SUCCESSION CASE DIGEST:

1. SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,

vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
JUGO, respondents. (G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985)

FACTS: Martin Jugo died testate. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him. In the said Will, the
testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his
estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom
he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully
wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the
Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his
children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.

On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the
deceased Martin Jugo.

On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging
that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; and
that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator hence making the will void.

On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted
in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's
admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident.

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and
decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of
a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by
law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same.

Respondent contends that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the
petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last
Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

WON the court has jurisdiction in ascertaining that the will is void based on the admission of the testator of
the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner, as manifested in the will.

RULING:

Yes the court has jurisdiction. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.

It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428) Except in cases
where the probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void, the
court may act correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established.

In the case at bar, there appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both
parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that
the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. Hence, the court may now move to ascertain the
intrinsic validity of the will.

Moreover the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons
who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even
assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the
testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

2. JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents. (G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000)

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855
square meters of that parcel of land. The codicil provides that at the time that the lease of Balbinito G.
Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give
to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies. Furthermore, should the buyer, lessee
or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall
turn it over to my near desendants.

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned
heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs
are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite
identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the
New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.

And furthermore, that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his
obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having
consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the
obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

ISSUE: WON Respondent has the right to seize the property in favor of the descendants of the Testatrix Aleja
Belleza?

RULING: Yes, respondent has the right to seize said property based on the will.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of
its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration
the circumstances under which it was made.23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its
parts must be adopted.24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of
sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise
negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the
sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's
near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the
property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed
by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by
the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how
his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot
be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

3. LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs. DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee (G.R. No. L-15737, February 28, 1962)

FACTS: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in
Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-
half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.

Don Nicolas died and his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno instituted a civil action for partition of the estate of
the deceased. By virtue of the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will.

On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and without
having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special
Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and
qualified judicial administrator.

Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow
Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became
vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause
7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title
to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that
she never remarried.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner (grandniece) may claim ownership of the estate of the deceased after the death of
the widow?

RULING: Yes, petitioner becomes the owner of the property.

The plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow
with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further
condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even
during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties,
even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion
mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of
"dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow
the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment)
during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal
heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6).

The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could succeed to the
properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried, has
unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as
equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.

ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." .(Each word of the will
must be given some effect)

Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his testament
should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are over the
primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole
condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been
unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.

Hence applying the above ruling, the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the
ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the
death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno.

4. In Re Will of Riosa G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918

Topics/Doctrines: The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force
at the time it is made (Art. 795, NCC).

FACTS:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of
the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls. Jose Riosa died on April
17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in
accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was
not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain
additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other
words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the
witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new
law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator,
without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid?
HELD:
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made after the
date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law. (Caraig vs
Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has further held in a
decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose death took place prior
to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918],
38 Phil., 276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was execute prior to
the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this law. The rule
prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the
statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no
retrospective effect. Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so
construed only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will,
formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would
unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though
before his death. (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209)

This court, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality.
Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of
[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

[189]

his property and that his desires should be respected by the courts. The act of bequeathing or devising
is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is
executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on the property until a
future time. The will of Jose Riosa is valid and section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the
applicable law.

5. Enriquez vs. Abadia G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954

Topic/Doctrine: Will and Testament

FACTS:

In September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed document purporting to
be his Last Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died onJanuary 14, 1943, in the municipality
of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October
2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will,
filedopposition.

During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction
that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wroteout in longhand the will
in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he signed on The left hand margin of the front page
of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with
Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence
of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed
their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other.
The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will; that it was in the hand writing of the
testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic
wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided
the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under
a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is
the controlling factor and may override any defect in form,said trial court admitted to probate the Last Will
and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed despite the fact that when it was executed the civil
code proscribes the execution of such wills.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that despite the effectivity of the new Civil Code allowing the executionof
holographic wills, the contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and admitted to probate. This is
because under Art. 795 of the Civil Code, the extrinsic validity of a will should be judged not by the law
existing at the time of the testator’s death nor the law at the time of its probate, but by the law existing
at the time of the execution of the instrument. For the verysimple reason that although the will becomes
operative only after the testator’s death, still hiswishes are given expression at the time of execution.

6. IBARLE v. PO GR No.L-5064 February 27, 1953

Topics/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment
of his death.

FACTS:

Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and
some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the
same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian
of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now
belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE:

Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD:

The sale to defendant is valid. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death."
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.

On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the
plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

7. QUIRICO L. SATURNINO, petitioner,

vs. FELIZA LUZ PAULINO, MAXIMO DALEJA, JUANA LUCAS, NEMESIO LUCAS, DONATA
GUILLERMO, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. (G.R. No. L-7385 May 19, 1955)

Domingo, Valenciano and Aguinaldo for petitioner.

Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz and Ruiz for respondent.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The pertinent facts are:

Upon the death of Jaime Luz Paulino, on February 10, 1937, he was survived by his children — Timoteo
Esteban, Macario and Feliza, all surnamed Luz Paulino — and a grandson-Quirico L. Saturnino, son of his
deceased daughter Antonia Luz Paulino. Among the properties left by Jaime Luz Paulino is a house and lot,
situated in Barrio No. 13, municipality of Laoag, province of Ilocos Norte, and more particularly known as Lot
No. 11366 of the Laoag Cadastre. On October 22, 1945, his daughter Feliza Luz Paulino executed a deed of
absolute sale of said property in favor of the spouses Maxima Daleja and Juana Lucas and Nemesio Lucas and
Donata Guillermo, for the aggregate sum of P1,200.00. In the language of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

As said sale was made without the knowledge or consent of Quirino L. Saturnino who, according to
him, learned of it in the early morning of October 23, 1945 (Exhs. B and I), and being desirous of
exercising his right of subrogation as co-heir of the vendor, on October 23, 1945, and again on the
29th of the month, in the presence and with the assistance of his lawyer, offered verbally and in
writing to the vendees to return then and there to them, in actual case, 4/5 of the purchase price of
said property, together with the expenses incurred by them in the preparation of the document, and
tendered to them in their respective houses in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, written copies of the offer and the
money in actual cash, Philippine currency, but defendants Juana Lucas and Donato Guillermo, for
themselves and in representation of their respective husbands who were absent, refused acceptance
thereof. For this reason on the following day, October 30, 1945, Quirino L. Saturnino instituted this
action in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte against the defendants mentioned in the captain
hereof, depositing with the Clerk of said Court the sum of P960, Philippine currency, for delivery to the
defendant vendees by way of reimbursement, together with the amount of P50 Philippine currency, to
cover the expenses incurred in the preparation of the deed of sale, and stating that he was ready and
willing to deposit other additional sums that the court may deem just and necessary. On these
averments plaintiff prayed in the complaint that judgment be rendered in his favor and against the
defendants:

a. Declaring the sale made by defendant Feliza Luz Paulino to her co-defendants illegal with
respect to one-fifth of the lot and to declare said one-fifth undivided share of the plaintiff;

b. To order the defendants Maximo Daleja, Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donato Guillermo
to accept and receive from the clerk of court the sum of P690 corresponding to reimbursement
of the price paid by them for four-fifths (4/5) of the lot which their co-defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino could legally convey; and the additional sum of P50 to cover their expenses in the
preparation of the deed of sale;
 c. Ordering the defendants Maximo Dalaja, Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo
to execute a deed of reconveyance of what they could legally buy from their co-defendant
Feliza Luz Paulino of the lot in question, in favor of the herein plaintiff; and

d. Ordering the aforesaid defendants to pay damages in the sum of P1,000 annually to plaintiff
until the reconveyance is effected, and an additional sum of P1,000 as damages to be paid by
all of the defendants for their malicious acts, and cost of the suit.

For such other remedies and relief just and equitable in the premises.

On November 14, 1945, defendants answered the complaint with counterclaim, which was amended on
December 12 of the same year, wherein it is alleged, among other things, that on April 25, 1937, at the
municipality of Laoag, province of Ilocos Norte, all their inheritance from the deceased Jaime Luz
Paulino had been divided in accordance with Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the last
verbal wish of the decedent before his death, giving the residential lot in question together with the
house of strong materials constructed thereon to Feliza Luz Paulino as her exclusive and only share,
and leaving her brothers, Timoteo, Esteban and Macario, and their nephew Quirino Saturnino to divide
all the agricultural lands among themselves, which division was duly effected. Defendants Maximo
Daleja, Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo allege that they are engaged in business
and purposely bought said lot to erect thereon a "camarin' for a rice mill and for use as a warehouse of
rice, "bagoong", coconuts and other articles of commerce and to deposit logs and lumber, and that
because of their inability to realize this plan due to action of the plaintiff, they will suffer damages in
the sum of P3,000 yearly unit this case is terminated. Wherefore all the defendants pray the court:

1. To dismiss the complaint;

2. To declare Feliza Luz Paulino as the exclusive owner of the whole lot in question;

3. To declare the sale made by Feliza Luz Paulino of the whole lot in question to her co-defendants
valid in full force and effect;

4. To order the plaintiff to pay three thousand pesos (P3,000) annually until this case is terminated and
the further sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the malicious acts of the plaintiff and the costs of
this suit; and

5. Any other relief just and equitable. (Roll, pp. 17-20)

This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 23 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.

Meanwhile, or on November 19, 1945, Quirino L. Saturnino had filed, with said court, a petition, which was
docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 37, for the probate of the will and testament of Jaime Luz Paulino.
Although, at first, all of the other heirs objected to said petition, on June 30, 1949, they eventually withdrew
their opposition thereto, and the probate of the will was allowed by an order dated July 6, 1949. Said will
provided that the property in dispute in Case No. 23, be distributed, share and share alike among the heirs of
the testator.

On or about March 10, 1950, the defendant in said Case No. 23 — respondents herein — filed a supplemental
answer alleging the plaintiff — petitioner herein — has no legal capacity to sue, because the property in
litigation therein is part of the estate which is the subject matter of Case No. 37, in which an administrator was
appointed but no adjudication had, as yet, been made. In due course, a decision was rendered in Case No. 23,
on December 2, 1950, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
 FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court renders judgment declaring the sale made by
defendant Feliza Luz Paulino to her co-defendants null and void with respect to one-fifth (1/5) of the
lot in question and the plaintiff is declared owner thereof as his undivided share; that the defendants
are ordered to receive from the Clerk of Court the sum of P960 corresponding to the reimbursement of
the price paid by them for four-fifths (4/5) of the lot in question which their co-defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino could legally convey to them, and to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of the plaintiff.
(Roll, pp. 20-21).

On appeal from this decision, that defendants contended in the Court of Appeals, that the lower court had
erred:

1. In not dismissing the complaint in so far as the recovery of one-fifth undivided interest in the lot in
question is concerned;

2. In not finding that there was an agreement between the defendant Feliza Luz Paulino on one hand
and Esteban, Timoteo and Macario Luz Paulino on the other by virtue of which the house and lot on
question were given and delivered to Feliza Luz Paulino;

3. In not finding the plaintiff-appellee fully confirmed the abovementioned agreement;

4. In not upholding the validity of said agreement duly confirmed by the plaintiff-appellee and in not
giving its effects and efficacy;

5. In declaring the sale of the lot in question invalid with respect to one-fifth share of the appellee;

6. In holding that there exists co-ownership in the lot between the appellee and appellants-purchasers;
and

7. In ordering the appellants-purchaser to let redemption prayed for by the appellee. (Roll, p. 21).

None of this questions was, however, decided by the Court of Appeals, which found it necessary to pass
instead, upon what it regarded a "prejudicial question." Said of the Court of Appeals:

Before delving into the merits of the appeal, we have first to pass upon a prejudicial question. There is
no dispute in this case that the properties left by the late Jaime Luz Paulino are in custodia legis, for
they are subject to testate proceedings in said Civil Case No. 37 which is still pending in the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Although the will of the testator had been allowed, no settlement of
accounts has been effected, no partition of the properties left by the decedent has been made, and the
heirs have not legally received or been adjudicated or assigned any particular piece of the mass of their
inheritance. This being the case, and pending such partition, adjudication or assignment to the heirs of
the residue of the estate of the testator Jaime Luz Paulino, none of his heirs can properly allege or
claim to have inherited any portion of said residue, if there may be any, because of his or her right of
inheritance remains to be in the nature of hope. Consequently, neither Feliza Luz Paulino, nor any of
her co-heirs, can legally represent the estate of the decedent, or dispose as his or hers of the property
involved in this case, included as item No. 20 of the inventory (Exh. 4), or institute any case in court to
demand any part of such estate as his own, or claim any right of legal redemption as co-heir in the sale
of any piece of the mass of the inheritance that may have been disposed of by any of the heirs. In the
case at bar, even if it were true that by agreement of the heirs the property involved herein had been
assigned to Feliza Luz Paulino as her share, that agreement and subsequent sale are of no legal effect
without the sanction or approval of the court before which Civil Case No. 37 is pending.

The foregoing conclusion relieves Us from considering the other points raised in the present
controversy.
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the complaint dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (Roll, pp. 21-23.)

The present petition for review by certiorari filed by Quirico L. Saturnino, is directed against this decision of the
Court of Appeals. It is clear, to our mind, that said petition must be granted. Pending "partition, adjudication
or assignment to the heirs" of a deceased estator, their "right of inheritance" is not merely" in the nature of
hope," for — pursuant to Article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines at the
time of the death of Jaime Luz Paulino — "the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death" and the heirs — pursuant to Article 661 of the same Code — "succeed to the deceased
in all his rights and obligations by the mere fact of his death." In other words, the person concerned is an heir
and he may exercise his rights as such, from the very moment of the death of the decedent. One of those
rights is that of redemption under Article 1067 of the aforesaid code (Article 1088 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines). What is more, this right of redemption may be exercised only before partition, for said provision
declares explicitly:

If either of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of his
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the purchase price,
provided it be done within the period of one month, to be counted from the time they were informed
thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

With reference to the adjudication, which the Court of Appeals seemingly considers essential to the enjoyment
of the right of redemption among co-heirs, it should be noted that a property may be adjudicated either to one
heir only or to several heirs pro-indiviso. In the first case, the adjudication partakes, at the same time, of the
nature of a partition. Hence, if the property is sold by the heir to whom it was adjudicated, the other heirs are
not entitled to redeem the property, for, as regards, the same, they are neither co-heirs nor co-owners. In the
second case, the heirs to whom the property was adjudicated pro-indiviso are, thereafter, no longer co-heirs,
but merely co-owners. Consequently, neither may assert the right of redemption conferred to co-heirs,
although, in proper cases, they may redeem as co-owners, under Article 1522 of the Civil Code of Spain
(Article 1620, Civil Code of the Philippines. Hence, commenting on said Article 1067, Manresa says:

La venta del derecho hereditario ha de hacerse antes de que sepractique la particion. Esto es evidente,
porque despues al derecho hereditario en abstracto sustituyen las cosas o derechos determinados
comprendidos en la respectiva adjudicacion, cesa la comunidad en la herencia, y podra proceder otro
retracto, mas no el retracto especiala que el art. 1067 se refiere. (7 Manresa [6th ed. Revised] p. 719.)

Again, the house and lot involved in the case at bar are not in custodia legis. Said property was sold by Feliza
Luz Paulino to Maximo Daleja, Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo on October 22, 1945, or
almost a month before Special Proceeding Case No. 37 was instituted (November 19, 1945). At that time, the
buyers of said property were in possession thereof. They still held it when the judicial administrator was
appointed in Case No. 37, and this must have taken place after the probate of the will on July 6, 1949 (Rule
78, section 4, Rule 79, sections 4 and 6, and Rule 80, section 5, Rules of Court). Up to the present, said
buyers remain in possession of the property in litigation. Neither the court, taking cognizance of Case No. 37,
nor the judicial administrator therein appointed, has even tried to divest them of said possession. In fact, if
they were as they are — unwilling to yield it and the administrator wished to take the property under his
custody, it would be necessary for him to institute a separate civil action therefor.

In view of the foregoing, and considering that the Court of Appeals has not passed upon the issues raised
therein by respondents herein and that the decision of said court does not state the facts essential to the
determination of those issues, said decision is hereby reversed, and let the records of this case be remanded
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision. Respondents, except the
Court of Appeals, shall pay the costs of this instance. It is so ordered.
8. IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918

Topics/Doctrines: Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or
subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country
of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or
country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect
as if executed according to the laws of these Islands ( sec. 636, Act No. 190)

FACTS:
Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden in 1877; in 1893, he emigrated to the United States and lived in
Chicago, Illinois. In 1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately afterwards left for
the Philippine Islands as a US Army soldier. A daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after
their marriage. After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he
continued to live in the Philippines. In 1902, Rosalie Johnson was granted a decree of divorce on the
ground of desertion. In 1903, Emil Johnson procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago, after
which he visited family in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila. In
Manila he had 3 children with Alejandra Ibaez: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. Emil Johnson also
had 2 children with Simeona Ibaez: Eleonor and Alberto. He died in Manila, leaving a holographic will.
This will, signed by himself and 2 witnesses only, instead of the 3 required witnesses, was not executed
in conformity with Philippine law. A petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this
will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence
could properly be probated here. The hearing on said application was set, and three weeks publication
of notice was ordered. In the hearing, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and
thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. Victor Johnson was
appointed sole administrator of the estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine court had jurisdiction?

HELD:
YES. The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
"The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the
state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the
world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case
where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of
law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the
constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short." (Citing In re Davis) Whether the
order of probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the petition, namely,
that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity
[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

with the laws of that State. - NO

The CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in
conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.
Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state
or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen
or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be
proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of these Islands.

9. Jimenez vs Fernandez

Facts:The eastern portion of a land, belonging to the decedent, is the subject of this case.The decedent,
Fermin Hernandez, had 2 sons in which Fortunato (other child),predeceased the decedent. On the other hand,
Fortunato also had one child,Sulipicia Jimenez, the petitioner in this case. Upon registration of the land, it
wasunder the name of Sulpicia and the alive child of the decedent, Carlos Jimenez, inequal shares. The latter
(Carlos), had an illegitimate child, named Melecia Jimenez.The latter sold the eastern portion to Cagampan
and Grado. Upon the death ofCarlos, Sulpicia executed and Affidavit of Adjudication as the sole heir of
thedeceased uncle. She filed a recovery of the eastern portion occupied by Grado, theperson whom Melecia
sold that portion of the land.
LC: Held that grado is the absolute owner of the land
CA: Affirmed RTC in toto
SC:
The lower courts erred in declaring that Sulpicia does not own the property inquestion. Melecia Jimenez, an
illegitimate child, is not the daughter of CarlosJimenez and therefore, had no right in the property in question.
Even assumingthat she was proven to be an illegitimate child, she HAD NO RIGHT TO SUCCEEDCarlos Jimenez
and could have not validly acquired nor legally transferred tobuyers that portion of the property.
Art. 795.
The validity of the will as to its form depends upon the observanceof the law in force at the time it is
made.The right to inheritance of a person who died with or without will, before theeffectivity of the New Civil
Code (1950), shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889.Carlos Jimenez died on Jul 9, 1936 before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code so itmust be in accordance with Civil Code of 1889. In the former Civil Code, a
childmust either be a legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledgednatural child- for an
illegitimate not natural is DISQUALIFIED TO INHERIT. Shecannot be considered an acknowledged natural child
because Carlos Jimenez waslegally married to Susana Abalos at that time. She is to be considered
anILLEGITIMATE SPURIOUS CHILD and not entitled to any successional right in theestate of Carlos, in the
absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos.

10. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.MARIA
CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,vs.EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-
appellees.G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967BENGZON, J.P.,

FACTS:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the state of Texas of the United States. In his first wife whom he divorced, he had
five legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children. Before he
died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine
Properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed
the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled if
Philippine law were to apply.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the sucessional rights of the illegitimate
children.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under the Texas Law, being
the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. Further, even if the deceased had given them share,
such would be invalid because the law governing the deceased does not allow such.

11. Cayetano v. Leonidas G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 3-Forms of Wills

GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court
EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia,
Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is
Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire
estate of Adoracion.
Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that
Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in
Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as
the executrix. Hence, this case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the will was valid
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issues.
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law
which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the
decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national
law of the decedent must apply.
As to the issue of jurisdiction:
[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where
she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a
citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in
the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction.
12. MICIANO vs. BRIMO
No. 22595.
November 1, 1924]

Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO LAW; NULLITY OF.—

If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the testator’s order that his property be
distributed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his
nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his
testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus making the institution
unconditional.
Facts:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The judicial
administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2)
the denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lanza of the deceased’s
business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and
the delivery of the deceased’s business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are
on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the
receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter. The refusal to give the
oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error, It is discretionary with
the trial court. and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force must
be complied with.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in approving the scheme of partition of the estate of Joseph G. Brimo?
[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

Held:
No. The approval of the scheme of partition in respect was not erroneous. In regard to the first
assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he
is one of the persons designated as such in the will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator’s will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this condition as it is expressed were
legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in
these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving
his legacy. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of
the Civil Code. And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator’s national
law when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the
one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor. Gomez vs. North Negros Sugar Co.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of the remaining
clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not
appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator’s national laws.
The orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in
such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.