The Emotions of The Ancient Greeks

The Emotions of the
Ancient Greeks: Studies in

Aristotle and Classical Literature
T HE R
THE O B S ON CLASSICAL
ROBSON C L A S SI C A L L ECTURES
LECTURES
Williams S.
S. Anderson, Barbarian Play: Plautus' Roman Comedy,
Comedy,
11993
993
Niall Rudd, The Classical
Classical Tradition Operation, 11994
Tradition in Operation, 994
Alexander
Alexander Dalzell, The Criticism of Didactic Poetry, 11996
of Didactic 996
M. Owen
Owen Lee, The Olive-Tree
Olive-Tree Bed and
and Other 1 99 7
Other Quests, 1997
David Konstan, The Emotions of
of the Ancient Greeks, 2001
DAVID KONSTAN
The Emotions
The Emotions of
of
the
the Ancient
Ancient Greel{s
Greeks
Studies
Studies in
in Aristotle
Aristotle
and
and Classical Literature
U NIVE R S ITY O
UNIVERSITY OFF TORONTO
T O R O N T O PRESS
P RE S S
Toronto Buffalo
Buffalo London
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© University
University of Toronto
Toronto Press Incorporated 2006
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Printed in Canada
ISBN 13
13:: 978-0-8020-9103-1
978-0-8020-91 03 - 1
ISBN 10: 0-8020-9103-2
0-8020-9 1 03-2
Printed on acid-free paper

Printed
Library and
and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Konstan, David
emotions of the
The emotions the Ancient
Ancient Greeks :: studies in Aristotle and
literature / David
classical literature David Konstan.
(Robson classical
classical lectures)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
0-8020-9 1 03 -2
ISBN 0-8020-9103-2
2. Aristotle -- Contributions in psychology.
11.. Aristotle. Rhetoric. 2.
3 . Emotions (Philosophy).
3. 4. Greek literature
(Philosophy). 4. literature - History and criticism.
- History
5. Emotions in literature. 1.I. Title. II. Series.
B491 .P8K65 2006
B491.P8K65 1152.4'092
52.4'092 C2005-906 754-3
C2005-906754-3
University
University of Toronto
Toronto Press acknowledges
acknowledges the financial
financial assistance
to its publishing program of the Canada Council
Council for the Arts and the
Ontario Arts Council.
Council.
University of Toronto Press acknowledges the

the financial support for
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publishing activities
activities of the
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For
ALEXANDRA, ZACHARY,
SADIE BLUE, and
and ANA
ANA
This page
page intentionally left blank
Contents
PREFACE ix
PREFACE IX
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XV
11 Pathos
Pathos and
and Passion
Passion 33
2 Anger 4
411
3 Satisfaction 77
4 Shame 9911
5 Envy and Indignation III

111
6 Fear 129
1 29
7 Gratitude 1156
56
8 Love
Love 1169
69
9 Hatred 185
1 85
110
0 Pity 201
201
1111 Jealousy 2219

19
viii / Contents
112
2 Grief
Grief 244
244
Conclusion 259
NOTES
NOTES 263
263
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY 365
365
INDEX
INDEX 4 11
411
Preface
How provisional
provisional ....,
. . , how difficult
difficult to reconstruct
reconstruct and how exorbi
exorbi-
tantly specialized
specialized of use, are the tools that in any given case would
would
allow
allow one to ask, What was it possible to think or do at a certain
moment of the past, that it no longer
longer is?
Sedgwick
Sedgwick and
and Frank
Frank 11995:
995: 23
11
11 y a une
une psychologie
psychologic implicite dans Ie
le langage.
Lagache 11947:
947: 1
1
The fact is that once we name an emotion

emotion it takes on a life of its
own.
w.I.
W.I. Miller
Miller 11997:
997: 31
31
The premise of this book is that

that the
the emotions of the ancient
ancient
Greeks were in some significant respects different
different from
from our own,
and that recognizing these differences
differences is important to our under-
under
standing of Greek literature and Greek culture generally. What is
more, I argue that the Greeks' conception of the emotions
emotions has
something to tell us about our own views, whether
whether about the
nature of particular emotions or the
the category of emotion itself.
The subject of the emotions has become popular over the last
thirty years or so in a variety of fields, including
including psychology,
anthropology, philosophy, sociology,
sociology, history, and even political
political
science, and more recently still has attracted the attention of
attention of
students of classical
classical Greece and Rome (e.g., Sorabji 2000, Harris
x!
x / Preface
200 1 , Nussbaum 200

2001, 2001;1 ; on Rome, d. c.A. Barton 2001,
cf. C.A. 2001 , Braund and
Most 2004, and Kaster
Raster 2005)
2005).. In the
the past, scholars have tacitly
assumed thatthat the Greek terms designating the several emotions
correspond more or less unproblematically to our own categories.
For many purposes,
purposes, the resemblance is undoubtedly close enough:
discussions of Greek literature retain their validity even if the the
subtle differences
differences between Greek and modern anger or shame are
elided. But beneath
beneath the similarities there are strikingstriking discrepan
discrepan-
cies, and these too repay scrutiny. When we speak of Greek ''anger' anger'
'love1 or 'envy,'
or 'love' 'envy/ it is easy to forget
forget that the Greeks themselves
themselves
did not use our terms, but rather words in their own language, language,
such as oIgeorge and philia and phthonos.
phthonos. We cannot take it it for
granted that the Greek words map neatly onto our own emotional
vocabulary.
Catherine Lutz ((1988:
1 988: 88)) has remarked that 'the process of of
translation involves much more than the the one-to-one
one-to-one linking of of
concepts
concepts in one language with concepts concepts in another. Rather, the the
process ideally involves providing the the context of use of the
the words
in each of the two languages between which translation translation is at
at-
tempted.
tempted/' Ancient Greece is long dead, and it is not possible to
interview
interview or observe people in emotional
emotional situations. We do, howhow
ever, have detailed analyses of the the emotions by Greek orators and
philosophers, and we can see the emotions in action in their
brilliant
brilliant literary and dramatic works. works. By By making use of these
sources, we can come closer to perceiving the disparities, some- some
times subtle and sometimes conspicuous, between their emoemo
tional repertoire and ours. And this in turn, I hope, will shed light
not only on their psychology, but on our own as well. well.
In the
the first chapter, I review some of the the modern controversies
over the nature of the emotions, with particular particular attention to the
question of whether the emotions are universal and invariant
across cultures, or differ from one society to the next. Given that
differ from
my purpose in this book is to investigate the divergences between
the Greek emotional lexicon and ours, I favour the latter view. But
the
the nature of thethe disagreement is, I believe, itself enlightening
enlightening for
our understanding both of classical antiquity antiquity and of emotional
theory today.
In the subsequent chapters,
chapters, I examine most of the emotions
Preface / xi
that Aristotle analyses in his treatise the Rhetoric (although

(although not
in the same order),
order)/1 where possible taking Aristotle as the point of of
departure for my own discussion. In each case, I look not not only to
what Aristotle or other philosophers have to tell us about the
emotion in question, but also to how it functions in contemporary
contemporary
works of literature, focusing chiefly
chiefly on the
the archaic and classical
epochs (roughly, the eighth to third centuries Be). BC). Above all, as I
have said, I am interested
interested in the ways in which the Greek emoemo
tions fail wholly to coincide with their nearest congeners in
modern English.
English. My discussions accordingly
accordingly tend to concentrate
on literary passages
passages that are particularly revealing of these differ
differ-
ences, rather than offering
offering complete surveys of classical Greek
usage in regard to the several emotions (in Greek, pathe). pathe}.
Not all the emotions, moreover, present one and the same kind
of problem for analysis. Sometimes the the overlap with modern
concepts
concepts is greater, for example
example in the case of love, sometimes
sometimes
less, as with anger. There are instances in which which there is appar
appar-
ently no corresponding term in one language
language for what seems to be
a basic emotion in the the other: such is the case,
case, II argue,
argue, with thethe
modern idea of of romantic jealousy
jealousy -- an emotion that is not part of of
Aristotle's inventory. In another case, Aristotle omits to discuss a
sentiment
sentiment -- grief
grief - that is
is central to most modern accounts of of the
emotions, and here I argue
argue that grief
grief did not fit Aristotle's concep-
concep
tion of an emotion.
emotion. Sometimes
Sometimes Aristotle's analyses
analyses are governed
or influenced by his systematic philosophical views and do not
provide a wholly reliable reflection of contemporary usage, for
example
example in the case of his notion of indignation
indignation (this is true also,
in part, of his treatment
treatment of anger). ThenThen again, Aristotle's discus-
discus
sion of the
the emotion of gratitude has been almost almost universally
misunderstood by modern commentators, and the burden of my
chapter on that topic is a clarification
clarification of Aristotle's argument,
followed by an indication of its import for the Greek concept
generally. The shape of individual chapters is thus determined in
part by the case at hand.
hand. I hope that the pleasures of variety will in
some measure
measure compensate
compensate for the lack of a strictly uniform
treatment of the various emotions.
emotions.
I conclude
conclude this preface with a mention of one aspect of the the
classical Greek view of the emotions that may seem provocative.
xii / Preface
Aristotle and other Greek philosophers held that animals and

small children
children did
did not have emotions
emotions -- or rather pathe: it is better
better
to employ the Greek word here - - in the proper sense of the term.
To us, counter-intuitive,2 so let me state the case in
us, this may be counter-intuitive?
favour of the
the Greek approach.
approach. The
The Greeks did not not conceive of
of
emotions as internal states of excitation. Rather, the the emotions are
elicited by our interpretation
interpretation of the
the words, acts, and intentions of of
others, each in its characteristic way. Without pausing here to
specify
specify just how each emotion is defined (this
(this is the burden of the
the
chapters that follow), I may say that one consequence
consequence of this
approach is that it is possible to alter people's emotions by chang-
chang
their way of construing the
ing their the precipitating
precipitating event. If I show you
that
that the insult
insult that has made you angry was unintended, or meant
something different
different from
from what you understood,
understood, or that the enemy
you fear has no hostile designs on you, I allay your emotionalemotional
response. Now, this is not not something you can do with dogs or
infants. Yes, you can make them them feel more secure by holding
them, perhaps, or causing them to relax in some other other way; you
may even show them that you are not threatening or dangerous.
But this is not thethe same as convincing them, by rational argu argu-
ments, to understand your intentions
intentions differently. A second-cen-
second-cen
tury AD writer named Achilles Tatius offers offers an elegant descrip-
descrip
tion of the
the function of words in rousing and allaying emotions in
allaying emotions
his novel Clitopho andand Leucippe
Leucippe (2.29):
Leukippe was caught in emotional chaos. chaos. She was vexed,

vexed, ashamed,
angered: vexed at being caught, ashamed at being criticized, angered at
not being believed. Shame, grief, and anger are three waves rising in the
soul. Shame enters at the eyes, where it takes away their freedom of
freedom of
movement; grief
grief lodges in the breast, where it dampens the soul's
soul's glow;
anger barks around the heart, where it overwhelms
overwhelms reason with its
foaming insanity. Speech
Speech is the father
father of all three:
three: like arrows aimed at a
target and hitting
hitting it dead center, words pierce
pierce the soul and wound it in
many places.
places. One verbal arrow is insult, and the wound it leaves is called
anger;
anger,- another is exposure of one's misfortunes, and this arrow causes
grief; a third is lectures
lectures on one's faults,
faults, and this wound is known
known as
shame. One quality common to all these weapons is that they pierce
deeply but draw no blood.
blood. The only remedy for them is counterattack
counterattack
Preface / xiii
with
with the same weapons. The wound
wound caused by one sharp tongue is healed
healed
by the razor edge of another. This softens the heart's anger and assuages
the
the soul's grief. If one is prevented by force majeur from
force majeur from uttering
uttering one's
defense, the wounds silently fester. Unable to eject their foam, the
the waves
swell
swell up in labor, distended
distended by the puffing
puffing breath of words within. (trans.
within,
Winkler 989: 202-3)
Winkler 11989: 202-3)
The emotions, as opposed

opposed to drives and appetites, depend on the
capacity for symbolization. For the Greeks, persuasion was cen-cen
tral to the idea of an emotion, whether in the law courts, in
political assemblies, or in the various therapies that
that relied on
verbal interactions to change the judgments
judgments that are constitutive
constitutive
of the
the passions. A good case can be made, I believe, that such an
approach has much to offer
offer our own conception of the
the emotions as
well. The evidence that I am able to muster in support of this
claim is in the book before you.
This page
Acl,nowledgments
Acknowledgments
This book has been in the the works over a number of years, and I
have naturally accumulated
accumulated a huge number of intellectual
intellectual debts
to colleagues around the world. Most of the material in the chap- chap
ters that follow
follow was tried out in one form
form or another in lectures,
conferences, and colloquia,
colloquia, and I have benefited enormously
enormously from
from
the acute and generous comments
comments of my audiences. Others have
offered
offered immensely
immensely helpful
helpful criticism
criticism on written
written versions, whether
in manuscript or in the formform of articles published
published in scholarly
journals. Almost everyone I know has been subjected
subjected in some way
to my obssession withwith the Greek emotions over the years, and
even a casual remark in conversation has often often helped me see
clearly something
something that until then
then had been opaque to me. To all
these people I am immensely grateful.
grateful.
Two colleagues - Regina Hoschele
Hb'schele and
and Haria
Ilaria Ramelli -- read
every chapter in manuscript, and provided comments with with unfail
unfail-
ing acumen and generosity. To their encouragement lowe I owe more
than I can indicate in this heartfelt acknowledgment of their
kindness. Others who deserve special mention
mention are Victor Caston,
William Fortenbaugh,
William Fortenbaugh, Charles Griswold, Robert Kaster,Raster, and Will-
Will
iam
iam Reddy, who read specific chapters and offered offered advice. I am
grateful
grateful also to the
the University
University of Toronto Press's two anonymous
referees, and to Barbara Porter, Suzanne Rancourt, and John St
James for their attentive
attentive and professional support in seeing this
book through to publication.
Although I had worked on one or another aspect of the the ancient
ancient
Greek emotions
emotions previously, it was the invitation
invitation to deliver the
xvi / Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
Robson Lectures at Victoria College in the the University of Toronto

that provided the impetus to devote an entire entire book to the subject.
Back then, in the autumn
autumn of 200 1 , I had not yet realized the
2001,1 the scope
of the
the project: the
the three original
original lectures
lectures dealt with anger, fear,
and jealousYj
jealousy,- in addition, I presented a paper on the the same occasion
to the Classics Department
Department concerning Aristotle's treatment treatment ofof
gratitude. Those four
four talks have now grown into a dozen ample
chapters. I hope that bigger is at least to some degree better in this
instance.
Portions of this book have been published published in various journals
and collections
collections of essays, which
which are listedlisted in the bibliography. I
am grateful
grateful to the editors and publishers for permissionpermission to use
these materials in the present study. Research on this project was
made possible by several grants and fellowships, which include include
two sabbatical semesters from from Brown
Brown University
University in 2000 and
2004j a fellowship at the Center
2004; Center for Advanced Study in the Behav- Behav
ioral Sciences at Stanford in 2004-Sj
2004-5; a grant from from the National
National
Endowment for the Humanities
Humanities in 2004j 2004; a fellowship provided by
the National Research Foundation
Foundation of South South Africa
Africa in 2003j
2003; a
William Evans Visiting Fellowship at the University of Otago in
the University
2002j
2002; a Leventis
Leventis Visiting
Visiting Research
Research Professorship at the University
of Edinburgh in 20012001,, where I organized a conference on Envy,
Spite, and JealousYj
Jealousy; an Alexander S. S. Onassis
Onassis Foundation Research
Grant, for study in Athens, in 200 2001; 1 j and residence as Member of of
High Table at King's College, Cambridge, in 2000. I also gave a
series of lectures on the emotions as Visiting Professor at the
Universidade de SiioSao Paulo in 2000, and at Washington University
in St Louis as Biggs Resident Scholar in 1999. 1 999. My year as director
of
of the Pembroke Center Seminar at Brown University University (2003-4), on
the topic 'Shame/ was a special privilege as well, and contributed
much
much to sharpening
sharpening my ideas on the subject.
Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to my wife, Pura Nieto,
who has been
been my companion
companion through
through all the labours that resulted
resulted
in the birth of this book, and to my families in the United States
and in Spain, who have always given love and support.
The
The Emotions
Emotions ofof the
the
Ancient
Ancient Greeks:
Greeks: Studies
Studies in
in
Aristotle and
Aristotle and Classical
Classical Literature
Literature
This page
C HAPTER ONE
CHAPTER ONE
Pathos and Passion
Each emotion ....

.. is a very exact message. This exactness is compa-
compa
rable to the exactness of color sense in those who are notnot color
blind. (For
(For instance, each person knows instantly
instantly and without
without
question whether they are seeing red or blue.)
Isaacs 1998: 13
1998: 13
To recognize that
that there can exist
exist a color-blindness to blue is as
much as to admit that blue exists, which these days seems to me to
be more than doubtful.
doubtful.
Tomeo 11986:
986: 6
In an essay entitled Compassion an Emotion,'

entitled 'Is Compassion Emotion/ Georges Dreyfus
observes: '[Tjhere
'[T]here is, or I should say there was, no Tibetan
Tibetan word for
our word emotion.
emotion. II said "there
"there was" because by now now Tibetan
Tibetan
teachers have been exposed to this question question so many times
times that
they have created a new word (tshor myong) to translate
(tshor myong) translate our
emotion' (Dreyfus
(Dreyfus 2002: 331). 1 ). Whatever thethe case in Tibetan, an
Tibetan, an-
cient
cient Greek had a word that, at least in certain certain contexts, is
customarily
customarily rendered in English as 'emotion.' That That word is pathos
pathos
(plural pathe),
pathe], the
the root from
from which
which terms such as 'pathology' and
'psychopath' are derived. Pathos itself is related to the the verb paskho,
pflsMzo,
'suffer'
'suffer' or 'experience/
'experience,' and more distantly
distantly to the
the Latin patior,
patior,
from which
which are derived both the English 'passion' and 'passive'
(both
(both roots
roots gogo back to
to aa prehistoric
prehistoric stem
stem *pa-, with
with the basic
basic sense
sense
of 'suffer').
'suffer'). In classical
classical Greek, pathos
pathos may refer
refer more generally to
44 I/ The Emotions
Emotions of the Ancient Greeks
Greeks
what befalls a person, often in the the negative sense of an accident or

misfortune, although it may also bear the neutral significance
significance of a
condition or state of affairs. In philosophical language, pathos
sometimes signifies
signifies a secondary quality as opposed to the essence
of a thing (cf.
(d. Aristotle Metaphysics
Metaphysics 11022b022b l15-21;
S-2 1 ; Urmson 1990:
1 990:
1126-7).
26-7) . Psychologically, it may denote a mental activity or phe-
mental activity phe
nomenon such as remembering (Aristotle (Aristotle De memoria et
reminiscentia 449b4-7; d. cf. 449b24-S
449b24-5 for memory as the of
the pathos of
formerly perceived or contemplated things). The The specific sense
of 'emotion' is in part conditioned by this penumbra of con- con
notations: insofar as a pathos
pathos is a reaction to an impinging event
or circumstance, it looks to the outside stimulus to which it
responds.
Among the pathe,
pathe, the Greeks included a set of terms that that are
normally
normally rendered into English by standard equivalents equivalents such as
'anger,' 'fear,
'fear/' 'love,'
'love/ 'pity,
'pity/' 'indignation,'
'indignation/ 'envy,'
'envy/ and so forth. The
patM thus appear to correspond
pathe correspond broadly
broadly to the kinds of senti
senti-
ments that we typically or at least sometimes classify classify as emo-
emo
tions. Often, however, the context will demand some variation.
For example, the ordinary
ordinary Greek term for 'love' is philia, but it
also does duty for the English 'friendship': we do not usually speak
of love in the the case of business relationships
relationships (cf.(d. Aristotle
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics 8. 1 3 ) . As this example indicates, there is not
8.13).
always a perfect overlap between the Greek and English emoemo
tional vocabularies.
vocabularies. The tendency to use basic English emotion
words as the regular counterparts
counterparts for Greek terms may lead us,
however, to overlook or discount significant differences differences in the
the
way the respective sentiments are conceived and experienced in
the two cultures. It is to these differences
differences that
that I shall
shall be calling
attention in the chapters that follow, in which I examine how the
Greeks defined,
defined, described, and deployed some of the the pathe they
regarded as basic.
basic. It will emerge that their pathe pathe do not in fact
coincide entirely with the way we understand the relevant emoemo
tions. Rather,
Rather, the way the Greeks conceived the individual emoemo
tions and emotion as such will prove to differ differ in important re- re
spects from
from the way they are characteristically conceived today,
both in popular parlance and in scientific literature. The differ differ-
ences, moreover,
moreover, will turn out to be at least in part systematic, in
Pathos and Passion / 5
the sense that there is a broad coherence in the way the ancient
Greeks viewed the the emotions. This coherence is grounded, I bebe
lieve, in the social world specific to the Greeks, which which was in
important
important ways unlike unlike our own. And yet, despite the disparate
cultural
cultural contexts, it sometimes
sometimes happens thatthat the Greeks' way of of
envisaging the pathe has something
something to contribute to ongoing
controversies over the emotions in psychology,
psychology, philosophy, and
related disciplines today.
It may seem strange, even impertinent,
impertinent, to question whether the
question whether
emotions of the the Greeks were thethe same as ours. We respond pro-pro
foundly
foundly to their
their epic and tragic poetry, laugh at their
their comedies, are
moved by their love lyrics, and look to their
their philosophy as a model
for
for our own. How could this be the the case if their emotional reper-
reper
toire was in some important
important respect different
different from
from ours? Besides,
emotions
emotions such as love, fear, and anger are surely basic human
capacities, and their manifestations
manifestations must be similar
similar everywhere,
whether
whether in antiquity
antiquity or today.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to suppose that this is not
necessarily the case. Let us take an analogy from from another sphere
of
of human
human experience, the the perception of colour. HumanHuman beings
everywhere are capable of sight, although individualsindividuals may
may be
partially or wholly blind. If our vision
vision is not
not defective, we all see
more or less the the same range of colours. But do we all see blue?
More precisely, does what is called blue in contemporary English
correspond precisely to some colour label in every other human human
language? Curiously enough, I believe that that I have been witness to
a change in the value of 'blue' in my own lifetime. When I was a
child, I was taught that the the rainbow has seven colours, one of of
which bore the name 'indigo' (the (the acronym ROYGBIV represented
the
the colours in order fromfrom red to violet). Today,
Today, few people think of
think of
'indigo' as one of the basic colour terms in English. Indigo lay
between violet
violet and blue, occupying a portion of the spectrum that
has presumably now been invaded by its neighbours. Blue, then,
should designate a wider spectral range today than it did when
comfortably alongside it. 1l
indigo still nestled comfortably
Now, in the the case of terms as close as indigo and blue, we can
perhaps accept the the possibility of cultural variation, and so too in
the field
field of the
the emotions. In English, there are several words that
6 / The Emotions of
of the Ancient Greeks
overlap
overlap withwith thethe idea
idea ofof anger,
anger, for for example,
example, including
including rage,rage, ire,
ire,
wrath, and resentment, and it is plausible that the fine distinc distinc-
tions
tions wewe draw
draw between
between these
these several
several concepts
concepts may may notnot exactly
exactly
match the vocabulary for anger in ancient Greek, which which is also
subtle.22 But sometimes the differences
rich and subtle. differences between lan- lan
guages may be more extreme. According to the dictionaries, the
Latin
Latin word flavus denotes
word f1avus denotes aa tawny
tawny yellowyellow colour,
colour, like
like that
that of of
wheat
wheat in the field field ('golden yellow,'
yellow/ 'flaxen-coloured' are the defi defi-
nitions offered
nitions offered in in Lewis
Lewis and Short's Latin Dictionary).
and Short's Dictionary}. And And yetyet thethe
word is etymologically related to the English term 'blue' (MacLaury
11999:
999: 20; Partridge 11959:
d. Partridge
20; cf. 959: s.v.
s.v. 'blue').
'blue'). The
The combination
combination 'fl' 'fl' in
in
Latin frequently
Latin frequently corresponds
corresponds to to 'bl'
'bl' in
in English,
English, asas in
in flo (cf.'in
flo (d. 'in-
flate')
flate') and
and 'blow,
'blow,'' or (whence 'flower'
f10s (whence
or/los 'flower')) and
and 'blossom.'
'blossom.' Closer
Closer to to
the
the sphere
sphere of of colour
colour terminology,
terminology, 'black' 'black' isis cognate
cognate with
with f1agIO,
flagro,
meaning 'burn''burn' ((compare
compare 'flagrant'
'flagrant').) . The connection
connection here here is per
is per-
haps easy to intuit, since things that burn or are near a fire tend to
blacken.
blacken. But But what
what hashas blue
blue toto do do with
with yellow?
yellow? According
According to to
Robert
Robert MacLaury
MacLaury ((1999: 1 999: 20),
20), the
the association
association between
between blue blue and and
reflects a categorization of colour by way of luminosity
yellow reflects luminosity
rather than spectral proximity, and indeed there are languages
today
today in in which
which blue,blue, green,
green, and
and yellow form form aa single category. A
single category.
dictionary of modern Welsh, for example, defines the the word gias glas as
(among
(among other
other things)
things) 'blue,
'blue,'' 'pale,'
'pale,' 'grey,
'grey,'' 'green,'
'green,' and
and 'silver' (Evans
(Evans
and Thomas 1989, S.V.).3 s.v.).3 So
SO too, the term glaukos in ancient
Greek
Greek is is rendered
rendered variously as as 'gleaming,'
'gleaming,' 'blue-green,'
'blue-green,' 'pale blue,'blue,'
4
and
and 'gray.'4
'gray.' 'For
Tor physiological
physiological reasons,'
reasons,' MacLaury
MacLaurywrites writes (21 ), 'green
(21), 'green
and blue appear more similar than green and yellow, yellow/' and yet
'culture
'culture sometimes
sometimes overrides neurology.'5 Colours
overrides neurology.'s Colours are are complex
complex
entities:
entities: apart
apart from
from the
the frequency
frequency of of their
their wavelengths,
wavelengths, they they are are
characterized
characterized also also by
by differences
differences of of hue,
hue, saturation,
saturation, andand luminos
luminos-
ity
ity (J.
(J. Lyons
Lyons 11999:999: 45).
45). Just as shifts in colour terminologyterminology may
occur
occur inin more
more than than aa single
single dimension,
dimension, emotionsemotions too too may
may resist
resist
being
being aligned
aligned on on aa single
single axis
axis or or continuum,
continuum, yielding
yielding combina
combina-
tions
tions that
that to to us
us seem
seem foreign
foreign oror unnatural.
unnatural.
Of
Of course,
course, we we see
see hues
hues for
for which
which we we have
have nono label
label asas well
well as as
those represented by the basic colour terms in English. Neverthe
English. Neverthe-
less,
less, our
our categories
categories may may affect
affect thethe way
way we we organize
organize aa visual
visual field.
field.
Suppose
Suppose thatthat wewe could
could view
view thethe Parthenon
Parthenon in in its
its original
original brilliant
brilliant
Pathos and Passion I/ 7
hues of red, blue, and gold, rather than the the pale marble that has
come to represent, for us, the austere purity of the the classical ideal:
would it look the same to us as it did to contemporary Greeks,
whose colour terms evidently took account of other factors in
addition to position on the spectrum,
addition spectrum, which is central to modern modern
colour sensibility?
sensibility? It is conceivable
conceivable that our 'blue' would have
been perceived by a classical eye as a mixed or derivative pigment,
or that we would pick out a contrast between blues and greens
where the Greeks would have seen more of an amalgam.6 amalgam.6 Might
not
not one or more of our basic emotions too have seemed to them a
blend of distinct and separable components, and vice versa? 77
The linguist
linguist John Lyons affirms
affirms that 'the interdependence bebe
tween language and culture' is such as to render impossible 'lit 'lit-
eral translation' in the domain
domain of colour
colour terms ((1999:
1 999: 39).
39). Colour
perception, Lyons agrees, is a universal phenomenon, but but thethe
identification of individual hues is liable to vary from from one society
to another. As Lyons puts it: 'I am assuming, then, that color is
real. I am not assuming, however,
however, that colors are real'j real',- rather,
'they are the product of the lexical and grammatical structure of of
particular languages' ((1999:41;
1999: 41j d.
cf. Lyons 11995:197-8).
995: 1 9 7-8 ). Now, colours
seem to be out there in the world,
world, 'neural responses that await a
name' (MacLaury 11999:999: 24, referring to thethe hypothesis of Berlin
and Kay
Kay 11969).
969) . How much more likely is it that such intangible
items as emotions should vary from from culture to culture?
culture? One
might even argue that, unlike colour, the ontological status of of
emotion itself is as hazy or ambiguous as that of the the individual
emotions.
I have belaboured the question
question of the relativity of colour
colour termi
termi-
nology because it is not just popular beliefbelief that resists the idea
that the emotional repertoire represented by everyday
everyday English is
necessarily universal. There is also an important current in emoemo
tion studies that maintains that that a certain array of emotions
emotions is
innate
innate and hence uniform across cultures. The principle is cau- cau
tiously formulated
formulated as follows (Smith and Scott 11997: 997: 229):
229):'There
'There
is considerable evidence indicating distinct, prototypical facial
signals that across a variety of cultures can be reliably recognized
recognized
as corresponding to at least six different
different emotions (happiness,
sadness, surprise, disgust, anger,
anger, and fear), and possibly others,
8 / The Emotions of
Greeks
including interest, shame, and contempt' (references suppressed;

for lists of ostensibly
for ostensibly basic emotions, see Parkinson
Parkinson 1995: 110-12;0-12;
LeDoux 11996:996: 1112-14;
1 2-14; and Konstan 2001a: 4). 4). On this view, anger
and fear for the ancient Greeks were and must have been identical identical
to ours, irrespective of the Greeks' own definitions or folk psy
folk psy-
chology. The modern scientific claim to this effect effect is associated
particularly
particularly with the the neo-Darwinist
neo-Darwinist school
school of experimental
experimental psy-psy
chology and with the field field of evolutionary psychology,
psychology, heir to the the
sociobiology.88
earlier quasi-discipline of sociobiology.
Charles Darwin's last book, book, The Expression of of the Emotions
Emotions in
Man and Animals, published in 11872, 8 72, was a worthy conclusion to
his researches
researches on evolution.
evolution. In The Origin of of Species, Darwin
Darwin had
set forth
forth his fundamental hypotheses concerning evolution; in
The Descent of of Man, he extended
extended the
the idea of evolution to includeinclude
human
human beings. With The Expression of the Emotions, however, he
of the
touched on even more hallowed ground, for he now related the
inner or emotional life of human human beings to that of the the more
primitive species from from which mankind had evolved. evolved. In tracing the
expression
expression of emotions
emotions in human
human beings to analogous behavioursbehaviours
in other mammals, Darwin supposed that that certain expressive fea- fea
tures in humans are as innate and universal as snarling is to dogs.
We might agree that all dogs, or at least all dogs of a certain
species, snarl in much the same way, and perhaps for much the
same reasons, irrespective
irrespective of the conditions in which which they were
reared - - though this is to ignore the possible effects effects of
of training,
which
which can alter ostensibly
ostensibly instinctive behaviour. So So too, the hu
hu-
man smile and other expressive behaviours were treated by Dar- Dar
win as invariants over different
different populations and cultures: 'With
all the
the races of man
man the expression of good spirits appears to be the the
same, and is easily recognized' ((1998:
1 998: 2 1 1 ). Darwin confirmed
211). confirmed his
hypotheses by examining
hypotheses descriptions of human
examining descriptions human responses drawn
from
from different
different cultures, particularly those that he and his contem contem-
poraries regarded
regarded as primitive, and therefore more likely, in his
view, to reflect nature: 'My informants,
informants,'' he continues, 'from vari
'from vari-
ous parts of the Old and New Worlds,Worlds, answer in the affirmative
affirmative to
my queries on this head, and they they give some particulars
particulars with
respect to Hindoos, Malays, and New Zealanders. Zealanders.'' Besides
Besides the
information
information derived from from other
other peoples, DarwinDarwin also observed
Pathos and Passion
Passion / 9
that ''[i]diots
[i]diots and imbecile
imbecile persons likewise afford afford good evidence
that laughter or smiling primarily expresses happiness or joy'
((195).
1 95). So too, observation of the the behaviour of a blind blind and
and deaf
deaf
person suggested to Darwin that that this reaction is unlearned and
9
hence instinctive and universal (21 1 ).9
(211).
By classifying
classifying the
the expressions of the the several emotions
emotions in human
beings, and relating these to corresponding expressions in ances- ances
tor species, Darwin
Darwin marked out out or delineated
delineated a wide range of of
reflexes that he took to be evidence of inner inner emotional
emotional states. He
did not
not hazard guesses about the the origins of many many of the the expressive
features he identified, among them smiling and laughter: '[W]hy
the sounds which man utters when he is pleased have the peculiar
reiterated character of laughter we do not not know ... ... It is an equally
obscure point why the corners of the mouth mouth are retracted and the
upper lip raised during ordinary laughter' (206). But he does assign
these reflexes a function, in that they serve to communicate communicate joy
among 'members of the the same social community/
community,' and he adds that
the
the sounds of laughter 'would naturally
naturally be as different
different as possible
10
from
from thethe screams and cries of distress' (206).10(206).
Darwin related the expressions he examined examined to a large pan- pan
orama of emotions, including suffering,
suffering, anxiety, grief, dejection,
and despair,
despair, as well as joy,
joy, love and devotion, meditation, sulki sulki-
ness and determination, hatred and anger, anger, disdain, contempt,
disgust, guilt, patience, surprise, fear fear and horror, shame, shyness,
and modesty. Since many of these are near relations of one an an-
other, they share elements in our expressive repertoire: we may
laugh outout of joy or upon hearing a joke. Weeping, however, is
common to grief grief and to intense laughter, which are otherwise
different states. Darwin writes: 'I was anxious to know
quite different
whether tears are freely
freely shed during excessive laughter by most of
most of
the races of men, and I hear from from my correspondents that this is
the case' (207). But Darwin
Darwin held that the several emotions are
nevertheless broadly recognizable by the the complex of reflexes that
they generate across the entire species.
Among the devices of which which Darwin
Darwin availed himself, apart
from
from the observation of animal and human human behaviour, were the
questionnaire
questionnaire -- he sent a list of of questions
questions to his correspondents in
various parts of the world, so that that they might
might report to him him on the
10 // The Emotions of the
10 Ancient Greeks
the Ancient
expressions of of the several

several emotions -- and, more especially, the
new
new technique
technique of photography.
photography. By recording responses to photo- photo
graphic images, Darwin could determine determine whether emotional ex- ex
pressions were identified by observers in a uniform way. He is
among the earliest scientists
scientists to incorporate photographs into his
text, or indeed to exploit them for purposes of research. Phillip
Prodger ((1998:
1998: 399)
399) notes that Oscar Rejlander 'presented Darwin
with
with more than seventy photographs photographs of human expression,
expression/' and
that 'the enthusiasm
enthusiasm and imagination with which he embraced
Darwin's project transformed
transformed the content of the book, and in turn
revolutionized the way in which scientists study human behav- behav
ior.' Darwin was particularly intrigued by a volume published by
Guillaume-Benjamin
Guillaume-Benjamin Duchenne, which 'included eighty-four large
eighty-four large-
format photographs depicting human human subjects in various expres-expres
sive poses' ((1998:
1 998: 404).
404). Duchenne worked at the the hospital of La
Salpetriere outside of Paris, and experimented
experimented on some of his his
patients
patients with
with electric shocks, by which means 'he found found that
that he
could artificially stimulate his subjects to produce a variety
could artificially of
variety of
facial expressions' (405 (405).). These images were sometimes
sometimes so exag- exag
gerated as to amount
amount to caricature
caricature (the electric wires used in the
experiments were edited out of the published photographs) photographs).. DarDar-
win also corresponded with the physician physician James Crichton Browne,
who was director of the the West Riding Lunatic Asylum in York York-
shire, and although Darwin made use of only one of his photo- photo
graphs in his book, Prodger reports that 'Darwin incorporated so
many of Browne's observations in Expression that in March 11871 871
h
hee wrote suggesting that Browne Browne should bbee credited as a co-author
of
of the
the book' ( 1 998: 406).
book'(1998: 406).
Darwin's influence on the subsequent study of the emotions
was enormous. Jon Elster ((1999a: 1999a: 48
48)) writes: 'The psychological
analysis of the emotions is little more than a hundred years old.
Darwin's Expression of [the] Emotion[s] in Man Man and
and Animals
( 1 8 72) and William James's "What Is an Emotion" (1884)
(1872) ( 1 884) are the
the
first
first studies of the emotions using scientific methodology.' In the the
article 'Emotion' (part 11 of 'Human Emotion and Motivation') in
the New Encyclopedia Britannica ((1986),
New Encyclopedia 1 986), Dr Endre Grastyan notes
that Darwin's Expression 'had a profound profound influence in systematiz
systematiz-
ing emotion research.
research.'' Grastyan himself concentrates almost ex-
elusively
clusively on the organic basis of the emotions: 'Investigation into
so-called emotional phenomena .... . . increasingly
increasingly is being directed
toward objective biological evidence' (348), focusing on visible visible
and adaptive responses such as aggression, fright, fright, and fawning,
fawning, as
well as stress responses, involuntary crying and laughing, sleep
patterns, and the like. Researchers
Researchers also began to explore the
operations of the
the sympathetic
sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous sys- sys
tems. Symptoms such as rate of heart beat, blood-sugar levels,
production of adrenalin and serotonin, galvanic skin response, and
respiration were carefully measured.
measured.
Over the past thirty
thirty years, Paul Ekman and his associates have
continued
continued Darwin's work, developing experiments designed to
demonstrate that the basic emotions are universally recognized
from
from facial expressions, irrespective of differences
differences in language and
culture. Ekman's Darwin and Facial Facial Expression:
Expression: A Century
Century of of
R esearch in Review ((1973)
Research 19 73 ) was published to coincide with the
centennial of Darwin's Expression, and Ekman has recently ((1998) 1998 )
reissued Darwin's original work, supplemented by an introduc- introduc
tion, afterword, appendices, and extensive notes to bring it up to
date. Ekman has used more refinedrefined techniques
techniques than
than Darwin did,
taking larger population samples, making the questionnaires
questionnaires more
objective, and employing the the results of carefully labo
carefully controlled labo-
ratory experiments. Like Darwin, he too has made extensive extensive use
of
of photography in order to show that that certain
certain expressions are
universally associated with
with corresponding emotions. Ekman found
it practical to reduce Darwin's
Darwin's large range of emotionsemotions to a few
basic ones that could be readily
readily discriminated: anger, disgust,
enjoyment, fear and surprise (the
sadness, enjoyment, (the two last sometimes
sometimes
conflated
conflated into one)
one) are his primary categories, although he sug- sug
gests as well that contempt
contempt and perhaps the complex of shame shame
and guilt
guilt have universal
universal expressions (Ekman 11998: 998: 390- 1 ). Ekman
390-1).
remarks, however, that '(j]ealousy
'[jjealousy seems to have no distinctive
distinctive
expression,' nor does envy (391), both of which, he suggests, are
complex or compound
compound emotions.
Jealousy is identified as a basic emotion emotion in the other main main
tradition indebted to Darwinism, evolutionary psychology, where
research on emotions is focused on their role in the evolutionevolution of of
the human
human species. Psychological traits of modern man, it is
the Ancient Greeks
assumed, were at some point advantageous to survival, and hence

favoured
favoured by natural selection. There is a certain temptation in the
field
field to construct narratives -- what Stephen Jay Jay Gould has called
just-so stories
stories -- about
about how how oneone or another characteristic was
another characteristic was
adaptive, and to treat this account as confirming confirming the evolutionary
hypothesis.
David Buss, a popular exponent exponent of evolutionary psychology,
affirms
affirms that '[p]eople
'[pjeople in all cultures experience love and have
coined specific words for it' (1994: 2,); 2); hence, love is transcultural,
transcultural,
as Darwin too assumed. Love is interpreted as an element of of
mating strategies: Buss Buss explains, for example, that that 'men and el- el
ephant seals share a key characteristic: both must compete to
attract females' (9). (9).1111 The competition to attract has as its comple-
comple
ment the struggle to retain retain the partner once she has been won:
unlike the so-called love-bug, love-bug, Buss
Buss points out (1 0), '[h]umans
(10), '[hjumans do
not engage in continuous
continuous copulatory
copulatory embraces for days' as a way
of holding on to a mate (it is hard not to think think that human
evolution took an unfortunate
unfortunate turn here). 'Male sexual jealousy, jealousy,''
then, 'evolved as a psychological strategy to protect men's cer- cer
tainty of their paternity' (1 6). Buss does not
(16). not make clear what the the
12
evolutionary
evolutionary advantage of such knowledge might be.12
knowledge might be. More
importantly, however, Buss's explanation explanation takes it for granted
that
that jealousy is in fact universal. But that very thing thing has to be
13
demonstrated. 13
In selecting a small set of basic emotions from from the
the wide array of of
emotions
emotions for whichwhich names names exist in ordinary language, Ekman Ekman and
other scientists
scientists are following
following a tradition much much older than Darwin.
St Thomas
Thomas Aquinas had identified eleven eleven fundamental
fundamental emotions,
emotions,
divided into two two classes -- concupiscible and and irascible - andand his
his
configuration
configuration had considerable
considerable influence well into the Renais- Renais
sance. Although Descartes conceived of his treatise Les Passions
de l'ame ( 1 649) as a refutation of the
rdme(\649) the Thomistic
Thomistic theory (1 988: 1195,
(1988: 95,
art. 68),
68), he too presented scheme of simple
presented a scheme simple or primitive emo
primitive emo-
tions, reduced however to six, namely, surprise or wonder
(!'admiration), love, hatred, desire, joy,
(l'admiration), joy, and sadness (1988: 195-6,
195-6,
14
art. 69).14
69). The emotions, Descartes held, are in large part involun involun-
tary responses to determinate stimuli. Principal among the exter- exter
nal signs
signs of the emotions 'are motions
the emotions motions of thethe eyes and the face'
13
(2 1 9, art. 1112),
(219, 1 2), along with changes ooff colour, trembling, laughter,
tears, sighs, and so forth. Descartes emphasizes that that 'there is no
passion that is not revealed by some motion of the eyes: this is so
obvious in some passions that that even the most stupid servants can
see by the eye of their their master' whether or not not he is angry with
them (220,
(220, art. 1113).13). Descartes adds that, although
although 'one easily
perceives these motions motions of the eyes and knows what they mean, it
is not on that account easy to describe them, because each is
composed of several alterations,
alterations,'' which
which are difficult
difficult to identify
identify
individually. The The same is true for facial expressions. It is of course
possible to control such responses up to a pointi point; but when an
emotion
emotion is intense,intense, the
the best one can do is repress 'some of the
movements to which which it inclines
inclines the body' ((183,
1 83, art. 46);
46h for ex-
ex
ample, restrain oneself oneself from
from striking another in a fit of anger or
running
running away under under the
the influence fear.15
influence of fear. 15
It is remarkable that Descartes's theory of the passions was also
closely associated, like Darwin's, with a series of visual represen- represen
tations of the the emotions, in this case the sketches of the Parisian
painter Charles Le Le Brun, who in the year 11668 668 -- almost
almost twenty
twenty
years after
after the publication of of Descartes's treatise -- delivered his
famous 'Lecture on the Passions' before the French Academy. Academy. Le
Brun illustrated his presentation with drawings of facial expres expres-
sions, some of them them adapted fromfrom previous paintings of his while
others were prepared specifically
specifically for the speech. Christopher Allen
observes: 'It is clear that that LeLe Bmn
Brun regularly conceived figures in his
paintings fromfrom the outset
outset as epitomizing distinct
distinct passions' ((1998:
1 998:
83). According to Allen, 'Le Brun attempts to establish establish a finite
repertoire of human expressions by applying a mechanistic model
of
of affective
affective behaviour, based on the the principle
principle of action and reac reac-
tion' (ibid.
(ibid.).). Allen further
further argues that Le Le Brun derived the inspira
the inspira-
tion for his conception of expressive painting precisely from from
Descartes's theory, which which 'emphasized a mechanistic
mechanistic sequence of of
action
action and reaction as the basis of the the passions ..... . Before, the
the
passions had been inner inner movements
movements of the soul, whichwhich might
might or
might not not manifest themselves
themselves adequately on the surface of the
bodYi
body; now the physical manifestation was the primary event, and
the artist could expect, by concentrating on the measurable move- move
ments of facial muscles, to grasp and convey the the essential
essential proper-
141
14 / The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks
the Ancient
ties of the
the passions' (93 ) . Allen
(93). Allen contrasts
contrasts this style of pictorial
representation
representation with that of Poussin, a generation earlier. 'For Tor
Poussin,' says Allen, 'there is no such thing
Poussin/ thing as joy or sorrow apart
from, or prior to, this or that specific jjoy oy or sorrow. Everything
starts with
with the particularity of the situation' (8 7), and it is the
(87),
complex of responses, subtly varied but but always seen as elicited
elicited by
events, never as isolatable sentiments,
sentiments, that
that constitutes
constitutes the fundafunda-
mental idea or pensee of a Poussin painting. In Poussin's method, method,
'expression involved not not only thethe interrelationship
interrelationship of all his fig- fig
ures, but
but the
the involvement
involvement of every aspect of the the composition'
(97).166
(97).1
Darwin
Darwin knew Le Brun's lecture in a posthumouslyposthumously published
published
and illustrated edition, which
which may have been more schematic and
reductive than the original presentation (see (see C. Allen 11998:998: 96li
96); in
any case, Darwin did not think very highly of some of the descrip
the descrip-
tions accompanying the the drawings (Darwin 11998: 998: 111; 1 ; but
but see p. 7
for
for a more positive
positive appraisal). Still, the interrelationship between between
the visual arts and analyses of emotional
emotional expression is intriguing.
intriguing.
In the seventeenth century, a philosophical
philosophical treatise on the pas- pas
sions, with a particular emphasis on expression, inspired a series
of drawings and, apparently, a new approach to the the pictorial
pictorial repre
repre-
sentation
sentation of the emotions. Two centuries
centuries later, the new technique
technique
of photography was instrumental
instrumental in stimulating
stimulating a novel scientific
theory of emotional
emotional expression that would largely set the terms
for
for research for a century to come. In both cases, attention attention to
expression in the arts seems to have run parallel to a similar
concern in investigations of emotional psychology: both were
emotional psychology:
focused
focused on the the individual
individual manifestations
manifestations of an array of archetypal
archetypal
sentiments.
sentiments. We We shall return to this correspondence later in this
chapter.
Ekman's project of identifying
identifying universal expressions of emoemo
tions has been challenged from from several quarters. Margaret Mead
and Gregory Bateson were among his early critics, maintaining maintaining
that human behaviour, and emotions in particular, were almost
that human
infinitely
infinitely malleable, and hence that culture was the decisive and
indeed the the unique determinant
determinant of such phenomena
phenomena (for a sum sum-
mary of this debate,
debate, see Ekman 11998).
998). Other anthropologists have
joined them
them in pointing to the wide variation in the meaning of of
15
emotion
emotion terms across cultures
cultures (ef.
(cf. Russell 1997: 307).
307). To take one
example among many, in her book Unnatural Emotions Emotions ((1988),
1 98 8 ),
Catherine A.A. Lutz describes her sojourn with the Haluk, a people
the Ifaluk,
who dwell on a tiny atoll in the South Pacific. One of the the funda
funda-
mental and most perplexing of the emotional terms that Lutz
encountered among the Haluk Ifaluk was 'fago,
'fago/' which she parses as the
combined expression 'compassion/love/sadness.' 'This concept
required,
required/' she writes, 'more than did most other Haluk Ifaluk emotional
concepts, an effort
effort to disentangle my own native emotional un un-
derstanding from
from theirs' ((119).
1 1 9) . Lutz concludes that 'emotional
experience is not pre cultural but preeminently
precultural preeminently cultural'; rather
than having a more or less uniform content content across different soci
different soci-
eties, the emotions and the meanings attached to them are 'a
social rather than an individual achievement - - an emergent prod
prod-
17
uct of social life' (5).17
uct (5).
Cultural history is a kind of anthropologyanthropology of the the past, and
students of ancient societies have recently raised similar kinds of of
doubts about the
the continuity and universality of emotions. Shweder
and Haidt (2000: 40 1 ) observe:
401)
Contemporary emotion researchers are likely likely to find

find the
the account
account of the
the
basic emotions
emotions in the 'Rasadhyaya' [the sixth chapter of the the third-century
third-century
AD Sanskrit book on drama entitled Natyas dstra] both familiar
Ndtyas astra] familiar and
strange. IfIf we compare the the Sanskrit list of nine (eight plus one)one) basic
emotions
emotions (sexual
(sexual passion, amusement,
amusement, sorrow, anger, fear, perseverance,
disgust, wonder, and sometimes
sometimes serenity)
serenity) with Paul Ekman's well-known
contemporary list of nine (six (six plus three) basic emotions
emotions (anger, fear,
fear,
sadness, happiness,
happiness, surprise, and disgust,
disgust, plus interest, shame, and con-
con
tempt) ....,
.. , the two lists are not closely coordinated, although
although they
they are not
18
totally disjoint either. 18
So too, as we shall see in the

the chapters that follow, the
the set ofof
emotions that Aristotle treats in his Rhetoric also exhibits impor-
impor
tant discrepancies with modern lists, sometimes cutting
cutting across
the categories by which we discriminate the emotions. To antici-
antici
pate, Aristotle seems to divide what we call anger into two dis- dis
tinct
tinct emotions; in turn, whereas we typically discriminate guilt
and shame, classical Greek appears to collapse the two into a
16// The Emotions of the
16 the Ancient Greeks
Greeks
single concept (and

(and yet it has two terms that seem to correspond correspond
to our idea of 'shame')
'shame').. What is more, some emotions that are
central to ancient Greek inventories are absent in modern cata cata-
logues: an example is ZlMos, zelos, which, as we shall see, connotes a
positive spirit of rivalry as contrasted with the the negative passion of of
envy. Pity may be another
another case: it is universally included in lists
universally included
of the pathe,
pathe, but figures so rarely in modern accounts that one
may wonder
wonder whether
whether it is conceived
conceived as an emotionemotion at all in
contemporary English.
English. In turn, sentiments
sentiments such as loneliness or
sadness are often
often classified as emotions
emotions today but but are missing
missing in
ancient
ancient Greek lists (d. (cf. Wood 11986:
986: 1194).
94). More
Moreremarkable
remarkablestill stillisis
the
the absence of grief
grief from
from Aristotle's survey of the pathe, although
the pathe,
it provides the narrative armature for Martha Nussbaum's neo- neo
Stoic analysis (see below).19
(see below).19
Such mergings, separations,
separations, hiatuses, and intersections config config-
ure the overall picture of the emotions in each given society, and
even the idea of emotion
emotion itself. We have remarkedremarked on the the apparent
apparent
absence of a term for 'emotion' in Tibetan, and on the the variety of of
meanings associated with the Greek word word pathos: indeed, the use
of pathos
pathos in classical Greek to refer refer specifically to emotion
emotion may
have been a relatively late development (Harris [200 [2001: 1 : 84]
84] suggests
that the term may have aquired this sense as late as 'the 420s and
, 20
probably later ).2o Even languages that contain words based on the
later').
same Latin root as 'emotion' may nuance the concept differently. differently.
Although the Spanish 'emoci6n/
'emocion,' for example, means 'emotion' in
psychological
psychological parlance,
parlance, in part under under the influence of English
usage, 'emoci6n'
'emocion' and the corresponding verb 'emocionarse' 'emocionarse' more
commonly
commonly refer to 'excitement' or 'suspense,' and may thus be
included as one of a list of 'emotions, 'sentimientos.'21 One can
'emotions,'' or 'sentimientos.'21
achieve a proper understanding of these differences only through a
close examination of emotional
emotional language in cultures foreign foreign to
one's own.
The linguist Anna Wierzbicka has mounted the most direct and
forceful
forceful attack on Ekman's project. Wierzbicka Wierzbicka ((1999:
1 999: 1168)68 ) cites
Ekman's claim ((1980:1 980: 1137-8)
3 7-8 ) that ' (r)egardless
that '[rjegardless theof the language, of
of
whether
whether the culture is Western or Eastern, industrialized or
pre literate, these facial expressions
preliterate, expressions are labelled
labelled with the the same
emotion terms: happiness, sadness, anger, anger, fear,
fear, disgust and sur-
17
prise,' and points out that these labels are hardly indifferent
prise/ indifferent to
language. As Wierzbicka
Wierzbicka puts it, Ekman
continues
continues to imply
imply that these 'discrete phenomena' can be identified by
means of English lexical categories such as 'anger' or 'sadness.' From this
perspective, English lexical
lexical categories such as 'sadness' or 'anger' appear
to cut nature at its joints .....,. , whereas the lexical
lexical categories of languages
like Ifaluk
Ifaluk or Pintupi . . . can only correspond to 'blends.'
Pintupi...
The result is that Ekman and his colleagues 'absolutize the Eng
the Eng-
lish folk-taxonomy
folk-taxonomy of emotions' ((171 ).22 Wierzbicka's
1 7 1 ).22 Wierzbicka's critique has
has
particular saliency for the
the study of the
the emotional taxonomies of of
other cultures, or even one's own at different
different times or in different
different
social environments.
environments.
It may appear that Wierzbicka
Wierzbicka and Ekman are talking past one
another. No one denies that the human human face has a variety of of
expressions, or that some gestures may have natural limits: one
can only raise the corners of the mouth so far in smiling, or
depress them so far to cause a frown. Such expressions may also
serve as elementary cues. As the neuro-physiologist Edmund Rolls
puts it ((1999:
1 999: 79):
79):
Although
Although most visual stimuli are not not primary
primary reinforcers,
reinforcers, but may be-be
come secondary reinforcers
reinforcers as a result
result of stimulus-reinforcement
stimulus-reinforcement associa·
associa-
tion learning, it is possible that some visual
visual stimuli, such
such as the sight
sight of a
smiling
smiling face or of an angry face, could be primary reinforcers.
reinforcers. It has been
shown
shown that
that there is a population
population of neurons in the cortex in the anterior
part of the macaque superior temporal sulcus that categorize face stimuli
based on the
the expression
expression of the (d. Blonder 1999:
the face (cf. 1999: 280-83; Laughlin
and Throop 1999:
1999: 345-46).
345-46).
There are also data to 'suggest that even very young infants ... are
able to discriminate the features of the
the face that to an adult denote
facial expressions' (Nelson
(Nelson and de Haan 11997:997: 1183;
83j d.
cf. 198).
198). But
why treat acute gestures as indices of basic or elementary emoemo
tions? Extreme
Extreme cases, as Aaron Ben-Ze'ev
Ben-Ze'ev (2000: 8) 8) remarks, 'are
mistakenly perceived to be both typical and frequent
mistakenly perceived frequent because ......
they are more noticeable.'
18/
Ekman's Darwinian
Darwinian approach, whichwhich seeks to demonstrate
demonstrate that
a limited set of of emotions is universally recognizable
recognizable on the basis
of extreme or exaggerated
exaggerated expressions, is vulnerable also to the the
criticism
criticism that the information communicated
communicated by facial and other
gestures is not as consistent
consistent as his research method might might lead
one to believe. A recent volume on The Psychology of of Facial
Expression (Russell
Expression (Russell and Fernandez-Dols
Fernandez-Dols eds 11997) 997) proposes
proposes to
address ''the
the link between
between facial expression
expression and emotion
emotion .... . . It is in
part a theme
theme of this book thatthat the belief in such a link link was not
always thus in the past and that it need not be thus in the future' future'
(Mandler 11997:997: vii).
vii). The editors observe: 'By the the 11980's,
980's, psycholo-
psycholo
gists had largely accepted as a "fundamental axiom of behavioral
science"
science" the link link between faces and emotions' (Russell (Russell and
Fernandez-Dols 11997a: xi).23 Some investigators have retreated to
997a: xi).23
the more modest claim claim of 'a clear and distinct affinity
affinity between
particular facial expressions and particular categories of emotion'
((Frijda
Frijda and Tcherkassof
Tcherkassof 11997:
997: 80).
80). Others
Others allow
allow that facial expres-
expres
sion may have a communicative
communicative function,
function, but deny the connec- connec
tion with emotion.
emotion. Thus, Fridlund (1997: ( 1997: 1104)
04) holds that 'facial
'facial
displays are simply messages, which which influence others' behavior
because vigilance for and comprehension
comprehension of signals co-evolved
with the signals themselves'; they are not 'readouts of "emotional "emotional
state,
state/"'" nor are they 'compromise formations
formations of an "authentic"
"authentic"
self
self inhibited
inhibited by a "social" one' ((123).
1 23). Emotion is thus 'unneces
'unneces-
sary to understand how our facial expressions both evolved and
operate in modern life' ((124).
124).
The most significant critique in Russell and Fernandez-DolsFernandez-Dols
volume
volume questions
questions the experimental
experimental validity
validity of using extremeextreme
expressions stripped of context as cues to descriptions of emoemo
tions. Fernandez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda ((1997: 1997: 255-6) recall
recall how
Eadweard Muybridge's photographs of galloping horses ((1872), 1 8 72),
made at thethe request of Leland Stanford, showed that centuries of of
artistic convention were anatomically wrong; thus, 'we ask a
question not unlike that that asked by Leland
Leland Stanford: What is the
actual facial behavior of a happy person, an angry person, and so
on?
on?'' (256). They
They go on to suggest that 'smiles, frowns, and other
"facial expressions of emotion"
emotion" do possess an "artistic "artistic truth.
truth.""
That
That is, if a painter, actor oorr lay-person sets out out ttoo convey happi-
Pathos and Passion
Passion / 19
19
ness oorr anger by a single image, then a smiling oorr frowning face is
the right image to choose.' But this is not the same as saying that
happy people smile or sad ones frownfrown (257). Photographs of people
actually
actually experiencing emotions may not correspond to such artis- artis
24
tically selected patterns.
patterns.24 After
After reviewing Ekman's and others'
experiments, Fernandez-Dols
Fernandez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda conclude that 'the
relationship between happiness and smiles .... . . is, at the
the moment,
far
far from
from clear ....
. . No clear link between happiness and smiles has
been found
found in research on spontaneous facial expressions' (264).25 (264).25
Writing in the same volume, Russell (1997: ( 1997: 295)295 ) recalls thethe
experiment by thethe Russian director Lev Kuleshov ((1917), 1 9 1 7), in which
the identical
the identical deadpan face of an actor set in different
different situations
situations
was described as reflecting a wide range of emotions. The The absence
of context may leave the observer uncertain as to the emotion
of
expressed, as in this passage from
from a work of fiction:
But now, as he turned his eyes in Zoffany's direction, he got a shock. The
man
man was gazing at Natalie Arno, had probably been doing doing so for the
the past
ten minutes, and his expression,
expression, hypnotic
hypnotic and fixed, was impenetrable.
impenetrable. It
might
might indicate
indicate contempt or envy
envy or desire
desire or simple
simple hatred. Wexford
Wexford was
unable
unable to analyze it, but
but he felt
felt a pang of pity for Zoffany's
Zoffany's wife, for
anyone who had to live with so much smouldering emotion.
much smouldering emotion. (Rendell
98 1 : 37)
11981:37)
Fernandez-Dols and Carroll ((1997: 1997: 276)

276)conclude
concludethat
that'[k]nowledge
'[kjnowledge
of the
of the context
context can ..... . lead us to doubt that a genuine (non-feigned)
smile expresses happiness, a genuine frown frown anger,
anger, or genuine
crying sadness.' Russell ((1997: 1 997: 3 1 2), in turn, observes that in
312),
experiments in which
which photographsphotographs were combined with with stories,
''[i]n
[i]n every case, the modal emotion chosen coincided with the
prediction based on the situation rather than on the face' (citing
Carroll and Russell 11996). 996). An additional factorfactor is facial mobility.
Bavelas and Chovil ((1997: 1997: 335)
335) point out thatthat 'the literature on
facial expression is full full of still photographs
photographs of people with with fixed,
unmoving expressions' (335). Invoking the the theory of discourse
analysis, they observe that, although 'facial displays may depict
emotional reactions ...., . . , they are not emotional expressions; they
signify
signify rather than reveal' (337). They conclude that 'faces in
20 // The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks
Greeks
dialogue move rapidly to convey meaning meaning in conjunction with with

other, simultaneous
simultaneous symbolic acts' (339), a practice that does not
lend itself to study by means of still photographs
photographs or segments of of
videotape.
Over the past thirty years or so, investigators in several disci- disci
plines have increasingly
increasingly recognized
recognized that emotions typically, and
perhaps necessarily, involve a substantial cognitive component.
The traditional opposition
opposition between
between reason and emotion emotion is no
longer the reigning paradigm in science philosophy.26 William
science or philosophy.26
Lyons (1980:
( 1 980: 70),
70), for example, defines an emotionemotion as consisting
consisting ofof
cognitive (or (or perceptual), evaluative, and appetitive elements, elements, and
observes that what differentiates
differentiates one emotionemotion from
from another is
precisely the evaluative part. Some theorists, in fact, have inter inter-
preted emotions as as nothing more than judgments judgments -- albeit judg judg-
ments of a particular
particular kind, so as to distinguish them from from other
other
cognitive activities. Richard Lazarus ((1991: 1 99 1 : 353)
353) writes thatthat 'cog
'cog-
nition is both
both a necessary
necessary and sufficient condition emotion/27
condition of emotion,J27
and Robert Solomon ((1993: 1 993: viii; d.
cf. xvii, I15,S, 60, and 125-6) states
baldly that 'emotions are judgments' (italics in original).
are judgments' original). More
recently, Martha Nussbaum has defended defended an extreme cognitivistcognitivist
interpretation in her
interpretation her book Upheavals
Upheavals of (2001).). Nussbaum
of Thought (2001
describes her view as 'neo-Stoic,
'neo-Stoic/' in acknowledgment of the an
the an-
cient Greek philosophical school whose principal exponents main main-
tained a narrowly intellectualist
intellectualist interpretation of the emotions.
In a nutshell,
nutshell, she stipulates
stipulates that emotions 'involve judgments
about important
important things' ((19). 19). We
We may illustrate her approach with
the example of grief, whichwhich Nussbaum includes in her own inven- inven
tory of emotions
emotions along with 'fear, love, joy, joy, hope, anger, gratitude,
gratitude,
hatred, envy, jealousy, pity, guilt' (24; (24; she later adds wonder and
awe to the list, 54). 54). 'The neo-Stoic,
neo-Stoic/' Nussbaum
Nussbaum writes, 'claims
that grief
grief is identical with the the acceptance of a proposition that is
both evaluative and eudaimonistic, that that is, concerned with with one or
more of the the person's important goals and ends' (41 (41).). More simply,
mourning just is the awareness that a person whom whom I love and
who has been central to my well-being (or (or my 'flourishing/
'flourishing,' as
Nussbaum renders the Greek word eudaimonia eudaimonia)) is dead. The loss
of such
such an individual
individual is not a neutral
neutral event, but but bears directly
directly on
my sense of what what is valuable to me. Thus, the proposition that that
21
expresses such a loss carries aan n intensity

intensity that
that distinguishes
distinguishes the
emotion fromfrom more narrowly intellectual
intellectual beliefs, without, how-how
ever, altering its character as a judgment. judgment. The 'real, full recogni
full recogni-
tion
tion of that terrible event
event.... . . is the upheaval' (45 (45).).
One may question whetherwhether the intensity characteristic of cer- cer
tain kinds of of judgments
judgments -- namely, those concerning matters that
are important for our life goals - - can be simply folded folded into the
judgment itself, as opposed to constituting an additional element
carrying precisely the affective
affective charge
charge that we associate with the
category of emotion. Aristotle, as we shall see, specified specified that
emotions are necessarily accompanied by pain and pleasure, which
are not, on his view, judgments sensations.28 Many
judgments but rather sensations.28
modern investigators stipulate that emotions are 'valenced,' that
is, positively
positively or negatively
negatively inflected (cf. Ortony, Clore, and Collins
11988:
988: 13;
13; Parkinson 11995: 995: 230-6; Isen 2000; Schorr 200 2001: 1: 3 1 ; and
31;
29
Reddy 2002001:1: 2 1-5 ),29 and identify
21-5), identify additional components in emoemo
tions such as physiological changes, characteristic facial expres- expres
sions and other surface manifestations,
manifestations, accompanying desires or
motives, and so forth. Aristotle himself himself recognized that that emotions
involve physical processes
processes in the body ((On On the Soul l1.1, . 1, 403 a 1 6-
403al6-
27; see Knuutilla 2004: 2004: 33-5
33-5).). Even those who emphasize the
centrality of judgment,
judgment, as in the the 'appraisal theory' school of the the
emotions, affirm
affirm that 'emotions are elicited by evaluations evaluations ..... . of of
events and situations' (Roseman and Smith 200 1 : 3)
2001: 3) -- the opera-opera
tive term is 'elicited.' An event 'triggers a process of appraisal appraisal and
subsequent emotion' (ibid.: 7,
subsequent 7, my emphasis);
emphasis); the judgment
judgment is not
the emotion itself.
In part as a result of the new turn in modern research on the the
emotions, the importance of cognition in classical Greek philo philo-
sophical analyses of the the passions has also been recognized in
recent years, beginning with the path-breakingpath-breakingstudy of Aristotle's
theories
theories by William
William Fortenbaugh (1975, ( 19 75, 2nd ed. 2002; cf. d. Sorabji
2000: 119-36).
9-36). As Richard Lazarus, one of the the founders
founders of modern
appraisal theory, observes, '[T]hose '[Tjhose who favor favor a cognitive-media-
cognitive-media
tional approach
approach must also recognize that Aristotle's Rhetoric
more than two thousand years ago ago applied this kind of approach to
a number of emotions in terms that seem remarkably remarkably modern'
(Lazarus 200
2001:1 : 40; cf. Hinton 11999a: 999a: 6).6). In the
the epilogue to the the
second edition
edition of his book, Fortenbaugh makes clear how
how radical
Aristotle's claim
claim is (2002: 94):
94):
Humans have the capacity to think

think and therefore can believe that
that an
insult threatens.30 Animals lack this
insult has occurred and that some danger threatens.3D
cognitive
cognitive capacity
capacity and therefore cannot
cannot experience
experience emotions
emotions as analyzed
analyzed
by Aristotle. Of course, animals can be said to experience pathe,
pathe, for this
word has multiple
multiple meanings
meanings and can be used inclusively
inclusively to cover both
both
the
the emotional responses of human
human beings and the
the reactions of animals. In
addition, emotion
emotion words like oIge
orge and phobos,
phobos, 'anger' and 'fear,' can be
used to describe usage.31
describe the behavior of animals, but this is analogical usage.31
One of the
the difficulties
difficulties with
with Martha Nussbaum's
Nussbaum's version of the the
cognitivist
cognitivist approach, in my view, is that that she ascribes emotions,
emotions,
and hence judgment, to animals ((2001: 89-138).32
200 1 : 89-138).32
Aristotle's analysis, as interpreted by Fortenbaugh ((correctly,
correctly, in
my viewL
view), raises a further question, which Fortenbaugh
Fortenbaugh does not
consider. Granted that
that a horse fears a snake (for example)
example) only in a
derivative or analogical sense of fear, do human
human beings sometimes
sometimes
react to snakes in this pre-emotional way, or is their their response
necessarily accompanied by the belief 'that some danger threat
necessarily threat-
ens'? Might
Might certain
certain kinds or episodes of human
human fear
fear be pre-emo-
pre-emo
tional
tional responses?
responses? This question
question will
will concern
concern us further in the
sequel (see
(see pp. 25-6).
25-6).
Unlike
Unlike the neo-Darwinian
neo-Darwinian view, the cognitivist
cognitivist model is hospi-
hospi
table to the idea
idea that the nature
nature of the emotions is strongly
strongly
conditioned
conditioned by the social environment.
environment. Indeed, even such physi-physi
processes as the accelerated
ological processes accelerated heartbeat
heartbeat associated
associated with
particular emotions
emotions may be a cultural
cultural variable. As Hupka et al.
((1996:
1996: 255, 258)
258) observe inin one
one of several comparative studies:
We found
found that anger is reported to be felt
felt across the
the five
five nations [Ger-
[Ger
many, Mexico, Poland, Russia, and the United
United States]
States] in the face, head,
and heart. Envy is located in the heart, face, and eyes.
eyes. Fear is felt
felt in the
the
heart and breath, and jealousy in the heart
heart and face. In brief, the
the heart is
reported to be involved in all four
four emotions, whereas the other sites are
more selectively
selectively attributed
attributed to the emotions ....
.. The findings corroborate
previous research reports of individuals
individuals claiming to differentiate
differentiate different
different
patterns of autonomic nervous system activity for different
different emotions.'
Pathos and Passion
Passion / 23
In Greek popular psychology, endorsed in part by the Stoics, the

seat of the emotions and of thought
the emotions thought itself
itself tended
tended to be located
located in
the diaphragm or liver rather than the heart or brain. Presumably,
the physical experience of certain emotions differed differed accordingly; I
am inclined to wonder, incidentally, whether whether intense concentra
concentra-
tion can have been associated with with a headache as opposed to
tension
tension in the midriff.
midriff.
Modern appraisal theorists too have begun to insist insist that
that 'the
appraisal process is more fundamentally social in nature than than has
generally been acknowledged
acknowledged to date' (Manstead and Fischer 200 2001:1:
23 1 ). A key focus of recent research in this area looks to the
231). the way
individuals
individuals respond to perceived emotions emotions in others: 'a basic
premise
premise for the occurrence
occurrence of social
social appraisals is that people are
sensitive to the emotional
emotional reactions of others and also motivated
to know them' (ibid.: 224).
224).Antony Manstead and Agneta Fischer
observe, for example, that 'cultures are likely likely to differ
differ in the
extent
extent to which they explicitly value social appraisals,' and this
difference
difference may depend in part on 'the way in which the self self is
conceptualized' (230), thatthat is, whether
whether there exists an 'indepen'indepen-
dent' as opposed to an 'interdependent' sense of self self (ibid., citing
Markus and Kitayama 11991 ).33 Two studies on Dutch
99 1 ).33 Dutch versus Span- Span
ish emotional responses indicate a 'greater Spanish focus on oth- oth
ers' evaluative judgments,
judgments, in contrast with with the greater Dutch Dutch
focus on autonomous
autonomous judgments';
judgments'; the investigators
investigators concluded
concluded
that 'Spanish participants'
participants' thoughts during pride and shame expe expe-
riences were more oftenoften other-centered,
other-centered, whereas Dutch partici partici-
pants' thoughts
thoughts were more often often self-centered' (ibid.
(ibid.:: 23
231,1 , citing
Fischer, Manstead, and Rodriguez
Rodriguez Mosquera 11999 999 and Rodriguez
Rodriguez
Mosquera, Manstead, and Fischer 2000). There is at least prima
facie reason to suppose that the emotional experience of the the
ancient
ancient Greeks and that of modern Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon cultures
cultures may
diverge along similar lines. Jon Elster ((1999a: 1 999a: 75)
75) has noted that
the world implied
implied by Aristotle's account of the emotions emotions in the
Rhetoric is one 'in which everybody knows that they are con- con
stantly
stantly being judged, nobody hides that they they are acting
acting like judges,
and nobody hides that they seek to be judged positively' (cited
more fully
fully in chapter 2, p. 75). It is plausible, then,then, that classical
representations and analyses of the emotions
emotions would have stressed
the interaction
interaction or interdependency of emotional
emotional responses, and
24
24 // The Emotions of the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
focused as well on the attitudes, motives, and actions of others

rather than on chance, mechanical, or natural events as the causes
or elicitors of emotion.
emotion. This approach may have relevance
relevance for the
the
modern interpretation of the emotions as well ((see see below)
below)..
Evaluation presupposes
presupposes values, and insofar
insofar aass emotions are a
function of value judgments, they will vary from
from one individual
individual to
another and according
according to the collective values of particular com-
com
munities. If, when people from different cultures confront
from different confront an
apparently similar
similar situation,
they experience
experience a different
different emotion, it is because they have appraised the
situation differently ...
... For example, if people attribute a negative event
such as illness to uncontrollable
uncontrollable impersonal
impersonal forces, such as fate or bad
luck, they should
should feel sad or depressed; if they
they attribute
attribute it to the actions
actions
of another person,
person, they should feel angry;
angry,- if they think they themselves
(Mesquita and Ellsworth 2001
are responsible, they should feel guilty. (Mesquita 2001::
233)
233)
What is more, the same event may be understood

understood as positive or
negative in valence, depending on the value system of the popula
the popula-
tion in question. People prepared to sacrifice
sacrifice their lives for a
religious or patriotic cause may regard death as noble or as a sign
of martyrdom rather than as an evil to be avoided and lamented. It
is possible, nevertheless, to imagine the emotional response
response of of
someone from
from another culture, provided
provided one factors in the rel- rel
evant description
description of the event
event and the value attached
attached to it. As
Batja Mesquita and Phoebe C. Ellsworth (200 235)put
1 : 235)
(2001: put it,
it, '[Olnce
'[O]nce
the interpretation of the eliciting event is known, the emotional
response to it, however strange it seems at first, becomes fully fully
understandable.'
understandable/ It is at the level of evaluation that cultural
differences in the determination of the emotions are most salient.
Whether or not
not a given
given stimulus induces anger or fear fear or some
other emotion depends
depends on whether one judges it to be threatening
or insulting, and such an appraisal
appraisal will involve a whole range of of
conditioned values and expectations.
socially conditioned expectations.
Although a chasm seems to divide the cognitivist view and that
of the
the neo-Darwinists,
nee-Darwinists, the
the difference
difference is in part a consequence of of
focusing on distinct moments
moments in the emotional
emotional process. Emotions
Pathos and Passion
Passion // 25
are not indivisible

indivisible events, at least conceptually. On the one hand,
emotions are elicited by a stimulus, which is located in the
outside world or else is generated by memory; memory,- on the other hand,
emotions result in a response,
response, which takes two forms: expression,
which
which may have a communicative
communicative function, as Darwin proposed,
and action, which is motivated by a wish or desire. Evaluative
judgments may be thought thought of as occurring between the the perceived
stimulus
stimulus and the the response, as Lyons suggested (unless (unless they are
treated as part of the stimulus). As the physiologist Joseph LeDoux
puts it: 'At the neural level, each emotional
emotional unit can be thoughtthought ofof
as consisting
consisting of a set of inputs, an appraisal mechanism, and a set
of
of outputs' ((1996: 1 996: 127).
127). Another investigator lists a typical se- se
quence of five five components presumed to be constitutive constitutive of an
emotion: '('(1) 1 ) objects, causes, precipitating events, (2) (2) appraisal, (3)
(3)
physiological
physiological changes, (4) (4) action tendencies/ action/ expression,
expression,
and (5) regulation' (Planalp 11999:11; suppressed).34
999: 1 1; italics in original suppressed).34
Cognition and appraisal look to the beginning of the the emotional
emotional
35
process, while expression is relevant to the outcome. outcome.35 It is per- per
fectly possible that the the range of expressions is more stereotyped
than the
the variety of emotional
emotional stimuli;
stimuli; for example, Russell ((1997: 1 997:
304) distinguishes between dimensions of facial expression, which
are physical, 'automatic, and elemental (they cannot be further
decomposed), and universal,universal,'' and categories of emotion, which
'are complex (they can be analyzed into features), and are, to some
degree, variable with with language and culture.' The problem lies in
assuming that expressions uniquely specify specify a complete process:
process: it
is the process, not just the outcome, that constitutes constitutes an emotion.
emotion.
To be sure, there are some elementary automatisms automatisms in human human
physiology, such as laughterlaughter provoked by tickling (to (to which mon
mon-
keys too are susceptible)
susceptible) or blinking when an object is thrust thrust
before one's eyes, in which the stimulus stimulus is closely related to the
response. One investigator (Provine 11997: 997: 1159)
59 ) argues that yawn
that yawn-
ing is 'associated with with the "emotions" of boredom or sleepi- sleepi
ness ....,
. . , two behavioral states that fail to make the list of approved approved
emotions, possible victims of of science by committee' -- with good
reason, I would add (Provine lumps together such varied acts as
'yawning, laughing, smiling, tickling, and talking'). The response
to a loud noise (sometimes labelled the startle reflex) or to a
Greeks
looming presence may be generated in a similarly similarly automatic

automatic way;
the latter reaction resembles fear, but perhaps it is better de- de
scribed as analogous to fear, like an animal's or even a human
being's instinctive
instinctive response to a predator.
predator. We We must
must be wary of of
classifying
classifying such automatisms emotions.36
automatisms as emotions.36
Paul Griffiths,
Griffiths, in his book What Emotions
Emotions ReallyReally Are (1997L
(1997),
proposes to resolve the tension tension between the neo-Darwinist and
cognitive
cognitive approaches by separating
separating out at least two different
different classes
classes
of emotions - - those analysed in the 'affect
'affect program' associated
with Ekman, and 'higher cognitive emotions such as envy, guilt, guilt,
jealousy, and love' (9; (9; d.
cf. chapter 6, p. 1129).
29). Given
Giventhis
thisdichotomy,
dichotomy,
Griffiths
Griffiths concludes that that 'the general concept of emotion is un un-
likely to be a useful
useful concept in psychological theory' ((14), 1 4), since
it embraces categorically distinct distinct items;
items,- indeed, he proposes
that ''"emotion"
'' emotion'' should be eliminated
eliminated fromfrom our psychological
vocabulary' (1 5).
(15).
Fear and anger, however, are arguably n noo less cognitive
cognitive than
than
envy and guilt, and elementary reflexes may enter into the forma forma-
tion even of highly cognitive emotions.
highly cognitive emotions. In his well-known
well-known analy-
analy
sis of fear, Joseph LeDoux states (1 69) that, in general, '[t]he
996: 69)
(1996:
perceptual representation of an object and and the
the evaluation of an
object
object are separately processed in the brain.' More particularly, 'a
fear
fear reaction
reaction system .... . . involves parallel transmission
transmission to the the
amygdala from from the sensory thalamus and sensory cortex. The
subcortical pathways provide a crude image of the the external world,
whereas more detailed and accurate representations
representations come from
the cortex' (165). LeDoux illustrates (284) (284)the process withwith the
reaction
reaction to the sight of a snake-like object on the ground: we
recoil instantly, and only afterwards discriminate whether whether the
stimulus was alive and dangerous rather rather than what we know to be
a harmless variety or just a stick. Conceivably,
Conceivably, animal responses
of the sort I have called pre-emotions are primarily mediated by
subcortical activity. But this is not enough to account for an
emotion
emotion like fear. In a culture
culture in which snakes are a delicacy, the the
final response to the sight
sight even of a dangerous snake might might not
not be
fear at all. The dual neural pathways only enable the the emotion
emotion we
call 'fear' when
when the autonomic reaction
reaction of shying
shying away is in synch
with
with a particular learned response to the given stimulus stimulus (an
(an analo-
Pathos and Passion
Passion / 27
gous split-level process may be at work in constituting

constituting the the osten
osten-
sibly higher emotion
emotion of pity;
pity,- d.
cf. Konstan 2001
2001a: a: 110-11).
0- 1 1 ).
question whether
One may question whether any definition
definition will include all the
sentiments
sentiments that are popularly classified
classified as emotions. Consider the
five components of emotion
emotion identified
identified by Sally Planalp: objects or
causes, appraisal, physiological changes, action action or expression, and
regulation. Anxiety, if it is an emotion, may have no specific specific or
identifiable cause; it is doubtful
doubtful thatthat pity or guilt is necessarily
accompanied by physiological alterations;
alterations,- jealousy is acknowl-
acknowl
edged as yielding
yielding no characteristic
characteristic expression.
expression. The situation is
still more complicated if one includes emotions emotions identified as
basic in other cultures, where, as we have seen, the lists may
differ
differ significantly from
from our own. It has recently been argued that
Aristotle's own definition of pathos fails to cover all the the items
he includes in his analysis, and that they are united united rather by
what Wittgenstein called 'family resemblance' (Fortenbaugh
2003-4)
2003-4), though I argue below that his account is more rigorous
'
than that.
Aristotle's most
most extensive treatment
treatment of the emotions is to be
found in his treatise on rhetoric
rhetoric rather
rather than in his book on psy- psy
chology ((OnOn the Soul). This circumstance in itself itself tells
tells us some
some-
thing about the difference
difference between the modern English and anan
cient Greek ideas of emotion: given that judgment and belief belief are
central to the dynamics of the emotions as Aristotle conceives
them, it is natural that
that an understanding of the pathe should form
part of the
the art of persuasion. Aristotle characterizes emotions as
consisting of two basic elements: first, every pathos pathos is accompa
accompa-
nied by pain and pleasure; second, the pathe pathe are, in Aristotle's
words, those things
things 'on account of which
which people change and differ differ
in regard to their judgments.' In a moment, we shall consider this
definition more closely; for now, we may remark that that one mustmust be
alert to the possibility thatthat a focus on the role of emotion emotion in
argument conditioned the kinds of sentiments
sentiments thatthat Aristotle
Aristotle and
other
other students of rhetoric selected
selected for analysis. But it may also be
that forensic and deliberative environments were seen as exhibit exhibit-
ing intensified scenarios of the the way emotions operated in Greek
life generally, where they were closely tied to communalcommunal interac- interac
tions and manifested principally in a continuous and public nego-
28 / The Emotions
28 Emotions of the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
Greeks
tiation
tiation of social roles. Emotions, seen this way, are not not static
expressions resulting from from impersonal stimuli, as with the pa- pa
tients subjected to electric shock in the photographs
photographs published by
Darwin, but but rather elements in complex
complex sets of interpersonal
exchanges, in which individuals are conscious of the motives of of
others and ready to respond in kind. It is not that Aristotle
Aristotle is right
right
on the emotions and Darwin wrong, wrong, but rather that Aristotle's
approach may better describe what the emotions meant meant in the
social life of thethe classical city state, whereas Darwin's may be
better suited to the way emotions are perceived in the modern,
post-Cartesian universe. Aristotle's view of the emotions depends
implicitly
implicitly on a narrative
narrative context.
The narrative context for an emotional display provides infor infor-
mation on the stimulus, and thus shifts the emphasis back to the
initial moment
moment in the emotional
emotional process. The resistance
resistance to recog-
recog
nizing the importance of context in the Darwinian
Darwinian tradition may
in part be a consequence
consequence of its fixation on the terminus of the the
sequence of events constituting an emotion. The The power of scien-
scien
tific
tific paradigms to condition
condition the nature of research programs is
well known, and it may be that that the
the coherence and elegance of of
Darwinian evolutionism is sufficient
sufficient to explain the narrow focus
of subsequent research.
research. But it is worth inquiring
inquiring whether the bias
toward the study of expression might itself itself have been facilitated
facilitated
by practices and habits of thought
thought in the culture at large.
I do not mean to suggest that the invention of photography
alone was sufficient to determine the course of Darwin'sDarwin's research.
research.
Photography in any event coincided with a shift shift towards expres
expres-
sionism
sionism in painting,
painting, which
which may also have a bearing on the atten atten-
tion that has been devoted for over a century to the featuresfeatures of the
the
face as revealing of an inner inner state of feeling. Fredric Jameson
((1984:
1 984: 661)
1 ) writes of Edvard Munch's
Munch's famous picture 'The Scream':
The very concept

concept of expression
expression presupposes indeed some separation
separation
within the subject, and along with that
that a whole
whole metaphysics
metaphysics of the inside
and the outside, of the wordless pain within the monad
monad and the moment
in which, often
often cathartically, that 'emotion' is then
then projected out and
externalized, as gesture
gesture or cry, as desperate communication and the the
outward dramatization
dramatization of inward feeling.
Pathos and Passion // 29
The emphasis
emphasis on expression
expression corresponds, then, not only only to an
interest
interest in the communicative
communicative function of the emotions but also
to a Romantic conception of the the self
self as an internal
internal and private
locus of feeling, which
which is exposed particularly in moments moments of of
intense
intense passion -- a view of of the self
self that
that was receptive as well to
the hermeneutics of Freudian depth psychology (d.
the hermeneutics (cf. Parkinson
11995:
995: 113-15, 265-72).. So
3- 1 5, 265-72) So too, the
the Cartesian emphasis on expres- expres
sion again coincided with with a view of the the self
self or soul as a distinct
internal
internal domain, which one was obliged to read or interpret by
. means of surface
surface manifestations in the the face and body.
In ancient
ancient Greece too a development in the interpretation
interpretation of thethe
emotions may have been accompanied by a like transition transition in
conventions of artistic representation
representation and in the conception of the the
37
self.37 The watershed comes with the Hellenistic
self. Hellenistic era.
era. After
After
Alexander's campaigns, the locus of political power shifted shifted from
from
independent city-states such as Athens to large kingdoms, like
that of the Ptolemies in Egypt, Egypt, governed by Greek elites. The
painting and plastic art produced in this period exhibits exhibits a ten
ten-
dency towards increased realism or naturalism, abandoning the
classical preference for idealized figures in favour favour of marginal and
even grotesque types. At the same time, Hellenistic Hellenistic artists en- en
joyed representing intense
intense or exaggerated
exaggerated expressions of pain,
pleasure, and emotional states.38 The famous
emotional states.38 famous statues of Laocoon
Laocoon
and the so-called Dying Gaul illustrate the vividness of such
mimesis
mimesis and its powerful
powerful effect
effect on the viewer.
Indeed, modern theories of emotional expression drew inspira- inspira
tion from
from Hellenistic
Hellenistic sculptures, and Darwin himself referred
39
((1998: 83) to the
1998: 1183) Laocoon group (discovered
the Laocoon (discovered in 11506).
506),39 In litera-
litera
ture too, where setting and motives are normally transparent, one
may perceive the influence of the new expressionism; thus
Catullus, a Roman poet steeped in Hellenistic Hellenistic conventions, de- de
scribes Ariadne at the moment
moment when she awakens to find herself
find herself
abandoned by Theseus on a deserted island: 'like the stone image
of a Bacchant,
Bacchant, she gazes,
gazes, alas, gazes
gazes and is tossed by great waves of of
anxiety' (64.6 1-2: saxea ut
(64.61-2: ut effigies pwspicit, eheu, //
effigies bacchantis, prospicit,
prospicit
prospicit et magnis curarum fluctuat undis). Ariadne's inner tur-
curaium fluctuat tur
moil is revealed by her resemblance to a statue type and analo- analo
gized to the turbulent stares.40
turbulent waters at which she stares.40
By contrast
contrast with Hellenistic styles, the art art of the
the classical age
seems almost expressionless. A glance at vase paintings, whether
of the black-figured variety or the the red-figured that superseded
superseded it
around the year 500, indicates that that for all the advances in
draughtsmanship
draughtsmanship over the ' archaic period, very little effort
the'archaic effort was
expended in representing emotions by way way of facial expression.
This is as true of funerary monuments and images of war, where
funerary monuments
one might
might expect signs of grief grief or rage, as itit is of scenes of of
marriage or love. When it comes to expressing emotion, classical classical
reticent.411
art appears to be remarkably chaste or reticent.4
One can, of course, often inferinfer the
the sentiment
sentiment of the
the characters
in a work of art from
from the context or other elements
elements in the scene. A
serious demeanour on a grave stele suggests sadness at loss,- loss; simi
simi-
larly, a warrior spearing an enemy might might be presumed from from the
situation
situation to feel hostile or angry, and one plausibly ascribes love
to a man
man presenting a gift gift to a woman or handsome boy. This
dependency on context is the more natural where the story of the
characters is known, as in the the case of mythological episodes
represented in art. It is notnot arbitrary or wrong to attribute such
emotions to the figures in a classical composition. The point point is
that
that one arrives at such
such an interpretation by way of inference from
the
the entire scene, supplemented by whatever one knows of the
larger context
context -- a wedding vase, a gravestone -- and back
and the back-
myth.42 Expression is minimal, I am arguing,
ground narrative or myth.42
because the information relevant to an understanding of the emoemo
tion in question
question lies in the stimulus
stimulus and its evaluation, not in the
visible sign of an otherwise
otherwise opaque inner inner state. So too, Anthony
Corbeill (2004: 1148),
48 ), observes:
observes:
Although
Although politics in classical
classical Athens
Athens also surely
surely depended on ....
.. face-to
face-to-
face relations, it
it is remarkable
remarkable that there
there is an 'almost complete
complete absence
of
of description
description of facial expression or gesture in the
facial expression the Attic
Attic orators' [citing
Evans 1969:
1 969: 4 1 ]. Ciceronian
41]. Ciceronian oratory, by contrast,
contrast, contains
contains constant tex
constant tex-
tual
tual cues to the
the need
need for visual
visual vigilance; included especially
vigilance,- included especially are refer
refer-
ences
ences to the
the visual
visual appearance of the the speaker, of the
the jurors or solo judge,
and
and of the defendant.43
the defendant.43
Aristotle's cognitively based account of the emotions may be
seen as the analytic
analytic counterpart
counterpart to the contemporary
contemporary cultural
31
Passion // 31
Pathos and Passion
disposition to view the emotions as responses

responses to stimuli in the
environment, as opposed to self-subsisting inner inner states that are
recognized through their corporeal manifestations. This orienta- orienta
tion was abetted by the competitively
competitively judgmental world of the the
classical city-state, in which
which people seem, as Jon Elster observed,
to have been constantly alert to the effect
effect of others' opinions and
actions on their
their social standing or reputation. It was a society in
which the self interdepen
self was in large measure conceptualized as interdepen-
dent rather than independent, in Manstead and Fischer's terms. If If
the Hellenistic
Hellenistic period was characterized, as many scholars have
claimed, by a novel spirit of individualism, it may have been
accompanied by a new interest
interest in private sensibilities, in which which
emotions were imagined as detached from from external causes and
reducible - at least according to to philosophers -- to to an
an eliminable
eliminable
44
disturbance of the soul.
sou1.44 What is more, in the suspicious
suspicious atmo-atmo
sphere of a court society, where people tend to assume a demeanour
conformable to the pleasure of the ruler, there is a new premium
placed on identifying
identifying an inner emotional state from from the close
examination
examination of outer signs. Forthrightness, or what the Greeks
called parrhesia, was now not a civic right, as it had been underunder
stood in the Athenian city-state, but the virtue chracteristic
chracteristic of an
exceptionally fearless
fearless individual (d.
(cf. Momigliano 1973 and Konstan
996). This situation
11996). situation gave rise, among other things, to a genre of of
treatises on how to distinguish
distinguish true friends fromfrom false. So So too,
Cicero observes (Letters
(Letters to His Brother
Brother Quintus 11.1.15) of
. 1 . 1 5 ) of
provincials who wish to serve a Roman praetor that, though they
may be good men, one must must judge with
with care: 'For the nature of
care: Tor of
each and every one of them them is wrapped in folds of pretence and
covered, as it were, in veils: their brow, eyes, and expression often
lie, but
but their speech does so almost invariably.' The world of the
court had a huge influence on Hellenistic literature.45
Hellenistic art and literature.45
Demonstrating a connection
connection between Aristotle's cognitive ap- ap
proach to the pathe and a cultural
cultural tendency in classical, as op- op
posed to Hellenistic, Greece to regard emotion
emotion as a reaction rather
than an inner
inner state to be disclosed will be the argument (in part) of of
subsequent chapters, in which Aristotle's philosophical account
of the individual emotions is compared with contemporary evi- evi
dence. We may, however, note some broad consequences of the the
Greeks
difference
difference between the two orientations. Insofar Insofar as attention is
fixed
fixed on the stimulus of an emotion, there is likely to be less
interest in emotional states for which a stimulus is presumed to
be either obscure or entirely absent, such as anxiety and general- general
ized resentment. Nancy Sherman (2000a: 1155) 55 ) notes that on
Aristotle's 'appraisal-based' view of the the emotions, 'emotional shifts
are the result of cognitive
cognitive shifts.
shifts.'' But, she adds,
adds, this intellectualist
intellectualist
approach constitutes a limitation to his theory: 'What Aristotle
doesn't explore is why some emotions don't reform reform at the beck
and call of reason' ((156).
1 56). Sherman extends her critique to ancient ancient
Greek and Roman thought as a whole: whole: 'The question Ancient
moral psychology
psychology leaves us with (though (though the Ancients never ask
it) is, why doesn't persuasion work? That is, why doesn't rational
discourse undo irrational emotions?
emotions?'' These are the very ques- ques
tions, as Sherman notes, that 'underlie Freud's Freud's project' ((157).
1 57).
Thus, although Freud 'allies himself with the Aristotelian view
that emotions have cognitive or ideational content,' he departs
from
from this view in a radical way by stipulating that 'ideational
content may be unconscious
unconscious ... Rage Rage at you may really be about
rage at myself
myself' (ibid.; see also Sherman 2000b).
In the Hellenistic
Hellenistic period, however,
however, some philosophical schools
did pose the question of why certain emotional responses seem to
be incorrigible.
incorrigible. The Epicureans
Epicureans in particular pointed to the re- re
peated social reinforcement
reinforcement of falsefalse or vain beliefs, which
which might
be countered
countered by living in Epicurean
Epicurean communities and constantly
rehearsing Epicurus's doctrines. In addition,addition, they held that people
may be mistaken about the cause of an emotion. Indeed, Indeed, people
generally are consumed
consumed by the the fear of death, a fear fear they either
conceal or misrecognize.
misrecognize. This idea comes very close to describing
a state of anxiety, in which the object or stimulus to fear is
displaced or unknown (see (see Konstan
Konstan11973 9 73 and
and2006a;
2006a;also
alsoGladman
Gladman
and Mitsis 1997).
1 997). It may be no accident that this view was elabo- elabo
rated by a philosopher writing at the beginning of the the Hellenistic
era, one who, moreover,
moreover, discouraged
discouragedparticipation
participationin in politics
politics and
and
proposed individual peace of mind as the highest good.46 good.46
The
The flip side of free-floating
free-floating emotion is a lack of affect affect in the
the
presence of an emotional
emotional stimulus. The Stoics regarded such
apatheia, or passionlessness, as the the mark of the the true sage. We
Pathos and Passion
Passion / 33
recognize it as well as a sign of modernist literature. In a short

story by the Japanese
Japanese writer Haruki Murukami
Mumkami ((2002:
2002: 74),
74),
Shozaburo discovers that his family perished in the
the Second World
War while
while he was interned in China:
China:
Shozaburo
Shozaburo was now alone in the world.
world. This was not a great
great shock to
him, however; nor did it make
make him
him feel particularly
particularly sad. He did, of course,
experience
experience some sense of absence,
absence, but
but he was convinced
convinced that everyone
everyone
ended up alone sooner or later. He was in his thirties, beyond the age for
complaining
complaining about loneliness.
loneliness. He felt
felt as if he had suddenly
suddenly aged several
several
years at once. But that was all. No further
further emotion
emotion welled
welled up inside him.
him.
Is Shozaburo Stoical?
Stoical? Aristotle, at all events, would regard regard his
response as inhuman.
inhuman.
The definition of emotion
emotion or pathos, however, that Aristotle Aristotle
offers
offers in the Rhetoric - the closest he comes to providing such a
-
definition
definition anywhere in his writings (d. (cf.Aspasius
Aspasius44.20-
44.20-1)1 ) --does
does
not relate emotion to its outer cause or stimulus, but insists
rather on its effect
effect on judgment.
judgment. Let us return once again to
Aristotle's definition,
definition, which is tantalizingly terse: terse: 'Let the emoemo
tions be all those things on account of which people change and
differ
differ in regard to their judgments, and upon which which attend
attend pain
and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such
things and their opposites'
things opposites' (2. 1 , 11378a20-3;
(2.1, 3 78a20-3; for different
different lists of of
pathe, d.
pathe, cf. Nicomachean Ethics 11105b21ff.1OSb2 1 ff.;; On the Soul 403a1
403al6- 6-
47
117).
7).47 The second component of the definition apparently looks to
what modern accounts call the 'hedonic or valence dimension' of of
an emotion, that is, its positive or negative affect, affect, which correcorre-
sponds to 'current conceptualizations
conceptualizations of the approach-avoidance
approach-avoidance
dichotomy based on two antagonistic or separate motivational motivational
systems' ((Kappas
Kappas 200 1 : 1160;
2001: 60; references omitted). An instance is
Edmund Rolls's definition of emotions as 'states elicited elicited by re- re
wards and punishers, including changes in rewards rewards and punish
punish-
ments'
ments' ((1999:
1 999: 60);
60); on this hypothesis, all emotions may be aligned
along two axes, representing the the presentation or omission
omission of posi-posi
tive or negative reinforcers (see (seeRolls's chart on p. 63 ). In regard to
63).
Aristotle's account, however, we may note that that pleasure and pain
are not alternatives: Aristotle
Aristotle is not dividing emotionsemotions into two
34 / The Emotions
categories in accord with their their positive or negative valence. Ac- Ac
cordingly, the fact fact that two emotions are described as opposites
does not entail that that one of them
them is accompanied
accompanied by pain, the other
by pleasure: both pity and its opposite, indignation, for example,
are characterized by pain. In some emotions, pleasure and pain are
combined; others perhaps involve just one of the two sensations.48 sensations.48
More remarkable is the first part of Aristotle's definition
the first definition of of
emotions, which which looks to their effect effect on judgments.
judgments. This condi
This condi-
tion is particularly apposite to Aristotle's immediate concern in
the
the Rhetoric, the the object of which
which is to influence the the decisions
decisions of of
jurors and legislators (d. (cf. Rhetoric l1.1,o l , 1354b8-1
1354b8-13 3 on how the
the pain
and pleasure involved in the emotions obfuscate [episkotein] judg
obfuscate [episkoteinJ judg-
ment; also 1.2, l o2, 1356a I 5-16: 'for
1356al5-16: 'for we do not not render judgments in the
same way when we are suffering suffering and rejoicing,
rejoicing, or loving and
hating'). Some scholars have supposed, supposed, accordingly,
accordingly, that the defi
defi-
nition is tailored to the context, and does not represent Aristotle's
nition Aristotle's
view on the nature nature of emotion
emotion as such. Thus, Fortenbaugh (2002: (2002:
1114)
1 4) comments: 'The The definition of emotions
emotions given in Rhetoric 2
is ..... . not intended as a general definition covering all the emotions
felt
felt by human human beings.' But I should should like to suggest
suggest that, for
Aristotle, the the manipulation
manipulation of emotions in forensic and delibera- delibera
tive contexts represents in a concentrated form form the way emotions
emotions
exploited in social
are exploited social life generally. If Aristotle
Aristotle subsumes emo
subsumes emo-
tion under rhetoric, then, it is in part because their effect effect on
judgment was for him him a primary feature of emotions emotions in the daily
negotiation of social roles.
negotiation
We have seen that the appraisal theory of the emotions, like
Aristotle's, holds that that beliefs 'are regarded as one of the major
determinants of emotion' (Frijda, Manstead, and and Bern 2000: 1; 1 ; cf.
d.
Parkinson 1 995: 27-64). However, as Nico Frijda, Antony
Parkinson 1995:27-64). Antony Manstead,
and Sacha Bern point out, '[TJhe reverse direction of influence in
'[T]he reverse
the relation between emotion and cognition cognition has received scant
attention' (ibid.). These These same investigators
investigators mention
mention Aristotle's
Aristotle's
view that 'we do not deliver judgments judgments in the same way when we
are grieving and rejoicing, or loving and hating' (Rhetoric 1 .2,
(Rhetoric 1.2,
1356a I 5- 1 6; my translation), and cite further Spinoza's definition
1356al5-16;
of emotions - - evidently derived from from Aristotle - - as
as 'states that
make the mind inclined to think think one thing rather than another'
Pathos and Passion I/ 35
(Spinoza 1989
1 989 [[1677],
1 6771, Part III: General Definition
III : General Emotions).49
Definition of Emotions).49
Popular opinion, in antiquity
antiquity and today alike, takes it for granted
that emotions influence beliefs (cf. (d. Yeats's famous phrase 'pas 'pas-
sionate
sionate conviction' ['Slouching Toward Bethlehem']). To take two
ancient examples among many, in Sophocles' Oedipus the King
(523-4), the chorus comment
comment on Oedipus's rash accusation accusation against
Creon: 'but perhaps this reproach arose in fact fact by dint of anger
rather
rather than the judgment of his mind' (all' (all' elthe men
men de touto
touneidos, takhtakh'' an d' /I orgei biasthen
biasthen mallon e gnomei phrenon) .
gnomeiphrenon}.
A little later, Jocasta remarks
remarks ttoo Oedipus concerning
concerning the fallibil
fallibil-
ity of oracles (973-4): 'I told you this a long time time ago,'
ago/ to which
Oedipus replies: 'You did, but but I was misled by fear' (oukoun ego
soi tauta proulegon palai; / Oed. eudas, ego de toi phoboi
paregomen) . And yet there has been 'hardly any empirical re-
paregomen}. re
search' on thethe subject ((Frijda,
Frijda, Manstead, and and Bern 2000: 5). 5).
Recently, however, experimental psychologists have begun to
examine the conditions
examine conditions under
under which
which emotions are likely to moti moti-
vate beliefs,
beliefs, for example when the the object of belief
belief is unfamiliar
(d. Parkinson
(cf. Parkinson 1995:
1 995: 64-7;
64-7; Forgas and Vargas 2000; and Forgas
2000), as well as the the role of affectaffect in the persistence of beliefs
in the
(Frijda and Mesquita 2000) and in focusing attention ((Clore
focusing attention Clore and
Gasper 2000; d. cf. Brinton 11988, 1 994hs50O progress
988, 1994),- progress has been made as
well in the analysis of just how emotions emotions operate on cognitive
functions
functions (Frijda and Mesquita 2000). 2000). But this is a far cry from
defining emotions as the
defining the cause of variation in a subject's judgjudg
ments. The operating definition offered by Frijda, Manstead,
definition offered Manstead, and
Bern (2000: 55)) is rather a typically composite one: 'Emotions can
be defined
defined as states that
that comprise feelings, physiological changes,
expressive behavior, and inclinations
inclinations to act.' Beliefs, on their
view, are relegated to a separate category: category: they impact on emoemo
tions as do emotions on beliefs, but but they are not not constitutive
constitutive ofof
emotion. I know of no theorist theorist since Aristotle and Spinoza who
assigns
assigns so massive significance to the
massive a significance the effect
effect of emotion on
belief. Why define emotions solely by their ability to alter opin- opin
ion, to the
the exclusion
exclusion of all other
other elements?
I believe that Aristotle's definition may be defended both with
respect to his own principles of analysis and for the the way it picks
out what is in fact the most salient
fact the salient feature
feature of emotions as he
understands them. We We may begin by considering Aristotle's un un-

derstanding of 'definition' or logos. logos. As we have seen, Aristotle
Aristotle
acknowledges that emotions involve physiological changes. In his
treatise On the Soul l(1.1, l . l , 403a29-b2L
403a29-b2), he explains that the natural
scientist (phusikos)
(phusikos) and the criticalcritical philosopher (dialektikos) will
philosopher (dialektikos)
define (horizesthai] the
define Ihorizesthai) pathe differently. The critical philosopher
thepathe
defines
defines anger, say,say, as 'a desire to return pain for pain, pain/' while the
scientist
scientist relates it to alterations in the circulation of blood blood and
heat around the heart. The scientist, that that is, specifies the matter
Ihule), while the dialectical
[hule], dialectical philosopher
philosopher limits his account
account to the
form (eidos)
(eidos) and formula (logos). True, the the formula of a thing
[pragma] ) is necessarily instantiated in matter; but the description
(pragma
of a house as something
something that that offers protection against
offers protection against the ele
ele-
ments is complete Ifor (for philosophical or dialectical purposes) even
without
without mention
mention of the materials of which it is built. Similarly,
the action of of the lancet -- that is, cutting -- cannot explain what it
means to perform a surgical intervention (e.g., drawing water off off
in the case of of dropsy), but the purpose -- an action for the sake of of
restoring health - - can do so ((cf.d. On the Generation of of Animals 5.8,
789b3-1
789b3-15 5;; also Metaphysics 8.4, 11044a32-bl044a32-bl on the different
different kinds
of explanation
explanation or aition, and 33.1, . 1 , 996b6-8 on form as thethe logos of a
house). These accounts are analogous analogous to the definition of the
emotions that Aristotle
Aristotle provides
provides in the Rhetoric, in that it too
looks to their purpose
purpose in the the sense of what they are used for.
Aristotle's teleological perspective may seem comparable to
that of evolutionary
evolutionary psychology and other other functionalist
functionalist theories,
theories,
which explain emotions in relation to the survival advantages advantages
they confer, such as the capacity to make rapid decisions, focus on
relevant stimuli
stimuli in situations of emergency, or summon summon up stored
information based on prior experience Isee (see Cosmides and Tooby
2000; Izard and Ackerman 2000; and Brandstatter and Eliasz 2001: 200 1 :
4-5). Aristotle, however,
however, is not concerned with how or why the
emotions evolved,
evolved, but rather with the ends to which a knowledge
of them
them can be put; accordingly, he is interested interested chiefly in their
use in persuasion. We have remarked that the purpose purpose of Aristotle's
Rhetoric is to instruct
instruct the orator in ways of influencing political
deliberations and the verdicts of jurors. In this context, 'judgment'
(krisis) evidently refers to decisions concerning policy or matters
(krisis)
Pathos and Passion
Passion / 37
of law, although
although in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle more often
employs the term in connection with perceptual discrimination
((e.g.,
e.g., 11126b3-4,
1 26b3-4, l1109h20-3,
109b20-3, 11119b23-5,
1 1 9b23-5, 11159a23-4
1 59a23-4j; for the con
the con-
nection with justice, cf. 11134a31-2:
justice, d. 134a3 1-2: ''[J]ustice
[J]ustice is a discrimination
discrimination
[faisis] between what is just and what is unjust/
[krisis] unjust/ 11143al9-24).
1 43a1 9-24). The
science of the emotions is thus akin to that of architecture: just as
architecture (or (or house-building,
house-building, in Aristotle's phrase)phrase) informs us
how to build a structure that will protect us from from the elements, so
knowledge of the emotions tells us how to arouse or induce
emotions that will dispose others in a way that that is to our own
advantage. The technique of inducing emotions requires an un un-
derstanding of the behaviours that arouse them, but its aim is to
supplement
supplement the other means of persuasion
persuasion that Aristotle analyses
analyses
in the Rhetoric,
Rhetoric, exploiting in particular the kinds of beliefbelief that are
attended by pain and pleasure.
pleasure.
Aristotle offers
offers no explicit
explicit indication of how emotions affect affect
judgments, but given his cognitive
cognitive approach
approach to emotion, we may
hazard the guess
guess that the kinds of of beliefs that
that elicit emotions --
she insulted me,me, he intends to do do me harm -- when excited by the
accompanying sensations of pleasure and pain, influence in turn
other beliefs or decisions, for example those concerning a
defendant's guilt or innocence or the motives of a rival politician.
The role of evaluation in emotion is thus not merely constitutive
but
but dynamic:
dynamic: a belief enters into the formation
formation of an emotion that
in turn contributes to modifying some other belief or, perhaps,
intensifying
intensifying the original one. one. In the latter case, the emotion
would act on belief
belief in such a way as to confirm the emotion itself.
Although Aristotle does does not spell out the implications of this
cycle, it would help explain why emotions are sometimes diffi diffi-
cult to eradicate:
eradicate: emotions tend to be self-validating because they
affect beliefs in such a way as to reproduce
can affect reproduce and strengthen the the
judgment that constituted the original stimulus to the emotion,
thus generating a closed or circular cognitive system. We know
how
how people in the the grip of emotion will offer offer a dozen reasons for
why they feel as as they do
do -- there is nothing more inventive than
passion -- and these reasons
reasons validate or even augment the emotion
that produced
produced them. We We may illustrate the process by a passage in
Virgil's Aeneid, in which the hero describes his response upon
38 I/ The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks
discovering that Troy has been penetrated by the Greeks and is

now in flames (2.3 1 4-1 7):
(2.314-17):
arma amens capio; nec

nee sat rationis
rationis in armis,
armis,
sed glomerare
glomerare manum bello
hello et concurrere in arc em
arcem
cum sociis
sociis ardent animi; furor
furor iraque mentem
menteni
praecipitant,
praecipitant, pulchrum que mori succurrit
pulchrumque succurrit in armis.
I grab arms mindlessly;

mindlessly; not that there is logic in arms, but my heart burns
to gather
gather a group for war and race to the citadel
citadel with my companions.
companions.
Rage and anger
anger drive my mind, and it occurs
occurs to me that it is beautiful
beautiful to
die in arms.
Rage generates a belief

belief that further
further motivates Aeneas's battle
fury. Emotion provides
provides the impulse, and thought then justifies the
act.51
act.51
In Sophocles' Oedipus the the King (339-40), Oedipus reproaches
the seer Teiresias: 'Who wouldn't be angry at you upon hearing hearing
such words,
words, with which you are now dishonouring the city? city?''
Provoked ttoo rage (orge)
(orge) by Teiresias's
Teiresias's stubborn silence,
silence, Oedipus
then jumps
jumps to the conclusion that Teiresias is not only withhold-
withhold
ing information
information about Laius's murder but but in fact conspired in
slaying him
him (345-9). Anger arising from
from a perceived insult ((Oedi-
Oedi
pus identifies the city with
with himself) in turn induces an alteration
in judgment
judgment that shores up Oedipus's fury. It may be that one
cross-cultural constant in emotions is the conspiracy
conspiracy they enter
into with reason to provide
provide their own justification.
justification.
If we enquire what kinds of beliefs are likely to be able to alter
judgments concerning
concerning legal guilt
guilt or a political
political course of action, it
is plausible to suppose that they will in large part concern the
attitudes, motives, and intentions of others. That such such judgments
are central to Aristotle's analysis is evident both fromfrom his descrip-
descrip
tions of the
the causes of the
the several emotions and from the kinds of
from the of
emotion
emotion that
that he examines in his treatise on rhetoric, the only text
in which he treats the patM
pathe in a detailed and systematic way.
Aristotle discusses in the Rhetoric anger and the allaying of of
anger, which he seems to treat as a separate
separate emotion; love and
hatred or hostility; fear
fear and its opposite, courage
courage or confidence;
confidence;
Pathos and Passion
Passion / 39
shame and shamelessness;

shamelessness; gratitude; pity and its opposite, indig- indig
nation; envy, emulousness or rivalry, and, finally, the the opposite of of
emulousness, namely, contempt. The emotions in Aristotle's cata- cata
logue are directed
directed principally
principally at agents,
agents, above all humanhuman agents.
agents.
One does not feel pity, indignation, envy, or emulousness
emulousness at the the
successes or failures of inanimate
inanimate things, nor again gratitude,
anger, hatred, or shame, in Aristotle's view. To put put it another way,
the kinds of sentiments
sentiments that
that find a place in Aristotle's
Aristotle's discussion
discussion
pathe seem to involve
of the pathe involve an awareness
awareness of other
other subjectivities.
subjectivities.
This is why such generalized moods as melancholy, the the feelings
inspired by music, wonder or awe at nature's grandeur (not (not a
sentiment
sentiment to which the Greeks were especially disposed), and
disgust at pallid or slimy things (as (as distinct
distinct from
from moral disgust) do
not count
count as pathe
pathe for Aristotle,
Aristotle, although they often qualify as
although they
emotions in modern inventories (for (for disgust, see W.I.
W.1. Miller 1 997:
Miller 1997:
7: 'Disgust is an emotion'; for music, Nussbaum 200 2001: 1 : 249-94). So
too, appetites such as hunger and sexual desire are not not emotions,
but rather factors that may predispose a person to experience an
emotion
emotion such as anger (cf. (d. Aristotle's
Aristotle's discussion
discussion in Rhetoric 2.2,
11379a9-18).
379a9-1 8 ) .
Fear might seem ttoo bbee aan n exception ttoo the above rule. Aristotle
himself
himself defines fear
fear as 'a kind of pain or disturbance deriving from from
an impression of a future
future evil that is destructive or painful'
painful' (Rheto
(Rheto-
ric 2.5, 11382a21-3),
382a21-3 ), and things are frightening when they they seem
seem
able to destroy us or to inflict
inflict harm accompanied by pain. This
account does not exclude the possibility that one may fear fear an
overhanging boulder, for instance. And yet, as we shall see (chap (chap-
ter 6), Aristotle's examples suggest that he is thinking
ter 6), thinking chiefly
chiefly of of
fear of enemies rather
rather than of inanimate objects.
This
This disparity between Aristotle's list and more recent typologies
of the
the emotions is not, I believe, a consequence merely of Aristotle's Aristotle's
philosophical commitments
commitments or his focus on rhetoric. Rather, Rather, I
would suggest, it derives from the the classical view of pathe pathe as
arising primarily
primarily in and from social interactions,
interactions, a perspective
perspective
that only recently has begun to receive attention attention in modern
theories of the
the emotions (cf.(d. Parkinson 11995:
995: 20
201:1 : '[E)motions
'[E]motions can
be defined
defined in terms of identity claims which are explained largely
in terms of changing social positions'; and Kemper Kemper 11978 978 and
40 /I The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks
2000)
2000).. We
We may particularly note the absence from from Aristotle's
inventory of such sentiments as sadness, loneliness, or grief,
which may result from from circumstances beyond
beyond anyone's control
rather than from a hostile intention on the part of others (on (on grief,
see chapter 12).
12). Such responses to natural loss, as opposed opposed to
morally charged social interactions and strugglesstruggles for status and
advantage, are notnot part of the
the core set of emotions in the
the classical
period.
In no culture
culture is the emotional
emotional vocabulary rigorously consistent,
and I do not
not mean to suggest that Greeks of the the classical era
differentiated between grief
systematically differentiated grief or sadness and emo-
emo
52
proper.52 1I do think, however,
tions proper. however, that Aristotle's failure to treat
these sentiments among the pathe discussed in his Rhetoric is not
thepathe
an arbitrary omission but but rather symptomatic
symptomatic of a Greek habit of
habit of
thought, which understood emotions as responses not to events
but to actions, or situations
situations resulting from actions, that entail
consequences for one's own or others' relative social standing.
standing. As
a result, some sentiments that typically count as as emotions in
English fall outside the category
category of pathe in classical Greek (Greek
oipathe
of
of the
the Hellenistic
Hellenistic epoch may may differ
differ in this respect). If this is
approximately correct, it has significant
significant implications for our unun-
derstanding of both ancient philosophical accounts of the the emo-
emo
tions and literary representations of the emotions in action. It
may also, I believe, offer
offer a useful
useful perspective
perspective on certain problems
in the scientific interpretation of the emotions today.
CHAPTER TWO
Anger
Anger
Anger is an emotion that would
would seem to be universal and unlearned
unlearned
1
if
if any
any emotion is. l
Solomon 11984:
984: 2421
242 *
One emotion
emotion that
that is included
included almost without
without exception in both
classical and modern inventories of the the passions is anger, and it
may well seem to be a prime example of an innate and universal
emotion. Nevertheless, there is reason to think think that the ancient
Greek concept
concept is in fact
fact significantly
significantly different
different from
from the modern.
In this chapter, as in many of those that follow, I take as my point
of
of departure Aristotle's account in the Rhetoric, which which is the most
sophisticated and detailed
detailed analysis of the emotions
emotions to come down
to us from
from classical antiquity. Apart from from Aristotle's acumen as
an ethical thinker, he was the only one among the major Greek
philosophers to accept the emotions as a natural and normal part
of human life, attempting
of neither to abolish them
attempting neither them utterly
utterly nor to
reduce them
them to mere wraiths of living passion.
Aristotle defines anger as I'aa desire, accompanied by pain, for a
perceived revenge,
revenge, on account of a perceived slight on the the part of
of
people who are notnot fit to slight one or one's own' (Rhetoric
(Rhetoric 2.2,
I378a3 I-3). Why 'accompanied by pain'? Among other reasons,
1378a31-3).
this element
element is required by the definition
definition of the pathe that
thepathe that Aristotle
offered
offered shortly before (cf.
(cf. chapter 1,
I, pp. 33-4): 'Let the
the emotions be
all those things on account of which people change their minds
and differ
differ in regard to their judgments,
judgments, and upon which attend
pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such
things
things and
and their
their opposites'
opposites' (2. 378a20-3 ).22 Pain
1 , 11378a20-3).
(2.1, Pain and
and pleasure
themselves do not count, for Aristotle, as emotions. Rather, they
are sensations
sensations or aistheseis. A painful
painful sensation
sensation may arise either
as
as aa result
result of
of direct
direct perception,
perception, or
or else
else by
by way
way of phantasia, that
of phantasia, that is,
is,
through recollection or anticipation
anticipation of something perceived.
perceived. In
Aristotle's own words:
Since feeling pleasure is in the

the perception of some experience [pathos],
[pathos],
and ph antasia is a weak kind of perception [aisthesis], some phantasia of
phantasia of
what one remembers or expects always occurs in a person when he
remembers or expects something .... . . Thus, it is necessary that all plea-
plea
sures are either present in perception or arise in remembering things
that have happened or in expecting things that will will happen. (1.11,
11.1 1,
3 70a27-34)33
11370a27-34)
Anger is accompanied not just by pain but but by pleasure, too,

which derives fromfrom the desire
desire to avenge the slight that has been been
suffered: for this desire is accompanied by the the expectation
expectation ( elpis)
(elpis)
of its fulfilment, which
which we regard as possible
possible -- if we did not, we
would not be experiencing the emotion emotion that
that Aristotle
Aristotle defines as
anger; and the expectation
expectation of revenge is pleasant. As we have seen
chapter I1,, p. 34),
((chapter 34), Aristotle does not
not differentiate
differentiate the the emotions
emotions
according to positive and negative valence, but but allows for mixed
cases ('upon which attend pain and pleasure,
pleasure,'' he writes, not 'pain
or pleasure').4 If the
or pleasure').4 the revenge, or anticipation
anticipation of revenge,
revenge, is to be
pleasant, moreover, it must
must be perceived, just as the slight
slight was, for
otherwise it would not have produced pain: as Aristotle says (2.4, (2.4,
1382al O), 'All painful
1382alO), painful things are perceptible [aistheta].'
[aistheta].' This is
why Aristotle insists on 'a perceived [phainomenes] revenge, on
perceived [phainomenes]
account of aa. perceived slight.'5
[phainomenen] slight.'s
perceived [phainomenen]
I assume that the the slight or the
the thought of the the slight
slight itself is
painful. Why, then, does Aristotle add the phrase 'accompanied
' accompanied by
pain'? For two reasons, perhaps.
perhaps. First, the
the pain associated with the
pathos anger may not be identical
pathos identical to the pain of the slight itself.6
slight itself.6
Second,
Second, Aristotle
Aristotle may
may wish
wish to
to differentiate
differentiate the
the desire
desire for revenge
for revenge
that
that is constitutive
constitutive ofof anger from
from related
related impulses
impulses that are are not
not
necessarily attended by pain. As we shall see, one way in which which
Anger / 43
hatred is distinct fromfrom anger, according to Aristotle, is that that 'the

one is accompanied by pain, while the other is not accompanied
by pain; for one who is angry feels pain, but but one who hates does
not' (2.4, 1382a12-13; d. Politics 55.8,
1382al2-13; cf. .8, 11312b25-34).
3 1 2b25-34). Hatred is a
response to what is bad or harmful (kakon) in general, not just to a
harmful (kakon)
slight, and certain forms of of harm -- Aristotle singles out vice itself itself
(kakia), e.g.
(kakia), e.g. injustice or stupidity
stupidity -- areare practically imperceptible
imperceptible
(hekista aistheta, 2.4, 1382a9-1
(hekista aistheta, 1382a9-ll), 1 ), and hence not particularly
painful.77
There are several elements in Aristotle's account of anger that
may seem remarkable:
remarkable: that anger entails, or is reducible to, a
desire for revenge;
revenge,- that this desire is provoked by a slight -- and
only a slight; and that some people, but but only some, are not fit to
slight
slight another. Let me begin, however, by noting the centrality of of
evaluation to Aristotle's approach.
approach. A slight or belittlement
belittlement is a
complex social event, which takes a considerable measure of of
judgment to recognize. As opposedopposed to an instinctive response to a
hostile gesture, anger involves an appraisal
appraisal of social roles (who (who is
or is not
not fit [prosekon]
[prosekon] to offer
offer insult), intentions,
intentions, and conse- conse
quences.8
quences.8
As indicated in chapter 1, I, it is now some three decades since
scholars began paying serious attention attention to the the importance of of
cognition in Aristotle's theory of the emotions (see (see especially
Fortenbaugh 2002 [orig. 11975]),
975] ), a development that coincided with
increased emphasis on cognition on the the part of philosophers,
biologists, anthropologists, and psychologists, sometimes to the
exclusion
exclusion of all other elements in the the constitution
constitution of the emo
the emo-
tions.9 This is in sharp contrast
tions.9 contrast to the polarized opposition bebe
tween reason and passion that has been characteristic characteristic of post- post
Cartesian philosophy and continues
continues to prevail in popular thought thought
((cf. Lewis, Amini, and Lannon [2000: 42],
d. Lewis, 42], who assert blandly that
'most emotions require no thinking all').10O The view that the
thinking at all').l
emotions are irrational
irrational coincided
coincided with a tendency, beginning beginning at
the end of the nineteenth
nineteenth century, to explain emotionsemotions entirely in
physical terms, thereby ignoring the element element of judgment alto- alto
gether (d.
(cf. Grastyan 11986,
986, quoted in chapter 1, I, pp. 110-11).
0- 1 1 ). Follow-
Follow
ing the
the pioneering work of the the physiologist Walter B. B. Cannon,
researchers also began to explore the operations of the the sympa-
44 / The Emotions of the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
thetic and parasympathetic

parasympathetic nervous systems, and symptoms such
as rate of heart beat, blood-sugar levels, production of adrenalin
and serotonin, galvanic skin response,response, and respiration.
respiration. Finally, the
function
function of the emotions was associated with drives, energy lev- lev
els, and efforts
efforts directed towards the the successful attainment of of
goals. The recent vogue of evolutionary psychology psychology is heir to this
11
research program. ! l
Although
Although Aristotle too, aass w wee have noted, holds that the emoemo
tions have a physical basis in the the organism (d. (cf. De anima
l1.1.403al6-b2,
. I A03aI 6-b2, esp.
esp. 403a25: The 'The emotions are reasonings set in
matter' [ta pathe logoi enuloi eisin]), he does not reduce the the
emotions to material states such as the temperature of blood
around the heart. In the Rhetoric,
Rhetoric/ of course, he is interested
interested in the
passions above all for their role in persuasion, but but there is good
reason to believe, as I argued in chapter 1, I, that his definition of the
the
pathe in terms of their effect effect on judgment is intended
intended to pick out
their
their essential quality.
The weakness in the narrowly physiological view of anger is
apparent in the following
following hypothetical situation. A woman is
pushed violently from from behind. Instinctively, her muscles tense
and her heart
heart beats faster. She may move to escape or defend
herself, perhaps aggressively, by striking at her assailant. 12
perhaps aggressively, l 2 But is
she angry? Very possibly,
possibly, but but if so, it is because
because she has made a
snap butbut complex evaluation of the event that includes, includes, among
other things, a supposition about the motives of the person who
shoved her, for example, that the man's action was intended to
harm her, and that she had done nothing to deserve it (Aristotle (Aristotle
Rhetoric 2.3, 1380b 1 6- 1 8, points out that we do not respond with
1380M6-18,
anger when
when we have done wrong and are suffering suffering justly). If the
the
woman subsequently discovers that the man pushed her by acci acci-
13
dent, she will very likely cease to be angry. 13 As Aristotle observes
in his discussion of calming down, which he treats as the opposite
of anger,
anger, a slight must be voluntary,
voluntary, and people therefore react
mildly
mildly towards unintentional offences, offences, or towards people who
wished to do the opposite of what they in fact fact accomplished (2.3,
(2.3,
1380a8-12).14 1 4 But suppose that the man pushed the woman in
order to save her life - say she was
- say was standing in the path of of an
oncoming car.car. In this case, she not only gives over her anger, anger, but
presumably feels grateful instead.
Anger / 45
Anger, then, involves a judgment of intentions.

intentions. That
That is why
why we
do not normally get angry at stones: they can hurt hurt us, but cannot
insult
insult us -- stubbing is not snubbing (d. (cf. Ben-Ze'ev 2000: 30). 30). Nor
can we take revenge on them. In addition, anger depends on
values, that is, what
what one regards as good or bad. Suppose the
woman in our thought
thought experiment knew the car was approaching,
and intended
intended to commit
commit suicide by hurling herself in front of it.
The
The man, by shoving her, prevented her her from
from taking herher life. Is she
angry at him?
him? Again, it will depend in part on whether she
believes that he was aware of her purpose and deliberately thwarted
it. Note how the same act and intention
intention thatthat evoked the woman's
gratitude in the previous scenario now rouse her ire. I S
15
My story is nevertheless defective in at least one respect as an

illustration of Aristotle's theory
theory of anger. For what is extraordi
extraordi-
nary about Aristotle's analysis is that that he limits the causes of anger
to intentional
intentional offences
offences of a single kind, which are summed up by
16
the term oligoria or 'slight.' 1 6 What, then, is an oligoria
oligorial? Literally,
the Greek term indicates a lessening or belittlement, belittlement, from the
root oligos meaning 'small' or 'few.' Aristotle defines a slight as
'the activation [or[or activity: energeia]
energeia] of a belief
belief about something
seeming worthless' ((energeia
energeia doxes peri to m edenos axion
medenos
phainomenon,
phainomenon, 2.2, 1378b l O-l l ).
1378blO-ll). To see how severe a restriction
this is, consider three classes
consider the three classes of slight
slight that Aristotle
Aristotle enumer
enumer-
ates. The first
first is kataphronesis
kataphronesis or contempt, which he defines as
the
the belief
belief that something is of no value; value,- it follows a fortiori that
we slight
slight a person whom we treat with contempt, since slighting
is just the active belief that a thing is or seems worthless. The
second category of slighting
slighting is more interesting. This is epereasmos
epereasmos
or 'spite/ which Aristotle defines as 'blocking the wishes [bouleseis][bouleseis]
of
of another not
not in order to have something for oneself but but rather so
that the other not have it' (2.2, (2.2, 1378b 1 8-19). In this case, the
1378bl8-19).
slight, Aristotle explains, lies precisely in that that the offender
offender seeks
no personal advantage.
advantage. The only explanation for such a gratuitous
hindrance of another's wishes, according to Aristotle, is that that one
neither fears himhim nor seeks his friendship;
friendship,- he is thus useless,
whether for good or ill, which is just Aristotle's Aristotle's definition of of
worthlessness. If the motive were self-interest, it would would not be a
clear case of belittlement,
belittlement, since one can impede another person's
plans out
out of selfishness
selfishness and still respect him him or her. And if that
the Ancient
were the case, then the act, according according to Aristotle, would not
produce anger, for anger results from from a slight and nothing else.
So too with Aristotle's third category of slighting, namely, hu hu-
bris or arrogant abuse,abuse, which is defined
defined as speaking or acting in
ways that cause shame to another, not so that something something may
happen to you or because something has happened, happened, but
but for the
sheer pleasure
pleasure of it (2.2, 1378b23-5)
13 78b23-5) - - a pleasure
pleasure that derives fromfrom
a sense of superiority, not from gain. gain.17 1 7 If the abuse is in return for
an injury, it does not not count as insolence but rather as revenge. revenge. The
kind of affront
affront that provokes anger, Aristotle explains, must be
that provokes
neither in reprisal for an offence
offence nor beneficial to the offender, but
purely a function
function of arrogance
arrogance (2.2, 1379a29-32)
13 79a29-32) - - that is, a form
form ofof
belittlement. 8
belittlement. 1
18
It is evident that the causes of anger,

the causes anger, in Aristotle's view, are far
19
more limited than is the case in English. English. 19 Anger is not a response
to harm as such, even when the harm is intentional. It is not that
one is indifferent
indifferent to deliberate
deliberate injury, of coursej
course,- but
but one reacts to
it, if I understand Aristotle correctly,
correctly, not with with anger butbut with
hatred or hostility (misein), unless it is the the sort of injury that
constitutes an affront.
affront. Aristotle is intensely conscious of the
difference
difference between these two emotions, which which overlap in English
to a far greater
greater extent than in Greek, Greek, to go by Aristotle's descrip-descrip
20
tions. Let me offer offer some illustrations.2
illustrations. o
Aristotle observes
observes that rejoicing at the the misfortune
misfortune of another is
the
the sign either of an enemy or of one who is slighting you (2.2, (2.2,
1 3 79b1 7-19). These are alternatives: an enemy may be expected
1379bl7-19).
to take delight in your ruin without it following that he or she
despises you as being of no account. When an enemy behaves behaves in
this way, accordingly, one does not necessarily necessarily react with anger.
In a similar vein, Aristotle points out that no one slights a person
(2.3, 1380a22-3
he fears (2.3, 1380a22-3),), because fear fear is a sign of one's own
weakness, and this is incompatible with contempt for the other.
Of
Of course, we can certainly hate such a person, person, and normally do.
As Aristotle says, 'No one likes [philei] [ philei] a person he fears' (2.4, (2.4,
138 1 b33 ). For the same reason,
1381b33). reason, we are not angry with those who
fear us, since their fear fear demonstrates their respect for us (hence,
they cannot
cannot slight
slight us),
us), though we may certainly certainly dislike them.
What is more, Aristotle says that 'it is impossible to be afraid afraid of
of
Anger / 47
and angry with someone at the the same time' (2.3, 1380a33)
1380a33).. The
reason for this, I presume, is that we acknowledge, by our fear, the the
superior status of the the other, who is accordingly in a fit position to
deliver a slight. Nor can we return anger for anger, according to
Aristotle, since those who are angry at us do not appear to act out
of contempt, but but are responding precisely to our disdain for them them
(2.3, 1380a34-5)j
1380a34-5); yet anger is listedlisted as one of the
the three primary
causes of enmity (2.4, (2.4, 11382al-2).
382al-2). TheThe result of a slight
slight or put-
put
down is that we find find ourselves diminished
diminished in esteem, and in order
to turn the tables on the offender, offender, we must first restore the
original equilibrium through an act of revenge. revenge. Until
Until that hap-
hap
pens, we are not in a position to diminish diminish the other, and hence
inspire her or his anger.
The sharp distinction
distinction that Aristotle draws between anger and
hatred or enmity may seem surprising, but it follows from from his
understanding of the the nature of the the two emotions. 2211 Enmity, ac
Enmity, ac-
cording to Aristotle, is the the opposite of friendship
friendship or affection;
affection;
whereas friends
friends desire the
the good of the
the other, the
the object of hatred is
to inflict harm (2.4, (2.4, 11382a8).
382a8 ). The object of anger,
anger, however, is to
cause pain to the other. 22 A slight makes one feel small, and the
22
the
only way to get even is to induce a similar feeling in the the other. It
follows that, for an angry person to get revenge, the original
offender
offender must be aware of it (aisthesthai),
[aisthesthai], since there is no such
thing as unperceived pain (hence (hence the stipulation in the definition
of
of anger that the revenge,
revenge, like the slight itself, must be perceived),
whereas to one who hates it is a matter of indifference
indifference whether
whether an
enemy is aware or not of the damage done to him. That That is why we
may wish that people whom we hate should die, but when we are
angry, what we desire is that the other person feel in return
(antipathein) the kind of diminishment
(antipathein) diminishment that provoked
provoked our anger
in the the first
first place (2.4,
(2.4, 1382a14-1
1382al4-15). 5). The death of the
the other would
render that impossible.
Anger is also more personal than than hatred. Aristotle
Aristotle asserts that
one can can be angry only at an individual -- at Clean,Cleon, for
for example --
and not not at a class of people or at mankind generally (2.2, 1378a34-
55),), whereas hatred or dislike may be directed against a group, group, e.g.
thieves or slanderers (2.4, (2.4, 1382a4-7). It is understandable, then,
that
that hatred need not be accompanied by pain in the way that anger
48 / The Emotions of the
the Ancient Greeks
over an intentional
intentional slight
slight must be. Hatred for Aristotle signifies a
settled antagonism that that is lasting and not subject, as anger is, to
23
being healed by the the passage of time (2.4, 1382a7-8).
1382a7-8).23
So far, I have discussed only one aspect of Aristotle's conception
of
of anger: that it is produced produced by a slight, and only that. We have yet
to consider
consider the implications of the connection connection with revenge, and
of
of the implicit
implicit distinction
distinction between those who may appropriately
appropriately
belittle another, and those who may not. We We shall return to these
issues shortly. But even on the the basis of whatwhat we have already
noted, it would seem that Aristotle's notion of anger relates to our
own in something like the way that indigo does to blue: they
overlap in part, but but do not have thethe same extension
extension (see
(see chapter 1, I,
pp.. 55).) . Now, Aristotle is a professional philosopher, and he is within
his rights to define a concept more narrowly or widely than
obtains
obtains in popular usage (we (we shall see below that he has, to a
certain degree,degree, availed himself of this privilege). Hence, we must
inquire whether classical Greek literature bears out the distinc distinc-
tion he draws between anger and hatred, and the limited scope
that this contrast leaves for the emotion anger. anger. To test it, we shall
examine a poetic text in which anger is universally recognized as
playing a central central role.
At the beginning of Greek literature stands Homer's Iliad, and,
as is well known, the first word of this epic poem is anger, or
rather, wrath: the term menis has a solemn and perhaps religious religious
register, and is often often associated with divine anger (Considine
24
11986:
986: 54). 54).24 Among mortals, the word is employed of Achilles'
anger against Agamemnon, who took from from Achilles the girl he
had won as a war prize. prize. There can be no doubt that what what provokes
Achilles' rage, or kholos -- the standard term for anger in the
Bomeric
Homeric epics (e.g., 11.224, .224, 283
283)) -- in this part of the epic is pre-pre
cisely his sense of having been slightedj slighted; as he says to his mother,
Thetis, 'wide-ruling Agamemnon has dishonoured me [iltimesenl' [etimesen]'
((1.356;
1 .356j d. cf. 11.412;
.4 1 2j 11.244:
.244: Agamemnon 'failed 'failed to honour the
the best of of
the Achaeans').
Achaeans').To Agamemnon, he declares: declares: 'Call me a coward,
coward, a
no-account, if I ever again submit to anything you say' ((1.293-4). 1 .293-4).
And when Agamemnon sends an embassy to Achilles' Achilles' tent, offer
offer-
ing to compensate Achilles with boundless gifts, Achilles' final
word is: is: 'My heart
heart swells withwith anger whenwhen I recall those things,
Anger / 49
how Agamemnon treated me shamefully before the Achaeans as

if
if I were some vagabond
vagabond without honour' (9.646-8). (9.646-8 ).
Achilles returns to battle after after he learns that Patroclus has been
slain by Hector; he will not rest or take food food until he has killed
Hector in return. What motivates his hostility hostility in this portion of of
the
the epic? One of the the sections ((7.3)
7.3 ) in Oliver Taplin's
Taplin's fine study of of
the Iliad is entitled
entitled 'Anger Displaces Anger' ((1992: 1 992: 1193;
93; the sec
the sec-
tion runs from from p. 1193
93 to p. 202).
202). Taplin argues that that Achilles'
Achilles' rage
after
after the death of Patroclus remains unchanged in substance, but
25
is transfered
transfered from
from one object to anotheL25
another. Taplin opens his discus- discus
sion with a citation of Achilles' Achilles' address
address to his mother in Iliad Iliad
118.94-126,
8.94-126, in which Achilles, stricken with grief at the
with grief the loss of his
friend, utters the the wish that strife (eris} might
strife (eris) might perish among gods
and mortals, and also khoios,kholos, or anger, which, Achilles says, 'is far
sweeter than dripping
dripping honey in the breasts of men'; so it was, he
says, whenwhen Agamemnon, lord of men, angered him him just now ((erne em e
ekholosen, 107-1
nun ekho16sen, 1 ). Taplin comments oon
107-11). n this passionate plea
( 1 99 ) : 'In sum,
(199): sum, Achilleus
Achilleus renounces
renounces all the the epL<:; ( eris) and
epiq (eris) x6"{0<:;
and ^dAos
(cholos) which have pervaded
(choios) pervaded the Iliad since its very beginning ...
Thus, half-way through through a speech, the passions passions of book 11 are
renounced: the menis poem is oveL' over.' Taplin continues ( 199-200):
continues (199-200):
'When Achilleus
Achilleus turns his attention to Hektor in 1114ff., 14f£., he shows
no awareness that what has happened is not that that he has given up
eris and cholos cholos altogether,
altogether, but that Hektor Hektor has replaced
Agamemnon as his target. target. The timing of this realization by the
audience
audience may vary; but but there
there will be no shortage of eris and
cholos, verbal and physical,
physical, in books 20 to 22. There are verbal
signals even sooner,
sooner/' Taplin
Taplin concludes
concludes (citing 118.337 8 .337 and 19.116).
19. 1 1 6) .
Hector has done Achilles, and the Achaeans generally, generally, great
harm, as Achilles himself acknowledges. At the moment
Achilles himself moment of his
triumph over Hector, when he is at his most savage savage and has
wished aloud that he might might be capable of devouring Hector's Hector's body
for
for what he has done to him him (22.346-7), he recognizes his stature
as a warrior who has damaged damaged the Greek side more than all the
other Trojans
Trojans combined (22.378-80). Achilles has every motive for
hating his opponent. But if anger is, as Aristotle defines it, a
response not to injury but to insult, and more particularly to
dishonour or belittlement, in what sense has Hector provoked provoked
SO
50 / The Emotions
this emotion
emotion in Achilles? True, Achilles Achilles tauntstaunts the dying Hector
for
for having forgotten, when he slew Patroclus, that a greater
spearman remained behind (22.33 1-5). But we can hardly con-
(22.331-5). con
clude from
from this that Hector's act was a sign of contempt for
Achilles. Warriors slaughter
slaughter whom they can.26 can.26
Was Aristotle wrong, then, about the motives for anger, anger, when
he restricted
restricted them to a narrow range that that belies the ample and
complex character of the
complex character the emotion? Of course, the the termterm that
that
Aristotle subjected to analysis, as I have mentioned, was orge, not not
the Homeric kholos (orge (orge does not
not appear in archaic epic)i epic); we have
no more reason, a priori, for assuming that orge and kholos kholos coin
coin-
cide in meaning
meaning that we do for assumingassuming that one or both both coincide
coincide
with the English term 'anger' (d. (cf. Harris 200 1 : 'It
1 : 551:
2001: Tt would be
extremely perilous to assume that that there was one constant mean- mean
ing that was attached to cholos or to orge or to ira in all ages').
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, I believe
believe that Aristotle's discussion
discussion is in fact illumi
illumi-
nating for the interpretation
interpretation of the Iliad, and that Achilles does
respond differently
differently to Agamemnon's affront affront and to the pain that
Hector inflicts on him. him.
Contrary to what what Taplin
Taplin suggests,
suggests, there
there are in factfact no references
to Achilles' kholos
kholos in books 20 to 22 of the Iliad, and indeed only
one in the last five books, books, apart fromfrom a single occurrence that
looks back to the original
original quarrel between
between him and Agamemnon Agamemnon
(kekho16menos
(kekholomenos Atrei" 24.395).27 Moreover,
6ni, 24.395).27
Atreioni, Moreover, when Achilles 'turns
his attention to Hector,'
Hector/ in his speech to his mother, he does not
mention his own anger. He simply declares that he will return to
battle in order to slay Hector, and with that he is prepared to
accept whatever Zeus and the other gods have in store for for him --
for
for his mother has just told him that that Hector's death is the prelude
to his own (18.96).
( 1 8 .96). Not
Not even Hercules, he observes, escaped his
fate, but
but destiny
destiny and the anger anger of Hera conquered
conquered him. Here the the
kholos does indeed occur ((18.119),
word kholos 1 8 . 1 1 9), but as frequently
frequently in the the
Iliad, the subject of the emotion
emotion is a god, god, and the gods -- especially
Zeus andand Hera -- are are notoriously sensitive
sensitive when it comes to
human
human overachievers
overachievers and other other obstacles
obstacles to theirtheir ambitions,
ambitions, which
they tend to treat as personal affronts.affronts.
It is not that
that Homer rigorously eschews the word kholos kholos in
connection withwith Achilles' feelings concerning
concerning Hector,
Hector, subsequent
subsequent
Anger
Anger / 5511
to his reconciliation with Agamemnon in book 18 1 8 and his osten

osten-
sible renunciation
renunciation of anger. Homer is neither neither a philosopher nor a
pedant, and the use of emotion terms in Greek cannot be neatly
circumscribed any more than it can be in English or any other
language. Thus, Achilles' grief grief for Patroclus is compared to that of of
a lion whose cubs have been stolen stolen by a deerhunter; a 'bitter
kholos seizes him' - - that is, the lion -- as
as he searches for for the tracks
of the man ((18.322).
1 8.322 ) . It may be that the lion feels insulted that a
mere deersman should have injured him, and that that by treachery
rather than combat.28 But the adjective
than in open combat.28 adjective 'bitter' ( (drimus)
drimus)
suggests thethe root meaning of kholos kholos as 'bile' (compare
(compare 'choleric'
and 'melancholy')
'melancholy'), and as applied to an animal the term appar appar-
'
ently signifies violent fury, irrespective of whether it is provoked
by harm or scorn (for drimus drimus used of kholos, d. cf. Hippocrates Airs, Airs,
Places 10).
Waters, Places 10). SoSo too, in the
the single use of the
the term in book 22,
Hector's
Hector's determination
determination (menos, 22.96) to face face Achilles is com- com
pared to the kholos
kholos (94) (94) that
thatseeps
seepsinto
intoaasnake
snakeasasititlies
liesininwait
wait
(meneisi), munching
(meneisi), munching its own poison. Hector himself is not de- de
scribed as angry;
angry,- butbut then
then he is afraid
afraid of Achilles, and anger,
according to Aristotle, is incompatible with with fear.
Achilles, however, does feel anger. He decides to sacrifice twelve
Trojan youths on the pyre of Patroclus, so enraged is he that
Patroclus has been slain (sethen (sethen ktamenoio kholotheis,
kho16theis, 18.337);
1 8 .337);
this is the same formula that recurs at 23.23, 23.23, which
which is the only
time in the final five books of the poem in which which kholos
kholos over
29
Patroclus's death
Patroclus's death is ascribed
ascribed to Achilles.29
Achilles. Achilles' passion here
evidently derives from from his pain at the loss of his friend friend (and
(and guilt,
perhaps, over his failure to bring him him home, 326-7); it is not said
to be directed specifically at Hector, although he has just vowed to
kill him
him for what he has done (334-5). (334-5). Be
Be that
that as it may, Zeus, in
his earlier prophecy of Patroclus's (and (and Sarpedon's)
Sarpedon's) death, explic-
explic
itly asserts that Achilles will slay Hector because of his anger over
Patroclus ((tou
Patroclus tou de kho16samenos
kholosamenos ktenei Hectora dios Akhilleus,
5 .68), and in the
115.68), the battle
battle round the the body of Patroclus, before
Achilles has learned the the news of his friend's death, Menelaus
doubts that
that Achilles, without
without armour, can join the fighting,
fighting, 'angry
though he may be at godlike Hector' (mala (mala per kekho16menon
kekholomenon
Hektori di6i, 17.710).
Hektorididi, 1 7. 7 1 0).
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
These third-person descriptions of his motives do not not prevent

Achilles from
from repeating a second time, in book 119, 9, that he has
desisted in his anger
desisted anger towards Agamemnon, and that that it is wrong 'to
rage forever' (aiei meneainemen, 9.67-8 ) - and
meneainemen, 119.67-8) -and this moments
after
after we are told that
that 'kholos seeps into him' ((19.16)
19 . 1 6 ) at the sightofof
his new armour. The word 'seeps' (edu), (edu), used also of the snake'ssnake's
kholos
kholos in book 23, 23, again suggests something
something like raw battle fury, I
think, rather than the focused anger aroused by an insult or
offence.30
personal offence.3o
And yet, I believe
believe that Aristotle's analysis
analysis of orge pointspoints the
the
way to a different,
different, and perhaps richer, appreciation of the emo
the emo-
tional
tional dynamics of the the epic. I should like to maintain
maintain that that there
does occur a shift in the poem from from anger on Achilles' part, which which
was provoked by Agamemnon's arrogance and disdain for his best
fighter, to a desire for retaliation against Hector that responds
rather to the pain that
that Hector has caused him. Despite a couple of of
references to Achilles' kholos
kholos against Hector, the poet insists on
the harm - kaka and andsimilar expressions -- that Hector has has done to
Achilles and the Greeks generally as the motive for Achilles' Achilles'
revenge. What is more, anger as a motive motive for combat
combat is explicitly
disparaged after
after Achilles 'renounces all the eris) and ,1'6..10<:'
spis ((eris)
the ept<:, ôAos
(cholos) which have pervaded
(cholos) Iliad since its very beginning'
pervaded the Iliad
(Taplin)
(Taplin).. When Achilles, after
after his return
return to combat, meets Aeneas
on the battlefield in book 20, he taunts Aeneas, in the martial
,
repartee known as 'fly ting, with his inferior
'flyting,' inferior status in the royal
line of Troy. Aeneas responds by reciting reciting his lineage,
lineage, and then
reminds Achilles that such wrangling is for women, 'who get
angry over some quarrel [eris [ens]1 that eats their
their hearts out and go out
into the middle of the street
street to hurl
hurl abuse at one another, whether
whether
true or not; for their
their anger drives them to it' (20.253-5).). Men,
(20.253-5
however, decide their conflicts not not with
with words, says Aeneas, but
with steel, or rather bronze (257; cf. Harris 200
(257; d. 2001:1 : 28).
28).
There
There is more than than one kind
kind of pain in the Iliad. Achilles Achilles
experiences both the resentment induced by an undeserved slight
-
- that is,
is, Aristotle's orge,
oige, the
the epic name for which is is kholos and
kholos - and
-
the fury
fury unleashed
unleashed by the death of his dearest comrade, in the heat
of
of which
which his earlier anger withers. There is no exact term in
Homer for the latter sentiment. Sometimes kholos kholos serves, as we
have seen, but it does not capture the grim duty to the deceased deceased
Anger / 53
and appreciation of the opponent's valour that mark Achilles'

return to battle, and it falls short too of defining defining the
the demonic,
'berserker' violence of Achilles' peak moment or aristeia. Achil- Achil
les is right to say that he has abandonedabandoned kholos kholos in the ordinary
sense after after the death of Patroclus. 'Anger' is too weak a term, or
the wrong term, for the emotion that displaces it. When Achilles
declares that, despite the way Agamemnon
Agamemnon angered angeredhim
him (ekho16sen,
(ekholosen,
118.111),
8 . 1 1 1 ), he is prepared
prepared to repress
repress the fury
fury in his breast (thumon eni
stethessi philon damasantes, 118.113 8 . 1 13 = 19.66) and go forth
= forth against
Hector for slaying his dearest friend, the scholia -- marginal notes
in the manuscripts that preserve preserve the comments of ancient critics
-
- observe:
observe: 'of the two two emotions besetting Achilles' soul, anger
[orge] and grief
[orgel grief [lupeL out ....
[lupe], one wins out . . For the
the emotion
emotion involving
involving
Patroclus is strongest of all, and so it is necessary to abandon his
wrath [menis][menis] and avenge himself on his enemies' (schol. bT ad I1. 71.
118.112-13).
8 . 1 1 2-13). The scholia
scholia have got it right. Perhaps they were com- com
posed under the the influence
influence of Aristotle's analysis of anger as result
result-
ing fromfrom a slight, rather than harm as such, but but if so, it only
confirms the value of taking Aristotle's view into account.31 account.31
At the end end of
of book 99 of
of the Iliad -- the 'Embassy' to Achilles --
Ajax makes a final attempt to assuage assuage Achilles' wrath and bring
him back to battle:
But Achilles, cruel

cruel as he is, harbours
harbours in his breast
breast an arrogant
arrogant temper
[thumos], nor does he care about the the love of his companions, we who
honoured
honoured himhim beyond all others by the ships. Pitiless! And yet a man
accepts compensation [poine] for the
compensation [poine] the murder
murder of a brother
brother or a child who
who
has died, and the murderer remains among his people when when he has paid
handsomely, while the heart and proud temper of the other are appeased,
when he has accepted the compensation. But the gods have placed in your
breast an implacable
implacable and evil temper for the
the sake of a single girl. But here
we are offering
offering you seven outstanding
outstanding girls and much
much else besides: adopt
a sympathetic
sympathetic temper. (9.628-39)
To this, Achilles
Achilles famously replies:
Ajax, son
son of Telamon,
Telamon, descended of Zeus, ruler
ruler of peoples, all that you
you
have said seems to me in accord with your [or
[or my] temper. But my heart
swells with kholos when
with kholos when I recall those things, how the son of Atreus
54 / The Emotions
Emotions of the
the Ancient Greeks
Greeks
treated
treated me as a fool in front
front of the
the Achaeans as if I were a vagabond
without honour. But go go and report this message: I shall not turn my
thoughts
thoughts to bloody war until divine
divine Hector, the son of wise Priam, arrives
arrives
at the tents and ships of the Myrmidons
Myrmidons as he slaughters
slaughters the Achaeans.
Achaeans.
(9.644-53)
In a recent
recent book on ransom and revenge in the the Iliad (2002), DonnaDonna
Wilson attempts to resolve the apparent inconsistency between
Achilles' words here and subsequent passages in which he sug- sug
gests that he might
might have returned
returned to battle
battle sooner if Agamemnon
had treated him
him more decently ((11.609-10,
1 1 .609-10, 116.71-3,
6. 7 1-3, 84-6). Wilson
solves the dilemma by distinguishing
distinguishing ((7-10)
7-10) between the terms
paine and apaina,
poine apoina, 'penalty' and 'ransom'
'ransom':: 'Although Achilleus
feels he is owed paine
poine for the
the seizure of Briseis, Agamemnon
offers
offers him apoina. Accordingly, Achilleus in Books
him apaina. Books 11 1 1 and 1166 can
legitimately
legitimately discount the previous offer, since Agamemnon's gifts gifts
are inevitably
inevitably unacceptable in form and function'
function' ((10).
1 0). Ajax, for
his part, 'misses the point
point of the quarrel. He fails, moreover, to
account adequately
adequately for Achilleus' singular demand: the the life for
32
which
which Achilleus
Achilleus seeks to secure painepoine is his own' (106).
( 106).32 I agree
with Wilson that Ajax misunderstands the reasons reasons why Achilles
remains uncompromising in his anger at Agamemnon, but it
seems to me that her explanation
explanation is mistaken.
mistaken. Ajax supposes that
the issue between Achilles and Agamemnon is the seizure of the
girl Briseis,
Briseis, and in this respect comparable,
comparable, though lesser in de- de
gree, to the loss of a relative
relative through
through violence.
violence. Such aggression
may be resolved, as Ajax says, by means of suitable compensation.
Achilles does not deny that this is so. so. Rather, he distinguishes
distinguishes an
attack that deprives
deprives a man of someone dear to him from from the
the
humiliation
humiliation he has suffered
suffered at the hands of Agamemnon, which is
the source
source of his anger. The latter requires, as Aristotle
Aristotle explains,
explains,
that the offender
offender be aware of and feel in return the the kind of of
mortification
mortification that provoked the anger in the first first place:
place: it is not
simply
simply a matter
matter of compensation.
compensation. Ajax's analogy is thus irrelevant irrelevant
to Achilles' anger, insofar
insofar as it was produced
produced by a slight and not by
mere harm to himself
himself or a dear one. But it corresponds
correspondsperfectly
perfectly to
the pain that
that Achilles experiences upon the death of Patroclus,
and thus anticipates the finale of the Iliad, when Achilles will in
Anger / 55
SS
fact accept a ransom for the the body of Hector: Hector has not
insulted Achilles and hence is not the object of his kholos in the
same way that Agamemnon is. As the scholia put put it (ad
(ad 9.646-7),
Achilles
Achilles 'again recalls Agamemnon's hubris, indicating that he
indeed would like to yield, but but the magnitude of the hubris does
it.'33
not permit it.'33
In rejecting Ajax's argument from from compensation in cases of of
homicide, Achilles
Achilles is not claiming
claiming that the anger he harbours is
too great for such a solution. He is indicating rather that that Ajax has
offered
offered examples of harm, while his own anger is a response to an
intolerable slight. Harm causes pain, grief, even perhaps a kind of of
rage, but not anger in the Aristotelian sense - - nor, I would say, in
the Homeric sense. It really is the case that, in book 118, 8, I'the
the menis
minis
poem is over,' as Taplin puts it; from from here on, it is about revenge
for another kind of injury, and the emotion that drives it
for another it is
different
different as well.
A slight, as we have seen, consists according to Aristotle in the the
active belief
belief that
that another person is of no account. The response to
such an act is to restore the the opinion of one's worth by an act of of
reprisal (getting even [antipoiein]
[antipoiein] itself is not
not arrogance
arrogance but re
but re-
quital, and hence does not not necessarily invite further
further acts of re- re
venge: Rhetoric 2.2, 1378b25-6).
13 78b2S-6). Anger is just the desire to restore
the
the state of affairs
affairs prior to the insult
insult by depreciating the the offender
offender
in turn. Not every slight slight inspires anger, however, on Aristotle's
view, but
but only those ton 'on the
the part of people who are notnot fit to slight
one or one's own.' Who, Who, then, is fit to belittle
belittle another? It is time to
return to this proviso
proviso in Aristotle's definition of anger.
For Aristotle,
Aristotle, what counts as belittlement
belittlement depends on status: ifif
your position
position is inferior, it is no insult to be reminded of it. Like
many other Greeks of his time, Aristotle is intensely conscious of of
rank and social role. One may speak to a slave in ways that would
constitute
constitute an intolerable affront affront if one were addressing a fellow
citizen. Slaves are not in a position to take offence, offence, but must be
careful
careful to appease
appease their masters' anger by humbling themselves, themselves,
confessing that they are at fault, and not talking back (Rhetoric (Rhetoric
2.3, 1 380a l S- 1 8 ) : back-talk,
2.3,1380al5-18): back-talk, indeed,
indeed, constitutes
constitutes a slight, and hence
exacerbates the master's ire, since slaves who speak up in their
own defence presume to treat the master as an equal. Such atti-
Ancient Greeks
Greeks
tudes
tudes are so deep seated
seated that they they seem
seem to correspond to natural
uses of language; thus, the grammarian Demetrius, in his treat- treat
ment of forceful
forceful expression or deinotes demotes in his essay On Style, Style,
observes almost in passing ((7): 7 ) : 'Giving orders is succinct and terse,
and every master is monosyllabic to his slave, whereas supplica- supplica
,34
tion and lamentation
lamentation go on at length. length/34 If Achilles really had been
'some vagabond without honour,'honour/ he could could not have been angry at
the way Agamemnon treated him.35 him.35
Since anger is defined
defined as a desire for revenge, moreover, Aristotle
concludes
concludes that anger can only arise where revenge is possible: possible: 'No
one gets angry at someone someone when when it is impossible to achieve
revenge, and withwith those who are far superior in power than than them
them-
selves people get angry either not not at all or less so' (Rhetoric 22.2, .2,
36
1370b 13-1 S).36
1370bl3-15). To take one example among many, in the first
book of the Iliad the priest Chryses and his patron god Apollo
react
react very differently
differently to Agamemnon's
Agamemnon's refusal to free free Chryses'
daughter (this episode triggers the quarrel between Agamemnon
and Achilles). Chryses pleads and offers offers a ransom; when he is
threatened and harshly
threatened harshly dismissed, he obeys in fear, although he
suffers
suffers inwardly (Iliad
(Iliad 11.33-4).
.33-4). He appeals to Apollo to take re- re
venge in his behalf (42), but but is not said to experience anger in his
own right. Apollo, however, is 'angry in his heart' (khoomenos (khoomenos
ker, 44) and immediately
her, 44) immediately punishes
punishes the Greeks for this slight slight to his
divinity; he
divinity,- he is, of course, entirely
entirely capable of doing so.
As a test
test case for differential
differential responses to insult as a function function of of
social roles and power, let let us consider the the nature of women's
women's
anger. Women may, of course, bicker bicker among
among themselves, as Aeneas
observes to Achilles;
Achilles,- so too can slaves. But could women experi experi-
ence anger at their husbands or fathers, men whose authority over
them was, if not not equal to that of a master master over a slave, neverthe
neverthe-
less tantamount
tantamount to that that of an aristocratic ruler, in Aristotle's Aristotle's
analogy (Nicomachean
(Nicomachean Ethics 88.10, . 1 0, 11160b32-3)?
1 60b32-3 ) ?
Women ddo o not constitute a homogeneous
homogeneous group, and their ac- ac
tual power will vary according to their their class or wealth; Aristotle
observes, for example, that that heiresses may exercise an undue domi- domi
nation
nation over their husbands.
husbands. In order to explore the world of women's
anger, I examine two works from from the Athenian
Athenian tragic stage that
offer
offer contrasting paradigms of a marital crisis.
Anger / 5577
Euripides' Medea
Medea is unforgettable
unforgettable for the savage vengeance that
the heroine takes upon her husband Jason for deserting her in
order to marry the daughter of Creon, the king of Corinth, where
he and Medea find themselves in exile. Medea's anger anger is high
high-
lighted
lighted at the beginning of the play when when her nurse, who speaks
the prologue, reveals her fear that Medea may harm her Own own
children: 'Fierce
Tierce is the temper of tyrants, and though though they start
smalt
small, because their power is great they curtail their anger with
difficulty'
difficulty' ((119-21; cf. the chorus's comment
1 1 9-2 1 ; d. comment at 1176-7).
76-7). These
These are
the words of a slave who recognizes that wrath is the prerogative
of the mighty. JasonJason too denounces Medea's savage anger, which which
he reproves as an uncontrollable
uncontrollable evil (446-7; d. 590). He
cf. kholos, 590).
claims
claims that he has attempted to assuage the anger of the Corinthian Corinthian
royal house against her (455-6),
(455-6), and he advises Medea to give over
her anger for her Own own good ((615).
6 1 5). At least in regard to their their
children,
children, Jason appears
appears to have been as good as his word, since the the
messenger who reports the deaths of Creon and his daughter,
incinerated by Medea's poisoned gifts, describes how Jason first
allayed the princess's anger and irritation irritation (orgas
(orgas ...
... kai kholon,
kholon,
1 50) towards them. Like the nurse, Jason sees anger as the right
11150)
of kings, and he rebukes Medea for harbouring a sentiment sentiment that is
incompatible with her humble situation situation as a foreign woman in a
trouble.37
distant land. Like a slave's anger, Medea's can only lead to trouble.37
Medea has, we may believe, every reason to be upset, and
Jason's excuses for contracting a politically
politically advantageous alliance
alliance
may seem mere sophisms, given the oaths he swore when she
gave up everything to save his skin in Colchis. But Medea smarts
particularly for what she sees as Jason's disdain for her. 'Go on,
insult
insult me!
me!'' (hubrize, 603),
603), she tells him, and throughout
throughout the play
she is concerned to laugh in triumphtriumph over her enemies rather than
the
the reverse (d.(cf. 383, 404, 797, l1049, 162, 1355). Medea is not
O49, 11162, not just
hurt
hurt and fearful,
fearful, she is humiliated
humiliated and dishonoured (etimasmene,
(etimasmene,
20; d.
cf. 33, 4417, 696). She is herself a princess, and Jason,
1 7, 438, 696). Jason, an
exile like her, is not fit to slight
slight her.
But anger, according
according to Aristotle,
Aristotle, requires
requires not just pride but
power. Contrary to Jason's warning, Medea can afford afford to be angry
because she is capable of revenge.
revenge. In the event, she murders Creon
and his daughter, and leaves Jason childless but alive to savour his
the Ancient Greeks
Greeks
loss -- which is just what anger seeks, says Aristotle. For For her part,
Medea escapes safely to Athens in an airborne chariot, courtesy of of
her grandfather, the the Sun God:God: 'You were not not about to lead a
pleasant after dishonouring
pleasant life after dishonouring my bed/ bed,' she gloats ((1354-5).
1354-5). One
should know better than to slight a woman like her.38 her.38
I have neglected, so far, far, to discuss one passage
passage in the the play that
that
casts a different
different light
light on women's anger. In order to allay Jason's
suspicions concerning her plans for revenge, Medea asks him him to
forgive her former anger, out out of respect
respect for the
the love theythey had for
each other (869-71
(869-71).). Jason magnanimously consents, letting slip
the patronizing platitude that that it is natural for females to work up
anger (eikos thelu poieisthai genos, 909; the
(eikos gar orgas the1u following
the following
two lines, which
which are suspect, indicate that that this is particularly so
when
when their
their husbands
husbands decide to marry another woman). How does
another woman).
this disposition to anger on women's part square with with their osten
their osten-
sible lack
lack of power relative
relative to men?
Aristotle holds thatthat the emotions,
emotions, including anger, are natural
and necessary;
necessary; a person who fails to respond angrily to a slight is
not so much tolerant as stupid and servile (Nicomachean (Nicomachean Ethics
11126a4-8).
126a4-8 ). But too quick a temper is as much a fault fault as no temper
at all, and Aristotle
Aristotle takes irascibility to be a sign of moral inconti inconti-
nence and vacillation (NE 11103bl9). 1 03b19). The inability
inability to govern one's
passions bespeaks softness and a lack of self-control,
self-control, and this, in
popular ethics as well as in Aristotle, was imagined to be charac- charac
teristic
teristic of women (cf. (d. NE 11145bl2-14,
1 45b12-14, 11150bl4-16
1 50b 1 4- 1 6;; Plutarch On
Controlling Anger 8, 8, 45 7A-B, on women's
457A-B, women's greater disposition
disposition to
anger as a consequence of their their weaker natures; Harris 200 1 : 264-
2001: 264-
74). Thus, while some people, Aristotle Aristotle says, approve of a fierce
temper as a masculine trait and a qualification for ruling others
NE 11226bl-2),
((NE 226bl-2), it may also be seen as an unstable and effeminate effeminate
quality, as the term malakos or 'soft,' which Aristotle employs
suggests.39
here, suggests.39
contradictions are inherent in any world view that as-
Such contradictions as
cribes essential psychological differences
differences to human beings on the the
basis of gender, race, or other other traits. If women display anger
despite their
their powerlessness, it must reflectreflect an infantile inability
to control themselves, which proves that they are unfit unfit to rule and
so justifies their socially
socially subordinate position.40o The irony is that
subordinate position.4
Anger / 59
Jason is wrong, and he will pay dearly for his mistake. For Medea
is able to avenge the slight, as her anger testifies, whichwhich is grounded
not in petty jealousy but but in a proud sense of honour.
In Sophocles' Women
Women of of Trachis, Hercules, enamoured
enamoured of the the
princess Iole,
lole, destroys her city, takestakes the girl captive,
captive, and brings
her home to Trachis, where he intends to instal instal her in his house
alongside his legitimate
legitimate wife Dejanira.
Dejanira. At first, Dejanira is de- de
ceived about
about her husband's purpose by a herald herald who seeks to
soften
soften the news, and she is moved to pity the proud young captive
who has been sent on ahead. However, she soon learns the truth,
and in despair at losing Hercules'
Hercules' love sends him a tunic tunic dipped in
what she believes is a love potion, but but in reality is a fatal poison
that
that causes the death of the hero. Dejanira Dejanira first
first recognizes thethe
possibility of her
her error when she observes the the corrosive effect of
effect of
the toxin on a piece of cotton, once it is exposed to sunlight, sunlight, and
she is understandably
understandably distraught.
distraught. The chorus submit that ''anger anger is
gentle toward those who slip up involuntarily,' but Dejanira re
Dejanira re-
plies: 'One cannot
cannot say so who is party to the the evil, only if nothing
weighs on you at home' ((727-30).
72 7-30). At this point, enter
enter Hyllus,
Hyllus, the
son of Hercules and Dejanira,
Dejanira, furious
furious at his mother. Only later,
after
after Dejanira has slain herself, does Hyllus learn that that her act was
unintentional,
unintentional, and that that he drove her to suicide 'on account of his
anger' (kat'orgen, 932-5).).4411
(kat'orgen, 932-5
It is understandable that Dejanira fears Hercules' anger, given
what she has done ((at at 11036,
036, Hercules says she rendered him
furious [ekholosen] with
furious [ekho16sen] with pain). But why is she at no point angry at
him for bringing another
another woman into her home? Her situation is
not
not so different
different from
from Medea's. Both women were won won in combat,
after
after a fashion; both were brought to live in a foreign foreign city; both
discover that their
their husband
husband has preferred
preferred another
another woman
woman (and(and a
younger one). Indeed, both respond by sending a poisoned gar-
one). Indeed, gar
ment, which in the one case destroys the rival princess and her
father, in the
the other the offending
offending spouse. To be sure, the the deed was
involuntary on Dejanira's part, whereas it was deliberate on
Medea's.42 But why
Medea's.42 why was it involuntary for Dejanira?
One can, of course, reply that that that
that is how the
the stories go.
go. Euripides
Euripides
portrays a proud woman's vengeance, Sophocles a timid but des
but des-
perate wife who accidentally
accidentally destroys the man whose love she
the Ancient
sought to rekindle. From the the beginning of the the play, Dejanira is
represented
represented as good but but naive. She is carried off by Hercules
Hercules after
he defeats the
the river god Achelous in a wrestling match, and from
that time on she has worried loyally during his long absences,
although
although she feels, she says, like a remote
remote pasture that the farmer
has ploughed but once (27-33 (27-33).) . Unlike Medea, Dejanira never
speaks of dishonour. She knows that Hercules has had adulterous
affairs
affairs (459-62), butbut she accepts it passively: 'It is not decent
43
[kalon] for a sensible woman to be angry/ she affirms
[kalon] affirms (552-3
(5S2-3).) .43
Or, with Aristotle: 'No one gets angry at someone someone when it is
impossible to achieve revenge, and with those who are far supe supe-
rior in power than themselves people get angry either either not at all or
less so.' With
With Hercules
Hercules all-powerful and Dejanira all too vulner vulner-
able, he is not
not of the class of people who are 'not fit to slight' her.
It is true that the personalities
personalities of Euripides' and Sophocles'
heroines are different; so too are their their resources. I am suggesting
that these two circumstances are not wholly independent. The
capacity for anger depends on status, and where where power is unevenly
unevenly
distributed between men and women, anger will be similarly
asymmetrical. Medea is the exception, a proud princess and a
sorceress,
sorceress, and for just this reason her anger is represented represented as
monstrous. By By deliberately murdering her her own children, she ex- ex
hibits the danger of feminine anger.anger. The initial conditions, so to
speak, of the two tragedies determine whether and by whom
anger can be expressed and acted on. Aristotle's analysis enables
works.44
us to see how it works.44
If the
If the wife
wife of Hercules is notnot in a position
position to feel anger at the the
behaviour of her her husband, what will have been the the reaction of of
people who have been conquered in war and are consequently consequently
without
without hope of resisting or avenging the the actions of the the victors?
Euripides composed several tragedies concerning the the plight
plight of of
women in the the aftermath of the
the Trojan War,War, when the the men
men of the
the
city had been massacred and the women and children were on the
point of being distributed
distributed as slaves among among the the Greek
Greek leaders.
Below, I examine Greek attitudes towards the mass annihilation annihilation
of defeated
defeated populations, and the emotions that drove or permitted
such brutality on the the part of the
the conquerors (cf. (d. also chapter
chapter 9, pp.
1194-8).
94-8 ). Here, however, I should like to focus on the the anger, or
Anger / 61
61
absence of anger, on the the part of the

the vanquished, in the the light of
light of
Aristotle's understanding
understanding of the close connection betweenbetween anger
and the power to exact revenge.
Euripides' Hecuba is a study in the the suffering
suffering of a queen reduced
to servitude. The embers of what was Troy are still smouldering,
her husband has been slain, and she awaits news of who her new
master will be. In the
the course of the play, she becomes aware of two
further
further losses that augment her anguish. First, the Greek army
decides to sacrifice her young daughter Polyxena to the ghost of of
Achilles; and later she learns that the body of her son Polydorus,
Polydorus,
whose safety she had entrusted to an allied king, has washed up
on shore, the boy having been treacherously murdered by the very
man who was supposed to protect him in the event event of Troy's
Troy's
capture. Hecuba responds differently, however, to each of the the
disasters. She argues vigorously
vigorously against the
the slaughter of Polyxena
when Odysseus
Odysseus declares the will of the Greeks, but in the end
resigns herself, as she must, to the event; her submission
submission is in part
eased because Polyxena herself, with regal pride, accepts her
death as preferable to a life of slavery. When Polymestor, the the
Thracian king who slew her son, comes to Troy togethertogether withwith his
young sons, Hecuba
Hecuba succeeds, with the help of the other other Trojan
women, in avenging the crime by killing the childrenchildren and blind-
blind
ing the unsuspecting father, who was unaware that his perfidy perfidy had
come to light. What is more, she defends her action action before
Agamemnon, the leader of the Greek host, and gains his verdict in
her favour ((1243-51).
1 243-5 1 ). In what respects do Hecuba's sentiments
sentiments
differ
differ in regard to the two bereavements?
bereavements?
One line of interpretation
interpretation of the
the tragedy has been to see Hecuba
as the
the victim
victim of a cumulative
cumulative sequence of ordeals that that ultimately
ultimately
reduce her to near-savage
near-savage viciousness, symbolized by the proph- proph
ecy uttered by the blind Polymestor of her metamorphosis into a
howling dog ((1270-3;
howling 1 270-3; cf.
d. Nussbaum
Nussbaum 11986:
986: 397-42 1 ). Thus, Will-
397-421). Will
iam Arrowsmith, in the introduction
introduction to his widely read transla-
transla
tion of the
the play ((1958:
1958: 3-4), writes:
[T)he
[T]he figure of the suffering
suffering Hecuba
Hecuba loosely
loosely presides, giving at least
least the
the
45
feel of unity to the
the various
various episodes
episodes as they occur.4S
occur. Carefully, ifif not
not
elaborately, her progress, from
from grief
grief to despair, toward the final atrocity
atrocity is
traced under the rhythm of the descending blows, each one heavier than
the last; but the emphasis is not
not so much on the psychology
psychology of the change
within Hecuba as the way in which, confronted by her tormentors,
tormentors, she is
forced to yield, one by one, her values, her self-respect, and the faith
which makes her human.
Alternatively, the cruelty of Hecuba's retaliation

retaliation against Poly
Poly-
mestor
mestor has been understood
understood to be motivated
motivated in part by her re-re
pressed hostility
hostility towards the Greeks: she takes it out on the
Thracian king because he is the only available target, but the
intensity of her vengeance
vengeance is redouhled
redoubled by her displaced
displaced rage against
against
Odysseus and the rest for the murder of Polyxena.
Polyxena. But while thethe
deaths of Polyxena andand of Polydorus are both sources of agony for
Hecuba, they are not equivalent in their moral significance, and
might thus be expected to elicit different
different emotional responses on
the Greeks', or at all events
events Aristotle's,
Aristotle's, view of the passions.
passions.
In reply to Hecuba's desperate plea for her daughter's life, in
which she proposes,
proposes, among other things, that that if a woman must
be sacrified, then Helen wouldwould be a more appropriate
appropriate victim
than Polyxena, Odysseus cautions her not to let passion ((to to
thumoumenon] mislead
thumoumenon) mislead her into considering him an enemy (299- (299-
300). Hecuba appeals to Odysseus's pity, and reminds him him of his
debt to her for having concealed his identity when he was spying
inside Troy, thereby
thereby saving his life. Against this, Odysseus ad
Odysseus ad-
vances pragmatic reasons of state for honouring military heroes; heroes,-
besides, speaking ghosts have intrinsic
intrinsic authority (no
(no one in the
play doubts that Achilles really appeared from
from the grave). Polyxena,
Polyxena,
in turn, beseeches Odysseus to be considerate of a mother's pas
mother's pas-
sionate feelings ((thumoomai),
thumoomai), while to her mother
mother she pleads, 'Do
not, poor woman, fight against those in power' (402-4). Polyxena
recognizes that Hecuba is in no position to rage against the
victorious Greek army, do what they will (thumos and its cog- cog
nates in this period sometimes approximate the idea of anger). She
is free only to lament, not to seek reprisal, and avenging Polyxena's
death does not cross Hecuba's
Hecuba's mind in the play.
The case is entirely different
different with
with respect to Polymestor. Hecuba
is intent on avenging
avenging the deaths of her children
children (she
(she uses the
plural, 749-50); she would, she says, gladly remain a slave her
Anger / 63
whole life for the the sake of vengeance ((756-7;

756-7; d. 882). In appealing
cf. 882).
to Agamemnon to be partner to the retaliation retaliation ((789-90,
789-90, 842-3),
Hecuba
Hecuba insists on the wrong that PolymestorPolymestor has done her, violatviolat-
ing thethe laws of guest friendship
friendship that are sustained
sustained by the
the gods: 'We
ourselves are slaves, and weak no doubt; but but the
the gods are strong as
is the law that governs them' (798-800). ( 798-800). Though
Though Agamemnon
hesitates to take action against an ally of the Greeks, he neverthe
hesitates neverthe-
less agrees that that Polymestor deserves punishment
punishment (852-3
(852-3).). What is
more, Hecuba and the other women are capable of exacting it on
their own, if only Agamemnon
Agamemnon will give them passive cover ((870- 8 70-
55);); with superior numbers and cunning they can defeat defeat a manman
(884), says Hecuba (she
(884L (she adduces in evidence the the stories of the the
Danaids and the Lemnian women). women). Later, she gloats over having
made Polymestor pay the penalty (diken (diken de moi dedoke,
ded6ke, 11052-3),
052-3L
as he emerges raging (thumoomai)
(thumoomai) from from the tent where she and
the other women took out his eyes and killed his sons. When
Agamemnon sees what has happened to him, he declares: 'Miser 'Miser-
able Polymestor, who has destroyed you, who has blinded your
eyes and bloodied the pupils, and slain slain these your sons? Whoever
it was bore a fierce anger [kholos]
[kholos] toward you and your children'
1 1 1 6-1 9), thus acknowledging the close connection
((1116-19), connection beween anan
ger and revenge.
revenge. Towards thethe end of the
the tragedy,
tragedy, when Polymestor
groans aloud at the the loss of his children and his eyes, Hecuba
exclaims: 'You are in pain? What then, do you think I felt felt no pain
for
for my my son?' 'You rejoice in your arrogant abuse [hubris] [hubris] of me,
you criminal/ Polymestor shoots back, to which which Hecuba replies:
'And should I not rejoice at avenging myself myself on you?'
you? ' (1255-8).
( 1255-8).
Getting even, as Aristotle says, is not not arrogance butbut requital.
The Greeks have harmed Hecuba, but but they have not wronged or
slighted
slighted her. They
They treat
treat her harshly, butbut she is a slave, no longer a
queen. The Greeks owe nothing to Hecuba: they they have conquered
her city, and their power over her is complete. She thus has no
motive for anger - - slaves, as Aristotle says, must
must rather take care
to appease theirtheir masters -- nor is she in a position
position even to imagine
exacting vengeance. If, If, as Aristotle stipulates, anger is just a
desire for revenge, and one only desires what is possible, then then on
these grounds too Hecuba cannot be angry. As both Odysseus Odysseus and
Polyxena herself remind the miserable queen, there is no place for
Ancient Greeks
passionate fury. This is not subversive irony on Euripides' part, as

most commentators on the play have supposed (e.g., Mossman
11995:
995 : 56):
56): Odysseus's
Odysseus's counsel
counsel is grim butbut practical (cf. Konstan
practical (d.
11997a).
99 7a).
The situation
situation is entirely different with
entirely different with the murder of Polydorus.
Polymestor was a friend friend and ally of thethe Trojan royal family, and
has betrayed their trust. Hecuba is justifiably outraged, outraged, as
Agamemnon
Agamemnon acknowledges; what what is more, she finds finds herself
herself in a
position to retaliate, despite the fact that she is a woman and a
slave. All the conditions for anger are thus realized. realized. As for the the
awful
awful act of slaying
slaying Polymestor's
Polymestor's children
children while leaving him
sightless but alive to experience his anguish, this is just what
Aristotle affirms
affirms to be the the objective of anger, as distinct
distinct from
enmity: revenge for an insult, as opposed to harm as such, de- de
mands that the offender
offender suffer
suffer in return the pain that he or she has
inflicted. The same intention was evident evident in Medea's vengeance
vengeance
upon Jason.
In her study of Hecuba as a revenge tragedy, tragedy, Judith Mossman
((1995:
1995: 207)
207) argues that 'the Polyxena-action
Polyxena-action must must be seenseen as
subordinate to, but contributing to the effect effect of,
of, the revenge plot,'
plot/
although the symmetry of the two episodes 'encourages us to
contrast Hecuba's reaction to Polyxena's death with with her response
to her discovery of Po1ydorus.
Polydorus.'' The contrast, I would add, is the the
clearer if we consider Hecuba's sentiments and behaviour behaviour from
from a
Greek perspective on the emotions, using Aristotle as our guide:
anger consists in a realizable desire for revenge; the the unique
unique stimu
stimu-
lus to anger is a slight
slight on the part of those not not fit to slight
slight one or
one's own. The first first movement of the the play is a study in loss and
grief; here, the response
response of Hecuba
Hecuba and the other
other Trojan women
women is
lamentation. The second movement, however, centres on anger
and retaliation. Of course, Euripides'
Euripides' portrait of Hecuba's emoemo
tional state is far richer
richer and more nuanced
nuanced than
than the schematic
difference
difference I have outlined (this is my sop to critics who abhor
reductionism). But as with with the Iliad, so too with
with Euripides' Hecuba,
a sensitivity to the specific character of anger in Greek culture culture
helps us to discriminate motives that are less transparently dis- dis
tinct to us than to them. Hecuba is not just subjected to a series of
series of
'descending blows, each one heavier than the last'; rather, she
Anger / 65
suffers
suffers helplessly
helplessly in the
the first
first major
major movement of thethe play, and
successfully
successfully avenges the acknowledged
acknowledged wrong she has endured
endured in
the
the second. Two situations, two two responses: part of the
the power of of
Euripides' tragedy is that
that each movement
movement is brilliantly
brilliantly articulated
according to its own moral and emotional logic.
Having relied implicitly
implicitly so far on Aristotle's analysis of anger,
or rather orge, as a guide to the sense of the concept in classical
classical
Greek generally, I must
must now enter a caveat: important as Aristotle's
Aristotle's
discussion
discussion in the Rhetoric is for an understanding of ancient
the Rhetoric
anger, there is nevertheless
nevertheless reason to believe that
that his specification
of
of a slight
slight as the
the only cause of anger is too narrow, and fails to
cover the range of stimuli recognized in contemporary litera litera-
ture.46 For example, William Fortenbaugh observes (2002: 1117)
ture.46 1 7)
that f[fJrom
'[f]rom Stobaeus and Seneca, we learn that that Theophrastus
Theophrastus
conceived of anger as a desire for revenge on account of injus injus-
,
tice/47
tice. 47 Theophrastus
Theophrastus was Aristotle's successor as head of the the
Lyceum, and he might might have wished
wished to correct Aristotle's
Aristotle's account
by enlarging the scope of the emotion. The passages themselves,
themselves,
however,
however, do not not indicate a sharp difference
difference of view.
view. The citation
preserved by Stobaeus (a (a late Greek excerptor) runs:
Wise people ought to do nothing in anger [orgel

[orge].. For temper [thumos]
[thumos] is
irrational, and never acts with
with forethought, but rather, intoxicated by
contentiousness,
contentiousness, acts randomly and on impulse.
impulse. Therefore you must not
take revenge at once on mistakes [hamartemata], whether of slaves or
others, so that
that you may always do what looks best to reason and not what
is dear to temper. Thus
Thus you will not cause grief
grief to yourself
yourself in harming
others. For to avenge onself
onself by harming oneself
oneself is to pay a penalty as
much
much as to exact one. Therefore one must seek to defend defend oneself
oneself at
leisure rather than chastise one's enemy swiftly
swiftly but
but without
without profit
profit to
oneself.
Theophrastus's
Theophrastus's main main object here is to discourage taking action in
a fit of passion d. On the Senses 45, where Theophrastus com
passion ((cf. com-
pares an angry person's judgment to that that of a child); there
there is no
reason to think
think that
that Aristotle would disagree.
Seneca, as a Stoic, takes a hard line against anger ((On On Anger
Angei
11.12.2-5):
. 1 2.2-5):
66 / The
The Emotions of the
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
A good man will carry out his duties clearheaded and unafraid unafraid ....
. . My
father
father will be killed? shall defend him;;
killed? I shall defend him he has been killed?
killed? I shall carry
48
out [my duties]
duties]48 because I ought
ought to, not
not because I am grieving. 'Good
men
men are angry for injuries done to their
their dear ones [irascuntur bani
boni uiri pro
suarum iniuriis}.' When you say this, Theophrastus,
suorum iniuriis].' Theophrastus, you look to cast
scorn on more powerful principles
principles and turn
turn away from
from the judge in order
to play to the
the crowd. Since everyone
everyone gets angry
angry when a misfortune of this
kind
kind befalls their
their own, you imagine
imagine that
that people will judge that what they
that what
should be done, since all people pretty much
do should much judge an emotion
emotion they
recognize to be justified.
justified. But they act thethe same if hothot water is not
adequately supplied, if a glass is broken, if their
their shoe is splashed with
mud. It is not filial piety but weakness
weakness that inspires
inspires such
such anger, just like
children
children who weep equally whether
whether they lose their parents or their
their parents their toys.
To be angry in behalf of dear ones is the the mark not
not of a dutiful soul but
but a
weak one.
Theophrastus's 'injuries' do not not seem to be confined

confined to slights, but
to include encroaching on the kind of acts
include harm generally, thus encroaching
that, for Aristotle, generate
generate hatred or hostility
hostility rather than anger.
But Theophrastus was undoubtedly
undoubtedly thinking of undeserved ofof
fences, which
which is what the Latin word iniuria normally normally connotes.
A little further
further on, Seneca reports (3. 1 4. 1 ): IIIIt
(3.14.1): '"It cannot happen,"
happen/'
Theophrastus says, ""that that a good man does not not grow angry at evils
[or at evil men: malisJ."'
malis].'"
The Stoic Chrysippus, however,
however, explicitly described orge as 'the
desire to take vengeance against one who is believed to have
49
committed
committed a wrong contrary to one's deserts.'deserts.'49 As Harris (2001:
(200 1 :
II '5
1 ) observes,
661) observes, i"Injustice"
"'Injustice" has replaced "slight."' 0 And yet, Aristotle
replaced "slight. 50
himself had already

himself already asserted that I'anger
anger resides in a perceived
perceived
injustice [adikia]' (Nicomachean Ethics 5.8, 1135b25-9;
[adikia]' (Nicomachean 1 135b25-9j cf.
d. n. 18
18
above).
Anger at injustice is, moroever,
moroever, a fundamental
fundamental theme in the
speeches of Athenian
Athenian pleaders in the fifth and fourth centuries
the fifth centuries
Be. Jurors and citizens are again and again invited to feel anger for
BC.
a wrong committed against another party, party, irrespective of direct
harm or insult to themselves.
themselves. In an oration by Lysias, for example,
the plaintiff
plaintiff admonishes the jurors ((15.9):
1 5.9):
Anger / 67
And if any one of you, gentlemen of the

the jury, thinks that the penalty is
the penalty
great and the law too harsh, you must recall
recall that you have not come here
as lawmakers
lawmakers on these matters,
matters, but rather
rather to vote according
according to the
established
established laws, nor to pity those
those who do wrong, but rather to be angry
with them and to come to the aid of the entire city.
51
The opposition between pity and anger here is revealing.5 revealing. 1 Else
Else-
where, Lysias
Lysias puts into the the mouth
mouth of a defendant 1 l .28) II
defendant (1.28) 'I believe
you know that those who do not act justly do not acknowledge
that their enemies
enemies are telling the truth, but rather, by lying and
scheming in this way, they instil in the wrongdoers anger against
those who do act justly' Id. (cf. 221.21,
l .2 1, 32. 1 9 ) . Clearly, anger is rightly
32.19).
directed against genuine malefactors.
malefactors. Another speaker in Lysias
(6. 1 7) affirms: 'This
(6.17) This man has been far more impious than Diagoras
the Mehan
Melian [famous for his atheism]. For Diagoras was impious impious in
words concerning other people's rites and festivals, festivals, while this
man was so in deeds and concerning matters in his own city. It is
right then, Athenians, to be more angry at citizens who do wrong
than at foreigners in these things.' things/ The historian historian Thucydides
sums it up ((1.77.4):
l . 77.4): 'It seems that men are more angry when they
are wronged than when they suffer suffer violence' (d. (cf. 5.46.5).
Demosthenes
Demosthenes fulminates
fulminates against a law that will result in the
jurors seeming to 'take their their oath, impose penalties, pronounce
their
their verdicts, grow angry, and do all that they they do in vain' (24.90).
Demosthenes comments specifically on the the usefulness of civic
anger against the unjust, since people are then likely to be more
careful
careful about unlawful behaviour (24. 1 43). Indeed, the
(24.143). the term orge
may be used in a way that is virtually equivalent to a negative
verdict or condemnation, as when Demosthenes Demosthenes says that the
laws authorize the jury to utilize anger that that is proportionate to the
offence
offence (24. 1 1 8; cf. 24.21
(24.118; 24.218, 25.6).52 As Danielle Allen
8, 25.6).52 Allen ((1999:
1 999: 194)
1 94)
observes: 'TheThe Athenians had no doubts about why they pun- pun
ished: it was simply because someone was angry angry at a wrong and
53
wanted to have that that anger dealt with.J53
with.'
Litigants were wary, of course, of seeming to disdain members
of a democratic jury, who who were generally of humble humble station.
Socrates, in Plato's Apology (35B-Cl, professes to fear that his
Apology (35B-C),
Ancient Greeks
failure
failure to appeal to the the jury's pity may be taken as a sign of of
arrogance, with the result result that the jurors will condemn condemn him in
anger (met' orges}.. In Aristophanes' Wasps
(met' orges) Wasps (243, 404, 424, 646,
72
727, 083), the
7, 11083), the jurors are fiercely
fiercely proud of their disposition to
anger; since
since they
they belong to the poorest
poorest class of citizens,
citizens, we may
suppose thatthat they are at least in part motivated by a sensitivitysensitivity to
slights. Aristophanes himself boasts ((1030) 1 030) of having an anger like
that of Hercules, thanks to which he has stood up squarely to
opponents like Cleon (MacDowell
(MacDowell glosses orge here as spirit or
courage; cf.
courage,- ef. Peace 752, Lysistrata 550 and 1 1 13). But anger against
and 1113). against
malefactors was not restricted to reactions to personal affronts, affronts,
unless we we maintain
maintain -- with a certain plausibility -- that any any offence
offence
against the law was ipso facto regarded as a disparagement
against disparagement of the the
demos or civic body.
demos
Anger may also be a response simply to personal harm. Thus,
Demosthenes (8.57) speaks to the Athenians of 'the anger that it
was natural that you feel if you were hurt hurt in the war' ((cf.
ef. 116.19,
6. 1 9,
119.302). Thucydides represents
9 .302). Thucydides represents the Spartan Archidamus as cau- cau
tioning that 'orge besets all those who perceive with their own
eyes and right before them that they are enduring something
unpleasant
unpleasant [aethes]' 2. 1 1 .6). One might
[aethes]' ((2.11.6). might suppose that that Achilles'
response to the the slaying of Patroclus was this sort of anger, but but in
the orators, at all events, there is always the implication implication that the
source of anger is unfairunfair mischief, and not not damage as such, and
this seems the prevailing conception.
If indeed orge was frequently a response not not just to a slight butbut
to an unjust
unjust act, why did Aristotle fail to mention mention this in his
analysis of anger in the Rhetoric (we (we have seen that he acknowl-
acknowl
edges it in the Nicomachean Ethics)? Ethics}'? The reason, I believe, is that
he appropriated this dimension of orge for another emotion, which
he elevated to the status of a primary pathos. I am referring referring to the
the
term nemesan,
nemesan, or 'be indignant.
indignant.'' I discuss why Aristotle intro- intro
duced this concept among his basic emotions, and allowed it to
encroach in this fashion on the territory of anger, in the chapter
encroach
devoted to indignation
indignation and envy. Here, it may suffice suffice to note that
anger at unjust behaviour and anger at a slight both look to
maintaining a proper relationship
relationship among the members members of the city-
city
state society. Both involve moral judgments, judgments, as opposed
opposed to reac-
Anger
Anger / 69
tions to impersonal events. You You can no more grow angry at an

object for violating the the law than you can for its having deliber- deliber
ately insulted
insulted you.
Anger was perceived to have a negative side. It is an impatient impatient
emotion, and leads to precipitous action. Demosthenes Demosthenes comments:
comments:
'It is the
the part of angry people to do some harm swiftly to the one
who has hurt them, but of those who have been wronged to
avenge themselves when when they have the wrong-doer wrong-doer in custody'
(24. 1 75). Appealing to the courts rather than relying on individual
(24.175).
vengeance is a sign that one is able to control one's anger and
respond not just to the personal affront affront but
but to the offence
offence against
the law. This is not to say that the desire for vengeance is aban- aban
doned; rather, it is pursued by different different means. Anger might might also
distort deliberation, whetherwhether in the courtroom or the assembly.
Antiphon, in his speech on the murder of Herodes (72), ( 72), writes:
'There
There is no one who judges well when angry. angry. For
For it corrupts that
very thing by whichwhich one deliberates, that is, a person's judgment
[gnome]. It is a large task, gentlemen,
gentlemen, as days go by to free one's
judgment fromfrom anger and find find the truth
truth of what happened.' Aristotle
himself worried about this problem in the opening chapter of the
Rhetoric, where he remarked that 'one ought not to warp a juror
54
by leading him him to anger or envy or pity' ((1354a24-5).1354a24-5) .54 It was a
view the Stoics would develop develop with with characteristic rigour and
consistency, as part of their attack on the passions generally.
Thus, the the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus ((third third century Be) af
BC) af-
firmed that 'anger is blind; it often prevents our seeing things that
are obvious and it often often gets in the way of things which which are
<already> being comprehended
comprehended... . . . For the passions, once they have
started, drive out reasoning and contrary evidence, evidence, and push forfor
ward violently towards actions contrary to reason' ((Plutarch Plutarch On
Moral Virtue 110,
Moral 0, 450C = SSVF
= VF 33.390;
.390; quoted in in Harris 200
2001: 1 : 370).
3 70).
The volatile
volatile nature of anger made it particularly
particularly problematic in
war. Thucydides (2. 1 1 .4) cites the warning of Archidamus, the
(2.11.4) the
Spartan king, that ''events
events in wars are unpredictable: many things
result from
from a small cause and undertakings are based on anger.' He
explains (2. 1 1 .6-8 ) that when the Athenians see the Spartans
(2.11.6-8)
ravaging
ravaging their land, they will be overcome by anger, 'and will
employ reason minimally
minimally and passion (thumos) (thumos) maximally,
maximally/' and
Ancient Greeks
so will fail to fight

fight effectively.
effectively. So So too Diodotus observes
observes in his
speech
speech opposing the slaughter
slaughter of the the Mytilenaeans (3.42.1):
(3.42. 1 ): 'I
believe that two things are most opposed opposed to good counsel, haste
and anger, of which
which the one tends to be accompanied by thoughtthought
lessness, the other by amateurishness and snap judgment.'55 judgment.'55
Xenophon, in his continuation
continuation of Thucydides' history called the the
Hellenica ((5.3.5-6),
5.3.5-6) describes
describes a scene in which which a general leads his
'
troops against a city in a fit of rage (orgistheis),
(orgistheis), with thethe result that
he himself is slain and his men massacred. Xenophon draws the
lesson (5.3.7) that masters ought not even to punish slaves in
anger, and that by doing so they frequently suffer suffer more harm than
they inflict; indeed, 'to attack opponents in anger and without without
intelligence [gnome] is a complete mistake, for anger is without
intelligence [gnome]
forethought, but intelligence
intelligence looks as much to avoiding harm to
oneself as to doing harm to one's enemies.
oneself enemies.''
Aristotle does not dwell, in the Rhetoric,
Rhetoric, oon n the adverse conse-
conse
quences
quences of acting under the the influence of anger, although
although he was
well aware of them. When he comes to examine the virtues in the the
Nicomachean Ethics (2.8, (2.8, 11117a5-15),
1 1 7a5-1 5 ) he observes that 'when
'
human beings are angry, they feel pain, and when they avenge
themselves, they feel pleasure; those who fight for such reasons
are warlike, yes, but
but they are notnot courageous:
courageous: for they do so not not for
the sake of what is good or in the manner dictated by reason
[pathos] .'S 6 So too, he includes
56
[logos], but
but rather
rather out
out of emotion [pathos].' includes
anger among the forms of wickedness (mokhtheriai),(mokhtheriai), along with with
self-indulgence (akolasia
(akolasia)) and cowardice, that are responsible for
(adikemata) - in the case of anger,
unjust actions (adikemata) - anger, for example,
striking another person.
person. I imagine that Aristotle is thinking thinking here
rather of a disposition to excessive anger (what he calls orgilotes, orgilotes,
or irascibility, 4.5,
4.5, 11125b29),
1 25b29), but it is revealing that that the bare term
57
orge can carry such a negative connotation.
connotation.57
There is one military context in which anger is invoked as a
legitimate
legitimate motive, and that that is in the treatment of the inhabitants
inhabitants
of
of conquered cities. It is a commonplace that, in ancient Greece,
those who were vanquished in war were wholly at the mercy of of
the victors, and that there were no constraints, apart from from sponta
sponta-
neous pity or calculated self-interest,
self-interest, that prevented the conquer-
conquer
ors from annihilating or enslaving the entire population. 58
from annihilating 58 While
Anger / 71
71
this was by no means always the price of defeat, it was common common
enough thatthat it stood as a real possibility in the minds of the war- war
ring parties. The Athenians
Athenians voted angrily angrily (hupo
(hupo orges, Thucydides
33.36.2)
.36.2) for the
the extermination
extermination of the the men
men and enslavement of the the
women and children of My til ene, an allied city during the
Mytilene,
Peloponnesian War, after after putting down a revolt there, and changed
their minds just in time to prevent the massacre ((only only a thousand
ringleaders were put put to death: Thucydides
Thucydides 3.36-49; for the Athe- Athe
nians' angry reaction to defiancedefiance on the the part of a weaker foe, d.
foe, cf.
4. 1 23 .2-3). The Thebans
4.123.2-3). Thebans and Corinthians urged a similar reprisal
against Athens itself afterafter its defeat in the war, and the city was
only spared thanks to the the opposition of the the Spartans (Xenophon
(Xenophon
Hellenica 2.2.
Hellenica 1 9-20). Isocrates,
2.2.19-20). Isocrates, in his Panegyric
Panegyric to Athens ((181),1 8 1 ),
observes of the the Trojan War that 'because of the the seizure of one
woman, all Greeks grew so enraged enraged on behalf
behalf of those who were
wronged [i.e., Menelaus and Agamemnon] Agamemnon] that they did not cease
from
from making war until they had utterly laid waste the city of the
man who had dared to offend offend against them.'
Polybius, writing in the second century century BC,
BC, describes how
Antigonus Doson of Macedon destroyed the the city of Mantinea and
sold the population into slavery. slavery. He explains that when the
Mantineans went over to the Spartans, Spartans, they slit the throats of the
Achaeans in their midst, in violation, Polybius says, of the laws
common to mankind. They thus deserved deserved any amount of anger
(2.58.8), and indeed there was no way they could have paid a
sufficient
sufficient penalty. Towards the the end of the Second Punic War (201 (201
BC),
BC), when Scipio
Scipio had already crossed into Africa Africa and Carthage had
sued for peace, a Roman supply convoy was driven ashore by a
storm and impounded by the Carthaginians. Scipio was infuri infuri-
ated, Polybius relates ((15.1.2),
1 5 . 1 .2), by this treacherous
treacherous behaviour even
more than by the material loss, and sent envoys to demand the
restitution of thethe ships and their cargo. cargo. The Carthaginians dis- dis
missed the envoys, and subsequently ambushed their their ship as it
approached the Roman Roman camp.camp. In response to this double breach of of
faith, Scipio decided no longer to take under his protection protection even
cities that voluntarily surrendered,
surrendered, but rather enslaved their popu- popu
lations, thereby manifesting
manifesting the anger (orge) (orge) he bore towards
towards the
enemy as a result of the the Carthaginians' perfidy perfidy ((15.4.2).
15 .4.2).
the Ancient
Treachery on thethe part of an enemy can be interpreted as a sign of of

contempt, and hence a motive for Aristotelian anger in the narrow
sense: why else would one flagrantly violate a truce and the
prevailing rules of warfare, unless one thought the enemy too
weak or cowardly to avenge such insolence?
insolence? In any case, anger and
the desire for revenge that is intrinsic to it were deemed to
constitute
constitute an appropriate
appropriate response to a betrayal of trust trust in the
the
59
classical Greek world.59
In the cases mentioned
mentioned above, the decision
decision to eradicate
eradicate a con
con-
quered population does not not derive from
from a judgment
judgment of its indelibly
vicious nature, butbut from
from a particular violation of good faith. The The
Greeks of the classical
classical period were prone to vaunt vaunt their superior
superior-
ity over barbarians,
barbarians, and some thinkers, like Aristotle, held that
non-Greeks were by nature suited to servitude (Politics 1 .2,
(Politics 1.2,
11252a31-4).
252a3 1-4). But while attacks
attacks on foreign cities and villages
villages were
sometimes motivated by a desire to take captives along with other
forms of wealth, thethe Greeks did not not typically seek justification for
such
such violence
violence in the evil character
character of the people: self-interest
self-interest and
the right of the victor sufficed
sufficed for that. When there was some
doubt or debate over whether to annihilate
annihilate a city, however, it was
anger at the
the enemy's guilt
guilt -- not
not the
the demonization
demonization of of the
the 'other' -
that provided
provided the motive, or the excuse, to do so.
A vicious feature of this way way of justifying
justifying mass slaughter is
precisely the connection with with juridical
juridical practice, in which anger
on the part of jurors was understood to be a legitimate
legitimate response to
wrongdoing. As a result,
result, the Greeks were less inclined than than we are
to invoke legal norms as a check on military violence. The speaker
who, according
according to Thucydides, argued for a more lenient lenient policy
towards Mytilene,
Mytilene, by which
which the city would be spared complete complete
annihilation,
annihilation, sought precisely to change the issue from from one of of
justice, by which
which standard the Mytilenaeans might be said to
deserve the harsher
harsher fate, to one of political
political advantage, where he
could maintain
maintain that a milder policy would encourage other rebel- rebel
lious states to surrender rather than fight fight to the bitter end
(Thucydides 3.44.4; cf.d. Aristotle
Aristotle Rhetoric 11.3,.3, 1358b20-9;
1358b20-9; Konstan
200 1 a: 80-3;
2001a: 80-3; and below, chapter 110, 0, p. 205 ). There was thus no
205).
place from
from which to condemn the immorality of extermination as
a violation
violation of
of rights;
rights,- it was in effect
effect simply a large-scale instance
Anger / 73
of capital punishment, likewise motivated by indignation indignation and an

impulse for revenge.
The world implied by Aristotle's account of anger is hierarchi hierarchi-
cal, consisting of people who are superior superior or inferior in regard to
strength, wealth, or status. The point of hubris, hubris, for example, is to
demonstrate one's superiority to another; hence, it is characteris- characteris
tic of the
the rich and also of young people (2.2, (2.2, 13 78b28), who
1378b28), who
presumably
presumably are physically
physically strong and at the same time need to
prove themselves. This is why people who have doubts about
themselves, in regard to looks or occupation occupation or whatever they they
take seriously, are particularly prone to anger, while while those who
are confident that that they excel (huperekhein)
(huperekhein) are not (Rhetoric 2.2,
not (Rhetoric
11379a36-b2).
379a36-b2). People who really do excel, however, whether by
virtue of family, power, wealth, or indeed a particular particular skill
skill such as
oratory (which is joined closely here to the ability to govern),
expect deference (poluoreisthai)
(poluoreisthai) fromfrom their
their lessers (hettones)
(hettones) on
account of their
their superiority (2.2, (2.2, 13 78b34-9a6), and are especially
1378b34-9a6),
likely to become angry if they suffer suffer a slight instead. So So too we
tend to be angry at those those who
who oppose us, if they are our inferiors,
inferiors, or
do not repay us in kind, as though we were their inferiors, and above
all at a slight
slight received from from people of no account (en medeni logoi), logoi),
for, as Aristotle
Aristotle says, 'we have assumed that that anger over a slight
slight is
directed to those who ought not prosekontes[ to do so, and
not [me prosekontes]
inferiors
inferiors ought not not to slight
slight [their betters]' (2.2,
(2.2, 11379M1-13).
3 79b l l-13).
We might
might describe the social situations
situations in which
which anger is trig- trig
gered or allayed in Aristotle'S
Aristotle's account as informed by an acute
sense of honour, with with its intense regard for status, protocols of of
conduct, and the opinion of of others -- Aristotle specifies, for ex- ex
ample, that
that we are more disposed to anger when a slight is
delivered in the presence of those with whom we compete, those
whom
whom we admire or wish to be admired by, or those before whom
we feel shame or who feel shame before us (2.2, (2.2, 11379b24-6).
379b24-6).
Aristotle himself
himself says that that disrespect (atimia)
(atimia) is a part of hubris,
and that to dishonour (atimazon) (atimazon) a person is to slight him, for
what is worthless has no value ((time),
what whether for good or ill (2.2,
time), whether (2.2,
1378b29-31 ). 6600 He cites in illustration
13 78b29-3 1 ). illustration Achilles' resentment against
Achilles' resentment
Agamemnon: 'He dishonoured me,' and 'treated me as a fool in
Agamemnon:
front
front of the
the Achaeans as if I were a vagabond without without honour
74 / The Emotions
Emotions of the
the Ancient Greeks
Greeks
[atimetos]' (Iliad 11.356,

[atimetos]' (Iliad .356, 9.648, etc.). The
The allusion
allusion to Homer sug- sug
gests, I think, that the use of the word time in the context of of
slights and anger may have had a poetic ring, since in prose usage
the term referred primarily
primarily to political rights and offices
offices or to
economic value. But honour captures well the extreme sensitivity sensitivity
that Aristotle reports towards offences
offences against one's dignity and
esteem in the eyes of one's fellow-citizens,
fellow-citizens, provided that we do
not assimilate the idea to the complex of honour and shame that
has become popular in so-called Mediterranean anthropology
so-called Mediterranean anthropology in
the past two or three decades,
decades, with
with its particular emphasis on the
need to control the sexual comportment of the women in one's
family. Athenian literature of the classical period offers offers little
evidence of an obsessive preoccupation with dishonour in this
defilement.61
narrow sense of defilement.61
Although thethe cause of anger is a slight on the the part of someone
who ought not
not to have rendered it, such as an inferior
inferior or a friend
friend or
beneficiary
beneficiary who might be expected to have a thought for one's
dignity, Aristotle recognizes that there are certain states in which
we are more or less disposed to be sensitive to such affronts, affronts,
62
irrespective of their
their source.62
source. When we are enjoying ourselves at a
party or feeling particularly
particularly prosperous, we are not inclined to
anger (2.3,
(2.3, 11380b2-5).
380b2-5 ) . Contrariwise, we are more irritable when
we are suffering
suffering (lupoumenos, 2.2, 1379al
13 79a1 1)
1 ) because of something
something
we want and lack, and are particularly prone to anger towards
those who obstruct the fulfilment
fulfilment of our desire, as when we are
thirsty, sick, poor, in love, and so forth. It may be that our condi condi-
tion of want exposes us the more to insult, just to the extent that
need,63 but it is important
a person fails to respect our need,63 important to distin
distin-
guish between the suffering
suffering that results from
from lack, as in thirst, ill
health, poverty,
poverty, and the like, and the pain that accompanies anger.
Pain of one kind makes us more susceptible, perhaps, to feeling
pain of another, but but the two have different
different causes in this case, and
pain.64
are not the same pain.64
Anger for Aristotle, then, is anything but but a reflex
reflex to pain or
harm, even when the cause is intentional. Aristotle envisages a
world in which self-esteem depends on social interaction: the
self-esteem depends
moment someone's negative opinion of your worth is actualized
publicly
publicly in the form of a slight, you have lost credit, and the only
Anger / 75
recourse is a compensatory act that restores your social position.

Anger is precisely the desire to adjust
adjust the record in this way.
Discussions
Discussions of anger in the the Hellenistic
Hellenistic age and later typically
stress the need
need to control
control or eliminate it.65 it.65 Such advice is usu-
usu
ally addressed to people in power, and is concerned with with 'the
great wrath
wrath of kings nurtured
nurtured by Zeus,
Zeus/' as Aristotle puts it /2.2,(2.2,
11379a4-5),
379a4-S ), citing a verse of Homer's Iliad /2. 1 96). For such a
(2.196).
public of princes and noblemen, it was important important to advise re- re
straint; anger, in particular, could vent itself in destructive rages
resist.66
against people helpless to resist.66
This is not the implied
implied audience of Aristotle's
Aristotle's treatise on rheto-
rheto
ric. Aristotle was writing for potential
potential orators before the the assembly
and above all in the courts,
courts, which were at their most most active
active and
popular in the fourth
fourth century. While defendants
defendants and prosecutors
courts may have come
in the courts come mainly
mainly from
from the wealthier classes,
classes,
the jurors were ordinary citizens,
citizens, and predominantly poor, as
Aristophanes' Wasps
Wasps indicates. These
These were not not people whose
anger reflected
reflected the
the caprices of omnipotence: they they were far more
likely
likely to suffer
suffer an indignity than than inflict one, and it was their
emotions that
that the aspiring orator had to manipulate. They They lived in
a democracy,
democracy, of course, but it was a democracy in which one had
to maintain at every turn one's dignitydignity and status.
status. Equality re
Equality re-
sulted not just from political
political rights but from continual
but from continual and uni-uni
versal vigilance to protect one's reputation and economic posi- posi
tion. Every public interaction
interaction was a scene of potential potential gains,
losses, and settlings of accounts,-
accounts; an insult
insult was a put-down, and
one was obliged to get even. Jon Elster (1999a:
/ 1999a: 75) deftly
deftly character-
character
izes the social world implied by Aristotle's description of the
emotions as 'intensely confrontational,
emotions confrontational, intensely competitive,
competitive,
and intensely
intensely public; in fact, much of it involves confrontations
public. It is a world in which
and competitions before a public. which everybody
knows that
that they are constantly being judged, nobody hides that
they are acting like judges, and nobody hides that they seek to be
judged positively. It is a world with very little hypocrisy, or ""emoemo
,
tional tact."'67
tional tact." 67 In this volatile
volatile environment, in which which equality
was an ideal but
but never a given, and had constantly to be asserted
and
and defended
defended if the
the image of a society of equals or similars
similars was to
be maintained,
maintained, anger was obligatory, 'insofar 'insofar as the individual
individual
citizen
citizen who
who was
was sensitive
sensitive to his honor
to his honor and
and guarded
guarded it
it with
with anger
anger
was
was also
also guarding
guarding his
his personal
personal independence,
independence, greatness,
greatness, and
and equal
equal-
ity'
ity' (D.
(D. Allen 29). 68
Allen 2000: 1129). 68
But
But itit was
was not precisely our
not precisely our anger.
anger. As
As Catherine
Catherine Lutz
Lutz has
has
observed
observed ((1988:
1 988: 8):
8 ):
The process of coming to understand the

The process the emotional lives of people in
different
different cultures can be seen first
first and foremost as a problem of transla-
transla
tion.
tion. What must
must be translated
translated are the meanings
meanings of the emotion words
spoken in everyday conversation, of the the emotionally imbued events of of
everyday life, of tears and other gestures, and of audience reaction to
emotional
emotional performance.
performance. The interpretive
interpretive task, then, is not primarily
primarily to
fathom
fathom somehow
somehow 'what they are feeling'
feeling' inside .,.... but rather to translate
emotional
emotional communications
communications fromfrom one idiom, context, language, or
sociohistorical mode of understanding into another.
The oige of
The orge of the
the Greeks, like anger
Greeks, like anger today,
today, was
was conditioned
conditioned byby the
the
social
social world
world in
in which
which it operated. It
it operated. It is
is the
the task
task of
of the philologist to
the philologist to
help
help reveal
reveal its
its lineaments.
lineaments.
C HAPTER THREE
CHAPTER
Satisfaction
It is revealing that the word for self-esteem

self-esteem in Japanese
Japanese is serufu
serufu
esutiimu. There is no indigenous term that captures the concept of
esutiimu. of
feeling good about oneself.
Nisbett 2003:
2003: 54
The definition of the emotions that Aristotle gives in his Rhetoric

runs, as we have seen, as follows: 'Let the emotions be all those
things on account of which people change and differ differ in regard to
their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure, for
example anger,
anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their their
opposites' (2. 1 , 11378a20-3).
(2.1, 378a20-3) . The opposite of an emotion, it would
appear, is itself an emotion, rather than, say, the absence of that that
1
emotion. l Having begun his analysis of the several emotions in
the Rhetoric with anger or orgelorge, Aristotle in fact proceeds imme
imme-
diately to discuss the pathos that he designates as the opposite of of
anger. Commentators and translators seem agreed in rendering
this passion, which Aristotle calls praotes,
praotes, as 'calmness,' 'calming
down,'
down/ or the equivalent. But in what sense is calmness an emoemo
tion? Has Aristotle
Aristotle been misled
misled into designating
designating calmness
calmness an
emotion by his habit, common to the ancient ancient Greeks generally,
contrasts?2 In this chapter,
of thinking in polar contrasts?2 chapter, after
after reviewing
earlier interpretations, I argue that the relevant emotion is -- or at
least should bebe -- the elation or positive disposition consequent
upon a compliment
compliment or other gesture that results in an enhanced
opinion of a person's worth. Such a belief may be activated when
Ancient Greeks
Greeks
an angry person is appeased, and this is the case with with which
Aristotle is chiefly concerned: hence the association
association with calm
calm-
ing down. But, I suggest, praotes need not be restricted to this this
scenario. In the the discussion, I consider too the
the course of the the place of
of
positive evaluations of worth, or self-esteem,
self-esteem, in classical Greek
thought, and how it might have played a role in the constitution
constitution
of an emotion.
emotion.
Here is how Aristotle introduces the new pathospathos that
that is to be
the
the opposite of orge (I
(I have for the
the moment
moment transliterated, rather
than translated, the Greek word praotes and related forms, since
their
their meaning is precisely what is in question):
question):
Since being angry [to orgizesthaiJ

orgizesthai] iiss the
the opposite of ttoo praiinesthai, and
orge the opposite
opposite of praotes,
praotes, we must now consider
consider in what state people
are praoi,
piaoi, and towards whomwhom they
they are praoi,
piaoi, and by means
means of whatwhat they
become praoi [praiinontai]. Let, then, praiinsis
piaoi [praiinontaiJ. praunsis be a settling down and
quieting of orge.
orge. If,
If, then, people
people are angry
angry at those who slight them, and a
slight
slight is a voluntary
voluntary thing, it is clear that
that people are praoi
piaoi in turn
turn towards
those who do no such thing or do such things involuntarily or who seem
to be such. (2.3,
(2.3, 1380a6-12)
1380a6-12)
What, then, does praos (plural praoi,piaoi, the adjective corresponding

to the abstract noun praotes) mean in this context?
As I have indicated,
indicated, commentators
commentators and translators
translators more or less
universally take the term to mean something like 'calm' or 'tran 'tran-
quil.' Thus,
Thus, W.
W. Rhys Roberts (1984),
( 1984), in the Bollingen translation
translation
of
of the
the complete works of Aristotle, renders the the above
above passage
passage as
follows
follows (the
(the italics
italics in the following
following versions are mine, intended to
highlight the relevant terms)
terms):: 'Since growing calm is the opposite
of growing angry, calmness the
angry, and calmness the opposite of anger, we must
ascertain in what
what frames of mind
mind men are calm, towards whom whom
they feel calm, and by what means they are made so. so. Growing
calm may be defined as a settling
settling down or quieting of anger,'
anger/ and
so on. So
So too, in a recent Portuguese translation
translation by Isis Borges
Borges da
Fonseca (2000), the chapter on praates
praotes is entitled
entitled 'Da Calma,'
Calma/ and
the opening phrases are rendered: 'Como 'Como estar calmo e 0o contrario
estar calma
de estar encalerizado,
encolerizado, e a colera se contrap6e deve-se
contrapoe a calma, deve-se
examinar em que estado de animo as pessoas sao calmas, calmas/' etc.
Satisfaction / 79
Franz Sieveke ((1980: 1 980: 991)

1 ) translates the beginning thus: 'Da nun nun
die Erregung
Erregung des Zornes der Besanftigung
Besdnftigung entgegengesetzt ist und
der Zorn der Sanftmut,
Sanftmut/ ' etc. Antonio Tovar ((1953: 1 953: 1101)
0 1 ) provides as
a title for the section 'De la calma 0o serenidad, serenidad/' and renders the the
opening: 'Puesto que a enojarse es contrario apia carse y la ira es
aplacarse
contraria
contraria de la calma, corresponde tratar tratar en que disposition
disposicion estan
los no airados
air ados y respecto de quienes 10 lo son y por que causa/ causa.'
H,e.
H,C. Lawson-Tancred,
Lawson-Tancred, in the the Penguin translation
translation ((1991:
1 99 1 : 1147),
47), has:
'Now since being angry is the the opposite of being calm, and anger
the opposite of calmness, we must must grasp
grasp in what condition men
are calm/
calm,' etc., and continues a little further: 'Let 'Let calming, then, then,
be a suspension or placationplacation of anger' (emphasis
of anger' (emphasis in in original).
original). To
take one more example from from an older translation, Adolf Adolf Stahr
offers
offers ((1862:
1 862: 125):
125):'Das Ziirnen ist der milden milden Stimmung und und der
Zorn der MildeMilde entgegengesetzt,'
entgegengesetzt/ etc.
Edward Cope, in his seminal seminal commentary on the Rhetoric
((1877),
1 8 77 ), introduces
introduces the section under discussion with the words
'Analysis of praotes, patience,'patience/ and remarks that 'praotes then,
that 'praotes then,
here, as as a pathos - in the Ethics it is a hexis
- hexis or virtue - - is this
instinctive affection, feeling, emotion, in a mild, calm, subdued
instinctive affection,
state (opposed to orge an emotion in a state of excitement); excitement); placid-
placid
ity
ity of temper' (32). Most recently, George Kennedy ((1991) 1 99 1 ) entitles
entitles
the chapter under discussion 'Praotes, or Calmness,' Calmness/ and trans- trans
lates: 'Since becoming calm is the the opposite of becoming angry,
and anger the opposite of calmness .../ . . . ,' etc.
Calmness, however, or mildness, gentleness, patience, good
temper, to cite the the list of equivalents provided by Grimaldi ((1988) 1 988)
in his epigraph to this chapter, is problematic problematic as an emotion. emotion.
Kennedy ((1991:1 99 1 : 130),
130), in his headnote on praotes, defends its status
as a pathos by disputing the rendering as 'calmness/ 'calmness,' despite his
own translation:
Aristotle regards
regards praotes as the emotion opposite to anger.anger. It is often
often
translated
translated 'mildness,'
'mildness/ which seems rather a trait
trait of character or absence
of
of an emotion, while Aristotle views it as a positive attitude
attitude toward
others and experience,
experience, involving an emotional change toward a tolerant
understanding: in colloquial English, 'calming down' is perhaps
perhaps the clos-
clos
est translation, but
but there is no single English word that quite
quite captures the
the Ancient Greeks
meaning. The appearance

appearance of mildness, gentleness, patience, tractability,
good temper
temper are all aspects
aspects of it.
it.
The variety
variety of terms
terms to which Kennedy resorts
resorts reflects his honest
recognition
recognition that
that 'calming down' will not not do in a good many of thethe
illustrations
illustrations of
oi praotes that
that Aristotle provides; but
but even if it did fit
more or most of them, it is not not clear that the
the process of becoming
calm is a pathos
pathos in Aristotle's sense of the term, any more than
the
the process of growing angry is one, as opposed to anger or orge. As
we saw in the previous chapter, Aristotle defines orge as 'a desire,
accompanied
accompanied by pain, for a perceived
perceived revenge' (for the
the rest of the
the
definition, see below); this scarcely describes ''an
an emotional change.'
Cope states the
the case against
against praotes as an emotion mostmost clearly
in his final comments on the section, and it is worth citing his
words
words in extenso ( 1 877: 42):
extenso (1877: 42):
I have already
already hinted a doubt iinn the notes on the preceding chapter
whether praotes is properly
properly ranked amongst the pathe. I think that it can
thepathe.
be made plainly to appear that it is not. It is introduced no doubt for the
purpose of giving the opposite side to the topics of anger, because the the
student of Rhetoric
Rhetoric is in every case required to be acquainted
acquainted with both
sides of a question.
question. And this purpose it may answer very well without
being a real opposite of orge or indeed a pathos at all. If we compare
praotes with the other
other pathe analysed in this second book, we find find that
it differs
differs from
from all of them in this respect -- that the rest are emotions,
instinctive and active, and tend to some positive result; wheareas praotes
instinctive
is inactive and leads to nothing but but the
the allaying,
allaying, subduing,
subduing, lowering, of of
the angry passion ...
... It seems plain therefore that it is in reality, what it
is stated to be in the Ethics, a hexis, not a pathos, of the temper .... . . It is
accordingly represented
represented in the Ethics Ethics as a virtue, the mean between
irascibility
irascibility and insensibility ..... . The true pathos
pathos is the orge, the instinc
instinc-
tive capacity of angry feeling.
feeling.
Over a century later, however, Grimaldi, in his commentary

( 1988: 49),
(1988: 49), sees no difficulty
difficulty in taking mildness
mildness as the
the opposite of
of
opposite,
anger, and, as an opposite, identifying it as an emotion: '[I]ts
opposition is of the
the same character as thethe opposition found be-
be
tween pity and indignation, fear
fear and confidence, shame and shame-
Satisfaction
Satisfaction / 81
81
lessness, kindness and unkindness .... . . The opposition

opposition A. speaks
speaks
about in all the above is contrary opposition, i.e., two positive
terms
terms denoting
denoting extremes
extremes of difference
difference within the same genus. genus.''33
Now, calmness, insofar as it is the negation or elimination elimination of of
anger, is in fact not comparable to the opposition opposition betweenbetween pity
pity
and indignation, on which which Aristotle particularly insists. As we
shall see in more detail in later later chapters, Aristotle defines 'being
indignant' (to nemesan) as 'feeling pain at someone who appears
to be succeeding
succeeding undeservedly' (Rhetoric 2.9, 11837a8-9). 83 7a8-9). Pity,
in turn, is defined
defined as 'a kind of pain in the the case of an apparent
destructive
destructive or painful harm in one not deserving deserving to encounter
encounter it,
which one might expect oneself,oneself, or one of one's own, to suffer, suffer, and
this when
when it seems near' (2.8,(2.8, 11835M3-16).
835b 13-16). Reduced to basics, the
contrast is between pain at undeserved good fortune and pain at
undeserved
undeserved misfortune (2.9, (2.9, 1386b9-12). Both emotions, Aristotle Aristotle
specifies, are characteristic of good men, since people ought not not to
fare ill or well undeservingly. Aristotle notes, however, that some
take phthonos, commonly
commonly rendered as 'envy,' as the opposite of of
pity, on the view that phthonos 'is related to and is indeed the
that phthonos
same thing nemesan'' (2.9,
thing as to nemesan (2.9, 1386b 1 6- 1 7) . The Stoics, indeed,
1386bl6-17).
characterized pity simply as pain at another'sanother's ill fortune, and envy
as pain at another's good fortune (e.g., Andronicus On the Emotions
2 p. 112 Kreuttner = SVF 3.414; d.
2 Kreuttner = cf. Cicero Thsculan
Tusculan Disputations
Disputations
3.21
3.21 and On the Orator l1.185, . 1 85, 2.206,
2.206, 2.2 1 6 ) . But in fact, Aristotle
2.216).
says, they are different: although phthonos too is 'a disturbing
although phthonos
pain arising fromfrom the
the well-being' of another (2.9, (2.9, 11386M8-19;
386b 1 8-19; cf.
d.
2. 1 0, 11387b22-4),
2.10, 3 87b22-4), it arises notnot because the the other person is unde- unde
serving, butbut simply because he is our equal or similar similar (2.9, 1386b 1 9-
(2.9,1386bl9-
20), and yet has gained an advantage over us.
Whether we take indignation or envy as the the opposite of pity,
each member of the the opposed
opposed pair has an independent definition;
neither
neither is described simply as the the absence or abatement of pity.
They are incompatible with pity because the eliciting eliciting circum
circum-
stances are mutually
mutually exclusive: someone is either suffering suffering or
prospering, not not both simultaneously. So So too of the the contrast bebe
tween fearfear and confidence
confidence or tharros.
tharros. Fear, according to Aristotle,
is 'a kind of pain or disturbance deriving from from an impression
[phantasia] of a future
[phantasiaJ future evil that
that is destructive or painful' (2.5, (2.5,
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
1382a21-3
1382321-3),I, whereas confidence arises when when there is hope accom-
accom
panied by an impression of imminent imminent safety, and frightening
frightening
things are either non-existent or remote. The things that inspire
confidence ((ta ihanalea] also include the
ta tharralea) the prospect of amelioration
amelioration
and assistance, and the knowledge that one has neither wronged
another nor been wronged,wronged, and that any rivals we may have are
either weak or friendly, or that we have more or stronger allies on
our side (2.5,
(2.5, 1383a1 6-25). Here again, the contrasting
1383al6-25). contrasting emotions
emotions
are conceived as responses to opposite kinds of stimuli: fear is
aroused by things that portend harm, whereas confidence derives
from
from what presages
presages security. Of course, these are normally mutu mutu-
ally exclusive,
exclusive, but while the absence of what is frightening is a
condition for confidence, confidence is not simply reducible to
the
the suspension of fear (people with no experience of danger are
'emotionless' [apatheis,
[apaiheis, 1383a28] in the sense, presumably, presumably, that
they are not
not given to fear). The case of love and hatred, to which
we shall return below, is also analogous analogous to these.
Neither kindness nor unkindness is an emotion for Aristotlei Aristotle,-
the section (2.7) of Aristotle's Rhetoric in question, as we shall see
(chapter 7),
7), in fact treats rather rather gratitude (kharin
(kharin ekhein) and
ingratitude (akharistia)
(akharistia) for a favour favour rendered.
rendered. Here, indeed, it may
be doubted
doubted whether Aristotle thinks of thanklessness as a full full-
fledged emotion. Rendering people ungrateful (akharistoi) (akharistoi) involves
involves
convincing them that the service service they received
received was not a genuine
favour (2. 7, 1385a33-b2), and depends
(2.7, depends essentially on negative
arguments. Aristotle does not describe describe a set of graceless acts that
would elicit the contrary of gratitude, although although one could perhaps
fill out
out Aristotle's account by suggesting that a positive feeling of of
ingratitude is aroused by a false or pretended service that was in
fact undertaken for selfish reasons. Again, Again, Aristotle seems to treat
shamelessness simply
simply as the absence of shame: 'Let shame be a
pain or disturbance
disturbance concerning bad things that appear to lead to a
loss of reputation [adoxia]
[adoxia] ....,
. . , while shamelessness is a contempt
[oligoria] and indifference
[oligoria] [apatheia] concerning these same things'
indifference [apatheia]
(2.7, 1383b1 2- 1 5 ) . Aristotle goes on to indicate in some detail the
1383bl2-15).
kinds of circumstances that induce shame, and then concludes
briskly (2.7,
(2.7, 1385a14-
1385al4-15): 1 5 ): 'So much for shame;
shame; as for shameless-
shameless
ness, clearly we can deal with it on the basis of what what is opposite.'
Satisfaction I/ 83
Once more, it is possible

possible to imagine
imagine an opposite
opposite emotion
emotion to
shame that has a more positive content: if shame shame results fromfrom the the
kinds
kinds of evils that bring
bring about
about infamy, its contrary
contrary might
might be a
pathos resulting from
pathos from those goods that are conducive to a superior
reputation
reputation or doxa (nothing prevents
prevents therethere being
being more than one
opposite to a given term: cf. Topics 2.7,
d. Topics 1.7, 1113al4-15:
13al4-1 5 : 'It is clear
cleadrom from
what has been said thatthat there may be several opposites to a single
thing'). In this case, one might label the emotion emotion opposite to
shame pride, as do some modern theorists of the the emotions (e.g.,
Nathanson
Nathanson 11992:
992: 86; d.cf. M. Lewis 2000; Ben-Ze'ev 2000: 49 491,1 , 512;
5 1 2;
and Manstead and Fischer 200 2001:1 : 23 1 ; and see below, chapter 4,
231;
p. 1100).
00). Why Aristotle does not not include a discussion
discussion of pride or
self-satisfaction among the pathe he examines in the Rhetoric is a
self-satisfaction
separate question, which
which will be considered in the chapter de- de
voted to shame. His discussion
discussion of anaiskhuntia or shamelessness,
shamelessness,
at all events, is meagre and negative.
Aristotle's
Aristotle's account of praotes, however, is neither. On the con- con
trary, praotes on its own receives more discussion discussion than
than gratitude
and ingratitude combined, and more than than is devoted to some
other
other major
major passions
passions such
such as envy and emulation (zelos). (zelos). Granted,
Aristotle begins by considering ways to counter counter anger by re- re
describing
describing the nature
nature of the offence
offence that has aroused
aroused it. Anger, for
Aristotle, is, as we have seen (chapter 2), 2), a response to a slight
slight or
put-down (oligoria),
(oligoria), and only that; as he defines it, orge is 'a fa desire,
accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account account of a
perceived
perceived slight on the the part of people who are not fit to slight
one or one's own' (2.2,
(2.2, 1378a3 1-3). This is, as I remarked in the
1378a31-3).
chapter on anger, a very restricted conception of the the stimulus to
anger, not
not only in comparison with with thethe range of 'anger' in English
but
but even in relation to Greek usage of the term orge, which which was
understood, as Aristotle himself
himself notes in the Nicomachean Ethics
(5.8, 11135b25-9),
135b25-9), as a response also to injustice. Nevertheless, it is
clearly the view that
that Aristotle adopts in the Rhetoric, and the
relevant one for interpreting his notion notion of praotes. Thus, among
the strategies for diminishing
diminishing or eliminating
eliminating anger that that Aristotle
mentions
mentions is demonstrating that a supposed slight slight was not such in
fact, by showing, for example, that that it was involuntary or unin unin-
tended. Alternatively, one may argue that that the
the agent of an osten-
Ancient Greeks
sible slight says or does the same things things in respect to him- or
herself
herself ('for
('for no one is believed to slight
slight himself/
himself/ 2.3, 11380313-14),
380a1 3-14),
or make it clear that the the offending
offending party has confessed
confessed and is
sorry, which
which undoes the social effect effect of the
the belittlement.
belittlement. TheThe
tactic is not dissimilar to that which Aristotle recommends
which Aristotle recommends in
regard to diminishing
diminishing gratitude by redescribing the nature of the the
service in such a way as to show that it was selfishly motivated,
unintentional,
unintentional, or the like, and hence not a true favour (see chapter
favour (see
7). Aristotle goes on to say that we are praoi piaoi towards those who
humble themselves before us and do not contradict us, for by this
'they are seen to concede that they are our inferiors, and those
who are inferior
inferior feel fear, and no one who feels fear fear offers
offers a slight'
(2.3, 1380a23-4).
1380a23-4). The context
context here is perhaps ambiguous: is
Aristotle referring
referring to apologetic behaviour subsequent to some
ostensible belittlement, in which which the self-abasement
self-abasement of the of
the of-
fender
fender is designed to prove that no offence offence could have been
intended? Or does he mean that that a humble attitude elicits
elicits praotes
in general, irrespective of whether there has been an offence? offence?
Probably the the former, since Aristotle adds that that anger is allayed
towards those
those who humble
humble themselves,
themselves, citing
citing in evidence
evidence the fact
that dogs do not bite those who sit down, though perhaps here one
is not
not obliged to think belligerence..
think of an abatement of a prior belligerence
But Aristotle
Aristotle then affirms
affirms that people who are serious or eager
about something
something are praoi towards those who are similarly dis- dis
posed, for they believe that they themselves are being taken
seriously and not being treated with contempt (2.3, (2.3, 1380a26-7);
this does not obviously
obviously refer
refer to a case in whichwhich an offender
offender
exhibits some form of contrition, but rather to respectful com
respectful com-
portment in and of itself.
itself. So
So too, we are praoi towards those who who
have obliged us, or begged and pleaded with us, since they are
humbler; or again, towards those who are never arrogant
humbler; arrogant or insult
insult-
ing towards people like ourselves (2.3, (2.3, 11380a27-31).
380a27-3 1 ). In these inin-
stances, we are praoi just because of the the consideration, or rather
the
the deference, of others, and not not necessarily because of some
supposed appeasement. Praotes,Praotes, it would appear, is elicited by
reverence or other admiring or self-abasing signals on the of
the part of
4
others that elevate our standing or esteem.4
esteem.
Such an account
account of praotes is not not wholly
wholly surprising in the the
Satisfaction / 85
context of Aristotle's analysis of anger. anger. If anger is a response to a

slight, as Aristotle
Aristotle holds, and if, if, moreover, a slight is the activa
activa-
tion (or(or activity)
activity) of a belief or doxa about a thing's seeming to be
worthless (2.2, (2.2, 11378M1),
378b l l ), then the
the opposite of anger should, or at
least could, be a response to the activation of a doxa about a
thing's (or a person's)
person's) seeming to be of great value. Praotes, Praotes, then,
might
might be defined as 'a desire, accompanied accompanied by pleasure, to treat
someone kindly, on account of a perceived gesture of respect.' It
would derive from the sense of an increase in one's status or doxa, doxa,
as opposed
opposed to its diminishment,
diminishment, as in the the case of orge. As an
emotion, we might might perhaps think think of it as the disposition
disposition to do a
service for another
another that results
results from praise or some other act that
enhances a belief in one's worth.
A pathos of this sort as the opposite of anger would be the the
counterpart to pride as the opposite of shame: a positive emotion
deriving from from an amelioration
amelioration of one's reputation or status (see ( see
chapter
chapter 4 below).
below). The difference
difference between
between the two would be analo analo-
gous to that between anger (orge) (orge} and shame itself (aiskhune):
(aiskhune): the the
One
one is triggered by a deliberate insult, insult, the other by an evil or
misfortune. PraotesPraotes would differ differ also from
from affection
affection or philia,
which Aristotle treats next in order, order, in the same way that that anger
differs
differs from
from hatred or misos. Affection,
Affection, as defined in the the Rhetoric,
Rhetoric,
consists in wishing good good things for another's sake and acting, to
the best of one's ability, to obtain them for the the other (2.4, 1380b35-
8 I a l ).
81al). It is an altruistic emotion, stimulated by an appreciation of
stimulated of
the other's character (or (or charm or usefulness), rather than by his
or her
her obsequiousness
obsequiousness or signs of admiration admiration or regard. Praotes
regard. Praotes
thus occupies a distinct distinct niche in Aristotle's system of the pathe
((once
once we appreciate that that the
the subject of section
section 2.7 of the
the Rhetoric
is gratitude rather than benevolence, it is clear that that there is little
little
overlap between it and either).
and praotes either).
At this point in his exposition
exposition of praotes, Aristotle
Aristotle reaffirms
reaffirms
that
that 'in general, one must must investigate what things make us praoi
praunonta] on the
[ta praiinonta) the basis of their opposites' (2.3,(2.3, 11380a31),
380a3 1 ), that
is, by contrast with with the things that are conducive to anger,5 anger,5 and he
proceeds to enumerate the kinds of people people with whom we are
disinclined
disinclined to grow angry, angry, for example, those we fear fear or before
whom we feel ashamed, or those who feel shame before us, as well
86 // The Emotions
as the states of mind in which which we are prone to praotes, such as

when
when we are at play or are successful successful or have recently avenged
ourselves on someone else. Nor do we get angry, Aristotle says, at
those who are ignorant or insensible
insensible of our revenge, such as the the
dead ((thethe orator is being advised, I presume,
presume, to show that the the
object of a jury's anger is beyond the the reach of vengeance). Aristotle
concludes by reasserting that to render people praoi (katapraiinein)
peoplepraoi (katapraunein)
one must make those with whom whom they are angry appear frightenfrighten-
ing or deserving of their shame or ingratiating (kekharismenoi)
(kekharismenoi) or
unwilling
unwilling or remorseful
remorseful in regard
regard to what was done ((1380b31-4).
1380b3 1--4).
Clearly, Aristotle's focus is on anger, and his treatment treatment of of
praotes is largely conceived as a means of checking anger in
others. A show of deference
deference can have that effect, but but so too can a
menacing posture:
posture: as Aristotle says,
says, 'It is impossible to be fright
fright-
ened and angry at the same time' ((2.3, 2.3, 11380a33-4).
380a33-4). The primacy of of
anger is not surprising in a treatise on rhetoric, since this was the
emotion that pleaders chiefly sought to arouse against their oppo oppo-
nents, just as they solicited the pity of the jurors for themselves
and their clients. As Danielle Allen puts it (2000: 1148), 48 ), 'The
The
language of anger and pity defined defined the
the contours of the competi
the competi-
tion between prosecutor and defendant' (cf., (d., e.g., Lysias 32. 1 9,
32.19,
Demosthenes 221.127).1 . 127). Allen adds:
adds: 'Other emotional concepts could
be used to flesh out the the core ideas of "anger" and of "pity" in the the
process of trying to establish desert. desert. The ideologies of hate, envy,
and fear ... ... could be grafted
grafted onto the ideology of anger' ((149). 149). But
anger, or rather orge, was crucial, and speakers speakers naturally tried to
direct it away from from themselves in the same measure as they
attempted to elicit pity for their
attempted their side. Hence, the importance
importance of of
techniques of anger management.
Aristotle himself, as Cope points out, offers offers a different
different account
of praotes in the Nicomachean Ethics, Ethics, where it is treated
treated as the
mean between the the excess of orgilotes or irascibility and the defi defi-
ciency of aorgesia, an 'absence of anger' or insensibility
insensibility to insult
insult
(2.7, 1108a4-9
1 l08a4-9;; 4.5, 1125b26-26blO),
1 125b26-26bl O), although, in fact, Aristotle
concedes, the mean state has not a proper name of its own, and
Aristotle imports praotes as something of a makeshift ((1125b27- 1 1 25b2 7-
88);); he also affirms
affirms that praotes is closer to the deficiency than the
excess, and hence
hence may serve as anger's opposite. In these these contexts,
contexts,
Satisfaction // 87
Satisfaction 87
where Aristotle is speaking also of such such mean states as cour- cour
age (andreia eleutheriotes), and high-mindedness
(andreia),), liberality ((eleutheriotes),
(megalopsukhia), praotes assumes the
(megalopsukhia), the character of a disposition
disposition
rather than a pathos: 'The person who is praos tends to be unper- unper
turbed and is not led by emotion but rather as reason directs'
((1125b33-5).
1 l 25b33-5 ). So
So too, in the Topics (4.5,
the Topics (4.5, I125b20-7)
25b20-7) Aristotle asserts
that one must not classifyclassify a disposition (hexis)
(hexis) under the genus
represented
represented by a capacity (dunamis),
[dunamis], and gives as examples
examples of this
error the
the subsuming of praotes under the the category of mastering
anger, or courage
courage under the the mastery of fears: 'for a courageous or
praos person is called emotionless [apathes],
[apathes], whereas one who has
mastery does experience [paskhein[paskhein] 1 the emotion but but is not
not led by
it.' Aristotle adds that if a courageous
courageous or praos person were to
experience the relevant pathos (fear and anger, respctively), he
would likely
likely not be dominated by it. However, this is not what what is
meant by being courageous or praos, praos, but
but rather being entirely
insensible with respect to such things, that is, is, to fear or anger.
An emotion
emotion or pathos for Aristotle, however, is always a re- re
sponse to some stimulus, not simply a trait of character: the very
term pathos, as we have seen (chapter I1,, p. 33), ), is related to paskh6,
topaskho,
'suffer'
'suffer' or 'experience.' Insofar
Insofar as praotes maymay be conceived of as
an emotion, accordingly,
accordingly, it must occur in reaction to some exter- exter
nal impetus, just as anger arises in response to a slight. As we
noted in the the discussion of anger, Aristotle's system of the emo
the emo-
tions is particularly attentive to status and to the everyday social
interactions that subtend and modify modify it. Fear, shame, pity and
indignation, emulousness
emulousness and envy all centre on the individual's
individual's
relative position or reputation in society. Anger, in particular, had
a key function in this environment. If anger was a response to a
loss of face or doxa as the the result of an affront,
affront, then praotes as an
emotion was elicited
elicited by behaviour that enhanced public respect
and esteem.
Even fear
fear as a cause ofof praotes has a place, perhaps, in Aristotle's
Aristotle's
conception of 'calmness' as an emotion. Not Not every slight, as we
have seen, results in anger.
anger. Aristotle specifies in his definition of of
orge that it arises 'on account of a perceived slight on the the part of
of
people who are not fit to slight one or one's own.' People do not
necessarily react with anger when they are slighted by those who
88 I/ The Emotions of the
are stronger or better placed in society, in part because of fear.

Thus, if one can demonstrate that the author of an ostensible
impertinence
impertinence is of a class superior to your own, then your status
will not have been damaged,
damaged, since it was already inferior, inferior, and the
emotion of oi praotes - the sense of being conciliated in respect to an
-
imagined attack
imagined attack on on one's status -- ensues.
Aristotle's account of praotes as an emotion emotion is not not wholly freefree
of contradiction.
contradiction. He sometimes speaks as though though praotes were
simply the
the absence or abatement of orge, oige, a neutral
neutral state of calm
free
free of pain or pleasure and not not a pathos
pathos in its own right. In this
regard Aristotle was in accord with with contemporary usage. JacquelineJacqueline
de Romilly ((1974:
1 9 74: 100)
1 00 ) notes that praotes enjoyedenjoyed a particular
vogue in the fourth
fourth century BC, Be, and adds that it would eventually
'lead to Polybianphilanthropia
Polybian philanthropia and to Roman clementia. Indeed,
dementia.'' Indeed,
Demosthenes
Demosthenes and others had already associated associated the word piaos praos
with philanthr6pos
philanthropes (('humane')
'humane') and epieikes
epieikes ('decent,' 'fair')
'fair' ) as
patient and gentle disposition
indicating a patient disposition ((e.g.
e.g. Demosthenes
Demosthenes
8.33), not
not a sentiment
sentiment elicited by mollification or regard. regard. Does
Aristotle's account of praotes as an emotion emotion (as I have recon- recon
structed it), that
structed it), that is, as a wish (accompanied
(accompanied by pleasure) to treat
kindly those who have shown one deference or respect, find
confirmation
confirmation in the the literature of his time? time? Is there, indeed, any
evidence that such a pathos pathos -- an emotion of proud elation in
response to a gesture of obsequiousness or respect -- for which
appropriated the term praotes in the Rhetoric, was
Aristotle appropriated
recognized at all (perhaps
recognized (perhaps identified by other words) ?
other words)?
Such evidence aass there iiss is exiguous. In the sixth oration in the
corpus of Lysias, the the speaker argues that Andocides, who had been
accused
accused of sacrilege and has surrendered himself himself to the the verdict
of the
the court, is now behaving like a citizen citizen with full rights, 'as
with full
though it were not not because of your praotes and want of time time that
he has not paid the penalty you set' (34). Praotes here could well
mean 'gentleness,' as Stephen Todd (2000: 771) 1 ) renders it. But the the
author might
might also be intimating
intimating that that the Athenians have re- re
sponded
sponded to Andocides' implicit humility and for that reason have
adopted a generous attitude towardstowards him. In another speech dubi- dubi
ously attributed
attributed to Lysias (20.21),
(20.2 1 ) the
the speaker notes that some of of
'
the guilty
guilty have fled, while fear has induced others not to remain
Satisfaction / 89
in Athens
Athens but rather to serve as soldiers, 'so that they might might
render you more praoi or influence these men [i.e., the prosecu- prosecu
tors).'
tors].' The speaker adds that Polystratus,
Poly stratus, the defendant, submit submit-
ted to a trial at once, though he was innocent innocent of wrongdoing.
Being praos here is not a matter of a permanent disposition, but
rather a response to ingratiating behaviour;
behaviour,- by implication, the
jurors ought properly to feel this way towards Polystratus himself,
because of his humble behaviour in presenting
humble behaviour himself before the
presenting himself
court, but
but not towards the others, who either ran off or else acted
in fear. In the Memorabilia of Xenophon (2.3
the Memorabilia . 1 6), Socrates urges
(2.3.16),
reconciliation
reconciliation with one's brother:
brother: 'Do not shrink back, my good
man, but try to render the man praos [katapraiinein),
[katapraiinein], and very
soon he will heed you; don't you see how concerned concerned for honourhonour
and magnanimous he is? is?'' Here again,
again, praotes is induced by humble
behaviour that augments the self-esteem of the other and for this
reason renders him him gentle. A few other passages are perhaps
subject to a similar interpretation ((e.g. e.g. Plato Euthydemus 288B,
R epublic 5572A,
Republic 72A, Herodotus
Herodotus Histories
Histoiies 2. 1 21 0). But the texts I have
2.1215).
examined do not not demonstrate conclusively, so far as I can judge,
that praotes was generally understood to be an emotion elicited
by deference and appeasement.
Aristotle's system of thethe emotions invites, I believe, or at least
allows
allows a place for,
for, a positive pathos opposed to anger that takes
positive pathos takes
the form
form of a pleasurable response to a gesture that that enhances one's
status or self-esteem. I think thatthat there are hints of such a mean mean-
ing in Aristotle's exceptional treatment
treatment of praotes, which is con- con
ditioned
ditioned by his definition
definition of anger or orge. But it comfortably
it comfortably
coexists with thethe notion of appeasement, and Aristotle does not
distinguish clearly between
between the two ideas. Perhaps the best name
for
for the sentiment of praotes as Aristotle conceives it, then, is
Aristotle conceives
'satisfaction,' which suggests both compensation for an injury or
insult and the
the self-esteem deriving fromfrom an affirmed
affirmed sensesense of self.
Even if the
the analysis I have proposed is not not quite Aristotle's, I
Aristotelian.6 Still, it is worth
venture to hope that it is at least Aristotelian.6
inquiring why Aristotle did not develop the self-affirming
self-affirming aspect
of
of praotes further, and why why a specific
specific emotion
emotion of this kind does
not figure among the pathe commonly
commonly recognized
recognized by the Greeks,
whereas anger,
anger, its ostensible opposite, occupies so prominent a
position. It may be that, in the fiercely competitive

competitive world of the
classical Greek city-state, gestures intended
intended to augment the repu- repu
tation of
of another - the opposite, that is,
is, of
of a slight
slight -- were so
so rare
that there was no need to give a special name to the response that
they elicited.
elicited. In many societies today one may observe
observe a compa-
compa
rable reserve
reserve in the lavishing of praise and commendation.
commendation. In the the
following chapter,
chapter, we shall see that a similar restraint may have
inhibited the
the emergence
emergence of a positive conception of pride,pride, which
is often
often included in modern inventories of the the emotions.
emotions.
CHAPTER FOUR
F OUR
Shame
La vergiienza es un sentimiento universal.

universal.
Marina 11996:
996: 146
[T]he
[T]he Balinese no more feel 'guilt' than we feel
feel lek, the Balinese
Balinese
emotion closest to our 'shame.'
Rosaldo 11984:142
984: 142
Shame has had a bad press for the the past century or so. As Thomas
Scheff
Scheff remarks ((1997:
1 997: 205 ): 'Over
205): 'Overthe
thelast 200years
last200 yearsininthe
thehistory
history
of modern societies, shame virtually disappeared.
disappeared. The
The denial of of
1
shame has been institutionalized in Western societies.societies.'I! Its status
as a moral emotion
emotion has been impugned by critics, among them
theologians
theologians and anthropologists, who consider consider it a primitive pre
primitive pre-
cursor to guilt: shame, the argument goes, responds responds to the judg-
judg
ments of others and is indifferent
indifferent to ethical principles in them them-
selves, whereas guilt is an inner sensibility
sensibility and corresponds
corresponds to the
morally autonomous self man.2 The
self of modern man.2 The shift
shift from
from a shame
culture
culture to a guilt
guilt culture,
culture, in the formula made popular by Ruth
Benedict ((1946),
1 946), is taken as a sign of moral progress.
progress. Thus, the the
warrior society represented in the Homeric epics - - a shame cul-cul
ture, according
according to E.R.
E.R. Dodds ((1951)
1 95 1 ) -
- slowly gave way to a guilt
culture, which began to emerge in fifth-century fifth-century democratic
Athens
Athens but did not achieve a fully expression in the
fully developed expression
Christianity.3
classical world until the advent of Christianity.3
Psychologists either ignored shame or treated it as characteris-
92 / The Emotions
Greeks
tic of an early stage in the socialization of the child,4

child/ at least until
Helen Block Lewis, in a highly influential study ((1971), 1 9 7 1 ), insisted
on the
the importance of shame in adult life. By By characterizing
characterizing shame
as the
the experience of thethe utter worthlessness of thethe self, however,
in contrast
contrast to guilt, which is limited
limited to a negative feeling about a
particular
particular act (40), Lewis too contributed
contributed to the general belief that
shame is something we would be better off without.swithout.5 True, guilt
can get outout of hand and become transformed into a generalized
emotion or guilt complex, a psychic condition that has in part
been fostered
fostered in Western culture by the Christian
Christian emphasis on
original sin.6 In addition, permissive
original sin.6 permissive attitudes
attitudes towards children
children
and a naive belief in the essential
essential goodness of human
human nature have
led to a disparagement of guilt as a pernicious form of conscience.
conscience.
Even so,so, guilt retains a certain dignity as a sentiment, while
shame seems at best infantile other-directed.7 Thus, Stephen
infantile and other-directed.?
Pattison (2000: 1129)
29 ) remarks,
remarks, 'While guilt may have a very con- con
structive role in creating and maintaining social relationships and
moral responsibilities,
responsibilities, shame has a much more dubious effect.' effect/
And Zygmunt Bauman (200 1 ) writes:
(2001) writes:
Just half a century ago, Karl Jaspers

Jaspers could still neatly separate 'moral
guilt' (the
(the remorse we feel when
when we do harmharm to other human
human beings,
whether
whether by what
what we have done or by what what we have failed to to)to) from
guilt'' (the guilt we feel when harm is done to a human
'metaphysical guilt
being, although this harmharm is in no way related
related to our action). This
distinction
distinction has lost its meaning
meaning with globalization. John Donne's
Donne's phrase,
'Do not ask for whom the bell tolls: it tolls for thee,'
thee/ represents as never
before the solidarity
solidarity of our destiny, although
although it is still far from
from being
8
balanced by the solidarity of our sentiments
sentiments and actions.s
actions.
Like many other cultures, Greece and Rome did not have dis- dis
tinct terms for what we call shame and guilt, and they seem to
have made do with
with one concept where we recognize two.9 Such a
recognize two.9
view of the matter, however,
however, presupposes
presupposes a natural correspon-
correspon
dence among psychological
psychological ideas across
across linguistic and social bound
bound-
aries. Thus, the Greek term we customarily translate as 'shame' is
imagined to match, more or less, the English concept, unless unless
perhaps, in the absence of a word for guilt, Greek shame had a
Shame / 93
somewhat wider extension so as to include some (or (or all)

all) of thethe
modern notion of of guilt. Alternatively -- and
and this is the more
common assumption - - the ancient Greeks simply failed
failed to achieve
a notion of guilt, which is in turn a sign of the poverty poverty of their
moral vocabulary
vocabulary and their incomplete psychological
psychological develop-
develop
ment. As we have seen, however, the ancient Greek emotional
lexicon does not map neatly onto modern English concepts concepts.. 10 IO
Rather than assume that the Greeks' emotional terminology for
shame was either fuzzier fuzzier or more primitive than our own, we may
better appreciate
appreciate their idea of this emotion and its ethical signifi signifi-
cance by paying close attention to their vocabulary. Here again,
moreover, we can avail ourselves ourselves of Aristotle's subtle analysis of of
(or, more precisely, of aiskhune),
shame (or, aiskhune}, which, I argue,
argue, offers
offers newnew
perspectives on several problems problems and paradoxes
paradoxes that arise within
modern treatments of shame and related sentiments. In the dis
the dis-
cussion that follows, then, I begin by examining the meanings and
connotations of certain Greek words. words. I beg the reader's
reader's indulgence
for what may seem an excessively
excessively lexical or philological
philological emphasis
(it will be relatively brief, but but those who wish to go go straight to
Aristotle may flip to p. 98). 98). The payoff, I hope, will be a richer
sense of thethe significance
significance of shame both in ancient Greek society
and in our own.
As it happens, there are two Greek words that are typically typically
rendered as 'shame' in English: English: aidos, which has received some
scholarly attention recently (notably Cairns 11993), 993 ), and aiskhune
aiskhune
(sometimes transliterated as aischyne). These terms are by no
means entirely synonymous, and it is a weakness in Bernard
Williams's fine book on shame in Greek antiquity ((1993) 1 993 ) that he
lumps
lumps aidos and aiskhune aiskhune together, although he provides an
excellent defence of shame as a moral sentiment sentiment and challenges
the 'progressivist' hypothesis
hypothesis of a great conceptual
conceptual shiftshift from
from
ancient to modern ethical thought, with its new concentration on
guilt ((7).
7). Thus, in an endnote Williams observes observes ((194
1 94 n. 9):
9): 'There
are two Greek roots bearing bearing the
the sense of ""shame":
shame" : aid-aid- ..... and
.
aiskhun-
aiskhun-... . . . I have not been generally concerned to separate
separate uses of
the two kinds of word. word. Not
Not much turns on the distinction, for my
purposes, and,and, in particular,
particular, many of the variations
variations are diachronic,'
diachronic/
with aiskhune
aiskhune taking the place of aidos as the latter became
Ancient Greeks
11
increasingly obsolete over the sixth to fourth centuries B.C. B.C.l 1
Williams
Williams cites the brief brief lexicographical analysis by George Shipp
((1972: 9 1 ), who notes that the two roots are in fact
1972: 1191), fact differentiated
in Herodotus, where terms based on aid- carry the sense 'respect
the power of,' of/ while the aiskh- words mean 'be ashamed. ashamed/'
Herodotus, however, wrote iin n the Ionic dialect. Shipp Shipp maintains
maintains
that, in the Attic dialect, which was the predominant vehicle of of
literature in the classical period, 'aiskhunomai [the verbal form]
took over both senses.'
senses/ This evolutionary
evolutionary story cannot cannot be right. As
Cairns
Cairns points out ((1993: 138), in Homer aiskhunomai
1993: 138), aiskhunomai already
serves as an equivalent to aideomai, the the verbal form of aidos (d. (cf.
Odyssey 1 .323-9) . What is more, Shipp's claim ignores
Odyssey 7.305-6, 221.323-9).
the fact that aidos, which, along with with its associated verbal form
aideomai, continues to occur in the classical period ((especially especially in
poetry), also acquired two senses.12senses.12
Douglas Cairns, who has written written the definitive study of aidos,
offers
offers the following as a preliminary
preliminary definition
definition of the term
term ((1993:
1993:
2): ''[L]et
[L]et aidos be an inhibitory emotion based on sensitivity sensitivity to
and protectiveness of one's self-image';
self-image'j Cairns suggests that the the
verbal form aideomai
aideomai roughly means 'I am abashed.' abashed/ The standard
Greek-English lexicon (Liddell, Scott, and Jones 940) defines
Jones 11940)
aidos as 'reverence,'
'reverence/ 'awe,'
'awe/ 'respect,'
'respect/ and a 'sense of honour'j honour7; the
term does not normally
normally designate the the feeling of shame for acts
committed. In Homer, where aidos and its relatives occur fre- fre
quently, 'aidos is always prospective and inhibitory' (Cairns 11993: 993:
13); 'it does not
13li not approximate to our notion of the the retrospective
"bad" or guilty conscience' ((145). 145 ). More crisply, Cairns affirms affirms
13
that 'aidos is not shame' (1993:
that'aidos ( 1 993: 114).
4 ) . 13
Aiskhune, on the contrary, is defined in Liddell, Scott, and Jones
(s.v.
(s.v.)) as 'shame,
'shame/' 'dishonour,'
'dishonour/ as well as a 'sense of shame' and
'honour'j
'honour',- in this latter
latter sense, we are told, it is 'like aidos. aidos.'' When a
term is said to bear contradictory senses such as 'honour' and
'dishonour,'
'dishonour/ one begins to suspect that a problem of interpretation
may be lurking. The vast new Diccionario griego-espanol griego-espanol ((1980-)
1 980-)
reports that aiskhune
aiskhune may denote denote 'disfigurement
'disfigurement or ugliness,'
ugliness/
as well as a sentiment induced by public disapprobation, disapprobation, citing
Euripides, Andromache
Andromache 244: 244: 'Shameful
'Shameful things [aiskhra] [aiskhra] entail
aiskhune.' Thucydides (2.37) contrasts offences offences against the law,
Shame / 95
which result in punishment, with those against unwritten cus- cus

toms, which
which engender aiskhune.
aiskhune. But aiskhune is also 'a re- re
strictive virtue' (una viitud restrictiva), and in this connotation
(una virtud
it means 'shame or honour [vergiienza, honor] honor] in the sense
of
of respecting one's commitments
commitments at all cost, principledness
[pundonor] and at times almost heroism.' Thus, Thucydides
[pundonor]
((1.84.3)
1 .84.3) is cited for the
the view that 'aMos
'aidos partakes most of mod-mod
14
esty, courage [eupsukhia] of aiskhune, 14 testifying incidentally
courage [eupsukhia]
to a still lively awareness of a distinction
distinction between the two terms
era.15
in the classical era.15
Although some scholars hold that there is 'no discernible differ differ-
ence' in Aristotle's use of the terms aidos and aiskhune aiskhune in his
16
ethical writings (Grimaldi
(Grimaldi 11988:
988: 1105),
05 ),16 a close analysis reveals
that
that he in fact their distinct
fact respects their distinct ranges of meaning, normally
limiting aidos to the prospective
prospective or inhibitory sense. While this is
not
not the
the place for a thorough survey survey of Aristotle's usage,
usage, we may
take as an illustration an important passage passage in the Nicomachean
Ethics ((1128b32-3),
1 1 28b32-3 ), often
often supposed
supposed to show the interchangeability
of
of the two: 'If'If shamelessness [anaiskhuntia] is a bad thing
shamelessness [anaiskhuntia] thing and
also not
not feeling aidos [to aideisthai] at doing shameful
me aideisthai]
[to me shameful things,
then it is not any more honourable for someone who does such
things to feel aiskhune [aiskhunesthai]/ that is, after
aiskhune [aiskhunesthai],' after the deeds
deeds
have been done.done. In this passage,
passage, aidos is clearly understood
understood to
inhibit bad behaviour, while aiskhune reflects back on it with
while aiskhune
regret.
But if aidos,
aidos, complex though
though it may be in its own right, is
nevertheless a reasonably concept,17 what shall we say
reasonably coherent concept,17
of aiskhune, which seems to have both a prospective prospective and a retro-
retro
spective dimension, signifying
signifying equally 'shame' and a 'sense of of
shame'?? 18
shame' 18 The two meanings are ostensibly quite diverse: diverse: why
should they cohabit in a single concept? concept? To be sure, they also
overlap in English:
English: 'Have you no shame? shame?'' means 'Have you no
sense of shame?
shame?'' ((so
so too in the
the negative compound 'shameless').
But Greek appears to have had available available a vocabulary by which to
disti nguish the two senses. Indeed, the
distinguish the two concepts would seem
to be psychologically
psychologically discrete, 'shame' being an emotion emotion while a
19
'sense of shame' is more like an ethical trait. 19
Greek philosophers
philosophers and rhetoricians
rhetoricians too seem regularly to have
the Ancient Greeks
classified aiskhune as an emotion or pathos, whereas the

classified aiskhune the status of of
aidos was more ambiguous.
ambiguous. It is aiskhune, not aidos, aidos, that
that Aristotle
chooses to analyse in the Rhetoric, his most extensive extensive and pen- pen
etrating discussion of the emotions. True, Aristotle at times lists
aidos among the patM pathe (plural
(plural of pathos],
pathos), and Douglas Cairns
states categorically
categorically ((1993:
1 993: 55):
) : '[T]hat aidos is an emotion is, I take
it, uncontroversial; Aristotle
Aristotle regards
regards it as more like a pathos, an
affect, than anything else.' else/ But the question is not quite so straight- straight
forward. For while pathos often approximates the English
often approximates English 'emo'emo-
tion/ it can have a much wider extension (see (see chapter 1, I, p. 4).
What is more,
more, precisely in those passages passages where Aristotle identi- identi
fies aidos as a pathos, it is clear that that he is using pathos in the
broad sense to include a variety of psychologicalpsychological states. Thus, in
the Eudemian Ethics ((1220b37-21al2)
I220b37-2 1 aI 2 ) we find find included
included under the
pathe, along with aidos,
pathe, aidos, such items as courage,courage, moderation,
moderation, just just-
ness, and liberality,
liberality, which Aristotle normally treats as virtues (d. (cf.
also Eudemian Ethics 11233bl6-34bl4,
233b 1 6-34b 1 4, 11233b26-35).
233b26-3 5 ) . Indeed,
Indeed, al- al
ready in antiquity the the scholar Alexander
Alexander of Aphrodisias
Aphrodisias ((or or some-
some
one writing in his name), commenting on Aristotle's discussion,
whether aidos could properly be classified as a pathos. 20
wondered whether 20
The Stoics, in turn, cite the unusual form aidemosune as a form
of sophrosune, 'modesty' or 'self-control' - - usually one of the four
cardinal virtues - - and define it as 'a careful
careful knowledge
knowledge of appropri
appropri-
blame.'21 Typically,
ate blame.'2l Typically, the Stoics
Stoics contrasted aidos with aiskhune, aiskhune,
treating the formerformer as a healthy sentiment (eupatheia) character
(eupatheia] character-
istic of the sage, sage, whereas aikshune was classified classified among the the
vicious emotions to which everyone everyone except the sage is subject
(SVF
(SVF 43 1 . 1 -9 = Diogenes Laertius 7.
431.1-9 = 1 1 5 ) . Thus, hagneia, 'purity'
7.115).
or 'chastity,'
'chastity/ turns up in the same category as aidos, namely,
eulabeia or 'caution,'
'caution/ the wise man's equivalent
equivalent of the fear (phobos) (phobos}
22
to which ordinary people people are exposed.22
exposed. Aiskhune, in turn, is
precisely 'a fear disgrace/23 It is true that Aristotle at one point
fear of disgrace.'23
in the
the Nicomachean Ethics ((1128M2-13) 1 128b 1 2-13) says of aidos: 'It is
defined as a kind of fear [phobos] of disgrace
fear [phobos] [adoxia]' ' -- or at least,
disgrace [adaxial
he adds,
adds, it is something like fear [paraplesian]
[paraplesion] -- and as a species
of fear it ought, in Aristotle's
Aristotle's terms, to be an emotion.24 emotion.24 If so,
however, it is one that looks to future future rather than to past or
present events, as Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition of fear in the Rhetoric
Shame / 97
stipulates
stipulates (2.5, 11382a21-2):
382a21-2): 'Let fear be a kind of pain or dis- dis
turbance deriving fromfrom an image [phantasia]
[phantasia] of a future
future evil that
is destructive or painfuL'
painful.' In this, as we shall see, aidos is quite
distinct
distinct from aiskhune.25 My guess is that Aristotle is casting
from aiskhune.25
about here for an adequate determination
determination of the the psychological
status of aidos, and brings in fearfear as a rough approximation
approximation in part
because it is prospective.
The Christian bishop Nemesius
Nemesius of Emesa, writing
writing in the fourth
fourth
century AD, locates aidos under the Stoic rubric of fear - - an
emotion or pathos - rather
emotion - rather than
than caution,
caution, and defines it as a 'fear of
'fear of
the expectation
expectation of blame/
blame,' though Nemesius adds the proviso that
[pathos].'26 But this is clearly a mistake
'this is the finest emotion [pathos].'26
in regard to orthodox Stoic doctrine. More interesting, however, is
the distinction that Nemesius draws between aidos and aiskhune.
Nemesius defines the the latter
latter as 'a fear in the
the case of a shameful
thing that has been done/
done,' and remarks that it is not unpromising
in respect to salvation. He then then adds that 'aidos differs
differs from
from
aiskhune in this, that a person who feels aiskhune
aiskhune aiskhune is shamed
[kataduetai] for things he has done, whereas a person who feels
[kataduetai]
aidos fears that he will land in some kind of disgrace;
disgrace,- the
the ancients
[i.e., Greeks of the
the classical era]
era] often
often call aidos aiskhune, but but
in this they misuse the terms.terms.'' Nemesius is the first, so far as I
have discovered, to distinguish explicitly these two meanings of of
shame - - the feeling
feeling ofof being ashamed and and a sense ofof shame -- as
well as the first
first to differentiate
differentiate between aidos and aiskhune
aiskhune on
the
the basis of this distinction.
distinction.
Nemesius is certainly wrong about the the semantics of aidos and
aiskhune in classical Greek: we have seen that both meanings
aiskhune meanings of of
shame coexist in the term aiskhune
aiskhune (see
(seefurther below).27 But the
further below).27
distinction that Nemesius
Nemesius draws between
between two concepts
concepts of shame,
shame,
one retrospective and oriented towards the past, the other pro- pro
spective and oriented towards the future, has had a considerable
influence on later thought. Kurt Riezler ((1943: 1 943: 462-3)
462-3), for ex-ex
'
ample, notes that French,
French, Greek, and German all have two words
for
for shame, and explains: 'Pudeur 'Pudeur means a kind of shame that
tends to keep you fromfrom an act, whereas you may feel honte honte after
after
an act.' While he acknowledges that ''[t]he [t]he Greek distinction bebe
tween Aidos
Aidos and Aischyne
Aischyne does not correspond
correspond to the French,'
French/ he
Ancient Greeks
nevertheless cites the definition provided by the great Renais-

nevertheless Renais
sance humanist
humanist Stephanus in his Thesaurus of the Greek lan- lan
guage: 'Aidos
'Aidos is shame that derives from from reverence, whereas
28
aiskhune is shame that derives from from immorality.'
immorality.'28 More re- re
cently, Melvin Lansky (1996: ( 1 996: 769)
769) notes that English 'shame' can
refer to a desire to 'disappear from
refer from view' or to 'comportment that
would avoid the the emotion
emotion (the obverse of shamelessness)/
shamelessness),' and
adds: 'Many languages have separate separate words for the emotion, emotion/'
citing French honte 'for the the emotion itself; pudeur,
pudeul, for the de- de
29
fense' ((769).
769).29 Thomas Scheff ( 1 997: 209), in
Scheff (1997: in turn, differentiates
differentiates
the Greek terms aiskhuyneaiskhuyne and aidos under the rubrics 'disgrace'
and 'modesty,' and compares them with with the Latin foedus
foedus versus
PUdOl, French honte
pudor, honte versus pudeur, German German Schande versus
Scham, and Italian
Italian vergogna versus pudore, while noting noting that
that this
30
distinction is absent in English.English.3D None of these contrasts captures
the value of the Greek concept of aiskhune, to which I now turn.
The
The fullest
fullest andand clearest analysis of shame, as of a variety of of
other emotions, bequeathed to us by the ancient Greeks is to be
found in the Rhetoric of Aristotle, as we have seen, since Aristotle,
found Aristotle,
like a number of his successors,successors, regarded the the job of exciting
exciting or
assuaging the the passions as a part of the art of persuasion. Aristotle's
the art
definition aiskhune
definition of aiskhune in this treatise runs as follows (2.6, 1383b 1 2-
1383bl2-
1 4): 'Let aiskhune, then, be a pain or disturbance concerning those
14):
either present, past, or future, that are perceived to lead to
ills, either
disgrace, while shamelessness
shamelessness is a disregard or impassivityimpassivity con-con
these same things.'
cerning these
Aristotle's inclusion
inclusion of futurefuture ills, along with with past or present
ills, in the
the definition of aiskhune as a cause of shame may may seem
surprising, since if we feel shame at something still still to come it
might be supposed that we would avoid the situation or behaviour
that will
that will induce the emotion. But Aristotle's Aristotle's definition makes it
clear
clear that
that he draws no distinction
distinction between prospective or restric restric-
tive shame, on the one hand, and retrospective retrospective or remorseful
31
shame, on the other. other.3 1 A key element in the definitiondefinition is the term
'perceived' or 'imagined' (the (the Greek word, phainomena, may also
mean 'are seen'). We remember past events, sense present ones,
and anticipate future future events, and things things good or ill may 'appear' to
us in all three
three modes. If the the ills we perceive or imagine are of the
Shame / 99
kind that bring about a loss of reputation

reputation or disgrace (adaxia
(adoxia),l, we
respond with
with the shame.32 Of course, such phenom-
the emotion of shame.32 phenom
ena, if they
they are memories, can no longer be altered or avoided,
save insofar
insofar as one can perhaps
perhaps change the the opinions that
that others
hold of them
them and thus limit the damage to one's status or repute.
By contrast, one will ordinarily try try to prevent foreseen
foreseen events of of
this type from
from being realized. But envisioning
envisioning an anticipated
anticipated ill
evokes the
the emotion
emotion of shame just as much much as recollecting a past
one does, and the very same sentiment
sentiment thatthat galls us in the
the case ofof
things that have been done moves us also to avert them, if we can,
future.33
in the future.33
It seems to me that that Aristotle has, in a stroke, resolved the
problem of of two kinds of shame -- retrospective and inhibitory
inhibitory -- or
or
recast the question in such a way that distinction between
that the distinction
them
them is otiose. It is not that aiskhune includes both kinds of
that aiskhune of
shame, one properly denoted by aiskhune aiskhune and the other by aid6s,aidos,
proposed. Whatever the case with the French hante
as Nemesius proposed. honte
and pudeur, the the German Scham and Schande, Schan.de, or the
the Spanish
pudor and vergiienza,
pudor veigiienza, classical Greek did not divide the concep- concep
tual sphere of shame between two distinct distinct terms. Nor is aiskhune,
aiskhune,
as Aristotle defines it, a complex idea, as the English 'shame' is
said to be, embracing within the two distinct
within itself the distinct notions of of
the experience of shame and a sense of shame. The
the The emotion, as
Aristotle understands it, is uniform,-
uniform; what varies is simply the
timing of the perceived
perceived ills. The lexicographers
lexicographers are thus wrong to
split
split aiskhune into subdefinitions, for there
subdefinitions, nothing to disam-
there is nothing disam
biguate.
The
The opposite of shame, in turn, is simply simply 'shamelessness'
(anaiskhuntia), a failure of sensitivity
(anaiskhuntial, sensitivity to thethe relevant kinds of ills,
whether past, present,
whether present, or future.
future. Whereas 'shamelessness' in En- En
glish is ordinarily taken to be the the antonym of a sense of shame, as
opposed to thethe feeling of being ashamed, for Aristotle, again, there
for Aristotle,
is no need to differentiate
differentiate the two connotations. His interpreta-
interpreta
aiskhune as a unitary
tion of aiskhune unitary sentiment allows him to treat
shamelessness as an insensiblity to all evils, regardless of tense,
tend to a loss of reputation
that tend reputation or disgrace. A person who is not
ashamed of having committed
committed such an act will not not refrain
refrain from
from
committing
committing it in the future.
future.
1100
00 / The Emotions
Emotions of the
the Ancient Greeks
Shamelessness, as Aristotle defines it, does not not seem to be a

distinct emotion
emotion that is shame's opposite, but but rather a lack of of
feeling or insensibility
insensibility (apatheia]
(apatheia) in respect to the kinds of ills
that
that arouse shame. In the Rhetoric, as we saw in the preceding
chapter (pp.
(pp. 881-3),
1-3 ), Aristotle tends to pair contrasting emotions,
such as love and hatred,
hatred, fear and confidence,
confidence, or pity and indigna- indigna
tion. Anger's opposite
opposite is given as 'calmness' or, or, if it is a true
emotion, as a sense of enhanced
enhanced esteem in response to a gesture of of
respect or self-abasement; pity, in turn, is defined as pain at the
undeserved misfortune
misfortune of another, while its opposite,
opposite, indignation,
is pain at another's undeserved
undeserved good fortune. It is not not difficult
difficult to
construct an emotion that is the contrary of shame as Aristotle
conceives
conceives it: for example, one might might define it as 'pleasure con- con
cerning those goods that are perceived to lead to a good reputation
or approval.' Such a sentimentsentiment we might well label something
like 'pride.' Many modern investigators, in fact, couple shame and
pride as opposites. Thus, Donald Nathanson Nathanson ((1992: 1992: 86)
86) writes:
34
'Shame, of course, is the the polar opposite of pride.
pride.''34 Classical Greek,
however, seems to lack a basic emotion term corresponding corresponding to a
positive sense of pride, pride, though the
the negative sentiment
sentiment of arroarro-
gance is well attested (e.g., in the hubris}.35 While it is
the form of hubris).35
beyond the scope of this book to consider consider all the reasons why
Aristotle and his contemporaries may not have identified identified pride as
an emotion, perhaps one factor factor is that in the
the competitive world of of
Greek city-state society, people were more likely to be struggling
to preserve theirtheir status under the critical
critical gaze of their fellow
citizens than to be basking in their admiration (d. (cf. chapter 2,
p. 75).
75). They were concerned
concerned to protect their reputations,
reputations, not to
make others feel good about themselves. Praise was easily read as
flattery. The pride the ancients meditated
meditated on was that which goes
36
before
before a falp6
fall.
Returning to Aristotle's definition of aiskhune, it is important
to note that shame is not conceived as a response response to perceived ill
repute or disgrace (adoxia)(adoxia) as such, but
but rather
rather to those ills that
lead to such a state. It is true that, a little later, Aristotle recapitu recapitu-
lates the definition
definition in an abbreviated
abbreviated form: 'Since aiskhune aiskhune is a
perception [or [or impression: phantasia] of disgrace,
impression: phantasia] disgrace, and this on its its
own account and not for what results from from it . . . ,' etc. However, the
it...,'
Shame / 101
101
wording of the initial and fuller description

description is, I think, significant.
Shame arises notnot at the
the contemplation of loss of honour in the the
abstract, but from
from specific
specific acts or events that
that bring about disgrace.
disgrace.
Aristotle immediately offers
offers examples of the
the kinds of ills he has
in mind:
If shame
shame is as we have defined
defined it, then
then it follows that
that we feel shame
shame for
those kinds
kinds of ills that seem
seem disgraceful,
disgraceful, either
either fc:
fcr :::curselves
:lIselves or those
those we
care about. Such are all those
those actions
actions that arise out
out of vice, for example
throwing away
away one's shield or fleeing;
fleeing; for they come from cowardice.
cowardice.
Also confiscating a deposit, or wronging someone; for they they come from
unjustness. And sleeping
sleeping with the wrong people, or those who are related
to the wrong people, or at the wrong time;
time; for they come from from sensuality.
sensuality.
Other examples of vices are wrongful

wrongful gain, illiberality or servility,
effeminacy,
effeminacy, small-mindedness, meekness, and conceitedness, each
manifested behaviour, such as making a profit
manifested in visible outward behaviour,
off
off the
the poor, lack of generosity,
generosity, flattery, lack of endurance, and
blowing one's own horn. All these these actions
actions are evidence
evidence of per-
per
sonal defects, and it is these in turn that, when recognized,
recognized, lead to
a loss of esteem and status. There are thus three elements elements that
together prompt the
the emotion of shame: a particular act (throwing
(throwing
away one's shield in battle);
battle); the fault of character that is revealed
the fault
by the
the act (cowardice); and thethe disgrace
disgrace or loss of esteem before
the community at large.
With this schema, Aristotle seems to bridgebridge the difference
difference that
modern investigators
investigators suppose exists between shame and guilt,
according to which guilt is elicited by a specific act of wrongdo-
wrongdo
ing, while 'we feel shame about the the very essence of our selves'
(Morrison 11996:
996: 12).
12). Shame, for Aristotle (and I would
Aristotle (and would say for
Greeks in the classical period generally), results from from imagining
particular
particular acts or events, whether
whether committed
committed or intended, for
example doing someone an injustice or failing failing to help another
when it is in one's power to do so. so. It is possible to make amends
for
for such offences,
offences, whether by apologizing
apologizing or by some other form
of
of compensation. They are limited acts, and do not not necessarily
entail an annihilation
annihilation of one's sense of self. At this level, Aristotle's
discussion encompasses the modern idea of guilt. Shame-indue-
Shame-induc-
ing behaviour, however, in addition

addition to being unjust or inappropri
inappropri-
ate, also testifies to a character flaw or moral failing, and in this
respect it is damaging, like modern shame, to one's self-esteem, or
at least to one's self-representation
self-representation in the world.
world. But to what
degree? " It is only a particular
particular trait or vice that is exposed, for
example
example avarice or boastfulness, and this need not destroy destroy a
person's standing completely. The close connection
connection between shame
shame
and honour in fact allows for gradations in the phenomenological
effects
effects of shame. There is no reason why it must be experienced as
an assault on one's essential being, and Aristotle, for whom shame
was a fact
fact of everyday life, does notnot suggest such
such drastic conse
conse-
quences.
To the causes of shame indicated above, Aristotle adds the the
condition of notnot sharing in those advantages
advantages which most or all of of
one's peers enjoy, whether fellow
fellow citizens, age-mates,
age-mates, or relatives,
for
for example, the the same level of education culture.37 Such a
education or culture.3?
deficiency could be the result of a personal
personal failing, but there might
also be other reasons for it. It is doubtless productive of shame to
appear boorish in cultivated company, even if it is not not one's own
fault. Here, then, Aristotle recognizes that shame may arise from
circumstances beyond one's control, in contrast to modern guilt,
which
which is commonly
commonly taken to presuppose responsibility.38
presuppose moral responsibility.38
Nico Frijda ((1993:
1 993: 367)
367) reports, however, that despite current
theories, his research indicates that while responsibility perhaps
pertains to the way we experience guilt, it is not necessarily a
component of the antecedent
antecedent appraisal; that is, one can feel guilty
for
for hitting or narrowly missing a child who jumps in front front of one's
car without believing one is at fault. So So too, 'Norm violation
violation does
not seem prominent
prominent in the causation
causation of guilt emotions that
emerged after
after serious loss for which the
the subject is not responsible;
responsible,-
for
for instance,
instance, when a relative has died, towards whom they felt
they should caring.'39 The borderline
should have been more kind or caring.'39
between modern guilt and shame seems fuzzier fuzzier than one might
might
imagine, and it may well be reasonable, with Aristotle, to see both
culpable and morally blameless behaviours as eliciting a single
emotion.
Aristotle
Aristotle adds, however, that all such such defects are the more
shameful
shameful 'if
'if they are perceived to occur on one's own account; for
1 03
Shame / 103
it is all the
the more a consequence of vice, if one is oneself respon- respon
sible for what has happened, is happening, or is going to happen.'
In his discussion
discussion of shame, then, Aristotle is not indifferent
indifferent to the
question of accountability. Rather, it figures as an exacerbating
condition in relation to those kinds of ills that do not derive from
vice or ethical deficiency. It would appear, then, that responsibil
responsibil-
ity plays a primary role in Aristotle's
Aristotle's concept of shame. While
Aristotle
Aristotle acknowledges
acknowledges that certain
certain behaviours, though
though strictly
speaking beyond one's control, may elicit elicit shame if the
the deficien
deficien-
cies they expose are closely
closely related to character
character (and
(and hence
hence are
easily imagined to be moral shortcomings),
shortcomings), he is not concerned
with trivial
trivial accidents
accidents that indicate
indicate nothing
nothing about the ethical self self
(we may recall thatthat the Greek word for character is ethos, whence
40
'ethical').4o
the term 'ethical').
Bernard Williams ((1993:
1 993 : 78)
78) writes that
that '[t]he basic experience
connected with shame is that of being seen, inappropriately,
connected inappropriately, by
the wrong people, in the wrong condition. It is straightforwardly
straightforwardly
41
connected
connected with nakedness.'41 Aristotle indeed observes that
nakedness.' Now, Aristotle
one feels shame more intensely when the acts that that evoke it are 'in
the
the eyes [sc.,
[sc., of others] and in public; whence
whence the proverb
proverb that
eyes.'"42 But rather than
"aidos is in the eyes."'42 than being fundamental to
shame, exposure is treated as an aggravating factor, like responsi-responsi
bility in the
the case of deficiencies
deficiencies relative to one's peers.
peers. I doubt
that nakedness and sexuality in general played so central a role in
Greek shame as modern critics sometimes sometimes suppose; after after all,
Greek males in the classical period exercised naked in public.43 public.43
As we have seen, Aristotle mentionsmentions sexual misconduct
misconduct among
the acts that
that can lead to shame, but his concern is with the
character flaw
flaw to which such behaviour testifies, not with with sex as
such.44
such.44
For Aristotle, shame has to do above all with loss of reputation
or adoxia, and since, Aristotle argues, 'no one worries about
[doxa] except via those who
reputation [doxa] who have an opinion of it [hoi[hoi
doxazontes], it follows that we feel shame before those people
whom we take seriously.' Examples Examples are those whom we admire
or who admire us, those with with whom we compete, and older or
cultivated
cultivated people, along with righteous folk not inclined inclined to par-
par
don or forgive. The The opinions of others are clearly relevant to
1104
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
shame, but they mustmust be opinions

opinions of those we have reason to
respect. This again indicates
indicates the fundamentally ethical charactercharacter
of shame, as Aristotle
Aristotle understands it. Aristotle
Aristotle goes on to say,
however, that we feel shame also before those likely to divulge
what we have done,-
done; 'for not proclaiming it is the same as not
believing [dokeinJ it.' Here, Aristotle's shame seems to part com-
[dokein] it/ com
pany with a wholly interiorized sense of guilt. Whatever we may may
feel at the knowledge that we have inflicted a secret injury injury on
another, it only becomes shame in the fullest sense when the
evidence of our vicious
vicious character
character has reached thethe ears of those
those
whose opinions
opinions we value. But this is not to say that that we may not
disapprove of our private vices. Such a condemnation
condemnation of our own
behaviour, however, would take the form of a moral judgment
rather than an emotion, comparablecomparable to the response of those
before whom we feel shame. If Aristotle had considered the the judged
rather than the judging self, the emotion he would have ascribed
shame.45
to it would, I expect, be shame.45
Aristotle's analysis
analysis of aiskhune plausibly
plausibly represents,
represents, I believe,
believe,
the quality
quality of the emotion
emotion among Greeks of his time. To take one
particularly
particularly illuminating example, at the beginning beginning of a court
court-
room speech that the orator Antiphon composed for the defence defence
against a charge of unintentional
unintentional homicide in the year 4419 1 9 Be,
BC, the
the
speaker declares (6. 1 ): 'The nicest thing, gentlemen of the
(6.1): the jury, for
a human being is never to be in jeopardy on a capital charge, charge, and in
one's prayers
prayers this is the thing to pray for. But if one is obliged to be
in jeopardy,
jeopardy, then at least that that the following obtain, which
which I deem
crucial in such a matter: that one know in one's own mind that
one has not erred, but that that even if some misfortune arises, it is
without vice (kakotesJ
(kakotes) or shame (aiskhuneJ,
(aiskhune), and by accident rather
than by injustice.
injustice.'' A deed may seem to others to be the sign of a
defect in character, and hence productive of shame, but true
shame arises only if one knows oneself to be at fault. Shame Shame is
aroused, as Aristotle observes,
observes, by an action of the kind that
exposes a defect in the agent, but the agent is not wholly at the
mercy of public opinion.
opinion.
Aristotle's discussion, moreover, sheds a different
different light
light on prob-
prob
lems attaching to the modern idea of shame, such as the tension tension
between its inhibitory and its a posteriori manifestations,
manifestations, the
Shame // 105
105
relation between judgments

judgments concerning specific actions and those
concerning the the self
self as a whole, and the role of responsibility
versus events beyond our control. The Greek concept no doubt is
consistent with
with a society that that placed a high value on public
46
honour
honour and reputationj46
reputation; it may also be that differentdifferent values and
practices in child-rearing
child-rearingfavoured a more positive role for shame,
in contrast with modern accounts that emphasize its devastating
effects
effects on the
the self
self and the
the importance of encouraging self-esteemself-esteem
in the child. The very idea of a 'self'self' may have differed
differed in antiquity
47
from the way it is conceived and experienced today. today.47 Without
Without
entering into these complex questions, I should like to conclude
by examining the role of aiskhune in two contrasting contrasting literary
literary
texts that are particularly indicative of the different different ways in
which
which ancient
ancient and modern shame are conceived.
After
After the
the death of Achilles at Troy, his arms were awarded awarded as a
special prize to Odysseus.
Odysseus. Ajax, enraged
enraged at what he considered
an insult to his own valour, undertook to kill the Greek leaders
he held responsible, including Odysseus Odysseus himself along with
Agamemnon, the chief commander of the Greek expedition, and
his brother Menelaus.
Menelaus. The goddess
goddess Athena, however, muddled the
wits of Ajax, so that he mistakenly took captive, tortured, and
finally slaughtered
slaughtered a herd of sheep rather than his enemies.
Sophocles' tragedy
tragedyAjaxAjax dramatizes
dramatizes the aftermath
aftermath of these events,
in which Ajax comes to his senses, realizes his blunder, and then,
deceiving his comrades about his intentions, seeks out an isolated
place and slays himself.
himself. The play concludes with with a debate bebe
tween
tween Odysseus, Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Teucer, Ajax's half half-
brother, over whether to permit the burial of Ajax's body after after his
attempt at vengeance.
In an illuminating
illuminating study, Melvin Lansky Lansky ((1996:
1 996: 76 1 ) argues that
761)
Ajax's shame 'leads to narcissistic rage, rage/' and remarks that 'classi
'classi-
cist critics, for the most part, have failed failed to distinguish an adher-adher
ence to the heroic code from from pathological shame and vengeful vengeful-
48
ness' ((765).
765).48 In the text, however, neither Ajax nor anyone else
indicates shame as the reason for his suicide, although the chorus
of Ajax's companions connect the rumour concerning his actions
with their own aishkune ((173-5). 1 73-5 ). How then are we to decide
Ajax's motive?
motive? It is true that Ajax sings (403--4):(403-4): 'Where can one
106
flee? Where can I go and stay?' But the the reason why he wishes wishes to
hide is that 'the whole army would kill me sword in hand' (408-9); (408-9Ji
not shame
shame but prudence moves him. Again, he dreads to face his
father, who brought home great spoils in his campaigns (462-3); (462-3 );
but
but the reason why is that he must must return
return naked, without
without the
armour of Achilles that, in his view, he most deserved (464). The
closest
closest Ajax himself
himself comes to suggesting shame as a motive is in
the
the remark (473-4)
(473-4) 'It
Tt is ugly [or
[or shameful: aiskhron] for a man
shameful: aiskhron] man to
49
desire a long life, when inalterably embroiled evils.'49
when he is inalterably embroiled in evils.'
There
There is, however, another
another possible motive
motive for Ajax's suicide,
suicide,
and that is anger -- the same anger that that inspired
inspired his attempt
attempt to
murder the
the Greek generals (d.(cf. verse 41,
4 1 , Athena speaking; 776-7,
Agamemnon speaking)
speaking).. Aristotle defines anger, as we have seen,
as 'a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge on
account of a perceived slight' (2.2, (2.2, 1378a3 1-2). Ajax sought
1378a31-2). sought to
exact revenge for what he perceived as a derisive insult, but but failed
because of a temporary
temporary spell of insanity.
insanity. Nothing
Nothing in the the play
suggests that he regrets the attempt, or that that he sees it as indicative
indicative
of a flaw in his character. Thus, there is no basis for shame; the the
disgrace that
that he acknowledges derives exclusively
exclusively from
from the award
50
of Achilles' arms to Odysseus.
Odysseus.5o He is distressed because his life is
now in danger, and despite his enduring anger he no longer has an
opportunity
opportunity to avenge himself. Aristotle
Aristotle does not specifyspecify the
emotion
emotion involved in such frustrated rage; rage,- perhaps he would just
label it anger. But it is not shame aiskhune.51
shame or aiskhune.51
A tragedy in which shame clearly does serve as a motive to
action is Sophocles' Philoctetes. When the play opens, PhiloctetesPhiloctetes
has been alone for ten
ten years on a deserted
deserted island, suffering
suffering from
from an
excruciating wound in his foot and surviving
surviving only by his skill at
archery. He had been bitten by a snake snake when he accidentally
intruded upon a sacred precinct on Onthe
the island
islandof ofChryse,
Chryse,where
wherethe the
Greek armada
armada had put in on its way to Troy, Troy, and he was subse
subse-
quently abandoned
abandoned on Lemnos
Lemnos by his comradescomrades because
because of his
continual cries of pain and the the reek of the the suppurating lesion.
The Greek forces at Troy,
Troy, in the meantime, have learned from from a
seer that Troy will fall only to Philoctetes' bow, bow, and Odysseus is
sent, along with Achilles' son Neoptolemus, a new recruit to the
army, to fetch it and, if possible, Philoctetes himself as well.
107
Shame / 107
Neoptolemus's role will be to feignfeign sympathy for Philoctetes

Philoctetes on
their common
the basis of their hatred for
common hatred for the Greek
Greek leaders, motivated
motivated
on Neoptolemus's part (he pretends) by the the award of Achilles'
arms to Odysseus, which he himself
himself ought rather to have received
as his father's heir. But the need to resort deceit (dalas)
resort to deceit (dolos) troubles
troubles
the idealistic young warrior:
warrior: 'Why by treachery, necessarily, rather
than lead him
him by persuasion?' he asks. To which which Odysseus replies:
'He cannot
cannot be persuaded; nor can you take him him by force' (101-3).
( 10 1 -3 ) .
For Achilles'
Achilles' son, force and persuasion are proper methods of of
compulsion,
compulsion, whereas he regards deception
deception as shameful. Odysseus
Odysseus
does not soften the element
not soften element of dishonesty in his scheme: rather,
he plainly calls it an act of theft
theft (55, 7), and sees Neoptolemus as
(55, 557),
the
the robber of Philoctetes' bow (77).
( 77). He explains:
explains:
I know that you are not not by nature disposed

disposed to say or plan such ignoble
ignoble
things, but it is sweet
things, but sweet to gain the
the prize of victory. Be
Be bold. We shall seem
just afterwards. Now, for my sake, give yourself to shamelessness [anaides]
[anaides]
for
for a brief
brief part
part of a day, and then for the
the rest of time be called most pious
of
of all mortals. (79-85)
( 79-85)
When Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus innocently
innocently asks, 'Don't you believe that it is
shameful [aiskhron] to tell lies?
shameful [aiskhron] lies?'' ((108),
108 ), Odysseus replies that
that lies
are justified
justified when survival depends on them. them.
Neoptolemus finally agrees to carry out the scheme, but it is
clear that
that it sits badly with
with him, and once he has obtained the bow
by insinuating himself
himself into Philoctetes' confidence, he begins
to suffer
suffer pangs of conscience: 'Everything is difficult,' difficult,' he tells
Philoctetes, 'when one has abandoned one's own nature and does
what is unseemly' (902-3).
(902-3 ). Philoctetes
Philoctetes assures him that that he is
doing nothing unworthy of Achilles in helping a good man, but but
Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus replies, 'I shallshall appear shameful [aiskhros]
[aiskhros] -- this is
what has pained me for some time now' (906), and he adds: 'Can I
be caught out being ignoble a second time, concealing what I
ought uttering the
ought not and uttering the most
most shameful [aiskhista] words? '
[aiskhista] of words?'
((908-9).
908-9). Philoctetes homes iin n on his qualms: 'How you have
deceived me! Are you not ashamed, you scoundrel, to look upon
me, your trophy, a suppliant?
suppliant? You have deprived me of my life by
taking my bow' ((929-31).
929-3 1 ). When Neoptolemus maintains a stony
1 08 // The Emotions of the
silence, he exclaims:
exclaims: 'He swore to take me home, but he is taking taking
me to Troy;Troy; he gave me his right right hand!
hand!'' (941-2).
(941-2). And when when
Neoptolemus at last last bursts out, 'A terrible pity has overcome me
for
for this man, not just now, but long since,' since/ Philoctetes
Philoctetes replies:
'Pity
Tity me, my child, by the gods, and do not open yourself to the
reproach of mankind by robbing me' (965-8; d. cf. 11136).
136).
Nevertheless, prompted in part by Odysseus, who enters oppor oppor-
tunely at this critical moment, Neoptolemus makes off with with the
bow, leaving Philoctetes to lament his fate alone. But in a new and
unexpected twist, just when things seem most bleak for for Philoctetes,
Neoptolemus returns, pursued by an amazed and outraged
Odysseus, to give back the weapon. To Odysseus's demand for an
explanation of his behaviour,
behaviour, Neoptolemus replies: 'I have come
to undo the errors I committed earlier. earlier.'' 'What error?
error?'' Odysseus
asks;
asks,- 'When I submitted to you and the whole army,' Neoptolemus
says, 'and seized a man by shameful deception and treachery'
((1224-8).
1 224-8). And again:
again: 'I acquired his bow shamefully and unjustly'
((1234);
1 234); 'I committed
committed a shameful error and I shall try to undo it'
((1248-9;
1 248-9; d.cf. 11282-3,
282-3, 1288). With this, Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus restores the
bow to Philoctetes,
Philoctetes, who henceforth has no cause to blame him
((1308-9),
1308-9 ), although
although when
when Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus persists
persists in the attempt
attempt to
persuade Philoctetes
Philoctetes to sail
sail to Troy, the latter
latter exclaims: 'You say
this and feel no shame before the gods?' To this Neoptolemus Neoptolemus
replies: 'Why shouldshould one feel shame for helping
helping another?
another?'' ((1382-3).
1382-3).
What induces shame in Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus is the act of entrappingentrapping
Philoctetes through deceit or treachery. The act, in turn, is taken
to reveal a flaw in character, in accord with Aristotle's analysis of of
the sentiment: as the son of Achilles, Neoptolemus should be
above such behaviour, and in consenting to oblige Odysseus in
this way he shows that he has abandonedabandoned his own nature, as he
puts it. Neoptolemus's awareness of this lapse into vice causes
him
him to feel shame in anticipation of the deed, deed, while Odysseus
Odysseus is
coaxing himhim into it; at the moment
moment of the theft theft of the bow itself;
and again later, and most intensely, when he has succeeded in
stealing it from
from Philoctetes, just as Aristotle gives us to underunder
stand. His shame deeply affects affects Neoptolemus's
Neoptolemus's sense of self,
but
but there is nevertheless a way to negate or nullify it, which which is
precisely by returning the bow and fulfilling
fulfilling the promise he made
Shame / 109
1 09
to Philoctetes in order to win his confidence, namely, that that he

would take him home -- and and not to Troy.
Neoptolemus's
Neoptolemus's change of heart in the the course of the action is
not, however, due simply to the fact that shame is greater for
actions done than for those that are still merely prospective.
Neoptolemus has also been moved to pity Philoctetes,
Philoctetes, since his
suffering
suffering and misfortune have been unmerited (see (see chapter 110,0, p.
2 12). In addition to feeling pity, Neoptolemus has come to respect
212).
the rough nobility and endurance
endurance of Philoctetes; he is now capable
of regarding
regarding the manman he is manipulating
manipulating not not as a stranger but
but as a
friend. To a degree, his pretence has got the better of Neoptolemus,
Neoptolemus,
and the bond he feigned
feigned with Philoctetes has become real. real. But his
newfound respect for Philoctetes means that Philoctetes' view of of
him matters. While lying was always contrary to Neoptolemus's
Neoptolemus's
moral code,
code, Odysseus took a different
different view, and so Neoptolemus
had no reason to feel shame before him. But in proportion
proportion to his
positive regard for Philoctetes, Philoctetes' judgment of his con- con
duct is increasingly important to him. Aristotle, as we have seen,
maintained
maintained that 'we feel shame before those people whom we
take seriously,' for it is their
their opinion of us thatthat we care about.
Neoptolemus's shame is sharpened
sharpened because the vice in his charac
charac-
ter, as exhibited
exhibited by the action performed
performed contrary to his own
principles, has now been made manifest to a morally serious
witness. Unlike Odysseus, the wizened Philoctetes shares the
belief
belief of Neoptolemus that 'it is shameful lies.'52
shameful to tell lies.'s2
In his complex analysis of the things that arouse laughter, Plato
observes that it is legitimate to experience pleasure at the misfor misfor-
tunes of enemies, but but not
not at those of one's friends
friends (Philebus 48B,
(Philebus 48B,
49C-D; d. cf. Xenophon,
Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.9.8, and pseudo-Plato,
pseudo-Plato, Defi
Defi-
nitions 4416;
nitions 1 6; see chapter 5, n. 4).
4). So
So too, as long as Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus
had no personal relationship with Philoctetes, he could place the
duty to obey his superiors (925-6) above above his sense of shame at
tricking, if not an enemy, at least a stranger. But when when his natural
natural
sense of the
the ignominy of deception is compounded
compounded by the the aware
aware-
ness that he has behaved treacherously towards a person who had
trusted him, and whose character, moreover,moreover, he has learned to
respect, he experiences the fullfull charge of shame that his conduct
entails.
1110
the Ancient Greeks
Richard Shweder and Jonathan Haidt (2000: (2000: 406)

406) observe that
'the contemporary Hindu conception of laffa lajja ((or
or lajya] . . is often
lafya) ...
. often
translated by bilingual informants
informants and dictionaries as "shame, "shame/"7
""embarrassment/'
embarrassment, " ""shyness/'
shyness, " or
or "modesty";
"modesty"; yet ... every
yet... every one
one of
these translations is problematic
problematic or fatally
fatally flawed.' They go on
to remark on 'how hazardous
hazardous it can be to assume that one can
render the emotional meanings of others with terms from our
53
received English lexicon for mental states' (407). (407).53 This is per-per
fectly
fectly just, butbut a careful
careful examination
examination of the the value of emotion
terms in other languages can also enrich and clarify clarify our own
emotional vocabulary.
Shame was a vigorous emotional
emotional category for the ancient Greeks.
Although
Although it has tended to be suppressed in contemporary
contemporary Ameri- Ameri
can society, or else treated as a morally deficient
deficient emotion (we are
ashamed of shame), writers in classical Greece saw it as funda funda-
54
mental to ethical behaviour. 54 And yet, we may have difficulty difficulty
recognizing the Greek concept as 'shame,''shame/ since its phenomenol-
phenomenol
ogy and
and modes of expression differed
differed from our own. What Ajax
from our
feels in the play described above
above is shame for us, but not, perhaps,
for him, just as we may perceive the colour blue in an ancient
for
painting where a native of the culture would have identified a
different
different complex of hues, defined not just by a shift in spectral
range but by visual elements that have ceased to enter into the
classification
classification of basic colour terms in modern English (see chap
(see chap-
5-7).55 And just as one may gain in visual sensitivity by
ter 11,, pp. 5_7).55
learning to apprehend an alternative colour system, so too, by
attending to the meanings and contexts of ancient ancient terms, we may
expand our awareness of how the emotions function,
how the function, even in our
own social world.
world. I venture to hope that this discussion of Greek
terms for shame has made a contribution in that direction.
C HAPTER FIVE
CHAPTER F IVE
Envy and Indignation
Envy ...
... is that one emotion in all human life about
about which nothing
good can be said.
Friday
Friday 11997:
997: 9
Feelings
Feelings of envy
envy are ... closely
closely linked to feelings about fairness.
Frank
Frank 11988:
988: 1
155
In this chapter, I discuss in tandem two emotions that Aristotle

analyses in his treatise on rhetoric. The two are commonly trans-trans
lated as 'envy' (the
(the Greek term is phthonos) and 'indignation,'
isphthonos) 'indignation/ and
they have a good deal in common, on Aristotle's description,
though Aristotle insists that there is a fundamental
fundamental difference
difference
between them. In what follows, I argue that historically they are
even more closely related than Aristotle suggests, and I attempt
attempt to
explain how and whywhy they diverged to the extent of constituting
two distinct
distinct sentiments in Aristotle's catalogue.
catalogue. I also maintain
maintain
that 'indignation,'
'indignation/ as Aristotle defines it, was not commonly
conceived of as an independent emotion in Aristotle's time. This,
then, is a case in which Aristotle
Aristotle seems to have introduced
introduced an
emotion, and treated it as basic, for reasons that have more to do
with his own systematic exposition than with actual usage.usage. I shall
try to indicate
indicate why he might
might have been moved to do so, and what
relationship his account has with popular conceptions of envy and
indignation. Let us begin, then, with 'indignation.
'indignation.''
The term iinn Aristotle's Rhetoric that I have provisionally trans-
1112
Ancient Greeks
Greeks
lated as 'indignation' is in factfact not a noun at all, but but rather a verbal
expression, to nemesan. This is a nominalized
nominalized infinitive
infinitive - to is
the Greek definite article, and nemesan nemesan is an infinitive
infinitive verb --
corresponding to the abstract noun nemesis; nemesis-, we may render to
nemesan indignant. ' We shall consider in a moment why
nemesan as 'being indignant/
Aristotle avoids the the noun in favour
favour of the verbal form. At all
events, Aristotle defines nemesan as 'feeling pain at someone
defines to nemesan
who appears to be succeeding undeservedly' (2.9, (2.9, 1837a8-9).
1 83 7a8-9). SoSo
understood, it is, Aristotle
Aristotle says, the opposite
opposite of pity, whichwhich he
defines in the same treatise, as we have seen, as 'a kind of pain in
the
the case of an apparent destructive
destructive or painful
painful harm in one not
deserving to encounter it, which one might might expect oneself, or one
of
of one's own, to suffer,
suffer, and this when it seems near' (2.8, (2.8, 11835bl3-
835b 1 3-
116;
6; see further
further chapter 10).10). Put schematically, to nemesannemesan is pain
at undeserved
undeserved good fortune, whereas pity is pain at undeserved undeserved
misfortune (2.9,(2.9, 1386b9-12).
1386b9-12). Both emotions,
emotions, Aristotle
Aristotle goes on to
say, are marks of a good character, since people ought neither
to prosper nor to suffersuffer undeservingly:
undeservingly: for what runs counter to
worth, Aristotle explains, is unjust. This is why, Aristotle con- con
cludes, we ascribe to nemesan
nemesan to the gods, the point point being that it
assessment of fairness or lawfulness. As the emotion
entails an assessment emotion
we feel when
when others unfairly acquire
acquire what
what they have done nothing nothing
to earn, to nemesan
nemesan may be taken as a rough equivalent to the
English 'indignation.'
Aristotle
Aristotle goes on to note, however, that according to some,
nemesan but also phthonos - the term commonly
not only to nemesan -
rendered into English as 'envy' -- is the opposite of pity, on the

grounds that phthonos related to and is indeed
phthonos 'is related indeed the same thing thing
as to nemesan' (2.9, 1 386b 1 6-1 7).
(2.9, 1386bl6-17). But in fact, Aristotle avers, the
two are different. For, For, as he explains, although phthonos phthonos too is
'a disturbing pain arising from from the
the well-being' of another (2.9, (2.9,
1 386b 1 8-19; d. 2. 1 0, 138 7b22-4),
1386M8-19; cf. 2.10, 1387b22-4), it arises not because the other
person is undeserving, but but simply because he is our equal or
similar (2.9, 1386bl9-20);
1386b 19-20); and suchsuch a person (we ought not
(we feel) ought not to
have an advantage over us. In his fuller definitiondefinition of phthonos
phthonos in
the chapter devoted to that emotion (2. 1 0, 11387b23-5),
(2.10, 3 8 7b23-5 ), Aristotle
states that 'phthonos
'phthonos is a kind of pain, in respect to one's equals,
for
for their apparent success in things called good, good, not
not so as to have
Envy and Indignation / 1113
13
7
oneself but [solely] on their account
the thing oneself account' - - that is, because
because
they have a good that that we do not, irrespective of its use to us.1l It is
this indifference
indifference both to desert desert and to one's own need that that renders
phthonos an emotion unsuited
phthonos unsuited to a decent ((epieikes]
epieikes) person. As
Aristotle conceives it, phthonos phthonos is motivated by a small-minded
concern for image - - it is characteristic, he says, of of people who are
philodoxoi ('enamoured of popular opinion' opinion')) and mikropsukhoi
mikropsukhoi
('small-souled,'
('small-souled/ 22.10, . 1 0, 11387b33-4).
3 8 7b33-4). So
So petty a sentiment
sentiment seems
little more than spite or malice (cf. (d. Milobenski 11964: 964: 62-5;
62-5; Cairns
1 993: 1194
1993: 94 n. 551).1 ). Indeed, among all the the emotions
emotions Aristotle dis- dis
cusses in detail in the Rhetoric, including including anger and calming calming
down, love and hatred, fear, shame, gratitude, pity, to nemesan nemesan
itself, and zelos or emulation, phthonos phthonos is the only one that he
treats as unqualifiedly negative. So too, the the psychologists
psychologists J. J. Sabini
and M. Silver ((1986:1986: 1169) 69) have remarked that that of thethe seven deadly
sins -- greed, sloth, wrath, lust, gluttony, pride, and and envy -- the six six
'other than envy involve involve acts havinghaving goals which which areare not in
themselves evil but which
themselves which have been done inappropriately
inappropriately or to
excess ..... Envy is out
. out of place on this list, as it does not not appear to
,2
point
point to a natural
natural goal. This is the paradox of envy.' envy. 2
Despite the confidence with with which
which Aristotle distinguishes
distinguishes to
nemesan from phthonos,
nemesan from phthonos, against against the view of those who identified
identified
them, in the later rhetorical and philosophicalphilosophical tradition it was in
fact the contrast between pity and phthonos
contrast between phthonos or 'envy' that pre- pre
vailed - - irrespective of of the question of of desert -- rather than than that
between pity and to nemesan.3 nemesan.3 The Stoics, for example, described
pity as pain at another's ill fortune, while envy is pain at another's another's
good fortune
fortune (e.g., Andronicus, On the the Emotions 21 p. 12 12 Kreuttner = =
SVF 3.4
SVF 1 4). Cicero effectively
3.414). effectively transposed Aristotle's dictum con- con
cerning pity and to nemesan nemesan when he wrote (Tusculan ( Tusculan Disputa
Disputa-
tions 3.2
3.21)1 ) that
that 'to pity and to envy [invidere] [invidere] befall the the same
person, since the same person who is pained at the adverse cir- cir
cumstances
cumstances of another is pained also at the
the favourable circum
circum-
stances of another' (d. (cf. On thethe Orator 11.185,
. 1 85, 2.206, 2.2 1 6; Ben-
2.216; Ben
Ze'ev
Ze'ev 2000: 338-40)
338-40).. Consequently, Cicero concludes in a Stoic
vein, a wise man will be subject to neither neither sentiment.
sentiment.
The Stoics, to be sure, rejected all emotion emotion as incompatible
incompatible
with virtue, and were not not interested in defending
defending the value of of
1114
the Ancient
those emotions based on an assessment of desert, such as pity and

nemesan, over ostensibly non-moral passions such as phihonos.
to nemesan, phthonos.
But there was another
another reason why Aristotle's contrast
contrast between
between
pity and to nemesan gave way to that between pity and envy: for
the term nemesan
nemesan and its associated noun, nemesis, were archaic
even by Aristotle's time, except in certain contexts, and were no
longer central to the Greek emotional
emotional lexicon
lexicon (the
(the more exhaus
exhaus-
tive Stoic lists, running to a hundred and more pathe, do include
Nemesis yielded to phthonos as pity's opposite by de-
nemesis) . Nemesis
nemesis}. de
fault, as it were. But the the replaceability
replaceability of the
the one term
term by the
other nevertheless suggests
suggests that there is more to be said than
Aristotle allows for the similarity between the two in his own
time and earlier. In what
what follows, I trace the evolution
evolution of the two
terms and lend support to the view of those who, according to
Aristotle, maintained that phthonos
phthonos was 'indeed the same thing
as to nemesan.' This is a case, case, then, in which
which the emotional
vocabulary of the Greeks themselves
themselves is shown to have a history.
And like most historical developments,
developments, this one too, I believe,
was a product of politics and social antagonisms.
I have preferred to speak of to nemesan
nemesan or 'being indignant' in
connection withwith Aristotle's analysis, rather than use the simple
noun nemesis, because, as I have indicated, Aristotle himself himself
eschews the latter term in the Rhetoric. The reason why is evi- evi
dent from
from a passage
passage in the Eudemian Ethics, where Aristotle
avails himself of the word nemesis
nemesis to indicate the virtuous mean
between
between two extremes: the excess is phthonos
phthonos or ''envy/
envy/ while
while the
deficiency, according
according to Aristotle, has no name in ordinary Greek
((1220b34-21alO).
1220b34-2 1 a l O) . Aristotle goes on to explain that phthonos - - the
emotion associated with with the phthoneros
phthoneros man
man -- consists in being
pained at those who are doing well and deserve to, whereas the
nameless pathos, characteristic of one who delights in the misformisfor-
tune of others (the epikhairekakos
epikhairekakos man, in Aristotle's phrase),
consists
consists in being pleased at thosethose who are faring ill even though
though
they do not deserve such misfortune.
misfortune. Aristotle labels the man
who strikes the mean between these extremes nemesetikos, and
adds that
that 'what the ancients consists in 'being
ancients called nemesis' consists
pained at [others']
[others'] faring ill or faring well contrary to desert,
desert, and
being pleased at these same states when they are merited.' This is
15
why, Aristotle
Aristotle says, people think that Nemesis is a goddess
(Eudemian Ethics 11233bl6-34).
(Eudemian 233b 1 6-34).
It is clear that Aristotle
Aristotle is self-consciously appropriating an
archaic word to designate the emotion
emotion associated with the charac- charac
ter type he calls nemesetikos, so as to have a noun that answers to
the vice of
ot phthonos. In contemporary diction, Nemesis normally
referred
referred to the divinity
divinity who for at least
least two centuries
centuries had had a
major
major cult
cult centre in the
the Attic deme of Rhamnous (for a catalogue
of
of all references
references to the personified deity, see Hornum Hornum 11993: 993: 991- 1-
1152;
52; the goddess
goddess is discussed further
further below). As defined in the the
Eudemian Ethics, moreover,
Eudemian nemesis is a curiously complex emo-
moreover, nemesis emo
tion, involving both a painful
painful and a pleasurable response to states
that
that may be either
either good or bad:
bad: pleasurable if they are deserved,
otherwise painful. So So interpreted, nemesis
nemesis encroaches on pity, as
Aristotle conceives it, since both entail entail pain at the undeserved
misfortune of another. Aristotle's efforteffort to contrast nemesis
nemesis with with
phthonos in this treatise appears
phthonos appears to be something
something of a dud.
In the Nicomachean Ethics ((1108M-10),
l 1 08b1-1O), Aristotle introduces
the noun epikhairekakia, roughly 'Schadenfreude,'
'Schadenfreude/ to name the
opposite pole to phthonos,
phthonos, with nemesis again serving as the
with nemesis
mean. Here, however, nemesis nemesis is restricted to being a painful painful
response to another's undeserved good fortune, while phthonos phthonos is
extreme in responding painfully
painfully to any good fortune, deserved or
not
not (on pain at others' good fortune, d. cf. Isocrates 115.149).
5 . 1 49 ) . The
The
epikhairekakos person, finally, is so far from
epikhairekakos from feeling
feeling pain as actu-actu
ally to take pleasure -- at the ill fortune of another, clearly, and and
irrespective of desert, though Aristotle does not explicitly.4
not say so explicitly.4
The reason for this reticence
reticence is, I think, that the appropriate
opposite to epikhairekakia
epikhairekakia should be pleasure taken in another's
justified misfortune, and this sense clashes with the more re- re
stricted definition of to nemesan given in the the Rhetoric. So So much
for
for Aristotle's rather
rather confusing attempts to adapt the opposition
opposition
between nemesis
nemesis and phthonos
phthonos to his tripartite model of mean
and extremes
extremes (further
(further discussion in Milobenski 11964: 964: 74-88).
Not just the noun
noun nemesis, but also the verb nemesannemesan and the
adjectives derived
derived from
from it were old-fashioned in Aristotle's time,
and where they, or nemesis, do occur after after the
the archaic period, it is
in a limited set of contexts
contexts and formulas that suggest fossilized
1116
1 6 / The Emotions
Emotions of the
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
locutions. Leaving
Leaving aside cases in which Nemesis Nemesis refers to the
goddess, whether
whether in cult or mythology, it and related terms fre- fre
5
quently describe the attitude of a deity deities.5 Apart from
deity or deities.
these instances of divine nemesis, the most common common uses are in
the formulas
formulas ou nemeseton or anemeseton (parallel (parallel to the expres-
expres
sion ou nemesis)
nemesis) meaning 'there is no blame attaching' to such
and such a word or deed. Here again, the the reference
reference is often
often to
things said of the gods, in the hope that they they will not take
6
offence.6 These and similar uses represent represent a substantial percent percent-
age of all occurrences
occurrences of the the root nemes- (apart from from the
the proper
name
name Nemesis) in classical and Hellenistic Hellenistic literature
literature down to the
first
first century BC. Be. There
There are about one hundred such instances instances in
all, of which
which thirty-three are to be found found in Aristotle alone and
another
another dozen in Plato -- amounting amounting together to nearly half half the
total; outside these two, there are some ten or fifteen
outside these fifteen occurrences
in prose. Later, nemesis
nemesis regains a certain certain popularity
popularity with archaizing
archaizing
or moralizing
moralizing authors,
authors, suchsuch as Diodorus
Diodorus SiculusSiculus and Dionysius
Dionysius
of
of Halicarnassus (especially in his Roman Roman Antiquities), as well
as with
with Plutarch
Plutarch and writers of the the Second Sophistic. By way way ofof
comparison, the root phthon- is found found seventy-eight times times in
Demosthenes
Demosthenes alone (a few of these in the morally morally neutral
neutral form
aphthonia 'abundance') .
aphthonia or 'abundance').
IIn
n Homer, aass iiss well
well known, nemesis iiss generally generally aroused
aroused at
behaviour
behaviour that that runs contrary to socially accepted norms. 7? These
norms are not universal in the sense of applying equally to all, but
take account of role and status. When Thersites Thersites addressed his
rude complaint
complaint to Agamemnon, the Achaean troops 'raged and
grew indignant
indignant [koteonto nemessethen t'] t'] in their hearts' (Iliad
(Iliad
2.222-3
2.222-3).). Achilles' far harsher
harsher rebuke of Agamemnon Agamemnon in book 11
evoked no such response in them,- them; here, however, the the defiant
insubordination
insubordination of a common common soldier soldier excites
excites their
their pique
(ef.
(cf. Quintilian,
Quintilian, Inst. Or. 111.1.37).
l . l .3 7 ) . In a contrary vein, Diomedes
silences
silences his henchman
henchman Sthenelus's irritation irritation at Agamemnon's
reprimand (4.4 13-1 7 ) : T
reprimand (4.413-17): 'I do notnot nemeso at Agamemnon, shep shep-
herd of the the peoples, for stirring the the well-greaved Achaeans to do
battle, for just as the glory will be his if the Achaeans should should
conquer the Trojans and capture holy Troy, so too vast grief grief is his
if
if the
the Achaeans should be conquered.' Diomedes recognizes that that
117
Agamemnon's position of responsibility entitles entitles him

him to speak in
ways that might
might well have caused offence offence on the lips of anotheranother
Greek leader.
Sometimes the bare verb, without without an explicit
explicit object, leaves the
motive for the sentiment vague, as when
motive when Apollo feels nemesis
(nemesese] and shouts
(nemesese) shouts encouragement to the Trojans as the
Achaeans advance upon the the walls of the city (Iliad (Iliad 4.507-8). It is
reasonable to suppose, however, that, as a god, he is indignant indignant that
a mortal army should threaten the city that he favours. When
Hera asks Zeus to share her indignation
indignation (Zeu (Zeu pater,
patei, au ou nemesizeH)
nemesizeit)
at Ares for supporting the Trojan side (5. 757-8 ), she protests that
(5.757-8),
Ares has no sense of what is right (themista, (tbemista, 76 1 ). Ares, in turn,
761).
appeals to Zeus
Zeus in similar terms after after he is wounded
wounded by Diomedes
Diomedes
at the instigation
instigation of Athena (5.872); his point is that that it is beyond
the
the province of a mortal to injure a deity.8 deity.8 Rutherford, who re- re
marks (1992: 46 ad 119.121)
( 1 992: 1146 9 . 1 2 1 ) that 'the sense of divine retribution,
common in later Greek and more or less universal in modern
usage, is not Homeric,'
Homeric/ suggests that passages in which a god god
expresses displeasure at mortal behaviour, as Apollo does in Iliad Iliad
24.53, 'perhaps show the germs of the the later meaning.
meaning/' But such
instances are perfectly in line with the gods' tendency tendency to take
offence
offence at mortal audacity or insolence.
Nemesis is sometimes
Nemesis sometimes paired in archaic poetry with with aidos, and
the two terms are commonly
commonly interpreted as designating the exter- exter
nal and internal responses to a violation of customary rules (cf. (d.
Hesiod, Works
Works and Days 1195-200, 95-200, where, in response response to the
decline in human
human morality, Aidos and Nemesis Nemesis are said to leave
the earth and join the other gods on Olympus). Olympus). Walter Leaf ob
Leaf ob-
served more than than a century ago (1888: ( 1 888: 1100 ad 13. 1 22): 'It is clear
13.122):
that the word [nemesis] objective, /I expressing the indignation
[nemesis 1 is 1/"objective,"
felt by other men. aidos, on the other other hand, is subjective, the
shame felt
felt by the
the offender.'
offender.' So too, StanfordStanford ((1959:
1959: 23 2311 ad 11.350)
.350)
explains: 'Two complementary qualities restrained the the fierce self
self-
centred
centred heroes - aidos, which
- which is a feeling of reverence
reverence for certain
conventions and privileges of gods and men;
conventions men; and the the fear of
fear of
nemesis, i.i.e.
e. just indignation
indignation against violations of aidos, includ
includ-
9
ing public censure and generally punishment punishment as well.' well.'9 The verb
aideistbai, however, commonly takes a person as direct object,
aideisthai,
1118
1 8 / The Emotions of the
the Ancient Greeks
and both sentiments are best treated as other-regarding, the one

indicating respect, the other disapproval. Both, moreover, involve involve
considerations
considerations of status. At times the verbs nemizesthai (middle
10
voice) and aideisthai seem all but synonymous. 10 Indeed, one can
feel nemesis
nemesis in regard to oneself, by imagining how one would
respond if others behaved that way; way,- Achilles cuts short a quarrel
between Ajax and Idomeneus by inviting them to do just that
(Iliad 23.473ff.;
(Iliad 23.473ff.; d.cf. Cairns 11993: 98).1111
993: 98).
The noun phthonos,
phthonos, by contrast, is not found in archaic epic,
didactic, or or hymnal poetry -- that is, is, the oral hexameter tradition
that the Greeks identified
identified collectively under the rubric epos. The
verb phthoneo
phthoneo doesdoes indeed occur, but is relatively rare: rare: there are
just two instances in the Iliad, and these within within two lines (4.55-
6). In return for the destruction of Troy, Hera surrenders surrenders to Zeus
two of her favourite
favourite cities and declares:
declares: 'If'If I phthoneo
phthoneo and do not not
allow [eao]
leao) you to demolish them, I shall not not succeed, for all that that I
phthoneo, for you a far stronger
phthoneo, stronger than 1.' I/ The meaning of phthoneo
here would seem to be 'refuse/ 'refuse/ though
though the stronger sense of of
'begrudge' is also compatible with the context.
The Odyssey
Odyssey offers
offers eight
eight occurrences
occurrences of phthoneo ((including including
the compound epiphthoneo
epiphthoneo at 111.149,
1 . 1 49, again opposed to eao). eao). For
example, Alcinous, king of the Phaeacians, says to his daughter daughter
Nausicaa, when she asks permissionpermission to wash her clothes at the
seashore: 'I do do not phthoneo you the mules that that you request, nor
anything else' (6.68
(6.68).). Here, the sense of phthoneo is hardly more
than 'deny' or 'decline to give' (so (so too at 11.346,
.346, 111.381,
1 .38 1 , 117.400,
7.400, and
119.348).
9.348 ). In one case, the term seems more charged charged than the bare
idea of 'refusal' would suggest.
suggest. When Odysseus,
Odysseus, dressed
dressed in rags,
seeks entry to his own house and is blocked blocked by the mendicant
Irus, who claims sole right to beg inside, Odysseus asserts: 'I do
Odysseus asserts:
you no harm in deed or word, nor do I phthoneo phthoneo what you are
given, though you have plenty; this threshold can hold both of us,
and there is no need for you to phthoneein others' ((18.15-18).
tophthoneein 1 8 . 1 5- 1 8 ) . Here
it would seem that the term assumes the connotation of 'be 'be-
grudge' or 'resent,' butbut this sense may be an effect effect of the the context
rather than the sign of a true lexical shift.12 shift.12
No form of phthonos occurs in Hesiod's Theogony.
of phthonos Theogony. The abstrac- abstrac
tion thus lacks a genealogy and even the the minimal
minimal degree degree of of
19
personification
personification that this entails, which is the more curious, given
the vast array of psychic and other concepts that are so dignified,
including nemesis itself ( 223-30):
itself (223-30):
And baneful
baneful Night also bore Nemesis, a misery [pema] for mortals, and
misery [pima]
after
after her Deceit and Love and destructive
destructive Old Age, and she bore Strife,
fierce of temper. Then hateful Strife bore painful
painful Toil and Oblivion
Oblivion and
Famine and tearful
tearful Aches and Battles and Wars and Slayings and Murders
and Feuds and Lies and Equivocal Words and Lawlessness and Madness,
all related to one another.
This is rather unsavoury

unsavoury company company for Nemesis, though in keep- keep
ing with her genesis from from Night, and it is plausible to suppose that
Nemesis here bears bears thethe negative
negative sense of 'resentment' or even
'hatred' rather than 'righteous indignation.'
In the Works
Works and Days, the verb phthonea phthoneo occurs once (26), and
here it is associated with what Hesiod calls 'good Strife,' which
stirs potters,
potters, carpenters,
carpenters, beggars (a (a reminiscence of the
the Odyssey?
Odyssey!),),
and singers
singers to healthy rivalryrivalry with each other. It is more or less
synonymous with speuda, speudo, zeloa,zeloo, and kotea,
koteo, which too are evi- evi
dently positive terms for competitive effort zeloo in a nega
effort (for zeloa nega-
tive sense, see 1195-6).
95-6). The contrast between the the benign sense of of
phthonea here and the
phthoneo the unappealing
unappealing characterization
characterization of the per- per
striking.13
sonified Nemesis is striking. 13 The verb is occasionally
occasionally used in
the neutral sense of 'I T don't mind' into the classical period.14 14
The noun phthonos makes its first appearance appearance in epinician
epinician or
victory poetry,
poetry, and it is prominent, along with its cognates, cognates, in the
odes of Pindar.15 15 Correspondingly,
Correspondingly, there is sharp decline in nem nem-
esis and its relatives,
relatives, in comparison
comparison with their frequent
frequent appear
appear-
archaic poetry. 16
ance in archaic 1 6 If there was a transition from
from nemesis to
phthonos, the moment at which to locate it is at the end of the
sixth and beginning of the the fifth
fifth centuries BC.
Be.
That nemesis
nemesis fell out out of favour
favour just as phthonos became popu- popu
lar, if it is not
not sheer coincidence,
coincidence, might be taken to reflect reflect a shift
in social values fromfrom the archaic world of the epic to that of the
newly emerging city-state.
city-state. This would be the more likely if the
two terms were always as different different in meaning as Aristotle makes
them out to be, the former
former signifying
signifying justified
justified indignation and the
120 / The Emotions
Emotions of the
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
latter a wholly invidious form form of resentment. We have seen,

however, that the the evidence of Homer
Homer and Hesiod Hesiod speaks
speaks against
such a sharp contrast. What is more, it is clear that phthonos was
not regarded as a uniformly negative emotion emotion even in the classical
classical
period.
As Aristotle indicates, the contrast between pity and phthonos
(rather than to nemesan and phthonos}
phthonos) was a commonplace in his
time. As Pindar puts it (Pythians
(Pythians 11.85), 'phthonos is better than
.85), 'phthonos
pity [oiktirmos},'
[oiktirmos]/ the point
point being that success is preferable to
that success
failure, despite
despite the envy it may entail.17entail.17 When the Athenian Athenian
soldiers in Sicily were facing defeat, Nicias attempted to reassure
them
them by observing that they were more deserving of the gods' pity
77.4) . 1 8 Lysias,
18
than of their phthonos
phthonos (Thucydides
(Thucydides 7. 7.77.4). Lysias, in his funeral
funeral
oration (2.67), contrasts envy for others' goods goods withwith pity for those
who have been wronged - - the latter
latter clearly considered
considered the more
virtuous
virtuous sentiment (d. 24.2). Pity, in turn, was associated
sentiment (cf. associated with
unmerited misfortune - - as
as opposed to to misfortune per per se
se -- well
before Aristotle, although Aristotle was perhaps the first first to make
this a formal part of the definition,
definition, and the connection between
pity and desert underlay appeals to pity in forensicforensic and deliberatory
19
rhetoric. 19 To take one example among many, Isocrates (On ( On the
48.6) asserts that
Chariot 48.6) must pity those who are unjustly at
that 'one must
,0
risk.'20
risk. 2
It is
is not surprising,
surprising, then, that phthonos too
that phthonos too -- as
as pity's opposite -
desert.21 Isaeus can say of his clients (6.6
should be linked with desert.21 1 ):
(6.61):
'Thus, they
they do not deserve phthonos,
phthonos, but much rather, by Zeus
and Apollo, these others do, if they acquire what does not not belong
to them.' Phthonos is legitimate
legitimate when when directed
directed at those who do
not have title to the goods they possess. Demosthenes, Demosthenes, in his
speech Against
Against Meidias
Meidias (2 1 . 1 96), assails his opponent: 'You would
(21.196),
have discovered a great rule, or rather a great art, if in so short a
time you could win for yourself two things that are absolutely
opposite to each other: phthonos
phthonos for your way of life, and pity for
your lies. But pity doesn't
doesn't fit you in any way, but just the opposite:opposite:
hatred
hatred and phthonos
phthonos and anger. That's what what you deserve for what
you do.' Meidias, according
according to Demosthenes,
Demosthenes, has earned phthonos,
earnedphthonos,
because his arrogance warranted.22 Towards
arrogance and privilege are not warranted.22
such an individual, phthonos
phthonos is perfectly appropriate,
appropriate, even re-
121
quired. Isocrates,
Isocrates, in in his speech, Panathenaicus (23 (23),), speaks of of
others as 'unjustly feeling phthonos'phthonos' towards him him (adikas
(adikos ... ...
phthonountas), and proposes proposes to teach them that 'they hold this
view neither
neither justly nor rightly' (has
(hos ou dikaias
dikaios oude prosekontas
prosekontos
....
. . tauten ekhousi ten gnomen). The implication is that their
tauten ekhousi
opinion of him him would have been justified if, by his behaviour, he
had in fact flaunted his superiority. The function of phthonos phthonos is to
preserve the proper hierarchy in society. If a person attempts to
exceed his station, he rightly incurs phthonos,
phthonos, as does an inferior
who pretends
pretends to equality with his betters ((e.g.,
e.g., the gods). Again,
when Isocrates,
Isocrates, in his letter to Philip of Macedon (22), complains
that he as much as Philip is a victim of phthonos, the suggestion
is that he, like Philip, is entitled to regard;
regard; this is why the senti-senti
ment
ment is malicious in their case.23 case.23 Clearly the term does not mean mean
'envy' in these contexts, if by envy we understand a gratuitous or
improper resentment at another's well-being. well-being. So So too the verb
phthoneo may carry the sense 'feel righteous indignation at.'24 at.'24
To be sure, Demosthenes can also affirm affirm to the Athenians
(20. 1 40): 'Phthonos is an absolute
(20.140): absolute sign of vice [kakia]
[kakia) in humanhuman
nature, and he who harbours it has no pretext by which to obtain
sympathy,'
sympathy/ in accord with Aristotle's own harsh evaluation evaluation of this
sentiment
sentiment (d. (cf. 1165;
65; also Plato, Timaeus 297D:
297D: 'No
'No phthonos
phthonos con- con
cerning anything ever arises in a good man'; and Isocrates, Antidosis Antidosis
42 on phthonos
1142 phthonos directed at those who are morally morally superior).
We can explain the apparent contradiction in these uses of of phthonos
by observing that it was never a compliment compliment to characterize
characterize
someone as ph thoneros, that is, temperamentally given to re-
phthoneros, re
senting others' well-being,
well-being, and manifestations of phthonos could
of phthonos
be taken as a sign of such a disposition. But this does not not mean
that phthonos is invariably illegitimate. The rich and powerful powerful
might attempt to stigmatize all phthonos as invidious,
might attempt invidious, but in the
world of democratic
democratic Athens, the way to avoid phthonos was to
make proper
proper use of one's advantages
advantages in the
the service of the com
the com-
large.25 Phthonos, then, was not simply a moral flaw,
munity at large.25
but had a constructive social function as well,2 well.266 As the philoso-
philoso
pher Hippias of Elea (a (a contemporary
contemporary of Socrates)
Socrates) said, 'There are
two kinds of phthonos,
phthonos, one just, when a person feels phthonos
phthonos in
regard to bad people who are held in esteem, the other other unjust,
122 / The Emotions
Emotions of the
the Ancient Greeks
when
when one feels it in regard to good people' (fragment (fragment B16 B 1 6 Diels
Diels-
Kranz; quoted by Stobaeus 3.38.32 from from Plutarch's lost essay On
Slander).
Slander}.
If phthonos, so understood, seems to approximate
li phthonos, approximate the sense that
Aristotle ascribes to to nemesan,nemesan, namely, a response to unde- unde
served prosperity (eupragein anaxios], Aristotle himself
(eupragein anaxi6s), acknowl
himself acknowl-
edges that to nemesan,
nemesan, in turn, is not simply indignation at the
illegitimate
illegitimate · acquisitions of another, but but is also modulated by
what we may call class entitlement.
entitlement. Thus, he says, 'the nouveaux
[neoploutoi]a who acquire office
riches [neoploutoi] office by means of their wealth wealth
offend
offend more than than the anciens riches [arkhaioploutoi]
[arkhaioploutoi] ...., . . , the rea
the rea-
son being that the latterlatter seem to have what is truly theirs, but the
former do not' (Rhetoric
(Rhetoric 2.9, 1387a22-5).
138 7a22-5 ). As Aristotle explains,explains,
'What is ancient
ancient seems practically natural' ((1387al6).
1387a 1 6 ) . The tradi-
tradi
tional elites are perceived to deserve wealth and office, office, and hence
escape reproach even when they have done nothing nothing to earn them.
This connection between nemesan and status is not very different different
from the way the term is used in Homer.
from
All in all, then, nemesis appears to overlap considerably
considerably with
phthonos in classical Greek. Both terms represent an emotional
terms represent emotional
response based on the judgment that a person, whether whether an equal
or an inferior, is getting above above himself. It is true that, at least in
democratic Athens, phthonos tended to be associated particularly
with
with what what we might call 'upward resentment/
resentment,' that is, the anger of of
the lower classes towards the rich, whereas in Homer, nemesis nemesis
seems more often often to express 'downward resentment' on the part
of superiors
superiors -- whether
whether gods or or mortals
mortals - - towards inferiors who who
overstep station.27 Aristotle
overstep their station.27 Aristotle himself
himself points
points out (Rhetoric
(Rhetoric 2.9,
1387b5-8
1387b5-8)) that those
those who are worthy
worthy of good things
things and in fact
possess them them are
are particularly nemesetikoi - - prone to feel neme neme-
sis - - because it is unjust
unjust that
that lesser people should be deemed
deserving of comparable goods. goods. But Aristotle also notes that the the
successful tend to be phthoneroi (Rhetoric (Rhetoric 2. 1 0, 1387b28-9;
2.10, 1387b28-9; for
the
the phthonos of kings, d. cf. Herodotus 3.80, 5.92.(-17;
5.92.£-rj; Demosthenes
Demosthenes
111.12;
1 . 1 2; Cairns 2003: 242).
242). The difference
difference between upward and
downward resentment does not seem
downward resentment seem adequately
adequately to distinguish
the two terms on an abstract conceptual level, although,
abstract conceptual although, as we
Envy and Indignation
Indignation 1/ 123
1 23
shall see, it provides a clue to the different

different connotations
connotations and uses
of
of phthonos itselfitself in Aristotle's own time.
time.
It is not
not clear whywhy the term nemesis
nemesis and its congeners fell outof of
favour
favour in the classical period. Perhaps they they merely sounded po- po
etic, like aidos itself, and came to be restricted to more elevated
like aid6s
registers
registers of diction, even though though the
the meaning
meaning of the terms re- re
mained
mained familiar and usable. We cannot cannot simply
simply assume, as I have
indicated, that nemesis was so closely bound up with
that nemesis with the values
of
of archaic epic poetry that that it became obsolete as an idea in the
society of thethe classical city-state. As fortot phthonos, the the reasons for
its absence in archaic hexameter
hexameter poetry,
poetry, and the morally neutral
or, in Hesiod, evidently positive significance
significance of thethe verb phthoneo
in contrast
contrast to its frequently
frequently pejorative sense in the classical era,
are lost in the the prehistory of the the Greek language. Glenn Glenn Most
(2003) has argued that heroic heroic epic self-consciously
self-consciously banished envy
banished
as a motive to the margins of the the heroic community
community (e.g., the
beggar Irus), preferring to ascribe to the warriors themselves themselves a
spirit of noble rivalry. But the the absence of thethe noun in Hesiod, who,
as Most notes, did not share the heroic ethos of the Homeric Homeric epics,
suggests that phthonos may not have had the ethically
that phthonos ethically charged
meaning that that it acquired in the classical period, and may have
something of a latecomer
been something latecomer as a central
central term in the Greek
moral vocabulary,
vocabulary, displacing, as it came into use, nemesis nemesis and its
relatives. Since our knowledge of everyday Greek in the the period
during which
which the epics were being actively composed is practi- practi
cally nil, it is idle to speculate on whether phthonos was a com-
whether phthonos com
mon term outside the the epic tradition, and if so, precisely where and
in which
which dialects.
If
If nemesis came subsequently
subsequently to be associated
associated more exclu
exclu-
sively with
with divine censure than it had been in archaic poetry, the
reason
reason may well be the rise to prominence
prominence of the local cult of the
the local
goddess Nemesis
Nemesis in the the Attic deme of Rhamnous ((see see especially
Stafford
Stafford 2000). The status of Nemesis Nemesis as a minor deity in myth
seems to have been ancient. A tradition perhaps going back to the
Cypria in the
Cypria the epic cycle makes her the the mother
mother of Helen;
Helen,- she
sought
sought to avoid Zeus's embrace by changing her shape (like Thetis),
but
but when
when she assumed the form form of a goose, Zeus metamorphosed
124
into a swan and overpowered

overpowered her. Hence it happened that Helen
was hatched from egg.28 But it is plausible that the Athenian
from an egg.2S
victory over the Persians at Marathon, located near the deme of of
Rhamnous, was perceived as a god-sent curb on the Persians'
overweening ambitions, comparable
comparable to Apollo's resentment
resentment at the
Achaeans' attack in the Iliad. In her indignation at the Persians,
nemesis, and this gave a boost, as Stafford
Nemesis enacted nemesis, Stafford ar- ar
gues (2000: 88-9
88-9),), to her status as emblem of divine retribution.
The importance of the cult of Nemesis ensured that nemesis
would remain
remain a live idea in ancient ancient Greece. As a personified
personified
concept, however, Nemesis was no longer just an emotional emotional re- re
sponse to the violation of social limits, but a complexly motivated
figure who could feel the very sentiment sentiment she stood for. for. The
epigraphical evidence suggests also 'a frightfulfrightful being who can
snatch away any success or good fortune a human human being has
obtained, a sort of malocchio' (Hornum 11993: 9), and one epitaph
993 : 9),
for
for an eighteen-year-old
eighteen-year-old boy from from the imperial period refers to her
as phthonen§,n Nemesis').29 Unlike Nemesis,
phthoneren Nemesin ('envious Nemesis').29 Nemesis,
phthonos seems never to have had a rite or mythology of its own,
but it too might be momentarily personified. In Sophocles'
Philoctetes, the
the hero, about to suffer
suffer a bout of his disease, hands
over to Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus the bow he had received received from
from Hercules
Hercules with
the words (774-8
(774-8)) 'Come then, take it, son;
son; and pray [proskuson]
[proskuson] to
Phthonos that this weapon may not bring grief grief to you, nor be what
it was for me and him him who owned it before me.' As an object of of
prayer, Phthonos
Phthonos acquires a human character, and one can appeal
to it not to exercize the very emotion
emotion it names -- that is, resent
is, resent-
ment
ment that a man should possess a weapon greater than that which
mortals.30 The analogy with
pertains to mortals.30 with divine Nemesis is clear,
but the positive sense of phthonos was not protectedprotected in the long
run, as nemesis was, by official
official worship.
That the
the gods were believed to be capable of phthonos phthonos has
scandalized
scandalized critics both ancient and modern. Plato, for example,
declares (Phaedrus
(Phaedms 247A7)247A7) that 'envy stands outside the chorus of of
gods.'31 Yet Herodotus put
the gods.'3! put into the mouth of Solon the state- state
ment
ment that 'the divine is wholly phthoneron' ((1.32.5-6;1 .32.5-6; d.
cf. 88.109),
. 1 09 ),
and comparable sentiments are expressed by other contemporary
writers.32 Inordinate success or ambition, like that of Croesus in
writers.32
Herodotus's tale, invites the gods' resentment because it threat threat-

ens to cross the line between mortal and divine. Though Though described
as phthonos,
phthonos, this top-down indignation
indignation is no different
different from
from that
expressed by the the older term nemesis.
nemesis. As Douglas Cairns ((1996: 1996: 118)8)
observes: 'There iiss in many a passage a strong connexion between
"thinking
"thinking more than mortal thoughts" and divine phthonos' (d. (cf.
118-22
8-22 for further
further examplesi
examples; Hornum 11993:
993: 9).
9). It is just in relation
to the gods that the moral distinction
distinction drawn by Aristotle between
nemesis and phthonos
nemesis salience.33
phthonos has least salience.33
We have seen that, in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle explains
the worship of Nemesis by her connection with justice, and that,
in the Rhetoric,
Rhetoric, he says that
that to nemesan is ascribed to the gods for
much the same reason. reason. Aristotle himself conceives of the divine
as wholly contemplative in nature (Nicomachean(Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1 0.8,
11178b8-23),
1 78b8-23), and
and hence devoid of emotion. His His association of of
nemesis with
nemesis with divinity
divinity serves to underscore the distinction
distinction he
draws between to nemesan nemesan as a virtuous sentiment
sentiment and the vice
of phthonos,
phthonos, once he had resuscitated the archaic expression
nemesan as a technical
to nemesan technical term to denote a morally acceptable
opposite to pity as he defined it. But if religious
religious personification
personification
helped to enhance the moral aspect of nemesis, nemesis, it is equally true
phthonos suffered
that phthonos suffered the opposite
opposite process of pejoration from its
neutral or even positive sense in archaic poetry to its status as a
moral failing in philosophy
philosophy and rhetorical
rhetorical topoi of the classical
period, where it is censured for being directed indiscriminately
indiscriminately at
all excellence superiority.34 Even in these
excellence or superiority.34 these cases, it is usually
implicit
implicit that phthonos
phthonos is not so much wrong in principle as
unjustified
unjustified in the particular instance, since the individual in
question is in truthtruth both exceptional and a benefit
benefit to the commu
commu-
nity. Aristotle himself
himself notes, as we have seen, that that people feel
phthonos only at the success of those who are or seem their
phthonos their equals
(Rhetoric 2.
(Rhetoric 1 0, 1387b25-6) and are near themselves
2.10, themselves in station
((1388a6-9),
1388a6-9), the logic being that equally.35
that equals deserve to prosper equally.35
Why did phthonos
phthonos acquire so negative a reputation in the classi- classi
cal period? The answer requires situating situating phthonos
phthonos in the ideo- ideo
logical struggles between the elites and the masses in the Greek
world, and especially in Athens, from from the sixth
sixth to the fourthfourth
centuries. It seems particularly to have been a charge levelled at
1126
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
the poorer classes

classes byby the rich -- hencehence its 'bottom-up' character
character in
forensic and philosophical discourse, as well as in aristocratic
poetry.36 No doubt the term circulated in all levels of society
lyric poetry.36
and had a certain semantic homogeneity across culture.37 But,
across the culture.37
from
from Pindar onward, an elite disdain disdain of lower-class resentment
resentment at
what they conceived of as their legitimate legitimate privileges seems to
have prevailed in conditioning its moral significance. significance.
There is an analogy, indeed, in the complex senses of the term
'envy' in modern English. We We have cited
cited Sabini
Sabini and Silver's obser
Silver's obser-
vation
vation that
that envy
envy stands
stands out as perverse
perverse even
even in the company of the the
six other capital sins, and it gives rise to some of the harshest
judgments in the whole range of the emotions. The popular writer
Nancy FridayFriday ((1997:
1 997: 9) 9) reports:
reports: 'Envy, I would learn, is that one
emotion
emotion in all human human life about which which nothing
nothing good can be said',- said'j
according to the philosopher Richard Richard Wollheim ((1999: 1 999: 991),
1 ), envy
is an example of an emotion that is 'invariably malformed'j malformed'; and
the social theorist and psychologist Robert Robert Solomon observes
( 1 993: 207):
(1993: 207): 'Envy is an essentially vicious emotion, bitter
vicious emotion, bitter and
vindictive.'38
vindictive.'38
Yet some investigators argue that envy is not a wholly negative
sentiment, but may may -- as as in ancient Greek usage -- have a socially
constructive function. The socio-linguist Anna Wierzbicka ((1999: 1 999:
234) judges
judges that '[e]nvy,
'[e]nvy, whichwhich used to be regarded as one of the the
seven deadly sins ...., . . , appears to be nownow seen as a less grave offensej
offense,-
after
after all, it can be said to imply only a desire for equality, which is
one of the key modern ideals.' So So too, the
the economist Robert Frank
((1988:
1 988: 115)5 ) affirms
affirms that 'it may pay people to feel envious, because
feeling that way makes them them better bargainers .... . . Feelings of envy
are also closely linked to feelings about fairness.' And the sociolo- sociolo
gist J.M.
T.M. Barbalet
Barbalet ((1998:1 998: 1106),
06), after
after citing Adam Smith's Smith's ((1982:
1 982:
243) characterization
characterization of envy as the the 'odious and detestable
detestable pas-pas
sion,
sion,'' comments that that ''[ejnvy
[e]nvy is not
not thought of today as a shameful
thing ..... . Envy
Envy is simply the the emotional form of a desire for benefits
which others are believed to possess.'39 possess.'39 Indeed,
Indeed, nearly four centu
four centu-
ries ago Descartes ((1988: 1988: 262 art. 1 82)
182) had already written: 'What
one commonly
commonly calls envy is a vice that that consists in a perversity
perversity of of
nature, which makes certain people angry at the good that they
see coming into the possession of other men. But I use the the word
Envy and Indignation 1 27
Indignation / 127
here to mean a passion that is not always vicious. Envy, then,

insofar
insofar as it is a passion, is a kind of sadness mixed with with hatred
that occurs when one sees a good coming into the possession of of
those who, one thinks, are are unworthy of it' -- a sense very like
Aristotle's definition of to nemesan.
Why should envy have such such different,
different, and apparently contrary
or incompatible, meanings in Anglo-American culture? It may be
that the term is changing valences as modern society becomes
more egalitarian in its ideology,
ideology, as Wierzbicka and others suggest.
Perhaps, too, the
the idea of envy both reflects and confirms polarized
social roles within
within the modern, politically democratic state. Thus, Thus,
Arlie Hochschild
Hochschild ((1975:
1 975: 29 1 ) observes:
291) observes: 'While the moral injunc-
injunc
tion against envy applies to winners and losers alike, envy is
unequally distributed
distributed among winners and losers. In other words,
the socially induced feeling and the rule against it are systemati
systemati-
cally discrepant.
discrepant.'' Envy is both a natural response to systemic
inequality
inequality and a stigmatized feeling feeling at the
the level of individual
morality
morality (Lansky [[1997:
1 997: 330J
330] observes that 'disowning is a major
clinical
clinical feature of envy'). To seem anything other than than petty, envy
must, according to Hochschild,
Hochschild, find find expression
expression in a social move
social move-
ment
ment (292). An analogous social dynamic -- but in the reverse
direction -
direction - may have contributed
contributed to the complex
complex sense otof pbtbonos
phthonos
in classical Athens.
Aristotle, like Plato, Isocrates,
Isocrates, and many other prominent
prominent Greek
intellectuals,
intellectuals, regarded
regarded democracy with with a certain suspicion, espe-
espe
cially in the extreme egalitarian form form it had assumed in Athens
in the fifth
fifth and fourth centuries BC. Be. It was thus natural that he
should have regarded pbtbonos as a vice endemic to democracy,
regarded phthonos
one that
that is excited by the prosperity of those we deem our equals
(Isocrates [Nicocles 8] affirms
[Nicoc1es 118] affirms that 'those who live under monar-
monar
chies have no one toward whom to feel pbtbonos,' phthonos/ since they do
not compare themselves
themselves with the king or imagine that they are on
he).40 As such, however, it was unsatisfactory as
the same level as he).40
the opposite emotion to pity, which which for Aristotle was a moral
sentiment responding, as we have seen, not to suffering suffering as such
but
but to unmerited
unmerited misfortune. It is for this reason, I believe, that
Aristotle appropriated an old-fashioned term for moral indigna indigna-
tion, one that had acquired a particularly high-minded tone through
1128
28 / The
The Emotions of the
the Ancient Greeks
its association with the cult cult of Nemesis

Nemesis at Rhamnous, and ele- ele
vated it to the first
first rank among the emotions
emotions that an orator
orator must
learn to manipulate, thereby sealing the reduction of oi phthonos to
a wholly unworthy sentiment
sentiment - the only one one in Aristotle's cata-
cata
41
logue that is not appropriate under any circumstances.
circumstances.41 Further
Further-
more, the decision to treat to nemesan as the the opposite of pity
pity had
had
an impact on Aristotle's account of another emotion in the Rheto Rheto-
ric - the one he treats first and at greatest length, namely, orge or
-
anger. For if nemesis was the the opposite

opposite of pity, then there was no
room for anger to occupy this this position, even though in the courts
and other deliberative contexts it was was most commonly anger --
certainly
certainly not the archaic term nemesis -- that that speakers contrasted
with pity (see
(see chapter
chapter 2, pp. 66-9).
66-9 ) . I suspect
suspect that, in the Rhetoric,
Aristotle deliberately limited the causes of anger to personal
slights, as opposed to injustices in general, at least in part because
he wished
wished to reserve the idea of outrage at an undeserved advan- advan
tage for the pathos that he chosechose to label to nemesan.
In this chapter, I have attempted to show that the opposition
between nemesis and phthonos to which which Aristotle testifies, and
which
which many modern scholars accept as the full full story, inasks
masks a
complementary
complementary similarity between between the two sentiments, insofar
as both denote a resentment at people who 'get above themselves'
and violate the status rules of a highly class-conscious society.
This is why phthonos in classical prose and poetry could substi substi-
tute for nemesis in archaic epic as the term for divine displeasure
at human
human immoderation (religious
(religious formulas tend to preserve anti anti-
quated diction). The further
further evolution
evolution of the two words, and their their
polarization
polarization as moral concepts, was not due to an original original differ
differ-
ence in meaning (at least so far as one can determine from surviv
from surviv-
ing texts), but was shaped by cultural and historical factors, inin
cluding the
the rise of the
the cult
cult of Nemesis
Nemesis and the the politically
politically charged
use of phthonos in the the ideological
ideological discourse
discourse of the
the polis. Even so,
the affinity
affinity between
between the two concepts was never wholly eclipsed
in classical Greek.
C HAPTER SIX
CHAPTER S IX
Fear
Fear -- of
of death, of pain, of disgrace -- is the main ground of courage.
courage.
w.I.
W.I. Miller
Miller 2000: 201
201
The
The unique function
function of fear
fear is to motivate escape from dangerous
situations.
Izard and Ackerman 2000: 260
Of all the
the emotions
emotions analysed by Aristotle, fear fear would appear to be
the most
most universal, identical, more or less, not only across human
cultures but pertaining to the higher animals as welL well. We might
doubt whether
whether a charging bull is angry, at least on Aristotle's
conception of anger as a response to a slightslight or, more generally, to
injustice, which
which requires a capacity to evaluate the the intentions of
intentions of
others in reference to a moral code. So So too with
with shame
shame and envy,
which depend on complex cognitive judgments. We We have little
hesitation, however,
however, about
about ascribing
ascribing fear
fear to a deer in flight. In
moving from
from these socially conditioned
conditioned emotions
emotions to fear, then, it
may seem thatthat we are changing in some measure the object under
investigation.
investigation.
Paul Griffiths
Griffiths ((1997:
1 997: 8-9), indeed, includes fearfear among 'short
'short-
term, stereotypical responses involving facial facial expression, auto-
auto
nomic nervous system arousal, and other elements,' elements/ as opposed
opposed
to 'higher cognitive emotions
emotions such as envy, guilt, jealousy, and
love' (Griffiths,
( Griffiths, however, lumps anger in with with fear
fear in the former
1
category, along with
with surprise, joy, disgust).l David Scruton, by
joy, and disgust).
130 / The
130 The Emotions of the
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
contrast, has coined the term 'sociophobics' in order to identify

the
the 'study of human
human fears as these occur and are experienced in
the
the context of the the socialcultural systems' ((1986:
1 986: 9),
9), in the
the belief
belief
that the emotions, including fear, are 'not innate ..... . any more than
language is' ((18).
1 8 ) . Scruton points out
out that '[m]uch
'[mjuch of our fearing
fearing is
not
not for self
self at all, butbut for others, and these fears can easily reach or
surpass the
the intensity of those for ourselves' (8). 'Fearing
Tearing for' should
involve cognitive processes as much as love does, though one may
question whether
whether it is the same emotion as direct fear.2 fear.2
Let us turn, then, to Aristotle, in order to see whether his
discussion sheds light on the the cognitive status of fear (later, we
shall
shall have occasion
occasion to consider his views on indirect indirect fear, in
particular in connection with tragedy). Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition of of
fear (or,
fear (or, rather, of phobos)
oiphobos] runs as follows:
Let fear
fear be a kind
kind of pain or disturbance deriving fromfrom an impression
impression
[phantasia]
[phantasia] of a future evil that is destructive
destructive or painful; for not all evils
not
are feared,
feared, for example
example whether
whether one will be unjust or slow, but
but as many as
are productive of great
great pain or destruction, and these if they are not not
distant
distant but
but rather
rather seem near so as to impend. For things that that are remote
are not
not greatly feared. (Rhetoric 2.5, 11382a21-5)
382a2 1 -5)
In illustration
illustration of the last clause, Aristotle points out that that all
people know they will die, but but because death is not near, they do
not fear
not fear it (Cephalus
(Cephalusin in the
the first
first book
bookof
ofPlato's Republic expresses
Plato'sRepublic expresses
a similar view; 330D).3 It follows from Aristotle's definition
cf. 330D).3
view,- d. definition
of fear, moreover, that frightening
frightening things (phobera)
(phobera) are just those
that seem to possess the power to destroy or to inflict inflict the kind ofof
harm that entails intense pain. Correspondingly,
Correspondingly, signs or tokens
(semeia ) of such things are also frightening,
(semeia) frightening, for then the
the fright
fright-
ening
ening thing itself seems near;
thing itself near,- danger, Aristotle
Aristotle adds, is just the
approach of what is frightening
frightening ((1382a25-32).
1382a25-32). Note that, al- al
though we fear fear pain, according to Aristotle, it is not pain that is
frightening
frightening but but rather those things that portend it, for example a
poisonous snake or a poised spear.4 spear.4 The
The track of a snake in the
sand, or a rattling
rattling sound, are frightening in turn because they
indicate that a snake is nearby. nearby. Fear involves knowledge and
inference.
Fear / 131
Fear/131
Aristotle's
Aristotle's account ooff fear
fear shares a number ooff elements
elements with
with his
his
analysis of pity, as his definition
definition of pity
pity makes clear: 'Let pity,
then, be a kind of pain in the the case of an apparent destructive or
painful
painful harm of one not deserving to encounter it, which which one
might
might expect onself, or one of one's own, to suffer, suffer, and this when
it seems near' (2.8,
(2.8, 11385bl3-16).
385b 13-1 6). Both emotions
emotions are described as
pain caused by the the proximity
proximity of something destructive or harmharm
ful. The differences
differences between
between the two are equally
equally revealing,
revealing, how
how-
ever. First, fear arises from
from a direct impression
impression of something
something bad,
and is not
not mediated by inference from suffering of another
from the suffering another to
what
what we might ourselves experience (we (we shall
shall see below that
Aristotle himself gives reason to qualifyqualify this description of fear).
Second, in in the
the case of fear
fear there is no reference to merit
merit or desert:
criminals
criminals fearfear punishment
punishment even if they deserve it, whereas pity
entails an assessment of whetherwhether thethe other
other is suffering
suffering justly or
not. Fear, then, does not involve the complex moral judgment
Aristotle ascribes
that Aristotle ascribes to pity
pity and to pity's contrary, nemesis, or
indignation.
This is not to say that that cognition
cognition plays no role in Aristotle's
account of fear. In modern scientific literature
literature on the
the emotions,
emotions,
5
cognition
cognition is used in various senses.senses.5 At one extreme, it refers
refers to
ethical
ethical evaluations
evaluations such as those Aristotle associates with pity.
At the other, it designates bare perception, which which is itself
itself a func
func-
tion of elaborate
elaborate processes in the cerebral cortex (Rolls 11999: 999: 6).
6).
Between the extremes of moral evaluation - - 'this is wrong' -- and
and
simple perception
simple perception -- 'this is painful' moment that
painful' (assuming for a moment
perceptions may may be rendered propositionally)
propositionally) -- we may may distin
distin-
guish a third kind of judgment of the the form 'this is harmful.'
harmful.' This
latter evaluation normally depends on experience; as Aaron Ben- Ben
Ze'ev (2000: 52) 52) puts it, we do not
not fear unless we have
fear motorcycles unless
'some knowledge
knowledge about the dangers of motorcycles.' Aristotle
himself
himself observes that that there are two ways in whichwhich people become
insensible (apatheis) frightening things: either because
(apatheis) to frightening because they
have no experience of the the danger, for example, the the perils of seafar
seafar-
ing (or of motorcycles),
motorcycles), or because they have the the resources to deal
with
with it ((1138a28-9).
1 138a28-9). Already in antiquity, Aspasius, who wrote the
earliest surviving commentary
commentary on any of Aristotle's works (mid- (mid-
2nd century AD), AD), criticized
criticized the
the view of thethe peripatetic philoso-
1132
the Ancient Greeks
pher Andronicus,
Andronicus, who held that ''an an emotion arises because
because of a
supposition [hupolepsis]
[hupolepsis] of good or bad things' (Andronicus's
(Andronicus'sfor for-
mula apparently cuts the difference
difference between
between utilitarian and ethi ethi-
cal judgments
judgments).) . In reply, Aspasius affirmed
affirmed that 'certain emotions
are generated simply by impressions [phantasiai],'
[phantasiai]" that is, they
arise 'as a result of perception (aisthesis)
(aisthesis) when something appears appears
as pleasant or painful'; hence they are prior to any supposition. supposition.
Although Aspasius does not mention fear,6 fear,6 one can see how he
might have arrived at his conclusion, since fear, according to
Aristotle,
Aristotle, arises
arises from phantasia-, but
from a phantasia; but Aristotle specifies, as we
have seen, that
that 'it is an impression of a future evil/ not
future evil,' not of pain per
se, that
that generates fear. At least in regard
regard to fear, then (and,
(and, we wemay
may
add, the other
other emotions
Aristotle discusses
discusses in the Rhetoric),
the truth lies more with Andronicus
Andronicus than with Aspasius.
The
The process of identifying
identifying a thing as frightening, as Aristotle
immediately
immediately makes clear, involves sophisticated social judgments
as well. Among the the causes of fear, for example, Aristotle
Aristotle includes
includes
anger or enmity on the the part of people who have the power
dunamenoi) to inflict harm or pain (2.5,
((dunamenoi) 1382a32-3 ) . Hatred or
(2.5, 1382a32-3).
enmity, as we saw in chapter 2, involves involves a disposition
disposition to cause
harm, whereas anger is by definition
definition a desire for
for a perceptible
perceptible kind
of
of revenge.
revenge. The ability to do harm, then, is not not in itself frighten
frighten-
ing, unless it is accompanied
accompanied by a hostile intention. But this
means that, to feel fear, we must understand the the nature of anger
and hatred, which themselves depend on complex judgments judgments (e.g.,
the
the significance of a slight or insult, and the the contexts in which a
given gesture counts as such).
Broadly speaking,
speaking, according
according to Aristotle, those people are fright fright-
ening who are unjust or arrogant,
arrogant, who fearfear us or are our competi-
competi
tors, whom we have wronged or who have wronged us, and indeed
anyone who is in a position to do us a bad turn, since, Aristotle
says, human beings will usually take advantage advantage of others if they
can (2.5, 11382b8-9).
382b8-9). The The chief catalyst
catalyst of fear in all these cases is
the
the superior strength of the the other party (2.5,
(2.5, 1382b 1 5-19). So too
1382bl5-19).
confidence ((to
to tharsos), which
which Aristotle characterizes
characterizes as thethe oppo
oppo-
site of fear, derives from
from the
the knowledge that that any rivals we may
have are either
either weak or of a friendly
friendly disposition, or else that that we
have more or stronger allies on our side (2.5, 1383a22-5
1383a22-5).) . Aristotle
Fear / 133
1 33
adds that confidence is inspired also by inference and comparison.

comparison.
Thus, we shall be confident
confident if we believe that we have defeated
people who are equal to or stronger than our enemies and rivals, or
that
that we have more wealth, friends, land, and materiel for war (2,
war (2,
7
55.1383a32-b3)
. 1383a32-b3 ) than
than they do.
do.7 In turn, people are rendered fearful
fearful if
if
they are reminded that more powerful
powerful people than they have
suffered
suffered reversals, since this causes them
them to recognize their
their own
vulnerability ((1383a.8-12)
vulnerability 1383a.8-12) -
- an inference from
from the fate of others
others
that is reminiscent
reminiscent of Aristotle's analysis of pity.
William Fortenbaugh describes well the complex role of ratioci
William ratioci-
nation in Aristotle's conception of fear
fear (2002: 1103).
03). A frightened
frightened
soldier, he explains,
sees a cloud of dust on the horizon and connects the the cloud
cloud with
with an
advancing army. He thinks the army hostile and capable of taking
taking his life,
which
which he values dearly. Making these connections is the
these connections the work
work of logos
[reason] (428a24);
(428a24); it also sets the stage
stage for a further
further exercise of logos. As
Aristotle tells us, fear makes men men ready to deliberate 1 38SaS).
deliberate (Rhet. 1385a5).
Believing themselves in danger, menmen desire safety and
and engage in practical
deliberations logos, in
deliberations ('whether to do this or that?'). That too requires logos,
8
which animals
which animals have no share.s
share.
Like anger, hatred, shame, and

and envy, fear, for Aristotle, was not not an
instinctive
instinctive aversion but a socially conditioned response in which which
relations of power and judgments
judgments concerning the the status and atti
atti-
tudes of others play a crucial role -- a subject for 'sociophobics,
'sociophobics,'' ifif
you like. Aristotle's conception of fear
fear pertains to that same world
of intense competition
competition and struggle for dominance that that we have
identified
identified as the
the context for most of the the emotions that he dis- dis
cusses in the Rhetoric.
To understand better how an apparently visceral reaction like
fear
fear can depend essentially on reasoning and evaluation, we may
appeal to the neurological
neurological analysis
analysis proposed by the physiologist
physiologist
Joseph LeDoux.
LeDoux. LeDoux
LeDoux recognizes that emotions have an impor- impor
tant cognitive
tant dimension, but he maintains that
cognitive dimension, '[t)he perceptual
that '[t]he
representation of an object and the the evaluation of an object are
separately processed
processed in the
the brain ...
... It is, indeed, possible for your
brain to know that
that something is good or bad before it knows
134
134 / The Emotions
exactly what it is' ((1996:

1 996: 69).
69). Thus, a snake-like object may cause
us to recoil before we determine, by slower neural pathways,
whether
whether the stimulus was in fact a dangerous reptile rather than,
say, a stick ((contra
contra Rolls 11999: 999: 6, 997,
7, 1104).
04). At this point, we can
correct our instinctive reaction (284). By 'good or bad,'
bad/ LeDoux
means simply 'positive or negative,' that
means that is, productive of aversion
or attraction. LeDoux does docs not
not indicate, however, what what relation
must obtain between the two neural events in order for a response
must
to qualify
qualify as fear. Is it enough to rear back at a snake-like thing,
even
even if one subsequently recognizes
recognizes that it is not in fact harmful,
or indeed that
that it constitutes
constitutes a tasty dinner item? Or must the
initial reaction be confirmed by the judgment that
initial that the object was
in fact dangerous if we are to speak of fear fear proper, and not
not just an
instinctive
instinctive reflex like the so-called startle response that is conse- conse
quent
quent upon a sudden
sudden loud noise?noise? For Aristotle, at all events, the
reflex alone is not an emotion:
emotion: for it to be a pathos
pathos requires that
one also have evaluated the object as being harmful, and hence
involves higher-order processes.9
higher-order neural processes.9
Fear for Aristotle
Aristotle is ((to to repeat
repeat his definition)
definition) a 'pain or distur-
distur
bance deriving fromfrom an impression
impression of a future eviL'evil.' The impres
impres-
sion includes the judgment
judgment or, or, perhaps more accurately, it is an
impression
impression of something
something already evaluated as harmful. harmful. Such an
impression is disturbing, and the result is fear. Fear, then, just is
the disturbance associated
associated with the impression
impression of harm, just as
anger is the desire
desire for revenge
revenge in response to a slight. Opinions
Opinions
may, of course, differ
differ about what constitutes
constitutes harm: Socrates
Socrates and
later thinkers such as the Stoics and Epicureans denied that death
was an evil, and to one who holds this view, the approach of death
is not
not a cause of fear. But if one considers a given event to be
harmful, and the the threat of it to be imminentimminent (for(for example, an
attack on the part of a powerful enemy), then one fears it. Fear is
not the sign of a moral or other deficiency; it just is the response to
a credible danger.
danger. Indeed,
Indeed, failure to experience fear in such cir cir-
cumstances would testify
cumstances testify rather to a cognitive deficit. Aristotle
makes
makes this clear in his analysis of courage, where he argues
(Nicomachean Ethics 11115b23-8)
(Nicomachean 1 1 5b23-8 ) that 'it is for the sake of what is
noble that the courageous man stands fast and does what courage
requires. Of those who go to excess, there is no name for the man
Fear !/ 135
who
who acts out out of lack of fear [aphobia] ....,
fear [aphabia] . , but
. but such a person would
be either mad or insensible
insensible to pain, if he feared
feared nothing, whether
an earthquake or seawaves, as they say is the case with with the
Celts.'10 So
Celts.dO So too, when
when Socrates, in Xenophon's Memorabilia (4.6. 10),
Memorabilia (4.6.10),
asks Euthydemus:
Euthydemus: 'Don't you think think that
that it is useful
useful to be ignorant
when it comes to terrible
terrible and dangerous things?'
things? ' Euthydemus
replies: 'On the contrary.' 'Then, those who are not afraid afraid of such
things
things because they do not know what what they
they are are not courageous
at all ? ' asks Socrates.
all?' Socrates. 'Right, for on that
that basis, many madmen and
cowards would be deemed courageous' (in (in the continuation,
continuation,
Socrates concludes that those who know how to make the right
use of terrible and dangerous
dangerous things are truly courageous).
courageous).Again,
Again,
Socrates says to Pericles, son of the famous general, in reference to
the famous
the decline of Athens's martial confidence
confidence after
after losses in battles
to the Boeotians:
Confidence [to tharrosl

thanos] instils carelessness, negligence [rathumia], and
negligence [rathumial,
heedlessness, whereas fear
fear makes people more attentive,
attentive, more obedient,
obedient,
and more orderly. You can judge
judge this by what
what happens on ships: whenever
whenever
the sailors fear
fear nothing,
nothing, they
they are bursting with disorder, but when
when they
fear
fear a storm or enemies,
enemies, they not
not only do all that they
they are commanded
commanded
II
but silently await members of a chorus. 11
await instructions, just like members
irrational, as Aristotle puts it, 'fear

Far from being irrational, 'fear makes people
deliberative [bauleutikos (Rhetoric 2.5, 1382a5
[bouleutikos]'l' (Rhetoric 1382a5).).
During the famous battle at Thermopylae, in which three hun- hun
dred Spartans lost their lives defending a pass against the invading
Persians, a certain Aristodemus,
Aristodemus, Herodotus tells us (7.229-31),
( 7.229-3 1 ),
missed thethe fighting because of eye trouble. Upon returning alive
to Sparta,
Sparta, he was the the object of 'reproach and dishonour' (oneidas,
(oneidos,
timie), and was dubbed 'he who trembled' (ho
aatimie], (ho tresas, 23 1 ). Later,
231).
however, at the battle of Plataea,
Plataea, Aristodemus removed the the stigma,
for
for he was far the best among the fighters, in Herodotus's judgjudg
ment (9. 7 1 ) . The Spartans,
(9.71). Spartans, however, refused
refused to grant himhim this
honour, because 'he clearly desired to die, on account of the
censure that
that attached to him, and only by raging madly and
leaving the battle formation did he demonstrate great deeds;
Posidonius, however, was a commendable man although he did
not wish to die, and precisely to this extent extent he was the better.'
Herodotus hints that envy might might have motivated the Spartans'
preference, but it is clear that courage was perceived not as a
disregard
disregard for death, but but as vacuous without the fear of it. it.
The idea that fearfear is simply the response to danger, above all in
the
the form
form of an enemy in a position to do one harm, makes a
difference
difference to how we understand the the nature and function of fear
in Greek literature. We may take as our first example the duel
between Hector and Achilles at the beginning of the twenty twenty-
second book of the Iliad. Hector stands alone outside the the walls of of
Troy, waiting
waiting nervously as Achilles
Achilles races towards him him for the the
final
final showdown after after the slaying of Patroclus.
Patroclus. Hector's mother
and father
father have attempted
attempted in vain to dissuade him from from facing his
more powerful \pherteros) adversary (40),
powerful (pherteros) (40), but Hector is deter-
but Hector deter
mined. Were it for martial pride alone, he might have retreated
into the safety of the city, but he is ashamed (105) ( 105) at the losses he
caused to the Trojan side by keeping the army in the field after after
Achilles' return to battle, and rather than face the Trojan men and
women he prefers to take his chances with Achilles. Caught
between shame and fear, Hector indulges in a strange reverie: he
imagines that he might lay down his armour and promise Achilles
to yield up Helen and all Troy's riches to the Achaeans. Achaeans. But he
knows that
that such a gesture is futile. The issue between him and
Achilles has transcended the the original cause of thethe war,
war, and Achil
Achil-
les, he reflects,
reflects, will kill him shamelessly, naked as he is, like a
woman ((124-5).
124-5). And so he decides to fight, but as Achilles draws
near, his armour blazing like the sun, a trembling
trembling seizes him and,
unable to stand his ground, he flees in fear ((bebe de phobetheis, 1137).
dephobetheis, 3 7 ) . 1 n2
Fearing and avoiding a stronger opponent iiss natural; only shame
at a previous lapse in judgment - - not shame at taking flight
flight itself
itself -
prevents Hector from from seeking refuge within the walls of Troy.
When Nestor, beset by the Trojans, proposed flight (phobos) (phobos) to
Diomedes ((8.139),
8 . 1 39), the greatest Achaean warrior after after Achilles,
Achilles,
Diomedes hesitated
hesitated at the thought that Hector would boast to the
Trojans that he, Diomedes,
Diomedes, had been put to rout in fear of him him
(phobeumenos, 1149),
(phobeumenos, 49), but in the
the end he yielded to Nestor's good
judgment and turned his horses to flight (phugade, 1157
flight (phugade, 5 7 answering
answering
to phobonde, 139).139). A scholiast
scholiast remarks of this passage, I'A A timely
timely
Fear / 137
13 7
retreat
retreat brings
brings no
no shame';
shame'; so so too
too Agamemnon
Agamemnon asserts
asserts ((14.80):
1 4.80): 'There
'There
13
is nothing invidious in fleeing harm [kakon]. 1 l3 Momentarily
harm [kakon].' Momentarily
paralysed by two conflicting emotions, Hector fantasizes fantasizes a way
of saving his life while retaining his honour, but but he immedi
immedi-
ately
ately realizes that this is impossible and decides decides to stand firm. As
Achilles approaches,
approaches, however, Hector's resolution, which which had
been prompted by shame, yields to fear fear ((danger,
danger, as Aristotle says,
is the approach of what is frightening,
frightening, while 'things that are
remote are not greatly feared'), and he takes to his heels.14 heels.14 We may
recall Aristotle's definition of the emotionsemotions as 'those things on
account of which people
people change their minds and differ differ in regard to
their judgments.
judgments.' 1 l
15S
Jean Delumeau, in his study of episodes of mass fear fear in Europe
Europe
from
from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, observes that the
chivalric code treated fearfear as shameful, and it is rarely mentioned
mentioned
in knightly literature ((1978:1978: 114, 4, citing Delpierre 11973: 9 73 : 7).
7). As
opposed to this 'archetype of the the fearless
fearless knight' ((15),I S ), ititisisthe
the
humble whowho are fearful
fearful ((16).
1 6). Even after
after the
the French revolution,
when the humble classes took power, they mimed the fearless-
when fearless
ness of the
the nobility ((17).
1 7) . AsAsa aresult,
result,Delumeau
Delumeau asserts,
asserts,a acon con-
spiracy of silence has surrounded
surrounded the the history of fear. Only with
modern warfare has a real change occurred: occurred:
It is probable
probable that knights in times past, impulsive, accustomed to war
and duels,
duels, who hurled their doomed
doomed bodies into the fray,fray, were less
conscious than soldiers of thethe twentieth century of the
the dangers
dangers of com-
com
bat, and so less susceptible to fear. In our times, at all events, fear
fear before
the enemy has become the rule. rule. On the basis of surveys
surveys taken in the
American army in Tunisia
Tunisia and the Pacific during the Second World War,
the Second War,
it turns out that only one in a hundred men asserted
asserted that they had never
been afraid. (21 ))16
16
The medieval
medieval contempt
contempt for fear
fear has its roots in antiquity, accord-
accord
ing to Delumeau: 'Fear
Tear proves souls ignoble' (degeneres
(degeneres animas
animos
timor aiguit], says Dido to her sister
timoi arguit), sister Anna (Virgil, Aeneid 4. 13,
Aeneid 4.13,
cited in Delumeau
Delumeau 19 78: 115),
1978: 5 ), although, curiously
curiously enough, she
begins her speech by confessing thatthat 'dreams are terrifying
terrifying me' (9),
and goes on to express
express her anxiety for Aeneas. SoSo too, the Homeric
138 / The Emotions
138 Emotions of the
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
Greeks
scholia (ad (ad 13.95)

13.951 remark that 'it is a Greek trait trait to appeal to
shame;
shame,- among the barbarians, Hector appeals not to what is
shameful
shameful but but rather to fear' (ef. (cf. Iliad 12.250) as a means of encour-
encour
aging them
them to fight (he threatens to stab laggards with his spear)
fight (he spear)..
17
Fear iiss already considered a sign ooff a debased spirit. l ?
Homer's Hector, however, iiss not not a coward.
coward. His fear fear iiss the
register of Achilles'
Achilles' superior power, as Aristotle might might express it.
Not to fear, in his circumstances,
circumstances, would be to fail fail to take account
account
of the realities. Achilles himself
of the himself is afraid (deisas, 2 1 .249) when he
21.249)
is caught in the flood of the river Scamander: Scamander: mortals cannot
normally prevail against an irate god (the (the river is personified
personified in
this episode)
episode).. Aristotle's
Aristotle's cognitive account of fear, according to
which fear fear is produced
produced by an impression of imminent imminent harm,
permits us to appreciate
appreciate Hector's reaction to the advancing advancing Achil
Achil-
les as compatible
compatible with courage. Shortly afterwards, when he be-
with courage. be
lieves, mistakenly, that his brother Deiphobus (really Athena in
disguise) is at hand to help him, Hector announces that he will
cease running away in fear fear (22.250)
(22.250).. Thi
Thiss again is to be expected,
since the odds are now closer to being equal. Whatever the case for
medieval knighthood, in archaic and classical Greece heroes were '
not supposed to be fearless in the face of a hostile hostile and superior
IS
force. 18
This is not not to say, of course, that that fear
fear is never a sign of coward-
coward
ice: if one's
one's own side is not not inferior, then
then fear
fear is evidence of undue
timidity, and Hector
Hector himself reproaches Polydamas for such trepi- trepi
)9
dation ((deos, 2.246 )).. 1 9 Obviously, there is room for error in evalu-
deos, 112.246 evalu
ating the
the balance of power: a disposition to fear fear will cause one to
overestimate the capacities of the enemy. Habitual success or
failure, in turn, also condition one's judgment: judgment: 'If'If fear
fear is accompa-
accompa
nied by a certain expectation that one will suffer suffer a destructive
experience,
experience, it is obvious that no one fears if he believes believes that there
is nothing he can suffer'suffer' (Aristotle,
(Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.5, 1382b29-3
1382b29-31). 1 ). As
a consequence, Aristotle
Aristotle continues, neither neither those who have con- con
tinually
tinually enjoyed
enjoyed good fortune nor those who believe they have
already endured the the worst are inclined
inclined to feel fear
fear (in
Jin this, too, fear
is analogous to pity as Aristotle Aristotle describes it). A given event or
perception in itself iiss neither terrifying nor the reverse; what
response it elicits depends on the disposition and expectations
response expectations of of
Fear / 139
1 39
20
perceiver. o As Keith Oatley ((1992:
the perceiver.2 1992: 119)
9 ) observes: 'There is no
physical situation that will reliably initiate
initiate particular emotions,
emotions depend on evaluations
because emotions evaluations of what has happened in
relation to the person's goals and beliefs.
beliefs.'' Oatley adds, however,
that 'it would be strange not to feel fear in response to a believable
threat of torture.
torture.'' Or, we may add,
add, to the impression produced
produced
by the
the approach
approach of a wrathful Achilles.
Achilles.
The
The idea that
that fear
fear arises from
from a credible threat
threat of harm also lies
behind
behind the Greeks' notion of political
political stability. In general, the
Greeks tended to favour
favour parity between contending parties as a
strategy for maintaining equilibrium, whether among states or
social classes. In his twenty-third oration, Demosthenes articu- articu
lates a doctrine of balance of power among the king
the Thracian king-
doms in the north as a way of protecting Athenian interests in the
area:
Consider that this is also advantageous to our citizens dwelling dwelling in the
Chersonese
Chersonese [in Thrace], namely, that none none of the
the Thracians
Thracians be strong, for
trepidation [tarakhe] and suspicion
trepidation [tarakhe] suspicion towards one another
another on their
their part is
our greatest and surest
surest safeguard
safeguard for the
the Chersonese. But this decree,
which
which grants safety
safety to the commander
commander in charge of Cersobleptes' opera
Cersobleptes' opera-
tions [Cersobleptes was one of the the kings] but
but creates
creates fear
fear and apprehen
apprehen-
ph o b on kai
sion [[phobon kai de os 1 in the
deos] the generals of the other
other kings lest they incur
incur
blame [i.e., with us Athenians], renders the latter weak and the the former,
though
though he is a single individual,
individual, strong. ((103)
1 03)
Demosthenes imagines the other kings remonstrating with the

Athenians over the decree (106):
Athenians ( 1 06): 'You, Athenians,
Athenians, not not only failed
to help us when we were wronged, but also created an extraordi- extraordi
nary fear should we attempt
fear in us, should attempt to defend ourselves' (d. (cf. also
23 . 140, 1175).
23.140, 75 ) . Superior
Superior power on the the side of Cersobleptes instils
instils
fear
fear in his potential enemies. There
potential enemies. There is no suggestion
suggestion that the other
Thracians are a particularly timid or pusillanimous lot. Their Their fear
is the natural consequence of their perception
natural consequence perception of danger, or, in
Aristotle's terms, the 'proximity of what is frightening,'
frightening/ the latter
being a function of relative
relative strength. Demosthenes explains
strength. Later, Demosthenes explains
that 'when Cersobleptes stood in fear' (23 . 1 70), it was possible to
(23.170),
compel him (anankazein)
(anankazein] to share authority
authority in Thrace, since
since he
1140
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
was sensible of the the power of Athens. As the Athenians put put it in
the Mehan
Melian dialogue recorded by Thucydides, there is no shame
aiskhune) in yielding to superior
((aiskhune) superior force, only to an equal (5.101).
(5. 1 0 1 ).
We may observe that Demosthenes is not recommending recommending a
balance of terror.
terror. Provided that
that no regime or combination
combination of of
regimes is too strong, none will have cause to fear fear the others.
Since fear, according
according to Aristotle,
Aristotle, is the
the perception
perception of greater
might in an antagonist, it is not not normally
normally reciprocal, although of of
course mutual
mutual apprehension may may arise if one or both parties is
mistaken
mistaken about
about the resources
resources of the other. The Greeks Greeks did not
have the
the modern strategic goal of Mutual
Mutual Assured Destruction
Destruction (or (or
MAD), in which
which dread restrains both sides from from aggressive action.
Where forces are equal, neither
neither party is afraid, and that
that is precisely
what guarantees the peace.
what guarantees
This
This way of conceiving fear fear helps us to understand as well the the
famous passage
passage in which
which Thucydides analyses the fundamental
causes of the
the Peloponnesian
Peloponnesian War.War. According
According to Thucydides
Thucydides ((1.23.6),
1 .2.3.6),
'the truest
truest rationale [prophasis]'
[prophasis]' for why the Athenians and
Lacedaemonians dissolved the peace that that had obtained between
them, though it was 'least evident
them, though evident in their statements [10g6i],'
[logoi]/ is
that
that 'the Athenians had grown powerful
powerful and induced fear fear in the
Lacedaemonians, thus thus compelling them
them to wage war' (Thucydides
(Thucydides
publically proclaimed reasons on either
observes that 'the publically either side'
emphasized
emphasized particular
particular treaty violations; d. cf. 11.88.1).
.88. 1 ). In ascribing
the Spartans' authentic motive to fear, Thucydides is not substi- substi
tuting
tuting a psychological for a political
political or economic cause of the the war,
as Francis Cornford ((1907)
1 907) supposed. The Lacedaemonians'
Lacedaemonians' alarm
is the
the subjective correlate of the the expansion of the the Athenian
Athenian em em-
pire and the
the consequent
consequent disequilibrium
disequilibrium of power among the the Greek
city-states.
city-states. It is the objective situation that compelscompels them forfor
mally to terminate
terminate the peace, if they are not to submit to Athe- Athe
nian hegemony.211 So
nian hegemony.2 So long as power was proportionate,
proportionate, neither
side had reason
reason to fear. An increasing
increasing power gap between
between statesstates
did not
not constitute
constitute adequate justification for a declaration of war,
any more than
than it does in today's political climate; this is why the
political climate,-
Spartans represented themselves as responding to Athenian Athenian inin
fringements of the treaty rather
rather than
than their growing
growing empire. Had it
Fear / 141
141
been for the

the infringements alone, the Spartans Spartans might have felt
anger, if they imagined that their power had been scorned, or
antagonism on account of the harm they suffered. Given how
things stood, however, the relevant
relevant emotion fear.22
emotion was fear.22
When the Corinthians
Corinthians raised a huge fleet against Corcyra,
Thucydides
Thucydides reports, the previously
previously neutral
neutral Corcyreans grew fright fright-
ened at their
their preparations ((1.31.2;
1 .3 1 .2; d.
cf. 11.42.2)
.42.2) and decided to ally
themselves with Athens and petition its help. The Athenians
responded positively - - a decision that that ledled directly to hostilities
hostilities
between themselves and and the Lacedaemonians
Lacedaemonians -- and and in the open-
open
ing phase of the naval battle, the the mere sightsight of the
the Athenian
Athenian ships
induced fear
fear in the Corinthians, even though they withheld withheld their
forces from
from combat ((1.49.4).
1 .49.4). On both sides, fear fear derives from the the
perception of of greater strength -- numerical or or tactical - in the
opponent.
Since fear depends
depends on an estimation of relative strength, it may
be augmented or reduced by arguments for for the
the superiority of one's
own or enemy forces. Thucydides provides provides us with with a textbook
illustration
illustration of the rhetorical strategies employed in such situa situa-
tions. When Cnemus, Brasidas,
Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian gen- gen
erals perceived
perceived that their men feared feared a naval encounter with the
Athenians
Athenians after
after a previous defeat (2.86.(2.86.5),5 ), they
they sought
sought to demon
demon-
strate that the fear
fear was unreasonable:
unreasonable: 'The The previous sea battle,
Peloponnesians, offers
offers no legitimate grounds for being afraid [ to
afraid [to
ekphobesai], if indeed any
ekphobesai], any of you
you fears the the impending one' ((87.1). 8 7. 1 ).
The generals
generals begin by attributing the earlier failure to poor prepa prepa-
ration, bad luck, and inexperience (8 7.2). They continue:
(87.2).
What
What you lack
lack in experience, you more than make up for in daring. Their
proficiency, which
which is what you most
most fear, will allow them to put what
they have mastered into practice in the
have mastered [en t6i
the crunch [en dein6iJ only
toi deinoi] only if it is
accompanied
accompanied by courage and presence of mind mind [mneme], because without
spirit no amount
amount of skill avails in danger. Fear knocks out out presence
presence of of
mind
mind [phobos explessei], and skill without mettle is useless.
\phobos gar mnemen explessei], useless.
Put your greater daring in the balance against their greater experience,
and against your fear [dedienaiJ arising
fear [dedienai] arising from
from your earlier
earlier defeat put
put the
the
fact that
that you were unprepared thatthat time
time around. (87.4)
1142
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
The generals conclude by reminding

reminding the men of their superioritysuperiority
in numbers, and encouraging them to sail out with confidence confidence
(tharsountes, 88), ), which, as Aristotle says, is the the opposite of fear.
Initially, the Peioponnesians
Peloponnesians are intimidated by the enemy's
perceived mastery of seacraft
seacraft and their prior success. The generals
respond with three kinds of counter-argument.
counter-argument. First, they explain
away the Peloponnesians' defeat as a result of unreadiness and bad
luck. Second,
Second, they stress the advantages
advantages -- greater boldness and and
numbers -- which compensate for for the Athenians'
Athenians' skill. Finally,
they assert that the enemy's reverse fear fear of Peioponnesian superi
Peloponnesian superi-
ority, above
above all in the matter of courage or boldness, boldness, will neutral-
neutral
ize their skill itself.
itself. This last is a clever move: move: the advantages
on either side are are asymmetrical - daring versus skill -- and and the
opponent's fear of ours nullifies theirs.
In alleging that fear will block the Athenians'
Athenians' ability to recol- recol
lect the skills they have learned, the generals acknowledge that
fear may, in the the face of what is terrible (deinon),
(deinon), befuddle wits
rather than render people more reflective (d. (cf. the
the observation of a
state trooper in a modern mystery novel: 'Fear Tear makes people
forget how to think' [Lehane 200 1 : 23
2001: 1 ]) . This
231]). This is plainly not the the
kind of fear that besets the Spartans at this juncture: juncture: their
their fear
invites reasoned discourse about whether, in the circumstances,
it is wise to engage the Athenians or put put off the fight for a more
favourable moment.
moment. The fear that may arise in the heat and
confusion
confusion of battle has a different
different effect, more akin to panic: panic: one
tip-off is the use of the verb ekplessa,
tip-off ekplesso, which along with the related
noun ekplexis (cf. English 'apoplexy') is a key term in descriptions
ekplexis (d. descriptions
of panic. We shall return to the distinction between panic and
Aristotle's account of fear later in this chapter.
Fear may be a deterrent
deterrent to battle, especially if the the disparity ofof
forces is great.
great. Again, it may provoke
provoke war, as in the Spartan case.23 case.23
And it may also be, as in the episode
episode we have been considering, a
factor in the fighting itself. We We recall that, according to Aristotle,
Aristotle,
fear arises from
from an expectation or impression of future future harm,
which typically involves a judgment
judgment of an adverse relationship of of
power. Aristotle
Aristotle does not specify the kind kind of response that fear
provokes, however, save in one respect. To experience fear, Aristotle
says, 'people must have some hope of safety [sateria] [soteria] in the
the matter
Fear / 143
1 43
over which they are contending'; it is in proof of this claim that

Aristotle adds:
adds: 'fear makes people deliberative
deliberative [[bouleutikos],'
bouleutikos],' for,for,
as he notes, 'no one deliberates
deliberates over things that are hopeless'
/(1382a5-8).
1382a5-8). Keith Oatley
Oatley 1(1992:
1 992: 20)
20) observes: 'When frightened,
we evaluate a situation
situation in relation to a concern for safety and
become ready
ready to freeze, fight, or flee.' Which of the three behaviours
we adopt depends
depends on a judicious calculation of possibilities that
fear itself encourages.
encourages. Greek fear, as Aristotle analyses it, is not
instinctive
instinctive avoidance.
avoidance. As he awaited the onset of Achilles, Hector
took counsel with himself, like a good Aristotelian. He was not
desperate, but had 'some hope of safety.' In the end, he ran. No
doubt the
the proximity of harm was a factor in his deliberations. But
in Homer too, fear involves cognitition.
Returning to Thucydides' sea battle, Phormia, Phormio, the general in
charge of the
the Athenian fleet, 'was alsoalso anxious [dedi6sJ
[dedios] because of of
his men's state of dread [[oirodia]'
orrodial' (88. 1 ), which derives precisely
(88.1), precisely
from
from the enemy's
enemy's numerical advantage.
advantage. 'I have summoned you
together, soldiers, because I saw that you were in fear of the the
quantity of enemy ships, and I did not not think
think it right that you
should be in dread
dread of what is not in fact terrifying' (89 . 1 ). Phormia
(89.1). Phormio
reminds his men that the Peloponnesians
Peloponnesians will be the more ner- ner
vous because they lost thethe previous engagement. If they are supe- supe
rior on land, the Athenians have the edge at sea: sea: what is more,
'they have no advantage when it comes to spirit - - we
we are are both
more experienced and more confident' (89.3 (89.3).) . Then, as though he
were responding directly to the Peloponnesian
Peloponnesian generals' exhorta- exhorta
tion, Phormio insists that his men need not fear the Pelopon- Pelopon
nesians' daring:
daring: 'You inspire much more fear in them, and more
credible fear, both because
because you have already defeated them and
because they cannot believe that you will not oppose oppose them in
a way worthy of greatgreat achievement' (89.5 (89.5).). Fear,
Fear, then,
then, will sap
the Peloponnesians' courage
courage rather than impair the Athenians'
seamanship. 'When they calculate [logizomenoiJ
[logizomenoi] these things, things/'
Phormia
Phormio continues, 'they are afraidafraid of us more for want of prob prob-
ability than relative preparation' (89.6). Phormio lists several prac- prac
tical considerations that favour
favour the Athenians, and concludes by
reminding them: 'This is a decisive engagement
engagement for you, in which
you will either destroy
destroy all hope the Peloponnesians may have in
1144 Ancient Greeks
their fleet, or else foster in the Athenians a fear of the the sea' (89.10).
In the event, the Peloponnesians emerged victorious from from the
battle.
Phormio and the Peloponnesian generals are as adept in the
rhetoric of fear
fear as courtroom pleaders were in the the tactics of pity
and anger. Since fear depends on the the relative degree of power, each
seeks to represent his own side as the stronger, so as to encourage
the troops to fight
fight rather than flee. In addition, they suggest that,
once the fleets are engaged,engaged, the enemy's fear, grounded in the
calculation of probabilities,
calculation probabilities, will handicap them them still further,
precisely in their
their strong point -- the Athenians' skill and and the
Peloponnesians' daring, since fear fear is the
the opposite of confidence.
Like Homer, Thucydides
Thucydides too illustrates how fear not only depends
on judgments
judgments but colours them them as well. The prior fear fear on the part
of the Peloponnesians and Athenians leads them to magnify magnify the
threat represented by their opponents;opponents,- by reducing their fear, and
indeed inducing the contrary emotion of confidence, confidence, the generals
seek to alter their perception
perception of the enemy's capabilities (again,
we recall Aristotle's definition of the emotions as 'all those things
on account
account of which
which people change their their minds and differ differ in
regard to their judgments,'
judgments/ Rhetoric 22.1, . 1 , 11378a20-l).
378a20- 1 ) . The subtle
interaction between fears and impressions, along with the second- second
order tactic of imagining
imagining the other's fear to stimulate one's own
confidence, lends Thucydides' text its corruscating brilliance.24 brilliance.24
The
The speeches he records (or (or invents)
invents) depend entirelyentirely on logos, that
is, arguments
arguments concerning
concerning the the objective balance of forces. forces. They
They are
anything but the the Irah! rah! ' of a football coach's pep talk.25
'rah! rah!' talk.25
In his comic parody
parody The Frogs, Aristophanes has the tragic poet
Aeschylus boast that,
Aeschylus that, in his day, sailors limited their their chatter
chatter to
the rowers' chant rhuppapai
rhuppapai ((1073).1 073 ) . When it comes to fear, howhow
ever, Aeschylus is as subtle a reasoner as Euripides Euripides or Thucydides.
Of all Greek tragedies, the one in which which fearfear is most central to the
theme
theme is Aeschylus's
Aeschylus's Seven against Thebes. The first words that
the chorus of Theban women utter upon learning that the enemy
army is approaching are ''II cry out out at great frightening
frightening [phobera]
[phobera]
troubles' ((78).
78 ) . As
Asthethedin dinofofarms
armsreaches
reachesthem,them,theytheyexclaim,
exclaim, 'I'I
dread [dedoika]
[dedoika] thethe clamour' (103), ( 103 ), and protest their 'fear 'fear [Phobos]
[phobos]
of
of martial arms' ((121).
1 2 1 ). To Athena and Poseidon they pray, pray, 'Grant
1 45
Fear !/ 145
us release from
from our fears' (132),( 132), and in their anxiety they break
into an inarticulate wail: e he e he ((150, 1 50, 1158).
58 ) .
The reigning king Eteocles, bby y contrast, like a good general,
seeks from
from the beginning to inspire confidence confidence in his men (eu
tharseite,, 34),
tharseite 34), and he is disgusted that the women, 'hateful 'hateful to all
sensible people' (sophronon
(sophronon misemata, 186), 1 861, are producing the the
contrary effect
effect with their frantic prayersprayers (d. (cf. tharsos, 1184):84): 'When
triumphant,' he declares of women, 'their confidence [tharsosj
triumphant/ [tharsos] is
insupportable, but when frightened [deisasa] ] they are a still greater
frightened [deisasa]
evil to home and city' ((189-90).
1 89-90). In reply, the chorus explain once
more that they were frightened edeis1',, 203)
frightened ((edeis 203) at the noise of the
enemy ((cf.d. phoboi, 2 1 4)
214). . Eteocles warns the women: 'Do not not fear
overmuch' (med' hupeiphobou, 238), to which they reply yet
(med' agan huperphobou,
again that the din of battle caused them to mount mount the acropolis
'in panicky fear' ({tarbosunoi phoboi, 240; d.
tarbosunoi phobOi, cf. dedoik', 249).249). Fear
(phobos} seizes their tongues (259
(phobos) ) and
(259) andcauses
causesthemthemtotocry cryout.
out.
Eteocles bids them, 'Be silent, and do not frighten frighten [phobei]
[phobei] our
own
own men [philoi]' (262). His style of prayer,
men [philoi]' prayer, he asserts, brings
'confidence to our men men lphiloi]
[philoi] and rids them them of fearfear of thethe enemy
[polemios phobos]' (270).
[polemics phobosl'
At the end of this exchange, Eteocles announces his plan to
select seven leaders, including himself, to oppose oppose the enemy at
each of the gates (282-4). The chorus continues to fear: they
cannot sleep for phobos /2S 71, they compare themselves to a dove
(287),
(huperdedoiken, 292)
terrified /huperdedoiken, 292) for its young at the the approach of of
protaibo,332),
(d. protarbo,
snakes (cf. 332),and andthey
theyconjure
conjureup upawful
awful images
imagesofof
defeat in war.
war. Eteocles' warnings seem to have been futile. At this
point, the messenger returns, and in the most famous famous but but also
most puzzling scene in the play he announces the names of the
seven enemy champions selected by lot and describes the shield
of each (3 75f£. ).
ofeach(375ff.).
The first
first is Tydeus and his haughty insignia. Eteocles replies, 'I
cannot tremble [tresaim'j
[tresaim'] before a man's m an's paraphernalia' (397), (39n and
selects Melanippus to oppose him: I'Ares Ares will decide the result result
with
with a toss of the dice' ((414), 4 14), he says, indicating
indicating thereby that the
two heroes are equally matched.
matched. The chorus make it known that
they, for their
their part,
part, continue to tremble (tIemo, (tiemo, 4419).
1 9 ) . Next comes
Capaneus: who, the messenger asks, will face him without shrink-
1146
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
ing (me tresas,

tresas, 436)? (He is opposed by Polyphontes.)
Polyphontes.) To stand
against the third, Eteoclus, the king picks Megareus, who 'is not
frightened [phobetheis] of the
frightened [phobetheis] the roar' (475)
(475) of whinnying
whinnying horses
and will not desert the gate at which he is posted. The enemy
Hippomedon 'glances fear' (phobon(phobon blepon, 498), and boasts that
Fear itself is at his gate (500); Hyperbius is selected
selected to oppose him.
Next
Next comes
conies Parthenopaeus,
Parthenopaeus, against
against whomwhom Eteocles
Eteocles appoints
appoints
Actor. The sixth champion is Amphiareus, the only one who is
reverent rather than
than boastful; as his counterpart, Eteocles
Eteocles chooses
Lasthenes, likewise a prophet
prophet and exemplary
exemplary for justice and piety. piety.
Last is Polyneices, Eteocles' brother, whom Eteocles himself will will
face at the seventh gate: 'Who else more justly? justly?'' (673
(673).) .
Here, aatt last, the chorus leaves off off fearing, its concern now
fixated
fixated on the pollution associated with
the pollution with fratricide
fratricide (677-82, etc.etc.).) . 'I
have shuddered' (pephrika,
(pephrika, 720),
720), they sing, at the the god destructive
to the house, and they conclude their ode: 'Now I tremble [treo]
their ode: [treo]
lest the Fury accomplish
accomplish it' ((790-1).
790- 1 ). When the messenger
messenger returns,
returns,
his first
first word to thethe chorus is 'Be confident!
confident!'' ((tharseite,
tharseite, 792),
792), for
the enemy has been defeated. He then announces the double
fratricide, and in its final song the chorus dilates on the theme.
The tragedy as we have it concludes (though (though some thinkthink this a
later interpolation)
interpolation) with the arrival of Antigone and Ismene and
Creon's proclamation
proclamation that the the body of Polyneices
Polyneices shall be left
unburied.
Many critics have felt felt that Eteocles' harsh treatment
treatment of the the
Theban
Theban women is a sign of his tyrannical tyrannical temper;
temper,- after
after all, he
himself
himself brought on the war by refusing refusing to share the the throne of of
Thebes with his brother, as he had sworn to do. do. Christopher
Dawson ((1970:
1 9 70: 5),
5), however, argues thatthat it is Eteocles' 'sense of the the
need for civic responsibility
responsibility that accounts
accounts in large measure
measure for his
violent attack on the Chorus of young women ....;. j all he is trying to
violent .
do may be undone by the irrational emotions of women.' This

interpretation presupposes
presupposes a sharp differentation between between male
and female psychology in the play, in which which women lack the self self-
control and courage characteristic of men. If the the women seem to
give over their fear before the outcome of the battle is known, it is
only because their
their anxiety is now focused on the the stigma of fratri
fratri-
cide, which displaces the threat posed by the invading army
(Dawson 11970:
9 70: 114-15).
4-1 5).
Fear / 147
I should like to suggest another way of understanding the the

women's change of attitude, based on what we have so far seen of of
the
the Greek conception of fear. If, in the first
in the first half
half of the
the play, thethe
women
women are frightened by the enemy enemy forces
forces at the gates, it is
because they believe that that they can conquer the city, an inference
based on their numbers
numbers and the din they raise. Eteocles has
confidence
confidence in his troops, but he fears that that the women's lamenta lamenta-
tions will discourage them,-them; he therefore attempts to browbeat
them into silence or else into adopting a more constructive constructive wayof of
supplicating
supplicating the gods.gods. In this, he fails utterly. In the scene of the
shields, however, Eteocles demonstrates that, despite the vaunt vaunt-
ing of the
the enemy champions and the arrogant emblems on their
bucklers, there are ThebanTheban heroes, including himself, equal to
each opponent and prepared to defend defend the gates. By By retaining his
equanimity
equanimity before
before the symbolic menace of the the besiegers, and
meeting the practical danger that that they pose by a judicious strategy
of defence, Eteocles makes
of makes it clear that the forces are in fact fact equal
equal
on both sides, a situation
situation that in principle favours the defenders.
The function of the shield
shield episode, on this reading, is to make this
parity manifest to the women, who constitute constitute the only inter- inter
26
nal audience in the scene.scene.26 And it works: at the conclusion conclusion of of
the
the scene, they
they give over their
their fear
fear of military
military defeat. Eteocles'
responses to the messenger are thus thus analogous to Brasidas's
Brasidas's and
Phormio's hortatory speeches in Thucydides, counteracting fear fear by
logistical arguments, whereas the women occupy the the place of the the
Athenian and Peloponnesian
Athenian Peloponnesian marines
marines in Thucydides' narrative.narrative.
Once freed
freed of fear, the women turn attention to the issue
turn their attention
of
of fratricide, which figuratively reflects the symmetry symmetry and parity
of
of the
the opposing sides. This new crisis involves miasma, or pollu- pollu
tion, rather than
than the physical
physical annihilation of the city, and the the
women respond to it not with with fear
fear but
but with (pephrika). The
with horror (pephrika).
shift
shift in emotional
emotional register in the Seven against Thebes is analo- analo
gous to that in the from
the Iliad from anger to fury ( d.
fury (cf. chapter 2, pp. 52-3
52-3):) :
a new kind ooff concern elicits the reaction appropriate to it. IIn n the
the
detective novel Darkness, Take Take MyMy Hand (Lehane 11996: 996: 272),
272), the
the
private investigator Angela Gennaro protests to her partner, Patrick
'I'm so tired
Kenzie: 'I'm. tired of being scared, Patrick. I'm I'm so tired
tired of all that
fear
fear turning into anger.anger. I'm exhausted by how much all of it
27
hate. 127 For us, it is natural
makes me hate.' natural to conceive
conceive of the emotions
emotions
1148
Ancient Greeks
as labile and readily convertible into one another. Our metaphors metaphors
of 'pouring out
out feelings,'
feelings/ Sally Planalp ((1999: 07 ) suggests, reflect
1999: 1107)
an underlying conception 'that the body is a container and emoemo
28
tions are fluids inside it.
it/'28 On a cognitive view such as Aristotle's,
however, a change of emotion is correlated with the the different
different
conditions that elicit it.
At the beginning of thethe play,
play, the
the chorus of Theban women are
panicky, and they clearly overestimate
overestimate the threat
threat to the city: their
misapprehension
misapprehension is a consequence of their ignorance ignorance of war but but
also of their fear. As Aristotle says, emotion affectsaffects people's judg
judg-
ments, and the erroneous
erroneous judgments,
judgments, in turn, augment the emoemo
tion. Eteocles
Eteocles is right to worry that they may communicate
communicate theirtheir
fear ((that
that is, their judgment of the the power of the the enemy)
enemy) to the the
Theban
Theban army, which will damage its effectiveness. But the women's women's
terror is not just a sign of feminine irrationality.
irrationality. Eteocles himself
himself
would be afraid
afraid if he thought
thought the odds against him him were insuper
insuper-
able, just as Hector was afraid
afraid in the Iliad. If he calms thethe women
down, it is by showing them that he is equal to the challenge and
is not daunted by the enemy's boldness,
boldness, any more than Thucydides'
Phormio was. WereWere the women anxious over the mere possibility possibility
of defeat, Eteocles' confident preparations would have no effect effect on
them.
My attempt to analogize
analogize the chorus of frightened
frightened Theban women
to soldiers hearing a pre-battle exhortation may appear out
appear out-
landish. Yet
Yet the women do cease fearing when Eteocles explains
his strategy and pooh-poohs
pooh-poohs the braggadoccio
braggadoccio of the enemy. The The
cognitive understanding
understanding of fear was, I suggest, so deep a part of of
Greek sensibility that it even shaped the argument of Aeschylus'sAeschylus's
tragedy.29
tragedy.29
The contexts in which I have examined fear have all been
military. Since fear involves a judgment
judgment of an enemy's superiority,
citizens in a democracy
democracy were unlikely to acknowledge
acknowledge it in re- re
spect to their political equals ((save
save in conditions of class warfare
or tyranny),
tyranny), and mentions
mentions of fear occur most often often in reference to
foreign states. Fear is pervasive in Thucydides' history (the (the root
phob- occurs 1183 83 times; 1160 60 times in Polybius;
Polybius,- 34 times in
Herodotus) and in those orators who occupied themselves with
foreign affairs
affairs (20
(2011 times in Demosthenes, 58 58 in Isocrates), while
Fear
Fear// 149
1 49
it is relatively rare in those who dealt chiefly with with private cases
(phob- is absent
(phob- absent in Isaeusj
Isaeus; of thethe sixteen occurrences
occurrences in Lysias,
eight are concentrated in his funeral funeral oration)
oration).. The Greek cities cities
were more or less continually
continually engaged in warfare, and were pre- pre
pared to meet a rival state courageously
courageously if the battle were on equal equal
terms. But where calculation
calculation revealed a wide differencedifference in power,
it was appropriate to be conscious of harm or destruction. destruction.
I have been arguing that, on the view that Aristotle articulates articulates
explicitly
explicitly but which
which represents a generalized Greek outlook outlook in his
time, the impression
impression that that causes fearfear derives from from a judgment
about the world, namely, that that someone with with a motive
motive to harm
you is in a position
position to do so. so. It follows thatthat fear
fear is not
not necessarily
a sign of cowardice but rather an inevitable response (unless one is
wholly insensible) to a plausible threat threat of danger.
danger. Managing fear
thus involves evaluating the relative balance of forces among
opponents, an exercise in calculation [logismos] and argument.
calculation (logismos)
There is also the further
further implication that that one is not simplysimply afraid:
afraid:
a person is always afraid
afraid of something. So So stated, thethe Aristotelian
Aristotelian
view of fear would seem to dismiss the the possibility
possibility of two two affects
affects
closely connected to fear: panic and anxiety.
Fear, as Jean Delumeau puts it (1978: ( 1 978: 30), 'relates to what is
known,'
known/ whereas anxiety relates 'to the unknown.30 Fear has a
the unknown.3o
determinate object that that one can confront. Anxiety does not, and is
experienced
experienced as a painful anticipation before a danger that is the
identified.'31 Outside the Rheto
more terrible for not being clearly identified.13l Rheto-
ric, Aristotle does allow the the possibility of fear in the the absence of a
perceived cause. In his treatise On the Soul ((1.1, l . l, 403a23-4J
403a23-4) he
observes that
that ''even
even though nothing frightening
frightening befalls them, people
do find
find themselves experiencing the the feelings of someone who is
afraid.'
afraid/ Although such fear, detached from from a specific object, re- re
sembles the the modern conception
conception of anxiety, Aristotle does not
develop
develop thethe idea of a free-floating
free-floating state of apprehension
apprehension detached
detached
from
from an impression of specific harm. It was the the Epicureans, with with
their
their hypothesis
hypothesis that
that irrational fears and desires have their their roots
in an unacknowledged
unacknowledged fear fear of death, who distinguished two types
of
of fear, the one responding to a concrete object, the the other to a
vague and indefinite impression. In the the second century AD, a
great inscription was erected in the the town of Oenoanda (now (now in
1150
southwestern Turkey), summarizing Epicurean Epicurean doctrine;

doctrine,- one of of
the
the still legible portions reads (35 (35 II Smith)
Smith):: 'As a matter of fact
this fear
fear is sometimes clear, sometimes not clear -- clear when we
avoid something manifestly harrnful harmful like fire through fearfear that we
shall meet death by it, not clear when, while the mind mind is occupied
with something else, it (fear) has insinuated itself into our nature
, , 132 The
32
lurksl ...,'
and [[lurks] The fear of death is of this latter kind, since, as
the Epicureans
Epicureans put it, 'Death iiss nothing to us' (Epicurus, Letter
to Menoeceus 1124; 24; Principal Doctrines
Doctrines 2; 2; Lucretius 3.830;
3 .830; cf.
d.
chapter 1,I, p. 32; Konstan 11973).9 73 ).
In his brief
brief essay On Dreams, Aristotle points out that, while
asleep, people see images in the the absence of an external stimulus,
stimulus,
and he observes that, under the influence of emotion, a slight
resemblance in an object to something we fear fear or love may cause
us to take it for that thing: 'The more one is under the sway of the
emotion [empathesteros],' the smaller the resemblance
emotion [empathesterosl,' resemblance needed to
generate the
the deceptive impression
impression (3,(3, 460b3-8
460b3-8).). In the
the case of thethe
emotions, as opposed
opposed to dreams, note that there is some external
stimulus, even if we mistake its nature; in addition, addition, the imagined
object is itself specific
specific rather than general. A fearful
fearful man
man may
imagine that someone rushing towards him intends him harm,
but
but he is notnot necessarily in a state of indeterminate anxiety
(though the envisioned threat may amplify the pre-existing fear,
the pre-existing
suggesting thethe possibility of a spiral of dread) dread).. It is Aristotle, I
believe, rather than the Epicureans,
Epicureans, who best captures
captures the way
fear was conceptualized
conceptualized in archaic and classical Greek literature.
Fear is fear
fear of something,
something, and whether that thing is really really frighten
frighten-
debate.33
ing remains open to debate.33
Panic, as opposed
opposed to anxiety, was an experience the Greeks
recognized well
well:: the term was believed to derive from from sudden
manifestations of the the feral deity Pan (half
(half goat, half man
man in ap-ap
pearance), which struck terror into onlookers. The Byzantine
lexicon called the the Suda (s.v. panikoi deimati, TT7T 20
(s.v. panik6i 1 ) notes that
201)
women celebrate
celebrate Pan noisily (hence his association withclamour), clamourL
and adds that 'peopl 'peoplee ascribed things
things that were without cause to
Pan.' The
The absence of an identifiabl
identifiable e cause is an element in many
modern accounts of panic, which tend to treat it either as a
pathology
pathology or as a physiological reflex. Thus, Jon Elster ((1999: 1999: 313)
313)
Fear / 151
Fear/ 151
includes '[p]anics or phobias that lack cognitive support' in a list

of 'putatively irrational emotions.' Robert Handly and Pauline
Neff
Neff ((1985:
1 985: 4, 26)
26) identify panic with
with physiological symptoms
such as sweaty palms, rapid heart beat, and a feeling of faintness,
and regard both panic and phobia as 'a reaction to an irrational
34
fear.
fear.''34 In antiquity,
antiquity, however, panic was understood
understood not as an
individual disorder but, typically, as a collective
collective response to an
indistinct
indistinct threat arising in a specific kind of situation. Philippe
Borgeaud, who devotes a chapter of his book on Pan to panic,
concludes ((1988:
1 988: 88-9) that
a panic is always
always an irrational
irrational terror involving noise and confused
confused distur
distur-
bance that unexpectedly overtakes a military
military encampment, usually
usually at
night. Its suddenness, its immediacy, is stressed .. . Furthermore, there is a
stressed...
stress on the lack of any visible cause, a lack that leads to fantasy; the
victims of panic are in the
the grip of the
the imagination,
imagination, which is to say, of their
their
attack.35
worst fears. Any noise is immediately taken as the enemy in full attack.35
So too, the Suda (ibid.; quoted by Borgeaud, 92) 92) explains that
panicky fear 'occurs among armies, when horses and men are
suddenly alarmed [ektarakhthosi]
[ektarakhthosi], although no cause is evident.'
'
As William
William Miller
Miller observes (2000:
(2000: 207)
207) in his exploration
exploration of cour-
cour
age, 'Fear
Tear ...
... is contagious. If the
the contagion is especially virulent
and spreads rapidly, we speak of panic.' Miller
Miller adds:
adds: 'Once we are
alarmed or given over to fear we are very susceptible to interpret-
interpret
ing events in line with our worst expectations.
expectations. Thus it is that in
battle, any unexplained rapid movement to the rear can set off a
panic.'
Panic so described is less a spontaneous outbreak of fear fear than a
reaction to an obscure event (noise or commotion)
commotion) that is taken to
be a sign (sem eion) of a genuine danger. There
(semeion) There is a plausible
plausible
Aristotelian interpretation of the phenomenon: in the initial
initial alarm,
the menace is exaggerated
exaggerated (as
(as Aristotle suggests, when one is
frightened
frightened one more readily interprets things as dangerous); the the
confused
confused reaction of the crowd in turn generates more pandemo-pandemo
nium, and thus compounds the stimulusstimulus that produced the fear.
The emotion arising from the initial impression of imminent imminent
harm becomes part of the reason why 'people change their minds minds
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
Greeks
and differ
differ in regard
regard to their judgments' of the the event itself, in thithiss
case intensifying the the original pathos
pathos (see
(see chapter 11,, pp.. 37).
37). On
such an account, panic panic retains
retains a cognitive
cognitive element.
element.
Nevertheless, the the Greeks regarded some kinds of fear as result result-
ing less from
from deliberation than a kind of shock or ekplexis, ekplexis, which
drives out reflection and either causes an instinctive impulse impulse
to flee or leaves One one dazed. It may be produced by music, for
example, and thus seems closer to an aisthesis (in Sophocles'
3 1 4- 1 8, the satyrs
Ichneutae 314-18, satyrs experience ekplexis when
experience ekplexis when they
they first
hear the
the lyre and Silenus runs away terrified). So So too, highly
effective audience.36 Josephus
effective oratory may 'stun' an audience.36 Josephus (Tewish
(Jewish War
5.469-72) describes how, when a fire suddenly breaks out, ekplexis ekplexis
'enters' ((empiptei]
empiptei) the Romans ((explexis expJexis tends to assail you; you,-
cf. Aeneas Tacticus 227.9,
d. 7.9, Pausanias 110'.23.5-8).
0.23.5-8 ). In Sophocles'
Trachinian WomenWomen (21-7),
(21-7), Dejanira says she was too stricken
with fear
fear (ekpepJegmene phoboi] to observe the wrestling contest
(ekpeplegmene phob6i)
between her two suitors, Hercules and the river god Achelous (d. (cf.
Euripides fr.fro 67 [Alcmaeon]:
[Alcmaeon]: 'When someone
someone gets up to speak at a
trial On
on a matter of life and death, phobos phobos impels a human's human's
mouth
mouth to ekpJexis
ekplexis and prevents the mind from from saying what it
wishes'). We We may recallrecall that ekpless6
ekplesso is the term
term the Spartan
generals use when they predict that the Athenians will be scared
witless
witless in the coming naval battle. Such a reaction is not strictly strictly a
pathos in the sense Aristotle gives the term in the Rhetoric.
pathos Rhetoric.
It may be that
that the women in Aeschylus'S
Aeschylus's Seven against Thebes
too should be regarded as suffering suffering under thethe impact
impact of panic
rather than fear proper (as (as I have been defining
defining it).
it). They
They refer
repeatedly to the din and hubbub of the attacking army, and
Eteocles is worried that their inarticulate cries
their inarticulate cries will sow fear
fear in his
troops. As w.I.
W.I.Miller (2000: 207) 207) says, when fear is infectious,
infectious, 'we
speak of panic.
panic.'' The boundary between rational fear fear and wild
fright
fright is not strictly policed
policed either in Greek
Greek or in English, and
Aeschylus'S
Aeschylus's representation of the women's fear may well blend
elements of both. Yet the the women in the play do engage in
argument
argument and are open to correction;
correction,- theirs is not simply a blind
blind
terror. A reading that takes account of the Greek tendency to
think
think of emotions as cognitively motivated, and that that does not not
take for granted the modern modern opposition
opposition between reason reason and
Fear / 1 53
Fear/153
passion, offers the the possibility

possibility of a richer interpretation of the the
tragedy.
Phobos is clearly not the only Greek word that broadly broadly corre-
corre
sponds to the English 'fear.' Robert Zaborowski (2002) has cata- cata
logued all the words that plausibly plausibly can be related
related to the idea of of
fear
fear ((and
and also of courage) in the the Homeric epics, and has come up
with
with forty-three
forty-three different
different terms ((deriving
deriving from
from twenty-two dis- dis
tinct roots), including, besides phobos, the nouns deos, aidos,
ssebas,
ebas, tham
thambos, tromos, and tarbos, and the verbs
bos, oknos, tromos,
atuzesthai, rhigein, perideidein, and ekplesso, the the last of which
he relates particularly to panic. Zaborowski sorts these terms in
various ways, for example whether whether they are experienced predomi- predomi
nantly by groups or by individuals,
individuals, whether
whether they elicit a positive
or negative reaction, and also according to the kinds of stimuli
and physical responses that characterize each. Some of these, like
oknos or tromos, refer refer to acts such as shrinking
shrinking back or trembling,
and
and hence designate symptoms of fear fear (or of other emotions)
rather than fear fear itself. Others, like aidos and sebas ('awe' or
'reverence't
'reverence'), undoubtedly share some features with with fear, and may
even be described as forms of phobos by ancient writers,37 writers,37 but
but
seem to belong to a distinct distinct semantic
semantic sphere. A lexicallexical survey
reveals certain affinities among items in the emotional vocabu- vocabu
lary, but
but may also bring under a single umbrella notions that are
dissimilar.38
in fact dissimilar.38
Although the term that Aristotle analyses in the Rhetoric and
elsewhere is phobos,
phobos, however,
however, the noun deos and the related verb
dedoika largely overlap with it. Indeed, Protagoras, in Plato's
dedoika
dialogue by that name, declares that phobos and deos are strictly
synonymous (358E5-7),
(358E5-n although the linguistic stickler Prodicus
linguistic stickler
professes to see some difference
difference between them (cf. (d. Philebus 12C),
1 2C),
and the two are often often paired in the
the way that
that 'trial and tribulation'
are in English, with no ostensible distinction distinction in sense (e.g.
(e.g. Lysias,
Lysias,
Oration 20. 1 8 ). On the
20.18). the basis of herher study of deos, phobos, and
their congeners in Thucydides,
Thucydides, however,
however, Jacqueline de Romilly
1 956: 1 1 9 ) took the side of Prodicus and the later
((1956:119) later Greek grammar-
grammar
ian Ammonius, who wrote a treatise on differences between
similar words:
words: Ammonius explains that deos is a presentiment
that I'deos presentiment of of
evil [kakou huponoia],L whereas phobos is a sudden quivering
[kakou huponoia
154
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
[parautika ptoesis].'' Thus, Romilly writes:

[parautika ptoesisj. writes: 'Opposed to emotional emotional
and irrational phobos, which
irrational phobos, which suddenly seizes body and soul, is
deos, an intellectual kind of apprehensiveness which involves
calculation relative to the future and measures that are taken as a
result.'39 Romilly
result.'39 Romilly notes ((119-20)1 19-20) that deos,
deos, accordingly,
accordingly, is con- con
nected with verbs of thinking ((e.g. e.g. at
at2.5.5.,
2.5.5.,33.93.1,
.93. 1 , 55.71.3,
. 7 1 .3, 88.109.1),
. 1 09. 1 ),
whereas phobos is rather associated with words indicating alarm
or perturbation ((tarakhe, . 79.3); deos implies
tarakhe, 33.79.3); implies action, but but phobos
leaves one defenceless
defenceless (6.36.2); deos often often has a happy outcome, outcome,
but phobos,
phobos, in general, a negative one: 'Although clearly the same
reality can be evoked by either word, word, and sometimes is by both, it
is certain that Thucydides, in selecting one or the other, means to
emphasize either the affective affective aspect and the presence of an
emotion, or else the intellectual aspect and the the presence of fore fore-
sight.
sight.''
rules,40 but iinn fact
Romilly iiss careful ttoo note exceptions ttoo her rules,40
Ammonius
Ammomus is simply wrong: wrong: there is no cognitive difference difference bebe
tween phobos and de os in ordinary Greek usage.
deos Deos, as well as
usage. Deos,
phobos, may be paired with
phobos, with alarm ((tarakhe:
tarakhe: Lysias 6.35); one may
Lysias 6.35);
feel phobos just as much as deos before the gods or the laws of the the
41
city (Lysias 32.
32.17, 4. 1 5 respectively; for de
1 7, 114.15 deosos and virtue,
virtue, 2.5 2.57).7).41
There attaches, I think, a slightly more elevated tone to deos, deos,
which thus more easily assumes the sense of reverent awe, but I
can find no context in which the two terms are not effectively effectively
interchangeable. Phobos,
Phobos, at all events, does not normally desig- desig
nate an irrational or panicky terror in Thucydides or elsewhere: as
we have seen, it is most often often a stimulus to argument and debate.
We began with Aristotle's definition of fear as 'a kind of pain or
disturbance deriving from from an impression of a future evil,' evil/ and saw
that such impressions result from complex judgments concerning
the state of mind and intentions of others, as well as inferences
from
from the experience of people similar to or stronger than oneself oneself
((likewise
likewise in the case of confidence). The The fear inspired by tragedy,
according to Aristotle, also involves this sophisticated sophisticated cognitive
cognitive
operation. What befalls a tragic hero, who is (as (as Aristotle says)
greater than we are, can happen to us, even though no such
catastrophe seems imminent. That That is why, as Aristotle puts it in
the Poetics,
Poetics, 'fear
'fear pertains to a person who is similar to ourselves'
Fear / 155
1 55
((13,
13, 1453a5-6), whereas pity responds to undeserved suffering. suffering.
Now, we have seen that pity too, according to the Rhetoric, is
evoked by misfortunes 'which one might might expect onseH,
onself, or one of of
one's own, to suffer' (2.8, 11385bl4-15),
385b1 4-1 5), and hence depends on a
sense of one's own vulnerability. How, then, does tragic fear differ differ
from
from pity?
The answer, I think, is just that this fear fear is not mediated by a
desert,422 As Stephen Halliwell ((1998:
judgment of desert.4 1998: 1176)
76) observes,
observes,
tragic fear is, at bottom, 'an emotion felt felt at one's own prospective
experience' - - and, like ordinary fear, I would add,
add, is unregarding
unregarding of of
merit. Halliwell goes on to state that such fear fear 'differs
'differs from
ordinary fear by virtue of being focussed on the the experience of of
others.'' Where I disagree, however, is with Halliwell's
others. Halliwell's further further
claim that ''Aristotle's
Aristotle's discussion of the
the nature of fear
fear ..... . does notnot
rule out the possibility that that its object can in some cases be the
prospect
prospect of others' sufferings.'
sufferings.' Halliwell
Halliwell explains: 'For this to be
so, we can deduce,
deduce, one condition must be satisfied: the prerequi- prerequi
site of strong sympathy. Once this exists, we can feel fear fear for
43
others analogous to fear for ourselves.'43
ourselves.' As we shall see (chapter ( chapter
110,
0, pp.
pp. 2 1 1-12), Aristotle restricts such sympathy
211-12), sympathy to the pain or
pleasure we share with dear ones. Characters on stage are not our
intimates. There is thus, I think, no basis in Aristotle's
intimates. Aristotle's account
account of of
the tragic emotions for vicarious fear or 'fearing
'fearing for' others. Spec- Spec
tators fear
fear for themselves, because they realize that that they are
equally liable to misfortune.
The Greeks were great debaters. The speeches in Homeric epic
and in historians such as Thucydides, the contrapuntal exchanges
or agones
agones of tragedy and comedy, the orations delivered in court
and in the assembly and theorized in rhetorical treatises such as
Aristotle's all testify
testify to the
the pervasive role of argument in Greek
society. The regime of the word conditioned
conditioned the Greek conception
of the
the emotions
emotions along with other areas of life. While it is true that
Aristotle's analysis of the emotions in the Rhetoric looks to the
practical needs of the public speaker, the idea that the emotions emotions
respond to deliberation was ingrained in Greek psychology. This
was as true of fear as of ostensibly more cognitive passions like
anger and pity. In this respect, Greek phobos differed differed subtly from from
'fear' in modern English. Fear too has had a history.
history.
SEVEN
CHAPTER SEVEN
Gratitude
Gratitude is an emotion, thethe core of which is pleasant feelings

feelings
about the benefit
benefit received. At the cornerstone of gratitude is the
notion of undeserved merit. The grateful
grateful person recognizes that he
or she did nothing to deserve
deserve the
the gift
gift or benefit;
benefit; it
it was freely
bestowed.
bestowed.
Emmons 2004: 5
To requite a benefit, or to be grateful

grateful to him
him who bestows it, is
probably
probably everywhere, at least under certain circumstances, regarded
regarded
as a duty.
Westermarck
Westermarck 11908:
908: 1154;
54; quoted
quoted in Gouldner
Gouldner 1996: 59
In the
the chapters
chapters of the second
second book of the Rhetoric that are conven
conven-
tionally numbered two to eleven, Aristotle analyses, as we have
seen, the several emotions or pathe that an orator should be able
to arouse and assuage. In chapter
chapter 2, he treats
treats anger, or orge, in 3
what I have called satisfaction, in 4 love and hate, in 5 fear, in 6
shame, in 88 pity, in 9 indignation ((to
to nemesan), in 1100 envy, and in
1111 the emulous
emulous impulse he calls zelos. ( 1385a1 6-b 1 1 )
zelos. Chapter 7 (1385al6-bll)
too examines pathos - but which? This is the question
examines a pathos - question that
occupies the first
first and principal part of this chapter; the second
part considers some ways in which Aristotle's analysis and Greek
usage generally shed light
light on a current problem in the philosophy
of
of the
the moral emotions.
emotions.
To go by all translations and all commentaries
commentaries but
but one (Rapp
Gratitude / 157
Gratitude/ 157
2002: aadd loc.) oonn this section of the Rhetoric, thethe pathos iinn ques-
ques
tion would seem to be entirely
entirely clear, for they are unanimous
unanimous on
this score. 11 Here, for example, is thethe first
first sentence
sentence of chapter 7 in
Roberts's translation,
translation, published
published in the Bollingen series edited
edited by
Jonathan Barnes (p. 2207): 'To
Barnes (p. To take Kindness next: the the definition
of it will show us towards whom it is felt, why, and in what what frames
of
of mind.' And the chapter concludes in Roberts's version: 'So
much for kindness and unkindness.
unkindness.'' The subject of the the chapter,
then, is precisely kindness. Or again, consider George Kennedy's
translation of the the opening and closing sentences ((1991:199 1 : 1149):
49): 'To
whom people show kindliness and for what reasons and in what
state of mind will be clear [to us us]1 after
after having defined kharis.' And
defined kharis.'
((151):
1 5 1 ): 'This finishes
finishes the
the discussion of being kindlykindly and being
unkindly.' Kennedy's
Kennedy's headnote to the chapter reads:
Kharis has a number

number of meanings in Greek -- 'kindliness,'
'kindliness/ 'benevolence,'
'benevolence/
will,' 'a favor/
'good will/ favor,' 'gratitude/
'gratitude, ' 'grace'...
'grace' ... Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition in section
section
2 makes
makes it clear that he is speaking about an altruistic feeling of kindli- kindli
ness or benevolence that at a particular time gratuitously moves a person
to do something
somethingfor foranother.
another.
Or
Or take
take Cope's commentary ((1877: 1 8 77: 87): 'x&P1^, the
87): 'xap£<:" the 1Ta(Jo<:"
ôtBo^, or or
instinctive emotion, of which which this chapter treats, represents the
tendency or inclination
inclination to benevolence, to do a grace, favour, or
service, spontaneous and disinterested to another, or to our fel- fel
low-man. It also includes
includes the feeling
feeling of gratitude, the instinctive
inclination
inclination to return favours
favours received.' In what amounts to a
translation of the
the opening sentence (88), Cope writes: 'The object
of benevolence, the
of the circumstances
circumstances and occasions (on which which it is
exercized), and
and the
the dispositions, characters, and moods of mind(of (of
those who exercize it), it), will be evident when we have defined
benevolence.' To be absolutely unambiguous, Cope adds that
'''gratitude'' and "ingratitude"
'"gratitude" "ingratitude" are not distinctly
distinctly noticed in the
,
chapter. 22
chapter/
Nor
Nor is this interpretation of thethe subject of chapter 7 of Aristotle's
Rhetoric a novelty. While I have not not examined every translation
ever produced (the(the number is very large, and many are difficult
difficult to
obtain), it is clear that the the modern consensus began at least as
158
158 / The Emotions
Greeks
3
early as the Renaissance.
Renaissance.3 For example, ErmolaoErmolao Barbaro, in his
Latin translation published in Basel in 11545, 545, has (387): 'to which
men, and in which matters, favour favour is seen to occur [gratia
[gratia fieri
fieri
videatur], and how those who do a favour faciunt] are
[gratiam faciunt]
favour [gratiam
4
disposed, will be clear from from the definition of the matter/matter.'4 The
commentary, which which was provided by Daniel Daniel Barbaro, worries at
the fact that in defining
defining gratia or kharis, Aristotle includes the
definiendum
definiendum in the definition
definition (426); but
but he rescues Aristotle from
this elementary logical error by claiming that the kharis kharis that is
defined
defined and that in the definition have different senses.5 Clearly
different senses.5
this distinction
distinction is contrived, though Barbaro was right to identify identify
6
a problem
problem here.6
here.
In what
what follows,
follows, I argue that
that the emotion
emotion in question, however,
is not
not kindness, kindliness, benevolence, 'favour' or anything of of
7
the kind.? Spontaneous munificence (as
kind. Spontaneous opposed to the generosity
(as opposed
that accompanies love or affection)
affection) is not an emotion for Aristotle,
for
for it fails to conform to the precondition
precondition for any pathos,
pathos, namely,
namely,
that it be a response or reaction to some stimulus
stimulus or event. All the
emotions analysed by Aristotle are so motivated, from from anger,
which is provoked
provoked by a slight, to shame, indignation, fear, pity,
and the rest. The pathos ha t Aristotle examines in chapter 77 is
pathos tthat
rather the gratitude that is elicited by a favour. Kindness, Kindness, I am
afraid,
afraid, must be expunged from from the list
list of Aristotelian
Aristotelian pathe.
There
There is unfortunately
unfortunately no other way to make make the case I am
proposing than
than by a close scrutiny of Aristotle's text, sentence
sentence by
sentence.8 Luckily, he devotes
sentence.8 devotes only a brief paragraph to gratitude,
gratitude,
and the exersise is not without
without interest for the insight
insight it provides
into his method of argument. The chapter, then, begins as follows:
'Those towards whom people have kharis kharis and in what circum-
circum
[or for what things] and how they themselves are disposed,
stances [or
will be clear when we have defined kharis.' kharis.' What does 'having
kharis' ekhein -- mean?
kharis' -- kharin ekhein mean? It means to feel gratitude, and and
only that ((e.g. l374a23 ).99 It never
e.g. Rhetoric 1374a23). never in all of Greek litera
litera-
ture means to show favour favour towards someone, be kindly, do a
service, or anything of the sort. sort. The way to say 'do a favour' in
Greek is kharin
kharin pherein, tithesthai, and so on, or with with the verb
kharizesthai. By way way of illustration, here is Plutarch's account of of
Cato's response to Lucius
Lucius Caesar's offer
offer to intercede in his behalf
behalf
Gratitude / 159
1 59
with
with Julius Caesar (Cato ( eato Minor 66.2): 'If 'If I wished to be saved by
the
the benefaction [kharis]
[kharis] of Caesar, I should should approach him him myself.
But I do notnot wish to owe gratitude [kharin ekhein] ekhein] to a tyrant for
something
something in which which he violates the law, and he violates violates the law by
saving me as my master, though it is not right for him him to have
despotic power/
power.' In the first use, kharis kharis means 'saved by Caesar's
grace/ in the second, it means ''gratitude.'
grace/ gratitude.' Again, compare Pericles'
account
account of the the Athenian
Athenian view of friendship friendship in his famous funeral
oration, as reported by Thucydides (2.40.4): 'The firmer firmer friend
friend is
the one who has treated the other well, with the result that,
through his goodwill [for the one] one] to whom he has given it [the
gratitude] owed.' 10
favour], he keeps it [the gratitude] l0
Aristotle next offers
offers a definition of the term kharis, on the the basis
of
of which, as he says, the the significance of kharin ekhein will be-
kharin ekhein be
come manifest: 'Let kharis, kharis, then, in accord with which one who
has it is said to have kharis, be a service to one who needs it, not in
return for anything, nor so that that the one who performs the service
may gain something, but but so that
that the other may.' Here, I expect, is
the
the chief
chief source of thethe misunderstanding of this chapter. It is true
that, in several other chapters on emotions, Aristotle uses the
formula
formula estoest6 de ('let such and such be ....') . . ') to introduce the the defini
defini-
tion of the pathos
the pathos under consideration, for example in the
the case of
of
anger ((1378a31),
l378a3 1 ), love (philein,
(philein, 11380b35),
380b35), fear fear ((1382a21),
1382a2 1 ), shame
1 385b 1 3 ) . 1 1 In chapter 7,
n
13 83b 1 3 ), and pi
((13831)13), ty ((1385bl3).
pity 7, however, Aristotle
offers
offers a definition not not of the the emotion
emotion itself, that is, gratitude,
which is signified in Greek by the compound expression kharin
ekhein, but of the constituent
constituent term kharis. It is not difficult difficult to see
why, if we translate literally. Roberts Roberts offers
offers the the following,
following, which
which
is fairly
fairly representative: 'Kindness -- under the influence of which which a
man is said to be kind - - may be defined as helpfulness toward
someone in need, not in return for anything, nor for for the advantage
of the
the helper himself, but but for that of the the person helped.' The The
redundant and and awkward formulation 'Kindness -- under the influ influ-
ence of which
which a man is said to be kind' is evidently an attempt attempt to
escape the definitional problem signalled by Daniel Daniel Barbaro in his
commentary of 11545. 545. What the the text text says, however, is this: 'Let "a
benefaction,
benefaction,"" then, in respect to which which the one who has it it [i.e.,
receives thethe benefaction]
benefaction] is said to feel feel gratitude, be a service to
60 I/ The Emotions of the
Greeks
one who needs it, not in return for something, nor so that some- some
thing
thing should accrue to the one who does the service, but rather
that
that it should accrue to the other.'other/ As I understand him, Aristotle
is here offering
offering a punning
punning explanation
explanation of how the the phrase ekhein
kharin (('have
'have kharis')
kharis'} came to mean 'feel gratitude': one receives
or has a favour
favour (kharis) from another,
(kharis) from another, and in turn is said to feel or
have gratitude (again, kharis). Barbaro Barbara was right that the two uses
of kharis
kharis here are different; he failed, however, to recognize recognize thethe
force of the expression kharin ekhein.12
kharin ekhein.12
The next few phrases expand on the conditions conditions inin which
which a
favour
favour is likely to inspire gratitude. Thus, 'the favour favour [kharis]
[kharis] is
great if itit is for someone in serious need, or in need of great or
difficult
difficult things, or at a time
time that
that is such
such [i.e., urgent], or if he [who
provides the the service does so]so] alone or first
first or chiefly.' Kharis here
presumably
presumably refers to the service performed. Aristotle Aristotle next speci
next speci-
fies the
the nature of needs: 'needs are desires [orexeis], and of these
above all those that are accompanied
accompanied by pain if it [i.e., the the thing
thing
desired] is notnot realized. Cravings [epithumiai]
[epithumiai] are desires of this
sort, for example erotic passion, and those desires connected with with
bad states of thethe body and withwith danger:
danger: for in fact
fact those who are in
danger and in pain do crave. 1 3 The text continues: 'Thus, people
crave.'' 13
who stand by those in poverty or exile, even if they do a small
service, yet because of the the magnitude of the the need and the
the urgency
of
of the
the occasion, are pleasing [kekharismenoi]'
[kekharismenoi], like the the man
man who
gave the mat mat in the Lyceum [the reference
reference is unkown].
unkown]. It is most
necessary, then, to receive service [ekhein ten hupourgian[
receive the service hupourgian] in
regard to these things, and if not not to these, thenthen to equal or greater
things' (text according to Kassel 1976). 1 9 76). There points that
There are two points
invite
invite elucidation.
elucidation. The first first is the meaning
meaning of the participle
kekharismenoi. Roberts,
Roberts, for example, translates: 'Hence those
who stand by us in poverty or in banishment,banishment, even if they do not
help us much, are yet really kind to us,
really kind us,'' and so on (my empha-
empha
sis).14 This interpretation
sis).I4 interpretation favours
favours the idea that that kindness is the
subject of this passage.
passage. However, it is highly dubious. The perfect
participle is connected
participle connected rather
rather with the passive voice of the verb,
and invariably bears the sense 'pleasing' (over 50 occurrences in
this sense
sense in the
the fifth
fifth and fourth centuries BC; for Aristotle, d.
Aristotle, cf.
Parts of Animals 645a4-1
of Animals 645a4-10), O), which puts the the focus on the
the recipient's
attitude. The second point
attitude. point concerns the meaning of the phrase
Gratitude / 161
161
ekhein ten hupourgian. Again, Roberts translates: The 'The helpful-

helpful
ness must therefore meet, preferably, just this kind of need,' need/
which, while it rather fudgesfudges the Greek, suggests that ekhein ekhein
bears the sense of 'do' or 'provide' a service.service. This yields an odd
construction, rather like taking ekheinekhein kharin in the sense of 'do a
service.'15
favour.' Hence, I have preferred to render it 'receive a service.'IS
Aristotle proceeds:
proceeds: 'Thus, since it is clear to whom and for what
things kharis occurs, and how they are disposed, it is obvious that
kharis must be elicited on the basis of the following: by showing
that the one party either is or has been in pain and need of this
sort, and that the other party has renderedrendered or is rendering such a
service in such necessity.' It is clear that the first clause -- 'to
whom and for what things kharis occurs, and how they are dis- dis
posed' -- answers to the clause with which the chapter begins:
'toward whom people have kharis kharis and for what things and how
disposed.'166 On my reading,
they themselves are disposed.'1 reading, then, kharis here
must be understood
understood as 'gratitude,
'gratitude,'' a perfectly good meaning
meaning of the
the
term, rather than a 'kindness' or 'service,' even though when
'let kharis .... be,
Aristotle defined kharis (('let . .be,'' etc.) he took it in the
17
latter sense. I ? The
The balance of the the sentence surely favours grati- grati
tude. Aristotle is offering
offering advice on how to produce produce kharis in an
audience. In actual courtroom situations,
situations, litigants often empha
often empha-
size the benefactions
benefactions they have bestowed on their fellow citizens citizens
or the city in an effort
effort to elicit the jurors'
jurors' gratitude and make it
clear that they have employed their wealth properly and for the
public weal (d.
(cf. chapter
chapter 5, p. 1121;
2 1 j Fisher 2003
2003).) . Rarely would one
try to induce in an audience a sudden impulse to bestow a favour
(acquittal or pardon do not
not count as a service or So too,
hupourgia) . So
orhupourgia).
the Rhetoric to Alexander
Alexander advises that 'people are grateful grateful [kharin
[kharin
d'ekhousi] to those thanks to whom or to whose friends they
d'ekhousiJ
believe that they or those they care for have experienced or are
experiencing or will experience some good beyond what is due
[para to prosekonJ'
[para (34.2-3),), whereas affection is stimulated by
prosekon]' (34.2-3
receiving what is in accord with desert.
Returning
Returning to Aristotle:
Aristotle:
It is clear too on what basis it is possible to diminish

diminish the kbaris
kharis and
render people akbaristoi.
akharistoi. Either [argue)
[argue] that the one party is rendering or
rendered the service for their own sake (this was said not
not to be a kharis),
1162
Ancient Greeks
or that
that the service happened by chance or they were constrained
constrained to do it,
or that they paid back rather
rather than
than gave, whether
whether knowingly
knowingly or not: for
either
either way, it is 'in return
return for something,' and so would
would not thus be a
kharis.
khans.
The
The three uses of kharis here clearly signify signify a favour or benefac
benefac-
tion, since
since ((among
among other things) the stipulation that it must be
altruistic refers back to Aristotle's definition of the term. The
point, then, is that showing that an act does not meet the condi- condi
tions for being a kharis in this sense renders people akharistoi. akharistoi.
The question is what this latter term implies. Roberts Roberts translates:
'We can also see how to eliminate the idea of kindness and make
our opponents appear unkind/ taking akharistoi akharistoi to mean refusal
refusal
to perform a genuinely
genuinely selfless act of kindness, and this is the the
standard interpretation. The difficulty
difficulty is that akharistos does not
mean 'unkind.' Rather, it means either 'miserable,' 'unpleasant,' 'unpleasant/
'ungrateful.'18 The most telling instances
or else 'ungrateful.'18 instances are to be found
found in
the
the works of Xenophon, where forms of the the adjective and adverb
occur twenty-three
twenty-three times, virtually always in the sense of 'un 'un-
grateful' (e.g.
(e.g. Hellenica 5.2.37: 'for 'for he was known
known notnot to be
akharistos to those who had done him him a service'). Indeed,
Indeed, Xenophon
Xenophon
is kind enough to provide provide us with a definition
definition of the term. At
Memorabilia
Memorabilia 2.2.1,2.2. 1 , Socrates says:
says: -- 'Tell me, son, do you know
akharistoi2.' -- 'Indeed I do,
that some people are said to be akharistoi?' do/' said the
boy. -
- 'And have you learned what those whom people people call by this
name do?
do?'' -- 'I have: when those who are well off off and are able to
repay a kindness apodounai] do not repay it, this is what
kindness [kharin apodounai]
people call them.' - - 'Ought we,we, then, to list those who are akharistoi
akharistoi
19
among unjust
unjust people?
people?'' -- 'I think we
we ought.'19
ought.' Aristotle's meaning,
accordingly, is: is: 'It is clear too on what basis it is possible to dis- dis
parage the favour that has been rendered and make the recipients
ungrateful
ungrateful [akharistoiJ.
[akharistoi].''
Aristotle
Aristotle continues:
continues:
One must also consider all the categories. For it is a kharis

kharis either
either because
it
it is this particular
particular thing or of such a quantity
quantity or sort, or at such
such a time
time or
place. An indication of this is if they did not do a lesser service [when
[when it
was needed], and if they
they did the
the same things
things or equal or greater for one's
Gratitude //163
1 63
enemies: for it
it is then
then obvious
obvious that what they did for us was not for our
sake. Or if they knowingly did an unworthy service:
service: for no one will
confess to have needed what is unworthy.
There is no question but that kharis here means a concrete favour

or kindness rather than gratitude:
gratitude: Aristotle is showing how the the
description of a favour
favour determines whether the response to it will
not.20
be gratitude or not.20
The chapter on kharis concludes: 'We have now finished dis dis-
cussing to kharizesthai and akharistein.'
akharistein.' I have already cited
Roberts's version of this sentence: 'So much for kindness and
unkindness.
unkindness.'' Kennedy's [(1991:
1 99 1 : 1151]
5 1 ) is similar: 'This finishes the the
discussion of being kindly and being unkindly.' For the first term,
I prefer ''doing
doing favours' to 'kindness' or 'being kindly,'
kindly/ inasmuch
inasmuch as
the latter terms introduce an unwarranted reference reference to a psycho-
psycho
state.21 As
logical state.21 As for akharistein,
akharistein, the meaning must, I think, be
'act ungratefully,'
ungratefully/ although it is just possible, I suppose, that it
bears the sense of 'begrudge' or 'withhold.'22
22
Since gratitude is elicited

elicited by a service, it is no wonder that
Aristotle's discussion of it focuses largely largely on what a service or
kharis consists
consists in. He is at pains as well to bring out the connec- connec
tion in Greek between
between the term for a favour favour and the expression
expression
meaning 'to be grateful,'
grateful/ that is, 'kharin ekhein.' To do a favour favour
{kharizesthai} puts the recipient
(kharizesthai) recipient in one's debt. debt. So
So too, the English
word 'oblige' means to both indulge and to put someone under
obligation; in return for a service, we say 'much obliged' (cf.
obligation,- (d.
Portuguese 'obrigado' = 'thank you')
= you').. This accounts for why
Aristotle summarizes the content of his chapter on gratitude gratitude by
referring both to the act of generosity (kharizesthai){kharizesthai} and the the
response of gratitude,
gratitude, or rather, in light of his concluding remarks
on how to belittle favours, ingratitude.
Performing a kindness is not an emotion; neither neither is kindliness,
kindliness,
for
for that matter. If a favour were to be prompted by an emotion, the the
relevant
relevant pathos would be love or (see chapter 88).
philia (see
orphilia ) . The pathe
Thepathe
in Aristotle are typically responses to the behaviour of others, and
more particularly to words or deeds that have consequences for
the relative
relative social standing or doxa of the parties involved.
Gratitude involves just such a relative positioning, since it de-
164
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
rives from
from the prior need of the recipient recipient in relation
relation to the
generosity of the benefactor, and the continued
generosity inferior
continued state of inferior-
ity until the debt can be repaid (in this, it resembles anger as
Aristotle conceives it). it).
That gratitude should figure among the basic emotions analysed
by Aristotle is no cause for surprise, then, although although it is very
23
rarely encountered in modern lists. lists.23 For the ancients, gratitude
was a powerful and innate innate sentiment. Cicero remarks of children, children,
whom
whom he takes to be a mirror mirror of mankind
mankind (On Ends 5.22.61):5.22.6 1 ):
'What a memory they have for those who have deserved well of of
them, what a passion to pay back a favour! favour!'' ((quae
quae memoria est in
iis bene merentium, quae referendae
Us referendae gratiae cupiditas;
cupiditas-, d. c.A.
cf. C.A.
Barton 200
2001: 1 ). It was also vital to a society predicated on compe-
1 : 111). compe
tition and reciprocity, where maintaining
maintaining one's status in the forum
esteem required continual
of public esteem continual effort
effort and wariness.
wariness.
We must,
must, then, revise revise the standard
standard list of basic emotions
emotions that
Aristotle treats in the Rhetoric, Rhetoric, expelling benevolence or kind- kind
ness, which never did sound much like an emotion (how (how is it
different
different from
from eunoia or good will? will?)) and inserting gratitude in its
place - - an emotion that that would
would otherwise have been conspicu- conspicu
ously
ously lacking
lacking in a treatise
treatise devoted to rhetoric. But this is not the
only consequence
consequence of understanding
understanding gratitude as the the pathos Aristotle
Aristotle
discusses in the Rhetoric. For gratitude has been interpreted by
many scholars as pertaining to an obligatory system of reciprocal
exchange, in which a service imposes upon the person who has
benefited from it a quid pro quo responsibility
benefited from responsibility to render compen-
compen
sation. Is gratitude, then, then, a duty or at best a virtue rather than
virtue rather than an
emotion?
Aafke Komter (2004: 1196), 96), for example, argues that gratitude is
not
not just a matter
matter of 'moral coercion' but but is also 'a moral virtue.
virtue.''
She sees gratitude aass 'part ooff a chain ooff reciprocity; iitt iiss universal
and has survival value' (208-9); (208-9); gratitude may be 'a response to a
voluntary giftgift but is itself imperative/ and it 'derives its social
importance
importance and effectiveness from from the moral obligation
obligation implied
in it.' So
So too, Alan GewirthGewirth ((1978: states: 'As for gratitude,
1978: 329) states: gratitude, it
should first
first be noted that the duty is not not one of feeling grateful,
grateful,
since this may not be within within the power of the person benefited
(though he can try), try),but
but rather
ratherone
oneofofexpressing
expressinggratitude
gratitudein inwords
words
Gratitude / 165
1 65
or deeds or both for some favor favor one has received

received fromfrom another'
((quoted
quoted in McConnell 11993: 83).24 Aristotle's own view of kharis
993: 83).24
in the Nicomachean Ethics, according to Filippo Mignini ((1994: 1 994:
36), is that
that 'only actual restitution
restitution and not not the
the sentiment
sentiment of of
acknowledging it satisfies the political requirementrequirement of equaliz-
equaliz
ing the social balance sheet' ('Solo la restituzione
restituzione fattuale e non
il sentimento
sentimento della riconoscenza soddisfa soddisfa l'esigenza
1'esigenza politica
politica di
pareggiare il conto sociale'). Indeed, Aristotle
Aristotle affirms
affirms that 'this is
the
the nature of kharis: one must do a service in return for the person
who
who did thethe favour' (NE 11133a4-5
133a4-5;; d.cf. 11164b26-33).
164b26-33) .
Now, a social obligation may bbee mediated by, by, or take the form
of, an emotional reaction comparable to the anger evoked by an
insult, the fear
fear at an impending threat of harm, or the the shame
deriving from
from an act that betrays a fault fault of character. As the the
sociologist Georg Simmel has put put it ((1996:45),
1996: 45); ''[Gjratitude
[G]ratitude emerges
as the motive which, for inner reasons, effects the the return of a
benefit where there is no external necessity for it.' Nevertheless,
its status as an emotion
emotion seems particularly equivocal. Thus, Thus,
Terrance McConnell, who has written the first first extended philo-
philo
sophical treatment
treatment of gratitude, states ((1993: 1 993 : 1112)
12) that 'the ab- ab
sence of feelings of gratitude is sometimes
sometimes indicative of moral
failure,
failure/' but adds that 'experiencing specified
specified emotions and feel feel-
ings is not
not morally required of an agent. As a consequence .'" ..., to
discharge a debt of gratitude one need not not feel grateful.' He goes
on to insist,
insist, however, that 'there is more to ethics ethics than
than overt
actions, more to being a morally good person than doing what one
ought to.' The additional elementelement is precisely emotion. So So too,
Hans van Wees (1998:
( 1998: 26)
26) speaks in the the same breath of the the 'law ofof
gratitude' and a 'feeling of obligation.'
That the
the Greeks themselves could think think of gratitude as aa. pathos
pathos
is evident from
from a variety of sources besides Aristotle's Rhetoric. Rhetoric.
A particularly clear illustration
illustration may be found in another philo philo-
sophical text, this one by the first-century
first-century BC BC Epicurean writer
Philo demus, many of whose works have been recovered in muti
Philodemus, muti-
lated condition from a private library that was incinerated in the
eruption of Mount Vesuvius in AD 79. 79. In his treatise on anger,
Philodemus drawsdraws a contrast between anger and gratitude: the
one is a response to deliberately inflicted harm, the other to a
1166
66 / The Emotions
Emotions of the Greeks
the Ancient Greeks
service ((On
voluntary service col. 46.
On Anger col. 1 8-4 1 ). The passage
46.18-41). reads
passage reads
(translation based on Sanders, unpublished):
unpublished):
If
If the
the sage will feel gratitude [eukharistein]
[eukharistein] toward people who
who have
treated him well, he will also get angry at those who intentionally harm
him. And he if doesn't get angry with the the latter, then he won't feel
gratitude toward the former. For the one passion in each case is the
contrary of the other, and the voluntariness moves us to anger just as it
does to gratitude.
gratitude. For just as we do not
not feel
feel gratitude
gratitude toward inanimate
objects that
that produce some effect,
effect, nor to those animate ones that provide
us something by no choice of their own, neither are we angry angry at them.
And they assert that
that we are naturally moved to anger just as we are to
gratitude by the contrary cause.25
contrary cause.25
Philodemus's contrast differs

differs from
from that of Aristotle, who treats
satisfaction as anger's opposite (see (see chapter 33),), since Aristotle
restricts the cause of anger to a slight, whereas Philodemus underunder
stands anger as a reaction
reaction to deliberate
deliberate harm
harm in general (this is in
line with the Epicureans' relative indifference
indifference to public opinion
26
and their focus on the well-being of the individual).26
the individual). But his
argument makes especially clear the parallel between anger and
emotions.27 That the emotion
gratitude as emotions.27 emotion depends on a judgment
of
of intention, and is not
not a mere irrational or spontaneous feeling,
accords perfectly with the cognitive conception of the the pathe en-en
dorsed by Aristotle. So So too, forensic orators tended to contrast
anger,28 and to pair it in turn with such generous
gratitude with anger,28
sentiments pity.29
sentiments as pity.29
Nevertheless, there are any number of passages passages in which
which the
emphasis falls rather on the obligation to make restitution. One
30
'demands back' (apaited)
(apaite6) kharis for services performed,-
performedj30 in turn,
31
one 'repays' (apodid6mi)
(apodidomi) kharis (Lysias 118.27)
8.27)31 or 'owes' it (ophei16),
(opheilo),
and the one who performed
performed the benefaction 'receives kharis back'
(apolambano: Lysias 20.3
(apolamban6: Kharis may thus be paired with time
1 ) . Kharis
20.31).
or 'payment' (Lysias 25.6). These locutions are too common to
require further
further illustration.
Does Greek usage, then, simply reflect reflect the confusion
confusion inherent
in the idea of gratitude,
gratitude, which simultaneously signifies the moral
acknowledgment of a debt and the the emotion elicited by a gratu- gratu-
Gratitude / 167
1 67
generosity?32 It does not, but

itous act of generosity?32 but to see why it is necessary
to attend not just to the word kharis itself but to its social and
grammatical syntax as well. Kharis is one of the richer terms in
classical Greek (d. (cf. Chirassi Colombo 11994; 994j Parker 11998:
998: 1108-14;
08-1 4j
and Harrison 2003: 40-3, 50-2, 75-7, and 1174-8). 74-8 ). It may mean
simply 'charm' or 'pleasure.' It may also signify signify a favour, as in the the
definition
definition that Aristotle offers offers in the Rhetoric, and again the
return for a service, as in the examples cited above. above. Finally, it
denotes gratitude. Now, when kharis bears the concrete sense of of
due return for a benefaction,
benefaction, it occurs in locutions that specifi specifi-
cally refer
refer to payment that is owed, owed, above
above all involving verbs with
the prefix
prefix apo- (roughly equivalent to the 're-' in 'return'j
apo- (roughly 'return'; e.g.,
apodidomi,
apodidomi, apolambano, apaiteo). apaiteo). When kharis refers to grati- grati
tude, however, it occurs invariably in the expressions kharin kharin
ekhein (literally, khans') or kharin
(literally, 'have kharis') kharin eidenai (literally,
(literally, 'know
33
or acknowledge kharis'). Ingratitude is akharistia, but
acknowledge kharis').33 but there is
no single term in classical Greek for the the positive sentiment
sentiment of of
gratitude apart from itself.34
from kharis itself.34
Whereas Greeks of the the classical period demanded and repaid
kharis (or
kharis (or a kharis) in the the sense of the the good turn deserved by
another (d. (cf. Sophocles,
Sophocles, Ajax 'kharis always gives birth to
522: 'kharis
Ajax 522:
kharis)/l/ the terms for asking or paying back are never found
kharis found in
connection
connection with with kharin ekhein or eidenai. The emotion
kharin ekhein emotion of grati-
grati
tude is distinct from
from the act of reciprocation:
reciprocation: it is felt, not due as
compensation.35 Thus Socrates,
compensation.35 Socrates, in Plato's Apology (20At asserts
Apology (20A),
that the disciples of the sophists 'give them them money and are grate- grate
ful
ful besides [khremata
[khremata didontas
didontas kai kai kharin proseidenai]/ that is,
kharin proseidenaiL'
over and above the payment that is required. The sentiment sentiment of of
course sustains the the social system of reciprocity, but but has its own
grammar and role. Gratitude is never owed.36 owed.36
It is natural that Aristotle should have concentrated on the
emotion of gratitude in his treatise on rhetoric, since it is this
sensibility, rather than repayment of an actual debt, that the
orator would normally seek to elicit from from his audience. His con- con
cern was different
different in his ethical works. The emotion emotion itself,
itself, as we
have seen, depends on an awareness of relative social positions,
but
but being grateful
grateful was not 'regarded as a duty' (Westermarck
(Westermarck 11908: 908 :
54). It was a response to the
1154). the receipt of a benefit that had been
168
the Ancient Greeks
bestowed precisely with

with no ulterior intention of gain on the the
benefactor's kharis.37
benefactor's part, as Aristotle insists in his definition of kharisP
Recognizing the
the distinct
distinct character of the
the emotion of gratitude, as
opposed to the social obligation to repay a service, may contribute
contribute
to a new
new understanding of the the subjective dynamics of classical
classical
Greek reciprocity.
C HAPTER EIGHT
CHAPTER
Love
[We cannot
cannot speak] as if the
the history of courtly
courtly love, Romanticism,
not to mention Christianity, makes no difference to a modern
reader's
reader's approach
approach to such a term.
Goldhill
Goldhill l990: 101
1990: 101
It
It is worth repeating that feelings
feelings are very difficult
difficult to reconstruct
historically.
Dixon 1992: 90
Dixon 1992: 90
Classical Greek is rich in words signifying love or affection. affection.

Passionate sexual attraction
attraction is denoted by the term eros (verb
eran, whence 'erotic'), the the love of parents for children by storge
(verb stergein). Agapan
Agapan means 'to like or be fond of,'of/ although
although the
the
noun agape, sometimes
sometimes rendered 'brotherly love,'love/ first
first occurs in
the New Testament.
Testament. But the most general and widely used term
for
for 'love' is philia, with
isphilia, with the associated verb philein (d. 'philhellene,'
philein (cf. 'philhellene/
'anglophile'). This idea, together with its opposite, hatred or en- en
mity (which we shall treat in the following
following chapter), is the subject
of
of section
section 4 of book 2 of Aristotle's Rhetoric.
Rhetoric.
One might have imagined that that love would pose relatively fewer
problems of interpretation than than other emotional concepts, and yet
here too there are difficulties
difficulties and disagreements, including
including over
matters of terminology. Philia, for example, is not not simply 'love,
'love/'
but
but is often
often better translated as 'friendship,'
'friendship/ and the cognate term
philos, which as an adjective means 'dear' or (less often) 'loving,
'loving/'
70 / The Emotions
1170 Emotions of the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
Greeks
commonly signifies 'friend. 'friend.'' Many scholars believe, however,

however, that
ancient
ancient friendship,
friendship, both Greek and Roman, Roman, had little or no affec
affec-
tive character, but but was wholly a matter of duty. Thus, Malcolm
Heath ((1987:
1 98 7: 73-4) writes that philia in classical Greece 'is not, at
that philia
root, a subjective
subjective bond of affection
affection and emotional warmth, but but the
the
entirely objective bond of reciprocal obligation; philos is the
obligation; one's philo" the
man one is obliged to help, and on whom whom one can ((or or ought
ought to be
able to) rely for help when when oneself is in need.' Simon Goldhill Goldhill
((1986:
1 986: 82)
82) agrees: 'The appellation or categorization philos is used
to mark not not just affection
affection but
but overridingly a series of complex
obligations,
obligations, duties claims.'1 Philia, then, would seem a poor
duties and claims.tl
candidate for a basic emotion, and hardly to correspond to the the
modern
modern conception of love.
But that
that is not all. Some scholars hold that the words philia and
philos do not in fact
philos fact refer
refer to friendship as we understand the the term
but
but rather to family
family ties. Thus,
Thus, Elizabeth Belfiore
Belfiore (2000: 20)
20) writes
that 'the noun philos
philos surely has the same range as philia, and both
refer
refer primarily,
primarily, if not not exclusively, to relationships among close
blood kin.' Worst of all, Aristotle himself seems to have doubts
himself seems doubts
about how to classify philia. philia. At the
the beginning of his extended
analysis of philia in books 8 and 9 of the
of philia the Nicomachean Ethics ((8.1, 8.1,
11155a3-4),
1 55.13-4), h hee affirms
affirms that philia 'either iiss a virtue or iiss accom-
that philia accom
,
virtue/22 and earlier, in his discussion
panied by virtue, discussion of virtues as a
mean, Aristotle treats philia as a disposition (hexis (hexis or diathesis)
diathesis]
rather than
than a pathos,
pathos, and locates it between
between the extremes
extremes of in-in
gratiation or flattery, on the high end, and generalized generalized grumpi
grumpi-
ness, on the low ((110826-30;
1 l O826-30; butbut note 11226b22-3,
226b22-3, where Aristotle
says that
that this mean
mean is 'most like philiaphilia .,.,, but
. . . but differs
differs from
from philia
in that it is without pathos').
pathos'}.
In my
my book Friendship
Friendship in in the Classical WorldWorld ((1997a),
1 997a), I argued
at length that friendship
friendship was fundamentally an affective affective bond in
ancient Greece and Rome, Rome, just as it is today, and that philos as a
noun means precisely 'friend.' Scholarly opinion, nevertheless,
remains sharply divided.
divided. Thus, Michael Peachin, the the editor of a
recent collection of essays entitled entitled Aspects
Aspects of of Friendship in the the
Graeco-Roman
Giaeco-Roman World World (200
(2001:1 : 135
135 n. 2),
2), describes 'the standard
modern view of Roman friendship' as one 'that tends to reduce
significantly
significantly the emotional
emotional aspect of the relationship
relationship among the the
Love / 171
Love/ 1 71
Romans, and to make of it a rather pragmatic business' (and (and the

same for Greek philia). Peachin notes that 'D. Konstan Konstan has re- re
cently argued against the majority majority opinion and has tried to inject inject
more (modern-style?
(modern-style?)) emotion into ancient amicitia/ but the
ancient amicitia/
majority
majority of the the articles that follow, as Peachin says ((7), n 'point us
back to a heavily
heavily formalized, even legalized, bond between friends.''33
between friends.
These controversies show no sign of diminishing. It is not not my
purpose in this chapter, however, to rehearse rehearse the argume�ts
arguments con-con
cerning friendship
friendship yet yet again.
again. Discussions of Aristotle's view of of
friendship tend to concentrate, reasonably enough, on his very
full
full treatment of of philia
philia in the Nicomachean Ethics. But it is in the
Rhetoric that Aristotle unequivocally includes philia philia among
the pathe,
pathe, and this, accordingly,
accordingly, is our point of departure in the
present investigation.
Aristotle introduces
introduces his inquiryinquiry into the emotions of love and
hatred ((as
as we shall
shall provisionally call them) them) as follows (2.4,1380b35-
(2.4, 1 380b35-
6): 'Let us speak of those whom people philousi [third-person [third-person
plural of the
the verb philein] and whom they hate, and why, by first
defining philia and to philein.' The latter expression, to philein philein,, is
a nominalized infinitive, produced producedby prefixing the definite article
(to = 'the') to the
= the infinitive philein (we (we have encountered a similar
construction
construction in the the case of 'being indignant' or to nemesan-,nemesan; cf. d.
chapter 5,5, p. 1112).
1 2 ) . I have for the moment transliterated rather than
translated
translated the key words involving involving the root phil-,
phil-, since it is just
the meaning of these terms that is in question. As it happens,
however, there is, oddly enough, relatively less disagreement about
the sense of the verb philein philein than about its congeners
congeners philia and
philos. Philein is commonly translated as 'love/ 'love,' 'regard with
affection/ 'cherish/ or 'like' (it sometimes carries the more con-
affection,' 'cherish,' con
crete sense of 'treat affectionately'
affectionately' or 'welcome/
'welcome,' but
but this usage is
chiefly poetic).
poetic). The nominalized
nominalized or articular infinitive,
infinitive, in turn, is
most naturally rendered as 'loving' (similarly, (similarly, its opposite, accord
accord-
ing to Aristotle, is to misein or 'hating')'hating').. Now, if we understand to
philein in this sense, and if, if, furthermore,
furthermore, we take Aristotle's
Aristotle's
phrase 'philia
'philia and to philein' as simply a rhetorical way of ex- ex
pressing a single idea -- or, or, perhaps,
perhaps, as as Aristotle's notice that philia
is here equivalent to to phileinphilein - then we may endorse the transla-
- transla
tion of the final bit given by Cope in his great commentary on the the
1172
Rhetoric ((1877,
1 8 77, vol. 2: 42):42): 'after
'after having firstfirst defined
defined love and
loving.
loving.'' Love
LovejJ then, is the the topic in thethe Rhetoric, and if philia has
the same meaning in all the contexts contexts in which
which it occurs, including
the Nicomachean Ethics, then we will have simultaneously veri veri-
fied
fied the connection
connection between friendship and affection, affection, at least so
far
far as Aristotle is concerned.
concerned. Thus, it is important to determine
just why Aristotle resorts to the compound expression here.
Aristotle continues ((1380b36-81al):
1 380b36-8 1 a 1 ) : 'Let to philein be wishing
for
for someone the things that he deem good,44 for the sake of that
deemss good,
person and not oneself, and the accomplishment of these tthings hings to
the best of one's ability.' What Aristotle proceeds to define, then, then,
is not ph ilia
philia but to philein,
philein, the verbal form that is generally agreed
generally agreed
to signify
signify 'love' or 'loving.
'loving.'' What is more, in contrast to his usage
in the ethical treatises, Aristotle continues to employ the verb, in
various inflections, throughout this section of the the Rhetoric, re-re
turning
turning to the term philia only at the end, and, as we shall see, in
a special context. Aristotle is, is, JI believe,
believe, being
being very careful
careful in his
choice of language here, deliberately restricting the the scope of the
the
definition to the verbal phrase phrase rather than the noun. In order to see
why, we must
must read a little
little further, and then compare
comparewhat what Aristotle
Aristotle
says here with his discussion in the Nicomachean Nicomachean Ethics.
Rather than proceed immediately
immediately to illustrate
illustrate the conditions
under which
which love arises, Aristotle pauses to offer offer an ancillary
definition
definition ((2.4,
2A, 138 1 a l-2): 'A phi105
1381al-2): philos is one who loves rho [ho phil6n:
philon:
[antiphiloumenos]/5 and
present participle] and is loved in return [antiphi1oumenos],'5
hc adds:
he adds: 'Those who believe that they are so disposed towards one
another believe
believe that they are phi10i philoi [plural philos].'6 Philoi,
[plural of phi10sJ.'6
then, constitute a subset of those who love, lovc, namely, just those
who both love and know or believe that their love is reciprocated. reciprocated.
Such mutual affection
affection is characteristic of friends, or those kin kin
who are so disposed towards one another (it is by no means the
case that all are). In the Nicomachean
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle notes (8.2,
11155b27-34jthat
1 55b27-34) that
in the
the case of affection [philesis] for inanimate things, one does
affection [philesis] docs not
not speak
of philia
philia:: for there affection [antiphiJesis]
there is no reciprocal affection [antiphilesis] nor the
the wish
wish for
their good ..... . But they say that one must:
must: wish good things for a friend
[philos] I for his sake. They call those who wish good things
[philos things in this way
Love
Love// 173
1 73
'well-disposed' [e unous ] if the same [wish]

[eunous], , [wish] does not
not occur on the other
person's part as well.
well. For [they say]
say] that goodwill in people who experi
experi-
ence it mutually
mutually [en antipeponthosi] is philia.
[en antipeponthosij philia.
Aristotle then adds

adds the further condition that each must know
othcr so disposed.
that the other is
It is easy to see what is happening here. here. In the Ethics Aristotle
elects to reserve the term philia, at least in the present context,
for
for the
the reciprocal benevolence that is characteristic of friends or
philoi. Accordingly!
philoi. Accordingly, the term
term is not appropriately applied either to
affection
affection for inanimate objects, such as wine, or for people who who do
not like us in return. To be sure, we may like them. For the first
kind of fondness, Aristotle coined the the word philesis (it is confined
wordphilesis confined
to the Nicomachean Ethics}.. In the case of a one-way fondness for
Nicomachean Ethics)
another human being,being, Aristotle adopts
adopts the term eunous, 'well 'well-
disposed' or 'bearing goodwill.
goodwill.'' It differs
differs from
from our liking
liking for wine
in that we do wish good things for the the other's sake, even if our
sentiment is not reciprocated; but it is still not full-fledged philia,
full-fledgedpiulifl,
because it is not mutual. As such, it corresponds
just because corresponds precisely to
to philein or 'loving' as Aristotle defines it in the Rhetoric: 'Let
the Rhetoric:
philein be wishing for someone the
to philein the things that
that he deems good,
for
for the sake of that person and not oneself.'
Eunous or 'well-disposed/
'well-disposed,' then, is a stop-gap
stop-gap term, designed to
distinguish unilateral fromfrom mutual
mutual love!
love, for which, as we have
said, Aristotle saves the word philia.
philia. Aristotle could just as well
have employed the participle ho philon (or (or rather the plural, hoi
philountes), as he did in the Rhetoric (thus: 'they call those who
wish good things in this way "ones who love"'V love"').7 In fact, it would
have been a better choice, since later in the Nicomachean
Nicomachean Ethics
(9.5, 11166b30-67a21),
1 66b30-67a2 1 ), Aristotle explicitly contrasts eunoia with
both philia
philia and philesis as rather a dispassionate form of affection
affection
8
(cf. Eudemian EEthics
(d. 7, 11241a3-14).
thics 7, 24 1 a3-14).8 Here, however, in his defini
defini-
tion of philia,
philia, Aristotle has not yet introduced this technical
distinction, and he reaches for a convenient term to denote the
unrequited sentiment.
But why does Aristotle go go to such trouble to invent
invent or press into
service words and expressions
expressions (including
(including to philein) to signify
signify a
unidirectional affection, while limiting philia to the mutual rela-
1174
tionship that obtains between friends? For philia, as the noun

corresponding to philein,
philein, can perfectly well designate love that that is
not
not reciprocal (Aristotle
(Aristotle himself speaks of 'love for' someone
[philia pros], Nicomachean Ethics 11161a22,
[philia 1 6 1 a22, etc.j cf. Isocrates
etc.; d. Isocrates 119.41,
9 .4 1 ,
etc.)
etc.).. The answer, I believe, iiss that that classical
classical Greek lacked an
ordinary noun corresponding to the English 'friendship' (or (or to the
Latin amicitia, for that that matter), which
which uniquely
uniquely designates mu mu-
tual
tual affection
affection as opposed to the individual sentiment sentiment (d. (cf. Konstan
11997a:
997a: 53-6). Hence, he presses philia philia into serving as the the name of of
the former, and finds other terms to do duty for the the simple
emotion, whether
whether the nonce words philesis and antiphiJesis, antiphilesis, or
eunoia (temporarily), or the verbal nOUn philein. In proposing
noun to philein. proposing to
define 'philia
'philia and to philBin,'
philein,' Aristotle really is indicating
indicating two
notions.99 It is to philein,
distinct notions. philein, or 'love,
'love,'' that is the focus of the the
discussion in the Rhetoric;
Rhetoric-, but he has no wish wish to exclude situa- situa
tions in which affection
affection is mutual, and so he briefly stipulates
what it is that constitutes two people people as philoi or friends: the
name of this two-way bond, though he does not not say so explicitly,
is just philia. 10 lO
.• Given the
the premises ((ta hupokeimena) implicit
ta hupokeimena) implicit iinn thethe preceding
definitions, Aristotle draws the conclusionconclusion that a friend (philosJ (philos]
must share the other's pleasure and pain 'for 'for no other reaSOn
reason than
the other's sake' (2.4, (2.4, 138 1 a5-6): this is so because people always
1381a5—6):
delight in the realization of what they desire and are grieved by its its
13 8 1 a3-7). 1n1 So
failure ((1381a3-7). So too, friends will regard the the same things as
good and bad, and have the the same friends and enemies. Contrari
enemies. Contrari-
wise, a person who wishes the same things for another as he does
for
for himself appears to be the the other's friend. People also feel affec affec-
tion (philousi] for those who have treated them well for their
tion (philousi) their own
sakes, or who, they believe, wish to do so, or who care about the the
same things they do. do. Aristotle here seems to lump together the
case of friends, which presupposes mutual love, and one-sided
affection, which
affection, which is but but half
half of friendship. He then adds that people
like 'those who are friends [Philoi] [philoi] of their
their friends and who like
[philein] people whom they themselves
[philein] themselves like, and those who are
liked by people liked by them; and also those who are enemies
[ekhthroi] of the same people and hate [misein]
[ekhthroi] [misein] whom they hate,
and those who are hated by people hated by them' ((1381al3-17). 13 8 1 a 1 3- 1 7).
Love ! 1 75
Love/175
For all these seem to regard the same things as good, and that is
12
the sign of a friend. 1 2 Now, why these cumbersome and appar- appar
ently redundant formulations? Aristotle is, I think, carefully tak
carefully tak-
ing into account
account three possible situations: first, he mentions
mentions those
who have the same friends friends or enemies (in these cases, the feelings
feelings
are mutual),
mutual), and then he adds those who either either like or are liked by
the same people - - instances of of to philein and to phileisthai (the (the
passive of philein)
philein} - without
without the further
further condition reciprocality.13
condition of reciprocality. 13
Aristotle goes on to list the character
character traits that inspire affecaffec-
tion in others: we like people who are generous, courageous, just,
moderate, and unintrusive, and also, he adds, those who are not
economically dependent on others: this latter is evidently
economically evidently a condi-
condi
tion for liberality.
liberality. Such people,
people, he notes, do not seek their their own
advantage unfairly,
unfairly, and hence are likely to wish good things for
us; if we ourselves are just,
USj just, we will in turn be similarly disposed
towards them. We We also like those with whom we wish to be
friends: virtuous and reputable or impressive
impressive people.
people. In general,
Aristotle adds,
adds, we are inclined
inclined to like those who are agreeable and
not quarrelsome,
quarrelsome, as well as those whom we admire and by whom
we wish to be admired.
admired. Clearly, we may in these cases like or love
another without the feeling being reciprocated,
reciprocated, though we may
desire that it be SOjso,- only if it is, however, will there be friendship.
At the end of the passage in the Rhetoric devoted to love,
Aristotle appends a short list of of the varieties of philia - here he
-
again uses the term itself - - which include 'comradeship [hetaireiaj,

[hetaireia],
familiarity [oikeiotes], kinship [sungeneia], and all such things'
((1381b34),
13 8 1 b34), and he addsadds that philia is produced by a service or
favour (kharisl,
(kharis), especially when it is not demanded
demanded and when one
does not publicize it, since in this way it seems to be performed
for
for the other and not not for some auxiliary motive. The affection affection
between comrades (for example, members of the the same club) and
relatives usually is mutual, though it need not be. 14 1 4 But a favour
favour
engenders love in the beneficiary,
beneficiary, and unless Aristotle is thinking
of his argument in the Nicomachean Ethics ((1167M7-18) 1 l 6 7b 1 7-1 8 ) to the
effect
effect that benefactors
benefactors love those they have helped more than the
reverse, he is using philia here loosely to signifysignify love per se.
Returning to the definition of loving or to philein,
philein, it is clear that
it represents an altruistic or generous sentiment in regard regard to
11761
76 / The Emotions
another (wishing
(wishing the good for that person's sake) that includes includes the
desire or intention
intention to provide the other with what she or he
values. 15 IS No other
other conditions for loving loving are specified: nothing
nothing is
said, for example,
example, about duty or obligation. As far as the per
the per-
formance of services is concerned, loving just consists consists in the the
uncoerced wish to provide provide them. Here, then, there is no tension
between the sentiment
sentiment of love and the requirement or even the the
demand that one help others in achieving the goods to which they
aspire. For if loving ((to
aspire. to philein) as an emotion
emotion just is thethe wish to
provide such assistance,
assistance, then the failure to aid another convicts convicts
one of a want of love itself. 16 16 Friendship, in turn, is mutual
mutual love of of
this sort.
In Aristophanes' Clouds, Strepsiades,
Strepsiades, who is eager to enrol his
son Phidippides in Socrates' 'thinkshop,' says: 'Kiss me and give
me your right hand.' Phidippides responds: responds: 'Here. What is it? it?''
Strepsiades then inquires: 'Tell me, do you love [philein] [philein] me?
me?''
Assured that the boy does, he continues: 'If you truly love me
from
from the heart, obey me, son' ((81-2, 8 1 -2, 86-7). It is not that love is
reducible to filial obedience; Strepsiades means that if his son
loves him, he will oblige him - - that is,
is, desire his father's good.
Xenophon, in his Memorabilia
Memorabilia (2.9.8), has Socrates recommend
friendships in which one 'receives services from from worthy men and
performs services in return.' This is practical advice, advice, but not
incompatible with an ideal of generosity among friends: decent
people deserve our goodwill. In a Latin comedy based on a Greek
model ((Plautus,
Plautus, Epidicus
Epidicus 1113),
13 ), a character declares: 'A friendfriend is
one who helps out in difficult
difficult circumstances,
circumstances, when there is need
of cash.
cash.'' It may sound as though
though friendship is being treatedtreated here as
a matter
matter of obligatory gifts or prestations (ef. |cf. Raccanelli 11998:
998:
1164-6),
64-6), but in fact
fact there is no discrepancy with with Aristotle's altruis
Aristotle's altruis-
tic formula. Love is put put to the test in situations of need, just
because it consists in the desire for another's well-beingY well-being.17
That
That love and friendship reside in an active wish to provide
good things
things for another gives a special cast to these concepts in
Greek (assuming
(assumingthat thatAristotle's
Aristotle's account
account isisrepresentative
representative of ofpopu
popu-
lar attitudes)
attitudes).. The second edition
edition of Webster's New New International
International
Dictionary ((1959)
Dictionary 1 959) defines
defines 'love' as 'a feeling of strong personal
attachment' and 'ardent affection.'
affection.' So So too, in a recent handbook
Love
Love// 177
1 77
on emotion, Elaine
Elaine Hatfield and Richard Rapson (2000: 654-5)
write: 'Most scientists
scientists distinguish
distinguish between two forms of of love --
"passionate love" and "companionate love. love."" Passionate love .... . . is
an intense emotion
emotion ..... . Companionate love .... . . is a far less intense
intense
emotion. It combines
combines feelings of deep attachment, commitment,
intimacy/18 Aristotle says nothing
and intimacy.'IS nothing about feelings
feelings or attach
attach-
ment; he mentions
mentions only a benevolent
benevolent intent
intent or concern for the
well-being of another, which manifests itself actions.19 Rather
itself in actions.19
than focus on interior
interior states, and the possibility of recognizing
them through involuntary signs such as facial expressions, Aristotle
typically attends, as we have seen, to the social motives and
consequences of the the emotions.
emotions.
So too, Aristotle carefully
carefully notes the personal qualities in others
that elicit our love and benevolence.
benevolence. Pathe for Aristotle,
Aristotle, as the
word suggests, are characteristically reactions to the merits and
intentions
intentions of others (see (see chapter I1,, p. 27):
27):this
thisisisasastrue
trueofofloveloveasas
it is for anger, indignation, or gratitude. The recognition of virtue
in others moves us to desire their their good -- for their sake. If If it were
only in the hope of a fair return, the sentiment
sentiment would not be love
as Aristotle defines it, nor as the Greeks in general conceived of it.
We may
may wonder, however, whether philia in the the sense of friend
friend-
ship counts as a pathos.
pathos, For philia does not depend solely on one
for philia
person's affection,
affection, but involves
involves the emotions
emotions of two. Thus, O.H.
Green writes: 'In order to understand love or friendship, we must
consider the attitude
attitude of friend
friend toward friend
friend or lover toward lover.
The attitude, of course, may be found found without
without the relationship,
relationship,
where it is not reciprocated;
reciprocated; but the reciprocation of the attitude attitude
is what makes up the relationship
relationship of love or friendship'
friendship' ((1997:
1 99 7: 215).
215).
Green goes oonn ttoo say:
say: 'It iiss in this vein that Aristotle, in Books VIII
and IX IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, considers philia, which is
"'2o
20
translated both as "friendship" and as "love" or "liking. "liking."'
So too, Martha Nussbaum, who describes love as 'an intense intense
response to perceptions of the particularity, and the particular
high value, of another person's body and mind' (200 1 : 465;
(2001: 465; cf. d.
Smith 11982:
982: 28),
28), writes:
[L]ove, while an emotion, is also a relationship. I may feel love for

someone, or be in love with
with someone, and that love is itself
itself an emotion in
1178
78 I/ The Emotions
the Ancient
the sense described here; but there is another

another sense in which
which love is
present
present only if there is a mutual relationship .... . . Aristotle ....., holds
holds that
love - philia - is not merely
- or at least pbilia - merely an emotion. Although it involves involves
emotion, it also has requirements
emotion/ requirements that
that go beyond the emotional
emotional ... ... In
other words, the term 'love' is used equivocally, to name both an emotion
and
and a more complex form of life. (200 1 : 473-4)
(2001:
We must not imagine, Nussbaum adds, 'that the emotions

involved in love are unaffected
unaffected by the the presence or absence of a
reciprocal relationship
relationship of the sort Aristotle
Aristotle depicts.' The knowl
knowl-
edge that another loves me may affect affect the
the quality of my
my feeling for
him or her (we(we recall that, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Ethics, Aristotle
insists that philoi must
thatphiloi must be cognizant
cognizant of one another's sentiment)
sentiment)..
Beyond this, Nussbaum continues, 'lovers will have emotions
toward their relationship itself, and the activities it involves.
Thus we cannot even understand the emotional aspects of love
fully
fully without seeing how it is frequently
frequently related to interactions
and exchanges of the sort Aristotle
Aristotle is thinking
thinking about' (474). There
There
is a way, then, in which the nature of love itself might be nuanced
by the mutuality condition attaching to philia philia between friends.
Aristotle
Aristotle does not raise these subtleties,
subtleties, although
although he is fully
fully
aware that confidence in love or friendship
friendship takes considerable
considerable
time to develop ((cf.ef. Nicomachean
Nicomachean Ethics 9.5, 1166b34).1 1 66b34). Philia
does not, I think, have the abstract status of a relationship, in the
sense of a bond distinct fromfrom each friend's love. It is not thethe kind
of entity
entity of which
which it is possible to say that friends 'will have
emotions toward their relationship itself,' itself/ any more than it can
impose obligations on those who love each other. The mutual
love that obtains between philoi
philoi is better described,
described, I believe, as a
state of affairs,
affairs, consisting simply in the fact that each loves the
other. As a name for simple love, that is, the altruistic
altruistic wish for the
good of another, philia, like to philein, is a pathos;pathos-, as a state of
of
affairs
affairs obtaining between friends, it consists of two pathe, pathe, one for
philos.21 If either
each philos.21 either fails to have the the appropriate wish
wish or to
provide good things for the other to the extent possible, the state
of affairs
affairs that depends
depends on thethe twin pathe is dissolved.
twinpathe
At the end of his discussion
discussion of loving in the the Rhetoric, we recall,
recall,
Aristotle provides
provides a brief
brief list of the
the various kinds or species ( (eide)
eide)
Love
Love// 179
1 79
of philia, among which which he includes

includes comradeship, familiarity, and
kinship. This group differs differs from
from the way Aristotle subdivides
philia in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he relates the different
philia different
types to the the kinds of things that are lovable (phileton). (phileton). Here he
explains (8.2, 11155bl8-19):
1 55b I 8-19): 'Not everything is loved, but but only what
is lovable, and this is the the good or the pleasing or the the useful' (since
a thing is useful, Aristotle says, because it leads to what is good or
pleasing, the the three categories of 'lovables' are reducible to two). two).
Scholars debate whether all three sorts are altruistic, or only that
based on recognition of the the other's virtue, which Aristotle calls
the best or complete type. I myself maintain maintain that all are, and that
they differdiffer not in regard to the wish for the other's well-being but
in thethe qualities that elicit elicit this desire ((so
so J.M.
J.M. Cooper 11997a,
99 7a, 1997b;
1 99 7b;
contra Pakaluk 11998:62-3). 998: 62-3) . Love or friendship inspired by another's
virtue is more durable than that inspired by an entertaining per- per
sonality, perhaps,perhaps, but but both are love only insofarinsofar as they involve a
selfless desire for the other'S other's good. One reason why philia based
on virtue is complete teleia), according to Aristotle
complete ((teleia), Aristotle (8.3,
(8.3, 11156b7-
1 56b7-
111),
1 ), is that people are good in themselves (kath'hautous), (kath'hautous), whereas
they are useful or pleasant pleasant only incidentally (kata (kata sumbebekos).
sumbebekos).
But this is something of a sleight of hand: for even if goodness is a
more stable trait of character character than wittiness, say, it does not
follow
follow that one likes a witty person only incidentally.22 incidentally.22
In this controversy, however, there is a tendency tendency to overlook
other forms of philia, and most especially those involved in kin kin-
ship and marriage. marriage. In the Nicomachean
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle offers offers
several explanations of these kinds of love. For example, fathers
love their children because they are part of themselves: they are
somehow, Aristotle says, says, one, even though they are separate separate indiindi-
viduals ((8.12, 8 . 1 2, 11161bl6-33).
1 6 1 b 1 6-33 ) . The love between siblings and other
blood relatives has a similar foundation, foundation, derived from from the bond
with the the father. There are, however, additional causes of fraternal fraternal
love, such as the fact fact that
that brothers are reared together and are of of
the same age: age: in this, their their affection
affection resembles thatthat among com- com
rades ((8.12,8 . 1 2, 11161b33-5).
1 6 1 b33-5 ). The philia between husband and wife wife is
in accord with with nature, Aristotle says, since human human beings are
naturally given to forming forming couples (8. 1 2, 11162al6-19
(8.12, 1 62aI 6- 1 9;; d.
cf. Politics
. 1 , 1 252a26-30). In addition, children bind parents together, which
11.1,1252a26-30).
1180
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
is why childless marriages more readily dissolve. These loves,

which
which correspond to the kinds of philia that that Aristotle identifies in
the Rhetoric ('familiarity' may well refer refer to the marriage relation),
are surely altruistic
altruistic as welL
well.
Aristotle states in the Poetics ((1453b 9-22) that the plot
1453b 119-22) of
plot of
tragedy arouses more pity when the conflict conflict occurs 'within loves'
((en philiais], that
en philiais), that is, as he specifies, between
between siblings or children
and parents. The evidence at our disposal confirms Aristotle's Aristotle's
judgment. In herher book Murder
Murder among Friends: Violation of of Philia
Tragedy (2000: xv),
in Greek Tragedy xv), Elizabeth Belfiore calculates that
offences
offences against blood ties are 'central to more than half' half the
extant tragedies. So So too, among fragmentary plays whose plots can
be reconstructed
reconstructed with some confidence, nearly half involve harm
or the threat of harm to blood relatives, and a dozen more harm to
spouses, together amounting to nearly three-fifths three-fifths of thethe total
23
number. 23 And yet, despite the title of Belfiore'sBelfiore's book, violence
between
between friends,
friends, as opposed to kin, is virtuallyvirtually non-existent in
Greek tragedy,
tragedy, so far as the evidence permits judge.24
permits us to judge.24
In Euripides'
Euripides' Hercules, the the hero, in an episode of madness,
murders his wife and children; in the end it is his friend friend Theseus
Theseus
who draws him him out of his suicidal depression
depression and brings him him to
live in Athens. The friendship
friendship between Orestes and Pylades was
legendary, and in his tragedytragedy Orestes, Euripides
Euripides contrasts the
loyalty of the
the friend
friend with thethe lukewarm support of Orestes' uncle,
Menelaus. As Orestes says: says: 'The saying is true: "Have comrades
[hetairoi], not just kin
[hetairai]' kin!"! " For a man, though
though an outsider, who is
conjoined by character is a better philos for a man to have than ten
thousand of his own blood' (804-6) (804-6).. In Aristotle's
Aristotle's terms, solidarity
on account of virtue is more secure than that based only on
biology.
Poulheria Kyriakou
Kyriakou has has argued
argued( (1998: 283)) that
1 998: 283 that Menelaus's
Menelaus's fault
fault
in the Orestes is notnot a want
want of altruistic
altruistic affection
affection but
but of reciproc-
reciproc
ity: as 'Agamemnon's only surviving male relative,' relative/ he is obliged
to 'succour his relatives, or philoi, in distress, thus returning the
many favors, or kharites [plural [plural of kharisl,
kharis], his dead brother had
generously granted him. him.'' Kyriakou
Kyriakou affirms
affirms (283-4) that ph ilia and
philia
kharis are closely related ideas: 'It should be noted that Menelaus
kharis
is not expected to help his nephew because of the natural affection affection
Love 181
Love// 181
kin
kin might
might feel for each other ..... . Irrespective
Irrespective ooff emotions oorr prin
prin-
ciples Menelaus is supposed to assist Orestes because his d ebt to
debt
25
Agamemnon obliges him to. to.''25 She
She points out that Orestes and
Electra continually
continually refer
refer to Menelaus as philos, philos, and yet 'nothing
like affection
affection or love governs their relationship.
relationship.'' Rather, they are
bound by 'a very strictly organized system of mutual mutual obligations,'
obligations/
on which
which Menelaus reneges.
reneges. Kyriakou
Kyriakou agrees that philos nor- nor
mally distinguishes
distinguishes friend
friend from
from relative in Greek literature, and
that, even among kin, the word usually suggests friendly feelings:
'But this does not mean that the term cannot be used irrespective
of emotions and that it does not not imply a system of reciprocal
obligations, in some contexts at least. least.''
N ow, oon
Now, n Aristotle's view, Menelaus's failure ttoo assist his nephew
exposes the
the limits of his benevolence, not not merely of his sense of of
duty. Orestes indeed reminds Menelaus of the kharis or good turn
he owes in return for Agamemnon's support in recovering Helen
from
from Troy,
Troy, but he also appeals to the philia implicit implicit in kinship:
'Give your dear ones [philois],
[philois], who are faringfaring miserably, a share in
your own well-being,
well-being, and do not keep for yourself what is good;
partake rather in our struggles in turn, and pay back the debt of of
gratitude to my father, to whom you ought. For they are friends friends
[philoi] in name, not deed,
[philoi] deed, who are not not friends in misfortune'
665-7). There are, I think, two demands here: the first is
cf. 665-7).
(450-5; d.
that Menelaus share with his nephew and niece, who should be
dear to him, something of his own prosperity,
prosperity, just as Agamemnon
had done for him, without
without regard to repayment; the second is a
claim on Menelaus's debt to Agamemnon.
Agamemnon. The concluding gener- gener
alization
alization recapitulates
recapitulates the first point: all philoi philoi are entitled
entitled to
expect spontaneous help from from one another in times of trouble,
irrespective of prior favours.
Menelaus acknowledges
acknowledges the claims of kinship: 'I respect you
and wish to struggle along with you in your plight' (682-3), he
says, and adds that
that it is right to participate in the difficulties of
difficulties of
blood relations (homaimones, 684), 684), when
when possible,
possible, both by dying
oneself
oneself and by slaying enemies (enantioi, 685). 685). But he protests
that
that he has not the forces to assist assist Orestes
Orestes in this way, and
recommends persuasion instead. Pylades Pylades is willing to gamble all
to save Orestes; Menelaus
Menelaus is not. As Orestes sees it (he (he sets a high
high
18
1822 / The Emotions
standard for loyalty), Menelaus is not not sufficiently

sufficiently desirous of his his
good. It is thus true, as Kyriakou
Kyriakou says, that Menelaus feels little
love for Orestes and Electra - and that is the point. For Forthe concern
concern
characteristic of a true philos, Orestes must await the the arrival of of
Pylades.
Isocrates, in a speech ((thethe 'Aegineticus') composed for the de
the de-
fendant
fendant in an inheritance trial before a court in Aegina, provides a
vivid depiction of a friendship. A certain Thrasylochus bequeathed
his property
property to the defendant,
defendant, but the will is being contested
contested by
the testator's
testator's sister. The fathers of the two men had been intimateintimate
friends and connected by marriage, and the sons were closer than
brothers: they shared everything, held similar political
political views, and
had the same friends and enemies. When Thrasylochus fell ill, the
defendant put his own health at risk and tended him assiduously,
although
although the former was bedridden for six months and so cranky
that no relative or even slave could abide him. On the point of of
death, indeed, Thrasylochus adopted adopted the defendant ((24-9;2A-9; cf. d.
Sternberg 2000). Now his sister, who did nothing for him when he
was living, has come to claim the legacy, as though she were a
relative of his
his money and and not
not of the
the deceased himself (30-1).) . IfIf
himself (30-1
there had been enmity ({ekhthra)
ekhthra) between her and her brother,
then it is no wonder, the defendant avers, that he left left her nothing,
nothing,
and if not, then all the more should she lose the inheritance, given
her callous indifference
indifference to him
him (32). It is not those who 'claim to
be kin by blood, but in their deeds behaved like enemies,' enemies/ who
should be vindicated, 'but much rather those who have not the
name of kin but in misfortune showed themselves to be closer
than the relatives'
relatives' (33).
As Aristotle affirms,
affirms, affection
affection and friendship reside in a selfless
selfless
concern to provide goodsgoods for the
the other to the best of one's ability;
ability,-
failure to assist in time of need, whether on the part of friends or
relatives, proves
proves the
the absence of thethe wish and hence the love itself.
Sentiment and succor go go hand in hand, for the sentiment
sentiment consists
precisely in the desire to promote
promote the other's welfare.
welfare. The speaker
in Isocrates' discourse is not arguing that the deceased was obli- ohli
gated to make him his heir, but that he wanted to, in response to
the kindness he had been shown (Thrasylochus himself, we are
told, felt a debt of gratitude or kharis, 111}.
1 ). To see his
his behaviour as
Love / 1183
83
motivated
motivated by interest
interest is to miss the benevolence that is the
essence of philia.
philia. Thrasylochus's
Thrasylochus's sister, who should have held
him dear, lacked this selflessness, and lost lost her place in Thra Thra-
sylochus's affections.
affections.
Euripides7 Orestes, affirms
Isocrates' discourse, like Euripides' affirms the solidar-
solidar
ity
ity of friends
friends as against relatives. In fact, betrayal of friends is
rarely if ever a subject of litigation
litigation in surviving forensic oratory
(see Cox 11998:
998: 1194-202),
94-202), and comedy too seems to have eschewed
the theme, whilewhile delighting in the representation
representation of quarrels
between
between fathers and sons and husbands husbands and wives (Konstan
(Konstan 2000a;
2000a;
2006a). What is the explanation for this apparent reticence in
respect to conflict among friendsfriends in the courts and on the stage of of
classical Athens, in contrast to its conspicuousness among kin?
Blood ties had a sacred character, and no doubt their their violation
was particularly shocking and pitiable, as Aristotle says. To see a
mother
mother slay her children, moreover, was wrenching because it
defied
defied an attachment
attachment that was presumed
presumed to be natural;
natural; for a child
child
to kill a parent was to disregard
disregard the unrepayable debt owed for the the
gift
gift of life itself (Nicomachean
(Nicomachean Ethics 88.14, . 1 4, 11163b
1 63bI9-28
19-28).) . So too, a
wife who defied her husband threatened to invert the social order.
But it may also be that the affectionaffection between friends was itself itself
idealized, and was thus protected from from negative representation.
Alfons Furst,
Fiirst, in his
his study of classical accounts of strife among
friends ((1996:119),
1 996: 1 1 9), cites Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics ((7.5,1239bl5-
7.5, 1 239b 1 5-
116)
6) for the maxim 'a friendship
friendship that is not stable is not not a friend
friend-
ship.' Furst
Fiirst concludes (228 (228)) that 'ancient reflections on friendship
friendship
were in the last analysis shot shot through
through with an unshakable opti- opti
mism.' If thethe only friendships
friendships are enduring friendships, then bebe
traying a friend
friend is logically impossible. A dramatic plot might
expose the
the consequences of a shallow confidence in a fair-weather
friend, but
but such people are merely contemptible. As Socrates puts
it in Xenophon's Memorabilia
Memorabilia (2.5.4): 'I neither
neither see good slaves
being sold nor good friends
friends being betrayed.'
Whereas various obligations and forms of deference regulated regulated
relations in the Greek family and city alike, friendship friendship may have
emerged as a privileged zone of disinterested affection.26 affection.26 In the the
larger community, moreover, one was always defending defending one's
status against insult,
insult, intimidation,
intimidation, or disapproval ((the the motives
1 84 / The Emotions
184 Emotions of the Ancient Greeks
the Ancient
behind anger, fear, and shame), resenting the the unfair

unfair advantage ofof
others (envy, indignation), or being conscious of one's debt to
them
them (gratitude)
(gratitude).. In this fraught
fraught arena of public life, friendship
appeared as the
the locus of a selfless desire
desire for another
another person's
person's
welfare that
that went beyond the demands of reciprocity or duty.27duty.27 It
was still marked, of course, by a concern with want want and security,
as opposed to being an etherealized feeling of attachment
attachment (as
modern
modern definitions would have it), it), and it was thus, like
like the other
pathe Aristotle discusses, embedded in the
Aristotle discusses, the world of social ex-
ex
change, whether
whether material
material or in the coin of reputation or status.
status.
But the love between
between friends
friends nevertheless
nevertheless looked beyond thethe self,
and in this resembles, for all the differences,
differences, the
the idea of love we
today.28
have today.28
C HAPTER NINE
CHAPTER
Hatred
I have ever hated all nations, professions

professions and communities, and all
my love is towards individuals.
individuals. For instance,
instance, I hate the tribe ofof
lawyers, but
but I love Councellor
Councellor such
such a one, Judge such
such a one. For so
with physicians
physicians (I(I will not
not speak of my
my ownown trade), soldiers, En-
En
glish, Scotch, French, and the rest. But principally I hate and detest
detest
that animal
animal called man, although
although I heartily
heartily love John, Peter, Thomas
Thomas
and so forth.
Jonathan Swift Pope, 29
Swift to Alexander Pope, 29 September 11725
7251
1
To foster
foster the
the conviction
conviction that God supports the
the murder
murder of innocents
requires a tightknit group and a settled hatred of the
the Other: in these
circles, whites hate blacks and Jews; Jews and Christians hate
Muslims
Muslims and vice versa;
versa,- anti-abortion crusaders hate gynecologists.
gynecologists.
All of them seem to have
have it in for homosexuals and most, even the
Americans, hate contemporary America.
Hinton
Hinton 2003: 50
Aristotle draws
draws a sharp distinction, as we have observed
observed (chapter
2, p. 47),
47),between
betweenanger,
anger,which
whichisisprovoked
provokeduniquely
uniquelyby byaaslight,
slight,
and enmity or hatred, which is a response
response to something bad or
harmful (kakoTI, as in 'cacophony'). Since Aristotle's account of
harmful (kakon, of
hatred is relatively brief, we may quote it almost in full
full (Rhetoric
(Rhetoric
2.4, 1382al-14):
1 382a l-14):
Concerning enmity [ekhthra] and hating

enmity [ekhthra] [to misein], one can understand
hating [to
them
them on the
the basis of their
their opposites. Anger, spite, and slander
slander are produc-
86 /! The Emotions of the
tive of enmity.
enmity. Anger, however, derives from from what
what happens to oneself,
whereas enmity
enmity arises
arises also without
without [the offence] being directed at oneself.
For if we believe
helieve that someone is a certain
certain kind of person, we hate him.
him.
Also, anger is always about individuals, for example
example Callias or Socrates,
whereas hatred [misos]
[misos] is also felt
felt towards types: for everyone hates a
thief and an informer. Moreover,
thief Moreover, the one is healed by time, while the
other
other is incurable. Also,
Also, the one is a desire to inflict pain, while
while the other
is a desire to inflict
inflict harm: for a person
person who is angry wishes to perceive [his
revenge], but
revenge), but to the
the one who hates this is a mattermatter of indifference ...
indifference ...
Besides this, the one iiss accompanied bby y pain, while
while the other occurs
unaccompanied by pain: for someone who is angry feels pain, but some
but some-
one who hates does not. Also, the the one might
might feel pity if enough
enough [misfor
[misfor-
tunes befall the other], butbut the other
other in no case: for the one wishes
wishes that
the person with
with whom he is angry shouldshould suffer
suffer in return, but the other
wishes that he should cease to exist.exist.
Let me highlight some of Aristotle's claims in this passage.

passage. First,
he maintains that the object of anger is to cause pain to the other,
while the object of hatred is to inflict harm (2.4, 11382a8).
harm (2.4, 3 82a8 ). We may
wish that
that people whom
whom we hate should
should die, but when we are
angry, what
what we desire is that
that the other person feel hurt in return.
In addition, we do not necessarily respond with hatred only to
those who have harmed us in particular,
particular, but may experience it for
wrongs directed to others as well. Finally, Aristotle affirms
affirms that
we do not
not feel anger,
anger, in contrast with
with hatred,
hatred, towards
towards groups
groups or
classes. It is one of the
the fundamental differences
differences between anger
and hatred that while the object of anger must be an individual - - it
is strictly
strictly a one-an-one
one-on-one passion (d.
fcf. 2.2, 1378a34-5
1378a34-5)) -- we can hate
thieves or informers in general, whether or not they they have injured
personally: it is enough that 'we believe that someone is a
us personally:
certain kind of person.' We
We may add that, according to Aristotle,
hatred is a more durable emotion than anger.
Aristotle is right, as we might have expected,
expected, about Greek
usage in respect to the generality of hatred. In practice,
practice, the verb
misein, unlike anger,
misein, anger, often
often expresses loathing for a category
category or
class of people rather than a particular individual.
individual. For example,
Phaedra, in Euripides'
Euripides' Hippolytus, declares: 'I hate women who
Hippolytus, declares:
are chaste in words
words but
but secretly engage
engage in ugly escapades' (3 1 3-
(313-
Hatred / 1 8 7
Hatred/187
114).
4 ) . Hippolytus, iinn turn, announces
announces that that hhee hates a wise woman
(640), and, a little later, all women indiscriminately
indiscriminately (664-5; d. cf. 93;
Plato, R 334C4-5). In the Prometheus
epublic 334C4-5).
Republic Prometheus Bound attributedattributed to
Aeschylus,
Aeschylus, Prometheus
Prometheus says to Hermes: Hermes: 'I have learned learned to hate
traitors' ((1068;
1 068; d.cf. Pindar, Pythian 4.284-6:
4.284-6: 'I have learned to hate
7
an arrogant man man'), ), while
while Lysias ((16.18)
1 6. 1 8 ) speaks of hatred of people
with
with long hair, an aristocratic affectation affectation in imitation
imitation of the the
Spartans (at 114.39, 4.39, Lysias contrasts hatred for the the Spartans with
anger towards the thirty tyrants, tyrants, who unjustly
unjustly usurped
usurped power in
2
Athens; d.
Athens,- cf. 25 . 1 8 ).2 The
25.18). The frequency withwith which
which first-person expres
first-person expres-
sions of antagonism towards women and other groups turn up
suggests that that it was something
something of a formula. Since hatred is
aroused by what what is harmful
harmful or prejudicial
prejudicial to one's
one's well-being, it
embraces
embraces a wide range of hostile relations, relations, including
including class con con-
flict, foreign enemies,
enemies, and partisan competition.
competition.
In his commentary on the Rhetoric, George Kennedy ((1991: 199 1 :
3 7 ) writes that
1137) that 'Aristotle regards hostilehostile emotions as awakened
by the perception that that someone belongs to a detested class of of
individuals,
individuals, such such as thieves or sycophants.
sycophants. The negative negative feeling
toward the class is a permanent one, but but the
the identification of an
individual with with the the class may be established
established or disproved in a
speech.' One can, of course, detest an instantiation instantiation of a type: thus,
a character in a fragmentary play of Euripides Euripides declares: 'I hate hate
womankind,
womankind, but but of all of them, you, who speak well but but do
wicked things' (Meleager, fro
things' (Meleager, fr. 528. 1-2; d.
528.1-2; cf. Menander, Sicyonius
60- 1 ) . I agree too that hatred is not
1160-1). not simply a reflexreflex of revulsion,
but
but a considered antagonism antagonism or animosity
animosity based on an ethical
judgment. In Euripides' Electra, Clytemnestra affirms, affirms, 'When
people understand
understand a matter, matter, then if it is right
right to hate it, it is just to
3
feel disgust [stugein] 10 1 5-1 7).3 However, Aristotle does not
[stugein] at it' ((1015-17).
deny that that hatred may be directed at an individual, nor does he
interpret
interpret all personal hatred as motivated by an association association be-be
tween the the individual and a group. In this, moreover, he is consis consis-
tent with ordinary
ordinary Greek usage. Thus, Medea, in Euripides' trag
Euripides' trag-
edy, indicates that that she bears no ill will towards Creon, since he,
owing her nothing, did not wrong her; her,- it is her husband she hates
(309-
(309-11; cf. Hippolytus
1 1 ; d. Hippolytus 962).962). In Sophocles' Electra, the the heroine
recalls how her mother abused her, calling her a 'hateful 'hateful creature
1188
Greeks
[misema]
[misema] loathesome to the gods' (289). In turn, Electra accuses
her sister
sister Chrysothemis of cowardice for failing failing to make manifest
in action her hatred (misos) for her mother (347-8),(347-8), and reproaches
her (357-8):
(357-8): 'For me, you are a hater who hates in words, but in
fact you live with
with our father's assassins.' Isaeus writes ((9.16): 9 . 1 6): 'I
will prove to you that
that Astyphilus was the worst enemy [ekhthiston]
[ekhthiston]
of
of Cleon
Cleon [not the
the Cleon
Cleon toto whom
whom Aristotle
Aristotle refers], and
and hated
hated him him
so thoroughly
thoroughly and justly that that he was far more disposed that that no
member
member of his household should talk to Clean Cleon than to adopt
Clean's son as his own' (ef.
Cleon's (cf. 9.3 1 ). In Aristophanes' Knights (225-6)
9.31).
a character affirms: 'There are a thousand knights, good men, who who
hate him' - - that is, thc Paphlagonian,
is, the Paphlagonian, who who is a thinly veiled stand-
stand
in for Clean,
Cleon, this time the very man Aristotle cites to illustrate
that one can be angry only at an individual, not not a type (cf.
(ef. 400).
400).
abound.4
Examples of this usage abound.4
Kcnnedy's
Kennedy's view corresponds better to the modern idea of hatred,
at least as it has evolved in the past few decades.
decades. In a recent book
on
on hate
hate crimes,
crimes, Jack
Jack Levin
Levin (2002: 11)) remarks:
Until recently, the term 'hate' referred to any intense

intense dislike or hostility,
hostility,
whatever its object...
object . . . Beginning in the mid- 1980s, the term 'hate' became
mid-1980s,
used in a much
much more restricted sense to characterize
characterize an individual's
negative beliefs and feelings about the the members of some other group of
group of
people because of their race, religious identity, ethnic origin,
origin, gender,
sexual
sexual orientation, age, or disability status.
Levin notes that, like 'hate,' 'prejudice' too has 'undergone a

major
major shift in meaning ....
. . from
from "any pre-judgment" to "a hostile hostile
attitude directed
directed specifically
specifically toward members
members of an outgroup'"
outgroup'"
(he might
might have addcd
added that
that the same is true for the term 'discrimi
'discrimi-
nation').5
nation').s
When such negative
negative beliefs are intensified
intensified to the point that the
other is perceived as less than human, they may enable people to
undertake the deliberate eradication of an entire group or nation.
Bartov, writing of G
Omer Bartov, erman action on the eastern front
German front in the
Second World War, observes
observes (200 1 : 83
(2001: ) : 'During the
83): the war in Russia
the process of dehumanisation of the
the the enemy
enemy was probably
probably more
successful
successful than in any other war in modern history -- the Rus-
Hatred / 189
Hatred/ 1 89
sians, Slavs, Jews, Mongols, all had lost any relationship relationship to the
human race, and were nothing more than satanic monsters trying
to appear human,
human, imposters
imposters whose identity had to be exposed and
whose existence
existence endangered everything which civilised civilised men held
dear.' So too, Aaron Beck (1999: ( 1999: 116)
6) observes:
observes: 'First, the
the members
of
of the
the opposition are homogenized; they lose their identities as
their identities
unique individuals. Each victim victim is interchangeable, and all are
disposable. In the next next stage the victims are dehumanized
dehumanized .... . .
Finally, they are demonized

demonized aass thethe embodiment ooff Evil' ((cf.
d . 1170-
70-
96).6 It is not acts, on this view, but
96).6 but identities
identities (as
(as determined
determined by
beliefs or other traits) that induce and excuse hostility hostility..
Is this what
what Aristotle
Aristotle means when when he says that hatred arises 'if 'if
we believe thatthat someone is a certain kind of person'? Aristotle
does not
not provide a definition of hatred, although the the Stoics did:
'Hatred is a desire for something bad to happen to another, pro- pro
gressively and continually' (Diogenes (Diogenes Laertius,
Laertius, Lives ofof the Phi
the Phi-
7
losophers 7.
losophers 1 13).1 The Stoic definition looks only to the impulse,
7.113).
however, and does not not include a reference to the the motive for
hatred, although we would expect such an account Aristotle.8
account of Aristotle.8
Since Aristotle treats hatred as the the opposite of love, we may
reasonably
reasonably seekseek to inferinfer the causes of it from
from his analysis
analysis of the the
latter emotion. Indeed, Aristotle invites us to do just this, since he
introduces his account of hatred with with the words: 'concerning
enmity [ekhthra]
[ekhthra] and hating [to misein] misein] one can understand them
on the
the basis of their opposites.'
As we saw in the the previous chapter, Aristotle defines love or
loving ((to philein]) as wishing good things for another for that
to philein
person's sake, and seeking seeking actively
actively to bring them about (2.4, (2.4,
1380b36-8 1 a 1 ) . One might, on this basis, conclude that
1380b36-81al). that hatred is a
disinterested desire that harm accrue to another, together with a
disposition to make it happen. This looks rather like the Stoic
formula, and perhaps gave rise to it. Aristotle is aware, however,
that
that a given term may have more than one opposite ((Topics Topics 2.7,
1113al4-15,
13a14- 1 5, quoted in chapter 3, p. 83), 83), and one must be cautious
in making such transpositions. In any case, Aristotle does not
include thethe causes of affection
affection in thethe definition, as he does,
does, for
example, in the case of anger, and so for this we must look to the
more detailed description that follows.
190 / The Emotions
Emotions of the
the Ancient Greeks
Aristotle observes that we generally find genial people likeable,

and it is plausible to suppose
suppose that we are inclined to dislike those
who arcare contentious. So So too,
too; he says, we feel affection
affection towards
those people whom we admire. admire. Now, the traits that are most
admirable in themselves
themselves are the virtues, and Aristotle duly lists lists
among the principal qualities that inspire affection affection liberality,
courage, justice, and moderation. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Ethics,
moreover, Aristotle observes that things are lovable (phileton) (phileton)
either because
because they are good or because they are pleasing (8.2, (8.2,
11155M8-19;
1 55b 1 8- 1 9; he subsumes the third category,
category, the useful, under the
preceding two, since things are useful because they bring about
the good or the pleasant)
pleasant).. The best and most
most permanent kind of of
love, he concludes, is that on account of goodness or virtue, since since
virtue pertains to one's character (as (as opposed to a personality trait
like affability). Aristotle, as we have seen, links the special role of of
character with the stipulation, in the definition of love, that the
desire for the other's good be for his or her sake, since, he argues,
our character is who we are ((see see chapter 8,8, pp. 1177-9).
77-9 ).
Aristotle mentions
mentions spite and slander as causes of hostility, and
these may be taken as the contrary of amiability. In tUIll turn,, an
odious person - - the kind we
we hate -- is
is plausibly the opposite ofof one
one
who is lovable
lovable because virtuous. If this is so, then the type of of
people we hate, according to Aristotle, arc are those with vicious
characters, that is, marked by vices instead instead of virtues. Hatred,
then, involves a moral evaluation as much as loving does.Y does.9
Aristotle's view clearly docsdoes not entircly
entirely conform to Jack Levin's
account of modern hatred as characterized by 'an individual's
negative beliefs
beliefs and feelings about the members of some other
group of people because of their race, religious identity, ethnic
origin, gender,
gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability status.' Aristotle
does regard non-Greeks and women as naturally inferior to adult
male Greeks (Politics
(Politics 11252a31-bl2,
252a3 1-b 12, 1254bI3-24)
1254bl3-24), but these groups
'
are nevertheless capable of virtue in accord with with their natures (as
(as
all creatures are).
are).There is thus no motive in Aristotle for hostility
hostility
towards a given natural class as such. What one dislikes are
groups made up of morally corrupt individuals, such as thieves
and informers,
informers, to cite Aristotle's own examples (an (an anonymous
Byzantine commentator
commentator remarks on this passage: 'I am not said to
Hatred
Hatred// 191
191
hate Callias
Callias [i.e., an individual] but but rather the whole race of of
Persians or informers' [99 . 1 5- 1 6 Rabet
[99.15-16 Rabe]; but
but the
the example of the
Persians is not not Aristotle's). One hates each member of these
groups for his or her own moral flaws, and the entire class since since it
is defined
defined by the vice in question. 10
10
The case is different for anger, since anger anger is provoked by an

intentional
intentional slight, whichwhich is necessarily addressed by one indiindi
vidual to another. It is true, as we saw in chapter 2 (pp. (pp. 70-2), that
treachery could
acts of treachery could arouse
arouse anger
anger against a city as a whole,whole, to
the point at which
which the conqueror was prepared to obliterate the
entire population. In these cases, however, the anger results results from
from
a devious or unprincipled action - - a particular offence that is
perceived as as undeserved -- to which the people are are understood to
have given theirtheir consent: it is, as it were, a collective slight, for
which
which each citizen must take responsibility. Such behaviour may,
of course, be read as the sign of an endemic endemic vice, but
but the Greeks
Creeks
did not tend to wage wars of extermination on the the grounds of the the
inveterate depravity (not to say sheer otherness)
depravity (not otherness) of the
the enemy, as
though it were constitutive of their identity. In this respect, mass
killing
killing in antiquity
antiquity was different
different in kind from from modern genocide: it
was motivated by anger at an unjust act, not not hatred of 'satanic
human.'11l
monsters trying to appear human.'l
Modern writers almost invariably classify classify the hostile emotions
as 'negative,' as opposed to ostensibly
ostensibly positive
positive emotions
emotions such as
love and sympathy. A not not untypical judgment by a psychologist
has it that
that 'hostility is an abnormal, destructive affect' (Kalogerakis
affect' (Kalogerakis
2004; cf. Emde 11980
2004,- d. 980 and the
the essays collected in Iganski 2003) 2003).. 1 n2
Even physiological studies
studies of aggressive violence.
violence may
may conclude
that 'negative affect
affect can precipitate and accentuate aggressive aggressive
behavior' (Davidson, Putnam, and Larson 2000: 59 1 ). Anger occa
591). occa-
sionally gets a better press (e.g. (e.g. MHhaven
Milhaven 11989),
989), but
but hatred is
almost universally condemned. Where Where it is defended, it is in the
tough-guy language of survival of the the fittest. Thus Melvin Konner
(2003
(2003),), reviewing Willard Caylin's
Gaylin's Hatred: The Psychological
Descent into Violence (2003
Descent (2003),), writes: 'I harbor real hatred and I
don't see it as pathological. Indeed,Indeed, contra Gaylin,
Caylin, hatred can be
adaptive, especially in a creature with with long memory; in hunter hunter-
essential.'' 13
gatherer life, it may have been essential. 13 Aristotle's analysis is a
the Ancient Greeks
salutary reminder that there may be people deserving of our

antagonism
antagonism -- even if absurd or fanatical figures, like Hippolytus,
can in in aa fit
fit of passion declare their hatred hatred for women in
for women in general
general..
As Isocrates ((15.142) 15 . 142) says,
says, hatred towards good people is the the sign
of a bad character.
There is a conundrumconundrum connected with with Aristotle's insistence
insistence
that hatred, as opposed opposed to anger,
anger, is not
not accompanied by pain (2.4, (2.4,
1382a12-13)
1382al2-13),' for this would appear to exclude hatred from from the
category of the the emotions, as defined by Aristotle: it will be re- re
called that emotions are said to be accompanied by pleasure and
pain.14 Perhaps Aristotle believed that hatred, like anger,
pain.14 anger, involves
an element of pleasure deriving from from the
the expectation
expectation of revenge
(or
(or rather, in the the case of hatred, the elimination
elimination of one's oppo- oppo
nent), and thus meets the definition definition of a pathos.
pathos. Just as loving,
moreover, causes one to share in the pain and pleasure of a dear
one
one (2.4, (2.4, 11381a5-6
38 1 a5-6;; d.
cf. chapter
chapter 8,8, p.
p. 1174),
74), so
so too
too hating
hating may
may induce
induce
a reverse
reverse kind of sympathy, and in this way fulfil fulfil the condition for
being
being an an emotion.
emotion. Aristotle says says that
that it
it is
is in
in the nature
nature of of emo
emo-
tions that that they cause people to differ differ in their
their judgments, and
loving and hating in particular, he notes, have the effect effect that
jurors and assemblymen
assemblymen 'can no longer see
see the truth
truth well enough,
enough,
but their their own pleasure or pain clouds their judgment' ((1354blO- 1354b l O-
1 ) , 11 55 But hatred of a class of people, such as thieves, no doubt
1II).
lacks the acute sense of injury that results from from an intentional
intentional
slight, and and this, I
I imagine, is why Aristotle describes it -
- byby
16
contrast
contrast with with anger
anger - - as
as aa painless
painless emotion
emotion.. 1 6
Aristotle lists anger, spite, and slander aass particularly produc- produc
tive
tive of of hatred
hatred (2.4,
(2.4, 1382a2-3
1382a2-3).) . Spite was
was also
also included
included among
among the the
causes
causes of anger, anger, as we have seen, since obstructing obstructing another's
another's
wishes for the the sheer pleasure of it bespeaks a good measure of of
contempt. Slander too, one supposes, could elicit anger, if it took
the
the form of a slight, but but it may
may also be a sign of bad character and
hence
hence the object of hatred: sycophants who habitually habitually denounce
their peers presumably are guilty of this offence. Anger seems
more difficult difficult to understand as a stimulus stimulus to hating. Aristotle
would seem to mean mean that it is the anger of anotheranother ((like
like the spite
spite
or slander of another),another), not not our own, that elicits our hostility, and
hence that of someone whom we ourselves have demeaned. demeaned. His
Hatred / 1193
93
reasoning, I imagine, is that that an angry person is by definition

seeking
seeking revenge, and hence out to do us harm. Similarly,
hence Similarly, the giving
of
of satisfaction would, I presume, generate a friendly feeling.
So far,
far, we have limited
limited our discussion
discussion to thethe emotion of hatred
or, more precisely,
precisely, hating: to misein is a verbal noun, preceded by
the definite article to, like to philein and to nemesan (cf.
tophilein (d. chapters
'
1 2, and 8,
5, p. 1112, 7 1 ) , Aristotle
8, p. 1171). Aristotleintroduces
introducesthe the topic,
topic,however,
however,
with the words 'Concerning enmity and hating, hating, one can under under-
stand them
them on the the basis of their their opposites.' Is enmity
enmity ((ekhthra)
ekhthra ) a
mere synonym of to misein, misein, or do the the connotations of the the two
terms differ
differ in some important respect?
important respect?
The word ekhthra
ekhthra is related to the verb ekhthairo, meaning 'to
hate/ and also to the concrete noun noun ekhthros, or 'enemy.''enemy/ Like
Latin, classical Greek had two words for 'enemy.' One of them, them,
polemics, derives from
polemios, from polemospolemos or 'war' and signifies a military military
enemy ((compare
compare the Latin hostis). hostis}. Ekhthros, by contrast, usually
denotes a personal enemy (like the Latin inimicus), although although it is
occasionally applied to foreign foreign opponents, especially when when the
hostility
hostility is felt
felt as particularly charged (e,g., (e.g., Lysias
Lysias 114.30, Demos
4.30, Demos-
3.53).17 Isocrates, who sought to unite
thenes, Philippics 3.53).17 unite Greece
and Macedon by means of their common antagonism to the the
Persians, speaks of a long-term hostility hostility ((ekhthra}
ekhthra ) towards barbarbarbar-
ians, imagined as inherited from from the time of the the Trojan War
(Panathenaicus
(Panathenaicus 42; cf. 1189;
42; d. 89; also Thucydides 2. 1 1 .2 on the
2.11.2 the ekhthos
ekhthos
or 'hatred' of subject cities towards Athens). Athens). In English, we do not
typically distinguish
distinguish the two kinds of enemy lexically, although
the term 'foe,'
'foe/ now pretty much much obsolete in the United States
except in certain
certain expressions, such as 'friend 'friend or foe,'
foe/ refers
refers chiefly
to enemy armies.
The Greeks tended to see their their social world as divided between
friends and enemies (that is, philoi philoi and ekhthroiL
ekhthroi], and to assume
that
that one was likely to have at least as many of the the latter
latter as of the
the
former
former (d,(cf. Chilon 33.14. 1 4 Mullach).
Mullach). The well-known formula 'help
friends and harm enemies' takes it for granted that that neither cat
neither cat-
vacant.18 Enmities might
egory is vacant,IS might even be defended
defended as socially
useful: Aeschines (Against Tim archus 2)
Timarchus 2) notes that that personal
enmities (ekhthrai idiaiL idiai], such as his own quarrel with Timar- Timar
chus, can promote the public welfare, since they move people people to
1194
Greeks
prosecute fellow citizens who violate the ethical standards standards of the
19
community.19
community. In these contexts, the term used is invariably
(cf., for instance, Polybius
ekhthros (d., Polybius 11.14.4
. 1 4.4 on hating the enemies
of one's friend).
friend).
To the best of my knowledge, no Greek text states that personal
enmity
enmity must be reciprocal,
reciprocal, and that each party mustmust be cognizant
of
of the hostility of the other, in the way that Aristotle stipulates
stipulates for
friendship or philia.
philia. But Aristotle seems clearly to treat el<hthraekhthra
as the counterpart to philia,
philia, just as to misein or hating answers to
philein. Hating
to philein. Hating is the simple emotion,
emotion, whereas enmity
enmity repre
repre-
sents the state of affairs
affairs that obtains when people regard each
hatred.20 As with friendship, this is likely to be
other with mutual hatred.20
a lasting situation, not least because it is self-reinforcing, each
side giving the other cause for continued
continued antipathy, accompanied,
no doubt, by the belief that the other possesses the detestable
traits of character typical of the the 'certain kind of person' who who
hatred.21
merits hatred.:!1
At the
the beginning of Euripides' tragedytragedy The Children of of Her
Her-
cules, Hercules'
cules, Hercules' sons and daughters, together with Hercules' Hercules'
mother Alcmene and his now aged comrade-in-arms
comrade-in-arms lolaus, have
taken refuge in the temple of of Zeus in Marathon, in the outskirts
outskirts
of Attica, to escape persecution by Eurystheus, the the king of Argos.
It was Eurystheus who had obliged Hercules to undertake his
famous labours; now, after after Hercules'
Hercules' death, Eurystheus is intent
upon killing his surviving
surviving kin, and especially his children,
children, so as to
eliminate
eliminate the potential
potential threat they pose to his throne (cf. (d. 465-70)
465-70|..
A herald,
herald, sent bbyy Eurystheus
Eurystheus ttoo dissuade the Athenians and their
king Demopho (the (the son of Theseus)
Theseus) from
from harbouring the suppli
the suppli-
ants, asserts that Argos
Argos has a right to punish
punish its own ((139-43)
139-43) and
warns against provoking
provoking war with a mighty foe for the the sake of a
few
few helpless strangers. lolaus protests that, having been expelled,
they are no longer under Eurystheus's jurisdiction jurisdiction ((184-9),
1 84-9), and
Demopho decides to protect the refugees. At this point, in one of of
those abrupt twists that are characteristic of Euripides, it is anan
nounced that, according to a series of prophecies,
prophecies, the Athenians
Athenians
can only emerge victorious from from battle with the Argives if the the
virgin
virgin daughter of a noble family is sacrificed (408 (408).). Demopho
refuses to immolate a daughter of his own or compel another
Hatred / 195
Athenian
Athenian family to do so ((411-13),
4 1 1-13), but
but Hercules' eldest
eldest daughter
daughter
offers
offers herself on behalf of her relatives and the the city that
that has
sheltered them (501-2).22 As she is led off to die, news arrives that
them (501-2).22
Hyllus, the eldest of Hercules's sons, has returned to Athens with
a company of soldiers, and old lolaus girds girds himself for battle. TheThe
Athenians are victorious ((784-7),
784-7), and lolaus, who has been magi- magi
cally rejuvenated
rejuvenated ((796,
796, 857-8), succeeds in capturing Eurystheus
alive (859-63
(859-63).).
Here again the action takes a surprising turn, apparently with with-
out precedent myth.23 Alcmene
precedent in the myth.23 Alcmene protests that lolaus shouldshould
have killed Eurystheus ((879-82)
879-82) on the battlefield rather than
spare his life, but
but the messenger who has brought her the the news of
of
the victory explains that lolaus wished precisely to put Eurystheus
in her power (883-4).
(883-4). lolaus's squire leads Eurystheus in, bound
and humbled, and Alcmene gives vent to her hostility hostility towards
him, declaring that he must must be killed: indeed he ought, she says,
to die many times over for what what he has done (958-60)
(958-60).. The squire
objects that it is not permitted to slay him, but Alcmene is
adamant: 'In vain, then, have we taken taken him
him captive' ((962).
962). If
If
Athenian tradition (nomos(nomos]) prohibits killing
killing a prisoner of war
(963-72), then
then she will
will execute him
him herself, for however muchmuch she
loves the city of Athens, Eurystheus
Eurystheus must
must not live, now that that he
has fallen (973-80) ,24
fallen into her hands (973-80).24
Here, then, thethe Athenians'
Athenians' defence of suppliants in a just cause
and their triumph
triumph over an arrogant enemy give way to a mood of of
bitter retribution, in which the former victims turn against against their
enemies with
with a violence and loathing that that seem no less extreme
than what they had previously suffered.
suffered. How is one to understand
the vehement hatred on the part of the foreign (that is, nonnon
Athenian) characters in the finale of the the play, which appears
appears to
contrast so sharply withwith the moderation and respect for law and
25
custom
custom that
that characterize Athens's intervention
intervention in their
their beha1f?
behalf?2s
It was, of course, Eurystheus who initiated hostilities against
the Athenians, but his goal was limited to reclaimingreclaiming the Argive
refugees. The Athenians,
Athenians, in turn, are content
content to defeat his forces
and protect the suppliants from from being violated. Alcmene, by con- con
trast, is moved by a fierce
fierce personal antagonism towards Eurystheus,
going back to the time when he imposed the twelve labours on
196 / The Emotions
Emotions of the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
Hercules.
Hercules. Thus, two kinds of enmity enmity are active in the play. lolaus
may refer
refer to the Argives as polemioi insofar insofar as he thinks of them
as a hostile army (3 1 5- 1 6 ); this is the
(315-16); the term he employs, for ex- ex
ample, in connection with with news from from the battlefield (382, 655), 655),
or again in reference to the the enemy ranks (676; (676; d.cf. 738). The squire
speaks of his desire to return to battle and engage with the
polemioi (678-9). But when lolaus declares that his only concern
polemioi
about dying is the possibility
possibility that that his death may bring joy to his
enemies (443--4),
(443-4), the term is ekhthroi d. 449-50 on the shame
ekhthroi ((cf.
involved in death at the hands of an ekhthros, ekhthws, that is, Eurystheus;
468). In battle, he prays to be rejuvenated so that he can
also 458, 468).
exact the due penalty from from his ekhthroi 849-53), here clearly
ekhthroi ((849-53),
thinking
thinking of the Argives as his personal enemies. Hercules' daugh daugh-
ter,
ter, having volunteered to die, tells lolaus Iolaus that he need no longer
26
fear the enemy's spear ((ekhthwn
ekhthron dom, dOTU, 500; d. 12, 530)
cf. 5512, 530)..26 But it is
Alcmene who is most conscious of the irreconcilable hatred that
exists between herself and Eurystheus.Eurystheus. She insists
insists that it is un un-
wise not to avenge oneself when when one has one's ekhthroiekhthroi in one's
power (88 1-2). The squire, as he leads Eurystheus
(881-2). Eurystheus in, tells Alcmene
that 'it is most pleasant to see an ekhthros ekhthws suffer
suffer misfortune after after
he has prospered' (939-40). Face to face with with Eurystheus, Alcmene
calls him
him 'a hateful
hateful thing' (6 (6 misos,
misos, 941 cf. 52, where lolaus
941;i d.
applies the same expression to the herald), and berates him him for
daring to look his enemies (ekhthroi}(ekhthroi) in the
the face (943). So too, she
justifies her intention
intention to kill Eurystheus with the words 'Don't
the Athenians thinkthink it a fine ekhthroi7.'' (965), to
fine thing to slay their ekhthroi?
which
which the squire replies, 'Not one who has been taken alive in
battle,' pointing
pointing up the contrast
contrast between
between personal antagonisms
antagonisms
27
and the
the protocols of war.27
war.
If
If Alcmene's ferocious assault on Eurystheus Eurystheus comes as a sur- sur
prise, no less so is Eurystheus's
Eurystheus's own response in the face of her
hostility.28 After
hostility.28 After refusing
refusing to confront
confront Hyllus, the the son of Hercules,
on the battlefield
battlefield in what, at least according
according to the report of the
messenger, seemed to be an open display of cowardice, cowardice, Eurystheus
suddenly acquires an unanticipated dignity as he confesses his
earlier crimes and accepts his death with calm assurance. assurance. He
explains that he had previously lived in fear of his ekhthroi; nor
will he deny that Hercules, though though an ekhthros,
ekhthws, was a noble man.
Hatred // 197
Hatred 197
After
After Hercules' death, he knew that he was hated (misoumenos) (misoumenos]
by his children
children thanks to their inherited
inherited hostility
hostility towards him
(ekhthra patioia],), and he tried to eliminate
(ekhthra patroia eliminate them
them as well; Alcmene
would have done the the same, he says, concerning the the cubs of a
hostile ((ekhthros}
ekhthros ) lion. He concludes by reminding Alcmene
that
that Athens has spared him, respecting the laws of the Greeks
and honouring the god above enmity (ekhthra} towards him
enmity (ekhthra)
(994- 1013).
(994-1013).
Alcmene iiss unappeased, and Eurystheus, prepared to die, anan
nounces - - in yet
yet another unexpected twist twist of
of the plot -- that, in
accord with
with an ancient
ancient prophecy of Apollo, if he is buried in Attica
he will prove a saviour of the city, although he will remain forever
at war (polemiotatos)
(polemiotatos) withwith thethe descendants of Hercules ((1032-4).
1 032-4).
The tragedy
tragedy concludes as Alcmene orders her servants to kill
Eurystheus, since he is an ekhthros
ekhthros and on top of thatthat his death
will aid Athens, and to throw his body to the dogs dogs ((1045-51).
1 045-5 1 ). In
their final comment, even the chorus of Athenians agrees agrees that it
is best for Eurystheus
Eurystheus to die ((1053-5),
1 053-5), which would seem to put put in
question all that Athens stood for earlier.
I have dwelled on the distinction
distinction between polemios
polemics and ekhthros
ekhthros
because it points the way to an interpretation of the the action of The
Children of of Hercules that goes beyondbeyond the
the contrast, emphasized
by many critics, between Alcmene's savagery and the civilized
restraint of Athens and its king. Ekhthroi Ekhthroi regard each other as
irremediably vicious. As Aristotle explains, although anger may
be eased by time, hatred is 'incurable/
'incurable.' Hatred seeks to inflict not
just pain but harm, and is indifferent
indifferent to whether
whether the revenge is
perceived: Alcmene would have preferred preferred to learn that Eurystheus
had been slain on the the battlefield.
battlefield. So
So too, hatred, unlike anger, is
pitiless, since it is not concerned with getting even (at which
point it may be mollified), but desires that the other simply 'cease
to exist.'
exist/
Nowhere in the play is Alcmene described as angry at Eurystheus;
the prevailing
prevailing passion is clearly personal hostility. At the time of of
the action, the enmity between them them has become inveterate: in
this sense, Alcmene's detestation of Eurystheus is not simply an
immediate
immediate response to his vicious nature but has hardened into a
long-term disposition. Just as friendship, or philia, as Aristotle
198 / The Emotions
Ancient Greeks
explains in the Nicomachean Ethics (9.5, (9.5, 11166b34),

1 66b34), requires time
for
for mutual
mutual confidence
confidence to develop, so too, we may infer, prolonged
enmity congeals into an entrenched distrust. Alcmene is un un-
moved by Eurystheus's apparently generous appraisal of Hercules,
which
which she may very well regard as self-serving under the circum circum-
stances, or the excuse that he feared for his throne, which is an
ignoble motive in any case. As Aristotle says, says, the emotions are
just those things that cause people to differ differ in their judgments,
their judgments,
and it is the pain or pleasure resulting from from loving and hating
that clouds the minds of jurors and assemblymen
assemblymen ((1354b1354b l10-11).
0- 1 1 ).
The Children of of Hercules is a study in hatred and enmity, but but it
does not, I think, simply condemn such sentiments sentiments as base or
perverse. Just as Athens overcomes its political enemies or polemioi
orpolemioi
on the battlefield,
battlefield, so too Alcmene and her family triumph over
their hated ekhthros.
ekhthros. The finale of the tragedy makes it clear clear
that Alcmene's determination
determination to eliminate
eliminate her enemy coincides
with the security
security of Athens itself. Rather than contrast her hate
with
with the honourable moderation of Athens's king, I would see
their motives as complementary and suited to their respective
situations. Alcmene's loathing is extreme, but it is neither ground- ground
29
less nor evip9
evil.
According to Aristotle, as we have seen, it is not necessary
necessary that
one suffer
suffer harm oneself in order to feel hatred. Demipho and the the
Athenians could detest Eurystheus, insofar as he exemplifies the
type of the
the unjust tyrant. Euripides
Euripides did not place such a generali-
generali
zation in the mouth of the Athenian king, despite his apparent
predilection for the formula, perhaps because he wished wished to keep
the focus on the highly personal enmity between Alcmene and
Eurystheus. So So too friendship, as a special case of loving, is typi typi-
cally represented as a reciprocal affection
affection between two people,
although
although others too may like and admire one or both friends friends for
their virtues (on(on mutual hatred, d.cf. Sophocles, Ajax
Aiax 11133-4;
133-4; Plato,
Republic 35
Republic 1 D-E) .
351D-E).
The Greek language had other other words for loathing,
loathing, among them
the verb bdeluttomai and related terms such as bdeluros ('loath ('loath-
some'), but
but here the core idea is that of being revolted by someone
or something (the (the term is particularly frequent
frequent in the comic poets:
,
cf. the
d. the name Bdelycleon,
Bdelycleon, or 'Cleon-Loather,
'Cleon-Loather,' in Aristophanes'
Hatred / 199
Hatred/199
Wasps}. In the
Wasps). the Hippocratic writings, for example, it is used half half a
dozen times in connection
connection with with nausea, and Orestes employs
bdeluktropoi ('disgusting') of the
bdeluktropoi the hideous Furies in Aeschylus's
Eumenides ((52). 52). It may
may also, of course, be applied to repugnant
behaviour (Andocides
(Andocides 1122; 22; d.cf. bdeluriai [abstract plural] at
[abstract noun, plural]
Isaeus 8.42). Demosthenes had a fondness for the the term (twenty-
(twenty
nine occurrences),
occurrences), but it tends to be concentrated in certain
speeches (over half half the
the uses are in orations 1199 and 221); 1 ); in speaking
of
of his arch-enemy Meidias, he pairs bdelmos bdeluros with hubristes,
'violently
Violently abusive' (2 1 . 1 43 ), with thrasus, 'reckless' ((21.98),
(21.143), 2 1 .98), and
30
with anaides, 'shameless' (21 . 1 07):30 Meidias, he intones
(21.107): intones ((21.98),
2 1 .98),
is 'wanton [aselges]
[aselges] and bdeluros: this is the truth. One ought to
hate such men, Athenians, rather than save them' ((note note that
associated with
misein is, as often, associated with hostility to a type). So So too,
thirteen
thirteen of the the fourteen
fourteen occurrences of the the root bdel- in the the
orations of Aeschines are in his attack on the repellent comportcomport
ment of Timarchus, whom he portrays portrays as a male prostitute ((Lysias Lysias
eschews the word). There is a moral quality to Aeschines' reac- reac
tion,
tion, butbut the sense is primarily
primarily one of revulsion
revulsion or disgust.
More closely related to misein is the set of terms based, based, like
ekhthia, on the stem ekhth-, including the verbs ekhthairo
ekhthra, ekhthaiio and
apekhthanomai ((later
apekhthanomai later in the form apekhthomai)
apekhthomai) and the adjective
apekhthes. In the Iliad (3.41
apekhtMs. 5 ), Aphrodite warns Helen to obey
(3.415),
her, lest her love for her turn to hatred.3 hatred.311 Pindar (Nemean
(Nemean 10.83) 1 0.83)
refers to 'hated old age.' In Sophocles' tragedy Ajax Ajax (457-8
(457-8),),
Ajax
Ajax concludes that that he is abhorred (ekhthairomai)
(ekhthairomai) by the the gods and
that the Greek army also hates him (misei); Ajax
him (misei); Ajax in turn turn hates
(misein} Hector, who is most inimical ((ekhthistos)
(misein) ekhthistos) to him him ((815-
8 1 5-
118).
8 ) . Isocrates is particularly
particularly fond fond of the the oxymoronic compound
philapekhthemon, 'fond 'fond of hatred' (noun: (noun: philapekhthemosune,
philapekhthemosune,
Antidosis 3315;
Antidosis 1 5; d.
cf. Demosthenes
Demosthenes 54.37), which which he associates with
savage cruelty and misanthropy. Ekhthairo and its cognates, howhow
ever, are more frequently
frequently passive in construction than than misein, and
their
their objects are less often often groups or types: like ekhthros itself,
they tend chiefly
chiefly to designate personal hostility.32 hostility.32
There are pathologies of hatred. If it is true that we sometimes
hate an aspect of ourselves that we have projected onto another,
then we remain attached to the abominated other, and do not
Greeks
really wish
wish to eliminate
eliminate him
him or her: '[H]ate transforms this or that
that
other into an object whose expulsion
expulsion or incorporation is needed,
an expulsion or incorporation that requires the the conservation of of
the object itself in order to be sustained' (Ahmed 2004: 551). 1 ). It
would not be difficult
difficult to produce an interpretation of Hippolytus's
Hippolytus's
extreme loathing
loathing of women generally, and of his stepmotherstepmother
Phaedra in particular, in this key.
key. Modern psychology has made
great advances in understanding the dynamics
dynamics of repression and
displacement in emotional life, and furnishes powerful, often often
indispensable, techniques for analysing
analysing classical literature
literature and
behaviour generally.
generally. Not
Not all hatred, however, need be explained as
a symptom of trauma or some other unconscious mechanism. In
this book, I am concerned to elicit the differences,
differences, where they
exist, between modern conceptions
conceptions of the emotions
emotions and those of of
the ancient Greeks, and to see whether and how an awareness of of
these differences
differences may
may affect
affect our appreciation of Greek culture.
Recognizing that the hatred that underpins enmityenmity was conceived
as a moral emotion will, I hope, contribute something to this end.
CHAPTER TEN
Pity
[T]o ask, say, why we feel sympathy for Philoctetes is a pseudo

pseudo-
problem
problem bred by a bogus historicism.
Eagleton 2003: xii-xiv
meaning of pity in English

[T]he history of the meaning English should
should caution us
not to assume that its modern
modern English usage is necessarily a guide
guide
to pity
pity in a foreign work
work of art like the Iliad.
Iliad.
Zanker 1994: 23
Although pity figures centrally in all ancient lists of the emotions,

it is remarkably absent from from modern inventories (e.g., Plutchik
11991:
99 1 : 1117-18).
1 7- 1 8 ) . In part,
part, pity has been displaced by neighbouring
ideas such as sympathy, empathy, and compassion,compassion, all of which
which
bear some relationship to pity, no doubt, but but also differ
differ in impor-
impor
tant ways, and more especially from from the classical Greek concept
represented
represented by the term eleos (from which which the English words
'eleemosynary' and, by a more circuitous route, 'alms' are de- de
rived). For one thing, Greek pity was not an instinctive
instinctive response
to another person's pain, but but depended on a judgment of whether
suffering was deserved or not. 11 Pity, like the pathe we
the other's suffering
have examined
examined in previous chapters, was both both cognitive
cognitive and so-
so
cial in character,
character, and involved moral appraisals
appraisals that
that inevitably
reflected norms and values specific to classical Greek culture. It
is precisely the distancedistance between the pitier
pitier and the pitied
pitied that
allows for this ethical dimension: to experience pity one has to
202 / The Emotions
Ancient Greeks
recognize a resemblance with the sufferer,

sufferer, but at the same time
not find oneself in precisely the same circumstances. Where com- com
plete identification occurs, one shares the emotion
emotion of the other,
and that is not pity as the Greeks conceived it (the (the relative
detachment characteristic of pity even today has led some to
condemn it as a form of contempt).
contempt).
I have explored some of the the implications of the
the Greek concep-
concep
tion of pity in my book Pity Transformed (2001
Pity Transformed a L to which I1refer
(200la),
occasionally in what follows. In this chapter, however, I take a
fresh look at some aspects of eleos that distinguish
distinguish it from mod
from mod-
ern views of pity, but
but which
which at the
the same time widen its sphere of of
operation, as it were, by modifying the strict requirement con- con
cerning desert. First,
First, I consider the role of public norms that set
implicit limits on what people might legitimately
legitimately be made to
suffer, irrespective of whether they brought their misfortune upon
themselves. Recognition of the the importance of upholding such
conventions provided the link by which pity might influence
deliberations concerning matters of state, where,where, as we shall see,
emotion
emotion was shunted aside in favour of arguments that that looked to
the public interest. Then, I take another look at the difference
difference
between pity and sympathetic identification in the context of of
Aristotle's theory of the tragic emotions, and argue that there is
a place
place in Aristotle's ownown scheme of the pathe for a kind kind of
humane sensibility towards the suffering
suffering of even an undeserving
indivi dual.
individual.
At the
the beginning of thethe Pcloponnesian
Peloponnesian War ((431
43 1 BC),
BC), Plataea,
Plataea,aa
small town in Boeotia to the north-east of Attica that was sympa- sympa
thetic to the Athenian
Athenian side, was penetrated by a contingent
contingent of of
Theban hoplites
hoplites (Thucydides
(Thucydides 2.2-5)
2.2-5).. The Plataeans overcame the
attackers and took a substantial number of prisoners, whom they
later put to death. Subsequently, the SpartansSpartans forced the last
defenders of the city to surrender.
surrender. These men then made their
case for being spared before the Spartans,
Spartans, while the Thebans
Thebans
argued in favour
favour of their execution. The Plataeans,
Plataeans, according to
the speech that Thucydides records,
records, appealed chiefly to the Spar
Spar-
tans' own advantage.
advantage. In their peroration, however,
however, they repre
repre-
sented themselves as suppliants (3.59.2), appealed to the common
laws of the Greeks (ta (la koina ton Hellen6n nomimo, 3.59.
Hellendn nomima, 1 ), and
3.59.1),
Pity / 203
entreated the Spartans

Spartans to be moved by reasonable pity (oiktai (oiktoi
sophroni, 3.59.
saphroni, 1 ). To this the Thebans retorted that pity is due
3.59.1).
only to those who have suffered
suffered unjustly:
unjustly: 'Those people are wor- wor
thy of pity who have sufferedsuffered something unsuitable, whereas
those who have suffered
suffered justly, like these men, on the contrary
deserve to be gloated over' (3.67.4). The Plataeans' fate, they
added, is precisely ennoma,
ennoma, that is, withinwithin the law (3.67.5). The
Thebans' argument won the day.
Plataea was restored in 386, but was again destroyed by Thebes Thebes
in 3373
73 (it would be refounded
refounded once more, many years later, by the the
Macedonians). In the same year, year, the orator Isocrates wrote the
tract called Plataicus,
Plataicus, in which the Plataeans are represented as
speaking before
before the Athenian assembly,
assembly, urging them them to take ven-
ven
geance on Thebes. In the course of their argument, argument, the Plataeans
Plataeans
adopt the
the posture of suppliants ((1, I , 6, 52, 53, 54, 56).
56). Towards the the
end of their speech, moreover,
moreover, they once again make an appeal to
pity, alleging that
that it is not reasonable (eikos] that individuals are
reasonable (eikos)
pitied if they have suffered
suffered unjustly (para dikaion)) while an
(para to dikaion
entire city that is being wrongfully destroyed (anomas (anomos diephthar
diephthar-
menen] should fail to win
menen) win any pity at all (52; cf. oiktron, 56).
(52;d. 56).
In both speeches, the Plataeans reserve their appeal to pity for
the peroration,
peroration, a strategy that was characteristic of forensic ora- ora
2
tory.2
tory. What is more, both times they link their claim to pity to the
justice of their cause (d.(cf. Hogan 11972:
9 72: 244).
244). This
Thisisisin
inaccord
accordwithwith
the prevailing
prevailing view of pity in classical Greece, which which was that
pity is due not to suffering
suffering as such but rather to unmerited unmerited or
illegitimate suffering.
suffering. In fact,
fact, the practice of placing the the appeal to
pity at the end of a discourse is not unrelated to the connection
between pity and desert.
desert. For speakers
speakers must first first demonstrate, or
attempt
attempt to demonstrate, that their their case is just;
just; only then
then can they
appeal to pity on the grounds that they do not deserve the penalty penalty
or punishment that is proposed
proposed for them (see (see Konstan
Konstan 200 1 a: 34-
200la: 34-
43; d.
cf. Lateiner 2005, Tzanetou
Tzanetou 20052005).).
The Greeks in the classical period,
period, accordingly, did not not perceive
the same tension between pity and justice justice that modern jurists
jurists do
when they exclude appeals to the emotions in the verdict phase
of
of a trial on the
the grounds
grounds that they impede a fair fair and impartial
appraisal of the evidence (Konstan
(Konstan 200la:
2001a: 28-30). True, the Stoics
204
rejected pity on the grounds (among(among others) that it corrupts

corrupts judgjudg-
ment, and their view was anticipated by Aristotle in the first
chapter of the Rhetoric,
Rhetoric, where he asserts that 'one ought not to
warp a juror by leading himhim to anger or envy or pity' ((1.1, 1 . 1, 11354a24-
354a24-
5), for that, Aristotle says, is like bending the ruler with which one
takes a measurement. But Aristotle immediatelyimmediately comes round to
endorsing thethe utility of appeals to the emotions, including pity,
and, as we know, devotes several chapters of the the second book of of
the
the Rhetoric to ways of rousing and assuaging them. This shift of
shift of
perspective
perspective hashas been
been seen
seen as
as aa glaring
glaring inconsistency
inconsistency in in the
the treatise
treatise
as we have it (e.g., Kennedy 11991: 99 1 : 28; Barnes
Barnes 11995:
995: 262; Frede
11996:
996: 264-5;
264-5; Wardy
Wardy 11996:
996: 1115-16).
1 5-16). But perhaps the understanding
of the emotions, and pity in particular, as grounded grounded in moral
judgments enabled Aristotle to accept their relevance to judicial
pleading. For the condition that pity is a response not to any
misfortune, or to misfortune that one has brought upon oneself,
but only to undeserved hardship, provides provides the link between pity
and justice.
justice.
Aristotle
Aristotle defines
defines pity as 'a kind of pain in the the case of an apparent
destructive or painful
painful harm in one not deserving to encounter it,'
and
and which, he adds, 'one might expect oneself, or one of one's
own, to suffer, and this when it seems near' (Rhetoric
(Rhetoric 2.8, 1385b 13-
1385bl3-
116;
6; on the
the proximity condition, d. cf. p. 1131).
3 1 ). So
So too, the
the Rhetoric
Rhetoric
Alexander (ascribed
to Alexander (ascribed by some scholars to the pre-Aristotelian
rhetorician Anaximenes) advises:
We shall be capable
capable of rendering
rendering things pitiable whenever we wish if we
are aware that
that all people pity those whom they suppose suppose to be well
well-
disposed towards
towards themselves and whom they believe to be undeserving
[anaxioi] of misfortune.
[anaxioi) misfortune. One must
must show that those whom one wishes to
render pitiable have these qualities, and demonstrate that they have
suffered
suffered or are suffering
suffering or will suffer [kakos], unless the
suffer wrongly [kakos], the hearers
help them. If this is not possible, then you must show that those for
whom you are speaking have been deprived
deprived <or are are being deprived or
will be deprived> of goods that all or most others have a share in, or have
never obtained or are not obtaining or will not obtain a good, unless those
who are now listening pity them [nikteirosin)
[oikteiiosin].. (34.4-6)
(34.4-6)
Pity / 205
Far from
from being incompatible with a verdict based on the merits of a
case, then, pity depends upon a belief in the petitioner's innocence.
innocence.
In Thucydides' report of the the debate over thethe fate of Mytilene,
which rebelled against Athenian hegemony near the the beginning of of
the
the Peloponnesian War, Cleon accuses his fellow Athenians of of
being naively disposed to pity in their treatmenttreatment of allied states
(3.37.2). Pity, he continues,
continues, is ruinous to empire, and is wasted
on those who are one's natural enemies (3.40.2-3) (3.40.2-3).. What the
Mytilenaeans deserve, Cleon maintains, is total annihilation. annihilation.
Diodotus,
Diodotus, in reply to Cleon, urges that the decision of the assem assem-
bly should be based,
based, not
not on considerations of justice
justice or sentiment
sentiment
but
but solely on advantage
advantage (see
(see Konstan 200 1 a: 80-2)j
200la: 80-2); the Athenians
are persuaded and vote to slay only a thousand of the insurgents.3insurgents.3
In the Rhetoric ((1.3,1 .3, 1358b20-9), indeed, Aristotle stipulates that
the
the object of deliberative oratory is precisely the the consideration of of
'advantage and harm' rather than justice, justice, which
which is the province of of
forensic rhetoric - - and hence, we we may
may add, the arena in which which
appeals to pity have a place. So So too, in Plato's Greater Alcibiades
((114D),
1 1 4D), the title character observes that in public deliberations
4
the Greeks 'look to which which will be of advantage to their affairs.'
affairs.'4 It
is telling that this pragmatic
pragmatic attitude is represented by Thucydides
as favouring the milder option in respect to the punishmentpunishment of the
Mytilenaeans. The connection between pity and desert was not
necessarily conducive to the humane treatment of the defeated,
since an enemy deemed to have been unjust or perfidious might
instead have to endure the victor's righteous anger (see (see chapter 2,
p. 70).
70).
Aristotle does allow that such painful painful but ethically
ethically neutral
neutral
conditions as death, old age, age, and disease are pitiable (Rhetoric
(Rhetoric 2.8,
1386a4-9
1386a4-9),), and in the Poetics he acknowledges
acknowledges that, even when
the moral conditions for tragic pity are are absent -- for example, when
a character slays an enemy who who presumably
presumably deserves
deserves his fate - the
sheer pain or pathos of the event may still be pitiable ((13,1453bl
13, 1 453b 1 7-
118;
8j cf.
d. Gorgias, Defence
Defence of of Helen 9, 32, but
but contrast 7; 7j Thrasy
Thrasy-
machus fro fr. 6 Diels-Kranz). Perhaps certain kinds of catastrophe
never seem truly to be deserved. deserved. We
We shall return below to the
question of whether pity or compassion might be evoked by the the
206 / The Emotions
suffering
suffering even of a vicious person, according to Aristotle. First,
however, let us consider
consider a case, drawn from from a Greek tragedy,tragedy, in
which cruelty in violation of conventional standards of decency
seems to furnish grounds for pity even though though the characters were
responsible for their own misfortune.
Euripides' Suppliant
Suppliant Women opens with a dramatic tableau. In
the centre is Aethra, the mother of the Athenian Athenian king Theseus, Theseus,
praying for the the welfare
welfare of her her son and her city in front front of thethe
temple of Demeter at Eleusis. Eleusis. A group of Argive women kneels at
her feet: they have come to Attica, along with their king, Adrastus,
to plead for help in retrieving the the unburied bodies of their their sons,
which
which lie at Thebes, after after the Argives' unsuccessful attack upon
that city. A second chorus made up of hoys, boys, the the sons of thethe fallen
Argive warriors,
warriors, also sits on stage. The old women bear a suppli- suppli
ant
ant bough,
bough, and have suffered,
suffered, as Aethra declares, a dreadful mis
dreadful mis-
5
(pathos pathousai deinon, 110-11
fortune (pathos 0-1 1 ).
).5
Now, supplication docs does not
not necessarily entail an appeal to pity:
the gesture by itself itself was ritually significant, and besides this,
suppliants
suppliants might might also promise compensation
compensation (Iliad (Iliad 221.75-80),
1 .75-80L
invoke formerformer services (Euripides, Hecuba 271-8), or claim claim a
personal bond with the beseeched (Euripides, Orestes 665-79) 66S-79)..66
But the prostrate posture of the the suppliant, enhanced by rent gargar
ments and unkempt hair, was designed to seem pitiable pitiable as well as
humble (cf. (d. Gould 11974:9 74: 94),
94), all the more so when when thethe appeal
came, as here, from from powerless figures such as women, children,
and the aged. aged. Thus, Aethra 'pities [oiktirousal
[oiktirousa] these childless,
grey-haired mothers of sons/ sons,' while at the same time she 'reveres
[sebousa
[sebousa]1 their sacred
sacred garlands,' that is, the the symbols of a ritual
petition (34-6).
The misfortune that prompts Aethra's pity is a double one. On
the one hand, she is sensitive to the women's childlessness childlessness as a
result of the the war ((11-16;
1 1 - 1 6; polias apaidas in 35 answers apaides apaides in
3 ); on the
113); the other hand, she regards the the refusal
refusal of the the Thehan
Theban rulers
either to bury the corpses of the fallen or return them them to their
mothers as a violation of divine law (nomim (nomim'' atizontes theon,
9 ) . 77 The Argive mothers are thus in the right.8
119). right.8 Aethra is also
conscious of the similarity
similarity between
between herself and them, which which
Aristotle lays down as a condition condition for pity ((Rhetoric
Rhetoric 2.8, 1386a25-
Pity / 207
7; Poetics 113,
7j 3, 1453a2-6):
1 453a2-6): the the chorus remind her her that
that she is aged, as
they
they are (50), and that that she too has a son (54-8j (54-8; d. cf. Euripides,
Hecuba 339-4
Hecuba 339-41).1 ) . Aethra's initial prayer for the the well-being of of
Theseus and Athens (1-7) ( 1-7) may indeed suggest that the women's
fate has reminded her her of her her own vulnerability
vulnerability as a mother.
As for the
the weeping figure figure of Adrastus, Aethra remarks coolly
that
that it was he who launched launched the unfortunate expeditionexpedition against
Thebes ((20-3),
20-3 ), and hence he bears the responsibility for its failure
( that women do not decide on war perhaps mitigates their culpa
(that culpa-
bility). Adrastus's plea that Athens take up his cause (24-8), ( 24-8 ), she
adds, is strictly
strictly a political
political matter
matter and thusthus men's business (40-1 (40-1);)j
she can do no more than summon Theseus Theseus so that
that he may con
con-
sider whether
whether to expel the Argives from from the land or else, by
helping .them,
them, perform a holy holy action for thethe gods (36-40). Aethra
clearly foresees the the pragmatic character of Theseus's Theseus's reaction.
When he arrives on the scene, he bids Adrastus uncover uncover his head
and tell his story. TheseusTheseus recognizes the grief-stricken
grief-stricken comportcomport-
ment
ment of the suppliants, but but he withholds
withholds judgment until he has
inquired
inquired into the the facts of the case.
Adrastus affirms
affirms his status as suppliant (114; ( 1 1 4j d.cf. 1130)
30) and re
and re-
ports the
the Thebans' denial of proper burial to the the fallen.
fallen. Theseus
acknowledges that Adrastus's demands are holy (hosia, 1123), 23), and
asks about the circumstances leading up to the disastrous cam- cam
paign: 'Did you approach any seers and watch the sacrificial
flame?
flame?'' he asks, to which Adrastus replies: 'Alas, you are pursuing
me where I most tripped up.' up. ' 'You didn't march forth, it seems,
with
with thethe favour
favour of the the gods.' 'Worse than that: I marched forth
against Amphiareus's will' (155-8). ( 1 55-8 ). Adrastus blames his action on
the
the pressure of young hotheads hotheads in Argos, but but Theseus is dismiss dismiss-
ive of this excuse (159-61).
( 1 59-6 1 ). At this point, Adrastus grasps Theseus's Theseus's
knees in thethe traditional gesture of supplication ((165), 1 65 ), and begs for
pity for himself and the the aged mothers of the the dead (168-9),
( 1 68-9), remind-
remind
ing Theseus
Theseus that
that those who are well off should look to the the pitiable
fortunes of others ((179). 1 79 ). Adrastus concludes his appeal by affirm affirm-
ing that
that Athens is both strong and has regard for what is pitiable
((188-90),
1 88-90), and the chorus add their voice to his in beseeching
Theseus's
Theseus's pity (oiktos, 194). 1 94).
Theseus responds with with a lecture on the gods' rational arrange- arrange-
the Ancient Greeks
ment
ment of the cosmos and the need for humility, humility, together with a
defence of
defence of the
the decisive
decisive importance
importance of of the middle class
the middle class for
for the
the
well-being of the polis. With that, he sends Adrastus packing
(246-9).
(246-9). While
While his his speech
speech may may seemseem to to be
be aa showpiece
showpiece of of Euripidean
didacticism
didacticism - - aa kind of of tragic parabasis
parabasis - - it
it in
in fact bears directly
directly on on
Adrastus's petition. Adrastus revealed his contempt contempt for the gods
by ignoring the omens when he marched marched into battle, and his
failure as a civic
civic leader by yielding yielding to the the pressure
pressure of the the young,
who
who hanker
hanker after
after war regardless of
war regardless of justice
justice - Theseus compares
- Theseus compares
their
their role
role to
to the
the influence
influence of of the
the mob
mob or or plethos in in aa democratic
democratic
state
state (232-7).
(232-7). Since
Since the the fault
fault lies
lies with
with Adrastus
Adrastus and and hishis city,
city, there
there
is no reason why Athens should become implicated implicated in their their woes.
Adrastus
Adrastus does
does notnot deserve
deserve to to bebe helped
helped or or pitied,
pitied, because
because he he has
has
brought his misfortune upon upon himself.
Adrastus
Adrastus sees
sees nothing
nothing for for it
it but
but toto submit
submit to to Theseus's
Theseus's decision,
decision,
but the chorus, weeping, throw themselves at the king's feet
throw themselves feet and
again beg for pity (280-1 (280-1).). The womenwomen make no allusion allusion to the
wisdom or justice of the the war against Thebes:Thebes: their their appeal is based
wholly
wholly on their terrible plight. There is no reason to
on their terrible plight. There i s no reason to suppose
suppose that that
they will succeed in moving Theseus Theseus where Adrastus has failed,
they do not. But Theseus perceives that
and they that his mother
mother is weeping
and groaning (286-9
(286-91), 1 ) and hears her exclaim: '0 'O wretched women! women!''
'
(292). With this, Aethra presents the case for supporting the Argives'
cause, on the grounds that it is right to honour honour the gods (301-2) (301-2 )
and that iitt will bring honour honour ((time,
time, 306) ttoo Theseus iiff he prevents
violent
violent men
men fromfrom confounding
confounding the the laws
laws of of all
all Greece (nomima
(nomima
pases Hellados, 3311). 1 1 ). Besides, she observes, if Theseus Theseus does not not
undertake to right this wrong, he will gain a reputation for cow- cow
ardice
ardice ((314-19).
3 1 4- 1 9 ) . Aethra
Aethra affirms
affirms thatthat she
she herself
herself is is unafraid,
unafraid, since
since
Theseus will set out with justice on his side (328
Theseus will set out with justice on his side (328). Theseus replies ). Theseus replies
that he stands by his former former opinion
opinion concerning Adrastus's fault,
but
but hehe nevertheless
nevertheless sees sees the force of
the force his mother's
of his mother's arguments:
arguments: it it
is not in his nature to avoid difficulties; difficulties; rather, he is ever the
chastiser of evils (338-4(338-41). 1 ). He will, nevertheless, present the case
first
first to the people for a vote, bringing Adrastus with with himhim to
support his arguments (350, (350, 354-5
354-5).).
There are no references to pity in this exchange, and in fact it
is not mentioned
mentioned again in the play. Nor is there any hint that
Pity
Pity / 209
Theseus's
Theseus's change of heart has been inspired by pity (on his dis- dis
missal of pity, d. 2004: 273
cf. Bernek 2004: 273).) . He has been convinced to
help the Argives
Argives on the grounds that that doing so will enhance his
reputation and that of Athens, and will also vindicate a divinely
sanctioned custom of the the Greeks. This is a politically
politically sober, ifif
high-minded, motive, and Theseus is sure that the people will
endorse it. ThatThat Adrastus foolishly
foolishly went to war and brought
disaster upon his city, however, sinks his claim to pity.
Aethra was moved to pity the women, at least, and hence tries
to persuade Theseus to take up their their cause ((emotion,
emotion, as Aristotle
says, is that on account of which people differ differ in their
their judgments).
She does so, however, not not by referring to the the women's misery but
by appealing to Theseus's reputation for valour. valour. It is a sensible
tactic, insofar
insofar as political decisions are based on interest, not
sentiment
sentiment and justice.
justice. But if pity drops out out of thethe argument,
Aethra at least opens a space for for considerations
considerations of right and wrong
in deliberative discourse by casting the unjust sufferings sufferings of the
women as a matter
matter of Athenian
Athenian interest.
I have suggested that Aethra's pity has an oblique relation to the
question
question of thethe Argives' desert. If no one may be justly prevented
from
from burying kin, then it is not right that the Argives Argives suffer
suffer this
irrespective of their responsibility
misfortune, irrespective responsibility for initiating the the
war. This is not quite the same as the view Aristotle advances in
his definition of pity: he focuses on the the responsibility of the the
sufferer
sufferer for her or his misery, not not its relation to a universal
standard of right. This latter conception is akin to the modern
doctrine of human rights, which today too has served as a motive
for
for intervention
intervention in disputes between foreign powers. Although the
foreign powers.
emotion of pity does not not enter into the political discussion, it
nevertheless finds common ground with the argument based on
norms, and thus provides
provides the link between Aethra's private senti- senti
ment and her advice to Theseus. The connection between inter- inter
est, the
the common beliefs of mankind, and a capacity for pity will
emerge clearly some three centuries later in the the history of Diodorus
Siculus ((13.20-7;
13 .20-7j see Konstan
Konstan 2002001a:1a: 75-95). But the problem was
in the air when Euripides'
Euripides' Suppliant Women was staged, staged, probably
probably
around the year 423 423 and thus shortly after after the debate over the fate
of
of Mytilinene
Mytilinene in 427,427, and thethe tragedy may be read in part as a
1 0 / The Emotions of the Ancient
2210 Ancient Greeks
commentary on the role of pity, interest, and justice in interna- interna

tional politics.
politics.
In a paper on the role of emotion
emotion in international
international politics, Neta
Crawford (2000: 1154) 54) points out that
that 'recently, several scholars
have argued that actors follow normative prescriptions for emoemo
tional reasons.
reasons.'' On the one hand, humanhuman attachment
attachment to social
norms is emotional in character;
character; on the other hand, 'sympathy is
an
an important element
element of decisionmaking'
decisionmaking' (f 1154
54 n. 1126,
26, referring to
to
Sen 11990),
990), even in the political sphere. The Athenians recognized
the
the influence of emotion, and of pity in particular, on judgment;
pity, moreover, was conceived of as based on desert, and hence hence
involving justice.
justice. In the political
political climate of the
the 420s, however,
when
when Euripides most probably produced the Suppliant Suppliant Women, it
appears that the Athenians
Athenians were beginning to separate out the
canons governing forensic discourse, to which which the question
question ofof
justice was central, fromfrom those of political
political deliberation, which
was now seen as being properly restricted to the issue of advan advan-
tage versus harm. Appeals to pity might still be made, of course,
and citizens were not so callous as to be insensible to them, but
they were likely to be dismissed as irrelevant to the hard realities
of international
international relations. However, where the claim to pity could
be linked to a violation of nomoi,
nomoi, or widely accepted principles of of
right or holy behaviour, then the argument from from pity might
might be
given a special twist. For the petitioner could then appeal to the
practical need and religious uphold such laws, and thus
religious duty to uphold
shift
shift the grounds of the argument to a form of of self-interest
self-interest -- and
hence a theme
theme proper to deliberative rhetoric. The Athenian
theatre thus showed how pity might might indeed have an effecteffect on
politics: even if it was not not itself
itself acknowledged as a basis for
setting policy, it might
might nevertheless help to condition
condition attitudes in
unfortunate.9
a way that was favourable to the unfortunate.9
Let us consider nownow some further
further implications
implications of Aristotle's
Aristotle's
conception of pity. Aristotle stipulates, as we have seen, that pity
is elicited by an undeserved evil of the sort that 'one might expect expect
oneself, or one of one's own, to suffer.'
suffer.' Because
Because we must
must be able to
anticipate thethe possibility of experiencing a misfortune
misfortune like that
afflicting
afflicting the pitied, pity requires that we ourselves be vulnerable.
Thus, Aristotle goes on to say thatthat those who have lost everything
Pity / 211
Pity/211
are incapable of feeling pity, because they do not not expect that
anything worse will befall them O
10
them.. l For the same reason, those
who are well off and confident
confident that they will continue to prosper prosper
immune to pity. 11
are immune l l Aristotle also states that there must be a
certain distance between the pitier and the pitied. We We pity ac- ac
quaintances when they they suffer
suffer a catastrophe, but when it befalls
someone who is closely related, for example one's own child, the
result
result is not pity but rather rather what Aristotle calls to deinon,
what Aristotle demon, or
'horror.' And horror, Aristotle observes, tends to drive out pity
(d.
(cf. Halliwell
Halliwell 2002:
2002: 2215-16).
1 5-16).
We can see fromfrom Aristotle's definition why he would distin distin-
guish between people we know and those who are kin or loved
ones in regard to pity, for he specifies that pity is elicited elicited by the
kinds of evils that might afflict
afflict us or our own. Those nearest to us
are as it were an extension of ourselves,
ourselves, whose misfortune
misfortune affects affects
us just as our own does.
does. Our kin are part of the the same substance as
we, as Aristotle
Aristotle puts it in the Nicomachean E thics ((8.12,1161bl7-
Ethics 8 . 1 2, 1 1 6 1 b 1 7-
119),
9 ), and friends, in Aristotle's
Aristotle's famous expression, are another self.
If, as Aristotle argues, 'in general, one must must presume that people
pity just those things, when they happen to others, that they fear
when they happen to themselves' (Rhetoric (Rhetoric 2.8, 11386a27-9),
386a27-9), then
fear rather than
than pity will result when such things happen, or
rather, threaten to happen, to those closest to us.
Aristotle
Aristotle notes
notes too that we pity pity those who are similar (homoioi)
(homoioi)
to ourselves, whether
whether in age, character, family, or some other
respect. If friends
friends are indeed other selves, then we are not not just
similar
similar but the same as they, in the strong sense of having a shared
identity. In speaking of such intimate intimate relationships, including
that with our own selves in the case of self-love, Aristotle avoids
the term eleos or pity. Rather, Rather, he prefers such expressions as
sullupeisthai, sunalgein, and sunakhthesthai, meaning meaning to 'con- 'con
dole' or 'feel pain together' with with another. Correspondingly,
Correspondingly, for
what
what we might call positive
positive sympathy, Aristotle employs employs words
such as sunkhairein, sunedesthai, and analogous compounds with
the prefix sun-,
sun-, which signify
signify that we feel the same pleasure as the
other, or feel it as our own. In the the case of pity, we do not not experi
experi-
ence the pain of the other directly.directly. Rather, the pain entailed in
pity, according to Aristotle, derives from from the awareness that we
2212
1 2 / The Emotions
Emotions of the A nc i en t Greeks
Ancient Greeks
might
might ourselves suffersuffer a like misfortune.
misfortune. This looks very much
like the
the pain involved in fear, which which Aristotle defines as 'a kind kind ofof
pain or disturbance deriving from from an impression [phantasial
\phantasia] of a
future evil that is destructive or painful' (Rhetoric
(Rhetoric 2.5, 11382a21-3;
382a2 1 -3;
see chapter 6, p. 130).
130).
The problem
problem with treatingtreating pity as emotional identification
identification
becomes clear when we consider the condition of the pitied and
the pitier. The title character in Sophocles' Philoctetes has been
abandoned
abandoned on a deserted
deserted island, and suffers
suffers from
from an agonizing
agonizing and
disabling infection in his foot. He has done nothing nothing to deserve this
affliction,
affliction, and is thus a prime subject for pity. Yet just because he
has lost everything, he is, on Aristotle's analysis, least likely likely to be
able to feel pity for another. What Philoctetes experiences is not
pity but pain, both physical and psychological;
psychological; but pain is not, on
Aristotle's definition, a pathos pathos at all, but
but rather a sensation or
aisthesis (pain and pleasure are, we recall, componentscomponents of pathe:
Rhetoric 2. 1 , 11378a20-3).
2.1, 378a20-3 ). In any case, a pitier would only feel the
pathos as
same pathos as the
the pitied
pitied in the
the rather strange
strange circumstance
circumstance in in
which what
what elicited
elicited pity waswas an excess of pity
pity -
- surely not the kind
of
of situation Aristotle imagined
imagined to to be
be characteristic
characteristic of tragedy.
of tragedy.
We can perhaps gauge gauge something of what the original audience
of Sophocles' Philoctetes might might have experienced upon observing
Philoctetes' suffering
suffering from
from the reactions of Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus and the the
chorus in the play. 12 12 At the sight of Philoctetes' miserable cave
the chorus exclaim: 'I pity him: no human human being to care for him,
with no companion in sight, wretched, forever forever alone, he is af- af
flicted
flicted by a savage disease and wanders at the the mercy of every need
that 1 69-75 ) . 13
that arises' ((169-75). Ll Later in the play, Neoptolemus is provokedprovoked
by Philoctetes' stubborn
stubborn refusal to go to Troy, even though though his
wound
wound can he be cured only if he does so: 'It is not not just to pardon or to
pity those
those who
who areare involved
involved in in self-willed
self-willed harm,
harm, like
like you'
you' ((1318-
13 1 8-
20t he
20), he asserts.
asserts. As Aristotle
Aristotle says, pity is is aroused
aroused by undeserved
by undeserved
suffering,
suffering, and someone who who suffers
suffers willingly fails to qualify. For a
Greek, then, the mere spectacle of pain was not enough to elicit
pity -- something
something one might might have inferred, I should think, from from a
consideration of sueh such practices
practices as the
the judicial torture of slaves.
Pity was certainly
certainly among the chief chief emotions
emotions that tragedy was
expected
expected to arouse, as Aristotle and other writers make clear
(Aristotle, Poetics 11452a2-3,
452a2-3, 1452b32-3,
1 452b32-3, etc.; Gorgias, Defence
Defence of of
Pity / 213
213
Helen 9j 9; Plato, R epublic 110,

Republic 0, 606B-Cj
606B-Q Isocrates, Panegyricus
Panegyricus 112,1 1 2,
1168).
68 ) . But Greek pity is not
not the sympathy of which
which Terry Eagleton
speaks (see (see epigraph to this chapter), when he suggests that to ask
why we respond as we do to Philoctetes' pain implies a 'bogus
historicism.'
historicism.'
Between Greek pity and modern English sympathy there is a
deep cultural divide, extending to basic conceptions of the self.14
the self.14
Sympathy involves putting oneself in the position position of another so as
to feel what the other person feels. Thus, Thus, Edmund Burke ((1990:41)
1990: 4 1 )
writes that 'sympathy must must be considered as a sort of substitu
substitu-
tion, by which we are put put into the place of another man, and
affected
affected in many respects as he is affected.'
affected/ David Hume, in turn,
supposes that the thought of another's passion may acquire 'such
a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself' itself
(A
(A Treatise of of Human Nature [[1906;
Human Nature 1 906j orig. 11739-40]:
739-40] : 3 1 7). Such a
317).
description of sympathy has little to do with the ancient Greek
notion of eleos, and its its roots lie elsewhere. 15IS The spectators of of
Philoctetes' suffering,
suffering, whether on stage or in the audience, did not
expect to be affected
affected as he was affected, or that his passion would
become theirs. As a distinct
distinct emotion in its own right, pity did not
mean identifying
identifying with
with the experience of anotherj
another,- rather, it was
just insofar
insofar as one did not share another's misfortune that one was
in a position to pity it. Eagleton's
Eagleton's facile assimilation
assimilation of ancient
ancient
pity to modern sympathy fails to perform the work of translation
that understanding the ancient emotions requires.
We have seen that that pity, according
according to Aristotle's
Aristotle's analysis in the
presupposes that there is a likeness between the pitier
Rhetoric, presupposes
and the pitied, and that that the suffering undeserved.16
suffering of the pitied is undeserved.16
In his discussion
discussion of pity and fear in the
the Poetics, however, Aristotle
modifies this position. The change occurs in his discussion of the
kinds of reversal characteristic of tragedy.tragedy. Here, Aristotle states
that pity and fear are not excited when one sees thoroughly bad
men brought to ruin, and he goes on to explain: 'for such a plot
may involve to philanthr6pon,
philanthropon, but
but neither
neither pity nor fear, for the
one concerns a person who is undeservedly unfortunate, while the
other concerns a person who is similar [homoios]:: pity concerns
similar [homoios]
the undeserving person, fear concerns the one who is similar' ((13, 13,
11453a2-6).
453a2-6).
In the
the Poetics, then, Aristotle splits up thethe factors of desert and
the Ancient
similarity, dividing them them between the two emotions of pity and
fear. Pity, he continues
continues to maintain, depends on the perception perception
that the other person is suffering
suffering undeservedly.
undeservedly. But Aristotle now
exploits the idea of similarity
similarity in order to explain why tragedy also
induces fear. If the the characters in a tragedy are like ourselves in
some relevant respect, then then their misfortune will induce in the
spectators
spectators 'an impression
impression of a future evil that is destructive destructive or
painful' to themselves (d. (cf. Halliwell 11998: 998: 1176,
76, cited in chapter 6,
p. 1155).
55 ) . But how
how is this
this fear different from
fear different from the
the fear
fear that
that Aristotle
has already associated with the emotion of pity, which is aroused
precisely insofar as we ourselves may expect to suffer something
like what
what the pitied
pitied is currently
currently experiencing? The answer, as I
suggested in chapter 6 (p. (p. 1155),
5 5 ), is that the misfortunes that occur
in tragedy may inspire fear, as opposed to pity, even if they seem
to be merited, insofar
insofar as we are vulnerable to such calamities. It
is, we may say, the the non-moral side of our response to tragedy.
In separating out fearfear from
from pity, might Aristotle also have had in
mind an other-regarding
other-regarding kind of fear that we might might call 'fear
'fear for
another'
another'?? Such an emotion
emotion would be distinct from from feeling pain
together with another person, which which Aristotle denominates, as
we have seen, by expressions such as sullupeisthaisullupeisthai and sunalgein.
sunalgein.
We recall that, according to Aristotle, this sensibility sensibility arises in
relation to those who are nearest and dearest to ourselves. It will
not be an emotional
emotional response to tragedy for two reasons. First, by
making eleos or pity one of the the two tragic emotions, Aristotle
makes it clear that we regard tragic characters characters not as kin or close
friends
friends but but rather as individuals at a certain distance from our
from our-
selves: they are of thethe class of gnorimoi or 'acquaintances,'
'acquaintances/ as he
puts it in the Rhetoric ((1386al8),
1386a I 8 ), not philoi or intimates. Second,
notphiloi
as we have remarked, feeling the same pain or pleasure as another
does not mean experiencing
experiencing the same emotion, since pain and
pleasure are not themselves pathe pathe butbut rather constituent
constituent parts of of
pathe. If my son is afraid
pathe. afraid of a monster, I may may share something
of his anguish, but but I do not
not share his fear, because I do not not believe
in monsters.
The fearfear that tragedy inspires
inspires differs
differs from
from pity, on Aristotle's
view, in that it takes no account of desert. But the ruin of a
thoroughly bad individual elicits neither pity nor fear, according
Pity / 215
215
ttoo Aristotle: for the first, because the the misfortune iiss deservedj
deserved; for
the second, however, it is because the spectators do not perceive a
relevant similarity
similarity between such a person and themselves.themselves. They
They
are not great malefactors, as for example a tyrant such as Lycus in
Euripides' Hercules, and hence hence they
they do not fear fear vengeance
vengeance fromfrom
those whom they have oppressed.
oppressed. Yet Aristotle states, as we have
seen, that such
such a story may elicit the mysterious
mysterious response he calls
philanthrdpon. What is the status of this curious concept? Is it
to philanthr6pon.
a third tragic emotion
emotion -- one
one that tragedy does better not to evoke,
perhaps, butbut which
which is nevertheless
nevertheless part of the the possible range of of
emotional responses
emotional responses to the genre? Is it a reaction
reaction that is somehow
somehow
emotion? Could it have something to do with the
other than an emotion?
modem
modern idea of sympathy?
There are some who maintainmaintain that philanthrdpon in fact
that to philanthr6pon
signifies something quite different
different from sympathy or a philan philan-
thropic sentiment
sentiment (see
(see Konstan 200 1 a: 46-7)
200la: 46-7).. These scholars take
Aristotle to mean rather that the sight of a bad person's fall into into
misfortune
misfortune is morally satisfying: it is just and decent to be pleased
at such a tum events.17 This interpretation
turn of eventsY interpretation has begun to enter
into translations of the Poetics, and it clearly requires serious
consideration. On this view, the audience is imagined as taking a
positive pleasure in witnessing
witnessing thethe destruction of a bad personj
person; on
the other, more traditional interpretation, however, the audience
is presumed to feel at least some pain at the the suffering
suffering even of of
those who deserve their their fate. Thus
Thus Gerald Else, in his magisterial
commentary
commentary on the the Poetics ((1967:
1967: 95 n. 88 88 ad 53a l ), remarks of to
53al),
philanthrdpon that
philanthr6pon that 'the least forced interpretation
interpretation of this much much
discussed term is that it denotes a rudimentary
discussed term rudimentary grade of pity
which is accorded to all human human beings (anthropoi)
(anthropoi] regardless of of
their deserts, whereas
whereas pity eleos) depends on a judgment that the
pity ([eleos]
sufferer
sufferer does not deserve his misfortune.' It is like pity but does
not
not involve
involve a judgment of desert: how, then, does to philanthr6pon
philanthrdpon
differ from fear? Might Aristotle be imagining a non-moral re- re
sponse to the
the misfortune of another that is independent
independent of consid-
consid
erations of our own vulnerability and results simply simply from
from the
the
perception of another's
another's suffering?
suffering?
In later Greek, the word philanthropia
philanthropia and its relatives came to
signify
signify something
something very close to the Latin humanitas, humanitas, that is, a
2216
1 6 / The Emotions of the
the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
humane generosity towards others; it was closely associated with

the term epieikeia 'kindness/' and might
epieikeia or 'kindness, might serve also as a near
synonym for eleos or 'pity/ 'pity,' as it often
often does in the the first-century
first-century BC
historian Diodorus Siculus ((e.g., e.g., 113.19-24;
3 . 1 9-24; d. cf. Dover 11994: 994: 20 1 -3;
201-3;
and Cavallero 2000- 2000-1). 1 ). To determine its meaning in usage of the the
fourth
fourth century BC, BC, I have taken occurrences in Demosthenes Demosthenes as a
test case. On the one hand, Demosthenes Demosthenes sometimes sometimes associates
philanthropia with
philanthr6pia with the the idea of justice,
justice, as at Philippics 22.12, . 1 2, where
he speaks of 'just and philanthropic arguments' (logous (logons dikaious
kai
kai philanthropous; d. cf. 7.3
7.31,1 , 20. l O9, ,36.55,
20.109, 3 6.55, 44.8
44.8).) . This connection
connection
might seem to favour favour the view that Aristotle, in the Poetics,
means by to philanthr6pon
philanthropon the just satisfaction one takes in
seeing evil duly chastised. Elsewhere in Demosthenes, Demosthenes, however,
philanthropia means something more like 'kind' or 'gentle.' It is
philanthr6pia
frequently
frequently paired with praos, for example, which which in Aristotle'sAristotle's
Rhetoric represents the state or emotion opposite to anger (cf. (d.
Demosthenes
Demosthenes 88.31, .3 1 , 24. 5 1 , 24.
24.51, 1 96, 4
24.196, 1 .2, Eroticus 113),
41.2, 3 ), as well as
with hemeios or 'tame' ((21.49);
with hemeros 2 1 .49); it is contrasted, in turn, with with the
quality of being frightening (phobezos, 113.17),
frightening (phoberos, 3 . 1 7 ), with
with savagery
(omotes, 118.231),
(6motes, 8 .23 1 ), and with
with envy (phthonos,
(phthonos, 20. 1 6 5 ) . Philanthr6pia
20.165). Philanthropia
is also associated with eusebeia or 'piety' ((21.12), 2 1 . 12), eunoia or 'good- 'good
will' ((18.5),
1 8. 5 ), and epieikeia
epieikeia (36.59); it is the quality that that restrains a
free man from behaving hubristically -- that is, is, with arrogant
abuse - - towards his own slaves (2 1 .48 ) . Finally, philanthr6pia
(21.48). philanthropia also
occurs in connection
connection with pity pity (25. 76, 25.
(25.76, 8 1 ; d.
25.81; cf. 221.185,
1 . 1 85, 24. 1 96). In
24,196).
all, then, the evidence of Demosthenes Demosthenes favours the traditional
view of to philanthr6pon
philanthropon as a sentiment sentiment analogous to sympathy or
humane concern.
In Aristotle's
Aristotle's own writings, philanthr6pia philanthropia may be applied to
animals
animals in the literal literal sense of friendliness towards human human beings
(History
(History of of Animals 6617b26, 1 7b26, 630a9);
630a9); when when used of humans, it is
connected, in the the Constitution of of the Athenians 116.2, 6.2, with
with gentle
gentle-
ness and a disposition
disposition to forgive those who err (pmos, (praos,
Philanthropia is associated with pity in particular
sungnomikos). Philanthr6pia
in the
the Adstotelian
Aristotelian treatise On Virtues and and Vices 5, 11250b32-5 250b32-5
((cited
cited in Apicella Ricciardelli
Ricciardelli 11971-2: 9 7 1 -2: 39 1-2 ), though this work,
391-2),
like the Constitution, is probably not by Aristotle himself but a
product of his school. We may also note that that in the Poetics itself itself
Pity / 217
Pity/217
! l 452b36-81, Aristotle claims that the

(1452b36-8), the sight
sight of 'bad men going
from
from bad fortune to good is the least tragic of all, since it has none
of
of the elements it ought, whether the philanthroponphilanthropon or the piti piti-
able or the frightening.' But the decisive passage, passage, in my view, is in
the Rhetoric ((1390al8-20),
1390aI 8-20), where Aristotle observes that, like the
young, old men too are given to feeling pity ((eleetikoi),eleetikoil, but but not
not for
the
the same reasons: for the the young are so disposed on account of of
philanthropia, while the
philanthropia, the aged are so because of weakness,
weakness, that is,
decrepitude. Philanthropia evidently represents an instinctive instinctive sen- sen
sitivity to the
the suffering
suffering of others, not one that that grows, as pity pity does,
with experience and the the consciousness it produces of one's own
vulnerability
vulnerability to misfortune.
misfortune. It is relevant too that that elsewhere in
the Poetics, as we have noted above, Aristotle recognizes that that pity
may be excited by the sheer emotionality
emotionality or pathos
pathos of the the events
portrayed (ouden
(ouden eleeinon ....plen
. . plen kat'auto to pathos,
pathos, 13, 13, 1453bl8).
1453b 1 8 ).
There is, I think, one additional bit bit of evidence concerning the the
nature
nature of to philanthropon
philanthropon in Aristotle
Aristotle that has not, to my knowl knowl-
edge, been adduced in this connection. In the Rhetoric, as we have
seen (chapter 5, 5, p. 1112),
1 2L Aristotle defines
defines indignation ((to to neme
neme-
san) as 'feeling pain at someone who appears to be succeeding
undeservedly' (2.9, (2.9, 11837a8-9),
837a8-9), and adds that it is the the opposite of of
pity, to nemesan
nemesan being pain at undeserved good fortune, while
pity is pain at undeserved misfortune
misfortune (2.9,(2.9, 11386b9-12).
386b9-12). Both emoemo
tions, Aristotle
Aristotle specifies, are characteristic
characteristic of decent
decent ( epiekeis)
(epiekeis)
individuals, since it is wrong that people should do either well or
ill if they
they do not
not deserve it. it.
Nevertheless, as we remarked in the chapter on envy and indig- indig
nation, Aristotle is aware that, according according to some, it is not to
nemesan
nemesan or 'indignation' that is the opposite of pity but rather
phthonos or 'envy' (indeed, they hold that envy 'is related to and is
phthonos
in fact
fact the same thing as indignation,' 2.9, 1386b 1 6- 1 7 ) . Aristotle,
1386M6-17).
however, insists on the distinction
distinction between the two emotions, emotions,
since even though
though phthonos
phthonos too is 'a disturbing
disturbing pain arisingarising from
from
the
the well-being' of another (2.9, (2.9, 11386M8-19;
386b 1 8-1 9; d.
cf. 2. 1 0, 1387b22-4),
2.10, 138 7b22-4),
it takes no account of desert, but arises solely because the other is
our equal or similar
similar to us (2.9,(2.9, 11386bl9-20
386b 1 9-20;; d.cf. 2. 1 0, 1387b23-5,
2.10, 1387b23-5,
where Aristotle specifies that phthonos phthonos arises just because others
have a thing, irrespective
irrespective of whether we ourselves need it or not). not).
2218
1 8 / The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks
It is this indifference
indifference both to desert and to one's own need that
renders envy an emotion unsuited to a decent ((epieikes] epieikes) person.
In ruling out envy as the the opposite of pity, however,
however, and treating
it rather as the contrary of indignation, Aristotle has implicitly
opened up a further
further question: what is the opposite of phthonos
itself? Since what disqualifies
disqualifies envy from
from being pity's opposite iiss
just the fact that iitt fails ttoo take desert into account, the opposite
to phthonos should in turn be a 'a disturbing pain' that arises not,
this time, 'from
'from the well-being' of another, as is the case with
envy, but rather from from another's
another's misfortune,
misfortune, in a way that is
indifferent to ddesert
equally indifferent esert and due simply to the the fact
fact of the
the
other's distress. The missing fourth term would seem to correcorre
spond precisely to the the idea of to philanthropon
philanthropon as a sympathetic
sympathetic
response to another's suffering
suffering irrespective of merit or of fear fear for
oneself. 111
18
A vivid awareness of another's present suffering suffering may generate

in us a fear
fear of a like misfortune occurring at some future future time
to ourselves.
ourselves. But suppose that we are not vulnerable to such a
mischance.
mischance. We We should in that case be able to experience neither
pity nor fear, according to Aristotle. We mortals, perhaps, are
never wholly free of anxiety at the the prospect of adversity,
adversity, even ifif
we have prospered
prospered or suffered
suffered inordinately, but
but a god is, certainly
on Aristotle's conception
conception of divinity. Yet a god can be philanthropos,
philanthropes,
in the sense of being concerned for human human beings, as Prometheus
is said to be in the tragedy ascribed to Aeschylus (11, ( 1 1 , 28).
28). Ordinary
Ordinary
perhaps,
people too, perhaps, do not experience pity or fear at the spectacle
of a very bad man man falling
falling from
from good fortune to bad,bad, because they
do not normally conceive of themselves as 'terribly bad' (sphodra (sphodra
poneroi), and hence do not not recognize their likeness to the figure
on the stage.
stage. Aristotle seems to have invested the notion of simi simi-
larity here with a particular ethical charge, charge, thereby moralizing
tragic fear
fear along with tragic pity. But one can experience the
sentiment
sentiment that moves a young person to pity, according to Aristotle, Aristotle,
and which has nothing to do with weakness or vulnerability. This
sentiment, which respondsresponds directly to the the suffering
suffering of another
person, irrespective of desert or fear fear for oneself, is, as Else Else and
and
others have maintained, what Aristotle means by to philanthropon.
philanthropon.
CHAPTER
CHAPTER EELEVEN
LE V E N
Jealousy
Jealousy
Jealousy per
per se
se is
is the
the same
same everywhere.
everywhere.
Baumgart
Baumgart 1990:
1990: 26
26
Jealousy
Jealousy in
in the
the twentieth
twentieth century
century neither
neither continues
continues unaltered
unaltered -- a
human
human or or Western constant
constant -- nor
nor neatly
neatly shifts
shifts from
from common
common to to
rare
rare as
as part
part of
of aa tidy
tidy then-now
then-now contrast.
contrast.
Stearns
Stearns 11989:
989: 1176
76
The
The cross-cultural
cross-cultural study of of the emotions requires aa special kind of
self-awareness on on the
the part
part of
of the
the scholar.
scholar. For For we
we tend
tend to
to think
think of
our own
our own emotional repertoire as natural and
as natural and to assume, conse
assume, conse-
quently,
quently, thatthat itit is
is universal.
universal. Pity,
Pity, which,
which, as as we
we have
have seen,
seen, was
was
included
included among
among the the basic
basic emotions
emotions in in classical
classical antiquity,
antiquity, today
often
often signifies
signifies something
something more more like
like charity
charity or or aa dutiful
dutiful disposi
disposi-
tion to help another
another person in distress,distress, aa sense
sense that eleos was
already
already acquiring
acquiring in in ancient
ancient Christian
Christian texts;
texts; soso conceived,
conceived, pity
pity
seems
seems outout of of place
place in in the company
company of of such
such visceral passions as as
anger,
anger, love,
love, andand fear
fear (see
(see Konstan
Konstan 200 1 a: 3-4,
2001a: 3-4, 1120-2).
20-2) . It
It is
is still
still
more
more difficult
difficult to to imagine
imagine thatthat anan emotion
emotion that that we
we consider
consider basic
basic
might
might be be entirely
entirely absent
absent in in another
another culture.
culture. Linda
Linda Wood
Wood ((1986:
1986:
1194)
94) has
has argued
argued that that loneliness
loneliness today has the the status
status ofofan
an emotion,
emotion,
though it of
though it is of recent vintage even English:
vintage even in English: before the twentieth
the twentieth
century,
century, she she observes,
observes, 'the 'the term
term ""loneliness"
loneliness" appears
appears to to refer
refer
most frequently
frequently to to the
the physical
physical absence
absence of of persons,'
persons/ whereas
whereas 'by'by
the 1 9 70s,
the 1970s, loneliness was treated as a feeling
treated as a feeling quite separate from
separate from
220
220 I/ The
The Emotions
Emotions of
Greeks
isolation.'' 1l Certainly, there is no corresponding term in classical

isolation.
Greek.
Jealousy is a still more elementary
elementary emotion in the modern
lexicon than loneliness, and enjoys a far longer pedigree. pedigree. Yet I
argue in this chapter that no term in classical Greek or Latin quite
answers to the English English 'jealousy' and its equivalents in other
languages, for example the Italian gelosia, gelosia, French falousie,
jalousie, and
Spanish celos.
celos. What is more, I go so far as to suggest that ancient
Greeks in the classical period may not have known jealousy jealousy at all
in the modern, romantic sense of of the word, and that what we call
'jealousy'
'jealousy' may may rather
rather have
have been
been distributed
distributed among
among aa variety
variety of of
other sentiments. The very concept, that is, may have been lack- lack
ing. Finally, I propose to identify
identify the moment
moment at which
which a notion
resembling romantic jealousy entered classical classical literature
literature -- not
Greek literature, in this case, but but Latin,
Latin, during the reign of the the
first
first Roman emperor, Augustus. If this is right, then we may be
able to witness the the birth of an emotion that had hitherto gone
unrecognized in the Graeco-Roman
Graeco-Roman world.
Perhaps one ought not to be entirely surprised if jealousy jealousy is
parcelled out among different
different emotions
emotions in cultures other than our
own. Many scholars and scientists have remarked remarked upon the the com
com-
posite nature of jealousy
jealousy as an aggregate
aggregate or alloy of other, more
fundamental
fundamental sentiments.
sentiments. Lily B. B. Campbell ((1960:
1 960: 1148)
48 ) observes
that '[j]ealousy
'[jjealousy was, in the thinking
thinking of the Renaissance,
Renaissance, not not one of of
the simple or elementary passions but but a derivative or compounded
passion. It is a species of envy, which which is in turn a species of of
hatred
hatred ....
. . It is this curious mingling of love and hatred with grief grief or
fear that we see in jealousy' (cited in Friday Friday 11997
997 [[1985]: 39). Paul
1 985]: 39).
Ekman, in the the 'Afterword' to his edition of Darwin's The Expres Expres-
sion of
of the Emotions
Emotions in Man and Animals ((1998: 1 998: 39 1 ), comments:
391), comments:
'Jealousy seems to have no distinctive expression, expression, perhaps bebe
cause it is an emotion where the person person feels a number
number of of other
emotions: angry with the one whose attention is lost or with the
rival; sadness at the loss; fear in anticipation of further further loss; or
disgust at himself or herself for feeling jealous.jealous. Envy, a term often often
confused
confused with jealousy,
jealousy, also does not have a unique expression.'
So too Sally Plan alp ((1999:
Planalp 74) remarks that '[j]ealousy
1 999: 1174) '[jjealousy ... ... is a
complex
complex emotion
emotion blended
blended primarily
primarily from
from anger-, sadness-,
sadness-, and
Jealousy / 22 1
Jealousy/221
feelings.'2 What reason is there for supposing that so

fear-like feelings.'2
tangled and synthetic
synthetic an emotion
emotion or emotional
emotional concept must be
3
universa1?3
universal?
Jealousy, or, more precisely, romantic
romantic jealousy, is also odd among
the emotions in that it 'pertains to a triangular relationship' (Segal
11973:
973 : 40, cited in R. R. Lloyd 11995:995: 3;3; Baumgart 11990: 990: 25).
25). The
Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines jealousy
Oxford jealousy ((s.v.,
s.v.,
definition
definition 4) 4) as 'the state of mind arising from from thethe suspicion,
apprehension,
apprehension, or knowledge of rivalry.' This general description is
divided into two parts. The first first pertains to amatory relations,
with
with which
which the
the present
present discussion
discussion is is exclusively
exclusively concerned.
concerned. Here,
jealousy is defined
defined as 'fear
'fear of being supplanted in the the affection,
affection, or
distrust
distrust of the
the fidelity, of a beloved person, esp. a wife, husband, or
lover' (the first
first citation dates to 1303). 1303). The second part of the the
entry treats jealousy 'in respect of success or
entry treats jealousy 'in respect of success or advantage,' and advantage,' and
offers synonyms.4 True, Jon Elster (1999a:
offers 'envy' and 'grudge' as synonyms.4 ( 1 999a:
144) maintains that '[m]any emotions .... . . are triadic,' in the
the sense
that they ''are
are triggered
triggered by beliefs that make reference to two other
persons,' but he acknowledges that 'jealousy is the only example
known to me of a triadic emotion that is named in ordinary
language' - - more specifically,
specifically, in English.
English. In particular, as Aaron
Ben-Ze'ev (2000: 289) 289)remarks,
remarks,this thisquality
qualityof ofjealousy
jealousyas as'a'athree
three-
party relation' distinguishes it from from envy. So So too Ruth Caston
observes that in definitions of jealousy,
jealousy, 'it is common to use envy
as a comparandum,'
comparandum/ and adds: adds: 'Jealousy tends to involve three
people, while envy involves two.'s two.'5 Once again, it is plausible that
not every language
language evolves a special term to express a sentiment sentiment
at once so complex and specific.
A further
further distinction
distinction between jealousyjealousy and envy is that ''[t]he [tJhe
wish in envy is for something one does not have, while in jealousy
losing.'6 Since jealousy
it is something one fears 10sing.'6 jealousy is a three-party
emotion, I would say rather that that it concerns someone we fear
losing.7 More precisely, what we fear
losing.7 fear in jealousy
jealousy is not losing the
person so much as the alienation
alienation of that affection.8 Death
that person's affection.8
may deprive
deprive us of a loved one, but but the emotion it produces is grief,
not jealousy. Even where a third third party is involved, as in kidnap- kidnap
ping, anger or hostility rather than jealousy jealousy is the characteristic
reaction.9
reaction.9
Ancient Greeks
Complex as jealousy may be, some theorists theorists have defended its
universality on functional grounds.grounds. Thus, Sally Planalp ((1999: 1 999:
1 74) holds that jealousy 'mobilizes us to protect our attachments
174)
with
with people whom we value.' value/ In the new discipline of evolution-
evolution
ary psychology
psychology (heir to the earlier 'sociobiology'), jealousy is some- some
times elevated
elevated to the
the status
status of a biological
biological necessity (d. Ben-Ze'ev
necessity (cf.
10
2000: 262; Buss 11994:
994: 2,
1, 116;
6; Buss 2000; d. cf. chapter 11,, p. 112).
2 ) . 10 But
such an account will only be persuasive if jealousy is in fact
common
common to all cultures;
cultures; an evolutionary
evolutionary argument
argument cannot
cannot be
invoked to demonstrate the innateness of jealousy. jealousy.
When in doubt about an ancient Greek concept, turn to Aristotle.
Aristotle, however, does not include jealousyjealousy among the emotions
emotions
he discusses in the Rhetoric, although he treats such competitive
sentiments as envy, emulousness,
emulousness, and indignation.
indignation. Perhaps this is
not surprising, given that his primary interest is in political and
forensic oratory,
oratory, where there was presumably less occasion to
manipulate
manipulate feelings of jealousy in the neither does
the audience. But neither
Aristotle discuss jealousy as such anywhere else. In fact, the the
Greek word thatthat is
is commonly translated as as jealousy -- zelotupia
zelotupia --
appears only once, I believe, in the Aristotelian corpus, in the late
compilation On Marvellous Tales ((846a28-31).
846a28-3 1 ).
ze10tupia
The term zelotupia is a somewhat odd formation, compounded
somewhat
of zelos, or emulousness, and the root tup- meaning to strike (as
of zelos, (as in
'type'). As Elaine Fantham observes ((1986: 1986: 46-7), the latter
latter stem
may be interpreted as
be interpreted as passive - 'struck by by envy' - or or active
active --
'striking out of envy.' The earliest occurrence of the term appears appears
to be in Aristophanes' Wealth (388 (388 BC),
BC), in which
which an old woman
complains that, now that riches are plentiful, the young man who
courted her has made himself scarce. Once upon a time, she says,
'At the Great Mysteries,
Mysteries, by Zeus, whenwhen someone kept looking at
me as I rode in a carriage,
carriage, I was beaten [etuptomen]
[etuptomen] for it the the
whole dayday-- that's
that's how
howviolently zelotupos the
violentlyzelotupos theboy
boywas'
was' ( (1013-16).
1 0 13-16).
The apparent pun on tupto and zelotupos zelotupos leads Fantham to won- won
der whether Aristophanes might not have coined the term him him-
self
self (47); I am inclined
inclined to think that
that it is a sign rather that
that the term
was already current, and that the humour humour consisted in bringing
out the implicit
implicit force of the termination -tupos. But more funda funda-
mentally,
mentally, can we be certain that that the meaning of zelotupos
ze1otupos here is
Jealousy / 223
in fact 'jealous'
'jealous'?? In the context, a significance
significance such as 'niggardly'
or 'grudging' - - that is, in regard to sharing her favours -- would be
as appropriate, particularly since the young man's man's motive must
have been to keep at bay other gigolos interested in her money - -a
nuance the audience would have been prepared to pick up. Indeed,
Chremylus, the protagonist of the comedy, mutters to himself, 'It
seems he liked eating alone' ((1017), 10 1 7), the point being that the youth
did not want any other men sharing in the bounty. 11 II
It may seem supererogatory to seek an alternative sense for

zelotupos, when 'jealous' is perfectly perfectly apt. That is how Liddell and
Scott render the term, while for the noun zelotupia zelotupia they give
'jealousy, rivalry,
rivalry, envy.' So too, Arndt and Gingrich's lexicon of of
New
New Testament
Testament Greek ((1957) 1 957) defines zelotupia
zelotupia simply as 'jeal 'jeal-
ousy.' Our confidence
confidence in the the equation may be shaken, however, if,
in the absence of an analysis by Aristotle, we consult consult the Stoics,
whose minute
minute classifications of the passions go back at least to
Chrysippus in the third third century BC BC and thus thus furnish the earliest
definition
definition of zelotupia
zelotupia that survives from from Greek antiquity. The The
Stoics, as we have mentioned previously, subsumed the emotions emotions
under four
four general headings: pleasure, pain, desire or attraction,
and fear
fear or repulsion. The doxographer
doxographer Diogenes Laertius reports
their list of emotions involving an element element of pain as follows:
'Pity is a pain arising when someone suffers suffers undeservedly;
undeservedly; envy
[phthonos] 1 is a pain at other people's goods;
[phthonos goods,- emulousness
emulousness [zelos [zelos]1 is
a pain at someone else having what one desires oneself; zelotupia zelotupia
is a pain at another's having what one also has oneself,' oneself/ and so
forth (D.L. 7.
forth (D.L. 1 1 1 = fro
7.111 = fr. 4412
1 2 SVFj.
SVF). So too too John Stobaeus,
Stobaeus, who who com-
com
piled an anthology of quotations in the the fifth
fifth century AD, follows
the Stoics in defining zelos as 'pain at someone else getting what
defining zelos
one wanted, when one does not not get it oneself'
oneself (he (he also provides a
couple of alternative meaningsj,
meanings), and zelotupia
ze10tupia as 'pain at another
getting what one wanted/ wanted,' irrespective, that is, of whether whether one
12
ultimately
ultimately gets it it oneself
oneself (Eel. 2.922.92.7. 7 W = fI.
= fr. 4414.14
14. 1 4 SVF).
SVF).12
The Stoics' conception of zelotupia zelotupia seems more like malice or
spite than jealousy,
jealousy, nastier even than envy. envy. Envy arises when
another is better off than ourselves, whereas zelotupia, as the
Stoics define it, occurs because another person has what we
ourselves already possess: we want to be the only one who has it.
224 I/ The Emotions of the Ancient
Ancient Greeks
There
There is no reference here to the role of a third party, to the
alienation
alienation of affection,
affection, or to losing what what is one's own. Stoic
zelotupia is rather a variant in the series of competitive
Z(2lotupia competitive emotions
emotions
that includes envy, rivalrousness, and even pity.
Although
Although Aristotle, as we have seen, does not discuss zelotupia, zelotupia,
the Stoic account is modelled on his analysis of related emotions.
Aristotle defines zelos zelos as 'a kind of pain at the perceived presence
of good and honourable things that that are possible to acquire for
oneself, belonging to those who are similar similar in nature [to our
[to our-
selves], not because the other has it but because one does not
oneself'
oneself (2. 1 1 , 11388a30-3).
(2.11, 3 88a30-3) . This comes close to the Stoic descrip descrip-
tion of zelos as rivalrous emulation.
emulation. In a similarsimilar vein, Descartes
defines
defines emulation
emulation as 'a warmth warmth thatthat disposes
disposes the soul to under under-
take things that it hopes [or [or expects]
expects] it can attainattain because it sees
13
others attaining them' ((1988: 1988: 257257 art. 1172).72 ) . 13 Being indignant
indignant
(nem esan), according to Aristotle, consists
(nemesan], consists in pain at the unde unde-
served success of another (2.9, (2.9, 11386b9-12)
386b9-12);; here, the the emphasis is
on the
the element of merit or desert, as in the the case of pity [see (see chapter
5, p. 1112).
1 2). Finally, phthonos,
phthonos, or 'envy,
'envy/' is 'a disturbing pain result- result
ing from
from thethe well-being of another' (2.9, (2.9, 1386b1 8-1 9 1, not, how-
1386bl8-19), how
ever, out of a desire to have something
something oneself but simply simply that thethe
14
other not have it (2. 1 0, 138
(2.10, 7b23-4). 1 4 This last qualification dis-
1387b23-4). dis
tinguishes
tinguishes envy from zelos, which, Aristotle explains, is a decent
from zelos,
emotion, whereas envy is base; for emulousness emulousness stimulatesstimulates one
to obtain good things for oneself, whereas envy merely aims to
deprive one's neighbour of them them (2. 1 1 , 1388a33-6)
(2.11, 1388a33-6).. Aristotle's
conception of of phthonos thus comes close to the Stoic definition of
zelotupia.
zelotupia.
The distinctions by which which Aristotle classifies the the rivalrous
emotions relate to the reason why one resents another'S another's goods:
because one wants them them oneself, because they they have been unjustly
acquired, or out out of simple malice in the the case of envy. 15 IS What of thethe
situation
situation in whichwhich one has been deprived of something that that is
one's own? The response, according to Aristotle, is either anger, if if
the other's motive was contempt, or hostility for the damage
suffered. Conceivably, indignation will be aroused if the appro appro-
priation is deemed illegitimate,
illegitimate, although I believe this sentiment sentiment
operates only where one's own interests are not directly at stake
Jealousy I/ 225
((in
in this, it is like its opposite, pity). Like the Stoics, Aristotle does
not separate out the special case in which which one has lost another's
affection
affection to a rival. Perhaps, to a Greek of his time, it did not not merit
a name of its own.
There are, in fact, numerous passages passages in Greek literature in
which zelotupia
zelotupia signifies the the kind of covetous resentmentresentment of of
another's goods
goods that
that the Stoic definition implies. In his speech
Against Ctesiphon
Ctesiphon ((211), 2 1 1 ), Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of of
saying the
the kind of thing wastrels do when when 'they feel ze10tupia
zelotupia of of
virtue.' Aeschines means that Demosthenes Demosthenes begrudges
begrudges the virtue
of
of better men without
without aspiring to it himself. Plutarch, writing
centuries later, asks rhetorically (Life (Life of 0.6): 'How can
of Pericles 110.6):
one believe Idomeneus when he accuses Pericles of having treach- treach
erously slain the popular leader Ephialtes out of zelotupia zelotupia and
envy of his reputation, when he was a friend friend of his and shared his
preference in type of government?
government?''
The historian Polybius, writing in the second century BC, Be,
connects zelotupia
zelotupia particularly with the behaviour of courtiers:
'For
Tor a new
new method of slander was discovered, discovered, doing harm not not by
finding fault but but by praising one's neighbours. neighbours. Such mischiefmischief
[kakentrekheia], denigration [baskaniaL
[kakentrekheiaL \baskania}, and treachery were first first
encountered among those who frequent frequent the court, and result from from
their zeJotupia
zelotupia and ambitious strife [pleonexia] [pleonexia] towards one anan
other' (History
(History 4.87.
4.87.1-5). Zelotupia here means something like
1-5 ) . Zelotupia
'invidious contention,' which is the more dangerous for the
veneer of politeness. So So too, Polybius characterizes those who who
disparaged Scipio'S
Scipio's accomplishments as motivated by intense
ze]otupia
zelotupia (diaze]otupoumenoi,
(diazelotupoumenoi, 36.8.2; d. cf. 116.22.5-8,
6.22.5-8, 29.7. 1-4).
29.7.1-4).
Diodorus Siculus (first (first century Be) BC) observes that, once one one ofof
Alexander's generals declared declared himself king, the the rest followed suit
out
out of zelotupia
zelotupia (20.53.4; d. 19.87.2-3),), and he distinguishes
cf. 19.87.2-3 distinguishes such
grudging contention from from honest rivalry: 'Among the Romans,
one can see the most distinguished men competing [hamil16me [hamilldme-
nous] for fame ....;
nous] . . ; in other states they feel zelotupia zelotupia for one
another, but the Romans praise one another' (3 1 .6. 1 [fragment,
(31.6.1 [fragment,
16
cited in Photius, Library p. 3381 8 1 B]).16
B]). While the Romans struggle
to advance
advance the common good, the malicious strife represented by
zelotupia harms the nation. 17
zelotupia 17
226 / The Emotions
Ancient Greeks
In the
the first century BC, Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes in an
century BC,
essay on literary
literary criticism
criticism (Letter Pompeius 11.13):
(Letter to Pompeius . 13): 'Plato
Tlato had, it
is true, a streak
streak of ambitiousness
ambitiousness [to [to philo timonJ in his nature,
philotimon]
despite his virtues; he manifested it above all in his zeiotupia zelotupia
towards Homer, whom he banished from from his ideal city, albeit
garlanded and annointed with myrrh.' myrrh/ Athenaeus, in turn, speaks
of Plato's zeiotupia
zelotupia towards Xenophon,
Xenophon, who also wrote Socratic
dialogues (Deipnosophistae ((11.112).
dialogues (Deipnosophistae 1 1 . 1 12). Plato evidently
evidently had a reputa
reputa-
tion for wanting to be top dog. dog. Philostratus, however, comes to
Plato's
Plato's defence by distinguishing
distinguishing between envy (phthonos) (phthonos) and
philotimia:: 'He (Plato]
philotimia [Plato] was as far from from maligning
maligning [the sophists] as
philotimia is from phthonos. For phthonos nurses wicked na-
from phthonos. na
tures,
tures, while philotimia rouses rouses brilliant ones; ones,- one maligns
maligns what
one cannot achieve, but has philotimia for what what one will be better
or at least at.'18
least not worse at.'l8
That zelotupia has a wider application than erotic jealousy
That zelotupia jealousy does
not exclude it from from designating erotic jealousy jealousy as well. We have
already remarked
remarked that, according
according to the Oxford Oxford English DictioDictio-
nary, jealousy
jealousy is 'the state of mind arising from from the suspicion,
apprehension,
apprehension, or knowledge rivalry,' and that, in addition
knowledge of rivalry/ addition to the
romantic sense, it may also signify signify envy of another person's suc- suc
cess, although today the latter sense pertains more to the adjec adjec-
tive, 'jealous,' thanthan to the
the abstract noun noun (ef.
(cf.Friday 11997 99 7 [[1985]:
1 985]:
36). Correspondingly,
Correspondingly, some ancient ancient definitions of zelotupia, zelotupia,
dating
dating from
from a later
later epoch than the Stoic classification,
classification, point
point to a
specific connection
connection of the the term with love. For example, the gram- gram
marian Ptolemaeus of Ascalon (2nd (2nd century BC BC to 2nd century
AD), in his treatise On the Differences
Differences between Words (ed.
between Words (ed.Heylbut
Heylbut
11887:
887: 395.32-4), writes that 'zelos is an imitation imitation of a fine person,
as when
when a boy feels zelos zelos towards his teacher,teacher, whereas
whereas ze10tupia
zelotupia
is being immersed in hatred [to huparkhein], as when
[to en misei huparkhein],
this man feels zelotupia
zelotupia in regard to this woman.' Pollux, in his
thesaurus composed between 1166 66 and 117676 AD, includes ze10tupia
zelotupia
in a catalogue of erotic terminology that features eros, him himeroseros
(yearning), pothos
pothos (longing), and epithumia
epithumia (desire), and specifies
that 'zelotupein is used in connection with
that 'zelotupein with young boys, women,
and anything
anything we like \panton agapomenon]' ' (3.68-72). The
[panton de ton agapomenon]
last phrase shows that Pollux knows the wider application of the the
Jealousy / 227
term, and thinks it worth mentioning

mentioning in this context (for the non non-
erotic sense of agapao,
agapad, see LST LSJ s.v.
s.v.).) . While Pollux illustrates
illustrates
zelotupia by reference to male
zelotupia male desire, the EEtymologicum tymologicum
Gudianum ascribes it to women: 'such-and-such a woman feels
zelotupia in regard to such-and-such
zelotupia such-and-such a man' (zelotupoi (zelotupoi de he
deina ton deina). The The fullest
fullest definition of the the erotic sense of the the
term, however, is to be found found in the Byzantine
Byzantine lexicon known as
the Suda (tenth century AD), AD), where zelotupia
zelotupia is glossed as 'suspi 'suspi-
cion on the
the part of a husband of his own wife wife in regard to a man man
who is licentious' (£ ( ( 58).
58). The Suda, like the sixth-century
sixth-century lexicog
lexicog-
rapher Hesychius, from from whom this definition seems to have been
(? 38 =
derived (£38 = Latte 966: 261; the
11966: the text
text is garbledl,
garbled), mentions
mentions other
meanings of zelotupia
zelotupia as well, equating it for example with with hatred
19
(?
(£ 59; cf. the
59; d. the scholia to Aeschines 3.2 3.211) 1 1 ) and envy. 19 But the the
amatory sense is clearly distinct
distinct and well defined.
There is good reason to believe that the definition in the Suda Suda
derives, by way of Hesychius,
Hesychius, fromfrom a Christian
Christian compilation
compilation known
as the Cyrillian
Cyrillian Glosses, which may have been composed by a
disciple of St Cyril to assist assist less-educated
less-educated readers of the the holy
works.20 If so, in defining ze10tupia
man's works.20 zelotupia the the author
author had in mind
Cyril's
Cyril's De adoratione et cultu in spiritu et veri tate (Migne,
veritate
Patrologia Graeca
Giaeca 68: 68: 132-1 1 25), where the
132-1125), the word occurs four
times
times (909. 1 7, 26, and 48 and 9912.16),
(909.17, 1 2 . 1 6), all in reference
reference to the
biblical book of Numbers. Indeed, in the Greek translation of the the
Hebrew Bible
Bible known as the Septuagint (third century century BCl,
BC), zelotupia
zelotupia
occurs only in Numbers (four (four times at 55:18.3,: 1 8.3, 55:25.2,
:25 .2, and 5:29.1),
5:29 . 1 ),
where it refers to a man's ritual responsibilities in testing and
responding to his wife's possible infidelity.
infidelity. We can, I think, safely
set aside the definitions that depend on the Cyrillian Glosses as
being of Christian inspiration.21
Christian or biblical inspiration.21
Ptolemaeus and and Pollux do, of course, testify testify to the the currency of of
zelotupia in amatory contexts outside of Christian
zelotupia Christian literature, a
fact that can be illustrated
illustrated from
from a variety of classical Greek texts. texts.
Since they offer
offer not
not so muchmuch definitions as uses of ze1otupia, zelotupia,
however, the question
question remains
remains open as to what it means. Let us,
then, examine
examine some specific cases, beginning with with the second
earliest
earliest mention,
mention, after
after Aristophanes' Wealth, of ze10tupia zelotupia in Greek
literature.
22R / The Em
228 otions of the Ancient Greeks
Emotions
In Plato's Symposium
Symposium ((213C8-D4;
2 13C8-D4j ef. cf. Fantham 11986: 986: 47-50),
Socrates complains to Agathon about h ow Alcibiades
how Alcibiadcs harasses
him: 'From the time I became his lover, lover, I can no longer look look at or
talk withwith a single pretty fellow, or else he feels zelotupia
zelotupia and envy
[phthonon], does outlandish things, insults
[phthonon], insults me, and barely keeps
his hands off me.' Clearly, Alcibiades wants Socrates entirely entirely for
himselfj
himself; but the charge is not that Alcibiades fears rejection, as
jealousy in the modern sense might might suggest, but rather that that he is
unwilling to share Socrates' company with with others. Once again,
the meaning
meaning of zelotupia
zelotupia seems to be an unwarranted insistence insistence
on exclusive
exclusive possession, even where nothing nothing is gained by hoard hoard-
ing. The situation
situation conforms nicely to the Stoic definition of of
zelotupia as 'a pain at another's having what one also has oneself.'
zelotupia
In his oration Antidosis (245), Isocrates compares grouchiness grouchiness
((duskolos
duslwlos ekhein zelotupia (verbal form), and being out
ekhein],), zelotupia out of sorts
diakeisthai) to what people experience when
(tetaragmenos diakeisthai) when they
are in lovej
love; the dominant
dominant idea would appear to be surliness. Again,
Aeschines, in his speech Against Timarchus Timarchus (58),(58), claims
claims that
'when he [Timarchus] deserted Pittalacus and was picked up by
Hegesander, Pittalacus was hurt, I believe, since he had spent spent so
much
much money in vain, and he felt zelotupia zelotupia over what happened
[ezelotupei gignomena].'' What emotion
[ezelotupei ta gignomena]. emotion is being indicated?
indicated? I
expect that Pittalacus expected exclusive possession of the boy in
return for his investment,
investment, and is resentful
resentful that
that another
another man is
profiting from from it. Alienation
Alienation of affection
affection is beside the the point, just as
it was for the young man in Aristophanes' Wealth. Even in mod-
Aristophanes' Wealth. mod
ern times, Descartes held the view that a jealous jealous man does not
love his wife so much much as 'the good that that he thinks
thinks consists in
having sole possession of her' ((1988: 1 988: 256 art. 168).
1 68).
Perhaps the personality most most consistently
consistently characterized by
zelotupia is Hera, for her peevish
zelotupia peevish reaction to the philandering
philandering ofof
her husband, Zeus, and here, at least, it would seem to correspond
to jealousy in the the modern sense (ef.(cf. Baumgart 11990:
990: 94:
94: 'Hera, on
the other hand, is jealous'). The word itself itself is not found in archaic
poetry, but but a schobum
scholium on Apollonius of Rhodes' Argonautica Argonautica
((1.761)
1 . 76 1 ) reports that, according to Pherecydes of Syros ((ca. ca. sixth
sixth
century BC), BC), 'Zeus had sex with Elara of Orchomenus and then
thrust her into the earth when she was pregnant, in fear of Hera's
thrust
Jealousy / 229
zelotupia. When she died, the earth sent forth

ze1otupia. forth Tityos.' We may
doubt whether
whether Pherecydes
Pherecydes himself used the word ze1otupia, zelotupia, but
the
the description of Hera's behaviour is familiar familiar from
from early Greek
literature, for example the Homeric Hymn Hymn to Apollo, where Hera
prolongs Leto's birth pangs out of ze10sune (3.
otzelosune 1 00: the word occurs
(3.100:
only here). The cause of this sentiment is that Leto will bear a
mighty son
son;; Hera resents (kholoomai, 3.305 3.305)) Zeus's splendid off off-
spring, in particular Athena, whom Zeus bore from from his own head,
whereas Hera's own child Hephaestus is lame (3.3 1 7). Since Zeus
(3.317).
had no partner in the the procreation of Athena (oios, 3.323L 3.323), Hera's
irritation
irritation is not over sexual infidelity.
infidelity. Her revenge is to produce
the monster
monster Typho by parthenogenesis, so that she too may have a
brilliant
brilliant child (326-30).
The epic poet Rhianus ((thirdthird century BC), BC), who is said to have
recounted the
the full
full story concerning Hera's jealousy of Alcmene (in
his Herac1ea,
Heraclea, fro
fr. 9 Powell [Collectanea Alexandrina p. 111];
[Collectanea Alexandrina 1 ]; cited in
Scholia A, B B on Homer, Iliad. 119.119),
9 . 1 1 9 L explains in turn that 'Hera,
who was constitutionally
constitutionally given to zelotupia [zelotup6s
[zelotupos diatetheisa
diatetheisa],L
repressed the birth pangs of Alcmene, and made Antibia (whom (whom
some call NicippeL
Nicippe), thethe wife
wife of Sthenelus, who was pregnant, give
birth to Eurystheus at seven months/months,' so that Eurystheus would
have priority over Hercules. Diodorus Siculus too recounts Hera's
jealousy over Alcmene (4.9.4L (4.9.4), as well as her revenge against
Semele, the
the mother
mother of Dionysus (3.64.3), and the the geographer
geographer Strabo
cites Hera's zelotupia
zelotupia in connection with her efforts to thwart
Leto's delivery of Apollo and Artemis ((Geography 4. 1 .20). So too
Geography 114.1.20).
Rhea, traditionally the wife of Cronus but but in one variant, which
Diodorus Siculus (3.68) found found in the the mythographer Dionysius
Scytobrachion ((second
second century BC), the the wife of Ammon, king of of
Lydia, reacts with zelotupia
zelotupia when Ammon takes an erotic inter- inter
est in Amalthea, who in this version gives birth secretly to Dio- Dio
nysus. This is clearly a take-off
take-off on the pattern usually associated
daughter.22
with Hera, Rhea's daughter.22
Is Hera jealous? Her principal preoccupation is with the status
of
of her children rather than with Zeus's Zeus's philandering as such. The
definition
definition of zelotupia recorded by John Stobaeus -- 'pain at an-
of zelotupia an
other getting what one wanted' - - seems to fit the case of Hera as
well as jealousy in the the modern or romantic sense. In a famous
the Ancient Greeks
scene in the Iliad, Hera, with the help of a magic girdle borrowed
from
from Aphrodite, entices Zeus to sleep with with her in order to distract
him from the battle raging below. The stratagem
him from stratagem works. Zeus
exclaims
exclaims to Hera: Hera: 'Never before has passion for a goddess or
mortal
mortal woman
woman so overcome the heart breast7 (14.315-16),
heart in my breast' ( 1 4.3 1 5-16L
and he proceeds to list seven of his earlier conquests conquests to confirm
the point. The episode is undoubtedly
undoubtedly comic, but it is neverthe neverthe-
less revealing of ancient
ancient attitudes jealousy.23
attitudes towards sexual jealousy.23
Among mortals,
mortals, the the paradigm of zelotupia
zelotupia seems to be Medea.
Again the report comes from from Diodorus Siculus (4.54.
(4.54.7),n who tells
us that ''soso far had she progressed
progressed in anger, along with zelotupia zelotupia
and indeed savagery [omotes], that that when
when he [Jason] had escaped
the danger
danger that accompanied
accompanied his bride [i.e., Creon's
Creon's daughter,
daughter,
incinerated by Medea's potions], she catapulted him into the
ultimate
ultimate disaster by the slaughter of their their own children.' Sand Sand-
wiched as it is between
between rage and barbaric cruelty, zelotupia
zelotupia might
be better rendered as 'resentment' than 'jealousy.' There is also an
odd story told by Myrsilus ((cited cited in a scholium
scholium to Apollonius of of
Rhodes 11.615)
.6 1 5) in the
the first book of his Lesbiaca, according to which
the Lemnian women acquired the foul odour that that drove away
their
their husbands when Medea I'cast cast a drug at Lemnos out of zeJotupia'
zelotupia'
as she was sailing by the island island on the Argo's return from from Colchis.
Colchis.
Medea's motivemotive was presumably Jason's earlier affair affair with
Hypsipyle, the queen of the Lemnians. I imagine that Medea's
zelotupia was by Myrsilus's
zelotupia Myrsilus's time (third century Be) BC) a common
common-
place (the
( the Stoic Chrysippus
Chrysippus wrotewrote a treatise about
about her),
her), and this
made it possible to invoke it in a deviant aetiology of the Lemnian
women's stench. Since the business business between
between Jason and Hypsipyle
Hypsipyle
was by now over and done with, however, 'jealousy' may not be
the best equivalent
equivalent for zelotupia;
zelotupia; again, 'pain at another
another getting
what
what one wanted/
wanted,' irrespective of whether whether one has acquired it
oneself, may come closer.24 closer.24
It is noteworthy that that the archetypes of zelotupia
zelotupia in conjugal
conjugal
contexts are mainlymainly women, and in fact it was considered to be
particularly vicious in wives.2s wives.25 Theano, a woman to whom whom sev-sev
eral neo-Pythagorean epistles epistles are attributed, counsels a fellow
disciple to mend her ways ((Hercher Hercher p. 604, Nr. 55):) : 'Theano greets
Nicostrate. I have heard of your insanity [paranoia] concerning
insanity [paranoia]
Jealousy I 23 1
Jealousy/231
your husband, because he has a courtesan and you feel zelotupia zelotupia
concerning him.'him/ Theano concludes with an allusion to Medea
(200): 'Hasn't tragedy taught you to control zelotupia, zelotupia, my dear --
the one with the plot in which Medea transgressed the law?' law ? '
Perictione (ca.
(ca. second century AD), iinn a pamphlet oon n 'Women's
Concord,
Concord/' advises that women yield to their husbands in every every-
thing, and pardon them if they stray: 'For this kind of error is
permitted
permitted to men, but never to women .... . . Thus, one must
must heed
custom and not feel zeiotupia, zelotupia, but one must bear his anger,
stinginess, fault-finding,
fault-finding, zeiotupia,
zelotupia, calumny, and whatever else is
in his naturej
nature; in this way a wise woman will dispose all things
in a manner that is agreeable
agreeable to him' (cited by Stobaeus 4.28.19, 4.28 . 1 9,
p. 688 Herscher [Mullach vol. 2, p. 34] 34]).). Plutarch, in his Life
in his Life of of
Lycurgus ( 1 5 .6), reports that when the
Lycurgus (15.6), the lawgiver had properly regu- regu
lated marriage, he furtherfurther 'expelled vain and effeminate zelotupia''
effeminate zelotupia
by making it honourable both to defend defend one's marriage against
insolent (hubris) and 'to share in the creation of children
insolent assault (hubris]
with other worthy men.'26 men.'26 Zelotupia
Zeiotupia in men was regarded regarded as a
traitj thus, in
barbarian trait; the Life
in the Life of
of Themistoc1es
Themistocles (26.4-5), Plutarch
comments: 'The Persian race is by nature savage and harsh in
regard to zelotupia
zelotupia concerning women. For not not only do they
strenuously guard their wedded wives but but also women whom
concubines.'27
they have purchased and keep as concubines.t27
We have seen that that in the public or political sphere, zelotupia zelotupia
signified
signified a selfish
selfish contentiousness, by which men men sought to block
the
the success of others either for their their own
own ends or out out of malicious
malicious
spite. In domestic contexts, however, zelotupia, while equally a
however, zelotupia,
vice, was more frequently associated with women. The gender- gender
weighted distribution of the the term in different
different spheres is ideologi-
ideologi
28
cally significant,
significant,28 but it does not necessarily mean that ze10tupia zelotupia
had two distinct
distinct senses, one applicable to political rivalries and
the other to amatory possessiveness, like the double definition
of
of 'jealousy' as 'fear'fear of being supplanted in the affection ...
the affection . . . of a
beloved person' and envy 'in respect of success or advantage. advantage.'' IfIf
the emotion designated by zelotupia zelotupia was more uniform uniform than that,
then its public use may tell us something about its significance in
amorous or matrimonial
matrimonial contexts as well. More precisely, in
ze10tupia to women, and above all wedded women,
ascribing zelotupia
232 / The Emotions
including Hera who was exceptional exceptional in the Olympian pantheon

for
for being married, Greek writers were not, I think, signalling signalling
anxiety
anxiety over loss of affection, such such as we associate
associate with the term term
'jealousy,'
'jealousy/ but rather a kind of selfish spleen that begrudges the the
husband the pleasures that custom itself permits him - - a licence
not regarded as reciprocal, as Perictione makes clear.29 clear.29 Hera's
zelotupia is not the jealousy
zelotupia jealousy of a scorned spouse, butbut an unseemly
unseemly
ambition
ambition to control
control her husband's behaviour
behaviour even when
when she stands
stands
to gain nothing from from it, and it brands her as a truculent
truculent spoilsport.
This is why Hera is invariably an unsympathetic character in the the
mythological
mythological tradition,
tradition, and her behaviour
behaviour is treated
treated as comical
comical or
perverse.30
perverse.3D
I have been approaching the idea of jealousy in classical Greece
by analysing the semantics of zelotupia, zelotupia, the term most com- com
monly rendered as 'jealousy' in English. English. The results are informa
informa-
tive for how Greeks later later than the fifth
fifth century
century BC,
BC,when
when zelotupia
zelotupia
and cognate terms first appear, appear, viewed the motives of Hera or
Medea, though of course the word itself is foreign to Euripides'
tragedy and contemporary
contemporary literature. If I am right, one ought ought
perhaps to modify
modify the entries in modern Greek-English
Greek-English dictionar
dictionar-
ies
ies.. Of course, there might might be other words in Greek for jealousy,
such as the simple form zelos. zelos. Even in the absence of a specific
term, it does not follow that the idea of jealousy was lacking.
Some concepts
concepts current
current in a society
society have no name. Aristotle pro- pro
vides several examples in the Nicomachean Ethics, such as the
trait of being too fearless or too little prone to anger (2.7, 11107b7- 1 07b 7-
8,
8, 11108a5;
l 08aSj 33.7,
. 7, 11115b25-6
1 1 Sb2S-6j; cf.
d. Ortony, Clore, and
and Collins 11988:
988: 8).8).
Ruth Caston, in her study of jealousy jealousy in the Roman elegists,
observes: 'In the the majority of cases, it is not a word or even a cluster
of words which announcesannounces the the presence of jealousy.
jealousy. Instead, we
must
must rely on references
references to other emotions
emotions like fear
fear and anger,
which are a crucial part of the jealousy complex, complex, the poetic
31
context, and characters' behavior' (Caston 2000: 3j cf. 110-11).
3; d. 0_1 1 ).31
It would be a lengthy and elusive business to review all the the
scenes in which jealousy might might occur and seek to determine
whether one is right to identifyidentify it there. In general, it is safe to say
that jealousy
jealousy in the modern sense is foreign to archaic epic.
Achilles in the Iliad wishes that Artemis had slain Briseis before before
Jealousy / 233
she could be the cause

cause of the
the deadly quarrel between
between himself
himself and
Agamemnon ((19.55-62):
1 9.55-62): she is not
not an object of jealousy, but but rather
a pawn in a struggle over honour between two men - the kind of of
rivalrous interaction
interaction among males that Eve Eve Sedgwick ((1985)1985) has
called a 'homosocial'
'homosocial' relationship. How different
different is Ovid's treat
treat-
ment in the Heroides, wherewhere Briseis imagines
imagines that Achilles in fact
loves her, and cannot understand how he could have refused refused the
rich ransom that Agamemnon offered offered him - - he ought rather to
have taken her back even without
without a reward (for a comparison of of
the two versions, see Lindheim 2003 2003:: 551-62).
1-62). Similarly, nothing
suggests that Menelaus
Menelaus is jealous of Paris in the Iliad, although
his wife has abandoned him him for a handsome lover (the (the domestic
scene with
with the reunited
reunited couple in Odyssey
Odyssey book 4 gives no hint of of
such
such a passion)
passion).. Nor has anyone, to my knowledge, ever imagined
that
that Odysseus feels jealousy
jealousy in respect to the suitors in the Odys Odys-
sey-, on the
sey; the contrary, he is proud of Penelope for prolonging
prolonging their
courtship in order to eke out gifts from
from them ((18.282).
1 8 .282). It would be
absurd to allege jealousy revenge.32
jealousy as the motive for his bloody revenge.32
Jealousy is equally absent in archaic lyric poetry (I (I consider
below the
the apparent exception of a famous poem by Sappho). Nor
does it play a significant
significant role in tragedy: no Othello ever stalked stalked
the ancient
ancient Greek stage.
stage. Neither
Neither are women portrayed as jealous
in this genre. The motive of of Euripides' Medea - - she is,
is, as we have
seen, the other outstanding
outstanding exemplum (along with Hera) of of
zelotupia in the later tradition -- is not so
ze10tupia so much
much jealousy
jealousy asas anger
at Jason's violation of his oaths and his want want of gratitude
gratitude for her
services.33 Although Jason complains that
services.33 that Medea and women
generally are fixated
fixated on the bed (555-6, 568-75
568-75),), and Medea herher
self
self acknowledges its importance in a marriage ((1367-8), 1367-8 ), Jason
believes it is a trivial matter and fails to see why Medea makes
such a fuss about it. Had he the word, he might have accused accused her
of zelotupia.
zelotupia. But thethe charge only serves to divert attention
attention from
from
his abandonment of Medea, which which is the real issue. Aegeus, the the
king of Athens who hears Medea's tale of woe, provides a clue to
how an ordinary man might respond to Jason's actions. That Jason
prefers another
another woman
woman as mistress
mistress of his household
household Aegeus re- re
gards as shameful; if he has done it out out of passionate love ((eras),
eros),
his advice to Medea is to let him him go (695,
(695, 699)
699).. When Medea
234 / The Emotions
Ancient Greeks
reveals that
that jason's
Jason's ambition
ambition is to ally himself to the royal house
of Corinth, Aegeus
Aegeus recognizes that her pain is legitimate; finally, finally,
when he learns that Tason
Jason has consented
consented to her banishment from from
Corinth, he expresses open disapproval ((703, 703, 707
707).) . Medea care
care-
fully
fully escalates
escalates the charges against
against Jason from
from a love affairaffair that
puts at risk her status
status in the household
household to outright
outright exile, but
Aegeus's concern, like Medea's own, is focused throughout
throughout on the
sensibilities.34
threat to her welfare, not on her amorous sensibilities.34
But surely men and women were hurt hurt when their loved ones
betrayed them. In Lysias's
Lysias's defence speech on the the murder of Era- Era
tosthenes ((1.32-3),
l .32-3), the defendant remarks that a law inscribed
in the Areopagus 'judged that men who commit rape [taus [tons
biazomenous] deserve a lesser penalty than seducers [[tons
biazomenousJ taus
peithontas\,' on the grounds that rapists are hated by their vic-
peithontas],' vic
tims, whereas seducers 'corrupt the soul in such a way as to make
other men's wives care more for them than for their own hus- hus
bands.' The anxiety
anxiety over the
the alienation
alienation of affection
affection is reminiscent
reminiscent
of the
the modern conception of jealousy. However, the the consequence
of this estrangement, according to Lysias,
Lysias, is that 'it is uncertain
uncertain
whether
whether the children are those of the the husband or of the adulterer.'
It is not so much
much his wife's love that the the speaker is concerned
concerned for
as the integrity of his home and the legitimacy children.35
legitimacy of his children.35
Modern jealousy,
jealousy, as we have seen, involves three parties: a
lover, a beloved,
beloved, and a rival who has alienated or is believed to
have alienated affections.36 The definition thus fur
alienated the beloved's affections.36 fur-
nishes both a cast of characters and a scenario, and it is reasonable
to expect that jealousy, even if it is not named, would find expres
find expres-
sion - if anywhere - - in genres that are
are characterized
characterized by by a narrative
narrative
structure in which
which the relevant conditions are met.37met.37 The Greek
genre most hospitable
hospitable to such
such a configuration
configuration is without a doubt
New Comedy, and the most most vivid representation
representation of a jilted lover
in all Greek literature is to be found, I believe, in Menander's
Perikeiromene or 'Shorn Girl' ((late late fourth century BC).38 BC).38 The
soldier Polemo, having learned that his concubine Glycera Glycera has
kissed the young man next door [it (it is possible that
that he witnessed
the scene personally), becomes enraged at her behaviour and cuts
off
off her hair. Glycera takes refuge with the people livingliving next
next door,
and Polemo moves out of the house he shared with her and gives
Jealousy / 235
himself
himself over to grief. He then then returns
returns to the stage with the
intention
intention of recovering Glycera by force, but but he yields to reason
when his friend
friend Pataecus points out that that even though
though Polemo
may have thought
thought of her as his legal wife, Glycera Glycera is in fact her
own mistress [heautes est'
mistress (heautes est' ekeine kuria, 497). 497). Thus, Polemo's
only recourse as lover [(ewnti, 499), rather than
eronti, 499), than husband, is persua-
persua
sion - - apart, perhaps, from
from lodging a legal complaint complaint [(enklema,
enklema,
503)) against the
503 the young
young man at some future time for having se
having se-
duced or corrupted Glycera (diephtharkos
(diephtharkos auten, auten, 499-500) in his
absence. Pole rna is desolate, and cries out pathetically:
Polemo pathetically: 'I don't
know whatwhat to say, by Demeter,
Demeter, except that I'll hang myself.
Glycera has leftleft me, Glycera, she's left left me, Pataecus!' (504-7).
Here are all the
the elements
elements of the the jealousy archetype: the the alienation
alienation
of the
the beloved's affections
affections by a rival (a (a licentious
licentious rival, in the the
Suda's genteel formulation), desperate grief, and, we may add, add, the
desire
desire to return to favour
favour with the beloved rather than retrieve retrieve her
violently
violently from
from the rival. Later, however, when when he realizes thatthat the
man Glycera had kissed was her brother and not a moikhos
(adulterer or paramour),
paramour), Polemo laments: 'But I, fiend fiend that I am
and zelotupos creature ....,
andzelotupos . . , immediately
immediately went crazy' (986-98; there
is a small lacuna in the papyrus). Here, zelotupos zelotupos seems to indiindi
cate not
not jealousy so much
much as an unwarranted or excessive reaction
to perfectly legitimate
legitimate behaviour.
It is no accident
accident that Glycera is a courtesan: only in this way
could she be 'her own mistress' rather than than dependent on a kurios kurios
or legal guardian in Attic comedy,-
comedy; as such, she is an autonomous
autonomous
desiring subject.39 Because she is free to grant
desiring subject.39 grant or withdraw
withdraw her
love, as Pataecus remarks (49 1 ), Polemo must
(491), must reckon with with the
'fear
'fear of being supplanted in [her] [her] affection,'
affection,' as thethe Oxford
Oxford English
Dictionary puts it. This would not be the case with a marriageable
Dictionary
citizen
citizen girl, who in New New Comedy is never the the subject of erotic
desire. It was social constraints
constraints of this sort, I expect, that that retarded
the representation
representation of romantic jealousy in archaic and classical classical
literature poetry.40 New
literature -- even in pederastic poetry.40 New Comedy itself, inin
deed, was sparing with the formula. Where the rival is the lover's
comrade, forfor example, the themetheme of the the false friend
friend rather than the
faithless courtesan
courtesan predominates, and the response is not not so much
jealousy as anger and disappointment.
disappointment. Thus, Charinus Charinus in Terence's
Greeks
Andria, believing that his friendfriend has chosen deliberately to marry

the girl with whom he himself himself is in love, exclaims
exclaims in language
that recalls Aristotle's definition of phthonos: 'Is it believable or
heard of that
that a person should have such innate lunacy [vecordia]
[vecordia] as
to rejoice in another's adversity and derive his pleasure from from the
the
other's displeasure?' (625-8). Charinus's role in the comedy may be
Terence's
Terence's own contribution, but there is a model for his reaction reaction in
Plautus and Menander ((cf. d. Plautus, Bacchides, 467-5 72, with
467-572,
Menander Dis exapaton
exapaton 102-12). Jealousy
Jealousy as such is absent.
In the opening scene of Terence's
Terence's Eunuch, Phaedria is indignant
indignant
that Thais has banished him him in favour
favour of a rich officer,
officer, whom she
is ingratiating, as she later explains, in order to acquire a girl who
is in his possession. When Phaedria protests that the story is a lie
and Thais really loves the the soldier, she agrees
agrees to oblige Phaedria
rather than
than have him him as an enemy. At this point point Phaedria ex- ex
claims: 'If'If only you said that from
from the heart and honestly [utinam
istuc verbum ex animo ac vere vete diceres], "rather than have you as
an enemy"
enemy"!! If I could believe that was sincerely
sincerely said [sincere dici],
did],
I could endure anything' ((175-7).
1 75-7). Phaedria at last consents to her
spending time with with the soldier, but he begs 'that when you are
with that soldier of yours,
yours, you not be with
with him; that day and night
you love me, miss me, dream of me, wait for me, think of me,
hope forfor me,
me, rejoice in me,
me, be totally
totally with me - - to sum it up,
become my soul [animus], since I am yours' ((191-6). 1 9 1-6). The situation
contains all the conditions for jealousy:
jealousy: an enamoured youth, a
rival, and the desire for reciprocated love, more sentimentally sentimentally
expressed here than in any other passage passage of ancient comedy.
Phaedria's
Phaedria's response, however, is not quite quite jealousy but but rather
rather
what we may call an interiorization
interiorization of passion: if Thais loves him him
sincerely and from from the heart, then he can accept her spending
three days with with the soldier. His reaction at the beginning
beginning of the
play prepares
prepares for
for the conclusion, in which Phaedria agrees to share
Thais
Thais with
with the soldier on a permanent basis, since he will will pay the
bills and, being a buffoon, will pose no threat to Thais's affection affection
for
for Phaedria.
Phaedria. We see here how New Comedy neglects to thematize
jealousy even where the scenarioscenario clearly favours it ((see see Konstan
11995:
995: 1131-40).
3 1 -40).
The heir to Roman comedy was elegiac poetry, poetry, which converted
the comic courtesan,
courtesan, who by convention
convention was of foreign rather
Jealousy / 237
than Attic birth, into a citizen woman of undisclosed lineage. No

fathers or brothers encumber the liberty of such women as
Propertius's
Propertius's Cynthia, Tibullus's Delia and Nemesis, Lygdamus's
Neaera, or Ovid's Corinna -- or, or, we may suppose, of of Gallus's
Callus's
Lycoris, who may have been the model for these later elegiac
mistresses - - although the poets do do not scruple to mention
mention moth
moth-
ers or sisters ((Konstan
Konstan 11994:
994: 1153-5;
53-5; d.
cf. Griffin
Griffin 11985:
985: 204-8). The
The
women of elegy,
elegy, like the
the cortesans of New
New Comedy, have no male
guardians. This convention permitted the elegiac mistressmistress to con-
con
sort freely
freely with lovers, even when she was imagined as married or
at least attached to a man vir), and it provided fertile
man ((vir), fertile ground for
jealousy. But if jealousy was a felt motive
motive in this genre, as Ruth
Caston has argued (2000), it nevertheless had antecedents in Ro- Ro
man
man lyric poetry of the first century Bc.41BC.41 Just how these earlier
elements coalesced in a remarkable poem by Horace to yield the
image of a passion very like modern jealousy
jealousy is the
the subject of the
the
balance of this chapter.
Catullus (approximately 84-54 BC) Be) wrote
wrotejust
justprior
priorto
tothe
the devel
devel-
opment of elegy as a distinct poetic form, with with its characteristi
characteristi-
cally subjective
subjective sensibility. But he too drew inspiration
inspiration from
from New
Comedy, taking as a modelmodel Phaedria's
Phaedria's plea in Terence's EunuchEunuch
for
for a sincere and heartfelt
heartfelt commitment
commitment by whichwhich he might
might endure
the soldier's power over Thais. Catullus adapts this outcry to his
own hope for a lasting relationship with with a woman who was
formally the
the spouse of another man:
Iucundum,
lucundum, mea vita, mihi proponis amorem
amorem
hunc nostrum
nostrum inter nos perpetuumque
perpetuumque fore.
fore,
di magni, facite ut vere
veie promittere
promittere possit,
possit,
atque
atque id sincere dicat et ex animo,
ut liceat nobis tota
tota perducere
perducere vita
aeternum
aeternum hoc sanctae amicitiae.42
sanctae foedus amicitiae.42
You, my life, promise me this pleasant

pleasant love --
this love of
of ours -- will last forever between us.
Great
Great gods, make
make her able to promise it truly
truly
and say it sincerely
sincerely and from
from the heart,
heart,
so that we may prolong for our whole life life
this eternal
eternal bond of sacred friendship.
friendship.
238
Catullus does not insist that Lesbia be his and his only (cf.
(d. 6 8 . 135-
68.135-
40, and esp. 1145-8),
45-8), which the circumstances
circumstances render impossible
in any case, since she is married.
married. What appals him
him is rather her
random promiscuity, and he expresses his consternation
consternation in a way
that recalls Polemo's anguished outburst in the Menander's Shorn
Girl (my emphasis):
Cae1i,
Caeli, Lesbia nostra, Lesbia illa,
ilia,
ilia Lesbia, quam Catullus unam
illa unani
plus quam se atque suos amavit omnes,
nunc in quadriviis et angiportis
glubit
glubit magnanimos nepotes.43
magnanimos Remi nepotes.43
Caelius, my Lesbia, that Lesbia,

Yes that
that Lesbia,
Lesbia, the only one whom
whom Catullus
Catullus
loved more than himself
himself and all his dearest,
dearest,
now on street corners and in alleys
is screwing
screwing the great-hearted
great-hearted sons of Remus.
The feeling is intense, but the emotion is evidently disgust rather

than jealousy. I am not convinced that Catullus ever expresses
expresses the
latter sentiment in relation to Lesbia.
Catullus's image of a life-long
life-long bond of affection
affection in the
the final
couplet of poem 110909 had a considerable
considerable influence
influence on later Latin
poetry, and it is conceivable
conceivable that Horace
Horace had it in mind when he
44
wrote the
the concluding verses of Ode 11.13:
concluding verses . 1 3:44
Cum tu, Lydia, Telephi

Telephi
cervi cern roseam, cerea Telephi
cervicem
laudas bracchia, vae meum
fervens
fervens difficili
difficili bile tumet
tumet iecur.
tum
turn nec
nee mens mihi
mihi nec
nee color
certa sede manet,
manet, umor
umor et in genas
furtim
furtim labitur, arguens
quam lentis penitus macerer
macerer ignibus.
uror, seu tibi
tibi candidos
turparunt inmodicae mero
turparunt umeros inmodicae mero
rixae, sive puer furens
furens
inpressit memorem
memorem dente labris notam.
Jealousy / 239
non, si me satis audias,

speres perpetuum dulcia barbare
laedentem oscula, quae Venus
quinta parte
parte sui nectaris imbuit.
felices ter et amplius
quos inrupta tenet copula nee malis
divolsus querimoniis
querimoniis
suprema citius sol vet amor die.
solvet
When you, Lydia, laud Telephus's rosy

shoulder, Telephus's waxen
arms, ayy! my boiling liver
swells with harsh bile,
neither my mind nor my complexion
stays put, tears secretly slide
down my cheeks, proving with what
slow fires I'm tortured inside.
I'm seared, whether what bruised
your white
white arms were wild fights
begot by wine, or the passionate boy's teeth
teeth
impressed a lasting mark upon your lips.
If you heed me well, you won't
won't
hope for a man
man who cruelly wounds
those lips which
which Venus has imbued
with the quintessence
with quintessence of her nectar.
Thrice happy and more are those
whom an unbroken bond unites, and whom love,
unsundered by evil quarrels,
will not set loose ere death itself.
More obvious, however, is Horace's allusion to the

the depiction of
depiction of
emotional
emotional symptoms
symptoms in Catullus
Catullus 551:
1:
Ille mi par esse deo videtur,

ille, si fas est, superare divos,
qui sedens adversus identidem
identidem te
spectat et audit
dulce ridentem, misero quod omnes
eripit
eripit sensus mihi: nam simul te,
240 / The Emotions
Emotions of
Greeks
Lesbia, aspexi,
aspexi, nihil est super mi
mi
<vocis in ore,>
lingua sed torpet,
torpet, tenuis
tenuis sub artus
flamma demanat, sonitu suopte
tintinant
tintinant aures geminae, teguntur
lumina
lumina nocte.
otium, Catulle,
Catulle, tibi molestumst:
molestumst:
otio exsultas nimiumque
nimiumque gestis,
otium
otium et reges prius et beatas
perdidit
perdidit urbes.
urbes.
He seems equal to a god to me,

he seems, if piety permit, greater than the gods,
who sits opposite you and again and again
sees and hears you
laughing sweetly, though it rips up
all my senses in my misery: for as soon as
I've seen you, Lesbia, I've no more
voice in my throat,
but my tongue is stiff,
stiff, a thin flame flows
beneath my bones, my ears ring
with
with their own buzz, my eyes are
covered in night.
Leisure, Catullus, is bad for you:
You delight
delight and perform too muchmuch in leisure,
ruined kings
Leisure has ruined kings ere now, has ruined
glorious cities.
Catullus's poem is, of course, a translation of Sappho 31, 3 1, apart

apart
from the
(perhaps) from the final
final stanza.
stanza. Although Sappho's and Catullus's
( like Horace's) both involve
poems (like involve three individuals
individuals -- the speaker;
the addressee, in each case a woman who is the
the the cause of the
speaker's condition;
condition,- and a man who sits calmly facing facing her --
neither, I would argue, portrays the
neither, the effects
effects of jealousy, in
in spite of
of
the consensus to the
the the contrary of the
the great majority
majority of scholars
scholars
45
today.45 The
today. The poems rather describe the the symptoms of passionate
The function of the
love. The the third party, who
who sits opposite the the be-
be
the extraordinary
loved, is to highlight the extraordinary reaction of the
the lover: that
Jealousy / 241
man
man must be a god if he can sit so close to the the loved one, engage in
intimate
intimate conversation and laughter with with her, and yet remain
immune
immune to her influence, which produces such a devastating
effect
effect upon the lover. The point
point is, of course, that that man is not
in love. After
After Sappho,
Sappho, the symptoms she describes become the
conventional lovesickness.46
conventional signs of love or lovesickness.46
In Horace's ode, the third person, Telephus, is not present;
rather, the poet's persona listens
listens as the
the addressee, called Lydia,
praises the other man's charms. The persona, and through through him the
reader, overhear her words, unlike situation in Sappho's and
unlike the situation
Catullus's poems, where the sight sight of the beloved blocks up the
speaker's ears (sonitu
(sonitu suopte tintinant aUles aures geminae), and the
47
conversation opposite goes unrecorded.
conversation opposite unrecorded.47 It is what what Lydia says
that
that induces a physical reaction in the speaker (cum .... . . turn,
tum, 1-5
1-5).) .
Lydia, wwee see, is infatuated with Telephus,
infatuated with Telephus, a circumstance we
have no reason to believe is paralleled in the poems by Sappho and
Catullus. What, then, is the speaker in Horace's ode feeling?
Quinn,
Quinn, in his commentary (1984: 1 49), takes
( 1984: 149), takesititfor
forgranted
grantedthat
thathehe
is jealous, but
but Nisbet
Nisbet and Hubbard ((1970: 74 ad v. 9),
1 970: 1174 9), with
exemplary
exemplary caution,
caution, leave open the possibility that Horace's
Horace's speaker,
like Sappho's and Catullus's,
Catullus's, is in the
the grip of erotic passion, or for
48
matter of anger, rather
that matter rather than jealousy.
jealousy.48 Here we see the
complexity of jealousy
jealousy as an emotion: unless he is enamoured of of
Lydia and simultaneously
simultaneously upset
upset or indignant at her relationship
with Telephus,
with Telephus, Horace's speaker will not not be jealous.
jealous. The set of of
symptoms on its own cannot answer whether whether these conditions
conditions
obtain. But even if Horace's persona is or has been in love with
Lydia, he may nevertheless
nevertheless be experiencing at this moment moment either
anger, or envy, or a sudden recrudescence of erotic
sudden recrudescence erotic passion, any
one of which
which is sufficient
sufficient to account for his reaction. The ques
The ques-
tion thus
thus remains
remains whether
whether Horace identified jealousy as an indiindi
vidual emotion
emotion in its own right, or rather perceived an array of of
sentiments -- 'anger-, sadness-, and fear-like feelings,' in
distinct sentiments
Planalp's words -- where we see see just one.
Although thethe symptoms described by Horace resemble the con
the con-
ventional
ventional syndrome lovesickness in classical literature, a mod-
syndrome of lovesickness mod
ern reader, like Quinn,
Quinn, has no difficulty
difficulty in understanding them them as
signs psychologist Leila Tov-Ruach reports
signs of jealousy. The psychologist reports that
the Ancient Greeks
'jealousy can, when it is experienced as a feeling, involve intense intense

vertigo, like that
that of fainting or a loss of consciousness, or a sense
of strong disorientation and disassociation' ((1980: 1 980: 470; cf. d. 471),
4 7 1 ),
and the actress Jeanne Moreau reports that that jealousy 'is more than
a feeling, it is a horrible sensation, so violent as to shake you from from
head to foot, your entire
entire body begins to tremble, you're on the
point of losing consciousness' (quoted in Chapsal 11977: 977: 116).
6) . For
us, jealousy is a familiar
familiar emotion
emotion with
with characteristic causes and
forms expression (cf.
forms of expression (d. Marguerite
Marguerite de Navarre, Heptameron
Heptameron 11999: 999:
3 77: 'Je s.;:ay
377: scay bien que la jalousie est une une passion aussi veritable
comme l'amour').
1'amour'). Although Quinn
Quinn is surely right (1984:
( 1984: 149
1 49 ad vv.
9-1 2 ) that what inflames Horace 'is not Lydia's beauty but the
9-12)
evidence
evidence of her new young lover'Slover's ardor,' just because he assumesassumes
that
that jealousy
jealousy is a well-defined passion in classical erotic litera litera-
ture, Quinn
Quinn fails to notice thatthat Horace's originality lies precisely
in having
having transferred the symptoms
symptoms normally associated with
normally associated
enamourment to this new context involving the beloved's infatu
enamourment infatu-
ation with another person. While preserving the three-person
structure
structure of Sappho's and Catullus's poems, Horace has in fact
scenario.49
constructed a wholly new scenario.49
Comparing Lydia's
Lydia's role in
in other odes of Horace ((1.8, .25, and
1 .8, 11.25,
imagines that Lydia was formerly Horace's
3.9), Quinn imagines Horace's mistress
and that, by taking him him into her confidence about her new lover,
she is 'thereby subjecting
subjecting H[orace] to an exquisite torture' while
maintain his detachment.50
he tries manfully to maintain 50 Quinn's story is
of consistent with
of course consistent with jealousy: if there had never never been a
relationship between Horace's persona and Lydia, then one ought
rather to identify his emotion as envy -- a possibility that that cannot
be excluded. But since the speaker announces
announces his torment
torment at the
very beginning, it is hard to believe that he is here adopting 'the
role of the
the middle-aged
middle-aged observer of the the human
human comedy.' Rather
than concoct fanciful
than concoct narratives where
fanciful narratives where the poet deliberately
deliberately leaves
matters unclear, we may turn to the contrast Horace introduces in
the
the final verses of the ode between Lydia's intense but but transient
passion for Telephus
Telephus and a life-long bond of love.
Horace's speaker does not not openly propose himself
himself as Lydia's
permanent partner, although his acute reaction to her current
enamourment suggests that
enamourment that he may be doing so implicitly. In
Jealousy / 243
Catullus poem 1109, 09, two alternative types of relationship - - a brief

brief
affair (amorem)) and an eternal bond of amicitia - are conceivedof
affair (amorem - of
as available
available to the poet's persona
persona ((cf.
d. mihi,
mihi,nobis) . Lesbia
nobis). Lesbiaoffers
offers
him the one, while he himself desires the other. By By representing
Lydia as amorously interested
interested in a third party, however, Horace
establishes a double opposition in his poem: on the one hand,
there is the tension between himself and Telephus as objects of of
Lydia's affection;
affection; and, on the other, there is the contrast between
two kinds of love, the one enduring, the other passionate but
transient. Horace's persona suffers suffers not only because Lydia is not
his, but
but because she prefers the the kind of affair
affair of which
which he disap-
disap
proves to the type of love that he himself, we may suppose, has to
offer.51 By grafting
offer.51 grafting the
the contrast between two types of love in
Catullus
Catullus poem 1109 09 onto the three-party scenario borrowed from
Catullus poem 551, 1 , Horace converts Lydia's
Lydia's preference
preference for a rival
into a rejection
rejection not
not only of himself as a lover but but also of his very
way
way of loving.
Tov-Ruach ((1980:
1 980: 47 1 ) explains that
471) that jealous
jealous fear
fear occurs 'when
the sense of danger to an aspect
the aspect of one's identity generates
generates a set of
of
obsessive scenario-constructing thoughts, thoughts,'' which 'generally inin
volve the construction of vivid stories, with the jealous person as
a voyeur of an endless series of vignettes that cause him him pain.' We
do not have to accept Tov-Ruach's psychoanalytic framework framework to
recognize the the cogency of her her description of modern romantic
52
jealousy.52
jealousy. Yet jealousy
jealousy of this sort is not not a natural or universal
emotion, but one that that emerges under determinate conditions and
in specific
specific forms. Horace's own social world was favourable to
such a development: among the upper classes, at least, an ideal of of
reciprocal love as the the basis for
for marriage was slowly gaining ground
(d. Veyne 11978).
(cf. 978). But the
the paradigm of jealousy required
required a con-
con
densed and exemplary expression, a scenario that united united what had
been disparate
disparate sentiments into a singlesingle archetype. I suggest
suggest that, by
combining elements in two poems of Catullus, which themselves themselves
allude in turn both to Sappho
Sappho and to a remarkable scene in Terence's
Eunuch (a (a comedy that Horace knew well: d. cf. Satires 2.3.259-7 1 ),
2.3.259-71),
Horace created a model case of a three-party passion that comes
very close to what a later epoch would come to think think of as erotic
53
jealousy.53
jealousy. We
We might even credit him him with being its inventor.
C HAPTER TWELVE
CHAPTER T W E LVE
Grief
Grief
Unlike mourning, in which

which the past is declared resolved, finished,
and dead, in melancholia
melancholia the past remains steadfastly alive in the
present.
1
Eng and Kazanjian
Kazanjian 2003b: 3--41
3-4
One may think of grief

grief as a human
human universal ...,
. .. , but
but the
the reality is
that grief
grief is quite different
different from
from culture to culture.
Rosenblatt 11997:41
997: 4 1
In the
the previous chapter, I argued that the Greeks of the classical
period had no term
term signifying romantic
romantic jealousy as it is underunder-
stood today. In this, the final chapter,
chapter, I take up another
another sentiment
that poses a classificatory
classificatory problem, namely
namely grief. I do not propose
to make the case that grief
grief too was unknown to the Greeks, of of
course. It was known, and named by a variety of terms, such as
lupe and penthos;
lupe penthos-, still other words denoted various manifesta-
manifesta
tions of grief
grief and mourning, including lamentation in various
forms, from
from sobs and ululation to ritualized actions such as the
tearing out
out of hair and the
the beating of one's breast.
breast. An entire genre,
the so-called consolation, was developed to help people recover
from sorrow over the
from the loss of a loved one (I
(I examine this literary
form
form in more detail below). The questionquestion remains, however,
whether
whether grief was conceived of as an emotion. Although it might might
seem to be among the most basic emotions
emotions of of all -- it is taken as
paradigmatic in Martha Nussbaum's recent recent (200 1 ) investigation
(2001) investigation
Grief / 245
Grief
of the emotions, for example - - I shall suggest that that it may not
typically have been grouped with with the other pathe pathe we have exam- exam
ined so far.
My point of departure for these reflections
reflections is the the absence of grief
grief
from Aristotle's treatment
treatment of the passions in the the second book of of
the Rhetoric. One explanation
explanation that suggests itself itself is that Aristotle's
inventory of emotions in this treatise is governed by their rele- rele
vance to or usefulness in persuasion, and it may not have seemed
to Aristotle
Aristotle and his contemporaries
contemporaries that grief grief was as salient in
this context as, say, anger,
anger, pity, gratitude, fear, shame, and hatred,
which are regularly appealed to in forensic and deliberative
speeches. Yet surely
surely grief
grief too could influence
influence the the opinion
opinion of a
juror or member of the the assembly, whether over private or public
losses. If the
the purpose of exciting the the emotions is to alter people's
judgments - - and
and the emotions
emotions are, according to Aristotle, pre
Aristotle, pre-
cisely 'all those things on account of which people change and
differ
differ in regard to their
their judgments,'
judgments/ with with the proviso that they are
attended
attended by pain and pleasure (2. 1 , 1 3 78a20-2) -
(2.1, 1378a20-2) - then grief
grief would
on the
the surface seem to be as eligible an emotion as any of the the rest
in Aristotle's
Aristotle's catalogue.
One reason why Aristotle
Aristotle may not have thought thought to devote a
special treatment
treatment to griefgrief turns, perhaps,
perhaps, on a point of Greek
vocabulary. As I have indicated above, one of the the Greek words for
'grief'
'grief -- indeed, by
by far the most common
common in ordinaryordinary language -- is
lupe. But lupe, we have seen, is just Aristotle's word for 'pain'; it is
the
the opposite of pleasure, and constitutes one of the the two sensations
or aistheseis that,
that, according
according to Aristotle, are consituent elements
of those pathe
pathe that qualify
qualify as emotions (the pathos, as we
(the term pathos,
noted in chapter 1, I, has a wide range of meanings in Greek, apart
from
from its use in thethe sense of 'emotion'). As William William Harris (2001: (200 1 :
343) observes, 'The meaning of lup- lup- words is from from a modern point
of
of view ambiguous: they can refer refer to physical pain or to psycho- psycho
logical distress.' Harris concludes
concludes (340)(340) that
that'the
'thearchaic
archaic and
andclas
clas-
sical Greeks did not not construct
construct any definite
definite barrier between physi- physi
cal suffering
suffering and intense emotional suffering. suffering.',22 This is perhaps
entirely the case. Words based on the root alg-
not entirely alg-,t such as algas
algos
and algedon (d. (cf. English 'analgesic'), refer refer principally to physical
pain, and indeed the Epicureans
Epicureans and Stoics, in the generation after after
Greeks
Aristotle, adopted algedonalgedon rather than lupe as the term for the the
3
strictly corporeal sensation.3
sensation. However this may be, since pain for
Aristotle is a sensation, and along with with pleasure is a component of of
emotion
emotion rather than than an emotion proper, he may have found found it
awkward to treat lupe, even in its significance as 'grief,' 'grief/ as a
phenomenon
phenomenon on the same level as other pathe.
But thethe absence of griefgrief from
from Aristotle's account of the emo
the emo-
tions may have been motivated by something something more than than a lexical
accident; or rather, the the coincidence of grief grief and pain in a single
term may itself be informative about the Greek view of sorrow as
sentiment.4 We
a sentiment.4 We may consider, first, that pain is not simply a
physical phenomenon: we may feel pain as occurring in our leg or
arm, but the sensation itself is not necessarily localized localized there.
Pain is registered in the mind, or what the Greeks would have
called the psyche.
psyche. Second, and more important, in affirming affirming that
the emotions
emotions or pathe are accompaniedaccompanied by pleasure and pain,
Aristotle is manifestly thinking.
thinking notnot of pain resulting
resulting from
from bodily
harm but
but of what we might might call psychological
psychological suffering. The pain
that forms part of the the definition of such emotions as anger, pity, or
indignation, for example, is not not a physical ache like that that of a
damaged tooth. It consists rather in a sense of injury or injustice, injustice,
like hurt feelings. Thus, the pain that is an ingredient of pathe pathe
already resembles
resembles grief physical pain. 5s
grief more than it does physical
The question remains whether whether grief
grief is something more than, or
different from, the kind of pain that, according to Aristotle, ac-
different ac
companies the pathe. pathe. It would seem that we could invent an
Aristotelian
Aristotelian account of grief grief in which pain was an element, for
example: Let griefgrief be a pain resulting
resulting from
from thethe death or loss of one
who is dear (cf.(d. the
the definition of envy as fa 'a disturbing pain result
result-
ing from
from the well-being
well-being of another,' 1386b 1 8-19). In
another/ Rhetoric 2.9, 1386bl8-19).
specifying
specifying thethe cause of the the pain peculiar to grief, we endow grief grief
with
with a cognitive component that would appear to differentiate
differentiate it
6
from
from the mere sensation
sensation of pain.6
pain. Is there something
something about the the
nature of the motivating stimulus stimulus in the case of griefgrief -- that is, the
fact of loss - - that distinguishes it from from the fact of another
another person's
well-being, which
which is what excites the acknowledged pathos pathos of of
envy?
It may be that the loss of a loved one involves relatively little in
Grief
Grief // 247
the way of appraisal, in comparison with with other emotions. Anger is

provoked by a slight, which
which requires, according to Aristotle, an
evaluation of thethe intentions
intentions of the the author of the the insult, that
person's status relative to our own, our own capacity to exact
revenge, and various other factors. Pity and indignation
indignation depend on
an estimation
estimation of desert, gratitude on the the disinterested nature of of
the
the benefaction. Fear requires a sense of whether whether another
another indi
indi-
vidual or group is hostile, and a judgment concerning their rela- rela
tive strength in comparison with one's own. Even envy entails entails
more complex intellectual
intellectual operations in the the fuller
fuller version of of
Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition (2. 1 0, 1387b23-5
(2.10, 1387b23-5),), where he stipulates that
that it
is 'a kind of pain, in respect to one's equals, for their apparent
success in things called good, not so as to have the thing oneself oneself
but [solely]
[solely] on their
their account': the provision concerning equals
implicitly
implicitly suggests, if not
not an appraisal of desert, at least a sense of of
equivalent entitlement.
entitlement.
Grief seems
Grief seems different
different in this respect: it involves
involves no judgmentof of
intentions,
intentions, no reckoning of relative power, no reference to desert
or to social status. We are aware, aware, of course, of our our degree
degree of of
closeness with
with the departed -- we we do
do not mourn for for just anyone -
but
but we do not normally calculate it along an axis of intimacy. The
loss of a loved one strikes us with greater immediacy, as if the the fact
itself
itself were painful, irrespective of anyone's intentions intentions or the the
consequences for our social position. In this sense, the grieving
consequences grieving is
like physical pain.
Grief
Grief is unlike
unlike other emotions
emotions too in thatthat it does not involve, or
only minimally
minimally involves, what is sometimes
sometimes called 'action readi
readi-
ness,
ness,'' that is, the enhanced disposition to respond to whatever
aroused the passion (on (on 'action tendencies' associated with emoemo
tion, d.
cf. Parkinson 11995:
995: 70-82).
70-82). Anger,
Anger, according to Aristotle, is
by definition
definition a desire
desire for revenge;
revenge,- love is the wish that good things
accrue to another, and a willingness to bring those things about
(hatred involves thethe reverse). Envy and competitive rivalry (zelos) (zelos)
look to equality
equality with
with one's peers; we seek to avoid those circum-circum
stances that are productive of shame or fear. While Aristotle does
not write into the definition of pity an impulse
impulse to ameliorate the
condition
condition of the pitied, it is implicit
implicit in his idea that pity, like
indignation, depends on a judgment of desert. Grief, however,
the Ancient Greeks
Greeks
invites no compensatory act, no attempt to redress a wrong or a

disequilibrium in one's social
social world. There is no agent who bears
responsibility for one's grief, no one to get even with. Of course,
loss can be thethe consequence of an action, as when someone,
through
through deliberate aggression or culpable
deliberate aggression culpable negligence,
negligence, brings
brings about
the
the death of another (along with with damage to one's public self self or
reputation). In that
that case, however, we hate or are angry with with the
author
author of the deed, but but the sense of bereavement
bereavement has as its object
not the one who caused the loss but the loved one who has passed
away. Nothing will will bring that
that person back, as the consolation
literature
literature constantly
constantly reminds
reminds those who are in mourning.
mourning. There
There
is simply nothing to do but wait until the pain diminishes. Time
alone heals such a wound.
The emotions
Aristotle identifies
identifies and analyses are social,
social,
in the strong sense that they are responses to behaviour by con- con
scious agents. They
They are not typically elicited
elicited by inaminate objects
(see chapter I, p. 39).
chapter 1, 39). What is more, they
they are deeply enmeshed
enmeshed in a
world of competitive honour and esteem ([doxa], doxa ), in which
which people
are intensely
intensely aware of theirtheir status relative to their
their peers, their
inferiors, and their
their betters, and of the the effects
effects on their
their public
public
standing of other people's attitudes and actions. Rather than a
mere reaction to an impinging event or circumstance, a pathos pathos is
part of a social transaction. The The natural fact of death stands
system.7
outside this system.7
In Sophocles' tragedy Electra, the heroine
heroine has been living under
the watchful
watchful eyes of her mothermother Clytemnestra, who, together
with her lover Aegisthus, murdered Agamemnon, her husband
and Electra's father, upon
upon his return
return from
from Troy and seized control
control
of
of the throne in Argos.
Argos. In the initial
initial scene, Electra's brother
Orestes has entered ArgosArgos secretly for the first
first time since Electra
arranged to have him him spirited
spirited away as an infant from from his native
land.
Electra's first
first words -- 'Oh wretched me! me!'' (6
(6 mal moi dustenos,
moi mal
77} - are uttered
77)- from inside
uttered from inside her house. When he hears Electra'sElectra's
cry, the old tutor who has accompanied Orestes mistakes it for the
groaning of a slave, but but Orestes divines that it may indeed be his
unhappy sister. When the men withdraw, Electra, unaware that
her brother is nearby,
nearby, emerges from from the house, and sings: 'Oh holv
Grief / 249
Grief
light of the sun, and sky coextensive

coextensive with the earth, how many many
odes of mourning, how many answering blows upon my bloodied
breast have you heard, each time dark night has been overtaken overtaken by
you? The hated bed in my miserable house knows the the sorrows of of
my wakeful nights as I bewail my wretched wretched father' (86-95). Electra's
Electra's
soliloquy and her subsequent
subsequent duet with with the
the chorus of Argive
young women are among the most most poignant passages in Greek
tragedy. What is it that Electra is feeling?
Given that she is lamenting
lamenting her deceased father, we might might well
suppose that it is grief. But Electra continues: 'my father, whom
bloody Ares [the god god of war]
war] did not seize in a barbarian land' --
that
that is,
is, in Troy, which
which the Greek army besieged for ten years -- 'but
my own mother and her bed-partnerbed-partner Aegisthus split his head with
a murderous
murderous axe like woodcutters splitting an oak' (95-9 (95-9).) . Electra
is not simply in mourning; had her father father died while
while fighting in
Troy, she would of course have grieved for him, but but the
the cause of of
her present distress is that he was assassinated by his own wife
and her paramour, dying not not a hero's death butbut by treachery. 'And
there has been no pity [or [or lamentation: oiktos]
oiktos] for these things
from
from anyone but but me, although you, my father, died so shamefully shamefully
and pitiably [aik6s
[aikos oiktr6s
oiktros tel'te]' ((100-2).
100-2). It is the
the nature of her
father's death thatthat galls Electra,
Electra, and it is anger, not sorrow, that
she is feeling (for (for a catalogue of her her motives, see her her almost
legalistic
legalistic brief
brief to her mother
mother at 558-609).
Electra calls upon the the gods of the the underworld and above all the the
Erinyes, or Furies, whose province is unlawful unlawful death and violated
marriage beds, to avenge the death of her father and bring Orestes
back, since she can no longer bear her anguish (lupe) (lupe) alone (110-( 1 1 0-
20)
20).. When the the women of the chorus enter, they try to pacify pacify
Electra, although they are aware of the the nature of Agamemnon's
death: 'Electra, child of a dreadful
dreadful mother, what is this insatiable
complaint
complaint that is wasting you away for Agamemnon, who was
godlessly ensnared long ago ago by your treacherous mother's
mother's wiles
and betrayed by her evil hand? May the the one who did it die, if it it is
right for me to say so! so!'' ((121-7).
12 1-7). Agamemnon's death belongs to the
distant past: why, the chorus wonder, must she still belabour
distant belabour it?
By pointing to the the remoteness of Agamemnon's death, the the
Argive maidens
maidens are exploiting,
exploiting, as we shall see, a commonplace
commonplace in
250 / The Emotions
Ancient Greeks
the literature of consolation. This genre did not not deny the propriety
of
of timely grief, but but advised thethe bereaved
bereaved to give over sorrowing
after
after a decent interval of time (cf. (d. Konstan 200la:
200 1 a: 63-4;
63-4; Euripides,
Alcestis 11077, 077, 1079:
1 079: 'What will you gain by desiring desiring to grieve
forever?
forever?'). '). As the chorus later put it, 'Time is a comforting comforting god'
((179;
1 79; ef.
cf. 11085:
085: 'Time will softensoften thethe pain, which is now still
8
young').8 In a similar vein, they remind Electra
young'). Electra of the the futility
futility ofof
lamentation: 'You will not
lamentation: not resurrect
resurrect your father from from Hades'
Hades'
communal
communal lake either either with
with wailing
wailing or with prayers' (137-9; ( 13 7-9; cf.
d.
Archilochus fro 13; Alcestis
fr. 13; Alcestis 8875:
75 : 'You are not not helping her her who
died'; and 985-6: 'Endure! You will not raise up the dead from
below by weeping'), and they offer offer the hoary solace that that she is not
the
the only mortal
mortal to have endured such instancing Electra's
such a loss, instancing
sisters and Orestes himself as examples ((153-63). 1 53-63 ). They mean to
say that
that death touches everyone (ef. Alcestis 892-4: 'Endure! You
(cf. Alcestis You
are not
not the firstfirst to have lost a wife; one or another tragedy tragedy
oppresses all mortals'; and 93 1-2: 'Death has undone the wives
931-2:
of
of many ere this'), but but they cannot help recognizing that only
Electra's siblings have suffered
suffered this particular outrage -- the slaugh- slaugh
ter of their father
father at the hands of their own mother -- along with
9
her.9
her.
The trouble with these consolatory
consolatory commonplaces
commonplaces is that they
do not apply to Electra's
Electra's case, since Electra
Electra is distraught not over
Agamemnon's death but but over his murder: 'Only a fool,' fool/ she says,
10
'forgets parents who have died pitiably [oiktros]' ( 145-6).10 Electra
[oiktros]' (145-6).
offers
offers as her own examples of perpetual perpetual mourning
mourning Niobe and the the
nightingale (148-52),
( 148-52), apparently
apparently forgetting
forgetting that the nightingale
murdered the very child for which it grieved grieved (cf.(d. 'child-slayer,
'child-slayer,''
1 07). Finally, the
107). the women of the the chorus counsel Electra to moder- moder
ate not just her griefgrief but her resentment
resentment as well: 'Entrust your all
too painful
painful anger [kholos]
[kholos] to Zeus, and don't suffer suffer overmuch
[huperakhthesthai] because of your enemies, nor
[huperakhthesthai] nor yet forget
forget them'
((176-7),
1 76-7), and they return obsessively to the moment of the murder,
which
which was inspired
inspired by erotic passion
passion and accomplished
accomplished by deceit
((193-200).
193-200) . In so doing, they move Electra to focus once again on
her
her desire for revenge (poinima pathea, 2210).
revenge (poinima 1 0) .
A
Att this point, the chorus alter their approach and advise Electra Electra
to temper her rage and stubborn outspokenness:
outspokenness: 'You are hurling
Grief / 25 1
Grief/251
yourself
yourself ignominiously
ignominiously to your own destruction' ((215-16). 2 1 5-16). But
Electra terminates the discussion with an an.. unanswerable
unanswerable state state-
ment
ment of principle: 'If
'If the dead man
man is to lie there wretchedly, mere
earth and nothingness, and they do not pay the murderous pen- pen
alty, there go reverence and piety among all human human beings' (245-
50). With this, the chorus yield, and Electra goes on to expound, in
the metre of ordinary
ordinary dialogue, the on-going humiliations that
feed her wrath.
There are, then, elements both of mourning mourning and of anger in the the
lyric exchange between Electra and the chorus, but the passion
that
that drives the
the heroine
heroine is less grief
grief than rage and a corresponding
desire for vengeance. There is a good dramatic reason for this
dramatic reason
latter motive. Bereavement is healed, if at all, by time; it would be
a static play that took for its theme a woman unable to accept the the
irreversible loss of her father.11 1 1 Electra's wrath sets her actively in
conflict
conflict with
with her mother
mother and Aegisthus; it is not merely the
psychic
psychic residue
residue of a past event but has implications for the present
event but present
and the
the future. It is thus a factorfactor in the the opposition of wills on
which
which drama depends. To put put it differently,
differently, thethe cause of Electra's
passion is not just an incident
incident -- the passing away of of her father
father -
but
but an action, instigated
instigated by agents whom she holds responsible.
This social dimension
dimension is what distinguishes
distinguishes Electra's emotional
emotional
response of anger from from thethe passive grief elicited by a morally
grief elicited
event.12 The opening scene of Sophocles' Electra can be
neutral event.12
read as a subtle examination and confrontation of two distinct distinct
kinds of sentiment. 13 13
Modern interpretations
interpretations of Electra, including
including dramatic adapta
dramatic adapta-
tions such as the the Elektm
Elektra of Hugo von Hofsmannsthal (and (and thethe
operatic version by Richard Strauss) or Eugene O'Neill's Mourn- Mourn
Electra, tend to treat Electra's fixation on the death
ing Becomes Electra,
of
of her
her father
father as pathological, a symptom of her inability to liberate
her inability
herself from
herself from grief
grief at the
the loss of her father. In Freud's terms (1957), ( 195 7),
she is suffering
suffering from
from melancholia,
melancholia, an irrational attachment
attachment to the
past, as opposed to normal mourning, from from which
which one is expected
to recover after
after a decent
decent interval of time time has elapsed.
elapsed. While it is
often
often productive to interpret ancientancient works of literature
literature according
to modern psychological theories, it is important important also to appreci-
appreci
ate the terms in which
which they present themselves. Sophocles' Electra
is obsessed with
with the past not because she has suffered
suffered a traumatic
traumatic
separation
separation from
from her father, but
but because he was slain in cold blood.
The
The deed demands vengeance, as does the the loss of status for
Agamemnon's children, and it is this that that consumes Electra,
Electra, not
just grief. The dynamic
dynamic interaction
interaction between
between the two motives
motives is
what gives the opening of Sophocles' play its dramatic tension.
The time allowed for grief grief has historically
historically been subject to
regulation.
regulation. The imposition of limitations regarding the the period ofof
mourning, attire, and otherother facets
facets reflects an understanding of of
grief
grief as a social function, not
not merely a private sentiment. Mourn
sentiment. Mourn-
ing is a condition
condition as much as a feeling: one speaks in English of of
being 'in mourning,'
mourning/ just as, in Greek, one is said to be en penthei
(d. Plato, Republic
(cf. Republic 395El2:
395E12: 'in misfortune and mourning and
lamentation' [en [en sumphorais te kai penthesin kai threnoisli Re
threnois]-, Re-
public 605C 1 2i Laws 958E
605C12; 958E7;7i Sophocles,
Sophocles, Electra 846i Euripides,
846; Euripides,
14
Helen 1166).
Helen 66).14 Here too one sees a difference
difference between grief
grief and
other
other emotions.
emotions. Grief, understood as mourning,
mourning, has a ritualized
ritualized
aspect, and hence falls under the the jurisdiction of public authority
and custom.
custom.
A funerary law from ancient Rome stipulates that 'parents and
from ancient
children over six years of age can be mourned for a year, children
under six for a month. A husband can be mourned for ten ten months,
months,
close blood relations
relations for eight months. Whoever acts contrary
eight months. contrary to
disgrace.'15 Plutarch writes
these restrictions is placed in public disgrace.'ls
to his wife concerning the death of their their young daughter ((612A)
6 1 2A)
that, according to custom,
custom, people
neither bring libations

libations to those of their children who died while still
infants
infants nor do they perform any other acts concerning them, such as it is
usual to perform on behalf of the
the dead, for they
they have no share of the
the earth
or the things of the earth. Nor do they frequent their graves, monuments,
and the layings
layings out of corpses
corpses here, or sit by their bodies: for the laws do
not
not permit
permit it for those of such
such an age.
These restrictions may seem heartless, but we must be on guard

against projecting
projecting our sentiments onto civilizations different
different from
from
our own. As Paul Rosenblatt ((1997:
1 997: 41)
4 1 ) observes:
observes: 'A mother in the
the
slums of Cairo, Egypt,
Egypt, locked for seven years in the the depths of a
Grief
Grief / 253
deep depression over the the death of a child is not not behaving patho-
patho
logically by the standards
standards of her community. A bereaved Balinese
who seemingly laughs off a death is also behaving appropriately appropriately
suppressed).16
by the standards of her culture' (references suppressed). 16 There
There is
also, of course, the the opposite danger of attributing to ostensibly
simpler societies a diminished
diminished capacity for humane feeling. feeling. Up
until the 11970s
9 70s in Australia, Aboriginal
Aboriginal children were forcefully
forcefully
separated from
from their
their families and raised in foster homes or state
institutions
institutions as a way of integrating them into modern society; society,- as
for
for the deprived Aboriginal parents, it was assumedassumed that their griefgrief
was short-lived
short-lived and that, in the words of one inspector, 'they soon
forget
forget their
their offspring'
offspring' (quoted in Bryson 2000: 353 353)) -- a view
view that
reflects intercultural insensitivity
insensitivity rather than an awareness of of
conditioned differences
socially conditioned differences in the experience of grief.
There are social norms that control the expression of emotions
such as anger and fear as well, but the time limits on mourning mourning
suggest that the proper duration of grief
the proper grief is in fact arbitrary,
arbitrary, in thethe
sense that its termination
termination does not depend on altering or rectify rectify-
ing a determinate state of affairs. The gestures associated with
grief, such as covering one's own body with ashes, have symbolic
significance, for example that of assimilating the living to the the
condition of the dead,
dead, but unlike the patht examined by Aristotle
thtpathe
they are not
not governed by considerations of competitive standing.
Mourning is a painful
painful state for which time is the only salve. salve. How
much time is established by convention, which both acknowl- acknowl
edges the necessity of griefgrief and sets limits to its extent.
There existed in classical antiquity a hard line on grieving for
the dead, according
according to which death is not an evil and hence not a
reason for sorrow.
sorrow. Anaxagoras famously replied to the news that
his son had died,
died, 'I knew he was mortal when I fathered him'
((Diogenes
Diogenes Laertius 2.3 1 ); since death is a natural
2.31); natural phenomenon
phenomenon it
equanimity.17 So
should be accepted with equanimityY So too Phaedo,
Phaedo, in Plato'S
Plato's
dialogue by that name, recalls the death of Socrates (58E-59A): ( 58E-59A):
Indeed, I experienced something amazing

amazing when I was with him.
him. No pity
overcame me, as if I were present at the
the death of someone dear to me: for
the man himself
himself seemed
seemed happy, Echecrates, both
both in his demeanour
demeanour and in
what
what he said ...
... Thus no sense of pity overcame me, as would seem
the Ancient Greeks
natural in the
the presence of grief, nor again pleasure as when we were
philosophizing
philosophizing together as usual -- for in fact there was such a discussion
-
- but rather II felt some entirely strange emotion, an unusual mixture
mixture
compounded of pleasure and pain at once.
Socrates' own tranquillity in the the face of death communicates

itself to his friends,
itself friends, without
without however entirely
entirely erasing the habitual
response of sadness.
sadness. These philosophical
philosophical responses
responses to grief
grief are
analogous to the treatment of the emotions, or pathe, in that they
orpathe,
redescribe the event that elicits the sentiment in such a way as to
change its valence: if death is not an evil, then it is not to be
then it
lamented any more than it is to be feared. To the extent that grief grief
is motivated by the idea that the deceased deceased are unhappy,
unhappy, the
strategy is reasonable,
reasonable, although such sorrow is more like pity for
another (as(as Phaedo suggests)
suggests) than a sense of one's own loss.
Consolation literature availed itselfitself of this kind of argument,
argument,
especially when it was addressed to people with pretentions to
philosophy, but but it typically acknowledged
acknowledged the the necessity
necessityof ofgrief
grief in
in
the immediate
immediate aftermath of bereavement. Servius Sui picius Rufus
Sulpicius Rufus
wrote to Cicero on the occasion of the death of his daughter
daughter Tullia
((To
To His
His Friends 4.5; translation in Shelton 11998:
Friends 4.5; 998: 93 ):
93):
Even if she had not not died aatt this time, she must
must nevertheless have died a
few years from
few from now
now because she was born a mortal .... . . Consider, for
example, that she lived as long as it was necessary
necessary .....,-.; she enjoyed
enjoyed almost
all of life's
life's blessings. And she departed from
departed from life when the
the republic died ...
died ...
There is nnoo grief
grief which the
the passage ooff time does notnot lessen oorr soften; but
it is unworthy
unworthy of you to wait for for the time to pass rather
rather than than anticipating
this result with your own good sense.
Sulpicius urges
urges upon Cicero,
Cicero, in consideration
consideration of his reputation for
wisdom, a dispassionate
dispassionate response
response to his loss, in the manner of of
Anaxagoras, although he tempers this argument with with the re
the re-
minder that Tullia had enjoyed
enjoyed a rich life and that
that circumstances
circumstances
in Rome
Rome were such that she might be better off having died when
did.18 In the
she did.18 the ordinary course of events, Servius acknowledges,
events, Servius acknowledges,
time of its own relieves the pain. Similarly, the consolation
consolation
ascribed to Plutarch, in which the author seeks to comfortcomfort a
Grief
Grief / 255
certain Apollonius on the the death of his child, begins: 'ForTor a long
while now, Apollonius, I have suffered suffered and condoled withwith you
[sunalgein, sunakhthesthail ' ( 10 1 F). So long as the
sunakhthesthai}' (101F). the disease was
ravaging the boy, the writer states, it would have been inappropri-
inappropri
ate to encourage the father
father to bear his lot as a mortal; rather, it
was necessary to share Apollonius's emotion (sumpathein, 1102A).
emotion (sumpathein, 02A).
But when enough has passed, friends should
when time enough should help one over-
over
come grief
grief and vain anguish ((102B).
102B) . Menander thethe rhetorician, in
his handbook
handbook on oratory, recommends
recommends that in composing
composing a conso
conso-
lation one begin by dwelling on the grief grief and only afterwards look
to comfort it (413.6, 221-3
1 -3 Spengel).
Spengel). Menander
Menander goes on to observe
(2. 1 1 4 1 9 .3-10):
(2.11=419.3-10):
=
If
If a funeral
funeral speech is delivered not
not very long after
after the
the death, but
but rather
after
after only some seven or eight
eight months have gone by, then one should
pronounce an encomium, although there is nothing against using con- con
solatory topics towards the end - - unless a close relative
relative of the deceased
happens to be giving the speech. For the latter, memory does not grant
release from
from the after a year,
the emotion even after after a
year, which is why, even after
year, he will retain the
the style of an emotional speech.
These writers take it for granted that that the initial response to the
loss of a loved one is grief, even as they recommend ways to
overcome it (cf. (d. Plato R epublic 110,
Republic 0, 603E7-8).
The Roman poet Statius (first (first century AD) composed several
poems known as epicedia, which which were imagined as being pro- pro
nounced at the the funeral
funeral itself. In one, on the death of the the foster
foster-
child of Atedius Melior ((SilvaeSilvae 2. 1 ), Statius acknowledges
2.1), acknowledges thatthat he
should
should be offering
offering healing words, butbut he concedes that that this would
be cruel, since Atedius is racked with with grief
grief ((5-6).
5-6). Accordingly,
Accordingly,
Statius encourages him him to give rein to lamentation
lamentation and the 'joy of of
weeping' -- work it through, we we might say say today
today-- until
until he
heisisready
ready
to heed 'friendly
'friendly entreaties' ((15-16).
1 5- 1 6). He himself, Statius says, is
equally riven by grief grief (25, 28-30). Only at thethe end of his poem does
he turn
turn to the consolation
consolation proper (208-34).
(208-34). Statius's 'Consolation
to Flavius Ursus on the the Loss of His Beloved
Beloved Boy' begins ((Silvae
Silvae
2.6 . 1 - 1 8, excerpted):
2.6.1-18, excerpted): 'You are too cruel, who would assign grada- grada
tions to tears and limits to grieving. It is pitiable for a parent to
light the pyre for infants and and -- horrible! -- growing children children ... . . . Do
Do
not
not repress your tears, do not not be ashamed: let let your grief
grief break its
bonds .... . . Who will disapprove of mourning given free free rein for this
funeral?7' Again, in Silvae
funeral? Silvae 3.3, the the 'Consolation for Claudius Claudius
Etruscus,'
Etruscus/ Statius asks: Tor 'For who, when when they see someone beating
his breast in unexhaustedunexhausted lamentlament and embracing the pyre and
falling upon the cinders, would not not suppose that that the funeral
funeral of a
young wife is being bewailed bewailed or the adolescent image of a child is
the adolescent
being seized by the flames? It is a father who is weeping' (8-12). In
the
the epicedion for the the death of his own foster-childfoster-child (5.3), Statius
exclaims: 'Perhaps Terhaps people will say I am too eager for grief grief and have
exceeded due modesty in my tears; but who are you to weigh out
my groans and lamentations?'
lamentations? ' (56-8 (56-8).). So too, Pliny (Epistles 5 . 1 6),
(Epistles 5.16),
a younger contemporary of Statius, describes his pain at the death
of his friend friend Fundanus's daughter, and remarks that that although
Fundanus is a learned man, all his wisdom is for naught; but but this,
he adds, is because the wound wound is still fresh fresh -- when
when time has
worked its healing, he will be ready to accept words of solace.
Grief, then, was reasonable and necessary in its proper place, or
rather, in its proper moment. moment. It is persistent, unrelenting unrelenting grief grief
that the ancients are unanimous unanimous in discouraging. Consolations Consolations
are necessary
necessary because there is a powerful desire to hold on to the
past and people do sometimes sometimes persist in grief grief beyond its season. In
his 'Consolation to Marcia' (6. l .6-7), Seneca asks:
(6.1.6-7), asks: 'What then will
be thethe end of it...? it ... ? The third
third year has now passed.' So So too, in the
'Consolation to Polybius,' Polybius,' Seneca offers offers the usualusual commonplaces
commonplaces
about mortality: not even the universe is eternal ((11.1.2), 1 l . l .2), all who
have lived so far have died ((11.1.4), 1 1 . 1 .4), grief
grief serves no purpose ((11.2.1), 1 1 .2. 1 ),
our tears cannot alter fate ((11.4.1), 1 1 .4. 1 ), life itself
itself is a vale of tears
((11.4.2-3),
1 1 .4.2-3), your own deceased brother brother would would wish you to give over
mourning ((11.5.2), 1 1 .5.2), excessive displays of grief grief are servile and wom wom-
anish ((11.6.2)
1 l .6.2) and inconsistent
inconsistent with with high stationstation ((11.6.4),
1 l .6.4), proxim-
proxim
ity to Caesar (to whom Polybius owes all) all) is itself a cure for grief grief
((11.8.1),
1 l .8 . 1 ) and your brotherbrother is better
better off off where he is now ((11.9.7-8).
1 1 .9.7-8).
'
And yet yet Seneca also affirms affirms ((11.18.5-6):
1 l . 1 8 . 5-6 ):
Never will
will I demand of you that you not
not grieve at all. I know that there
are to be found
found certain men, whose wisdom is more harsh than than coura-
Grief
Grief / 257
geous, who deny that a wise man

man should
should mourn. I don't believe that these
these
men have ever experienced
experienced such a misfortune,
misfortune, for otherwise fortune
would have knocked suchsuch arrogant wisdom
wisdom out of them
them and forced them,
all unwilling,
unwilling, to confess the truth. Reason will manifest itself
itself sufficiently
if
if one simply eliminates from
simply eliminates from one's grief
grief whatever
whatever is excessive and
disproportionate: no one should hope or desire to feel that it is wholly
wholly
non-existent ... Let the tears flow,
non-existent... flow, but let them also cease,-
cease; let the groans
groans
be drawn from
from one's deepest bosom,
bosom, but let them also come to an end.
When mourning takes the form of an inveterate and unending

dedication to the dead, it becomes
becomes an obsession -
- melancholia,
in Freud's terminology. Such is the warning
warning that Plutarch
Plutarch gives
his own wife in connection with the death of theirtwo-year-old
two-year-old
daughter (609F l OA) :
(609F-10A):
-
Each person invites his own grief

grief to stay with
with him. When, in the courseof of
time, it is established and becomes
becomes his companion and housemate, it does
not leave even when people really want it to. This is why one must
struggle with it at the doorway and not abandon one's guard through through
funereal dress or cutting
cutting one's hair or any of those things which, by
confronting
confronting and shaming us daily, make our minds minds small, narrow, closed,
harsh, and timid, so that they no longer taketake part in laughter
laughter or light or a
generous table, since our minds are clad and practised in such such things on
account
account of grief. Neglect
Neglect of the
the body follows upon this evil, and disparage-
disparage
ment of unguents, baths, and any other of life's comforts.
ment
The genre of the consolation

consolation was intended not so much to cut
grief
grief off at the
the root as to prevent it from
from settling in as a permanent
habit.
The Greeks and Romans
Romans recognized the the power of grief, and
devised ways
ways of assuaging
assuaging it, from
from philosophical advice
advice to official
official
limits on the period of mourning. AfterAfter a certain
certain amount
amount of time,
it was necessary to forget
forget the dead and to cease dwelling on the
past (forgetting is not necessarily easier than remembering). 19 1 9 But
grief
grief was One
one thing, defence of one's dignity and an angry antago
antago-
another.20o A photograph
nism to injustice another.2 photograph in the Spanish daily El
Pa'is (Azmirez
Pais 7), which accompanies
(Aznarez 2002: 7), accompanies an article on thethe crisis
in Venezuela
Venezuela over the coup d'etat that briefly removed Hugo
Greeks
Chavez from
from power on 1111 April 2002,
2002, shows a man man holding up two
posters with
with the motto: PROHIBIDO
PR OHIBIDO OLVIDAROLVIDAR .... . . iTUSTICIA
rfUSTICIA
YA! ('It
YA! ('It is forbidden to forget ... Justice now ! ' ) .
now!'). The occasion is a
occasion
demonstration in Caracas protesting the the shooting of several par- par
ticipants
ticipants in an earlier march against Chavez' regime. Injustice
inspires anger, and anger endures until such such time as one is in a
position to avenge the initial wrong or insult. ForgettingForgetting anger, or
love, gratitude, and shame, for that matter, takes on the character
failure.21
of a moral failure.21
As the consolation
consolation tradition insists, there is no way to redress
the loss of one who has died.died. One can only wait until until time does its
work of healing, and in the meanwhile
meanwhile be careful
careful not not to indulge in
mourning
mourning to the point point at which
which it becomes,
becomes, as Plutarch
Plutarch puts it, a
guest in our home that is impossible to expel. Whereas Whereas in politics
one may insist, with with the Venezuelan protester, that that forgetting is
prohibited,
prohibited, the Roman law regarding mourning mourning enjoined just the
opposite, that griefgrief must, after
after a due period of time, come to an
end.
Today, when emotions are commonly
when emotions commonly understood
understood as feelings or
internal
internal phenomena, without without a necessary component
component of evalua- evalua
tion and reference
reference to the outside world, it seems natural to think
of controlling or eliminating
eliminating painful affects
affects as such, whether
whether grief
grief
or rage.
rage. That
That anger is grounded in a perceived injustice, whereas
grief
grief is rooted in loss, is of less consequence, on this modern view,
than the perturbation of the psyche that both sentiments engen
sentiments engen-
der. On the classical conception
conception of the emotions,
emotions, however, which which
looked more to agency and effect effect on social standing than to one's
inner state, grief
grief and anger look radically different,
different, even to the the
point
point that grief
grief might
might not qualify as a pathos
pathos at all. Recognizing
Recognizing
the distinction
distinction between the two kinds of sentiment sentiment may not only
help illuminate
illuminate classical literature and psychology,
psychology, but may also
contribute
contribute something
something to our understanding
understanding of grief today.22today.22
Conclusion
The world that Aristotle

Aristotle evokes in his account
account of the emotions
emotions is
highly competitive. It would appear that the Greeks were con- con
stantly jockeying to maintain or improve their social position or
that
that of dear ones, and were deeply conscious of their standing in
the eyes of others. When ordinary people stepped
the stepped out
out of the the house
and into the streets of Athens, they must, on the the basis of the the
picture Aristotle draws, have been intensely aware of relative relative
degrees of power and their own vulnerability to insult insult and injury.injury.
The emotions of the ancient Greeks, in turn, were attuned to
1
these demands. l
IItt was understood that people naturally strive ttoo have the goods goods
that others - - or
or at least, their equals -- have; emulation or or
rivalrousness (zelos)
(zelos) is an emotion characteristic of decent decent people,
according to Aristotle, for it motivates them them to obtain things
appropriate to their
their position. Envy is the
the mark of poor character or
ethos, since it aims merely to deprivedeprive one's neighbour of such
goods, without advantage
advantage to oneself (2. 1388a33-6).2 But emu-
1 1 , 1388a33-6).2
(2.11, emu
lation too has a negative side:side: for its opposite,
opposite, Aristotle says, says, is
contempt (kataphronesis),
(kataphronesis), and those who are disposed to emulate
others or be emulated by them tend to be contemptuous of people
who do notnot have the goods
goods that are vied for (zei6ta,
(zelota, 22.1-1,1388b23-
. 1 1 , 1 388b23-
7). We
We may recall, although Aristotle does does not mention
mention it in this
context, that contempt was among the three causes of anger,
which is the impulse to avenge
avenge a slight. Like emulation, anger too
works to maintain
maintain an equilibrium of goodsgoods or honour in a society
where everyone
everyone is trying to get ahead of the rest.
260 / Conclusion
Conclusion
Fear depends
depends on an evaluation of the the relative strength of one's
enemies (2.5, 1382M5-19),
1 382b 1 5-1 9), just as confidence, fear's opposite,
derives from
from the knowledge
knowledge that our competitors -- if we have
any -- are
are either weak or well disposed
disposedtowards us (2.5, 1383a22-5
1383a22-5).) .
We feel shame for our vices, such as cowardice, cowardice, injustice, and the the
servility
servility that is manifested in begging or flattering others for the
sake of some advantage,
advantage, and also for not not having the
the fine things our
equals have (2.6,
(2.6, 1384a9-1
1384a9-ll):1 ): like emulation, shame is a goad to
maintaining one's level in society. We We feel shame particularly
particularly
before those who who are of some account, for example people people whowho
admire us or whom we admire - - or those with whom we compete.
Like anger, shame is symptomatic of a society in which which one's
reputation in the eyes of others is crucial: one must not not be seen to
sink beneath the level of one's peers.
Some passions respond to the the relative success or failure of of
others, without primary reference to oneself: oneself: pity is elicited by
undeserved misfortune,
misfortune, indignation by undeserved good fortune. fortune.
But both are predicated
predicated on norms of well-being, which are corre corre-
lated with social station. There are generous sentiments, such
lated such as
love, by which we wish others well without advantage advantage to our-our
selves;
selves,- gratitude is the emotional response response to a benefit
benefit that has
been altruistically bestowed. But love and gratitude mark out
smaller circles of intimacy and alliance within within the larger, rough-
rough
and-tumble context of Aristotle's Athens, where there was always
the
the threat of loss of station.
The attitudes that entered into the ideological construction of of
3
the emotions in ancient Greece are not the same as ours.3 ours. The
change in perspective is no doubt in part associated with with the
relative neglect
neglect of thethe categories of honour
honour and insult in modern
social life,
life, at least in the United States.States. In part, too, it reflects an
altered sense of self, in which the the emotions are perceived as interior
states of feeling rather than than responses to social interactions.
I do
do not wish to deny that there are broad broad similarities between
the ancient pathe we have discussed in the course of this book and
emotions, as represented by the basic emotion terms in
modern emotions,
English. Perhaps there exist, at a more general level than emoemo
tions proper, something like what Silvan Tomkins ((1995) 1 995 ) calls
affects,
affects, which
which have a universal extension. We might might imagine, for
Conclusion
Conclusion / 261
example, that thethe cross-cultural constants in emotionsemotions are like

the
the four
four elementary
elementary tastes of bitter, sweet, sour, and salty. If we
rely on taste buds alone, shutting
shutting our eyes and holding our nose,
then apples and onions,
onions, which
which have similar
similar textures,
textures, are indistin
indistin-
guishable (this was an experiment that delighted children children once
upon a time).
time). Add smell, and the difference
difference between the two is
evident. Knowledge
Knowledge is also a factor: we recognize a taste better
when we know and can name the food in question. We may think think
of
of emotions, too, as constructed on the the basis of some elementary
human
human responses, but profoundly
profoundly conditioned by other sensibili
sensibili-
ties and cognitive
cognitive distinctions.
distinctions.
The Greek emotions are specific to Greek society and to socie- socie
ties similar
similar to that of the Greeks. But cultures have blind blind spots:
we can doubtless perceive better than than Aristotle himself
himself the ways
in which the pathe
pathe he describes form a coherent group. group. In turn,
attention
attention to classical Greek ideas of the emotions may illuminateilluminate
some unclear aspects of our own emotional concepts. As we have
seen ((chapter
chapter I1,, pp. 34, 39),
39), it is only recently that
that psychologists
have begun to investigate the emotions as responses to inten inten-
tional acts, as well as the effects
effects of emotion
emotion on belief, which was
central to Aristotle's definition of a pathos.
pathos. Finally, we may note
that in no society are the emotions, either severally or as a whole,
understood in a uniform way across time and place or class and
gender. The views that I have been attributing to the Greeks will
resonate with
with some people today more than others; in turn, no
doubt, the
the Greeks themselves thought of the pathe variously, ifif
the pathe
indeed
indeed they all understood
understood the term pathos itself
term pathos itself to signify
signify an
emotion
emotion in Aristotle's sense of the word.word. It is impossible, for want
of
of sources, to recover the nuances
nuances that corresponded to differences
of social condition in classical antiquity. But I do not not doubt that ifif
we knew the whole story, there would be areas in which which their
conception of the emotions would come closer to our own, and
others, perhaps, in which the distance would be still greater than
we have so far perceived.
This page
Notes
Preface
11 For
For example,
example, II have
have placed
placed the
the chapter
chapter on
on shame
shame immediately
immediately after
after
that on satisfaction, since both involve a discussion
discussion of a positive
sentiment
sentiment analogous to 'pride.' I have also postponed the chapters
on love and hatred, since they both have a somewhat problematic
status
status as emotions
emotions on Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition.
definition.
2 But see J.M.
J.M. Jones
Jones 11995,
995, who takes the view that emotions are a
function
function of human cognitive capacities, which is what differentiates
differentiates
them from
from the feelings that animals have; with the acquisition of
acquisition of
language, human
human feelings, Jones argues, changed fundamentally.
Chapter One
1 Interestingly,
Interestingly, English
English seems
seems to to owe
owe the
the importance
importance of of indigo
indigo asas a
basic colour to Isaac
Isaac Newton, although Newton himself himself vacillated
over whether
whether the spectrum should be divided into six or seven
zones; in the
the end, he opted for seven because of the mystical
mystical value
of
of that numeral (Gage 11995).
995). For a comparison between emotion
emotion and
colour, see Reddy 200 1 : 3-8.
2001: 3-8.
2 Longinus, Sublime 22.
Longinus, On the Sublime 22.11 speaks of 'innumerable emotions';
emotions';
the
the Stoics provided long lists of them
them (Diogenes
(Diogenes Laertius 7. 1 1 1;
7.111;
Andronicus, On Emotions
Emotions (Peri pathon). More recently, Cohen 2003
(Peripathon).
has created a taxonomy of no fewer
fewer than 4412
1 2 discrete human
emotions.
3 My thanks to Hugh
Hugh Mason for this reference.
reference.
2.64 / Notes to pages 6-8
264
4 Liddell,
Liddell, Scott, and Jones 11940, 940, s.v.;
s.v.; E.
E. Irwin ((1974:
1974: 5-7) notes that
the difficulty
difficulty in interpreting Greek colour terms according to
spectral
spectral values
values led some scholars, including
including Goethe
Goethe and William
William
Gladstone, to conclude that the Greeks were colour-blind. colour-blind.
5 Cf.
Cf. Pastoureau 2.00 2001:1 : 113-48
3-48 on the absence
absence of a coherent category of
'blue' in classical antiquity; and Ball 2.001
classical antiquity; 2001:: 233-8
2.33-8 on the difficulty
of
of producing
producing blue pigments. In English, the only basic colour terms,
besides black, white, and grey, that that are non-spectral
non-spectral in nature are
brown and pink. So So too, in the time of Goethe the the German
German word
'braun' signified
signified not only what we call 'brown' in English, which which is
more or less what Germans mean by 'Braun' today, today, but also tones
in the region of violet or purple, which, unlike unlike modern brown, are
grouped with the spectral colours of the rainbow. rainbow.
6 To
To someone
someone who can aurally distinguish phonemes not present in
English, e.g.,
e.g., Arabic stops, poetry in that language will yield richer
aesthetic effects
effects than to one whose ear is deaf deaf to them.
them.
7 Yvor Winters once analysed
analysed the verse by Robert Robert Browning
Browning 'So wore
night; the
the East was gray' (from (from 'A Serenade
Serenade at the Villa') by explain- explain
ing: 'The verb wore means literally that the night night passed, but it
carries with it connotations of exhaustion and attrition attrition which
which
belong to the the condition of the protagonist;
protagonist; and grayness is a color
which
which we associate with such a condition' (cited (cited in Brooks 1 970:
Brooks 1970:
2.00).
200). To this, Cleanth
Cleanth Brooks
Brooks responded (2.01 (201):): 'But the
the word wore
does not mean literally
literally "that
"that the night passed,
passed,"" it means literally
"that the night wore" -- whatever wore may mean, and as as Winters'
own admirable analysis
analysis indicates,
indicates, wore "means" .... .. a great deal.' I
would add that 'gray' too means a great deal, and that its meanings
will not necessarily be the same as ostensible synonyms of 'gray' in
other languages.
8 It has found
found an unlikely exponent,
exponent, however,
however, in the Marxist critic critic
Terry Eagleton,
Eagleton, who cites (2.003: (2003: xii-xiv) the distinguished Italian
philologist, Sebastiano
philologist, Sebastiana Timpanaro
Timpanaro (1975:1 1975: 52)
52.) for the view that
'[c]ultural
'[cjultural continuities ... ... "have been rendered possible by the fact
that man as a biological being has remained essentially unchanged
from
from the beginnings of civilization
civilization to the present; and those senti senti-
ments and representations
representations which closest
which are closest to the biological facts
biological
of human existence have changed little.'" little. '" Eagleton
Eagleton is undeterred by
the possibility that 'culturalists
'culturalists may wince at this cheek-by-jowl
Notes to pages 9-1
9-122 / 265
consorting of "sentiments
"sentiments and representations" with with "biological
facts. '"
facts."'
9 Though the collocation of non-Europeans, children, imbeciles, imbeciles, and
the insane may suggest a racist view, it is worth stating that that this was
not Darwin's intention.
intention. Rather,
Rather, by demonstrating that 'the chief chief
expressions exhibited
expressions exhibited by man are the same throughout world,'
throughout the world/
Darwin thought to show as well that [are] de
that 'the several races [are] de-
scended fromfrom a single parent-stock' ((1998:
1998: 355).
355).That all human
human
beings have a common
common range of emotions
emotions was an argument, in
Darwin's
Darwin's view, against innate racial differences.
differences.
110 0 Because
Because the the character of the
the response seems not not to be determined by
the function as as such -- presumably
presumably otherother signalling behaviours
behaviours could
have served as well -- Darwin implicitly
implicitly appeals to one of of his three
basic explanatory principles for emotive expression, namely, antianti
thesis. According to this principle,
principle, once a certain state
state of mind
mind is
associated with particular habits, then, 'when a directly opposite
state of mind is induced, there is a strong and involuntary tendency
to the
the performance of movements
movements of a directly
directly opposite nature,
nature,
though these are of no use' ((1998:1 998: 34).
34).
1111 Buss notes that 'only 5 percent of the the male elephant seals do 85 per- per
cent of thethe mating' ((1994:
1994: 9);
9); a colleague has pointed out to me that
in this respect,
respect, the analogy with
with human
human beings obtains principally
in high school.
12 Buss writes: 'Since all an ancestral man
12 man needed to do to reproduce
was to impregnate a woman, casual sex without commitment would
without commitment
have sufficed
sufficed for him' ((1994:
1994: 49). Sufficed
49). Sufficed for what? Unless he was
going to tend his progeny, what need had he to be sure that they
were his? Buss further
further explains (2000: 52) 52) that by being faithful,
faithful,
'men risk wasting all the mating effort effort they expended,
expended, including the
time, energy,
energy, and gifts they have invested while courting a woman.
The man also incurs what economists
economists call "opportunity costs," the
missed opportunties with with other women as a result of devoting all
their
their effort
effort to one woman.' The image of primitive men men diversifying
diversifying
their sexual portfolio is anachronistic, and arbitrarily projects onto
them a proprietary
proprietary interest in their offspring.
offspring.
113
3 Even neuro-scientists tend to produce produce quixotic explanations of bebe
haviour when they seek evolutionary explanations. Thus, Edmund
Rolls ((1999:
1999: 229)
229) suggests that
that masturbation effects
effects the
the removal
266 / Notes to pages 112-15
2- 1 5
from
from the vagina oorr the testes ooff old sperm; thus the male aatt the time
of intercourse
intercourse 'will have many young sperm sperm especially
especially of the killer
killer
(d. Baker and Bellis 11995),
and fertilizing type' (cf. 995), and be better pre-
pre
pared to engage in 'sperm warfare' (230; the term is taken from
warfare' (230;
Baker 1996).
1 996). More immediate
immediate reasons for the practice suggest
themselves.
14 Descartes recognized that there are innumerable
innumerable subspecies of the the
basic types, which
which he defines in the third part of his essay.
115 5 We may add that that the Cartesian emphasis on expression coincided
with a view of thethe self
self or soul as a distinct internal domain, which
distinct internal which
one was obliged to read or interpret by means of surface manifesta- manifesta
tions in the face and body.
1166 Christopher
Christopher Wright 1(1984:1 984: 94)
94) appears
appears to take an opposite view,
for
for example in his comment
comment on Poussin's Tudgment of
Poussin's Judgment of Solomon,
painted in the late 11640s:
640s: 'All the figures are seen in exaggerated
exaggerated
gestures of anger,
anger, accusation, fear, embarrassment and violence.
Poussin was expressing, through the means of this composition, his
whole theory of emotion. Each figure figure must
must be made to typify
typify the
the
specific emotions concerned.' So too he remarks of the Lamentation Lamentation
Christ: 'Each figure is taken to an extreme of exag
over the Dead Christ: exag-
geration, saturated with grief, almost over-acting' ((114-15),-
1 14-15 ); compare
too the
the vivid expressions on the faces of Poussin's
Poussin's early The Martyr
Martyr-
dom of of St Erasmus, or his late St Peter Healing a Sick Man. Still,
the individual figures seem poised in a choreographed arrangement,
bound up with the eventsevents of which
which they are part. The representation
representation
of
of a personal emotion does not not stand free of the
the context so as to
claim the viewer's exclusive attention.
117
7 So too, Grinker ((1998:
1998: 78-9) writes
writes of the
the Korean concept
concept of.of han:
'Although han is loosely and simply defined defined as "resentment,
"resentment,"" it
requires an elaborate discourse to explicate it more fully. Han refers
to a consciousness
consciousness of ongoing trauma and a lack of resolution
ongoing trauma resolution and
reconciliation. Paradoxically,
Paradoxically, however, han also provides a means of of
resolution ... Han is a distinctive psychological concept
resolution ... ..., a com-
concept..., com
plex of suppressed
suppressed emotion.' My thanksthanks to Stephen
Stephen Epstein
Epstein for this
reference. Ayumi Nagai informs me that that there are no precise English
equivalents for the Japanese
Japanese expressions 'natsukashii,'
'natsukashii,' denoting the
'feeling we have when
when we think about ((or or see or hear or smell)
something we haven't
haven't seen for a while';
while',- 'sabishii' (or
(or 'samishii'), thethe
Notes to pages 115-16
5- 1 6 / 267
'feeling that we're "missing" something'; and 'setsunai,' 'setsunai/ the 'feeling
we get when we want something, but can't get it' (though (though not used
of material things).
things). Cf. Metcalf and Huntington
Huntington 11991: 60: 'Cultural
99 1 : 60:
differences
differences work on human human emotional reactions, just as they do on
supposedly universal modes of reasoning or requirements of institu institu-
tional arrangement'; and Reddy 200 2001:1 : 34-62.
8 Cf. Ekman 11984;
118 984; and Oatley 2003: 1169. 69 . LeDoux ((1996:
1 996: 1112-14)
12-14)
provides a summary of the various theories; see also Hillman 1 992:
Hillman 1992:
40-
40-1. 1.
9 IInn an undergraduate class ttoo which I had assigned the
119 the second book of of
Aristotle's
Aristotle's Rhetoric (in translationL
translation), I asked the students
students each to draw
up a list of ten emotions. It was remarkable how small an overlap
there was between their their inventories and the passions analysed by
Aristotle. Anger was prominent in both sets, but beyond that, there
was little agreement. Among the emotions suggested by the students
which do not figure in Aristotle's discussion were grief, sorrow,
sadness, happiness, jealousy, missing someone, and loneliness. By By
contrast, none of the students
students mentioned pity, envy, indignation,
shame, gentleness or satisfaction, confidence, rivalry, or gratitude.
satisfaction, confidence,
Cf. Barbalet
Barbalet 11998:
998: 82: 'Confidence is conventionally not not thought of of
as an emotion' -- though it figures in Aristotle's
Aristotle's inventory. Planalp
((1999: 76) cites Schoeck 11966
1 999: 1176) 966 for the
the view that 'envy is particularly
unmentionable
unmentionable in the United States because Americans do not want
to admit that they are not all equals.'
equals. '
20 For example, the pre-Aristotelian Rhetoric to Alexander Alexander ((1428a36-b5)
1428a36-b5)
includes under pathos sensations such as pleasure and pain, as well
as desires.
2211 Cf. the the Spanish translation
translation of Christa
Christa Wolf's Kassandra
Kassandra ((1986:1 986: 114-
4-
5 ) : 'De como el asalto de
115): de sentimientos
sentimientos irreconciliables
irreconciliables -- asombro,
emocion, admiracion, horror, desconcierto y, sl, si, incluso
incluso unauna infame
hilaridad -- desemboco en un ataque de
hilaridad de risa' (('How
'How the attack
attack of con
of con-
tradictory emotions [sentimientos] - - shock, suspense [emoci6n],
[emocion],
wonder, fear, confusion, and yes, even a shameful hilarity - - ended in
uncontrollable laughter'); and Moliner 11990:
andMoliner 079, s.v. 'emocion':
990: 11079,
'Alteracion afectiva intensa acompana 0o sigue inmediatamente
intensa que acompaiia inmediatamente
a la experiencia de un suceso feliz or desgraciado
desgraciado 0o que significa un un
cambio profundo
prof undo en la vida sentimental
sentimental... .. . Puede consistir
consistir tambien
en interes expectante 0o ansioso con que el sujeto participa en algo
1 7-20
que esta ocurriendo' ('An intense intense change of feeling that accompanies
or follows immediately
immediately upon the the experience of a happy or unfortu
unfortu-
nate event, or that that indicates
indicates a deep alternation
alternation in one's affective
affective life
..... . It can also consist
consist in an eager or anticipatory
anticipatory interest that one
feels at something
something occurring at the moment').
22 Cf. Harris 200 2001:1 : 36: 'The study of classical
classical emotions has been
seriously
seriously impededimpeded by our failure to realize, with a few noteworthynoteworthy
exceptions, that the relevant Greek and Latin terminology is very
unlikely
unlikely to correspond neatly to modern English usage. usage.''
2233 Cf. Russell and Fernandez-DoIs
Fernandez-Dols 1997b: 4: 'Linking faces ttoo emotionsemotions
may be common sense, but it has turned out to be the single most
important
important idea in the the psychology of emotion. It is central to a re- re
search program that that claims Darwin
Darwin as its originator.' On the small
number
number of basic, innate innate emotions
emotions presupposed by this program, see
p. 111; 1; on the universality hypothesis,
the universality 1 4- 1 7; and for an excellent
hypothesis, pp. 14-17;
summary of the the debate over facial
facial expression as a sign of emotion,
see Parkinson 11995: 995: 1121-38.
2 1-38.
24 This argument
argument was anticipated by Landis (1934; ( 1 934; cited by Fernandez-
Fernandez
Dols and Ruiz-Belda 11997: 997: 258-9), but
but the
the results of his experiments
experiments
met with incredulity.
incredulity.
25 In a further
further study, Fernandez-Dols and Carroll ((1997: 1 997: 275
275)) ask what
'are the figure-ground
figure-ground interactions between facial expression and
context? The answer implicit in the mainstream view of facial
expression is very simple: There are none.'
26 Of course, it continues
continues to be part of popular attitudes towards the
emotions, as reflected, for example, in modern fiction and popular
thought,- d.
thought; cf. Eloy Martinez 2002: 56: 56: 'The emotions are always
irrational and possesspossess human beings in the same irrevocableirrevocable and un-un
avoidable manner as diseases' ('Las pasiones son siempre insensatas
y se apoderan de los seres humanos del mismo modo fatal e inevi inevi-
table que las enfermedades');
enfermedades'),- or Lt Colonel Bryan McCoy, com com-
mander of the the Third
Third Battalion in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq: Iraq: '"I'm
not
not allowed to have the luxury of emotions emotions to guide my decisions,"
decisions, "
he said. "It'll cloud my decisions, and I'll make a bad one if I submit
to that. I have to look at everything
everything very clinically'"
clinically'" (quoted in
Maass 2003: 35). 35). The view of thethe emotions as irrational was implicit
in the 'mentalites' school of cultural cultural history (see(see Rosenwein 2003:
434); it was also a commonplace view in classical classical antiquity: cf. d.
Notes to pages 20-2
20-2 / 269
Euripides, Medea
Medea 446-50, and Antiphon, On the the Murder
Murder ofof Herodes
71-2, with
with Harris 2001
2001:: 1169-73
69-73 and 1178: 78: 'Herodotus was one of the
first surviving writers to create an opposition between anger and
opposition between
rational decision making.' For the contrary view, d. cf. Shakespeare,
Shakespeare, A A
Midsummer Night's Dream 11.1.234:
Midsummer . 1 .234: 'Love looks not with the eyes,
but with the mind' -- this for love's love's power to make the vilest object
appear attractive.
27 Cf. also Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman 11980: 980: 1198;
98; and Solomon
11984:
984: 249: 'an understanding
understanding of the the conceptual
conceptual and learned
learned appeti
appeti-
tive functions of emotion is all that there is in identifying and
distinguishing
distinguishing them from from each other and from from non-emotions'; also
Frijda
Frijda 11993;
993; there
there is a survey of cognitivist views views in LeDoux 11996: 996:
22-72; see also Buck 2000; 2000,- Gainotti 2000; and Konstan 2001a: 200la: 8-10.
8-10.
28 Fortenbaugh (2002: I111 I I n. 11)) rightly challenges Martha Nussbaum's
Nussbaum's
view /200 1 : 64)
(2001: 64) that Aristotle 'views pain itself itself as an intentional
state with
with cognitive content'; rather, Aristotle 'distinguishes
between the cognition and the pain involved in emotions like fear,
anger and pity. The former is intentional; the latter is so only in a
derivative way.' On pain and pleasure as sensations, see Fortenbaugh Fortenbaugh
p. 17.
1 7.
29 Aristotle, however, holds that emotions,
Aristotle, emotions, or at least some emotions,
emotions,
involve both pain and pleasure; see below, pp. 33-4). 33-4).
30 Fortenbaugh
Fortenbaugh notes (2002: 1100) 00) that
that for Aristotle, 'believing (doxa
(doxa-
427b21 ) is not idly entertaining a thought; it is thinking that
zein 427b21)
something actually is the case. And when the belief concerns things things
terrible or encouraging, then emotionalemotional response follows: one feels
frightened
frightened or emboldened,
emboldened, seeksseeks safety or acts aggressively' (I (I won
won-
der whether this sequence of belief belief followed
followed by an emotional feelingfeeling
quite captures Aristotle's
Aristotle's view). However, the mere image or phan
orphan-
tasia of a thing, independently of belief, 'does not not have the
the same
effect. Much as we view a painting or drawing of something something threat
threat-
ening without
without becoming afraid, -- we do do not confuse
confuse an artistic
artistic
representation with with reality -- so so we may may imagine
imagine a threatening
threatening
situation
situation without
without being frightened, for we do not believe the danger
real.'
3311 Aristotle holds that that animals possess 'similarities to intelligent
understanding' (tt'ls(tes peri ten dianoian sunese6s
suneseos homoiotetes,
homoiotetes, History
History
of 588a23-4; d.
of Animals 588a23-4; cf. Politics 11332b5-6
332b5-6 for human
human beings alone
270 /I Notes to pages 22-5
22-5
possessing reasonreason (logos). Compare

Compare also Nicomachean Ethics
11098a3-4,
098a3-4, Eudemian Ethics 11224a26-7, 224a26-7, Metaphysics 980b26-8; 980b26-8;
History
History of of Animals 641 b8-9;; and Sorabji 11993:
641b8-9 993: 13.
13. Hence, only man man
can feel happiness
happiness (Parts of Animals 656a5).
(Parts of 656a5). So too, animals are
incapable of philia or love in the the full
full sense of thethe term (Eudemian
Ethics 7.2, 7.2, 1236b6).
1 236b6). The
The elder Pliny (Natural History 7, proem 5)
(Natural History 5)
affirms
affirms that only man man can experience grief, fear fear of death, and
hostility. Fear, according to Aristotle, makes people more delibera- delibera
tive (Rhetoric 385a5; d.
(Rhetoric 2.5, 11385a5; cf. chapter 5, 5, p. 135);
135); but
but only human
beings can deliberate (History (History ofof Animals 488b24-5
488b24-5).). For the ex
the ex-
treme position of the Stoics, who held that the difference difference between
human beings and other creatures ruled out the possibility of justice
between them, see Diogenes Laertius . 1 29; d.
Laertius 77.129; cf. Cicero, De officiis
officiis
11.50
.50 and, for a similar view, Epicurus, PrincipalPrincipal Doctrine 32. Con- Con
trast Plutarch, On the Cleverness of of Animals, e.g. e.g. 960-2, where
the claim
claim is made that animals
animals do have a share both in reason and
patM (966B); d.
pathe cf. Scully 2002:
2002: 227-8; also Newmyer 2006. 2006. On anan-
cient attitudes toward animals, see also the survey in Franco Franco
2000-
2000-1. 1.
32 The
The emotions for Aristotle (and (and for the Stoics: d
the Stoics: cf.. Seneca,
Seneca, On Anger
11.3.3-4)
.3 .3-4) pertain to a world fullyfully symbolized in language. Even if they
have their origin in animal responses, human emotions and the
judgments they involve involve are possible
possible only in human Evolu
human society. Evolu-
tionary explanations of the emotions fail, among other reasons, bebe
cause the reactions favoured
favoured by natural selection at the pre-human
level are categorically distinct from from human emotions.
33 Cf. Oliker ((1998:1 998: 20):
20): 'The cultural ethos of individualism encour- encour
aged people to view themselves as distinct, complex, and interesting
-- to develop
develop identities that could not be be specified by by their social
roles'; as a result, people tended toward introspection
introspection and the cultivcultiv-
ation of 'individual selves and inner lives.' lives/ A sense of inwardness,
personal uniqueness, and separation from from others may generate a
view of the the self as wholly
wholly autonomous
autonomous and sealed sealed off from
from the
the
outside world -- a monad within within which the emotions circulate in
an endless loop, feedingfeeding on themselves.
34 It is worth noting the absence in this list of feeling feeling tone, or what is
called the 'quale' in philosophical literature on the emotions. There
is no reliable way of measuring such states of consciousness, or of of
determining whether a given state corresponds corresponds to a specific emo-
Notes to pages 25-9
25-9 / 271
tion. On the the physiological basis of 'feelings,'

'feelings/ see Damasio 11994: 994: 1160-
60-
4j
4; Kim 11996:
996: 69-70, following
following Hilary
Hilary Putnam, argues that mental
states cannot
cannot be reduced to states of the the brain (or
(or the
the body generally)
generally)
if a sense of pain (for example) is the the same for creatures with with differ
differ-
ent physiological systems (the (the 'multiple realization' argument).
argument). Of Of
course, there are typical descriptions of feelings, and these vary from
one culture to anotherj
another; for some vivid Greek metaphors, metaphors, see Padel
11992:
992: 881-98.
1-98.
35 Action is relevant to ancient ideas of the the emotions, but but does not
play the central role it does in modern models that that stress
stress the
function
function of emotion in producing motivationj motivation; d. the Encyclopedia
cf. the
Britannica entry on 'Human Emotion and Motivation,' Motivation/ cited above,
or the volume Socioemotional Development Development (Thompson 11990) 990) in
the
the Nebraska
Nebraska Symposium Motivation. Robert Gordon ((1987:
Symposium on Motivation. 1 987: 84)84)
explains emotions as 'wish-frustrations,'
'wish-frustrations/ consisting of a belief belief and
and a
desire, and affirms
affirms thatthat emotions 'motivate' us to act in regard to
things we 'care about.'
36 Modern action action movies, with their chase scenes, explosions, sus- sus
pense, and sudden violence, produce intense sensations in the
audience, but but these are not not emotions in the Aristotelian
Aristotelian sense of of
pathe.
3377 Thus, II dodo not mean simply to contrast modern individualism individualism with with
the
the social rivalry characteristic of Athens's face-to-face culture.
38 Harris (2001:
(200 1 : 78)
78) notes the 'change which which occurred in the practice
of Greek artists in the the fourth
fourth century
century B.C.B.C. ...
... Sculptors and painters
began to represent emotional states for their own sake.' Harris
quotes Pliny, Natural History 35.98 on Aristeides: 'He, first
Natural History first of all,
depicted the mind and attitudes [animus et sensus] sensus] of man -- what
- [perturbationes]. ' See
the Greeks call ethos - and also emotions [perturbationes].' See also
Zanker
Zanker2004:2004: 1152-61.
52-6 1 .
3399 Brilliant
Brilliant (2000: 116) 6 ) notes Cicero's Stoic approval of mastering pain
((Tusculan Disputations 2.23.55), 'thereby translating
Tusculan Disputations translating an exemplum
exemplum
doloris, such as the Laocoon, into an exemplum virtutis.'' Contrast
exemplum virtutis.
Winckelmann's
Winckelmann's view (1968 ( 1 968 [orig. 11764]:
764): 4. 10. 1 .6j cited by Brilliant
4.10.1.6;
p. 117)
7) of the
the statue as 'representing a man man in extreme suffering
suffering ......
While the muscles are swelling and the nerves are straining straining with
torture, the determined spirit visible in the turgid forehead ...
spirit is visible ... The
expression of the the face is complaining, but but not screamingj the
not screaming; the eyes
are turned for for help to a higher power. power. The mouth
mouth is fullfull of sorrow,
and the sunken under lip is heavy with with the same feeling; but in the
upper lip, which is drawn upwards, this expressionexpression is mingled
mingled with
one
one of pain.'
40 On expressiveness in in art, d.
cf. Cicero Orator 70-4;
70-4; Cicero describes
describes
the sadness visible in the portraits
portraits of several present at the
several figures present
immolation
immolation of Agamemnon's daughter, Iphigeneia, but but adds that
Agamemnon is represented covering himself himself with his garment,
because 'that extreme
extreme of grief cannot be reproduced with a paint paint-
brush' (translation
(translation is that of Perry 2002: 1 54).
2002: 154).
4
411 It is worth noting too that in the theatre in Aristotle's time, the
faces of actors were concealed
concealed by masks, which necessarily pre
necessarily pre-
served a uniform expression throughout the drama.
42 Mackay (2002:(2002: 62)
62) shows how
how thethe complex use of allusion
allusion in black-
black
figured
figured vase painting works to 'bring to the forefront forefront additional
contexts in order to heighten the potential emotional content of the
picture.' Mackay emphasizes the the use of contrastive references,
references, e.g.
to a happy moment such as a wedding that that precedes the tragic
episode that is the principal scene on the vase, but her examples
also reveal how vase painters systematically evoked the causes and
context of an emotional ·representation.
"representation.
43 Corbeill notes further
further (2004: 159)
159)how, according to Tacitus Annals Annals
I, the
1, the aristocracy under Tiberius
Tiberius 'arranged their expressions (vultu (vultu ...
...
composito) s o not t o
composite) so as not to seem too happy at
at Augustus' death o r too
or
upset at the new beginning ... ... The Republican model of truth truth in
appearances has been subverted; the faces of the elite have become
appearances
texts that are deliberately misinterpreted by Tiberius, a perverse perverse
reader' ( 1 59).
reader'(159).
I do not
not mean to suggest that Greeks of the classical period did
not imagine that the face could reveal emotion, although more
often
often they looked not not so much for signs of passion, which could be
inferred from
inferred from the
the situation, as signs of character,
character, which couldcould not.
This is also the case for the the physiognomic treatises, the the earliest
of
of which go back to the the time of Aristotle; d. pseudo-Aristotle
cf. pseudo-Aristotle
Physiognomonica 805a. B05a. lB-3
18-311 and 805a.33-b.9
B05a.33-b.9 on ethos-,
ethos; 806a.l2-18
B06a. 1 2-1B
and B06b.28-34
806b.28-34 on how facial expressions of patM (e.g.
oipathe (e.g.anger)
anger)may
may
reveal temperament (irascibility); and 808b.27-34 on the the expression
of patM in animals. Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia
oipathe 3. 10. 1-5 for the
Memorabilia 3.10.1-5
mimetic representation of character (the (the ethos of the
the soul, e.g.
e.g. the
the
Notes to page 30 / 273
difference
difference between a proud and servile nature), nature), which which Socrates
argues is revealed through the eyes. Socrates then then questions
questions the
sculptor
sculptor Cleiton
Cleiton on his technique
technique for the the life-like representation
of
of athletes
athletes (3. 10.8): 'Does not
(3.10.8): not representing the pathe of bodies in
the paihe
action give pleasure
pleasure to the viewersviewers ...?
.. ? And shouldn't one represent
. represent
the threatening
threatening look in the eyes of men men who are fighting, and
imitate thethe glance of the the happy victors ....? . . ? ItItisisnecessary,
necessary,then,
then,
that a sculptor
sculptor represent
represent the deeds [ergaJ [erga] of the soul in the the physical
physical
appearance [eidosJ.'
[eidos].' Xenophon clearly expects that sculpture sculpture will
capture something
something of the the emotions of the the subject, above all in the the
eyes.
Ann Mackay has pointed out to me in a personal communication communication
that the
the Exekias 'Ajax' (Boulogne-sur-mer 558 = ABV = ABV [= [= Beazley
Beazley
1956J
1956] 145 Add.2 40) reveals furrows
. 1 8, para. 60, Add.2
145.18, furrows on the the brow and
cheek of thethe hero that are, quite exceptionally, indicative indicative of strong
emotion (for general dicussion of this image, see Mackay 2002: 66-8j 66-8;
d.
cf. Toohey 2004: 171-2). 1 7 1-2). Peter Toohey (2004: 15-20) 1 5-20) argues that
classical vase paintings in fact fact give evidence of certain emotional
states, in particular melancholy, that are not described in literature
until much
much later, when the literary tradition was able to '''catch "'catch up"
with the insights exemplified by the Eumenides Painter's Orestes'
(p. 20; the
the reference is to the the Apulian red-figure vase painting asas
cribed to the so-called Eumenides Painter and labelled 'The Purifica Purifica-
tion
tion of Orestes,'
Orestes/ dating to the the first
first quarter of the the fourth century BQ
fourth century BCj
the vase is number CP 7710 1 0 in the Louvre
Louvre Museum).
Museum). Toohey observes
that
that 'the picture itself provides no explanation, no etiology for
Orestes' state of mind mind ..... . It aims not at explanation but but at the con
con-
veying of affect
affect... ... It presents to us a vision of sorrow without without cause'
(25) -- not an emotion in the Aristotelian
Aristotelian sense, I would add. Toohey
considers that, in modem modern terms, Orestes (along with Ajax, Hercules,
Bellerophon, and even Jason) would be classified as manic-depressives manic-depressives
(34)
(34).. John J. Herrmann Jr, Jr, curator of classical art art atat the Museum of
the Museum of
Fine Arts in Boston,
Boston, has pointed out to me that that Apulian vases,
which derive from from Greek towns in South Italy, are more given to
indicating differences in facial
indicating differences facial expression
expression than are contemporary
vases produced in Greece. The conventions conventions of Apulian vases are
indeed quite different
different in various respects, including including painterly
technique.
1-3
44 Jakob Wisse ((1989:

1989: 292-4) has drawn attention to a difference difference
between Aristotle's treatment of pity in the Rhetoric and Cicero's in
between
De ora tore (2.2
oratore 1 1 ; d.
(2.211; . 1 08 ), where Cicero places a
cf. De inventione 11.108),
new emphasis on the personal experience of the pitier as a factor
that enables pity. In the words of Antonius, a character in Cicero's Cicero's
dialogue, 'Pity
Tity is aroused when he who listens can be brought to
refer
refer to his own circumstances [ad suas res revocat] revocat] -- the bitter
things that he has endured or fears fears -- that which
which he is lamenting lamenting in
the case of the other, so that he may, while contemplating the other,
frequently
frequently turn back to himself revertatur].' So
[ad se ipsum revertatur].'
himself [ad So too
Virgil's Dido tells Aeneas: 'not unacquainted with with misfortune, I have
learned to help those who are suffering' (Aeneid (Aeneid 11.630:.630: non ignara
mali miseris
miseris succurrere disco).
disco}.
45 Reddy (200 71-2) writes of eighteenth-century France:
1 : 1171-2)
(2001: France: 'The court,
its manners,
manners, and its fashions became the epitome epitome of immorality
and corruption .... .. Doubts about sincerity had tc! to arise, when open
emotionality no longer gave an unambiguous message.'
46 Compare too the Stoic analogy between between emotions and a person person who
is running and cannot stop when he chooses to; to; the emotions, once
aroused, continue independently of the original impulse. In Ovid's Ovid's
series of elegies The Loves, Cupid's arrow inspires in the the poet an
erotic passion before there is any object for it; his mistress Corinna
first makes her appearance in the third elegy ((1.3.1-2); 1 .3 . 1-2); see Cahoon
Cahoon
985: 29; and Greene 11998:
11985: 998: 72. Toohey (2004: 4-5, 4-5, 881-7, etc. )
1 -7, etc.)
identifies a change in the representation of the emotions with the the
emergence of boredom,
boredom, melancholy, depression, and lovesickness as
well-defined
well-defined emotional states. Contrast Harris 200 2001: 6: 'Aristotle
1 : 116:
and all the other
other classical authors who defined anger agreed, in
effect, that it was an emotion with a specific object, which is pre- pre
cisely what a mood is not.' On anxiety in particular, note Philo Philo-
demus's distinction in On Anger Anger between
between orge (anger) as a rational
emotion that the sage too may experience and thumos (temper), an
irrational passion based on empty belief.
47 For other lists of emotions, see Aristotle, Rhetoric 33.19, . 1 9, 11419b24-6,
4 1 9b24--6,
where, in speaking of the epilogue to a speech as the place to rouse
emotion, he mentions
mentions eleos (pity), dein6sis
deinosis (perhaps = shock = shock or
outrage), orge (anger), misosmisos (hatred), phthonos (envy), zelos (emula (emula-
tion), and eris (i.e., bad competitiveness)
competitiveness).. Cicero, de Ora tore 2.206,
Oratore
Notes to page
page 33 / 275
says that the most important emotions to arouse are am amor,or, odium,
odium,
iracundia, invidia, misericordia, spes, laetitia,
laetitia, timor, molestia,
which May and Wisse render 'affection,
'affection, hate, anger, envy, pity, hope,
joy, fear, and grief';
grief; this is Aristotle, plus spes, laetitia, and molestia. molestia.
In Brutus 188, Cicero says that a crowd listening listening to a good speaker
gaudet, dolet, ridet, plorat, fa vet, odit, contemnit, invidet,
favet, invidet, ad
misericordiam
misericordiam inducitur, ad pudendum, ad pigendum; irascitur, irascitur,
mitigatur, sperat, timet ('feels joy and pain, laughs and cries, lauds
and hates, scorns, envies, is moved to pity, shame, and disgust, grows
angry, calms down, hopes, and fears'; d. cf. Marincola
Marincola 2003). Cicero has
clearly added representatives of the Stoic fourfold
the Stoic fourfold classification of of
emotions, namely, pleasure, pain, desire or anticipation, and fear
emotions, fear
or avoidance, rendered in the first first passage as spes, laetitia, timor,
m olestia, and less distinctly in the second as gaudet, dolet, ridet,
molestia, ridet,
mitigatur =Aristotle's orge and
plorat. Irascitur and mitigatur = praiinsis. See
andpraunsis.
also Dionysius of Halicarnassus Demostbenes
Demosthenes 22 (1.322, ( 1 .322, Usher
11974-85),
9 74-85 ), who says that when he reads Demosthenes'
Demosthenes' speeches,
he is led to feel one emotion afterafter another (entbousio
(enthousio te kai deuro
kakeise agomai, pathos
kakeise patbos beteron
heteron ex beterou metalambanon, apiston,
exheterou
agonion, dedios, katapbronon, mison, eleon, eunoon,
kataphronon, mison, eunoon, orgizomenos,
pbtbonon,
phthonon, bapanta
hapanta ta pathe
patbe metalambanon, bosa hosa kratein
kratein pepbuken
pephuken
anthropines gnomes, which Usher translates: 'I am transported:
antbropines transported: I am
led hither
hither and thither, feeling one emotion
emotion after
after another
another -- disbelief,
anguish, terror, contempt, hatred, pity, goodwill, anger, envy -- every
emotion in turnturn that can sway the human mind.' Of this list, the
first
first two
two items areare odd
odd as
as emotions -- disbelief and and anguish -- and and are
are
better taken as responses,-
responses; anguish perhaps = lupe, while apiston
=
suggests amazement or wonder (tbaumal, (thauma], which was considered an

emotion
emotion in various contexts. Cf. Horstmanshoff 1999: 261
Cf. Horstmanshoff 261 on thethe
list in the medical writer Caelius Aurelianus, who 'caracterise les
emotions: appetere, desiderare, timor, maestitudo et iracundia
appetere, desiderare,
comme des passiones animae, des affections affections de 1'ame,
l'ame, distinctes des
passiones corporis, des maladies
maladies du corps'; Galen, On Diagnosing
and
and Curing Ailments of the Soul 3.5.
of tbe 3.5.77 K.,
K., who cites as patbe pathe
psukhes: tbumos
thumos kai orge, kai phobos kai lupe, kai pbthonos, phthonos, kai
epithumia sphodra
epitbumia sphodra philein e misein botiounhotioun pragma (('temper 'temper and
anger, fear and pain, envy, and an intenseintense desire to love or hate any- any
thing');
thing'),- and Gregory
Gregory of Nyssa, On tbe Beatitudes 44.
the Beatitudes 1 228.2 1-33. See
44.1228.21-33.
34-5
Lada 11993:
993: 99-100 on thethe importance of arousing emotions in the the
audience, and on the requirement that the orator himself feel them
in order to induce them
them the better, Quintilian 6.2.26-36 with Bons Bons
and Lane 2003: 14 1-4.
141-4.
48 Frede 1996 argues that
that the
the mixture of pleasure and pain in the the
emotions as described in the Rhetoric betrays betrays the still lively
influence upon Aristotle of Plato's account in the Philebus-, Philebus; by the
time he wrote the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle Aristotle had moved away
from
from the Platonic notion of 'process-pleasures' to his own mature
view of 'activity-pleasures' fp. (p. 278).
278).Striker
Striker1 1996
996 draws
drawsthetheline
line
rather between the brief
brief account of the emotions in Rhetoric 11.10- . 1 0-
I I, where Plato's influence is still palpable, and the more detailed
11,
description
description of the individual emotions in Rhetoric 2.2-1 2.2-11;1 ; here,
even if painful
painful emotions may be associated with with pleasures, pleasure
is not a necessary ingredient in them (29 1 ). Striker argues that
(291). that in
this part Aristotle is clearly moving towards a dichotomized class- class
ification
ification of emotions
emotions according to pleasure vs. pain (292), which which
anticipates the later elaboration of this opposition by the Stoics
(294). Aspasius, in his digression on the emotions in his commen- commen
tary on Aristotle's Nicomachean
Nicomachean Ethics (42.27-47.2,
(42.27-47.2, Heylbut 11889), 889),
affirms
affirms that the
the emotions are grouped generically
generically according to
pleasure (bedone)
(hedone) and
and pain (Jupe);
(lupe); Sorabji 11999 999 argues that desire or
appetite is also essential to thethe Aristotelian classification.
classification.
49 Cf. Spinoza 11989:
989: 223; the
the translation by Shirley ((1982:1 982: 1151)
5 1 ) reads:
reads:
'The emotion
emotion called a passive experience
experience is a confused idea whereby
the
the mind affirms
affirms a greater or less force of existence of its its body,
body, or
part of its body, than was previously the the case, and by the occurrence
of
of which the
the mind is determined to thinkthink of one thingthing rather than
another.'
50 Cf. Ortega y Gasset
Gasset 11976
976 (orig. 11924):
924): 54: 'Perhaps the the vision
vision of of
someone in love is more acute than that of a lukewarm individual;
perhaps in every object there are qualities and values that only
reveal themselves to the excited gaze ... ... Typically, the case is that
someone
someone in love with another
another person or thing has a more precise precise
image of them than one who is indifferent...
indifferent ... No, love neither lies,
nor is blind, nor deludes:
deludes: what it does is situate the beloved in a
light so favorable that the most hidden charms become apparent.'
Notes to pages
pages 38-42 / 277
See also Reddy 2001:

200 1 : 94-5
94-5 for
for a definition
definition of emotion
emotion as sets ofof
thoughts that
that tend to be activated together.
5511 Parkinson ((1995: 285) states: 'I
1 995: 285) 'I would argue that anger does not
depend on concluding that that someone else is to blame, as appraisal
theory has implied, but
but rather is an interpersonal tactic for blaming
someone else'j
else'; I would rather say the two processes
processes are interdepen-
interdepen
dent.
52 Value terms typically have a range of meanings that that are not
not always
reducible to a single core sensej
sense; see Rademaker
Rademaker 2005: 14-35.
1 4-35 .
Chapter Two
1 Solomon
Solomon goes
goes onon the
the indicate
indicate howhow risky
risky this
this assumption
assumption is. is. Cf.
Cf. also
also
Rosaldo 11984:
984: 1144-5.
44-5.
2 The mention of pain and pleasure pleasure may be a succinct
succinct way of distin-
distin
guishing emotional responses from exclusively
from those based exclusively on
reason or enthymemes, a topic that Aristotle treated with with particular
pride in the first
first book of the Rhetoric. The same criterion is in in-
voked, however, at Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, l1105b21-3. 1 05b21-3.
3 The
The relationship between phantasia and aisthesis in Aristotle is
controversialj the most
controversial; most relevant
relevant evidence is On the Sou1 Soul 3.3 and On
Dreams 2, 459aI 5-19, where phantasia is said to be a motion that
459al5-19,
from (or
arises from (or as a result of)
of) the
the activity
activity of perception. Nussbaum
Nussbaum
((1996:
1 996: 307)
307) suggests that phantasia
phantasia here is not not so much
much a technical
term as the abstract noun corresponding to the verb phainomai.
Aristotle does not make clear just what the nature is of the pain that
accompanies anger, but it seems reasonable to suppose that that it results
from direct perception
from perception of something
something harmful
harmful or unpleasant, rather
than from
from memory or anticipationj
anticipation; contrast the the case of fear, which
Aristotle defines as 'arising from from the phantasia of a future
the phantasia future evil that
is fatal or harmful'
harmful' (ek phantasias
phantasias mellontos kakou phthartikou e
]uperou, 2.5, 11382a21-2).
luperou, 382a21-2).
4 Aristotle adds that by dwelling on revenge revenge in our minds (dianoia),
(dianoia],
phantasia that thereby
the phantasia thereby arises instils pleasure, analogous
analogous to that
we feel in dreams (2.2, (2.2, 1378b l-9). I cannot agree with Grimaldi
1378M-9).
((1988:
1 988: 25
25 ad 11378bl-2)
3 78bl-2) that '[t]he feeling
feeling dominant
dominant in the emotion
emotion
anger is hedone.'
hedone.' Compare Nicomachean
Nicomachean Ethics 4.5, 11126a21-2,
1 26a2 1-2,
278 / Notes to pages
pages 42-3
42-3
Aristotle says that 'revenge ends one's anger, instilling

where Aristotle
pleasure in place of pain.'
5 Cf.
Cf. Aristotle's definition
definition of pity
pity as a painful feeling
feeling in response
response to 'a
perceived evil that is either fatal or painful'painful' (epi
(epi phainomenoi kakoi
luperoi) that has befallen another person who has not
phthartikoi e 1uperoi)
deserved it (2.8, 11385bl3-14).
385bI 3-14). There is no need to take phainomenos
in the sense of 'manifest' or 'conspicuous' ((e.g.
the sense e.g. Roberts 1984:
1 984: 22195;
195;
d.
cf. Grimaldi
Grimaldi 11988:
988: 2121 ad 11378a31-3),
3 78a3 1-3 ), still less to delete phainom enes
delete phainomenes
before timorias (Spengel, Ross).
6 At Topics 4.5,
4.5, 1125b28-34,
25b28-34, Aristotle states that pain cannot be
equated with anger, since pain is prior to anger and not not vice versa;
versa,-
I take it that the painful
painful thing upon which anger follows is just the
slight. At 4.6, 1127b26-32,
27b26-32, Aristotle
Aristotle argues that pain involved involved in
anger and the suspicion (hupolepsis) of a slight are two distinct
suspicion (hupolepsis)
aspects of anger.
anger. Finally, at 6.13, 1151al4-19,
5 1a 1 4- 1 9, Aristotle states that
being caused by pain is not the same as being accompanied by pain.
7 Spite (epereasmos),
[epeieasmos], which is listed as one of the three types of slight slight
in Aristotle's treatment of anger (2.2, (2.2, 11378bl4),
3 78b14), is also cited as one
of the causes of hatred or enmity (2.4, 1382a2) 1 382a2);; itit would appear that,
in certain circumstances,
circumstances, spite can generate a hostile response response that
is not accompanied
accompanied by pain, and is therefore distinct from from anger.
8 Cf.
Cf. Solomon
Solomon 11984:
984: 250:
250: 'Anger ..... . is essentially a judgmental
judgmental
emotion, a perception of an offense offense (as(as Aristotle argued in Rhetoric).
Rhetoric}.
It consists of a series of concepts and and judgments
judgments that among other
ingredients, involve the concept of blame.'
9 Lazarus, Kanner,
Kanner, and Folkman ((1980: 1 980: 198),
198), for example, define
emotion as 'consisting of cognitive
emotion cognitive appraisals, action impulses, and
action impulses,
patterned somatic reactions,' and assert: 'Emotions and cognitions
are thus inseparable.' Solomon ((1984: 1 984: 249)
249) states (and (and endorses) a
strong version of 'a cognitive theory of the the emotions' which holds
that 'an understanding of the conceptual and learned appetitive
functions
functions of emotion
emotion is all that there is in identifying and distin distin-
guishing
guishing them
them from
from each other
other and fromfrom non-emotions'
non-emotions' (the (the weak
version is that these are sufficient
sufficient conditions).
conditions). For a survey of of
modern studies of cognitive aspects of the the emotions, together with with a
critique of definitions of the the emotions based exclusively on cogni- cogni
tive properties, see Griffiths
Griffiths 11997:
997: 21 -43; see further
21-43; further chapter 1, I,
pp. 20-4.
20-4.
Notes to pages 43-5
43-5 / 279
10 Cf. also, e.g., Damasio 11994: 994: xi: 'I had

had been advised early in life that
sound decisions came from from a cool head, thatthat emotions
emotions and reason
did not
not mix
mix any more than water',- and d.
than oil and water'; cf. Hillman 1 992:
Hillman 1992:
1188;
88; and Bailey 11983:
983: 24: 'The dichotomy between between reason and
emotion
emotion is part of our overt culture;
culture,- that is, part of thethe shield of
shield of
falsification
falsification by which we make life comprehensible'; see also Bar- Bar
balet 11998:
998: 29-61
29-61.. The view has a long pedigree: Plutarch, e.g., in his
pedigree: Plutarch,
Comparison of of Theseus and and Romulus (3. 1 ), speaks of the
(3.1), the 'irrational
temper' (thumos alogistos) and 'anger's unreasoning haste' (orge (orge
aboulon] that drove Theseus to slay his son and
ekhousa takhos aboulonJ
Romulus his his brother; d. cf. Alexiou 11999:
999: 104.
1 04.
1111 Introductions to this approach may be found found in Zahn-Waxler, Cum- Cum
mings, and Iannotti
lannotti 1986, and Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992. 1 992.
In a popular vein are Buss 11994 994 and
and 2000, and Lewis, Amini, and
Lannon 2000. Anger has been defended defended from
from a phenomenological
perspective, e.g.
e.g. by Milhaven 1989; for an accessible and sensible sensible
survey
survey of views
views on anger;
anger, see Tavris 11989.989.
12 She may simply be startled. On the the difference
difference between fear fear and
being startled, d. cf. Oatley 11992:
992: 119;9; and Nussbaum 11996: 996: 306.
13
13 Compare Strawson 11974: 9 74: 5:
5: 'If
'If someone treads on my my hand
hand acciden
acciden-
tally, while
while trying to help me, the pain may be no less acute than than ifif
he treads on it in contemptuous disregard of my existence existence or with
with a
malevolent
malevolent wish to injure me. But I shall generally feel in the second
case a kind
kind and degree of resentment
resentment that I shall not feel in the first.'
One's feelings change as new knowledge of another's another's motives is
acquired.
1144 On thethe theory that
that stimuli
stimuli resulting in emotional
emotional responses may
travel by two distinct
distinct pathways in the brain, the shove, indicating indicating
danger, might
might be imagined
imagined as travelling
travelling directly
directly from
from the thalamus
to the amygdala, triggering the relevant reaction, while while the thalamus
thalamus
also transmits
transmits information to the sensory cortex, which which processes
it and sends it in turnturn to the amygdala, permitting
permitting a second, more
reflective
reflective response (the (the shove was likely to be accidental, etc.). See See
LeDoux 11996:996: 168-78,-
1 68-78; and Elster 1 999b: 331-5.
Elster 1999b: 1 -5.
115
5 Cf. Oatley ((1992:
1 992: 119):
9): 'I may
may suddenly feel frightened
frightened if the
the vehicle
in which
which I am traveling seems to be heading heading for an accident. I
evaluate a perception in relation to my concerns for safety, though
not necessarily consciously. This This may be the commoncommon experience in
45-6
such
such situations. But a person confident
confident that an accident
accident would
would not
occur, perhaps the one who is driving, or the one who is uncon uncon-
cerned about personal safety at that moment, moment, may not not feel fear.' If
If
the woman in my story were to persist in feeling angry, angry, perhaps as a
result of heightened physiological tension, she would undoubtedly
produce a narrative
narrative that justified it.
116
6 Modern English speakers
speakers are inclined to identify a wider range of of
causes or anger (or (or irritation), including frustration, noise, and
including frustration,
crowds;
crowds,- see Tavris 11989:
989: 1164-77.
64-77. Plutarch continues to see mockery
and other insults
insults as chief
chief causes of anger, although he, like others of of
his time, believes
believes that a wise person should rise above such such provoca
provoca-
tions; d.
cf. On Controlling AngerAnger 454D, 460D-E, Alexiou 11999: 999: 105.
17 On the idea of superiority in in connection
connection with anger, see Viano 2003. 2003.
18 One might suppose that Aristotle excludes revenge or retribution retribution as
a cause of anger
anger on the grounds that the victim victim is aware
aware that he has
earned
earned it, and, as Aristotle says, we do not get angry when we
suffering justly (d.
perceive that we are suffering (cf. NE
NE 5.8, 11135b25-9,
1 35b25-9, where
Aristotle remarks that 'anger residesresides in a perceived injustice [adikial
perceived injustice ' ).
[adikia]'}.
But
But what of harm inflicted for the the sake of personal advantage?
advantage?
Aristotle's reasoning is clearly the same in both cases: cases: getting even
with
with another, or doing harm for the sake of gain, do not in them them-
selves betray a belief
belief that thethe target of such behaviour is of no
importance, and hence do not count as slights, which are the only
importance, only
grounds for anger.
anger. For fuller
fuller discussion, see Konstan 2004.
19 Yet
19 Yet the
the difference
difference is not, perhaps, as extreme as it may seem. Andre
and Lelord (2002: 45 45)) report that 'an Australian researcher asked 158
employees to describe an event at the workplace that provoked their
anger'; the result was that 44% identified being treated in an unjust unjust
manner; 23 23% % being witness to incorrect
incorrect behaviour;
behaviour,- and 115% 5 % being
witness to incompetence
incompetence on the job; job; while 1111 %% pointed to beingbeing
an object of contempt or disrespect, and 7% 7% to enduring a public
humiliation
humiliation (45-6, citing Fitness 2000). To treat another unjustly,
if
if there is no advantage to be gained, is a sign of disrespect.
the near equation of anger and hatred, d.,
20 For the e.g., Baird and
cf., e.g.,
Rosenbaum 11999: 999: 10.
10. Bishop Butler ((1896:
1 896: 139-44) distinguishes
between deliberate anger (or (or resentment)
resentment) as a necessarily
necessarily moral
emotion
emotion and what he calls 'sudden anger,' an instinctive instinctive response to
pain or harm that does not not necessarily entail a judgment
judgment of injury or
Notes to pages 47-9
47-9 / 2281
81
injustice oonn the

the part ooff another (I aam m grateful
grateful ttoo Charles Griswold
for
for calling my attention
attention to this passage).
21
21 Stocker ((1996:
1 996: 266-7) rightly distinguishes the the causes of enmity
from
from those of anger in Aristotle.
Aristotle.
22 In Topics
Topics 88.1,
. 1 , 1156a27-b3,
56a27-b3, Aristotle confronts
confronts the objection that
the objection
anger towards parents does not entail a desire for revenge: in fact
it does, he argues, although the pain to be inflicted is limited limited to
remorse.
23 If hatred does not not involve pain, does it qualifyqualify as a pathos
pathos on
Aristotle's definition, which stipulates that emotions must be
attended by pleasure and and pain (2. 1 , 1378a2
(2.1, 1378a21-21-2;; d.
cf. J.M. Cooper 11996:996:
243; and
and Fortenbaugh
Fortenbaugh 2002: 1114, 1 4, cited in chapter I, 1, p. 34)? In the
the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that that philia resembles a settled
state of character or hexis, since it is accompanied by deliberate
choice (proairesis),
[pioaiiesis], and he coins the term philesis -- a 'feeling of love'
-
- to denote the pathos (8.5, (8.5, 11157b28-32).
1 5 7b28-32). ButBut there he is concerned
concerned
principally with philia in the sense of friendship friendship (that is, between
philoi}. In the Rhetoric, however, philia and hatred (misos]
philoi). (misos) are
treated as pathe (as (as also at NE 1 105b2 1-3 ) .
1105b21-3). Aristotle sup
perhaps sup-
posed that the wish (boulesthai)
(boulesthai] that good things accrue to a friend friend
(or bad to an enemy) is accompanied by a phantasia of its its fulfilment,
just as the
the desire (orexis)
(orexis) for revenge
revenge is in in the
the case of anger.
anger. If so,
both love and hatred hatred would be accompanied by pleasure (J.M.
Cooper [[1996:
1 996: 248]
248]notes that hatred ought not not to be a pleasurable
pleasurable
emotion; but Aristotle, as we have seen, does not not divide the emo-emo
tions on the
the axis of pleasure vs. pain). See further further chapter 9, p. 192. 1 92.
24 Muellner ((1996:
1996: 331) 1 ) understands
understands menis as 'the irrevocable
irrevocable cosmic
sanction
sanction that prohibits
prohibits some characters
characters fromfrom taking
taking their superiors
for
for equals and others from from taking their equals for inferiors,' a
definition
definition that suits the resentment that Achilles feels towards
Agamemnon.
25 So too, Harris (2001 (2001:: 1131)
3 1 ) observes
observes that 'the hero's rage, first first against
Agamemnon, later against the Trojan prince Hector, gives the poem
its principal structure' (d. (cf. 1143:
43 : 'The second of Achilles' great
angers'/;
angers'); and Lateiner 2004: 27: 27: 'Achilleus' rage at Hektor replaces
and surpasses his rage at Agamemnon.' George George Robertson
Robertson ((1999:
1999: 5)5)
comments that '[t]he Achilleus whom we see towards the end ooff the
poem is motivated
motivated by emotional forces similar to those that prompt
282 / Notes to page 50
his desire
desire to kill Agamemnon
Agamemnon in Book 1,' forces that are indicated indicated by
his blazing eyes. I grant grant that the intensity of Achilles' passion in the
two contexts
contexts is comparable, as Robertson Robertson argues, but stop short short at
characterizing the emotions as being entirely the same. Robertson
has kindly informed
informed me that he finds finds the above account cogent.
26 After
After Achilles and Agamemnon are reconciled, Agamemnon
prepares to deliver the gifts he had promised him him if he would return
to battle ((19.184-97).
1 9 . 1 84-97). Achilles, however, prefers to put put off the
the
exchange and go immediately
immediately into battle for the the sake of the
the men
men
whom Hector cut down while Zeus granted him glory (kudos, (kudos,
19.204), and to dine only at nightfall, when 'we may avenge the
outrage' (teisaimetba
(teisaimetha l6ben, loben, 119.208).
9.208). Does the term lobe lObe here
suggest
suggest that Achilles regards Hector's Hector's rampage as an insult? Achilles
Achilles
uses the
the verbal form (l6baomai)
(lobaomai] of Agamemnon's
Agamemnon's behaviour
behaviour in
book 11 ((232,
232, repeated
repeated by Thersites at 2.242), 2.242), and later
later refuses Aga-
Aga
memnon's giftsgifts until such time as he shall compensate compensate for the
'heart-rending l6be' lobe' (9.387). Clearly, then, the word can pertain pertain to
the kind of affront
affront or insolence that has led Achilles to withdraw
from
from battle. The noun 16beter, Thersites (2.275
lobetei, which is applied to Thersites (2.275))
by the Greek army, bbyy Diomedes ttoo Paris for employing the bow
rather than
than the spear ((11.385),1 1 .385), and by Priam to his remaining sons
now that
that Hector is dead (24.239), seems a more general term of of
abuse. Hector in turn reproaches Paris for being a lobe l6be in the eyes ofof
others (3.42), and when Hector challenges one of the Achaeans
Hector challenges Achaeans to an
individual duel, MenelausMenelaus declares
declares that it would
would be a lobe16be if no one
volunteered
volunteered to confront him ((7.97); 7.97); here, 'scandal' or 'disgrace'
seems the relevant
relevant meaning
meaning (at (at 24.53
24.531,1, Achilles says that he on
whom Zeus bestows only evils is 16betos, lobetos, 'subject to outrage').
In Book I11, I, Peisander and Hippolochus, two sons of Antimachus,
plead for their life with Agamemnon. Antimachus had been bribed
by Paris to oppose the return of Helen, and when Menelaus and
Odysseus came to Troy to claim her back, back, proposed killing
killing them.
Now, says Agememnon, 'you will pay for [tisetel [tisete] the
the foul 16 of
be of
lobe
your father' ((11.142).
1 1 . 1 42). L6be
Lobe here clearly signifies outrageous action:
slaying unarmed ambassadors and defending the the unjust seizure of of
Helen -- for
for base motives, at that - are are signs of contempt for the
of contempt
Achaeans, which inspire Agamemnon's Agamemnon's anger anger and the desire for
revenge. So So too in book 13, Menelaus slays another
13, Menelaus Peisander (the
another Peisander
repetition of the name is not, I think, mere coincidence) and de- de
nounces the lobe and shameful
shameful deeds (aiskhos) of the arrogant
deeds (aiskhos) arrogant
Trojans, who stole his wife and much wealth besides; besides,- Menelaus
implores Zeus to punish them them for their violent contemptcontempt (hubristes)
[hubiistes]
and insatiable passion for war ((13.620-39).
13.620-39). Finally, when the the goddess
Iris descends fromfrom Olympus to informinform Achilles of the the battle round
the
the body of PatrocIus,
Patroclus, she says that it would be a lobe, Achilles if
lobe for Achilles if
PatrocIus's corpse were mutilated ((18.180).
Patroclus's 1 8 . 1 80). What, then, is the lobe
that Achilles
Achilles hopes that that he and his men (or (or the Achaeans in general)
will avenge in book 119? 9 ? I suspect that it refers to the the Trojans' arro
arro-
gance in fighting
fighting for an unjust
unjust cause, in the the course of which they
have harmed so many Achaeans and now Patroclus Patroclus as well. This is
what demands requital, not just the personal personal loss that Achilles has
suffered.
27 Kholos in this part of the epic is used in reference reference to women's
women's
quarrels (20.25 1-5;
(20.251-5; Aeneas speaking); to Zeus's possible anger should
Achilles
Achilles slay Aeneas before his time is up (20.300-2; (20.300-2; Poseidon is the
speaker); to the river Scam ander's anger at Achilles' vengefulness,
Scamander's
which is appropriate
appropriate for a god in respect to a mortal's pride (21.136-8;(21 . 136-8;
d.
cf. 221.146-7,
1 . 1 46-7, where Xanthus is enraged at Achilles' lack of pity); to
Hera's anger at Artemis for daring daring to oppose her in in battle (21 .478-82);
(21.478-82);
and to a snake's
snake's kholos, or venom, in a simile simile illustrating Hector's
determination to face Achilles' onslaught (22.93-7); (22.93-7); this is the sum
total for books 20 to 22. 22. The first occurrence in book 23 is indeed
applied to Achilles' rage over the death of Patroclus as the motive motive
for
for his maltreatment of Hector's body and the the sacrifice
sacrifice of twelve
Trojan youths (23.2 1-3 ) . A little later, the term is used in reference
(23.21-3). reference
to Patroclus's anger, whichwhich caused him to slay a young companion
in a quarrel over a game of knucklebones (23 .88); several subsequent
(23.88);
occurrences in book 23 23 have to do with bickering among contestants
in the funeral
funeral games (23 .482, 543, and 567).
(23.482, 567).The Thefinal
finalbook
bookofofthethe
epic mentions the the anger of Hera (24.55) and and of Zeus (24. 1 14 = 135);
(24.114 = 135);
there is also the reference
reference to Achilles' anger at Agamemnon, noted noted
above (24.395), while the the last occurrence in the entire poem (24.586)
is in reference to Achilles'
Achilles' command to cover Hector's corpse for
fear that Priam may become angry upon seeing seeing it. Some of these
these
passages are discussed below; below; for an exhaustive discussion of kholos
in the Homeric epics,epics, and the difference
difference between kholos and kotos,
1 -3
which signifies the long-term

long-term hostility associated with the feud, see
TR. Walsh 2005.
T.R.
28 We recognize
recognize too that one purpose of the simile is to underscore underscore
Achilles' sense of of paternal responsibility for his comrade comrade -- conceiv-
conceiv
ably there is an allusion here as well to his feelings feelings concerning
concerning
Briseis, whom Agamemnon
Agamemnon stole from him.
29 Other heroes become angry when they feel feel slighted or cheated in the
course of thethe funeral games (book 23); 23); see n. 26 above.
above.
30 The Latin term ira also carries both senses; contrast Virgil, Aeneid Aeneid
112.108 2.946, and d.
2 . 108 with 112.946, cf. Braund
Braund and Gilbert 2004.
3311 The confrontation
confrontation between a ruler and his greatest warrior, and the
pattern of of insult
insult leading to the warrior's
warrior's seething rage, are common
to many epics, e.g. e.g. El Cid, Le chanson de Roland, the Persian Persian Shah
Shdh-
ndma-, see D
nama; .A. Miller
D.A. Miller 2000: 1178-87 78-87 for examples, and esp. 1183 83 on
Irish
Irish tales that 'depict a mortal mortal tension
tension between a king and his
"man," as when a champion's
champion's loyalty to his chief is broken because
of a woman'; also pp. 20 1-3, and Jackson 1982. This pattern is often
201-3,
accompanied by the hero's demonstration
demonstration of his prowess in slaying a
great antagonist, whom he may pity or else abuse in defeat ID.A.
defeat (D.A.
222-5);; Achilles'
Miller 2000: 222-5) Achilles' reaction is violent at first, but finally
compassionate when he returns Hector's body to Priam. The ambi- ambi
tion to avenge the death of a dear friend friend is a separate motif, and has
its source not in the arrogance of the king but in the identification identification
between warrior and squire or friend; friend; the hero's motive here is not
anger at a slight
slight but
but an almost
almost transcendental
transcendental or existential griefgrief
over the loss of one so intimateintimate as to constitute
constitute a part of his very
self. The intersection
intersection of of these two motives -- mistreatment
mistreatment by a
superior and the death of a friend friend -- can lead in real life to the kindof of
unbounded rage that Achilles experiences; see Shay 1994.1 1994. I under-
under
stand the Iliad
Iliad as an exploration of the warrior's psychology under
extreme stress, rather than as 'a lesson against uncontrolled and
unassuaged wrath' for the danger that it poses to the civil commu
civil commu-
nity (Harris
(Harris 2002: 153).
153). See
See also Hammer
Hammer 20012001:: 213: 'The
The pain that
Achilles
Achilles experiences from from the loss of Patroklos recasts his earlierearlier
understanding
understanding of pain that caused him him to withdreaw fromfrom battle.
Achilles saw himself
himself as "suffering-from"
"suffering-from" the dishonor brought about
by Agamemnon.
Agamemnon. Achilles'
Achilles' response is one of anger: anger: he seeks to
restore his esteem.
esteem . ....
. . With the death of Patroklos,
Patroklos, though, Achilles
Notes to pages
pages 54-6
54-6 / 285
experiences a "suffering-with," in which which his own pain pain is connected

connected
to the
the suffering
suffering of another.'
32 To be fairfair to Wilson's subtle argument, I quote at some length her
summary of it: 'Achilleus'
'Achilleus' aggressive
aggressive appropriation of a conflated
Chryses/Apollo model brought him him the embassy and Agamemnon's
apoina. His strategy has failed, however, to produce a culturally
apaina. culturally
acceptable offer offer of paine
poine or to cast Agamemnon in a dependent
position in relation to himself. Achilleus is, as I have already
suggested, determined that that Agamemnon's superiority, unlike Zeus'
own superiority,
superiority, is not unassailable. He will therefore therefore deploy his
strategy of tisis to the limit, limit, and beyond,
beyond, in the
the struggle for domi- domi
nance. Moreover, he does so not by rejecting heroic tradition, tradition, but but by
appropriating and aggressively
aggressively exploiting its ambiguities
ambiguities ... ...;j he is set
on taking paine poine and, after after that, apaina'
apoina' ((107).
1 07).
33 The scholia
scholia remark too (ad 9.65 1-2) on Achilles' use
9.651-2) use of thethe epithet
'divine' (dios)
(dias) in regard to Hector, which, they point out, Homer
does not employ
employ in his own voice. They They explain
explain it as Achilles' way
of irritating (lupan)
(lupon) the the Achaeans (they compare 9.356, Achilles
speaking to Odysseus),
Odysseus), but it is worth noting that that his attitude
attitude
towards a military
military enemy is very differentdifferent from
from the
the wrath
wrath he bears
towards Agamemnon.
34 This is not to say that slaves really were unresentful at abuse, even
if
if it was prudent for them to swallow their their pridej
pride; see Barton 200 1:
2001:
1 1 : '[E]motionally the
11: the slave was every bit aass sensitive
sensitive ttoo insult
insult as
his or her master.' Barton Barton cites ((12)
1 2) Horace, Satires 11.6.23-4,
.6.23-4, 'sed
fulgente trahit
trahit constrictos
constrictos gloria curru / non minus minus ignotos
generosis' (('but'but glory draws, in its shiningshining chariot, the humble
humble no
less than the noble') and ((13) 13 ) Cato the Elder, as quoted
quoted by Aulus
Gellius ((10.3.7):
1 0.3 . 7): 'servi
'send iniurias nimis aegre ferunt' ('slaves bear
insults badly'); d.
insults very badly'li cf. Seneca, On Constancy
Constancy 55.1,
. 1 , etc. Aristotle's
Aristotle's
class analysis does not reveal the entire truth truth about ancient
ancient sensi
sensi-
bilities. Cf. also Abu-Lughod 11999 986): I111,
999 (orig. 11986): l l, a propos
Bedouin society: ''[Dependents,
[D]ependents, including women, strive for honor
in the traditional
traditional sense. They share with with their
their providers the same
ideals for self-image and social reputation, which which they try to follow
in their
their everyday lives. Yet the situations
situations in which
which they can realize
these ideals, in particular those of independence and assertiveness,
are circumscribed.'
56-8
35 Harris (200 1 : 139)

(2001: 139) observes:
observes: 'Showing anger was a prerogative
prerogative of the
the
gods and of princes'; but but it may be that even feeling anger was such
a prerogative;
prerogative; as Harris notes, in the Odyssey,
Odyssey, 'Telemachus
'Telemachus has to
learn anger' ((140).
1 40). For the
the association
association of anger with
with dishonour, see
also Sophocles, Oedipus the King 339-40 (quoted in chapter 1, I,
p. 38).
36 Richardson
Richardson Lear (2004: 19) 19) notes that, for Aristotle, 'without a
final resting
resting point, ""ourour desire
desire (orexis) empty and vain"
(orexis) would be empty
((1094a20-l)'
1 094a20-1 )';; for 'no one would try to do anything if he were not
going to come to a limit' (peras, Metaphysics a2, 994b
(peras, Metaphysics 1 3-14).
994bl3-14).
Compare Iliad 22. 1 5-20, where Achilles, who has been distracted
22.15-20,
from
from the battle before the walls of Troy by Apollo, declares that he
would make the god god pay for the harm that that he has done him -- if he
could. But vengeance is not possible, and neither neither is anger against a
god. Reginster ((1997:1997: 297)
297) observes that 'the purpose of revenge is
not
not the
the punishment
punishment of a deed of which which one disapproves.
disapproves. Rather,
if I have been defeated,
defeated, my revenge essentially aims to restore restore my
challenged superiority.' For Nietzsche, the the abiding desire for re-
re
venge, coupled with the certaintycertainty that it is unattainable,
unattainable, produces
the characteristic psychological state of ressentiment. The slave, on
the contrary, is one who 'never even forms the expectation to live
the life his masters value' (ibid., 287). 287).
3377 Cf. Harris 2002001: 1 : 139: 'Showing anger was was a prerogative of the
the gods
and of princes'; Creon, in Sophocles' Antigone, and Oedipus, in
Oedipus Tyrannus, are both quick to become angry.
Oedipus
38 For Medea as a revenge play, see Mastronarde Mastronarde 2002: 8-15, and on
Medea's anger, 117-18, 7-18, 3312-13;
1 2-13; for a different
different reading of anger in
Medea, see Harris 2001: 200 1 : 1169-71,
69-71 , 277-8.
39 TheThe same tension is apparent in the the classical Greek
Greek conception of of
erotic love, which casts men as as the subject ofof passion -- men are
lovers, women are are loved -- but at the same time represents the lover
as feminized because he is dominated by desire; see Konstan 2002b
for
for discussion.
discussion.
40 Compare the the topos of women's excessive and violent anger towards
servants in modern literature, for example in the second act of of
George Bernard
Bernard Shaw's Widowers' Houses-, by such representations,
Widowers' Houses;
strong-willed
strong-willed womenwomen are shown shown to be unfit to exercise authority and
exercise authority
thus safely reduced to a subordinate role.
Notes to pages
pages 59-65 / 287
41
41 Though the phrasing is difficult,difficult, editors agree that the the anger must be
that of Hyllus, not Dejanira.
not Dejanira.
42 Wahl
Wohl ((1998:
1 998: 8)
8) remarks that the robe Dejanira Dejanira gives to Hercules
'evokes the robe in which Clytemnestra kills Agamemnon in
Aeschylus' Agamemnon,'
Agamemnon/ and notes further further that weaving is the
characteristic activity of women (25). Like Medea, Clytemnestra Clytemnestra is
sufficiently
sufficiently powerful
powerful to exact revenge, and hence to experience
anger at Agamemnon's treatment of her. On women and weaving,
see also Ferrari
Ferrari 2002:
2002: 112, 2, and D. Lyons 2003: 1122-3,22-3, who describes
the poisoned garment sent by Dejanira Dejanira as 'a feminine delivery
system'; Foley (2004: 78) 78) describes
describes a production in 2002 of Bad Bad
Women, by Tina Shepherd,Shepherd, Sidney Goldfarb, and the the Talking Band,
which had 'Medea and Deianeira simultaneously simultaneously rubbing poisons on
different
different ends of the the same huge strip of cloth, followedfollowed by Clytem
Clytem-
nestra with her ... .. , deadly tapestry and net.'
43 Cf. 543, on Dejanira's inability to 'grow wroth' (thumousthai) (thumousthai) with
Hercules for his behaviour; Harris 200 1 : 266. It is possible to sup-
2001: sup
pose that Dejanira's
Dejanira's error in regard to the potion was an unconscious
aggression; d.
act of aggression; cf. Scott 11995.
995. Carawan (2000) argues that Dejanira
would have been perceived as guilty by the Athenian audience
because her act, even if not intentional,
intentional, was nevertheless reckless
and resulted in her husband's death; be that as it may, she does not
act in anger.
anger. In the Senecan version (attribution of the the Hercules
Oetaeus to Seneca is disputed),
disputed), Dejanira
Dejanira initially reacts with furyfury to
the news concerning Iole, lole, and determines to seek vengeance:
vengeance: 'I shall
not go unavenged.
unavenged. Though you bear up heaven and the whole world
owes its peace
peace to you, there is something worse than the Hydra: Hydra: the
pain of an angry wife' (282-5; (282-5; d.cf. 296-8, 308, 436-2). But her her nurse
(442; d.
counsels fear (442; cf. 476),
476), and Dejanira
Dejanira decides
decides to employ a love
potion instead (473-534; d. cf. Carawan 2000: 207 n. 45). 45).
444
4 For what the statistic
statistic is worth, in Virgil's Aeneid Aeneid women are
represented as angry twelve times, but ten of these cases pertain to
goddesses, whereas men's anger is indicated indicated thirty-eight
thirty-eight times, with
only two instances pertaining to deities: the winds at 11.57 .57 and
Cupid at 4.532 (Dian(Dion 11993:993: 68-9).
45 Cf.
Cf. Mossman 11995: 995: 208 208:: fA
'A certain
certain unity, then, is to be found within
the character of Hecuba.'
46 Harris (200 1 : 58)
(2001: 58) observes, in connection with Aristotle's Aristotle's insistence
insistence
65-7
that
that one must be in a position to retaliate in order to experience experience
anger: 'It lIt would be absurd to suppose suppose that Aristotle's definition
of orge was seriously mistaken. This was what orgt
of orgt orge was.' Harris
accordingly emphasizes the the quality of algi! orge as 'a propensity for
action' rather than a feeling. Be Be that as it may, Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition
of orge seems too restricted even in Greek terms.
of orgi!
47 Cf. Stobaeus,
Stobaeus, Anthologia 33.19.12 . 1 9 . 1 2 Hense = 526.4, Fortenbaugh
= Fortenbaugh et al.
1 992; Seneca, On Anger 1.12.3
1992; = 446.1 , Fortenbaugh et al. 1992.
1 . 1 2.3 = 446.1, 1 992.
48 Lewis
Lewis and Short and the the Loeb edition translate exsequar here as
Itake revenge' or lavenge
'take 'avenge him'; the Oxford Oxford Latin Dictionary
Dictionary (ed. led.
Glare, 1982)1 982) does not cite this passage passage s.v.
49 SVF 3.395 = Stobaeus 2.9
= 1 . 1 0; cf.
2.91.10; d. Diogenes Laertius 77.113; . 1 1 3; also
Posidonius fro fr. 1155,
55, Edelstein-Kidd 11972 972 = Lactantius, On the
= the Anger
of God
of God 117.13.
7.13.
50 It may be doubted, doubted, however, whether whether this change represents la 'a
certain shiftshift from
from shame culture to guilt culture,' as Harris (200 (2001) 1)
suggests; on the question of shame
the question shame culture,
culture, see chapter 4, p. 91. 91.
5511 Cf. Aristophanes,
Aristophanes, Wasps Wasps 5572-4;72-4; also Virgil, Virgil, Aeneid
Aeneid for the the contrast
between ira, 12.946, 12.946, and misericordia, 12.933-6.
andmisericordia,
52 Cf. also Andocides
Andocides 1.8, 1 .8, 1.24,
1 .24, 1.30;1 .30; Lysias 110.26,0.26, 10.29,
1 0.29, 11.10,
1 1 . 1 0, 12.20,
1 2.20,
1 2.58, 112.96,
12.58, 2.96, 14.8, 14.13, 116.17, 6. 1 7, 20. 1 , 25.
20.1, 1 6, 27.
25.16, 1 5, 28.2, 29.9, 29.12,
27.15, 29. 12,
30.23, 331.11;1 . 1 1; and Demosthenes 116.19, 6. 1 9, 118.18,
8. 1 8, 118.20,
8.20, 19
19.7,.7, 19.302,
2 1 .34, 24.21
20.8, 21.34, 24.215, 5, 40.5. It is wrong to conclude conclude from from this usage,
however, that orgt orge and orgizesthai 'came to mean, for a time, not
only "anger" and "to be angry" but also sometimes "punishment" "punishment"
and ""to to punish'"
punish"' (Harris 2001: 62). Harris himself attributes to
/Harris 2001 : 62). Harris himself attributes
Demosthenes a frank frank desire to stimulate stimulate the the anger of his public
/(188-90).
1 88-90).
53 For the the role of anger in judicial verdicts, see also D. Allen Allen 2000:
118-24;
8-24; and on anger as the counterpart to pity, Konstan 200 200la: 1a: 41-3
41-3..
Even the resentment
resentment at long-term domination by another power
might
might be described
described as orge orge rather than than as hatred or hostility; thus,
Thucydides /2.8.5) observes that both cities that wished to be free
(2.8.5) observes free of
of
Athenian rule and those that feared being subjugated to it regarded regarded
the Athenians
Athenians with orgi! (the attitude can also be described as
orge (the
ekhthos or 'hatred,' 2.11.2). 2. 1 1 .2). Tomkins /(1995: 1 995: 139)
139) sees contempt
contempt for
the
the other as characteristic of hierarchical societies, which depend on
aloofness from from the other, whereas democracies more typically typically resort
Notes to pages 69-74 / 289
to shaming,
shaming, which which may be accompanied I
accompanied by 'anger anger in which
which the
critic seeks redress for the wrongs committed committed by the other.'
54 For the apparent
apparent contradiction
contradiction between
between this admonition and
Aristotle's advice in the second book on how to arouse emotion, see
Konstan 200 2001a: l a: 44-5;
44-5; also below, chapter chapter 110,0, p. 204.
55 For the
the contrast between anger and judgment (gnome), (gnome], d.cf. Thucy
Thucy-
dides 2.23 . 1 , 2.59.3; 8.2.2 on anger motivating
2.23.1, motivating a decision
decision (cf.
(d. 33.43.5);
.43.5);
and, for anger paired with haste, 4. 1 22.5, 8.27.6.
4.122.5,
56 Compare also NE NE 7.6, 11149a24-32,
149a24-32, where Aristotle compares thumos
((analogous
analogous to anger) to a slave who carries out out an order precipitous-
precipitous
ly, before having listened to all his master (i.e., reason) has to say.
57 Contrast NE NE 55.8, .8, 11135bl9-29,
135b I 9-29, where Aristotle explains that that an
unpremeditated act, such as those due to anger, is indeed a wrong
(adikema), but
(adikema), but thethe injury
injury does not not arise out of wickedness
(mokhth
(mokhtheria):
� ria ): 'For
Tor it is not he who acts in a passion who initiates
initiates
[the conflict], but but he who angered him him ...... For the
the anger depends on a
perceived injustice.' So too Aristotle regards regards lack of self-control
self-control in
respect to anger (thumos, which is here equivalent equivalent to orgel
orge) as more
venial than carnal appetites, insofar insofar as it is more human and natural
(NE
(NE 7.6, 11149b27-9).
149b27-9).
58 Cf. Pritchett
Pritchett 11991: 99 1 : 3312;
12; Konstan 200 1 a: 76-7;
200la: 76-7; Konstan 2006c;
2006c; and,
on Rome,
Rome, Lintott 1968: 42-4. The entire population, or at least least adult
males, was held responsible for the actions of the state, and hence
could
could be punished for them.
59 Attitudes towards anger, especially among the intellectual intellectual elite,
changed to a certain extent extent after
after the classical period (conventionally
(conventionally
marked by the the death of Alexander the the Great in 323 BC); for details,
see Harris 200 2001. 1 . Already in the the fifth
fifth and fourth centuries
centuries BC,
BC, there
was a tendency to distinguish judicial cases, where justice
distinguish judicial justice was at
stake, from
from public deliberation over international affairs, affairs, where
policy, some held, should be decided on the basis of interest interest alone
(d. Aristotle Rhetoric 11.3,
(cf. .3, 1358b20-9; furtherfurther discussion in Konstan
Konstan
200
2001:1 : 82-3;
82-3; and Konstan 2005c; 2005c; and see chapter 110, 0, p. 210).
2 10).
60 On slighting and time, d. cf. Grimaldi 1988: 1988: 22 ad 1373b28.
61 See
61 See Herman 11995 995 on time in the the Attic orators;
orators; contra, e.g.,
e.g., Cohen
11991.
99 1 .
62 Aristotle notes at D Dee anima 11.1, . 1 , 403a19-22
403al9-22 that when we are tense,
we are more vulnerable to emotions in general.
74-7
63
63 Kassell ((1976)
1 976) excises the words in 2.2, 11379al5-18 3 79a15-18 that point point to
this line of reasoning.
64 Cf. Elster 11999a:
999a: 54. On analogous differences
differences between kinds of of
pleasures, d. cf. NE 110.5,
0.5, 1175al9-30
1 1 75a1 9-30 and and Leighton 1996:1 996: 2219.
19.
65 See Seneca, O Anger; Plutarch,
Onn Anger-, Plutarch, O Onn Controlling
Controlling Anger-,
Anger; and a
comprehensive
comprehensive survey of the the sources in Harris 200 2001. 1 . Anderson
((1964:
1 964: 1173
73 and passim) argues that that even Juvenal came to doubt the
propriety of anger, and abandoned the the severe indignation
indignation of his
persona in the later
persona later satires.
satires.
66 The condemnation
condemnation of royal anger continued into the Middle Ages;
cf. Biihrer-Thierry 11998:
d. 998: 75: 'If 'If anger was
was reprehensible
reprehensible for all
mankind, it was still more so for kings.' There was also, however, an
alternative tradition of just anger, which which was not not only the the preroga
preroga-
tive but
but the
the duty monarchs. Althoff
duty of monarchs. Althoff ((1998:
1 998: 59)
59) writes: 'Royal
anger thus appears as a part of his [the king's] "rulership practice," practice/'
that
that is, as part of a personally grounded system of rulership based on
a range of unwritten
unwritten laws'; d. cf. S.D.
S.D. White 11998:
998: 139: 'Public displays
of anger are almost alwaysalways made by kings kings or other males whose whose
noble status entitles
entitles them
them to express anger'; and R.E. R.E.Barton 11998: 998:
1154:
54: '[A]nger
'[Ajnger was frequently
frequently justified
justified as necessary and righteous,
especially when exercised by those with with rightful
rightful authority.'
authority.' The The
model for royal anger was the the just wrath
wrath of God (d.
(cf. Lactantius's
essay On the Anger of
the Anger of God).
God}.
67 Partially cited
cited in chapter 1, I, p. 23. Elster concludes that that 'being
ashamed of one's anger was not not a typical Greek reaction.' This This is
true, but
but only because anger was not necessarily a vice or the the sign of
of
a vicious
vicious character
character (d.(cf. NE 2.7, 11108a4-6)
l08a4-6);; being ashamed
ashamed of spite or
envy, which
which are reprehensible in themselves (2.6, 1 107a8-1 1 ), is
(2.6, 1107a8-ll),
entirely consistent with Aristotle's view of the emotions.
with Aristotle's
68 This description applies, of course, only to adult adult male citizens,-
citizens;
where there
there were real status differences, e.g. between between free free man
man and
slave, the
the anger of thethe subjugated had to be repressed or concealed.
Chapter Three
11 The
The contrast
contrast between
between pain
pain and
and pleasure
pleasure cannot be
be the
the basis of
of these
these
oppositions, as the
the case of pity and indignation shows, since both ofof
these emotions, which Aristotle insists are opposites, are said to be
Notes to pages 77-91 I/ 291
29 1
accompanied by painj pain; see chapter 11,, p. 33, for discussionj

discussion; also
chapter 110, 0, p. 217.
2 1 7.
2 See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., G.E.R. Lloyd 11966. 966.
3 Grimaldi adds:adds: 'There would be no reason to question this this save that
that
St.
St. Thomas Aquinas in his extended study of the emotions ... . ..
remarks, Summa Theologiae Ilaa Hae, Ilae, q. 23, art. 3, q. 46, art. 11,, that
anger alone of the emotions has no contrary.' Grimaldi goes on to
concede Thomas's point, insofar as 'In the other other emotions the
contrary is usually a possibility toward which which a person can move ...
But this is not true of anger.anger. In anger the move toward the contrary
is effectively
effectively blocked since the evil which causes the anger is
actually present in the individual
individual... .. . The only alternatives open to
him are to accept this evil and so experience the concomitant concomitant pain
and distress, or to reject the evil and so become angry' ((1988: 1 988: 49-50).
If I understand
understand Grimaldi's argument argument here ((and and I am not
not certain that I
do), then thethe opposite of anger proves not to be an emotion after after all.
4 An anonymous Byzantine commentator, or rather scholiast, notes notes
that
that we become praoi in respect to one who, we learn, intended the
opposite of a slight because 'he did it not not for contempt butbut for my
esteem [dia doxan emen emen]'l ' ((93.32-3
93 .32-3 Rabe).
5 Kassell
Kassell ((1976),
1976), for
for no very
very good reason,
reason, marks this comment as a
later addition by Aristotle.
Aristotle.
6 Compare Heath (200 1 ), who offers
(2001), offers an Aristotelian
Aristotelian explanation
explanation of
why the painful emotions
emotions of tragedy yield pleasure, although although he
concedes that it may not be Aristotle's own.
Chapter Four
11 Cf.
Cf. Tangney
Tangney and
and Dearing
Bearing 2002:
2002: 111:
1 : 'In
'In everyday
everyday conversations,
conversations,
people typically avoid the term "shame"'j
"shame"'; Barton 200 1 : 235: 'At the
2001:
time II am writing,
writing, the idea is popular in the United States that no
one should ever be shamed. We We forget
forget that teasing and mild shaming
are among the most important
important socializing mechanisms of of society --
provided
provided that trust is there and that the teaser is prepared
prepared to ex-ex
teased.' Correspondingly,
change roles with the teased.' Correspondingly, the study of shame
neglected; d.
has been largely neglectedj cf. Gilbert and Andrews 1998:1998: v: 'Shame
has been recognized since antiquity. A strong theme of shame exists
in the early stories of Adam and Eve.
Eve. However, it has only been in
1-2
the last 20 years or so that shame has been subject to systematic

research and theory development'; Kaster Raster 2005: 28-9.
28-9. For a good
survey
survey of recent theories, see Gilbert
Gilbert and Andrews 11998.
998.
2 Cf. Wurmser 198 1981: 1 : 117,
7, though Wurmser maintainsmaintains that one can 'be
ashamed in front front of oneself
oneself andand feel guilty in front
front of someone else';
Kant 11981:
98 1 : 62;
62; Sartre 11996: 996: 302: 'I am ashamed
ashamed of myself
myself as I appear
appear
to the Other ... ... I recognize that I am as the the Other sees me';me',- Creighton
11990:
990: 296: 'Shame, with with its corresponding fear of rejection,
rejection, is not a
very effective
effective sanction in American society, where individuals are
encouraged to become independent.
encouraged independent.'' For a critique of the idea that
shame requires an audience, see Taylor 11985: 985: 557-68;
7-68; Cairns 11993: 993:
116-18;
6- 1 8; Morrison 1996: 1996: 116: 6: 'To feel shame, therefore, we do not not need
the presence of an actual shamer or even a viewing audience; audience-, we
need only these internalizedinternalized figures who have become a part of of
what we are'; are',- and Tangney and Dearing 2002: 14, 14, who report that in
their empirical studies ''"solitary" ''solitary'' shame was about as prevalent as
"solitary" guilt.' Cf. Kaster Raster 11997:
997: 4-7
4-7 on Roman pUdOl
pudor as 'generated
from
from within' (5). Seidler (2000: 3) 3) discusses the
the phenomenology of of
the self-visualization
self-visualization involved in shame.
3 Cf.
Cf. Pattison 2000: 43-4; 43-4; for criticism
criticism ofof the idea of a shame culture,
see Lloyd-Jones 1987: 1987: 2; 2; Creighton
Creighton 11990;990; C airns ((1993:
Cairns 1 993: 27-47)
affirms
affirms that criticism
criticism has left left the
the antithesis
antithesis 'in tatters' (42); Wiss-
Wiss
mann: 1997: 117. 7. But the the idea persists
persists in modern
modern scholarship,
scholarship, e.g.
Margalit 11996: 996: 248-9.
4 Creighton 11990: 990: 286: 286: 'Shame feelings precede the the development of of
the superego, although although they they may laterlater be integrated
integrated into the supersuper-
ego formation. Guilt Guilt develops later during the oedipal phase and
requires the the presence of a superego'; Scheff Scheff 1997:
1997: 2210;
1 0; Scheff
Scheff 2000:
86. Jacoby ((1991:
199 1 : 53)53) observes
observes that '[i]n [Erik] Erikson's
Erikson's view, shame shame
is connected with with being seen by others, and is therefore therefore prior to a
sense of guilt, in which one is alone with with the voice of the the superego
or the internalized
internalized "other'" "other"' (referring to Erikson 11950). 950).
5 Nathanson 11992: 992: 119: 9: 'Whereas shame is about the quality quality of our
person or self, guilt is the painful painful emotion triggered when we
become aware aware that we have acted in a way to bring bring harm
harm to another
another
person or to violate some important code. code. Guilt
Guilt is about action and
laws. Whenever we feel guilty, we can pay for the damage inflicted'; inflicted',-
Jacoby 199 1991: 1 : 11:: 'Feelings of guiltguilt make me feel like a bad person person
because I have done something -- or perhaps only thought about

doing something
something -- that I should not have done ... ... Feelings of guilt
have to do with ethical or moral principles called "should-laws" in
philosophical ethics .... . . At a certain intensity, shame has the power
to make us feel completely worthless, degraded degraded from head to foot,
sometimes
sometimes without our having done anything anything bad at all'; M. M. Lewis
11992:
992: 110;
0; Lansky 11992: 992: 1105-6; 05-6; Williams 11993: 993: 89-90; Sedgwick
11995:
995: 2212;
1 2; Morrison, 11996: 996: 12: 12: 'We feel guilt
guilt about our wrongdoing;
we feel shame about the the very essence of our selves'; Denham 1998:
40-1
40-1:: in shame, 'the offensive
offensive behavior is seen as a reflection of an
equally offensive
offensive self . . . ; guilt motivates corrective action rather
self...;
than motivating avoidance'; M. M. Lewis 2000:
2000: 629: 629: 'The emotional
state of guilt or regret is produced produced when individuals evaluate their
behavior as failure but but focus on the the specific features or actions of the the
self
self that led to the the failure .... .. In fact, the emotion
emotion of guilt guilt always has
associated with it a corrective
corrective action that the individual can take
(but does not necessarily
necessarily take) take) to repair the failure ... ... As such, the
the
emotion is less intense and more capable capable of dissipation ... ... The
The
emotion of guilt
guilt lacks the the negative intensity
intensity of of shame'; Ben-Ze'ev
2000: 498;
498; Tangney and Dearing Bearing 2002:
2002: 24: 'Shame involves fairly
global negative evaluations of the the self
self (i.e., "Who I am"). am"). Guilt
involves a more articulated condemnation of a specific behavior li.e., (i.e.,
"What I did" ),' although surveys show that
did"),' that thethe two terms are often often
used 'inconsistently or interchangeably' I(11). l l ).
But contrast Solomon 11993: 993: 259, 30301:1 : 'What distinguishes guilt
[from
[from shame] .... . . is its ability
ability to encompass the sense of worth of the the
whole person'; shame 'is more specific than guilt guilt... ... and not gener-
gener
ally self-demeaning'; Cairns 11993: 993: 23-4: 'I doubt very much whether whether
shame must involve the ..... . complete denigration of the self; self'; also 25:
'[EJven
'[Ejven if a distinction
distinction between self-evaluations which which focus on what
we are and those which focus on what we do is tenable in the
abstract, this distinction will not furnish furnish an absolute criterion for
the separation of shame and guilt in ordinary usage.'
6 Plutarch IOn Bashfulness 528D) discusses an
(On Bashfulness an exaggerated
exaggerated shyness or
(dusopia), but this is a disposition (in Aristotle's
sensitivity to shame (dus6pia), Aristotle's
terms, a hexis) rather than a generalized emotional state,- state; Plutarch
refers, however, to the intense shame itself itself as a harmful pathos pathos
(529E); cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 11108a33-4.
(529E); d. 108a33-4.
92-4
7 Cf. Ohly:
Ohly: 11992;
992; H. Lewis ((1987a:
1 987a: 111)
1 ) remarks that in modernmodern
theories, 'shame is an even less prestigious emotion than guilt.'
8 Barkan (2000:
(2000: xxviii)
xxviii) remarks
remarks on what he sees as a new sensitivity
on the part of entire nations to guilt: 'One new measure of this
public morality is the growing political political willingness, and at times
eagerness, to admit
admit one's historical
historical guilt.'
9 The Greeks
Greeks could, nevertheless, describe describe something very like our
sense of guilt; thus Thucydides ((7.75.2-5)
7.75 .2-5 ) reports that when the
Athenians, having been defeated at Syracuse, Syracuse, could not rescue their
wounded comrades, they experienced 'censure of their
they experienced their own selves'
selves'
(katamempsis
(katamempsis sphonsphon auton); for discussion, see Sternberg 1999: 1 999:
1196-7.
96-7.
10 It is claimed that shame exists in all human cultures cultures (Casimire
(Casimire and
2003), but
Schnegg 2003), but this begs the the question
question of possible differences
differences in
the meaning
meaning of the terms terms used. For shame in China, with a bibliog bibliog-
raphy on shame in other cultures including those of Indonesia,
India, Japan, and thethe Middle East, see Li, Li, Wang,
Wang, and Fischer 2003.
1111 The noun aiskhune first occurs in the sixth-century poet Theognis
aiskhune first Theognis
the sense of being a 'disgrace,' and becomes
(verse 1272), in the becomes common
common
towards the
the middle of the the fifth
fifth century BC. Be.
1122 Shipp endorses Dodds's hypothesis of a development from from shame
culture
culture to guilt culture in Greece, which which he sees reflected
reflected in the
shift from aidos to aiskhune.
shift from aiskhune. I ignore here the different nuances
the different nuances of of
the
the noun aidos and the the verb aideomai, although as Cairns ((1993: 1 993: 2)
observes, they 'do have different
different senses.' IInn Euripides'
Euripides' Hippolytus
Hippolytus
verse 244, Phaedra exclaims: 'I feel aidos [verbal form aidoumetha] aidoumetha]
at what
what has been said,' which which indicates
indicates that the verb can assume assume the
sense of remorseful shame;
shame,- for a similar
similar use
use of the
the noun,
noun, cf.d. Euripides,
Hecuba 968-72, where it is equivalent to aiskhune. aiskhune. See See also
'Gauthier and Jolif
Jolif 11970:
9 70: 320, who affirm
affirm that aidos in the the classical
period Vest
'n'est plus seulement l'apprehension d'un
seulement 1'apprehension d'un deshonneur futur, futur,
mais aussi la honte d'un deshonneur present . . et le
deshonneur present... . Ie regret d'une
d'une
faute passee'
passee' ('is no longer only the the apprehension of a future dis
future dis-
honour, but
but also shame at a present dishonour ... ... and regret over a
past error').
113
3 Hooker ((1987)
1 987) argues that aidos and related related terms
terms only acquired the the
sense of 'shame' in post-Homeric literature. An illustrative case is
Odyssey 8.83-9, where Odysseus covers his head with
Odyssey with a cloth to
conceal
conceal his tears fromfrom the Phaeacians,
Phaeacians, who have been enjoying a
poetic recital of his quarrel with Achilles during the the war at Troy: 'for
he felt aidos [verb:
[verb: aideto] Phaeacians as he let tears drop
aideto] before the Phaeacians
from
from beneath his eyelids' (8.86). Odysseus is not not ashamed at having
seen to weep, since it is to avoid just this that he conceals
been seen conceals
himself. Nor is it likely
likely that he feels shame at the thoughtthought that
that he
might
might be seen ('prospective' shame, though clearly not inhibitory in
not inhibitory
this instance).
instance). Rather, he is motivated by respect for the Phaeacians,
who are his hosts, and hesitates to interrupt their pleasure in the
interrupt their
song by a display of his his own
own grief.
14 Compare W.I. W.I. Miller 2000: 70: 70: 'Shame bears a close connection
connection with
courageous motivation; it might in fact fact be its chief
chief motivator'; d. cf.
Wissman 11997:
997: 13-18. In Euripides' tragedy Children of of Hercules,
the
the girl Macaria consents to be sacrificed
sacrificed for the
the good of Athens,
since she would be ashamed (516) not not to die on behalf of thethe city
that
that gave them
them refuge (d. 541-2); the
refuge (cf. the Athenian king Demipho
recognizes her
her gesture as a sign of courage (eupsukhia, 569 ).
(eupsukhia, 569).
115
5 In Euripides' Ion 934, cited by Shipp, Creousa exclaims: 'I feel
aiskhune [verbal form, aiskhunomai]
aiskhune aiskhunomai] before you, aged sir'; d. cf. also
verses 341, 367, 395, 10 74. It is the
1074. the 'restrictive' sense of aiskhune
that is chiefly at play in Plato's Gorgias, where it inhibits inhibits Socrates'
interlocutors from
from confessing openly openly to opinions that are at odds
with conventional values;values,- cf. 482E, 48 7B-E, 492A, 494C-E, 508B-C,
487B-E,
etc., and, for discussion of individual
individual passages, Chichi 2002, with
references to earlier studies. Cf. Cf. also Euripides,
Euripides, Electra 45-6,
45-6, in
which a humble farmer who has been given Electra as wife affirms: affirms:
'I feel aiskhune
aiskhune [aiskhunomai] at treating arrogantly the the offspring
offspring of of
upper-class men whom I, who am not not worthy, have received.
received.'' In the
previous verse (44) he affirms
affirms that
that he has not 'shamed her in the
marriage bed,' but rather she remains a virgin; the point is that that it
would be shameful for the princess Electra to submit submit to a humble
peasant.
16 Gauthier
Gauthier and Jolif
Jolif ((1970:
1970: 321
321)) specify
specify that
that Aristotle does not
distinguish
distinguish aidos from from aiskhune in the Rhetoric.
Rhetoric.
1177 Cairns ((1993:
1993: 113)
3 ) distinguishes
distinguishes two two senses of aidos, namely, 'I feel
shame before ......'' and 'I respect,' butbut he adds that
that the two are related:
'[T]o feel inhibitory
inhibitory shame ...... is to picture oneself as losing honour,
while to show respect is to recognize
recognize the honour of another. The
95-6
combination
combination of the two in one concept, however, is unfamiliar,' unfamiliar/
though it is also, Cairns affirms, quite logical. For the rich meta- meta
phorical texture surrounding the idea of aidos, which includes the the
image of a protecting mantle, see Ferrari Ferrari 2002: 74-8 1 , and d.
74-81, cf. Kaster
Raster
11997:
997: 33:: 'Sensitivity to the the emotion [the Latin pudor] pudor] is ...... often
often
spoken of metaphorically as a garment, a cloak that conceals the the
ethically naked selfself and provides an acceptable social identity.' identity/
118
8 The verbal form aiskhunomai, like that of aidos, is used in the the
sense of 'feel shame before ....'; . . '; d.
cf. Aeschines (fourth century BC),
Against Timarchus 24, also 180:
Against ISO: 'One of the the old menmen before whom
they feel shame [aiskhunontaiJ
[aiskhunontai] and whom they fear stepped for for-
ward.
ward/' Aeschines uses the negative expressions anaides, anaideia = =
'shameless' (e.g.
(e.g. l1.189),
. I S9), but not aidos, whichwhich was, as I have said,
obsolete by this time. In contrast,
contrast, Kaster
Raster ((1997:
1 997: 12)
12) observes of the the
Roman idea of pudorpudor that 'it is vastly more often often a source of remorse
or reproof
reproof than of counsel and prevention.'
prevention/
19 w.I.
19 W.I. Miller ((1997:
1997: 34)34) observes that that shame that inhibits 'is not the the
emotion
emotion shame, but the sense of shame, shame, the
the sense
sense of modesty
modesty
and propriety
propriety that keeps us from from being shamed.'
shamed/ The adjective
aiskhuntelos denotes shyness or bashful
aiskhunteIos bashful modesty as a character
trait, and stands to aiskhune in the way that aidemon does to aidos
(or, in Latin, as verecundus and pudicus stand to verecundia and
andpudicus
pudor}. Plato, in the Charmides ((158C),
pudor). 15SC), remarks that 'Charmides
'Charmides
blushed and seemed even more handsome; handsome,- for his modesty [to
aiskhuntelon] was suitable to his age.'
aiskhunteIonJ age/ Cf. 1160E:
60E: 'It seems to me, he
said, that modesty [sophrosuneJ
[sophrosune} makes a man man feel aiskhune
aiskhune and
renders a man aiskhuntelos, and that modesty [sophrosune] [sophrosune} is
basically aidos'; Aristotle,
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 11220bl7, 220b 1 7, 11128MO-35,
1 2Sbl O-35,
Physiognomonica 8812a30-l; 1 2a30- I ; and, for the contrast between
aiskhuntelos and anaiskhuntos ('shameless') ('shameless'),' Rhetoric I390aI-2.
1390al-2.
CCf.f. also Menander's Misoumenos ('The Hated Man') 20S-lO, 208-10, in
which
which a young would-be
would-be seducer blushes with shame when he is
exposed. The reaction indicates both his base intention intention and, at the the
same time, a saving sense of modesty in his character, character, which
which
prepares for the denouement of the comedy, in which which the boy will
be recognized
recognized as the brother of the protagonist
protagonist who is his rival; see
the discussion in Lape 2004: 2004: 222-3
222-31. 1.
2200 Questiones naturales eett morales book I1,, problem 21 21 ('On Aidos'),
Aidos'}, in
Notes to pages 96-7
96-7 / 297
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Graeca, suppl. 2.2, ed. I. Bruns;

Brims; the
treatise is generally supposed to be wrongly attributed to Alexander.
Once again, I cannot
Once enter into this question exhaustively here, and
cannot enter
limit myself to observing that Aristotle tends to treat aidos in the
ethical
ethical works as an emotional temperamenttemperament or dun amis, and speaks
dunamis,
in these contexts of ho aidemon or 'a man man given to feeling aidos.' aidos.'
In popular parlance, aidos and many other affects, affects, such
such as eros or
passionate love, could of course be described as pathe; d. Heraclitus
pathe,; cf. Heraclitus
the Allegorist (first
(first century AD) AD) 28.7, describing Helen Helen in the IliadIliad
as torn between
between two pathe, ''eros eros for Paris and aidos towards
Menelaus.'
Menelaus.'
21
21 Stoicorum
Stoicomm veterum
vetemm fragmenta
fragmenta (SVF (SVF = Arnim 1921-4) 3.264.9-10,
=
from
from Stobaeus 2.60.9; d. cf. Kamtekar 1998: 137-8. The The sense
sense of aidos
'chastity7 comes particularly close to that
as 'chastity' that of sophrosune
sophrosune in erotic
contexts.
22 Cf. SVF 432 = Andronicus, On Emotions
= Emotions 6, p. 20 Kreuttner;
Kreuttner; SVF SVF
439. 1-3 = Plutarch, On Moral
439.1-3 = Moral Virtue 449A; SVF 440 = Galen, On the
= the
Opinions
Opinions of of Hippocrates
Hippocrates and and Plato 4.4 [140]
[ 1 40] p. 354 M. 221, 1 , etc.; see
Kamtekar 11998:998: 1138-43
38-43 on the problems that that this
this classification
entails. Kamtekar argues argues ((144-60)
1 44-60) that Epictetus
Epictetus reclassifies
reclassifies aidos
as a self-evaluative
self-evaluative cognitive capacity, akin to the the modern idea of of
conscience
conscience ((147,
147, 160).
1 60).
23 The definition is Zeno's, recorded in Diogenes Laertius 7. 1 12; cf.
7.112; d.
Definitions 4
Definitions 1 6A9 ((ascribed
416A9 ascribed to Plato
Plato but almost certainly a later
product of his Academy)
Academy).. Cf. Aulus Gellius 19.6.3: 'One might might still
inquire
inquire why
why shame [pudorJ[pudor] diffuses
diffuses the
the blood, while
while fear
fear reduces it,
given that pudor
pudor is a species of fear fear and
and is defined
defined as follows: 'fear of
'fear of
just reproach.' For so the the philosophers [surely the Stoics] Stoics] define it:
"aiskhune is fearfear of just blame.
blame."' "' Cicero (Republic
(Republic 5.6)5.6) offers
offers a
similar definition of verecundia as 'a kind of fear fear of not
not unjust cen- cen
sure.
sure.'' On pudor
pudor and verecundia, see Raster Kaster 2005: 113-65.
3-65.
24 In common
common parlance, both aidos and aiskhune might might be associated
with
with fear; cf. (e.g.) Xenophon, Memorabilia
fear; d. Memorabilia 3. 7.5.
3.7.5.
25 There are various other indications in this passage that that Aristotle
considers aidos to be different
different from
from aiskhune, as Alexander of of
Aphrodisias too observed (in the text text cited above), for example, that
aidos is particularly
particularly appropriate
appropriate to young people,-
people; d.cf. Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics 4.9, 11128bl5.
Nicomachean 1 28b1 5 .
pages 97-9
97-9
3.41 6.1 7-22 = Nemesius,

26 SVF 3.416.17-22 � Nemesius, On the the Nature
Nature of Man chap. 20;
of Man
Kamtekar (1998:
( 1998: 1140-1)
40-1 ) suggests
suggests that Nemesius may be responding responding
Epictetus's innovative
to Epictetus's innovative conception
conception of aidos.
27 Rusten ((1990:
1 990: 1169),
69), commenting on Thucydides 2.43.1, 2.43 . 1 , remarks that
'aiskhune and aiskhunomai denote properly the guilty shame for an
act committed, aidos and aidoumai aidoumai the inhibitory
inhibitory emotion which
prevents such acts; but the distinction
distinction between them them becomes
blurred by the late fifth fifth century, so that aiskhunomai
aiskhunomai may be used
positively here';
here',- but
but the evidence does not, I think, think, support this
story progressive confusion between
story of progressive between the two terms. terms.
'Aidos est pudor profectus ex verecundia. Aischyne est pudor
28 'Aidos
profectus ex turpitudine/
turpitudine. ' Riezler adds: 'The origin of Aischyne Aischyne is
dishonor, of Aidos, awe, awe/' and affirms
affirms that the former
former pertains to
'man-made codes,'codes/ while the latter responds to a sense of how things
naturally are.
29 So too Cope (1877: ( 1 877: 71-2), commenting on Aristotle's
Aristotle's Rhetoric,
distinguishes between 'aidos, verecundia, a subjective
distinguishes subjective feeling of of
which precedes
honor which precedes and prevents a shameful act' and ''aiskhune, aiskhune,
pudor, an objective aspect aspect which reflects upon the consequences
consequences of of
the act and the shame shame it brings with it' (as (as summarized
summarized in Grimaldi
11988:
988: 107).
107).
30 Cf. Scheff
Scheff 1995:
1 995: 11053:
053: '[W]hen
'[Wjhen we compare the the concept in other
languages, the the definition of shame in English is narrow and ex- ex
treme'; Scheff
Scheff adds ((1053-4)
1 053-4) that French hontehonte is equivalent to
English shame, pudeur pudeur to a 'sense of shame.' Spinoza (1992: ( 1 992: 147)
147)
affirms: ''Shame
Shame is the the pain
pain that follows on a deed of which which we are
ashamed. Bashfulness is the apprehension of shame, whereby
the fear or apprehension
a man is restrained from some disgraceful act.' On Scham and
Schande, cf. Parker 2000: 559-63 559-63..
3311 For a similar inclusiveness in the the Chinese conception of shame, see
Li, Wang,
Wang, and Fischer 2004.
32 For the close connection
connection between aiskhune aiskhune and disgrace or adoxia,
see (e.g.) Demosthenes,
Demosthenes, Oration 1 9.41, 83, 146.
Oration 19.41, 1 46. On the
the basis of 'a
survey of some two thousand places in classical Latin where pudor
and its occur,' Raster
its cognates occur/ Kaster (1997:
( 1997: 4) offers
offers a definition
definition of the
emotion that
Roman emotion comes close to Aristotle's view of aiskhune:
that conies
'[PJudor primarily denotes a displeasure with
'[P]udor with oneself caused by
vulnerability to just criticism
criticism of a socially diminishing
diminishing sort.'
33 Some researchers have argued that that memory itself itself is 'forward-acting,
predictions and intentions,
generating predictions intentions, rather than being a contem contem-
plative and retrospective faculty,'
plative faculty/ and that 'a recollection
recollection ought
ought to
be called an anticipatory image' (McCrone (McCrone 2004: 4, referring to the
work of U. Neisser; cf. Neisser 1988,
d. Neisser 1 988, 2000).
34 Cf. Scheff
Scheff ((1997:
1 997: 206):
206): 'We propose that that pride is the the emotional
emotional
correlate of a secure social bond; and shame, the the emotional
emotional correlate
of
of a threatened bond'; also Cooley Cooley 11983:983: 1183; w.I. Miller 11997:
83; W.I. 99 7: 24;
M. Lewis 2000; Ben-Ze'evBen-Ze'ev 2000: 491 , 5 1
491, 512; 2; and Manstead and Fischer
200
2001:1 : 23 1 ; Jacoby 11991
231; 99 1 is entitled
entitled Shame and the Origins of
and the of Se1f
Self-
Esteem, and devotes a chapter chapter (pp.
(pp. 24-45) self-esteem and the
24-45) to self-esteem
related notion of personal dignity. Spinoza's gloria, or 'honour,' is
something like pride; Spinoza ((1992: 1 992: 1147)
47) defines it as 'pleasure
accompanied
accompanied by the the idea of some actionaction of ours which we think that
others praise,' whereas '[s]hame is a pain accompanied accompanied by the the idea of of
some action of ours that we think think that others censure'; cf. d. also
Descartes
Descartes 1988: part 3, art. 204. Contrast Seidler Seidler 2000: 103:1 03 : 'The
postulation
postulation of shame and pride as polar opposites is frankly uncon
frankly uncon-
vincing. Only if we decide to limit "shame" to the the affective expres
affective expres-
sion of the
the impairment of self-esteem can we conceivably conceivably regard
"pride" as the opposite pole, and even then then it would appear more
appropriate to regard the capacity for realistic self-evaluation to be
the more convincing
convincing alternative.'
3355 Scheff
Scheff ((1997:
1 997: 208)
208 ) notes that in in the
the Hebrew Bible,Bible, '[v]irtually
'[virtually every
reference places pride in a disparaging light,' and speaks of the the need
for a notion of 'justified
for 'justified pride.' Cf. M. Lewis 1992: 1 992: 78:
78: 'Hubris can be
defined
defined as an exaggerated pride or self-confidence
self-confidence ... ... It is an example
of
of pridefulness, something
something dislikeable and to be avoided ... The The
emotion I label pride is the consequence of a specific action.' On the
complex meaning of self-esteem or pride in English, see also Scheff, Scheff,
unpublished.
unpublished.
Kaster 1997:
36 Cf. Raster 1 997: 11:
1 1 : 'To a person with an active sense otpudor, of pudor, all
those
those who constitute
constitute his social world are constantly constantly visible, as he is
visible
visible to them.' From another point of view, the
another point the opposite
opposite of shame
might be seen as envy: both reflect reflect an underevaluation
underevaluation of the the self,
manifested
manifested in the the case of shame as a pain at one's own disgrace, and
in the
the case of envy as the the overevaluation of another's
another's reputation
reputation or
achievement; see Lansky 11997. 997. A given term may have several
300 I/ Notes to pages 1102-3
02-3
opposites, as Aristotle himself observes (Topics 2.7,

observes (Topics 2.7, 1113al4-15;
13a14- 1 5;
quoted in chapter 3, p. 83).
37 A character in Aristophanes' Clouds ((1220) 1220) declares that he will not
put his country to shame by failing to collect on a debt - - that
that is, not
living up to the standard that his countrymen set. Those of an
inferior
inferior social class will not necessarily feel shame at shortcomings
relative to their their superiors:
superiors: the humble farmer farmer to whom Electra has
been wedded in Euripides' Electra (357-432) does not hesitate to
invite two well-born guests into his modest home, though Electra
herself
herself is mortified at the the idea. A special
special case is that of persons
whose status has changed abruptly, for example, those who have
been recently enslavedenslaved and cannot cannot accept the deference required of
required of
them in their new role (as (as Kaster
Raster [[1997:
1 99 7: 9]
9] observes, elite Romans
supposed that '[s]laves
'[sjlaves had no sense of pudor at all');
oipudor all'l; Euripides'
Hecuba and Troian Trojan Women provide poignant poignant illustrations of this
situation. A similar
situation. similar tension arises when a despised group achieves a
new sense of equality, and begins to experience shame at treatment
formerly
formerly regarded
regarded as natural or inevitable; thus, Lewis Lewis ((1987a:
198 7a: 4)
4)
observes that 'our sexist intellectual heritage contains an explicit
devaluation of women and an implicit, insoluble demand that they
accept their inferior
inferior place without shame. shame.''
3388 Izard 19 77: 423-4: 'Guilt results from
1977: from wrong-doing';
wrong-doing',- H.B.
H.B. Lewis
Lewis
11971:
9 7 1 : 881:
1 : 'Guilt .. . is evoked by ... the
'Guilt... the acceptance or acknowledg-
acknowledg
ment of moral transgression' (both cited in Frijda 11993: 993: 364).
364).
39 Cf. Gilbert and and Andrews 11998: 998: 111;
1 ; H.B.
H.B. Lewis
Lewis 11987a:
98 7a: 18.
1 8.
40 If Aristotle had the the word, he might perhaps recognize recognize such events as
productive of embarrassment.
embarrassment. But cf. cf. the
the Hippocratic treatise On
the Sacred
Sacred Disease 15, 1 5, where it is observed that people on the point
of an epileptic attack hide 'because of shame at the the condition
condition and
not
not out
out of fearfear of a demon, as most most people suppose ... But childrenchildren
allow themselves
themselves to fall anywhere at first, and later run to their
mothers or other people whom they know, out out of terror and fear of of
the condition;
condition; for they do not yet know what what it is to be ashamed [to
gar aiskhunesthai oupo gignoskousin}.' Plutarch, however, writing
oupo gignoskousin].' writing
in the first century AD, argues that Homer 'scorns those who cast
shame [aiskhunomenon] upon lameness
shame [aiskhunomenon] lameness or blindness,
blindness, since he does
not
not consider blameworthy [psekton] [psekton] what is not not shameful
shameful [or [or ugly:
aiskhron] nor shameful what occurs not through ourselves but by
aiskhron]
Notes to page 1103/301
03 / 30 1
chance [tukheJ'
[tukhe]' ((On On How
How a Young
Young Man Should Listen to Poetry
35C).
4
411 Cf. p. 89: 'The mostmost primitive experiences of shame are connected
with
with sight and being seen, but it has been interestingly
interestingly suggested
that
that guilt is rooted in hearing'; H.B. H.B. Lewis 11987a:
987a: I1,, 'Shame makes
us want to hide.' Pindar, Pythian 8.8 1-7 describes how young men
8.81-7
who have been defeated
defeated in athletic contests skulk in shame upon
returning
returning to their home cities. Jacoby ((1991: 1991 : 113-14),
3-14), after
after surveying
surveying
attitudes towards nakedness in various cultures, concludes that
'nudity has taken
taken on various unusual meanings that can be mutually mutually
contradictory,' and is 'related on the one hand to the humiliation humiliation
of
of being stripped, but but on the other to the will to power and domi- domi
nance.' He observes
observes further
further that
that 'it is clear that
that the potential for for
sexual attraction in physical nakedness is one of the most important
causes of shame. For any society, it is important to keep unbridled
instinctuality
instinctuality in check and to redirect sexuality into civilized
channels,' and Jacoby expresses
expresses the hope that his 'comments have
sufficed
sufficed to establish the the association of the
the archetypal feeling of
feeling of
shame with the the unveiling
unveiling of physical
physical nakedness.' If this is meant
as an account of how how and whywhy a sense of shame evolved,
evolved, it seems
dubious to me.
42 There is some debate about the the original meaning of the proverb;
Grimaldi ((1988:
1 988: 1117)
1 7) argues that it refers to the
the look of thethe guilty
person (d.
(cf. Ferrari 2002:
2002: 54-6
54-6 on the
the Visibility
visibility of maidenly aid6sL
aidos],
but
but Kennedy
Kennedy ((1991:
199 1 : 146
146 n. 57)
57) defends the
the possibility that
that it per-
per
tains, as Aristotle evidently
evidently takes it, to the disapproving look of of
others.
43 Jacoby ((1991:
1 99 1 : 111-13)
1 -13) plays down thethe significance of this and related
related
customs, concluding that 'the practice of nudity hardly implies an
absence of shame' ((12-13).
1 2-13). The preoccupation
preoccupation with sexuality and the
body characteristic of Christian
Christian asceticism and Victorian prudish-prudish
ness can lead to intense
intense sensitivity
sensitivity to shame connected with with the
body, particularly the sexually mature or maturing body. Simone de
Beauvoir ((1974:
1 974: 344-55
344-55)) describes
describes with
with particular vividness the
shame experienced by pubescent girls in respect to their their emerging
breasts and the onset of menstruation,
menstruation, but she concludes that '[iJn '[i]n a
sexually equalitarian society, woman
sexually equalitarian woman would
would regard menstruation
simply as her
her special way of reaching adult life ... ...;; the
the menses
1 03
inspire horror in the adolescent girl because they throw her into an
inferior
inferior and defective category' (354), and hence are experienced as a
sign of inadequacy.
inadequacy. It may be worth noting that in Greek medicine
of the
the classical
classical period, menstruation
menstruation was regarded as a natural natural way
of releasing
releasing bad blood, which in men had to be achieved achieved by the the
artificial
artificial means of blood-letting (see
(see Dean-Jones 1 994:
1994: 64, 1 23-4).
123-4).
Modern psychoanalytic theory relates shame to narcissism, or
more precisely to the narcissistic
narcissistic stage in infantile development, at
which point the child begins begins to project an ego ego ideal; this precedes
the
the Oedipal stage, when the the superego is formedformed (H.B.
(H.B.Lewis
Lewis[ 1[1987b:
98 7b:
331-2]
1-2] challenges this distinction). It is sometimes
sometimes suggested that
shame is a reaction to the fear fear of separation from from thethe parent,
typically
typically the mother,
mother, whereas
whereas guilt is a response to the the fear ofof
punishment
punishment by the father (d. Morris on 11989:
father (cf. 989: 60-1
60-1).). Freud himself
himself
wrote little about shame, and mostly in the early years, before he
had arrived at the idea of the superego (Morrison (Morrison 11989:
989: 22-9), butbut
the Freudian focus on sexuality
sexuality has led other writers in the psycho- psycho
analytic
analytic tradition
tradition to identify infantile sexual sexual abuse as a majormajor source
source
of pathological shame. H.B. H.B. Lewis ( 1 98 7a: 5)
(1987a: 5) observes that
that '[i]n
turning his attention
attention away from
from actual seductions to guilt over
fantasies, Freud turned away from from shame.
shame.'' For subsequent contribu- contribu
tions in the Freudian tradition, Morrison 1989: 31-66.
tradition, see Morrison 3 1 -66. Jacoby
((1991:
199 1 : 221)
1 ) is unusual in the psychoanalytic tradition in acknowledg- acknowledg
ing a positive function
function for shame: 'Shame reinforces interpersonal
distinctness and a sense of one's own individual individual identity. On the the
other
other hand, an excessive
excessive tendency
tendency toward
toward reactions
reactions of shameshame may
lead to disturbances of contact and social isolation ... Shame's
function
function is thus highly complex, serving the interests of both
individuality
individuality and conformity';
conformity',- and again (46): 'Shame ...... sets bound- bound
aries on interpersonal
interpersonal contact,
contact, thus protecting
protecting individuality
individuality and
identity.
identity.'' Jacoby concludes (60) that '[s]hame '[sjhame stands in close rela- rela
tionship
tionship to the persona.
persona. When the persona has holes in it, letting
what is beneath "show through, through,"" there is a feeling of nakedness, and
thus
thus a reaction of shame.'
44 Let me note here again that that the shame honour complex
shame and honour complex identi
identi-
fied
fied by so-called Mediterranean anthropology (see, (see, e.g., Cohen 11991)99 1 )
is not
not particularly evident in the Greek world ooff this period.
Aristotle observes that we may feel shame over the
Aristotle the deeds of ances-
04-5 / 303
tors or near kin, butbut he does notnot single out

out sexual misconduct
misconduct of of
female relatives
relatives as a cause of such shame; see Herman 11995. 995. On
honour as a traditional value, see Bourdieu 11966; 966; for a powerful
powerful
critique of thethe notion of 'tradition' in this context, see Narayan
11997:
997: 43-80.
45 The idea of a divided self self was perfectly
perfectly familiar to Aristotle and
his contemporaries; see Aristotle's discussion of self-love in
Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, and d. cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations
Disputations
2.20.47. Euripides' Electra 900-5 offers an interesting case in point.
Electra wishes to gloat over the the corpse of her arch enemy, Aegisthus,
whom her brother Orestes has just slain, but she simultaneously
simultaneously
feels shame at the idea: she understands triumphingtriumphing over the the dead to
represent a vice. Orestes reminds her that they now have nothing nothing to
fear,
fear, but
but she is concerned thatthat someone may react with disapproval
with disapproval
((the
the term here is phthonos); her sense of shame is not independent
of
of what others may think. Orestes assures his sister that no one will
blame her, but but she remains wary of a town given to censuring them. them.
Finally, Orestes dispels her doubts by reminding her that that their
hostility
hostility towards Aegisthus is implacable, and hence (we (we infer) not
even death exempts him from from the ill treatment
treatment due to enemies.
enemies.
Electra's inner
inner conflict is thus resolved by a new description
description of thethe
act.
46 Corbeill (2002) argues that that the Roman public speaker had a positive
duty to maintain
maintain a 'desirable fear
fear of shame' ((198),
l98L and in the the service
of
of this moral goal made vigorous use of vituperation
vituperation and personal
insult.
47 See especially Gill 11993,
993, 11996;
996; Foucault 11985 985;; and the
the essays in
Larmour, Miller, and Platter 1998. 1 998.
48 On shame as the the motive for Ajax's suicide, d. Williams 11993:
cf. Williams 993: 85. Of
Of
course, if shame is understood to affect the the essence of thethe self
self and
and to
induce a desire for concealment, it is natural to take it as the cause
of
of self-destructive violence. Shame is also taken to be the the motive by
Elise Garrison, in her catalogue of male suicides (on the the web);
web); but
but
the ancient sources she cites do not not mention
mention shame (in her disserta-
disserta
tion [[1987:
1 987: 56],
56L Garrison describes Ajax's suicide
suicide as 'egoistic/
'egoistic,' in the
the
terminology of Durkheim 11996; 996; d.cf. Garrison 11995:
995: 46-53)
46-53).. Nelli
(2002) argues persuasively that suicidio de A
that 'el suicidio yax se vuelve heroico
Ayax
a traves de la re-significaci6n
re-significacion que Ie le otorga la puesta en pnictica
practica de
1 06
un ritual' ('the suicide of Ajax Ajax becomes heroic via the resignification
that
that thethe establishment
establishment of a ritual bestows upon it'). Van Hooff Hooff ((1990:
1 990:
85) produces a chart in which 32 per cent cent of motives for attested
suicides antiquity are ascribed
suicides in antiquity ascribed to pudor
pudor or shame, but the analy analy-
ses of individual
individual cases ((107-20)
1 07-20) leave some doubt as to the the actual
motive; thus, van Hooff Hooff notes that that a captive 'could be disfigured
disfigured by
torture, which especially in ancient eyes meant a fatal loss of dignity.
Therefore in most most cases of suicide of people confronted
confronted with captiv-captiv
ity it was not anguishanguish or despair
despair that were regarded as the main
motives,
motives, but shame' ((110). 1 10). The argument is not not wholly compelling.
49 Aiskhune
Aiskbune occurs elsewhere in the play in contexts unrelated unrelated to
Ajax's
Ajax's sentiments.
sentiments. In the debate over the burial, Menelaus insists insists
that fear (deos, pbobos)
that fear phobos) and shame (aidos (aidos and aiskbune)
aiskhune} are neces-neces
sary to the the well-being
well-being of a city, since they prevent prevent the kind
kind of of
outrage that Ajax Ajax sought to commit ( 1073-86). Later, Teucer
commit (1073-86).
declares he feels no shame before Agamemnon and Menelaus with
respect to their ostensibly nobler birth ((1304-5). 1304-5). The first
first is an
instance of prospective, the the latter of retrospective shame. Of course,
it is possible that that Ajax's shame is implicit
implicit in the play, unrecognized
by himself
himself or anyone else but but present as a latent
latent force. Lansky (2001 (2001::
1 0 1 5), writing
1015), Shakespeare's Tempest,
writing of Shakespeare's observes that '[m]anifest
Tempest, observes
shame never appears in the play at all, but the defenses deployed are
defenses specifically against shame.'
50 Unless
Unless perhaps he perceives his madness as contributing to a loss of of
standing; but but this motive is not emphasized in the drama.
5511 Thus, for Aristotle,
Aristotle, hubris, which which he defines as speaking
speaking or acting
in ways that cause shame to another for the sheer pleasure of it
(Rhetoric 2.2, 11378b23-5),
(Rhetoric 378b23-5) is one of the the causes
causes of anger (see(see chapter
'
2, p. 46).
46). Modern psychology tends rather to associate humiliation humiliation
with
with shame (d. (cf. Jacoby 11991:
99 1 : 69-72). H.B.
H.B. Lewis ((1987a)
1987a) comes close
to equating shame with with what she calls 'humiliated fury' ( 1 2-13; cf.
fury' (12-13; d.
H.B. Lewis 11987b: 98 7b: 32-5), which
which entails among other things that that one
'try to get even or turn the tables on the
the tables "other'" ((12,
the "other"' 1 2, cf.
d. 19;19; 1987b:
35); I find
find the
the collapse of a distinction
distinction between
between shame and and anger to
be one of the the confusing
confusing elements
elements in her her treatment
treatment of shame. Toohey
(2004: 40-40-1)1 ) argues that Ajax was in fact fact melancholic, or in modern
manic-depressive, and that after
terms manic-depressive, after his attack of madness, he
exhibits the signs 'of 'of someone
someone who has fallen victim to such such a
09-13 / 305
manic attack' [41;

(41; d.
cf. 1172:
72: 'Ajax was
was probably mentally ill'). Accord
Accord-
ing to Toohey, 'People do not kill themselves because they are
depressed or lovesick or bored or in pain .... .. They kill themselves
because they are ill' (161).
( 1 6 1 ) . Toohey recogizes
recogizes that suicide as a literary
motif has its own logic or mythic structure ((189).
motif 1 89).
52 After
After Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus returns
returns the bow, Philoctetes
Philoctetes persists
persists in his
intention
intention to return home rather than proceed to Troy, where he can
both be healed
healed and assist in the conquest
conquest of the city;city; he only
only changes
his mind when the ghost of Hercules himself appears and bids him
fulfil his own destiny and that of the
fulfil the bow. In an intriguing paper,paper, so
far
far unpublished, on Philoctetes, Melvin Lansky analyses Philoctetes'
reaction as a function
function of hidden shame.
53 Shweder and Haidt explain that 'to be full full of lajja
la}}a is to be in posses-
posses
sion of the
the virtue of behaving in a civilized manner and in such a
way that the social order and its norms are upheld' (408), and they
add (409): 'In a cultural world based on an ethics of community,
emotions
emotions may existexist that are not fully fully felt
felt by those whose morality
morality is
based on an ethics of autonomy. La}}a Lajja is a clear example.' Cf. Abu- Abu
Lughod 11999:
999: 105: 'In the the leading dictionary of modern standard
Arabic, various words formed formed fromfrom the triliteral root l;1ashama
hashama are
translated by a cluster of words modesty, shame, and
words including modesty,
shyness. In its broadest
broadest sense, it means propriety.'
54 Scheff
Scheff (2000 and elsewhere) describes describes the utility of shame as
the social utility
creating a bond within a community,-
community; but but shame can also serve to
exclude those who are shamed. shamed. These two functionsfunctions are evident also
in ridicule
ridicule or joking ((cf.
d. O'Higgins
O'Higgins 2003: 4).
55 This does not
not mean, of course,
course, that it is illegitimate to interpret
Ajax's behaviour as shame in the modern sense, sense, or to detect 'hidden
shame' in his behaviour.
behaviour. I am grateful
grateful to Melvin Lansky com
Lansky for com-
ments on this and other aspects of the the present chapter.
Chapter Five
11 Cf.
Cf. Lucian, Prometheus 118,
Lucian, Prometheus 8, who
who defines phthonos as
defines phthonos as 'preventing
'preventing
people from sharing in things
from sharing they need although it costs you
things they
nothing'; Rawls 11971:
9 7 1 : 532, on envy as 'the propensity to view with
hostility the greater good of others even though
though their being more
fortunate than we does not detract from from our advantages.'
13-1 6
2 Planalp ((1999:
1999: 1176)
76) cites Schoeck ((1966)
1 966) for the view that 'envy is
particularly unmentionable
particularly unmentionable in the United
United States because
because Americans
Americans
do not wantwant to admit
admit that they are not all equals'; d. cf. Hochschild
11975:
975: 292: 'Envy without a social movement movement is a particularly
particularly
private, unlegitimated
unlegitimated feeling'; and Elster 11999a: 999a: 1164,
64, 1167-9,
67-9, 1183.
83 .
The ideology of equality in classical Athens does not not appear ttoo have
had the same repressive effect effect on the concept of of phthonos, butbut see
Plutarch ((lst-2nd
1 st-2nd century AD),AD), On Envy
Envy 537E;
537E; and Dickie 1981 1981 on
Roman satire.
3 There are exceptions, of of course; Pseudo-Plutarch, On Homer 132
follows Aristotle.
Aristotle. Cicero, To To Atticus 5. 1 9 .3 distinguishes two senses
5.19.3
of the Latin invidia
invidia with reference to the difference between between to
nemesan and to phthonein;
phthonein; Kaster
Raster (2003, 20052005)) shows that
that the
the
former
former sense predominates in Roman literature, and is invoked to
elicit
elicit shame or pudor in another.
4 Aspasius, a second-century
second-century AD commentator on Aristotle's Ethics
(p. 55 . 1 2-27 Heylbut 11889),
55.12-27 889), confesses
confesses his confusion at Aristotle's
Aristotle's
classification
classification here. In his dense analysis of the the laughable, Plato
describes
describes phthonos as pleasurepleasure at the misfortunes
misfortunes of others, which is
legitimate (and (and therefore not phthoneron or malicious) in the the case of of
enemies
enemies and illegitimate (and (and hence strictly speaking malicious) in in
the
the case of misfortunes sufferedsuffered by friends (Philebus 48B, 48B, 49C-D).
Plato's phthonos thus comes close to Aristotle's epikhairekakia, or
'Schadenfreude,' and is translated as 'malice' by Dorothea Frede
((1997:
1 997: 437-4). Plato specifies that in itselfitself phthonos is painful, and
hence the pleasure associated with with it is mixed (50A). The reference
reference
to friends versus
versus enemies perhaps goes back to Socrates himself, himself,
since Xenophon (Memorabilia 3.9.8) ascribes to him the view that
phthonos is 'pain ... ... not at the misfortunes of friends nor at the good
fortune of enemies, but but rather only those feel phthonos who are hurt
by the
the well-being of friends.' Cf. also pseudo-Plato,
pseudo-Plato, Definitions
Definitions 4416,1 6,
where phthonos is defined defined as 'pain at the goods,
goods, either present or
past, of friends.' But the latter two characterizations are otherwise
consistent with Aristotle's
consistent Aristotle's view. On pleasure in the misfortune of of
enemies, compare Euripides, Children of of Hercules 939-40: 'For it
is sweetest to see one's enemy [ekhthros][ekhthros] fall from
from good fortune and
suffer
suffer misfortune.'
5 E.g.,
E.g., Theognis 11.660,
.660, 11182;
1 82; Pindar, Isthmian 11.3-4;.3-4; Euripides,
16-1 8 / 307
30 7
Orestes 1361-2; Sophocles, Philoctetes 5518, 1 8, 602; Herodotus 1.34; 1 .34;

Plato, Minos 3319A3-4;
19A3-4; Plato Comicus, Phaon fr. 173.13-14 1 73 . 13-14 Kassel-
Kassel
Austin;
Austin,- Theocritus, Idy11 Idyll 27.63; Theophrastus, On Piety Piety frofr. 33.1-2;
. 1-2;
Callimachus, Aitia fro fr. 96, Hymn
Hymn to Delos 259; 259; Polybius 27.8.4
(a speech).
6 Cf.,
Cf., e.g.,
e.g., Theognis 11.280;.280; Plato, Cratylus 401 A5, Theaetetus 1175E2,
401A5, 75E2,
Laws 684E4, 876C8; 8 76C8; Aeschines, Against
Against Ctesias 66. 1-3; Calli
66.1-3; Calli-
mach
machus,us, Hymn
Hymn to Artemis 64, Hymn Hymn to Delos 107.
7 It is an 'emotionale Reaktion ... auf Handlungen anderer, anderer, die nicht nicht
den aUg.
allg. moralischen Erwartungen
Erwartungen entsprechen' ('emotional
reaction
reaction to the behaviour
behaviour of others who do not respond to general
moral expectations'), Stenger Stenger 2000: 8818.
1 8.
8 Cf.
Cf. also 88.198;
. 1 98; Stenger
Stenger (2000:
(2000: 818)
818)observes
observes that the gods gods respond
nemesis 'wenn Menschen
with nemesis Menschen versuchen,
versuchen, die Grenze zu ihnen zu
iiberschreiten' (('when
'when human beings attempt to overstep overstep their
boundaries').
9 Cf. N.R.E.
N.R.E. Fisher 11992: 992: 1193;
93; Cairns 11993:
993: 551-2;
1-2; for the
the pairing of of
shame with
with negative judgments
judgments on the part of others in Chinese,
see Li, Wang, and and Fischer 2003.
110
0 E.g., Odyssey
E.g., Odyssey 11.263;.263; cf. Redfield 11975:
9 75 : 1117;
1 7; and
and Cairns 1993:1 993: 85
n. 1120.
20. This is not the place to investigate in detail the Homeric idea
of
of aidos and aideisthai, but but I should like to suggest that aidos is not
simply
simply a response to social norms, but but also a way of invoking
invoking their
application: one adopts a posture of modesty (that is, one shows
oneself to be aidoios}
oneself aidoios) in order to elicit respect (aidos}(aidos) in the the other.
As Gloria Ferrari (2002: 55) 55) argues, 'Aidos
'Aidos ... is made visible
visible by the the
chastely downcast glance and by the the act of covering oneself.' Aidos Aidos
is thus something one performs as well as elicits: it it is a reciprocal
concept. A paradigmatic case is the the plea of thethe young Trojan Lycaon, Lycaon,
who, stripped of his armour, encounters a raging raging Achilles on the
battlefield (Iliad 221.74-5)
battlefield (Iliad 1 .74-5) and assumes the the position of supplication:
'I grasp your knees, Achilles; you, in turn, show me aidos and pity
me;
me,-1I am in the the position of an aidoios suppliant.' Had Achilles
accepted thethe plea (in fact, he did not), not), he would have acknowledged
a relationship between himself himself and Lycaon represented by the term
aidos. The double sense is inherent inherent in the word aidoios, which
means deserving of aidos or regard (Liddell, (Liddell, Scott, and Jones 11940: 940:
aidoios), but
s.v. aidoios}, but also 'showing reverence or compassion' (ibid. = LSJ; =
1 1 8-19
d.
cf. Adrados
Adrados et al. 11980-,980-, s.v.). Both aspects are part of the the exchange
in which an appeal to aidos is enacted. For examples of the active
and passive senses of aidoios, d. cf. Odyssey
Odyssey 9.269-79.269-71; 1 ; Iliad 3 . 1 72
Iliad 3.172
(Helen addresses
addresses Priam as aidoios:
aidoios: he is worthy of her her reverence but
also the
the only one who has shown regard for her); her); and 14.210
1 4.21 0 (Hera
declares thatthat she will
will be an aidoia friend Aphrodite; d.
friend of Aphrodite; cf. 118.386,
8.386,
394, of Thetis). Ferrari has called called attention to the the passage in
Pausanias (3.20. 10), in which
(3.20.10), which Penelope, after after choosing
choosing Odysseus
Odysseus
as her husband,
husband, is pursued
pursued by her father Icarius, who wishes wishes that she
and Odysseus remain with him in Lacedaemon. When Odysseus
Odysseus remain Odysseus
demanded to know whether whether she will be a wife or a daughter,
Penelope nothing, 'but covered her face with a veil in reply
Penelope said nothing,
to the question, so that Icarius, realizing realizing that she wished wished to depart
with Odysseus,
Odysseus, let let her
her go, and dedicated an image of of Aidos.'
Aidos .' ByBy her
Penelope both
gesture, Penelope both exhibits aidos and demands due regard. She
cannot
cannot openly defy defy her father. Instead,
Instead, she reminds
reminds him him that she is
aidoia and entitled to aidos. Brought up short, short, Icarius
Icarius acknowledges
acknowledges
his daughter'S
daughter's simultaneous
simultaneous sign of her her own decorum and her claim
to his respect, and he erects the statue to Aidos. Aid6s.
1 1 Cairns (1993:
11 ( 1 993 : 53) observes thatthat '[t]he range of nemesis is very wide,- wide;
it is frequently employed in condemnation of violence or excess,
and also in a number of minor minor social contexts, where it it censures
infringement
infringement of decorum.decorum. In some cases it it seems to signify
signify little
more than
than anger, although, as Redfield Redfield [1975: 1 1 7] points out, it
[ 1 975: 117]
always connotes anger in which which the subject feels himself himself justified.'
justified/
This last qualification is doubtless true, but but itit is equally so of orge
'anger, ' at least according to Aristotle's definition of orge as 'a
or 'anger/
desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a
perceived slight
slight on the part of of those who
who are not not fit
fit to slight one or
one's own' (Rhetoric 2.2, 11378a31-3).
378a3 1-3 ) .
1 2 So Herrmann 2003; contra Most 2003; Bulman 11992:
12 992: I1,, 15-1
15-166 takes
it that Homeric usage is simply simply loose.
13 There is also a second occurrence of the
13 the root phthon- in the form
aphthonon, 'abundant' ((118), 1 1 8 ), a sense that
that perhaps points to an
original meaning of 'deny' or 'begrudge' for phthoneo (phthoneo is
the only formform that
that appears
appears in the Homeric Hymns: To To Aphrodite
Aphrodite
4.536; To Earth MotherMother ofof A11
All 30.8, 16).
1 6) .
114
4 Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes 236; Euripides, Euripides, Medea Medea 63; 63; Plato,
1 9-21 / 309
Gorgias 489A; Xenophon, Symposium Symposium 3.5; d. cf. ibid. 1.12:

1 . 12 : 'It is
shameful
shameful to begrudge [phthoneo] someone the
begrudge [phthoneo] the shelter
shelter of a roof: let
him
him enter'; Isocrates, Antidosis 62 on people who 'will not not go so far
as to say "good'"
"good"' (to gar 'eu eipein); Walcot 11978:
'eu'' phthonesousin eipeinh 978: 26.
115
5 Twenty-five
Twenty-five occurrences, according to Bulman 1992: 1 992: 1;1; four
four times
times
in what remains of Bacchylides; once in Theognis, 11.770; . 770; for the the
different
different attitude
attitude towards phthonos in Pindar, where it inevitably
accompanies success, and Bacchylides,
Bacchylides, where poetry can moderate
it, see Most 2003.
1166 Only three times in Pindar, as in Theognis; twice in Aeschylus as
contrasted with
with seventeen times for phthonosphthonos and related terms,
excluding aphthonos
aphthonos and the like, in the surviving plays.
17
17 Cf. Herodotus 33.52;
. 52; Thales 1108.10dl7,
08. 10d 1 7, Diels and Kranz 11951-2;
95 1-2;
Heliodorus, Aethiopica
Aethiopica 6. 1 0.2; and Arnold Schwarzenegger, gover-
6.10.2; gover
nor
nor of California, as quoted in LeDuff 2004: A12:
LeDuff 2004: A12: 'You have to
remember something. EverybodyEverybody pities
pities the weak. Jealousy you have
to earn.'
18 Nicias hints that the the phthonos of the the gods may have been provoked
by the
the Athenians '
Athenians' overreaching ambition; for the novelty of this
concession on the part of an Athenian
concession Athenian within Thucydides' history, history,
and its relation to the theme of the other states' states' envy of Athens, see
Tzifopoulos 11995:
995: 1100-1,
00-1 , and 1997:
1 997: 501-4.
501--4.
19 See Konstan 200200la:1a: 34--43;
34-43; d.cf. Euripides' Suppliant
Suppliant Women
Women 168 1 68 with
1186
8 6 and 194, 233 with 280, 304, and 328 (the words are oiktos oiktos and
oiktirein}; Nicev 1985.
oiktirein);
20 Cf. Plataicus 52.4
52.4;; Against
Against Callimachus 62; Plato, Protagoras
Protagoras 323D.
21
21 For the
the positive sense of phthonos
phthonos in Attic prose, see Fisher 2003:
199-202; Sald
Said 2003: 225; 225; and Cairns 2003: 246-8.
22 The scholia comment unhelpfully: 'phthonos and pity are two most
unhelpfully: 'phthonos
opposite things' ((Dilts
Dilts 1986:
1986: 247).
247).
23 Cf. Plataicus 47; Peace 1124; 24; To Archidamus 15, 1 5, on
on unjust envy of of
people of greater ability; Panegyricus
Panegyricus 47, of those with with greater
knowledge;
knowledge,- To Nicocles 59, where Isocrates
To Nicoc1es Isocrates advises his disciples not
to phthonein those who excel ((tois proteuousin], but rather compete
tois proteuousin),
(hamillasthe] so as to make themselves
(hamillasthel themselves equal (exisousthai),
(exisousthai], the
point being that phthonos
phthonos towards those who have made progress progress is
wrong, since it implies
implies a desire to bring them down to one's own
level rather than
than raise oneself
oneself to theirs (phthonos would have been
3310/Notes
1 0 / Notes to page 121
121
their due if they had advanced themselves themselves illegitimately); oonn these
and
and other examples in Isocrates, see SaId Sa'id 2003.
24 LS]
LSJ s.v. 1.3, citing Isocrates 88.124, . 1 24, 44.184,
. 1 84, Demosthenes 28. 28.18;1 8; cf.
d.
Walcot 1978: 3: '[E]ven phthonos is not
1978: 3: not wholly bad'; bad',- and especially
Ranulf
Ranulf 11933: 933: 1106-11
06-1 1 for the
the 'moral' use of phthonos phthonos and cognate
terms.
25 On litigation against the rich, d. cf. Demosthenes
Demosthenes 20. 139-40; Isocrates
20.139-40;
115.31,
5 .3 1 , 14 1-2, and 1159-60;
141-2, 59-60; Lysias
Lysias 221.15;1 . 1 5; Walcot 1978: 1978: 67-73; Ober
1989: 2217-19;
1989: 1 7-19; and Cohen 11995: 995: 82-3,82-3, 1113-14;
1 3-14; on service to the the
demos, P. P. Wilson 2000: 1172-84;
72-84; Cairns 2003; N.R.E. Fisher Fisher 2003;
and Said 2003. Benefactions by the rich rather rather deserve
deserve gratitude:
gratitude:
Pindar, Olympian
Olympian 7.89-97.89-91,1, Nemean 111.13-17; 1 . 1 3-1 7; Demosthenes,
Demosthenes,
Epistles 3.28; d.
Epistles cf. Walcot 11978:
978: 73-4;
73-4; and Kurke 11991: 99 1 : 209-14.
26 Cf.
Cf. Euripides, Electia 30 (of Clytemnestra's decision not
Euripides, Electra not to kill
Electra): 'She feared
feared she might be subject to phthonos phthonos [phthonetheie]
[phthonetheie]
for
for the murder of her children'; ibid. 902, where Electra Electra hesitates
hesitates to
gloat over the corpsccorpse of Aegisthus, 'lest lest someone smite her with
phthonos.' Bulman ((1992: 1992: 11)) affirms
affirms that that 'human tj;fJ6vo<;4>0dvos in Pindar is
a completely negative emotion' arising from 'ignorance of human human
limitations' and a passion to transcend them (d. (cf. p. 33:: 'tj;fJ6vo<;
'cf>()dvo<; is the the
supreme n egative emotion in Pin
negative dar '), but
Pindar'), but that 'the ¢f)6v(}<f>0ovo<;<; of thethe
gods is better understood as equivalent to IJS;U;ut<;,' v£fj.em<;,! and shouldshould bc be
translated
translated not as ienvy'
'envy' but rather as iretribution,'
rather 'retribution,' for example at
Isthmian 7.39-42 (3
Isthmian 1; survey of examples of human phthonos
(31; phthonos in
Pindar on pp. pp. 117-31,
7-3 1, and of divine
divine phthonos
phthonos on pp. 331-6). 1-6). But
Bulman offers no explanation for why the word should have such
radically different
different meanings in the two contexts. As Cairns ((1996: 1 996:
20) remarks:
remarks: 'There is no question of a total separation of me�ning meaning
between human and divine phthonos'; when the gods feel phthonos, phthonos,
they, like human beings, believe that the emotion emotion is justified ((21). 2 1 ).
Bulman is right, in my view, to reject the the attempt of Steinlein ((1941: 1 94 1 :
20) and others to salvage a positive sense for phthonos phthonos as fa barom
'a barom-
eter to measure the good fortune fortune possessed by an individual' (5); cf. d.
Milobenski 11964); 964); no self-respecting
self-respecting aristocrat wants to deserve deserve
envy in the sense of being perceived to possess good things to which
he is not entitled
entitled or whieh
which he abuses. The phthonos phthonos that Pindar
singles out for blame is that directed against virtue (Part11. (Paith. 11.8-9; .8-9;
d.
cf. Pythian 7.1 9-20, on phthonos
7.19-20, provoked by kala;
phthonos provoked kala-, also Pythian
Pythian
22-5 / 311
31 1
111.29)
1 .29) - - that is, the misguided phthonos characteristic of the
phthoneioi, who harbour an illegitimate
phthoneroi, illegitimate resentment
resentment against
against their
betters. This This does not mean that phthonos is never deserved,
however; and it is just this justified justified sense of phthonos that that the gods
presumably feel at human excess, and which human beings can feel
as well. While Pindar's usage certainly anticipates, as Bulman says
(n the
(7), the negative account of phthonos in Aristotle, as contrasted for
example with with zelos, it reveals less a 'thoroughly consistent consistent concept
of ¢>fJ6vo<; ' ((1)
of (frffdvos' 1 ) than the
the social source of the the pejorative
pejorative sense of the the
term.
27 Stearns (1989:( 1989: 112) 2 ) suggests that
that envy maymay be characteristic of the the
lower orders, since 'it involves coveting something or some attribute
that someone else has/ while jealousy, as the desire to retain what
one possesses, is typically 'the emotion of the the upper classes.' For For
phthonos on the
phthonos the part of the
the worse towards their betters, cf. d. Euripides,
Euripides,
Alcestis 306.
28 Cypria fro
Cypria fr. 9, Bernabe 1987 1 987 = Athenaeus 8.334B; d.
= Apollodorus
cf. Apollodorus
33.10.7;
. 1 0.7; Hornum 11993: 993: 1-9;
1-9; Stafford 2000: 78-9;
Stafford 2000: 78-9; and Stenger 2000:
8818.
1 8.
29 Hornum 11993: 993: 1174
= 74 = no. 35 in hishis catalogue of inscriptions
inscriptions mention-
mention
ing Nemesis or nem nemesisesis on pp. 1 53-3 1 7;
153-317; also published in G. Mik
Mik-
hailov, Inscriptiones graecae in Bulgaria Bulgaria repertae I: I: 118
1 1 8 n. 220.
30 For the the personification of Phthonos, cf. d. also Callimachus, Hymn Hymn to
Apollo 1105-13. 05-l3.
31
31 Cf. Lucian, Prometheus
Prometheus 18: 18: 'The gods
gods ...... should stand outside all
phthonos.'
phthonos.'
32 E.g.,
E.g., Pindar, Pythian 10.2 1-2; cf.
10.21-2; d. Olympian 13 .25-6; Aeschylus,
Olympian 13.25-6;
Persians 362; Euripides, Euripides, Alcestis 1135; 1 135; Iphigeneia
Iphigeneia at Aulis, 1097;
Suppliant Women 348; d.
Suppliant cf. Dodds 11951:
95 1 : 28-63; and Dickie 1987. 1 987.
Kirkwood (1984: ( 1 984: 176)
1 76) suggests that divine envy may may be a topos of of
praise in Pindar;Pindar; cf. d. Cairns 2003: 250.
33 In Sophocles' Electra, Electra, Aegisthus, believing that that Orestes lies lies dead
before him, exclaims ((1466-7): 1466-7) : '0
'O Zeus, I see an apparition that that has
descended not without phthonos; whether
without phthonosj nemesis too attends on it
whether nemesis
I cannot say.' Aegisthus presumably means that Orestes had ofof
fended
fended the gods (hence (hence their phthonos},
phthonosL but that perhaps there will
be no further vengeance. Ranulf
further vengeance. Ranulf ((1933:
1 933: 90-106)
90- 106) argues that the
Greeks of the the classical period did not not clearly discriminate between
3312
1 2 / Notes to pages 1125-6
25-6
cases in which the gods visited misfortune upon human beings

because of their guilt (his Type I), I), randomly (Type II), or or out of
out of
jealousy (Type III). He allows, however, that 'the expression "jeal "jeal-
ousy
ousy of the
the gods" may stand for "moral disapproval disapproval on the part part ofof
the gods" in Euripides' ((110). 1 10). Ranulf's erroneous assumption that
original sense' of phthonos
the ''original phthonos was jealousy jealousy ((111)
I l l ) leads him
him to
assume that this meaning was was progressively 'toned down,' down/ thus
acquiring a moral significance
significance it did not originally possess; possess,- but the the
analogy between divine phthonos phthonos and divine nemesis nemesis undermines
undermines
his theory.
34 E.g.,
E.g., Aeschines 2.22, 551, 1 , 54, 1129,
29, 33.81;
. 8 1 ; Isocrates 112.15-16,
2 . 1 5-16, 114.4,
4.4, 8,
13, 1163-4,
63-4, 244-6; Lysias
Lysias 3.9.
3355 Cf. Plato, Lysis
Lysis 2215D
1 5D;; Milobenski
Milobenski 11964: 964: 66-9,
66-9, 72 nn. 41-2; 41-2; Schoeck
Schocck
11966:
966: 39; Walcot 11978:
978: 111,1 , 63-5;
63-5; Elster 11999a: 999a: 1171;
7 l ; and Cairns 2003:
240: 'Envy thus aims at ideal equality, but thrives on perceived
in cq uality.'
inequality.'
36 For Pindar's role, sec n. 26 above. There is perhaps a hint hint of a wider
contention over the class character of of phthonos
phthonos in the the view ex-ex
pressed by the chorus of sailors in Sophocles' Ajax. Aware that
Odysseus is accusing Ajax of having slaughtered slaughtered the the army's cattle,
'About you he
they remark: 'About he is
is very persuasive, and everyone everyone who
hears him speak rejoices the more insolently over your troubles,
since one never misses when when casting at great spirits. If someone
were to say such things against m me,e, he would persuade
persuade no one, for
phthonos
phthonos stalks the one who has' ( 1 50-71.
(150-7). The object of envy here is
not so much one who exceeds exceeds his station (the (the older view) aass one
whose station or character is above the ordinary: ordinary: Odysseus
Odysseus is cast as
a demagogue
demagogue (often his role in tragedy, although although he is not, in fact, fact,
in this one) who is stirring up resentment among the masses. The
chorus members themselves
themselves defend a hierarchical order based on a
mutually beneficial relationship between a great or noble individual
and lesser men ((158-61),
1 58-61 ), a point that senseless people - - an allusion
to the rabble -- arc
are incapable of of grasping ((162-3).
162-3 ).
,37
1 7 Thcre
There is an interesting analogy with the differentiationdifferentiation between the
archaic nemesis
nemesis and the more recent phthonos phthonos in the pair homilos homilos
(Ho
(Homeric) okhlos, meaning 'crowd.' As Karpyuk (2000:
me ric) and okhlos, (2000: 881)
1)
observes, okhlos
okhlos 'surfaces for the first time' in the the 'first half
half of the
Notes to pages
pages 1126-7
26-7 / 313
313
fifth
fifth century B.c.,'
B.C./ when there was considerable activity in the the
coining
coining of new terms. 'Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Thucydides Thucydides used
the two words interchangeably,' but in the course of the fifth cen
fifth cen-
tury
tury okhlos assumed the pejorativepejorative connotation of 'mob.' For a
model study of how the meaning of a Greek value term (e1eutheria (eleutheria
or 'freedom') mightmight be modulated by class interests,
interests, see Raaflaub
Raaflaub
2004.
38 Cf. Walcot 11978: 978: 1165;
65; Fuentes 200
2001:1 : 54:
54: 'Envy is a powerless poison';
Farrell 1989: 254 on envy as 'something objectionableobjectionable and, in its its
extreme forms, even sinful'; Lansky Lansky 11997:
99 7: 327:
327: 'Envy is especially
malignant
malignant because the hate and destruction it engenders are directed
at what is seen as good, good, not as bad'; Lansky
Lansky argues that that chronic envy
'is instigated by an experience of shame' (33 1 ), and simultaneously
(331), simultaneously
generates feelings of shame (332).
39 Cf. Ben-Ze'ev
Ben-Ze'ev 2000:
2000: 262,
262, 283; Farrell
Farrell 11989:
989: 262:
262: '[E]nvy does not, in
our culture, come in for anythinganything like the abuse that jealousy tends
to receive' (Farrell [[1989:1989: 253, 263]
263] questions whether 'friendly 'friendly envy'
or admiration counts as envy at all); all); Smith 11991:83:
99 1 : 83: 'the person
feeling envy (in (in its typically hostile
hostile form) will believe that the
envied person's advantage is to some degree unfair' (ef. 89); Parrott
(cf. 89);
((1991:
1 99 1 : 10)
10)distinguishes
distinguishes between non-malicious envy (('I 'I wish I had
what you have' have')) and malicious
malicious envy ('I wish you did not have what
you do'). In a New New Yorker cartoon (21 (21 May 200 2001, 1 , p. 991)
1 ) by Barbara
Barbara
Smaller, a man man standing before his boss's desk says: 'O.K., if you
can't sec see your way to giving me a pay raise, how about giving
Parkerson a pay cut ?'
cut?'
440
0 Plutarch
Plutarch too associates
associates 'the hostility of the masses toward emi emi-
nence' with fifth-century
fifth-century Athenian democracy;
democracy; d. cf. Wardman 1974: 1 974:
73.
73. It suits an elite class to assume that they are naturally naturally immune
immune
to the envy of their inferiors; but but see Aristotle, Politics 11280a23-5, 280a23-S,
1301a28-35 on the poor seeking to equal the rich while the rich
desire to preserve their privileges: the result is envy on the part of of
the poor:
poor: ton men phthonounton ton de kataphronounton
kataphronounton
((1295b21-3)
1 295b21-3);; d. cf. Walcot 11978:
978: 64, ObeT
Ober 11989:
989: 202-8. Parrott ((1991: 1 991 : 7)
7)
follows Aristotle in insisting that envy is principally directed
towards equals: 'People do not necessarily
necessarily envy the Rockefellers'
Rockefellers'
wealth, because
because the discrepancy does not reflect badly on them.'
3314
28-32
4411 Rawls ((1971:

197 1 : 533)
533J distinguishes between envy, which
which is not a moral
feeling, and resentment,
resentment, which is;is,- so too Emanuel Swedenborg
wrote in 11768
768 that 'there is a just and an unjust jealousy' (English
trans.
trans, in Swedenborg
Swedenborg 11928;
928; cited by Stearns
Stearns 11989:
989: 15).
15).
Chapter Six
11 Scheff
Scheff (2000:
J2000: 97)
97)observes
observes more
more cautiously
cautiously that
that '[t]he
'[t]he sources
sources of
of fear
fear
and anger,
anger, unlike shame, are not sociaL'
not uniquely social.'
2 Latin,
Latin, we may remark
remark in passing,
passing, distinguishes the two senses by
varying the case of the object (accusative
(accusative versus dative), where as
Greek, like English, uses a preposition.
3 Contrast Delumeau 11978: 978: 22:22: 'L'animal n'anticipe pas sa mort.
mort.
L'homme au au contraire sait - tres tot tot - qu'il mourra.'
rnourra.'
4 As indicated in chapter 2 (p. (p. 42),
42), Aristotle treats the anticipation of
anticipation of
pleasure (and
(and presumably of pain as well) as a weak phantasia, or
perception (Rhetoric
(Rhetoric 11.11,
. 1 1, 11370a27-34);
370a27-34); the the mere
mere expectation or
presentiment
presentiment of pain, then, is an aisthesis, not a pathos.pathos. The
emotion of fear entails
entails a judgment about the the harmful nature
nature of a
perceived thing or event.
55 Solomon (2000:
(2000: 111-12)
1-12) points out that cognition
cognition is variously
equated by students of the emotions
emotions withwith beliefs, judgments,
thoughts (e.g., Spinoza), and evaluations.
evaluations.
6 Aspasius adds rather that his claim is particularly evident in the the
case of desires,
desires, as in the
the desire for something beautiful
beautiful ([Commen-
Commen
tary on Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 44-5
tary 44-5 Heylbut).
Heylbut). Whether desire
constitutes an emotion for Aristotle is debatable;
debatable; Sorabji 11999:
999:
134-6) holds that it does,
does, whereas my own view is that it is rather
an appetite. Certainly, the Stoics added desire, along with fear, fear,
to Aristotle's simple pair of pleasure
pleasure and pain, and classified
classified all
emotions under one or another of these four rubrics. Both anger and
hatred, for example, fall under the genus desire in their system. This This
still does not mean that the Stoics considered desire itself to be an
emotion, any more than Aristotle held pain and pleasure to be
emotions; rather, they are a necessary
necessary component
component of any emotion
(the Stoic categories may be conceived as 'approach' and 'avoidance'
rather than 'desire' and 'fear' in theirtheir usual sense). We
We need not enter
into the question
question of the Stoic genera here, as it involves some highly
3,,-5 I/ 315
315
technical
technical issuesj
issues,- it seems clear, at all events, that Aspasius was
prepared to denominate desire as an emotion, and on the the basis of of
this description to argue that emotions may be aroused by simple simple
perception, independently
independently of belief or judgment.
7 William Miller, who approves approves an element
element of rashness in courage,
writes (with Aristotle in mind) that '[t]he proponents of deliberate
courage are rather
rather uncharitable to the more passionately motivated'
(Miller 2000:
2000: 1160).
60). In the
the Rhetoric, however, confidence (tharros) (thaiios) is
an emotion, not a vice, and, precisely as an emotion, emotion, it involves a
large measure of calculation. A rash person (thrasus) [ihrasus] tends to have
an excess of confidence (Nicomachean Ethics 2.7,
confidence (Nicomachean 2.7, 11107b2-3;
l 07b2-3; 3.7,
3 .7,
11115b28-9).
1 15b28-9 ). When courage
courage is defined
defined as a mean between fear fear and
confidence INicomachean
(Nicomachean Ethics 3.6, 11115a6-7), 1 15a6-n the extremes stand
for
for dispositions Ifearfulness,
(fearfulness, boldness) rather than passions.
8 At Nicomachean Ethics 11116b31-3 1 16b3 1-3 Aristotle
Aristotle contrasts
contrasts humans
humans with with
animals, which are moved by pain or thumos but not by rational
motives; d. cf. Polin 11953:
953: 20 on Thomas Hobbes: 'La crainte, passion
proprement humaine, est bien bicn diffcrente
differente de la terreur qu'eprouvent
aussi les animaux' I'Fear,('Fear, properly a human emotion, is quite
different
different from
from the terror that animals also experience'; cited in
Romilly 11956:956: 1124
24 n. 1).
1 ).
9 Demetrius ([On On Style 1159)59) notes
notesthe
the comic
comiceffect.
effect,that
that results
resultswhen
when
someone is relieved
relieved from
from an empty Idiakenes)
(diakenes) fright, for example
mistaking a strap for a snake. Scruton ((1986: 1 986: 34)
34) observes that fear
of snakes does
of does not
not develop until children reach a certain age; if it
is in some sense innate, it is nevertheless activated by training or
education.
110
0 Cf. Eudemian Ethics 11228b4-30a34
228b4-30a34 (contrast Topics 4.5);
(contrast Topics 4.5); Smoes
Smoes
11995:
995: 2217-33.
1 7-33. Plutarch, in his essay 'On How a Youth Should Listen
to Poems' 29E, 29E, observes that the Trojan Dolon boasts that that he can
reach Agamemnon's own ship (iliad [Iliad 110.325-6);
0.325-6); 'Diomedes, however,
does not boast,
boast, but
but says that he is less afraid afraid if he is sent out with
another [Iliad
[Iliad 110.222-3].
0.222-3]. Foresight is Greek and smart, boldness
barbarian and ignoble.' Aristotle's
Aristotle's view of the relationship between
courage and fear fear is complicated by his belief belief that a continent or se1£ self-
controlled person resists and conquers pains and pleasures, whereas
a virtuous
virtuous person
person is free of such internal conflict; thus, a truly
courageous person should not experience the pain associated with
3316
35-7
fear ((see
see Leighton 11987:
987: 881-2).
1 -2 ) . Aristotle can call a person person coura- coura
geous who
who is fearless
fearless (adees\, for example, before the the prospect of of
a noble death (Nicomachean
(Nicomachean Ethics 11115a33). 1 1 Sa33 ). As Leighton (85 (85))
observes, however,
however, Aristotle's 'commitment to fearlessness fearlessness in
courage is not long lasting.
lasting.'' C f. Eudemian Ethics 11228b24-37
Cf. 228b24-37,/
where Aristotle distinguishes things that are frightening frightening to a
person qua human
human being, but not qua courageous. courageous. For For further
discussion of Aristotle's position
position on courage, see Pears 11978; 978;
Mills 11980;
980; and Duff
Duff 11987.
987.
1111 Xenophon, Memorabilia
Memorabilia 3.5.5-6; d. cf. Xenophon, On Horsemanship
Horsemanship
7.7 (plwbos)i
(phobos); Isocrates Areopagiticus 6 (dedienai). (dedienai}.
112
2 Andronicus,
Andronicus, a scholar living in the the time of Augustus who is fre fre-
quently
quently cited in the Homeric scholia, adopted the view of Aristarchus
that in Homer the word phobos and the associated verb phobeomai
just mean 'flight' or 'flee/
'flee,' while 'what we call phobos, he [i.e.,
Homer] calls deos'
decs' (ad 111.71;
1 .7 1 ; d.
cf. ad 2. 767, 55.223
2.767, .223 [followed
[followed by LST LSJ s.v.
phobeomai}, 55.252,
phobeomai], .252, 5.272, 6.97, 6.278, 8. 1 59, 111.173,
8.159, 1 . 1 73, 111.402,
1 .402, 112.144,
2. 1 44,
etc.). Andronicus is worried by 12.46, with good reason: tarbei is
clearly equivalent here to phobeitai.
phobeitai. Cf. also 9.2, where phobos phobos is
the companion of flight and is described as 'cold' (on coldness as a
sign of fear, d.
cf. Pseudo-Plutarch, On Homer Homer 1131 3 1 and Porphyry,
Questions p. 64.5-1
Homeric Questions 64.5-12 2 Sodano 11970);
9 70); also scholia
scholia ad 110.10: 0. 1 0:
'Homcr phobos cowardly fear [deiliasis]
'Homer usually calls phobos [deiliasis] accompanied
accompanied
by flight.' At Odyssey
Odyssey 22.299 (of (of the suitors), the term clearly
indicates flight, being equivalent to epessumenoi epessumenoi at 307. Thus, a
propos the present passage,
passage, Andronicus
Andronicus remarks that phobMheis phobetheis is
used in place of phug6n,
phugon, 'taking to flight.' While Andronicus Andronicus over over-
states the case for synonymy, in my view, we need not belabour the the
issue: if phobos
phobos means
means 'flight,
'flight,'' it is flight
flight induced
induced by danger danger and no
other
other kind. Hector
Hector runs
runs in fear. But it is fear fear proportionate to the the
cause. After
After a careful
careful review of passages, Harkemanne ((1967: 1 967: 661)
1)
concludes: 'chez Homere, ¢6{3o<; </>o/3o<; signifie deja "peur.'"
"peur."'
13 Cf. Odysseus at Iliad
13 Iliad 111.404-10;
1 .404-1 0; Trumpy
Triimpy 11950: 950: 23
231: 1 : 'Die Flucht [sc.
in Homer]
Homer] ist eine taktische Massnahme, gilt also meist nicht als
feige Handlung'
Handlung' ('Flight is a tactical
tactical measure, and so it does not
usually count
count as cowardly behaviour'); Wissmann 11997: 997: 29. As
W.I. Miller 2000: 1129-30
29-30 remarks, 'Fear was a tormenting omnipres omnipres-
ence in the heroic world .... . . One paid homage to fear .... . . Homer insists
Notes to pages
pages 137-8 ! 317
137-8/317
that the
the strong-hearted
strong-hearted feel the grip of fear; fear; no hero in the IliadIliad does
not feel fear at one time or anothcr.'
another.' See See too the newly edited but
still unpublished fragment
fragment of Archilochus (Oxyrhynchus papyrus
4708), available in partial form on-line at http://
www.papyrology.ox.ac.uk!monster!demo!Page1
www.papyrology.ox.ac.uk/monster/demo/Pagel.htrnl. .html.
14 W.I. Miller
W.I. Miller (2000: 7 1
71) ) remarks: 'In the
the Western aggressive prece
prece-
dence-setting
dence-setting system
system the assumption is that only the few will not
show themselves
themselves cowards
cowards some of the time. Even Hector Hector must run,
Ajax and Diomedes retreat.' This This may be true of the later Western
tradition,
tradition, but it does not apply, I am arguing, to the Homeric code.
115 5 We might
might be inclined
inclined to distinguish
distinguish between deliberate
deliberate flight
flight and a
panic reaction, which
which is outside our power to control: 'rOlf '[O]f fleeing
there be two sorts;
sorts,- the
the one proceeding of a sudden sudden and unlooked
unlocked for
terror, which is least blameable
blameable;; the other is voluntary, and, as it
were, a determinate
determinate intention
intention to give place unto the enemy -- a fault
exceeding foule and not not excusable' (W.I. (W.I.Miller
Miller2000:
2000:96, 96,quoting
quoting
William Winthrop'S
Winthrop's Military
Military Law and Precedents [[1920] 1 920] under
'Running Away/ which which in turn cites the late-sixteenth-century
late-sixteenth-century
writer Robert Barker ((1602: . 1 6). But it is not clear that
1 602: 11.16). that the distinc
distinc-
tion is germane to Hector's conduct here. I return to the Greek
conception of panic below.
116 Cf. w.I.
6 Cf. W.I. Miller 2000: 130: 'It is not not until the nineteenth
nineteenth century that
we first
first find soldiers admitting in letters home or in memoirs memoirs thatthat
they were afraid,
afraid, but they still took all due precaution about voicing
their fears to comrades.' Contrast the official official ideology
ideology of fearlessness
in the face of death that is expressed in the following citation citation for the
the
Medal of Honor awarded
awarded to gunnery sergeant William Walsh (Second
World War),
War), who is said to have 'fearlessly charged .... . . against
against the
the
Japanese entrenched on the ridge above him, utterly utterly oblivious
oblivious to
the unrelenting
unrelenting furyfury of hostile
hostile automatic weapons fire' (U.S. (U.S.Senate
Senate
Medal
Medal of Recipients 705, as quoted by w.I.
of Honor Recipients W.I. Miller
Miller 2000: 68). 68).
1177 W.I.
W.I. Miller
Miller (2000: 87) observes that 'so insistent arc
(2000: 87) are the
the beliefs
engendered by a model of fearless warrior courage, courage, a model [men] [men]
even know is not the only model of courage nor the only one they
may subscribe to, that the experience
experience of fear makes them, in their their
own eyes, a chicken.'
8 At the
118 the end of Prometheus Bound, Prometheus acknowledges that the the
thunderbolts and threats of Zeus arouse phobos
thunderbolts phobos in himhim ((1089-90);
1089-90);
3318
38-41
this fear, however,

however, does not diminish diminish his resolve.
resolve. GriffithGriffith 1(1983:
1 983: 279
ad lac.)
loc.) comments:
comments: 'Po 'P. can feel fear l(cf. ef. 1127,
27, despite 933), 933), but
but not
not to
the
the point of "cowering" 1(174, 1 74, 960)
960) or surrendering
surrendering his his secret . . . Like
secret... Like
most of the great tragic heroes, he is subject to the same emotions emotions.
and weaknesses that ordinary ordinary people experience ...., . ., yet at the same
time distinguished
distinguished from from ordinary people by peculiar characteristics characteristics
....
. . which enable himhim to act in extraordinary ways. If P. P. felt no pain or
fear, his plight would not move us.' I would say more simply that
fear is is inseparable
inseparable fromfrom courage, and and no one
one -- not even a god god--
would be fearless in Prometheus's position.
19
19 Wissmann 1(1997:1 997: 75)75) concludes
concludes that avoiding the the charge of coward- coward
ice was a crucial motivation in the warrior society represented by
Homeric epic.
20 Today, by contrast, 'lilt '[i]t is usually
usually supposed that fear fear leads to flight'
flight'
IW.I.
(W.I. Miller 1997:
1997: 25 25).).
2211 See c.A.C.A. Barton
Barton 200
2001: 1 : 2:
2: 'What we, with our ideal of freedom from from
the befuddling
befuddling fumes
fum.es of passion,
passion, might ascribe to politics or eco- eco
nomics, class or gender, the Romans would have attributed attributed to fear,
desire, shame, arrogance, ambition, envy,
arrogance, ambition, envy, greed,
greed, love, love, or lust.'
22 Hostile states may be mutually mutually wary of each other, especially especially if one
is restless to get out from from under the the domination of of the
the other, for
then there is a permanent
permanent motive for attack, residing precisely in the the
fear
fear that the other party may grow too strong. At Thucydides 3. 1 1 .2,
3.11.2,
the Mytilenaeans appeal to the Spartans Spartans to support them in their
rebellion against Athens.
Athens. Benjamin Jowett translates: translates: 'Mutual fear fear
[to antipalon deos] is the the only solid basis of alliance: for he who who
would break faith is deterred from from aggression by the consciousness
of inferiority [Wi proukhon].'' But how can there be a mutual
me proukhon].
[toi me
consciousness of inferiority
inferiority?? In fact, Thucydides says 'by virtue of of
not exceeding
exceeding the other.' Now, the Mytilenaeans had already ex- ex
pressed their fear of Athens's growing power as they themselves
were becoming more isolated 13.1 0.4-1 1 . 1 ). Before the rest of the
(3.10.4-11.1). the
allies had been reduced, the Mytilenaeans' naval power induced fear
(phobos) in the Athenians that they might ally themselves with
(phobos) with
another state (3. 1 1 .6). During this stand-off, there was mutual
(3.11.6).
anxiety, the Athenians fearing (dediotes, 33.12.1)
fearing Idediotes, . 1 2 . 1 ) what the Mytilen
Mytilen-
aeans might do in case of war, the Mytlinaeans fawning on the the
Athenians in peacetime.
peacetime. 'Whereas it is goodwill that most confirms
Notes to pages
pages 1142-4
42-4 / 319
319
trust
trust for others, for us it was fear \phobos] that
fear [PhobosJ that made iitt strong, and
we were bound together as allies by dread [cfeos] [deos] rather than friend friend-
ship, and to whichever side security furnished confidence confidence [tharsos],
[tharsos],
that was the side that was going to transgress' (3 . 1 2. 1 ). If the
(3.12.1). the Myti
Myti-
lenaeans made the first first move, that too was reasonable, they claim;
'for
'for if we were able to counter-plot
counter-plot and outwait them them on an equal
basis, why on a similar basis basis did we have to be in their their power? Since
it was in their
their power ever to attack, with with us lay the necessity
necessity as well
to anticipate them
them by defending ourselves' (3. 1 2.3 ). And they con-
(3.12.3). con
clude: 'Having such motives and reasons, Lacedaemonians and
allies, we revolted, reasons clear enough for those who hear us to
know thatthat we did what was natural, and sufficient sufficient for us to fear
and to turn to some safety' (3. 13. 1 ). For all their waffling,
(3.13.1). waffling, the
Mytilenaeans' fear fear is the same as that which drove the Spartans
to make war on Athens.
23 The Romans inclined
inclined to think
think that fear fear of the enemy (metus (uietus
hostilis] inspired courage;
hostilis) courage; d. cf. c.A.
C.A. Barton
Barton 2000: 5511 with n. 93: 93: "'Up
'"Up
against
against the wall" was, for the Romans, the most most stimulating and
indeed the strongest 5 1 -2). w.I.
strongest position' ((51-2). W.I. Miller (2000:
(2000: 1133) 33 ) observes
that
that Nicias
Nicias exhorts
exhorts his men in Sicily (Thucydides 6.68) 'not by
rousing rah-rah, but but by cold reason's grimmest
grimmest assessments of the the
present situation.' Cf. Romilly 11956: 956: 112222 (of Thucydides):
Thucydides): 'Et l'on 1'on
bientot aa ce paradoxe que la crainte devient une
arrive bient6t une force
force et rend
Ie
le faible superieur au fort' (('One 'One soon arrives at the the paradox that fear
becomes a force and rendersrenders the weak superiorsuperior to the the strong').
24 I say 'Thucydides' text,'text/ because
because neither the Peloponnesian
Peloponnesian generals
nor Phormio is likelylikely to have addressed their their troops in this manner.
Apart from
from the characteristically compressed
compressed style that Thucydides
employs in all his speeches,
speeches, which reveals his active hand in com- com
posing them, it is in practice impossible,
impossible, Mogens Hansen Hansen has argued
((1993),
1 993), to deliver
deliver such orations to an army with the unaided voice, voice,
except under
under special conditions,
conditions, though there is a case to be made
that the ancient historians were aware aware of the difficulties
difficulties and recog recog-
nized a difference
difference between pre-deployment and post-deployment
harangues.
25 w.I.
W.I. Miller
Miller ((2000:
2000: 1169-71)
69-7 1 ) offers
offers a remarkable analysisanalysis of the the general
Demosthenes'
Demosthenes' speech to the Athenians Athenians defending Pylos against the
landing of a superior force of Spartans (4. 10). Demosthenes
(4.10). Demosthenes begins by
1 47
cautioning his men not to be clever (sunetos) (sunetos) and calculate

eklogizomenos) the risk, but to engage the enemy with uncritical
((eklogizomenos) uncritical
optimism (aperiskept6s euelpis).. Miller paraphrases
(aperiskeptos euelpis) paraphrases ((170):1 70): 'Don't
think, just charge.
charge. Thinking
Thinking will only prompt despair.' But, But, as Miller
notes, Demosthenes proceeds proceeds to contradict his own advice and
demonstrate
demonstrate that the situation is in fact better better than it seems: the
Athenians already control the beachhead, and there is no reason
greatly
greatly to fear (agan phobeisthai) the
fear (agan the Spartans'
Spartans' superior
superior numbers
numbers
since they will not be able to land their men simultaneously. simultaneously.
Demosthenes
Demosthenes reminds his men that the Spartans too will face
obstacles. As Miller explains Demosthenes' strategy, strategy, he insinuates
insinuates
that 'the Spartans must must be scared stiff stiff because ..... . we have been in
the exact situation the Spartans are in now and we were scared stiff stiff
ourselves' ((171)
171) - - though not as badly,
badly, since the Athenians are are better
Thus I believe,
sailors. 'Thus believe,'' Demosthenes
Demosthenes concludes, 'that their difficul difficul-
ties will counterbalance our numbers.' The Athenians, Thucydides
tells us ((4.11), etharsesan) from
4. 1 1 ), took heart ((etharsesan) from Demosthenes' exhorta exhorta-
tion. As Miller
Miller says, 'The speech is rhetorically and psychologically
masterful. Demosthenes' wits did not undo his courage, but he did
not need them to embolden himself. Rather his courage kept his
wits functioning so that that he could use them them to aid the cause of his
men's faltering
faltering courage,
courage, undone in part by their their wits' ((171).
1 7 1 ). The
mutual
mutual interaction
interaction of judgment and emotion (for (for Miller's
Miller's 'courage'
it is better to understand 'confidence') illustrates perfectly perfectly both the
cognitive basis of the the emotions and their their role as 'those things on
account of which
which people change their their minds and differ differ in regard to
their judgments.
judgments.'' For modern discussions of this reciprocal influ influ-
ence, see Frijda, Manstead, and Bern, eds 2000. Walbank ((1985: 1985: 242-
242-
3) refers the inclusion of speeches by the ancient historians to 'the
the inclusion
concept that man is a rational being, whose actions are the result of of
conscious decisions, and that these decisions are the outcome of of
discourse.'
26 Thalmann
Thalmann ((1978: 1 978: 1102)
02) observes:
observes: 'The chorus are not not just a group of of
panic-stricken virgins ... ... they represent Thebes as a whole.'
27 Cf. Marina and L6pez Lopez Penas 200 2001: 1 : 47:
47: 'Los sentimientos
sentimientos producen
otras
otros sentimientos. El desprecio provoca provoca el rencor,
rencor, el rencor la
venganza, la venganza el dolor y el odio y a veces la frustration, frustraci6n, y
posiblemente la culpabilidad' ('Emotions generate other emotions.
Notes
Notes to pages
pages 148-9
148-9 / 321
321
Contempt
Contempt induces resentment, resentment, resentment
resentment revenge, revenge pain
and hatred and sometimes sometimes frustration, and possibly possibly guilt too');
Lansky 11991: 99 1 : 484 on 'the transformation of shame shame into fear' ((cf.
d. 488;
the idea of such such transformation is central to psychoanaltyic theory); theory);
Rendell 198 1981:1 : 37 (quoted
(quoted in chapter 1, I, p. 19).
19).Ancient
Ancient Greek writers
writers
tended
tended to think of contradictory emotions as coexisting rather than than
displacing one another: another: d. cf. Diodorus Siculus 32.27.2 (Const.(Const. Excerpt
4, pp. 380-1380-1));; Fusillo 11999; 999; Kytzler 2003. Longinus ((On On the Sublime
1 . 1 ), however, m
221.1), entions how people jump
mentions jump fromfrom one emotion to the the
next
next and back again.
28 Cf. Kovecses
K6vecses 2000: 117, 1 -86 on the
7, 661-86 the widespread image of emotion as
a force,
force, and for discussion discussion of the 'hydraulic' conceptionconception of emotions,
Rosenwein 2003; contrast contrast the the metaphor of entanglement
entanglement or fifir fifiz
nagnafa among the Cheke Holo of the
nagnafa the Solomon Islands,
Islands, as described
described
in White 2000: 36-7. 36-7.
29 Livy reports
reports that
that during the debate over whether whether to rescind
rescind the Lex
Oppia, which put severe limits on women's women's right to conspicuous
luxury
luxury items such as jewellery, jewellery, the Roman matrons took to the
streets to pressure the Senate and tribunes into endorsing the repeal
(34. 1-8). Cato the Censor, ddending
(34.1-8). defending the law, argued that the women's
riotous conduct shows just why they must be subject to restraint; restraint;
the tribune
tribune Lucius Valerius, however, replied replied that the women
women were were
behaving just as other citizens do when wronged. wronged. The contrasting
contrasting
interpretations of the women's women's behaviour, seen as a manifestation
manifestation
of irrational passion by Cato and as a practical political gesture by
Valerius, correspond, I suggest, suggest, to the opposing views of the chorus
in the Seven against Thebes as hysterical or rationally fearful fearful for
their
their city.
,30
,0 Cf.
Cf. Gordon 1987: 1987: 22: 22: ''[I]t
[IJt appears that no one is truly angry unless
he or she is angry about something.'
31
31 Cf. Wierzbicka 11999: 999: 83, who explains the the 'freefloating'
'freefloating' character
character of of
anxiety as the feeling that that 'the bad events
events threatening
threatening me are unun·
identified,'
identified/ though she includes in this category uncertain uncertain outcomes,
outcomes,
as in the case of 'a student awaiting the results results of examinations.'
James ((1997:1 997: 1102) 02 ) points out that that 'Descartes does not rule out the the
possibility
possibility of passions whose objects objects are vague,
vague, even to the point
where it is difficult
difficult to make sense of the claim that they have
objects at all . . . ; the functioning
all...; functioning of a passion does not not depend on its
50- 1
having an identifiable object, nor do all passions possess possess them.' So

too, Hobbes ((1991:
1 99 1 : 76)
76) argued that in a state of intense anxiety 'we
often
often invent
invent a terrifying
terrifying object of it' ((cited
cited in James 11997:
997: 1166).
66). Cf.
LeDoux 11996:
996: 228: 'Anxiety is usuallyusually distinguished
distinguished from
from fear
fear by
the lack of an external stimulus that elicits the reaction'; and
Griffiths
Griffiths 11997:
997: 28:
28: 'States such as depression, elation, and anxiety anxiety
are generally
generally thought
thought to be capable of clinicalclinical instances where they they
have no ((intentional)
intentional) object.'
32 Trans. Smith 11993: 993 : 385; the last
last word represents
represents one possible
possible
restoration
restoration of the Greek text, which which breaks off at this point.
point.
33 Cf.
Cf. Thucydides
Thucydides 6.53 .3, on the mood
6.53.3, mood in Athens
Athens after
after the desecration
desecration
of the herms:
herms: 'The people were continually afraid afraid and regarded
everything with suspicion.' This mood of persistent persistent mistrust
mistrust is not
precisely anxiety, but a worry that a real danger might come from from
any quarter (d. (cf. 6.53.2, panta hupoptos appdekhomenoi}. The point
hupoptos apodekhomenoil.
is that
that people are are nervous,
nervous, edgy, skittish
skittish - but because they know
that a precise kind of danger lurks. lurks.
34 Keith Oatley ((1992:
1 992: 65
65)1 lists among the 'psychopathological exten- exten
sions' of fear
fear 'phobias, panic attacks, generalized anxiety states, and
obsessive-compulsive disorders. Phobias are intense intense fears of specific
objects or circumstances.
circumstances. A panic attack attack is a strong autonomic
autonomic
disturbance with with an irresistible urge to escape to safety. Anxiety
states may have no apparent object. object.'' Webster's International
Dictionary
Dictionary of of English (2nd ed.) defines panic as '[a] sudden, overpow-
(2nd ed.) overpow
ering fright;
fright,- esp. a sudden and groundless fright; terror inspired by a
trifling cause or a misapprehension
misapprehension of danger, esp. esp. when accompa
accompa-
nied by unreasoning
unreasoning or franticfrantic efforts
efforts to secure safety.' In colloquial
usage, 'panic' may mean no more than intense fear; d. cf. the response
of
of Connecticut
Connecticut State Representative Themis Klarides to a case of of
anthrax poisoning (Zielbauer 2001 2001):I: 'We can't panic until
until we know
where it came from.' On the neurophysiology of panic, and its
treatment with the tricyclic
treatment tricyclic antidepressant imipramine and other
drugs, d.cf. Schneier 11999:999: 284; on thethe biochemical
biochemical basis of anxiety,
see Pujol Gebelli 200 2001.l.
35 Borgeaud ((1988:
1 988: 89-951
89-95) cites as examples of panic Josephus, Jewish
War 5.7-9 (the collapse of a tower during the night);
War night); Pausanias
10.23.5-8, on the Gauls after after their defeat at Delphi: 'They snatched
up arms and killed one another another or were killed, without
without recognizing
Notes to pages 1152^
52-4 / 323
their
thek own language or one another's faces or even the the shape of their their
shields' (Loeb trans.
trans.);); Cornutus, Theology 27: 27: 'Panic alarms are
sudden and irrational' (Cornutus (Cornutus compares them to the fright fright that
that
sometimes
sometimes seizes sheep and goats at a sudden soundh sound); Aeneas
Tacticus
Tacticus 4; Polybius 20.6. 20.6.12;1 2; and Longus, Daphnis
Daphnis and Chloe Chios
2.25 .3-4, where Pan frightens off pirates with a horrible
2.25.3-4, horrible noise.noise.
Borgeaud notes (90) that one way to counteract panic is with pass- pass
words or countersigns, which allow one to distinguish distinguish enemies from from
friends.
36 Cf. Thucydides 2.65.9 on Pericles' speeches; Critias fragment B B 25.28,
Diels and Kranz 11951-2; 95 1-2; Gorgias, Palamedes 4; 4- Plato, Phaedrus
Phaedms
26 1A8; Isocrates, Evagoras 99.10.
261A8; . 1 0.
37 E.g.,
E.g., Plato, Euthyphro
Euthyphio 112B9-11,2B9-1 1 , where aidds aidos and ais]{hune
aiskhune are
associated with deos and phobos; d.
andphobos, cf. Laws 646E3-47C6
646E3^7C6 on two
kinds of phobos,
phobos, one concerned with future evils, the other with with
one's reputation
reputation or doxa; doxa-, the latter fear is again connected connected with both
aiskhune and aidds
aiskhune (d. also pseudo-Plato,
aidos (cf. Definitions 4415E5-8;
pseudo-Plato, Definitions 1 5E5-8;
Sophocles, Ajax 1071-80; Oedipus at Colonus 11625:
Ajax lOll-SO; 625 : phob6i
phoboi
deisantes}. At Phaedo 68D, Plato poses the paradox
deisantes). paradox that that courageous
men face death for fear (phobos)
men (phobos} of still greater evils; evils,- hence men men
(apart from
from philosophers) are courageous by virtue of fright fright (deos)
{deos}
and fearing. See See Renehan 11971: 9 1 1 : 70-1 on the expression
expression ((quotedquoted in
the Euthyphro)
Euthyphio] 'where there is deos, there too there is aidds'; aidos'; the
scholiast ad loc. loco in codex T. attributes
attributes it to Stasinus's Cypria Cypria = h.= fr.
I18,
S, Bernabe 11987 987 (so
(so too Stohaeus,
Stobaeus, Anthology 3.67 1 . 1 I ); Renehan
Antho7ogy3.671.il);
compares a similar formula in Epicharmus frag. 22 2211 Kaibel (d. (cf.
Bernabe's apparatus ad loc. loc.).). The association
association was clearly traditional.traditional.
connection between phobos and sebas, d.
For the connection cf. Aeschylus,
Aeschylus,
Eumenides 690- 690-1.1.
38 At Sophocles, Trachinian
Tiachinian Women 457, for example, dedoika dedoika is
contrasted
contrasted with tarbed.taibeo.
39 Cf. Smoes 11995: 995: 5511 on tbarsos: s'oppose aa la crainte, au deos (peur
thaisos: 'II s'oppose
raisonee); il empeche de ceder aa la panique, au phobos
raisonec); pbobos (peur subite et
instinctive).'
40 E.g.
E.g.p. 1121,
2 1 , citing 11.75.3,
. 75 .3, 6.83.4 (deos) (deos] vs. 11.77.6,
. 77.6, 11.123.1
. 1 23 . 1 (pbobos)
(phobos} in
politics; 4.62.4 vS.
4.62.4 vs. 6.34.9 on preparations for war; d.
cf, Miiri 11947:
947: 265:
'Fear before the unknown, fear that has no visible basis, is called 'the
unsubstantiated (atekmarton] deos of the
unsubstantiated (atekmarton) the unseen' (4.63 (4.63.1,. 1 , 2.87.
2.87.1).1 ).
54-7
41 Wartelle ((1989:
41 1 989: 54-6) notes that fearfear in relation to the sacred is
usually
usually phobos in earlier Christian literature ((Septuagint,
Septuagint, New
Testament, apostolic fathers), whereas deos is rare.
Testament,
42 Needless to say, the the nature of tragic pity and fearfear has been much
debated. For views different
different from
from mine, see MaruSic
MarusiC 2000, esp.
esp. 1120-4;
20-4;
Halliwell
Halliwell 200 1 : chap. 7,
2001: 7, sec. 2.
43 As Halliwell (2002: 2217) 1 7) observes, Aristotle states in the the Rhetoric
that fear
fear can drive out pity (2.8,
(2.8, 1386a3 1 -2). Halliwell continues:
1386a31-2).
'That goes to show, first, that those who think fear fear in the Poetics
is principally a self-regarding (as (as opposed to a vicarious)
vicarious) emotion
have a serious exegetical problem, because Aristotle appears not
to believe that pity and overtly self-regarding fear fear belong together;
and, second, that not everything said about the emotions in the
Rhetoric ... is necessarily or straightforwardly
... straightforwardly transferable
transferable to the
the
interpretation of tragic pity and fear.' In a note (n. (n. 32),
32), Halliwell
reaffirms
reaffirms his earlier interpretation of tragic fear fear as 'essentially other-
other
regarding, felt notnot directly for oneself but but vicariously ""for"
for" (peri,
{peri,
Poet. 113.1453a5-6)
Poet. 3 . 1 453a5-6) the tragic agents; it is therefore not so much a
distinct impulse as an index,index, in the experience of mimetic art, of the the
intensity of the impulse to pity.' I am not convinced that this view
can be extrapolated from from Aristotle's statements, whether
whether in the
Rhetoric or the Poetics.
Chapter Seven
Seven
11 Christof
Christof Rapp
Rapp and
and II arrived
arrived independently
independently at at the
the interpretation
interpretation
defended
defended below, butbut he has the honour of priority in publication (as
Rapp notes, Striker [[1996:
1 996: 30
3011 n. 115]
5] had already adumbrated the
view). I first
first presented my arguments in a seminar at the University
of Toronto, during the same week in which JI gave the Robson
of Robson
Lectures on which this volume is based; based; I presented a revised
version a year later (2002) at a conference at Rutgers University in
honour of William Fortenbaugh. I wish to express my gratitude to
David Mirhady
Mirhady and William Fortenbaugh for valuable comments comments on
that occasion.
2 So
So too the Spanish linguist Antonio Tovar ((1953: 1 953: 1115)
1 5 ) renders the
the
opening phrase: 'A quienes se hace favor favor y sabre
sobre cwiles
cuales casas,
cosas, 0o en
que disposicion, resultara claro una vez que hayamos definido el
Notes to page 1158
5 8 / 325
favor.' Lane Cooper ((1932: 1 932: 1117)

1 7) titles thethe section
section 'Benevolence.' The The
Penguin edition (trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred,
Lawson-Tancred, 11991: 99 1 : l111)
l l ) begins: 'To
what people men show favour/ favour/ etc. The Bude version (trans. DuFour
11960:
960: 80)80) runs: 'A l'egard
1'egard de quelles personnes, en quelles occasions
et dans quelles habitus lIon 1'on est obligeant, c'est ce que sera evident evident
quand nous aurons defini defini cette passion.' Franz G. Sieveke ((1980 1 980 [3rd.
ed. 11989]:
989]: 108)
108) offers:
offers: 'Wem gegenuber
gegeniiber man man Freundlichkeit
Freundlichkeit (Wohl (Wohl-
Gunst] erweist und
wollen, Gunst) und wofur
wofiir bzw.bzw. in welcher Disposition, das
wird klar, wenn der Begriff Begriff "Freundlichkeit"
"Freundlichkeit" definiert ist.' ist.' The Loeb
version (trans.
(trans. Freese 11926)
926) hashas'benevolence';
'benevolence';the the Spanish
Spanishtransla
transla-
tion by Bernabe ((1998:1 998: 1166)
66) offers
offers 'Con quienes
quienes tenemos generosi- generosi
. ./ and the still more recent one by Ramirez Trejo (2002: 90)
dad ..../ 90)
gives 'Y a quienes hacer un un favor ... ' And
favor ...' And so on.
3 What survives of of the seventh-century
seventh-century Byzantine commentary commentary by
Stephanus of Alexandria (ed. (ed. Rabe, 11896) 896) does notnot treat
treat this section
section
of
of the
the Rhetoric, nor do two two fragmentary
fragmentary commentaries or periphra- periphra
ses (also edited by Rabe). The The anonymous Byzantine commentary, or
rather scholia, to the Rhetoric begin with with the
the definition of kharis
((108.9,
108.9, Rabe,
Rabe, 11896),
896), thus skipping the crucial introductory sentence
in Aristotle; for the rest, the comments deal exclusively exclusively with kharis
rather than kharin ekhein ekhein or gratitude.
4 The fullfull text reads:
reads: 'quibus hominibus, et quibus in rebus gratia fieri fieri
videatur, et quo pacto affectiaffecti sint qui gratiamgratiam faciunt, ex definitione
definitione
eius rei aperte constabit. Gratia est res, qua is qui facit facit et collocat
gratiam, dicitur obsequi precibus, indigentiaeve alicuius, alicuius, non
reddendae vicissitudinis
vicissitudinis causa, aut aut gratiae referendae, sed gratuito.'
5 The passage
passage reads:
reads: 'aliud enim significat
significat Gratia quae definitur,definitur, aliud
Gratia quae in definitione ponitur. nam prior absolute beneficium
non significat,
significat, ut
ut posterior, sed beneficium quod gratia illius fit,
quern confertur. reliqua sunt facilia' ('The gratia that is being
in quem
defined
defined means one thing, that which is included in the definition
another. For the former does not, like the latter, mean an unquali unquali-
fied
fied benefit, butbut rather a benefit
benefit that is for the the sake of the the person
upon whom it is bestowed.
bestowed. The rest is easy' easy').).
6 So
So too
too Theodore Goulston, in his edition and translation translation of 11619 619
(p. 1110),
10), which was frequently
frequently reprinted (see K .
(see K. Erickson 1 975 for a
1975
full catalogue),
catalogue), provides the chapter title 'De gratia seu Gratificandi
affectu,'
affectu/ and renders the first first sentence: 'Quibus autem Gratiam
5 8-60
praebeant homines, et in Quibus rebus, et Quomodo ipsi se

habentes,
habentes, cum definiverimus gratiam, perspicuum fuerit: Sit igitur
Gratia, per quam is, qui rem possidet, dicitur gratiam gratiarn exhibere ei,
qui indiget;
indiget; non pro ulla re accepta, neque ut ut quicquam omnino omnino
referatur ipsi qui exhibet, se ut
referatur ut illi soli, cui exhibetur, contingat
bonum.' The chapter concludes (p. (p. lI llll)):: 'Ac de conferenda
conferenda quidem
Gratia, et non conferenda
conferenda dictum est.' The sense of the phrases
'gratiam praebere' and 'gratiam conferre' is evident from from 'gratificor'
in the chapter
chapter rubric.
7 Nor again 'obligeance,'
'obligeance/ 'Freundlichkeit,'
Treundlichkeit/ 'Wohlwollen,'
'Wohlwollen/ 'beneficium,'
'beneficium/
or 'se obsequia' (in the the Portuguese version of Fonseca 2000: 49, 53). 53).
8 Here II supplement the rather more brief analysis in in Rapp 2002.
9 It is otiose to cite examples,
examples, but simply for the record, record, d. cf. Herodas,
Mimiambi 5.81:
Mimiambi 5.8 1 : kai ekhe ten kharin
kharin tautei, which which plainly
plainly means,
'Be thankful
thankful to her'; also Plutarch, De audiendis 42C6.
10 As Jeffrey
Jeffrey Rusten ((1990:1 990: 1157)
57) - from whom
- from whom I have borrowed the
translation fromfrom 'with the result that that...' ...' -
- explains, 'Xaptv'xapiv 80iJvat=
dovvau =
"grant a favour";
favour"} xapLV dfyeiX&iv = "owe gratitude.'"
^dpLv o</Je{AeLV = gratitude.'"
1 1 Aristotle
11 Aristotle varies the formula in introducing
introducing the last last three emotions
emotions
he treats, namely, indignation, envy, and emulousness: for the the first
and last he employs the the expression
expression 'if, then, it is ... ( ei gar esti,
... (ei esti,
138 7a8-9, 1388a30),
1387a8-9, 1388a30), while for phthonos he uses the synonymous
eiper estin ((1387b22).
phrase eiper 1 387b22).
12 Compare also the the expression aitian ekhein in the the sense of 'be
accused,'
accused/ as opposed to aitian epipherein,epipherein, etc., 'impute a fault' fault' (LSJ
s.v. aitia;
aitia-, my thanks to Eckard Schutrumpf
Schiitrumpf for this observation).
Donald Russell suggests to me that kath kath'' hen here may specify specify the
sense of kharis
kharis according to which which one who 'has' it is grateful, grateful, that
is, a disinterested
disinterested service as opposed to other senses of kharis kharis such
as 'grace' or 'charm.'
13 Why does Aristotle insist
13 insist on the
the intensity
intensity of the the need? According to
Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition of aa. pathos (Rhetoric 2.
pathos (Rhetoric 1 , 11378a20-3),
2.1, 3 78a20-3L pain and
pleasure are necessary
pleasure components of an emotion, and the
necessary components the pain
associated with gratitude might might consist in a recollection of the
disagreeable state that called for the favour. Being indebted to a
benefactor, however, is in itself a condition of social diminishment, diminishment,
and enough to account for the the unpleasantness of the emotion.
60-3 / 327
114
4 Roberts
Roberts thus associates the the perfect
perfect participle with the the middle verb
kharizesthai, which which uniquely
uniquely means 'do a favour,' favour/ 'please,'
'please/ 'oblige';
examples in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 11133a3-5, 133a3-S, 11164b31-2
1 64b3 1-2
and Politics 11263b5-6.
263bS-6.
IS
15 It is true that lambanein or apolambanein would be the more more
natural verb (d. (cf. Xenophon,
Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.2.5, 2.2. 14). I suspect
2.2.14).
that Aristotle may again be playing with the idea that 'receiving a
benefaction' (ten kharin ekhein) gave rise to the expression 'feel
gratitude' (kharin(kharin ekhein), and is here simply substituting substituting
hupourgian for kharin.
hupourgian kharin.
1166 Cf.
Cf. 2. 1 , 11378a23-4,
2.1, 3 78a23-4, where Aristotle sets out three aspects relevant to
the discussion
discussion of any emotion: pas pos diakeimenoi [ekhousinj,[ekhousin], tisin,
tisin,
and epi poiois.
poiois.
1177 In the
the present passage, Roberts translates 'kindness is shown',-
passage, Roberts shown'; for
the meaning 'gratitude' in Aristotle, Aristotle, cf., d., e.g.,
e.g., Politics 1334b40-2,
1334b40-2, on
the kharis of childrenchildren towards
towards their
their elders.
1188 For thethe sense 'miserable,'
'miserable/ d. cf. Euripides' Medea Medea (chorus) 659-60: 659-60: 'May
he die akharistos who does not honour his philoi'; philoi'-, so too, in
Isocrates, To Demonicus 331.7-8
To Demonicus 1 . 7-8 the adverb means something like
'ungraciously' ('nor did he do favours favours ungraciously,
ungraciously, as most people
do'; note the wordplay
wordplay in kharitas akharistas akharistos kharizomenos).
kharizomenos). In
Euripides, Ion 8879-80, 79-80, however,
however, it may well mean 'ungrateful': 'I
shall not not point out the akharistoi betrayers betrayers of the the bed';
bed',- d.
cf. Hecuba
137, 254. When Herodotus (5.91 . 1 5 ) speaks of the
(5.91.15) the akharistos demos,
demos,
the
the term clearly carries the the sense of ungrateful
ungrateful (cf. (d. Aristoph., Wasps
Wasps
45
451).1 ).
9 For the noun akharistia and the verb akharistein d.
119 cf. ibid. 2.2.2-3;
also 2.2. 13-14, 2.6.
2.2.13-14, 2.6.19,1 9, 4.4.24; Anabasis 11.9.18,
4.4.24; Anabasis .9 . 1 8, 7.6.24;
7.6.24; Cyropaedia
Cyropaedia
11.2.7;
.2.7; Agesilaus 111.3. 1 .3. For
For the sense 'unpleasant,
'unpleasant/' see Oeconomicus
7.37, Anabasis
Anabasis 2. 1 . 1 3, 2.3
2.1.13, . 1 8; for akharistein in the sense, 'not to
2.3.18;
indulge,'
indulge/ d. cf. Eryximachus in Plato, Symposium Symposium 1186C 86C and Republic
4411E2,
1 1 E2, where akharistia is paired with arrhuthmia and evidently
means 'gracelessness.' On kharin apodounai = 'repay a favour,' ; d.
favour/ cf.
Isocrates 4.57; contrast kharin prodounai = 'betray a kindness,'
; kindness/
Euripides, Heraclidae 11036. 036.
20 When Roberts Roberts translates ''As As evidence of the the want of kindness, we
may point out that a smaller service had been refused refused to the man in
63-5
need,'
need/ etc., he imports a reference to a disposition disposition rather than an act,
in accord with
with the supposition that that kharis in this passage denotes a
pathos.
pathos.
21 Paul Gohlke's ((1959)
21 'Ober Dank und
1 959) 'Uber und Undank is damit gehandelt'
cannot be right in respect to kharizesthai; Gohlke's Gohlke's version is
presumably
presumably indebted to Sieveke ( 1 989: 1 09): 'Das sei nun
(1989: 109): tiber die
nun liber
Erweisung von Dank und und tiber
uber das Undankbar-Sein
Undankbar-Sein gesagt.'
22 Cf. Plato's Symposium 186C
Plato's Symposium 1 86C (quoted above), where too it it is con-
con
trasted with kharizesthai. The Portuguese version of Fonseca (2000:
53)) gets it right, in my view: 'Relativamente ao fato
53 fato de prestar favor
e de nao retribuirlo, ja tudo foi dito.' dito.'
23 See Solomon 2004: v: 'Gratitude is one of the the most
most neglected
emotions and one of the the most underestimated
underestimated of the the virtues. In
most accounts of the emotions,emotions, it receives nary a mention.' mention. ' Cf. Mig-
Mig
nini 994: 1177 on the 'inesistenza
nini 11994: 'inesistenza di una una storia sistematica dell'idea
sistematica delPidea
di gratitudine nella letteratura filosofica filosofica 0o psicologica' ('absence
of a systematic
systematic history
history of the the idea of gratitude in philosophical
philosophical or
psychological scholarship'); Mignini provides a survey of the the concept
from
from Homer to Kant and beyond.
McConnell 1993:
24 Cf. McConnell 1 993: 3: 'Richard Price lists gratitude as one of his
six "heads of virtue,
virtue,"" and of it says, "The "The consideration
consideration that
that we
have received benefits, lays us under peculiar obligations to the
persons
persons who have conferred them'" ((quoting 974 [orig. 1797]:
quoting Price 11974 1 797]:
52 ); Gouldner 1996: 62: '[T]he
1152); ' [T]he norm
norm of reciprocity holds that
people should help those who help them them and, therefore, those whom
you have helped have an obligation obligation to help you',-you'; Bollnow 1992: 37:
'Die Dankbarkeit ist also eine Tugend' ('Gratitude is thus thus a virtue').
Note also Mignini
Mignini 11994:
994: 27:27: 'n'II sostantivo charis indica
indica piu spesso
favore, godimento
godimento e gradimento.
gradimento. Ma vi sono anche anche testi nei quali si
allude al ricambio dei favori come a un un mezzo di equilibrio
economico e sociale, 0 o nei quali la gratitudine nei confronticonfronti di un
ricevuto ee considerata
beneficio ricevuto considerata come virtu e dovere' ('The noun
charis most often often indicates a favour, enjoyment, and gratitude. But
there are also texts in which there is an allusion to an exchange of of
favours means of economic
favours as a means economic and social social equilibrium, or in which
gratitude in response to a benefit benefit received is considered a virtue and
a duty').
66-7 / 329
25 Cf. Epicurus, Principal Sayings 1; 1; Letter to Herodotus 77.

26 Cf. R.C. R.C. Roberts 2004: 75: 75: 'Like resentment
resentment and regret, envy is in
some ways the the reverse of gratitude, so that that the
the disposition
disposition to grati-
grati
tude tends
tends to rule out the disposition
disposition to envy and thus to reduce
episodes
episodes of envy.' In this contrast, gratitude gratitude is a positive attitude
towards the relative prosperity of others, whereas envy and resent resent-
ment
ment are negative
negative attitudes.
attitudes.
27 Philodemus
Philodemus employs the the term eukharisteo for 'feel gratitude' (a
term eukhariste6 (a
Hellenistic or later usage, according according to LSJ; cf. Harrison 2003: 74),
LSJ; d.
in place of the the classical
classical kharin ekhein;ekhein-, see also Bremer 11998: 998: 129.1 29.
28 E.g.,
E.g., Lysias
Lysias 112.80 (orge), 27.
2.80 (orge), 1 1 (orgizesthai);
27.11 (orgizesthai}-, Isocrates, Panegyricus
Panegyricus
1157,
5 7, On the Peace
Peace 14 14 (opposed to dusko16s
dusk-olds diatithesthai),
diatithesthai], Aegin. 2
((contrasted
contrasted with khalepos pherol, Busiris 6 ((contrasted
khalepos phero], contrasted with
aganaktein and paired
aganaktein paired with praos);
piaos}-, d. cf. Xenophon,
Xenophon, Memorabilia
Memorabilia
2.6.2
2.6.21, 1 , 2.7.9.
29 Cf. Lysias
Lysias 6.3 (katakharisasthai
(katakharisasthai paired with kateleesai),' 114.10;
with kateleesai) 4 . 1 0;
Isocrates 118.62,8. 62, Against
Against Callimachus on gratitude and pity owed to
those who have earned it.
30 Lysias
Lysias 118.23; cf. 118.27
8.23; d. 8.27 ([exaiteomai],
exaiteomai), 21.25.2 1 .25 .
3311 Cf. dounai kharin, 221.17; 1 . 1 7; also 30.27, 331.24;1 .24; and Isaeus 77.41,
. 4 1 , 9.23.
32 On the the paradox,
paradox, see Derrida 11995: 995: 881-115;
1-1 1 5; Derrida 11997a:
997a: 118-19;
8- 1 9;
and Derrida 11997b: 99 7b: 1128:
28: 'For there to be a gift, there must be no
reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt. If the the other gives
me back or owes me or has to give me back what I give him him or her,
there will not have been a gift'; this is the the ground of 'the impossibil
impossibil-
ity or double bind of the the gift'
gift' ((131).
13 1 1. Cf. Bourdieu 11977:977: 6;
6; Bourdieu
11990:
990: 1105;
05; and Bourdieu 11997: 997: 23 1 : 'The major characteristic of the
231: the
experience of the gift gift is, without
without doubt, its ambiguity. On the one
hand, it is experienced ((or or intended) as a refusalrefusal of self-interest and
egoistic calculation,
calculation, and an exaltation
exaltation of generosity -- a gratuitous,
gratuitous,
unrequited gift. On the other other hand,
hand, it never entirely excludesexcludes
awareness of the the logic of exchange or even confession of the the re
re-
pressed impulses
impulses or, or, intermittently,
intermittently, the denunciation
denunciation of another,
denied, truth of of generous exchange -- its constraining constraining and costly
character.' For a response Derrida's notion of the impossibility
response to Derrida's
of the
the gift, see Bernasconi 11997. 997. Guizzi 11998 998 sees a historical
historical shiftshift
from
from Pericles' dictum dictum in the funeral
funeral oration (Thucydides 2.40.4-5 2.40.4-5))
330 I/ Notes to pages 1167-8
330 6 7-8
that the Athenians

Athenians win loyalty by bestowing
bestowing rather than receiving
receiving
favors, to an aristocratic
aristocratic conception of disinterested
disinterested generosity as
defined
defined by Aristotle; but but the two aspects of kharis coexist in both
periods.
33 In Bremer Papyrus 49, a certain Hermaeus writes to Aelius
Apollonius,
Apollonius, thanking
thanking himhim for his goodwill
goodwill and friendship (philia)
(philia)
and explaining
explaining ((7-8):
7-8): 'Since I aamm small, I aam
m grateful [kharin soi
eidenai], but the gods will compensate
eidenaij, compensate you [ameipsontail';
[ameipsontai]'; the
feeling of gratitude is distinct from from actual repayment. It is a weak-
weak·
ness in James Harrison's fine study (2003 (2003)) that
that he does not discrimi-
discrimi
nate adequately the sense of kharin kharin ekhein and eidenai from from kharin
kharin
apodidonai, etc.
34 As a disposition, ingratitude
ingratitude is also a vice or defect of character;
character;
thus, Hecuba
Hecuba (Euripides,
(Euripides, Hecuba 245) 245) brands the
the entire tribe of
tribe of
demagogues as ungrateful (akhariston, 254). 254). It is worth
worth remarking
remarking
that in classical Greek there is no adjective meaning 'grateful.'
35 Harrison (2003:(2003: 48
48)) observes that kharis 'captures the the attitudinal
attitudinal
aspects behind the reciprocity system, spotlighting not only the
conventional return of favour favour but
but also the
the importance of a genuine
and commensurate
commensurate gratitude
gratitude on the part of the benefiCiary.
beneficiary.''
36 In Latin, one must similarly
similarly distinguish between
between the expressions
expressions
gratiam habere and gratiam agere, etc.; the former signifies grati
andgratiam grati-
tude as a sentiment, not a material return return for a benefaction,-
benefaction; it is
gratitude, not compensation, that one offers offers the gods in Roman
rituals
rituals of thanksgiving ((cf. d. Hickson
Hickson Hahn 2004a, 2004b).
3377 Harrison (2003: 1167-210)
6 7-2 1 0) surveys the
the topics of benefaction
benefaction and
gratitude in the Greek and Roman philosophical traditions, particu- particu
larly in relation to the 'ethos of reciprocity'; although he duly notes
((174-5)
1 74-5 ) that Aristotle and others
others stipulated
stipulated that a true
true benefaction
benefaction
must
must be wholly
wholly altruistic, he emphasizes
emphasizes the contrast
contrast between
between the
Graeco-Roman view of euergetism and Paul's conception of
and St Paul's of
divine grace, which
which 'up-ends the hellenistic ethics of beneficence'
and is 'unilateral, notnot reciprocal' (288). Leaving aside the question of of
Pauline theology, I believe that a more nuanced distinctiondistinction between
generosity
generosity and gratitude, on the the one side, and the repayment
repayment of a
debt, on the other, mitigates
mitigates the apparent
apparent conflict between
between pagan
and Christian attitudes.
attitudes.
70-2 / 33
3311
Chapter
Chapter Eight
1 Cf.
Cf. Walter
Walter Donlan
Donlan ((1980:
1 980: 14):
14):'Homeric
'Homeric"friendship"
"friendship"appears
appearsasasaa
system
system of calculated cooperation, not not necessarily
necessarily accompanied
accompanied by
any
any feelings of affection.'
affection.'
2 Carlo Natali has suggested (oral communication) that the reference
to virtue or arete is in effecteffect a transitional
transitional formula to connect
connect the the
philia books with with the main argument
argument of the Nicomachean
Nicomachean Ethics;
Ethics-,
but Aristotle's belief that that virtue is an activity (energeia
(energeia)) and not just
a capacity (dunamis)
{dunamis} maymay also have motivated the association.
association.
3 For
For a response, see Konstan 2002a. 2002a. Some
Some critics
critics have
have sought
sought a
compromise between the two positions, according according to which ancient
friendship involved
involved both an affective
affective component and the expecta-
expecta
tion of practical
practical services.
services. Thus, Raccanelli ((1998: 1998: 20) remarks:
remarks:
'Certainly, Konstan is right to observe observe that the common model of of
true friendship
friendship must grant major major importance to sentiment
sentiment.... . . But
But it
is nevertheless
nevertheless well not to ignore the role that notions of obligation,
mutual exchange of gifts, and prestations also play within within relations
of friendship
friendship ... The
00' The element of concrete and obligatory
obligatory exchange
seems inseparably bound up with friendship, which which can not be
identified
identified with the mere affectiveaffective dimension of the relationship.'
And yet, we too expect friends to assist assist us in times of crisis, withoutwithout
thereby denying
denying the affective
affective nature of the bond. The inference runs: runs:
'If you loved me as a friend, you would assist me in my time of need;
'If
since you do not, you are not a true friend.' friend.'
4 Cope ((1877,
1 8 77, vol. 2:
2: 42)
42) translates 'whatever we think think good,' but the the
singular oietai goes better with the antecedent tini; those who love,
according to Aristotle, do not not necessarily impose their own idea of of
what is good on their friends.
5 Kassell
Kassell ((1976)
1 9 76) marks this sentence as a later addition to the text by
Aristotle himself, on insufficient grounds, in my opinion. Grimaldi
((1988:
1988: 67)
67) defends it, rightly on my view, on the grounds that that it is
'necessary to indicate the reciprocity of the feeling required if the the
word philos is to be employed as it is in the following sentence.'
woidphilos
Cope ((1877,
1 8 77, vol. 2:
2: 4,3
43)) renders: 'And a friend
friend is one that
that loves, andand is
beloved in return.'
6 This definition accords
accords with that in Nicomachean Ethics, book 8;
in Nicomachean
73-4
however, when Aristotle treats ph ilia as a virtue, that is,

philia is, the mean
between the the excess of flattery
flattery and thethe deficiency
deficiency of enmity or
hostility (ekhthra), he takes it to be a quality
hostility (ekhthral, quality of an individual, whom
he designates as a philos - - that is,
is, one who behaves behaves as a philos ought
(Magna
(Magnet Moralia .3 l . 1-2); d.
Mora.Ha 11.31.1-2); cf. MM 2. 1 1 .6-7, where Aristotle argues
2.11.6-7,
that philia is indeed used of our feelings towards god or inanimate
things such as wine, but that he is investigating investigating not this type, but
rather 'that towards animate things, and moreover those capable of of
feeling philia in return [antiphilein].'
[antiphilein].'
7 Cf.
Cf. Eudemian
Eudemian Ethics Ethics 7, 7, 11236b3-5:
236b3-S: philon
philon men men gargar to
to philoumenon
philoumenon
tai
toi philounti, philos de tai toi philoumen6i
philoumenoi kai antiphi16n antiphilon (('What
'What is
loved is dear to the one who loves it, but a friend friend is dear to the one
who is loved and loves in return').
At NE 9.5,
8 At 1 66b30":'5, Aristotle
9.5, 11166b30-5, Aristotle asserts
asserts that eunoia has has not thethe
'tension and longing' associated associated with philesis.
philesis.
9 Philia
Philia and to philein are paired on 011three
threeoccasions
occasionsininthe the
Nicomachean Ethics. In one passage, passage, Aristotle says that among
good men 'both to philein philein and philia arc are most present and are best
,
[ariste]
[ariste]' (|1156b23-4);
1 1 56b23-4); the last term ('best') is in the the feminine singular,
thus strictly modifying
modifying only philia, which suggests perhaps that
Aristotle is here treating philia and to philein philein as effectively synony
effectively synony-
mous. A little later, Aristotle says that that 'there is more of philia in
loving [[to to philein; sc,sc. than in being loved, to phileisthaij,'
phileisthai],' and adds
philein seems to be the virtue of
that 'to philein philoi' ((1159a33-5).
oiphiloi' 1 1 59a33-SI.
1100 Aristotle might have called friendship something like 'loving and
being loved' (to (to philein kal antiphileisthai), or else specified
kai antiphileisthail, specified it as
philia between philoi. Ncither Neither he nor other Greeks, however, however, spoke
this way,
way, and the the mutuality of philia as friendship must be inferred
from
from the context.
context. Although the focus of the two ethical treatises treatises is
on reciprocal
reciprocal love, once he has clarified clarified the nature of this bond,
Aristotle does not hesitate to employ the word philia in the sense
simply of 'love/ for example when he states that that the most natural
philia is that of a mother for her infant
kind of philia infant child (8.8,(8.8, 11159a28-
1 59a28-
33; this caused great perplexity for the ancient Greek commentator commentator
Aspasius [[179.28-80.5,
1 79.28-80.5, Heylbut 11887], 887], who with misplaced rigour
suggests that Aristotle ought to have labelled this affection affection philesis;
see Konstan 1997: 68-9 68-9).).
1111 In his definition of a pathos (Rhetoric (Rhetoric 22.1, . 1 , 11378a20-3),
378a20-3 1, Aristotle
Notes to page 1175
75 / 333
stipulates, as we have seen, that it is accompanied by pain and

pleasure. The pleasure associated
associated with the impression (pbantasial
(phantasia) or
anticipation of a loved one's welfare (and (and pain at thethe reverse)
reverse] would
seem to meet
meet this condition;
condition,- at all events, it is not radically differ differ-
ent from
from the pleasure
pleasure of imagined revenge that Aristotle sees as
intrinsic to anger ((see
see chapter 2, p. 42;42; alternatively, the pleasure
may lie in anticipating
anticipating one's own success in imparting goods goods to the
other). In Aeschylus'S
Aeschylus's Libation Bearers ((222-3), 222-3), Electra, still suspect
suspect-
ing that the stranger she has met may not be her brother, asks: asks: 'Do
you then wish to laugh at my adversity?
adversity?';'; to this Orestes
Orestes replies: 'At
mine too then, if yours.' Needless to say, love is also among those
things
things 'on account of which people change and differ differ in regard
regard to
their
their judgments.'
12 That two people regard the the same things as good does not not guarantee
that they will desire these things for each other. Presumably the
awareness that others share our idea of what is good and bad dis- dis
poses us to like them and hence to wish good things for their sakes.
13 I disagree
13 disagree with Cope ((1877,
1 8 77, vol. 2: 45), who takes kai kai as epexegetical:
'And friends' friends, that is (kai)
lkail the friends
friends of those whom we love
himself notes, 'If
ourselves'; as Cope himself 'If friendship is mutual, surely
this is a "vain repetition."'
repetition. '" Grimaldi ((1988:
1 988: 69)
69) is right to state
that 'kai here introduces another group: group: namely, /I and those who
"and
like the people whom they themselves like."' like.'" As
As Grimaldi observes,
'There is no reason to think from from 88la1 a 114-20
4-20 that mutuality
mutuality (pbilon
(philon -
antiphiloumenos, 881laa 2-32-3)) is present in each of the topics menmen
tioned.' There is, I think, a similar inclusiveness
inclusiveness at Nicomachean
Ethics 9.4, 11166a2-6,
1 66a2-6, where Aristotle
Aristotle writes: 'They posit that that a
philos is one who wishes and performs good things, or what appear
to be good things, for the other's sake, or else one who wishes that
his philos
philos exist and
and live for his [i.e., the other's]
other'S] sake -- which is what
towards their children, and, among philoi, those who
mothers feel towards
have quarrelled.' The definition that Aristotle ascribes ascribes to unnamed
others is similar
similar to his own, save that it does not include the ele-
ele
ment
ment of reciprocity,
reciprocity, and adds the simple desire for the continued
existence
existence of the other. He illustrates this latter sentimentsentiment first
first with
with
reference to maternal love, and then among pbiloi philoi - or rather,
philoi, since even when they have parted ways, they still at
former philoi,
least desire that the other survive.
survive. Christopher Rowe (2002) trans-
75-7
lates: 'so it is with mothers towards their their children, and with with friends
friends
who are angry with with each other'; and Terence Irwin ((1985) 1 985) has, 'this
is how mothers feel towards their children, and how friends who
have been in conflict feel [toward each other].' Douglas Hutchinson
(oral communication) suspects a lacuna before the the phrase, 'and of of
philoi . . ./ since the transition
philoi...,' transition seems harsh; but if we take 'oi 'of philoi'
as complementary to 'mothers,' the latter exemplifying exemplifying a one-way
one-way
(in accordance
philia (in accordance with the preceding preceding definition), while the
former adds the case of philoi proper, in Aristotle's sense, sense, then the
sentence may stand as is.
14 Cope ((1877,1 877, vol.vol. 2: 55)55) takes the the three relationships specified specified by
Aristotle as 'three degrees degrees of association,' and adds: 'en koin6nidi koinonidi
pasa philia esti' (('all 'all philia resides in community': Nicomachean
Ethics 88.14,
. 1 4, 11161bll).
1 6 1 b l l ). Kinship,
Kinship, for Aristotle, is a source of love, love, and
often
often of mutual love; love,- butbut kinkin are not automatically philoi; see
Nicomachean Ethics 88.12, . 1 2, 11161bll-16,
1 6 1 b l 1-16, and Konstan 11997a: 99 7a: 69-7
69-71. l.
1155 On altruism
altruism in Greek thought, see Konstan 2000a. Schopenhauer
((1995:
1995: 1143-4)
43--4) too affirmsaffirms that there is altruism altruism only 'when the
ultimate motive for doing or omitting omitting to do a thing thing is precisely and
exclusively
exclusively centered in the weal and woe of of someone e1se/else/ but
but such
a motive 'necessarily presupposes .... . . that II am in some way identi
identi-
fied with him, in other words, that this entire difference
fied difference between
me and everyone
everyone else, which is the the very basis of my egoism, is
eliminated,
eliminated, to a certain extent at least.' For Aristotle, the other
remains a distinct person.
116
6 Cf. Cope ((1877, 1 877, vol. 2: 43 43): ): 'Love is a feeling, a sort of appetite, the the
wish to do good.'
1177 Numerous Greek aphorisms aphorisms testify testify to the expectation that friends friends
will provide
provide help in a crisis (e.g., Democritus fragments fragments 1101 0 1 and 1061 06
Diels-Kranz; Euripides,
Euripides, Orestes Orestes 454-5; Menander, Menander, Sentences 1.40, l AO,
1143,
43, 1147,
47, 263, 276), 276), as well as to the the reality that few prove prove true
friends in the crunch.
118
8 O.H. Green ((1997: 1 997: 209)
209) argues that love is not not an emotion, which which
involves 'belief-based intentionality
intentionality and rationality,'
rationality/ but rather
rather a
complex conative state, a set of desires' (d. 216). Green sees his
(cf. 216).
account as compatible with Aristotle's, save that
with Aristotle's, that Aristotle assigns
primacy to 'the desire for the the good of the the friend' (216),
(21 6), whereas
Green emphasizes
emphasizes 'the desire for association association with with one who is loved.'
Notes to pages
pages 1177-83
77-83 / 335
Here again we see a sign of the the modern preoccupation with intimacy. intimacy.
Aristotle recognizes that friends rejoice in each other's company and
wish to live together (suzein),
(suzein), but he treats this desire as the active
state or energeia
energeia of friendship,
friendship, which
which permits the the realization
realization of the the
wish to provide good things to the other (Nicomachean(Nicomachean Ethics 8.5,
11157b5-ll).
1 5 7b5-1 1 ).
119
9 In general, Aristotle pays little attention in the Rhetoric to 'qualia,' 'qualia/
that is,is, the feeling
feeling states peculiar to the several emotions.
emotions.
20 Strictly
Strictly speaking,
speaking, a one-way attitude also constitutes a relationship,
namely, that between lover and beloved. beloved. Green does not define define
'relationship,'
'relationship/ but 'relation' customarily renders Aristotle's Aristotle's term
pros ti ('towards something'), which which he introduces
introduces in the Categories:
Categories:
the
the examples he offersoffers are 'double, half, and larger' ((Ib29-30)
1b29-30);; as we
have seen, Aristotle speaks of philia pros or 'love towards' someone
Nicomachean Ethics. Perhaps
in the Nicomachean Perhaps we can define a relationship as
a symmetrical relation (both parties are equally lover and beloved).
21 Contrast Grimaldi 11988:
21 988: 65:
65: 'Friendly feeling rather than friendship
is perhaps a more accurate interpretation of philia since as an
emotion it is a transitory, psycho-physical
psycho-physical experience rather than
what is implied in English by friendship,
friendship, i.e., a more permanent
disposition or state.
state.''
2222 A little later (8.4,
(8.4, 11157al4-16),
1 57a14-1 6), Aristotle states that
that friends on
account of the the useful
useful are philoi
philoi not
not of one another but but rather of of
what
what is advantageous
advantageous (to lusiteles], but strictly speaking
(to lusiteles), speaking there can be
no philia for an object. In the the Magna Moralia (2.
Magna Moralia 1 1 . 1 4-1 7), Aristotle
(2.11.14-17),
affirms
affirms that friendships based on pleasure or utility utility are related to
that based on virtue in that they they depend on the same thing, or are
about and derived from from the same things;
things,- he compares the the way a
scalpel and a physician may both be called 'medical.'
23 On the centrality of the filial bond to tragedy, see Alaux 11995. 995 .
24 Belfiore's 'friends' renders the Greek philoi, which which she takes to have
a wider application than the English term, though on my view the the
noun
noun normally means 'friend' to the exclusion of kin; kin; see Konstan
Konstan
11996
996 and 11997a:
997a: 53-6.
53-6.
25 Kyriakou
Kyriakou ((1998:
1 998: 284 n. 5) 5) directs her argument against my claim claim
that philia 'denotes the affectionate
affectionate feelings
feelings shared by family
family
members and does not not imply a set of reciprocal
reciprocal formal obligations.'
26 Cf. the elegant methodological statement statement by Citroni
Citroni Marchetti
Marchetti
184
2000: viii: fse l'amicizia ee cambiata per il cambiamento di potere,

'se 1'amicizia
possiamo chiederci se anche Ie le formule non siano cambiate nel loro
significato: se esse, pur essendo Ie le stesse, non si applichino di fatto fatto
a qualcosa di diverso
diverse da ciacio che originariamente e naturalmente
significavano'f ('if
significavano ('if friendship is changed by a change in power power,f we
may wonder whether
whether the expressions too haven't haven't changed in
meaning
meaning -- whether,
whether, even though
though they
they are the same, they are not in
fact
fact being applied to something different
different from
from what they originally
and naturally
naturally signifiedl
signified').
27 Archaic Greek poets, for example Solon and Theognis, did caution
against false friends, though generally in a sententious
sententious and imper-
imper
sonal vein. AnAn Athenian drinking
drinking poem
poem runs (number 908 908 Page):
'He who does not not betray a manman who is his friend
friend [andra philonJ has
[andia philon]
great honour among mortals and gods, gods, in my judgment.' Such verses
were recited in the aristocratic
aristocratic milieu of symposiastic clubs, clubs, where
friendship to some extentextent served as a model for upper-class alle- alle
giance;
giance,- it thus
thus retained a political
political function,
function, and was not, perhaps,
conceived of as the the manifestation of a wholly personal affection.affection.
Again, in the Hellenistic
Hellenistic courts, where kings employed official official
advisersf one sees a new concern
councils of 'friends' as advisers, concern with the
need to distinguish
distinguish between true and false friends (see Konstan 1996
friends (see 1 996
and
and 11997a:
997a: 95-1 08).
95-108).
28 Contrast
Contrast the attitude towardstowards friends in the following
following -- first, a Latin
epigram ascribed to Seneca but but probably dating to the the second or
third century AD (403.3-12,
(403 .3-12, Shackleton Bailey 1982 1 982 = 407.3-12,
=
Riese 11926):
926):
'Live and avoid all friendships': this is more true

Than
Than just favoid
'avoid friendships with
with kings.
kings.''
My fate bears witness: mmyy high-ranking ruined me,
high-ranking friend ruined
My humble
humble one abandoned me. Shun the whole pack alike.
For those who had been my equals fled the crash
equals fled
And abandoned the house even before it collapsed.
Go then and avoid only kings
kings!! If you know how to live,
Live for yourself only -
- for you'll die for yourself.
The second
second is from
from a Byzantine
Byzantine advice book (Wassiliewsky and
Jernstedt 11984:
984: 236): 'If you have a friend
236): 'If friend living in another place and
he passes through the town in which you live, do not instal him him in
Notes
85-7 / 337
your house, but let him

him go elsewhere. For in your house, hear how
many problems you will have: One is that that your wife, your daugh-
daugh
ters, and your daughters-in-law will not be able to come forth from
chambers and therefore will not properly take care of your
their chambers
house. If it is necessary, however, that they appear,
appear, your friend will
crane his neck to inspect
inspect them ....
. . When he finds a chance, he will
pursue your wife with amorous attentions
attentions and gaze
gaze at her with
with
intemperate eyes, and, if he is able to, he will even seduce her. And
when
when he departs, he will brag unworthily
unworthily about what he did.'
did/
Chapter Nine
11 My
My thanks
thanks to to Andy
Andy Silber
Silber for
for this
this reference.
reference.
2 Cf. Euripides, Electra 645, where Orestes' old tutor declares:
Cf. Euripides, declares: 'An
impious woman is hated [sc. [sc. by all]'; Archelaus fr. 248.2-3, Kannicht
2004; Erechtheus fro 360.30; Me1anippe
fr. 360.30,- Melanippe fro fr. 492.2-7, 498 . 1 ; Chrysippus
498.1; Chrysippus
fro
fr. 886. 1-3; also the
886.1-3; the uncertainly
uncertainly attributed fragments
fragments 905 905.1 . 1 and
11053.1-2.
053. 1-2. Conceivably, this usage was perceived as a tick of of
Euripides, since Aristophanes, in the Frogs Progs ((1427-8),
1 427-8), puts in his
mouth the sentence
sentence 'I hate a citizen who appears appears slow to aid his
country, but quick to harm it greatly,' greatly/ but the formula also occurs occurs at
Acharnians 509 (hatred of the the Lacedaemonians),
Lacedaemonians),while whilein inthe the Birds,
Birds,
Prometheus declares ((1547): 1 54 7): 'I hate all the gods' (d.(cf. Lysistrata 11018, 0 1 8,
of women).
women). Cf. also Isaeus (3.66): 'No one hates profit profit or values
others more than himself; Demosthenes, Oration 119.258.5-6,
himself'; Demosthenes, 9.258.5-6, 268.8;
21 .98 .4-5; Menander, Sentences 11.332,
21.98.4-5; .332, 352, 360; Plato, Republic 2,
402A, on hating falsehood or lies (d.
382A-C, 402A, (cf. Euripides fro fr. 4410,
10,
Kannicht
Kannicht 2004, on hating hating what
what is shameful).
shameful). Aristotle
Aristotle himself
himself in
Nicomachean Ethics 11172a23, 1 72a23, 11179b26
1 79b26 uses the verb in this way.
Aeschylus's Seven against Thebes, Eteocles calls the hysterical
In Aeschylus'S hysterical
women of the chorus 'hateful 'hateful things [misemata]
[misemata] to anyone with with
self-control' ((186); cf. also Plato, Republic 334C, 382A4-402A2
1 861; d. 382A4-402A2 and
Laws 653B, 660A, 802C, 887C; 887C; Aeschines,
Aeschines, Against
Against Tim arch us 188
Timarchus 1 88
(in 1146,
46, the
the object is an individual, but but represents a type of vicious
behaviour). In Homer, the verb misein occurs only once (Iliad (Iliad
117.272),
7.272), used with
with the infinitive; when Achilles expresses his
disdain for thethe class of people who say one thing but but mean another,
he says rather: 'that man is an enemy enemy [ekhthros]
[ekhthios] who ...' . ' (Iliad
.. (Iliad
8 7-9
9.3 1 2-13). For the impossibility of hating people

9.312-13). people in certain catego
catego-
ries, d.cf. Sophocles, Electra 770-770-1, 1 , where Clytemnestra responds responds to
the news of Orestes' death:death: 'It is a terrible thing to bear children; for
even when they treat you badly it is impossible to feel hatred for
those you've borne'; also Euripides
Euripides ff. fr. 296 Kannicht
Kannicht 2004:
2004: 'A good
man never hates a good man.'
3 On the basis basis of
of this passage,
passage, the
the standard
standard Greek-English
Greek-English lexicon (LST (LSJ
s.v. stuge6)
stuged] observes
observes that
that stugein is 'stronger than mise6, miseo, for it
means to show show hatred, not merely to feel feel it';
it'; however,
however, the distinc
distinc-
tion might better be drawn between the evaluative character of of
misein and the reflex of loathing associated with the root stug-
misein stug
(mainly in poetry), as in the adjectives stugeros stugeros (used of Hades and a
Fury in Homer,
Homer, Iliad 8.368 and Odyssey Odyssey 2.135, respectively)
respectively) and
stugnos ((employed
employed describe
to describe a sullen expression in Aeschylus,
Agamemnon 639),
Agamemnon 639), or the abstract
abstract form stugnotes (referring to the the
gloom of a frigid
frigid climate, Polybius 4.2 1 . 1 ; d.
4.21.1; cf. 3.20.3).
4 At Sophocles, Electra 11309-11,
Sophocles, Electra 309- 1 1 , Electra
Electra sayssays that her inveterate
hatred for her mother allows her to mask the joy she feels at
Orestes' arrival, and thus not give away the game to Clytemnestra.
See too Aeschylus's Seven against Thebes, where the chorus
characterizes Clytemnestra as 'an object of hatred [misos] [misos] to the
the
(and d.
citizens' (and Agamemnon 11411,
cf. Agamemnon 4 1 1 , 1413).
1 4 13).
55 Cf.
Cf. Ahmed 2004:2004: 49:
49: 'Hate may respond
respond to to the particular,
particular, but it
tends to do so by aligning the particular with with the general.' Bishop
Butler ((1896:
1 896: 1162-3)
62-3) argues that with anger in the sense of hatred,
'the whole man appears monstrous, without without any thing right right or
human
human in him: him: whereas the resentment
resentment should should surely at least least be
confined
confined to thatthat particular
particular part of the the behaviour which which gave offence:
offence:
since the other parts of a man's life and character stand just the the
same as they did before' (Butler uses the term 'resentment' in the
sense of moral anger).
6 See
See further the essays in in Wistrich 11999;999; R. R. Rorty
Rorty 11999:
999: 263-5 doubts
that an inclusive
inclusive definition of the human species is by itself itself enough
to avert extreme violence against other groups.
77 Or,
Or, more literally, 'accompanied by by a certain
certain maturation
maturation and
duration [meta prokopes tinos kai parataseos].' The Stoics, who
kai paratase6s].'
divided emotions into four general classes classes under the the headings of of
(epithumia], and fear, located both anger and
pain, pleasure, desire (epithumia),
89-9 1 / 339
hatred (along with eros) under desire: 'Anger is a desire for revenge
against someone who, one believes, has wronged one inappropri- inappropri
ately' (so
(so too thumos, which is characterized as 'incipient anger').
Aristotle had
had already identified the the desire (orexis)
(orexis) for revenge as
essential to anger, as we have seen (chapter 2, pp. 441,
essential 56). Cf. Cicero,
1 , 56).
Disputations 4.24.21: 1 : 'Let anger [ira]
[ira] be a desire to punish punish one
who is believed to have harmed one undeservedly ... ...,, hatred [odium]
[odium]
an inveterate anger, and enmity [inimicitia] anger that awaits the
enmity [inimicitia]
right time to take revenge' (Cicero's excandescentia corresponds to
thumos or, as Cicero calls it, thumosis).
thumosis}.
8 Either Zeno or Chrysippus argued that that the object of of erotic
erotic desire
is philia or love rather than sexual intercourse, citing in evidence
Menander's Misoumenos
Misoumenos or Hated Man (Diogenes (Diogenes Laertius 7. 1 29).
7.129).
In this comedy,
comedy, Thrasonides, a soldier, refrains from from touching a girl
he loves, even though she is his slave and in his power, because
she hates him. Her hatred is based on the mistaken mistaken belief that
Thrasonides has killed her brother, and in their their more detailed
analyses the
the Stoics would necessarily have cited the the kinds of of
judgments that elicit
elicit hatred and other emotions.
9 Contrast Espana 2000: 22, who writes that 'often one need not know
2000: 22,
one's opponent in order to hate him. Strolling along the street, one
runs into individuals whose face, expression, way of walking or
dressing makes one want to hit hit them
them ....
. . We find
find ourselves facing facing the
the
purest of hatreds, the
the origin of which which is entirely
entirely aesthetic and before
which
which we are unable to adopt a rational attitude.'
10 Contrast Gordon 11987:987: 33:: ''[I]t
[Ilt is in
in the
the nature of anger that it arises
from
from -- is "provoked by"by" -- certain specific types of of situations
situations (or (or
"cognitions"), such
such as a "slight,
"slight,"" whereas hatred is a long-term
disposition that, once established, needs no provocation provocation at all.'
Bishop Butler ((1896:
1 896: 139-4
139-41) 1 ) distinguishes between 'sudden anger,'
which is sometimes
sometimes 'mere instinct,
instinct,'' and 'settled anger,' which he
calls 'resentment.' The latter is provoked by insult insult or injustice, and
is directed 'against vice and wickedness.' As distinct distinct fromfrom malice,
this kind of resentment
resentment 'is one of the common bonds, by which which
society is held together;
together,- a fellow-feeling,
fellow-feeling, which which each individual has
in behalf
behalf of the
the whole species,
species, as well as of himself' himself ((141).1 4 1 ).
l11i On the
the role of anger, as opposed to hatred, in justifying justifying mass
exterminations, see chapter 2, pp. 70-3, 70-3, and d. cf. Isaac 2004: 47, who
340 / Notes to pages 19 1-2
191-2
despite 'a good deal of bloodshed, mass murder, and

argues that despite
cruelty' in the ancient
ancient world, there was 'no racist society as such such nor
any systematic racist policy leading leading to mass murder murder as seen in the
twentieth
twentieth century';
century',- also 222: 'There was no emotional emotional need for the
Romans to declare their victims animals or inferior inferior humans. None
of
of our sources express a need to justify justify such
such acts.' In the the Iliad, the the
Greek
Greek leader
leader Agamemnon
Agamemnon cries out: '[L]et not not one of them [i.e., the the
Trojans] go free
free of sudden
sudden death and our hands; hands,- not
not the
the young man man
child
child that the mother
mother carries still in her body, not even he, but let
all of Ilion's people perish, utterly blotted out out and unmourned for'
[Iliad 6.57-60, trans. Lattimore 11951;
(Iliad 9 5 1 ; d.
cf. Konstan 2006c). Achilles,
Achilles,
in his anguish over the death of Patroclus, compares the the antagonism
between him him and Hector to that that between wolves and lambs (22.262), (22.262L
and wishes thatthat he could eat Hector's raw flesh flesh (22.346-8)
(22.346-8).. YetYet
neither
neither hero imagines that the Trojans are 'satanic monsters' monsters' or
'the embodiment of Evil.' Hate in this sense is absent from from the Iliad.Iliad.
On later Greek attitudes to Persians, see Isaac 2004: 25 7-303.
257-303.
12 Espana
Esparia (2000: 9) 9) remarks: 'es evidente que que una canci6n que
una cancion que se
hubiera titulado Hate is in the air no se habria encaramado
precisamente a los primeros puestos de las listas de vent a' (('It's
venta' 'It's
obvious thatthat a song called "Hate Is in the Air" would not exactly
have risen to the top of the the sales charts').
1133 As the
the last
last clause indicates, Konner too sees hate as atavistic.
Espana (2000: 113) 3 ) is among thethe few who assert that 'hatred, as a
human
human emotion, can on occasions be positive for those who know
how to channel it,' but no consistent
consistent view of hatred emerges in this
journalistic ensemble of pugnacious opinions.
114
4 Fortenbaugh (2002: 105) 105) observes that
that in the the Politics, 'Aristotle
compares hate with with anger and argues that that hate
hate makes greater use of of
calculation,
calculation, "for anger is accompanied by pain, so that that it is not
not easy
to calculate, while hate is free free of pain"
pain" ((1312b32-34).'
1 3 1 2b32-34).' Fortenbaugh
Fortenbaugh
concludes ((107)
107) that, given the absence of pain, 'hate fails to qualify
as an emotion.' He cites ((109) Eudemian Ethics 11220bl2-14:
1 09) Eudemian 220b 1 2-14:
'Emotions are suchsuch things as rage, fear, shame,shame, appetite
appetite and gener
gener-
ally things that are in themselves accompanied for the most part by
sensory pleasure and pain,' and suggests that the phrase epi to polu
('for
('for the most part') may point to the exceptional nature of hate and
love, but
but he wisely
wisely rejects this way out of the the dilemma.
dilemma.
1 92-5 / 341
Notes to pages 192-5 34 1
1155 Cf. the

the plea ttoo thethe jurors neither ttoo love nor ttoo hate iinn Lysias 116.19. 6.19.
1 6 The Epicurean philosopher
16 philosopher Philodemus
Philodemus (first (first century
century BC),BC),iinn his
treatise On Anger Anger (col.(col. 441.28-42.14),
1 .28-42. 1 4), allows
allowsthatthat the
thewise
wisemanmanwillwill
sometimes become angry, but he will not have a powerful powerful desire
(epithumia) to pursue offenders,
(epithumia) offenders, even when the harm is great; rather,
'they are kept far removed,removed, and he hates [misein] [misein] them -- this fol fol-
lows - - but he does not experience a great disturbance [tarakhe],' [tarakhe]/
external things
since external things are of small importance to the sage. Unlike Unlike
anger, hatred,
hatred, as a steady kind of hostility, is not not incompatible with
the
the imperturbability (ataraxy) of the the wise.
1177 The ancient grammarian Ammonius, Ammonius, writing writing on the distinctions
between near synonyms in Greek ((On On the Differences
Differences among Words Words
208), states that that ''ekhthros
ekhthros differs
differs from polemios
polemics ... ... For an ekhthros
is a former
former friend, while while a polemios
polemics is someone who advances
towards one under arms'; his meaning is evidently that an ekhthros
is in the
the category
category of those who might be a friend. friend.
1188 On this contrast,
contrast, see Blundell 11989; 989; and cf. d. inter alia Homer, Odys Odys-
sey 66.184-5;
sey . 1 84-5; Solon
Solon 13.5-6; Plato, Philebus 49D 49D;; Euripides, Alcestis
Alcestis
11037,
037, where Dale's preference ((1954: 1 954: 124 ad v. v.)) for aiskhroisin over
ekhthroisin, on the grounds that an allusion here to enemies would
ekhthroisin,
be 'ungracious,' overlooks
overlooks the the Greek habit of treating ph iloi and
philoi
ekhthroi as all-inclusive. On the
ekhthroi the possible derivations of philos philos and
ekhthros from
ekhthros from roots meaning
meaning 'close' (Indo-European
(Indo-European bhi] bhi) and
'outside' (eks),
(eks), see Schwartz 1982: 1 982: 196.
1 96.
119
9 For personal enmity in in Athenian lawsuits, see Rhodes 11998: 998: 1160-1;
60-1 ;
and Kurihara 2003, who shows that the expectation was that 'public
suits should not be motivated by private enmity' (466); and, in
Athenian
Athenian politics, Mitchell Mitchell 11996 996 and Rhodes 11996, 996, who show that
political alliances do not always line up neatly with with personal
friendships. On political enmity enmity at Rome,Rome, d. cf. Epstein 1987. 1 987.
20 We can of course be hated hated by someone we love; cf. d. Plato, Lysis
2 1 2B-C.
212B-C.
2
211 The suggestion that one treat enemies as potential friends friends (thereby
acknowledging the vicissitudes of time) was undercut undercut by the parallel
recommendation that that one regard friends
friends as potential enemies,-enemies; d. cf.
Demosthenes 23 . 1 22; Sophocles,
23.122; Sophocles, AjaxAjax 678-83.
22 Mendelsohn
Mendelsohn (2002: (2002: 88) 88) argues that Demopho's
Demopho's refusal to allow allow the
the
sacrifice of an Athenian maiden shows that, for him, 'the affairs of
affairs of
pages 1195-6
95-6
the polis
polls are a private, even family affair.' But this is not
family affair.' not Athens's
war; gestures
gestures of sacrifice are appropriate appropriatewhen whenone's
one'sown owngroup
groupisisatat
risk. In general, Mendelsohn seems to me to place excessive empha- empha
sis on the contrast between loyalty to the the values of the city and a
more narrow commitment commitment to the clan, represented above above all by
Iolaus ( 79; cf.
lolaus (79; d. 91,
9 1 , 97).
97).
Mendelsohn 2002: 17-18;
23 Mendelsohn 1 7-18; on the the shocking
shocking character
character of the the scene,
cf. Seidensticker 11982:
d. Seidensticker 982: 99-100.
Mendelsohn (2002:
24 Mendelsohn (2002: 1120)20 ) observes: 'Not surprisingly, this scene has
been thethe object of especially
especially harsh critical puzzlement
harsh critical puzzlement and outrage';
like other critics,
critics, Mendelsohn notes that that 'in pursuing her terrible terrible
revenge Alkmene becomes the the double of her arch-enemy' (126). ( 1 26). I am
not convinced,
convinced, however, by Mendelsohn's Mendelsohn's claim that Alcmene's Alcmene's
'mad scene' ((120) 1 20) is 'motivated by an extreme version of the genos
the genos-
creed' ((121;
1 2 1 ; d. 1 24-5 ),
cf. 124-5), that is, loyalty to clan values as opposed to
those of the the city. A desire for vengeance vengeance is equally characteristic of of
civic hostilities.
25 For the
the positive representation of Athens in the the play, with a bibliogbibliog-
raphy of earlier views, views, see Grethlein 2003: 396-424. 396-424.
26 The expression ekhthron dam doiu is also used in 312-15,
3 1 2-15, where lolaus Iolaus
says that the Heraclids must forever forever regard the Athenians as philoi,
that is, friends, and never raise a hostile spear against them. Philos,
which may mean 'ally' as well as 'friend,' is usually paired paired with
ekhthros as its opposite; d.
its opposite; 1 9-20, 690-1 (on the
cf. 19-20, the order of the the lines,
see Wilkins 1993: 1 993: 138).
27 When the messenger reports to Alcmene the Athenian victory, victory, he
says (786-7): victorious over our ekhthioi
( 786-7): 'We are victorious ekhthroi and a trophy has
been set up bearing bearing all the arms of your polemioi'-,polemioi'; I presume that
the trophy
trophy elicits the the idea of a defeated army. At 410, 4 1 0, however,
Demopho announces that that it is necessary to sacrifice a girl to be a
trophy over their ekhthroi. Cf. Cf. Euripides, Electra 832-3 (Aegisthus
speaking): 'The son of Agamemnon is the the most hated [ekhthistos)
[ekhthistos] of of
mortals and a foe [polemios) \polemios] to my house.' On the contrast contrast between
polemioi and ekhthroi, see also Thucydides
polemioi Thucydides 3.54-9, where the
Plataeans, defending themselves before the Spartans, Spartans, 'carefully
'carefully
distinguish between polemioi polemioi (which is what they are)'and echthroi
(which is what they are not)' (Macleod 1977: 1 977: 233 n. 1111 = 1983:
= 1 983:
09 n. 11).
1109 1 1 ).
Notes to pages
pages 196-203 / 343
28 I do not
not see that
that Eurystheus has 'become a double' of Macaria,
however, as Mendelsohn (2002: 128) 128)suggests,
suggests,nor
northat
thatthere
thereisisan
an
implicit
implicit feminization of his character.
29 For further
further discussion of violent antagonism in this play and in
Euripides' Suppliant
Suppliant Women, see Konstan 2005c. The various
mentions of Electra's hatred for herher mother in Sophocles' Electra
(289, 347-8, 357-8, and 11309-11,
309-1 1 , all cited above) also point to a
justified
justified antagonism on her part, whereas Clytemnestra, who is
depicted in this play as clearly in the wrong,
wrong, vacillates in her
hostility to her children
children (770-1).
(770-1 ).
30 It is elsewhere associated also with poneros, 'wicked' (35.46), and
with anaiskhuntos, 'shameless' (43.39).
3311 For the contrast between love and hatred, d. cf. Iliad 9.614; on being
hateful
hateful to the
the gods, Odyssey
Odyssey 10. 74-5; Lysias 6.53; d.
10.74-5; cf. Demosthenes
22.59 for the compound theoisekhthria;
theoisekhthria-, and Plato, Euthyphro
Euthyphro 8A-C8A-C
for the contrast between theophiles and theomises;
for theomises-, and Laws 9916E.1 6E.
32 The noun apekhtheia
apekhtheia is applied to hatred or antagonism
antagonism towards the
Thebans at Demosthenes, On the Crown 36; 36; d.
cf. pseudo-Andocides,
pseudo-Andocides,
Against Alcibiades 28. Verbal forms based on ekhth- are on the
Alcibiades 28. the
whole far less common than the nouns ekhthros and ekhthra. ekhthra.
Chapter Ten
1 For
For empathy
empathy as as the vicarious
vicarious sharing
sharing of
of another
another person's
person's emotional
emotional
or intentional
intentional state, see Bischof-Koehler
Bischof-Koehler 11988,
988, 11989,
989, 11991,
99 1 , 1994,
1 994,
and 2001
2001;; Bischof-Koehler
Bischof-Koehler distinguishes empathy from from 'emotional
contagion,'
contagion/ which involves
involves an indistinct assimilation to another
person's mood, without a full full awareness that the shared state is that
of
of another.
another. Bischof-Koehler relates the capacity
capacity for empathy to
mirror-recognition in young children. Unlike sympathy or compas- compas
sion, moreover, Bischof-Koehler
Bischof-Koehler argues that empathy need not not lead
to pro social emotions, but is compatible even with intentional
prosocial intentional
cruelty.
2 Macleod ((1977:
19 77: 227,
227, 234, 236-67) reads the entire speech as an
example of forensic oratory (227); d. 236: '59.
cf. 236: '59.11 explicitly evokes
pity, and the whole speech aims to create it.' But he too recognizes
that the Plataeans chiefly
chiefly cast their
their argument in terms of the the
Spartans' interests
interests (234).
3 Diodotus does does notnot entirely ignore considerations of right; as as Orwin

Orwin
((1984: 492) observes, 'From the
1984: 492) the depths of Diodotos' argument pipes
Diodotos' argument
the still, small voice of justice.'
4 Alcibiades continues: 'For Tor I do not think that that what is just and what
is advantageous
advantageous are the same; same; on the contrary, many who have
committed great wrongs have profited from from them, while others who
have performed just deeds deeds have reaped no advantage'; d. cf.
Chrysothemis
Chrysothemis in Sophocles, Electra 11042: 042: 'There are times when when
even justice
justice brings harm.' Socrates,
Socrates, of course, dissents from from the
the
common view; see Denyer 200 1 : 132-4.
2001:
5 There is a marked resemblance to the staging staging of
of the opening scene of of
Sophocles' Oedipus the King. King.
6 Turner
Turner (200
(2001: 28) argues
1 : 28) argues that a 'suppliant may be in the right by
virtue of striving
striving toward a socially acceptedaccepted goal . . . or, more vaguely,
goal...
by simply suffering
suffering hardship from from a position of weakness,' but but ifif
both these criteria fail, the 'assumption of the suppliant's role is
invalid.' This is, is, I think, to confuse supplication
supplication with the appeal to
pity. Unlike the claim to pity, supplication, especially at an altar,
has a ritual component, the the efficacy
efficacy of which is independent of a
prior evaluation
evaluation of right and wrong. Cf. Cf. Giordano 11999: 999: 190- 1 : 'The
190-1:
inviolability of refugees extendsextends not only to those who are truly in
need, that is, the classical types of Homeric supplication, but also to
murderers and those condemned to death, and to criminals of every
kind.'
7 Cf. Euripides,
Euripides, Hecuba 799-801 799-801 for the gods as guarantors
guarantors of nomos;nomos-,
Hogan 11972:
972: 247.
88 Cf.
Cf. the chorus' claimclaim that
that their
their case
case is endika, 65. 65. Perhaps
Perhaps there is a
reference to justice also in 43-4, if the unintelligible anomoi
conceals a reference to unlawful treatment of the corpses, as A.y.
the corpses, A.Y.
Campbell ((1950: 123) and Kovacs ((1998,
1 950: 123) 1 998, in the
the critical apparatus)
apparatus)
have suggested, rather rather than an expression
expression suchsuch as ana moi or the the
like, adopted
adopted by the Oxford Classical Text (Diggle 198 1-4).
1981-4).
9 ForFor further
further discussion, and comparison
comparison with Aeschylus's Suppliant
Women and and Euripides' Children of of Hercules, see Konstan 2005c.
Bernek (2004: 115-44) 5-44) outlines the paradigm
paradigm thatthat informs
informs the Greek
suppliant tragedies (including
(includingAeschylus's Eumenides and Sophocles'
Oedipus Colonus], and proposes a model for an intertextual
Oedipus at Colonusl, intertextual
interpretation; the result is an emphasis on Euripides' Euripides' ironical
1 1-13 / 345
transformation
transformation of the the Aeschylean pattern (cf. 236, 263 on the
pattern (d. the
Children of of Hercules, 306-7 on the the Suppliant
Suppliant Women).
Women}.
110 0 Stephen Halliwell (2002: I183) B3 ) writes
writes that thethe 'notion of sympathy,
which
which underlies
underlies both pity and fear, is not a vaguely humanitarian humanitarian
instinct:
instinct: it is the capacity to recognise a likeness between oneself oneself
and the object of one's emotions, a likeness which imports with it a
sense that one could imagineimagine suffering
suffering such
such things oneself.'
oneself/ Those
Those
who have suffered
suffered most, however, are presumably best able to
imagine what anotheranother person is suffering,
suffering, yet are least susceptible
to feeling pity, according to Aristotle. Pity is not not a matter
matter of sym-
sym
pathetic identification. When misfortune is present rather than
prospective,
prospective, one does not not fear
fear it (fear is of future harm), and without
the fear, there is no pity.
1111 Would thethe gods, then, be capable of pity? On Aristotle's Aristotle's view, they
should not be,
should be, and in general, the Greeks seemed not to have
expected pity of them; see Konstan 2001 a: 1105-13.
2001a: 05-13 .
1122 Cf. Halliwell
Halliwell 2002: 20B-l 208-11,l , who points out that that 'it is aann extraordi
extraordi-
nary feature of Phi]octetes
Philoctetes that it invites its audience
audience to recognize
recognize
the increasing aptness of pity .... . . without
without having access, until much much
later, to Neoptolemus's own reactions' (209).
1133 The chorus's pity does not necessarily signify a disposition to help
Philoctetes;
Philoctetes; Philoctetes
Philoctetes himself
himself mentions
mentions that
that merchants
merchants who from from
time to time
time took refuge
refuge on Lemnos pitied him (eleousi], indeed, but
him (eleousi),
refused
refused to take him him aboard their ships ships (307- If Philoctetes' cries
1 1 ). If
(307-11).
and the stench of his wound really were unbearable, as Odysseus
the stench
claims ((1-11),
1- 1 1 ), then
then perhaps it was not wrong to abandon him, and
hence, despite the accidental nature of his affliction, he is not
hence, despite
deserving of pity. But Neoptolemus
Neoptolemus moves to touch touch thethe wretched
Philoctetes when his malady is at its most intense intense ((756-62),
756-62), thus
intimating the the hollowness of Odysseus's excuse. excuse.
114 sumpaskho at Republic
4 Plato employs the term sumpaskh6 Republic 605D, but but the sense
is apparently to feel pain or pleasure along with with someone (cf. (d. sun
sun-
khair6) rather
khairo) rather than to experience another another person's emotion
emotion by a
process of identification.
115
5 Modern ideas of sympathy
sympathy are inspired
inspired by an epistemological
epistemological
question: how is it that that human
human beings, each locked into his or her
own private world of sensations,
sensations, ever come to know and appreciate
the
the feelings of otherother people? This is the the so-called problem of other
213-21
minds, and it is a major

major issue in philosophy today.today. The ancients,
however, are almost entirely silent on it. They took it for granted
that we know what others feel, and were concerned principally with
the
the ethical character of our responses. For a splendid analysis of the the
difference
difference between ancient pity, as an emotion specific to a detached
observer, and modern notions
notions of identification,
identification, see Halliwell 2002:
207-16.
1166 Stephen Halliwell ((1998: 74) rightly
1 998: 1174) rightlypoints
points out
out that
that this
thislatter
latter
condition
condition 'cannot be held to have been a universal universal presupposition
presupposition
of
of Greek pity';
pity',- but
but as we have seen, it was widely shared.
1177 See Apicella Ricciardelli 1971-2; Carey 11988: 988: 137-9; and Zier1 1 994:
Zierl 1994:
24, 28, 1138; cf. Aristotle
38; d. Aristotle Poetics 18,1 8, 11456a20-4.
456a20-4.
8 In the
118 1 l08b1-1Oj, where Aristotle exploits
the Nicomachean Ethics ((1108bl-10),
the threefold classification of virtues and emotions according according to
excess, mean, and deficiency,
deficiency, he offers
offers the term epikhairekakia
epikhairekakia or
pleasure
pleasure at another's misery
misery as the opposite
opposite to phthonos, with
nemesis occupying
nemesis occupying the mean;mean,- the paradigm,
paradigm, however, is not entirely
coherent (see chapter 5, pp. 1114-15).
14-1 5).
Chapter Eleven
11 Melanie Klein
Klein ((1975b: 76 ) writes:
1975b: 1176) writes: 'By
'By the
the sense
sense of of loneliness
loneliness II am
am
referring not
not to the
the objective situation of bieng deprived of external
companionship. I am referring to the inner sense of of loneliness -- the
sense of being alone regardless of external circumstances, of feeling
lonely even when among friends or receiving love.'
2 Planalp
Planalp refers here to Sharpsteen 1991, who argues that 'jealousy is
cognitively organized as a blended emotion' (3 cf. also Caston
1 );; d.
(31)
2000: 9, 'a nexus
nexus of emotions'; White and Mullen Mullen 11989: 989: 9, 'a com
com-
plex of thoughts, emotions,
emotions, and actions';
actions'; Farrell 1980:
1980: 543: 'not
some one affective
affective state';
state',- Marina 11996: 1 : 'un complejo entramado
996: 331:
de sentimientos'; Neu 11980: 980: 425-6, citing Spinoza, Ethics Part 3,
Proposition 35, and Freud 1955: 1955: 223. However, Duchenne arranged arranged
scenes to show passions, including 'three scenes of Lady Macbeth
expressing
expressing {{the
"the aggressive
aggressive and wicked
wicked passions, of hatred, of of
jealousy, of cruel instincts,
instincts," " modulated to various degrees by
degrees con-con
trary feelings of filial
filial piety' (Sobieszek 11999: 2 1 , citing Duchenne
999: 1121,
de Boulogne 1862: part 3, 1169-74 69-74 = Duchenne
= Duchenne de Boulogne
Boulogne 11990:
990:
20-2 [translation of preceding]
1120-2 preceding]).).
Notes to page 221
221 / 347
3 Stearns ((1989:
1 989: xi-xii) notes that 'most students of of human
human jealousy
have argued thatthat jealousy
jealousy is an amalgam of of more basic emotions --
fear of impending
impending loss, grief, and anger at the the source of loss. As an
amalgam, jealousy
jealousy is open to various socially determined combina- combina
tions'; d.
cf. 5-6.
5-6. So
So too, in thethe case of shyness, Crozier ((1999: 1 999: 17)
1 7)
suggests that 'shyness is not a unitary experience but refers to two
experiences, fear
distinctive experiences, fear and wariness
wariness on the one hand and
shame and embarrassment on the other .... . . Whether or not it is the
case that the lay perspective tends to blur distinctions distinctions among
different
different emotions, the trend in psychological research is to empha- empha
size the differences among the self-conscious emotions rather rather than
their
their similarities.'
4 Of the three earlier definitions, 'zeal against' and 'zeal in favour' are
described
described as obsolete; the third, 'solicitude/
'solicitude,' is still in use but is
largely restricted, at least in the United States, to cultivated cultivated lan
lan-
guage. Farrell ((1997:
1 997: 1167-9)
67-9) observes that professional
professional jealousy,
jealousy, like
sibling rivalry, may also take the form of a three-party relationship, relationship,
e.g., a performer displaced
displaced by another
another in the esteem of the public public
(which acts as the third in the the triangle). On the the range of meanings of of
the French 'jalousie/ see Lagache Lagache 11947:
947: 2-3.
2-3.
55 Cf.
Cf. W.L.
W.L. Davidson 11912: 9 1 2: 322, 'three persons
persons are involved in the the
situation'; Klein 11975c:
situation',- 975c: 1180:80: '[EJnvy
'[E]nvy implies the subject's
subject's relation
to one person only and goes back to the exclusive relation with the
mother. Jealousy is based on envy, envy, but involves a relation to at least
two people'; Farrell 11980:980: 529-3
529-311 = Farrell 11989:
= 989: 247-9;
247-9; also Farrell
1 997: 1 66, 1 70-1; Segal 1 973:
1997: 166, 170-1; Segal 1973: 40, cited in R. Lloyd 11995:
995: 3. Psy-
Psy
chologists sometimes see the origin of jealousy jealousy in competition
competition
among siblings for the mother's affection, affection, as well as in the rivalry
associated
associated with the Oedipus
Oedipus complex ((cf. d. Klein 11975c:
975c: 1197-201).
9 7-201 ).
These three-party relationships may indeed serve as models for the
experience of jealousy,
jealousy, but they will be activated in societies societies that
that
place particular emphasis on a romantic ideal of love.
6 Ben-Ze'ev 2000: 281; d. cf. Lagache
Lagache 11947:
947: 5,
5, citing D'Alembert, Oeuvres
vol. 3:
3: 320: 'On est jaloux
jaloux de ce qu'on possede et envieux de ce que
possedent les autres'; Neu Neu 11980:
980: 433; Steams
Stearns 11989:
989: 112;
2; Parrott 11991:
99 1 :
4; Caston 2000: 8.
7 As
As Caston
Caston ((2000:
2000: 88)) notes, 'Jealousy is most most often about a person, person,
while envy is about a thing.' Modern Greek zelia and ze1ophthonia zelophthonia
mean both 'envy' and 'jealousy' (so (so too the verb zeleuo
ze1eu6 and adjective
adjective
348 / Notes to page 22 1
page 221
zelidres}-, d.
zeJidres); cf. Stafilidis 11998
998 s.vv.
s.vv. Irini Christophoros points out out to
me (personal
(personal communication)
communication) that Modern Greek does not distin- distin
guish lexically between the feeling that arises when something is
stolen, when someone has what you want, and when a person you
love goes off with another. Baumgart Baumgart ((1990: 1 990: 82)82) reports that God's
jealousy, expressed by 'qineab 'qineah in the language of the Bible, kinah in
Bible, kinab
modern Hebrew,'
Hebrew/ is 'still semantically undifferentiated
undifferentiated from from "envy'"
"envy"'
(d. 1 06).
(cf. p. 106).
88 Cf.
Cf. Tov-Ruach
Tov-Ruach 11980: 980: 466; Farrell 11980: 980: 535;
535; Farrell
Farrell 11989:
989: 252;
252; Neu
Neu
1 980: 433, '[W]e may fear for their loss ....
1980: . . as feeling agents'; Farrell
11989:
989: 26261:1 : 'A man
man who thought
thought of his wife strictly strictly as an object
wouldn't
wouldn't in fact feel jealousy, it seems to me, when when he suspected
suspected her
of infidelity
infidelity ... ... On the
the contrary, I should think he would feel
something
something more like indignation'; Marina Marina 11996: 996: 1179:79: 'El
'EI amante
amante no
desea po seer al amado como posee una cosa ....;
poseer . .; quiere
quiere poseer una una
libertad
libertad como libertad' ('A lover does not desire to possess possess the be
the be-
loved
loved as one possessespossesses a thing ....; . . ; he desires to possesspossess a freedom [in
the
the other] as such'); Farrell 11997: 997: 1172-3;
72-3; Wierzbicka 11999: 999: 99: I[T]he
'[T]he
jealousy scenario can be summed summed up in three three key components
components ...: .. : (1)
. (1)
II
'I want
want this person to feel good feelings for me'; me',- (2)(2) 'I think this
person feels good feelings for someone other other thanthan me'me';; (3)
(3) 'this is
bad.' Everything else is variable'; Caston Caston 2000: 177. 1 77 .
9 C Cf.f . Parrott 11991:
99 1 : 15-16.
15-16. Jealousy
Jealousy differs from envy envy also iinn that iitt is
concerned with with a particular
particular individual, not just any person: person: we may
envy someone who has a girlfriend or boyfriend boyfriend when when we do not; we
are jealous
jealous when we are in love with with the woman or man in question;
cf. Caston 2000: 9; Farrell 11980:
d. 980: 534; Neu 1 980: 433-4. Modern
Neu 1980:
theorists sometimes
sometimes refer jealousy
jealousy (and (and envy) to a generalized lack of of
confidence;
confidence,- thus Rubin ((1975 1 975 [a
[a self-help manual]manual]:: 220):
220): 'Jealousy
and envy are a function of insecurity insecurity and low self-esteem self-esteem .... . . Envy
comes from from feeling so deprived that it seems that everyone must must
surely have more than we do. Jealousy Jealousy is born of feeling that we
have so little to give compared to someone else'; Lagache 11947: 947: 125:
1 25 :
'Le fond affectif
affectif de llaa jalousie
jalousie vecue est l'anxiete'
1'anxiete' ('The affective
affective
basis of jealousy as it is experienced is anxiety'). Farrell Farrell ((1980:
1980: 5551-3)
5 1 -3 )
acknowledges insecurity aass a factor factor iinn jealousy, but denies that it
constitutes a complete explanation;
explanation,- d. cf. Farrell 11989:989: 258-9; also Neu Neu
11980:
980: 433: 'At the the center of jealousy
jealousy is insecurity'; Tov-Ruach Tov-Ruach 1980: 1 980:
467: 'A person is jealous only when

467: when the perceived deprivation makes
him
him doubt himself';
himself; Leguina 2002: 62: 62: 'AI
'Al fin y al cabo, los celos,
creo yo, son un producto mas, el mas doloroso quiza, de nuestra
propia inseguridad' ('In the end, I believe that that jealousy is one more
product - - perhaps the most painful painful -- ofof our
our own
own insecurity'). Con-
Con
trast
trast Fuentes 200 2001: 54: 'Envy is a powerless poison: we want
1 : 54: want to be
someone else. Jealousy is noble: we want the the other to be mine' ('la
envidia es unauna ponzona impotente, queremos ser otro. El celo es
generoso, queremos que el otro sea mio'). Another feature of jeal jeal-
ousy is the
the passion to know, to be informed; informed; Leguina 2002: 62: 62: 'la
angustia de los celos se produce,
produce, especialmente, por desconocimiento,
desconocimiento,
por la necesidad de saber como, incluso en que posturas y actitudes
estan en cada precise
preciso momento los amantes ausentes' ausentes' ('the anxiety
associated with jealousy
jealousy is produced especially by unawareness, by
the need to know how how -- even in what positions and and poses -- the
absent lovers are at each precise moment').
110 0 Neu
Neu ((1980: 442) offers
1 980: 442) offers a more flexible version of the the functionalist
position: 'While social arrangements may vary, whatever the social
arrangements, jjealousy
ealousy serves to reinforce them/ them.' For a sophisticated
defence of moderate jealousyjealousy as an Athenian mean, see Kristjansson
2002: 136-69.
1111 Cf. W.e.
W.C. Green 11892:892: 77:77: 'Nay, says Chremylus, he wanted to keep
your gifts
gifts to himself.'
1122 Cf. Andronicus, On the Emotions 2, p. 12
the Emotions 12 Kreuttner;
Kreuttner; Cicero,
Disputations 44.18: . 1 8 : 'Obtrectatio'
'Obtrectatio' autem est ea quam
£T]\OTVTTCav volo, aegritudo ex eo, quod alter quoque potiatur
intellegi 67JAOTV11'CaV
eo, quod ipse concupiverit'
eo, concupiverit' ('Obtrectatio is what I understand by
zelotupia, that is, a pain arising from from the fact
fact that
that someone else also
has what one has oneselfoneself wanted' [sc. [sc. 'and now has/
has,' which is the
force of 'also']); Graver 2002: 1143: 43: '[Jlealousy
'[J]ealousy [on the
the Stoic definition]
is when I am distressed that another has obtained what I wanted
even though I have also obtained it.'
3 Aristotle treats zelos as a positive emotion, and in this he is consis
113 consis-
tent with
with ordinary Greek usage; usage,- d.cf. Said 2003 on thethe use of the
the term
in Isocrates, where zeloun (verb) is associated with such positive
notions as thaumazein ('admire'), epainein ('praise'), makarizein
('felicitate'), epithumein
epithumein ('desire'
('desire'),I, mimeisthai ('imitate'), and
exisosai ('equal'); contrast phthonein ('to envy'), which occurs in the
company of epitiman ('reproach'), diaballein ('slander'),

company
blasphemein ('speak ill of'),
blasphemein of), loidorein (('abuse'
'abuse' or 'insult'), and
epibouleuein ('plot against')
epibouleuein against').. For zelos as competition for excellence,
excellence,
d.
cf. Panathenai
Panathenaicus 'cus 1159,
59, Evagoras 77,77, and Demonicus 1111 (in the the latter
two philosophy
philosophy is the the goal of such effort).. In Antidosis 148-9,
such effort)
Isocrates contrasts the the zelos of right-thinking people with with a feeling
feeling
of pain and irritation
irritation at the the goodness of others. Hesiod,
Hesiod, Theogony
Theogony
383-4 makes Zelos the the offspring
offspring of Night (like Nemesis); in Works Works
and Days, zelos is positivepositive at 23 and 3 13 (in verbal form), negative
313 negative
at 1195-6.
95-6.
14 So
14 So too, Descartes
Descartes notesnotes that 'what one commonly
commonly calls envy is a
vice that consists in a perversity of nature, which makes certain
people angry at the good that they they see coming into the possession of of
other men' (262(262 art. 1182),
82), although he adds:adds: 'But I use the word here
to mean a passion that is not always vicious.'
1155 This cognitive approach is shared by modern investigators of of
jealousy and related emotions, e.g. Parrott 11991: 99 1 : 4: 'In analyzing
envy and jealousy,
jealousy, I assume that the emotion people experience experience is
determined by the cognitive appraisals that that they make and by the
aspects of those appraisals on which they focus their attention. attention.''
1 6 Cf.
16 Cf. the contrast between phthonein as a negative emotion and
hamillasthai as productive competition for excellence in Isocrates,
Nicocles 59.
To Nicoc1es
1177 For ze10tupia
zelotupia in connection with with political or public competition, d. cf.
Plutarch, Pelopidas 4.3, Flamininus 13 .2,
13.2, Lucullus 4.5 (the
(the tension
between Pompey and Lucullus), 116.2, 6 .2, Alexander
Alexander 771.5, 1 .5, Cato Minor
37. 1 , Dion 118.1,
37.1, 8 . 1 , Aratus
Aratus 54. 7, etc. For the invidiousness (ze1otupia)
54.7, (zelotupia) ofof
eunuchs, who serve in royal courts, d. cf. Heliodorus, Aethiopica
Aethiopica 8.6.2,
('zelotupia is native to the
9.25.5 ('zelotupia the tribe of eunuchs, for they are
assigned to bar others from from what they themselves lack'); of courte- courte
sans, 2.8.5.
18 Epistle 73;
18 jealousy of skill at painting, d.
73; for jealousy cf. Lucian, On Not Not
Readily Believing in Slander 2;
Readily zelotupia, d.
2; for envy paired with zelotupia, cf.
also Epictetus, Enchiridion 19.2 and Plutarch, On Good Cheer 468B; 468B;
for zelotupia in regard to the
for a younger brother's ze10tupia the hereditary right of of
an older, in this case to a priesthood, Heliodorus, Aethiopica Aethiopica 11.25.6,
.25.6,
7.2.4.
19 Photius's
Photius's definition (( 341 is identical to that
(£34) that of the
the Suda,
Suda, apart from
Notes
351
textual
textual corruption; see Theodoridis
Theodoridis 11998: 243 with the apparatus
998: 243
criticus. So too for zelotupoun ((g( 35), Photius gives anti tou ton misou,
'instead of hatred,
hatred/' with
with reference
reference to Aeschines 3.2 11.
3.211.
20 Cf. Serrano
Serrano Aybar 1977: 0 1 i Burguiere 11970;
1977: 1101; 970; on thethe history of the the
major
major manuscript tradition and its early arrival in southern Italy, see
Luca 11994.
994.
21
21 In a study of thethe origin of terms for jealousy
jealousy in the
the romance lan- lan
guages (Proven�al
(Provencal gelos, French ialoux; jaloux; Italian geloso,
geloso, Spanish
celoso, etc.), Grzywacz ( 1 937: 4)
Grzywacz (1937: 4) notes that this emotion was late in
find ing an unambiguous term to denote it (cf.
finding (d. R.
R. Lloyd 11995:995: 4).
Grzywacz argues that the the romance terms arose as learned, rather
than popular, formations and were based on occurrences of zelos and
popular, formations
zelotes in the Bible;
Bible; their
their modern significance thus owes something something
to their
their connection
connection with the idea of a jealous God.
22 Cf. also Lucian, On Sacrifices
Sacrifices 7; also Dialogues of of the
the Gods 7. 1 , 8.
7.1, 1,
8.1,
8.5, 112.2,
2.2, 117.2,
7.2, 22.2; Fantham 11986: 986: 56.
23 Cf. Sissa and Detienne 2000: 1105: 05: 'Hera takes umbrage at every
decision, every thought
thought that her husband does not share with her.
She wants to know everything and, indeed, has a knack of finding
out all that Zeus does or wants to do. do. As we have seen, a detailed
list
list of his amorous infidelities does not not bother her ... ... But when Zeus
hides his military complicity with Thetis Thetis from
from her, she cannot bear
it.' This account
account of Hera's behaviour
behaviour in the Iliad is perfectly just; I
disagree with Sissa and Detienne only over characterizing it as
jealousy. Cf. Odyssey . 1 1 8, in
Odyssey 55.118, in which Calypso accuses the the gods of of
being zelemones, 'spiteful,'
'spiteful,' because while they freely freely enjoy
enjoy sex with
mortal women, they begrudge goddesses goddesses coupling with with mortal men.
24 Cf. Quintus of Smyrna, Post-Homerica
Post-Homerica 9.333-49, where where thethe Lem
Lem-
nian
nian women murder their husbands with with a 'spiteful
'spiteful mind' (zelemoni
(zelemoni
nous6i, 348), because they slept with their maids rather than with
nousoi, 348),
their wives; what irks the wives is the the dishonour lou (ou tieskon, 340),
340),
which roused them them to anger ((thumon, 345); there is no mention
thumon, 345); mention of of
alienation
alienation of affections.
affections.
25 Herodas's fifth
fifth mime ((third
third century BC), which which stages Bitinna's
savage treatment of a slave whom whom she accuses
accuses of sexual
sexual infidelity,
Zelotupos
bears the title Zelotupos (probably not assigned by Herodas himself).
Plutarch reports (Coniugal Precepts 1144B-C)
(Conjugal Precepts 44B--C) that a certain Melan
Melan-
thius responded to a speech by Gorgias at Olympia Olympia concerning
23 1
concord among the Greeks: 'This fellow is counselling counselling us on

concord, while
while he can't
can't persuade himself, his wife, and his maid --
three private individuals - - to get along. For For II gather that Gorgias felt
a passion [eros]
[eios] for the maid, while his wife felt zelotupia zelotupia towards
her'; d.
her',- cf. also Ctesias 688 F 29 FGrHist FGrHist (Jacoby 11923-54) 923-54) on the
the
zelotupia of Artoxerxes' wife Parysatis towards Stateira. Arsace in
zelotupia
Heliodorus, A ethiopica 7.7.7, in love with
Aethiopica with the hero Theagenes, is
said to be 'not without zelotupia' of Chariclea, to whom Theagenes
without zeJotupia' Theagenes
is betrothed (cf.(d. 7.8 .6, 7.
7.8.6, 1 0.6, 7.21
7.10.6, 7.21.5,.5, 7.26.6-7); Arsace desires sex,
not marriage, with with Theagenes, but Theagenes, faithful faithful to Chariclea,
will not consent (cf. (d. too Achaemenes' zelotupia zelotupia in respect to
Chariclea at 7.27.4,
7.17A, 7.29
7.29.1,. 1 , where each time time the term is paired with with
orge or 'anger').
In early modern times, 'jealousy was assumed to be a particularly particularly
masculine emotion in support of proper patriarchal governance'
(Stearns 11989:
989: 115);
5 ); Baumgart ((1990: 1 990: 1121)2 1 ) observes of the
the Middle Ages
and the Renaissance:
Renaissance: 'It is conspicuous how seldom seldom jealous
jealous women
appear not only in popular literature but but also in the literature of the
high
high culture.
culture.'' J.B.
J.B.Bryson ((1991: 1 99 1 : 1191)
9 1 ) reports that a study of jealous
responses in various European countries today, however, indicates indicates
that
that 'the profiles for males and females are quite similar,' similar/ the United
States being exceptional
exceptional in this respect. White and Mullen Mullen (1989:
( 1 989:
1127)
27) note that despite the the popular stereotype of the the sexually posses
sexually posses-
sive male, 'most research has reported no gender differences differences in the
level of self-reported jealousy, and and those studiesstudies finding a difference
difference
are not consistent in finding one gender to be more jealous than than the
other.'
26 Cf. Diogenes Laertius
Laertius 77.131:
. 1 3 1 : 'They [the Stoics] are pleased pleased that wives
should
should be in common
common among the sages; a man will enjoy whatever whatever
woman
woman he chances
chances on, as Zeno says in his book On the Republic Republic
and
and Chrysippus in his On the R epublic: "we shall love all the
Republic:
children equally
equally like fathers, and zeJotupia adultery will be
zelotupia over adultery
elimina ted. "'
eliminated."'
27 Cf. Cleopatra's resentment of honours honours bestowed
bestowed on Octavia
Octavia in
Plutarch's Life of Antony 57.2.
Life of 5 7.2. In a satirical context, a man man may be
reproached for exhibiting too little zelotupia;
reproached ze1otupia; thus, in Lucian's
dialogue
dialogue on the misanthrope Timon ((16), 1 6), the god Wealth offers an
Wealth offers
analogy
analogy for Timon's former promiscuity promiscuity in regard to money: 'If 'If
Notes to pages 23 1-3 / 353
231-3
someone has lawfully married a young, pretty woman and then

[phulattein} her nor has any zelotupia
neither guards [phulattein] zelotupia at all, but but lets
her gogo walking where she pleases night night and day and associate with
whomever she wishes ... ...'' For the expression zeJotupos
zelotupos phulattein,
d.
cf. On MenMen Hired
Hired for Salary 7.
for Salary 1 9-20; d.
7.19-20; cf. also Catullus 117. 7.
28 Modern 'jealousy' is ideologically
ideologically gendered as well; d. cf. Farber 1978: 1 978:
1182:
82: 'A man
man is cuckolded;
cuckolded; a woman is unfortunate.' Buss (2000: 3) 3)
asserts that women universally find 'emotional infidelity more
upsetting,'
upsetting/ while men 'find 'find the prospect of a partner's sexual
infidelity
infidelity more agonizing';
agonizing',- the evidence he cites, however, does not
unambiguously support
unambiguously support his conclusion.
conclusion.
29 Cf. also Lucian, Dialogues of of Courtesans 2.2, 2.2, and contrast 88.1 . 1 on the
the
legitimacy of male zeJotupia,
zelotupia, whichwhich is taken as a sign of genuine
love. Rademaker
Rademaker 2005: 1158 58 notes that, in Euripidean
Euripidean tragedy,
tragedy,
'absence of jealousy, and and absence of possesive infatuation with men,
is indeed part of the the ideology of female sophrosune';
sophrosune''; female jealousy,
I am arguing,
arguing, was understood precisely as a form of possessive
infatuation.
30 On thethe problematic nature of Hera's marriage and her her vindictive
temperament, see Clark 11998: 998: 16-17.
1 6- 1 7.
3311 This is a different
different matter from from what Jon Elster (1999a:
( 1 999a: 1101)
0 1 ) calls a
'weak proto-emotion,'
proto-emotion/ by which he means that that the relevant concept
is lacking
lacking in a given culture. Elster offers offers guilt ((159)
1 59) and boredom
(258) as examples of proto-emotions in classical antiquity.
32 Odyssey book 8.265-366, Hephaestus's
In Odyssey Hephaestus's response to the discovery
that his wife Aphrodite
Aphrodite has been sleeping with Ares is to shame the
adulterers by trapping
trapping them in bed and exposing them them to the
mockery of the the rest of the the gods; Hephaestus does not try try to conceal
his humiliation
humiliation - - ensnaring Ares is vengeance
vengeance enough, since he
inflicts on him the same indignity indignity that he suffered: there is no
question
question of romantic jealousy.jealousy. Cf. Bourdieu
Bourdieu 11966:966: 220:
220: 'If
'If a Kabyle
avenges his honour which has been impugned through his wife, this
does not necessarily mean that he is impelled by jealousy or love;
even if he was without either of these feelings he should neverthe- neverthe
less carry out his duty, and in so doing he would increase increase his merit.'
33 Contra, e.g.,
e.g., Pucci ((1999:
1 999: 222),
222),forforwhom
whomMedea Medeaisis'tormented
'tormentedby byanan
uncontrollable
uncontrollable jealousy';
jealousy',- but but see Bongie 11977;977; Knox 1977;1977; Foley
11989;
989; and Boedeker 11991. 99 1 . Note too that the chorus pray that that they
themselves not be smitten by the arrow of desire (632-3

themselves (632-3),), not that
their husbands be faithful.
faithful. There is a judicious
judicious survey of Medea's
multiple or overdetermined motivation, including a significant
element of resentment at Jason's betrayal of the the marriage bed, in
Mastronarde 2002: 116-22. 6-22.
Dejanira's emotion,
34 Dejanira's emotion, in Sophocles'
Sophocles' Women
Women of Tracbis, when Hercules
of Trachis, Hercules
brings Iole
lole into her home perhaps comes closer to jealousy, but again
she is primarily concerned to protect her position in the household
rather than being peeved at Hercules' infidelity; infidelity; as she says (459-62),
she has long endured his philandering (see (see chapter
chapter 2, p. 60).60).
35 The tyrant in Xenophon's Hiero (3 .3-4) remarks that
Riera (3.3-4) that adulterers are
punished
punished by death death because
because they corrupt
corrupt 'the love [pbilia]
[philia] of wives
for their husbands;
for husbands; since when a woman woman has sex as a result of some
mishap their husbands esteem them no less, provided that their their love
seems to remain uncontaminated'; although this account seems
closer to the modern concern with with the other's affective
affective state, I
suspect that Hiero's point is substantially
substantially the same as Lysias's.
Hupka (1991)
( 1 99 1 ) suggests that
that romantic jealousy may not arise in
societies
societies in which collective identification
identification overrides the individual individual
sense of self (d. 1 996: 140-1).
(cf. Marina 1996: 140- 1 ). As Hupka puts it it ((1991:
1 99 1 : 265),
265),
''[Different
[D]ifferent motives for the the arousal of jealousy
jealousy raise thethe question of of
whether the the predicaments are comparable
comparable and and even can be regardedregarded
as jealousy
jealousy situations. Are the Andalusian husband and the Kabyle Kabyle
husband, when avenging the honor that has been impugned by the
liaisons of their wives, propelled by the emotions as an
the same emotions
American husband confronting his wife's affair?
American affair?''
3366 I do not
not mean to suggest that modern jealousy jealousy is uniform and lacks
a history; as Stearns ((1989: 1 989: 4)
4) remarks of this emotion in American
experience, '[Jlealousy
'[Jjealousy has changed significantly over time.'
Theocritus 6.25-8 might
37 Theocritus might seem to suggest the the arousal of a jealous
response (so Gow 1950:
response 1 950: 124
1 24 ad v. 27);
27); the
the Cyclops, frustrated by
Galatea's
Galatea's indifference towards him, sting her back, and
him, sings: 'But I sting
don't look at her, but but say I have another as wife; when she hears this
she feels zelos [verb zaIoi,zaloi, in Doric] towards me, 0 O Paean, and melts
with
with love, and grows passionate as she looks out from from the sea at my
cave and my flocks.' But Polyphemus is not not so much thinking of of
making Galatea jealous as of stimulatingstimulating her interest
interest in him him by a
show of unconcern
unconcern -- the principle
principle of playing hard to get. As Daphnis
Notes to pages
pages 234-8 / 355
puts
puts it earlier in the the poem ((17),
1 7), 'She flees if you
you court her her and pur
and pur-
sues if you do not.' In 33.50, .50, the
the singer exclaims, 'I feel zelos [za16] [zalo]
towards lasion,'
lasion/ but but here the point is that lasion's lot as lover of of
Demeter
Demeter was enviable, even though he paid for it with his life
(Odyssey 55.125);
(Odyssey . 1 25 ); so too Endymion is called za16tos, zalotos, 'enviable' (49).
Misoumenos or 'Hated Man' is so fragmentary.
38 It is a pity that his Misoumenos fragmentary.
39 The theme of reciprocal love enters New New Comedy with with the the role of
of
the
the young courtesan;
courtesan,- see Konstan 11995: 995: 146-7.
40 Jealousy
Jealousy may also have been inhibited inhibited by the the prevalence of arranged arranged
marriages and the the availability of female slaves for sex, along with
the expectation that men were permitted such relations; for other
factors, see Konstan 11995: 995: 1148-52
48-52 on Menander's
Menander's Epitrepontes.
Epitiepontes. As
jealousy emerges as a possibility in a society previously governed by
communal
communal restraint,
restraint, popular literature may be reticent reticent about
describing it; d. cf. Stearns 11989:
989: 2 1-2 for the
21-2 the response to jealousyjealousy
during the Victorian era in the United States.
41 On elegy, however, d.
41 cf. James
James 20032003:: 105-6, who notes that 'the
problem of the rival, which which on its face seems to be about sexual
jealousy, turns out to be primarily about money ... ... Sexual jealousy is
merely a symptom of the the real problem.' Cf. also magical binding
formulas, e.g. #28 in Gager 11992: 992: 997-100
7- 1 00 (Egyptian,
(Egyptian, third or fourth
century AD, accompanied by a female figurine figurine pierced by thirteen thirteen
needles), in which Sarapammon
Sarapammon petitions that Ptolemais 'not be had
in a promiscuous way, way, let her not be had anally, nor let her do
anything for pleasure with with another man, just with me alone,
Sarapammon, to whom Area gave birth, and do not not let her drink or
eat, that
that she notnot show any affection,
affection, nor go out, nor find find sleep
without
without me ... Drag her by the hair and her heart until she no longer
stands aloof
aloof from
from me ... ...,, and I hold Ptolemais herself ... ...,, obedient for
all the
the time of my life, filled with love for me, desiring me, speaking speaking
to me the things she has on her mind.' The formula is a common
type in this epoch. It may be doubted that that Sarapammon contem contem-
plates marriage with Ptolemais.
Ptolemais.
42 Catullus 09; d.
Catullus 1109; cf. Reitzenstein 11940; 940; Konstan 1972-3; Buchner 1974: 1 974:
256-7.
43 Catullus
Catullus 58;58; repetition of the the beloved's name is more common in
exclamations of devotion than than of despair, e.g.e.g. Anacreon 359, cited cited by
Nisbet and Hubbard 11970: 970: 11717 1 ad Horace 11.13.1-2.
. 13 . 1-2.
44 Cf.
Cf. perpetuum, v. 14. 14. On the the application
application of vinculum,
vinculum, catena,
catena,
foedus, and the
foedus, the like to non-conjugal
non-conjugal relations, see La Penna Penna 11951: 95 1 :
1187-95;
8 7-95; and Nisbet and Hubbard 11970: 9 70: 1177-8
77-8 ad v.
v. 118;8; for Horace's
'ambiguous acknowledgement and suppression suppression of Catullus,'
Catullus/ and his
'technique of inverting or reversingreversing Catullan models/ models,' see Hubbard
2000 (quotations
(quotations on pp. 331, 1, 36;
36; bibliography on 25 n. 3). 3 ).
45 See, e.g., Romano 1991:1 99 1 : 535-6: 'La trattazione del tema della gelosia gelosia
e la descrizione dei sintomi
sintomi patologici di essa avevano avevano un celebre
archetipo,
archetipo, il carme 31 3 1 L.-P. di Saffo
Saffo ......,, che a Roma era stato stato imitato
imitate
da Valerio
Valeric Edituo ...... e, sopratutto, da Catullo' Catullo' ('The treatment of the the
theme of jealousy and the description of its
the description pathological symptoms
its pathological symptoms
had a celebrated
celebrated model -- poem 5511 L. -P. of Sappho ....,
L.-P. . . , which was
imitated in Rome by Valerius Aedituus Aedituus and above all by Catullus');
Owens 11992:
992: 24 1 : '[I1n
241: '[I]n Catullus
Catullus 551, 1 , the
the poet
poet is jealous
jealous of another
man
man who enjoys Lesbia's affections'; Dover 11994 994 [[orig.
orig. 11971]
9 7 1 1 108:
'Sappho describes, with with almost clinical
clinical precision, the symptoms of of
an anxiety
anxiety state caused ... ... by homosexual jealousy'; and Toohey Toohey
2004: 75,
75, who sees Sappho's jealousy jealousy as one manifestation of the the
disease of love-sickness. In 11711, 7 1 1, Ambrose Philips translated:
Blest as th'immortal gods is he,

The youth who fondly sits by this,
this,
And hears and sees thee all the while
Softly
Softly speak and sweetly smile.
'Twas
'Twas this deprived
deprived my soul of rest,
And raised such tumults
tumults in my breast, etc.
"Twas this' refers
refers unambiguously to the communion
communion of the other
two as the source of the poet's emotion, but it is not in the Greek.
See now
now Furley 2000 for a vigorous critique
critique of this interpretation,
interpretation,
and a defence of the view that the the man opposite Sappho
Sappho is godlike
'because he does not succumb to the girl's charms even when
exposed to their
their full
full force at such close proximity ... ...;; there is no
question
question of Sappho feeling jealous
jealous,of
of the
the foil she introduces merely
to underline her
her own predicament' ((13).13). Furley (2000: 13 13 n. 26)
26) notes
that
that Radt ((1970:
1 9 70: 340-3
340-3)) and Bremer ((1982:
1 982: 1114)
1 4) had
had already antici
antici-
pated this interpretation. Furley is disposed, however, to see jeal- jeal
ousy at work in Catullus's
Catullus's adaptation of Sappho's poem, perhaps
because he read Sappho this way 'or he may have deliberately
Notes to pages 241 -2 / 357
241-2/357
refashioned
refashioned the original
original to serve his own purposes' purposes' ((14);
14 ); for Furley,
the rearrangement of sexual roles ((Catullus's Catullus's persona is male) male) is part
of
of the reason why 'Catullus' poem invites invites interpretation
interpretation along the
lines of jealous love' (15).( 1 5).
46 Nisbet
Nisbet and Hubbard ((1970: 1 970: 117373 ad v. 55)) cite Callimachus,
Callimachus, Epigram Epigram
43 . 1-2, Apollonius
43.1-2, Apollonius of Rhodes 33.297-8, .297-8, Theocritus
Theocritus 2.1 06ff., Asclepia
2.106ff., Asclepia-
des, Anthologia Palatina 12.
des, 1 35, Lucian, [up.
12.135, Tiag. 2, and Plutarch,
Jup. Trag.
Life
Life ofof Dem etrius 38.4 on the
Demetrius the Greek side; on the the Latin, Valerius
Epigram 11.2ff.
Aedituus, Epigram .2££. (cited in Aulus Gellius 19.9 . l O ) and Ovid,
19.9.10)
Metamorphoses 9.535££.
Metamorphoses 9.535ff. Cf. Stendhal
Stendhal 11916
9 1 6 (orig. 11822):
822): 1124, 24, who
who in
the chapter 'Of 'Of Jealousy' remarks on the tendency tendency of jealous lovers
to 'exaggerate the happiness of your rival, exaggerate the insolence insolence
happiness produces in him him .,.... The only remedy is, perhaps, to ob- ob
serve your rival's happiness at close quarters. Often Often you will will see him
fall peacefully asleep in the same salon as the woman, for whom
your heart stops beating, at the mere sight sight of a hathat like hers some
way off in the street.' ThoughThough jealousy is at work, the contrast
Stendhal draws here is between the nonchalance nonchalance of the the rival, whose
deepest
deepest passions
passions have not been stirred, stirred, and the experience
experience of being
profoundly in love.
47 Horace's
Horace's speaker
speaker retains also his voice and capacity capacity to argue; cf. d.
Ancona 11994: 994: 1123,
23, and
and contrast Epodes Epodes 111.9-10.
1 .9- l O.
48 Cf. Ancona 11994:994: 123. A propos lentis (8), Nisbet and and Hubbard
((1970)
19 70) note: 'The word indicates the the prolonged agony of Horace's
(d. Gauly 11995:
love' (cf. 995: 9393;; D. West 11967: 967: 65, followed
followed by Rad'iciRadici
Colace 11985:985: 53-9,
53-9, imagines culinary imagery), and of penitus: 'love
otpenitus:
was believed to attack the bones, and particularly the marrow.'
Concerning uror Nisbet
Concerning Nisbet and Hubbard ((1970: 1 970: )) write: 'In erotic poetry
uri normally
normally refers to love, but there is no reason why it should not
have been
been used
used of a more complicated
complicated set of feelings,
feelings,'' and they refer
and they
the reader to Epistles 11.2.12: .2. 1 2: hunc
hune amor, ira quidemquidem communiter
urit utrumque.
49 Today, the the scenario is a romantic commonplace;
commonplace,- for an example, see
Fragoulis 200 1 : 147:
2001: 147: 'Ariadne put put on some clothes,
clothes, made some tea
and then
then told the
the story of her six-day lovefest in intimate detail, as
Medea sat pokerfaced, absorbing the information and watching her
friend's changing expressions without without blinking
blinking her envious, evil
eye.' Earlier,
Earlier, on learning of her friend'sfriend's affair,
affair, 'Medea shook with
jealousy and rage' (144).( 1 44). For an early example, see the the description
description of of
Chaereas's ze10tupia in Chariton's
Chaereas's zelotupia Charitoh's novel Callirhoe ((1.3.4-6,
1 .3.4-6, 11.4.8);
.4.8);
Paglialunga (2000) notes that Chaereas's jjealous ealous symptoms resemble
resemble
those
those of lovesickness.
lovesickness.
50 Quinn
Quinn 11984:
984: 1149;
49; d.cf. 1150.ad
50 ad vv. 115-16:
5- 1 6: 'confirming the
the suspicion
suspicion
that Lydia was once H.'s mistress'; also Maleuvre 11990: 990: 1132-7.
32-7.
5511 Ancona ((1994:
1 994: 1122-5)
22-5) acknowledges
acknowledges the the two
two different
different ideals of love,
but emphasizes the tension between Horace's desire to dominate
Lydia and the source of this desire in Lydia's relationship with
Telephus.
52 Two important moments in the evolution of the the modern paradigm
of jealousy are manifested in the the novel Pandosto, Triumph of
The Triumph of
Time ((1588),
1 588), by Robert Greene, and in Samuel Richardson's Richardson's Pamela
( 1 740). In the
(1740). first (the basis for Shakespeare's
the first Shakespeare's Winter's Tale), the the
king Pandosto conceives a morbid jealousy over the relationship relationship
between his wife, Bellaria, and his childhood
between childhood friend, Egistus, who,
while Pandosto is occupied with affairs affairs of state, have taken to
walking together in the garden, 'where they two in private and
pleasant devises would pass away the time to both their their contents'
contents'
(para. 4).
4). Pandosto is unable to believe that their their affection
affection can be
innocent. His suspicions recall the situation in Horace's ode, but
with a difference: in Greene's novella, the husband's passion is
represented as paranoid,
paranoid, since the the wife is in fact faithful;
faithful; as she says,
'[T]hat I loved Egistus I can not deny: that I honored him him I shame
not
not to confess ... ... But as touching
touching lascivious lust, I say Egistus is
honest, and hope my self to be found found without spot' (para. 31). 3 1 ). 1t
It is
the
the idea of jealousy as a disordered state of mind mind that is new: 'Ah
Tealousy,' Pandosto soliloquizes, 'a hell to the mind, and a horror
Jealousy,' Pandosto
in the conscience, suppressing reason, and inciting inciting rage: a worse
passion then frenzy, a greater plague than madness' (para. 34). 34). In
Pamela, Mr B- B— suspects that Pamela harbours an affection affection for a
young clergyman that puts in question her loyalty to himself himself
(Richardson 1958:
1958: 227, 524-5524-5).). Here too, there are no grounds for Mr
B-'s
B—'s anxiety, as Pamela has no amorous interest in the other man
(by contrast, the
the knowledge that that Mr B---
B— has had a daughter by
another woman and continues to support the girl arouses in Pamela
the most
most generous
generous sentiments, 458-9, 507-17). Here again, jealousy
is configured
configured around a man's lack of trust in his his wife's innocent
innocent
friendship
friendship with another.
53 Stroh ((1993:
1 993: 1170)
70) remarks of this poem: 'an quisquam
quisquam gravius
gravius ac
copius illius affectus
affectus vim descripsit, qui cum apud Romanos
Romanes proprio
nomine careat, a posteris plurimis Graeca voce dicitur dicitur zelotypia (i.e.
(i.e.
"Eifersucht,
"Eifersucht,"" "gelosia")?' (('has
'has anyone described
described the power
power of that
emotion more seriously and and fully
fully -- an emotion that lacked a name
of
of its own among the Romans, but but is called by many later writers by
the Greek
Greek term
term zelotypia [i.e. "jealousy"]?
zelotypia [i.e. ').
"jealousy"]?').
Chapter Twelve
11 The
The quotation
quotation refers
refers to
to Freud's
Freud's ((1957)
1 957) distinction
distinction between
between mourning
mourning
and melancholy. Cf. Brown
Brown 2003: 459: 'The irony of melancholia,
melancholia,
of
of course, is that attachment to the object of one's sorrowful loss
supersedes any desire to recover from from this loss, to live free
free of it in
the present, to be unburdened by it. This is what renders melancho melancho-
lia a persistent condition,
condition, a state, indeed, a structure of desire, rather rather
than a transient
transient response to death or loss.' For Freud, this suggested
that
that melancholia
melancholia was a response to 'an object-loss
object-losswhich
which is with
with-
drawn from
from unconsciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, mourning, in
which
which there is nothing about the loss that that is unconscious'
unconscious' (Freud
11957:
957: 245).
245) .
2 Some scholars
scholars attempt
attempt ttoo capture the ambiguity lupe iinn philo
ambiguity of lupe philo-
sophical literature by resorting to the more inclusive English word
'distress' (e.g., Long and Sedley 11987).
987).
3 On terms for pain in the Greek medical writers, writers, see King
King 1988: 58- 58-
60; in addition to lupe
lupe and aalgema
lgem a or algos, King discusses odune,
commonly used (especially
(especially in the
the plural)
plural) of labour pains (60), but but
also of 'sharp pain, pain which
which pierces the the body,' and (plural
ponos (plural
andporzos
ponoi), 'often
'often used for long-lasting pain, dull pain' (58). PanosPonos refers
more generally to hard work or toil, particularly in connection
connection with
agriculture; King sees its connection
connection with
with 'pain in both war and
childbirth' (59) as a sign that these are both valorized effortful
effortful
activities
activities that require struggle, and for this reason were not treated
with painkillers.
4 For
For the close association between grief grief and pain, see Sophocles, A;ax Ajax
360
937, 940-1, 946-9, 951, 95 957,7, 9972-3,

72-3, 982, 993-4, and 11005, 005, vvhere
where the
vvords
words ania, algistos, and pathos itself describe
pathos itself describe the reaction
reaction of his
dear ones to Ajax's death. Tecmessa
Tecmessa and the chorus also believe that
Odysseus and the Atridae vvill will shovv
show contempt
contempt for them, vvhich which
Aristotle treats as an emotion in Rhetoric 2. 1 1 ; but
2.11; but their grief itself
grief itself
is not
not so much an emotion as a state of pain.
5 A
A nevvpaper
newpaper article under the headline headline ''Anglers
Anglers Cast Doubts That
Fish Feel Pain' (Providence
(Providence Journal, 7 May 2003, A6, taken from from thethe
New
New York Times] reports:
York Times) reports: 'Eminent scientists
scientists have concluded that,
despite anglers' long-standing protestations
protestations to the contrary,
contrary, fishfish do
indeed feel pain when vvhen hooked. Animal-rights
Animal-rights activists ... ... novv
now say
they are encouraged in their insistence
insistence that anglers should desist
from
from their pastime. "While fishing fishing might
might seem fun, fun, there's a terri-
terri
fied
fied animal fighting for its life at the the other end of the the line,
line,"" said
Davvn Carr, an animal-rights
Dawn animal-rights activist.' That the fish fish feel pain
pain is
plausible, and it is reason enough to oppose oppose sport fishing. But the
inference
inference fromfrom the animal's pain to the idea that it experiences the
emotion
emotion of fear fear is unvvarranted.
unwarranted.
6 Grief
Grief might be said to differ differ from pain in its directedness or inten inten-
tionality: vvewe do not
not simply grieve but but grieve for someone. But even
in the case of physical pain, vve we often
often experience not not just pain but,
e.g., a pinprick: vve we say 'the needle hurts,' not 'there is pain.'
7 The anguish
anguish to vvhich
which death, like any intensely felt loss or absence,
gives rise is perhaps more like a desire or epithumia epithumia than a pathos
in the narrovv
narrow sense; compare the longing (in fin Greek, pothos)
pothos] that vve we
feel vvhen
when vvewe are deprived of the the company of a loved one. For the the
analogy betvveen grief and erotic pining, d.
between grief cf. Aristotle Rhetoric
11370b22-8.
3 70b22-8.
8 Cf.
Cf. Sophocles, Ajax 713-
Sophocles, Ajax 1 7; but in fact Ajax has not given
713-17; given over his his
anger, any more than than Electra has.
9 So
So too Electra cites her mother's
mother's reproach: 'Are you the only one
vvhose
whose father
father has died? Is there no other mortal in mourning? mourning?'' (289-
90); d.cf. the
the chorus's comment at 11171-3 1 71-3 (by
(by vvhich
which time they should
knovv
know better): 'Consider, Electra,Electra, that you werevvere born of a mortalmortal
father,
father, and Orestes vvas was mortal. Do not not groan too much, for vve we are
all bound to suffer
suffer this.' On the topos that that vvhat
what is done cannot be
remedied, d. cf. the chorus in Sophocles' Ajax, responding
responding to the hero's
250-1 / 361
36 1
exclamations
exclamations of anguish: 'Why are you you suffering
suffering [algoies]
[algoies] over
what
what has been done; there is no way these things can be as though though
they were not so' (377-8). But Ajax is not simply simply lamenting
lamenting a state
of
of affairs;
affairs; rather, he still harbours hopes of revenge by killing
Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Odysseus (as (as he had intended) and
then slaying himself (387-9 (387-91). that it is he who
1 ). Ajax still believes that
has been
been insulted and mocked, and his rage has as its object those
who have, in his view, harmed him him deliberately and unjustly
((cf.
d. chapter 4, p. 106). 106).
10 Cf. 1 L.. MacLeod 2001: 200 1 : 45: 'To the the Chorus, [Electra's] behaviour
behaviour
seems excessive and futile, futile, and at the beginning it assumes that
her lamentation
lamentation has its source in purely personal reasons, grief grief for
Agamemnon ...
Agamemnon ...,-; the
the women do not not understand why she continues
continues to
lament
lament for a father
father now long dead.' Aristotle Aristotle does concede that 'time
ends anger,'
anger, ' Rhetoric 1380b6; see also the tragic poet Theodectes
fragment
fragment 9, Snell 1971-: 1 97 1-: '0'O wretched Thyestes, endure and bite back
the
the bit
bit of anger ... ... Infinite time time obscures all.'alL'
1111 This might be the theme of a modern modern drama, in which the action
consists chiefly
chiefly in the the manifestation of an interior interior condition
condition or
struggle; butbut such
such a plot was foreign foreign to the
the ancient
ancient stage.
2 Leona MacLeod
112 MacLeod (2001: 39) observes that
(200 1 : 39) that 'mourning need not not mean
that Elektra is governed solely by her passions. True, she hates the
rulers and deeply
deeply grieves her father's murder, but there is an ethical
murder, but
basis to her lamentation
lamentation ... ... Her passions contain
contain an ethical
ethical truth.'
The vehicle
vehicle for the the ethical
ethical dimension,
dimension, I argue, is Electra's anger
rather than
than her grief grief as such.
13 Helene
13 Helene Foley (200 (2001: 1 : 1151) observes: 'In these early scenes, Electra
5 1 ) observes:
practices through
through her aggressive lamentation lamentation what
what I shall call an
ethics of vendetta. Lamentation has a particular particular function to play in
the jural system
system of cultures cultures thatthat practice feuds or vendetta justice; it
aims to provoke revenge through through the awakening
awakening of shared
shared pain.' The
pain, however, is not caused by grief grief but
but rather by an injustice, a
that remains implicit
point that implicit in Foley's analysis. On lamentation
lamentation as a
socio-political gesture, Foley cites Seremetakis 11991;
socio-political 99 1 ; I nevertheless
nevertheless
wonder whether
whether vendetta, as opposed to rectification of an injustice,
is at stake in the play.
Prometheus Bound, attributed to Aeschylus but
In Prometheus but probably com-
pleted and produced by his son after Aeschylus's death (M.L. West
11990:
990: 67-72), Prometheus cries out in language reminiscent reminiscent of of
Electra's apostrophe to heaven and earth: 'O '0 bright air and swift
winds, river streams and endless laughter laughter of sea waves, and earth, earth,
mother
mother of all and the circle of the
the all-seing circle the sun, I call on you to see
what
what I, a god, suffer
suffer at the
the hands of gods' (88-92). Like Electra,
Prometheus
Prometheus complains
complains not about his pain as such such but rather of the
but rather
disgrace (aikeia, aeikes, 93, 97) 97) to which
which Zeus is subjecting him. him.
The daughters of Ocean who form form the chorus
chorus reprove Prometheus
Prometheus
for
for his headstrong
headstrong resistance
resistance to Zeus's inexorable
inexorable power ((178-80),1 78-80),
by which he augments his own suffering. suffering. Like Electra again,
Prometheus concedes that he has brought Zeus's wrath upon
himself (('I
himself 'I erred deliberately,
deliberately/' 266
266).). But he is convinced that he
is in the right (cf.
(d. 9976,
76, 11093),
093), and his resolute hostility to Zeus is
grounded in resentment
resentment at the unjust way he has been treated. The
tension between Prometheus's physical pain and his anger are
analogous, I suggest,
suggest, to that between Electra's grief grief for her father
and her rage at Agamemnon's murderers.
114 Phaedms 258b for verb penthein = 'be sorry'; penthos has a
4 Cf. Phaedrus =
somewhat formal register, like the English 'mourning' in compari- compari

son with 'grief';
'grief; three of the four
four occurrences in Demosthenes are in
his funeral
funeral oration, six of the seven occurrences in Lysias Lysias are in his.
115 1 909: 2.334-5 = Paulus, Opinions 11.21.2-5,
5 Bruns 1909: = .2 1 .2-5, 8-14,
8-14, as cited
cited in
Shelton 1998: 94. Shelton comments: 'A mother's grief grief for her
her child
would undoubtedly
undoubtedly extendextend well beyond a month ... ... The social
demand that they suppress their grief may well well have caused hysteri hysteri-
cal symptoms
symptoms in many women.' Shelton adduces the medical medical writer
writer
Soranus (second century AD), who remarks in his Gynecology (3.26)
century AD),
that 'hysterical suffocation'
suffocation' is most
most often
often 'preceded by repeated
miscarriage,
miscarriage, premature
premature childbirth,
childbirth, long widowhood,
widowhood, retention
retention of of
menses, menopause, or inflation of the the womb' (ibid., 302). But
miscarriage scarcely counts as infant death, and I am not not confident
that
that this passage
passage provides evidence for the the harmful
harmful effects of
effects of
suppressed grief.
116
6 Ancient Hebrew law restricted the period of mourning normally
to seven days (e.g., Genesis 50: 1 0, 11 Samuel 331:13),
50:10, 1 : 13 ), and at times
to a single day or less (2 (2 Samuel 11:12);
: 1 2); thirty days is also indicated
((Numbers
Numbers 20:29). For discussion of the the relationship between
Notes to pages
pages 253-8 / 363
mourning, which
which is a ritual act, and grief, which which is a psychological
function, see Olyan 2003.
1177 Cf. the
the advice, in a treatise ascribed to Seneca ((On On Remedies
Remedies for
for
Chance Events 13 . 1 ), to a person who has lost his sons: 'You're
13.1),
a fool to weep over the mortality of mortals,' mortals/ a sentiment
sentiment that
Rudolf Kassel ((1958:
Rudolf Kassel 1 958: 14)14) describes as 'shocking to the the modern
reader.'
118
8 In the
the case of the
the aged,
aged, death was understood to be less tragic. Thus,
the Greek rhetorician
rhetorician Menander (third or fourth century AD)
century AD)
remarks that
that it is ridiculous to recite lamentations
lamentations for the very old
(436.23-4 Spengel 11854-85;
854-85; translation in Russell and Wilson 11981). 98 1 ).
119
9 In his treatise
treatise On Memory
Memory and Recollection, Aristotle observes that
Aristotle observes
without time there can be no memory; memory,- consequently, 'only those
animals remember that that can perceive time' (449b28-9)
(449b28-9).. The
Thecondi
condi-
tion for memory
memory -- that its object no no longer be be present -- is simulta
simulta-
neously what makes forgettingforgetting possible.
possible. As Glenn Most (200 1 : 149)
(2001: 1 49)
observes, Virgil himself 'recognized that memory even presupposes
forgetting and depends upon it.' Memory's Memory's desire to overcome
overcome
forgetting would result
result in the cessation of time and hence the end
of memory itself.
20 There
There is a similar tension in Virgil's Aeneid between Dido's resolu
Aeneid between resolu-
tion to remain faithful
faithful to her deceased husband, Sychaeus, and what
may seem a perverse attachment
attachment to her grief grief for him. Her sister,
Anna, treats
treats it as the latter, and rehearses the commonplaces
commonplaces of of
consolation literature (4.3 1 -5) : 'You who are dearer than
(4.31-5): than light to
your sister, will you let your youth be consumed in grief, and not
know sweet
sweet children
children or the rewards of love? Do you believe that
ashes or buried ghosts care about that? that?'' For further
further discussion, see
Konstan 2003a.
2211 Compare
Compare Mosley
Mosley 2003: I11, I, in connection
connection with the the destruction
destruction of of
the
the World Trade Center in New New York City on 1111 September 200 2001: 1:
'The thing I feared most most was the healing quality that time has
on the human
human heart. I knew knew that after
after a while I would
would fall back into
complacency - - that
that I would learn to accept that which which I knew was
unacceptable.'
22 This is not to deny that that the two sentiments may mutually reinforce
one another: thethe combination of grief grief and outrage at injustice forms
a powerful motive, as the the case of Electra
Electra herself testifies.
Conclusion
11 Striker
Striker ((1996:
1 996: 289)
289)comments
comments of of the
the account
account of of emotions
emotions inin the
the
Rhetoric: 'Book 2 focuses exclusively
exclusively on emotions
emotions relating
relating to other
other
people.'
2 Neu ((1980:
1 980: 434)
434) distinguishes
distinguishes between 'admiring envy' and 'mali 'mali-
cious envy'; with malicious envy, 'one wants to lower the other (to (to
one's own level or below); in the the case of admiring envy,envy, one wishes to
raise oneself (to
(to become like the other).' Neu adds that that both senti
senti-
ments involve 'a desire to overcome inequality, but the desire comes
from
from different
different directions'
directions' (440).
3 Stocker
Stocker ((1996:
1 996: 265-322), commenting on 'The 'The Complex Evaluative
World of Aristotle's Angry Man/ Man,' notes that, for Aristotle, anger is
evaluative, and hence orge is 'a moral notion' (266), deeply connected
with honour. When Aristotle's man 'is not accorded the rank and
respect
respect he thinks due ...... [hIe
[h]e experiences
experiences thethe lack of respect
respect as a deep
wound to himself, that is, to his self' self (268
(268).). Such dependency on
others' reassurance
reassurance suggests a narcissistic personality (269-70); (269-70); but it
may be that ''Aristotle's
Aristotle's men and our narcissists cannot have the
same structure of feelings'
feelings' (271
(271),), and Stocker concedes he may be
describing
describing what
what we would be like if we were similar to Aristotle's Aristotle's
men
men (272). Stocker affirms: 'The psyche of Aristotle's man man is, furt
furt-
her, constituted
constituted by a desire .... . . that he be a center, if not thethe center, ofof
attention, concern, and understanding' (277), and this conditions his
need for friendship
friendship (280); but
but thethe demand to be 'understood' is itself a
modern phenomenon; Konstan 11997a:
phenomenon,- see Konstan 997a: 14-18, 152-3.
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This page
Index
Achilles: anger of, 48-55; experi- experi aiskhunesthai (('feel

aiskhunesthai 'feel shame')
shame'),
'
ences fear, 138 296n1
296nl88
Achilles Tatius, xii-xiii aisthesis ((sensation
sensation or perception),
action readiness and emotion, 42, as sufficient
sufficient cause of emoemo
247-8 tion, 1131-2
3 1 -2
advantage in deliberative rhetoric, Ajax: on Exekias
Exekias vase, 273n43; in
205-1
205-100 the Iliad, 53-4; in Sophocles'
Sophocles'
Aeschines: oonn enmity, 1193-4; 93-4; on Ajax, 1105-6,
Aiax, 05-6, 1110 10
loathing, 199;
199; on ze1otupia,
zelotupia, 228 akharistein (('act'act ungratefully'),
ungratefully'),
Aeschylus: in Aristophanes' Frogs, 1163
63
1144;
44; Prometheus Bound, 187, 1 8 7, akharistos ('ungrateful,'
('ungrateful,' 'unpleas-
3 1 7n 1 8, 361nl3;
317nl8, 361n13; Seven against ant'), 162
1 62
Thebes, 144-8, 152-3 152-3 algedon ('pain'), 245-6
algedon 245-6
Agamemnon: in the Iliad, 48-9, 48-9, Allen, Christopher, 13-14 13-14
52; in Euripides' Hecuba, 63 Allen, Danielle, 75-6, 86
agency and emotion, 39-40 altruism and love, 1175-6, 75-6, 1182-382-3
Ahmed, Sara, 200 Ammonius, 1153-4, 53-4, 34 3411 nnl1 77
aidos ('respect,'
('respect/ 'shame'), 93-8; 93-8; in Anaxagoras on death, 253
archaic literature, 1117-18;
1 7- 1 8; and Anaximenes, Rhetoric to
nemesis, 1117-18;
1 7- 1 8; as aa. pathos,
pathos, Alexander, 1161, 6 1 , 204
96; prospective, 9 7-8; and social
prospective, 97-8; Andronicus (philosopher)
(philosopher)on on
norms, 307nl
307nlO;O; Stoics on, 96-8 96-8 emotion, 132
aiskhune ('shame'), 94-6, 94-6, 98-1
98-110;1 0; Andronicus (scholiast) on phobos,
onphobos,
Aristotle on, 98-105; Aristotle's 3316nl2
16n 1 2
definition
definition of, 98; as retrospec-
retrospec anger, 41-76, Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition
tive, 997-9;
7-9; Stoic view of, of, 96-8
96-8 of,
of, 41-3,
41-3, 83; —, -, limitations
limitations of of
4412
12 //Index
Index
definition, 65-6; 65-6; cause of (in appetites

appetites vs. emotions,
emotions, 39, 74,
Aristotlel,
Aristotle), 43, 45-6; 45-6; as a cause 3314n6
1 4n6
of hatred, 192-3;
of and democ-
192-3,- and democ appraisal theory
appraisal theory of emotion,
emotion, 23-423-4
racy, 75; vs. demonization of of Aristophanes: Clouds, 1176; 76; Frogs,
the other, 72; 72; in Demosthenes,
Demosthenes, 1144;
44; Knights, 1188; 88; Wasps, 68;
67; diminishing
diminishing of, 83-5; 83-5; in Wealth, 222-3
Euripides' Hecuba, 57-9; 57-9; in Aristotle, 115-16,5-16, 21-2,
21-2, 77, 1 37,
77, 137,
Euripides' Medea, 661-5; 1 -5; and and passim; on anger, 41-8; 41-8; and
gratitude, 1164-6; 64-6; vs. grief, 247-247- anxiety, 1149-50;
49-50; on calmness or
52, 25 7-8; and harm, 68;
257-8; 68; vs. satisfaction,
satisfaction, 77-90; on courage,
hatred, 42-3, 42-3, 46-8,
46-8, 1185-6,
85-6, 1191,
9 1, 70; on definition,
definition, 36; definition
197; and hierarchy,
hierarchy, 73; 73; and of emotion, 27-8, 27-8, 33-7,
33-7, 41-2;
41-2;
honour, 73-4; 73-4; and humility,
humility, 84; on envy, I111-15,l l-IS, 1120;
20; on fear,
in the Iliad, 48-56; incompat- incompat 130-5, 1138-9,
38-9, 154-5;
1 54-5; on friend
friend-
ible with fear, 46, 87-8; 87-8; vs. in
in- ship, l171-5,
l l-5, 182-4; on gratitude,
dignation, 68, 1128; 28; and
and injus
injus- 1156-64;
56-64; on hatred, 1185-94,85-94, 198;
1 98;
tice, 65-8,
65-8, 72-3;
72-3; and judgment, on humaneness,
humaneness, 2213-18; 13-18; on
44-5;
44-5; medieval, 290n66; 290n66; as indignation, I111-15, l l-IS, 1120,
20, 1122,
22,
negative, 69-70; as personal, 47, 1125;
25; on irascibility, 70; 70; on love,
1186;
86; vs. pity, 67; and and revenge, l171-6,
l l -6, 1178-84;
78-84; on nemesis in
4
41, 1 , 43, 54, 56-65; Seneca on, the Ethics, 1114-16; 14-16; on philan
onphilan-
65-6;
65-6; in Sophocles' Ajax, 1 06,
A]ax, 106, thropia, 2216-17;
1 6-1 7; on physiology
1110;
10; in Sophocles'
Sophocles' Electra,
Electm, 248-
248- of emotion,
of emotion, 44; on pity, 204-18;
52; in in Sophocles' Women Women of of -,
—, conflicting view of, 203-4;
Trachis, 59-659-61; 1 ; and status, 55-6,
55-6, on reason in animals, 269n3 269n31, 1,
661;1 ; suppression of, 75; 75; suscepti
suscepti- on rivalrous emotions, 224-5;
bility
bility to, 74; 74; Theophrastus on, on shame, 98-105
65-6;
65-6; Thucydides on, 67-70; Arrowsmith, William, 61-2
and war, 70-3; 70-3; of women, 56- 56- art
art and expression, 13-14, 29-30
661.
1 . See
See also kholos, menis, menis, orge Aspasius: on emotion, 13 1--2,
131-2,
animals: absence of emotions in, 306n4;; on
306n4 332n l O
philia, 332nlO
onphilia,
absence of reason
xii, 22; absence reason in, automatisms not emotions, 25-6 25-6
269n3
269n311 autonomy vs. vs. interdependency,
Antiphon: on anger, 69; 69; on shame,
shame, 23-4
23-4
104
anxiety, 32 32;; in Aristotle, 149-50; balance of power, role of fear in,
in,
in Epicureanism, 149-50 139-4
139-411
apoina ('ransom'I,
apoina ('ransom'), 54 Barbaro,
Barbara, Daniel, 1158-60
58-60
Index / 4413
13
Barbaro,
Barbara, Ermolao, 151588 consolation, 250, 254-7
Bartov, Orner,
Omer, 188-9 contempt,
contempt, 45, 259
Bauman, Zygmunt, 92 corrigibility
corrigibility of emotions,
emotions, 32, 37-8
37-8
bdeluttesthai ('loathe'), 1198-9
bde1uttesthai 98-9 courage, 70;
70; and fear, 1135-7,
35-7, 1149;
49;
Beck, Aaron, 189 Herodotus on, 135-6; Xenophon
Xenophon
Belfiore, Elizabeth, 180
1 80 on, 135
blue, 6 court society and emotion,
emotion, 3311
blushing, 296n 19
296nl9 cowardice. See courage
Borgeaud, Philippe, 151
151 Crawford, Neta, 221010
Bourdieu, Pierre, 329n32 cultural construction
construction ooff emotions,
emotions,
Browning, Robert, 264n7 22-2
22-2
Burke, Edmund, 221313
Buss, David, 12 Darwin, Charles, 8-1 8-10,0, 114,
4, 28
definition: Aristotle's formulas
Cairns, Douglas, 94, 96, 125 1 25 for, 1159; 59; Aristotle's
Aristotle's view of, 36
calming down, 77-8 77-8 dehumanization
dehumanization and hatred, 1188-9 88-9
calmness: Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition of, Delumeau, Jean, Jean, 1137,
37, 149
77-8
77-81;1 ; as an emotion, 77-90; democracy: and anger, 75; 75; and
opposite of anger, 77-80. See envy, 1127; 27; and fear, 1148-9
48-9
also praotes demonization
demonization of the the other, 72
Campbell, Lily, 220 Demosthenes:
Demosthenes: on anger, 67-9; 67-9; on
Caston, Ruth, 232 balance of power, 139-40; on
Catullus
Catullus 551, 1 , 239; -,
—, 58, 238; -,—, envy, 1120-1;20-1; on fear, 1139-40;
39-40; on
64, 29; -, —, 1109,
09, 237-8, 243 loathing, 1199; 99; on phi1anthr6pia,
philanthropia,
Chrysippus on anger, 66, 69. See 221616
also Stoics deos ('fear'), 1153-453-4
Cicero: on behaviour in royal Derrida, Jacques, 329n32 329n32
courts,
courts, 331; 1 ; on gratitude,
gratitude, 1164;
64; on Descartes, Rene, 12-13, 1126, 26, 224,
pity, 274n44 228
city-state and emotion,
emotion, 331,
1 , 75-6
75-6 desert: and envy, 1120-1, 20-1 , and fear,
class differences
differences and and envy, 122,
1 22, 1131,
3 1 , 2214-15;
1 4-15; and pity, 1120,20, 201-
201-
1125-8
25-8 8, 2212-13
1 2-13
classical
classical art lacking expression, 30 Diogenes of Oenoanda, 1150 50
cognition: and emotion, 20-2, 20-2, 26, disgust, 39
43-4,
43-4, 1131-2;
3 1-2; and fear, 1131-3
3 1 -3 dispositions vs. emotions,
emotions, 70
colours, cultural
cultural variation of, of, 5-7 Duchenne, Guillaume-Benjamin,
Guillaume-Benjamin,
confidence, opposed
opposed to fear, 881-2,
1 -2, 110
0
132-3, 3315n7
1 5n7 Dying Gaul (sculpture),
(sculpture), 29
4414
14 / Index
ekhthaiio ('hate'), 199

ekhthair6 1 99 25, 27; vs. reason, 43; and
ekhthra ('enmity'), 1189, 89, 1193-4;
93-4; rhetoric, 27-8, 27-8, 337; 7; and social
opposed to philia, philia, 1194,
94, 1196-7
96-7 interaction, 39-40, 74-5, 74-5, 87;
ekhthros ('enemy'), 1193-4, 93-4, 341n
341nl7 17 Stoic view of, 32-3; 32-3; valence of,
Ekman, Paul, 111-12, 1-12, 114-17,
4- 1 7, 220 221, 1 , 33, 42; women prone to, 58,
ekplexis ('panic,' 'shock'), 142,
ekplexis 133, 163, 259-60; words for, for, 3-5
3-5
115252 empathy, 343n1 343nl
elegy and jealousy,
jealousy, 236-7 emulation, 224, 259
eleos. See pity enemy: personal, 1193-4; 93-4; military
military
Else, Gerald, 2215 15 (foe), 1193 93
Elster, John, 23, 75, 75, 1150-1,
50-1 , 22
2211 Aristotle on, 193-4; in
enmity: Aristotle
emotion: and agency, agency, 39-40, 1163; 63; Euripides' Children of of Hercules,
in animals, xii, 22; and appe appe- 1 94-8; as opposite of friendship,
194-8;
tites, 39, 3314n6; 1 4n6; appraisal 1189,89, 1193-4
93-4
theory of, of, 23-4;
23-4; Aristotle's
Aristotle's envy I111-15,l l-IS, 1118-28;
1 8-28; in archaic
definition
definition of, of, 27, 33-7,
33-7, 441-2,
1-2, poetry, 1118-19;1 8-19; Aristotle's
77, 13 137;7; Aristotle's
Aristotle's list, 338-9,8-9, definition of, of, 1112-13;
12-13; and class,
1131-1,
3 1-1, 148; vs. automatisms,
automatisms, 125-8; and democracy, 1127; 27;
25-6;
25-6; and the city-state, 331, 1, Descartes on, 1126-7; 26-7; and desert,
75-6;
75-6; and cognition, 20-2, 26, 1119-20;
1 9-20; vs. emulation, 224; of of
43-4;
43-4; components of, of, 27; cor-
cor the gods, 1124-5; 24-5; Hippias on,
rigibility of, of, 32, 337-8;
7-8; and court 1121-2;
2 1 -2; vs. humaneness, 2217-18; 1 7-18;
society, 31;
society, 3 1 ; and culture,
culture, 23-4;
23-4; vs. jealousy, 221; as a negative negative
disgust as an emotion, 39; in emotion, 1113, 13, 1121-2,
2 1-2, 1126,
26, 128;
1 28;
Epicureanism, 32; and evolu- evolu pejoration of, 1125-6; 25-6; in Pindar,
tion, 111-12,
1-12, 36; and facial 1119-20,
1 9-20, 3310n26
1On26;; vs. pity, 81, 81,
expression, 7-14, 117-20, 7-20, 25; -, —, 1112-13;
1 2-13; positive sense of, of, 1126-
26-
not described
described by orators, 30; 30; and 7; Adam Smith Smith on, 1126; 26; Stoics'
feeling, 270n34;
270n34; as fluid, 148; 1 48; view of, 1113-14; 13-14; twotwo sides of,
and
and interdependency,
interdependency, 23-4, 23-4, 331; 1; 1121-2,
2 1-2, 126-8. See See also phthonos
and judgment,
judgment, 34-8; 34-8; as labile, epereasmos (('spite'),
epereasmos 'spite'), 45
1147-8;
47-8; lists of basic, 112, IS,
2, 15, epicedion (funeral
epicedion speech), 255-6
(funeral speech),
274n47; neural pathways of, Epicurean view: of anger, 1165-6; 65-6;
26-7;
26-7; as opposites, 77, 77, 881-3;
1-3; of anxiety, 1149-50; 49-50; of emotion,
emotion,
organic
organic aspect
aspect of, 111; 1; pain
pain and 32; of gratitude,
gratitude, 1165-6 65-6
pleasure in, 21, 21, 33-4; perception epikhairekakia ('Schadenfreude')
epikhairekakia ('Schadenfreude'),
'
as cause of, 1131-2; 3 1-2; physiology 1115
15
of, I11,I , 22, 26-7,
26-7, 43-4; as process, eukharistein ('feel gratitude'), 166 1 66
Index / 415
Index/415
Eumenides Painter, 273n43 and deliberation,

deliberation, 143; 1 43; and
!'good will'), 1173
eunoia ('goodwill'), 73 democracy, 148-9;1 48-9; and desert,
Euripides: Alcmaeon, 1152; 52; Cbild-
Child- 2214-15
1 4-15;; and flight, 1143; 43; in
of Hercules and enmity
ren of the Iliad, 136-9; in medieval
1194-8;
94-8; Electra
Electro, and hatred, 1187;
8 7; France, 1137;3 7; neural pathways
pathways of,
Hecuba and anger, 61
Hecuba -5; Hercu-
61-5; Hercu 26-7,
26-7, 1133-4;
33-4; for others, 1155; 55; and
les, 1180,
80, Hippolytus
Hippolytus and hatred, the Peloponnesian
Peloponnesian War, 1140-4; 40-4;
1186-7;
86-7; Medea
Medea and anger, 57-9;
57-9; and pity, 1131,3 1 , 2213-14;
13-14; vs. reason,
- and hatred, 1187;
— and 87; —
- and 142; and rhetoric
rhetoric (in lin war),
war), 141-4,
jealousy, absence of, 233-4; 1148-9;
48-9; and shame, 136-7; and
Orestes and friendship,
friendship, 1180-2;
80-2; social interaction, 132-3; in
Suppliant Women and pity,
Suppliant Women Thucydides, 1140-4; 40-4; and tragedy,
206-10 154-5; Xenophon
Xenophon on, 1135; 35; and
evolutionary psychology, 111-12,1-12, women, 1144-8;44-8; words for, 153.
36, 222 See also phobos
pbobos
Exekias, 273n43
273n43 fearlessness, 137 137
expressionism, 28-928-9 feeling and emotion, 270n34
Fortenbaugh, William, 22, 34, 133 1 33
face: expression ambiguous, Frank, Robert, 126 1 26
117-20;
7-20; expressive of emotion, friends: wish
wish the same things, things,
7-14,
7-14, 25 1174;
74; wish
wish things for for the other's
other's
favour, 1157-64,
5 7-64, 1167;
67; Aristotle's
Aristotle's sake, 1174
74
definition
definition of, 1158-60;
58-60; as cause friendship, 1169-74;
69-74; absence of of
of
of love, 1175;75; as consequence
consequence of of Greek
Greek term for, 1174; 74; in archaic
love, 1180-1.
80-1 . See also kbaris
kharis poetry, 336n27; causes of in
fear, 1129-55;
29-55; in Aeschylus's Seven Aristotle, 1174-5;
74-5; vs. enmity,
Thebes, 1144-8;
against Tbebes, 44-8; and 1189;
89; idealization
idealization of, 1183-4. 83-4. See
agency, 39; and anger, 87-8; 87-8; also pbilia
philia
Aristotle on, 130-5, 138-9, Freud, Sigmund, 29, 32, 25 2511
154-5; Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition of, Frijda, Nico, 102 1 02
1130,
30, 1134,
34, 1154,
54, 2212;
1 2; in Aristotle's Furst,
Fiirst, Alfons, 1183 83
Poetics, 2213-15;
13-15; and balance of of
power, 1139-41;
39-4 1 ; causes of, 132-3; Gewirth, Alan, 1164-5
64-5
cognitive character of, 131-3; 1 3 1-3; gods and envy, 1124-5
24-5
vs. confidence, 881-2, 1 -2, 132-3; and Goldhill, Simon, 1701 70
courage, 135-7; and cowardice, Goulston, Theodore, 325n6
1138,
38, 1149;
49; culturally condi
culturally condi- gratitude, 82, 1156-68;
5 6-68; and anger,
tioned, 1130;30; definition
definition of, 81; 81; 1164-6;
64-6; Aristotle
Aristotle on, 1156-64;
56-64; -,
—,
4 1 6 / Index
416/
in Rhetoric
Rhetoric 2.7,
2.7, 1156-64;
56-64; con-
con on, I185-94,
S5-94, 1198;9S; causes of, 190,
ditions for, 160,160, in the courts, 1192-3;
92-3; for classes of people,
1161;
6 1 ; diminishing,
diminishing, 1162;
62; eliciting,
eliciting, 1186-7;
86-7; definition of j(Stoic),
StoicJ, I189;
S9;
161; generosity vs. obligation
obligation as disposition,
disposition, 1197-8;97-8; for indi
indi-
in, 167; vs. kindness, 1156-64;
56-64; viduals, I187-8; S 7-S; vs. love, I189-90;
S9-90;
and obligation, 1165-7;65-7; as a as negative affect, affect, 1191;
91 ; without
without
pathos, 165-6; Philodemus on,
pathos, pain, 47-8,47-8, 1192;
92; and trauma,
trauma,
1165-6;
65-6; and reciprocity, 1164-8.
64-8. 200; and vice, I187-8, S7-S, 1190-1.
90-l .
See also kharis, kharin ekhein See also ekhthra, misein
Green, O.H., 177 1 77 Heath, Malcolm, 170 1 70
Robert, 358n52
Greene, Robert, Hector, 49-50, 136-9 136-9
grief, 244--5 S; and action
grief, 244-58; readi
action readi- Hellenistic art and emotion, emotion, 29
ness, 247-8;
247-8; vs. anger, 247-52,
247-52, Hellenistic
Hellenistic society and emotion, emotion,
257-8; not among Aristotle's 3311
emotions, 245-7; and consolaconsola- Hera as paradigm of zelotupia,
tion, 250, 254-7; denial of, 228-30
253-4; and judgment, 247; Herodotus: on courage, courage, 135-6, on
limitations
limitations on, 252-3; Menan- Menan divine envy, 1124-5 24-5
der Rhetor on, 255; in modern Hesiod on Nemesis,
Nemesis, 1119 19
psychology, 251-2; and mourn mourn- j'state,' 'disposition'), 79
hexis ('state,'
ing, 252; vs. other emotions, hierarchy and anger, 73
246-8; and pain, 245-6; Plato Hippias of Elea on envy, 121-2
on, 253-4;
253-4; in Pliny, 256; Plu
Plu- Hochschild, Arlie, 127 1 27
tarch on, 252, 257; ps.-Plutarch Homer, Iliad: anger in, 48-56; fear
on, 254-5; Servius Sulpicius on, and courage in, 136-9; narrative
254; and social interaction,
254; interaction, 248; pattern of, of, 284n3
284n311
in Sophocles' Electra, 24S-52.
248-52. honour and anger, 73-4; 73-4; and
See also lupelupe shame, 102 1 02
Griffiths, Paul, 26, 129
Griffiths, Horace, Odes 11.13, . 13, 238, 241-3
241-3
guilt
guilt vs. shame, 991-3, 1-3, 1101-2
01-2 hubris j'arrogant
hubris ('arrogant abuse'), 46, 73, 73,
1100
00
Halliwell,
Halliwell, Stephen, 155 humaneness,
humaneness, 208, 2213-18 13-1 S
han j(Korean),
Korean), 266n1
266nl77 Hume, David, 213
Harris, William, 268n22 humility
humility and anger, 84
hate: and dehumanization, l188-9; SS-9; hupourgia j'service'),
hupourgia 161
('service'), 161
modern
modern sense of, 1188, 88, 190
1 90
hatred, I185-200;
S5-200; vs. anger, 42-3;
42-3; identification
identification vs. pity, 202, 2212-13
1 2-13
46-S,
46-8, IS5-6,
185-6, 1191,
9 1, 1197;
97; Aristotle indignation
indignation vs. anger, 6S,
68, 1128;
2S; in
Index / 417
Index/417
archaic literature, 1116-18;

1 6-18; judgment: and anger, 45;
45; and
Aristotle's definition of, 1112; 12; emotion, 34-5;
34-5; effect
effect of emo-
emo
and
and class, 1122;
22; of the
the gods, 1125;
25; tion on, 35,
35, 37-8;
37-8; effect
effect on
vs. pity, 881,
1 , 2217-18.
1 7-18. See
See also emotion, 34; and grief, 247;
nemesan, nemesis
nemesan, meaning of Greek term, 36-7 36-7
individualism, 270n33
ingratitude, 82 kataphronesis ('contempt'
kataphronesis ('contempt'),I, 45
injustice
injustice and anger, 65-8, 65-8, 72-3
72-3 kekharismenos ('pleasing'I,
('pleasing'), 1160
60
interdependency vs. vs. autonomy, Kennedy, George, 1187 87
23-4, 31
23-4, 31 kharin apaitein (('demand
'demand back a
irascibility, 70 favour'),I, 1166-7;
favour' 66-7; — apodidonai
- apodidonai
Isaeus: on envy, 1120; 20; on hatred, ('return a favour'), 1162, 62, 1166-7;
66-7;
1188
88 ekhein ('feel gratitude'l,
— ekhein
- gratitude'), 1158-
58-
Isocrates, 771;
1; on envy, 1121; 2 1 ; on 63, 1167;
67; — opheilein ('owe a
-
enmity, 1193;
93; on friendship, favour'l,
favour'), 1166;
66; —pherein
- pherein ('do a
1182-3;
82-3; on pity, 1120,203
20, 203 favour'l,
favour'), 158-9
158-9
kharis ('favour'I, 15 7-64, 167;
('favour'), 157-64, 1 6 7;
James, William, 10 10 Aristotle's definition of, of, 1158-60;
58-60;
jealousy, 111-12,
1-12, 220-43; as as cause of love; 1175, 75, as sign ofof
aggregate of emotions,
emotions, 220; love, 1180-1
80-1
not in archaic lyric, 233; and kharizesthai ('do a favour'l,
favour'), 1158-9,
5 8-9,
Catullus, 237-4
237-41;1 ; vs. envy, 221;
221 ; 1163
63
evolutionary explanation
explanation of, kholos ('anger'
kholos ('anger'),), in Homer, 48,
gendered nature of,
222; gendered of, 227-32, 50-I,
50-1, 283n27
283n27
3351n25,
5 1 n25, 353n28; in Greene's kindness (not(not an Aristotelian
Aristotelian
Pandosto, 358n52; not in emotion), 1157-64
57-64
Homer, 232-3; and Horace, kinship and philia, 1180-2; 80-2;
Odes 11.13,
. 13, 238, 24 1-3; and
241-3; responsibilities
responsibilities of, 1180-3 80-3
insecurity, 348n9; and loss of of Komter, Aafke, 164 1 64
affection,
affection, 22 1; and magical
221; Konner, Melvin, 191 191
formulas, 355n4
355n411 ;; and New krisis ('judgment'), 36-7 36-7
Comedy, 234-6; in Richardson's Kuleshov, Lev, 19 19
Pamela, 358n52; and Roman Kyriakou, Poulheria, 1180-2 80-2
elegy, 236-7; and Sappho, 240- 240-
1; and three parties, 22
1; 1 ; not
221; not in lajja (Hindil,
lajja (Hindi), 1110
10
tragedy, 233-4; and ze1otupia,
zelotupia, Lansky, Melvin, 98, 1105,
05, 127
1 27
222. See also ze10tupia
zelotupia Laocoon (sculpturel,
(sculpture), 29
Josephus on panic, 1152 52 laughter, in Plato's Philebus, 1 09
Philebus, 109
4 1 S I Index
418/Index
Le Brun,
Brim, Charles, 13-14 Miller, William 1., 1151-2
William I., 5 1-2
LeDoux, Joseph,Joseph, 26-7,
26-7, 133-4 misein ('to hate'), 1185-200;
85-200; of
of
Lehane, Dennis, 1142, 42, 147 classes of people, l186-7
S6-7
Levin, Jack, 1188, 88, 190 Jeanne, 242
Moreau, Jeanne,
loathing, 1198-9 98-9 Mossman, Judith,
Judith, 64
lobe ('outrageous act'), 282n26 Munch, Edvard ('The Scream'),
Munch,
loneliness, 116, 6, 2219-20
1 9-20 28
lovable, 190 1 90 Murukami, Haruki, 33
love, 1169-84;
69-84; affective
affective character Muybridge, Eadweard,
Eadweard, 1188
of, 1170-1;
70-1 ; and altruism, 1176, 76, Mytilenaean debate, 70-2,
70-2, 205
IS2-3;
182-3; causes of, 175, 1 75, 1190;
90; and
favours, 1175, 75, 1180-1;
80-1 ; vs. hatred, natsukashii (Japanese), 266n 266nl7 17
1189-90;
89-90; and intimacy, 1176-7; 76-7; nemesan ('be indignant'), 68, 81, 81,
and kinship, 1180-2; 80-2; modern 1111;1 1 ; archaic word, 1114-16;
14-16; in
definitions, 1176-7; 76-7; as a pathos,
pathos, Aristotle's
Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics, Ethics,
I171;
l l ; and reciprocal
reciprocal obligation,
obligation, 1114-15;
14-- 1 5; in Aristotle's Nico
Nico-
1170,
70, 1176,
76, 1180-2;
80-2; as a relation-
relation machean Ethics, 1115; 1 5; and class,
ship, 177-8;
1 77-8; two types of, of, 243; 1122,
22, vs. env�envy, 1112-13;
12-13; of the
the
varieties of, 1175, 75, 1179-80;
79-80; words gods, 1125; 25; in Homer, 1116-17;
1 6- 1 7;
for, 1169.69 . See also philia and phthonos,
phthonos, 1122-3;22-3; vs. pity,
lovesickness, 241 1112,
1 2, 2217-18.
1 7-18. See also indigna-
indigna
lupe (('pain/
lupe 'pain,' 'grief'), 245-7 tion vs. anger
Lutz, Catherine, x, 115, 5, 76 nemesis ('indignation'): and aidos,
Lyons, John,John, 7 1117-18;
1 7- 1 S; in Aristotle, 1114-15;
14-- 1 5; in
Lysias: on anger, 66-7; 66-7; on envy, Homer, 1116-17; 1 6- 1 7; vs.
vs. phthonos,
1120;
20; on hatred, 1187; 8 7; on praotes
onpraotes 1119-20
1 9-20
(('satisfaction'),
'satisfaction'), 88-9;88-9; on seduc-
seduc Nemesis (goddess), 1116, 16, 1123-4,-
23-4; as
tion, 234 a witch-like figure, 124; cult of
at Rhamnous, 1123-4; 23-4; in Hesiod,
Mackay, Ann, 272nn42-3 1 19
119
McConnell, Terence, 1651 65 Nemesius of Emesa, Emesa, 997-8
7-8
MacLaury, Robert,
Robert, 6-7 neo-Stoic theory of emotion, 20-1 20-1
Menander's Shorn Girl and neural pathways of emotion,
jealousy, 234-5 26-7
26-7
Menander
Menander Rhetor on consolation,
consolation, nomoi ('customs,' 'laws'), as
255 generally accepted principles,
menis ('wrath'), 48 208-1
208-100
Mignini, Filippo, 165
1 65 Nussbaum, Martha, 20-1, 20-1, 1177-8
77-8
Index / 4 19
419
Oatley, Keith, 139, 143 1 43 as philia, 1170-1;

70-1 ; vs. philia,
obligation: and gratitude, 165-7; 1173-4
73-4
of
of kin, 1180-2;
80-2; and love, 1170,70, ('affection,' 'liking'),
philesis ('affection,'
1176,
76, 1180-2
80-2 1 72-3, 281n23
172-3,
Odysseus: in Euripides' Hecuba,Hecuba, philia (('love/
philia 'love,' 'friendship'), 169-76;
1 69-76;
63-4; in Sophocles' Philoctetes, as an affective
affective bond, 1170-1;70-1; al-
al
1106-9
06-9 truistic, 1175-6;
75-6; as a disposition,
disposition,
olig6ria ( 'slight'), 45-7
oligoria ('slight'), 45-7 1170;
70; vs. ekhthra, 189, 1 89, 1194
94;; and
opposites
opposites in emotions,
emotions, 77,77, 881-3,
1-3, favours (kharis), 1175, 75, 1180-1;
80-1; as
1 00. See also Aristotle, defini
100. defini- friendship,
friendship, 1172-4;72-4; and kinship,
tion of emotion
emotion 1180-2;
80---2 ; non-reciprocal, 1174; 74; and
orators: on anger, 66-8; emotions
anger, 66-8; obligation, 1180-2;80-2; as a pathos,
described by, 30 1177-8;
77-8; as to philein, l170-1, 70-1 , 175;
1 75;
Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 276n50 vs. to philein, 1173-4;
73-4; in tragedy,
1180-2;
80-2; varieties
varieties of, 175,
1 75, 179-80.
1 79-80.
pain: and anger, 42-3, 278n6;; and
42-3, 278n6 See also love
emotion,
emotion, 221, 1 , 33-4, 42; and grief, Philodemus,
Philodemus, 165-6 165-6
245-6; not accompanying philos ('dear'; as noun, 'friend'),
philos 'friend'),
hatred, 48-9,
48-9, 1192;
92; as psychologi-
psychologi 1169-74;
69-74; Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition of,
cal suffering,
suffering, 246 1172;
72; and kin, 1170,70, 1180-2
80-2
Pan and panic, 1150-1 50-1 phobos 1129-49,
phobos 29-49, 1154;
54; Andronicus
panic, 142, 1150-3
50-3 on, 3316nl2.
1 6n1 2. See also fear
parrMsia (frank
panhesia (frank speech),
speech), 3311 Phormio (Athenian general),general),
pathos (pl. pathe), xii, 3-5;
(pi. patM), 3-5; as 143-4
143-4
response to a stimulus, 163, photography, 110-11 0-1 1
1 77; senses
177; senses of, 3-4,
3-4, 27, 87 phthoneo ('to envy,'envy/ 'begrudge'),
Peachin, Michael, 170-1 1 70-1 1118-20
1 8-20
Peloponnesian
Peloponnesian War and and fear, phthonos ('envy'), 81, 81 , 1111-28;
1 1-28; and
1140-4
40-4 class, 1125-7;
25-7; of the
the gods, 124-5;
1 24-5;
phantasia ('impression'), 132
phantasia and nemesan, 122-3; vs. nem nem-
philanthropia ('humaneness'), 88,
philanthr6pia esis, 1119-20;
1 9-20; not in archaic
archaic
2215-17;
1 5-1 7; in Aristotle, 2216-17;
1 6-1 7; in poetry, 1123; 23; pejoration of,
Demosthenes, 216 216 125-6; personified, 1124; 24; in
philanthropon (('humane'),
'humane'), 213-18;
2 13-1 8; Pindar, 1119-20;
19-20; in Sophocles'
vs. envy, 2217-18
1 7-18 3 1 2n36;; in Thucydides,
Ajax, 312n36 Thucydides,
philein ('to love'), 171171 1120.
20. See also envy
philein (to), 'loving', 1171;7l ; physiology of emotion, 111, 1, 26-7,
26-7,
Aristotle's
Aristotle's definition of, 1171; 7l; 43-4;
43-4; varies with culture,
culture, 22
420 / Index
physiognomy, 272n43 42; at harm to enemies, 1109; 09;

Pin dar: hatred in, 1187;
Pindar: 87; phthonos mixed, 276n48; as sensation, 42
in, 1119-201 9-20 Pliny
Pliny on grief, 256
pity 201-18; vs. vs. advantage,
advantage, 205- 205- Plutarch: on anger, 58; on grati-
anger, 58;
10; vs. anger, 67; Aristotle on, tude, 1159;
59; on grief, 252,
252, 257
204- 1 8; Aristotle's definition
204-18; definition poine ('penalty'), 54
poine
of, 204;204; in Aristotle's Poetics, polemics ('foe'), 1193,
polemios 93, 1196-7
96-7
213-14;
213-14,- as charity, 2219; 1 9; and Pollux on zelotupia,
zelotupia, 226-7
desert, 1120, 20, 201-8, 2212-13;
1 2-13; and Polybius
Polybius on anger, 71 71
distance from from the pitied, 201-2, Poussin, Nicolas, 14 14
2211;1 1; in Euripides'
Euripides' Suppliant praos ('calm,' 'gentle'
'gentle'),), 77-90
77-90
Women, 206-10; and fear, 1131, 31, praotes ('satisfaction,' 'calmness'),
2211,1 1 , 2213-15;
1 3-15; vs. identification, 77-90; vs. anger,
anger, 77-80, 85-6;85-6;
202, 2212-13;1 2-13; vs. indignation, Aristotle's definition of, of, 78-8 1;
78-81;
80-1,
80-1, 2217-18; 1 7-18; in Isocrates, 120, 1 20, iinn Aristotle's Nicomachean
203; in oratory, 203; in perora- perora Ethics, 86-7;
86-7; in Aristotle's
tion, 203; in Rhetoric to Alex Alex- Topics, 87; conditions condu-condu
ander, 204; and similaritysimilarity cive to, 85-6;
85-6; as a disposition,
to pitied, 206-7, 210-11; 2 10-1 1 ; in 85-6, 88
85-6, 88;; vs. hatred, 85 85;; in
Sophocles' Philoctetes, 2212-13; 1 2-13; Lysias, 88-9;
88-9; and philanthr6pia,
philanthropia,
Stoics' rejection of, 204; 204; for 88; in Xenophon,
Xenophon, 89
suffering
suffering as such, 205-6; and pride, as opposite of shame, 83,
supplication, 206; vs. sympathy, 90, 100
2211-13;
1 1-13; in Thucydides, 202-3, process and emotion, 25, 25, 27
205; and tragedy, tragedy, 1155;
55; and ps.-Plutarch on grief, 254-5
universal norms, 208-1 208-100 ps.-Seneca on friendship,
friendship, 336n28
336n28
Planalp, Sally, Sally, 220-2 Ptolemaeus of Ascalon, 226
Plataea, destruction of, of, 202-3 pudor (Latin 'shame'), 298n32,
pUdOl
plato: on advantage (Greater
Plato: (Greater 299n36
299n36
Alcibiades), 205; on anger
(Apology), 67-8; 67-8; on envy, 1121 2 1 ;; reason vs. emotion, 43
oonn gratitude, 1167; 67; oonn grief
grief reciprocity:
reciprocity: and gratitude,
gratitude, 1164-8;
64-8;
(Phaedo], 253--4;
(Phaedo), 253-4; his zeiotupia,
zelotupia, and
and love, 117070
226; on laughter (Philebus),
(Philebus), 109, 1 09, Rendell, Ruth, 19 19
306n4;
306n4; on zelotupia
zelotupia (Sympo
(Sympo- revenge, 4 1 , 43, 54, 56-65, 248-52
41,
sium), 228 rhetoric: and emotion, 27-8,
27-8, 337;
7;
Plautus, Epidicus, 1176 76 and fear, 141-4
pleasure and emotion, 221, 1 , 33-4,
33-4, Richardson, Samuel, 358n52
Index / 42 1
Index/421
Rolls, Edmund, 117,

7, 33, 265n1
265nl33 Shipp, George, on terms for
Romilly,
Romilly, Jacqueline de, 1153-4
53-4 shame, 94
Rosenblatt, Paul, 252-3 shyness, 347n3 347n3
Simmel, Georg, 165 1 65
Sanskrit terms
terms for emotions,
emotions, 1155 slaves and anger, 55-6 55-6
Sappho 331,240-1
1, 240-1 slight, as cause of anger, 45-7 45-7
satisfaction, 77-90 Smith, Adam, 126
Scheff, Thomas, 991, 1 , 98 social interaction: and emotion, emotion,
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 334n1 334nl55 39-40, 74-5, 87, 259-6 1 ; and
39_40, 74-5, 87, 259-61;
Scruton, David, 129-30 grief, 248
seduction, 234 Sophocles:
Sophocles: Ajax, AJax, 1105-6,
05-6, 3312n36
1 2n36;;
self,
self, divided, 303n45
303n45 Electra, 1187-8,
87-8, 248-52;
248-52; lch
Ich-
Seneca: on anger, 65-6,65-6, 287n43;
287n43; neutae, 1152;
neutae, 52; Oedipus
Oedipus the King
on grief,
grief, 256-7 35, 38; Philoctetes,
Philoctetes, 1106-9,
06-9, 124,
1 24,
shame 991-110;
1-1 1 0; and aidos, 93-8;93-8; 2212-13;
1 2-13; Women
Women of of Trachis, 59-
59-
and aiskhune, 94-6, 94-6, 98-1 1 0; in
98-110; 661,1 , 1152
52
Antiphon, 1104; 04; Aristotle on, 98- 98- Spanish terms for emotions,emotions, 1166
1105;
05; and being
being seen, 1103; 03; and
and Spinoza, Baruch, 34-5 34-5
blushing, 296n1
296nl9; 9; causes of, spite, 45
1100-3;
00-3; definition
definition of, 82, 98; and and Stanford, Leland, 18 18
disability, 300n40; excessive, Statius, epicedia, 255-6
293n6; vs. guilt, 991-3,
293n6; vs. 1-3, 1101-2;
0 1 -2; Stoics: on aidos, 96-8; 96-8; on
and honour, 302n44;
302n44; and hum hum- aiskhune, 96-8; 96-8; on anger, 66,
iliation, 304n5
304n51; 1; vs. lajja,
lajja, 1110;
10; 69; on emotion, 32-3; 32-3; on envy,
in modern psychology,
psychology, 991-2, 1 -2, 1113-14;
13-1 4; on hatred (definition),
(definition),
302n43;
302n43; neglect of, of, 991-2;
1-2; and 1189;
89; on pity, 203; on zelotupia
zelotupia
nudity, 301nn41
301nn41,, 43; 43; and repu-
repu (definition), 223-4
tation,
tation, 1103-4,-
03-4; and responsibil
responsibil- stugein ('feel disgust'), 338n3
stugein
ity, 1102-3;
02-3; retrospective
retrospective vs. Sulpicius,
Sulpicius, Servius (apud (apud Cicero),
prospective, 96-9;96-9; 'shame 254
culture,'
culture/ 991;1 ; vs. shamelessness,
shamelessness, supplication,
supplication, 206
82-3,
82-3, 99-100; in Sophocles' suppression
suppression of anger, 75
Ajax,
Aj ax, 105-6; in Sophocles'
Sophocles' susceptibility
susceptibility to anger, 74
Philoctetes, 1106-9;
06-9; Stoics on, sympathy, 2211-13 1 1-13
96-8. See also aidos, aiskhune
96-8. See
shamelessness, 82-3, 82-3, 99-100; as Tacitus on concealing emotion,
an emotion,
emotion, 83 272n43
Sherman, Nancy, 32 Taplin, Oliver, 49-50
422 / Index
Terence: Andria and jealousy, 236; 135; on friendship, 183;1 83; on

Eunuch and jealousy, 236
Eunuch ingratitude,
ingratitude, 1162
62;; on praotes
onpraotes
tharros ('confidence,'
('confidence/ 'excite- ('satisfaction'), 89;
89; on returning
returning
mene), 881-2,
ment'), 1 -2, 132-3, 3315n7
1 5n7 a favour, 1176;
76; on seduction,
seduction,
Theophrastus on anger, 65-6 65-6 354n35
Thomas Aquinas, 112, 2, 29 1 n3
291n3
Thucydides: on anger, 67-71;
67-71 ; on Zaborowski,
Zaborowski, Robert, 153
enmity, 1193;
93; on envy, 1120;
20; on zelos ('emulation'), 224, 259,
fear, 1140-4;
40-4; on gratitude, 159;
1 59; 349n
349nl313
on Mytilenaean
Mytilenaean debate, 70-2 70-2 zelotupia ('possessiveness,'
zelotupia ('possessiveness/
Tibetan
Tibetan terms for emotion, 3, 16 16 'malice'), 222-32; in Aeschines,
Aeschines,
time (('honour'),
'honour'), 73-4
73-4 225; and court society, 225; in
Tov-Ruach,
Tov-Ruach, Leila, 241-3241-3 the Cyrillian
Cyrillian Glosses, 227; as
tragedy: and fear, 1154-5;
54-5; and love effeminate, 23 1 ; etymology of,
231;
(pMia), 1180-2;
(philia), 80-2; and
and pity, 155
1 55 222; in Diodoms
Diodorus Siculus, 225;
in Dionysius
Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
Halicarnassus,
valence of emotions, 21 21,, 33, 42 226; Hera as paradigm of, of, 228-
228-
Virgil, Aeneid
Aeneid 2.3 1 4- 1 7, 38
2.314-17, 30; Medea as paradigm of, 230,
233-4; Perictione,
Perictione, advice to
war: and anger, 70-3;
70-3; and fear, women
women on, 23 1 ; Plato accused
231;
1140-4,
40-4, 148-9
148-9 of, 226; in Plato's Symposium,
Symposium,
Wierzbicka,
Wierzbicka, Anna, 116-17,
6- 1 7, 126
1 26 228; in Plutarch,
Plutarch, 225; Pollux,
Pollux,
Bernard, 93-4,
Williams, Bernard, 1 03
93-4, 103 definition, 226-7; in Polybius,
Wilson, Donna, 54 225; Ptolemaeus of Ascalon,
women: and anger, 56-656-61;1; and definition,
definition, 226; and Roman
fear, 1144-8;
44--8 ; hatred of, 1186-7;
86-7; as elegy, 237; in the Septuagint,
prone to emotion, 58; and
emotion, 58; 227; Stoic definition, 223-4;
zelotupia, 227-32
zelotupia, Suda, definition,
definition, 227; Theano,
advice to women on, 230-1; and
Xenophon: on anger (Hellenica
(Hellenica women, 227-32. See also
5.3), 70;
70; on art
art and emotion, jealousy
272n43; on fear
fear and courage,

The Emotions of The Ancient Greeks

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The Emotions of the

Ancient Greeks: Studies in

Printed on acid-free paper

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the

5 Envy and Indignation III

1111 Jealousy 2219

The fact is that once we name an emotion

The premise of this book is that

200 1 , Nussbaum 200

that Aristotle analyses in his treatise the Rhetoric (although

Aristotle and other Greek philosophers held that animals and

Leukippe was caught in emotional chaos. chaos. She was vexed,

The emotions, as opposed

Robson Lectures at Victoria College in the the University of Toronto

Pathos and Passion

Each emotion ....

In an essay entitled Compassion an Emotion,'

what befalls a person, often in the the negative sense of an accident or

including interest, shame, and contempt' (references suppressed;

expressions of of the several

assumed, were at some point advantageous to survival, and hence

Contemporary emotion researchers are likely likely to find

So too, as we shall see in the

single concept (and

Fernandez-Dols and Carroll ((1997: 1997: 276)

dialogue move rapidly to convey meaning meaning in conjunction with with

expresses such a loss carries aan n intensity

Humans have the capacity to think

In Greek popular psychology, endorsed in part by the Stoics, the

focused as well on the attitudes, motives, and actions of others

What is more, the same event may be understood

are not indivisible

looming presence may be generated in a similarly similarly automatic

gous split-level process may be at work in constituting

The very concept

disposition to view the emotions as responses

recognize it as well as a sign of modernist literature. In a short

understands them. We We may begin by considering Aristotle's un­ un-

discovering that Troy has been penetrated by the Greeks and is

arma amens capio; nec

I grab arms mindlessly;

Rage generates a belief

shame and shamelessness;

Since feeling pleasure is in the

Anger is accompanied not just by pain but but by pleasure, too,

hatred is distinct fromfrom anger, according to Aristotle, is that that 'the

thetic and parasympathetic

Anger, then, involves a judgment of intentions.

My story is nevertheless defective in at least one respect as an

It is evident that the causes of anger,

how Agamemnon treated me shamefully before the Achaeans as

to his reconciliation with Agamemnon in book 18 1 8 and his osten­

These third-person descriptions of his motives do not not prevent

and appreciation of the opponent's valour that mark Achilles'

But Achilles, cruel

absence of anger, on the the part of the

Alternatively, the cruelty of Hecuba's retaliation

whole life for the the sake of vengeance ((756-7;

passionate fury. This is not subversive irony on Euripides' part, as

understands them. We We may begin by considering Aristotle's un un-

to his reconciliation with Agamemnon in book 18 1 8 and his osten

which result in punishment, with those against unwritten cus- cus

Herodotus's tale, invites the gods' resentment because it threat threat-