Farm Worker Movement (Jenkins, Perrow)

Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972)
Author(s): J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Apr., 1977), pp. 249-268
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094604
Accessed: 25-01-2016 12:22 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Sage Publications, Inc. and American Sociological Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to American Sociological Review.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 152.15.47.133 on Mon, 25 Jan 2016 12:22:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
INSURGENCY OF THE POWERLESS:
FARM WORKER MOVEMENTS (1946-1972)*
J. CRAIG JENKINS CHARLES PERROW

Center for Policy Research Center for Policy Research
and and
University of Missouri, Columbia State University of New York, Stony Brook
American Sociological Review 1977, Vol. 42 (April):249-268
Drawing on the perspective developed in recent work by Oberschall (1973), Tilly (1975) and
Gamson (1975), we analyze the political process centered around farm worker insurgencies.
Comparing the experience of two challenges, we argue that the factors favored in the classical
social movement literature fail to account for either the rise or outcome of insurgency. Instead,
the important variables pertain to social resources-in our case, sponsorship by established
organizations. Farm workers themselves are powerless; as an excluded group, their demands
tend to be systematically ignored. But powerlessness may be overridden if the national political
elite is neutralized and members of the polity contribute resources and attack insurgent targets.
To test the argument, entries in the New York Times Annual Index are content coded and
statistically analyzed, demonstrating how the political environment surrounding insurgent
efforts alternatively contains them or makes them successful.
From about 1964 until 1972, American Our thesis is that the rise and dramatic
society witnessed an unprecedented success of farm worker insurgents in the
numberof groups acting in insurgentfash- late 1960s best can be explained by
ion. By insurgency we mean organized changes in the political environment the
attempts to bring about structuralchange movement confronted, ratherthan by the
by thrusting new interests into decision- internal characteristics of the movement
making processes. Some of this in- organization and the social base upon
surgency, notably the civil rights and which it drew. The salient environment
peace movements, had begun somewhat consisted of the government, especially
earlier, but after 1963 there were or- the federal government, and a coalition of
ganized attemptsto bringabout structural liberal support organizations. We shall
changes from virtually all sides: ethnic contrast the unsuccessful attempt to or-
minorities (Indians, Mexican-Americans, ganize farmworkersby the National Farm
Puerto Ricans), welfare mothers, women, Labor Union from 1946 to 1952 with the
sexual liberation groups, teachers and strikingly successful one of the United
even some blue-collarworkers.The pres- Farm Workers from 1965 to 1972.
ent study isolates and analyzes in detail The immediate goals of both
one of these insurgentchallenges-that of movements were the same-to secure
farm workers-in an effort to throw light union contracts. They both used the same
on the dynamics that made the 1960s a tactics, namely, mass agriculturalstrikes,
period of dramaticand stormy politics. boycotts aided by organized labor, and
political demands supportedby the liberal
* This is part of a larger study of insurgency in the
community of the day. Both groups en-
1960s directed by Charles Perrow, Center for Policy
countered identical and virtually insur-
Research, Inc., New York, and funded by NIMH, mountableobstacles, namely, a weak bar-
Grant No. 5 ROI MH20006-04 SSR. Field investiga- gainingposition, farmworkerpoverty and
tions by Jenkins were conducted with the aid of a a culture of resignation, high rates of mi-
National Science Foundation Dissertation Grant grancy and weak social cohesion, and a
(Proposal/Grant No. 1SOC 75-08476). We owe
thanks to anonymous ASR readers for their com-
perpetualoversupply of farm labor, insur-
ments on an earlier version and colleagues too ing that growers could break any strike.
numerous to mention. The difference between the two chal-
249
250 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
lenges was the societal response that in- duced by anomie, the central thrustis
surgent demands received. During the consistent. Fluctuations in the level of
first challenge, government policies discontent account for the rise of
strongly favored agribusiness; support movements and major changes in move-
from liberal organizationsand organized ment participation.
labor was weak and vacillating. By the Recent research,though,has cast doubt
time the second challenge was mounted, on the classic "discontent" formulations.
the political environment had changed Disorders do not arise from disorganized
dramatically. Government now was di- anomic masses, but from groupsorganiza-
vided over policies pertaining to farm tionally able to defend and advance their
workers;liberals and organizedlabor had interests (Oberschall, 1973; Tilly et al.,
formed a reform coalition, attacking ag- 1975).As for relative deprivation,Snyder
ribusinessprivileges in public policy. The and Tilly (1972) and Hibbs (1973) have
reform coalition then furnished the re- failed to find it useful in accountingfora
sources to launch the challenge. Once wide varietyof collective disruptions.Nor
underway,the coalition continuedto fend is it clear that we can use the concept
for the insurgents, providing additional without falling into post hoc interpreta-
resources and applying leverage to tions (cf. Wilson, 1973:73-9).'
movement targets. The key changes, In this study, we do not propose to test
then, were in support organization and each of the various "discontent" formula-
governmental actions. To demonstrate tions currently available. A priori, it is
this, we will analyze macro-levelchanges ratherhard to believe that farm workers'
in the activities of these groups as re- discontent was, for example, suddenly
ported in the New York Times Annual greater in 1965, when the Delano grape
Index between 1946 and 1972. strikebegan, than throughoutmuchof the
1950s when there was no movement or
The Classical Model strike activity. Indeed, it seems more
plausibleto assume that farm workerdis-
In taking this position, we are arguing content is relativelyconstant, a productof
that the standard literature on social establishedeconomic relationsratherthan
movements fails to deal adequately with some social dislocation or dysfunction.
either of two central issues-the forma- We do not deny the existence of discon-
tion of insurgent organizations and the tent but we question the usefulness of dis-
outcome of insurgentchallenges. Drawing content formulations in accounting for
on Gusfield's (1968) summarystatement, either the emergence of insurgentorgani-
the classical literature holds in common zation or the level of participationby the
the following line of argument. See also social base. Whatincreases, givingriseto
Turnerand Killian (1957; 1972), Smelser insurgency, is the amount of social re-
(1962), Langand Lang(1961),Kornhauser sources available to unorganizedbut ag-
(1959), Davies (1962; 1969) and Gurr grieved groups, making it possible to
(1970). launch an organized demand for change.
Social movements arise because of As for the outcome of challenges, the
deep and widespread discontent. First, importance of resources is obvious.
there is a social change which makes pre- Though the classical literaturehas rarely
vailing social relationsinappropriate,pro- dealt with the issue directly, there has
ducing a strain between the new and the been an implicit position. The resources
old. Strain then generates discontent mobilizedby movementorganizationsare
within some social grouping. When dis- assumed to derive from the aggrievedso-
content increases rapidly and is widely cial base. The outcome of the challenge,
shared, collective efforts to alleviate dis- then, whether or not one adopts a
content will occur. Though there is dis-
agreementabouthow to formulatethe link I
between strain and discontent, e.g., sub- tiveShifts in perceptions,treatedas centralby rela-
deprivationtheorists, in our view wouldbe sec-
jective gaps between expectations and ondary to the main process-changes in social re-
satisfactions versus emotional anxiety in- sources.
INSURGENCY OF THE POWERLESS 251
"naturalhistory" model of movement de- ful challengedependedupon the interven-
velopment, should depend primarilyupon tion of established liberal organizations
internal considerations, e.g., leadership and the neutralityof political elites.
changes and communication dynamics We can then summarize the classical
among the membership. model as follows. (1) Discontent,tracedto
However, are deprivedgroupslike farm structuraldislocations, accounts for col-
workers able to sustain challenges, espe- lective attemptsto bringabout change. (2)
cially effective ones, on their own? We The resources required to mount collec-
think not. Both of the movements studied tive action and carry it through are
were, from the outset, dependent upon broadly distributed-shared by all size-
external groups for critical organizational able social groupings. (3) The political
resources. Nor, as the history of agricul- system is pluralistic and, therefore, re-
tural strikes amply attests (McWilliams, sponsive to all organized groups with
1939; London and Anderson, 1970; grievances. (4) If insurgents succeed, it is
Taylor, 1975), have farm worker due to efforts on the part of the social
movements proven able to mobilize num- base; if they do not, presumably they
bers sufficient to wring concessions from lacked competent leaders, were unwilling
employers. For a successful outcome, to compromise, or behaved irrationally
movements by the "powerless" require (e.g., used violence or broke laws).
strong and sustained outside support. In contrast, we will argue that (1) dis-
If this line of argument is correct, we content is ever-present for deprived
need to contest a second thesis frequently groups, but (2) collective action is rarelya
found in the classical literature-the as- viable option because of lack of resources
sertion that the Americanpolity operates and the threatof repression. (3) When de-
in a pluralistic fashion (cf. Kornhauser, prived groups do mobilize, it is due to the
1959; Smelser,1962). A pluralisticpolity is interjection of external resources. (4)
structurallyopen to demandsfor change.2 Challenges frequently fail because of the
As Gamson (1968; 1975) has put it, the lack of resources. Success comes when
political system should be structurally there is a combination of sustained out-
"permeable," readily incorporatingnew side supportand disunityand/ortolerance
groups and their interests into the on the part of political elites. The impor-
decision-making process. Once or- tant variables separating movement suc-
ganized, groups redressing widely-shared cess from failure, then, pertainto the way
grievances should be able to secure at the polity respondsto insurgentdemands.
least some part of their programthrough
bargainingand compromise.3Yet our evi- Structural Powerlessness of Farm
dence shows that farm worker challenges Workers
have failed, in part, because of the opposi- The major impedimentto farm worker
tion of public officials, and that a success- unionization has been the oversupply of
farm labor, undercutting all attempted
2 Note also the central role played in pluralistic
harvest strikes. There are few barriersof
interpretationsby the "discontent" hypothesis. As-
habit or skill that restrict the entry of any
sumingthat all groups have ready access to the re- applicantto work in the fields. The result
sources needed to mobilize,Rose (1967:249)argued: is an "unstructured"labor market, offer-
"As soon as a felt need for some social change ing little job stabilityand open to all com-
arises, one or more voluntary associations im- ers (Fisher, 1953).The fields of California
mediately springs up to try to secure the change."
I As the central tenet of pluralist theory, the and Texas are close enough to the
"permeability"argumentcan be foundin almostany poverty-strickenprovinces of Mexico to
presentationof the view. Dahl (1967:250)argues: insure a steady influx of workers, many of
"even minoritiesare providedwith opportunitiesto whom arrive by illegal routes (Frisbee,
veto solutions";Truman's(1951)speculationsabout 1975). Continuous immigrationnot only
"potential groups" and Smelser's (1963:364-79)
recommendationsto elites for channeling "value- underwritesthe oversupply of labor, but
oriented" movements into "norm-oriented"ones complicates mobilization by insuring the
both build on the assumptionof a flexible political existence of cultural cleavages among
system based on a pluralisticsocial structure. workers.
Furthermore,there are reasons to be- Mexican-descent, short-term workers,
lieve that a significantnumberof workers most of whom only recently had migrated
have only a limited economic interest in across the border. Not only were
the gains promised by unionization. The linguistic-cultural cleavages somewhat
majorityof farm workers, both domestic less pronounced, but these new immi-
and alien, are short-termseasonal work- grants were more likely to settle and de-
ers. During the early 1960s, farm em- velop stable community ties than their
ployment in Californiaaveragedless than "Okie" predecessors.
three months of the year (Fuller, 1967). Also, the United Farm Workers pur-
This means that a majorityof workers are sued a mobilization strategy better de-
interestedprimarilyin the "quick dollar." signed than that of the NFLU to sustain
Imposition of union restrictions on easy the participationof farm workers. From
access to jobs would conflict with that its inception, the UFW was an Alinsky-
interest. And for the vast majorityof farm styled community organization. The pri-
workers, regardlessof job commitmentor mary advantagewas that it offered a pro-
citizenship status, income is so low as to gram of services and social activities that
leave little economic reserve for risk- did not depend upon first securinga union
taking. Since a majorportionof the year's contract. Members developed an attach-
income comes during the brief harvest ment to the organizationindependent of
period, workers are reluctantto risk their the immediate gains that might derive
livelihood on a strike at that time. from any strike. Though the National
In additionto these structuralrestraints Farm Labor Union had taken limited
on collective action, there were the very steps in a similar direction, its program
direct restraints of the growers and their remained primarily that of the conven-
politicalallies. The CaliforniaDepartment tional "business" union, promisingwage
of Employmentand the U. S. Department gains and better workingconditionsrather
of Labor have long operated farm place- than social solidarity and community
ment services that furnish workers for benefits.
strike-bound employers. Insurgent ac- But the critical issue is whether differ-
tions that directly threaten growers, like ences in either the structuralposition of
picket lines and mass rallies, consistently farm workers or the mobilizationstrategy
have been the target of official harass- adoptedby the movements affected either
ment. Thoughnever returningto the scale dependent variable. As we shall see, the
of the "local fascism" of the 1930s impetus for both of the challenges came
(McWilliams, 1942; Chambers, 1952), from the interjection, into an otherwise
grower vigilante actions are not uncom- placid situation, of a professionally-
mon. trainedcadre backed by outside sponsors.
Bringing these considerations to bear Farm worker discontent remained unex-
on the comparison of farm worker chal- pressed in any organizedway untiloutside
lenges, there is reason to believe that cir- organizersarrived on the scene.
cumstances were slightly more conducive As for the question of challenge out-
to the mobilization efforts of the UFW. come, despite the UFW's advantages, it
Between 1946 and 1965 farm wage rates experienced no more success in strike ef-
rose slightly and a few public welfare forts than did the NFLU. Where the
benefits were extended, at least within NFLU had to contend with the semi-
California. Presumably, farm workers official use of braceros as strikebreakers,
were slightly more secure economically the UFW had to deal with vastly in-
by the mid-1960s. More significant, creased numbers of illegal aliens and
though, were changes in the social com- short-term workers crossing the picket
position of the farm labor force. During lines. The combinationof structuralcon-
the late 1940s farm workers in California straints and direct controls insured that
were either "dustbowlers" or Mexican neitherunion was able to mobilize a suffi-
braceros (government-importedcontract ciently massive social base to be effective.
workers);by the mid-1960sthe California What separatedthe UFW success from
farm labor force was predominantly the NFLU failure was the societal re-
sponse to the challenges. The NFLU re- example, use it to test hypotheses on the
ceived weak and vacillating sponsorship; internal dynamics of mobilization. For
the UFW's backing was strong and sus- this, we have gone to interviews and pub-
tained. Under the pressure of court in- lished sources. Nor, as Danzger's (1975)
junctions and police harassment, the work has recently indicated, can we view
NFLU boycott collapsed when organized the Times reportageas a complete picture
labor refused to cooperate. By contrast, of all insurgentactivity and environmental
the UFW boycotts became national responses to insurgency. Since it is a na-
"causes," receiving widespread support tional newspaper, the New York Times
from organizedlabor and liberalorganiza- will not provide us with day-to-daycover-
tions; though official harassment re- age, for example, of police repression in
mained, the UFW did not deal with the Delano, California.Nor can we count on
same systematic repressionconfrontedby the Times to reveal the hidden bargains
the NFLU. The success of a "powerless" and machinationsthat mightunderliepub-
challenge depended upon sustained and lic positions and alliances.
widespread outside support coupled with We do not ask it to do so. What we are
the neutrality and/or tolerance from the using the Times for is to construct a sys-
national political elite. tematic, reliable index of the publicly
visible political activities that formed the
Method environment of each challenge. By com-
paringstatistics drawnfrom this data base
To test this argument we need two and relatingthese measuresto differences
bodies of information, one bearing on in challenge outcome, we can see if our
events leading to the initiation of in- environmentalthesis holds up.5
surgency and the other dealing with the To see if the New YorkTimes is a reli-
political environment shaping challenge able source, we have compared the
outcomes. For the first, we have drawnon coverage given by the Times with that of
published accounts of the movements, two other newspapers, the Chicago
filled in and corroboratedby extensive Tribune for a more conservative picture
interviews conductedwith movementpar- and the Los Angeles Times for a more
ticipants and informedobservers. For the proximate source. After comparing the
second, we have turned to newspaper stories on farm labor carried by these
sources to provide a pictureof the societal three papers for one month (selected at
response to the two challengers. By con- the peak of activity for the three periods
tent coding the abstracts of news stories of analysis), we have concluded that the
that dealt with farmlaborissues printedin New YorkTimes is basically a more com-
the New York Times over a twenty- plete version of the same "news." In the
seven-year period (1946-1972), we can month selected from the first period
determine the types of groups concerned (March, 1951), the New YorkTimes cov-
with the question of farm labor, whether ered seventeen events, only one of which
their actions favored the structural was picked up by each of the other pap-
changes advocated by insurgents, the ers; no events in the "test" papers were
types of activities in which they were en- missed by the New York Times. In the
gaged and, finally, the pattern of interac- second period (April, 1958),the New York
tion prevailing between these various Times carried nine events, two of which
groupsduringthe course of the respective the Los Angeles Times covered and none
challenges. This way we have a systema- of which the Tribune covered; again the
tic data base againstwhich to test hypoth- New York Times missed no events cov-
eses bearing on movement-environment ered in the other papers. Only in the third
interaction.4 period (October, 1968)did the New York
As with any data source, there are Times miss an event, one involvinga local
limits to the Times data. We cannot, for
5 Inter-coder reliability was set at 90%; all items
4For a copy of the coding schedule used, contact failing to meet this standard were excluded from the
the first author. analysis.
organization that pressured the Los launched a strike wave in the Central Val-
Angeles City Council to boycott grapes. ley of California that ended with the abor-
This was reported in the Los Angeles tive Los Baflos strike of 1952. The selec-
Times. Of eight events covered by the tion of 1955 as the end point of the period
New York Times, half appeared in the Los was somewhat arbitrary.
Angeles Times and none in the Tribune. In By comparison, the third period,
sum, if you want newspaperreportageon 1965-1972, covers the sustained and suc-
farm labor events, the New YorkTimes is cessful challenge of the United Farm
a more thorough source and reveals no Workers. The 1965 Coachella and Delano
clearly differentbias than the otherpapers strikes announced the UFW challenge; in
duringone period of time, say, the NFLU 1970, after two years of nation-wide
challenge, than another, e.g., the UFW boycott efforts, the UFW brought table-
effort. grape growers to the bargaining table and
Finally, there is the question of whether began institutionalizing changes in the po-
news reportage, regardless of cross- sition of farm workers. (The Teamster
validation with other news sources, is entry in 1973 is not dealt with in this
valid. Danzger (1975) has argued that paper.)
news coverage is affected by editorialpol- During the period intervening between
icy, and that systematic error creeps in the two challenges, 1956-1964, important
because the geographic location of na- changes took place in the political system
tional wire service offices produces un- that set the stage for a successful chal-
even reportage of relevent events. It is lenge. In the absence of a major "push"
importantto note that we code events, not from insurgents,6 issues pertaining to farm
news stories. The prominence given to labor received a different treatment in the
stories by the editors of the New York hands of established liberal organizations
Times is irrelevant,as are the evaluations and government officials. We will argue
of the events by news personnel. Addi- that these years constituted a period of
tionally, our data set should be relatively germination and elite reform that made
immune to the main source of error iden- possible the success of the late 1960s.
tified by Danzger. Both insurgenciescen- From the New York Times Annual In-
tered in the same locale. Assuming that dex, we have coded the types of groups
the corrective mechanisms within the involved, the direction and form of their
news agencies identifiedby Danzgerwere activity and the issues involved. The
operative, time-series data should be less groups are: (1) the farm worker associa-
vulnerable to error than cross-sectional tions and unions that represented farm
data. Also, we should note the limitations worker insurgents; (2) federal, state and
to Danzger's conclusions given his own local governments; (3) the liberal organi-
data base. As Snyder and Kelly (1976) zations (religious, philanthropic, political
have demonstrated, news-based conflict action and "public interest" groups); (4)
data dealing with violence appear quite organized labor; (5) agribusiness associa-
valid; more errorexists in nonviolent pro- tions, corporations and individual farm-
test data (employed in Danzger's test). ers, referred to collectively as the grow-
Extendingthat distinctionto our own data ers. Of these, the growers have the fewest
set, we can place more confidence in our events reported in the Times, probably
measures of "concrete" activities than because fewer of their activities are likely
those for "symbolic" ones. to constitute "notable" events in a jour-
nalistic sense-e.g., securing the services
Basic Variables
6
The Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee
Our analysis centers on the comparison (AFL-CIO) was chartered in 1959, but never posed a
of three time periods. The first, 1946- serious threat to growers (London and Anderson
1955, spans the challenge of the National 1970: 46-78); the National Farm Worker Association
was an independent community organization
FarmLabor Union. Charteredto organize launched by Cesar Chavez in 1962 and entered the
farm workers at the 1946 American Fed- labor question in an offensive way only in 1965
eration of Labor convention, the NFLU (London and Anderson, 1970: 148-53).
of local police, hiring strikebreakers, place between insurgentsand amongvari-

rounding up support among legislators. ous groups in the polity, Pearson
Their views are generally presented quite product-moment correlations are re-
effectively by the Departmentof Agricul- ported. The scores entering the analysis
ture so they need do little public relations are counts of actions taken by different
on their own. groups, on different issues, for conven-
The first step is to break down group tional calendar years. High r's are taken
activity by direction-into actions favora- to indicate that considerableconcomitant
ble, unfavorable,ambiguous, or not rele- activity took place over the time period
vant to the interests of farm workers. between relevantpairs of groups, e.g., in-
(Only government had significant num- surgentsand liberals;low r's, the absence
bers of both favorable and unfavorable of concomitant activity. Bringingthis to
actions. All other groups were either bear on the environmentalthesis, differ-
wholly favorable or unfavorable. Gov- ences in descriptive statistics and r's for
ernment was also the only type with a relevantpairingsof groups will reveal any
large number of "ambiguous" or "not differences that existed in the societal re-
relevant" actions. These are excluded sponse to the challenges.7
from the analysis; they do not depart in
terms of issue or type of action from "di- Period 1: The NFLU Conflict (1946-1955)
rected" actions.) We then can estimate
the balance of favorable/unfavorableac- The first period illustrates in classical
tions in the political system during the terms the obstacles to a sustained and
course of each challenge, and chart the successful farmworkerchallenge. In addi-
fluctuations in favorable and unfavorable tion to the structuralconstraints restrict-
actions by different types of groups (see ing farm worker activity, the political en-
Figures 1 and 2). vironmentconfrontingthe insurgentswas
In addition to group and direction, we unfavorable. Government officials at all
are concerned with the form of action levels and branchescame into the conflict
adopted. We will distinguish between predominantlyon the side of the growers,
' symbolic" and "concrete" actions. despite the mandate of agencies such as
Purely rhetorical acts which attempt to the Departmentof Laboror the Education
shape public opinion, e.g., speeches or and Labor Committees in Congress to
hearings, are "symbolic"; actions that at- protect the interests of deprived groups
tempt to directlyallocate control over ma- like farm workers. Though external sup-
terial resources, e.g., court rulings and port was decisive in launching the chal-
mass protest, fall under the rubric of lenge, it was weak and frequently ill-
''concrete.'" focused, dealing with the consequences
Issue is our final variable:(1) labor sup- rather than the causes of farm worker
ply, which is largely centered around the grievances. When support was with-
importationof Mexican labor under the drawn, the challenge soon collapsed.
bracero and "green card" programsand Charteredat the 1946convention of the
which was the dominantissue duringthe American Federation of Labor, the Na-
NFLU challenge; (2) working and living
conditions of farm workers, which domi- 7 Contrary to most time-series analyses, controls
nated the remaining two periods; (3) for auto-correlation are inappropriate. The correla-
unionization,i.e., the legality of collective tion analysis does not causally relate a dependent
bargaining in agriculture, a question variable (e.g., level of insurgent activity) to a set of
independent variables (e.g., level of liberal activity).
which first appeared in significant mea- Instead, it is designed to reveal whether significant
sure only duringthe UFW challenge. differences exist between time periods in
Two types of statistics drawnfrom this movement-environment interaction. These differ-
data set will be used. N's, percentages ences are then held to account for the divergent
and percent differences set off the rough outcomes. Instead of asking, "Does liberal activity
cause insurgency?" we are asking, "Did insurgent
differences between the three periods of and liberal activities co-occur to a different extent
activity. To capture more precisely the during one challenge than another? Did this -differ-
divergent patterns of interaction taking ence relate to different challenge outcomes?"
tional Farm Labor Union set out to ac- peared in the Los Bahos strike of 1952to
complish what predecessors had been un- break the challenge (Galarza, 1970:79).
able to do-successfully organizethe farm In response, the NFLU launched a
workers of California's "industrialized" two-pronged political challenge-a de-
agriculture.The leadershipcadre was ex- mand for terminationof the bracero pro-
perienced and resourceful. H. L. Mitch- gram and, to get around the problem of
ell, President of the NFLU, was former ineffective strikes, requests for organized
head of the Southern Tenant Farmers labor's support of boycotts. Neither de-
Union; the Director of Organizations, mand found a favorable audience. Lack-
Henry Hasiwar, had been an effective or- ing strong labor or liberal support, the
ganizer in several industrialunion drives demand for an end to the bracero traffic
during the 1930s; Ernesto Galarza, who ended in minor reforms in the bracero
assumed primeresponsibilityfor publicity administration(Galarza, 1970: ch. 4). As
efforts, had served as political liaison for for the boycott, despite initial success, it
Latin Americanunions and had a Ph.D. in collapsed when a court injunctionwas is-
economics from ColumbiaUniversity. sued (improperly)on the groundsthat the
Initially, the strategywas quite conven- NFLU was covered by the "hot cargo"
tional: enlist as many workers as possible provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. The
from a single employer, call a strike, de- National Labor Relations Board initially
mand wage increases and union recogni- concurredand reversed its position over a
tion, and picket to keep "scabs" out of year later. By then the Union's resources
the fields. AmericanFederationof Labor were exhausted and organized-laborsup-
affiliates would then provide strike relief port had long since collapsed (Galarza,
and political support to keep the picket 1970:73-92).
line going. An occasional church or stu- Figure 1 charts the level of favorable
dent group would furnish money and actions by selected groups, allowingus to
boost morale. gauge the societal response to insurgency.
But the government-sponsored alien The curves delineating government, lib-
labor or bracero programprovided grow- eral, and farm worker activities move
ers with an effective strike-breaking roughly in concert. (Organized labor,
weapon. According to provisions of the though, played little public role in this or
law, braceros were not to be employed the next period.) Checking these impres-
except in instances of domestic labor sions, Table 1 reportsPearsonr's on rele-
shortage and never to be employed in vant pairs of groups. Largely a reflection
fields where domestic workers had of the pressure campaign waged by the
walked out on strike. Yet in the two major NFLU, the strongest correlation is be-
tests of union power, the DiGiorgiostrike tween insurgents and favorable govern-
of 1948 and the ImperialValley strike of ment activity (.63), concrete activities
1951, the flood of braceros undermined seemingly being more efficacious (.70
the strike effort of domestic workers versus .49 for symbolic acts). R for
(London and Anderson, 1970; Galarza, insurgent/governmentactivity drops only
1970;Jenkins, 1975:ch. 3). In the Imperial slightly when controls are introducedfor
strike, the NFLU used citizen's arrests to liberalactivity (.57), indicatingthat liberal
enforce statutes prohibiting employment activity was not necessary for this mea-
of braceros in labor disputed areas. How- sure of official response.
ever, local courts ruled against the tactic The main issue for the period was labor
and the ImmigrationService refused to supply. Looking at activities concerned
remove alien "scabs" from the fields with this issue, the correlation between
(Galarza,1970:78; Jenkins,1975: ch. 4). insurgent and pro-farm worker govern-
Nor were affairs changed when the brac- ment activities is high (.59); for the issue
ero administrationwas transferredto the of living and workingconditions, the rela-
U.S. Department of Labor in 1951. tion disappears (-.08). The union at-
Domestic workers were pushed out of tempted, throughcourt actions, lobby ef-
crops by braceros, and braceros reap- forts and public protest, to pressure gov-
70- Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
60-
40-
30-
20
10
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

Government
30
20
10
1945 1950 ~~1955 1960 1965 1970

Liberal Organizations
30
20
10
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

Organized Labor
40 , I I , I I I I I1I1I1I1I
I I . I I I I I I I I I I
30
20
10 l
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

Insurgents
Figure 1. Actions Favorable to Insurgents
ernmentto end the bracero programsince ment tended to respond to concrete in-
it was so centralto the control of the labor surgency with favorableconcrete actions,
supply. The official response, however, the majority of favorable governmental
was largely symbolic. Though govern- actions were actually symbolic (58%).
Table 1. Extent of Concomitant Activity-Pro Farm Worker (r's)
All Symbolic Concrete

Acts Acts Acts
Period 1 (1946-1955)
Insurgents and Government .63 .49 .70
Insurgents and Liberal Pressure Groups .45 .56 -.02
Insurgents and Organized Labor .08 -.08 _b
Liberal Pressure Groups and Government .33 .37 -.17

Organized Labor and Government .36 .35 b
Period 11 (1956-1964)
Insurgents and Government -.26 -.26 -.42
Insurgents and Liberal Pressure Groups -. 10 .05 -.13
Insurgents and Organized Labor .59 .67 -.33
Liberal Pressure Groups and Government .50 .53 .25
Organized Labor and Government .06 -.60 .58
Period III (1965-1972)
Insurgents and Government .26 .26 .04
Insurgents and Liberal Pressure Groups .62 .06 .83
Insurgents and Organized Labor .16 .43 -.01
Liberal Pressure Groups and Government .04 .16 -.08
Organized Labor and Government -.002 .46 -.54
a
Symbolic or concrete for both types of groups.
b N for one group during this period was zero.
Nor did many of these concrete moves government was more responsive to ag-
decisively aid the farm worker cause. Key ribusiness interests. Clearly, in critical in-
actions, such as pulling strikebreaking stances, e.g., leaving braceros in struck
braceros out of the fields, did not occur. fields, government policies favored grow-
What, then, are we to make of the fact ers over workers.
that 50% of reported governmental ac- In addition to the predominantly un-
tions were coded as favorable to the inter- favorable response of government, the
est of farm workers? Was government re- NFLU failed to receive sustained, solid
sponding to the conflict between insur- support from the liberal community. The
gents and growers in some even-handed major problem was the type of activities in
"pluralist" way? Here it is necessary to which liberals engaged. When they acted,
recall that we are using news media repor- liberals consistently supported farm
tage on a social problem and efforts to workers over growers but they rarely
redress that problem. The news media will moved beyond symbolic proclamations.
be more sensitive to efforts attempting to Only 24% of liberal actions during the
define or solve that problem than to ef- period were concrete. By contrast, 38%
forts to maintain the status quo. Con- during the UFW challenge were so. Even
sequently, unfavorable actions by gov- more indicative, though, is the modest
ernment and growers are underrepre- level of the correlation between liberal
sented in our data. If only 50% of news- and insurgent activity (.45). What con-
reported government actions can be comitant activity did exist between these
coded as favorable, then the full universe two groups involved only symbolic acts
of governmental activities should, in the (.56 versus -.02 for concrete acts). Look-
balance, be more favorable to growers. ing ahead, the respective r's for the UFW
The strength of this assertion is borne challenge indicate a quite different liberal
out by information on actions favorable to response. Overall, r was .62; for concrete
growers. Figure 2 charts these actions for actions, r was .83 and, for symbolic acts,
government and growers. The correlation .06. Where the UFW experienced consis-
between pro-grower government activi- tent and concrete support, the NFLU
ties and grower activities is quite high found itself relatively isolated.
(.75), actually stronger than the respective Though liberals did not rush to the side
r for insurgents. In quantitative terms, of the NFLU, they did play a role in the
60 -
so _ Period 1 Period 2 @ Period 3
40 -
30 -
2 0-
10 /
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

Government
30 -
20 -
10 -
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

Growers
Figure 2. Actions Favorable to Growers
pressure campaign.When controls are in- Period II: Elite Reform and Realignment
troduced for government activity on the (1956-1964)
relation between insurgents and liberals,
the modestly positive relation turns nega- The late 1950s and the early 1960s, the
tive (-.10). Insofar as liberals did act second Eisenhower administration and
alongside insurgents, apparentlyit was in the brief Kennedy period emerge from
the presence of public officials. But there this and other studies in the largerproject
were problems even with this limited- as a period of germination. Contrary to
scale liberal support. Liberals focused al- some interpretations,the remarkablein-
most exclusively on the working and liv- surgencies of the late 1960s did not origi-
ing conditions of farmworkers. Following nate with the Kennedy administration,but
the lead of Progressive Party candidate with developments that initially began to
Henry Wallace in 1948, several religious appearduringEisenhower's second term.
and "public interest" associations spon- Nor did the Kennedy years witness a
sored conferences and issued study re- dramatic escalation of insurgent activity.
ports publicizing deplorable camp condi- Indeed, in the case of farm workers, in-
tions and child labor. In what might be surgency showed a decline (Figure 1). For
considered a typical pattern of liberalism our purposes,the two presidentialadmin-
of the time, they were concerned with the istrationscan be treatedas a single period,
plight of the workers rather than the fact one that witnessed important realign-
of their powerlessness or the role of the ments and shifts in political resources in
bracero program in underwriting that the national polity, culminatingin a sup-
powerlessness. It was a humanitarian, portive environment for insurgent activ-
nonpoliticalposture, easily dissipated by ity.
"red baiting" in Congressionalinvestiga- Farm worker insurgency duringthe re-
tions and "red scare" charges by growers form period was at a low ebb. Actions by
and their political allies throughout the farmworkerinsurgentsdroppedfrom 16%
late 1940s and early 1950s. The two is- to 11% of all pro-worker activity. In
sues, poverty and the question of labor 1956-1957 the NFLU, now renamed the
supply, were not to be linked by the lib- National Agricultural Workers Union
eral organizationsuntil well into PeriodII. (NAWU), secured a small grant from the
Table 2. Extent of ConcomitantActivity-Pro Grower (r's)
All Work-Life Labor Union-
Issues Conditionsa Shortagea izationa
Period I (1946-1955)
Insurgentsand Government .63 -.08 .59 __b
Insurgentsand Liberal Pressure Groups .45 .21 .76
Insurgentsand OrganizedLabor .08 .17 .08
Liberal PressureGroups and Government .33 .02 .40
OrganizedLabor and Government .36 .18 .37
Period 11 (1956-1964)
Insurgentsand Government -.26 -.28 -.04
Insurgents and Liberal Pressure Groups -. 10 -.13 -.04
Insurgentsand OrganizedLabor .59 .20 .58
LiberalPressureGroups and Government .50 .50 .23
OrganizedLabor and Government .06 .21 -.05
Period III (1965-1972)
Insurgentsand Government .26 .74 b .21
Insurgentsand Liberal Pressure Groups .62 .84 .35
Insurgents and Organized Labor .16 .57 - .09
LiberalPressureGroups and Government .04 .49 -.08
Organized Labor and Government -.002 .13 - .36
a
Work-life for both types of groups: labor shortage for both, unionization for both.
b
N for one group duringthis period was zero.
United Auto Workers,enablingit to hang ronment: (1) policy conflicts within the
on as a paper organization. Galarza, by political elite that resulted in a more "bal-
then the only full-time cadre member, anced," neutral stance towards farm
launched a publicity campaign to reveal workers;(2) the formationof a reformco-
maladministrationand corruption within alition composed of liberal pressure
the bracero administration.Aside from a groups and organized labor that, in the
brief and ineffective organizing drive midst of elite divisions, was able to exer-
launched in 1959 by the Agricultural cise greaterpoliticalinfluence;(3) the ero-
WorkersOrganizingCommittee(AWOC), sion of the Congressional power-base of
generating only one reported strike (in conservative rural interests, stemming
1961),this was the sum of insurgentactiv- immediatelyfrom reapportionment.
ity for the nine-yearPeriod If (Figure 1). The concern of liberal pressuregroups
Growers remained publicly inactive and initially was focused on the need to im-
seemingly secure in their position, prove housing and educationalconditions
aroused only at renewaltime for the brac- of migrantworkers. In 1956, the Demo-
ero programto lobby bills through Con- cratic National Convention included a
gress. Until the insurgency of Period III plank for increased welfare aid to mi-
began, growers retained a low profile in grants. The next year, the National Coun-
the Times (Figure 2). cil of Churches, already involved in the
With the direct adversaries largely re- early civil rights movement in the South,
tired from the public arena, affairs shifted began a study of migrantcamp conditions
into the hands of governmentand the lib- and child labor. In early 1958,the Council
erals. Despite the absence of significant broughtpublic pressure to bear on Secre-
insurgency, the balance of forces in the tary of Labor James Mitchell to enforce
nationalpolity had begun to shift. Actions existing laws regarding migrant camps
favorable to the interests of farm workers throughoutthe nation. In late 1958, sev-
increasedfrom 50Wo to 73%, remainingon eral liberal pressure groups were joined
the same plane (75%)throughoutthe fol- by the AFL-CIO in attackingthe bracero
lowing UFW period. Beginningduringthe program, scoring administrative laxity,
last years of the Eisenhower administra- and arguing that federal labor policies
tion, three interrelated developments were the origin of social problems. The
brought about this new supportive envi- two as yet unrelatedissues-poverty and
labor policies-were now firmly linked in in Period I to 65%. Indicative of the

the public debate. change taking place in official views, the
The fusion of these two issues was sig- focus of governmental attentions shifted
nificant. Of course, economic conditions from the labor supply issue (56%of favor-
already had been linked with social depri- able actions duringPeriod I) to the ques-
vations in public parlance, but the con- tion of farm workers' living and working
cern of liberalgroups in the past had been conditions (73% during Period II).
with inspection of housing, assurances of The change in official actions stemmed,
educational opportunity, and public in part, from internal conflicts within the
health measures.To arguenow that a pub- nationalpolitical elite. Secretaryof Labor
lic program of importing foreign labor JamesMitchellwas a surpriseEisenhower
perpetuatedthe list of conditionsdeplored appointee from the Eastern wing of the
by liberals was a substantial change. As RepublicanParty, a former labor consul-
later happened more generally with the tant for New York departmentstores and
New Left (cf. Perrow, 1972), the advo- a future protege of Nelson Rockefeller.
cates of reform had begun to look at the Mitchell took the Departmentof Labor in
source of problems in terms of a system. a more pro-union direction than was
About the same time, organized labor thought possible, at the time becoming a
took a new interest in farm workers. In "strong man" in the cabinet because of
1959, the AFL-CIO Executive Council his success in mollifyingunions.8In 1958,
abolishedthe NAWU and created the Ag- an open fight between the Taft and East-
riculturalWorkersOrganizingCommittee ern wings of the Republican Party de-
(AWOC), headed by Norman Smith, a veloped, with the conservativesfavoringa
former UAW organizer.Despite strongfi- national"right-to-work"law. Mitchell, as
nancial backing, the AWOC producedlit- an advocate of unionism and apparently
tle results. Concentrating on 4 A.M. jockying for position for the Republican
"shake-ups" of day laborers, the AWOC Vice-Presidential nomination, became a
managedto sponsor a numberof "job ac- figure of elite reform within Republican
tions" but only one majorstrike and little circles.
solid organization. Like the NFLU, the A second factor contributingto the shift
AWOC had to confront the problem of in official actions was the pressure cam-
braceros. In the one reported strike, the paign launched by the reform coalition.
ImperialValley strike of February, 1961, The effects of the campaign can be cap-
the AWOC used violence to intimidate tured, in part, from the Times data.
strikebreakingbraceros and create an in- Thoughthe correlationbetween liberalac-
ternational incident over their presence. tivity and government activity favorable
Officials quickly arrested the cadre, and to farm workers is modest (.50), it is con-
the AWOC ceased to exist except on siderably higher than during the other
paper. Though the AWOC drive con- periods (.33 for the first and .04 for the
sumed over one million dollars of AFL- third) and it is independent of insurgent
CIO funds, it produced neither contracts activity.
nor stable membership(London and An- Tangible effects of the pressure cam-
derson, 1970:47-50, 77). Yet, and this in- paign appeared almost immediately. In
dicates the shift, this type of financial 1957, under pressure from the liberal re-
supporthad never before been offered by form coalition, the Departmentof Labor
organized labor. under Mitchell's guidance carried out an
The final element in the formationof a internalreview of farmlabor policies. The
supportive environment was a shift in upshot was a series of executive orders to
governmental actions. Actions favorable tighten up enforcement of regulations
to farm workers increased from the un- covering migrant camps (Craig, 1971:
favorable 50% prevailing during Period I 151-5). When the economic recession of
to a more "balanced" 68% of all gov- 1958-1959 arrived, sensitivity within the
ernmental actions. Of these, the portion
coded "concrete," and therefore more 8 New York Times. October 5, 1958, VI; 9: 2;
likely to have impact, increasedfrom 40% October 20, 1964: 37: 1.
Administration to rising unemployment did refocus the concern of liberals and
levels increased. In response, Mitchell organizedlabor on the structuralproblem
vowed to enforce more fully the 1951sta- of farm worker powerlessness.
tutes requiringfarmemploymentto be of- The reform coalition sustained the
fered to domestic workers prior to impor- campaign over the next three years. In
tation of braceros. Growers, long accus- 1960, the Democratic platform con-
tomed to having their bracero requests demned the bracero program.Once in of-
met automatically,rebelledwhen asked to fice, the New Frontiersmen, though de-
provide more justification (Jacobs, 1963: mandingno importantstatutory changes,
183-4). In February, 1959, Mitchell took did vow to enforce fully the laws restrict-
an even stronger step, joining the liberal ing bracero use (Craig, 1971:174).By re-
reformersin support of legislation to ex- newal time in 1963,the Kennedy Adminis-
tend minimum-wagelaws to agriculture trationwas in the pursuitof a public issue
and to impose new restrictionson the use ("poverty") and courting minority-group
of braceros. votes. For the first time, the White House
The following year, the division within went formally on record against the pro-
the Eisenhower Administration opened gram. Only at the last minute was a pres-
up into a full-scale, cabinet-level battle sure campaign,mountedby GovernorPat
over renewal of the bracero program. Brown of Californiaand the Department
The Farm Bureau and the state grower of State, responding to Mexican diplo-
associations engaged that other adminis- matic pressure,able to save the program
tration "strong man," Secretary of Ag- temporarily. Amid promises from Con-
riculture Ezra Taft Benson, to defend gressional farm bloc leaders that this was
the program. In testimony before the the last time the program would be re-
House Committee on Agriculture, the newed, a one-yearextension was granted.
White House took a neutral stance; Ben- In addition to the efforts of the reform
son defended the program,while Mitch- coalition, which played a critical role in
ell argued that the programexerted dem- other reformsof the same period, and the
onstrable adverse effects upon domestic new elite-level neutrality, the fall of the
workers and should be abolished (Craig, bracero program stemmed from the nar-
1971: 156-61). Into this breach in the rowing power base of the Congressional
political elite stepped the liberal-labor farm bloc. Congressional reapportion-
support coalition. At the same time, the ment had visibly shaken the conservative
House Committee on Public Welfare farm bloc leaders. Searchingfor items in
opened hearingson health and camp con- the farm programthat could be scuttled
ditions, giving the Cotton Council and the without damaging the main planks, the
MeatcuttersUnion a chance to air oppos- farm bloc leaders fixed on the bracero
ing views. program.The mechanizationof the Texas
Initially, the reform effort failed. In cotton harvest had left Californiagrowers
March, 1960,SecretaryMitchellwithdrew of specialty crops the mainbracero users.
his program,resolving the dispute on the When the test came, bracero users, as a
cabinet level. The next month, agribusi- narrow, special interest, could be sac-
ness pushed a two-year renewal of the rificedto keep the mainplanksof the farm
bracero programthrough Congress. But, programintact (Hawley, 1966).
for the first time, the issue had been de- Period II, then, emerges from this anal-
bated seriously and a loose coalition of ysis as a period of reform and political
liberal pressure groups (e.g., National realignmentthat dramaticallyaltered the
Council of Churches, National Advisory prospective fortunes of insurgents. Re-
Committeeof Farm Labor, NAACP) and forms, stemmingfrom elite-level conflicts
organized labor had formed. Though the and a pressure campaign conducted by
eventual terminationof the bracero pro- liberal public-interest organizations and
gram did not underminegrowers' ability organizedlabor, came about in the virtual
to break strikes (there were other substi- absence of activity by farm worker insur-
tutes, e.g., "green card" commuters, il- gents. The activism of several key liberal
legal aliens), the fight againstthe program organizations depended, in turn, upon
broad economic trends, especially the The initial base for the United Farm
growth of middle-classdisposableincome Workers was Cesar Chavez's National
that might be invested in worthy causes Farm Workers Association (NFWA) and
(McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Insurgents remnants of the AWOC still receiving
did not stimulatethese changes in the na- some support from the AFL-CIO.9 During
tional polity. Rather, they were to prove the 1950s, Chavez had been director of the
the beneficiaries and, if anything, were Community Service Organization, an
stimulatedby them. Alinsky-styled urban community-organ-
ization with strong ties to civil rights
groups, liberal churches and foundations.
Period III: The UFW Success (1965-1972)
Frustrated by the refusal of the CSO
During the NFLU period, the number Board of Directors to move beyond issues
of insurgent actions reported totalled 44. salient to upwardly-mobile urban Mexi-
Most of these were symbolic in character, can-Americans, Chavez resigned his post
only 27% being concrete. Insurgencywas in the winter of 1961 and set out to
brief, concentrated in a four-year period organize a community organization
(1948-1951). However, in the third among farm workers in the Central Valley
period, insurgency became sustained. In- of California. Drawing on his liberal con-
surgent actions reached a new peak and tacts, Chavez was able to secure the back-
remained at a high level throughout the ing of several liberal organizations which
period. A total of 143 actions conducted had developed a new concern with pov-
by farmworkerinsurgentswere recorded. erty and the problems of minority groups.
Significantly,71%of these were concrete The main sponsor was the California Mi-
in character.By the end of the period, the grant Ministry, a domestic mission of the
success of the United Farm Workerswas National Council of Churches servicing
unmistakable. Over a hundred contracts migrant farm workers. During the late
had been signed; wages had been raised 1950s, the Migrant Ministry followed the
by almost a third;union hiringhalls were prevailing policy change within the Na-
in operation in every major agricultural tional Council, substituting community
area in California;farm workers, acting organization and social action programs
through ranch committees set up under for traditional evangelical ones (Pratt,
each contract, were exercising a new set 1972). By 1964, the Migrant Ministry had
of powers. teamed up with Chavez, merging its own
The key to this dramatic success was community organization (the FWO) with
the altered political environment within the NFWA and sponsoring the Chavez-
which the challenge operated. Thoughthe directed effort.10
potential for mobilizinga social base was By summer, 1965, NFWA had over 500
slightly more favorable than before, the active members and began shifting direc-
UFW never was able to launch effective tions, expanding beyond economic benefit
strikes. Though the UFW cadre was ex- programs (e.g., a credit union, coopera-
perienced and talented, there is little rea- tive buying, etc.) to unionization. Several
son to believe that they were markedly small "job actions" were sponsored.
more so than the NFLU leadership; Operating nearby, the remaining active
neitherdid the tactics of the challenge dif- group of the AWOC, several Filipino
fer. The boycotts that secured success for
the UFW also had been tried by the 9 For a detailed discussion, see Jenkins (1975: chs.
NFLU, but with quite different results. 7-8).
What had changed was the political 10 There was also a brief challenge launched in
environment-the liberal communitynow 1965 among black tenant farmers in the Mississippi
was willing to provide sustained, massive Delta region (the Mississippi Freedom Labor
supportfor insurgency; the political elite Union). The dynamics of that challenge are virtually
indentical to the UFW-sponsorship by liberal
had adopted a neutral stance toward farm churches, labor union, etc. (for a history, see Hilton,
workers. 1969). Given the low event-count for this chal-
As before, external support played a lenge, though, the statistics reported pertain to the
critical role in launching the challenge. UFW.
work-crews, hoped to take advantage of sustained sponsorship on the part of the
grower uncertaintygeneratedby termina- Migrant Ministry and organized labor
tion of the bracero program.The AWOC guaranteeda stable resource base.
launched a series of wage strikes, first in Nor were the uses of protest-acquired
the Coachella Valley and then in the resources the same. Lipsky's rent-strikers
Delano-Arvinarea of the San JoaquinVal- sought liberal pressureon public officials.
ley. With the AWOC out on strike, For the UFW, protest actions were used
Chavez pressed the NFWA for a strike to secure contributionsand, in the form of
vote. On Mexican Independence Day, a boycott, to exercise power against
September 16th, the NFWA joined the growers. Marches, symbolic arrests of
picket lines (Chavez, 1966; Dunne, 1967; clergy, and public speeches capturedpub-
London and Anderson, 1970). lic attention; contributions from labor
Though dramatic, the strike soon col- unions, theater showings and "radical
lapsed. Growers refused to meet with chic" cocktail parties with proceeds to
union representatives;a sufficientnumber "La Causa" supplemented the budget
of workerscrossed the picket lines to pre- provided by sponsors and membership
vent a major harvest loss. Over the next dues.
six years, the same pattern recurred-a Given the failure of strike actions, a
dramaticstrikeholdingfor a week, grower successful outcome required indirect
intransigence,police intimidation,gradual means of exercising power against grow-
replacementof the work force by playing ers. Sympathetic liberal organizations
upon ethnic rivalriesand recruitingillegal (e.g., churches, universities, etc.) refused
aliens (cf. Dunne, 1967; London and An- to purchase "scab" grapes. More impor-
derson, 1970; Matthiessen, 1969; Kush- tant, though, major grocery chains were
ner, 1975;Taylor, 1975).Whatproved dif- pressured into refusing to handle "scab"
ferent from the NFLU experience was the products. To exercise that pressure, a
ability of the insurgents,acting in the new combinationof external resources had to
political environment, to secure outside be mobilized. Students had to contribute
support. time to picketinggrocery stores and ship-
Political protest was the mechanism ping terminals; Catholic churches and
through which much of this support was laborunions had to donate office space for
garnered.By dramaticactions designedto boycott houses; Railway Union members
capture the attention of a sympathetic had to identify "scab" shipments for
public and highlightthe "justice" of their boycott pickets; Teamsters had to refuse
cause, insurgentswere able to sustain the to handle "hot cargo"; Butchers' union
movement organizationand exercise suf- members had to call sympathy strikes
ficient indirectleverageagainstgrowersto when grocery managers continued to
secure contracts. The UFW's use of pro- stock "scab" products; political candi-
test tactics departed from that of rent dates and elected officials had to endorse
strikersanalyzed by Lipsky (1968; 1970). the boycott. The effectiveness of the
Though the basic mechanism was the boycott depended little upon the re-
same (namely, securing the sympathy of sources of mobilized farm workers; in-
third parties to the conflict so that they stead, they became a political symbol. It
would use their superior resources to was the massive outpouring of support,
intervenein supportof the powerless), the especially from liberals and organized
commitmentsof supportingorganizations labor, that made the boycott effective
and the uses to which outside supportwas and, thereby, forced growers to the bar-
put differed. Lipsky found that protest gaining table.
provided unreliable resources, that the The strengthof liberal-laborsupportfor
news media and sympatheticpublic might the UFW is indicatedby the high level of
ignore protesters' demands (cf. Golden- concomitant activity between insurgents
berg, 1975)and that, even when attentive, and their supporters. While the correla-
they often were easily satisfied with sym- tion of insurgentand liberalactivities was
bolic palliatives. Though the UFW ex- modest in Period I (.45), it was strong
periencedthese problems,the presence of duringthe thirdperiod (.62). More impor-
tant, liberals were far more concrete in quiescent but the liberal-labor coalition
their support for insurgents. In the first was experiencinggrowinginfluence in na-
period, concomitant activities were al- tional politics, 67% were favorable,
most wholly symbolic (.56 versus .02 for slightly more than on the federal level.
concrete activities);duringthe UFW chal- But when insurgency reappeared in
lenge, it was concrete activities (.81 ver- Period III, the percent favorable dropped
sus .06 for symbolic activities). Nor do to 45%, far lower than the federal level.
statistical controls for governmental ac- Governmentdivided on the question, fed-
tions favorable to farm workers reduce eral actions tending to be neutral, if not
the correlation(r=.64). Given the fact that supportive, of insurgents while state ac-
liberal activities rarely occurred jointly tions, still under grower dominance, con-
with pro-worker government activities tinued to oppose insurgents.
(r=.04), it is clear that liberals directed Significantly little of the pro-worker
their efforts toward supportinginsurgents trend in governmentalactions duringthe
rather than pressuringgovernment.1 UFW period is associated with either in-
The more "balanced," neutral posture surgentor liberal activities. For insurgent
of governmentthat was the productof the and favorable government actions, r is
reform period continued. Sixty-nine per- low (.26 versus .63 during the NFLU
cent of all official actions were favorable period); the correlation between liberal
to farm workers (as against 50%and 68% organizations and favorable government
in Periods I and II). Concretely, this actions drops to the lowest point in the
meant that court rulings no longer study (.04 versus .33 and .50 for Periods I
routinely went against insurgents;federal and II, respectively). Only organized
poverty programs helped to "loosen" labor appeared to be performinga pres-
small town politics; hearings by the U.S. sure function. There is a modest correla-
Civil Rights Commission and Congres- tion between symbolic activities by or-
sional committees publicized "injustices" ganized labor and government (.46),
against farm workers; welfare legislation largely centeringaroundthe legitimacy of
gave farm workers more economic secu- unionism in agriculture (r-.35). Official
rity and afforded insurgents a legal basis positions had already undergone impor-
to contest grower employment practices. tant changes during the reform period.
National politicians, such as Senators The terminationof the bracero program
Kennedy and McGovern, lent their re- had left governmentin a neutralizedposi-
sources to the cause. tion. No longer a key player in the con-
The most strikingchanges in official ac- flict, but still under the influence of the
tions took place on the federal level. Ac- reformpolicies, governmentpreserved its
tions favorableto farmworkers rose from neutralstance despite less visible pressure
46% of federal level activity in the first from any of the partisans.12
period, to 63% in the second and 74% in There was, of course, opposition on the
the third. State and local government, part of growers and allied governmental
more under the control of growers (cf. actors. There were numerousinstances of
McConnell,1953:177; Berger, 1971), fol- police harassment, large-scale purchases
lowed a different pattern. In Period I, of boycotted products by the Department
when growers had opposition only from of Defense, and outspoken opposition
insurgents, only 26% of official actions
were judged favorable to workers. In
Period II, when farm workers were ac- 12 Corroborating this interpretation, the correla-
tion between insurgent/liberal actions and pro-

worker government actions is considerably stronger
I Despite the fact that help from organized
labor (.74 and .58, respectively) once insurgent and liberal
was critical to the boycott's success, our correla- actions are lagged by one year. As a roughly neutral
tions hardly document the point. In the NFLU chal- participant, government followed along a year be-
lenge, r was .08; in the UFW period, .16. This rela- hind the chief partisans, though not responding di-
tion is weaker than that for liberal pressure groups, rectly to pressure as before. Though not conclusive,
we would argue, because much of the supportive the fact that this was the only instance in the study in
labor action was "local" in character and often went which time-lags produced marked increases in r's
unreported in the Times. lends the interpretation some plausibility.
from Governor Reagan and President opening for reform measures then being
Nixon. pressed by a newly active coalition of es-
However, growers had lost their en- tablished liberal and labor organizations.
trenchedpoliticalposition. Public officials Thoughthe reformsdid not directly effect
no longeracted so consistently to enhance success, the process entailed by reform
grower interests and to contain the chal- did result in a new political environment,
lenge. An indication of the sharpness of one which made a successful challenge
the displacement of growers is given by possible.
the levels of concomitance between If this analysis is correct, then several
grower actions and pro-grower gov- assumptionsfound in the classic literature
ernmental actions. In Period I, r for are misleading. Rather than focusing on
grower-governmentactivity was .75; in fluctuations in discontent to account for
Period II, .62. But, duringthe UFW chal- the emergence of insurgency, it seems
lenge, the correlationdroppedto a negli- more fruitful to assume that grievances
gible .05. By the time the United Farm are relatively constant and pervasive.
Workers struck in 1965, agriculturalem- Especially for deprived groups, lack of
ployers were no longer able to rely upon collective resources and controls exer-
government, especially at the federal cised by superiors-not the absence of
level, to be fully responsive to their inter- discontent-account for the relative in-
est in blocking unionization. frequency of organized demands for
change. For several of the movements of
Conclusion the 1960s, it was the interjection of re-
sources from outside, not sharpincreases
The critical factor separating the Na- in discontent, that led to insurgentefforts.
tional Farm Labor Union failure from the Nor does the political process centered
United Farm Worker success was the aroundinsurgencyconformto the rules of
societal response to insurgent demands. a pluralistgame. The Americanpolity had
In most respects, the challenges were not been uniformly permeable to all
strikingly similar. In both instances, the groups with significant grievances (cf.
leadership cadre came from outside the Gamson, 1975).Governmentdoes not act
farm worker community; external spon- as a neutralagent, serving as umpireover
sorship played a critical role in launching the group contest. Public agencies and of-
both insurgent organizations; both ficials have interests of their own to pro-
movements confronted similar obstacles tect, interests that often bring them into
to mobilizinga social base and mounting close alignment with well-organized
effective strikes; both resortedto political private-interestgroups. When insurgency
protest and boycotts. What produced the arises threateningthese private interests,
sharp difference in outcome was the dif- public officials react by helpingto contain
ference in political environment encoun- insurgency and preserve the status quo.
tered. The NFLU received token con- But if an opposing coalition of established
tributions, vacillating support for its organizationsdecides to sponsor an insur-
boycott and confronted major acts of re- gent challenge, the normal bias in public
sistance by public authorities.In contrast, policy can be checked. Sponsors then
the UFW received massive contributions, serve as protectors, insuringthat the polit-
sustained supportfor its boycotts and en- ical elite remainsneutralto the challenge.
countereda more "balanced," neutralof- The implications for other challenges
ficial response. are rather striking. If the support of the
The dramaticturnaboutin the political liberal community is necessary for the
environment originated in economic success of a challenge by a deprived
trendsand politicalrealignmentsthat took group, then the liberal community is, in
place quite independent of any "push" effect, able to determinethe cutting edge
from insurgents. During the reform for viable changes that conform to the
period, conflicts erruptedwithin the polit- interests of those groups still excluded
ical elite over policies pertainingto farm from American politics. Moreover, there
workers. Elite divisions provided the is the possibility of abandonment. Since
liberalsupportcan fade and political elites 1975 The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood,
shift their stance, as has-happened to the II.: Dorsey.
UFW since 1972, even the gains of the Goldenberg, Edie
1975 Making the News. Lexington, Ma.:
past may be endangered. The prospects Lexington Books.
for futureinsurgency,by this account, are Gurr, Ted
dim. Until another major realignment 1970 Why Men Rebel. Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
takes place in American politics, we ton University Press.
Gusfield, Joseph
should not expect to see successful at- 1968 "The study of social movements." Pp.
tempts to extend political citizenship to 445-52 in David Sills (ed.), Interna-
the excluded. tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences, Volume 14. New York: Macmil-
REFERENCES lan.
Hawley, Ellis W.
Berger, Samuel 1966 "The politics of the Mexican labor issue."
1971 Dollar Harvest: The Story of the Farm Agricultural History 40, 3 (July):157-76.
Bureau. Lexington, Ma.: Heath. Hibbs, Douglas
Chavez, Cesar 1973 Mass Political Violence. New York: Wiley.
1966 "The organizer's tale." Pp. 138-47 in Hilton, Bruce
Staughton Lynd (ed.), American Labor 1969 The Delta Migrant Ministry. New York:
Radicalism. New York: Wiley. Macmillan.
Chambers, Clarke Jacobs, Paul
1952 California Farm Organizations. Berke- 1963 The State of the Unions. New York:
ley, Cal.: University of California Press. Atheneum.
Craig, Richard C. Jenkins, Craig
1971 The Bracero Program. Austin, Tx.: Uni- 1975 Farm Workers and the Powers: Farm
versity of Texas Press. Worker Insurgency (1946-1972). Unpub-
Dahl, Robert lished Ph.D. dissertation. Department of
1967 Pluralist Democracy in the United States. Sociology, State University of New York,
Chicago: Rand McNally. Stony Brook.
Danzger, M. Herbert Kornhauser, Arthur
1975 "Validating conflict data." American 1959 The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe, II.:
Sociological Review 40:570-84. Free Press.
Davies, James C. Kushner, Sam
1962 "Toward a theory of revolution." Ameri- 1975 Long Road to Delano. New York: Interna-
can Sociological Review 27:5-19. tional Publishers.
1969 "The J-curve of rising and declining satis- Lang, Kurt and Gladys Lang
factions as a cause of some great revo- 1961 Collective Dynamics. New York: Crowell.
lutions and a contained rebellion." Pp. Lipsky, Michael
671-709 in Hugh Davis Graham and Fred 1968 "Protest as political resource." American
Robert Gurr (eds.), Violence in America. Political Science Review 62:1144-58.
New York: Bantam. 1970 Protest in City Politics. Chicago: Rand
Dunne, John Gregory McNally.
1967 Delano. New York: Farrar, Straus and London, Jaan and Henry Anderson
Giroux. 1970 So Shall Ye Reap. New York: Crowell.
Fisher, Lloyd Matthiessen, Peter
1953 The Harvest Labor Market in California. 1969 Sal Si Puedes: Cesar Chavez and the New
Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University American Revolution. New York: Random
Press. House.
Frisbee, Parker McCarthy, John and Mayer Zald
1975 "Illegal migration from Mexico to the 1973 The Trend of Social Movements in
United States: a longitudinal analysis." In- America. Morristown, N.J.: General
ternational Migration Review 9:3-14. Learning Corporation.
Fuller, Varden McConnell, Grant
1967 "A new era for farm labor?" Industrial Re- 1953 The Decline of American Democracy. New
lations 6:285-302. York: Atheneum.
Galarza, Ernesto McWilliams, Carey
1964 Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero 1939 Factories in the Fields. Boston: Little,
Story. San Jose, Ca.: Rosicrucian Press. Brown.
1970 Spiders in the House and Workers in the 1942 Ill Fares the Land. Boston: Little, Brown.
Field. London: University of Notre Dame New York Times
Press. 1945- New York Times Index. New York: New
Gamson, William 1974 York Times.
1968 "Stable unrepresentation in American so- Oberschall, Anthony
ciety." American Behavioral Scientist 1973 Social Conflict and Social Movements. En-
12;15-2 1. glewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Perrow, Charles Taylor, Ronald B.
1972 The Radical Attack on Business. New 1975 Chavez and the Farm Workers. Boston:
York: McGraw-Hill. Beacon.
Pratt, Henry J. Tilly, Charles
1972 The Liberalization of American Protes- 1975 "Revolutions and collective violence." In
tantism. Detroit, Mi.: Wayne State Uni- F. I. Greenstein and N. Polsky (eds.),
versity Press. Handbook of Political Science. Reading,
Rose, Arnold Ma.: Addison-Wesley
1967 The Power Structure. New York: Oxford Tilly, Charles, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly
University Press. 1975 The Rebellious Century. Cambridge, Ma.:
Harvard University Press.
Smelser, Neil J. Truman, David
1962 The Theory of Collective Behavior. New 1951 The Governmental Process. New York:
York: Free Press. Knopf.
Snyder, David and WilliamKelly Turner, Ralph and Lewis Killian
1977 "Conflictintensity, media sensitivity and 1957 Collective Behavior. Englewood Cliffs,
the validity of newspaperdata." American N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Sociological Review 42:105-23. 1972 Collective Behavior (2nd ed.). Engle-
Snyder, David and CharlesTilly wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1972 "Hardship and collective violence in Wilson, John
France, 1830to 1960."AmericanSociolog- 1973 Introduction to Social Movements. New
ical Review 37:520-32. York: Basic Books.
SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE FAMILY:

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, 1850-1870O
BARBARA LASLETT
University of Southern California
American Sociological Review 1977, Vol. 42 (April):268-291
Using Marx's description of "the so-called primitive accumulation" which he associates with
the development of capitalism in the West, a theoretical formulation is presented which
explores the impact on the family of changes in the individual's access to actual and potential
wealth. A multivariate analysis, based on the individual census schedules for the city of Los
Angeles in 1850 and 1870, is used to explore the changing relationships between economic,
demographic and other structural variables on household structure. Thefindings suggest that a
dynamic, Marxian model can help explain the effects of social change on the family.
Theories of social change in relation to would permit an empiricalassessment of

the family have received considerableat- these theories. This paper, which presents
tention from social scientists. (see, for in- a macro-structuralanalysis of household
stance, Parsons, 1959; Linton, 1959; organizationin a developing nineteenth-
Goode, 1963;Skolnick, 1973:ch. 3; Hare- century American city, hopes to make a
ven, 1976). Until recently, however, his- contribution to this assessment and to
torical research has been lacking which suggest a new conceptual frameworkfor
understanding the family in historical
* This investigationwas supportedby Biomedical perspective.
Sciences SupportGrantRR07012-08from the Divi- Studies of social change can attend not
sion of Research Resources, Bureauof Health Pro- only to outcomes-such as variations in
fessions Education and Manpower Training, Na-
tional Instituteof Health. Special thanksare given the distributionof familytypes in different
to James E. Smithfor his work on the largerproject time periods-but also to the processes by
of which this paper is one part. The author would which these changes came about. The
also like to thankEdnaBonacich,David Heer, Carol longitudinal design of the research dis-
Warren,Lutz Berknerand RobertBrennerfor criti-
cal readingsof this paper, a version of which was cussed in this paper provides an opportu-
presented at the 1976 meetings of the American nity to empiricallyassess process as well
Sociological Association, New York. as results. The conclusions of studies of

Farm Worker Movement (Jenkins, Perrow)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Farm Worker Movement (Jenkins, Perrow)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Farm Worker Movement (Jenkins, Perrow)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What is the main topic of the article?

What is the main topic of the article?

What perspective do the authors use to analyze farm worker movements?

What perspective do the authors use to analyze farm worker movements?

Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972)

Author(s): J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow

J. CRAIG JENKINS CHARLES PERROW

American Sociological Review 1977, Vol. 42 (April):249-268

of local police, hiring strikebreakers, place between insurgentsand amongvari-

70- Period 1 Period 2 Period 3

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

1945 1950 ~~1955 1960 1965 1970

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

Figure 1. Actions Favorable to Insurgents

All Symbolic Concrete

Liberal Pressure Groups and Government .33 .37 -.17

so _ Period 1 Period 2 @ Period 3

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

labor policies-were now firmly linked in in Period I to 65%. Indicative of the

likely to have impact, increasedfrom 40% October 20, 1964: 37: 1.

tion between insurgent/liberal actions and pro-

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE FAMILY:

American Sociological Review 1977, Vol. 42 (April):268-291

Theories of social change in relation to would permit an empiricalassessment of

You might also like