IENT V.

TULLET PREBON
G.R. No. 189158, January 11, 2017
Sereno, C.J:
FACTS:
Tradition Group, where petitoners herein are employed, and Tullett are competitors in the
inter-dealer broking business. On the Tradition Group's motive of expansion and diversification
in Asia, petitioners lent and Schulze were tasked with the establishment Tradition Financial Serv
ices Philippines, Inc. However, Tullett, filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecution Office
of Makati City against the officers/employees of the Tradition Group for violation of Sections 31
and 34 of the Corporation Code which made them criminally liable under Section 144. Impleaded
as respondents in the Complaint-Affidavit were petitioners lent and Schulze, Jaime Villalon who
was formerly President and Managing Director of Tullett, Mercedes Chuidian who was formerly a
member of Tullett's Board of Directors. Villalon and Chuidian were charged with using their former
positions in Tullett to sabotage said company by orchestrating the mass resignation of its entire
brokering staff in order for them to join Tradition Philippines which was evident on their conduct
of several meetings with the employees. According to Tullett, petitioners lent and Schulze
have conspired with Villalon and Chuidian in the latter's acts of disloyalty against the company.
Petitioners argued that there could be no violation of Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation as
these sections refer to corporate acts or corporate opportunity, that Section 144 of the same Code
cannot be applied to Sections 31 and 34 which already contains the penalties or remedies for
their violation; and conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to the Sections
31 and 34 of the Corporation Code. The city prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint however,
on respondent’s appeal to the Department of Justice, the dismissal was reversed finding the
arguments of the respondent proper. CA affirmed the decision of the DOJ secretary.
ISSUE:
: WoN Section 144 of the Corporation Code applies to Sections 31 and 34 of the same
code, thus, making it a penal offense so that conspiracy can be appreciated and the petitioners
can be impleaded?
RULING:
No, The Supreme Court said that there is no provision in the Corporation Code using
similarly emphatic language that evinces a categorical legislative intent to treat as a criminal
offense each and every violation of that law. Consequently, there is no compelling reason for the
Court to construe Section 144 as similarly employing the term “penalized” or “penalty” solely in
terms of criminal liability. The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not
primarily as a penal statute. Sections 31 to 34 in particular were intended to impose exacting
standards of fidelity on corporate officers and directors but without unduly impeding them in the
discharge of their work with concerns of litigation. Considering the object and policy of the
Corporation Code to encourage the use of the corporate entity as a vehicle for economic growth,
we cannot espouse a strict construction of Sections 31 and 34 as penal offenses in relation to
Section 144 in the absence of unambiguous statutory language and legislative intent to that effect.
 MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142396, 2003 February 11
Vitug, J: RULINGS:
FACTS: 1. Yes, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, to which the Philippines is a
Sometime in May 1986, an information for violation signatory, grants him absolute immunity from
of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against suit being an agent of the US Drugs
petitioner Khosrow Minucher with the RTC. The Enforcement Agency. However, the main
criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is
concluded by the Philippine police narcotic agent in a diplomat entitled to immunity is the
the house if Minucher where a quantity of heroin, a determination of whether or not he performs
prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The duties of diplomatic nature. The Vienna
narcotic agents were accompanied by private Convention lists the classes of heads of
respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, diplomatic missions to include (a)
become one of the principal witnesses for the ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the
prosecution. On January 1988, Presiding Judge heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or inter
Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the accused. nuncios accredited to the head of states, and
Minucher filed Civil Case before the RTC for (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the
damages on account of what he claimed to have been ministers of foreign affairs. The Convention
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of
Arthur Scalzo. In his defense, Scalzo asserted his missions or members of the diplomatic staff,
diplomatic immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic thus impliedly withholding the same privileges
Note. He contended that it was recognized by the US from all others. Scalzo asserted that he was
Government pursuant to the Vienna Convention on an Assistant Attache of the US diplomatic
Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine government mission. Attaches assist a chief of mission in
itself through its Executive Department and DFA. The his duties and are administratively under him.
courts ruled in favor of Scalzo on the ground that as These officials are not generally regarded as
a special agent of the US Drug Enforcement members of the diplomatic mission, nor did
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic they normally designate as having diplomatic
immunity. Hence, the present recourse of Minucher. rank.

2. Yes, it was sufficiently established that,

ISSUES: indeed, he worked for the USDEA. A foreign
agent, operating within a territory, can be
1. Is Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic
cloaked with immunity from suit but only as
immunity?
long as it can be established that he is acting
within the directives of the sending state. The
2. Is the Doctrine of State Immunity from suit
consent of the host state is an indispensable
is applicable herein?
requirement of basic courtesy between the
two sovereigns. All told, Scalzo is entitled to
the defense of state immunity from suit.
 LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000
Davide, Jr:

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994,
for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
with two counts of oral defamation, Petitioner was arrested and was eventually bailed. The MeTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the
motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for
review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.

ISSUE:
(1) Is petitioner’s case covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t?

RULING:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to
the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding
effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but
also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence,
slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
 People v Tulin
GR NO. 111709 August 30, 2001
FACTS:
MT Tabangao, cargo vessel owned by PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, was
sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a
total value of 40.4M was suddenly boarded by seven fully armed pirates. The pirates detained the
crews and took control of the vessel, the PNOC logo were painted over with black and was painted
over with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore and later went back to
Batangas, Philippines and remained at sea. Days later, it sailed back to Singapore and later
another vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it. Cheong San Hiong, supervised the Navi’s
crew and received the cargo on board MT Tabangao/Galilee. After the transfer of goods were
completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee sailed back to the Philippines and the original crew members
were released by the pirates and was ordered not to report to authorities. However, the chief
engineer reported the incident to the coast guard and thereafter followed a series of arrests were
effected and charged the accused of qualified piracy or violation of PD 532.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused are guilty of qualified piracy.

RULING:

Yes, the accused are guilty of piracy. Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in
the high seas) provided that piracy must be committed in the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. It was amended by RA 7659, which
broadened the law to include offenses committed in Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other hand,
embraces any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in the
Philippine waters. Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any person is covered by
the law. No conflict exists among the mentioned laws; they exist harmoniously as separate laws.
The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters,
although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore, where its cargo was
offloaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was done under Hiong’s supervision. Although the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo was not done in Philippine waters, it is still
deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an exception to
the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is
charged with violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC. Regardless of the law penalizing
piracy, it remains to be a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
 White Light Corp. v City of Manila 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code
which confers on cities the power to regulate
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
FACTS: houses, lodging houses and other similar
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. establishments, including tourist guides and
Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance transports. Also, they contended that under
No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they
Short-Time Admission, Short-Time have the power to enact all ordinances it may
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate deem necessary and proper for the
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
Establishments in the City of Manila” (the peace, good order, comfort, convenience
Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any and general welfare of the city and its
person or corporation who will allow the inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
admission and charging of room rates for violation of ordinances.
less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms Petitioners argued that the ordinance is
more than twice a day. unconstitutional and void since it violates the
The petitioners White Light Corporation right to privacy and freedom of movement; it
(WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. is an invalid exercise of police power; and it
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation is unreasonable and oppressive interference
(STDC), who own and operate several hotels in their business.
and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and
intervene and to admit attached complaint- affirmed the constitutionality of the
in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did
ordinance will affect their business interests not violate the right to privacy or the freedom
as operators. The respondents, in turn, of movement, as it only penalizes the owners
alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate or operators of establishments that admit
exercise of police power. individuals for short time stays. Second, the
virtually limitless reach of police power is only
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and constrained by having a lawful object
void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it
by the Constitution.” Reference was made to aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
the provisions of the Constitution lawful method since the establishments are
encouraging private enterprises and the still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse
incentive to needed investment, as well as effect on the establishments is justified by the
the right to operate economic enterprises. well-being of its constituents in general.
Finally, from the observation that the illicit
relationships the Ordinance sought to Hence, the petitioners appeared before the
dissuade could nonetheless be SC.
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour
stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents
asserted that the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Section
ISSUE: namely wash rate admissions and renting out
a room more than twice a day. The ban is
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid
evidently sought to be rooted in the police
exercise of police power of the State.
power as conferred on local government
RULING: units by the Local Government Code through
such implements as the general welfare
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be clause.
considered as a valid exercise of police
power, and as such, it is unconstitutional. Police power is based upon the concept of
necessity of the State and its corresponding
The facts of this case will recall to mind not right to protect itself and its people. Police
only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr power has been used as justification for
ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate numerous and varied actions by the State.
Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc.,
v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common The apparent goal of the ordinance is to
thread that runs through those decisions and minimize if not eliminate the use of the
the case at bar goes beyond the singularity covered establishments for illicit sex,
of the localities covered under the respective prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals,
ordinances. All three ordinances were by themselves, are unimpeachable and
enacted with a view of regulating public certainly fall within the ambit of the police
morals including particular illicit activity in power of the State. Yet the desirability of
transient lodging establishments. This could these ends do not sanctify any and all means
be described as the middle case, wherein for their achievement. Those means must
there is no wholesale ban on motels and align with the Constitution.
hotels but the services offered by these
SC contended that if they were to take the
establishments have been severely
myopic view that an ordinance should be
restricted. At its core, this is another case
analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
about the extent to which the State can
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
intrude into and regulate the lives of its
only restraint imposed by the law that they
citizens
were capacitated to act upon is the injury to
The test of a valid ordinance is well property sustained by the petitioners. Yet,
established. A long line of decisions including they also recognized the capacity of the
City of Manila has held that for an ordinance petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional
to be valid, it must not only be within the rights of their patrons – those persons who
corporate powers of the local government would be deprived of availing short time
unit to enact and pass according to the access or wash-up rates to the lodging
procedure prescribed by law, it must also establishments in question. The rights at
conform to the following substantive stake herein fell within the same fundamental
requirements: (1) must not contravene the rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial to include “the right to exist and the right to
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude.
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not freedom from physical restraint of the person
be unreasonable. of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
The ordinance in this case prohibits two he has been endowed by his Creator, subject
specific and distinct business practices,
only to such restraint as are necessary for existing laws and regulations penalizing
the common welfare, prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional
businesses of the petitioners and other
right must be recognized and the invasion of
legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent
it should be justified by a compelling state
that the ordinance can easily be
interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition
circumvented by merely paying the whole
to the right to privacy independently of its
day rate without any hindrance to those
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug
deserving of constitutional protection.
dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
Governmental powers should stop short of
“wash rates” from their clientele by charging
certain intrusions into the personal life of the
their customers a portion of the rent for motel
citizen.
rooms and even apartments.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses
SC reiterated that individual rights may be
of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
adversely affected only to the extent that may
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties
fairly be required by the legitimate demands
in with another constitutional requisite for the
of public interest or public welfare. The State
legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
is a leviathan that must be restrained from
measure. It must appear that the interests of
needlessly intruding into the lives of its
the public generally, as distinguished from
citizens. However well¬-intentioned the
those of a particular class, require an
ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary
interference with private rights and the
and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
means must be reasonably necessary for the
establishments as well as their patrons. The
accomplishment of the purpose and not
ordinance needlessly restrains the operation
unduly oppressive of private rights. It must
of the businesses of the petitioners as well as
also be evident that no other alternative for
restricting the rights of their patrons without
the accomplishment of the purpose less
sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly
intrusive of private rights can work. More
equates wash rates and renting out a room
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist
more than twice a day with immorality without
between the purposes of the measure and
accommodating innocuous intentions.
the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
public interest, personal rights and those The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
pertaining to private property will not be REVERSED, and the Decision of the
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites,
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
the police measure shall be struck down as
pronouncement as to costs.
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to
curtail is in fact already prohibited and could
in fact be diminished simply by applying
existing laws. Less intrusive measures such
as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and
drug dealers through active police work
would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of
 Garcia vs. J. Drilon orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
FACTS:
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition petition on the theory that the issue of
before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
Protection Order against her husband, opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An collateral attack on the validity of the law.
Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective ISSUES:
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She WON the CA committed serious error in
claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
psychological and economic violence, being discriminatory, unjust and violative of the
threatened of deprivation of custody of her equal protection clause.
children and of financial support and also a
victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not
finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
The TPO was granted but the petitioner
failed to faithfully comply with the conditions
set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent WON the CA erred in not finding that the law
filed another application for the issuance of a does violence to the policy of the state to
TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a protect the family as a basic social institution
modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA
should not be modified. After the given time 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer it allows an undue delegation of judicial
submitted the required comment as it would power to Brgy. Officials.
be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for

prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO
on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA RULINGS:
9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has
modified TPO for being “an unwanted limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate
product of an invalid law.” to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of authority and jurisdiction to consider the
the TPO but however, denied the petition for constitutionality of a statute. The question of
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
his pleadings before the trial court and the possible time so that if not raised in the
petition for prohibition to annul protection pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and
if not raised in the trial court, it may not be enforceable and to determine whether or not
considered in appeal. there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of any part of any branch of the Government
equal protection of the laws. Equal protection while executive power is the power to
simply requires that all persons or things enforce and administer the laws. The
similarly situated should be treated alike, preliminary investigation conducted by the
both as to rights conferred and prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. function. The same holds true with the
Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
ruled that all that is required of a valid Officials and other law enforcement agencies
classification is that it be reasonable, which is consistent with their duty executive
means that the classification should be function.
based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences; that it must be germane The petition for review on certiorari is denied
to the purpose of the law; not limited to for lack of merit
existing conditions only; and apply equally to
each member of the class. Therefore,
RA9262 is based on a valid classification and
did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the Senate
extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process

clause of the Constitution. The essence of
due process is in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of one’s defense. The
grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due
process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a

mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention
that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the
court shall not refer the case or any issue
thereof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial

power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
 Guingguing v People established: first, that libel against a public
person is a greater offense than one directed
G.R. No. 128959 September 30,2005 against an ordinary man, and second, that it
is immaterial that the libel be true. This Court
has accepted the proposition that the actual
malice standard governs the prosecution of
criminal libel cases concerning public figures.
FACTS:
As it has been established that
On Oct 13, 1991 Lim published a paid complainant was a public figure, it was
advertisement at the Sunday post edited and incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
published by petitioner Guingguing, actual malice on the part of Lim and
containing the pictures of arrests made and petitioner when the latter published the
records of criminal cases filed against Ciser article subject matter of the complaint. It
Torralba who is a radio broadcaster should thus proceed that if the statements
journalist. Torralba filed a complaint against made against the public figure are essentially
Lim and Guingguing asserting that the paid true, then no conviction for libel can be had.
advertisement was libellous. Lim claimed
that Torralba made defamatory attacks From the foregoing, it is clear that
against him and his family over his radio there was nothing untruthful about what was
programs, so he opted for paid published in the Sunday Post. The criminal
advertisements to answer his attacks. cases listed in the advertisement as pending
against the complainant had indeed been
The RTC concluded that the publication was filed.
indeed libellous. The CA affirmed RTC’s
To this end, the publication of the
decision and imposed penalties.
subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim
cannot be deemed by this Court to have
been done with actual malice. Aside from the
fact that the information contained in said
ISSUE: publication was true, the intention to let the
public know the character of their radio
Is the publication subject matter of the instant commentator can at best be subsumed
case indeed libellous? under the mantle of having been done with
good motives and for justifiable ends.
RULING: Wherefore, petition is GRANTED.
Decision of the RTC and CA is REVERSED
Yes. Criminal libel is defined as a and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who
is dead.
Two major propositions in the
prosecution of defamatory remarks were
 Estrada v. Escritor

AM No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006

RULING:

FACTS: NO. A look at the evidence that the

OSG has presented fails to demonstrate "the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter interests" which could limit or override
since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas respondent’s fundamental right to religious
City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, freedom. Neither did the government exert
wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding any effort to show that the means it seeks to
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, achieve its legitimate state objective is the
requesting for an investigation of rumors that least intrusive means.
Escritor has been living with Luciano
Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had In its Memorandum-In-Intervention,
eventually begotten a son. According to the the OSG contends that the State has a
complainant, respondent should not be compelling interest to override respondent’s
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary claimed religious belief and practice, in order
for it will appear as if the court allows such to protect marriage and the family as basic
act. social institutions. The Solicitor General,
quoting the Constitution and the Family
Escritor is a member of the religious Code, argues that marriage and the family
sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and are so crucial to the stability and peace of the
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society nation that the conjugal arrangement
where her conjugal arrangement with embraced in the Declaration of Pledging
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious Faithfulness should not be recognized or
beliefs. After ten years of living together, she given effect, as "it is utterly destructive of the
executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of avowed institutions of marriage and the
Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved family for it reduces to a mockery these
by the congregation. Such declaration is legally exalted and socially significant
effective when legal impediments render it institutions which in their purity demand
impossible for a couple to legalize their respect and dignity."
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has Be that as it may, the free exercise of
been a presiding minister since 1991, religion is specifically articulated as one of
testified and explained the import of and the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It
procedures for executing the declaration is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
which was completely executed by Escritor position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most
and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was inalienable and sacred of human rights," in
signed by three witnesses and recorded in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not
Watch Tower Central Office. enough to contend that the state’s interest is
important, because our Constitution itself
ISSUE: holds the right to religious freedom sacred.
Whether or not respondent should be found The State must articulate in specific terms
guilty of the administrative charge of "gross the state interest involved in preventing the
and immoral conduct” exemption, which must be compelling, for
only the gravest abuses, endangering liberties. Again, the Solicitor General utterly
paramount interests can limit the failed to prove this element of the test.
fundamental right to religious freedom. To
Thus, we find that in this particular
rule otherwise would be to emasculate the
case and under these distinct circumstances,
Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by
respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement
itself.
cannot be penalized as she has made out a
Thus, it is not the State’s broad case for exemption from the law based on
interest in "protecting the institutions of her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
marriage and the family," or even "in the The Court recognizes that state interests
sound administration of justice" that must be must be upheld in order that freedoms -
weighed against respondent’s claim, but the including religious freedom - may be
State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as
exception for the cohabitation which a preferred freedom, however, man stands
respondent’s faith finds moral. In other accountable to an authority higher than the
words, the government must do more than state, and so the state interest sought to be
assert the objectives at risk if exemption is upheld must be so compelling that its
given; it must precisely show how and to violation will erode the very fabric of the state
what extent those objectives will be that will also protect the freedom. In the
undermined if exemptions are granted. This, absence of a showing that such state interest
the Solicitor General failed to do. exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to
the Infinite. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant
As previously discussed, our
administrative complaint is dismissed.
Constitution adheres to the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus,
in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement
she had was "illegal per se because, by
universally recognized standards, it is
inherently or by its very nature bad, improper,
immoral and contrary to good conscience,"
the Solicitor General failed to appreciate that
benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
Finally, even assuming that the OSG
has proved a compelling state interest, it has
to further demonstrate that the state has
used the least intrusive means possible so
that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen
a way to achieve its legitimate state end that
imposes as little as possible on religious
 People v Echagaray
G.R. No. 117472 February 7,1997
FACTS: policy of the legislative, 3) perversity of the
accused.
Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray
was charged and convicted for the crime of The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime not so much the death penalty itself, but the
having been committed sometime in April, arbitrariness pervading the procedures by
1994, during which time Republic Act No. which the death penalty was imposed by the
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty jury. It was nullified because the discretion in
Law, was already in effect, accused- which the statute vested in trial judges and
appellant was inevitably meted out the sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
supreme penalty of death. In appealing the without any parameters, guidelines, or
conviction, it raised the constitutionality of the standards.
Death Penalty Law as being severe and
excessive, cruel and unusual in violation of With regard to the case of Coker vs.
the constitution. He invokes the ruling in Georgia, the SC held that this case has no
Furman vs. Georgia wherein the US bearing on Philippine experience and
Supreme Court categorically ruled that death culture. Such a premise is in fact an
penalty is cruel and degrading. He also ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive
argues that death is an excessive and cruel justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
punishment for a crime of rape because tooth". But, the forfeiture of life simply
there is no taking of life in rape. He invokes because life was taken, never was a defining
the ruling in Coker vs. Georgia which said essence of the death penalty in the context
that while rape deserves serious of our legal history and cultural experience;
punishment, it should not involve the taking rather, the death penalty is imposed in
of human life. In rape, life is not over for the heinous crimes because the perpetrators
victim. Death penalty should only be imposed thereof have committed unforgivably
where the crime was murder. execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with
severely destructive effects, and because
they have so caused irreparable and
ISSUE: substantial injury to both their victim and the
Whether or not Death Penalty is cruel and society and a repetition of their acts would
unusual punishment. pose actual threat to the safety of individuals
and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so.
RULING: RA 7659 already sufficiently defined
what are heinous crimes – crimes punished
NO. The penalty is neither cruel,
with death are those that are grievous,
unjust nor excessive. In the US case of
odious, and hateful by reason of inherent
Kemmler, it was held that punishments are
viciousness, atrocity and perversity, those
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
that are repugnant and outrageous to
death. It implies there something inhuman,
common standards of norms and decency
barbarous, something more than the
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
extinguishment of life. It is degrading if it
society. They also include crimes which are
involves public humiliation. The severity is
despicable because life is callously taken, or
not sufficient, but must be disproportionate to
the victim is treated as an animal or
the crime committed. Excessiveness is
dehumanized.
measured by 1) seriousness of the crime, 2)
 However, he admitted obtaining a loan from
Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was
CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that
G.R. No. 180016 APRIL 29, 2014 the same receipt was then dated May 2,
1991 and used as evidence against him for
the supposed agreement to sell the subject
pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
FACTS:
RTC and CA – accused is guilty of estafa.
Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and
Lito Corpuz, petitioner, met at the Admiral ISSUE:
Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in
1990. WON the demand to return the subject the
subject jewelry, if unsold, or remit the
Tangcoy was then engaged in the business proceeds, if sold, is a valid demand under
of lending money to casino players and, upon one of the elements of Estafa under Art. 315
hearing that Tangcoy had some pieces of (1) (b) of the RPC?
jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on
May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered RULING:
to sell the said pieces of jewelry on YES. Demand need not even be
commission basis. formal; it may be verbal. The specific word
Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he "demand" need not even be used to show
turned over to petitioner the following items: that it has indeed been made upon the
an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's person charged, since even a mere query as
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another to the whereabouts of the money [in this
men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of case, property], would be tantamount to a
P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of demand. As expounded in Asejo v. People:
even date. With regard to the necessity of demand, we
agree with the CA that demand under this
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit kind of estafa need not be formal or written.
the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to The appellate court observed that the law is
return the same items, within a period of 60 silent with regard to the form of demand in
days. The period expired without petitioner estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus: When the
remitting the proceeds of the sale or law does not qualify, We should not qualify.
returning the pieces of jewelry. When Should a written demand be necessary, the
Tongcoy was able to meet petitioner, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the
latter promised the former that he will pay the word "demand" should be interpreted in its
value of the said items entrusted to him, but general meaning as to include both written
to no avail. and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to present a written demand as
A criminal complaint for estafa was filed
evidence is not fatal. In Tubb v. People,
against Corpuz.
where the complainant merely verbally
On the prosecution, it was established that inquired about the money entrusted to the
Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents accused, we held that the query was
of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the tantamount to a demand, thus: x x x [T]he law
financing business of extending loans to does not require a demand as a condition
Base employees. For every collection made, precedent to the existence of the crime of
they earn a commission. Petitioner denied embezzlement. It so happens only that
having transacted any business with failure to account, upon demand for funds or
Tongcoy. property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. The same
way, however, be established by other proof,
such as that introduced in the case at bar. In
view of the foregoing and based on the
records, the prosecution was able to prove
the existence of all the elements of the crime.
Private complainant gave petitioner the
pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission
basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2,
1991 with an obligation to sell or return the
same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There
was misappropriation when petitioner failed
to remit the proceeds of those pieces of
jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to
return the same pieces of jewelry within or
after the agreed period despite demand from
the private complainant, to the prejudice of
the latter.
People vs Ferrer them without a judicial trial does it become a
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972 bill of attainder.

In this case, when the act is viewed in its

actual operation, it will be seen that it does
FACTS:
not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the member thereof for the
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for
purpose of punishment. What it does is
violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion
simple to declare the party to be an
Act was filed against the respondent
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Feliciano Co, as he became an officer of the
Government for the purposes of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an
prohibition.
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the government.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines"
issues solely for definitional purposes. In fact
Co moved to quash on the ground that the
the act applies not only to the Communist
Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Party of the Philippines but also to "any
organisation having the same purpose and
Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another
their successors." Its focus is not on
criminal complaint was filed with before Nilo
individuals but on conduct.
Tayag and fiver others with subversion, as
they were tagged as officers of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive
organization instigating and inciting the
people to organize and unite for the purpose
of overthrowing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Tayag also moved to quash the complaint on

the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2)
it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one
subject not expressed in the title thereof; and
(4) it denied him the equal protection of the
laws.

ISSUE:
Whether RA 1700 otherwise known as Anti-
Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court said it is only when a
statute applies either to named individuals or
to easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on
 US v. Diaz Conde should each be discharged from the custody
of the law.
G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922
The lower court opined that even though the
contract was established prior to the passage
FACTS: of Act No. 2655, the defendants still collected
a usurious amount of interest after the
On 30 December 1915, Bartolome Oliveros adoption of said law and therefore, violated
and Engracia Lianco borrowed P300 from such law and must be punished in
the defendants and by virtue of a contract, accordance to Usury Law.
the former obligated themselves with the
interest rate of 5% per month, payable within ISSUE:
the first 10 days of every month, and the first
W/N the defendants are guilty in violation of
payment shall be made on 10 January 1916.
Usury Law (Act. No. 2655).
Usury Law (Act. 2655) took effect on 01 May RULING:
1916, or four months subsequent to the
execution of said contract. No. An ex post facto law is a law that makes
an action, done before the passage of the
On 21 May 1921, a complaint was filed
law, and which was innocent when done,
against the defendants in violation of the
criminal, and punishes such action. In the
Usury Law. The Court of First Instance of
present case, the defendants executed an
Manila found the defendants guilty and
act which was legal before the Usury Law. To
sentenced them to pay a fine of P120 and in
make said law applicable to the defendants’
case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
previous act would render it an ex post facto
imprisonment in accordance with the
operation. Moreover, if a contract is legal at
provisions of law.
its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by
The appellants contend that: any subsequent legislation. Also, no law shall
be passed impairing the obligation of
The contract upon which the alleged contracts. If a law is passed rendering the
usurious interest was collected was executed opposite effect, the law is null and void with
before Act No. 2655 was adopted; respect to Jones Law.
At the time said contract was made Wherefore, all premises considered, the
(December 30, 1915), there was no usury higher court hereby decide that the acts
law in force in the Philippine Islands; complained of the defendants did not
Said Act No. 2655 did not become effective constitute a crime at the time they were
until the 1st day of May, 1916, or four months committed, and therefore the sentence of the
and a half after the contract in question was lower court should be, and is hereby,
executed; revoked; and it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the complaint be dismissed and
Said law could have no retroactive effect or that the defendants be discharged from the
operation; custody of the law, with costs de oficio.
Said law impairs the obligation of a contract;
All of said reasons the judgment imposed by
the lower court should be revoked; that the
complaint should be dismissed, and that they
 EN BANC
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINO
ABILONG, defendant-appellant
[G.R. No. L-1960. November 26, 1948.].

FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of September,
1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
Florentino Abilong, the accused, being then
a convict sentenced and ordered to serve
destierro during which he should not enter
any place within the radius of 100 kilometers
from the City of Manila for attempted robbery,
evaded the service of said sentence by going
beyond the limits made against him and
commit vagrancy.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in imposing a
penalty on the accused under article 157 of
the Revised Penal Code, which does not
cover evasion of service of "destierro."
RULING:
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used
in the English text is a wrong or erroneous
translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion
de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is
equally clear that although the Solicitor
General impliedly admits destierro as not
constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation
of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as
in the present case, the appellant by his
sentence of destierro was deprived of the
liberty to enter the City of Manila. Under the
case of People vs. Samonte, as quoted in the
brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear
that a person under sentence of destierro is
suffering deprivation of his liberty and
escapes from the restrictions of the penalty
when he enters the prohibited area."
 PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES
G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950
HELD:

FACTS: No. He is not an imbecile. According

Dr. Francisco Gomes, although he was
In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo feebleminded, he is not an imbecile as he could
was living on his farm in Camarines Sur w/ his still distinguish between right & wrong & even
wife, Julia Agricola & their 5 children. From feel remorse. In order that a person could be
there they transferred in the house of his half- regarded as an imbecile w/in the meaning of
brother, Zacarias Formigones in the same RPC A12 so as to be exempt from criminal
municipality to find employment as harvesters liability, he must be deprived completely of
of palay. After a month, Julia was sitting at the reason or discernment & freedom of will at the
head of the stairs of the house when Abelardo, time of committing the crime. (Note that
w/o previous quarrel or provocation definition is same as insanity)
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the
house & stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the As to the strange behavior of the accused
blade penetrating the right lung & causing a during his confinement, assuming it was not
severe hemorrhage resulting in her death. feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be
Abelardo then took his dead wife & laid her on attributed either to his being feebleminded or
the floor of the living room & then lay down eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition
beside her. In this position, he was found by the produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
people who came in response to the shouts A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy &
made by his eldest daughter, Irene take violent measures to the extent of killing his
Formigones. wife who he suspected of being unfaithful to
him, in the belief that in doing so, he was
The motive was admittedly that of jealousy vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded
because according to his statement, he used to as an imbecile. WON the suspicions were
have quarrels with his wife for reason that he justified, is of little or no importance. The fact is
often saw her in the company of his brother, that he believed her faithless. Furthermore, in
Zacarias; that he suspected the 2 were his written statement, he readily admitted that
maintaining illicit relations because he noticed he killed his wife, & at the trial he made no effort
that his wife had become indifferent to him. to deny of repudiate said written statements,
During the preliminary investigation, the thus saving the government all the trouble &
accused pleaded guilty. At the case in the CFI, expense of catching him & securing his
he also pleaded guilty but didn’t testify. His conviction.
counsel presented the testimony of 2 guards of
the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined But 2 mitigating circumstances are present:
to the effect that his conduct was rather strange passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife in
& that he behaved like an insane person, at a jealous rage) & feeblemindedness.
times he would remain silent, walk around stark
naked, refuse to take a bath & wash his clothes Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found
etc… The appeal is based merely on the theory guilty of parricide & the lower court’s judgment
that the appellant is an IMBECILE & therefore is hereby affirmed w/ the modification that
exempt from criminal liability under RPC A12. appellant will be credited with half of any
preventive imprisonment he has undergone
ISSUE: (because of the 2 mitigating circumstances)

WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the

time of the commission of the crime, thus
exempted from criminal liability
 Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 141066, Feb. 17, 2005 BP 22

FACTS:
Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA
spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well in affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner
that they did not have sufficient funds as conspirator applying the suppletory
deposited with the United Coconut Planters character of the RPC to special laws like BP
Bank (UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check 22 is applicable?
No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the
amount of P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo
Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the RULING:
latter that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the bank to cover up the A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised
amount of the check, did then and there Penal Code, especially with the addition of
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, the second sentence in Article 10, are
indorse, give and deliver the said check to applicable to special laws. It submits
Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any
aforementioned checks; however, upon prohibition regarding the applicability in a
presentation of the check to the drawee bank suppletory character of the provisions of the
for encashment, the same was dishonored Revised Penal Code to it.
for the reason that the account of the Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART.
accused had already been closed, to the 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of
damage and prejudice of Alfredo. this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the future may be punishable under special laws
Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable are not subject to the provisions of this
doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico Code. This Code shall be supplementary to
applied for probation which was granted. On such laws, unless the latter should specially
the other hand, petitioner brought the case to provide the contrary.
the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC The article is composed of two clauses. The
erred in finding her criminally liable for first provides that offenses which in the future
conspiring with her husband as the principle are made punishable under special laws are
of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. not subject to the provisions of the RPC,
22 which is a special law; moreover, she is while the second makes the RPC
not a signatory of the checks and had no supplementary to such laws
participation in the issuance thereof.
B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly
proscribe the suppletory application of the
ISSUE: provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence
of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the
a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in general provisions of the RPC which, by their
violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
invoking art. 10 of RPC? applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent
case of Yu vs. People the Court applied
suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of
conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals
under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals. BUT In the
present case, the prosecution failed to prove
that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be
established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Thus,
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is
ACQUITTED of the charges against her
under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to
costs.
 People vs. Martin Simon Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994 Sale of
thousand pesos and to pay the costs.
Prohibited Drugs
Simon then seek the reversal of the
judgement
FACTS:
Accused Martin Simon was charged with a
ISSUE:
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of Was the conviction of Simon correct?
1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-
buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing RULING:
a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to
laboratory examination, were found positive To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited
for marijuana. drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established. To sell means to
Simon denied the accusation against him, give, whether for money or any other material
claiming that on the day of question, he was consideration. It must, therefore, be
picked up by the police at their house while established beyond doubt that appellant
watching TV. He was told that he was a actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
pusher so he attempted to alight from the marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who
jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for
they finally reached the camp, he was two twenty-peso bills.
ordered to sign some papers and, when he
refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight After careful review, the Court held that there
or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold
compelled to affix his signature and and there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana
fingerprints on the documents presented to confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged
him. He denied knowledge of the marked of selling for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.
money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana However, there is an overlapping error in the
leaves, and insisted that the marked money provisions on the penalty of reclusion
came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, perpetua by reason of its dual imposition,
the reason why he vomited blood was that is, as the maximum of the penalty where
because of the blows he suffered at the the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and
hands of Pejoro. also as the minimum of the penalty where the
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident marijuana involved is 750 grams or more.
physician of Romana Pangan District The same error has been committed with
Hospital, declared that she treated appellant respect to the other prohibited and regulated
for three days due to abdominal pain, but her drugs provided in said Section 20. To
examination revealed that the cause for this harmonize such conflicting provisions in
ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did order to give effect to the whole law, the court
not see any sign of slight or serious external hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed
injury, abrasion or contusion on his body. where the quantity of the drugs involved is
less than the quantities stated in the first
paragraph shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also
concordant with the fundamental rule in
criminal law that all doubts should be
construed in a manner favorable to the
accused.
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425,
as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties
under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence with their technical
signification and effects. In fact, for purposes
of determining the maximum of said
sentence, the court have applied the
provisions of the amended Section 20 of said
law to arrive at prision correccional and
Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in
the medium period. Such offense, although
provided for in a special law, is now in
effect punished by and under the Revised
Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, the court applied first part of the
aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in
imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense.”
Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be
begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto
mayor, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional which is the maximum range
have fixed through the application of Articles
61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For,
with fealty to the law, the court may set the
minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day
of prision correccional.