A.

)Effect and Operation of law

CASE #1
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have
no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall”
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would
be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

CASE #2
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS JUDGE VEGA

FACTS:

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans Bank. It was
published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual
claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for
rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA
7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24,
1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:

Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on January 2,
1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not necessary for its effectivity.
RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it took effect on the date provided for and hence was
rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days
following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise
provided”.

B.) Purpose of Interpretation and Construction (When necessary, when not necessary)

Case #1
Bolos vs. Bolos GR No. 186400 October 20,2010
Facts : Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage invoking Article 36 of the Family Code on July
10, 2003. The RTC granted her petition on August 2, 2006. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration after
respondent received the decision of the lower court. The decision as declared final after a motion to reconsider denial of
appeal was denied.
Respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and hereby granted. The appellate court ruled that AM
no 02-11-10-SC did not apply to the case at bar as their marriage was solemnized Feb 14 1980 before the family code
took effect. The said court procedure required a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal cases on declaration
of absolute nullity on void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages. Petitioner filed her manifestation and a motion
for partial reconsideration but was denied by the appellate court as the 15-day reglementary period to file is not
extendable.
Petitioner filed this said petition to the Supreme Court contending that the appellate court erred in ruling that their case is
not covered by the Family Code; that AM no 02-11-10-SC covers/pertains to the word “petitions” instead of “marriages”;
if the Family code covers the case then a motion of reconsideration is a precondition for an appeal; and, since the
respondent refused to comply with the precondition of filing a motion for reconsideration, a relaxation on the rules of
appeal is not proper.
Issue: Whether or not AM no 02-11-10 SC “Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of void marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages” is applicable to the case.
Held: No. the court ruled that AM 02-11-10-SC is strict in its scope wherein section 1 of the rule reads:
“Section 1. Scope – This rule shall govern petitions for declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.” Applying the rule verba legis, the said section leaves no
room for interpretation and is very clear that it would only cover marriages under the Family Code. Also it would only be
applied to “marriages” not to “petitions.”

Case#2
Municipality of San Juan Manila vs. CA
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing and seeking to reverse and
set aside: a) the decision dated November 23, 1995 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 159; and b) the resolution dated May 28, 1996 denying reconsideration of said
decision.
The generative facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal
Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of
San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters. Only after resettling
these squatters would the municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal government center on the subject
land.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government center
by constructing the INP Building, which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and the site
to house the two salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed
thereon are the Central Post Office Building and the Municipal High School Annex Building.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation pertinently reads as follows:
PROCLAMATION NO. 164
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1716, DATED FEBRUARY 17, 1978, WHICH
RESERVED FOR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT CENTER SITE PURPOSES
CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METROPOLITAN MANILA, ISLAND OF LUZON,
BY EXCLUDING FROM ITS OPERATION THE PARCELS OF LAND NOT BEING
UTILIZED FOR GOVERNMENT CENTER SITES PURPOSES BUT ACTUALLY
OCCUPIED FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES AND DECLARING THE LAND OPEN
TO DISPOSITION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, AS
AMENDED.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend
Proclamation No. 1716, dated February 17, 1978, which established for municipal government center site
purposes certain parcels of land mentioned therein situated in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila, by excluding from its operation the parcels of land not being utilized for government center site
purposes but actually occupied for residential purposes and declaring the land so excluded, together with
other parcels of land not covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless occupied for residential
purposes, open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended, subject to future
survey, which are hereunder particularly described as follows:
Lot 1 (Port.) Psu-73270
xxx xxx xxx
Lot 4 (Port.) Psd-740
and Psd-810
xxx xxx xxx
Lot 5 (Port.) Psu-73270
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty-seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
By the President:
(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Acting Executive Secretary
(Rollo, pp. 148-151.)
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent
prayer for restraining order against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan
Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the association members who were claiming
that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164.
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in question is being utilized
by the Municipality of San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164 is
absent.
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed in a decision dated July 17, 1991. This decision became final and
the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, 1992.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents hired a private surveyor to make
consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the same to respondent Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their application for a grant under Proclamation No. 164.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private
respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels of
land covered by Proclamation No. 164.
The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present recourse.
Cutting through the other issues, it would appear that ultimately, the central question and bone of contention in the
petition before us boils down to the correct interpretation of Proclamation No. 164 in relation to Proclamation No. 1716.
Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of Appeals by hammering on the issue of res judicata in view of
the fact that an earlier judgment, which had become final and executory, had already settled the respective rights of the
parties under Proclamation No. 164. This notwithstanding, petitioner reiterates the reasons why the court had previously
ruled in favor of petitioner's rights over the subject property against the claims of private respondents.
We find good legal basis to sustain petitioner's position on the issue of res judicata insofar as the particular area covered
by Proclamation No. 164, which was the subject matter of the earlier case, is concerned.
The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between
the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action (Mangoma vs. Court of Appeals, 241
SCRA 21 [1995]).
The existence of the first three elements can not be disputed. As to identity of parties, we have ruled that only substantial
identity is required and not absolute identity of parties (Suarez vs. Municipality of Naujan, 18 SCRA 682 [1966]). The
addition of public respondent DENR in the second case will thus be of no moment. Likewise, there is identity of cause of
action since the right of the municipality over the subject property, the corresponding obligation of private respondents to
respect such right and the resulting violation of said right all remain to be the same in both the first and the second actions
despite the fact that in the first action, private respondents were the plaintiff while in the second action, they were the
respondents.
The last requisite is identity of subject matter. Res judicata only extends to such portion of land covered by Proclamation
No. 164 which the court ruled may not be automatically segregated from the land covered by Proclamation No. 1716. It
does not include those portions which are outside the coverage of Proclamation No. 1716.
Withal, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon the above premise and our discussion
may properly end here. However, there exists a more basic reason for setting aside the appealed decision and this has
reference to a fundamental and gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 on October 16, 1987 by then President
Aquino.
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of
legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said
Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid
act of legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of
power under a revolutionary government. On March 24, 1986, she issued her historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating
the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1 of the
Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened
under a new constitution. Then came the ratification of the draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution.
When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative
power was already solely on Congress.
Although quite lamentably, this matter has escaped the attention of petitioner as well as the courts before which this case
has already passed through, this Court cannot help noticing this basic flaw in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164.
Because this unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the most basic principle in the
separation of powers between the three branches of government enshrined in our Constitution, we cannot simply close our
eyes and rely upon the principle of the presumption of validity of a law.
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid (Salas vs. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734 [1970];
Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978]). However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by
legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch.
For this Court to allow such disregard of the most basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of
presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back to its sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus,
also, it is in the discharge of this task that we take this exception from the Court's usual practice of not entertaining
constitutional questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently,
said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent Department of
Environment and Natural Resources is hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing Proclamation No. 164.
SO ORDERED.

C.) Judicial Power to Construe

Case #1
Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy,
simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent
like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To
the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by
the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief
as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies
to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function
of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of
the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate
is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression
of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Case #2
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS et al

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
 Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong
Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over
Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but
simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisionS.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the
tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage
the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted
to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which
the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State
acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS
and MHC a “state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when
the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action;
and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state action.” Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore
subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements
of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches
of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated
and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are
they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate
itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission
of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction
itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the
bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.

D.)Intrinsic Aids
Case #1
Pascual vs. Ballesteros

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the spouses Roman A.
Pascual and Mercedita R. Pascual (Spouses Pascual), Francisco A. Pascual (Francisco), Margarita Corazon D. Mariano
(Margarita), Edwin D. Mariano and Danny R. Mariano (petitioners) assailing the Decision[1] dated July 29, 2008 and
Resolution[2] dated January 30, 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89111.
 The instant case involves a 1,539 square meter parcel of land (subject property) situated in Barangay Sta.
Maria, Laoag Cityand covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-30375[3] of the Laoag City registry. The
subject property is owned by the following persons, with the extent of their respective shares over the same: (1) the
spouses Albino and Margarita Corazon Mariano, 330 square meters; (2) Angela Melchor (Angela), 466.5 square meters;
and (3) the spouses Melecio and Victoria Melchor (Spouses Melchor), 796.5 square meters.

Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share in the subject property was inherited by their daughter
Lorenza Melchor Ballesteros (Lorenza). Subsequently, Lorenza and her husband Antonio Ballesteros (respondents)
acquired the share of Angela in the subject property by virtue of an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute
Sale[4] dated October 1, 1986.

On August 11, 2000, Margarita, then already widowed, together with her children, sold their share in the subject
property to Spouses Pascual and Francisco.[5] Subsequently, Spouses Pascual and Francisco caused the cancellation of
TCT No. 30375 and, thus, TCT No. T-32522[6] was then issued in their names together with Angela and Spouses Melchor.

Consequently, the respondents, claiming that they did not receive any written notice of the said sale in favor of
Spouses Pascual and Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City a Complaint[7] for legal
redemption against the petitioners. The respondents claimed that they are entitled to redeem the portion of the subject
property sold to Spouses Pascual and Francisco being co-owners of the same.

For their part, the petitioners claimed that there was no co-ownership over the subject property considering that
the shares of the registered owners thereof had been particularized, specified and subdivided and, hence, the respondents
has no right to redeem the portion of the subject property that was sold to them.[8]

On January 31, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision[9] dismissing the complaint for legal redemption filed by the
respondents. In disposing of the said complaint, the RTC summed up the issues raised therein as follows: (1) whether the
respondents herein and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-owners of the subject property who have the
right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code; and (2) if so, whether that right was seasonably exercised by the
respondents within the 30-day redemption period under Article 1623 of the Civil Code.

On the first issue, the RTC held that the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-
owners of the subject property considering that the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the respective
shares of each of the registered owners thereof were indeed particularized, specified and subdivided.

On the second issue, the RTC ruled that the respondents failed to seasonably exercise their right of redemption
within the 30-day period pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding the lack of a written notice of the
sale of a portion of the subject property to Spouses Pascual and Francisco, the RTC asserted that the respondents had
actual notice of the said sale. Failing to exercise their right of redemption within 30 days from actual notice of the said
sale, the RTC opined that the respondents can no longer seek for the redemption of the property as against the petitioners.

Thereupon, the respondents appealed from the January 31, 2007 decision of the RTC of Laoag City with the CA.
On July 29, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision[10] the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the appealed January 31, 2007 Decision is,
accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered approving [respondents]
legal redemption of the portion in litigation. The rest of their monetary claims are, however, DENIED for
lack of factual and/or legal bases.

SO ORDERED.[11]

In allowing the respondents to exercise their right of redemption, the CA held that the 30-day period within which
to exercise the said right had not yet lapsed considering the absence of a written notice of the said sale. Thus, the CA
stated that [t]he mandatory nature of the written notice requirement is such that, notwithstanding the actual knowledge of
the sale, written notice from the seller is still necessary in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.[12]

The petitioners sought for a reconsideration of the said July 29, 2008 Decision, but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution[13] dated January 30, 2009.

Undaunted, the petitioners instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari before this Court essentially
asserting the following arguments: (1) their predecessors-in-interest and the respondents are not co-owners of the subject
property since their respective shares therein had already been particularized, specified and subdivided; and (2) even if
such co-ownership exists, the respondents could no longer exercise their right of redemption having failed to exercise the
same within 30 days from actual knowledge of the said sale.

The petition is denied.

 Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is
one of fact.[14]

The first issue raised by the petitioners is a factual question as it entails a determination of whether the subject
property was indeed co-owned by the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. Such determination
would inevitably necessitate a review of the probative value of the evidence adduced in the case below.

In any case, it ought to be stressed that both the RTC and the CA found that the subject property was indeed co-
owned by the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. Thus, in the absence of any exceptional
circumstances to warrant the contrary, this Court must abide by
the prevailing rule that findings of fact of the trial court, more so when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive
upon it.[15]

Anent the second issue asserted by the petitioners, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA in ruling that
the 30-day period given to the respondents within which to exercise their right of redemption has not commenced in view
of the absence of a written notice. Verily, despite the respondents actual knowledge of the sale to the respondents, a
written notice is still mandatory and indispensable for purposes of the commencement of the 30-day period within which
to exercise the right of redemption.

Article 1623 of the Civil Code succinctly provides that:

Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be.
The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of
the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (emphasis supplied)

The indispensability of the written notice requirement for purposes of the exercise of the right of redemption was
explained by this Court in Barcellano v. Baas,[16] thus:

Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows that there was a written
notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of thirty days within which the right of
legal pre-emption may be exercised, does not start.

The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the early case of Conejero v.
Court of Appeals, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes:

With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such notice is
indispensable, and that, in view of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code
is couched, mere knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the
redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The written notice was obviously exacted by
the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet
any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The statute not having provided for any
alternative, the method of notification prescribed remains exclusive.

This is the same ruling in Verdad v. Court of Appeals:

The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the
selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its
efficacy and status.

Lately, in Gosiengfiao Guillen v. The Court of Appeals, this Court again emphasized the
mandatory character of a written notice in legal redemption:

From these premises, we ruled that [P]etitioner-heirs have not lost their right to
redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day
period has not even begun to run. These premises and conclusion leave no doubt about
the thrust of Mariano: The right of the petitioner-heirs to exercise their right of legal
 redemption exists, and the running of the period for its exercise has not even been
triggered because they have not been notified in writing of the fact of sale.

xxxx

Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement, would explain in his
commentaries on the New Civil Code that despite actual knowledge, the person having the right to
redeem is STILL entitled to the written notice. Both the letter and the spirit of the New Civil Code argue
against any attempt to widen the scope of the written notice by including therein any other kind of notice
such as an oral one, or by registration. If the intent of the law has been to include verbal notice or any
other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, there would have been no
necessity or reason to specify in the article that said notice be in writing, for under the old law, a verbal
notice or mere information was already deemed sufficient.

Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. x x x (citations omitted)

Here, it is undisputed that the respondents did not receive a written notice of the sale in favor of the petitioners.
Accordingly, the 30-day period stated under Article 1623 of the Civil Code within which to exercise their right of
redemption has not begun to run. Consequently, the respondents may still redeem from the petitioners the portion of the
subject property that was sold to the latter.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated July 29, 2008 and Resolution dated January 30, 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89111
are AFFIRMED.

Case #2
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. CA

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 promulgated on June 17, 1996 in CA-GR
No. CV-43239 of public respondent and its resolution2 dated November 29, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.3
The facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals and which we find supported by the records are as follows:
On various dates in September, October, and November, 1980, appellant Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) extended a
series of credit accommodations to appellee ECO, using the trust funds of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
(PVTA) in the aggregate amount of P26,109,000.00. The proceeds of the credit accommodations were received on behalf
of ECO by appellee Oñate.
On the respective maturity dates of the loans, ECO failed to pay the same. Oral and written demands were made, but ECO
was unable to pay. ECO claims that the company was in financial difficulty for it was unable to collect its investments
with companies which were affected by the financial crisis brought about by the Dewey Dee scandal.
xxx
On October 20, 1981, ECO proposed and submitted to LBP a “Plan of Payment” whereby the former would set up a
financing company which would absorb the loan obligations. It was proposed that LBP would participate in the scheme
through the conversion of P9,000,000.00 which was part of the total loan, into equity.
On March 4, 1982, LBP informed ECO of the action taken by the former’s Trust Committee concerning the “Plan of
Payment” which reads in part, as follows:
xxx
Please be informed that the Bank’s Trust Committee has deliberated on the plan of payment during its meetings on
November 6, 1981 and February 23, 1982. The Committee arrived at a decision that you may proceed with your Plan of
Payment provided Land Bank shall not participate in the undertaking in any manner whatsoever.
In view thereof, may we advise you to make necessary revision in the proposed Plan of Payment and submit the same to
us as soon as possible. (Records, p. 428)
On May 5, 1982, ECO submitted to LBP a “Revised Plan of Payment” deleting the latter’s participation in the proposed
financing company. The Trust Committee deliberated on the “Revised Plan of Payment” and resolved to reject it. LBP
then sent a letter to the PVTA for the latter’s comments. The letter stated that if LBP did not hear from PVTA within five
(5) days from the latter’s receipt of the letter, such silence would be construed to be an approval of LBP’s intention to file
suit against ECO and its corporate officers. PVTA did not respond to the letter.
On June 28, 1982, Landbank filed a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money against ECO and Emmanuel C. Oñate
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50.
After trial on the merits, a judgment was rendered in favor of LBP; however, appellee Oñate was absolved from personal
liability for insufficiency of evidence.
Dissatisfied, both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. LBP claimed that there was an error in
computation in the amounts to be paid. LBP also questioned the dismissal of the case with regard to Oñate.
On the other hand, ECO questioned its being held liable for the amount of the loan. Upon order of the court, both parties
submitted Supplemental Motions for Reconsideration and their respective Oppositions to each other’s Motions.
On February 3, 1993, the trial court rendered an Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision, dated December 3, 1990, is hereby modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Eco Management Corporation to pay plaintiff Land Bank of the
Philippines:
A. The sum of P26,109,000.00 representing the total amount of the ten (10) loan accommodations plus 16% interest per
annum computed from the dates of their respective maturities until fully paid, broken down as follows:
1. the principal amount of P4,000,000.00 with interest at 16% computed from September 18, 1981;
2. the principal amount of P5,000,000.00 with interest at 16% computed from September 21, 1981;
3. the principal amount of P1,000,000.00 with interest rate at 16% computed from September 28, 1981;
4. the principal amount of P1,000,000.00 with interest at 15% computed from October 5, 1981;
5. the principal amount of P2,000,000.00 with interest rate at of 16% computed from October 8, 1981;
6. the principal amount of P2,000,000.00 with interest rate at of 16% from October 23, 1981;
7. the principal amount of P814,000.00 with interest rate at of 16% computed from November 1, 1981;
8. the principal amount of P2,295,000.00 with interest rate at of 16% computed from November 6, 1981;
9. the principal amount of P3,000,000.00 with interest rate at of 16% computed from November 7, 1981;
10. the principal amount of P5,000,000.00 with interest rate at 16% computed from November 9, 1981;
B. The sum of P260,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
C. The costs of the suit.
The case as against defendant Emmanuel Oñate is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED. (Records, p. 608)4
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the amended decision of the trial court.5
On June 9, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a resolution dated November 29,
1996. Hence, this present petition, assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals:
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT BASED ON THE FACTS AS
ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE, THERE EXISTS A SUBSTANTIAL AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUND UPON WHICH
THE LEGAL NOTION OF THE CORPORATE FICTION OF RESPONDENT ECO MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
MAY BE PIERCED.
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT A[T]TACHING LIABILITY TO RESPONDENT
EMMANUEL C. OÑATE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY WITH RESPONDENT ECO MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION FOR THE PRINCIPAL SUM OF P26 M PLUS INTEREST THEREON.
C
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THE
SAME NOT BEING SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.6
The primary issues for resolution here are (1) whether or not the corporate veil of ECO Management Corporation should
be pierced; and (2) whether or not Emmanuel C. Oñate should be held jointly and severally liable with ECO Management
Corporation for the loans incurred from Land Bank.
Petitioner contends that the personalities of Emmanuel Oñate and of ECO Management Corporation should be treated as
one, for the particular purpose of holding respondent Oñate liable for the loans incurred by corporate respondent ECO
from Land Bank. According to petitioner, the said corporation was formed ostensibly to allow Oñate to acquire loans from
Land Bank which he used for his personal advantage.
Petitioner submits the following arguments to support its stand: (1) Respondent Oñate owns the majority of the interest
holdings in respondent corporation, specifically during the crucial time when appellees applied for and obtained the loan
from LANDBANK, sometime in September to November, 1980. (2) The acronym ECO stands for the initials of
Emmanuel C. Oñate, which is the logical, sensible and concrete explanation for the name ECO, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary. (3) Respondent Oñate has always referred to himself as the debtor, not merely as an officer or a
representative of respondent corporation. (4) Respondent Oñate personally paid P1 Million taken from trust accounts in
his name. (5) Respondent Oñate made a personal offering to pay his personal obligation. (6) Respondent Oñate controlled
respondent corporation by simultaneously holding two (2) corporate positions, viz., as Chairman and as treasurer,
beginning from the time of respondent corporation’s incorporation and continuously thereafter without benefit of election.
(7) Respondent corporation had not held any meeting of the stockholders or of the Board of Directors, as shown by the
fact that no proceeding of such corporate activities was filed with or borne by the record of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The only corporate records respondent corporation filed with the SEC were the following: Articles of
Incorporation, Treasurer’s Affidavit, Undertaking to Change Corporate Name, Statement of Assets and Liabilities.7
Private respondents, in turn, contend that Oñate’s only participation in the transaction between petitioner and respondent
ECO was his execution of the loan agreements and promissory notes as Chairman of the corporation’s Board of Directors.
There was nothing in the loan agreement nor in the promissory notes which would indicate that Oñate was binding
himself jointly and severally with ECO. Respondents likewise deny that ECO stands for Emmanuel C. Oñate.
Respondents also note that Oñate is no longer a majority stockholder of ECO and that the payment by a third person of the
debt of another is allowed under the Civil Code. They also alleged that there was no fraud and/or bad faith in the
transactions between them and Land Bank. Hence, private respondents conclude, there is no legal ground to pierce the veil
of respondent corporation’s personality.8
At the outset, we find the matters raised by petitioner in his argumentation are mainly questions of fact which are not
proper in a petition of this nature.9 Petitioner is basically questioning the evaluation made by the Court of Appeals of the
evidence submitted at the trial. The Court of Appeals had found that petitioner’s evidence was not sufficient to justify the
piercing of ECO’s corporate personality.10 Petitioner contended otherwise. It is basic that where what is being questioned
is the sufficiency of evidence, it is a question of fact.11 Nevertheless, even if we regard these matters as tendering an issue
of law, we still find no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
A corporation, upon coming into existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those persons
composing it as well as from any other legal entity to which it may be related. 12 By this attribute, a stockholder may not,
generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of the said corporation, and vice versa. 13 This separate and distinct
personality is, however, merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote the ends of justice.14 For this
reason, it may not be used or invoked for ends subversive to the policy and purpose behind its creation 15 or which could
not have been intended by law to which it owes its being.16 This is particularly true when the fiction is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime,17 confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues,18 perpetrate
deception or otherwise circumvent the law.19 This is likewise true where the corporate entity is being used as an alter ego,
adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of another corporate entity. 20 In all these cases, the
notion of corporate entity will be pierced or disregarded with reference to the particular transaction involved. 21
The burden is on petitioner to prove that the corporation and its stockholders are, in fact, using the personality of the
corporation as a means to perpetrate fraud and/or escape a liability and responsibility demanded by law. In order to
disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly
established.22 In the absence of any malice or bad faith, a stockholder or an officer of a corporation cannot be made
personally liable for corporate liabilities.23
The mere fact that Oñate owned the majority of the shares of ECO is not a ground to conclude that Oñate and ECO is one
and the same. Mere ownership by a single stockholder of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not by
itself sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.24 Neither is the fact that the name
“ECO” represents the first three letters of Oñate’s name sufficient reason to pierce the veil. Even if it did, it does not mean
that the said corporation is merely a dummy of Oñate. A corporation may assume any name provided it is lawful. There is
nothing illegal in a corporation acquiring the name or as in this case, the initials of one of its shareholders.
That respondent corporation in this case was being used as a mere alter ego of Oñate to obtain the loans had not been
shown. Bad faith or fraud on the part of ECO and Oñate was not also shown. As the Court of Appeals observed, if
shareholders of ECO meant to defraud petitioner, then they could have just easily absconded instead of going out of their
way to propose “Plans of Payment.”25 Likewise, Oñate volunteered to pay a portion of the corporation’s debt.26 This offer
demonstrated good faith on his part to ease the debt of the corporation of which he was a part. It is understandable that a
shareholder would want to help his corporation and in the process, assure that his stakes in the said corporation are
secured. In this case, it was established that the P1 Million did not come solely from Oñate. It was taken from a trust
account which was owned by Oñate and other investors.27 It was likewise proved that the P1 Million was a loan granted
by Oñate and his co-depositors to alleviate the plight of ECO.28 This circumstance should not be construed as an
admission that he was really the debtor and not ECO.
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the evidence presented by the petitioner does not suffice to
hold respondent Oñate personally liable for the debt of co-respondent ECO. No reversible error could be attributed to
respondent court’s decision and resolution which petitioner assails.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 43239 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

E.)Extrinsic Aids
CASE #1
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
Facts:

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup d’état was crushed,
DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he should not be
suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several
municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the
planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of
the rebel soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation.
Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Vice-
Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order
with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the
power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local governmentofficial under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg.
337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove
petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty
 committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of
evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of
Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been removed from office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet
attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the
resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case moot and
academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.

Held:

1. Yes. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending moot
and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among
the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a publicofficial cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds
no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials isanchored on both the Constitution and a
statutory grant from the legislativebranch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987
Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the
power of general supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head
are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337
was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to
the legislature the power and authority to enact a local government code, which provides for the manner of removal of
local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had the occasion to state that
B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local
Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is
found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof required is
only substantial evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992)

Case#2
Bonifacio vs. Dizon
The issue raised in the instant petition for certiorari certified to us by the Court of Appeals in its resolution 1 dated
November 28, 1986 in CA-G.R. SP No. 10033 as involving a pure question of law is phrased by petitioners, thus:
WHETHER OR NOT, THE FAVORABLE JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY THE DECEDENT IS
INHERITED BY THE COMPULSORY HEIRS, THEREBY VESTING TO THE LATTER, ALL THE
RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THE JUDGMENT TO (sic) THE DECEDENT. 2
The favorable judgment adverted to by petitioners traces its origin to the complaint filed on July 1, 1968 by Olimpio
Bonifacio before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch I-A of Baliwag, Bulacan, seeking
the ejectment of private respondent Pastora San Miguel from Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig,
Marilao, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27298. The ground relied upon therefor was personal
cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code (CAR Case No.
2160-B'68).
After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered therein on September 18, 1970 by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio:
1. Granting authority to plaintiff OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject defendant PASTORA SAN MIGUEL
from the landholding in question situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares,
more or less, and consequently, ordering said defendant to vacate the same landholding and deliver
possession thereof to said plaintiff for the latter's personal cultivation, subject to the provisions of Section
25 of R.A. 3844; and
 2. Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims of the parties. 3
On appeal by private respondent Pastora San Miguel, the Court of Appeals 4 modified said judgment with respect to her
counterclaim by ordering Olimpio Bonifacio to pay her the amount of P 1,376.00. The judgment was affirmed in all other
respects. 5
Still dissatisfied, private respondent Pastora San Miguel sought relief from this Court. During the pendency of her
petition, on August 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died. As no notice of such death was given to the Court, no order for the
substitution of his heirs was made. On July 31, 1985, the Court En Banc resolved to deny private respondent's petition for
lack of merit and to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 6
Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and Gabriel, Ponciano, Tiburcio, Beatriz, Generosa,
Silveria, Leonardo, Felomena, Encarnacion and Leonila all surnamed Bonifacio, as children and heirs of Olimpio
Bonifacio, moved for the execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 before the respondent Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued on February 20, 1986 and on March 6, 1986, the Deputy Sheriff
submitted his Report (Partial Delivery of Possession), stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied by the
house of Pastora San Miguel which the latter refused to vacate, he had delivered the land subject matter of the action to
Rosalina Bonifacio as surviving wife of Olimpio Bonifacio.
Thereafter, private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution. This was opposed by petitioners
who in turn sought the issuance of a writ of demolition and an order declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt of court for
allegedly re-entering the subject land.
After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution on July 15, 1986, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the implementation of the writ of execution of the Decision dated September 18, 1970
made by the Sheriff of this Court, per directive contained in our Order of February 18, 1986, is hereby
declared null and void; the "Motion for Demolition" filed by plaintiff is hereby denied; and, the "Petition
for Contempt" likewise denied.
SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioners assail this resolution in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, which as stated earlier, was
certified to us pursuant to Section 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in relation to Section 5 (2) [e], Art. X of the 1973
Constitution and Rule 50, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in ruling
that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 can no longer be executed as said action is purely personal in character and
therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio's death, be inherited by his heirs. They assert that CAR Case No. 2160-B'68,
being an ejectment case and not one of those specifically provided by law to be purely personal, survives the death of a
party. Furthermore, as under Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the Rules of Court, a judgment is binding not only upon the parties
but also on their successors-in-interest, petitioners are entitled to enforce the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68.
Private respondent, on the other hand, places stress on the fact that the action under consideration is not an ordinary
ejectment case but an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. She theorizes that the right being asserted in
the action is personal to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily died with him. She further contends that the non-
substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered the proceedings taken after his death null and void. She also
points to certain supervening events which allegedly prohibit execution of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68, to
wit: the amendment of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 by R.A. No. 6389 and 2) the promulgation of P.D. No. 27.
Private respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 as more than an ordinary ejectment case. It is,
indeed, an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee, which in the light of the public policy involved, is
more closely and strictly regulated by the State. This factor, however, does not operate to bar the application to the instant
case of the general rule that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. 8
Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for ejectment under Section 36 (1) of
R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the impression that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was
allowed only if and when the landowner-lessor and no other opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving use to a
bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal
right alone. A reading of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 however readily demonstrates the fallacy of this interpretation. Said
section provides:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final
and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school
site or other useful non-agricultural purposes . . . .
Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to
cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. In so providing, the law clearly did
not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such right
to the members of his immediate family. Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right
exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation
likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family members.
The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-
lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm
household. In this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his
immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in "personal cultivation."
Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a
restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to
the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family members.
Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family members of the deceased
landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 not being a purely
personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-
interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68.
Rules of procedure make it the duty of the attorney to inform the court promptly of his client's death, incapacity or
incompetency during the pendency of the action and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representative. 9 In case of a party's death, the court, if the action survives, shall then order upon
proper notice the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased within a period of
30 days or within such time as may be granted. 10
In the case at bar, Olimpio Bonifacio's death during the pendency of private respondent's petition was not communicated
to the Court. As ruled by this Court in the case of Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, supra, involving substantially the same facts
and issue:
. . . The petitioners challenge the proceeding in the Court of Appeals after the death of the plaintiff-
appellant Adela Salindon. They are of the opinion that since there was no legal representative substituted
for Salindon after her death, the appellate court lost its jurisdiction over the case and consequently, the
proceedings in the said court are null and void. This argument is without merit.
There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. The supervening death of
plaintiff-appellant Salindon did not extinguish her civil personality (Republic v. Bagtas 6 SCRA 242;
Vda. de Haberes v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, Salindon's counsel after her death on December 11, 1976 failed to inform the court of
Salindon's death. The appellate court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of
Salindon without the proper manifestation from Salindon's counsel. In such a case and considering that
the supervening death of appellant did not extinguish her civil personality, the appellate court was well
within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. There is no showing that the appellate court's
proceedings in the case were tainted with irregularities.
Private respondent's challenge against the proceedings held after Olimpio Bonifacio's death cannot therefore be heeded.
Neither can private respondent derive comfort from the amendment of Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 by Section 7 of R.A.
No. 6389 11 and the promulgation of P.D. No. 27. 12 In Nilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34586, April 2, 1984,128
SCRA 519, we categorically ruled that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under the
general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein.
There being no cogent reason to nullify the implementation of the writ of execution in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68,
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in having done so. The writ prayed for should issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution dated July 15, 1986 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
immediate execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 is ordered. This decision is immediately executory. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

F.) Presumptions in Aid of Construction

Case#1
De Guia vs. Guingona --- not found

Case #2
ARROYO vs. De Venecia
Facts: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called ”sin
taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral
committee after submitting its report to the House, the chairman of the committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship
speech and was interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was defeated and
put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and the bill was approved on its third reading.
Issue: Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of quorum?
Decision: Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department of the Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find their
remedy in their own department.
G.) Latin Maxims
Case #1
Remo vs. Sec. Foreign Affairs

Case Doctrines:

● A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but
only her civil status.

● Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her
maiden name, except in cases of: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.

● The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s constitutional right to
travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel
documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is
merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.

Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine passport,
which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and
“Remo” as her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and
surname in the replacement passport. When her request was denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to
use her husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been
used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of
marriage, divorce, and death of the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary’s ruling. The CA also affirmed the
ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of
1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using
her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court [311 Phil. 696,
707 (1995)]

Issues:

Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her
maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

Held:

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists.

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court
(supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but
only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle.

RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden
name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married
woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her
husband’s surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her
maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the
submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden
name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of
her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce,
(3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden
name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must
be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Yasin case not in point

Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is
already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume
one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of
one’s marriage.

Special law prevails over general law

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically
dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on
the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.

Implied repeals are disfavored

Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently
conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For
a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to
be irreconcilable with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application. If her present request would
be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such
unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents,
cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s constitutional right to
travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel
documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is
merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid. (Remo vs Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March
5, 2010).

Case #2
Ysidoro vs. People of the Phils.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering from malnutrition
to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.
The Facts and the Case
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public propertry (technical malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code.1
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core
Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to
rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the
beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This worried Lolita
Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction
materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in
charge of the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio
told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already
distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After
explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two
boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2 Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the
accounting department regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal
Accountant’s Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the
release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the
matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per auditing rules.
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint
against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP goods were
intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children. She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding
Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro
committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the poor of the
municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good
faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro
pointed out that the COA Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found
nothing irregular in its transactions.
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical malversation. But,
since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum
misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it
has been appropriated by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion for
reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.
The Questions Presented
In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he committed technical malversation. He particularly
raises the following questions:
1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different from their
originally intended purpose;
2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that could be used to augment
the other authorized expenditures of the municipality;
3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be taken against him; and
4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
The Court’s Rulings
One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code4 has three elements:
a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to
some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for
which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.5 Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the
offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries
were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133
appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.6 This appropriation was based on the executive budget7 which allocated
P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services8 which
covers the CSAP housing projects.9 The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate
separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFP’s needs,
observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target clientele of the
SFP according to its manual10 are: 1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to 72
months; and 2) the families of six members whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and below.11 This rule provides
assurance that the SFP would cater only to the malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the government’s
limited resources.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those providing free labor for the
rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction
materials appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the
food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that, therefore, the same could
already be diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People12 which states that funds classified as
savings are not considered appropriated by law or ordinance and can be used for other public purposes. The Court cannot
accept Ysidoro’s argument.
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran throughout the year.
Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished its project, leaving funds or goods that it
no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had already distributed the food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the
second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom constituted unneeded savings. Since
the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject
goods were no longer needed for the remainder of the year was quite premature.
In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly apply funds, already
appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose. Thus:
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be available exclusively for the specific purpose for
which they have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations from one item
to another. However, the local chief executive or the presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be
authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget for their respective offices from savings in other items
within the same expense class of their respective appropriations.
The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law gives the Sanggunian the
power to determine whether savings have accrued and to authorize the augmentation of other items on the budget with
those savings.
Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of the subject goods, such
finding should be respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to present the municipal auditor at the trial,
the presumption is that his testimony would have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes against the rule
on the presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor testified, his testimony would
have been adverse to the mayor. The municipal auditor’s view regarding the transaction is not conclusive to the case and
will not necessarily negate the mayor’s liability if it happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore, be
drawn into speculations regarding what the municipal auditor would have said had he appeared and testified.
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries
came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting department if the goods could
be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the
crime.1âwphi1
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property
earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita,
meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as defined
by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.14
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical
malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228
dated February 8, 2010.

H.) Stare Decisis

Case #1
Pesca vs. Pesca
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo Pesca, a seaman,got married March 1975 after a whirlwind
courtship. Their union begot 4 children. However, in1988, petitioner noticed that her husband was emotionally immature
and irresponsible.Respondent became violent. On March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed acomplaint
and respondent was convicted by the MTC of Caloocan for slight physical injuries andsentenced to 11 days of
imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking
psychological incapacity. On November 1995, RTC decided infavour of the petitioner. CA reversed the decision of the
trial court, stating that petitioner hadfailed to establish that (1) respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would
cause him tobe incognitive of the basic marital covenant as provided in Article 68 of the Family Code (2) thatincapacity
is grave, (3) preceded the marriage and (4) is incurable (5) that such incapacity ispsychological (6) that the root cause has
been identified medically/clinically (7) that it has beenproven by an expert (8) that such incapacity is permanent and
incurable in nature. Petitioner fileda Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner argued that the doctrine enunciated in
Santos v. CA(promulgated on January 1995), as well as the guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina(February
1997) should have no retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the applicationof the Santos and Molina dicta
should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial courtfor further proceedings and not its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and Molina cases apply tothe case at bar
RULING:
The Court held that the “doctrine of stare decisis” ordained in Article 8 of the CivilCode, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of thelegal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the legal maxim –
“legis interpretado legis vimobtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneouslegislative intent of
the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute apart of that law as of the date the statute was
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the Courtfinds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to beapplied prospectively in favour of the parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
actedin good faith in accordance therewith (“lex prospicit, non respicit”). Petitioner utterly failed, both inher allegations
and in her evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of therespondent.
HELD:
Petition is DENIED.

Case #2
Delta Motors Corp. Vs. CA
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 dated 5 January 1995[2] and 14 July 1995.[3] The former denied the
Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner Delta Motors Corporation (hereinafter DELTA), while the latter amended the earlier
Resolution.
The pleadings and annexes in the record of CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 disclose the following material operative facts:
Private respondent State Investment House, Inc. (hereinafter, SIHI) brought an action for a sum of money against DELTA
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch VI. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-23019. DELTA
was declared in default, and on 5 December 1984, the RTC, per Judge Ernesto Tengco, rendered a decision[4] the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay unto
plaintiff the amount of P20,061,898.97 as its total outstanding obligation and to pay 25% of the total obligation as and for
attorney's fees, plus cost of suit.
The decision could not be served on DELTA, either personally or by registered mail, due to its earlier
dissolution. However, Delta had been taken over by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the meantime. This
notwithstanding, SIHI moved, on 4 November 1986, for service of the decision by way of publication, which the trial
court allowed in its order of 6 December 1986. The decision was published in the Thunderer, a weekly newspaper
published in Manila. After publication, SIHI moved for execution of the judgment, which the trial court granted in its
order of 11 March 1987 on the ground that no appeal had been taken by DELTA despite publication of the decision. The
writ of execution was issued and pursuant thereto certain properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied
upon and sold. The sheriff likewise levied on some other properties of DELTA.
DELTA then commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 23068, wherein DELTA insisted that: (a) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant (DELTA) since there was no valid/proper service of summons, thus rendering the decision null and void; and
(b) the void decision never became final and executory.
In its decision of 22 January 1991[5] the Court of Appeals ruled against DELTA on the first ground, but found that the
record before it "is bereft of any showing that a copy of the assailed judgment had been properly served on P.N.B. which
assumed DELTA's operation upon the latter's dissolution." Accordingly the Court of Appeals ruled that:
[T]he [decision] did not become executory (Vda. de Espiritu v. CFI, L-30486, Oct. 31, 1972; Tuazon v. Molina,
L-55697, Feb. 26, 1981).
It further opined that service by publication did not cure the fatal defect and thus decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, while the assailed decision was validly rendered by the respondent court, nonetheless it has not
attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner DELTA, which may appeal therefore within the
reglementary period.[6]
In a motion for reconsideration, DELTA insisted that there was no valid service of summons and the decision of the
RTC was not in accordance with the Rules, hence, void.[7] SIHI also filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that
DELTA was not dissolved, and even if it were, its corporate personality to receive service of processes subsisted;
moreover, its right to appeal had been lost.[8] These motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 27
May 1991.[9] Unsatisfied, DELTA filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 100366) which was
denied in the resolution of 16 September 1991 for non-compliance with Circular No. 1-88. A motion for reconsideration
was denied in the resolution of 9 October 1991, a copy of which was received by DELTA on 31 October 1991.[10]
On 12 November 1991, DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal[11] with the RTC in Civil Case No. 84-23019, indicating
therein that it was appealing from the 5 December 1984 decision, and prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that this Notice of Appeal be noted and
the records of this case be elevated to the Court of Appeals.
SIHI filed on 2 December 1991 a motion to dismiss DELTA's appeal[12] on the ground that it was filed out of time,
since DELTA obtained a certified true copy of the decision from the RTC on 21 September 1990, hence it had only fifteen
days therefrom within which to appeal from the decision. Despite DELTA's opposition,[13] the trial court dismissed the
Notice of Appeal.[14] DELTA moved to reconsider,[15] which SIHI opposed.[16] In its order[17] of 14 September 1992 the
trial court denied Deltas motion.
DELTA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO. 29147.[18] In its petition, Delta prayed for the: (a) annulment of the order of the trial
court dated 3 June 1992 dismissing the Notice of Appeal dated 6 November 1991; (b) annulment of the order of the trial
court dated 14 September 1992 denying the motion for reconsideration of the former; and (c) elevation of the original
records of Civil Case No. 84-23019 to the Court of Appeals.
On 30 October 1992 the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 a restraining order enjoining respondents
and any and all other persons acting on their behalf "from enforcing or directing the enforcement of the Decision, subject
of the petition."[19] Thereafter, in its resolution promulgated on 22 December 1992,[20] the Court of Appeals gave due
course to the petition in said case, considered the comments of private respondents therein as its answer and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
On 17 June 1993 the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision[21] in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the dispositive portion
providing:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the respondent court dated June 3, 1992, dismissing the notice of appeal dated
November 6, 1991; and the order dated September 14, 1992 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration filed
by the petitioner, through counsel, are hereby SET ASIDE; and respondent court hereby ordered to ELEVATE the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals, on appeal.
On 18 January 1993, the RTC elevated the record of Civil Case No. 84-23019 to the Court of Appeals.
SIHI appealed to this Court from the decision by way of a petition for review. [22] It contended that DELTA had lost
the right to appeal in view of the lapse of more than 15 days from DELTAs receipt of a certified true copy of the RTC
decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019. This petition for review was docketed as G.R. No. 110677.[23]
While SIHI's petition in G.R. No. 110677 was pending before this Court, DELTA filed on 14 February 1994, in CA
G.R. SP No. 29147 of the Court of Appeals, an Omnibus Motion[24] to:
1) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY FORCE AND EFFECT THE
ORDER OF RESPONDENT COURT DATED MARCH 11, 1987 ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
WRIT OF EXECUTION;
2) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY FORCE AND EFFECT THE WRIT
OF EXECUTION ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE ORDER DATED MARCH 11, 1987;
3) ALL OTHER PROCEEDINGS HELD, CONDUCTED AND EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT SHERIFF
IMPLEMENTING THE AFORESAID WRIT OF EXECUTION.
SIHI opposed the motion[25] on grounds that: a) there was a pending appeal by certiorari with this Court, thus the
Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain the Omnibus Motion; b) the Omnibus Motion was barred by res
judicata; and c) the filing of the Omnibus Motion was a clear act of forum-shopping and should then be denied outright.
In its resolution of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals merely noted the Omnibus Motion and stated:
 It appearing that there is a pending petition for review with the Supreme Court of this Court's Decision dated
June 17, 1993, it would be improper for this Court to act on the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner Delta Motor
Corporation x x x.[26]
On 18 July 1994 this Courts Second Division issued a resolution [27] in G.R. No. 110677 denying the petition therein
for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in the questioned judgment. SIHI's
motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution of this Court of 21 September 1994.[28]
On 26 October 1994 DELTA filed a manifestation and motion[29] to resolve its Omnibus Motion of February 10,
1994.
In its resolution of 5 January 1995,[30] the Court of Appeals denied DELTA's Omnibus Motion, holding:
[T]he matters prayed for in the Omnibus Motion of petitioner Delta Motor Corporation dated February 10, 1994
and abovequoted are matters which were not raised as issues by petitioner in the instant petition and, therefore,
not within the jurisdiction and power of this Court in the instant petition to decide.[31]
On 27 January 1995 DELTA filed a motion for reconsideration and/or clarification [32] wherein it alleged that: (a)
while it was true that the matters prayed for in the Omnibus Motion of petitioner were not raised in the instant petition,
they were, nevertheless, included in the general prayer in the petition for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable
in the premises; (b) it could not file the Omnibus Motion with the RTC since the records of Civil Case No. 84-23019 had
already been elevated to the Court of Appeals and upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court lost jurisdiction over
the case; and (c) the matters raised in the Omnibus Motion were incidental to and included in the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, on 2 February 1995, SIHI filed a motion for clarification [33] wherein it asked for the deletion, for
being mere obiter dictum, the following paragraph in the Resolution of 5 January 1995, to wit:
While it is true that as a necessary consequence the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 22, 1991
ruling that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 "has not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof
on petitioner Delta, which may appeal therefrom within the reglementary period", all proceedings and/or orders
arising from the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 are null and void x x x .
SIHI argued that this paragraph was not necessary to the decision of the case before it[34] and cannot be considered
binding for the purpose of establishing precedent; [35] likewise, the Resolution itself did not decide the incident on its
merits or consider and dispose of the issues, nor determine the respective rights of the parties concerned.
In its resolution of 14 July 1995,[36] the Court of Appeals granted SIHI's motion for clarification and denied DELTA's
motion for reconsideration. As to the latter, it ruled that:
[P]etitioner DELTA is not without remedy, especially considering the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the first
petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 23068) which ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, while the assailed decision was validly rendered by the respondent court, nonetheless
it has not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner DELTA, which may appeal
therefrom within the reglementary period."
Clearly, the only issue in this petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 29147) is as to the validity of the questioned orders of
respondent court dated June 3, 1992 (dismissing the notice of appeal dated November 6, 1991) and the Order
dated September 14, 1992 of the same court (denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner
through counsel).[37]
It then decreed to amend its Resolution of 5 January 1995 by deleting the assailed paragraph.
DELTA then filed the instant petition, insisting that the matters raised in the Omnibus Motion were incidental to and
included in the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; hence, it had jurisdiction to rule on said motion. As regards
the grant of SIHI's motion to strike out a paragraph in the resolution of 5 January 1995 for being obiter dictum, DELTA
submitted that the latter contained a finding or affirmation of fact, thus could not have constituted obiter dictum.
After SIHI filed its comment, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. DELTA and SIHI did so on 16 April 1996 and on 13 May 1996, respectively.
After a painstaking review of the record in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we are more than convinced that respondent
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in denying DELTAs Omnibus Motion. The decision of the Court of
Appeals of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 had long become final insofar as DELTA was concerned, and it very
well knew that the only issues raised therein concerned the trial courts orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. As a
matter of fact, at the time Delta filed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the orders sought to be declared null and void
in the Omnibus Motion had already been issued, they having been so issued at the commencement of CA-G.R. SP No.
23068. In short, if DELTA intended such orders to be challenged in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, it could have explicitly
alleged them as sources of additional causes of action and prayed for the corresponding affirmative relief therefrom, and if
this course of action initially proved unavailing then DELTA could and should have moved for reconsideration on that
aspect. After the finality of the decision in said case, any attempt to introduce or revive the issue had become procedurally
impermissible. Plainly, the issues raised in the Omnibus Motion could have been allowed during the pendency of said
case by way of amendments to the petition.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner's Omnibus Motion in keeping with
jurisprudence[38] concerning Section 7 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court on the Procedure in the Court of Appeals, which
mandates that:
Sec. 7. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter
will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at
its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors.
Clearly then, the Court of Appeals could only consider errors raised by petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, which
were limited to the trial court's orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. These were the only errors Delta argued
extensively in its brief. To allow DELTA's Omnibus Motion which it filed more than eight months from promulgation of
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, or long after finality of said case, would result in abandonment of sound judicial
process.
In light of the dispositive portions of the Court of Appeals decisions of 22 January 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23068,
and of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we cannot agree with SIHI that DELTA is barred by res judicata. This
conclusion is further fortified by the unequivocal statements of the Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 14 July
1995 that:
[P]etitioner DELTA is not without remedy, especially considering the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the first
petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 23068) ...
xxx
Clearly, the only issue in this petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 29147) is as to the validity of the questioned orders of
respondent court dated June 3, 1992 (dismissing the notice of appeal dated November 6, 1991) and the Order
dated September 14, 1992 of the same court (denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner
through counsel).
The Court of Appeals likewise did not commit reversible error in deleting the phrase SIHI protested as obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not
necessary to the decision of the case before it.[39] It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision
upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a
point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument. Such are not binding as precedent.[40]
The assailed phrase was indeed obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter not raised by petitioner expressly in its
petition assailing the dismissal of its notice of appeal. It was not a prerequisite in disposing of the aforementioned issue.
The body of the resolution did not contain any discussion on such matter nor mention any principle of law to support such
statement.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the challenged resolutions of 5 January 1995 and 14 July
1995 in C.A. G.R.-SP. NO. 29147 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

I.) AIDS to Construction

Case#1
Ebarle vs. Sucaldito
FACTS
The petitioner, Bienvenido Ebarle, is the then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for election for
the same position. He has been charged for the violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
RA No. 3019, and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code by the herein respondents. The petitioner claims on his
defense that the respondents failed to comply with the provisions of EO N.O. 264, “Outlining the Procedure by Which
Complainants Charging Government Officials and Employees with Commission of Irregularities Should Be Guided”,
prior to their criminal recourses.
ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of EO No. 264 are applicable to the respondents.
HELD
No, EO No. 264 has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The title speaks of “commission of
irregularities”. There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal offenses, that is to say, crimes. Even though
crimes amount to irregularities, the aforesaid Order could have very well referred to the more specific term, had it
intended to make itself applicable thereto.

Case #2
City of Baguio Vs Marcos
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings.
In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared
public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his
predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were
illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita
Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period
provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing
on the issue.

Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was
ENACTED on June 20, 1953

Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings

Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain
Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED
within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such parcels of land,
on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of
judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval of this act.” If the title is to be
followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If
Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition
would be invalid.

StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be
supplied or remedied by its title.

J.) Legislature cannot overrule Judicial Construction

Case #1
Endencia vs. David
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A case was filed.
However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from
paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from
the compensation received by judicial officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is considered as
against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished
during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the
republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec
9 has provided.
Facts
Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s andJustice
Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. 13. No salarywherever received by any
public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exemptfrom the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensationfixed by the Constitution or by law.” According to the brief of
the Solicitor General on behalf of appellantCollector of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
supra, was not receivedfavorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic
Act No.590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussionin the
Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
Issue(s)
Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590
constitutional?
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather exhaustive and wellconsidered
decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto vs.Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge
Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income taxes from the salariesof Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia
was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and soo r d e r e d t h e r e f u n d o f s a i d t a x e s . O n
t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r S e c t i o n 1 3 o f R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 5 9 0 i s constitutional, the court believes
that this is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of themeaning of the phrase “which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found insection 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative fiatas enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590,
Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicialofficer is not a decrease of compensation. This act of interpreting
the Constitution or any part thereof bythe Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined
and established province and jurisdiction of theJudiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature
cannot pass any declaratory act, or actdeclaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding
weight with the courts. Alegislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere;otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The court
reiterates thedoctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income taxon
the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Further,
thecourt holds that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within
theexclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislaturemay not
legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby
tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especiallywhen the interpretation sought
and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretationalready given in a case by the highest
court of the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed,that Section 13, Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides
that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer
shall b e c o n s i d e r e d “ n o t t o b e a d i m i n u t i o n o f h i s c o m p e n s a t i o n f i x e d b y t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n o r b y l a w ” , constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, the
court is of theopinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental principles
underlyingthe separation of powers. In the light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries, dissentingopinion
of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries are subjected to the Income TaxLaw prevailing.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provisionin question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to
make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. Theascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional constructionthat the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect.Hence, court affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on
the issue of imposing income tax on judges’salaries.

Case #2
Quimpo vs. Mendoza
FACTS
The case is about the basis for computing the penalty for real estate taxes. Quimpo is the owner of a parcel of land in City
of Cagayan De Oro (CDO) City valued at 20,000 P in 1969. The realty tax for this property is 400.00 pesos
annually payable in 4 equal instalments. He paid on time for the first 3 installments amounting to 300.00 but
he defaulted with the last payment and it was only on the 27th of August the next year that he settled the last instalment.
He tried paying to the City Treasurer of CDO for 124.00 inclusive of the penalty however the Treasurer declined payment
saying that he ought to pay 196.00 (100 pesos for the unpaid tax and 96 pesos representing the penalty). As such, Quimpo
filed action for mandamus with damages against the City Treasurer and consigned 124.00 pesos before the Court of First
Instance. He asserts that he suffered mental anguish caused by the Treasurerthereby praying for 12,000 Peso worth of
Moral, Actual and Exemplary damages.
ISSUE/S & HELD
1. The basis of computing the penalty of unpaid instalment. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner and held that the
provision of the Charter of CDO being invoked by the City Treasurer is not applicable in the case at bar. It was repealed
impliedly by RA 5447. Since petitioner is allowed by law to pay his real estate tax in four equal instalments due
and payable on four specified due dates and having paid the three instalments religiously and faithfully, it
is manifestinjustice, sheer arbitrariness and abuse of power to penalize him for doing so when he fails to pay the fourth
and last instalment. Accordingly, petitioner’s total liability as of August 27 when he tendered payment to City Treasurer is
computed as follows: 100.00 (the fourth and last instalment) plus 16.00 penalty (8 months of delinquency from January to
August, at two percentum on the amount of the delinquent tax of (100.00) which totals 116.00 pesos.
2. Whether damages can be obtained by Quimpo against the City Treasurer. NO. The city treasurer’s actuations and
decisions were not tainted with bad faith. As held in one case “ an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the
provisions of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an
award of damages.

Quimpo v. Mendoza
· Where a statute which requires that the annual realty tax on lands or buildings be paid on or before the
specified date, subject to penalty of a percentage of the whole amount of tax in case of delayed payment, is amended by
authorizing payment of the tax in four equal installments to become due on or before specified dates.
· The penalty provision of the earlier statute is modified by implication that the penalty for late payment of an
installment under the later law will be collected and computed only on the installment that became due and unpaid, and
not on the whole amount of annual tax as provided in the old statute.
· Legislative intent to change the basis is clear when the later law allowed payment in four installments.