 inches7
(305 mm)
1. All thicknesses are nominal thicknesses. Reinforcement ration is not a significant
factor in bullet resistance
2. For concrete masonry unit construction, all cells must be grouted full.
3. Brinnell Hardness Number for mild steel is 110 to 160
4. Brinnell Hardness Number for rolled homogeneous armor is 220 to 350
5. Bullet resisting fiberglass is not commonly available for bullets of these calibers
or compositions.
6. Minimum compressive strength of 3000 psi (21 MPa).
7. Minimum compressive strength of 5000 psi (35 MPa).
Table 5-4 Anti-Tank Weapon Resistant Construction

Material Thickness
Rolled Homogeneous 22 inches (560 mm)
Armor
Mild Steel 28 inches (710 mm)
Aluminum 39 inches (990 mm)
Lead 20 inches (280 mm)
Copper 21 inches (530 mm)
Concrete 40 inches (1016 mm)
Concrete Masonry 44 inches (1118 mm)
Clay Brick Masonry 46 inches (1168 mm)
Granite 38 inches (965 mm)
Rock 39 inches (990 mm)
Soil 55 inches (1400 mm)
Water 62 inches (1575 mm)
Green wood 66 inches (1676 mm)
32
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
5-3.4.2 Design Using Computations.
Where threats are different than those in Table 2-1, where designers wish to explore
options not included in the tables, or where they want to explore multiple materials or
layers, the design tables above will fall short and designers will need to apply
computational methods. Examples of evaluating multiple layers or materials include
determining the required thickness of an inner wythe of a cavity wall after a bullet
passes through the outer wythe and determining the effect of a steel plate mounted on
the interior surface of a masonry wall. Note in the latter case that application of those
equations is conservative where the two materials are in contact. Computational
methods are presented separately for various materials for the ballistics threats, but
there is only one computational method for the anti-tank weapons threat.
5-3.4.2.1 Ballistics Threats.

There are multiple ways to apply computational methods for designing building
components to resist penetration by ballistics rounds. Complex finite element models
can be used, but they are very expensive and seldom warrant the effort. There are also
equations. The equations in this UFC come from the penetration chapter of UFC 3-340-
01. In some cases, they have been modified slightly to compute the desired quantity,
which is commonly the thickness of the material needed to resist perforation by a
particular round. Applying the equations requires detailed knowledge of both the round
and the material. Material properties that are not commonly known are provided.
Projectile properties, including mass, velocity, and ratios needed to evaluate nose
performance coefficients can be found in \1\ Appendix C /1/. All velocities in
\1\Appendix C /1/ are muzzle velocities. Using those velocities is conservative because
bullets will lose some velocity over distance due to drag.
Note that some of the equations are in metric units and some are in English units.
Because the equations are largely curve fits of actual data, they are left in their original
form rather than attempting to convert them to metric or English units.
5-3.4.2.1.1 Wood.
Equation 5.1 gives the thickness of wood necessary to resist perforation. Values for
density and hardness for various species of wood can be found in Table 5-5. Where the
thickness of wood target is less than that given by Equation 5-1, use Equation 5-2 to
determine the residual velocity that the round will have after passing through the wood.
Note that the latter case is how energy absorption screens can be designed. That
residual velocity could then be applied to another material layer. In doing so, it is
commonly assumed (conservatively) that the bullet retains all of its mass.
33
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Equation 5-1. Wood Thickness to Prevent Projectile Perforation
 
 
 v 0.4113 w1.4897 
TW = 9837 1.3596 
  πD 2  
 ρ   H 0.5414 
  4  
Where:
TW = thickness of wood necessary to prevent perforation (in)
v = projectile impact velocity (ft/s) (conservatively use muzzle velocity in Appendix C)
w = projectile weight (lbs) (see Appendix C)
D = projectile diameter (in2)
ρ= wood density (lbs/ft3) (see Table 5-5)
H = wood hardness (lbs) (see Table 5-5)
Table 5-5 Wood Properties
Species Density (lbs./ft3) Hardness (pounds)

Pine Dry 23.5 38.7
Wet 30 51.1
Maple Dry 35 76.9
Wet 40 72
Green Oak Dry 55 88.1
Wet 55 72.1
Marine Dry 37 68.7
plywood Wet 37 58.8
Balsa Dry 6 21
Wet 6 61.5
Fir plywood Dry 30 75
Wet 30 68.9
Hickory Dry 50 74.3
Wet 55 63.5
Equation 5-2. Residual Velocity from Wood Target
  t 
0.5735

 
vr = v 1.0 −    
  w
T 
Where:
vr = residual velocity (ft/s)
t = actual target thickness (in)
34
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
5-3.4.2.1.2 Steel Plate.
The projectile velocity at which a given type and thickness of steel plate can prevent
perforation is commonly referred to as the limit velocity. Equation 5-3 is a manipulation
of the limit velocity equation for steel to give plate thickness. Note that the thickness
reported by Equation 5-3 is what is necessary to stop complete perforation (the
projectile passing completely through the plate and emerging with zero velocity). That
represents a safe condition for most applications, although there are times when
ensuring that there is no rear face spalling is necessary. In those cases, add two bullet
diameters to the plate thickness determined from Equation 5-3. Note that Equation 5-3
is only valid for calibers of 0.50 (12.7 mm) or less. For larger calibers, refer to UFC 3-
340-01.
If the plate thickness is less than that given in Equation 5-3, the bullet will pass through
the plate with a residual velocity, which can be predicted using Equation 5-4. That
residual velocity could then be applied to another material layer. In doing so, it is
commonly assumed (conservatively) that the bullet retains all of its mass. In that
equation, impact velocity can initially (conservatively) be taken to be muzzle velocity.
Where the equation is used to evaluate multiple protective layers, the residual velocity
would be used as the impact velocity in equations 5-3 or 5-4 or in other similar
equations for other materials.
Equation 5-3. Steel Thickness to Prevent Projectile Perforation
1.25
 vm 0.5 cos 0.8 θ 

TS = D 
1.5 
 1.125 D log 10 BHN 
Where:
v = impact velocity (m/s) (initially use maximum muzzle velocity from Appendix C.)
D = projectile diameter (mm) (see Appendix C)
TS = thickness of steel plate to prevent perforation (mm)
θ = angle of obliquity (degrees)(see glossary)
m = mass of projectile (kg) (see Appendix C)
BHN = Brinnell Hardness Number (see Table 5-3)
Equation 5-4. Residual Velocity from Steel Plate Target

0.5
  0.8
 
2
  t 
1.1275  D log10 BHN  
1 . 5
 2  D  
vr = v −
  m cos θ
0.5 0.8
 
   
   
Where:
t = thickness of steel plate (mm)
vr = residual velocity (m/s)
v = impact velocity (m/s)
35
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
5-3.4.2.1.3 Concrete.
Concrete is the most common construction material used to provide bullet resistance.
Calculating the thickness of concrete needed to stop projectiles requires the application
of two equations. Use Equation 5-5 to determine projectile penetration into concrete for
an air backed slab. If the wall is soil backed rather than air backed, see UFC 3-340-01.
Determine the minimum thickness of concrete to prevent perforation of the wall slab by
entering the results of Equation 5-5 into Equation 5-7, which provides the thickness at
which the nose of the projectile reaches the back face of the slab, but with zero velocity.
That is sufficiently safe for most applications in that any concrete that “spalls” off the
back face is likely to represent a minimal hazard. Where that is not considered
acceptable, use Equation 5-8, which provides the thickness required to prevent spall.
These equations can also reasonably be used to estimate behavior of masonry. To do
so, enter the lower of the compressive strength of the grout, the mortar, and that of the
'
blocks or bricks themselves in Equation 5-5 for f c .
If the concrete thickness is less than that calculated in Equation 5-7, the bullet will pass
through the wall with a residual velocity, which can be predicted using Equation 5-9.
That residual velocity could then be applied to another material layer as the impact
velocity. In doing so, it is commonly assumed (conservatively) that the bullet retains all
of its mass.
36
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Equation 5-5. Penetration into Concrete (air backed)
0.075
 m 
56.6 3  N mv1.8 0.15
 D  D
PC =   f age + D
'
D 2 fC ' c
Where:
PC = Maximum penetration into concrete (mm)
D = projectile diameter (mm) (see Appendix C)
m = projectile mass (kg) (see Appendix C)
c = maximum gravel size in concrete (mm)
(assume to be 19 mm for most concrete and 4 mm for concrete masonry)
v = impact velocity (m/s) (conservatively use muzzle velocity in Appendix C)
f C' = concrete compression strength (MPa)
N = nose performance coefficient (see equation 5-6)
• = 0.91 for low threat severity level
• = 1.26 for medium threat severity level
• = 1.39 for high threat severity level
• = 1.31 for very high threat severity level
fage= concrete age factor
fage Concrete age (days)
1.0 ≥ 360
1.01 180
1.02 66
1.05 ≤ 28
37
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Equation 5-6. Nose performance coefficient
L 
N = 0.72 + 0.25 N  (values for N are tabulated in Table C-1 for common bullets)
 D 
0.5
LN R 
 − 0.25 
D can also be calculated as  D 
R
D is tabulated in some publications as CRH (caliber radius head)
Note: If the tangent ogive is

D truncated, use the actual LN of the
truncated nose in equation 5-6. If
the nose shape does not conform to
a tangent ogive, select an
R equivalent ogive with a similar
length-to-diameter ratio using
engineering judgment
LN = nose length of projectile
R = tangent ogive radius
Equation 5-7. Perforation Limit Thickness for Air Backed Concrete Slabs
 P  
TBD = D 1.375 C  + 2
 D 
TBD = thickness to prevent back face damage (mm)
Equation 5-9. Residual Velocity Equation from Concrete Slab Target

0.733
 t 
 
v r = v 1 − D 
 T PL 
 
 D 
Where:
vr = residual velocity (m/s)
v = impact velocity (m/s)
t = slab thickness (mm)
5-3.4.2.2 Anti-tank Weapon Threat.

Anti-tank weapon penetration of building materials is not as well understood as ballistics
penetration, but Equation 5-10 can be used to estimate common building material
38
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
thicknesses necessary to resist perforation by anti-tank warheads for weapons within
the family of antitank weapons covered by the UFC. The equation is a function of
warhead diameter and is based on the required thicknesses of rolled homogeneous
armor. The material multiplication factor “corrects” the thickness for armor to that for
other materials. The following are common warhead diameters for the weapons
discussed in Chapter 2 that can be used in applying Equation 5-9.
• Russian RPG 7 (and similar copies): 70 mm

• Russian RPG 18 (and similar copies): 64 mm
• Russian RPG 22 (and similar copies): 72.5 mm
• US M 72: 66 mm
Equation 5-10. Building Material Thickness to Resist Anti-tank Weapons
T = 7.79 D M
Where:
T = thickness of the building material to resist perforation (in)
D = warhead diameter (in)
M = Material Multiplication Factor (see Table 5-6)
39
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Table 5-6 Material Multiplication Factors for Antitank Weapon Resistance
Material Multiplication
Target Material Material Density
Factor (M)
Rolled Homogeneous 1.00 7850 Kg/m3
Armor (490 lb/ft3)
Mild steel 1.25 7850 Kg/m3
(490 lb/ft3)
Aluminum 1.75 2600 Kg/m3
(160 lb/ft3)
Lead 0.88 10,600 Kg/m3
(660 lb/ft3)
Copper 0.94 8900 Kg/m3
(556 lb/ft3)
Concrete 1.82 2400 Kg/m3
(150 lb/ft3)
Concrete Masonry 1.98 2000 Kg/m3
125 lb/ft3
Clay Brick Masonry 2.02 1920 Kg/m3
120 lb/ft3
Granite 1.68 2800 Kg/m3
(170 lb/ft3)
Rock 1.75 2600 Kg/m3
(160 lb/ft3)
Earth 2.47 1300 Kg/m3
(80 lb/ft3)
Water 2.80 1000 Kg/m3
(60 lb/ft3)
Green wood 2.97 900 Kg/m3
(60 lb/ft3)
ρs
Note: For other materials M = ρs = density of steel
ρt
ρt = density of target material
5-3.4.3 Design Based on Testing.

For ballistics threats there are a number of testing standards that can be used to test
building components against a range of different ballistics rounds. Those test standards
specify how the test specimens will be set up, the mass and velocity of the bullets to be
used in the test, the number and positioning of the shots, and the criteria for “passing”
the test. Testing can be used to test complex material interactions, to evaluate
materials for which there are no computational methods and in cases where
manufacturers wish to optimize designs. Refer to the test standards tabulated in \1\
Appendix C /1/ for detailed information. There are no standardized tests for antitank
weapons, but tests can be conducted using similar failure criteria to those of the
ballistics tests.
40
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
5-4 WINDOWS.
incorporating the minimum standards of UFC 4-010-01, the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism
Standards for Buildings, and since there are no minimum standards related to mitigating
direct fire weapons effects against windows, there are no requirements for windows at
this level of protection.
sight to targeted assets, window requirements are focused on obscuration. This level
of protection applies to all ballistics and anti-tank weapon threats. Obscuration can be
accomplished by controlling sight lines to assets through window layout and placement,
window design, window treatment application, or shielding. In addition, consider
minimizing the number and size of windows to decrease visible window area and limit
available targets. In addressing window layout and placement, consider layouts and
placements that do not allow sight lines to assets from outside the building using
window configurations such as those shown in Figures 5-4 and 5-5. Alternatively,
arrange rooms to ensure that potentially targeted assets cannot be seen through the
windows or block sight lines through windows using screening materials such as fences
or vegetation as described in Chapter 4.
41
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 5-4. Narrow Obliquely Recessed Windows
Figure 5-5. Elevated Windows
5-4.2.1 Low Level of Protection Alternatives.

An alternate approach is to design windows to limit sight lines through them by using
translucent or figured glazing that allows light in but is not sufficiently transparent for
people to be able to see anything through them.
42
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Windows can also be treated with reflective films or glazing tints to limit views into
buildings from outside. This is particularly useful for windows in existing buildings
where there is little opportunity for reconfiguration. Reflective films are made by
applying a thin metallic layer to a polyester or similar film to limit how much light passes
through the film, a characteristic referred to as “visible transmittance”. When one side
of the film is brighter than the other side, a relatively large amount of light is reflected off
the bright side of the film. The reflection of that light results in an observer on the bright
side seeing a mirror –like image while an observer on the darker side can see through
the window. At night when the outside of the window becomes darker than the inside,
more light is transmitted from the lit rooms inside of the building to the outside and an
observer outside will see through the window while people inside the room will see a
reflective surface. That suggests that drapes or blinds may need to be provided to
obscure assets at night.
The design strategy for this level of protection is to employ energy absorption or
predetonation screens to limit the energy with which the projectiles impact the target
and to provide hardened construction to prevent the projectiles from penetrating the
protective envelope. In general, is not practical to apply that strategy to window designs
to resist high caliber ballistics (12.7 mm or .50 caliber) and anti-tank weapons. Windows
cannot be practically designed to resist predetonated anti-tank rounds, and while it may
be feasible to design windows for reduced energy ballistics, most windows are designed
and tested to meet particular ballistic standards, none of which address reduced energy
ballistics. Developing window designs for that situation would therefore be impractical.
One approach that can be used for both anti-tank weapons and high caliber ballistics is
to use Tables 5-1 or 5-2 or Figures 5-2 or 5-3 to locate energy absorption or
predetonation screens and to locate walls constructed to resist reduced energy or
predetonated rounds a short distance in front of windows to shield them. Where such
options are employed, ensure that the walls and screens do not provide opportunities
for concealment with in the unobstructed space required by UFC 4-010-01. A more
common approach to addressing this level of protection for the high caliber ballistics
and antitank weapons is to minimize the number and size of windows to decrease
visible window area and limit available targets. While that does not fully provide the
medium level of protection to the same extent that it is provided for walls or other
building components, doing anything else has limited practicality.
The design strategy for the high level of protection applies similarly to all threat severity
levels. It entails providing windows that resist the direct impact of the ballistic or anti-
tank rounds. Designing windows to resist antitank rounds is impractical, however. The
only practical approaches to addressing this level of protection against anti-tank
weapons are to either eliminate windows or to take the reduced window area and layout
approaches described in the low level of protection paragraph above. The latter will not
fully mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with this tactic, which will require assumption
of some risk on the part of the building occupants.
43
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Ballistic resistant windows are commonly designed based on testing to standards such
as those tabulated in Appendix C. It is important to note that window designs to meet
those standards must include entire window assemblies including glazing, frames, and
connections assembled as they would be in the field. Testing assemblies ensures that
all potential impact points on a window provide ballistics resistance. Window designs
will usually be proprietary and may use a variety of glazing and frame materials.
Manufacturers certify their compliance with the standards, usually through independent
testing laboratories. Window designs for non-armor piercing rounds of 7.62 mm (.30
caliber) and below are commonly available from most bullet resistant window
manufacturers. Designs to resist armor piercing rounds are less common. That makes
it important that designers review the actual test reports to ensure the tests follow
procedures similar to those in national standards and that the results appear to be
reasonable.
5-5 DOORS.
While the design strategy for the very low level of protection is limited to incorporating
the minimum standards of UFC 4-010-01, the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for
Buildings, there is a minimum standard that involves doors. It requires main entrances
to inhabited buildings to be oriented such that they do not face installation perimeters or
uncontrolled vantage points to minimize vulnerabilities to people entering or leaving
buildings. Where such orientations are not an option, the standard allows for providing
means to block lines of sight. Means to block lines of sight are described in the
following paragraph. In existing buildings changing entrance orientation may require
significant changes in building operations, such as using an alternate entrance as a
main entrance. The option of blocking sight lines is often the most practical for existing
buildings.
sight to targeted assets, door requirements are focused on obscuration. This level of
protection applies to all ballistics and anti-tank weapon threats. Obscuration can be
accomplished by controlling sight lines through door layout, door design, or shielding.
In addressing door layout, consider door arrangements that do not allow sight lines to
assets from outside the building such as the layout shown in Figure 5-6 or through the
use of foyers in front of doors. Alternatively, arrange rooms to ensure that potentially
targeted assets cannot be seen through the doors.
44
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 5-6. Entrance Layout to Limit Sight Lines
Doors can also be designed to limit sight lines through them by making them opaque
(as wood or metal doors would be) or by using translucent or figured glazing for vision
panels that allow light in but are not sufficiently transparent for people to be able to see
anything through them. Vision panels in doors can also be treated with reflective films
or glazing tints to limit views into buildings from outside as described above for
windows. Note that drapes or blinds need to be provided to obscure assets at night as
described previously. Drapes or blinds cannot be used for egress doors, however,
unless they are built into the doors’ vision panels or the doors will violate the
requirements of NFPA 101, the Life Safety Code. Sight lines to doors can also be
blocked by shielding the door from vantage points using walls or other screening
materials as illustrated in Figure 5-7. This is a particularly useful option for limiting
sightlines through existing doors. For the low level of protection, the screening material
only needs to be sufficient to limit vision through it. Design the shield to be wider than
the door by a distance established by extending a line from the door frame to the end of
the wall at a 450 angle from the building on both sides of the door as shown in Figure 5-
7. Design the shield to be higher than the door by at least the distance shown in Figure
5-7. Ensure the shield does not interfere with the requirements in NFPA 101 for egress
and egress discharge. Doing so may require the shield to be moved away from the
door, which may make it necessary to extend the wall.
45
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 5-7. Door Shielding
In general, the medium level of protection is only practical for high caliber ballistics (.50
caliber or 12.7 mm) or anti-tank weapons. The applicable design strategy is to employ
energy absorption or predetonation screens to limit the energy with which the projectiles
impact the target and to provide hardened construction to prevent the projectiles from
penetrating the protective envelope. It is not practical to design doors to resist
predetonated anti-tank rounds. While it may be possible to design doors for reduced
energy ballistics, most doors are designed and tested to meet a particular ballistic
standard and the reduced energy ballistics would not be reflected by any of those
standards. Developing door designs for that situation would be impractical. The
approach used, therefore, is to use Tables 5-1 or 5-2 or Figures 5-2 or 5-3 to locate
energy absorption or predetonation screens and to select wall construction to resist
reduced energy or predetonated rounds. Such walls should be configured in foyer
arrangements as illustrated in Figure 5-8 or in shielding configurations as in Figure 5-7.
In either case, the walls would provide all the necessary resistance to the threat and the
doors could be of any material.
46
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 5-8. Hardened Foyer Configuration
The design strategy for the high level of protection is to provide construction that resists
the direct impact of ballistics or anti-tank rounds. Approaches to applying that strategy
for doors are different for high caliber ballistics and anti-tank rounds and smaller caliber
ballistics.
5-5.4.1 Small caliber ballistics.

For ballistics below 0.50 caliber (12.7 mm) the design approach is to use bullet resistant
door assemblies. Those assemblies are tested in accordance with standards such as
those in Appendix C. Note that, as for windows, tested door designs to meet those
standards must include entire door assemblies including, frames, hardware, vision
panels, and connections assembled as they would be in the field. Testing assemblies
ensures that all potential impact points on a door provide ballistics resistance. Doors
are available from multiple manufacturers to meet the various standards, although not
all manufacturers provide doors to meet all the standards.
Door designs will commonly be proprietary and may use a variety of different door and
frame materials. Manufacturers certify their compliance with the standards, usually
through independent testing laboratories. Ballistics resistant doors will often be of the
same approximate dimensions and outward appearance as conventional doors, but
their cores may include other materials such as steel or bullet resistant fiberglass as
shown in Figure 5-9. Note that bullet resistant doors may be significantly heavier than
conventional doors, which may make them more difficult to operate and may require
heavier duty door operators where they are necessary. Egress doors must meet the
requirements of NFPA 101 for maximum allowable door operating force.
47
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 5-9. Bullet Resistant Fiberglass Door Core
5-5.4.2 High Caliber Ballistics and Anti-tank Weapons.

Doors designed to resist direct impacts from anti-tank rounds are not practical;
therefore, the approach to providing the high level of protection for that threat for doors
is to design foyers in front of the doors as shown in Figure 5-8. The exterior foyer wall
would be designed to provide the full resistance to the anti-tank round. Door designs to
resist .50 caliber (12.7 mm) rounds are available, but at the time this UFC is being
written none were tested to any nationally approved standards because such a standard
was only recently developed. That makes it important that designers review the actual
test reports to ensure the tests follow procedures similar to those in national standards
and that the results appear to be reasonable. Alternatively, application of hardened
foyers as described above is a good option for protecting doors against high caliber
ballistics.
5-6 VENT COVERS AND GRILLES.
Where there are potential sight lines to assets through vents or other building openings
they should be protected similarly to windows and doors.
incorporating the minimum standards of UFC 4-010-01, and since there are no
minimum standards related to mitigating direct fire weapons effects against vent covers
or grills, there are no requirements for vents or grills at this level of protection.
48
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Because the design strategy for the low level of protection involves obscuration, ensure
that any vent covers or grilles through which there are potential sight lines to assets are
designed such that aggressors cannot see through them. Alternatively, shield them or
block sightlines to them using opaque materials or vegetation or ensure through room
arrangement that there is nothing that could be targeted through them. Any shielding
using site furnishings or vegetation must avoid providing opportunities for concealment
within the \1\/1/ unobstructed space required by UFC 4-010-01.
The design strategy for the medium level of protection is to employ energy absorption or
predetonation screens to limit the energy with which the projectiles impact the target
and to provide hardened construction to prevent the projectiles from penetrating the
protective envelope. That approach is only practical for high caliber ballistics (.50
caliber or 12.7 mm) or anti-tank weapons. Designing vent covers or grilles to resist
predetonated anti-tank rounds is not practical; therefore, the vents should be shielded
by a wall designed to resist the predetonated round as described in the sections above
on walls and doors. Vent covers or grilles could be designed to resist reduced energy
ballistics or they could be shielded with walls designed to resist the reduced energy
rounds. To design vent covers and grilles to resist the reduced energy rounds locate an
energy absorption screen in accordance with the section above on walls and use
Equations 5-3 and 5-4 to design steel louvers. Where shielding walls are used, ensure
that their location and configuration are communicated to the mechanical engineers to
ensure that their heating, ventilation, and air conditioning designs take the potential for
reduced air flow into account.
Because the design strategy for this level of protection requires protective elements to
resist the direct impact of rounds and because resistance of vent and grill materials to
anti-tank weapons and low and high caliber ballistics are so different, each of those
applications will be discussed separately.
5-6.4.1 Low Caliber Ballistics.

Design vent covers or grilles with steel plate using equation 5-3 or use vent covers and
grilles that have been tested for ballistics resistance to an appropriate standard.
5-6.4.2 High Caliber Ballistics and Antitank Weapons.

Designing vent covers and grilles to resist the direct impact of 12.7 mm (.50 caliber)
bullets or anti-tank rounds would be impractical. Use shielding walls to resist the
rounds or orient the openings so they cannot be targeted. Where shielding walls are
provided, ensure that their location and configuration are communicated to the
mechanical engineers to ensure that their heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
designs take the potential for reduced air flow into account.
49
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
5-7 ROOFS.
Designing roofs to resist direct fire weapons is only an issue where there are sightlines
to roofs. Where that is the case, design the roof similarly to walls.
incorporating the minimum standards of UFC 4-010-01, and since there are no
minimum standards related to mitigating direct fire weapons effects against roofs, there
are no requirements for roofs at this level of protection.
Because the low level of protection is predicated on blocking sightlines to assets,

ensure the roof is opaque or translucent and treat any skylights like windows using the
guidance in the window section above.
Because the design strategy for this level of protection involves erecting energy
absorption or predetonation screens and designing to resist the reduced energy or
predetonated rounds it is only practical for high caliber (12.7 mm or .50 caliber) or anti-
tank rounds. Designing for this level of protection will require erecting an energy
absorption or predetonation screen above the roof by the appropriate distance and of
the appropriate material and designing the roof to resist the reduced energy or
predetonated round. Follow the guidance in the wall section above in designing for this
condition. That design will be conservative because it is predicated on perpendicular
impacts and roof impacts will most likely be at oblique angles. The steel penetration
equations for ballistics do take angle of obliquity into account, however.
Because the design strategy for the high level of protection depends on building
components resisting the direct impact of incoming rounds, where there are direct sight
lines to roofs the roofs will have to be designed using materials such as reinforced
concrete or steel to provide the necessary resistance.
Use the guidance in the wall section of this chapter to design roofs to resist either
ballistics or anti-tank threats. Note that impacts on roofs will commonly be at oblique
angles, so the tabulated material thicknesses in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 will be conservative
as will most of the equations in this chapter. The exception to that is Equation 5-4 for
steel, which includes angles of obliquity. Another option is to provide high parapets that
block sightlines to the roof. For this level of protection those parapets would either be
sufficiently constructed to provide all the penetration resistance necessary or the
combination of the parapet and the roof material would have to provide the resistance.
Refer to the wall section of this chapter to design the parapets. Figure 5-10 shows a
raised parapet configuration.
50
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Figure 5-10. Raised Parapets
51
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
52
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
APPENDIX A REFERENCES
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS (ASTM) INTERNATIONAL
http://www.astm.org/Standard/standards-and-publications.html
ASTM F 1233-08, Standard Test Method for Security Glazing Materials and Systems,
2013
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS)
SD-STD-01.01, Certification Standard Forced Entry and Ballistic Resistance of

Structural Systems Revision G April 30, 1993
FOREIGN STANDARDS
Australia / New Zealand AS/NZ 243, Bullet-Resistant Panels and Elements, 1997
British Standards Institution Standard BS 5051, Security Glazing, Part 1. Specification

for Bullet Resistant Glazing for Interior Use, 1988
Deutches Institut fur Normung (DIN) 52 290, Security Glazing, 1988
European Standard DIN EN 1063:2000: Glass In Building - Security Glazing - Testing

and Classification of Resistance Against Bullet Attack, 2000
NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (NFPA)
NFPA 101, Life Safety Code 2012
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE STANDARD (NIJ)
NIJ) 0108.01, Ballistic Resistant Protective Materials, 1985
UNDERWRITER’S LABORATORY
Underwriters Laboratories Standard 752, Bullet-Resisting Equipment, 2005
UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA
http://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod/unified-facilities-criteria-ufc
UFC 1-200-01, General Building Requirements
UFC 3-340-01, Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons

Effects (FOUO)
UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings
UFC 4-020-01, DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual
53
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
UFC 4-020-02, DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual, currently in Draft
and unavailable
OTHER
• H.P. White Laboratory, Inc. HPW-TP 0500.03, Test procedure: Transparent

Materials for Use in Forced Entry or Containment Barriers, 2003
54
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
APPENDIX B GLOSSARY
B-1 ACRONYMS
ANSI American National Standards Institute
AP Armor piercing
ASTM Not an acronym. Formerly American Society for Testing and Materials
AT Anti-tank
CNSC Conical nosed soft core
CRH Caliber Radius Head
DoD Department of Defense
FCJ Full copper jacket
FMCJ Full metal copper jacket
FMJ Full metal jacket
FSJ Full steel jacket
ft/s Feet per second
g Grams
gr. Grains
JSP Jacketed soft point
lbs Pounds
LAW Light anti-tank weapon
mm Millimeters
m/s Meters per second
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIJ National Institute of Justice
RN Round nosed
RNL Round nosed lead
RNSC Round nosed soft core

55
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
RPG Rocket propelled grenade
SHC Steel hard core
SWC Semi - wadcutter
UL Underwriters Laboratories
56
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
B-2 DEFINITION OF TERMS:
Ammunition. One or more loaded cartridges consisting of a primed case, propellant

and with or without one or more projectiles.
Angle of obliquity. The vertical angle from the perpendicular at which a projectile
strikes a target.
Armor piercing. The characteristics of bullets that allow them to penetrate armor,
relying on the design characteristics of the projectile, such as the shape of the tip and
materials used in the bullet, rather than upon increased muzzle energy. The effects of
armor piercing rounds differ from other rounds only in their ability to penetrate greater
material thicknesses, especially of hardened or armored materials such as steel or
composite assemblies including multiple layers of steel.
Ball. In ballistics, a general term used to describe military bullets which are entirely
inert and intended for antipersonnel and general use. The term is used to distinguish
them from specialized bullets such as tracers.
Ballistic Limit Velocity. That velocity for which there is a 50% probability of target
perforation.
Buckshot. The coarse lead-alloy spherical pellets loaded in shotgun shells as

projectiles. Buckshot is manufactured in sizes up to 1/3-inch diameter.
Building elements. Components of buildings and countermeasures associated directly

with building interiors and exterior surface features.
Bullet resistant. A descriptive term for a material designed to prevent injury to persons
or damage to objects positioned behind it when subjected to a ballistics attack.
Caliber. The caliber of a bullet refers to its diameter and is expressed either in
decimals of an inch or in millimeters. Typical examples include the 9mm (.38 caliber),
5.56mm \1\ (.22 caliber) and 7.62mm (.30 caliber) /1/ ammunition for military arms.
Controlled perimeter. For the purposes of this UFC, a physical boundary at which
vehicle access is controlled with sufficient means to channel vehicles to the access
control points. At a minimum, access control at a controlled perimeter requires the
demonstrated capability to search for and detect explosives. Where the controlled
perimeter includes a shoreline and there is no defined perimeter beyond the shoreline,
the boundary for measuring standoff distances will be at the mean high water mark or
the elevation associated with top of bank (associated with a flood recurrence interval of
1.2 years). (UFC 4-010-01)
Countermeasure. Any protective element put in place to mitigate the effects of a

threat. Countermeasures may include building elements, sitework elements, building
support systems, equipment, and manpower and procedures.
57
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Design Strategy. The approach for developing a protective system to mitigate the
effects of an attack. There are both general design strategies and specific design
strategies (specific to levels of protection) associated with each tactic.
Dudding. Rendering a live round inert.
Effective range. The maximum distance at which a weapon may be expected to be

accurate and achieve the desired effect.
Energy absorption screen. A solid surface that causes the energy of a projectile to be
reduced as the projectile passes through the screen with a residual velocity.
Full metal jacketed. A bullet made of lead and completely covered, except for the
base, with a copper alloy jacket (approximately 90 percent copper and 10 percent zinc).
Most military bullets are full metal jacketed.
Gas checked. In ballistics, a method for preventing the lead buildup in high velocity
handguns. A lead buildup occurs when an uncased soft lead bullet is propelled through
a gun barrel by a column of gas, causing enough friction to melt the edges of the base
of the lead bullet and subsequently causing a deposit of molten lead on the inner barrel
of the gun. To prevent this, a shallow copper cup is placed on the base of the bullet to
insulate it from the heat of the powder gases and to prevent lead buildup along the rifle
bore.
Gauge. In ballistics, the size of a shotgun expressed as the number in a pound of

round lead balls of a size to just fit into the barrel.
Grain. In ballistics, a measure of weight which is 1/7,000th of an English pound.

Grains are used to express the weight of bullets used for all ballistics standards.
Jacketed soft point. A bullet made of lead and completely covered, except for the
point, with copper alloy (approximately 90 percent copper and 10 percent zinc). The
absence of jacketing at the point of the bullet enhances its deformation upon impact.
Level of Protection. The degree to which an asset (person, equipment, object, etc.) is
protected against injury or damage from an attack. (UFC 4-010-01)
Lines of sight. Unobstructed direct views from vantage points to targets.
Magnum. A load or cartridge having greater power than other cartridges of the same
caliber. A magnum case is generally longer than a common case. For example, a .44
Magnum is approximately 1/8 inch longer than the .44 Special. A .44 Magnum revolver
will chamber either round, but a .44 Special revolver will chamber only the .44 Special
cartridge. Another variation of the magnum is a cartridge with an exceptionally large
propellant capacity in relation to the bore diameter, such as the .300 Winchester
Magnum.
Muzzle velocity. The velocity of a projectile as it exits the muzzle of a firearm.
58
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Obscuration. Blocking sightlines using any form of screening, vegetation, or building
treatment.
Parabellum. Cartridges and pistols originating with Deutsche Waffen and Munitions
Fabrik, Berlin; a term derived from their telegraphic address and trademark.
Penetration. Intrusion of a projectile beyond the strike face of a material without

emerging from the protected face.
Perforation. Complete penetration through a material creating an opening in both the

threat (target) face and the protected face.
Predetonation screen. A solid surface that causes an antitank round to detonate

before it reaches its target. When placed at the proper distance for the facility
construction, the screen will prevent penetration of the facility exterior by the antitank
round.
Residual velocity. In ballistics, the velocity a projectile has after it has perforated a
layer of material.
Round Nosed Lead. A lead bullet with a blunt, rounded tip.
Semi wadcutter. Intermediate bullet shape between round-nose and wadcutter (flat
point).
Sitework elements. Countermeasures that are applied beyond 1.5 meters (5 feet)
from a building, excluding countermeasures categorized under equipment.
Small arms. describes any number of smaller infantry weapons, such as firearms that
an individual soldier can carry. It is usually limited to revolvers, pistols, submachine
guns, shotguns, carbines, assault rifles, rifles, squad automatic weapons, light machine
guns.
Spall. The condition in which pieces of a material are broken loose from the inner
surface of a wall, roof, or similar element by tensile forces that are created when a
compression shock wave travels through the body and reflects from the surface.
Temperate zone. Either of two middle latitude zones of the Earth; the Northern
Temperate Zone and the Southern Temperate Zone, lying between 23-1/2 degrees and
66-1/2 degrees north and south.
Unobstructed space. Space around inhabited buildings in which there are no

opportunities for concealment from observation of explosive devices 6 inches (150 mm)
or greater in height or width. (UFC 4-010-01)
Witness panel. In ballistics, a material such as aluminum foil or corrugated cardboard

that is positioned behind and parallel to a test target. Witness panels are used to
provide evidence of penetration and spall created during impact of a test sample.
59
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
60
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
APPENDIX C BALLISTIC STANDARDS
C-1 BALLISTIC STANDARDS
Number
Organization Standard or Rating Ammunition Weight Diameter N Velocity
of Shots
9 mm Parabellum 9 mm Parabellum 124 gr. .354 in 1350 - 1450 ft/s
0.94
/Submachine Gun FMJ 8.04 g 9 mm 411 – 442 m/s
.38 Super 130 gr. .357 in 1230 - 1330 ft/s
.38 Super / Handgun 0.94
FMJ 8.42 g 9.07 mm 375 – 436 m/s
.44 Magnum 240 gr. .427 in 1400 - 1500 ft/s
.44 Magnum / Handgun 0.91
ASTM JSP 15.55 g 10.85 mm 427 – 457 m/s 3
F 1233 7.62 mm (.30 caliber) M-80 147 gr. .30 in 2750 - 2850 ft/s
7.62 mm NATO / Rifle 1.26
NATO 9.53 g 7.82 mm 838 – 869 m/s
.30-’06 Armor Piercing / .30-’06 M2 AP 165 gr. .30 in 2725 - 2825 ft/s
1.39
Rifle 10.69 g 7.82 mm 831 – 861 m/s
12 Gauge Shotshell, 3 # 00 Buckshot 808 gr. 1265 - 1365 ft/s
n/a n/a
inch Magnum / Shotgun 3 inch Magnum 52.36 g 386 – 416 m/s
9 mm Parabellum 115 gr. .355 in 1294 – 1362 ft/s
G0, 9mm Parabellum 0.94
FMJ 7.45 g 9 mm 394 – 415 m/s
.357 Magnum 158 gr. .357 in 1467 – 1532 ft/s
G1, .357 Magnum 0.94
SWC 10.24 g 9.07 mm 447 – 467 m/s
Councils of .44 Magnum 240gr. .427 in 1568 – 1634 ft/s
G2, .44 Magnum 0.91
Standards SWC 15.55 g 11.18 mm 478 – 498 m/s 3
Australia / New .223 caliber, 5.56 mm NATO 55 gr. .223 in 3182 – 3248 ft/s
R1, .223, 5.56 NATO 1.17
Zealand M193 3.56 g 5.66 mm 970 – 990 m/s
AS/NZ 2343 .30 caliber, 7.62 mm NATO 147 gr. .30 in 2766 – 2831 ft/s
R2, .30, 7.62 NATO 1.26
M80 7.53 g 7.82 mm 843 – 863 m/s
493 gr. 1289 – 1355 ft/s
S0, 12 Gauge, 2-3/4 “ 12 Gauge, 2-3/4” Shot n/a n/a
31.95 g 393 – 413 m/s
S1, 12 Gauge, 382 gr. 1532 – 1598 gr.
12 Gauge, 2-3/4” Slug n/a n/a 2
2-3/4” 24.75 g 467 – 487 g
BSI, G0, 9 mm 9 mm Parabellum 115 gr. .355 in 1280 – 1378 ft/s
0.94
British Parabellum FMJ 7.45 g 9 mm 390- 420 m/s
Standards 158 gr. .357 in 1427 – 1526 ft/s 3
BSI, G1, .357 Magnum .357 Magnum JSP 0.94
Institution 10.24 g 9.07 mm 435 – 465 m/s
BS 5051 240gr. .427 in 1496 – 1594 ft/s
BSI, G2, .44 Magnum .44 Magnum JSP 0.91
15.55 g 11.18 mm 456 – 486 m/s
61
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Number
of Shots
.223 caliber, 5.56 mm NATO 63 gr. .223 in 3015 – 3114 ft/s
British BSI, R1, .223, 5.56 NATO 1.17
M885/SS109 4.08 g 5.66 mm 919 – 949 m/s
Standards 3
.30 caliber, 7.62 mm NATO 147 gr. .30 in 2674 – 2772 ft/s
Institution BSI, R2, .30, 7.62 1.26
M80 9.53 g 7.82 mm 815 – 845 m/s
BS 5051
BSI, S86, 12 Gauge 2- 438 gr. 1332 – 1463 ft/s
(continued) 12 Gauge, 2-3/4” Slug n/a n/a 1
3/4” 28.38 g 406 – 446 m/s
40 gr. .222 in 1048 – 1214 ft/s
BR1, .22 LR .22 LR RNL 0.95
2.59 g 5.63 mm 319 – 370 m/s
124 gr. .354 in 1280 – 1345 ft/s
BR2, 9 mm Parabellum 9 mm Luger FSJ-RNSC 0.94
8.04 g 9 mm 390 – 410 m/s
158 gr. .357 in 1378 – 1444 ft/s
BR3, .357 Magnum .357 Magnum FSJ-CNSC 0.94
10.24 g 9.07 mm 420 – 440 m/s
240 gr. .427 in 1411 – 1476 ft/s
BR4, .44 Magnum .44 Magnum FCJ-FNSC 0.91
15.55 g 11.18 mm 430 – 450 m/s 3
European 5.56 x 45 NATO (.223
62 gr. .223 in 3084 – 3150 ft/s
Standard BR5, 5.56 x 45 NATO AP Remington) SS 109 1.17
4.02 g 5.66 mm 940-0960 m/s
DIN EN 1063 steel penetrator
7.62 x 51 NATO M80 147 gr. .30 in 2690 – 2756 ft/s
BR6, 7.62 x 51 NATO 1.26
FSJ 9.53 g 7.82 mm 820 – 840 m/s
7.62 x 51 NATO AP 150 gr. .30 in 2657 – 2723 ft/s
BR7, 7.62 x 51 NATO AP 1.26
SHC 9.72 g 7.82 mm 810 – 830 m/s
12 Gauge solid lead 478 gr. 1312 – 1444 ft/s
SG1, Shotgun n/a n/a 1
Brenneke slug 30.97 g 400 – 440 m/s
12 Gauge solid lead 478 gr. 1312 – 1444 ft/s
SG2, Shotgun n/a n/a 3
Brenneke slug 30.97 g 400 – 440 m/s
C1-SF and C1-SA, 9 mm 9 mm Parabellum 124 gr. .355 in 1165 – 1198 ft/s
0.94
Parabellum FMJ 8.04 g 9 mm 355 – 365 m/s
German
C2-SF and C2-SA, .357 158 gr. .357 in 1362 – 1394 ft/s
Deutche .357 Magnum FMJ 0.94
Magnum 10.24 g 9.07 mm 415 – 425 m/s
Institut fur
C3-SF and C3-SA, .44 240 gr. .427 in 1427 – 1460 ft/s
Normung .44 Magnum FMJ 0.91 3
Magnum 15.55 g 11.18 mm 435 – 445 m/s
(DIN)
C4-SF and C-4 SA, .30, .30 caliber, 7.62 mm NATO 147 gr. .30 in 2575 – 2608 ft/s
52-290 1.26
7.62 NATO M80 9.53 g 7.82 mm 785 – 795 m/s
C5-SF and C5-SA, .30, .30 caliber , 7.62 mm NATO 150 gr. .30 in 2625 – 2657 ft/s
1.26
7.62 NATO M61 AP 9.72 g 7.82 mm 800 – 810 m/s
62
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Number
of Shots
.38 Special 158 gr. .357 in 700 – 800 ft/s
A, .38 Special 0.94
RNL 10.24 g 9.07 mm 213 – 274 m/s
9 mm x 19 124 gr. .355 in 1100 – 1180 ft/s
B, 9 mm x 19 0.94
HP White FMJ 8.04 g 9 mm 335 – 360 m/s
Laboratories 240gr. .427 in 1350 – 1450 ft/s
C, .44 Magnum .44 Magnum 0.91
HPW-TP 15.55 g 11.18 mm 411 – 442 m/s
0500.02 147 gr. .30 in 2725 – 2825 ft/s 3
D, 7.62 x 51 7.62 x 51 NATO M80 1.26
9.53 g 7.82 mm 831 – 861 m/s
165 gr. .30 in 2725 – 2825 ft/s
E, .30-06 .30-06 M2 AP 1.39
10.69 g 7.82 mm 831 – 861 m/s
MIL-SAMIT .30 caliber, 7.62 mm NATO 147 gr. .30 in 2750 - 2800 ft/s
.30, 7.62 NATO Part 1 1.26
(Military Small M80 9.53 g 7.82 mm 838 - 853 m/s
Arms Multiple .30 caliber, 7.62 mm NATO 150 gr. .30 in > 2800 ft/s
Impact Test) .30, 7.62 NATO Part 2 1.26 25
M61 AP 9.72 g 7.82 mm > 853 m/s
.22 Long Rifle, High 40 gr. .222 in
.22 long rifle 0.95
Velocity, Lead 2.6 g 5.64 mm
Type I
158 gr. .357 in 800 – 900 ft/s
.38 Special .38 Special RN 0.94
10.2 g 9.07 mm 244 – 274 m/s
Lower velocity 158 gr. .357 in 1200 – 1300 ft/s
.357 Magnum JSP 0.94
.357 Magnum 10.2 g 9.07 mm 366 – 396 m/s
Type IIA
Lower velocity 124 gr. .355 in 1050 – 1130 ft/s
9 mm FMJ 0.94
9 mm 8.0 g 9 mm 320 – 344 m/s
National Higher
158 gr. .30 in 1345 – 1445 ft/s
Institute of velocity .357 .357 Magnum JSP 0.94 5
10.2 g 7.82 mm 410 – 440 m/s
Justice Type II Magnum
(NIJ) Higher 124 gr. .355 in 1135 – 1215 ft/s
9 mm FMJ 0.94
0108.01 velocity 9 mm 8.0 g 9 mm 346 – 370 m/s
.44 Magnum Lead SWC Gas 240 gr. .427 in 1350 – 1450 ft/s
.44 Magnum 0.91
Type Checked 15.55 g 11.08 mm 411 – 442 m/s
IIIA Submachine 124 gr. .355 in 1350 – 1450 ft/s
9 mm FMJ 0.94
gun – 9 mm 8.0 g 9 mm 411 – 442 m/s
Type III (High Powered 7.62 mm / .30 Winchester 150gr. .30 in 2700 – 2800 ft/s
1.26
Rifle) FMJ 9.7 g 7.82 mm 823 – 853 m/s
Type IV (Armor Piercing 166 gr. .30 in 2800 – 2900 ft/s
30-06 AP 1.39 1
Rifle) 10.8 g 7.82 mm 853 – 884 m/s
63
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Number
of Shots
SD – Minimum, 9 mm 115 gr. .354 in 1350 – 1450 ft/s
9 mm Parabellum FSJ 0.94 3
Parabellum 7.45 g 9 mm 411 – 442 m/s
SD - Minimum, 12 556 gr. n/a 1275 – 1375 ft/s
12 gauge, 2-3/4”, #4 Buck n/a
gauge, 2-3/4” 36.03 g 389 – 419 m/s
SD - Rifle .30, 7.62 NATO .30 caliber, 7.62 mm NATO 147 gr. .30 in 2700 – 2800 ft/s
1.26
(Part 1) M80 9.53 g 7.82 mm 823 – 853 m/s
SD - Rifle .223, 5.56 .223 caliber, 5.56 mm NATO 55 gr. .223 in 3135 – 3235 ft/s
1.17 1
NATO (Part 2) M193 3.56 g 5.66 mm 956 – 986 m/s
SD - Rifle .223, 5.56 63 gr. .223 in > 2950 ft/s
State .223 caliber, 5.56 NATO M855 1.17
NATO (Part 3) 4.08 g 5.66 mm > 899 m/s
Department
SD – Rifle, 12 gauge, 2- 556 gr. n/a 1275 – 1375 ft/s
SD-STD-01.01 12 gauge, 2-3/4”, #4 Buck n/a
3/4” (Part 4) 36.03 g 389 – 419 m/s
SD – Rifle AP, .30, 7.62 .30 caliber, 7.62 mm NATO 150gr. .30 in 2700 – 2800 ft/s
1.39 3
NATO (Part 1) M61 AP 9.72 g 7.82 mm 823 – 853 m/s
SD – Rifle AP, 12 gauge, 556 gr. n/a 1275 – 1375 ft/s
12 gauge, 2-3/4”, #4 Buck n/a 1
2-3/4” (Part 1) 36.03 g 389 – 419 m/s
SD – Rifle AP, .30, 30-06 165 gr. .30 in 2800 – 2900 ft/s
.30-06 caliber M2AP 1.39 3
(Part 1) 10.69 g 7.82 mm 853 – 884 m/s
SD – Rifle AP, 12 gauge, 556 gr. n/a 1275 – 1375 ft/s
12 gauge, 2-3/4”, #4 Buck n/a 1
2-3/4” (Part 1) 36.03 g 389 – 419 m/s
64
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
Number
of Shots
124 gr. .354 in 1175 – 1293 ft/s
Level 1 9mm FMCJ w/ lead core 0.94
8.0 g 9 mm 358 – 394 m/s
158 gr. .357 in 1250 – 1375 ft/s
Level 2 .357 Magnum JSP 0.94 3
10.2 g 9.07 mm 381 – 419 m/s
.44 Magnum lead SWC, gas 240 gr. .427 in 1350 – 1485 ft/s
Level 3 0.91
checked 15.6 g 11.18 mm 411 – 453 m/s
.30-06 caliber rifle lead core 180 gr. .30 in 2540 – 2794 ft/s
Level 4 1.39
soft point 11.7 g 7.82 mm 774 – 852 m/s
1
7.62 mm (.30 caliber) rifle 150gr. .30 in 2750 – 3025 ft/s
Level 5 1.26
lead core FMCJ , Military Ball 9.7 g 7.82 mm 838 – 922 m/s
124 gr. .354 in 1400 – 1540 ft/s
Underwriters Level 6 9 mm FMCJ with lead core 0.94
8.0 g 9 mm 427 – 469 m/s
Laboratories
5.56 rifle, FMCJ with lead 55 gr. .223 in 3080 – 3388 ft/s
(UL) 752 Level 7 1.17 5
core 3.56 g 5.66 mm 939 – 1033 m/s
7.62 mm rifle lead core FMCJ, 150 gr. .30 in 2750 – 3025 ft/s
Level 8 1.26
military ball 9.7 g 7.82 mm 838 – 922 m/s
.30-06 caliber rifle, steel core 166 gr. .30 in 2715 – 2987 ft/s
Level 9 1.39
lead point filler, FMJ (APM2) 10.8 g 7.82 mm 828 – 910 m/s
1
.50 caliber rifle lead core 709.5 gr. .51 in 2810 – 3091 ft/s
Level 10 1.31
FMCJ Military Ball, M2 45.9 g 12.95 mm 856 – 942 m/s
437 gr. n/a 1585 – 1744 ft/s
12-gauge rifled lead slug n/a
28.3 g 483 – 531 m/s
Supplementary Shotgun 3
650 gr. n/a 1200 – 1320 ft/s
12 gauge 00 buck shot n/a
42 g 366 – 402 m/s
ABBREVIATIONS:
AP = armor piercing JSP = Jacketed Soft Point N = Nose Shape in = inches

CNSC = Conical Nosed Soft Core RN = Round Nosed Coefficient mm = millimeters
FCJ = Full Copper Jacket RNL = Round Nosed Lead n/a = not applicable
FMCJ = Full Metal Copper Jacket RNSC = Rounds Nosed Soft Core (lead) ft/s = feet per
FMJ = Full Metal Jacket SHC = Steel Hard Core second
FSJ = Full Steel Jacket SWC = Semi Wad Cutter m/s = meters per
second
gr. = grains
g = grams
65
UFC 4-023-07
7 July 2008
C-2 UL LEVELS
LEVEL 1: Protection against hand guns of medium power, such as the 9 mm, Super 38
Automatic, and the like, with muzzle energy of 380 – 460 foot-pounds (515 – 624 J).
LEVEL 2: Protection against hand guns of high power, such as the .357 Magnum, and the
like, with muzzle energy of 548 – 663 foot-pounds (743 – 899 J).
LEVEL 3: Protection against hand guns of super power, such as the .44 Magnum, and the
like, with muzzle energy of 971 – 1175 foot-pounds (1317 – 1593 J).
LEVEL 4: Protection against high-power hunting and sporting rifles, such as the 30-06,
and the like, with muzzle energy of 2580 – 3120 foot-pounds (3498 – 4929 J).
LEVEL 5: Protection against military ball full metal copper jacket ammunition fired from a
hunting rifle such as the 308 Winchester or a military rifle with muzzle energy of 2519 –
3048 foot-pounds (3416 – 4133 J).
LEVEL 6: Protection against multiple shots from a submachine-gun, such as a 9 mm Uzi,
LEVEL 7: Protection against multiple shots from a military assault rifle, such as an M-16,
LEVEL 8: Protection against multiple shots from a military assault rifle, such as an M-14,
LEVEL 9: Protection against armor piercing rounds fired from an M1 Garand rifle or the
like, or high-power hunting and sporting rifles with muzzle energy of 2717 to 2777 foot-
pounds (3683 – 4457 J). The bullet will be a .30-06 armor piercing round such as the US
Military APM2.
LEVEL 10: Protect against one shot from a military sniper rifle, such as the Barrett M82
A1 (XM 107), with a muzzle energy of 12,439 – 12. 706 foot-pounds (16, 863 – 20,404 J).
The bullet will be a .50 caliber round such as the US Military M2.
SUPPLEMENTARY SHOTGUN: A supplementary test using a rifled lead slug with a
muzzle energy of 2438 – 2950 foot-pounds (3306 – 4000 J) and 00 lead buckshot with a
muzzle energy of 2078 – 2415 foot-pounds (2818 – 3275 J), fired from a 12-gauge
shotgun. Products shall be tested with both loads. Products complying with this test may
have the suffix ²-SG² added to the rating designation.
66

Unified Facilities Criteria (Ufc), Design To Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Unified Facilities Criteria (Ufc), Design To Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Unified Facilities Criteria (Ufc), Design To Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

UFC 4-023-07

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

DESIGN TO RESIST DIRECT FIRE

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

DESIGN TO RESIST DIRECT FIRE

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND (Preparing Activity)

AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT AGENCY

Record of Changes (changes are indicated by \1\ ... /1/)

Change No. Date Location

This UFC supersedes UFC 4-023-07, dated Jul 2008.

Superseding: UFC 4-023-07, Design to Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects

Description: This change updated the document’s format, incorporated multiple

Reasons for Document:

Table 2-1 Threat Parameters................................................................................... 7

1-5 VULNERABILITY AND RISK ASSESSMENT.

1-6 GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS.

Appendix C contains acronyms, abbreviations, and terms.

1-9 SECURITY ENGINEERING UFC SERIES.

1-9.2 Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual.

1-9.3 DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual.

UFC 4-020-02 provides interdisciplinary design guidance for developing preliminary

1-9.4 Security Engineering Support Manuals.

1-9.5 Security Engineering UFC Application.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

2-2 THREAT LEVELS.

2-2.1 Threat Severity.

Design Basis Weapons / Standards Effective Range

2-3.1 U.S Standards.

2-3.2 Non-U.S. Standards.

2-4 ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS.

Figure 2-1. Representative Anti-tank Round Cross-Section

Figure 2-2. Shaped Charge Penetration

2-4.3 Older Warheads.

This chapter describes the approach to developing systems of countermeasures to

3-2 DESIGN STRATEGIES.

3-2.1 General Design Strategy.

3-2.2 Specific Design Strategies.

3-2.2.1 Very Low Level of Protection.

3-2.2.2 Low Level of Protection.

3-2.2.4 High Level of Protection.

3-3 THE PROTECTIVE SYSTEM.

3-3.1 Sitework Elements.

3-3.2 Building Elements.

3-3.3 Building Support Systems.

Equipment as a category of countermeasures includes such things as electronic

3-3.5 Manpower and Procedures.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

4-2 FACILITY LOCATION.

4-2.1 Locating Away from Vantage Points.

4-2.2 Locating on High Points of Land.

4-2.4 Locating Near Other Buildings.

4-3 COUNTERMEASURES FOR VERY LOW LEVEL OF PROTECTION.

4-4 COUNTERMEASURES FOR LOW LEVEL OF PROTECTION.

4-4.1 Planting and the Unobstructed Space.

4-4.2.1 Shrubs for Hedges.

4-4.2.2 Shrubs to Avoid.

4-4.4 Fences and Walls.

4-4.5 Using Landforms to Increase the Height.