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Module 3 Exercises

The document contains 10 exercises related to game theory concepts. The exercises provide payoff matrices and scenarios involving simultaneous decisions between two or more players. Players must determine their optimal strategies taking into account the other players' possible actions and the payoffs that result from different combinations of moves.

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John gutierrez
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39 views

Module 3 Exercises

The document contains 10 exercises related to game theory concepts. The exercises provide payoff matrices and scenarios involving simultaneous decisions between two or more players. Players must determine their optimal strategies taking into account the other players' possible actions and the payoffs that result from different combinations of moves.

Uploaded by

John gutierrez
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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MODULE 3 EXERCISES

1.) SIMULTANEOUS LEGISLATOR’S VOTES

A votes for a raise


C votes for a raise C votes against a raise C abstain
B votes for a raise 1,1,1 1,1,2 1 , 1 , 0.8
B votes against a raise 1,2,1 -1 , 0, 0 -1 , 0 , 0.8
B abstain 1 , 1.8 , 1 -1, 0.8, 0 -1 , -0.8 , -0.8

A votes for against a raise


C votes for a raise C votes against a raise C abstain
B votes for a raise 2,1,1 0 , -1 , 0 0 , -1 , -0.8
B votes against a raise 0 , 0 , -1 0 , 0, 0 0 , 0 , -0.8
B abstain 0 , -0.8 , -1 0 , -0.8 , 0 -1 , -0.8 , -0.8

A abstain
C votes for a raise C votes against a raise C abstain
B votes for a raise -0.8 , 1 , 1 -0.8 , -1 , 0 -0.8 , -1 , -0.8
B votes against a raise -0.8 , 0 , -1 -0.8 , 0, 0 -0.8 , 0 , -0.8
B abstain -0.8 , -0.8 , -1 -0.8 , -0.8 , 0 -0.8 , -0.8 , -0.8

2.) GUESS THE AVERAGE GAME

BETH
1 2 3 4
A 1 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4
(TIE) (Ann wins) (Ann wins) (Ann wins)
N 2 2,1
(Beth wins)
2,2
(TIE)
2,3
(Ann wins)
2,4
(Ann wins)
N 3 3,1
(Beth wins)
3,2
(Beth wins)
3,3
(TIE)
3,4
(Ann wins)
4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4
(Beth wins) (Beth wins) (Beth wins) (TIE)
DECISION RULE: Based on the payoff bimatrix, the game has Nash Equilibrium, since both Ann and Beth
will have the same number of wins.

3.) TWO BARS

Bar 2 2$ 4$ 5$
Bar 1
2$ 10 , 10 14 , 12 14 , 15

4$ 12 , 14 20 , 20 28 , 15

5$ 15 , 14 15 , 28 25 , 25

Bar 2 4$ 5$
Bar 1

4$ 20 , 20 28 , 15

5$ 15 , 28 25 , 25

Since in this situation, 6,000 tourists and 4,000 natives.

4.) SCHEDULING A DINNER PARTY

Beth Friday Saturday


Ann
Friday 10 , 10 4,5

Saturday 5,4 10 , 10

5.) SELECTING CLASS

Adam selects ITA100


Cindy selects ITA100 Cindy selects FRE100
Bill selects ITA100 2,0,0 1 , 1 , -1
Bill selects FRE100 1 , -1 , 1 0 ,1 , 1
Adam selects FRE100
Cindy selects ITA100 Cindy selects FRE100
Bill selects ITA100 0,1,1 1 , 0 , -1
Bill selects FRE100 1 , -1 , 0 2,0,0

6.) DEADLOCK

2nd Player Cooperate Defect


1st Player

Cooperate 1,1 0,3

Defect 3,0 1,1

7.) STAG HUNT

2nd Player
1st Player Cooperate Hawk

Cooperate 2,2 3, 1

Hawk 1,3 0,0

8.) CHICKEN

2nd Player
1st Player Dove Hawk

Dove 2,2 3, 1

Hawk 1,3 0,0


9.) TWO CARS INTERSECTION

Car B Proceed Yield


Car A

Proceed 100 , 1000 5,5

Yield 5,5 10 , 10

Maximin move for both cars were to yield.

Dominating move for both of them is also to yield.

Their best response is to yield also.

10.) THREE CARS INTERSECTING

Car A proceeds Car A yields

Car B proceeds 100 , 1000 0,5

Car B yields 5,0 10 , 10

Car A proceeds Car A yields

Car C proceeds 5,5 5,5


Car C yields 5,5 10 , 10

Car C proceeds Car C yields

Car B proceeds 100 , 1000 5,5

Car B yields 5,5 10 , 10

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