Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines become irrelevant.

become irrelevant. Hence, to the extent that it has lost its basis for
G.R. No. 101538 | June 23, 1992 approval, it has become unconstitutional.
- The petitioner is invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus: “this
FACTS: doctrine constitutes an attempt to formulate a legal principle which
1. Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines would justify non-performance of a treaty obligation if the conditions
2. Private respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign with relation to which the parties contracted have changed so
corporation with principal office in Minnesota, USA, and licensed to materially and so unexpectedly as to create a situation in which the
do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines exaction of performance would be unreasonable.”
3. October 21, 1986: petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket - the expenses and difficulties he will incur in filing a suit in the
in San Francisco, USA, for his flight from San Francisco to Manila United States would constitute a constructive denial of his right to
via Tokyo and back (Scheduled departure date: December 20, 1986); access to our courts for the protection of his rights. He would
No date was specified for his return to SF consequently be deprived of this vital guaranty as embodied in the
4. December 19, 1986: petitioner checked in at NOA counter in SF Bill of Rights.
airport for scheduled departure to Manila - The lower court erred in not ruling that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
5. Despite previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed Convention is a rule merely of venue and was waived by defendant
that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He when it did not move to dismiss on the ground of improper venue
had to be wait-listed - Lower court erred in not ruling that under Article 28(1) of the WC,
6. Petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati this case was properly filed in the Philippines because the defendant
7. NOA moved to dismiss complaint on the ground of lack of had its domicile in the Philippines
jurisdiction - Lower court erred in not ruling that Article 28(1) does not apply to
- Complaint could be instituted only in the territory of one of the actions based on tort
High Contracting Parties, before:
(a) the court of the domicile of the carrier; ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the
(b) the court of its principal place of business; case
(c) the court where it has a place of business through which
the contract had been made; HELD: NONE
(d) the court of the place of destination.
- Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its principal place RATIO:
of business
- Neither was the petitioner’s ticket issued in this country nor was The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the
his destination Manila but SF, USA Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
8. LC: granted motion and dismissed case otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13,
9. Petitioner appealed to CA 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution
10. CA affirmed the decision of LC No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed
11. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; denied by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with
12. Hence, this petition. the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became
applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955,
Petitioner: President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our
- The provisions in the Convention were intended to protect airline formal adherence thereto, “to the end that the same and every article and
companies under “the conditions prevailing then and which have clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of
long ceased to exist.” He argues that in view of the significant the Philippines and the citizens thereof.”
developments in the airline industry through the years, the treaty has
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the High Contracting Parties,” the provisions of the Convention automatically
Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its
country. passenger.
Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being
The treaty has not been rejected by the Philippine government. The doctrine from the United States to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is
of rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically to render the treaty subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1),
inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act of rejection, usually made which enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be
by the head of State, with a statement of the reasons why compliance with brought.
the treaty is no longer required. In lieu thereof, the treaty may be denounced
even without an expressed justification for this action. Such denunciation is A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article 28(1) as
authorized under its Article 39. Obviously, rejection of the treaty, whether on a jurisdiction and not a venue provision. First, the wording of Article 32,
the ground of rebus sic stantibus or pursuant to Article 39, is not a function which indicates the places where the action for damages “must” be brought,
of the courts but of the other branches of government. The conclusion and underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this
renunciation of treaties is the prerogative of the political departments and characterization is consistent with one of the objectives of the Convention,
may not be usurped by the judiciary. The courts are concerned only with the which is to “regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international
interpretation and application of laws and treaties in force and not with their transportation by air.” Third, the Convention does not contain any provision
wisdom or efficacy. prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that
the phrase “rules as to jurisdiction” used in Article 32 must refer only to
RELEVANT: Issue of Jurisdiction Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with
the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1) as “jurisdictions,” which, as such,
Obviously, the constitutional guaranty of access to courts refers only to cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the time when the
courts with appropriate jurisdiction as defined by law. It does not mean that a damage occurred.
person can go to any court for redress of his grievances regardless of the
nature or value of his claim. If the petitioner is barred from filing his In other words, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention,
complaint before our courts, it is because they are not vested with the jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense
appropriate jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention, which is part of the must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
law of our land. Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be
established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question
By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken
persons performed by aircraft for hire. up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which
the case is submitted.
International Transportation (par. 2 of Article 1): any transportation in
which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure Destination accorded treaty jurisdiction?
and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the
transportation or a transhipment, are situated (either) within the territories of Butz vs. British Airways: The “place of destination” referred to in the
2 High Contracting Parties Warsaw Convention “in a trip consisting of several parts . . . is the ultimate
destination that is accorded treaty jurisdiction.”
Whether the transportation is “international” is determined by the contract of
the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is
carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this
designated terminals “within the territories of two case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the
petitioner’s ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco.
Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage
between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner
to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely
an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a “destination” and an “agreed

The domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where the complaint is
allowed to be filed under Article 28(1). By specifying the three other places,
to wit, the principal place of business of the carrier, its place of business
where the contract was made, and the place of destination, the article clearly
meant that these three other places were not comprehended in the term
“domicile.”

Gravamen of complaint within the coverage of Warsaw Convention?

The private respondent correctly contends that the allegation of willful

It is understood under the article that the court called upon to determine the
applicability of the limitation provision must first be vested with the
appropriate jurisdiction. Article 28(1) is the provision in the Convention
which defines that jurisdiction. Article 22 merely fixes the monetary ceiling
for the liability of the carrier in cases covered by the Convention. If the
carrier is indeed guilty of wilful misconduct, it cannot avail itself of the
limitations set forth in this article. But this can be done only if the action has
first been commenced properly under the rules on jurisdiction set forth in
Article 28(1)