KENNETH MEGILL

GEORG L U K A C S AS A N O N T O L O G I S T *

The publication of Georg Lukacs' Aesthetics has been widely hailed as

one of the most significant philosophical events of our decade. 1 This
major philosophical work meets the high standard which Lukacs set for
himself - to "apply Marxism to the problem of aesthetics" (I, 16).2
Lukacs has effectively destroyed the argument of those who have claimed
that there could be no Marxist aesthetics by producing an aesthetics
which must be recognized as a significant work by both Marxist and
non-Marxist philosophers. It is perhaps natural that the primary work
of interpreting and evaluating this work will be done by those interested
in aesthetics. Some of the explication and analysis has already begun,
some in English, more in German. 3
Important as Lukacs' latest work may be for aesthetics, perhaps of
more general interest and of potentially much greater importance is the
kind of philosophy which Lukacs has begun to do within the last ten years.
He calls this philosophy 'ontology' and has entitled his forthcoming book,
Zur Ontologie des Gesellschaftlichen Seins (On the Ontology of Social
Being). According to Lukacs, the Aesthetics is just the first in a series of
ontological works which will include an ethics and a systematic study of
the nature of society, as well as the aesthetics. The fact that an important
philosopher sets forth after he is 75 years of age to write ontological
works is astounding. But to begin such a project in the 1960's appears
to many as either a sign of senility or as a failure to keep up-to-date with
current philosophical developments. The uniqueness of Lukacs' attempt
requires a consideration of the place of the ontological works in relation-
ship to his earlier works as well as a tentative evaluation of the important
elements of his ontology.
Lukacs' interest in aesthetics and literary works dates from the beginning
of this century until the most recent publication of his systematic aes-
thetics. As Lukacs points out in his introduction to the Aesthetics:
I began as a literary critic and essayist and sought my theoretical support in Kant's
aesthetics and later in that of Hegel. The first plan for an independent systematic

Studies in Soviet Thought 9 (1969) 334-353; © D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland

 G E O R G L U K A C S AS AN O N T O L O G I S T 335

aesthetics was made in Florence in the winter of 1911-12 and I developed this plan in
Heidelberg in the years 1912-14. I still remember with great thankfulness the well-
intended critical interest which Ernst Bloch, Emil Lask, and above all Max Weber,
showed in my attempt (I, 2).

The 50 years after 1912 were filled with events which made Lukacs an
important figure not only in philosophy but in politics and literary criti-
cism as well. The completion of the Aesthetics is really a completion of a
life-long project, but the Aesthetics is more than a summation; it is far
more the beginning of a significant new philosophical phase in Lukacs' life.
One can distinguish three major periods in Lukacs' philosophical
activity:
(a) Philosophical and political activity until Geschichte und Klassen-
bewufltsein (1923).
(b) Literary and philosophical critical works (until 1956).
(c) Ontological works (since 1956). 4
In every period of Lukacs' life one can find philosophical, political, and
literary critical works. Even in his earliest works on aesthetics which he
wrote before World War I there is an 'ontological' tone and manner of
writing. Although it would be a mistake to separate the three periods of
Lukacs' life in any sharp way, one must recognize that Lukacs, as an
historically important thinker, has already been influential in two separate
fields.
Among the students and the new left, particularly in Europe, the name
of Lukacs is understood to mean the author of Geschichte und Klassen-
bewufltsein. Even though Lukacs has repeatedly renounced this early work
it has been widely read and discussed. In the introduction for the re-
issuance of this classic work as a part of the collected works, Lukacs has
described how he judges his development to and beyond Gesehichte und
Klassenbewufltsein. But no matter what Lukacs may say about this early
work, it is nevertheless a book which has had and continues to have great
influence. Among the students of the new left, Lukacs' Geschichte und
Klassenbewufltsein is considered to be one of the classics in the non-
Stalinist Marxist tradition and is the source of much of the theory of
the new democratic movement. For these younger people who are in-
volved in both a political struggle and in the development of a theoretical
position, Lukacs' discussion of the nature of orthodox Marxism, the
strategy of the organization of the workers' movement and the concepts
336 KENNETH MEGILL

of 'Praxis" and 'Verdinglichung" is still the best available. Geschichte und

Klassenbewufltsein is today not only an historically important work - it
is one of the most important works for understanding the theory and
practice of the new left in the 1960's. It is difficult to imagine that even
when this work was published 45 years ago, Lukacs was already 38 years
of age and yet that today its primary appeal is still among the younger
generation.
The works of the second period of Lukacs' career which deal primarily
with literary criticism have already become classics. Both in Hungary
and abroad, directly and through his pupils, his influence continues to
the present day. In the United States and England the second Lukacs of
literary criticism is far better known than the first of political theory and
philosophy.5 During the 1930's and early 1940's Lukacs was forced to
live in the Soviet Union and was not able to play any significant role in
the political developments of his time. It was during this time and from
1944-56 when he was a professor of aesthetics at the University of
Budapest that he was able to write and publish the great bulk of his
literary and critical works. It is true that during this period he also
completed the two philosophical critical works, Der Junge Hegel (written
1938, published 1948) and Zerst6rung der Vernunft (published 1954), but
nothing of the systematic nature of either Gesehiehte und Klassenbewuflt-
sein or of his current ontological works was written.
The appearance of the Aesthetics and the forthcoming publication of
other ontological works marks the beginning of a third important period
in Lukacs' life. After 1956, when Lukaes was forced to retire from the
university and was expelled from the party for his role in the 1956 revolt,
he had the leisure to devote himself to completing the long-delayed
Aesthetics. Of course in this new period there is an obvious continuity
with the earlier periods (particularly with the discussion of 'Verding-
lichung" in Gesehiehte und Klassenbewufltsein and his classical study of
the young Hegel), but the current period is distinguished by the fact that
Lukaes has returned to writing general philosophical works. During the
long domination of Stalinism and dialectical materialism, Lukacs devoted
himself primarily to working out a theory of aesthetics within the Marxist
tradition. The ontological works mark a return to philosophy by a great
thinker who has lived and written enough during the 'interlude' to already
merit consideration as an important thinker of our century. His return
 GEORG LUKACS AS AN ONTOLOGIST 337

to philosophy is a demonstration (as was Geschichte und Klassenbewuflt-

sein) that philosophical work, political activity, and being a Marxist are
not incompatible. Indeed it would seem that, at least in the person of
Lukacs, this combination can produce the highest quality of work.
To yield to the temptation to look upon the ontological works as
historical works even before they have been completed is to miss their
significance as the beginning of a new stage in Marxist philosophy.
Lukacs brings the great intellectual and philosophical tradition of Marxism
in the twenties to the philosophical problems of today. He is the only
Marxist philosopher who was active and creative in the twenties and who
is active and creative today. In his works and in his life we find the
continuity necessary for developing a Marxist philosophy which can take its
place in the philosophical life today. Although the Aesthetics is written in a
style which betrays the fact that Lukacs received his philosophical educa-
tion before World W a r I, it is still a most important and creative contribu-
tion to the philosophical discussion of the 1960's. Precisely because the
Aesthetics is the work of the sixties, it promises to produce yet a third
generation of Lukacs adherents - the philosophical followers of Lukacs.
Instead of undertaking an impossible summary of the Aesthetics, we
shall focus here on two of the important concepts of Lukacs' ontology
- the concept of the every-day and the nature of science and aesthetics -
in an attempt to identify some of the important problems with which
Lukacs deals in his latest period.

I. THE EVERY-DAY

Perhaps the greatest barrier to understanding the latest period is the use
of the old-fashioned word 'ontology' to describe his philosophy. F o r
Lukacs, the Aesthetics is an ontological work although he does not
explicitly discuss the nature and function of ontology in this work. In a
recent interview, Lukacs has said that

We use the pretty word ontology, and I am getting used to it, although one really
should say that he discovers the form of Being (Seinsform) .... The fact that new
phenomena can be fundamentally genetically derived from their every-day existence
(Alltagsdasein) is only one moment of a general context, namely that Being is a process
of an historical kind. Being does not, in a strict sense, exist at all; precisely that Being
which we like to call every-day Being (Alltagssein) is a certain highly relative determi-
nation of complexes within an historical process.6
338 KENNETH MEGILL

Lukacs is an ontologist who denies that Being, in a strict sense, exists

at all. He is an ontologist who insists that to understand Being, one must
investigate the nature of what he calls the Alltiiglich, the everyday. Lukacs'
ontology takes on a peculiarly practical and historical form which sets
him apart from other ontological works such as Whitehead's Process and
Reality or Hartmann's massive ontological works. For him the best ex-
ample of an ontological work is the discussion of the nature of money
in Marx's Capital. An ontological work, because it is a discussion of
forms of Being, must be an historical work. The every-day life of man
must be understood as historically developed. An ontology cannot pro-
vide us with eternal categories which are revealed by reason, insight, or
any other abstract philosophical method. The problem of Lukacs' on-
tology is to discover the Seinsformen which are revealed in our every-day
experience and the forms of human activity which have been produced
in the history of man. 7
Since ontology begins its investigation by considering the nature of the
forms of existence present in every-day life, the first chapter of the
Aesthetics, 'Probleme der Wiederspiegelung im Alltagsleben' (Problems
of Reproduction in Every-Day Life), occupies a particularly important
place in Lukacs' ontological works. In the opening pages of the Aesthetics
he sketches a theory of the nature of the every-day which provides the
possibility for developing not only an aesthetics, but also a philosophy
of science, an ethics, and a philosophy of religion.
The conduct of man in every-day life (Alltagsleben) is most important, but this is an
area which is to a large extent uninvestigated, despite its central position for under-
standing the higher and more complicated forms of reaction .... The every-dayconduct
of man is at once the beginning point and ending point of every human activity (I, 13).
Although Lukacs insists that the nature of the every-day has not been
investigated, it is evident that the problem of every-day experience and
language has been at the center of philosophical discussion in this century.
If we were to look for similar problems which have been the focus of
philosophical investigation, not only could we think of obvious examples,
such as the late Husserl's discussion of the Lebenswelt, but also of the
discussion of the nature of ordinary language and of the naturalism which
has been widely accepted in the English speaking world. In the English
philosophical tradition, those concerned with the problem of the nature of
common sense have also dealt with what Lukacs calls the every-day.
 GEORG LUKACS AS AN ONTOLOGIST 339

Although Lukacs m a y not be correct when he says that he is a lonely

pioneer in treating the nature of every-day experience in contemporary
philosophy, he is still one of the few philosophers to discuss the problem
of the ordinary life as an ontological problem. Lukacs does not start
from every-day life as some kind of given, but attempts rather to under-
stand how every-day life is constituted and how the products of m a n ' s
activity change the nature of every-day life. The tendency a m o n g most
other philosophers in this century who have approached the problem
with which Lukacs deals has not been to take the forms of every-day life
or every-day language as products of social development, but as products
which have a fixity and certainty because they are every-day. The every-
day has priority for Lukacs only in the sense that it is the starting point
and ending point for all h u m a n activity. Being is historical for Lukacs
and one understands the forms which Being takes by an investigation of
every-day life as a product of past h u m a n activity which changes in the
course of history. By quoting Marx (a passage which is relatively un-
known, so that it is necessary to bring it here despite its length), Lukacs
explains why the problem of the every-day has not been satisfactorily
treated in the philosophical tradition:
In his judgment of Ricardo Marx says: "Ricardo correctly (for his time) considered
the capitalistic production as the most advantageous form of production and as the
most suited form for producing wealth. Ricardo wants production for the sake of
production, and he is correct in wanting this. If one wants to claim, as the sentimental
opponents of Ricardo have done, that production is not the goal in itself, then one
forgets that production for the sake of production means nothing else than the
development of human powers of production, that is to say, the development of the
richness o f human nature for its own sake .... It is not understood that this development
of the capacities of the species Man, although it is at first brought about at the cost
of the majority of human individuals and certain human classes, finally breaks through
this antagonism and coincides with the development of the single individual, and
therefore that the higher development of individuality can only be bought by an
historical process in which individuals are sacrificed." Here another reason becomes
clear why we do not possess a philosophically based analysis of every-day life and
every-day thought. This analysis must somehow take a stand, directly or indirectly,
to the antagonistic duplicity of every-day life in capitalism which was sketched by
Marx (I, 67).

An adequate analysis of the every-day is possible, according to the

Marxist Lukacs, when it is possible to have a perspective of a social
system in which social and individual development proceed at the same
rate. As long as society is organized to increase social production (and
340 KENNETH MEGILL

this includes the production in the sciences and arts as well as in other
areas of human activity) at the costs of the individuals in society, then
there will be an alienation of the individual from his products and the
gap between the social products and man's individual life will become
increasingly great. Until capitalism can be overcome, man's every-day
life will always be split into two parts - man as a member of society and
man as an individual who lives his own private life. There can be no
every-day life in which alienation is overcome until this gap between
human activity as a member of society and private life can be overcome.
To discuss the nature of every-day life, for Lukacs, is not only to criticize
the nature of the present-day society, but is also to gain a perspective on
the life in which social production and the development of the human
individual are complementary.
The problem of how a meaningful every-day life is possible in a society
in which social production has been tremendously increased must be at
the center of a Marxist philosophy which is relevant to the social situation
of the sixties. The problem today is not only to make the every-day life
of man more meaningful, but to bring the every-day under man's control.
In its historical development capitalism has been a system which has
created tremendous social productivity but which has not yet been able
to solve the problem of creating an every-day life of quality. Neither have
the socialist societies which have suffered greatly, both theoretically and
practically, from the long dominance of Stalinism been able to create a
society in which man can control his every-day life. It is from philosophers
such as Lukacs that we can begin to have an understanding of the correct
relationship between man's great accomplishments, science and art, and
man's every-day life. In the past Marxist philosophy has concentrated on
the general development of society while ignoring the quality of life which
is being produced. Marxists have traditionally been able to provide more
or less convincing criticisms of social development, but have failed to
develop how man can live in his every-day life.
At one point in the Aesthetics, Lukacs states that the goal of his
'reconstruction' of the every-day

... is therefore a societal state without objectifications. This expression o f course

immediately requires a qualification; we should say: a societal state with a m i n i m u m
o f objectification . . . . The real genesis o f objectification must encompass the humani-
zation o f m a n (Menschenwerden des Menschen umfassen) (I, 180).
 GEORG LUKACS AS AN ONTOLOGIST 341

In Lukacs' more recent ontological works and even in some other parts
of the Aesthetics Lukacs has ceased speaking of a state of society without
objectification. Such a society is both impossible and undesirable.
Throughout his discussion, however, Lukacs insists that the true purpose
of objectification must be the humanization of man. For those who are
familiar with recent Marxist discussion it is clear that in considering the
nature of objectification Lukacs is concerned once again in a much more
detailed and philosophically adequate way with the problem of alienation
which he was one of the first to discuss. By raising the question of the
nature of every-day life Lukacs is continuing in the non-dogmatic
and non-Stalinist tradition of Marxism to which we could name the
three great Marxists of the 1920's - Gramsci, Korsch and Lukacs,
himself.
Lukacs does not understand true human activity only to be possible by
returning to a simple utopian life. Objectification plays an important role
in the humanizing of man. Like Marx, Lukacs recognizes that the develop-
ment of social productivity is essential for a humane society, but that this
social development has until now only been possible by increasingly
destroying the possibility for the human individual to develop. Objecti-
fication is a part of man's life; for example, work and language are forms
of objectifications which are the two most important human activities in
every-day life. But unless work and language can be used both to create
a humane life and to produce social goods there remains a radical sepa-
ration between man as an individual and man as a member of society
(which is one of the most important forms of alienation). To understand
the nature of a society in which man becomes man, it is important to
understand the structure of the objectifications of human activity.
Although Lukacs emphasizes the nature of every-day life, he does not
idealize the present every-day life or argue against objectification as an
important part of human activity. Indeed, science and art are two im-
portant forms of objectification which he considers in the Aesthetics.
The problem of the Aesthetics is to identify the forms of objectification
and how they properly relate to every-day life.

The every-day conduct of man is at once the beginning point and ending point of every
human activity. That is, if one imagines the every-day as a great stream, science and
art branch off from this stream as higher forms of perception and reproduction of
reality, they differentiate themselvesand build their own appropriate goals, reach their
342 KENNETH MEGILL

pure form in their own particular characteristics (which spring out of the needs of
social life) and then, because of their effectiveness, flow back into the stream of every-
day life to affect the life of man (I, 13).
Lukacs' discussion of the every-day is distinguished from others in this
century in that he sees that the stream of every-day experience can only
be considered by considering the reproductions which are an important
part of h u m a n life. By discussing the nature of art in his Aesthetics Lukacs
is considering only one of the forms of reproduction which have been
developed by man. But a work of art is one of the most important forms
of reproduction and art provides a way for m a n to understand important
aspects of his every-day life. In the Aesthetics Lukacs sets out to specify
the manner in which an art work reproduces reality and how art and
science differ as forms of reproduction. The every-day remains the foun-
dation of the entire ontological system. One can only understand the
structure of the every-day by considering the various forms of reproduc-
tion. W h a t Lukacs says of the true work of art can apply to any of the
important forms of h u m a n activity which reproduce reality.
When we look at this complex of problems from the point of view of our conception
of the aesthetics, then we can (well knowing that a static picture cannot possibly
portray the real facts) look at the whole appearances of life as a hilly area out of which
the works of art rise up as a mountain peak or as a chain of mountains. The fact that
we can see countless transit points between hills and mountains does not change the
fact that there is a qualitative gap which separates hills and mountains at all points
(II, 530--532).
The forms of reproduction of the every-day are 'mountain tops' which
emerge out of our h u m a n experience. Lukacs takes the traditional Leninist
theory of knowledge which holds that h u m a n activity mirrors reality
seriously (although he emphasizes that such a mirroring is not a photo-
copy - I, 269) and argues that all systematic h u m a n sciences and art works
are reproductions of reality. Lukacs' realism is consistent b o t h in his
epistemology and in his aesthetics and is based on his understanding of
the nature of the every-day and the forms of reproduction of reality
which are a part of the every-day.

II. S C I E N C E A N D A E S T H E T I C S :
T W O F O R M S OF R E P R O D U C T I O N OF R E A L I T Y

Although Lukacs does not give a detailed philosophy of science (a work

which would require a study comparable to that of his Aesthetics), his
 G E O R G L U K A C S AS AN O N T O L O G I S T 343

discussion o f the characteristics o f the aesthetic is filled with comparisons

o f a w o r k o f art and a w o r k o f science. F o r Lukacs b o t h scientific and
artistic works are forms o f reproduction o f reality. As the m o t t o for his
b o o k states, "Sic tun es, aber sic wissen es nicht" (They do it, but they
do n o t k n o w it) (Marx), the purpose o f studying the forms o f reproduction
is to understand h o w it is that m a n reproduces his life and h o w this
reproduction changes the life o f man. The process o f re-producing reality
in art and science has been going on for centuries; the philosopher brings
to consciousness the central characteristics o f this process.
The question o f the kind o f objectification which takes place in a
scientific w o r k becomes crucial b o t h as a philosophical and as a social
problem. Lukacs describes the difference between the f o r m o f objectifi-
cations in w o r k and science as follows:

Decisive is ... the level of abstraction, the distance from the immediate praxis of
every-day life with which, of course, both science and work in their presuppositions
as well as in their consequences remain bound. The relationship is, however, for science
a more or less broader and more complicated relationship, while work, even when it is
the application of the most complicated scientific knowledge, has primarily an im-
mediate character. The more immediate are the connections to immediate praxis, ... the
weaker, more changeable and less stable are the objectivations. Put more exactly:
the more immediate are the connections, the greater are the possibilities that their ...
fixation does not arise from the essence of the objective object, but rather has a sub-
jective ... basis. That means that the results of science are structurally models (Gebilde)
which are much more independent of man than is work itself. The development is
seen in the fact that in scientific praxis a model generally develops through emphasis
on individual variations that are often expressly recognized (in capitalism) as market
reasons, In capitalism work and the products of work approach the structure of science
(I, 41--42).

The fact that an increasing n u m b e r o f societies (and one might include

some so-called socialist societies a m o n g them) have a d o p t e d the 'structure
o f science' instead o f a structure o f w o r k as the basis for organizing h u m a n
life has m e a n t that h u m a n activity has become increasingly alienated.
Lukacs' o n t o l o g y assumes the i m p o r t a n t task o f investigating the nature
o f an every-day life o f quality and the proper relationship o f objectifi-
cation to every-day life.
I n the Aesthetics Lukacs sometimes discusses science and art as if they
were the only two forms o f reproduction. In his latest w o r k in which he
discusses his ontology more explicitly, however, he has emphasized that
other forms o f objectification are an i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f h u m a n activity.
344 KENNETH MEGILL

Work, for example, is a form of objectification. H u m a n institutions and

laws are objectifications as well. In the Aesthetics Lukacs is concerned
with h u m a n activity which reproduces reality through the great products
of h u m a n activity such as art and science. These forms of reproduction
do not simply reflect every-day life, but have a career and independence
of their own. Lukacs' Aesthetics in its completed form would be a dis-
cussion of this separate career of art as a form of reproducing reality and
the role art has played in man's development. The projected work on
ethics is to be a systematic consideration of the ethical life of m a n and
the norms which govern this life.
Science is the attempt to discover general laws. Knowledge is discovered
by tile method of science and Lukacs suggests that art should not even
claim to give knowledge (I, 513). Science, as we saw earlier, is at a higher
level of abstraction from the every-day praxis than work (I, 41-42), but
nevertheless shares m a n y of its characteristics. Science, unlike art, is not
anthropomorphic and the purpose of science is to understand at a high
level of abstraction the world as an object apart from man.
The de-anthropomorphising of science is an instrument by which man masters the
world: it is a making-conscious, a raising up to a method, that form of conduct which,
as we have shown, begins with work that differentiates man from animal and which
helps make him into a man. Work and the highest conscious form which grows out
of work, scientific conduct, is in this case not only merely an instrument for mastering
the world, but in its very nature is a detour which enables a rich discovery of reality
which enriches man himself and makes him more complete and more humane than he
could be otherwise (I, 158).
The detour which science makes is a necessary detour for the humani-
zation of man. Science always returns to the every-day and the knowledge
gained through science, the knowledge of the world as an object of
knowledge, is used to make the world accessible to man. To use the more
traditional language of ontology,
... science focuses o n Being as s u c h a n d seeks to re-produce it in its purest possible
form which is freed from all subjective additions, while the aesthetic focus is always
on the world of man (II, 294-295).
Science attempts to discover knowledge about the world as a totality.
It tends toward monism and a final unity of all sciences (I, 671). The
aesthetic mirroring of reality, on the other hand, is "essentially pluralistic"
(I, 671), and is concerned with the world of man. Lukacs repeatedly
emphasizes that he is not an expert in science, but it is important that
 GEORG LUKACS AS AN ONTOLOGIST 345

as an aesthetician he develops an ontology which enables an adequate

philosophy of science to be developed. A philosophy of science is one of
the most important unfinished tasks for an ontology in Lukacs' spirit.
Art, unlike science, "is and remains far more definitely than in every-
day life in reference to the subject (Subjektbezogen)" (I, 514). This does
not at all mean that art, itself, is "subjective" in the sense that it is only
the product of an individual person to be perceived individually. In art,
"there arises an atmosphere of specialness" (II, 231). Indeed, art achieves
a totality which is not relative.
Sciencestands objectivelyin uninterrupted continuous interaction with its environment,
through which its character of totality is constantly relativized. Subjectively such
knowledge appears ... as mere approximation, postulation or correction. On the other
hand the objectification of the aesthetic form of mirroring, the work of art, is an
absolutely self-contained, completed totality (II, 232).
The concept of totality has played a central role throughout Lukacs'
writings, particularly in the classic Geschic.hte und Klassenbewufltsein. For
our purposes here it is enough to emphasize that Lukacs has recognized
that the objective scientific knowledge of the world, precisely because it
is general, will always remain relative. The objectification in the realm
of art on the other hand is an objectification which claims absoluteness,
completeness and specialness only because it does not claim to embody
general laws.
The completeness and specialness which is characteristic of art receives
the major portion of Lukacs' attention in the Aesthetics. He not only
shows how the specialness is present in the classical forms of art (such
as literature and painting), but by discussing certain border areas, such
as architecture, music and gardening, he works out the way in which art
is an objectification of the 'special' in man's life. Art is not merely
pleasant, but special in its claim for totality and absoluteness. For Lukacs,
individuality (Einzelheit), specialness (Besonderheit), and generality (All-
gemeinheit) are not merely points of view toward reality, but are
essential characteristics of objective reality, and without the knowledge of their
relations and connections man could not even orient himself in the world, let alone
master the world or put the world subordinate to the goals of man (II, 194).
The special is seen as a mediator between the general and the individual.
A work of art does not merely point out and present the special, but
organizes it.
346 KENNETH MEGILL

What is specifically aesthetic is that the special is not simply postulated as a mediation
between the general and the individual, but as an organized middle. The result is that
the movement which brings about the mirroring is not merely, as is the case with
knowledge, from the general to the individual and back again (or in the opposite
direction), but that the special as the middle is the beginning point and end of the
movement ... (II, 206).

The work of art, in its mediating role between the individual and the
general, creates
an harmonic synthesis between subjectivity and objectivity, between appearance and
essence ... so that ... in a work of art individuality, as well as generality, must be
transcended in specialness (II, 229).

W h a t makes art, art, is the concretizing of the general in the special

and the raising of the individual to the special (II, 667). The world of art
is the world of specialness and in art a unity of subject and object is
achieved.
We have said repeatedly: the world of art is the world of man. In this way the unity of
subjectivity and objectivity is expressed ... (II, 226).

Art is the specific form of h u m a n activity in which the special, rather

than the individual or the general is expressed. Art raises the individual
experiences of an author or a painter, not to a general law, but to
something special which reproduces a totality. A work of art is a form
of objectification important for the every-day, just as is a scientific theory,
but it is a form of objectification which recreates the specialness rather
than the general laws which govern our lives. In a scientific theory it is
inessential who discovered the law or in what manner it was developed;
in a work of art the individual personality and the life of the author or
painter is an important part of the work (I, 790).
As would be expected from the fact that the every-day is the beginning
point and ending point of all h u m a n activity, the work of art returns to
influence our every-day life. Instead of leading us away f r o m the every-
day, the reproduction of an art work leads back to the every-day which
is "truer, more objective, more exact, broader, deeper, more elastic, more
comprehensive, etc." (II, 105). Without the detour of art, just as without
the detour of science, m a n ' s life is not yet fully human. One of the most
important influences of a work of art on every-day life is "the raising of
personal culture, the deepening and preparation of receptivity for every-
thing which can bring about the enriching of the h u m a n species through
 G E O R G L U K A C S AS A N O N T O L O G I S T 347

the development of individuals" (II, 157). Lukacs has planned two further
parts to his aesthetics, which are provisionally called, 'Kunstwerk und
~isthethisches Verhalten' (The Work of Art and Aesthetic Attitude) and
'Die Kunst als gesellschaftlich-geschichtliche Erscheinung' (Art as a Social-
Historical Appearance) (I, 14-15). Judging from the number of projects
which he hopes to complete before finishing the aesthetics, it appears
most unlikely that these two parts will ever be written. However, even
in the two volumes which have been completed, the general outlines of
the manner in which art influences the development of society is clear.
For not only the entire artistic praxis is characterized by specialness, but also, its
continuous streaming into life is an essential moment of human culture (II, 266).
The reproduction of reality in science and art is not merely a reading-off
from the data which are presented to man in his every-day life. There is
a dialectical relationship between the every-day and the reproductions of
reality so that the results of the investigations of art and science change
the very nature of every-day life. Every-day life, art and science are
historical. Lukacs does not glorify the every-day in opposition to the
forms of reproduction, but instead understands that every-day life, as a
human activity, is the result of the reproductions of the every-day working
back on every-day life.
The scientific and aesthetic mirroring of objective reality in the course of human
development, work themselves out, make constantly finer differentiations of mirroring
and find their final fulfillment in life itself. Their special characteristics are constituted
by the direction in which they become ever more precise and fulfill the possibilities
given as social functions. They therefore create in their relatively late developed purity
on which rests the scientific or aesthetic generality the two poles of general mirroring
of objective reality, whose fruitful middle is every-day life (I, 34).
The reflections of reality such as science and art change the character and
nature of every-day life which "is at once the beginning and end". The
ontological works of Lukacs must not only describe the process of ab-
straction and reproduction which are characteristic of art, science, ethics
and religion (I, 14), but must also show in what sense these reproductions
have molded and shaped man's development. Ontology must not merely
be a description of the various forms for mirroring reality, but must also
be a history of the development of the forms of reproduction and how
these forms change the nature of the every-day.
Lukacs' ontology cannot be taken, as was the case with traditional
348 KENNETH MEGILL

ontology, as the working out of the fundamental structures of reality.

His work must be understood as capturing the Seinsforrnen present at
the present stage of historical development. But the 'only' does not mean
a demeaning or relativizing of the philosophical t a s k - instead philosophy
(or ontology, to use Lukacs' word) becomes one of the most important
tasks for developing society. The solution of theoretical questions, to
which Lukacs has devoted much of his life, is not merely an interesting
task, but has an immediate and important impact upon the life of man.
Lukacs has not only been a philosopher, a great thinker who reflects
upon the real nature of things, but has constantly been drawn into practi-
cal political discussion and action. Even more important, he has constantly
served as an example of a Marxist philosopher who has remained true
to the tradition of the working-class movement, while rejecting the
Stalinistic and dogmatic forms which it developed. Lukacs' continued
adherence to the Communist Party, even when it has not wanted to
adhere to him, is based on his belief that philosophy is an activity which
can take place only within the movement for democracy and socialism.
No matter how abstract Lukacs' writings may appear to be, his entire life
is an example for the kind of genuine Marxist philosophy which is neces-
sary if one is to understand the every-day life which is both the beginning
and the end of all human activity.

III. S O M E C R I T I C A L COMMENTS

It is hoped that this sketchy outline of the place of aesthetics and science
in the ontology of Lukacs has given some indication of both the origi-
nality and the importance of this latest phase of Lukacs' life. It is doubtful
if Lukacs will complete his entire ontology, and he admits that he is not
capable of writing one significant part, a philosophy of science. The
forthcoming work on the nature of social existence will focus on the
questions of work, reproduction, ideology and alienation, as well as give
a long and sometimes rather questionable interpretation of the major
tendencies in current philosophy. The Ethics, which is to be the next
major project in Lukacs' ontological works, will be concerned with the
systematic consideration of the nature of human decision and human
choices in every-day life. The every-day life of man is a life which is
determined by the society and historical situation in which man lives.
 G E O R G L U K A C S AS AN O N T O L O G I S T 349

This does not mean that man is not free, but rather that man is determined.
Man is free in the situation in which he lives to choose alternatives which
are open to him and these choices will, in turn, determine the kind of
future alternatives both for him and for others. In this situation, an
ethics, through which men can come to an understanding of the criteria
upon which choices can be made, becomes necessary. Ethics, like aes-
thetics, becomes a possibility in a Marxist sense when the nature of the
every-day is properly understood.
There are some intriguing comments on the nature of ethics in the
Aesthetics which lead one to expect another important contribution to
Marxist theory. 8 Perhaps the development of an ethics, which Lukacs
says is the "mediating middle between legality and morality" (II, 216),
will go a long way toward correcting one of the major failures of Marxist
theory which has concentrated on emphasizing a deterministic view of
history. As Lukacs points out:

The requirements of ethics always appear as demands of the day, as the moment of
decision, as choice. In these moments the personality creates itself and achieves
completeness or is reduced to disruption, to decay (II, 235).

By developing the philosophical basis for understanding the nature of

individual decisions, perhaps Lukacs can help Marxism to escape from
the crude determinism which has made it such an unsatisfactory position
in the past.
The development of Lukacs' ontology is not only a philosophical event,
but is also an important political event. By surviving the days of Stalinism,
during which he engaged in what he calls a 'partisan war' against the
Stalinistic system and devoted himself to the specialized task of developing
a Marxist aesthetics, Lukacs is in a position to continue the great tradition
of Marxist philosophy which began in the 1920's. His Aesthetics shows how
much work must be done before an adequate philosophy for the twentieth
century can be developed. His philosophical work must not be accepted
as if it were a new textbook in Marxism, but as a prod for further real
philosophical investigation into all areas of human activity. As he states
in the opening pages of his first ontological work (and not in false modesty,
but in the spirit which has motivated his whole life), "Hopefully impetus
will be given by the presentation given here so that research will continue
which will change much of what is said" (I, 37). Even in the moment in
350 KENNETH MEGILL

which his philosophical activity surpasses that of any of his associates in

socialist countries and equals that of the great philosophers of our age,
he insists upon seeing his work, not as the conclusion of a philosophical
system, but as a prod for further research and thinking about the world
in which we live.
We are still too near to the creation of Lukacs' ontology to evaluate
fully its truth and importance. We can already say that Lukacs' work
is important now both as an example of Marxist theory and as a general
philosophical work. It is important in the way in which true philosophical
work has always been important - as a spur for further research and
further development. Despite the fact that the first part of the Aesthetics
encompasses more than 1700 pages, Lukacs has not given us a complete
philosophy. The length of Lukacs' latest works does not only deter po-
tential readers, but also makes it difficult to achieve an adequate interpre-
tation. The notion of the every-day, which has played such an important
role in our analysis here, is still neither clearly nor consistently developed.
Lukacs points in the direction which one must go, but does not lead us
there himself. Scattered throughout his work we find many interesting
and provoking suggestions for an analysis of the every-day, but in the
end it seems that one must understand art, science, religion and morality,
both practically and theoretically, in order to give an adequate analysis
of the every-day. Lukacs' monumental attempt shows us how a systematic
philosophy is possible today and that such a systematic philosophy cannot
be the product of one great thinker. A complete philosophy today is
impossible, not only because of the state of knowledge, but also because
of the necessity of combining theory and practice in order to produce an
adequate systematic philosophy.
The systematic aesthetics which Lukacs has already completed will
undoubtedly be the most important part of his personal contribution
to ontology, for it is the one field in which he can combine profound
theoretical understanding with decades of practical work. The rest of his
ontological works will necessarily fail to display the same combination
of practical and theoretical competence. Lukacs as an ontologist has not
written the ontology and one has the impression that neither he nor any
other man could write an ontology of the kind which he sees to be re-
quired today.
The failure to really achieve the goal of a general ontology is perhaps
 GEORG LUKACS AS A N O N T O L O G I S T 351

best seen by the inadequate interpretations which he gives of some other

philosophical positions (such as existentialism and positivism). It is true
that his view of such philosophical positions is often much fairer than
their view of Marxism, but it is clear that Lukacs has had neither the
time nor the opportunity thoroughly to participate in important philo-
sophical developments of the last generation. The failure really to in-
corporate the progressive features of other philosophical positions leads
to an oversimplification and, even more often, to an ignoring of positions
which are important. The failure to see the place of his own work in the
philosophical discussion today leads him to an attempt to give his opinions
about all possible subjects. Lukacs the systematic philosopher is almost
always superior to Lukacs the critic.
The failure to understand other philosophical schools is particularly
unfortunate in those areas in which Lukacs is not an expert, and where
he still insists upon speaking. Particularly the discussion of the nature of
science suffers from an insufficient break with the official dialectical
materialism which has plagued Marxist philosophy. He still speaks of
nature in terms of the formulations of Engels and other Marxist phi-
losophers of nature and, even more unfortunately, he has adopted much
of the philosophy of nature of Nicholai Hartmann. In the end Lukacs
has almost nothing of importance to say about philosophy of science
except to point out the place which a philosophy of science can take in
philosophical research. If this particular side of Lukacs' writings is em-
phasized it is possible to show that he is still a 'traditional' dialectical
materialist. If this is really the case then it would be best to ignore him,
just as most of the philosophy which has been done in socialist countries
in the tradition of dialectical materialism is best treated by a lack of
notice. The ambiguity present in Lukacs' writings enables two traditions
to claim him - one which accepts his arguments in favor of realism in
art and his dialectical materialism as the starting point, and the other
which sees his ontology as a method for developing an open and critical
Marxist philosophy.
Lukacs provides a link with the democratic Marxist tradition and
throughout his life he has worked for a Marxist philosophy of a high
quality. In all periods of his life he has been influential on his associates
and has sought out and encouraged others to do good theoretical work
in the Marxist tradition. The development of philosophical life in Hungary
352 KENNETH MEGILL

since the end of the war is to a large extent the product of Lukacs'
presence, either as a result of his direct influence or in reaction to his
wrifingsP He has shown by word and deed that Marxism does not need
to be identified with Stalinism and that it is possible to be a good Marxist
and to be a good philosopher. The most recent writings by Lukacs will
play an important part in the development of philosophy in any country
which claims to be following the Marxist position. Since his re-admission
to the party, his works are appearing in Hungarian philosophical journals
and we can expect a development of considerable interest in his proposed
ontology in the Marxist tradition.
The study of Lukacs must not only be a study of what he has done,
but of what will become of his ontology as the basis for a Marxist phi-
losophy. Lukacs as an ontologist is an important philosopher who has
indicated a p r o g r a m for philosophical work in the twentieth century. I f
he can escape the fate of other important philosophers who saw their
doctrines adopted by a school which sought to maintain their purity and
in the process became less and less interesting, the latest Lukacs will
perhaps one day be regarded as one of the leading systematic philosophers
of our century. I f the followers of Lukacs continue in the tradition which
he has set, both by personal example and in his philosophical work, then
his works will not be treated as the philosophy, but as a spur to further
research. I f this is done, we can have hope that Marxist philosophy will
once again become an important part of philosophical life in the world
today. 10
REFERENCES

* An article similar to but not identical with this one appeared in the June, 1969,
Serbo-Croation edition of Praxis.
1 Lukacs, Georg, Die Eigenart des ~sthetischen, Teil I, Luchterhand Verlag, 2. Halb-
b~inde, 1963. Volumes 11 and 12 of his Collected Works.
2 Future reference in the text are to the first (I) or second (II) Halbband and the page
number of the Aesthetics.
z See, for example, Heller, Agnes, 'Lukacs' Aesthetics', New Hungarian Quarterly 7,
No. 32 (1966), 84-94; Vera Maslow, 'Lukacs' Man-centered Aesthetics', Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, June, 1967, 542-552; Morawski, Stefan, 'Mimesis,
Lukacs' Universal Principle', Science and Society 32 (1968), 26--38.
4 For a bibliography of Lukacs writings see Benseler, Frank (ed.), Georg Lukacs.
Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag, Luchterhand, 1965. For a discussion of Lukacs' de-
velopment see Watniek, Morris, 'Georg Lukacs: An Intellectual Biography', Soviet
Survey, No. 22 and 23, and Ludz, Peter (ed.), Georg Lukacs. Schriften zur Ideologic
undPolitik, Luehterhand, 1967, pp. 709-719. In English only the book by Victor Zitta,
 G E O R G L U K A C S AS AN O N T O L O G I S T 353

Georg Lukacs' Marxism. Alienation, Dialectics, Revolution, The Hague 1964, seeks to
give a systematic treatment of Lukacs (and then only until 1923). Zitta's failure to
understand even the barest outlines of Lukacs' philosophy, as well as his desperate
anti-communism, makes the entire work less than useful.
5 Of course, one reason for this fact is that only the works of this second period have
been translated into English. The English translations of complete works by Lukacs are:
The Historical Novel, 1962; Studies in European Realism, 1964; Essays on Thomas Mann
1964; Realism in Our Time. Literature and the Class Struggle, 1964.
8 Gesprtiche mit Georg Lukacs, (ed. by Theo Pinkus), Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1967, p. 15.
7 Ibid.,p. 9.
s Agnes Heller, a close associate of Lukacs, has been particularly involved in developing
a Marxist ethics. See for example 'Die Stellung der Ethik im Marxismus', Praxis 2
(1967).
9 See my article 'Philosophy in Hungary', International Philosophical Quarterly, June,
1969, for a discussion of the members of the 'Lukacs' School' in Budapest today.
10 Research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the National Endowment
for the Humanities, which enabled the author to spend eight months in Budapest.
The author wishes to thank those who discussed with him the content of the paper
and particularly those who read and gave helpful criticisms of earlier drafts.