ELPIDIO TAGAAN MAGANTE vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 230950-51, July 23, 2018

The lack of statutory definition on what constitutes "prompt" action on a

complaint opened the gates for judicial interpretation, which did not draw
definite lines, but merely listed factors to consider in treating petitions
invoking the right to speedy disposition of cases.

Attempts in jurisprudence
to define "inordinate delay"

Prevailing jurisprudence on the speedy disposition of cases is sourced

from the landmark ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Barker v.
Wingo1 (Barker) wherein a delicate balancing test was crafted to
determine whether or not the right had been violated:

A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach

speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more
than identify some of the factors which courts should assess
in determining whether a particular defendant has been
deprived of his right. Though some might express them in
different ways, we identify four such factors: length of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his
right, and prejudice to the defendant.

The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering

mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively
prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other
factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of
the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay
that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent
upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but
one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary
street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex
conspiracy charge.

Closely related to length of delay is the reason the

government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too,
different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the
defense should be weighted heavily against the government.
A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded
courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless

1
407 U.S. 514 (1972)
 should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances must rest with the government, rather
than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a
missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.

We have already discussed the third factor, the defendant's

responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a
defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other
factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be
affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the
reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal
prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he
experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more
likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant's assertion
of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary
weight in determining whether the defendant is being
deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the
right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was
denied a speedy trial.

A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of

course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of
defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to
protect his Court has identified three such interests: (i) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the
most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay,
the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the
distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always
reflected in the record, because what has been forgotten can
rarely be shown. (emphasis added)

Factors to consider in
determining inordinate
delay

a. Length of the delay

The Court has never set a threshold period for concluding

preliminary investigation proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman premised on the idea that "speedy disposition"
is a relative and flexible concept. It has often been held that
a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient in determining whether or not there was inordinate
delay on the part of the investigating officer, and that
particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.35 This is diametrically
opposed with Sec. 58 of the 2008 Manual for
Prosecutors36 observed by the National Prosecutorial
Service, which states that the investigating prosecutor must
terminate the preliminary investigation proceeding within
sixty (60) days from the date of assignment, extendible to
ninety (90) days for complaints charging a capital offense.
And to further contradistinguish, the Judiciary is mandated
by the Constitution to resolve matters and controversies
within a definite timeline.37 The trial courts are required to
decide cases within sixty (60) days from date of submission,
twelve (12) months for appellate courts, and two (2) years for
the Supreme Court. The prescribed period for the Judicial
branch at least gives the party litigants an idea on when they
could reasonably expect a ruling from the courts, and at the
same time ensures that judges are held to account for the
cases not so timely disposed.

b. Reasons for the delay

Valid reasons for the delay identified and accepted by the

Court include, but are not limited to: (1) extraordinary
complications such as the degree of difficulty of the
questions involved, the number of persons charged, the
various pleadings filed, and the voluminous documentary
and testimonial evidence on record; and (2) acts attributable
to the respondent.

xxx

c. Assertion of Right by the Accused

The Court had ruled in several cases that failure to move for
the early resolution of the preliminary investigation or similar
reliefs before the Ombudsman amounted to a virtual waiver
of the constitutional right. Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan
(Dela Peña), for example, ruled that the petitioners therein
slept on their rights, amounting to laches, when they did not
file nor send any letter-queries to the Ombudsman during the
four-year (4-year) period the preliminary investigation was
conducted. The Court, citing Alvizo, further held therein that:
 x x x The matter could have taken a different
dimension if during all those four years, they
showed signs of asserting their right to a speedy
disposition of their cases or at least made some
overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution,
to show that they are not waiving that right. Their
silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver
of such right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the
petitioner therein was insensitive to the
implications and contingencies of the projected
criminal prosecution posed against him by not
taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the
disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces
to the perception that the supervening delay
seems to have been without his objection, [and]
hence impliedly with his acquiescence.

Following Dela Peña, it is the duty of the respondent to bring

to the attention of the investigating officer the perceived
inordinate delay in the proceedings of the formal preliminary
investigation. Failure to do so may be considered a waiver of
his/her right to speedy disposition of cases. If respondent
fails to assert said right, then it may be presumed that
he/she is allowing the delay only to later claim it as a ruse for
dismissal. This could also address the rumored "parking fee"
allegedly being paid by some respondents so that delay can
be set up as a ground for the dismissal of their respective
cases. Needless to say, investigating officers responsible for
this kind of delay should be subjected to administrative
sanction.

d. Prejudice to the respondent

The length of the delay and the justification proffered by the

investigating officer therefor would necessarily be
counterbalanced against any prejudice suffered by the
respondent. Indeed, reasonable deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that
cases may be adjudged only after full and free presentation
of evidence by all the parties, especially where the
deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any
party.45 As taught in Coscolluela:

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy

disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards
the objective of spurring dispatch in the
 administration of justice but also to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite
time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary
objective" is to assure that an innocent person
may be free from the anxiety and expense of
litigation or, if, otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the
tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of
time should be weighed against the State and in
favor of the individual.46 x x x

"Prejudice," as a criterion in the speedy disposition of cases, has been

discussed in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan47 in the following manner:

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant

that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive
pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to
trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the
most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also
prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events
of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is
still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.