FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING

CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THE IMPORTER OR CONSIGNEE SHOULD NOT BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR ANY
UNDERDECLARATION OR MISDECLARATION MADE BY THE BROKER UNLESS EITHER
A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THEM HAD BEEN ALLEGED AND PROVED

Alvin Mercado V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 167510. July 8, 2015
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
This appeal is taken from the decision of the CA affirming the judgment rendered by the RTC
convicting the petitioner of the violation of Section 3602, in relation to Section 2503, of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP).

The Prosecution established that a shipment from Bangkok, Thailand had arrived at the Manila
International Container Port (MICP) on July 29, 2000 on board the vessel Sumire. The shipment,
which was declared to consist of one 1 x 20 container of assorted men's and ladies' wearing
apparel, textile and accessories in 162 packages was consigned to Al-Mer Cargo Management,
an entity owned and managed by the petitioner. Sensing a possible violation of the TCCP, Atty.
Africa, then the Director of the Customs Investigation and Intelligence Services, issued an Alert
Order directing Customs Special Agent Tibayan to witness the 100% examination of the shipment
by the assigned customs examiner. Meanwhile, Al-Mer Cargo Management filed an Informal
Import Declaration and Entry (IIDE) and Permit to Deliver through its broker, Consular Cargo
Services, describing the items in the shipment as personal effects, assorted mens and ladies
wearing apparel textile and accessories. Upon examination of the shipment by Customs Examiner
Dizon and SA Tibayan they found out that the shipment to contain general merchandise in
commercial quantities instead of personal effects of no commercial value. Accordingly, the
shipment was seized. The Prosecution further established that pending the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, the petitioner sought the settlement of the case in exchange for the payment of the
proper taxes and duties, plus 20% penalty. The Customs Commissioner Villanueva approved the
offer of settlement amounting to P85,000.00 and the release of the shipment with the exception
of the infringing Levi's jeans and assorted bags. But despite the payment of the settlement, the
petitioner and Seña were still charged with the violation of Section 3602 of the TCCP, in relation
to its Section 2503, and with the violation of the Intellectual Property Code. Prosecutor Navera of
the Anti-Smuggling Task Force of the DOJ found probable cause against the petitioner and Seña
for the violation of Section 3602 of the TCCP.

In his defense, the petitioner asserted that he had only accommodated the shipment upon the
request of Seña and Apolonio Viray, President of Worth Brokerage Corporation. According to him,
Seña had represented to him that the shipment contained only personal and household effects.
He further said that he did not have any participation in following up the clearance for the shipment
and that as a licensed customs broker, his signature did not appear in the informal entry. Also, he
executed a deed of assignment over the shipment in favor of Benita Ochoa and that the broker
prepared the import entry declaration.
The RTC found the petitioner guilty as charged. It appearing that accused Lito Sena has not been
apprehended nor voluntarily surrendered, the case against him was archived. On appeal to the
CA, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the petitioner. Hence the present appeal was
filed. The petitioner argues that it was not him, but Rolando Saganay, a licensed customs broker
from Consular Cargo Services, who had made and signed the IIDE; that he did not participate in
following up the clearance of the shipment; that the entry of the cargo was not made through a
false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, letter or paper; that the import declaration was made in
accordance with the shipping documents that were entirely prepared by the supplier from the
country of export; that he relied in good faith on the entries prepared by Saganay, which he
presumed to be true and correct; and that he could not be held criminally liable for the violation of
Section 3601 of the TCCP, an offense for which he was not charged.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not criminal intent is a necessary element to convict a person of violation of
Sec. 3603 (Various Fraudulent Practices Against Customs Revenue) in relation to Sec. 2503
(Undervaluation, Misclassification and Misdeclaration in Entry) of the TCCP.
2. Whether or not a person charged with violation of Sec. 3602 of the TCCP may be held
guilty of violating Sec. 3601 of the same Code.
3. Whether or not the consignee may be held liable for any underdeclaration or
misdeclaration made by the broker.

HELD:
1. YES, criminal intent is a necessary element to convict a person of violation of Sec. 3603
(Various Fraudulent Practices Against Customs Revenue) in relation to Sec. 2503
(Undervaluation, Misclassification and Misdeclaration in Entry) of the TCCP. The act imputed
against the petitioner — making an entry by means of false and fraudulent invoice and
declaration — fell under the first form of fraudulent practice punished under Section 3602 of
the TCCP. The elements to be established in order to convict him of the crime charged are,
specifically: (1) there must be an entry of imported or exported articles; (2) the entry was made
by means of any false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, or paper; and (3) there
must be intent to avoid payment of taxes. After reviewing the records, the Court holds that the
petitioner deserved an acquittal because the Prosecution did not prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It is undisputed that the customs documents (like the IIDE and Permit to
Deliver) were filed with and the imported goods passed through the customs authorities, thereby
satisfying the first element of entry of imported articles. However, the second and third elements
were not established beyond reasonable doubt.

Although there was a discrepancy between the declaration made and the actual contents of the
shipment, the petitioner firmly disavowed his participation in securing the clearance for the
shipment as well as in preparing and filing the import documents. He insisted that being only the
consignee of the shipment, he did not file the informal entry in the Bureau of Customs; that based
on the documents, the filer was Consular Cargo; that he had no knowledge about the entry; that
it was the broker who prepared the import entry declaration; that the papers were submitted by
Viray; and that only Saganay signed the IIDE.

2. NO, a person charged with violation of Sec. 3602 of the TCCP may not be held guilty of
violating Sec. 3601 of the same Code. It is relevant to clarify that the term “entry” as used in
the TCCP is susceptible of any of the following three meanings, to wit: (1) the documents filed at
the Customs house; or (2) the submission and acceptance of the documents; or (3) the procedure
of passing goods through the Customs house. Customs declaration forms or customs entry forms
required to be accomplished by the passengers of incoming vessels or passenger planes are
embraced in the section.

The petitioner was not charged with making an entry of goods at less than the true weight or
measure, or the filing of any false or fraudulent entry for the payment of drawback or refund of
duties, other acts punishable under Section 3602 of the TCCP. He was specifically
charged only of making an entry by means of a false and fraudulent invoice and declaration. The
importance of properly alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the information should
not ever be taken for granted by the State. It is elementary that to try him for and convict him of
an offense other than that charged in the information would be violative of his Constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. As such, he could not be tried for and
convicted of a crime, even if duly proved, unless the crime was properly and fully alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.

3. NO, the importer or consignee should not be held criminally liable for any underdeclaration
or misdeclaration made by the broker unless either a conspiracy between them had been alleged
and proved, or the Prosecution sufficiently established that the importer had knowledge of and
actively participated in the underdeclaration or misdeclaration. Indeed, to allow the act or omission
of Saganay to bind the petitioner would be unacceptable under the principle of res inter alios
acta embodied in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Neither did the information aver that Saganay was at all an accomplice of the petitioner. Under
Article 18 of the RPC, an accomplice is one who, without being a principal either by direct
participation, or by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation, cooperates in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

It would violate the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the charge brought
against him if he were held criminally responsible for Saganay's act or omission on the basis that
Saganay had been his agent in the transaction.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
CONSPIRACY EXISTS WHEN TWO OR MORE PERSONS COME TO AN AGREEMENT
CONCERNING THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY AND DECIDE TO COMMIT THE FELONY

People of the Philippines V. Edgardo Zabala y Balada and Romeo Albius Jr. y Bautista
G.R. No. 203087. November 23, 2015
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
At 8 o'clock in the evening of December 12, 2003, the victim, Joseph Agapay (Joseph), Cesar
Lopez (Cesar), Emmanuel Rumbawa (Emmanuel), Roland Albius (Roland) and Aldrin Zabala
(Aldrin) were exchanging stories at the house of their friend, Catherine Perez. At 9 o'clock in the
evening, Joseph told his friends that he was going home, and the latter offered to accompany him
on his way home. Joseph declined but his friends still decided to follow him after five minutes.
While Joseph was walking along the road, appellants Romeo and Edgardo suddenly appeared
and followed Joseph from behind. When Joseph's friends were about 15 to 20 meters away from
him, the group heard the latter's outcry and saw appellant Romeo place his left hand on Joseph's
shoulder and instantly box the latter, while appellant Edgardo held Joseph's hands from behind.
Joseph struggled to free himself from appellant Edgardo's hold until they fell down the nearby
creek. Despite Joseph's plea, appellant Edgardo continued throwing fist at Joseph and ordered
him to shut up.

Appellant Romeo, who was then standing beside the creek, saw Joseph's friends looking and
approached them and told them to just go home and not to get involved, hence, the group then
all ran away from the crime scene. However, Aldrin and Roland immediately returned to the crime
scene and saw appellants mauling Joseph who then fell to the ground unconscious.Appellant
Edgardo then smashed Joseph's head with a stone.Aldrin and his friends reported the incident to
the police the following day and executed their respective sworn affidavits.

Both Aldrin and Cesar testified that they know appellants as they are neighbors and friends. Cesar
also declared that he would go to appellants' houses three or four times a week talking to them
or their siblings.

Appellant Romeo denied knowing the victim23 and claimed that he was with his wife and child at
their house in Lalawigan, Mercedes which is around 4 1/2 hours drive away from Barangay
Mangcamagong. He admitted knowing prosecution witness Aldrin and that he had been in
Mangcamagong several times because his parents live there. Appellant Edgardo also denied
knowing Joseph. He claimed that on the night of the incident, he was tending his store at Barangay
Mangcamagong; and that he knew prosecution witnesses Aldrin and Cesar because they live in
the same barangay. Geronimo Credo corroborated Edgardo's alibi saying that he and a
companion were having a drinking spree at appellant Edgardo's balcony while the latter was
watching the store.

The RTC found that although it was dark at the time the crime was committed, prosecution
witnesses were able to identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime charged; that
conspiracy between appellants was established and that treachery attended the commission of
the crime. The RTC also issued a supplemental judgment.
Appellants appealed their case before the CA and rendered its Decision which affirmed in toto
the RTC judgment.

Appellants are now before the Court for a final review of their conviction contending that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They also argue that assuming
that they killed Joseph, it was a reversible error to find that treachery attended the killing.

ISSUE:
1. Is there a conspiracy between the appellants in this case?
2. Are the appellants' alibi admissible?
3. Is there treachery in this case?

HELD:
1. YES, there is conspiracy between the appellants. We agree that conspiracy between
appellants was established in this case. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the
actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or
inferred from their acts. It was convincingly shown that both appellants had acted in concert to
achieve a common purpose of assaulting and killing Joseph. Appellants were together when they
followed Joseph walking along the road; appellant Romeo held Joseph by his shoulder and boxed
him while appellant Edgardo held Joseph's hands from behind. Appellant Romeo told Joseph's
friends who saw what was happening to go home and not to be involved; appellants continued
mauling Joseph and when he fell to the ground unconscious, appellant Edgardo smashed his
face with a stone. Appellants walked away together from the crime scene as soon as they had
achieved their common purpose.

2. NO, the alibis are not admissible. Appellants' defenses of denial and alibi were correctly
rejected by the RTC. Appellant Romeo's claim that he was in Lalawigan, Mercedes, Camarines
Norte at the time the crime was committed was not supported and it was not shown that there
was physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene at Mangcamagong, Basud. Appellant
Edgardo admitted that he was at Mangcamagong, Basud attending to his store on the fateful
night, thus it was not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. While appellant
Edgardo presented Credo to corroborate his claim, we agree with the RTC when it found Credo's
testimony doubtful since after knowing that Edgardo was a suspect, he still did not tell his superior
officer in CAFGU Detachment nor went to the Basud Police Station to tell that appellant Edgardo
was tending his store when the incident happened.

Appellants' alibi and denial cannot prevail as against the positive identifications made by the
prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any improper motive to falsely testify against
them. Where there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness
to testify falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

3. YES, there is treachery in this case. The Court also found that treachery attended the
commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended
party might make. Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment
of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.
Joseph was walking home unsuspecting of the imminent danger to his life. Appellants came from
behind and in a sudden and unexpected manner assaulted Joseph who was not able to defend
himself from such attack. In fact, he was continuously mauled until he fell to the ground
unconscious and then appellant Edgardo smashed his head with a stone. Even if the attack is
frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend
himself, there would be treachery.

All told, the RTC did not err in convicting appellants of the crime of murder as all the elements of
the crime are present, to wit: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed that person; (c) that
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248, and (d)
the killing was neither parricide nor infanticide.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THE ACT OF TAKING HOLD OF THE ARMS OF THE VICTIM WHILE ANOTHER
PERPETRATOR WAS ABOUT TO STRIKE HIM WITH A HOLLOW BLOCK IS INDICATIVE OF
A CONSPIRACY

Marasigan V. Fuentes
G.R. No. 201310. January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Mark Reynald Marasigan was walking on his way home. After he had passed by
respondent Reginald Fuentes’ house where some merrymaking had been ongoing, petitioner felt
someone throw an object at him from behind. Turning around, he saw Fuentes, who, upon noticing
that he had been seen, disappeared. A witness then spoke with petitioner, confirming that it was
indeed Fuentes who threw the object at him. While they were speaking, Fuentes appeared with
respondents Robert Calilan and Alain Delon Lindo, as well as another unidentified individual.
Fuentes suddenly punched petitioner on the face, making his nose bleed. Calilan and Lindo also
hit him while their unidentified companion sought to stop them. Fuentes picked up a stone (i.e.,
piece of a hollow block) and attempted to hit petitioner’s head with it, but the latter parried the
stone with his hand, causing his hand to fracture. Fuentes again picked up the stone while Lindo
and Calilan took hold of each of petitioner’s arms. Sensing that Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo were
determined to crush him with hollow blocks from a nearby construction site, petitioner shouted for
help. The witness’ mother came rushing out of their house and tried to pacify the respondents,
but failed. It was only upon the arrival of the neighbors that respondents ceased their assault and
fled.

Fuentes and Calilan were charged with less serious physical injuries. Lindo was cleared of any
liability, since there were no qualifying circumstances to support a charge for murder.

Petitioner argued that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength justified
prosecution for frustrated murder. He added that Lindo’s acts were unambiguous and indicated
his participation in a design to kill him. Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla partially granted
petitioner’s Petition for Review and ordered the provincial prosecutor to file informations for
attempted murder against Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo. Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla faulted
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor for relying on the medico-legal findings to the exclusion of other
evidence. She reasoned that respondets’ acts, as recounted by the witnesses, indicated a design
to kill petitioner, which was only stymied by these witnesses’ arrival. She added, however, that
precisely because of the arrival of these witnesses, respondents failed to complete all the
punching, kicking and stoning needed to kill petitioner. Thus, they could not be charged with
frustrated murder, but only with attempted murder.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. While said Motion for Reconsideration was
pending, the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office filed the Information for attempted murder before the
RTC. Afterwards, Secretary Devanadera issued a Resolution which absolved Fuentes and Lindo
of liability and deemed that Calilan could only be charged with less serious physical injuries.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of taking hold of the arms of the victim while another perpetrator was about
to strike him with a hollow block is indicative of a conspiracy

HELD:
YES, the act of taking hold of the arms of the victim while another perpetrator was about to strike
him with a hollow block is indicative of a conspiracy.
In the present case, it remains that respondent Fuentes attempted to hit petitioner on the head
with a hollow block while respondents Calilan and Lindo made efforts to restrain petitioner. The
fact of successfully blocking the blow does not negate any homicidal intent on the part of the
respondents. Also, it has been held that a perpetrator’s act of holding the victim’s hand while
another perpetrator is striking a blow is indicative of conspiracy. Based on the foregoing,
therefore, it is apparent that all three of them acted out of a common design as is indicative of a
conspiracy.

Therefore, respondents are guilty of attempted murder.

 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PROOF OF A PRIOR MEETING BETWEEN THE PERPETRATORS TO DISCUSS THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME IS NOT NECESSARY AS LONG AS THEIR CONCERTED
ACTS REVEAL A COMMON DESIGN AND UNITY OF PURPOSE

People of the Philippines V. Ireneo Jugueta

G.R. No. 202124. April 5, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Ireneo Flores Jugueta was charged with the murder of Mary Grace Divina and
Claudine Divina. He is also charged, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, with
the attempted murder of Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina, and children Elizabeth Divina
and Judy Ann Divina. San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them,
based on which, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Estores and San
Miguel, thus dismissing the case against the two with the trial proceeding only as to accused-
appellant.

As per the witnesses of the prosecution, it was established—that as the entire family lay down on
the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped
off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained; that with the covering of the wall gone,
the 3 men responsible for the deed came into view, whom he identified as accused-appellant,
Estores and San Miguel; that the 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he
refused to do so; that upon his refusal and despite his subsequent plea for mercy, a gunshot was
fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect
them from being hit; that thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction
where his family huddled together in their hut; that when the volley of shots ceased and the 3 men
left, Norberto saw that his 2 young daughters were wounded; that his wife went out of their house
to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the 2 wounded children
out to the street; and that Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at
the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her. Accused-appellant denied the allegations.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty on both cases. Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments,
accused-appellant appealed to the CA. The CA then rendered a Decision affirming appellant's
conviction for the crimes charged. Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, accused-appellant elevated
the case to this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists a conspiracy between accused-appellant and Estores and San Miguel

HELD:
YES, accused-appellant and Esteros and San Miguel are in conspiracy.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission
of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss
the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common
design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all.
Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together,
each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the
bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children. Accused-appellant and the
two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters.

Therefore, accused-appellant is guilty of 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder,

and the Prosecutor General is directed to immediately conduct a reinvestigation on the possible
criminal liability of Estores and San Miguel regarding this case.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THERE IS AN UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM WHEN HE PUTS
THE LIFE, LIMB, OR RIGHT OF THE PERSON INVOKING SELF-DEFENSE IN ACTUAL OR
IMMINENT DANGER

People of the Philippines V. Cristina Samson

G.R. No. 214883. September 02, 2015
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
The appellant Cristina Samson and the victim Gerry Delmar, her husband, had one of their usual
fights. As testified by appellant herself, she and her two children were watching television in their
home when the victim arrived drunk. Victim asked for his dinner but appellant was not able to
cook food which led to the fight. Christine, the youngest daughter, narrated that she witnessed
the fight between her parents, that as the fight escalated, appellant was able to get hold of the
knife which was placed on the roof and stabbed the victim. The victim fell on the ground and
crawled until he reached the door. Christine remembered that people arrived in their home, helped
the victim board a tricycle and brought him to the hospital. Appellant, on the other hand, ran out
and went to her father and asked for money and left. That was the last night that Christine and
Cherry Lou saw their mother.

The appellant maintains that she was in their house watching television together with her children
when her husband, Gerry Delmar, who was drunk at that time, arrived. He asked her if she had
cooked food already but the latter answered that she had no money to buy food. He scolded and
slapped her. They had an altercation for about ten minutes when Cristina's father arrived and
pacified them. Gerry left but after thirty minutes, he returned and pointed a knife at her neck. She
begged him not to hurt her but continued pointing the knife and told her to stop talking or
otherwise, he will put a hole in her neck. Then, he slapped her face twice. While he was still
holding the knife, she pushed him and he fell on the ground. She took the knife which he was
holding and begged him not to come near her. She was holding the knife near her chest pointed
at him when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the knife went in contact with his
chest. When she saw her husband bloodied, she shouted for help and her father (Rodolfo
Samson) and brother (Allan Samson) came and brought him to the hospital.

ISSUE:
Is the appellant entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense?

HELD:
YES. To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the accused
to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the
second paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression, it means an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person. There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts the
life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense in actual or imminent danger. There must be
actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is present only when the one attacked faces
real and immediate threat to his life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it does not constitute
aggression warranting self-defense. Here, appellant’s perceived peril to her life continued and
persisted until she put an end to it. It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the
knife from her husband, he did not stand down but, instead, continued to move towards her
despite her plea that he should not come nearer. He grabbed her by the arm which could have
precipitated her well-grounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to wrest
the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to presume that, being stronger; he could have easily
overpowered her and eventually killed her.

In the case at bench, the lone stab wound located on the victim's chest supports the argument
that Cristina feared for her life and this fear impelled her to defend it by stabbing him. It was a
reasonable means chosen by her in view of the attending circumstances, to wit: that her stronger
husband, who had earlier pointed the said knife to her throat, approached her and grabbed her
arm, despite her plea that he refrain from coming near her; and that she had no other available
means or any less deadly weapon to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand. She did not
have the time or sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be
used. In predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon the processes of formal reason
but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. When it is apparent that a person has
reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction that act or to mitigate
his liability.

The last requisite to be considered is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. The Court cannot sustain the trial court's observation that it was Cristina who
provoked her husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him cannot be considered a
sufficient provocation proportionate to the act of aggression. She merely capitalized on a window
of opportunity, when her husband removed the knife away from her throat, to save herself from
what she had perceived to be a danger to her life. Anybody, in her situation would have acted in
the same reasonable way.
 FELONIES ANG CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FLIGHT NEGATES HIS PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE AND INDICATES GUILT

People of the Philippines V. Nestor Roxas

G.R. No. 218396. February 10, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
In the evening of October 25, 1995, victim Severino Manalo and Vicente Dimalibot were talking
to each other in front of the house of Alfredo Asi. Then, Vicente saw accused Roxas approach
Severino from behind and suddenly stab the latter thrice with a white sharp bladed weapon. The
three successive stab blows landed on Severino's back, his stomach and on his side. Upon seeing
the victim sprawled on the ground already dead, Roxas immediately boarded a jeep to go to his
sister's place in San Pascual, Batangas before moving to Bicol where he hid from the authorities
for 15 years.

For his part, the accused Roxas invoked self-defense. He recalled that he was in front of his house
when Severino, Vicente and Alfredo arrived. Without warning, Severino boxed the accused.
Roxas asked the reason why he did that to him, but a knife was poked by Manalo. While he and
Severino grappled for its possession, both of them fell and rolled on the ground. It was only when
Roxas stood up that the he noticed that he sustained stab wounds on his left hand and saw
Severino lying on the ground. Fearing retaliation from the family of Severino, the accused
immediately proceeded to his sister's place in San Pascual, Batangas and later escaped to Bicol.

During the trial of the case, the RTC rejected accused Roxas’ theory of self-defense for failure to
show unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Moreover, the trial court declared that the
killing was attended by treachery as the attack made on the victim was sudden, unexpected and
unforeseen. The CA agreed with the finding of the trial court. Hence the instant appeal.

ISSUES:
Whether or not flight of the accused is inconsistent to his plea of self-defense

HELD:
YES. In criminal cases, the accused must prove all the indispensable ingredients of such defense,
to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

Accused fails to establish the requisites of self-defense. First, only the accused himself testified
regarding his allegation that the incident started with a sudden punch thrown at him by the victim;
no other witnesses were presented by the defense to bolster their theory of self-defense. Second,
the location and the number of stab wounds sustained by the victim weakens his defense. To
reiterate, the first stab blow hit Severino's back jibing with Vicente's assertion that the former was
stabbed from behind. Then, when the victim was totally caught by surprise with the initial attack,
the second and third stab blows were delivered. Additionally, the number of wounds suffered by
Severino invalidates the accused-appellant's allegation that he was only defending himself for the
number of wounds inflicted are rather demonstrative of deliberate and criminal intent to end the
life of the victim. Lastly, was his behavior immediately after the incident. In the case at bar, the
accused admitted that upon seeing the victim lying on the ground, he boarded a jeep to go to his
sister's place in San Pascual, Batangas before moving to Bicol where he hid from the authorities
for several years. The accused-appellant's flight negates his plea of self-defense and indicates
his guilt.

Therefore, the plea of self-defense by accused Roxas must fail.

 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THERE IS AN INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE SINCE BASED ON THE WOUNDS SUSTAINED
BY THE VICTIM, THE MEANS USED BY PETITIONER TO PREVENT OR REPEL THE
ATTACK WAS NOT REASONABLE

Rafael Nadyahan V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 193134. March 2, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
This is a review of the CA decision which affirmed the judgment of the RTC finding Rafael
Nadyahan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide for the death Mark Anthony D. Pagaddut.

Accused Nadyahan recounts that he was driving his motorcycle when he was flagged down by
the group of Marcial Acangan, Elias Nabejet, Mariano Binwag and victim Pagaddut. Acangan
asked petitioner for a ride home and the latter readily. Then, Acangan asked that they be treated
for a drink. Petitioner refused and explained that he already spent his last money on drink earlier
in that day. This angered Acangan. Acangan slapped petitioner in the forehead and kicked his
foot. Nadyahan fought back. Nadyahan saw Acangan’s companions pick up pieces of wood, and
he was hit by Nabajet. Nadyahan impulsively took his knife from the windshield of the motorcycle
and ran. He was chased by Acangan’s group. Upon reaching the parking area of the KMS Line,
he was hit by Pagaddut with a belt buckle. As petitioner was starting to lose consciousness, he
thrust his knife and stabbed Pagaddut before both of them fell down.

On the other hand, the prosecution portrayed petitioner as the aggressor. Acangan narrated that
he and Pagaddut had just come from Viewer's Live Band located at the market where they had a
few drinks. Pagaddut went inside the cab of a tricycle with Acangan as driver. While Acangan was
about to start the engine, petitioner who were riding a motorcycle, approach them. After saying
that he has no problem with Pagaddut, petitioner suddenly wielded a knife. Acangan ran and
petitioner chased him around the tricycle. Pagaddut alighted from the tricycle cab and tried to start
the motorcycle engine. When petitioner saw Pagaddut, he kicked the latter in the chest. Petitioner
turned his ire on Pagaddut and stabbed his upper right buttock. Nabejet came and tried to hit
petitioner with a piece of wood but he missed. Petitioner, in turn chased Nabejet. Acangan
followed them and upon reaching the station of the KMS Line, he saw petitioner pull the knife from
Pagaddut's body.

Accused Nadyahan pleaded self-defense. After the trial, the RTC ruled that petitioner is not the
aggressor. However, the RTC found that there is an incomplete self-defense since based on the
wounds sustained by the victim, the means used by petitioner to prevent or repel the attack was
not reasonable. On appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Nadyahan acted in self-defense.

HELD:
NO, accused Nadyahan did not act in self-defense. The elements of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense are the following: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. While the SC subscribes with the finding
of the trial court that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of petitioner, the following circumstances, as cited by the appellate court,
negate the presence of a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. First,
there is intrinsic disproportion between a knife and a belt buckle. Second, physical evidence
shows that the accused-appellant suffered only a lacerated wound on the forehead. Third, the
victim Pagaddut and his companions were already drunk before the fatal fight. This state of
intoxication, while not critically material to the stabbing that transpired, is still material for purposes
of defining its surrounding circumstances, particularly the fact that a belt buckle and a piece of
wood might not have been a potent weapon in the hands of a drunk wielder. Fourth, and as the
trial court aptly observed, the knife wounds were all aimed at vital parts of the body, thus pointing
a conclusion that the accused-appellant was simply warding off belt buckle thrusts and used his
knife as a means commensurate to the thrusts he avoided.

In conclusion, the RTC correctly ruled that there was incomplete self-defense that would mitigate
the guilt of accused Nadyahan.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF FREEDOM AND INTELLIGENCE AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME EXEMPTS THE ACCUSED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

People of the Philippines v. Joel J. Galamay

G.R. No. 206917. September 2, 2015
Notice

FACTS:
Appellant Joel Galamay was charged with murder and multiple frustrated murder. He hacked
several times Raymunda Ramos, Teresita, Elpidio, Pearl Lalaine, Crystal Mae all surnamed
Ganotisi with an ax, inflicting upon Ramos bodily injuries which caused her death and that of the
other victims who did not die because of timely medical attendance.

Teresita and her two daughters, Pearl Lalaine and Crystal Mae, were all sound asleep in one of
the rooms of their house. All of a sudden, accused-appellant Galamay, who was then holding an
ax, entered the room. Accused-appellant without warning struck Teresita and her daughters with
the ax. Meanwhile, the shouting of Teresita caught the attention of her father-in-law, Elpidio, who
lived nearby their house. Elpidio ran towards the house of Teresita and upon arriving thereat he
saw accused-appellant Galamay hacking Raymunda Ramos, the maid of Teresita, with an ax in
the living room of the house. Elpidio was also hacked with an ax. Thereafter, Elpidio, Teresita,
Pearl Lalaine, Crystal Mae and Raymunda Ramos were rushed to the provincial hospital. They
were confined at the hospital for several days. Except for Raymunda Ramos, all the other victims
survived.

Appellant proffered insanity as a defense to exempt him from criminal liability. He testified that he
had been hearing voices — those of evil spirits, a dwarf and little dolls — since his teenage years
when he started taking prohibited drugs and other illegal substances. He further testified that he
could not recall because he was in a dark place and could not see. He said he only saw a lot of
figures such as dogs and flying ducks.

For the death of Ramos, he was convicted of murder qualified by treachery. Appellant was also
found guilty of three counts of frustrated murder qualified by treachery for the injuries sustained
by Teresita Ganotisi and her two daughters, Pearl Lalaine and Crystal Mae. For the injuries
sustained by Elpidio, appellant was found guilty of attempted homicide.

The appellate court found appellant guilty only of homicide, instead of murder for the death of
Ramos. The appellate court admitted the plea of insanity proffered by appellant. Nevertheless, it
still found him guilty of homicide, frustrated murder and attempted homicide. Thus, he was not
exempt from any criminal liability.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not all mental disorders exempt an accused from criminal liability.
2. Whether or not the swift and unexpected manner in which the appellant executed the
crime constitute treachery.
HELD:
1. NO, not all mental disorders shall exempt an accused from criminal liability especially if it
has been shown that he was not completely deprived of freedom and intelligence at the time of
the commission of the crime. Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for one of the
circumstances which will exempt one from criminal liability which is when the perpetrator of the
act was an imbecile or insane, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. This
circumstance, however, is not easily available to an accused as a successful defense. Insanity is
the exception rather than the rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the
presumption is that every human is sane.

In the instant case, although it is clear from the Reports of the NCMH that appellant is suffering
from a mental disorder, his illness does not exempt him from criminal liability. Proof of the
existence of some abnormalities in the mental faculties will not exempt the appellant from
culpability, if it has been shown that he was not completely deprived of freedom and intelligence
at the time of the commission of the crime. Hence, from the above, it is clear that the defense
failed to overcome the presumption of sanity and to prove that appellant was insane at the time
he committed the crime.

2. YES, an act of the accused that was so swift and unexpected that it did not give the
unarmed and unsuspecting victim an opportunity to resist or defend herself constitutes treachery.

The attending circumstances proven satisfy the two elements of treachery. Treachery is present
when the following conditions are present: (1) the employment of such means of execution that
gave the one attacked no opportunity to defend oneself or to retaliate and (2) deliberate or
conscious adoption of the means of execution.

In the instant case, we find that the trial court correctly found the presence of treachery. The
manner in which the appellant executed the crime was so swift and unexpected that it did not give
the unarmed and unsuspecting Raymunda an opportunity to resist or defend herself. What
witness Elpidio saw when he came to the aid of the victims supports the theory that Raymunda
was defenseless when appellant attacked her at the dead of night. The manner in which appellant
carried out the attack on the Ganotisis, for which he was convicted of murder due to the presence
of treachery, could not have been different from the manner in which he attacked Raymunda.
That the manner of attack could not have been different is inconceivable, considering that the
attacks were done in succession and in a single episode.

Hence, treachery was present in the killing of Raymunda Ramos.

 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
INSANITY MUST BE PRESENT AT THE TIME THE CRIME HAD BEEN COMMITTED TO BE
AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

Solomon Verdadero y Galera V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 216021. March 2, 2016
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision finding accused
Solomon Verdadero yGalera guilty of the crime of Homicide for killing Romeo B. Plata (Romeo).
On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00pm, Maynard Plata and his father Romeo were at the Baggao
Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo, they went there to report that Verdadero had stolen
the fan belt of their irrigation pump. After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the
three men made their way home on a tricycle but stopped at a drugstore. Romeo proceeded
towards a store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store,
Maynard saw Verdadero stabbed Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.
Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of a Rambo
knife. He again struck Romeo's upper back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help
his father but Verdadero attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself using a small stool,
which he used to hit Verdadero in the chest. Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to
seek assistance. The responding police officers arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie
brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring him to the hospital. Romeo, however, died
upon arrival. Based on the Post-Mortem Examination Report, his cause of death was
cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and
hack wounds.

Verdadero invoked insanity. He said that he had been an outpatient of the hospital’s Psychiatric
Department as he claimed to hear strange voices and had difficulty in sleeping. Sometime in
2001, Miriam Verdadero, Verdadero's sister, again brought him to the Psychiatric Department
after he became violent and started throwing stones at a tricycle with a child on board. Verdadero
was confined for two (2) months and was diagnosed to be suffering from mental depression. He
was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications to address his mental illness.
Verdadero would irregularly consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic disease.

RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide. The RTC ruled that
the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish the presence of
treachery and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court, however,
opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial court
posited that Verdadero was unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the
time he stabbed Romeo or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with
the commission of the crime. The CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. Hence, this
present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed to be
considered an exempting circumstance.
HELD:
YES. To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that he
had suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane
person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The
defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved for there is a presumption that the acts
penalized by law are voluntary. In the case at bench, it is without question that Verdadero was
suffering from schizophrenia and the only thing left to be ascertained is whether he should be
absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental state.

A showing that an accused is suffering from a mental disorder, however, does not automatically
exonerate him from the consequences of his act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.

The standard in upholding insanity as an exempting circumstance is when there is a complete

deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts
without the least discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is
a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity
as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

Insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of
the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he must be adjudged guilty for the said
offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of
insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence
because of his mental condition or illness; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must
be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense.

In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the crime because such
defense is in the nature of a confession or avoidance. As such, he is duty bound to establish with
certainty that he was completely deprived, not merely diminished, of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime. Failing which, Verdadero should be criminally punished for impliedly
admitting to have stabbed Romeo to death.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THE DEFENSE OF ACCIDENT PRESUPPOSES LACK OF INTENTION TO KILL

People of the Philippines V. Manuel Macal

G.R. No. 211062. January 13, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Auria Macal is the legitimate wife of accused Manuel Macal with whom he begot two children.
The family just arrived home from the fiesta. The couple was accompanied by Auria’s mother,
Angeles, and some friends. Auria and Manuel went straight to their bedroom while the rest of the
group stayed at the living room. Shortly, Auria cried for her mother’s help. Angeles and her
companions raced towards the bedroom, forced open the door of the bedroom, and saw a
bloodied Auria on one side of the room with with a stainless knife stabbed on the upper left portion
of her chest. Next to Auria was the accused Manuel who was then trying to stab himself with the
use of an improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle). Auria was immediately taken to a hospital, but
was pronounced dead on arrival. The accused jumped over the fence and managed to escape
before the policemen could reach the crime scene.

For his part, accused raised the defense of accident and invoked Articles 12(4) and 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. He claimed that he saw his wife and a man seated beside each other
conversing. Furious by what he had seen, Manuel went out of the room, got a knife and delivered
a stab blow towards the man but the latter was shielded by Auria. In the process, the stab blow
landed on Auria. After Auria was accidentally stabbed, the man ran outside and fled.

The lower courts gave credence to the evidence established by the prosecution and rejected
accused Manuel’s defense. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of accident may be appreciated when there is intent to kill on the part
of the accused.

HELD:
NO, the lower courts did not err in disregarding the defense of accident by Manuel.

Article 12 (4) of the RPC provides that to release the accused-appellant from criminal liability, the
following essential requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance must be proved: (1) a
person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere
accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it.

The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill. This certainly does not hold true in
the instant case based on the testimony of the accused that he intended to kill the man who was
allegedly with his wife. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who were then within hearing
distance from the bedroom, testified that they distinctly heard Auria screaming that she was going
to be killed by the accused. Further was his actions immediately after the incident. Instead of
taking his wife to the hospital, which should be the natural reaction of the spouse, accused Manuel
came up with an improvised bladed weapon that he could use to hurt himself and later ran away
from the crime scene leaving Auria's relatives and neighbors to tend to his dying wife is indicative
of his guilt.

On the other hand, Article 247 necessitates the proof of the concurrence of the following elements:
(1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter)
or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. Among the three
elements, the most vital is that the accused-appellant must prove to the court that he killed his
wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

As disclosed by the accused, when he saw Auria with a man, the two were just seated beside
each other and were simply talking. Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is
not applicable in the present case.

Therefore, the accused Manuel failed to establish his defense of accident since the elements of
Art. 12(4) and 247 were not duly proven.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A PERSON INVOKING THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE MUST SHOW THAT THE
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE REDUCED HIM TO A MERE INSTRUMENT

People of the Philippines V. Roderick Licayan

GR No. 203961. July 29, 2015
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

FACTS:
This involves the case of kidnapping for ransom charged against Roderick Licayan, Roberto Lara
and Rogelio Delos Reyes committed against Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay. During the
trial, Co identified Delos Reyes as one of the perpetrators of the kidnapping. On the other hand,
Delos Reyes testified that he was forced to guard the victims by Tata Placio, which the latter did
by pointing a gun at him. According to Delos Reyes, the real culprits are Tata and Allan Placio.
The RTC convicted all the accused of the crime as charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
conviction. Hence, this appeal to the SC where Delos Reyes reiterates his defense that the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear was present in his case.

ISSUE:
Is the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear present in this case?

HELD:
NO, the existence of the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear was not proven by clear
and convincing evidence. It is settled that a person invoking the exempting circumstance must
show that the irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will
but also against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending; and it must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death
or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. A speculative,
fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future injury, is insufficient. Such fact may be determined
through the deportment of the accused. The matter of assigning values to declarations on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available
but not reflected on the record.

Here, the trial court even expressly stated that it observed the demeanor of Delos Reyes when
he testified and found that he is obviously lying through his teeth. This is in contrast to the
testimony of Co which the trial court described as very clear, positive and straightforward. Even
without the advantage of being able to observe the demeanor of Delos Reyes, however, a mere
examination of the transcript of his testimony convinces us of the hesitation and untruthfulness of
his testimony. Delos Reyes kept on changing details and correcting himself even without
inducement from opposing counsel. The content of the testimony was itself incredible. This Court
finds it hard to believe that a person who accidentally discovers kidnap victims would be held at
gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said victims; or that Delos Reyes did not find it unusual to
see a woman with her hands tied.

Thus, the accused is guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
IN ACTING UNDER AN IMPULSE OF UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR THREAT OF FUTURE
INJURY IS NOT ENOUGH

Adina B. Manansala V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 215424. December 9, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
On May 31, 1999, private complainant Kathleen L. Siy, former Vice President for Finance of UMC
Finance and Leasing Corporation (UMC), instructed her secretary, Marissa Bautista, to withdraw
via ATM the amount of P38,000.00 from her Metrobank and BPI bank accounts. However,
Bautista was not able to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so she took it upon herself
to get such amount from the petty cash custodian of UMC instead, but she forgot to inform Siy
where she got the money. On June 9, 1999, UMC Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao
informed Siy that as per the Petty Cash Replenishment Report of the same date prepared by
UMC Petty Cash Custodian Manansala, she allegedly made a cash advance in the amount of
P38,000.00 which remained unliquidated. It was only then that Siy found out what Bautista had
done, and she immediately rectified the situation by issuing two (2) checks to reimburse UMC's
petty cash account. As the checks were eventually encashed resulting in the replenishment of
UMC's petty cash account, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to revise the subject report by deleting
the entry relating to Siy's alleged cash advance, to which Manansala acceded. On June 11, 1999,
Lacanilao reported the incident to UMC President Conrado G. Marty.

Sometime in March 2000, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to retrieve the subject report, re-insert
the entry relating to Siy's alleged cash advance therein, reprint the same on a scratch paper, and
repeatedly fold the paper to make it look old. On the basis of the reprinted subject document, Siy
was administratively charged for using office funds for personal use. On April 18, 2000, Siy was
terminated from her job and Lacanilao succeeded the former in the position she left vacant. The
foregoing prompted Siy to pursue criminal charges against Marty, Lacanilao, and Manansala for
Falsification of Private Documents. Eventually, the charge against Marty was withdrawn.

In her defense, Manansala maintained that she was just following Lacanilao's orders as the latter
is her superior who approves her work. She added that when Lacanilao instructed her to reprint
the subject report, she was apprehensive to follow because she suspected something, but
nevertheless acquiesced to such instruction.

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Manansala's
conviction for Falsification of Private Documents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear may be appreciated when there is
a threat of future injury.

HELD:
NO. "Acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear," to be appreciated in favor of an accused,
the following elements must concur: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear
must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that
committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death
or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.

In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in committing a
falsity in the preparation of the subject report as she did not know the repercussions of her actions,
nothing would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that matter, threatened her
with loss of employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and
imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do what she
did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THERE IS TREACHERY WHEN THE MANNER OF EXECUTION OF THE CRIME LEFT THE
VICTIM WITH NO OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND HIMSELF OR EVEN TO RETALIATE

People of the Philippines V. Antonio Edaño and Nestor Edaño

GR No. 206970. July 29, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
This involves a case of murder committed by Antonio and Nestor Edaño against Leonardo
Dabalos. During trial, the prosecution presented the eyewitness Fernando Layson testifying that
he saw Antonio stabbed Leonardo several times while Nestor was holding him on both arms. The
RTC and CA, on appeal, convicted both the accused of the crime as charged. Hence, this appeal
to the SC.

ISSUE:
Is the qualifying circumstance of treachery proven?

HELD:
YES, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Here, treachery is evident from the fact that the method employed by the accused
rendered Leonardo helpless. Both of Leonardo’s arms were held by Nestor while accused-
appellant was stabbing him. Clearly, this manner of execution left the victim with no opportunity
to defend himself or even to retaliate.

Thus, both the accused are guilty of murder qualified by the circumstance of treachery.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
HIDING FIRST THEN BLINDSIDING THE VICTIM CONSTITUTES TREACHERY

People of the Philippines V. Rodelio Llobera

G.R. No. 203066. August 5, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Rodelio Ofiza Llobera was charged with the murder of Cristituto Biona, Jr..
The prosecution offered the testimonies of the relatives of the victim who witnessed the shooting
incident firsthand. According to said testimonies, a commotion took place in front of their house.
When it was over, they, including the victim, went out of the house to find out what happened. It
was then that accused-appellant, who suddenly emerged from a nearby house armed with an
improvised shotgun (sumpak), shot the victim on the left side of his body that led to his death.
The defense avers, presenting the testimony of the accused-appellant, that accused-appellant
was at his house with his family and certain visitors planning a swimming event.

The RTC rendered a judgment of conviction for murder, holding that treachery attended the killing
of the victim for the prosecution’s evidence shows that accused-appellant suddenly and
unexpectedly appeared and shot the victim who did not sense any danger upon him. Accused-
appellant appealed to the CA, questioning the appreciation of treachery by the trial court. The CA,
however, affirmed his conviction, likewise upholding the finding of treachery, reasoning that
accused-appellant’s mode of attack was such that the victim appeared not to have seen him prior
to, during, or after the attack, leaving him no chance to defend himself.

ISSUE:
Whether or not hiding first then blindsiding the victim constitutes treachery

HELD:
YES. Hiding first then blindsiding the victim constitutes treachery.

The RPC, in Article 14(16), defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is done
in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no
chance to resist or escape.

In the present case, the fact that accused-appellant hid behind the victim’s neighbor’s house first
and then blindsided the victim shows his conscious effort to adopt a deliberate attack which
affords no warning to the victim. Furthermore, the use of a shotgun against an unarmed victim is
undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the victim the chance to fend off the offender.

Therefore, the accused-appellant is guilty of murder.

 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
AN ACT WHICH IS SWIFT, SUDDEN AND UNFORESEEN CONSTITUTES TREACHERY

People of the Philippines V. Reggie Villariez Alias "Toti"

G.R. No. 211160. September 02, 2015
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
According to the prosecution, while attending the burial of the uncle of Perla (wife of Enrique
Olimba), a gun explosion was heard. It turned out that Enrique was shot. Ana and Randy,
daughter and son of the victim, saw appellant Reggie Villariez alias "Toti" holding a gun at the
back of Enrique, accompanied by his brothers Amado and Tomas. Ana was also able to ask her
father the identity of the person who shot him. At the brink of death and with a voice she could
hardly hear, her father uttered the name "Toti." The three accused then fled on a motorcycle.
Thereafter, Enrique's body was brought to their house and Dr. Bermejo, the Rural Health
Physician was summoned. He eventually died. Dr. Bermejo testified that the victim's cause of
death was severe hemorrhage, antecedent to a gunshot wound with the entrance of the bullet at
the back. The accused together with Tomas and Jalbuna denied the allegations of the
prosecution's witnesses.

The RTC found Villariez guilty of homicide. However, it found that the prosecution failed to
establish the existence of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and taking advantage of
strength. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. It appreciated the qualifying
circumstance of treachery hence convicted the accused of murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of shooting a person from the back constitutes treachery.

HELD:
YES, an act depriving the victim of any defense constitute treachery. Thus, it qualifies the act of
killing to murder.

The Court agrees with the CA in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving
the victim of any chance to defend himself.

Here, Randy witnessed that it was Villariez who shot his father at the back. Enrique, deep in
thought while listening to the burial service, was unprepared and had no means to put up a
defense. Enrique was shot unexpectedly which insured the commission of the crime without risk
to Villariez. This treacherous act qualified the killing to murder.

Therefore, the shooting that was swift, sudden and unforeseen which placed Villariez at a position
which afforded him no risk arising from a defense which the victim might have made is appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance of treachery.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THERE IS TREACHERY WHEN THE CULPRIT EMPLOYED MEANS, METHODS, AND
FORMS OF EXECUTION WHICH TENDED DIRECTLY AND SPECIALLY TO INSURE THE
OFFENDER'S SAFETY FROM ANY DEFENSIVE OR RETALIATORY ACT ON THE PART OF
THE OFFENDED PARTY

People of the Philippines vs. Bonifacio Dandanon

G.R. No. 196258, September 28, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J

FACTS:
As recalled by the witnesses, victim Prosecutor Godofredo R. Paceño, Jr. boarded a multicab. A
few meters away, accused Dandanon boarded the same and seated right across Paceño, Jr.
While traversing the highway, accused suddenly pulled out a gun and shot Paceño twice. Paceño
sustained multiple gunshot wounds on his head, thereby causing his instantaneous death.

Both the RTC and the CA were that treachery attended the killing of the victim which qualified the
crime to murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not treachery is present when the victim is unarmed.

HELD:
YES. The essential elements of murder are the following: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the
accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. One of the qualifying
circumstances is treachery which requires the concurrence of these elements: (1) the culprit
employed means, methods, and forms of execution which tended directly and specially to insure
the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which
means that no opportunity was given the latter to do so; and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him.

All elements of murder are extant herein. Foremost, the prosecution witnesses positively identified
the accused as the victim’s killer who shot the latter twice on the head. Second, treachery is
evident in the following circumstances: (a) he armed himself with a gun; (b) he consciously
boarded the same multicab with Paceño and sat across the latter; (c) Paceño was unarmed and
unaware of any impending attack against him; (d) without any provocation, accused-appellant
suddenly pulled out his gun, and aimed and shot Paceño twice in the head, leaving the latter with
no means to defend himself, much less retaliate. Lastly, the killing was neither parricide nor
infanticide.

In conclusion, the lower courts correctly convicted the accused for the murder of the victim.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
TREACHERY EXISTS WHEN THE OFFENDER COMMITS ANY OF THE CRIMES AGAINST
PERSONS, EMPLOYING MEANS, METHODS, OR FORMS IN THE EXECUTION THEREOF
WHICH TEND DIRECTLY AND SPECIALLY TO INSURE ITS EXECUTION, WITHOUT RISK
TO HIMSELF ARISING FROM THE DEFENSE WHICH THE OFFENDED PARTY MIGHT MAKE

People of the Philippines V. Oscar Parba y Solon

G.R. No. 214506, October 19, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
The prosecution presented eyewitness Jesus Catapan, a security guard of the Salazar Institute
of Technology (SIT). According to Catapan, he was buying cigarettes from a vendor stationed
near the main gate of SIT Elementary Department. Suddenly, accused Parba, who was then
seated beside the vendor, stood up, pulled a gun from his belt bag, and shot a man at the back
of the head while the latter was helping his daughter disembark from a motorcycle. At that
instance, the victim, later on identified as Mark P. Navaja, fell to the ground, while accused Parba
and a companion exited towards the highway, chased by the fellow security guards of Catapan.
The accused was arrested the following day.

Accused Parba appeals his conviction, denying the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not attacking an unsuspecting victim constitutes treachery.

HELD:
YES. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish
the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused
killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide. One of the
qualifying circumstances is treachery which exists when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Parba's attack on Navaja was so sudden and
executed in such a manner that Navaja was caught off-guard on what Parba intended to do.
Eyewitnesses testified that at the time of the attack, Navaja was helping his child alight from the
motorcycle when Parba, without warning, shot him at the back of his head. It is inconceivable how
Navaja could have expected the attack since clearly, he merely intended to take his daughter to
school.

Therefore, the lower courts correctly convicted accused Parba of murder.

 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
KILLING THE VICTIM WITH A BOLO AT NIGHT TIME AND WHILE HE WAS SLEEPING
CONSTITUTES TREACHERY

People of the Philippines V. Apolonio Babor a.k.a. "Julito"

G.R. No. 215319, October 21, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
One evening, while Marife Babor, wife of the accused-appellant Apolonio "Julito" Babor, together
with her parents and children, were sleeping, Marife was awakened by some noise and saw her
husband bringing a bolo. She approached him but then, the accused-appellant stooped down and
hacked her left foot. Immediately thereafter, accused-appellant hacked her father, Bartolome
Amahit, who was still asleep, hitting his head. Upon being hit, Bartolome squatted and then fell
down lying. While Bartolome was lying down, accused-appellant continued hacking him, hitting
Bartolome's face and arm after which the accused-appellant left the house through the door. Dr.
Brun-Salvatierra’s post-mortem examination on Bartolome Amahit's body shows that when she
conducted the examination, the body was already in the state of rigor mortis. The doctor
concluded that victim died due to hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple hacking wounds.
Accused-appellant denied killing his father-in-law. The RTC rendered a decision convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime of murder. The trial court considered that the killing was qualified
by treachery since the victim was sleeping when he was hacked by the accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant appealed the RTC Decision. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the decision of the CA.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the killing of the victim with a bolo at night time and while he was sleeping
constitute treachery.

HELD:
YES, killing the victim with a bolo at night time and while he was sleeping constitutes treachery.

With respect to the presence of treachery in the killing of Bartolome, which is a qualifying
circumstance necessary for a murder conviction, paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in
the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order
for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.

In this case, accused-appellant killed the victim with a bolo at night time and while he was
sleeping. Clearly, he was not in a position to defend himself. Also, it is evident that accused-
appellant consciously and deliberately waited for the victim to sleep, returned to the house late at
night and armed himself with a bolo to ensure the success of his atrocious act.
 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
TREACHERY IS APPRECIATED AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IF THE ATTACK WAS
SO SUDDEN AND SO UNEXPECTED THAT THE DECEASED HAD NO TIME TO PREPARE
FOR HIS OR HER DEFENSE

People of the Philippines V. Salibad y Dilo

G.R. No. 210616, November 25, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Eddie Salibad y Dilo shot the victim, Raymundo Dacuyan y Cabannag thereby,
inflicting a gunshot wound on his abdomen that caused his death.

Manuel Binwag and Diego Aclibon went to a mine site and asked permission from Raymundo
Dacuyan, the security guard of the place, to allow them to dig scrap iron. Raymundo allowed them
to dig but stopped them in the afternoon. After talking to them to stop already, Raymundo turned
around to go back to his post. At that moment, appellant Eddie Salibad suddenly appeared in
front of Raymundo and instantaneously shot him hitting him in the middle right portion of his
abdomen. Raymundo was able to prevent a second shot from being fired at him but fell to the
ground in that instant. The second shot hit the wall. Manuel and Diego ran away after they saw
Raymundo fall down. While running, they heard another gunshot. According to the autopsy, the
death of Raymundo was bleeding secondary to the gunshot injury.

Appellant, however, denied having shot the deceased guard and of seeing and knowing any of
the witnesses who positively identified him, namely: Manuel and Diego.

The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-appellant filed an appeal
before the CA which affirmed the RTC Decision convicting accused-appellant.

Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the decision of
the lower courts.

ISSUE:
Whether an attack that was so sudden and so unexpected that the victim had no time to prepare
for his or her defense constitute treachery?

HELD:
YES, there is treachery if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the victim had no
time to prepare for his or her defense.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the direct employment
of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. The Court has ruled that the essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. In
People v. Perez, it was explained that a frontal attack, such as the shooting in this case, does not
necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack
was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her
defense.

In this case, the sudden appearance of accused-appellant while Raymundo was preoccupied
talking to Manuel and Diego and the use of a firearm resulted in a situation where the attack
caught the victim by surprise depriving him of the chance to put up any defense before the fatal
shot was fired. While he was able to parry a second shot, the first shot fired by appellant has
already inflicted a fatal wound in the victim's body.

Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated in this case.

 FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A SUDDEN ATTACK ON THE VICTIM INSIDE HER APARTMENT CONSTITUTES
TREACHERY FOR THE VICTIM COULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARE THAT HER LIFE WAS IN
IMMINENT DANGER INSIDE THE COMFORTS OF HER OWN HOME

People of the Philippines V. Federico de la Cruz y Santos

G.R. No. 207389. February 17, 2016
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Appellant Federico Santos De la Cruz was charged with the murder, qualified by treachery, of
Corazon Nadera Claudio. The prosecution, through its witnesses, including the victim’s live-in
partner, Joan De Leon Sabilano, established that while the victim and her live-in partner were
having breakfast inside their room in a rented apartment, appellant suddenly barged into the room
and pulled out a balisong. Without warning, he grabbed the victim by her neck and stabbed her
in the back, causing her to fall down on the bed. Although she had fallen down on the bed,
appellant continued to stab Corazon on the left side of her body, and near her heart. Two weeks
before the stabbing incident, the now deceased victim told Sabilano that appellant had threatened
to kill the victim because he suspected that the victim was having an affair with his wife, a teacher
at the school where the victim also worked as a janitress. The appellant denied the allegations.

The RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder, appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, having found the assault against the now deceased victim sudden and
unexpected, affording the latter no chance to defend herself. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC’s ruling. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a sudden attack on the victim inside her apartment constitutes treachery.

HELD:
YES, a sudden attack on the victim inside her apartment constitutes treachery.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape.

In this case, appellant’s sudden attack on Corazon inside her apartment amply demonstrates that
treachery was employed in the commission of the crime. Corazon could not have been aware that
her life was in imminent danger inside the comforts of her own home. When appellant barged in,
Corazon was having coffee with Joan totally unaware that she would be attacked inside the
confines of her own house. When appellant grabbed her neck and stabbed her in the back,
Corazon was afforded no chance to defend herself and retaliate or repel the attack. Although she
struggled, such was not enough to protect or extricate her from the harm posed by appellant.

Therefore, appellant is guilty of murder in view of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

 PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
THE CONVICTION OF A PERSON AS A PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT REQUIRES (1) THAT
THE INDUCEMENT BE MADE WITH THE INTENTION OF PROCURING THE COMMISSION
OF THE CRIME; AND (2) THAT SUCH INDUCEMENT BE THE DETERMINING CAUSE OF
THE COMMISSION BY THE MATERIAL EXECUTOR

Albert G. Ambagan, Jr. Vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 204481-82. October 14, 2015
Velasco, Jr., J:

FACTS:
At the time the Informations were filed, petitioner Ambagan was already on his second
consecutive term as municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite. As mayor with salary allocation of grade
27, the cases against him and his fellow accused were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Ambagan
eventually ran and won for a third term, and was subsequently elected as member of the provincial
board of Cavite.

In the evening of July 4, 2004, before the shooting incident happened, accused Roger V.
Causaren (Roger), Michael T. Malabanan, Celestino (Ely) Garcia, Flor Amparo (Flor), Domingo
Villasis, and the deceased Leandro Causaren (Leandro), were at the place of Barangay Captain
Gina B. Salazar in Banay-banay, Amadeo, Cavite, to address a robbery threat to the barangay.
When two suspicious speeding motorcycles passed by, they all dashed to catch them. Leandro
drove the MB100 van, Villasis the barangay patrol owner-type jeep, and Flor, his owner-type jeep.
Hours later, accused Mayor Albert G. Ambagan went to Salazar's place. Not long enough,
Leandro followed him after purportedly having turned over to the police station one of the two
motorcycles they had chased earlier.

Meanwhile, the victim Reynaldo Santos coming from a police station in Maragondon, Cavite, went
to Edgardo R. Mamuyac's house. Since Mamuyac was already asleep, Santos called Victorino J.
Patam who was with the victim Domingo Bawalan, for company. After a little chat outside
Mamuyac's house, at past 11:00 in the evening, the three decided to go home. Domingo rode
with Santos in the latter's Space Gear van, while Patam drove his Toyota Corolla car. Santos
went ahead of Patam, although both took the southern direction going to Barangay Tamacan.

When Santos and Domingo reached the boundary of Tamacan and Banay-banay (after passing
by the latter's parents' house and having a short talk with Ronnel Bawalan), they came across an
MB100 van owned by Mayor Ambagan, parked at the right side of the road facing south
(Poblacion of Amadeo). Santos positioned and parked his vehicle at the back of the MB100 van,
and as soon as he has alighted, ordered the four men armed with long and short firearms to get
out from the van and line up at the other side (left) of the street. These men turned out to be
Alberto C. Angcanan, Juanito S. Loyola, Melanio S. Bayot, and the deceased Edrelin John Jamon.
Santos Called Superintendent Cabillo, referred to as "GD," to inform him of the situation. Cabillo
said that he was coming. On the other hand, Angcanan called Mayor Ambagan, through Rene
Amparo, over the two-way radio saying that Santos apprehended him and his companions.
Thereupon, Mayor Ambagan, Leandro, and Rene boarded the Mayor's Isuzu Trooper and headed
to Tamacan where the group of Angcanan was.

When Mayor Ambagan arrived at the place of the incident, he approached Santos and requested
the latter that they just settle whatever the problem was. But Santos replied that the Mayor should
just wait for GD. While Santos and Mayor Ambagan were talking, Rene Amparo went near Santos.
Mayor Ambagan repeatedly made the same request, but Santos stood pat and rejected the
Mayor's requests. Mayor Ambagan then got angry and said: "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga
kasama banatan na ninyo iyan." Thereupon, the first gunshot was fired, followed by successive
gunshots from the men of Mayor Ambagan, namely, Michael Malabanan, Ely Garcia, and Roger
Causaren. The shooting incident which lasted for about five minutes left five men dead —
Leandro, Rene, Jamon, Santos, and Domingo. The first three were from the group of Mayor
Ambagan.

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner, among others, of the crime of double homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not to be a principal by inducement requires that the inducement be the determining
cause of the commission by the material executor.

HELD:
YES. The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the inducement
be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and (2) that such inducement
be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.

Here, the Sandiganbayan adjudged petitioner guilty for two counts of homicide as principal by
inducement for allegedly uttering "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo
yan" which impelled petitioner's bodyguards to open fire at the victims.

As applied, the Sandiganbayan would have been correct in holding petitioner criminally liable if
he indeed made the utterance immediately before the shooting incident. However, this Court is
not inclined to believe that petitioner indeed made the declaration that started the fray. The court a
quo failed to take note of substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of star prosecution
witnesses Patam and Ronnel Bawalan. These contradictions refer not only to minor details but
even to the facts constituting important aspects of the case, seriously eroding the weight of the
evidence of the prosecution, and casting reasonable doubt on the culpability of petitioner
Ambagan. Noteworthy in the present controversy is that out of the eighteen (18) prosecution
witnesses presented to satisfy the quantum of evidence required, only Ronnel Bawalan testified
that petitioner uttered "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo yan" just
before the shooting.

Curiously, this is in stark contrast with the testimony of the other star prosecution witness, Patam,
who, despite being only two to three arms-length away from petitioner during the latter's
altercation with Santos, never testified that Ambagan uttered the imperative phrase.

Interestingly, between the two star prosecution witnesses, it is Patam, being in closer proximity to
Ambagan, who was in the better position to know whether or not Ambagan ordered his men to
open fire at the victims. Yet, Patam claimed that he only heard Ambagan shout invectives at
Santos and that when the shooting started, he and petitioner were already in the compound of
his cousin, Miling Javier. AcICHD

Despite having been presented several opportunities to do so, Patam did not declare under oath
that he categorically heard petitioner say "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na
ninyo yan."

Petitioner Albert G. Ambagan, Jr. is ACQUITTED of the two counts of homicide.

 PENALTIES
HABITUAL DELINQUENCY IS CONSIDERED ONLY WITH RESPECT TO CRIMES
INVOLVING SERIOUS OR LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES, ROBO, HURTO, ESTAFA
OR FALSIFICATION, AS REQUIRED BY THE RPC. HENCE, THE LAW ON HABITUAL
DELINQUENCY IS SIMPLY INAPPLICABLE TO CONVICTIONS ON THE DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT

People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Dalawis y Hidalgo

G.R. No. 197925. November 9, 2015
Peralta, J:

FACTS:
An asset of PO2 Aranza arrived at the police station with information that shabu could be
purchased from a certain Edwin Dalawis. Acting on said information, Aranza, together with SPO4
Alea, PO3 Dimaano, PO3 Gonda, PO2 Villas, PO2 De Chavez and PO2 Lindbergh Yap, formed
a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. They prepared a marked money for the operation and
proceeded to the target area.

There, the police officers frisked the asset to ensure that he did not have anything illegal in his
possession, gave him the marked money, and told him to walk towards the place where he would
meet the appellant. The policemen followed the asset thereto, and watched from the opposite
portion of the station in the tinted van. Aside from appellant who was already thereat, they also
saw the notorious drug pusher named Robert Lagmay operating under the alias "Tagpi" coming
out from Villa Anita. Thereafter, at a distance of more or less seven (7) meters, the policemen
saw the asset hand the marked money to appellant who, in turn, handed a small transparent
plastic sachet they suspected to contain shabu. Their asset, then, signalled to the policemen the
consummation of the transaction by scratching his head. Upon seeing the signal, they
immediately alighted from the van to apprehend the appellant. PO2 Aranza confiscated the
marked money from appellant's right hand, while his asset turned over to him the plastic sachet.
At the same time, PO2 De Chavez was also able to confiscate a sachet filled with what they
suspected was shabu from the notorious drug pusher, Lagmay. The policemen then informed
appellant and Lagmay of their constitutional rights and brought them to the barangay hall where
their arrest was recorded in the barangay blotter. From there, they proceeded to the police station
where appellant and Lagmay, together with the marked money and confiscated plastic sachet,
were presented to the desk officer. PO2 Aranza marked the plastic sachet with his initials and the
date of confiscation, executed his sworn statement, and signed the arrest report. The findings on
the seized items tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.

Appellant testified on his own version of facts. According to him, on the day of the incident, he
was at his house in Villa Anita when he heard a commotion nearby. He peeped through the door
and saw that the commotion was coming from outside the house of Fe Abag. He then approached
the persons thereat and uttered the words "putang ina niyo, ano gang gulo yan?" All of a sudden,
a man turned his back and poked a gun at him. He panicked and retreated to his house, realizing
that the persons at the commotion were policemen. He was then called upon by one of them to
go out of his house. He went out and apologized. However, a policeman cursed at him
saying, "putang ina ka, gusto mo pa yatang harangin ang paghuli namin dito kay Fe." The
policemen then forcibly took appellant into custody, together with the other arrested persons, one
of whom was the notorious drug pusher, Robert Lagmay, and brought them first, to the barangay
hall, and then next, to the police headquarters. Inside the intelligence section, appellant was
asked if he had any previous involvement in illegal drugs, to which he replied in the positive.
Afterwards, appellant and Lagmay were put in jail. On cross-examination, appellant admitted that
he had been twice convicted of offenses involving illegal drugs. Appellant's testimony was
corroborated by his neighbors, Julius Javier and Lorna Catipan, who were watching from inside
their respective houses, particularly as to how appellant was forcibly brought out of his house by
the policemen. RTC convicted accused-appellant. On appeal, CA affirmed his conviction with
modification to the effect that the trial court erred in withholding the benefit of parole from appellant
on the ground of habitual delinquency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law is considered in finding habitual
delinquency.

HELD:
NO. Article 62 of the RPC partially provides: “For the purpose of this article, a person shall be
deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or
last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or
falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.” It is clear, therefore,
that habitual delinquency is considered only with respect to the crimes specified in the
aforequoted Article. In the instant case, appellant was charged with violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Law, the same crime adjudged in his two (2) prior convictions, and not of crimes of serious
or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, as required by the RPC.
Hence, the law on habitual delinquency is simply inapplicable to appellant.
 EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
DEATH OF THE ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION EXTINGUISHES HIS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY, AS WELL AS HIS CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO

People of the Philippines V. Demetrio Ricaplaza y Abalde, (deceased), Rico Ricaplaza y

Canon and Eddie Ricaplaza y Canon
G.R. No. 205151. September 16, 2015.
NOTICE

FACTS:
Romeo Manalo y Bautista @ "Jape" was killed inside the fenced premises of the residence of
accused Eddie and his wife Alma Ricaplaza where both accused Rico and Demetrio were at the
time. The accused were convicted of murder by the RTC based on the testimony of Gilbert Tupas
who was an eyewitness to the incident. The court found that the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength to have attended the killing. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Pending
appeal, the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) informed the CA that appellant
Demetrio died at the NBP Hospital.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of an accused pending his appeal totally extinguishes criminal liability.

HELD:
Yes. As regards appellant Demetrio, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by virtue of his
death before final judgment.

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;

It is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
case.

Given the foregoing, the criminal case should be dismissed insofar as Demetrio is concerned.
 EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
DEATH OF THE ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION EXTINGUISHES HIS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY, AS WELL AS HIS CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO

People of the Philippines V. Armando Dionaldo y Ebron, et al.

G.R. No. 207949, September 9, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
On its July 23, 2014, the Supreme Court rendered its decision finding the accused Armando
Dionaldo, Renato Dionaldo, Mariano Gariguez, and Rodolfo Larido guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. Thereafter, the
accused-appellants collectively moved for reconsideration of the decision which the Court denied
with finality on September 24, 2014.

On even date, the Court received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections, dated September 16,
2014, informing the former of the death of one of the accused Renato Dionaldo as evidenced by
a Certificate of Death attached thereto.

ISSUE:
What are the effects of Renato’s death on his criminal liability?

HELD:
Renato’s criminal liability is totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article 89 of the RPC.

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
xxx xxx xxx

As Renato's death transpired before the promulgation of the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution in
this case, i.e., when his appeal before the Court was still pending resolution, his criminal liability
is totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

In People v. Amistoso, the Court explained that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Consequently,
Renato's death on June 10, 2014 renders the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and
ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against Renato is
dismissed.
 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
THE ACT OF ANTEDATING AN OFFICIAL RECEIPT FOR PAYMENT RECEIVED FOR A PAST
TRANSACTION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE MAKING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A
NARRATION OF FACTS

People v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)

G.R. No. 197953. August 5, 2015
Brion, J.

FACTS:
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas charged respondents, Mayor Quintin B.
Saludaga, Revenue Collection Clerk Arthus E. Adriatico, and private individual Romeo De Luna
for falsification of public documents penalized under Article 171 of the RPC. The prosecution
alleged that sometime in January 1999, Adriatico issued an Official Receipt (subject OR) dated
August 27, 1997, to De Luna representing the latter’s payment (P200.00) for his mayor’s permit
to operate as a pakyaw contractor. Both Mayor Saludaga and Adriatico purportedly knew that De
Luna was not a licensed pakyaw contractor when they issued the mayor’s permit and the subject
OR. The prosecution further claimed that the provincial treasurer only issued the Official Receipt
Booklet containing the subject OR to the municipality in October 1998, and thus, it could not have
been used as an official receipt for a transaction completed in 1997. The respondents then filed
a joint demurrer to evidence.

The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer, unconvinced that the subject OR was falsified despite
Adriatico’s admission that he antedated it upon De Luna’s request, holding that although Adriatico
prepared and issued the subject OR, he did not make untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
because the statements were not altogether false since there was some recognizable truth in
these. Hence, this petition for certiorari by the People.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of antedating an OR for payment received for a past transaction constitutes
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts

HELD:
NO. The act of antedating an OR for payment received for a past transaction does not constitute
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

Reduced to its elements, a violation under par. 4 of Art. 171 of the RPC requires that: (1) The
offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) He has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (3) The facts narrated by
him are absolutely false. The prosecution must likewise prove that the public officer or employee
had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. The offender is considered
to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the
document which he falsifies.

In the instant case, while Adriatico admitted that he issued the subject OR and that he antedated
it, such act does not constitute falsification. If the statements are not altogether false, there being
some colorable truth in them, the crime of falsification is deemed not to have been committed.
Adriatico did not necessarily make an untruthful statement of fact as to the date, there being truth
that the payment received was for a past transaction.

Therefore, respondents are not guilty of falsification.

 CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
MALVERSATION IS COMMITTED EITHER INTENTIONALLY OR BY NEGLIGENCE

Amelia Carmela Constantino Zoleta V. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 185224. July 29, 2015
Brion, J.

FACTS:
An anonymous complaint was filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian, and Sheryll Desiree
Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for participating in a scheme involving
provincial funds. COA conducted a special audit and among the irregularities discovered by the
Special Audit Team was a P20,000.00 financial assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP),
which was later found out to be a dummy organization. Based on the report submitted by the
COA, the Ombudsman, charged the petitioner, Vice-Governor Felipe Constantino, Violeta
Bahilidad, Maria Camanay, and Teodorico Diaz with malversation of public funds by falsification
of public documents. While the rest were arraigned, Diaz and Camanay remained at large. On
April 25, 2006, Vice-Governor Constantino died in a vehicular accident. In its decision, the
Sandiganbayan found the petitioner and Bahilidad guilty of the crime charged. It held that Vice-
Governor Constantino had control and custody of the funds by reason of his office, and that his
signature was needed before a grant, donation, or assistance could be released to a requesting
party. The court concluded that Vice-Governor Constantino approved the P20,000.00
disbursement despite the lack of the required documentation and that he conspired with the other
accused in using WIP to facilitate the malversation. It explained that the petitioner, who was Vice-
Governor Constantino's own daughter and who held the position of Executive Assistant III in his
office, ordered Gadian, a computer operator at the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, to
make a letter-request for financial assistance using a nonexistent cooperative. Then, she directed
Tangan, the Local Legislative Staff Officer of the Office of the Vice-Governor, to falsify the
signature of WIP's secretary, on the request-letter and certified and approved the disbursement
voucher and then presented it to Diaz, Camanay, and Vice-Governor Constantino for their
respective signatures. The Sandiganbayan ruled that falsification was a necessary means to
commit the crime of malversation.

In the present petition, the petitioner argued among others, that the Sandiganbayan denied her
due process since she was charged with willful malversation but convicted of malversation
through negligence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person may be convicted of malversation through consent, abandonment, or
negligence even though this allegation was not contained in the Information.

HELD:
YES, a person may be convicted of malversation through consent, abandonment, or negligence
even though this allegation was not contained in the Information. Malversation is committed either
intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in
the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. All that is necessary for
conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not
have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily
explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly
necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts. A
possible exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars of the
indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that it may be said due
process was denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous comprehension of the charge
against him. That is not the situation in the present case.
 CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
AN ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER IS ONE WHO WAS THE DUTY TO COLLECT MONEY OR
PROPERTY FROM THE PUBLIC

Domingo G. Panganiban V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 211543. December 9, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Domingo G. Panganiban, during his tenure as mayor from 2004 to 2007, obtained a
cash advance of Php500,000.00 from the municipality sometime in May 2006, ostensibly for
defraying the projected expenses of a planned official travel to the City of Onkaparinga, Adelaide,
South Australia, to study and research said city’s sustainable environmental projects. However,
for undisclosed reasons, the said official travel did not push through.

His attention called to the unliquidated cash advance, petitioner instructed Lorenzo to withhold
his salaries which the latter started doing in July 2006 and recorded and posted the payments in
the journal and subsidiary ledger, respectively.

COA State Auditor Ciriaco examined the financial records of the municipality of Sta. Cruz and
discovered that the aforesaid cash advance had not yet been liquidated. In addition to submitting
her reports in accordance with COA regulations, Ciriaco consequently served a letter, demanding
petitioner's liquidation of the cash advance. On the basis of the documents on hand, however,
Ciriaco noted that petitioner had an unliquidated cash advance of Php463,931.78.

As a consequence, an investigation of the non-liquidation of the cash advance was subsequently

conducted. During the pendency thereof, petitioner's salary deductions continued such that, by
the expiration of his term in June 2007, the remaining unliquidated amount was reduced to
Php256,318.45. The new State Auditor Tria then wrote a demand letter to petitioner. In an
explanation, the latter apprised Tria of the arrangement to have the cash advance liquidated by
means of salary deductions.

Then, petitioner was issued a certification signed by, among others, Lorenzo and Valles, to the
effect that the unliquidated balance of the subject cash advance will be deducted from his terminal
leave pay.

Based on the facts stated, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman issued a resolution, finding
probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of malversation of public funds. Although an
information charging him for malversation of the full sum of Php500,000.00 was subsequently
filed, petitioner paid the unliquidated balance by causing the same to be deducted from his
terminal leave pay. When the COA Regional Office called him about petitioner's unliquidated cash
advance in December 2007, Tria consequently reported that the amount was already paid in foil
by means of the aforesaid deduction.

Petitioner was found guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a mayor, who has no custody or control of the funds or property even temporarily,
in addition to his main duties as mayor, may be held liable for malversation
HELD:
NO. In order to be liable for malversation, the public officer must have had custody or control of
the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.

For a prosecution of the crime to prosper, concurrence of the following elements must be
satisfactorily proved: (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he has custody or control of the funds
or property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) the funds or property are public funds or
property for which he is accountable, and most importantly, (d) he has appropriated, taken,
misappropriated or consented, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take them.

To have custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, a public
officer must be a cashier, treasurer, collector, property officer or any other officer or employee
who is tasked with the taking of money or property from the public which they are duty-bound to
keep temporarily until such money or property are properly deposited in official depository banks
or similar entities; or until they shall have endorsed such money or property to other accountable
officers or concerned offices. Petitioner was not shown to have been such public officer, even
temporarily, in addition to his main duties as mayor. Needless to say, he was not accountable for
any public funds or property simply because it never became his duty to collect money or property
from the public. Therefore, petitioner could not have appropriated, taken, misappropriated or
consented, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.

The confusion in this case arose from the start, when the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon accused petitioner with the crime of malversation of public funds, notwithstanding the fact
that what he received from the Municipality of Sta. Cruz Laguna was a cash advance - a cash
advance which was not shown to have been fraudulently taken by petitioner from the municipality,
either by himself or in cahoots with the treasurer, cashier or any other accountable officer. In fact,
said cash advance was shown to have been properly acquired by documentary proof
Therefore, petitioner is acquitted.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
IN DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, THE KILLING MAY "BE INFLICTED
ONLY DURING THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE OR IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER

People of the Philippines vs. Romulo Marasigan

G.R. No. 208030, September 16, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J

FACTS:
The witnesses narrated that the victim, Vivencio Maguindayao, was seated on a mahjong table,
watching four men playing the game when appellant Romulo Marasigan suddenly emerged from
behind the victim and stabbed him at the back of his neck. They claimed that the accused did it
out of jealousy since Maguindayao and accused Marasigan’s wife allegedly had an extramarital
affair. In convicting him of murder, both the RTC and the CA that treachery attended the
commission of the crime and that the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense
should be appreciated in accused's favor.

Accused admitted the killing Vivencio but invokes the privilege granted under Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. He claims that he surprised his wife while she was in the act of sexual
intercourse with Vivencio immediately before stabbing the latter.

ISSUES:
1. Whether treachery attended the killing of the victim.
2. Whether the RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of vindication
of a grave offense.
3. Whether the accused is entitled to the privilege granted under Article 247 of the RPC.

HELD:
1. YES, treachery attended the killing of the victim.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and an unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance
to resist or escape.

In this case, Vivencio was completely unaware of the impending threat to his life. He was merely
sitting on the mahjong table and watching the game when appellant suddenly attacked him by
stabbing him at the back of his neck. The suddenness of the attack left him with no opportunity to
resist or escape from his assailant.

2. YES, both the RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of vindication
of a grave offense.

One of the mitigating circumstances enumerated under Article 13 of the RPC reads: That the act
was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony
(delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees.”
The illicit relationship between Vivencio and appellant's wife must have trampled not only
appellant's honor but also that of his family. As a consequence, perhaps even the mere sight of
Vivencio must have triggered an uncontrollable emotional outburst on his part so that even a
chance meeting may have caused in him an irresistible impulse powerful enough to overcome all
reason and restraint, coupled with the fact that the illicit affair, the grave offense sought to be
vindicated, appears to have continued on until the death of Vivencio.

3. NO, the accused is not entitled to the privilege granted under Article 247 of the RPC.

In People v. Wagas, the SC ruled that under Article 247, the killing may "be inflicted only during
the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter”.

Here, nobody corroborated appellant's claim that the attack was preceded by catching his wife
and Vivencio having sexual intercourse. On the contrary, it was established that the victim had
been sitting on the mahjong table for about three hours before he was attacked.

Therefore, the accused cannot invoke Article 247 of the RPC.

 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
KILLING BY WAY OF AN AMBUSH QUALIFIES THE CRIME TO MURDER BY THE
ATTENDANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines V. Rolly Adriano y Samson

G.R. No. 205228. July 15, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC convicting
accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide for the killing of
Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and for the crime of Murder for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes).

According to the prosecution, on 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., PO1 Garabiles and PO2
Santos, in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle
along Olongapo-Gapan National Road. While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla (Corolla), heading towards the same direction, overtook
them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV (CRV). When the Corolla reached
alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot the CRV and caused the
CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4) armed men then suddenly
alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who was later identified as
Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near the road
embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back to the Corolla and
immediately left the crime scene. PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos followed the Corolla but lost
track of the latter. Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds. Cabiedes
was pronounced dead on arrival at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot
wounds on the left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the head.
During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of
Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but
clarified that the Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business, which he
leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corolla, where he was
identified by PO2 Santos and PO1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants who alighted from the
passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was immediately
arrested.

Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the incident, he was at
his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After doing the
laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there. At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went
to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a lighter spring needed to repair his
motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari's house, Adriano went home and brought his child to his
mother. On his way to his mother's house, he met his brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga).
After leaving his child at his mother's house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights,
where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon). After the fights, he left the cockpit at about 2:00
p.m. and went home and took a rest After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and
proceeded to a store and stayed there. At around 5:00 p.m., he went back home. After a while,
he received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corolla from him, which
he rented from Rivera. At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After dropping
Garcia off, Adriano went to Rivera to return the Corolla, where he was arrested by police officers,
thrown inside the Corolla's trunk, and brought to a place where he was tortured.
The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon corroborated
Adriano's testimony.

RTC convicted Adriano. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court upheld the conviction of Adriano.
Hence this appeal was filed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in murder by ambush.
2. Whether or not there the accused may be held criminally liable for the death of a bystander
who was hit by a stray bullet.
3. Whether or not the crime is complex when two victims are hit by separate and different
bullets.
4. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery may be appreciated in aberratio
ictus.

HELD:
1. YES. In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following
elements: 1. That a person was killed; 2. That the accused killed him; 3. That the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and 4. The killing is not
parricide or infanticide. In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the
elements of murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification
of Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as generic
aggravating circumstances. As regards the death of Cabiedes the same is a case of murder by
ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure that the victim is killed and at the same
time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the victim — ambush
exemplifies the nature of treachery. Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as
the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The "essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter
of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself."
Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed defenseless at the time
of the attack. Adriano, together with the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the
unsuspecting victim along the national highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes
and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of multiple gunshot wounds.
When the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly turn to the right
and on to the road embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRV was trapped,
precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other logical conclusion, but that the
orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano, together with his co-accused, who are still on the
loose, was in conspiracy with each other to ensure the death of Cabiedes and their safety. The
means of execution employed was deliberately and consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give
Cabiedes no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. All these circumstances indicate that
the orchestrated crime was committed with the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and use of
firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of escaping or defending himself.
2. YES. As for the death of Bulanan, he was merely a bystander who was killed by a stray
bullet. He was at the wrong place at the wrong time. Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately
and often without warning, precluding the unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending
himself. Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means of
attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her,
as she was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty
of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the RPC, pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio
ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's
intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan's death caused by the bullet
fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault
against Cabiedes. The fact that accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no
moment. Evidently, Adriano's original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission
of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the
consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. Criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who
commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found
in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado', or he who is the cause
of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

3. NO. There are two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. When various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes not a complex crime. As borne by the records,
the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from a
.45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single burst. Rather, separate shots are
evidenced. One or more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is
thus no complex crime. The felonious acts resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.

4. YES. Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the
prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora, where the Court ruled that treachery may
be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of
murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by
a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus,
we follow the Flora doctrine. Hence, the accused is guilty of the crime of murder for Bulanan’s
death because the killing was attended by treachery.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
THE NATURE, LOCATION AND NUMBER OF WOUNDS SUSTAINED BY THE VICTIM
DEMONSTRATE ACCUSED’S INTENT TO KILL

Hermie Olarte y Tarug, et al. V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 197731. July 4, 2016 (NOTICE)
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This Notice stemmed from a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by the petitioners.

Petitioners Hermie Olarte y Tarug (Olarte) and Ruben Olavario y Maunao (Olavario), together
with Salvador Pasquin y Marco (Pasquin), were charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in
an information. All the three accused posted bail. But Pasquin jumped bail, so only petitioners
Olarte and Olavario were arraigned where they pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The prosecution averred that in the early morning of September 15, 2002, the victim Eugene M.
Villostas (Villostas) was fetched by his half-brother, Charlie Penilla (Penilla), from a drinking
session. On their way home, Villostas decided to buy cigarettes from a nearby videoke bar. Inside
the bar, however, three men who belonged to a group then singing and drinking suddenly stabbed
him on different parts of his body. They only stopped when bystanders started throwing stones at
them. This whole incident was witnessed by Penilla who was then only seven to eight arms length
away from the crime scene. Barangay tanods immediately responded and brought the
malefactors to the Barangay Hall where they were later identified as petitioners and their co-
accused Pasquin. Meanwhile, Villostas was rushed to the Valenzuela General Hospital where he
was treated by Dr. Pascual. Dr. Pascual testified that Villostas sustained multiple stab wounds
and according to him, all these wounds could have caused Villostas' death were it not for the
timely medical attention given him.

The defense, on the other hand, alleged that at around 2:00 o' clock in the morning of September
15, 2002, while petitioners, Pasquin and some other companions were having a drinking spree
inside a videoke bar, several persons threw stones at them hitting Olarte and another companion.
Their group thus disbanded. While most of them headed straight home, Olarte, together with a
certain Joni, went to the Barangay Hall to have the stoning incident entered in its blotter. Upon
arrival thereat, however, they were surprised that Olarte, Olavario and Pasquin were being
implicated in a stabbing incident. The three were then brought to the Valenzuela General Hospital
where Villostas identified them as his assailants. Thereafter, they were arrested and detained at
the city jail. RTC found petitioners guilty of frustrated homicide while the case against Pasquin
was archived. On appeal to the CA, the petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by the appellate court.

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal which was granted by the RTC. Before the CA, petitioners
questioned the credibility of Villostas and Penilla as prosecution witnesses. They pointed out
inconsistencies in their testimonies respecting the victim's degree of intoxication at the time of the
incident, the kind or brand of liquor that he imbibed, and the length of time that he had been
drinking immediately prior thereto. Petitioners argued that such inconsistencies rendered doubtful
their identification as the culprits by said prosecution witnesses. The CA, on appeal, debunked
petitioners' arguments as it found the inconsistencies pointed out by them as relating to mere
minor detail. Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court where the Supreme Court affirmed their conviction. The petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was eventually denied. Meanwhile, the court received a
Manifestation and Motion from the Olarte’s counsel stating that Mr. Olarte died of Acute
Myocardial Infraction so in view of this supervening event, petitioners' counsel prayed for the
dismissal of the case against Olarte.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not intent to kill as an element of frustrated homicide may be deduced from
the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.
2. Whether or not the death of the accused pending resolution extinguishes his criminal and
civil liabilities.

HELD:
1. YES, intent to kill as an element of frustrated homicide may be deduced from the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim. The elements of frustrated homicide are:
(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the RPC
exist. These elements were proved during trial. First, direct and positive testimonies of
prosecution witnesses established that Villostas sustained seven stab wounds on vital parts of
his body caused by a pointed sharp object. Plainly, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by him demonstrate petitioners' intent to kill. Next, the injuries suffered by Villostas were
all fatal. Particularly critical were the 5-centimeter wound below his left armpit, the 3.5-centimeter
wound on the mid-part of his left chest which required inserting a tube thereon to drain blood so
as not to impede his breathing, and the 5-centimeter stab wound on the right side of his abdomen
which also injured his liver. As testified to by Dr. Pascual, Villostas would have succumbed to
death due to the said injuries if not for the timely medical attention. Finally, no qualifying
circumstance for murder was alleged in the Information to have attended the commission of the
crime.

2. YES, the death of Olarte on October 18, 2015 pending finality of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon following the
Court's ruling in People v. Bayotas. In People v Bayotas, the Supreme Court held that the death
of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

The Supreme Court dismissed the case insofar as Olarte is concerned on account of his demise.
Futhermore, the Supreme Court pronounced that his criminal and civil liabilities are extinguished
by reason of his death.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
RAPE CASES ARE NOT ALWAYS COMMITTED IN SECLUSION

People of the Philippines V. Andy Regaspi

G.R. No. 198309. September 7, 2015
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
AAA recalled that on the evening of January 11, 2000, she and her friends attended a dance party
in their barangay. Upon arrival, they stayed outside the dance hall and had a drink inside a tricycle.
After consuming a bottle of beer, her friends proceeded to the dance floor, but AAA decided to
stay because her feet were already aching.

Suddenly, Regaspi approached AAA and pointed a knife at her. AAA noticed that Regaspi also
dropped a tablet into the glass of beer that he was holding. He then ordered AAA to take said
glass and drink the beer. Out of fear, she did as she was told, after which, AAA lost
consciousness.

When she woke up the following day, AAA found herself inside a nipa hut in the middle of a rice
field. She was naked and Regaspi was on top of her, forcing her to have sexual intercourse with
him. She tried to resist Regaspi, but the latter still prevailed. After around two (2) hours, he finally
left AAA, bleeding and in extreme pain.

On the other hand, Regaspi vehemently denied the accusations against him. He claimed that it
was actually AAA who offered him a drink and asked him to dance. Later, AAA left him. That was
the last time Regaspi saw her that night. The next day, he saw AAA sleeping at the chapel near
the dance hall. He woke her up but AAA simply smiled at him and went home.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged commission of rape in a public place or the lack of resistance thereto
belies the accusation against the accused

HELD:
NO. Rape cases are not always committed in seclusion. It is settled that lust is no respecter of
time or place, and rape defies constraints of time and space. The accused also points out that
AAA did not seem to have offered any resistance during the supposed ordeal. For two (2) hours,
there was no indication that she tried to punch, bite or scratch the accused. She never shouted
or cried for help. But the lack of resistance on the part of the complainant is not inconsistent with
a claim of rape. Lack of resistance does not automatically mean that the complainant consented
to the sexual act, especially when the accused had intimidated said person into submission. Here,
AAA was not only intimidated but likewise rendered unconscious. True, there was no test
conducted to determine that AAA was indeed drugged, but this is of little relevance as the same
is not an indispensable element in a prosecution for rape. It is sufficient that the prosecution was
able to prove that AAA had been sedated by Regaspi at the time the latter had carnal knowledge
of her.
 CRIMES AGIANST PERSONS
MERE TOUCHING OF THE EXTERNAL GENITALIA BY THE PENIS CAPABLE OF
CONSUMMATING THE SEXUAL ACT ALREADY CONSTITUTES CONSUMMATED RAPE

People of the Philippines V. Victor P. Padit

GR No. 202978, February 1, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant in the present case is Victor P. Padit, charged of the crime of rape. He was
the victim’s neighbor and the uncle of her mother, whom AAA calls as Lolo Victor.

The victim, AAA, a four-year-old girl, was playing inside their house while her mother was looking
after her younger brother. After a while, AAA went out of the house to buy bread. On her way to
the store, she was called by accused-appellant. Accused-appellant brought AAA inside his house
and allowed her to play. He then brought her upstairs, caused her to lie down and removed her
short pants. Accused-appellant also removed his short pants and proceeded to rub his penis
against AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain but was rendered helpless and prevented from making any
sound as accused-appellant covered her mouth with his hand. Thereafter, accused-appellant
threatened to hurt AAA with his knife if she tells anybody about the incident.

Meanwhile, AAA's mother was about to serve lunch when she noticed that AAA was not yet
around. She then went out of their house and around their neighborhood calling for AAA. While
she was in accused-appellant's yard, the latter came out of his house and told her that AAA is
inside watching him weave baskets. Accused-appellant then went back inside the house and,
after a few minutes, brought AAA outside.

Back at their house, her mother asked AAA why she did not respond to her calls. AAA then told
her mother about what accused-appellant did to her. AAA’s parents filed criminal complaint
against the accused-appellant.

RTC found Padit guilty as charged, which was affirmed by CA. Hence, this appeal. Accused-
appellant contended that that the prosecution failed to prove carnal knowledge on the ground
that AAA explicitly stated in her testimony that accused-appellant merely rubbed his penis
against her vagina.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was carnal knowledge despite the fact that accused-appellant merely
rubbed his penis against her vagina.

HELD:
YES, there is carnal knowledge despite the fact that the accused-appellant merely rubbed his
penis against AAA’s vagina. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual
bodily connections with a woman. This explains why the slightest penetration of the female
genitalia consummates the rape. As such, a mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis
capable of consummating the sexual act already constitutes consummated rape. In the present
case, AAA testified that she felt pain when accused-appellant "rubbed his penis [against her]
vagina." This Court has held that rape is committed on the victim's testimony that she felt
pain. In fact, AAA still felt severe pain in her vagina when she was being given a bath by her
mother after her molestation. This kind of pain could not have been the result of mere superficial
rubbing of accused-appellant's sex organ with that of the victim. Such pain could be nothing but
the result of penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape. Thus, Padit should be held guilty of
the crime of rape.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
IN RAPE THROUGH FORCE OR INTIMIDATION, THE FORCE EMPLOYED BY THE GUILTY
PARTY NEED NOT BE IRRESISTIBLE

People of the Philippines V. Jeffrey Victoria y Cristobal

G.R. No. 201110. July 6, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
The present case is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed the conviction of Jeffrey
Victoria (accused-appellant) for the crime of rape.

AAA, the victim in the present case testified that in the evening of December 1, 2006, she was at
Jumil's Funeral Homes in Calumpang, Rizal to collect payments for "ending," a betting game of
chance. While waiting for payments from the players, AAA saw accused-appellant sit at the
opposite side of the same bench where she sat. Thereafter, Noel and Michael, friends of accused-
appellant, arrived at Jumil's Funeral Homes and invited him to eat lugaw with them. Accused-
appellant accepted the invitation and also convinced AAA to come with them. However, upon
finding that the lugawan was closed, the group decided to return to their homes. At this point, AAA
claimed that accused-appellant told her to instruct Noel and Michael to head home first. Then,
AAA alleged that accused-appellant lured her to a dark place where he covered her mouth with
one hand, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her.

BBB testified that she observed that AAA was pale and crying when she arrived at their house.
Furthermore, BBB noticed the dirty clothes of AAA and the bloodstains on her buttocks and groin.
When BBB asked AAA about her condition, the latter positively identified the accused-appellant
as her assailant. BBB proceeded to the house of the accused-appellant, but they did not find him
there. AAA and BBB reported the incident to the barangay and police authorities.

On the other hand, accused-appellant admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA, but
claimed that such act was consensual as AAA was his girlfriend. Thus, accused-appellant
contended that he did not employ force, threat or intimidation in having sexual intercourse with
AAA.

The defense also presented the testimony of Edison Baltar who claimed that in when he passed
by Jumil's Funeral Homes where he saw accused-appellant sitting on AAA's lap. He also testified
that AAA kissed accused-appellant on his forehead.

RTC found accused-appellant guilty of rape. The trial court struck down the accused-appellant's
"sweetheart defense.” Assuming the "sweetheart defense" can pass muster, the trial court
observed that such sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. On appeal to the
CA, appellate court affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant
emphasizes that the absence of any abrasion on AAA's body indicate that the latter consented to
the sexual intercourse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of any abrasions on the victim’s body indicate that the latter
consented to the sexual intercourse.
HELD:
NO, the absence of any abrasions on the victim’s body does not necessarily indicate that the latter
consented to the sexual intercourse. In rape through force or intimidation, the force employed by
the guilty party need not be irresistible. It is only necessary that such force is sufficient to
consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. Similarly, intimidation should be evaluated in
light of the victim's perception at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that it
produced the fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her
ravisher, some evil would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. Hence, what is
important is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to the will of
the appellant.

Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially
when that person was intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is
committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence. In this case, AAA's lack of resistance was
brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke
of the incident.

AAA's conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also
not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act
within reason or in accordance with society's expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a
standard rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot
be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of
a human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
PREGNANCY IS IMMATERIAL TO THE CRIME OF RAPE

People of the Philippines V. Nonieto Gersamio

G.R. No. 207098. July 8, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding Nonieto
Gersamio (herein appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against AAA, but, deleting the portion ordering the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to
support the child of AAA.

AAA's first sexual ordeal at the hands of the appellant happened sometime in 1999, when she
was only 13 years old, having been born on 11 April 1986. It was repeated for several times
thereafter. The last incident of rape occurred on 28 August 2002. On the said date, at around 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon, while AAA was about to enter their house, the appellant, who was then
hiding behind a coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her towards the back of their house
which was a banana plantation. AAA could not do anything but cry as the appellant pointed a
knife at her neck. The appellant also put a handkerchief over her mouth and told her not to say a
word. At the banana plantation, the appellant commanded AAA to lie down but she resisted,
prompting the former to kick the latter in her thigh. When AAA was already lying on the ground,
the appellant removed her t-shirt, short pants and underwear. The appellant also threatened to
kill AAA. Defenseless, AAA simply cried. The appellant then lay on top of AAA and began kissing
her on her cheeks and later on her lips. After a short while, the appellant, who was no longer
wearing any shirt, pulled down his shorts and brief with his right hand while his left hand was still
holding the knife. Thereafter, the appellant held his penis, inserted it inside AAA's vagina and
made push and pull movements. AAA felt pain and cried. After satiating his lust, the appellant
immediately stood up, kicked AAA on her thigh and instructed her to wear her panty and short
pants. The appellant likewise wore his brief and short pants. Before leaving, the appellant warned
AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone what happened between them. Out of fear for
her life, AAA suffered in silence. She never told anyone about the dreadful acts done to her by
the appellant. However, eventually AAA's grandmother, BBB, discovered her pregnancy because
of the changes in her physical appearance. When asked about the father of her child, it was then
that AAA disclosed to BBB her harrowing experiences at the hands of the appellant, which began
in 1999 when she was only 13 years old, the last of which was on 28 August 2002.

At once, BBB went to the house of the appellant and confronted him regarding what he did to
AAA. Nonetheless, in order to save AAA and their whole family from shame as the appellant is
AAA's uncle, being the first cousin of AAA's mother, BBB would just like to keep the matter among
themselves and merely asked the appellant to acknowledge and support the child of AAA.

The appellant vehemently denied that he raped AAA. He maintained that from 1999 until 2002 he
was in Cebu City working as a driver of a public utility jeepney (PUJ) and that he only went home
every Saturday afternoon. While working as a jeepney driver, he stayed at the shop of his brother.
From 1999 up to 2000, he had a girlfriend, who is a teacher previously assigned in Consolatrix
Academy. He admitted having known AAA, being the granddaughter of her mother's older sister.
He claimed that on 22 September 2002, her mother informed him that he was being accused of
raping AAA. He got angry as it was not true and he never had any sexual relationship with AAA.
On the same day, to their surprise, AAA and BBB went to their house asking him to support AAA's
child. But, he refused. He stated that prior to the filing of this case, his family and that of AAA were
still in good terms even though they had a previous misunderstanding regarding a video CD
allegedly stolen by AAA. He is also willing to submit himself to DNA testing to determine the
paternity of AAA's child but he has no money to spend for it. Dominga Gersamio corroborated the
appellant's testimony.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not pregnancy of the victim is an essential element in the crime of rape.
2. Whether or not the presence of hymenal lacerations is an indispensable requirement for
the prosecution of the crime of rape.

HELD:
1. NO, pregnancy is immaterial to the issue of rape since pregnancy is not an essential
element of the crime of rape. So, whether the child whom the rape victim bore was fathered by
the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is
that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her consent,
and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. As long as the elements of rape
are present and proven by the prosecution, the accused could be adjudged guilty thereof
notwithstanding the attendance of other matters that are completely irrelevant to the crime.

2. NO, it is well settled that medical findings of injuries in the victim's genitalia are not
essential to convict the appellant of rape. Hymenal lacerations are not an element of rape. What
is essential is that there was penetration, however slight, of the labia minora, which circumstance
was proven beyond doubt in this case by the testimony of AAA. Moreover, Dr. Faciol clarified that
after 8 to 10 days from the time the victim was raped there would no longer be any indication or
manifestation of rape on the victim's vagina. This would precisely explain the lack of any injury on
AAA's genitalia.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
THE RUPTURE OF THE HYMEN IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL AND MATERIAL FACT IN RAPE
CASES; IT ONLY FURTHER CONFIRMS THAT THE VAGINA HAS BEEN PENETRATED AND
DAMAGED IN THE PROCESS

People of the Philippines vs. Alexander Bangsoy

G.R. No. 204047. January 13, 2016
Brion, J.

FACTS:
AAA testified that her uncle, herein appellant, inserted his penis inside her vagina on two
occasions. In its August 16, 2010 decision the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of statutory rape. The RTC explained that AAA testified clearly despite her
mental weakness, and that she never wavered during cross-examination.

The CA affirmed the RTC's decision. The CA held that AAA positively identified the appellant as
the person who sexually abused her on two occasions in April 2004, and who threatened to kill
her if she would report the incidents to her father. The CA further ruled that the absence of
hymenal lacerations did not negate a finding of rape. It added that rape is not always committed
in seclusion since lust is no respecter of time and place. The CA also ruled that the inconsistencies
in AAA's testimonies refer to only minor details and collateral matters. Finally, the appellate court
ruled that AAA's act of returning to the house of her father did not impair her credibility since she
should not be "judged by the norms of behavior expected of mature persons."

Appellant claims that he could not have raped AAA because he was in Honeymoon Road in April
2004 not in Brookside; that the presence of the victim's father in the room negates the commission
of the crime; that the victim's act of returning to the place where she was sexually abused tainted
her credibility; and that the absence of lacerations in the victim's hymen negated sexual
intercourse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of lacerations in the victim's hymen negated sexual intercourse.

HELD:
NO. For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he
accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Carnal
knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law.
Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving
consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the
accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.

Honeymoon Road and the place where the rape took place — Brookside — are both located in
Baguio City. It was not physically impossible for the appellant to be at the locus criminis on the
date of the first rape.

The presence of the victim's father in the room does not negate the commission of the crime.
Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside,
within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same
room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for
the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual
assault is being committed. It is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is
known to happen in the most unlikely places.

The absence of lacerations in the victim's hymen does not negate sexual intercourse. The rupture
of the hymen is not an essential and material fact in rape cases; it only further confirms that the
vagina has been penetrated and damaged in the process. Additionally, in the present case, the
genital examination on AAA was conducted on May 17, 2005, or more than one year after the
rape took place.

However, his conviction in Criminal Case No. 24762-R was not proven with moral certainty. AAA's
testimony in this second charge of rape to be overly generalized; it lacks specific details on how
the second rape was committed.

Notably, AAA was also below 12 years old at the time of the incident, as evidenced by the records
showing that she was born on March 1, 1993. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In the present case,
however, the relationship of the appellant to the victim was not alleged.

Nonetheless, the Information averred that AAA was a mental retardate and that the appellant
knew of this mental retardation. These circumstances raised the crime from statutory rape to
qualified rape or statutory rape in its qualified form under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
Since the death penalty cannot be imposed in view of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines), the CA correctly affirmed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole imposed by the RTC on the appellant.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
A WOMAN WHO IS MENTALLY DEFICIENT IS AUTOMATICALLY CONSIDERED
INCAPABLE OF GIVING CONSENT TO A SEXUAL ACT HENCE CARNAL KNOWLEDGE OF
SUCH WOMAN CONSTITUTES RAPE

People of the Philippines V. Jerry C. Palotes

G.R. No. 209786. July 6, 2015
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
The is an appeal filed by the accused-appellant Jerry C. Palotes from the decision CA which
affirmed with modification the decision of RTC adjudging the accused-appellant guilty of one count
of rape.

The fourteen (14) years old minor victim, AAA, lives with her mother BBB and her father CCC.
AAA has the mental abilities of an 8-9 years old child. Sometime prior to July 2005, AAA was
asked by her neighbor, Dimple, to buy a diaper. While AAA was on her way back to her neighbor's
house, she was pulled by appellant Jerry Palotes inside the latter's house. Appellant then held
AAA, laid her down, removed her short pants and underwear. He then lowered down his brief up
to his knees, kissed AAA's lips and neck and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. When AAA felt
pain, appellant stopped and told her to go home. Upon reaching home, she did not tell her mother
about what happened because she was scared. The second time that the appellant had sexual
intercourse with AAA was when her friend called her to take care of her niece while Jerry was
also inside the same house. Appellant invited the victim to enter the house, held her hands, laid
her down, removed her short pants and underwear, kissed her lips and neck and inserted his
penis and pushed it inside AAA's vagina despite her pleas not to continue. The third time that
appellant had sexual intercourse with AAA was when he was washing clothes in front of the minor
victim's house. They had a brief chat and then he rushed washing his clothes and told AAA to get
inside the house while he hang dry his clothes. When AAA was inside the house, the appellant
followed her and removed her short pants and panty. He then inserted his penis inside AAA's
vagina just like what he did last time. He then told AAA not to tell anyone and it would be between
the two of them. Afterwards, AAA went home.

AAA’s grandmother eventually noticed that AAA did not have her monthly period. When AAA was
brought for medical examination, it found out that she was already pregnant for five (5) months.
When BBB tried to ask AAA who impregnated her, AAA said nothing. AAA eventually told her
mother that it was Jerry Palotes whom she had sexual intercourse with but she cannot recall when
it happened. AAA gave birth last April 5, 2006.

Dr. Rosemarie Gonato, a psychiatrist, conducted a psychological evaluation on AAA. She

confirmed that AAA's mental age is equivalent to 6 to 7 years of age and places her functioning
within the mild mental retardation range.

Accused Jerry C. Palotes strongly denied the allegations against him and alleged that when this
case was initially filed at the Office of the Barangay, AAA could not identify or remember who
sexually abused her. Palotes argued that AAA was merely prodded by her relatives to point him
as the perpetrator in their desperate effort to get financial support for the child. He surmised that
since the complainant gave birth to the child in April 2006, he could not have been the father of
the child since he was always not in his rented house. Moreover, since he has a live-in partner,
there was no opportunity for him to do the alleged act aside from the fact that he does not have
any sexual desire on her because he treated her as a younger sister. Further, he heard from
among the neighbors that the complainant would usually go with other people and was even seen,
on separate occasions, sleeping together with a balut vendor and a taxi driver. Furthermore, on
two occasions, he was approached by the mother of the complainant telling him that she would
not pursue the filing of the case if he promised to shoulder the hospital expenses and support the
child.

During the trial, the defense requested for the conduct of a DNA test in order to prove that the
accused-appellant was not the father of AAA's child. The RTC granted this request. The results
of the examination concluded that there is a 99.9995% Probability of Paternity that the accused-
appellant is the biological father of DDD.

RTC convicted the accused-appellant of one count of rape pursuant to Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. 8353. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
the accused-appellant

ISSUE:
Whether or not carnal knowledge of a woman who is mentally deficient constitutes rape.

HELD:
YES, carnal knowledge of a woman who is mentally deficient constitutes rape under Article 266-
A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as such a woman is automatically
considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. For a charge of rape to prosper under the
above provision, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she
was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or
was demented. The phrase “deprived of reason” under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to
include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation." Accordingly, what
needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the
mental retardation of the latter. That AAA was mentally deficient, thus, deprived of reason, when
the accused-appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her was clearly established
in this case. Dr. Gonato, a psychologist indicated in her psychological evaluation of the victim that
AAA's mental age was equivalent to a child of 6 to 7 years of age and her functioning was within
the mild mental retardation. Moreover, as found by the trial court, the accused-appellant himself
admitted that he knew of AAA's mental deficiency and defense witness Marina Abella likewise
attested that AAA had a mental problem.

The Court notes that the prosecution filed only one information for rape against the accused-
appellant yet in the statement of facts set out in the Brief for the Appellee filed before the Court of
Appeals, the prosecution related three instances of rape committed by the accused-appellant
against AAA. Nonetheless, we agree with the lower courts that the accused should be penalized
for only one count of rape. This is so as AAA testified to only one count of rape, without any
mention at all of any other instance of sexual abuse. No other evidence was presented to
substantiate the alleged second and third incidents of rape. Settled is the rule that every charge
of rape is separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
A PERSON'S MENTAL RETARDATION CAN ALSO BE PROVEN BY EVIDENCE OTHER
THAN MEDICAL/CLINICAL EVIDENCE, SUCH AS THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES AND
EVEN THE OBSERVATION BY THE TRIAL COURT

People of the Philippines V. Allan Rodriguez y Grajo

G.R. No. 208406. February 29, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Appellant Allan Rodriguez y Grajo and AAA were neighbors. At around 3:00pm of December 18,
2004, AAA, who was then 27 years old but mentally retarded, was making rugs at their house
when appellant called her to look after his one-year-old son as his wife was doing laundry work
at an employer's house. AAA obliged and went to appellant's house. As soon as she entered the
house, appellant closed the door, kissed her, and removed her clothes and his pants. He then
inserted his penis into her vagina and it was painful. After satisfying his lust, e then dressed AAA
and warned her not to tell anyone about the incident. Appellant just left and played cards with his
friends while AAA looked after his son until appellant's wife came back. On December 25, 2004,
AAA told her mother, BBB, that appellant molested "ginalaw" her. BBB confronted appellant who
just denied the accusation. BBB brought AAA to the police station to file a complaint against
appellant. AA was referred to the Regional Crime Laboratory and was examined there. It was
found out among others, that she had a deep recently healed lacerations which can be three
weeks to two months old at the time of physical examination.

A battery of psychological test was conducted on AAA for two days and there, AAA was diagnosed
to be suffering from severe mental retardation with an IQ of 38 and a mental age consistent with
a six year and two months old child. She further testified that based on her examination and
interview on AAA, the latter can remember persons and incidents that happened in the past and
she can testify in court regarding the alleged rape even with her mental age of a six years old as
a four (4) year child can do so. She also noted that AAA's retardation was congenital because
she started walking and talking at the age of 3 years old when other can do the same at age one.
Appellant denied the accusation against him testifying that on December 18, 2004 at around 3
o'clock in the afternoon, he was doing carpentry work in Mang Henry's house which was located
at the back of his house, and got home at 6 o'clock in the evening. His wife corroborated his alibi
and further claimed that she was at home doing laundry work at the time of the alleged
incident. He argues that the mental retardation of AAA was not sufficiently proven.

RTC found appellant guilty of the crime of rape. CA affirmed appellant’s conviction. Hence the
present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person’s mental retardation may only be established by medical evidence.

HELD:
NO. A person's mental retardation can also be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical
evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court. Here,
BBB also confirmed that her daughter is mentally retarded. Dr. Camarillo also testified on AAA's
mental retardation as he observed that the latter gave incoherent answers during her interview
as well as the way she looked at him. Notably, it was the RTC that referred AAA for a neuro-
psychiatric examination and evaluation. Thus, AAA is no doubt a mental retardate.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
IN RAPE, ELEMENT OF INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE MAY BE SUBSTITUTED BY MORAL
ASCENDANCY

People of the Philippines V. Enrique Galvez

G.R. No. 212929. July 29, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This involves the case of four counts of qualified rape and four counts of sexual abuse under RA
7610 charged against Enrique Galvez committed against his niece, AAA, a girl of 13 y/o. During
the trial, the lone testimony of AAA was presented to prove the fact of the rape, which was
corroborated by the positive findings of a medico-legal. In defense, the accused denied and
interpose that it was AAA’s father who molested her. Records also show that no birth certificate
was offered in evidence to prove AAA’s age. Neither was there any other authentic document
offered to prove AAA’s age. The RTC convicted the accused of all the offense as charged. On
appeal, the CA convicted the accused of the crimes of rape only on the ground that the accused
may not be subjected to criminal liability twice, for both sexual abuse for the same act. Hence this
appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:
Is the accused-appellant guilty of four counts of qualified rape?

HELD:
NO, the accused is not guilty of qualified rape but is guilty of simple rape. Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. by using force
or intimidation; 2. when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When
the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. And rape is in its qualified form when the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.

Here, the element of carnal knowledge was sufficiently established by AAA’s narration that
accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her. The credible testimony of the victim narrating
that she was defiled, such as the testimony of AAA in this case, is sufficient for a conviction of
rape. Furthermore, when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings,
there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.

With respect to the element of violence or intimidation, it is settled in jurisprudence that said
element may be substituted by moral ascendancy. In this case, the existence of moral
ascendancy was established because accused-appellant is AAA’s uncle and AAA lived with him
during the time the acts of rape occurred.

With respect to the element that makes the offense qualified rape, that is, the minority of the victim
coupled with the fact that the accused is related to her within the third civil degree, both minority
and the third degree relationship must be established. Here, the minority of AAA was not proved
as no birth certificate was offered in evidence to prove AAA’s age. Neither was there any other
authentic document offered to prove AAA’s age.
As to relationship between AAA and accused, it is settled that if the offender is merely a relation
– not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common-law spouse of the mother of the
victim – it must be alleged in the information that he is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity, as
the case may be, within the third civil degree." Here, the Informations contained only a statement
that the accused-appellant was the uncle of AAA without stating that they were relatives within
the third civil degree, the qualifying circumstance of relationship cannot be appreciated.

Thus, the accused is found guilty of four counts of simple rape.

 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
AS A SPECIAL QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN RAPE, THE MINORITY OF THE VICTIM
AND HER RELATIONSHIP TO THE OFFENDER MUST BE ALLEGED IN THE CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

People of the Philippines vs. Henry Caladcadan

G.R. No. 205379, September 23, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
On June 21, 1999, 16-year old AAA was left in their house with her father, accused Henry
Caladcadan, and two siblings as her mother, BBB, was in Baguio. She was sleeping when
accused Caladcadan suddenly entered her room and forcibly removed her pants and her
underwear. AAA tried to resist but accused-appellant was too strong. Accused managed to insert
his penis into AAA's vagina while covering her mouth to prevent her from shouting. Two days
later, accused again crept into bed with AAA and mounted her again. Accused threatened to burn
their house should AAA report the incident to her mother. Out of fear, she complied. It was only
on October 1999 that BBB discovered that AAA was pregnant. AAA confessed that her father
raped her; thus, BBB filed two informations charging accused with two counts of rape. The
Informations alleged the minority and filiation of AAA. Her birth certificate showing that AAA was
only 16 years old at the time of the rape incident was likewise offered in evidence by the
prosecution. Accused likewise admitted that AAA was her daughter during pre-trial.

The RTC rendered its decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence the instant appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Caldadcadan is guilty for two counts of qualified rape beyond reasonable
doubt.

HELD:
YES, accused Caldadcadan is guilty for two counts of qualified rape beyond reasonable doubt.

Rape is qualified when the following elements of the offense charged are present: (a) the victim
is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, an ascendant,
a step-parent, a guardian, a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and, (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the
victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.
Furthermore, under Article 266-B of the RPC, rape is punishable by death when the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim. As a special qualifying
circumstance for raising the penalty for rape to death, the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information, and proved
conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.

AAA's testimony categorically establishes the fact of rape. Also, the two Informations jointly
alleged minority and relationship. As a matter of fact, accused-appellant admitted during pre-trial
that AAA is his daughter. Her birth certificate showing that AAA was only 16 years old at the time
of the rape incident was likewise offered in evidence by the prosecution. The death penalty
cannot, however, be imposed in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.

In conclusion, the conviction of the accused for two counts of qualified rape is in order.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
IT IS SUFFICIENT THAT THE VICTIM IS BELOW TWELVE YEARS OLD OR DEMENTED AND
THAT THERE WAS CARNAL KNOWLEDGE TO ESTABLISH STATUTORY RAPE

People of the Philippines V. Felipe Bugho

GR No. 208360. April 6, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
AAA was only 10 years old having been born on May 4, 1994, and a grade 4 student. Felipe
Bugho a.k.a. “Jun the Magician” is the accused in the present case.

AAA and Bugho used to be neighbors. After AAA’s dismissal from school, she and her younger
sister BBB went to Bugho’s house to watch the latter’s magic tricks. Bugho then asked BBB to
leave the house as he was going to tell a secret to AAA so BBB left and waited outside the gate.
Bugho brought AAA to his room and removed her pants and panty and laid her on the bed. He
kissed her lips several times, licked her vagina and pressed his penis against it while on top of
her. AAA felt a sticky liquid coming out from Bugho’s penis. Later, Bugho told AAA to put on her
dress and gave her thirty pesos (P30.00). AAA then left. DDD, AAA’s father, got suspicious when
he was approached by CCC, his godfather who saw BBB passed by Bugho’s house, so DDD had
a heart to heart talk with AAA, where AAA told him what Bugho did to her so they brought her to
the police station and filed a complaint. Medical examination on AAA showed erythema and
swelling of the urethra and periurethral area and erythema on the hymen.

Bugho denied the allegation saying that he was doing laundry chores outside his apartment
when AAA approached him to collect the amount of P30.00 as payment for taking care of his
doves and rabbits, which he then paid. He later saw AAA sliding down on the stairway railing
with her hands and her two feet clipped over the pole. By past noon, he was asked by BBB
regarding AAA's whereabouts to which he replied that AAA had already gone home.

RTC found Bugho guilty of the crime of rape under par. 1 (d) of RA 8353, affirmed by CA. Bugho
appealed to SC arguing that there was no showing that he had a penile penetration to
consummate rape.

ISSUE:
Whether or not proof of force, intimidation and consent is necessary in statutory rape.

HELD:
YES, there is statutory rape. Article 266-A of the RPC established two elements for statutory
rape such as: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman
is below twelve years of age or demented. Thus, proof of force, intimidation and consent is
unnecessary since none of these is an element of statutory rape as the only subject of inquiry
is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. In this case, AAA was only
10 years old when appellant had carnal knowledge of her on September 17, 2004 as she was
born on May 4, 1994. AAA's age was stipulated and admitted by appellant and his counsel
during the pre-trial conference. AAA had narrated in a positive and categorical manner how she
was sexually abused by appellant.
Penile invasion necessarily entails contact with the labia and even the briefest of contacts
without laceration of the hymen is deemed to be rape. Hence, carnal knowledge being
established and AAA being only ten years old during the incident, Bugho is guilty of the crime
of statutory rape.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
SEXUAL CONGRESS WITH A GIRL UNDER 12 YEARS OLD IS ALWAYS RAPE

People of the Philippines V. Rod Famudulan y Fedelin

G.R. No. 212194. July 6, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
The present action is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification
appellant Rod Famudulan's conviction for the crime of statutory rape as defined under Article 266-
A (1) (d) of the RPC by the RTC.

AAA, a six-year-old girl, testified that the appellant was her aunt's neighbor. She stated that on
January 1, 2010, at around noon, she was cornered and ordered by the appellant to fellate him
while he inserted his finger in her vaginal orifice. Thereafter, accused inserted his organ in her
orifice. Accused threatened to kill her if she told anybody of what had happened.

Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that on January 1, 2010, at noontime, he
went to his cousin Joel Falame's house to borrow P500.00 as bus fare to Batangas. Thereafter,
he boarded a van bound for Calapan. Deciding that it was too late in the day for him to take the
trip all the way to Batangas, appellant alighted in Banus and spent the night at the house of one
Evelyn Rosas. The following day, he boarded the bus going to Batangas and arrived there the
day after. He testified that he did not know of any reason why AAA or her family would file the
case against him.

RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape. The RTC
noted that Bansud is not too far from Banus. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling but
modified the award of damages. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not statutory rape is committed when the accused had carnal knowledge of a girl
under 12 years old.

HELD:
YES, statutory rape is committed when the accused had carnal knowledge of a girl under 12 years
old. The crime of statutory rape is defined by Article 266-A (1) (d) of the RPC. Sexual congress
with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. In the prosecution of statutory rape the following
elements must exist: (1) the victim is a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and (2) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim. In order to successfully convict an accused for
statutory rape therefore, it is imperative that the prosecution prove that the woman is under 12
years of age and carnal knowledge took place. That AAA was six years old at the time of the
incident was proven when her Certificate of Live Birth was introduced in evidence. Appellant
presents no compelling reason to disturb the RTC and the CA's assessment of AAA's credibility.
He merely attacks AAA's testimony for its supposed lack of detail. It has been held that when a
woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in
truth, a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Given AAA's
immaturity and the injuries as found in the medical report, consistent with sexual abuse, this Court
finds no reason to reverse the CA and the RTC decisions.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
IN STATUTORY RAPE, MINORITY MUST BE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AND
ESTABLISHED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY

People of the Philippines V. Arsenio D. Misa III

G.R. No. 212336. July 15, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
The victim, AAA testified that on October 18, 2004 as she and BBB, her younger sister, were
walking back to school after taking their lunch at home, appellant called out to the sisters.
Appellant told them that he would tell AAA's fortune by reading her palm. He then grabbed AAA's
hand and examined her palm. He told AAA that any person who would court her will die. Appellant
then handed AAA twenty pesos and BBB five pesos. After handing BBB the money, the appellant
then told her to go to class and threatened to hit her forcefully on the head if she disobeyed. BBB
obeyed. Appellant then grabbed AAA and dragged her to the back portion of the school
compound, but there being a lot of children, the appellant hailed a trisikad and forced AAA to
board with him. When they disembarked, appellant dragged AAA to an area where several
banana trees grew. Thereafter, he ordered AAA to lie down on the ground. He undressed her and
himself and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of AAA, making her bleed. Throughout the
ordeal appellant held a sharp pointed object. Then, he left AAA in the middle of the banana farm.
AAA then went to the house of the barangay tanod to seek help. The latter assisted AAA to the
police station and informed AAA's parents of what had just transpired. Appellant denied knowing
AAA and raping her. He alleged that he could not have been the perpetrator because on the day
of the supposed incident he was working as a conductor plying the Tabunok-Carcar route and
that he did not match the cartographic sketch of the alleged rapist.

RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape. On appeal to the CA, the
appellate court noticed that while the prosecution presented AAA's birth certificate as Exhibit 'H'
in its formal offer of exhibits, no such document was surrendered by the prosecution to the trial
court. So CA concluded that appellant could only be found guilty of simple rape because AAA's
minority was not proven in evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the age of the victim as an element of statutory rape may be appreciated without
the presentation of the victim’s certificate of live birth.

HELD:
NO. For a successful prosecution for the crime of statutory rape there are two elements which
must be proven: (1) that the victim was under 12 years of age at the time of the incident and (2)
carnal knowledge by the assailant of the victim. Both must be proven before an accused may be
found guilty of statutory rape. For minority to be considered as an element of a crime or a
qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape, it must not only be alleged in the Information, but it
must also be established with moral certainty. Under Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, it is
inferred that the victim's birth certificate is the best evidence of her age. Absent AAA's certificate
of live birth and other means by which her age as alleged in the Information could have been
ascertained beyond doubt, this Court is constrained to agree with the CA and deem the crime
committed as simple rape.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
ENTRIES IN PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL BOOKS OR RECORDS MAY PROVE THE ELEMENT
OF MINORITY IN THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED RAPE

People of the Philippines V. Rodolfo Pateño y Dayapdapan

G.R. No. 209040. December 9, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
AAA, the victim, related that she was only four years old when her parents left her to the care of
her aunt, BBB. AAA started living with accused-appellant only in 2000 in a two-bedroom house.
On 25 March 2002 at around 10:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, was awakened by accused-
appellant who removed her short pants and underwear. Accused-appellant likewise took off his
clothes. He threatened AAA with a scythe and ordered her to stay quiet. He then mounted her
and made pumping motions. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left without saying a word.
He proceeded to perform this bestial act on AAA for the four (4) succeeding nights. When AAA
could no longer bear it, she left the house and stayed in the house of her teacher from 30 March
to 1 April 2002 where she intimated to the latter her harrowing experience in the hands of accused-
appellant. A pastor of the United Church of Christ of the Philippines (UCCP) testified on the
contents of the Membership Record Book which show that AAA was born on 10 September 1987
and was baptized on 5 June 1988. Said document also listed accused-appellant as AAA's father.

Accused-appellant confirmed that AAA started staying with him in March 2002 but added that
there were five of them living in the house of his nephew, Rene Pateño. He denied raping AAA
and claimed that AAA is taking revenge because during a beauty contest in April of that year, he
pinched AAA in front of her fellow contestants and barangay councilors. Accused-appellant's
nephew, Rene testified that accused-appellant lived with him but AAA was living with his sister.
Rene's sister Arly corroborated Rene's statement that AAA was living with her on the dates of the
alleged rape incidents. Both witnesses speculated that AAA wrongfully accused her father of rape
because she harbored a grudge towards accused-appellant who would always scold her.

Accused-appellant was found guilty of five (5) counts of rape.

Accused-appellant argues that AAA's testimony regarding the time and manner of the purported
five (5) rape incidents is incredulous. Accused-appellant insists that AAA did not feel any fatherly
love towards him and she had the motive to falsely accuse him of rape. Accused-appellant
claimed that AAA had been reprimanded numerous times by him because of her unacceptable
behavior. Finally, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove AAA's age at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Membership Book which was used to prove the minority and relationship of
the victim is admissible in evidence.

HELD:
YES. Anent the element of minority, the prosecution presented a certification from the UCCP
Office in Ayungon, Negros Occidental stating that AAA was baptized according to the rites and
ceremonies of the UCCP. The certification shows that AAA was born on 10 September 1987 to
accused-appellant and a certain Nely Fabel. A page of the UCCP Membership Book was
submitted bearing the same information. It was held that a birth certificate, baptismal certificate,
school records or documents of similar nature can be presented to prove the age of a victim. In
this case, the Membership Book, which is considered an entry in official records under Section
44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is admissible as prima facie of their contents and corroborative
of AAA's testimony as to her age. Moreover, entries in public or official books or records may be
proved by the production of the books or records themselves or by a copy certified by the legal
keeper thereof.

The RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the twin qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship. Accused-appellant admitted during the pre-trial conference that AAA was his
daughter. Thus, relationship between accused-appellant and AAA is established.

Considering that accused-appellant committed rape qualified by the twin circumstances of

minority and relationship, the proper penalty to be imposed is death. Since the imposition of the
death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, the lower courts properly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of rape.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
RAPE; DISCREPANCIES AS TO MINOR MATTERS, IRRELEVANT TO THE ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A GROUND FOR ACQUITTAL

People of the Philippines V. Ricardo Lagbo

G.R. No. 207535. February 10, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant in the present case is Ricardo Lagbo, father of the victim AAA who was 12
years old when the accused first raped her.

In October 2000, AAA was alone with her father inside their house when she washing dishes.
All of a sudden, Lagbo grabbed her and forcibly removed her short pants and her panty. . After
removing his short pants, accused appellant pushed AAA and made her lie down on
their "papag". Thereafter, he boxed AAA's face twice and threatened to kill her mother and
siblings. He then placed himself on top of AAA and made pumping motions while covering her
mouth and pulling her hair. AAA felt pain and cried as accused-appellant's sex organ penetrated
hers. After gratifying himself, accused-appellant put on his clothes, sat beside AAA and told her
to stop crying. AAA did not relate this incident to her mother for fear that accused-appellant
would make good his threat to harm her mother and siblings.

In March 2001, Lagbo again violated AAA’s womanhood. , while she and accused-appellant
were alone inside their house, the latter again boxed AAA's face, forced her to lie down on
the "papag", undressed her, threatened her, placed himself on top of her, covered her mouth
and pulled her hair while repeatedly making pumping motions. This time, however, AAA
mustered the courage to relate the incident to her mother when the latter arrived. To AAA's
disappointment, though, her mother refused to believe her. CAIHTE

Accused-appellant committed the third rape on February 14, 2002. He and AAA were again left
alone inside their house. She was made to lie down on the kitchen floor where accused-
appellant succeeded in sexually defiling her.

AAA was finally able to report her rape to the police when her mother filed a complaint against
accused-appellant for allegedly mauling her. Taking advantage of this opportunity, AAA related
her misfortune to the authorities. Thus, Lagbo was indicted for three (3) separate informations
of qualified rape.

RTC found Lagbo guilty of the crimes charged against him, affirmed by CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime in the
victim’s testimony may be considered a ground for acquittal.

HELD:
NO. The elements of qualified rape are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by
force and without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape;
(5) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. ,
AAA's recollection of the heinous acts of her father was vivid and straightforward. She was able
to positively identify the accused-appellant as her sexual assailant. While there are minor
inconsistencies, her testimony was given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
candid manner.

This Court has ruled that since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions,
accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility
of a witness. Moreover, the Court considers AAA's alleged inconsistency in testifying, with
respect to the place where the first and third rapes were committed, as a minor inconsistency
which should generally be given liberal appreciation considering that the place of the
commission of the crime in rape cases is after all not an essential element thereof. What is
decisive is that accused-appellant's commission of the crime charged has been sufficiently
proved. The alleged disparity in the victim's testimony may also be attributed to the fact that,
during her direct examination, AAA was first questioned regarding her third rape in 2002, while
questions with respect to her first rape in 2000 were the last to be asked. In any case, Courts
expect minor inconsistencies when a child-victim narrates the details of a harrowing experience
like rape. Such inconsistencies on minor details are in fact badges of truth, candidness and the
fact that the witness is unrehearsed. These discrepancies as to minor matters, irrelevant to the
elements of the crime, cannot, thus, be considered a ground for acquittal. In this case, the
alleged inconsistency in AAA's testimony regarding the exact place of the commission of rape
does not make her otherwise straightforward and coherent testimony, on material points, less
worthy of belief.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
IN INCESTUOUS RAPE OF A MINOR, ACTUAL FORCE OR INTIMIDATION NEED NOT BE
EMPLOYED WHERE THE OVERPOWERING MORAL INFLUENCE OF THE FATHER WOULD
SUFFICE

People of the Philippines V. Obaldo Bandril y Tabling

G.R. No. 212205. July 6, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the decision of the CA affirming appellant's conviction for three counts of rape
and one count of acts of lasciviousness.

Appellant Bandril was charged of raping his 14-year-old daughter, AAA, three times and
attempting to rape her at another time. In the commission of the offense, the qualifying
circumstances of relationship is attendant, the accused being the father of the complainant and
the complainant being then under eighteen (18) years of age.

The prosecution established that AAA was born on December 17, 1993. She is the daughter of
appellant and BBB. Sometime in March 2007, at around 11:00 p.m., while AAA's mother BBB
was not in the house, appellant removed AAA's clothes, took his own clothes off and ordered AAA
to lie down. Appellant mounted on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt
pain. After satisfying his lust, appellant ordered AAA to wear her clothes and walk away. Out of
fear of her father's threats, she did not divulge the incident to anyone. Sometime in June 2007,
appellant and AAA were planting coconut seedlings. Again, appellant removed AAA's clothes and
ordered her to lie down on the banana leaf gathered by appellant. Appellant inserted his penis
into AAA's vagina and fondled her breast. Around October 2007, while at a lanzones plantation,
appellant approached AAA, ordered her to lie down on the grass and took her clothes off. Then
appellant inserted his penis into AAA's vagina, fondled her breast and kissed her lips. Thereafter,
appellant clothed AAA and ordered her to collect the lanzones. Sometime in 2008, appellant
attempted to rape AAA in their house. He was able to undress her but failed to rape her. Several
months later, BBB noticed that AAA's stomach was getting bigger. BBB took AAA to a hilot who
told BBB that AAA is eight months pregnant. It was at this time that AAA told BBB that she was
raped by her father. AAA gave birth to a baby boy whom they gave away for adoption.

Appellant denied the charges and insisted that they were instigated by some persons unknown
to him to destroy his good reputation and character.

RTC found appellant guilty of three counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness.
Appellant appealed the decision. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision
with modification in that the award of exemplary damages in the three rape cases.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not actual force or intimidation must necessarily be employed for the crime of
incestuous rape of a minor to be committed.
2. Whether or not undressing the victim counts as attempted rape.
HELD:
1. NO, in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where
the overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice. In this case, appellant had carnal
knowledge three times of his daughter, AAA, who was then only 14 years old.

Article 266-A of the RPC provides that the crime of rape is committed by a man having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or
intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is
under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.

2. NO, without the offender’s penis touching any part of AAA’s body, attempted rape cannot be
said to be committed. The appellant's acts of undressing AAA and trying to sexually assault her
a fourth time are lascivious acts. These acts are clearly lewd, indecent and inappropriate.
Lewdness is defined as an "obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous" act which signifies that
form of immorality carried on a wanton manner. Indeed, appellant cannot be convicted of
attempted rape since appellant's penis never touched any part of AAA's body. For there to be an
attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to
the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
RAPE IS QUALIFIED WHEN THE OFFENDER IS THE VICTIM’S PARENT

People of the Philippines V. Antonio Balcueva y Bondocoy

G.R. No. 214466. July 1, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
The present case is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Antonio Balcueva y Bondocoy
(Balcueva) assailing the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding
Balcueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape under the RPC, as
amended by RA 8353, otherwise known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which he allegedly
committed against the person of his own biological daughter.

According to the prosecution, at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of February 15, 2007, AAA just
returned home from school and since Balcueva did not want her to leave the house, she decided
to just take an afternoon nap. At that time, Balcueva asked AAA's siblings to leave the house and
thereafter, approached AAA who was lying in bed, removed her shorts and underwear, and
threatened to spank her if she told anybody about this incident. Balcueva then removed his shorts
and underwear, mounted AAA, restrained her hands, and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA
resisted and even told Balcueva that she was having her menstruation, but Balcueva simply told
her to keep quiet and that it was better as she will not get pregnant. While Balcueva was ravishing
AAA, the latter's sister sought the help of their neighbor, who then peeped through a hole,
interrupting Balcueva in his dastardly act. Thereafter, AAA's sister and their neighbor reported the
incident to the barangay hall, which led to Balcueva's apprehension.

For his part, Balcueva interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He averred that at the time of
the alleged incident, he was repairing appliances when AAA and a friend arrived from school and
asked him if they can roam around. When he did not allow them to do so, AAA and her friend got
angry. In retaliation, they went to the barangay hall and fabricated the story that he raped AAA.

RTC found Balcueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape. Aggrieved,
Balcueva appealed his conviction to the CA which in turn affirmed the RTC's ruling in toto. Hence,
the instant appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of rape is the qualified when the offender is the victim’s parent.
2. Whether or not the proper penalty for qualified rape is reclusion perpetua in lieu of the
death penalty.

HELD:
1. YES, the crime of rape is the qualified when the offender is the victim’s parent. The
elements of Qualified Rape under the foregoing provisions are as follows: (a) the victim is a
female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim
either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority. A perusal of
the records discloses the presence of the aforesaid elements in this case. Thus, the RTC and the
CA committed no reversible error in convicting Balcueva of the crime of Qualified Rape.

2. YES, the proper penalty for the crime of qualified rape is reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9346. Also, in view of prevailing
jurisprudence, where the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be
imposed upon Balcueva because of the provisions of RA 9346, the Court increased the damages
awarded to AAA as follows: (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral
damages; and (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, the Court imposed interest at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of
this Resolution until fully paid.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
RELATIONSHIP OF THE VICTIM AND THE ACCUSED WHICH IS WITHIN THE THIRD CIVIL
DEGREE BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY ALLEGED IN
THE INFORMATION IN ORDER TO QUALIFY THE CRIME OF RAPE

People of the Philippines V. Edgardo Perez y Alavado

G.R. No. 208071. March 9, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Eduardo Perez y Alavado was charged with the crime of rape, committed by
having carnal knowledge of his niece, AAA, a 13-year-old girl, against her will and to her damage
and prejudice.

AAA testified that there was a time when she woke up inside the room of appellant, who was
wearing only a white towel wrapped around his waist. Thereafter, he removed his towel, mounted
her, and inserted his penis into her vagina, thereby causing her pain. While doing this, he was
kissing her lips and breast. She cried and kicked him, but he did not stop. Afterwards, appellant
gave her P10.00 which she used to buy "chippy." Then she went home to BBB, her father. She
did not tell him about the incident until confronted by him. Thereafter, he brought her to the
barangay officials who advised them to have her examined by a doctor and obtain a Medico-Legal
Certificate.

In contrast, appellant essentially interposed a defense of denial and alibi. Appellant further
testified that the only reason why AAA and her father filed the rape charge against him was
because BBB had a personal grudge against him.

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having carnal
knowledge of AAA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary to specifically allege that the relationship of the victim and the
accused was within the third civil degree in order to qualify the crime of rape.

HELD:
YES, it is necessary to specifically allege that the relationship of the victim and the accused was
within the third civil degree in order to qualify the crime of rape.

Jurisprudence is replete with rulings requiring that Informations charging an accused with the
crime of rape qualified by relationship must succinctly state that said accused is a relative within
the third civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. The Court has thus held: "However, as regards
the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the victim, we agree with the Court
of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree
by consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that appellant admitted that the victim is his niece."

Similarly in this case, the Information merely alleged that "the accused is an uncle by affinity of
the latter," failing to clearly state that appellant herein is AAA's relative within the third civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity, as expressly required by the aforecited ruling. Appellant herein cannot,
therefore, be properly convicted of rape in its qualified form resulting in a higher award of
damages.

Hence, in view of the failure of the Information to expressly allege the qualifying circumstance of
relationship, the accused cannot be convicted of the crime of qualified rape.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
THE GRAVAMEN OF RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT IS THE INSERTION OF THE
PENIS INTO ANOTHER PERSON'S MOUTH OR ANAL ORIFICE, OR ANY INSTRUMENT OR
OBJECT, INTO ANOTHER PERSON'S GENITAL OR ANAL ORIFICE

Roldan Carrera V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 217804. September 02, 2015
Velasco Jr., J.

FACTS:
AAA was walking on her way home from a tailor shop in Poblacion Barotac Viejo when she saw
the accused Carrera emerged from the street and approached her. Taken aback by Carrera’s
sudden appearance, AAA then asked the latter if there was any problem, followed by an invitation
to have supper at her house. Carrera reacted by saying: “Quiet! Or else I will kill you”, after which
he grabbed AAA's arm and dragged her toward a nearby church. Upon reaching the left side of
the church structure, Carrera pushed AAA to the ground, then immediately pinned her down by
placing his knees on top of her back and holding her left arm. Carrera then pulled down AAA's
garterized shorts and panty with his free hand while she was pinned down and then inserted a
finger into her vagina against her will. While doing this, Carrera also kissed AAA along her ears
and her face. AAA struggled, only to be overpowered by the stronger Carrera. She tried kicking
and boxing him, but her position on the ground proved to be an obstacle. She shouted for help,
but the heavy downpour drowned her voice. AAA continued struggling and crawling until her
attacker loosened his hold on her arm, enabling AAA to move both her hands and to break free.
AAA ran toward their house half naked. With her mother, AAA went to the nearby police station
to report the incident.

The accused maintains that he was at his place of residence, at the time the supposed crime was
committed. He narrated that on June 13, 2004, he went to Dumarao, Capiz to attend the burial of
a relative, after which event he boarded a bus at around 3:00 p.m. for his return trip. He arrived
at Barotac Viejo Terminal at around 5:00 p.m. and from there, he boarded a tricycle driven by
Jovan Cartagena, who drove Carrera to his home barangay. At Brgy. Sto. Tomas, Carrera
stopped by a store to join a group of drinking friends. After the drinking spree, Carrera, together
with a friend, Ananias Balleras, went home by foot. Nancy Vistal, a sister-in-law, saw him reaching
home. He took his dinner and thereafter went to sleep at about 7:30 p.m. While in deep slumber,
he was suddenly awakened by the police. Upon being informed by the police about a complaint
against him, Carrera was brought to and detained at the police station of Barotac Viejo, where, to
his surprise, his brother, Rodeo Carrera, was also being detained, also as a suspect. His brother
would later be released when AAA pointed at Carrera as the perpetrator.

ISSUES:
1. Has the crime of Rape by sexual assault has been proven?
2. Does the lack of force employed by the accused upon the person of AAA belie her claim
of rape and imply voluntariness on the part of the victim?

HELD:
1. YES. Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R. A. No. 8353, enumerates the manner
by which rape by sexual assault is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
 a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Clearly then, rape can be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape
by sexual assault is committed under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 and
through any of the means enumerated under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A. The gravamen of rape
through sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into another person's genital or anal orifice." It is also called "instrument
or object rape" or "gender-free rape."

AAA accuses petitioner Carrera of inserting his finger into her vagina without her consent and by
use of force, the overt act constituting rape by sexual assault within the purview of Article 266-A.

2. NO. Petitioner's pretense that the prosecution failed to establish that he employed force
upon AAA in committing the sexual assault deserves scant consideration. Indeed, AAA testified
that the petitioner had to hold both of her arms and drag her toward the church, where the actual
assault was committed. All the while, she tried to set herself free but was unsuccessful. Surely
the mix of the adverted acts of the petitioner constitute, as aptly observed by the CA, the force
contemplated in the law. The absence of visible bruises, scratches or contusion on the body, if
this be the case, is in context of little moment. External signs of physical injuries on the victim is
not an element of the crime of rape, and their absence, without more, does not necessarily negate
the commission of rape.

Further, AAA’s testimony is very categorical when she narrated that while she was pinned down
by the appellant she struggled very hard, she tried to kick or box appellant but she could not
overpower him. She testified that she fell on the ground facing down, and that appellant
immediately knelt on her back to restrain her with his weight and held one of her arms, while
appellant's other arm was used to commit the sexual assault. Her efforts were indeed futile
because the appellant overpowered her, but that does not mean she did not exert any effort to
resist.

In any event, the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim's
submission to the criminal act of the offender.

All told, there is a total absence of voluntariness on the part of AAA. The conviction of Carrera for
the rape by sexual assault of AAA stands. Nothing in the records would show any circumstance
of substance, like hostility, malice or ill sentiments, and accepted by the courts below that would
becloud the veracity of AAA's narration of every ugly detail of her traumatic experience.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
FINDING OF HEALED AND NOT FRESH LACERATIONS DOES NOT NEGATE THE
COMMISSION OF RAPE

People of the Philippines V. Mark Anthony Roaquin y Navarro

G.R. No. 215201, December 9, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Mark Anthony Roaquin was charged with the rape of AAA before the RTC.
According to the prosecution, the offended party was on her way to a canteen where she worked
when she was stopped and then forced to go inside a billiard hall, where the accused-appellant
and his friends were present. She was urged to drink substantial amounts of Emperador brandy
which left her half asleep. In her state, she felt that she was led to the house of one of accused-
appellants friends. This is where the rape occurred. The following day, she complained to the
authorities. And two days after the incident, she was examined by a medico-legal officer at the
PNP Crime Laboratory. The results of the medical examination stated that the offended party had
a deep-healed laceration at 9 o’clock position accompanied by vaginal bleeding. The accused-
appellant denied the prosecution’s claims. However, the RTC sided with the prosecution and
convicted accused-appellant. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. Hence, accused-
appellant appeals to the SC, arguing that, since the medical examination was conducted two days
after the supposed incident, lacerations sustained by the offended party should have been fresh
not healed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not healed and not fresh lacerations negates the commission of rape.

HELD:
NO. The finding of healed and not fresh lacerations does not negate the commission of rape.

The fact that the accused-appellant succeeded to have carnal knowledge of the offended party
with use of force and without her consent consummates the crime of rape. Medical evidence is
merely corroborative, and is even dispensable, in proving the crime of rape.

Therefore, the accused is guilty of rape.

 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
RAPE; HEARING THE SOUND OF THE VOICE OF SUCH ACCUSED IS AN ACCEPTABLE
MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION

People of the Philippines V. Eliseo D. Villamor

GR No. 202187. February 10, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant in the present case is Eliseo D. Villamor, charged with five (5) counts of rape
committed against his own daughter, AAA, a 15-year-old girl.

On November 5, 2005, while AAA was asleep beside her sister, brothers, and grandmother, at
the second floor of their house in Barugo, Leyte, she was awakened by Villamor who was fondling
her breasts and vagina. Sensing that she was awake, he threatened to kill her if she made noise
or tell anybody about what he was doing to her. For fear of her life, AAA silently tried to resist and
push her father away, but to no avail as he was much stronger than her. She could only cry while
appellant mounted her, let his penis out of his loose short pants, took her underwear off, and
inserted his penis inside her vagina by making a push-and-pull movement. AAA felt pain as her
father penetrated her and then ejaculated inside her. During all of this, her siblings and
grandmother were sound asleep.

The same incident happened four (4) more times that year, particularly on November 7, November
10, December 3, and December 15. During those times, AAA did not open up to anyone for not
only was she afraid of her father, she had no one to confide in as her mother was working as a
domestic helper in Singapore. When, however, AAA became pregnant in February 2006, she
finally told her mother, who angrily came home in April 2006 and helped her file a complaint
against her father.

RTC found Villamor guilty of five (5) counts of incestuous rape, which was affirmed by CA.
Hence, this appeal. Villamor maintained that AAA's credibility is doubtful for as she admitted,
she did not see the perpetrator's face. She only identified him from his voice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused may be identified through the sound of his voice.

HELD:
YES. For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in
order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim
is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. That AAA's credibility is doubtful due to the fact
that she did not see the perpetrator's face, and only recognized him for his built, voice, and
smell, is of no moment. As the Court have held before, a person may be identified by these
factors for once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification is quite an easy
task. Even though a witness may not have seen the accused at a particular incident for reasons
such as the darkness of the night, hearing the sound of the voice of such accused is still an
acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew
each other personally and closely for a number of years. Here, it cannot be denied that AAA
personally knew appellant's built, voice, and smell, having lived with him her entire
life. Therefore, despite the fact that AAA did not see the perpetrator’s face, it can be identified
that it is the accused, making him guilty of the five counts of qualified rape.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
THE SWEETHEART DEFENSE MUST BE COUPLED WITH AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE TO
SUBSTANTIATE SUCH CLAIM SUCH AS MEMENTOS, LOVE LETTERS, NOTES OR ANY
PICTURE PROVING THAT THE ACCUSED AND THE VICTIM WERE INDEED
SWEETHEARTS

People of the Philippines V. Raul Yamon Tuando

G.R. No. 207816. February 24, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Raul Yamon Tuando (Tuando) was charged and was found guilty of qualified rape under Article
266-A (1) (c) in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the RPC.

The victim AAA narrated that she was 13 years old when the first incident happened. She recalled
that during the month of January 2006, upon coming home from school at noon-time, Tuando
offered her softdrinks, which she accepted and drank. After consuming it, she felt dizzy. It was at
this moment that Tuando pulled her inside the bedroom and put her on the bed. Tuando then
removed her school uniform and undergarments, kissed her and laid himself on top of AAA. She
tried to resist his advances but he boxed her hand and threatened to kill her whole family.
Thereafter, he kissed the victim's breasts and inserted his penis inside the victim's private organ
despite pleas to stop. After satisfying his lust, Tuando again threatened the victim not to tell her
mother about what happened. Since then, Tuando continued raping her upon arriving from school
with threats to kill her family. Months later, AAA's mother BBB noticed that AAA was not having
her monthly menstrual period. When she was examined by Dr. Baluyot of PGH, the latter
confirmed through her Final Medico-Legal Report that AAA was 20 to 22 weeks pregnant. On 7
October 2006, AAA was again raped by Tuando when she went back to their house to visit her
brothers. She decided to spend the night inside the house upon learning that Tuando was not
around during that time. However, late in the evening, she was awakened when she felt that
Tuando was on top of her and started kissing her. Tuando covered her mouth and raped her
again, this time with a knife poked at her. The next day, AAA told BBB that she was raped again
by Tuando. Prompted by the abuse on her daughter, BBB filed a complaint before
the barangay officials, who in turn, invited Tuando to their office for questioning.
Tuando denied raping AAA. He testified that sometime in the year 2005, he and AAA had a
relationship like a husband and wife but only started to be sexually intimate in January 2006. Their
relationship was kept secret because during that time, he and BBB were still in a common-law
relationship. On June 2006, BBB came to know of his relationship with AAA when she noticed
that the latter was getting very close to him. Turning her anger on her daughter, she scolded AAA.
Tuando told the court that he knew that it was AAA's brother, CCC, who filed the case against
him out of revenge when he scolded him. At the end of his testimony, Tuando insisted that he
never forced AAA to submit to sexual intercourse; that it was consensual and that it was
committed out of love. Finally, he found nothing wrong in his relationship with AAA despite her
minority and the fact that she is the daughter of his common-law spouse.

RTC was convinced that Tuando raped AAA and so convicted him of Qualified Rape.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sweetheart defense may be appreciated without other evidence.
HELD:
NO, the sweetheart defense must be coupled with affirmative evidence to substantiate such claim
such as mementos, love letters, notes or any picture proving that the accused and the victim were
indeed sweethearts, hence justifying the sexual intercourse between them.

As testified to by the accused, he and BBB were common-law spouses living under the same roof
with the children of the latter, including AAA. After four years, he now claims before this Court that
upon his separation from BBB, he entered into a romantic relationship, this time with the minor
daughter of his former partner. When the trial judge asked the accused if he found nothing wrong
with his relationship with a minor, he answered negatively. It is hard for this Court to fathom that
a minor, a 13-year old child-woman, would enter into a relationship with a man thrice her age and
worse, a former common-law spouse of her own mother. It is even absurd, if not disturbing, to
even entertain the thought that a child like AAA, who has been living with her step father, the
accused, since she was 9 years old, would freely consent to sexual intercourse with the accused
in their own home.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
ACCUSED MAY BE CONVICTED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE
VICTIM

People of the Philippines V. John Wile

G.R. No. 208066. April 11, 2016
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This involves a case charging John Wile, Efren Buenafe, Jr., Mark Lariosa and Jaypee Pineda of
Rape committed against AAA and BBB. All of the parties involved are minors during the
commission of the rape. During the trial, the prosecution posits that AAA and BBB was raped in
front of each other as a result of an alleged initiation rites to join the SWAK fraternity or Sana
Wala Akong Kaaway to which the accused are members. On the other hand, the defense of the
accused consists mainly of alibi and denial. The RTC convicted the accused. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the conviction. Hence, this appeal to the SC where all of the accused attacks the
credibility AAA and BBB which raises doubts as to the commission of the rape.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim.

HELD:
YES. The prosecution was able to establish all the elements of rape in the case at bar,
substantially giving weight and credence to the testimonies of the victims AAA and BBB. Under
Article 266-A(l)(a) of the RPC, elements of rape are: (a) that the offender, who must be a man,
had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (b) that such act is accomplished by using force or
intimidation. In resolution of rape cases, the victim's credibility becomes the primordial
consideration. When the victim's testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis thereof. Here, The credibility of victims AAA and BBB is further bolstered by the unique
circumstance that AAA and BBB had witnessed the rape of each other, and the testimonies they
gave in court were consistent with and corroborative of each other.

With respect to the accused’s defense of denial, which is refuted by the positive identification
made by AAA and BBB. It was settled that “a plain denial, which is a negative self serving
evidence, cannot stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape
victim.” Hence, the guilt of all the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus, all the accused are guilty of the crime of rape.

 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
ACCUSED MAY BE CONVICTED OF RAPE ON THE BASIS OF THE VICTIM’S SOLE
TESTIMONY

People of the Philipines V. Allan Menaling

G.R. No. 208676. April 13, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
AAA, who was twelve (12) years old at the time of the incident, is herein named victim while Allan
Menaling, who is AAA’s father is the accused.

AAA was sleeping with her sibling and BBB (her mother) on a bed in their house when Menaling
woke her up by tapping her foot and asked her transfer to the floor where he was sleeping. AAA
sat down, refused his request, and cried but Menaling held her hands. Then he directed her to
remove her clothing. When AAA refused this, he himself removed her clothing, kissed her and
inserted his male organ into her. AAA cried in pain. He threatened AAA with harm if she would
tell BBB about the incident. BBB woke up shortly and asked AAA to transfer to the bed. In the
afternoon of the same day, AAA and her four siblings were sleeping when Menaling again woke
her up and sexually assaulted her. Her brother woke up and witnessed the incident. He ran away
and told his aunt about it until word reached BBB. BBB cried when she learned of the incidents
from her sister. BBB immediately reported the crime to the police resulting in the filing of charges
against Menaling. The medical examination found that AAA’s hymen was not intact and was found
to have old healed lacerations at 7 o’clock position and her female anatomy admits of two fingers
with ease.

Menaling denied raping his daughter AAA and claimed that AAA was a problem child who had a
relationship with a lesbian. He confessed though that he always created trouble every time he
went home drunk which may have prompted AAA to charge him of rape. He also asserted that
he could not have possibly raped AAA because his wife, BBB, always stayed home.

RTC found Menaling guilty of qualified rape which was affirmed by CA. Menaling appealed to SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused may be convicted of rape on the basis of the victim’s sole testimony.

HELD:
YES, the prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had carnal
knowledge of his twelve (12) year old daughter, AAA, through force and intimidation. It is settled
that rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret, usually leaving only
the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. As such, the accused may be convicted
of rape on the basis of the victim’s sole testimony provided such testimony is logical, credible,
consistent and convincing. Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim is given full weight and
credence considering that her denunciation against him for rape would necessarily expose herself
and her family to shame and perhaps ridicule. Here, the initial testimony of AAA appears to be
truthful, candid and spontaneous. The oft-repeated adage that no young Filipina would publicly
admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless it is the truth, for it is her natural
instinct to protect her honour finds application in this case. No young girl would concoct a tale of
defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and undergo the expense, trouble and
inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact,
raped. Hence, Menaling’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus, the accused Allan Menaling is guilty of Qualified Rape.

 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
A VICTIM WHO IS A MENTAL RETARDATE MAY BE A CREDIBLE WITNESS IN CASES OF
RAPE

People of the Philippines V. Reynaldo Umanito

G.R. No. 208648. April 13, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
This involves a case charging Reynaldo Umanito of Rape committed against AAA, a mute and a
mentally retarded 19 y/o girl. During the trial, AAA, assisted with an interpreter, testified using sign
language. She pointed to Umanito as the one who raped and impregnated her. When asked what
appellant did to her, AAA responded by tapping her thigh with her two fingers, which was
interpreted as sexual intercourse. BBB, AAA’s mother, also testified to prove the carnal
knowledge upon noticing the baby bump of AAA. On the other hand, Umanito testified in his own
behalf and denied that he had raped AAA. The RTC convicted Umanito of Rape. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the conviction. Hence, this appeal to the SC where Umanito reiterated his innocence
and contends that AAA's testimony is vague to warrant his conviction. He posits that proof of
carnal knowledge, an essential element of rape, could not be deduced from AAA's gesture of
tapping her two fingers. Umanito argues that carnal knowledge is present only upon showing of
penile penetration or contact with vagina which the prosecution failed to prove.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a mental retardate may be a credible witness.

HELD:
Yes. When a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has in fact been committed. The lone testimony of the victim in a prosecution for
rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. Also, mental retardation per se
does not affect credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. In fact, it was settled that
it is highly improbable that a mental retardate would fabricate the rape charge against the
perpetrator. Due to her mental condition, only a very traumatic experience would leave a lasting
impression on her so that she would be able to recall it when asked. Here, AAA was consistent in
identifying appellant as the one who had carnal knowledge of her and consequently impregnated
her. Also, the prosecution has sufficiently established that AAA is a mental retardate. Through
AAA and corroborated by her mother BBB, the element of carnal knowledge was proven. In fact,
there was no denying that AAA became pregnant and she pointed to no other than Umanito as
the culprit. Hence, thru the testimony of AAA, prosecution was able to establish that Umanito had
sexual intercourse with AAA without her consent or against her will.

Thus, the accused Reynaldo Umanito is guilty of Rape.

 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
THE ESSENCE OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING IS THE ACTUAL DEPRIVATION OF THE
VICTIM'S LIBERTY

People of the Philippines V. Franco Darmo De Guzman y Yanzon, a.k.a. Darmo Yazon y
Cortez, a.k.a. Franco De Guzman y Cortez
G.R. No. 214502, November 25, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
On October 1, 2010, appellant Franco De Guzman, while in Isetann Mall, Recto, Manila, sought
help from complainant AAA, then a 17-year-old minor because his personal belongings were
stolen. Appellant requested that AAA accompany him to the bank so that he may be able to
withdraw funds. AAA assented. When they got to the bank, however, appellant was unable to
withdraw money since he did not have with him suitable identification cards. Appellant asked AAA
if he could stay at his house. With AAA's mother's permission, appellant stayed at AAA's house.

On October 6, 2010, appellant accompanied by AAA, CCC, and their friend Vincent went to
Citibank to withdraw P500,000.00. AAA and CCC were each promised a reward. Appellant went
inside the bank while the other three waited for him at a fast food restaurant across the street.
After 15 minutes, appellant arrived at the restaurant with a piece of paper which needed to be
filled up by AAA and CCC to obtain an ATM card. Having no ballpen with them, appellant said
they would have to go to the bank with him one at a time. AAA went with appellant first to the
bank ostensibly to fill out the forms. CCC and Vincent waited at the fast food restaurant. However,
neither AAA nor the appellant returned to the restaurant where the other two waited until 7:00
p.m. CCC and Vincent went to the bank and tried to ascertain if AAA and appellant were there
but the bank was empty. They then decided to go home thinking that AAA and appellant already
did so. When they arrived they were informed that AAA and appellant were not there.

AAA testified that appellant enticed him to accompany him to Cogeo, Antipolo under the guise
that he had to open a vault. They left the bank at 3:00 p.m. and rode the MRT to Antipolo to an
old decrepit house. It was there that AAA was detained from October 6 to October 14, 2010.
Appellant threatened him not to go out of the house because his bodyguards were watching him.
Appellant also told AAA that he was a sultan and that before he could adopt him he had to
complete "missions" two of which were to provide him with sustenance and perform sexual acts.
Out of fear, AAA sold his cell phone in the market so that he would have money to provide for
food and he allowed appellant sexual liberties on his person. Appellant continuously threatened
AAA with his bodyguards.

In the evening of October 14, 2010, a neighbor knocked on the door and demanded that appellant
surrender AAA. The neighbor had seen the evening news which featured AAA as a missing
person. Appellant told AAA to hide in the bathroom. A policeman knocked at the bathroom door
and told AAA to come out. Both AAA and appellant were brought to the police station where AAA's
statement was taken.

Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he is an unlicensed physical therapist
from Baguio City. He stated that contrary to AAA's claim, he met AAA, a minor, in 2009 at Isetann
Mall, Recto, Manila, when AAA approached him and invited him to eat. It was while they were
eating that AAA told him about his problems and solicited money from appellant. From then on,
they became friends who were in constant communication with one another. They had agreed to
meet at Isetann Mall, Recto on October 1, 2010. Upon arriving at the Manila bus station,
appellant's wallet and bag got stolen. He nevertheless went to Isetann Mall and met with AAA.
He told AAA about the loss of his belongings. Appellant then requested AAA to accompany him
to the bank to complain about his lost credit cards. They then proceeded to Citibank but
appellant's complaint was not acted upon for lack of identification. He then decided to go back to
Baguio but was stopped by AAA who was very insistent that appellant stay with him and his family.
He stayed there until October 6, 2010. It was on that day that he, accompanied by AAA, CCC and
friend, first went to another branch of Citibank. He was referred to Citibank, Makati where he was
not allowed to withdraw funds. Appellant allegedly told AAA to go home, since he had to go to
Antipolo to get money and his identification card. AAA insisted on going with him claiming that he
already had his parents' consent.

Appellant insists that he did not detain AAA. Since all the locks in the house were broken,
appellant could not have locked AAA in. Appellant stated that AAA could freely leave the house
which he in fact did when he went out to play computer and returned drunk to the house. Appellant
denied performing sexual acts and maintained that AAA was like a son to him. The policemen
and barangay tanods came to the house upon his behest because he saw his face on the evening
news as a suspect for kidnapping. When the police found AAA in the bathroom taking a shower
while appellant was brushing his teeth, the door was broken so they could be readily seen.

RTC found appellant guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. It gave credence to the
minor victim's testimony of deprivation of liberty. It stated that AAA's testimony was corroborated
by the testimonies of his brother, his father, and the two arresting officers. The RTC also stated
that while the crime of sexual abuse was present, appellant was only charged with kidnapping.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the victim’s act of voluntarily going with the accused on the based on latter’s
misrepresentation negates the crime of kidnapping.

HELD:
NO. The following are the elements of kidnapping, viz.: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b)
he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;
(2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained, or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or
detained, is a minor, a female, or a public officer. If the victim is a minor, or is kidnapped or
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of detention becomes immaterial. The
essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.

The fact that AAA voluntarily went with appellant to Antipolo, upon appellant's pretension that he
had to open the vault of his house, is immaterial. What is controlling is the act of the accused in
detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody.
In short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
can either be made forcibly or, as in the instant case, fraudulently.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
THE AGE OF THE BABY AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD BEEN PLACED UNDER THE
COMPLETE CONTROL OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSTITUTED DEPRIVATION OF
LIBERTY

People of the Philippines V. Miraflor Uganiel Lerio

G.R. No.209039. December 9, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
On 10 September 2005, around 5:30 in the morning, Anniban was in her kitchen preparing milk
for her infant child, Justin Clyde, when accused-appellant entered the house and lay down on the
bed beside the child and began chatting with her.

Accused-appellant then told her that she would take the infant outside. Anniban refused this as
the child had not yet been bathed. A few minutes later, Anniban realized that accused-appellant
and her child were no longer in the house. When Anniban left the house to search for accused-
appellant, she met her neighbor Yvonne on the way who told her that she had seen accused-
appellant carrying her son and that accused-appellant was en route to Toledo City.

Anniban sought the help of her neighbor Virginia Baldoza. Baldoza and her daughter thereafter
accompanied Anniban to the South Bus Terminal. Thereat, a dispatcher informed them that
accused-appellant had been fetched by a tattoed man on board a taxicab and that both headed
for the pier to get on the M/V Asia Philippines.

Anniban reported the incident to the Maritime Police and requested assistance. SPO4 Paragas,
PO3 Banilad and PO1 Ricky Yeban accompanied Anniban to the vessel.

Inside the ship, Anniban saw Arellano rocking her child in a cradle. Certain that it was Justin
Clyde, she took the child and told Arellano that the child is hers. Both grappled for the baby.
Shortly, accused-appellant, who had been standing a few meters away, joined Arellano and both
were arrested.

Accused-appellant claimed that she and Anniban used to be neighbors. She did confirm that on
10 September 2005, she had gone to Anniban's house and chatted with her. While Anniban was
busy doing her chores, she told her that she would take the child outside but was uncertain
whether she had been heard by Anniban. Accused-appellant did take the child outdoors and
proceeded to the pier as she had gotten a call from her boyfriend requesting her to meet with him
on the vessel M/V Asia Philippines. Accused-appellant brought the child with her as her boyfriend
allegedly wanted to see the child. On the vessel, accused-appellant averred that she had received
a call from Anniban asking for her child's whereabouts. Accused-appellant allegedly replied that
they were just meeting with her boyfriend and that she would return the child that same afternoon.
In response, Anniban purportedly threatened to file a case for kidnapping against accused-
appellant if she did not return her son. Accused-appellant and her boyfriend were indeed arrested
and charged with kidnapping of a minor by the maritime police officers.

ISSUE:
Is the accused-appellant proven to be guilty of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention?
HELD:
YES, the accused-appellant was proven to be guilty of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention.

The Court finds no reason to reverse the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The
prosecution has established the elements of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; and (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public
officer.

The prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proven that accused-appellant is a private
individual; that accused-appellant took one-month old baby Justin Clyde from his residence,
without the knowledge or consent of, and against the will of his mother; and that the victim was a
minor, one-month old at the time of the incident, the fact of which accused-appellant herself
admitted.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
TIME IS NOT A MATERIAL INGREDIENT IN THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING

People of the Philippines V. SPO1 Catalino Gonzales, Jr.

G.R. No. 192233. February 17, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
SPO1 Catalino Gonzales, Jr. was charged of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. The victim
Peter Tan (Tan) and his wife Huang Haitao (Haitao) operated a stall in a market. Haitao narrated
in that in the morning of 28 December 2005, Haitao left the house ahead of Tan and their two-
year old son to go to the market. When Haitao arrived at their stall, she tried calling Tan in his
phone but the latter did not answer. Finally, the call was answered by someone who introduced
himself as an NBI agent and who told Haitao that her husband was arrested for illegal possession
of shabu. Haitao immediately asked for her husband's whereabouts but the alleged NBI agent
hung up. Haitao then called Tan's phone again. Before she could talk to her husband, someone
snatched the phone away from Tan and told her that someone would get in touch with her. At
around 10:30 a.m., an unknown Chinese man called up Haitao and informed her that her husband
and son were detained for possession of drugs, and that she should pay off the captors. That
evening, a man called Haitao and demanded P5 Million for the release of her husband and son
which was later lowered to P3 Million. Haitao was ordered by the captor to prepare the money
and go to Luneta Park on the following day. Haitao reported the incident to the authorities.
Meanwhile, the Luneta Park meeting did not push through but Haitao was eventually reunited
with her son. Haitao then received a text message from an unidentified man who claimed that he
knew about Tan's kidnapping and demanded P30,000.00 from Haitao. The authorities staged an
entrapment operation so when Haitao and the man, later identified as Edwin Torrente met, the
latter was arrested. It turned out that Torrente was part of the group which forcibly took Tan and
his son. Torrente was later on placed under the Witness Protection Program and was utilized as
a state witness. Torrente narrated he was approached by appellant and told about a plan to arrest
Tan, an alleged drug pusher in Tanza, Cavite. The group conducted a surveillance and when they
chanced upon Tan who was inside his vehicle, they immediately blocked Tan's car, forced him
and his son to alight from the vehicle, and boarded them into another vehicle.

Appellant denied the charges against him and proffered the defense of alibi. Appellant claimed
that on the time and date of the alleged incident, he was at the Land Bank of the Philippines
Dasmariñas branch to encash his check. After encashing his check, appellant went home and
stayed there until 8:00 p.m. to attend a party. On 31 December 2005, Torrente went to his house
and together, they conducted a surveillance against drug suspects. On 17 January 2006, he
planned to meet up with Torrente at the Shell Station along Anabu Road in Imus, Cavite. When
appellant arrived at the gas station, two armed men alighted from their vehicles and poked their
guns on him. Appellant was then forcibly dragged into the vehicle. Appellant claimed that he was
subjected to physical and mental torture by the authorities.

The branch manager of Land Bank, Mr. Edgar Deligero, corroborated appellant's alibi. He noted
that based on the bank's verification procedure, the signature of appellant is valid and an
identification document was presented by the appellant. Appellant's daughter corroborated
appellant's statement that he was tortured.
On 12 July 2006, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.

Appellant challenged the trial court's decision affirming his conviction on the ground of alleged
discrepancies in the testimonies and statements of prosecution witnesses. Specifically, the
discrepancy in the time of the commission of the crime.

The OSG stressed that the corpus delicti in this case is the actual confinement, detention and
restraint on the victims. The OSG asserted that the prosecution has proven that the detention of
the victims was perpetrated by appellant, among others.

ISSUE:
Whether or not inconsistent statements of prosecution witnesses with regard to the time of the
commission of the crime calls for the acquittal of an accused.

HELD:
NO, if the inconsistency concerns an element which is not an essential to the crime, such
inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to. The
alleged inconsistencies related to the time the kidnapping was committed. The elements of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, are as follows: (a) intent on
the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of
his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.
Time is not a material ingredient in the crime of kidnapping. As long as all these elements were
sufficiently established by the prosecution, a conviction for kidnapping is in order.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERT AND SECURITY
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING WITH RAPE IS COMMITTED WHEN ON THE
OCCASION OF KIDNAPPING, THE VICTIM WAS ALSO RAPED

People of the Philippines V. Pamuel A. Magno

GR No. 206972. December 2, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
On 20 February 2000, BBB left her 5-month old baby, AAA to the care of her eldest daughter
CCC while she went to her mother's house to boil water. When BBB came back, AAA has gone
missing. A neighbor informed them that he saw an ice cream vendor carrying a baby around the
time when AAA went missing. The incident was reported to the police.

Meanwhile, a cargo truck driver narrated that while on his way home, he saw a man abusing a
baby on a bench in Plaza Libertad, Tacloban City. He noticed that the baby's private parts were
bloodied. He beckoned four bystanders but when they returned to the plaza, the man had already
fled and left the baby lying on the bench. The police proceeded to Plaza Libertad and found AAA
thereat. Police Officer 2 Raul De Lima (PO2 Delima) informed BBB of a possible sighting of AAA
in the plaza. He then accompanied BBB to the plaza. BBB confirmed that the baby lying on the
bench is AAA. She then brought AAA to the hospital.

Acting on a tip, the police proceeded to Barangay 37 in Seawall Area to apprehend accused-
appellant. The cargo truck driver positively identified accused-appellant as the assailant.

For his part, accused-appellant claimed that he was sleeping inside the house when the police
came, manhandled and arrested him. He denied raping AAA and claimed that he only came to
know the charges against him during arraignment.

Accused asserts that there was no proof that he intended to restrain the victim of her liberty, which
is an element of kidnapping and also insists that the eyewitness did not see him inserting his penis
on the victim's vagina hence carnal knowledge, as an element of rape, was not established.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not actual taking of the victim without the consent of her parents proves the
intention of the accused to deprive the victim of her liberty.
2. Whether or not the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape is committed when on
the occasion of kidnapping, the victim was also raped.

HELD:
1. YES, the actual taking of the baby without the consent of her parents is clear proof of
intent to deprive victim’s liberty. The elements of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another,
or in any other manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping
is illegal; and (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer. The
prosecution has satisfied the constitutionally required proof that the accused-appellant is a private
individual; that accused-appellant took AAA, -a baby, without the knowledge or consent of her
parents; and that AAA was only five-months old at the time of the kidnapping.
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter's liberty,
in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof. And in this case, the actual taking of
the baby without the consent of her parents is clear proof of appellant's intent to deprive AAA of
her liberty.

2. YES. Aside from the testimony of the eyewitness, rape was also proven by the medical
findings on AAA. As attested to by her physician, the Medico-Legal Report confirmed that AAA
suffered injuries in her vagina. It has been established that appellant committed kidnapping and
on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA. He is thus found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
BEING IN POSSESSION OF RECENTLY STOLEN ITEMS RAISES THE DISPUTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF BEING THE TAKER OF THE STOLEN ITEMS

Eduardo Celedonio V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 209137. July 1, 2015
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Eduardo
Celedonio (Celedonio). Celedonio was charged with the crime of Robbery with Force Upon
Things.

On the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain Adriano Marquez (Marquez) witnessed the robbery
perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman (De Guzman) while she was away to attend
to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was left in the house. Marquez, whose house was
opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other, identified
Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman reported it to the police and
requested that Celedonio be investigated for possibly having committed the crime, based on the
account of Marquez. Later, a follow-up operation was conducted PO1 Roque and SPO2 Sugui,
accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to survey the area for the possible identification and
apprehension of the suspect. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle as
Celedonio. The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he was
Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui informed
Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained silent and just bowed
his head. SPO2 Sugui then asked him, "Where are the stolen items?" Celedonio then alighted
from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen
items. PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan
po." Thus, Celedonio was arrested. More items were seized from Celedonio at the police station.
After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to Evidence citing as his ground
the alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his motorcycle. The RTC denied the
demurrer because the issue of legality of arrest mooted by his arraignment and his active
participation in the trial of the case. In his defense, Celedonio claimed that he was at home with
his wife, sleeping, at the time of the incident. RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things. The CA affirmed the RTC in toto. CA
stressed that Celedonio was not arrested when he voluntarily opened the compartment of his
motorcycle. He was only brought to the police for investigation after some of the stolen items were
found in his motorcycle compartment. Celedonio moved for reconsideration, but his motion was
denied.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not guilt of the accused may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
2. Whether or not being in possession of recently stolen items raises the disputable
presumption of being the taker of the stolen items.

HELD:
1. YES, the guilt of the accused may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Jurisprudence
tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw
its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the
finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes the accused-
appellant's participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that
leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime, the latter should be
convicted. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken
together, constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was
the perpetrator. These circumstances are: accused was a next door neighbor of private
complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their
houses and ransacking a room in complainant's house; during the time, no one was inside
complainant's house as all of them were at the wake of private complainant's recently demised
husband; two (2) days after, most of the items discovered to have been stolen that night were
found in the compartment of the accused's motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted by
the police; the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant as her stolen property;
during the trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his possession and claimed
that they were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In short, the
accused could not explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole possession.

2. YES, being in possession of recently stolen items raises the disputable presumption of
being the taker of the stolen items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts
of ownership over, is owned by him. First, Celedonio was in fact caught in exclusive possession of
some of the stolen items when the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-
up operation. He failed to give a reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items.
Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged stolen items were
found in his motorcycle compartment which he had control over, the disputable presumption of
being the taker of the stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he failed
to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario that could be inferred
therefrom was that he took the items.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
NO CRIME OF FRUSTRATED THEFT

Jovito Canceran V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 206442. July 1, 2015
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed and
modified judgment of the RTC, convicting petitioner Jovito Canceran and his co-accused
Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz for consummated theft involving 14 cartons of Ponds White
Beauty Cream belonging to Ororama Mega Center.

The prosecution witnesses saw Canceran approach one of the counters, pushing a cart which
contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid P1,423.00. However, upon inspection by
the Customer Relation Officer and by the packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes
were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream
worth P28,627.20. Canceran hurriedly left and a chase ensued. Upon reaching the Don Mariano
gate, Canceran stumbled as he attempted to ride a jeepney. After being questioned, he tried to
settle with the guards and even offered his personal effects to pay for the items he tried to take.

An Information was filed charging petitioner Canceran and his co-accused with “frustrated theft”
alleging that the crime was not produced after being discovered by the employees of Ororama
Mega Center. However, after the trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and his co-accused with
“consummated theft”, in line with the ruling in Valenzuela v. People that there is no crime of
"frustrated theft."

ISSUE:
Whether or not theft may be committed in its frustrated stage.

HELD:
NO, there is no crime of frustrated theft. The Information can never be read to charge Canceran
of consummated theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced.
Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was being charged with theft
in its attempted stage only.

Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4)
the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things. . "Unlawful
taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the
felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution,
the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all."

Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE MUST EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OTHER
PERSON HAS COMMITTED THE OFFENSE CHARGED

Franco V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 191185. February 1, 2016
Reyes, J.

FACTS:
On November 3, 2004 at around 11:00 a.m., Nakamoto went to work out at the Body Shape Gym.
After he finished working out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth P18,500.00 on the altar
where gym users usually put their valuables and proceeded to the comfort room to change his
clothes. After ten minutes, he returned to get his cell phone, but it was already missing.

Rosario informed him that he saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto
requested everyone not to leave the gym, but upon verification from the logbook, he found out
that Franco had left within the time that he was in the shower.

Ramos testified that he saw Franco in the gym but he was not working out and was just going
around the area. Ramos even met him near the door and as Franco did not log out, he was the
one who indicated it in their logbook. When Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was missing
and asked that nobody leaves the place, he put an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in the
logbook to indicate that he was the only one who left the gym after the cell phone was declared
lost.

Nakamoto, together with Jeoffrey Masangkay, went to Coral Street to find Franci but he was
already gone. A vendor told them that he saw a person who was holding a cell phone, which was
then ringing and that the person was trying to shut it off. When they went to Franco's house, they
were initially not allowed to come in but were eventually let in by Franco's mother. They talked to
Franco who denied having taken the cell phone.

Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost his cell phone at around 1:00
p.m., he and his witnesses could have confronted him as at that time, he was still at the gym,
having left only at around 2:45 p.m. He also admitted to have taken a cap and cell phone from
the altar but claimed these to be his.

The RTC convicted Franco of theft. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has
committed the offense charged.

HELD:
YES. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft
are: (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away
was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force upon
things.
The corpus delicti in theft has two elements, to wit: (1) that the property was lost by the owner;
and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. In this case, the crucial issue is whether the prosecution
has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish the corpus delicti of the crime.

Here, it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. His lone
testimony, however, cannot be considered a positive identification of Franco as the perpetrator.
Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive identification. While it
may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it does not establish with
certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming that he did, was Nakamoto's cell phone.
Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell phone." What was firmly established by Rosario's
testimony is that Franco took a cell phone from the altar. But Franco even admitted such fact.
What stands out from Rosario's testimony is that he was unable to particularly describe at first
instance what or whose cell phone Franco took from the altar. He only assumed that it was
Nakamoto's at the time the latter announced that his cell phone was missing. Moreover, it must
be noted that save for Nakamoto's statement that he placed his cell phone at the altar, no one
saw him actually place his cell phone there. Ramos, the gym caretaker, also testified that he did
not see Franco take Nakamoto's cell phone and only assumed that the cell phone on the altar
was Nakamoto's.

The facts and circumstances proven by the prosecution, taken together, are not sufficient to justify
the unequivocal conclusion that Franco feloniously took Nakamoto's cell phone. No other
convincing evidence was presented by the prosecution that would link him to the theft. The fact
Franco took a cell phone from the altar does not necessarily point to the conclusion that it was
Nakamoto's cell phone that he took. In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the rule is that
the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence
must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the offense charged.

Franco, therefore, cannot be convicted of the crime charged in this case. There is not enough
evidence to do so. As a rule, in order to support a conviction on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty.
In this case, not all the facts on which the inference of guilt is based were proved. The matter of
what and whose cell phone Franco took from the altar still remains uncertain.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
TO QUALIFY THE CRIME OF SIMPLE THEFT TO QUALIFIED THEFT, THE CRIME OF THEFT
MUST BE COMMITTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE

People of the Philippines V. Carolina Boquecosa

G.R. No. 202181. August 19, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Boquecosa was a sales clerk and vault custodian of Gemmary Pawnshop and Jewelry
(Pawnshop). As a sales clerk, Boquecosa was also in-charge of receiving orders for class rings
and for their payments. However, upon conducting an inventory, the Pawnshop discovered that
Boquecosa failed to remit the proceeds from the class ring orders. As to the pieces of the pawned
jewelry, these were nowhere to be found in spite of a thorough search. Because of the incident,
the management conducted an inventory. Based on the findings, P457,258.80 worth of pieces of
jewelry, unremitted class ring collections, and cell card sales was missing.

Upon inquiry, Boquecosa broke down and cried, and admitted that she used the missing class
ring collections and cell card sales for her own personal gain. Boquecosa also admitted that she
took the missing pieces of jewelry (necklace and bracelet), and pawned them at M. Lhuiller
Pawnshop and H. Villarica Pawnshop using fictitious names. To redeem the pieces of jewelry,
Mark Yu, the Pawnshop’s proprietor, used the letter of authority executed by Boquecosa.

The accused maintains that when a customer requested for a loan renewal, Tirso Gaña, the
attending sales clerk, asked Boquecosa to retrieve the customer’s pledged pieces of jewelry from
the vault. However, Boquecosa only found the necklace and could not find the bracelet.
Apprehensive of the missing pieces of jewelry, the Pawnshop’s management conducted an
inventory. Boquecosa was summoned to answer for the missing pieces of jewelry, and for the
unremitted class ring collections and cell card sales, but she denied having anything to do with
the matter. Boquecosa averred that she was not the only one who had access to the vault because
a certain Arlene, her co-employee, also had such access to the vault.

The defense raised the lone assigned error that the trial court erred in convicting Boquecosa for
the crime charged despite the fact that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt because nobody was able to directly identify her as the one who stole the pieces of jewelry,
unremitted class ring collections, and cell card sales.

ISSUE:
Has the prosecution proved the crime of Qualified Theft beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:
YES. For the prosecution of the crime of theft as punishable under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, the prosecution must be able to establish the presence of the following elements:
“(1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking
was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the
taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things.”

To qualify the crime of simple theft to qualified theft, the crime of theft must be committed with
grave abuse of confidence. All of the elements for qualified theft are present in this case.
Proceeding from the fact that Boquecosa was, on the dates of the crime, a sales clerk and vault
custodian of the Pawnshop, she admitted having pawned the missing pieces of jewelry. The act,
of course, presupposes a previous taking of the items. Boquecosa's position as vault custodian
entailed a high degree of trust and confidence. As such custodian, Boquecosa was entrusted with
the vault combination. Boquecosa gravely abused that trust and confidence, which her employer
reposed upon her.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
THE ESSENCE OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE RPC IS THE
APPROPRIATION OR CONVERSION OF MONEY OR PROPERTY RECEIVED TO THE
PREJUDICE OF THE ENTITY TO WHOM A RETURN SHOULD BE MADE

Paz Cheng y Chu V. People

G.R. No. 174113. January 13, 2016
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu was convicted of three (3) counts of the crime of Estafa defined and
penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Private complainant, Rowena Rodriguez, and Cheng entered into an agreement whereby
Rodriguez will deliver pieces of jewelry to Cheng for the latter to sell on commission basis. On
three different dates, Rodriguez delivered various sets of jewelry. Upon delivery of the last batch
of jewelry, Cheng issued a check as full security for the first two (2) deliveries and as partial
security for the last. When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to return the unsold jewelry on
due date, Rodriguez presented the check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored due
to insufficient funds. Upon assurance of Cheng, Rodriguez re-deposited the check, but again, the
same was dishonored because the drawee account had been closed. Rodriguez then decided to
confront Cheng, who then refused to pay.

In defense, Cheng denied receiving any jewelry from Rodriguez or signing any document
purporting to be contracts of sale of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a usurious moneylender.
She then admitted having an unpaid loan with Rodriguez and that she issued a check to serve as
security for the same, but was nevertheless surprised of her arrest due to the latter's filing of
Estafa charges against her.

The RTC found Cheng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa. Aggrieved,
Cheng appealed to the CA. The latter affirmed Cheng's conviction.

Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the decision of
the lower courts.

ISSUE:
In order to constitute the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC, does
misappropriation for one's own use include only conversion to one's personal advantage?

HELD:
NO, to misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal
advantage.

The elements of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1)
the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or
denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or
property received. In the case of Pamintuan v. People, the Court held that the essence of this
kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of
the entity to whom a return should be made. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote
the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not
only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal
presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale
or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.

In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals that the elements of Estafa, as defined
and penalized by the afore-cited provision, are present, considering that: (a) Rodriguez delivered
the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of selling them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required
to either remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry after one month from delivery; (c)
Cheng failed to do what was required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; (d)
Rodriguez attempted to encash the check given by Cheng as security, but such check was
dishonored twice for being drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account; (e)
Rodriguez demanded that Cheng comply with her undertaking, but the latter disregarded such
demand; (j) Cheng's acts clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its value.

Thus, the petitioner is found guilty of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
A PERSON MAY SIMULTANEOUSLY BE CONVICTED FOR ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
UNDER THE LABOR CODE AND ESTAFA UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE

People of the Philippines V. Alelie Tolentino

G.R. No. 208686. July 1, 2015
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA decision affirming the RTC decision convicting appellant Alelie
Tolentino of illegal recruitment in large scale under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code) and of five counts
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

Complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, Jimmy Lejos, and Marcelino Lejos alleged that
appellant Tolentino offered them work as factory workers in Korea for a fee of P80,000. They
allegedly gave appellant P20, 000 each as partial payment, and Tolentino promised to secure
their visas and employment contracts within three months. On their second meeting, complainants
signed an employment contract which, however, bore the names of other applicants who sought
Tolentino’s services but later backed out. Appellant assured them that original contracts bearing
their names would subsequently be provided. Thereafter, complainants paid P15,000 each as
their second partial payment. On both occasions, appellant issued petty cash vouchers as
evidence of the payments by complainants. Later, however, complainants were informed of the
arrest of appellant Tolentino for illegal recruitment based on the complaint of another person.
Another complainant, Lederle Panesa, suffered the same fate when she sought the help of
appellant to be employed in Korea for a placement fee of P75, 000.

As a consequence, a case for illegal recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code) and five
counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC were filed against appellant
Tolentino by the complainants.

Appellant denied the charges against her. She testified that she was introduced to private
complainants by a certain Cezar Manonson and that the owner of the office she is renting is her
relative. Private complainants allegedly sought her help regarding possible work in Korea and that
she merely explained the procedure for overseas employment to them. She was hesitant to help
them because she does not recruit workers as she herself was also applying for work as factory
worker through Narcisa Santos. She admitted having received money from private complainants
and issuing receipts for the payments, upon instructions from Narcisa Santos. She confirmed her
signature on the petty cash vouchers she issued to private complainants, evidencing their
payments. She testified that she gave the payments to Narcisa Santos. However, she admitted
that she does not have proof that she indeed turned over the money to Narcisa Santos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person may convicted of illegal recruitment under RA 8042 and estafa under
RPC simultaneously.

HELD:
YES, appellant Tolentino, for the same acts, may be convicted simultaneously for illegal
recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.
RA 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,"
established a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of the migrant workers,
their families and overseas Filipinos in distress. RA 8042 also broadened the concept of illegal
recruitment for overseas employment and increased the penalties, especially for Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate, which are
considered offenses involving economic sabotage. Part II of RA 8042 defines and penalizes illegal
recruitment for employment abroad, whether undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority or by a licensee or holder of authority.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale
if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

In this case, the prosecution sufficiently proved that appellant engaged in large-scale illegal
recruitment.

First, appellant is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Part of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution is a POEA Certification dated 10 March 2003, stating that appellant is not licensed
by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Appellant admitted that she has no
valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers.

Second, despite the absence of a license or authority to undertake recruitment activities, appellant
gave the impression that she has the power or ability to secure work for private complainants in
Korea. Private complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos all testified that
appellant promised them work as factory workers in Korea and induced them to pay placement
fees, which included the expenses for medical examination and the processing of their documents
for work in Korea. Appellant even showed pictures of previous applicants, whom she allegedly
helped find work abroad. Appellant also explained to them the procedure for overseas
employment and promised them that she would secure their visas and employment contracts
within three months. The testimonies of Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos were
corroborated by private respondents Marcelino Lejos and Lederle Panesa, whose Affidavits of
Complaint were adopted as their direct testimonies.

This Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents to others that he could send
workers abroad for employment, even without the authority or license to do so, commits illegal
recruitment.

Third, there are at least three victims in this case which makes appellant liable for large-scale
illegal recruitment.

The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation.

In this case, appellant Tolentino deceived complainants into believing that she had the authority
and capability to send them to Korea for employment, despite her not being licensed by the POEA
to recruit workers for overseas employment. She even showed them pictures of past applicants
whom she allegedly sent abroad for work. She also assured them that she would be able to secure
their visas and employment contracts once they pay the placement fee. Because of the
assurances given by appellant, private complainants paid appellant a portion of the agreed
placement fee, for which appellant issued petty cash vouchers with her signature, evidencing her
receipt of the payments.

Clearly, these acts of appellant constitute estafa punishable under Article 315 (2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
A PERSON MAY BE CHARGED AND CONVICTED SEPARATELY OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA

People of the Philippines V. Ma. Fe Torres Solina A.K.A. Ma. Fe Baylon Gallo
G.R. No. 196784. January 13, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Ma. Fe Torres Solina a.k.a. Ma. Fe Baylon Gallo was charged with the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale under Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

Accused-appellant maintains her denial that she was engaged in the business of recruiting
possible workers for jobs abroad. She insists that like all the private complainants, she was also
an applicant for a job as an overseas worker and that she merely accompanied them to a
recruitment agency. She alleges that private complainant Dela Vega and Dela Cruz conspired
together, used her name, and represented themselves to the other applicants as being authorized
to collect documents and fees and that she only met the other private complainants in the
trainings/seminars she attended. Anent the acknowledgment receipt signed by her and presented
by the prosecution as evidence, accused-appellant argues that it does not prove that the money
received by her was the consideration for private complainant Garces' placement abroad.

As to the charges of estafa, accused-appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove that she
employed deceit to entice private complainants to part with their money because she did not
represent or pass herself off as a licensed recruiter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person may be simultaneously charged with estafa and illegal recruitment based
on the same facts.

HELD:
YES. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under R.A. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code.

The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to
the offended party or third person.

As aptly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, accused-appellant defrauded the private
complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them for overseas
employment in Japan and because of such assurances, private complainants each parted with
P20,000.00 in exchange for said promise of future work abroad. Still, accused-appellant's promise
never materialized, thus, private complainants suffered damages to the extent of the sum of
money that they had delivered to accused-appellant.

All the elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are present, namely: (1) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. 8042);
and (3) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group.

First off, the first element is admittedly present. Appellant had no license to recruit or engage in
placement activities and she herself had admitted to her lack of authority to do so. In like manner,
the second and third elements also obtain in this case. On separate occasions and under different
premises, appellant met with and herself recruited the private complainants, six (6) in number,
giving them the impression that she had the capability to facilitate applications for employment as
factory workers in Japan.

All these complainants testified that appellant had promised them employment for a lee amounting
to P20,000.00. Their testimonies corroborate each other on material points, such as the amount
exacted by appellant as placement fee, the country of destination, the training that they had to
undergo to qualify for employment and the submission of documentary requirements needed for
the same. The private complainants were positive and categorical in testifying that they personally
met the appellant and that she asked for, among others, the payment of placement fees in
consideration for the promised employment in Japan.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
THE CONVICTION FOR ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE DOES
NOT PRECLUDE LIABILITY FOR ESTAFA ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY

People of the Philippines V. Marissa Bayker

GR No. 170192. February 10, 2016
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant in the present case is Marissa Bayker,

OCP Makati filed in the RTC informations against Accused-appellant and her two co-accused,
Nida Bermudez and Lorenz Langreo. One witness testified that he met the accused who
represented herself to be recruiting workers for overseas employment as hotel porters in
Canada. He paid the accused P4,000 for his medical examination and she had then
accompanied him in his medical examination. Then, the accused had gone to his house
informing him that he would be deployed as a seaman instead but he had to pay P6,000 more,
which he then paid to the accused. Two weeks thereafter, she called him about his deploymen
on April 21, 2001. On the promised date, he had gone to her office but no one was around. He
had then gone to her house, and she had then told him that his seaman’s application would not
push through. The two of them had then proceeded to her office bringing all his certificates of
employment, and that it was there that she had introduced him to her manager, the accused
Bermudez, who promised his deployment in Hongkong within two weeks. Because he had not
been deployed as promised, he had gone to the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), where he had learned that the accused, Bermudez and Langreo, had
not been issued the license to recruit and place people overseas. He had then decided to charge
them all with illegal recruitment and estafa in the Philippine National Police Crime Investigation
and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Similar incidents happened to
two other witnesses.

RTC found Bayker guilty beyond reasonable doubt for having violated Section 6 (m) of RA 8042
(The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) and for the crime of estafa penalized
under RPC, which was affirmed by CA. Hence, this appeal..

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa
simultaneously.

HELD:
YES. The conviction of Bayker for illegal recruitment in large scale does not preclude her
personal liability for estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of RPC on the ground of subjecting her to
double jeopardy. The elements of estafa as charged are, namely: (1) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a third
party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. In contrast, the crime of
illegal recruitment committed in large scale, as indicated earlier, requires different elements.
Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-appellant for both
crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from each other not only from their being
punished under different statutes but also from their elements being different. The active
representation by the accused-appellant of having the capacity to deploy Miparanum abroad
despite not having the authority or license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit as the first
element of estafa. Her representation induced the victim to part with his money, resulting in
damage that is the second element of the estafa. Considering that the damage resulted from
the deceit, the CA's affirmance of her guilt for estafa as charged was in order.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
ESTAFA BY MEANS OF DECEIT IS COMMITTED BY MAKING IT KNOWN TO THE
COMPLAINANTS THAT THE ACCUSED HAD THE AUTHORITY TO SEND THEM TO WORK,
FOR WHICH REASON THEY GAVE HER SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF MONEY

People of the Philippines V. Suzette Arnaiz a.k.a. “Baby Rosal”

G.R. No. 205153. September 09, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Prosecution witnesses Cayetano, Bunuan, and Cantor testified that they individually contracted
the services of the accused Suzette Arnaiz, Ruel P. Garcia, and Chita Lorenzo who operated a
travel agency, Florida Travel and Tours located in Manila, for their promises of overseas
employment. Notwithstanding several instances where the accused asked the witnesses for
money to process papers, they were never able to leave for overseas work. Later on, the travel
agency appears to have ceased operations thus prompting the witnesses to file individual
complaints against the accused.

In the criminal cases for estafa against the accused, appellant Suzette Arnaiz testified that her
office was only a travel agency and they only processed the issuance of visas in the different
embassies in the Philippines. She claimed that one of the witnesses went to her office in June
2000 with one Julie Landicho, and it was Landicho who recruited Bunuan and assisted him in
getting a visa from their office. Appellant averred that Bunuan went to their office with Cantor, Jr.
who said that his brother in Korea instructed him to get a Korean visa. Two weeks later, Bunuan
and Cantor, Jr. were able to get their visas after paying P65,000, covering the airfare, consultancy
and visa assistance fees. The two were able to leave for Korea but were held at the airport.
Appellant claimed that she was able to refund Bunuan and Cantor, Jr. the amount of P135,000
each. She asserted that the signature appearing on the voucher was that of her secretary Suzette
Arnaiz who is now residing abroad, and insisted that her name is Rosita Rosal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether all the elements for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale has been
established
2. Whether all the elements for estafa has been established beyond reasonable doubt

HELD:
1. YES. To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur: (a) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the
prohibited practices under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042); and (c) the
offender committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale were proven in this case. One, appellant has no
valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement of workers. The Labor and
Employment Officer of the POEA, Mildred N. Versoza, confirmed that based on the records of
their office, appellant and Florida Travel and Tours were not licensed to recruit workers for
deployment abroad. Two, appellant clearly engaged in recruitment activities and promised
employment abroad to the complainants as proven by their testimonies. Three, appellant
committed illegal recruitment against three persons.

2. YES. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.

These elements were proven in this case. By means of deceit, appellant made complainants
believe that she had the proper authority to send them to work in Australia and Korea, for which
reason they gave her substantial amounts of money. Appellant clearly misled the complainants
who believed she had the power to send them to work in Australia and Korea. They were required
to submit their bio-data and passports, and were asked to give substantial amounts of money for
the processing of their visas and other documents necessary for deployment. Efforts to recover
their money after they were not deployed for the promised work abroad failed resulting to
monetary damages on their part.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
FRAUD AND/OR DECEIT BY MISREPRESENTATION MUST BE THE RESULT OF OVERT
ACTS

Clarita Estrellado-Mainar V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 184320. July 29, 2015
Brion, J.

FACTS:
Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale to Eric Naval (Naval) portions of land
located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. During the negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told
Naval that the title to the land she was selling had no problems and that the area subject of the
proposed sale would "still be segregated from the mother title."

On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to Buy and Sell where the petitioner
agreed to sell to Naval a 200-square meter portion of TCT No. T-19932 representing a portion of
the petitioner's share in the estate of her deceased father, Nicolas Estrellado. Naval paid a down
payment of P100,000.00, and then Naval was permitted to build his house on the subject land.

Then, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. demolished Naval's house. It was only then
that Naval discovered that the lot sold to him had been the subject of a dispute between the
petitioner's family and JS Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner the return of the amount
he paid for the land, as well as to pay the value of the house demolished, but the latter refused to
heed these demands.

The prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under Article
316, paragraph 1 of the RPC.

MTCC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of other forms of swindling
under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCC decision in toto.

The petitioner also maintained that she did not misrepresent the subject land to be free from any
lien or encumbrance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not deceit as an element of swindling may be merely implied.

HELD:
NO, fraud and/or deceit by misrepresentation contemplated by law must be the result of overt
acts; they cannot be implied or presumed. The Information in the present case did not allege that
the petitioner made an express representation that the property sold is free from any
encumbrance.

The Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval did not contain any
representation by the petitioner that the property being sold was free from any encumbrance.
At any rate, paragraph 2 of Article 316 does not prohibit the sale of an encumbered property; the
vendor must have represented to the buyer that the property was free from encumbrance. What
brings about criminal liability is the deceit in selling the property.

Corollarily, the deed must have a statement of warranty that is false in order to commit the
offense. The petitioner's passive attitude regarding the presence of an adverse claim (she
assumed that Naval became aware of this inscription after showing to him a copy of TCT No. T-
19932 and "never complained") is not sufficient to constitute fraud within the meaning of the law.
 CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
THE SECOND SPOUSE, IF INDICTED IN THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, IS LIABLE ONLY AS AN
ACCOMPLICE

Leonila G. Santiago V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 200233. July 15, 2015
Sereno, C.J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the decision
of the CA affirming the Decision the RTC convicting her of bigamy.

Petitioner Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos was married on July 29, 1997. But it was
later found out that Santos had already been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974.

Estela Galang, Santos’ first wife testified that she had met petitioner Santiago as early as March
and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September
1997, or after she had already married Santos.

Petitioner averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should
be proven valid by the prosecution. But in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due
to the lack of a marriage license. Evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only
known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not
have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage. However, it appears that the two of
them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for
at least five years before they married each other. This lie led to the issuance of the Certificate of
Marriage, in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was
necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. The
Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. So there is an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not
satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than
her marriage contract.

RTC convicted Santiago of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. While Santos escaped the criminal suit. The CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of bigamy entail the joint liability of two persons
2. Whether or not the second spouse in the crime of bigamy is to be punished as a principal.
3. Whether or not bigamy may be committed when the second marriage is void ab initio due
to the lack of marriage license because of the misrepresentation of the contracting parties that
they have been cohabiting with each other without legal impediments for 5 years.
4. Whether or not acquittal for bigamy is in order on the ground that the second marriage
lacked the requisite marriage license hence void ab initio.
HELD:
1. NO, the crime of bigamy does not entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each
other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. In the crime of bigamy,
both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances,
as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage.
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, she should have had
knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. The knowledge of the second wife of the fact of
her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission
of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice. Only if the second spouse had
knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information as a co-accused. Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's
knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang.

2. NO, the second spouse in the crime of bigamy is not to be punished as a principal. The
second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to
Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether
man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in
lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." Therefore, her conviction should
only be that for an accomplice to the crime.

3. YES, bigamy may be committed when the second marriage is void ab initio due to the lack
of marriage license because of the misrepresentation of the contracting parties that they have
been cohabiting with each other without legal impediments for 5 years. Jurisprudence requires
that for the accused be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all
the essential requisites for validity. In this case, the subsequent marriage was celebrated without
a marriage license because of the contracting parties’ misrepresentation before the solemnizing
officer. The Supreme Court said that it cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. To do so would only make
a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court
will "lend its aid to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon
which the cause of action is founded." If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or
that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the
courts. As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.

4. NO. Petitioner cites People v. De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal
for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that
case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on
18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August
1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage
license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy. Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the
falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and
Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit
act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De
Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
 CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
MARRIAGES ARE NOT DISSOLVED THROUGH MERE CERTIFICATIONS BY THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR

Norberto A. Vitangcol V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 207406. January 13, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo. Born into their union were three (3) children. After some time,
Alice "began hearing rumors that her husband was previously married to another woman." She
eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan on July
17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the NSO. Alice subsequently filed
a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.

Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987. After much
prodding by their friends and relatives, he and Alice decided to get married in 1994. Before
finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake marriage"
with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan. Nevertheless, despite Norberto's revelation,
Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were married.

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an
affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone
conversation with her paramour. Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later
on convinced Alice to end the affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability
she may incur if she continued seeing her paramour.

RTC convicted Norberto of bigamy.

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence
a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar which states that the Office has no record of
the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no
proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution
fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the legal
dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy. According to Norberto,
nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with
Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license issued proves the nullity the first marriage

HELD:
NO. The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage
license does not prove the nullity of the first marriage. Assuming that it is true, it does not
categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved
through mere certifications by the civil registrar.
For an accused to be convicted of bigamy, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements: that the offender has been legally married; that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and that
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued
to the parties."

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Register does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage
was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License
does not exist.

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife, Gina. The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a
positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage. This should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to the absence of any record of the
marriage.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
SUBSEQUENT RECOVERY OF THE STOLEN ARTICLE WILL NOT PRECLUDE THE
CONVICTION OF A PERSON OF CARNAPPING

People of the Philippines V. Julkipli Asamuddin y Salapudin

G.R. No. 213913. September 02, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Emelina Gloria y Umali, hired accused-appellant Julkipli Asamuddin y Salapudin as messenger
in the E. Gloria Money Changer, Mandaluyong City, sometime in 2006, with the main function of
delivering local or foreign currencies to clients or other money changers. Assigned to appellant to
be used in the performance of his work is a blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-
9142. At 12:30 in the afternoon of July 11, 2007, Emelina handed to appellant the cash amount
of P800, 000.00 and various foreign denominations. She instructed appellant to bring the
currencies to her friend Rina Rosalial, a money changer in Mabini, Manila. After receiving them
from Emelina, appellant left aboard his service motorcycle on his way to Manila. Imee, the
domestic helper of Emelina, was then inside E. Gloria Money Changer and saw Emelina hand to
appellant currencies of various denominations and as appellant left using his service motorcycle.
By 1:30 p.m. of the same day, Emelina received a call from Rina Rosalial informing her that
appellant has yet to arrive in her shop. Emelina's calls to the cellular phones of appellant and his
wife were at naught, prompting her to lodge a complaint against appellant at the Philippine
National Police, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. In August 2007, the blue Honda XRM
motorcycle with plate number UU-9142 was found abandoned in Silang, Cavite, and was returned
to Emelina.

Appellant vehemently denied asporting currency totaling P1,077,995.00, and the subject
motorcycle. He admitted working as a Messenger/Runner at the E. Gloria Money Changer starting
October 2006 but he resigned from his job on July 10, 2007. Appellant asserted that the money
he received from Emelina on July 11, 2007 was his last salary for the period July 1 to 10, 2007.
His family's return to Zamboanga City on September 7, 2007 was due to the high cost of living in
Metro Manila which he could no longer afford.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not carnapping is committed even when the stolen article was subsequently
recovered.
2. Whether or not the taking of an article by a messenger constitutes Qualified Theft.

HELD:
1. YES. The elements of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, as
amended, are:(1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;(2) the taking is without
the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using
force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.

In the case, all of the elements were established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Exhibits proved that the blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-9142 used as a
service vehicle by appellant was acquired by Emelina's spouse, establishing the first element. It
is the second element that the appellant claimed was not proven because the prosecution's
evidence failed to show that he took the motorcycle without the consent of Emelina. Indeed,
Emelina herself tasked the appellant to proceed to Mabini, Manila, and permitted him to use the
service motorcycle. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without
the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. The Solicitor General aptly argued
that appellant's failure to return the motorcycle to Emelina after his working hours from 8:00 a.m.
to 5:00 p.m. constitutes "unlawful taking".

The subsequent recovery of the stolen motorcycle will not preclude the presence of the third
element. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain or animus
lucrandi. Intent to gain is an internal act presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle
which the appellant failed to overcome with evidence to the contrary. Verily, the mere use of the
thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain. Appellant is thus guilty of the crime of carnapping under
R.A. No. 6539.

2. YES. For the successful prosecution for Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of
confidence, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1)
taking of personal property; (2) that the said property belongs to another; (3) that the said taking
be done with intent to gain; (4) that it be done without the owner's consent; (5) that it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
and (6) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

All these elements are present in the instant case. Emelina positively and credibly testified that
she entrusted to appellant the amount of P800,000.00 and foreign currencies valued at
P277,995.00. Instead of delivering the money to the designated money changer as directed by
Emelina, appellant breached the trust reposed in him and disappeared with the cash bills.

The function of the appellant as a messenger of the E. Gloria Money Changer is to deliver
amounts of money, both peso and foreign currency, to the clients or to exchange the currency
with another money changer. Emelina routinely entrusts to appellant, on a daily basis, various
amounts of money from P50,000.00 to P500,000.00 without requiring the latter to acknowledge
receipt thereof. Emelina testified that she does not have proof that he handed to appellant
P800,000.00 and various foreign currency on July 11, 2007 because of her total trust and high
degree of confidence on appellant ("tiwalaan lang po"). This exhibited the trust and confidence of
Emelina to the appellant which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of the
former.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
A CHILD IS DEEMED SUBJECTED TO OTHER SEXUAL ABUSE WHEN HE OR SHE
INDULGES IN LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT UNDER THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY
ADULT

Mustapha Dimakuta Y Maruhom V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 206513. October 20, 2015
Peralta, J.:

FACTS:
AAA, was a domestic helper to the petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta’s household. On September
24, 2005, petitioner allegedly embraced a 16 year old victim, touched her breast and private part
while she was sleeping. The RTC convicted petitioner for violation of Section 5 Paragraph (b),
Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discriminatory Act. The petitioner denied the charges and argued that even
assuming he committed the acts imputed, there is still no evidence showing that the same were
done without the victim’s consent because the victim was asleep at the time the alleged acts were
committed. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opined that the petitioner should only be
convicted with Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).The
CA then rendered a decision adopting the recommendation of the OSG.

The petitioner, instead of further appealing the case, he filed before the CA a manifestation with
motion to allow him to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. The CA issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's manifestation with motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not sexual abuse has been committed.

HELD:
The elements of sexual abuse are as follows: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to sexual abuse; and 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse
when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. This
statutory provision must be distinguished from Acts of Lasciviousness under Articles 336 and 339
of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of the RPC, Acts of Lasciviousness has the following
elements:(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) That it is done
under any of the following circumstances: a. By using force or intimidation; or b. When the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c. When the offended party is
under 12 years of age; and (3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.

In case the acts of lasciviousness is covered by lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 and it is
done through coercion or influence, which establishes absence or lack of consent, then Art. 336
of the RPC is no longer applicable.
The offender may likewise be liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 if the victim is at least
eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition. There could be no other conclusion, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving
rational consent to any lascivious act, taking into account the constitutionally enshrined State
policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth, as
well as, in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's best interests in all actions
concerning him or her.

As correctly found by the trial court, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610 are present in the case at bar.

First, petitioner's lewd advances of touching the breasts and vagina of his hapless victim
constitute lascivious conduct as defined in Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7610.

Second, petitioner clearly has moral ascendancy over the minor victim not just because of his
relative seniority but more importantly due to the presumed presence of mutual trust and
confidence between them by virtue of an existing employment relationship, AAA being a domestic
helper in petitioner's household. Notably, a child is considered as sexually abused under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 when he or she is subjected to lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some
compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the
offended party. The law does not require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral
coercion or ascendancy is sufficient.

Finally, the victim is 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under Section
3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, "children" refers to "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
THE DISBURSEMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS PAID TO A CONTRACTOR DESPITE THE
LATTER’S FAILURE TO DELIVER THE SUPPLIES VIOLATES SEC. 3 (E) OF RA 3019

Melchor G. Maderazo and Dionesio R. Verden, Jr. V. People of the Philippines and
Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 209845. July 1, 2015
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on the decision of the Sandiganbayan which found petitioners Melchor
G. Maderazo, Acting Municipal Mayor of Caibiran, Biliran, and Dionesio R. Veruen, Jr., Acting
Municipal Accountant, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Caibiran, Biliran enacted Resolution No. 01, Series of 1998,
authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a negotiated contract with a local fabricator of
tapping saddles for the improvement of the water system of Caibiran, Biliran. Thereafter, Acting
Municipal Mayor Maderazo entered into a Job Contract with Artemio Vermug, proprietor of
Vermug Welding Shop, for the fabrication of 400 pieces of tapping saddles worth P160, 000. The
Municipal Treasurer disbursed the said amount after he received the Disbursement Voucher and
the undated Inspection Report, among others, of the allegedly delivered tapping saddles as
certified both by Maderazo and Veruen, Jr.

However, when Mayor Rodito Ramirez resumed office, he found that there were no tapping
saddles delivered despite the payment made. Hence, a case for malversation and for violation of
RA 3019 were filed against Malderazo, Veruen, Jr. and the members of the Sangguinan before
the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan ruled against Maderazo and Veruen, Jr. but found no sufficient evidence to
link the Sangguinian members to the crime. The Sandiganbayan held that conspiracy existed
between Veruen and Maderazo, since the crime would not have been possible without each
other's participation as shown by their execution and approval of the Disbursement Voucher,
check, and undated Inspection Report.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is violated when a public
officer causes the disbursement of public funds to be paid to a contractor despite the latter’s failure
to deliver the supplies.

HELD:
YES. The crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 has the following elements: (a) the accused
must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action
caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
All these elements are present in this case. It is undisputed that both Maderazo and Veruen were
public officers discharging administrative functions at the time material to this case. Maderazo, as
the Acting Mayor, and Veruen, as the Acting Municipal Accountant, ensured the release of the
payment for the tapping saddles on the same day that the Job Contract was executed. However,
the tapping saddles were not delivered upon payment: The evidence on record, however, reveals
that despite the disbursement of the amount of P160,000.00, no tapping saddles were actually
delivered to the municipality on the said date.

By disbursing P 160,000 despite the non-existent tapping saddles, Maderazo and Veruen caused
undue injury to the LGU of Caibiran for the said amount. Their concerted actions, which
demonstrate a common design, justify the finding of conspiracy.

Therefore, the acts of Maderazo and Veruen, Jr. violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
AN ACT WHICH IS BASED UPON HONEST AND SINCERE BELIEF OF A PUBLIC OFFICER
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE BAD FAITH AND MANIFEST IMPARTIALITY

Teofilo Giangan, Santos Bontia, and Liberato Dumail V. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 169385; August 26, 2015
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Teofilo Giangan, in his capacity as the barangay chairman at the time material to this
case, along with his co-accused Domail, a barangay councilor, and Bontia, the head of the
barangay tanods, were charged with the violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) for having destroyed the fence made of wooden posts and straight
wires in an agricultural land owned by Aurelia Bernadas without proper court order or authority of
law. Bernadas testified that she had caused the construction of the fence on her three properties
because the fruits of the coconut trees growing on her properties were frequently stolen, and also
because the sand on the seashore within her properties was being excavated and that she
reported the theft to Giangan, who did not take any action on her complaint. Many landowners
put up fences on their properties in the area, but the fences were not removed. Giangan stated
that as the barangay chairman, he believed that the site of the fence was a road because the
residents complained that they could longer pass through especially during high tide that was why
he removed the fence. He then turned over of the wooden posts to the police station. The RTC
convicted them of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Hence, Giangan as the lone surviving accused appeals under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an act which is based upon honest and sincere belief of a public officer constitute
bad faith and manifest impartiality.

HELD:
NO. In connection with the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, good faith means honest,
lawful intent; the condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and without intent to assist in a
fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Furthermore, manifest partiality should be inferred only
if there was a clear showing that there had been others who had been bothered by the similar
allegedly illegal constructions and had complained, but the accused, in their capacities as
barangay officials, did not deal with such complaint with the same alacrity. Giangan and his co-
accused did not act with gross bad faith and manifest impartiality when they removed the wooden
posts of the fence of Bernadas. On the contrary, their actuations evinced good faith. It was not at
all disputed that access through the road had long been permitted even by the owner and her
predecessor. In that context, Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and
sincere belief that he was then summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the
obstructed road had just reported to him. A further indication of the good faith of Giangan was the
turning over of the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that the accused were acting
within the scope of their authority. The Sandiganbayan further erred in finding the presence of
manifest partiality on the basis that there had been other allegedly illegal constructions that the
accused did not similarly remove in their capacities as barangay officials. Bias should still not be
imputed against them because they were acting on the complaint against the inconvenience
brought about by the obstruction erected on the access road.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

AN ACT OF A PUBLIC OFFICER IN MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH, AND
INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE CONSTITUTES A CORRUPT PRACTICE UNDER R.A. NO.
3019

Carlos C. Moreno, Jr. v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 218620; September 2, 2015
NOTICE

FACTS:
Petitioner Carlos C. Moreno, Jr., as municipal accountant, was charged of violation of Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,"
for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Rodrigo S. Villanueva, President and General Manager
of AM-Europharma Corporation, by awarding a government contract for the supply of medicines
to the municipality of Janiuay, Iloilo, despite AM-Europharma's disqualification to bid due to the
suspension of its accreditation by the DOH.

In response to an Invitation to Bid by the Office of the Municipal Mayor for the supply of medicines,
three medical suppliers (AM-Europharma, Mallix Drug, and Phil. Pharmawealth) participated in
the public bidding. Despite the absence of the Provincial Auditor, the Committee on Awards, all
public officers, awarded the contract to AM-Europharma. The following day, the medicines were
delivered to the municipality. The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information before the
Sandiganbayan against the members of the said committee, Mayor Frankie H. Locsin, Moreno,
Budget Officer Ramon T. Tirador, Municipal Treasurer Luzviminda P. Figueroa, and Municipal
Mayor Ricardo S. Minurtio, for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty.

Moreno argues that as a municipal accountant, it is not his duty to determine whether the winning
bidder is pre-qualified or not.

Hence, the present petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision
of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Does the act of the accused, Moreno, in awarding the contract despite disqualification constitute
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence?

HELD:
YES, despite the circumstances to declare a failed public bidding, Moreno awarded the contract,
in manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, to an unqualified bidder.

All the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 concur: 1. That the accused are
public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2. That said public officers
committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their
public positions; 3. That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a
private party; 4. That such injury was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and 5. That the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In the case at bar, Moreno was a public officer charged with the duty to award the procurement
contract on behalf of the municipality. With regard to the defense's argument that it is not within
the Committee on Awards' duty to ascertain whether the bidder is pre-qualified or not, the
contention must fail. Assuming that he indeed has no such duty, Moreno, with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, and inexcusable negligence, failed to exercise prudence and did not further
inquire into the matter, when he already knew of AM-Europharma's disqualification due to the
expiration of its accreditation at the time of the bidding.

Hence, as a public officer, Moreno, in awarding the contract to an unqualified bidder, showed
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence giving unwarranted
benefits or preference to Villanueva, which caused injury to the municipality. This is in violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
HAZING IS A CRIME MALA PROHIBITA

Dandy L. Dungo, et al. V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 209464. July 1, 2015
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the CA affirming the
RTC decision which found the petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr.
(Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 or
the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The petitioners are alleged to be members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity. The petitioners, in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not yet known
used physical violence against the person of MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA (VILLANUEVA),
a neophyte of the said fraternity as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting
him to physical harm, resulting to his death.

According to the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, at around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of
January 14, 2006, the victim Villanueva was brought to the emergency room of JP Rizal Hospital.
Dr. Masilungan, the attending physician, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing
and had no heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes.
Villanueva, however, did not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr.
Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several
injuries on his arms and legs. He further attested that Villanueva's face was cyanotic, meaning
that blood was no longer running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when he pulled
down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions on both legs, which extended from the upper
portion of the thighs, down to the back of the knees. Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men
brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him that they found Villanueva lying motionless
on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, and brought him to the hospital. Dr.
Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report. Due to the nature, extent and location
of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing
injuries because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also because of
his experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.

Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that
he performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva. Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were
hazing-related. During the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the
marking of Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fraternity.

Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards
on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00
o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men,
who signed on the logbook under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the
lifeless body of a person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the
security guards did not allow the two men to leave the hospital because they called the police
station so that an investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the hospital.
During his testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dungo as the two persons who brought
Villanueva to the hospital.

PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (PO2 Ignacio) testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock
in the early morning, Natividad called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless
body of a man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When PO2 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva's
corpse with contusions and bite marks all over his body. PO2 Ignacio and his policemen
companions then brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what
happened, but they invoked their right to remain silent.

The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners.

Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 Dungo
stayed and slept at her boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14,
2006, they were roused from their sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort
in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo then left the boarding house.

Dungo testified that upon his arrival at the resort, Sibal led him inside. There, he saw Rudolfo
Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and Villanueva, who was unconscious. Dungo
told them that they should bring Villanueva to the hospital. They all agreed, and Castillo called a
tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He identified himself before the security guard as
Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his real name.

Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO — Theta Chapter.
He said that he noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a
bruise on the left side of his face. They then went to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba
City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to the second floor of the resort. He
confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva. Around 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in the
evening, Gopez decided to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort and accompany
Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other neophytes, Gopez left the resort and went back
to UP Los Baños.

Sibal testified that he was a Brother Actuary of the APO — Theta Chapter, and was in charge of
fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood donations.
On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he saw Castillo with their neophyte
Villanueva, who had a bruised face. Thereafter, they proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort. Once
inside the resort, he accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a rest. A few minutes
later, he went down and confronted Castillo about the bruises on Villanueva's face. He then stayed
outside the resort until Gopez and the other neophytes came out and told him that the final
initiation rite was cancelled.

After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva. He saw Villanueva,
who looked unconscious, seated in one of the benches on the ground floor. He then called Dungo
for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal
Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the
same.

RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a
notice of appeal with the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Hence this petition was
filed
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the having no intent to kill the hazing victim is a defense in the crime of
hazing.
2. Whether or not the victim’s consent is defense in hazing.
3. Whether or not conspiracy in the crime of hazing must be proven by the prosecution.
4. Whether or not Sec. 4 of the Anti-hazing Law is unconstitutional because the disputable
presumption of conspiracy in hazing violates the accused’s right to be presumed innocent.

HELD:
1. NO, having no intent to kill the hazing victim is not a defense in the crime of hazing. R.A.
No. 8049 was made a malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the defense of
good faith.

Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and
acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala
prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to
public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.

A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality,
however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No.
7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as
technical malversation.

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibitacrimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in
itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statute.

Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person
charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no
intention to commit so grave a wrong.

Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in
se adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead,
it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.

The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public
policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the
crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.

2. NO, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense
in hazing. During the discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as a punishable act under
the law, the issue of consent was tackled. Senator Lina said that the defense of consent will not
apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a
punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates
the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature
of the act.

3. YES, conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need
not prove conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there
must be a common design to commit a felony. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In
conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined
to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and
offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.

R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption
of actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6
thereof provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This
provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the
offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to
prevent the commission of the hazing.

4. NO, Sec. 4 of the Anti-hazing Law is not unconstitutional. The disputable presumption of
conspiracy in hazing does not violate the accused’s right to be presumed innocent. Under Sec. 4,
there is a disputable presumption of conspiracy and the common design of offenders is to haze
the victim. Some of the overt acts that could be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan
the hazing activity as a requirement of the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim
to attend the hazing; and (3) actually participate in the infliction of physical injuries. In this case,
there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing because of their
presence in the venue. Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy. Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders
in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during
the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
B.P. BLG. 22; THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AS TO THE ACTUAL DATE OF RECEIPT OF
THE DEMAND LETTER DOES NOT RAISE THE PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF
INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS

Robert Chua V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 196853. July 13, 2015
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were long-time friends and neighbors. On different
dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of varying amounts
pursuant to their rediscounting arrangement at a 3% rate. However, See claimed that when he
deposited the checks, they were dishonored. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good the
checks. Hence, See filed on December 23, 1993 a Complaint for violations of BP 22 against Chua.
In a Resolution, the prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the filing of charges
against Chua. Accordingly, 54 counts of violation of BP 22 were filed against him.

Chua asserts that the second element of the offense charged, i.e, knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, was not proved by the
prosecution. He argues that the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds only arises after it is proved that the issuer actually received a notice of dishonor and within
five days from receipt thereof failed to pay the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment. Here, the date when Chua allegedly received the demand letter dated November 30,
1993 was not established by the prosecution since there is no date of receipt from which to reckon
the aforementioned five-day period, the presumption that he has knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds at the time of the issuance of the checks did not arise.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of evidence as to the actual date of receipt of the demand letter raises
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

HELD:
NO, the absence of evidence as to the actual date of receipt of the demand letter does not raise
the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. In order to successfully hold an accused
liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential elements must be present: "(1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the
maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment." Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the hardest to prove as it involves
a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds, which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice
of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check
or to make arrangements for its payment.
In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua asserts that
the absence of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated November 30,
1993 prevented the legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from arising. On the
other hand, the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua's actual receipt of the subject demand
letter is not affixed thereon, it is presumed that he received the same on the date of the demand
letter (November 30, 1993). The prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 gives the
accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution.
In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or
drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg.
22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period."

In the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of BP
22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received the demand letter
dated November 30, 1993.

The MeTC cannot simply presume that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of
Chua's receipt thereof. There is simply no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence.
In addition, from the inception of this case Chua has consistently denied having received subject
demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the purported demand letter was still blank
when presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for another purpose. Given
Chua's denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the
November 30, 1993 demand letter.

However, all that the prosecution did was to present it without, however, adducing any evidence
as to the date of Chua's actual receipt thereof. It must be stressed that '[t]he prosecution must
also prove actual receipt of [the notice of dishonor] because the fact of service provided for in the
law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused." "The burden of proving
notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice"
which the Court finds wanting in this case.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
THE COURT OF THE PLACE WHERE THE CHECK WAS DEPOSITED OR PRESENTED FOR
ENCASHMENT CAN BE VESTED WITH JURISDICTION TO TRY CASES INVOLVING
VIOLATIONS OF BP 22

Armilyn Morillo V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 198270. December 9, 2015
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong, and Bing Nanquil, introducing themselves as
contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio
Construction, purchased construction materials from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea
General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that all payments shall be
via postdated checks. Upon delivery, respondent paid partly in cash and partly in the form of 2
postdated checks, drawn from Metrobank Pampanga branch. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted
to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCIBank in Makati City. However, both
were dishonored by the drawee bank. Upon communicating the dishonor to respondent,
respondent once again issued 2 postdated checks. Upon deposit in her savings account at
Equitable PCIBank in Makati City, the checks were once again dishonored. After several demands
to the respondent, petitioner then filed a complaint for BP 22 against respondent.

Respondent then appealed to the RTC, asserting that since the subject checks were issued,
drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid for none
of the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati City. The RTC affirmed the MeTC
ruling, holding that a violation of BP 22 is a continuing or transitory offense; thus, jurisdiction may
be had in several places where one of the acts material to the crime occurred.

On appeal, however, the CA, holding that since all the essential elements of the offense happened
in Pampanga, the case can only be filed in said place, reversed the lower courts’ rulings and
dismissed the case without prejudice to it refilling in the proper venue

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment
can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22

HELD:
YES, the court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment can be
vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22.

It is well-settled that violations of BP 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes,

meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur
in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any
of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
In the present case, the fact that the check subject of the case was drawn, issued, and delivered
in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is
undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati
Branch of Equitable PCIBank.

Therefore, the MeTC of Makati, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its
decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
MARKING UPON IMMEDIATE CONFISCATION CONTEMPLATES EVEN MARKING AT THE
NEAREST POLICE STATION OR OFFICE OF THE APPREHENDING TEAM

People of the Philippines V. Efren Basal Cayas

G.R. No. 215714. August 12, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Efren Basal Cayas is charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs. According
to the prosecution, a civilian informant came to the police station to report the rampant sale of
illegal drugs by accused-appellant. The police officers then designated said civilian informant as
poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation. During the transaction, the civilian informant gave accused-
appellant the buy-bust money, and the latter consequently gave the plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu to the former. Then the civilian informant
executed the prearranged signal that the sale was consummated by scratching his head with his
right hand. Immediately, the police officers rushed to the scene. The said police officers arrested
accused-appellant and informed him of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant avers,
however, that the police officers planted evidence against him, after he failed to divulge the
identities of the persons involved in selling illegal drugs in the area.

The RTC ruled that the prosecution successfully established the elements of illegal sale of drugs
as appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a valid buy-bust operation. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision, holding, among others, that the prosecution proved the existence of
all the elements constitutive of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Appellant is clutching at straws in insisting the lack of a pre-operation report, the non-marking of
the seized sachet of shabu at the place of the commission of the crime and the non-presentation
in court of the civilian informant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-marking of the seized sachet of shabu at the place of the commission of
the crime is fatal to the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

HELD:
NO, marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. In this light, the marking of the seized sachet
of shabu at the police station immediately after the arrival thereat of the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation was in accordance with the law, its implementing rules and
regulations, and relevant jurisprudence.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
THE ILLEGAL DRUG MUST BE PRODUCED BEFORE THE COURT AS EXHIBIT AND THAT
WHICH WAS EXHIBITED MUST BE THE VERY SAME SUBSTANCE RECOVERED FROM
THE SUSPECT

People of the Philippines vs. Enrico Mirondo

G.R. No. 210841, October 14, 2015
MENDOZA, J

FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted to effect the arrest of accused Mirondo who was a supposed
seller of illegal drugs with PO1 Jifford Signap acting as the poseur-buyer. After the consummation
of the sale, the apprehending officers arrested the accused while PO1 Signap marked the seized
sachets of shabu with the initials “EM-B”. The team brought the accused to the police station and
prepared their Pre-Operational Plan, the Certificate of Inventory as well as the official request for
chemical and laboratory examination of the suspected shabu. Significantly, the examination
conducted disclosed that the white crystalline substance contained in the plastic sachet recovered
from the appellant tested positive for the presence of shabu. Mirondo assails the prosecution
evidence for its failure to establish the proper chain of custody of the seized plastic sachet
allegedly containing shabu since the same was not presented before the trial court for
identification. What was presented were mere pictures depicting the accused together with the
subject shabu and the buy-bust money.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission to present before the trial court for identification the plastic sachets
containing shabu allegedly seized from the accused is fatal to the prosecution of the crime of
selling illegal drugs.

HELD:
YES. For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following
essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were
identified. Further, in People v. Gatlabayan, the Court held that it is of paramount importance that
the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt; and that it must be
proven with certitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same
substance offered in evidence before the court. In fine, the illegal drug must be produced before
the court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be the very same substance recovered
from the suspect.

Here, the second element is wanting. It appears that the subject shabu allegedly confiscated from
Mirondo was never presented in evidence during the trial for identification by the prosecution
witnesses. Instead, the prosecution endeavored to establish the existence and identity of the
narcotic substance through mere photographs depicting the accused together with the subject
shabu and the buy-bust money.

Therefore, the accused should be exonerated from the crime charged against him.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
IN THE ILLEGAL SALE OF A PROHIBITED DRUG, THE IDENTITY OF THE PROHIBITED
DRUG MUST BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT ANY DOUBT

People of the Philippines V. Anita Miranda y Beltran

G.R. No. 205639. January 18, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
After a surveillance conducted outside appellant's house, it was confirmed that she was engaged
in the illegal sale of shabu. Thus the police formed a buy-bust team designating PO2 Rodil to act
as the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Buhay and PO2 Chan as the arresting officers and the other team
members as back up. Marked and given to PO2 Rodil were four (4) one hundred peso bills. PO2
Rodil saw appellant outside her house and after a brief conversation, told her that she was buying
shabu worth P400.00. Appellant then went inside her house and upon her return, handed to PO2
Rodil one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. After PO2 Rodil
gave appellant the marked money as payment, she then made the pre-arranged signal. SPO1
Buhay and PO2 Chan effected appellant's arrest. PO2 Chan got the marked money from
appellant, while PO2 Rodil held on to the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
The team then informed Arnel Almazan, Barangay Councilor of Barangay Ibaba West, about the
operation and they all brought appellant to the Calapan Police Station.

Both the inventory of the seized item and the taking of appellant's photos were made at the police
station. PO2 Rodil marked the seized item and submitted the same for laboratory examination on
the same day. The Forensic Chemist confirmed the specimen submitted positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

Appellant denied selling illegal drugs saying that at 2:00 p.m. of May 6, 2005, she was at home
watching TV when the police officers entered her house, frisked her and searched her house. She
was later brought to the Calapan Police Station where she was asked to point to the shabu placed
on top of a table; and that she was also subjected to a drug test. Appellant insists that there was
no indication of full compliance with Section 21 (1) of RA 9165.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule on chain of custody is required to be complied with strictly.

HELD:
NO. It is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug that the drug, which
is the corpus delicti, be presented as evidence in court. Hence, the identity of the prohibited drug
must be established without any doubt. Even more than this, what must also be established is the
fact that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in
court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. In this case, we find
that the prosecution was able to establish the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized
sachet of shabu. After PO2 Rodil received the plastic sachet of white crystalline substance from
appellant, she was in possession of the shabu up to the time appellant was brought to the police
station for investigation. With the buy-bust team and appellant at the police station were the Kill
Droga Provincial President, Nicanor Ocampo, Sr. and Barangay Councilor Almazan. PO2 Rodil
made an inventory of the seized item which was attested by Ocampo. She also marked the seized
item with her initials "MDR". Appellant's photos were also taken pointing to the plastic sachet.

There is no doubt that the sachet of shabu, which was bought and confiscated from appellant,
brought to the police station, and was submitted to the crime laboratory for a qualitative
examination, was the very same shabu presented and identified in court. The police had
sufficiently preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item, thus, complying with
the prescribed procedure in the custody and control of the confiscated drugs.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
IN ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS, THE DELIVERY OF THE ILLICIT DRUG TO
THE POSEUR-BUYER AND THE RECEIPT BY THE SELLER OF THE MARKED MONEY
CONSUMMATE THE ILLEGAL TRANSACTION

People of the Philippines V. Juan Asislo y Matio

G.R. No. 206224. January 18, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
PDEA received intelligence information about the proliferation and distribution of marijuana in La
Union, and the same revealed that the accused Juan Asislo had delivered a huge volume of
marijuana in Baguio City to an unidentified buyer sometime in the first week of April 2008.
Regional Director Apalla directed IA1 Natividad to build a case against Asislo.

On May 2, 2008, the confidential informant “Jojo” reported that Asislo disclosed that the prevailing
price of marijuana was P1,500.00 per kilo. Per Natividad's instruction, Jojo apprised Asislo that
the buyer from Manila who was willing to buy 200 kilos of marijuana will be in Baguio for a
vacation. In a phone call, Asislo insisted in talking with the buyer. Natividad talked with him
through the phone and reiterated to him his interest to buy 200 kilos of dried marijuana leaves.
However, Asislo notified him that he only had around 100 kilos of marijuana leaves. Eventually,
they agreed to meet.

Around 5:00am on May 13, 2008, the entrapment and arresting team proceeded to the area.
Natividad asked Asislo to see the marijuana before he pays. Appellant showed him as requested.

Natividad removed his ball cap, their pre-arranged signal, and held Asislo in a tight embrace. He
removed his service firearm and introduced himself as a PDEA agent. The back-up team rushed
to the scene and arrested the other accused.

Because of the volume of the confiscated dangerous drugs, the team brought the sacks of
marijuana to the PDEA office. Thereafter, the drugs were turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Office for chemical analysis.

The accused argues that it was an error for the court to hold him guilty of the crime charged due
to the lapses in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs, and the failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of illegal sale of drugs is committed when the consideration was not
given.

HELD:
NO. In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction. In
the case at bar, the sale was not consummated since there was no receipt of the consideration.
IA1 Natividad arrested Asislo immediately after the latter opened one of the sacks loaded with
bricks of marijuana. It was also admitted that the agents did not prepare marked money for the
buy-bust operation.
A review of the allegations in the Information readily reveals that accused-appellant Asislo is
charged with "delivery and transport" of marijuana although the Information charges the accused
with violation of Section 5, R.A. No. 9165. Accused-appellant Asislo could still be convicted for
violation of Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, because the evidence on record clearly establish
"delivery and transport" although prosecution witness IA1 Natividad admitted, during the direct
and cross examination, the lack of consideration/payment for the 110 kilograms of marijuana.

Nevertheless, Asislo can still be liable for violation of Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 for
illegal delivery and transportation of marijuana. The essential element of the charge of illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to
another.

There is no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the
circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation
itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is
actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed.

In the case at bar, Asislo was found in possession of 110 kilograms of dried marijuana leaves
contained in five sacks and a plastic bag, and that his drug test yielded negative result. The
following circumstances strongly indicate that he has the intention to sell, distribute, deliver or
transport the said marijuana.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
DELIVERY OF THE ILLICIT DRUG TO THE POSEUR-BUYER AND THE RECEIPT OF THE
MARKED MONEY BY THE SELLER SUCCESSFULLY CONSUMMATE THE BUY-BUST
TRANSACTION

People of the Philippines V. Ronwaldo Lafaran

G.R. No. 208015, October 14, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
SPO3 Yema, SPO2 Aro and PO3 Pera conducted a buy-bust operation for the arrest of accused
Lafaran with the confidential informant designated as the poseur-buyer. At the target area, the
team witnessed the exchange between their asset and the accused. The asset gave the marked
money to the accused and the latter, after accepting the money, handed one small plastic sachet
containing suspected shabu. The asset executed the pre-arranged signal by touching his head
and immediately thereafter, the police officers approached the two. As they accosted the accused,
the asset secretly handed the plastic sachet to SPO2 Aro, who immediately placed the markings
"WGA-RAL" in the presence of SPO3 Yema and PO3 Pera. PO3 Pera recovered the marked
money from the accused. Then, the team brought the accused and the plastic sachet to the police
station. There, SPO2 Aro turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to PO3 Pera who prepared
the Inventory, Request for Forensic Examination, and Spot Report. The plastic sachet was
delivered to the laboratory, and after examination, the subject plastic sachet was found to contain
shabu. The subject plastic sachet and the marked money bills were then duly presented and
identified by SPO2 Aro in open court.

The accused claims that there was a broken chain of custody as the poseur-buyer who allegedly
touched and took the drug specimen during the buy-bust operation did not testify in court, as the
marking of the plastic sachet was not done at the place of operation, and as the inventory is not
signed by accused nor by his counsel or representative nor was it executed at the place of
operation. Hence, since the identity of the object of the alleged illegal sale of shabu was not
established, he cannot be held guilty for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a broken chain of custody of the subject specimen allegedly
seized from the accused.
2. Whether or not the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were duly
established.

HELD:
1. NO, there was an unbroken chain of custody of the subject specimen allegedly seized
from the accused. While the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, "as it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove the identity and integrity of the seized item.
The plastic sachet given by accused to the poseur-buyer was, in turn, handed over by the latter
to SPO2 Aro. He marked it with his initials and the initials of accused "WGA-RAL" in the area
where accused was arrested and such marking was witnessed by SPO3 Yema and PO3 Pera.
Upon reaching the police station, SPO2 Aro turned over the plastic sachet to PO3 Pera who
prepared the Inventory, Request for Forensic Examination, and Spot Report. After preparing
these documents, the plastic sachet was surrendered to the crime laboratory for examination. The
subject plastic sachet marked as WGA-RAL was then duly presented and identified by SPO2 Aro
in open court.

Therefore, the apprehending team has preserved the identity and integrity of the shabu sold by
the accused to the asset.

2. YES, the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were duly
established.

In a catena of cases, the SC laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a
successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs,
like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of
the marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.

The apprehending team has established the identity of the accused as the seller of the shabu, as
well as its delivery to the asset and payment for such. PO3 Pera recovered the marked money
from the right hand of the accused and were presented in court.

Indeed, the guilt of the accused for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
IT MUST BE ESTABLISHED WITH UNWAVERING EXACTITUDE THAT THE DANGEROUS
DRUG PRESENTED IN COURT AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED IS THE SAME AS
THAT SEIZED FROM HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE

People of the Philippines V. Fernando Ranche Havana

G.R. No. 198450. January 11, 2016
Castillo, J.

FACTS:
A buy-bust operation led by of PO2 Enriquez was conducted pursuant to a report of an informant
on the alleged involvement of accused Havana in the illegal drug trade at Punta Princesa, Cebu
City. An unnamed "civilian informant" was designated as poseur-buyer and provided him with a
P100.00 marked money bill. SPO1 Vicente R. Espenido, Jr. recovered marked money from the
appellant while the plastic pack was given by the "civilian informant" to SPO1 Espenido. After the
arrest and seizure of the subject specimen, the accused was taken to the police station for
investigation. The marked money and the plastic pack were turned over to SPO2 Jasper C. Nuñez
who marked the plastic pack with "FA" the initials of herein appellant. He then prepared a letter
requesting for examination of the item seized from the accused addressed to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. The report of Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas revealed that the specimen yielded
"positive result for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug."

Accused Havana appeals before the SC his conviction raising the non-compliance by the police
officers with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as well as the
dubious chain of custody of the subject shabu.

Firstly, after the alleged initial custody and control of the drug, and after immediately seizing and
confiscating the same, the apprehending team never made a physical inventory of the same, nor
did it ever photograph the same in the presence of the accused from whom the alleged item was
confiscated.

Secondly, he alleges that no record was presented as to what happened after the turn-over of the
pack of shabu from the poseur-buyer to the apprehending team’s leader, SPO1 Espinodo. During
the trial before the RTC, only PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Cañete testified in respect to the identity
of the alleged evidence. SPO1 Espenido to whom the specimen was allegedly surrendered by
the poseur-buyer was not presented in court to identify the person to whom it was given thereafter
and the condition thereof while it was in his possession and control. SPO2 Nuñez, who allegedly
received and marked the specimen at the police station, was likewise not presented in court.
Furthermore, Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas did not categorically and straightforwardly assert that
the alleged chemical substance that was submitted for laboratory examination and thereafter
presented in court was the very same substance allegedly recovered from the accused.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the rule on chain of custody requires continuous and unbroken chain of
custody of the seized illegal drug.
2. Whether or not non-compliance by the buy-bust team of Section 21(1), 26 Article II of RA
9165 as regards the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized plastic packs of
shabu affects the chain of custody.
HELD:
1. YES. Here, there was no continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized illegal
drug and the lack of integrity of the evidence in view of the police officers’ non-compliance with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. It must be established with unwavering exactitude
that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that
seized from him in the first place. The chain of custody requirement performs this function.

While witnesses PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Cañete testified that after the sale and apprehension
of accused Havana, the poseur-buyer turned over the subject pack of shabu to their team leader
SPO1 Espenido, there is no record as to what happened after the turn-over. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to show how, when and from whom SPO2 Nuñez or SPO1 Cañete received
the evidence. Lastly, the testimony of Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas was limited only on the result
of the examination she conducted and not on the source of the substance.

The inexplicable failure of the police officers to testify as to what they did with the alleged drug
while in their respective possession resulted in a breach or break in the chain of custody of the
drug.

2. NO, there was non- compliance by the buy-bust team of Section 21(1), 26 Article II of RA
9165 as regards the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized plastic packs of
shabu.

The physical inventory of the confiscated item and the taking of photograph of the same in the
presence of the accused from whom the alleged item was confiscated are a rudimentary
procedural safeguards relative to the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section
21(1),26 Article II of RA 9165. While the SC in certain cases has tempered the mandate of strict
compliance with the requisite under Section 21 of RA 9165, such liberality, as stated in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied only when the evidentiary value and integrity
of the illegal drug are properly preserved as we stressed in People v. Guru.

Here, the alleged apprehending team after the alleged initial custody and control of the drug, and
after immediately seizing and confiscating the same, never ever made a physical inventory of the
same, nor did it ever photograph the same in the presence of the accused from whom the alleged
item was confiscated. Neither was there any explanation offered for such failure. In the case at
bar, the evidentiary value and integrity of the alleged illegal drug had been thoroughly
compromised.

Therefore, in view of the non-compliance of the prescribed procedure under Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165, as well as the dubious chain of custody of the subject shabu, the decision of the CA
is reversed and set aside.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO SUBMIT IN EVIDENCE THE PHYSICAL INVENTORY
AND PHOTOGRAPH OF THE SEIZED DRUGS, AS REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 21,
ARTICLE II OF THE IRR OF R.A. NO. 9165, WILL NOT RENDER THE ACCUSED'S ARREST
ILLEGAL OR THE ITEMS SEIZED FROM HIM INADMISSIBLE.

People of the Philippines V. Edgar Bolo y Franco

G.R. No. 200295. August 19, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Acting on the information furnished by their confidential informant that the accused Edgar Bolo y
Franco alias Gagay was engaged in illegal drug activities, Col. Cuaton ordered that a buy bust
team be formed to conduct an operation against the said person with PO1 Montefrio acting as the
poseur buyer with two P100 bills as buy bust money pre-dusted with ultra violet powder. On the
other hand, PO3 Pagsolingan and the rest of the team were designated as back-ups.

Upon their arrival and upon seeing alias Gagay, the latter was introduced by the informant to
Montefrio who immediately announced his intention to buy shabu. Upon receipt of the money, the
accused took from his pocket a plastic sachet from which he pulled one plastic sachet which he
gave to PO1 Montefrio who thereafter gave the pre-arranged signal. Thereafter, he arrested the
accused and introduced himself as a police officer and recovered the buy bust money from the
hand of the accused. The police officers then brought the accused to their office where they turned
him over together with the recovered evidence to the investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito. Upon
receipt of the evidence, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito marked the evidence that he received from PO1
Montefrio as EBF-1 Buy Bust 04-01-06.

The accused that he was drinking with his friends in Caloocan City and as he was leaving the
place, he was accompanied by a lady friend who looked back and saw four male persons coming
towards them. Upon seeing that they were holding pipes and clubs, he ran towards 6th St. While
running, he shouted for help. He was blocked on his way by an owner type jeep from where SPO1
Moran alighted, pointing a gun at him. He was brought to Sangandaan. He asked them what was
his violation, but they did not answer. It was only when he was inquested that he knew of his
violation which is Section 5 and Section 11 of RA 9165. Then he had his medical check-up. While
he was handcuffed, PO1 Montefrio wiped both his hands and his pockets with marked money.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compliance with the chain of custody of the illegal drugs is indispensable.

RULING:

NO. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be
established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-
bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section
21, Article II of [R.A.] No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the
protection of the identity and [the] integrity of dangerous drugs seized.

However, "this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be
perfect, in reality it is not, 'as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.' The
most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items as they will be used to determine the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Hence, the
prosecution's failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized
drugs, as required under Section 21, Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, will not render the
accused's arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible."

The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical
inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons.
Although the seized items were marked only at the police station and not during the actual
apprehension and seizure, in People v. Loks, it has held that the "marking of the seized
[substance] immediately upon xxx arrival at the police station qualified as a compliance with the
marking requirement."

In prosecuting a case for illegal possession of illegal drugs, the following elements must concur:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.”

In the case at bar, all these elements were proven. First, the three plastic sachets containing
shabu, which were the subjects of the charge for illegal possession of dangerous or prohibited
drugs, were seen by PO1 Montefrio and found on accused-appellant's person by PO3
Pagsolingan following accused-appellant's arrest in flagrante delicto for the illegal sale of shabu.
Second, accused-appellant was not able to establish his legal authority to possess the said shabu.
And third, accused-appellant's act of giving PO1 Montefrio, the poseur-buyer, one sachet and, in
the process, bringing out three more sachets indicated that he freely and consciously possessed
the said shabu. Moreover, as testified to by PO3 Pagsolingan, after he recovered the three
sachets from accused-appellant, he kept them until he turned them over to PO2 Hipolito at the
police station. PO2 Hipolito then marked them (EBF-2, EBF-3 and EBF-4) and turned them over
to PSI Dela Rosa who attested that the substance inside the subject sachets was shabu.
Consequently, accused-appellant was rightfully convicted of illegal possession of shabu.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
THE FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SEC. 21(1), ART. II OF RA 9165 DOES NOT
NECESSARILY RENDER AN ACCUSED’S ARREST ILLEGAL OR THE ITEMS SEIZED OR
CONFISCATED FROM HIM INADMISSIBLE. WHAT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE IS THE
PRESERVATION OF THE INTEGRITY AND THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED
ITEMS, AS THESE WOULD BE UTILIZED IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE GUILT OR
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.

People of the Philippines V. Dats Mamalumpon y Bañez

G.R. No. 210452. August 26, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that the accused-appellant Mamalumpon is selling
shabu, a buy-bust team was formed with SPO1 Arevalo tasked as the poseur-buyer. Two pieces
of One Hundred Peso bill were prepared as marked money and SPO1 Arevalo placed a marking
of “DSOG,” at the upper right corner of the bills. When the team reached the target area, accused-
appellant approached SPO1 Arevalo and the confidential informant. SPO1 Arevalo told accused-
appellant that he will buy shabu worth Two Hundred Pesos. Accused-appellant demanded
payment before he produced a plastic sachet from his pocket. Immediately after the exchange,
SPO1 Arevalo arrested accused-appellant then the accused-appellant was brought to the police
station. Thereat, SPO1 Arevalo marked the plastic sachet he received with accused-appellant’s
initials “DMB.”

SPO1 Velasco testified that he witnessed the entire buy-bust operation from where he was
strategically situated some seven meters away from the scene. Police Inspector Maritess Mariano
found that the seized plastic sachet is positive for the presence of shabu.

Accused-appellant denied the charges against him and testified that he was resting inside his
room when several police officers barged into the house. The police officers were apparently
looking for a certain person selling shabu. Unable to find that person, they brought accused-
appellant to the police headquarters. Accused-appellant claimed that he was manhandled and
detained for two days.

Accused-appellant insists that the standard procedures for the custody and disposition of the
confiscated drugs as provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with. Accused-
appellant notes that the police officers failed to immediately mark the evidence upon arrest, to
make an inventory and to photograph the prohibited drug in his presence.

ISSUE
Whether or not the failure of the officers to conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of
the seized item render the evidence inadmissible.

HELD:
NO. The failure of the prosecution to conduct a physical inventory and take photograph of the
seized item does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. There is a
proviso in the implementing rules stating that when it is shown that there exist justifiable grounds
and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved, the seized
items can still be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Likewise, the failure to immediately mark the confiscated shabu after its seizure does not affect
its integrity. The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily
render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Accused-appellant broaches the view that the failure to mark the confiscated shabu immediately
after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as to the drug’s identity. People v. Sanchez, however,
explains that RA 9165 does not specify a time frame for “immediate marking,” or where said
marking should be done: What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure
that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of
arrest.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
FAILURE TO STRICTLY FOLLOW THE DIRECTIVES OF SECTION 21, ARTICLE II OF RA
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS NOT FATAL AND WILL NOT NECESSARILY RENDER THE
ITEMS CONFISCATED INADMISSIBLE

People of the Philippines V. Jocelyn Posada and Francisco Posada

G.R. No. 196052. September 02, 2015
Brion, J.

FACTS:
In the morning of April 8, 2006, police officers went to the house of the accused-appellants in
Virac, Catanduanes, to implement a search warrant. After the search warrant was read, accused-
appellant Francisco argued with the police officers as he insisted that he be allowed to have
breakfast before anything else. While PO1 Tacorda and Kagawad. Sarmiento were escorting him
to the nearby eatery, they saw him throw something on the pavement. PO1 Tacorda immediately
accosted and reprimanded accused-appellant Francisco while Kag. Sarmiento picked up the
plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance. A total of thirty-seven (37) sachets were
recovered from the pavement. These were photographed by PO3 Santos, and then were turned
over to the crime laboratory for inventory, documentation, and examination. The results of the
examination of the contents of the thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets done in the crime laboratory
showed that these contained shabu.

Thereafter, Kag. Arcilla and accused-appellant Jocelyn accompanied P/Supt. Villamer, PO1
Jacinto, PO1 Sevilla, and PO1 Tacorda to the place designated in the search warrant. While
searching the kitchen, PO1 Jacinto came upon a plastic bag of charcoal near the stove. He
examined its contents and found a matchbox hidden between the pieces of charcoal. Inside the
matchbox were five (5) heat-sealed plastic transparent sachets containing a white crystalline
substance. PO3 Santos photographed the plastic sachets and then turned these over for
inventory and documentation. Upon examination of the contents of the five (5) plastic sachets in
the crime laboratory, the forensic chemist found that they likewise contained shabu.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the failure to strictly observe the chain of custody prescribed by law renders the
confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:
NO. Based on the records, PO1 Jacinto narrated how he found the five heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets and how he turned over said items to PO1 Sevilla after they were photographed
by PO3 Santos. Kag. Arcilla, who was present during the search, corroborated his testimony. The
RTC found that PO1 Jacinto properly placed all five plastic sachets in a transparent plastic bag
which was sealed with masking tape and duly signed by him. As for the thirty-seven plastic
sachets, PO1 Sevilla testified that Kag. Sarmiento saw Francisco throw the plastic sachets on the
pavement; and that Kag. Sarmiento and he picked up said plastic sachets. The RTC found that
all thirty-seven plastic sachets were placed in a transparent plastic bag which was sealed with
masking tape duly signed by Kag. Sarmiento. Finally, PSI Josephine Macura Clemen narrated
that the forty-two heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances were turned
over to the crime laboratory for qualitative examination; that said confiscated items were thereafter
found positive for shabu, and were identified by PSI Clemen herself before the RTC. It is settled
that the failure to strictly follow the directives of Section 21, Article II of RA Republic Act No. 9165
is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated inadmissible. What is important
is that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved. The succession
of events in this case show that the items seized were the same items tested and subsequently
identified and testified to in court. We thus hold that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs
seized from the accused-appellants were duly proven not to have been compromised.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
NON-COMPLIANCE TO SEC. 21 IS TANTAMOUNT TO FAILURE IN ESTABLISHING
IDENTITY OF CORPUS DELICTI IN THE SALE OF ILLEGAL DRUGS

Howard Lescano y Carreon @ "Tisoy" V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 214490. January 13, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
An informant reported about drug pushing activities taking place in some streets of Olongapo to
the City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Team (CAIDSOT) of Olongapo City. Acting on this
tip, the CAIDSOT monitored the area and allegedly found the informant's claims to be true. A buy-
bust operation was then planned. It was decided that PO3 Javier would be the poseur buyer. At
the target area, the informant introduced PO3 Javier to Lescano. Lescano asked PO3 Javier how
much marijuana he was willing to buy. PO3 Javier responded by handing the marked P100 bill to
Lescano. Lescano then gave PO3 Javier a medium-sized plastic sachet supposedly containing
marijuana. At this, PO3 Javier gave the pre-arranged signal to the buy-bust team. PO1 Mataverde
approached them and introduced himself as a police officer. He then frisked Lescano and
recovered the buy-bust money.

The rest of the buy-bust team arrived as Lescano was about to be handcuffed. PO3 Javier marked
the medium-sized plastic sachet with the initials "HJ" and turned it over to SPO1 Delos Reyes.
Lescano was then brought to the CAIDSOT office for investigation. Inside the CAIDSOT office,
an inventory was allegedly conducted and photographs of the marked money and the sachet were
taken.

In his testimony, Lescano denied that he was selling marijuana. He claimed that on July 8, 2008,
at around 5:00 p.m., he was at Tulio Street just sitting and passing time when P/Insp. Javier
arrived and introduced himself as a police officer. P/Insp. Javier then frisked Lescano but the
search turned out futile as nothing was recovered from him. Other police officers arrived. PO1
Mataverde and PO3 Javier then told him that something was confiscated during the frisking.
Lescano insisted that there was nothing confiscated from him. The officers, however, replied by
stating: "Don't worry, tomorrow there will be." He was then charged with illegal sale of prohibited
drugs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inventory requirement under Sec 21 must be strictly complied with.

HELD:
YES. In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.

As regards corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as
amended by Republic Act No. 10640 stipulates requirements for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia.

Compliance with Section 21's requirements is critical. "Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in

establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-
compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused."

Section 21 (1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical inventory and
photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom the items were
seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution
Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused
or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her
representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the representative of the National
Prosecution Service, a representative of the media may be present in his or her place.

It is glaring that despite the prosecution's allegations that a buy-bust operation was carefully
planned and carried out, it admitted that Section 21 (1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act was not faithfully complied with. While an inventory was supposed to have been conducted,
this was done neither in the presence of petitioner, the person from whom the drugs were
supposedly seized, nor in the presence of his counsel or representative. Likewise, not one of the
persons required to be present (an elected public official, and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media) was shown to have been around during the inventory and
photographing. Petitioner must be acquitted.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IS ENOUGH. THE DANGEROUS DRUG ITSELF
CONSTITUTES THE VERY CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE AND IN SUSTAINING A
CONVICTION UNDER R.A. NO. 9165, THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS
DELICTI MUST DEFINITELY BE SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN PRESERVED.

People of the Philippines vs. Ronaldo Casacop y Amil

G.R. No. 210454. January 13, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Acting on a tip from an informant that a certain Edong was selling shabu in Quezon Street, Police
Superintendent Dimandal formed a team to conduct surveillance on appellant. Upon receiving a
positive result, SPO4 Dela Peña prepared a pre-operation report which was sent to the PDEA.

SPO4 Dela Peña then formed a buy-bust team composed of PO1 Signap as the poseur-buyer.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. PO1 Signap and the informant
approached appellant's house. PO1 Signap was introduced to appellant by the informant as the
buyer of shabu. He handed the marked money to appellant, who took a plastic sachet from his
left pocket and gave it to him. PO1 Signap made the pre-arranged signal. The backup team
rushed towards appellant's house and arrested him. PO1 Signap frisked appellant and recovered
an improvised glass tooter, aluminum foil strip, cigarette lighter, two (2) small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets, and the marked money. PO1 Signap conducted a physical inventory
of the seized items and correspondingly marked them in appellant's house.

Thereafter, appellant was brought to the police station. Thereat, SPO4 Dela Peña prepared a
certificate of inventory. A request letter was sent to the PNP Crime laboratory for the examination
of the seized items. The seized items tested as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.

Appellant, for his part, denied the charges of possession of shabu and its paraphernalia and sale
of shabu. Appellant testified that he was urinating at the back of his house when five (5) police
officers barged into his house. After confirming that he is Edong, appellant was handcuffed and
brought to the police station. Appellant claimed that the police only planted evidence against him
because they were not able to pin him down in a robbery case.

Appellant asserts that the chain of custody of the object evidence was never established.
Moreover, appellant claims that Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 9165 was not complied with.

ISSUE:
Whether or not strict compliance to Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is always
required.

HELD:
NO, substantial compliance is enough. The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case,
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under R.A. No.
9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been
preserved.
Records show that PO1 Signap recovered from appellant three (3) plastic sachets of shabu, a
glass tooter and aluminum foil. These items were marked and inventoried in the house of
appellant and in his presence. Thereafter, these seized items were brought to the police station
where a request for qualitative examination was made. SPO4 Dela Peña signed the request and
it was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Police Senior Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna
Villa P. Huelgas conducted the examination. Thus, the chain of custody was clearly accounted
for.

As the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to establish the
corpus delicti were proven, substantial compliance with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 will suffice.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
SECTION 21 (A) OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF R.A. NO. 9165
REQUIRES "SUBSTANTIAL" AND NOT NECESSARILY "PERFECT ADHERENCE"

People of the Philippines V. Glen Piad y Bory, et al.

G.R. No. 213607. January 25, 2016
Mendoza, J

FACTS:
A team, composed of PO1 Arevalo, PO1 San Agustin, PO1 Bayot, PO1 Danilo Pacurib, PO2
Nipales, and PO1 Bibit, conducted a buy-bust operation. PO1 Arevalo was assigned as poseur-
buyer and was provided with the marked money
.
The team arrived at the house of Piad in Lifehomes Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig City. The
confidential informant, with PO1 Arevalo, knocked on the door. When Piad opened the door, the
confidential informant introduced PO1 Arevalo as a buyer of shabu. Piad asked PO1 Arevalo how
much he wanted and the latter answered P150.00. Thereafter, Piad closed the door and returned
after a few seconds. Upon opening the door again, PO1 Arevalo noticed that a group of male
individuals were inside the house. PO1 Arevalo handed to Piad the P150.00 marked money. In
turn, Piad handed to PO1 Arevalo a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
After the transaction was completed, PO1 Arevalo introduced himself as a police officer and held
Piad. Piad, however, struggled to free himself. PO1 Arevalo was eventually forced to enter the
house amidst the struggle. The back-up team followed suit and entered the house.

After arresting him, PO1 Arevalo asked Piad to bring out the marked money. Piad complied. PO1
Arevalo also asked him about the source of the drugs he sold. Piad pulled out a metal box from
his pocket and it revealed two (2) other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance.
PO1 Arevalo marked all the items confiscated from Piad at the place of the arrest. Meanwhile,
the back-up team saw Villarosa, Davis and Carbo inside the house, sitting on the floor. They were
surrounded by three (3) sachets of white crystalline substance (one was heat sealed, while the
other two were unsealed), aluminum foil, a tooter and disposable lighters. The items were
confiscated and were marked by PO1 Bayot thereat.
The team brought Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis to the police headquarters.

The RTC found Piad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, while Villarosa, Carbo and Davis were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during parties and illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia during parties. The CA affirmed the conviction of Piad, Villarosa
and Davis.

The accused argued that the chain of custody rule was not complied with because PSI Ebuen did
not testify on the condition of the confiscated items; that it was not shown how the said items were
brought before the court; and that no photograph was taken or an inventory of the seized items
was conducted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the chain of custody rule requires perfect adherence.

HELD:
NO. Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 requires
"substantial" and not necessarily "perfect adherence" as long as it can be proven that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Moreover, the prosecution was also able to prove that Piad committed the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. When he was arrested in flagrante delicto, he was asked about
the source of his drugs. He then brought out a metal box, which contained two (2) more sachets.
It was confirmed in a laboratory test that these sachets contained 0.06 gram of shabu.

With respect to the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a party and the crime
of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party, the prosecution also established that
after the arrest of Piad, the team found Villarosa, Carbo and Davis sitting on the floor and
surrounded by one (1) heat-sealed sachet and two (2) unsealed sachets. A laboratory report
showed that these sachets contained a total of 0.03 gram of shabu. The said persons were also
found with an aluminum foil, a tooter and disposable lighters, which were considered drug
paraphernalia. As correctly held by the RTC, the elements of such crimes were proven because
there was a proximate company of at least two (2) persons without any legal authority to possess
the illicit items, citing Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
NONCOMPLAINCE WITH SECTION 21 RAISES QUESTIONS WHETHER THE ILLEGAL
DRUG ITEMS WERE THE SAME ONES ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM THE ACCUSED

People of the Philippines v. Eduardo Yepes

G.R. No. 206766. April 6, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
This involves a case charging Eduardo Yepes of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
or Illegal Sale of Prohibited Drugs. Yepes was arrested in a buy-bust operation allegedly
conducted by the police officers wherein the information was acquired from a police asset.

During trial, the prosecution presented the police officers involved in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation, PO2 Ervin Ariño, PO2 Roy Lapura, SPO4 Romy Dela Cruz and PO3 Jay Ilagan. PO2
Ariño, as poseur buyer, testified that the buy-bust operation was made possible by virtue of the
tip of the police asset and that he received one (1) sachet of powdered substance believed to be
shabu. He also testified that he turned over the said sachet to PO3 Ilagan, then he left. SPO4
Dela Cruz testified that he did not witness the buy-bust operation, and that PO2 Ariño handed him
three (3) sachets of the alleged shabu, which he tasted and concluded as such.

PO2 Lapura testified that after the buy-bust operation, he handed the alleged sachet of shabu to
SPO4 Dela Cruz. PO3 Ilagan testified that he received three (3) sachets of the alleged shabu
from PO2 Ariño and PO2 Lapura. On the other hand, accused Yepes denied the indictment
against him.

The RTC convicted Yepes.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. Hence, this appeal to the SC where Yepes argued
that no buy-bust operation was conducted and the shabu was planted by the police officers. In
addition, the police officers failed to observe the proper procedure in the handling, custody and
disposition of the seized drug.

ISSUES:
1. Does the prosecution able to prove the guilt of Yepes beyond reasonable doubt as regards to
the crime as charged?
2. Was the proper procedure in handling, custody and disposition of the seized drug observed
by the police officers?

HELD:
1. NO, beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions for the sale of illegal drugs
demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti, the body of
crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Under the law, to secure a conviction for illegal
sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: (a) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing. It is material to establish that the transaction or sale actually took place,
and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence. Here, there are material inconsistencies
between and among the testimonies of the police officers raising doubts whether an entrapment
operation had indeed been made; and serious questions regarding the integrity of the corpus
delicti if truly there had been a buy-bust operation. Corpus delicti is the "actual commission by
someone of the particular crime charged." In illegal drug cases, it refers to the illegal drug item
itself. When there are reservations about the identity of the illegal drug item allegedly seized from
the accused, the actual commission of the crime charged is put into serious question and courts
have no alternative but to acquit on the ground of reasonable doubt. Hence, the prosecution was
not able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

2. NO, the police officers failed to observe the procedure laid down under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165. Section 21 requires that upon seizure of illegal drug items, the apprehending team
having initial custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take
photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or
confiscated and (d) a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any
elected public official (e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies
thereof. Here, the procedure was not observed at all. Such noncompliance raises questions
whether the illegal drug items were the same ones allegedly seized from accused-appellant.
Although justifiable grounds may excuse noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, the police
officers in the present case presented no justifiable reason for the non-observance of the
procedure. Lamentably, both RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to even note at all that there
were deficiencies in the handling of the seized evidence much less inquire into the reasons for
the non-observance of procedure.

Thus, accused Eduardo Yepes is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
THE ACT OF PDEA AGENTS OF NOT IMMEDIATELY CONDUCTING THE INVENTORY AT
THE PLACE WHERE THE ITEMS WERE SEIZED, AND DOING SO ONLY AT THE FIELD
OFFICE, DOES NOT RESULT IN THE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE ON THE
SEIZURE AND CUSTODY OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

People of the Philippines V. Regie A. Breis and Gary T. Yumul

G.R. No. 205823. August 17, 2015
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
Appellants Regie Alvarado Breis and Gary Tuazon Yumol were charged with violation of Sec. 11
of RA 9165. The prosecution averred that an informant went to the PDEA-CAR field office and
offered the information that appellants were bound to transport, by a public transport bus, a box
of marijuana. After careful examination, a team was created composed of Intelligence Officers
Elizer Mangili and Ryan Peralta as arresting officer and seizing officer, respectively. Pretending
to be bus passengers, Mangili and Peralta boarded the bus where appellants were in. There they
found appellants seated and carrying a box marked with “Ginebra San Miguel.” Mangili then
casually asked Yumol who owned the box, to which the latter replied it was theirs. Yumol suddenly
stood up and attempted to leave but Peralta blocked his way, while Mangili interrogated Breis as
to the content of the box. Instead of answering, he tried to flee, but was likewise blocked. Peralta
then summoned the backup officers to help secure the bus and subdue the accused. After
introducing themselves as PDEA agents, Mangili asked the accused Breis to open the box but
Breis ignored the request which made Mangili lift and open the box. He took one brick and
discovered it was marijuana. The “Ginebra San Miguel” box yielded three more bricks of
marijuana. Mangili then marked the items on site. Agent Peralta then informed the accused that
they were being arrested for violation of Rep. Act No. 9165 and then he read their constitutional
rights in Pilipino to them. Thereafter, the team returned to the PDEA-CAR office for documentation
and physical inventory and photograph of the seized marijuana. Appellants, however, argued that
the box containing the marijuana did not belong to them, and that they were forced to admit
ownership thereof, with the police officers hitting them with bricks of marijuana and squeezing
appellant Yumol’s scrotum.

The RTC gave credence to the prosecution’s version and convicted appellants. On appeal,
appellants argued that the PDEA agents did not comply with Sec. 21, par. 1, Art. II of RA 9165.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the requirements of Sec. 21, Art. II of
RA 9165 were satisfied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the PDEA agents of not immediately conducting the inventory at the
place where the items were seized, and doing so only at the field office, results in the non-
compliance with the procedure on the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs

HELD:
NO. The act of PDEA agents of not immediately conducting the inventory at the place where the
items were seized, and doing so only at the field office, does not result in the non-compliance with
the procedure on the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs.
Sec. 21, par. 1, Art. II of RA 9165 provides that the apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. Its IRR further provides that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures.

In the case at bar, as the seizure of the marijuana was a valid warrantless seizure, the physical
inventory and photograph were conducted at the PDEA-CAR field office. This was in conformity
with RA 9165 and its IRR.

Therefore, appellants are guilty of a violation of Sec. 11 or RA 9165.

 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
THE LINKS IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY MUST REMAIN INTACT AND UNBROKEN

People of the Philippines V. Romel Sapitula y Paculan

G.R. No. 209212. February 10, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
The police officers received a tip from a confidential informant that accused Romel Sapitula was
selling shabu, they conducted a surveillance and an entrapment operation on him. The buy-buy
operation yielded a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance which tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride after laboratory examination. The apprehending police
officers informed the accused Sapitula of his constitutional rights; took a photograph of the latter
as well as the area and the plastic sachet which he marked was as well marked. He also made
an inventory of the marked money and the seized plastic sachet in the presence of the Barangay
Captain and another witness. The police officers filed a criminal action for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs against Sapitula. In his defense, Sapitula claimed frame-up as defense. The RTC found
Sapitula guilty of attempted sale of a dangerous drug. The CA convicted Sapitula of the crime
charged as the sale had been consummated by the exchange of the marked money and shabu.
Sapitula appealed his conviction before the SC arguing that he procedure for the custody and
disposition of confiscated drugs as provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, was not complied
with as the police officers had not conducted an inventory of the plastic sachet of shabu and the
same had not been photographed in the presence of accused and representatives from, the
media and the Department of Justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements in Sec. 21 of RA. 9165 should be strictly complied with.

HELD:
NO, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were duly preserved and the chain of
custody remained unbroken. The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-
bust situation are: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

In the present case, the police officer/poseur buyer at the time of arrest photographed and marked
the confiscated sachet of shabu in the presence of the accused, the Barangay Chairman and
concerned citizens in the area of arrest. He also made a physical inventory of the seized item
there. The accused and the seized items were then brought to the police station and then to the
crime laboratory for examination. Finally, in court, the police officer/poseur buyer opened the
envelope from the Forensic Chemist and identified its contents as the same sachet of shabu he
had purchased from accused. Therefore, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item
has been preserved and the links in the chain of custody remained intact and unbroken.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE WILL NOT RENDER AN
ARREST ILLEGAL OR THE SEIZED ITEMS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE

People of the Philippines V. Manuela Flores y Salazar @ Wella

G.R. No. 201365. August 3, 2015
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
An informant arrived at the Manila Police District and disclosed that a certain alias Wella was
selling illegal drugs around Quiapo, Manila. Later, alias Wella was identified as Manuela Flores,
herein accused. When buy-bust team and the confidential informant reached the corner of
Palanca Street, Flores, met them and asked, "Kukuha ba kayo?" The poseur-buyer, PO3
Salvador, answered, "Oo, kukuha kami, pang-gamit," then gave her the marked money.
Thereafter, Flores took out several pieces of sachets and handed PO3 Salvador a plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance. After receiving the sachet, PO3 Salvador made the pre-
arranged signal, prompting the other police officers to arrest Flores. They apprised her of her
constitutional rights and ordered her to surrender the remaining plastic sachets from her pocket.
PO3 Salvador marked the seized specimen from the sale and the other sachets. They then
brought Flores to the police station where PO3 Salvador turned over the seized plastic sachets
and the buy-bust money to PO3 Garcia, the precinct investigator. They likewise prepared an
inventory and took photographs of the seized items. Afterwards, the buy-bust team executed a
Joint Affidavit of Apprehension. The results of the laboratory examination of the confiscated
substance yielded positive for shabu. Flores now seeks her acquittal before the Court. She
contends that the arresting officers failed to comply with the procedure provided under Section
21, Article II of R.A. 9165.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule renders an arrest illegal or the
seized items inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:
NO, the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule will not render an arrest illegal or the seized
items inadmissible in evidence. Substantial compliance is allowed as provided for in Section 21
(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165.

The records in the case at bar would show that the authorities were able to maintain the integrity
of the seized sachets and that the links in the chain of custody of the same were clearly
established.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE OF THE RULE ON CHAIN OF CUSTODY IS ENOUGH

People of the Philippines V. Nicolas Lara III y Agatep, et al.

G.R. No. 198796. September 16, 2015
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Accused Abdul Mammad, Ladger Tampoy, and Hata Sariol seek the reversal of the affirmation
by the CA on the judgment of RTC finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.

Acting on a confidential information on the alleged shabu trade by the accused in Quezon City,
Police Chief Inspector Paterno formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation and designated
PO2 Panlilio as the poseur-buyer. Upon reaching the target area, PO2 Panlilio was able to buy
shabu worth P500 from the accused. PO2 Panlilio gave the marked money as payment.
Thereafter, PO2 Panlilio scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal. The accused were then
arrested. The team was able to recover plastic sachets of shabu from accused-appellants.

The authorities went to the police station where PO2 Panlilio immediately marked it with
"MSP/LBT", which stands for his initials and that of Tampoy. He then turned it over to the police
investigator who prepared the letter request for laboratory examination. After examination, the
submitted substance tested positive for shabu, as reflected in the report of the Forensic Chemical
Officer. The same plastic sachets of shabu were presented and identified before the court.

In the instant petition, the accused assert that the police officers failed to follow the procedures
laid down in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 since the police officers failed to make an
inventory and take photographs as mandated by law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to strictly comply with the procedures laid down in Section 21, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 makes the seized items inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:
NO, failure to strictly comply with the aforementioned provision will not result in an illegal arrest
or the seized items being inadmissible in evidence. Here, the police officers showed a substantial
compliance with the laid down in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Under Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165,
substantial compliance is recognized. Moreover, there are links that must be established in the
chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, to wit: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the illegal
drug seized to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of
the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.

Here, while it is true that the police officers failed to make an inventory and take photographs, the
prosecution was able to prove, however, that the sachet of shabu confiscated during the buy-bust
operation was the same item presented and identified before the court.
Verily, the prosecution was able to establish the unbroken chain of custody over the recovered
drug, from the time it came into the possession of the apprehending officers, to the time it was
brought to the police station, then to the crime laboratory for testing, up to the time it had to be
offered in evidence.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY
RULE

Roberto Palo y De Gula V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 192075. February 10, 2016
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Two police officers were walking along a street one night and with them was a boy who was a
victim of a stabbing incident. At that moment, they saw the petitioner Roberto Palo along the alley
holding a plastic sachet in his hand who was then showing it to his co-accused Jesus Daguman.
Believing that the plastic sachet contained shabu, the police officers arrested both Roberto Palo
and Jesus Daguman. The contents of the plastic sachet tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. The RTC found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner Roberto Palo elevated
the case to the SC via petition for review on certiorari arguing that the police officers failed to
observe the proper handling of the seized shabu as required by the chain of custody rule. They
challenge particularly the requirements of markings, physical inventory and photograph of the
seized items immediately after confiscation which was done at the police station and according
to them translates to their failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
item.

ISSUE:
Does the marking of seized items at the police station amount to a failure to preserve their integrity
and evidentiary value?

HELD:
NO, the marking of the seized items at the police station and not at the place of confiscation do
not compromise the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The law requires marking
of the seized item upon immediate confiscation which contemplates markings done not only at
the place of seizure but also markings done at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical inventory nor the lack of photograph
of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as these would be used in
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In this case, both Palo and Daguman were brought to the police station after their arrest and there,
the plastic sachet was marked with the initials of petitioner Roberto Palo before the same was
turned over for laboratory examination and finally, to the court. Therefore, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item has been preserved even if the requirements of the chain of
custody rule has not been strictly complied with.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
WHETHER THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS HAD BEEN
PRESERVED IS THE FUNCTION OF THE RULE ON CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Willy Esguerra

G.R. No. 198111, September 21, 2015
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Pursuant to a confidential information regarding the illegal drug transactions of accused Esguerra,
an entrapment operation was conducted with PO2 Gasid as the poseur buyer. Upon arrival at the
target area, PO2 Gasid expressed his intention to buy two sachets of marijuana from the accused.
From where he was, PO2 Gasid could see the accused remove a plastic container containing
what appeared to be marijuana brick from a cabinet without difficulty considering that the house
still had no door and windows. After the consummation of the sale, PO2 Gasid took off his bull
cap as a pre-arranged signal for the back-up officers to come forward for the arrest of the accused.
PO2 Gasid then entered the house and went towards the aforementioned cabinet wherein he
recovered a plastic container containing a suspected marijuana brick. PO2 Gasid marked the two
sachets of suspected marijuana leaves and the suspected marijuana brick and its container in the
presence of the accused with WEE to WEE-3, inclusive, which were the initials of the accused.
At the police station, a request was made for laboratory examination of the seized items "WEE"
and "WEE-3” which was then delivered to the crime laboratory together with the seized items.
After the examination, the report of the forensic chemist concluded that the seized items yielded
positive results for the presence of marijuana. The marked items were likewise offered in evidence
during trial.

Accused Esguerra contends, among others, that the apprehending police officers did not comply
with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 on the immediate inventorying and
photographing of the items seized without justifiable grounds which demonstrated a broken chain
of custody that tainted the validity of the incrimination, and rendered the evidence against him
weak and unreliable is unworthy of serious consideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a broken chain of custody as a result of the non-compliance by the
apprehending officers with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 on the immediate
inventorying and photographing of the items seized.

HELD:
NO, there is no broken chain of custody despite the non-compliance by the apprehending officers
with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 on the immediate inventorying and
photographing of the items seized. Whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
had been preserved is the function of the rule on chain of custody. There are links that must be
established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, viz.:first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
Here, the chain of custody was established through the following links: (1) the poseur-buyer SPO2
Ruchyl Gasid marked right at the place of arrest and in the presence of accused the two seized
sachets of marijuana leaves subject of buy-bust with "WEE" and "WEE-1," and the marijuana
brick in a plastic container found inside a cabinet in accused's house with "WEE-2"; (2) upon
arrival at the police station, the request for laboratory examination of the seized items "WEE" and
"WEE-3” was prepared; (3) the request and the marked items seized were delivered to the crime
laboratory; (4) the report of the forensic chemist confirmed that the marked items seized from
accused were positive for the presence of marijuana; and, (5) the marked items were offered in
evidence as Exhibits "I" to "I-3".

Hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been duly preserved by the
apprehending police officers.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
NOT STRICTLY COMPLYING WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY PROCEDURE DOES NOT
RENDER THE CONFISCATED ILLEGAL DRUGS INADMISSIBLE

People of the Philippines vs. Juliet Pancho

G.R. No. 206910, October 14, 2015
PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
On the basis of a search warrant, members of the Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Bureau,
accompanied by barangay tanods, conducted a search in the house of accused Juliet Pancho
and her husband Samuel Pancho. The search yielded three big plastic packets of
suspected shabu weighing a total of 14.49 grams, which were recovered under a jewelry box
placed on top of a cabinet divider. PO1 Veloso handed the packets of shabu to PO2 Ilagan who
recorded them in the confiscation receipt and made markings on the plastic packets. Thereafter,
the team brought the accused to the police station. PO1 Veloso accompanied PO2 Ilagan in
handing over the seized articles and the letter-request to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory. After the test, the forensic chemist confirmed the presence of shabu from the three
plastic bags seized from the house of the accused.

In this appeal, accused Pancho condends that the search was tainted with irregularities since the
prosecution failed to present photographs of the seized items and that there were no
representatives from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ) during the conduct of
inventory of the seized items, in violation of the requirements set forth under Article II, Section 21
of R.A. 9165. She argues that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and prays to be
exonerated from the crime charged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-compliance by the raiding team with the procedure laid down under Article
II, Section 21 of R.A. 9165 rendered the confiscated three plastic packets of shabu inadmissible
for evidence.

HELD:
NO, the non-compliance by the raiding team with the procedure laid down under Article II, Section
21 of R.A. 9165 did not render the confiscated three plastic packets of shabu inadmissible for
evidence. In People v. Salvador, the SC ruled that the failure to submit in evidence the required
physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph, as well as the absence of a member
of the media or the DOJ, pursuant to Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, is not fatal and will
not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and [the] evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

In the instant case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not broken. The recovery
and the handling of the seized illegal drugs were satisfactorily established in this case.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
WHILE THE PROCEDURE ON THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY SHOULD BE PERFECT AND
UNBROKEN, IN REALITY, IT IS ALMOST ALWAYS IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AN
UNBROKEN CHAIN

Amado L. Saraum V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 205472. January 25, 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
A buy-bust team composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2 Sta. Ana, PO1 Cabahug, and
PO1 Aniñon was formed against a certain "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana was designated as the poseur-
buyer accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the back-up of PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest
of the team as the perimeter security. During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run
towards his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust
team also saw Saraum and Esperanza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in
preparation to have a "shabu" pot session.

They recovered from Saraum's possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil
(tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua wrapper,
and made initial markings.

By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on
the date and time in question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his
parents-in-law when he was held by men with firearms. They were already with "Antik" and "Pata,"
both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he had not committed anything illegal, he resisted
the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only when he was brought to the court.

The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165.
The CA sustained the judgment of conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule on chain of custody was complied with.

HELD:
YES. The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. In this case, the
prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia,
particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and
admitted in evidence.

In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. presented in court as
the ones actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed
procedure under Section 21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within
the saving clause provided in Section 21 (a), Article II, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR)of R.A. No. 9165;17 and (b) there was an unbroken link (not perfect link) in the chain of
custody with respect to the confiscated items.

Although Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team must immediately
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph them, non-compliance therewith
is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. While
nowhere in the prosecution evidence show the "justifiable ground" which may excuse the police
operatives involved in the buy-bust operation from making the physical inventory and taking a
photograph of the drug paraphernalia confiscated and/or seized, such omission shall not render
Saraum's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him as inadmissible in evidence. Said
"justifiable ground" will remain unknown in the light of the apparent failure of Saraum to specifically
challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the subject
drug paraphernalia before the trial court. He cannot be allowed too late in the day to question the
police officers' alleged non-compliance with Section 21 for the first time on appeal.

The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the confiscated
items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or
drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the time they are
presented in court.

While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is almost
always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21
(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's arrest illegal or
the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
IN ILLEGAL DRUGS CASES, WHAT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE IS THE PRESERVATION
OF THE INTEGRITY AND THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS

People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan

G.R. No. 199087, November 11, 2015
Villarama, Jr.,

FACTS:
PDEA Team were ordered to conduct a search on the house of the accused appellants Punzalans
who were alleged to have been keeping illegal drugs. When they were already outside the house
of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, which is a three-storey structure, IA1 Sandaan knocked on the
door. A woman, later identified as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door.
When they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they have a
search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but was not successful since the
PDEA agents pushed the door open. The team was able to enter the house and showed and read
the search warrant infront of accused-appellants.

Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the table. 101
Pagaragan was able to seize nine (9) heat-sealed plastic sachets, two (2) square-shaped
transparent plastic containers and a small round plastic container. All three (3) plastic containers
contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance of suspected shabu.
There were also other paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale. Accordingly, SI2
Esteban and IO2 Alvarado effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan
after informing them of their constitutional rights. 101 Pagaragan immediately marked the seized
items by placing the marking "ADP". After searching and marking the evidence found on the first
floor, the team, together with the barangay officials and accused-appellants, proceeded to, and
conducted the search on the second and third floors but found nothing. They went downstairs
where they conducted the inventory of recovered items. 101 Pagaragan prepared the
Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which were later
signed by the barangay officials.

Accused-appellants were brought to the Atty. Gaspe at the PDEA Office were they were booked,
photographs and inventories of the seized sachets were conducted. These were then sent to the
laboratory for examination. The results shows that they were positive of shabu, a dangerous drug.

The trial court convicted accused-appellants for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants. The CA held that there was a
valid search and seizure conducted and the seized items are admissible in evidence.

Accused-appellants assert that the chain of custody rule has not been complied with when no
inventory or acknowledgment receipt signed by Atty. Gaspe was submitted in evidence and that
no evidence was shown as to the condition of the specimen upon its presentation to Atty. Gaspe,
who was not presented in court to explain the discrepancy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of an inventory receipt breaks the chain of custody.

HELD:
NO. The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty. Gaspe does
not undermine the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized from accused-
appellants. The failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized
drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
CONVICTION FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF EQUIPMENT, INSTRUMENT, APPARATUS
AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA FOR DANGEROUS DRUGS REQUIRE THAT THEY WERE
INTENDED FOR INTRODUCING ANY DANGEROUS DRUG INTO THE BODY

Luis Derilo V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 190466. April 18, 2016
Brion, J.

FACTS:
The police team conducted a police operation to serve a search warrant at the residence of Luis
Derilo. Initially, they searched the pockets and wallet of Derilo, then they proceeded inside his
bedroom where they recovered twelve (12) plastic sachets inside a matchbox, each containing
white crystalline substance. The police officers also recovered suspected drug
paraphernalia, i.e., new and used aluminum foil, lighters, and a tube, which were scattered in
plain view in different parts of the house. Some of the used aluminum foils were found under the
house. While at the scene, SPO1 Evasco proceeded to mark the confiscated items with his initials,
"S.B.E.," while SPO1 Calupit took their photographs. In addition, SPO1 Evasco prepared an
inventory of the items seized, but the Derilo refused to sign the inventory. Derilo and the seized
items were then taken to the police station. In the laboratory examination, the test yielded positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," a dangerous drug. Derilo was then
charged with violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of RA No. 9165, for possession of twelve
(12) plastic sachets containing 0.3485 gram of shabu and for possession of drug
paraphernalia, i.e., forty-one (41) pieces of rolled aluminum foil, one (1) used aluminum foil, one
(1) tube, two (2) lighters, and one (1) matchbox, respectively.

RTC convicted Derilo of the crimes charged, which was affirmed by CA. Derilo appealed to the
SC arguing that the search became unlawful when barangal tanods were tasked to search the
bedroom; that there are inconsistencies with the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies as to who
actually found the matchbox containing the twelve (12) plastic; and that the chain of custody of
the seized items appears broken and questionable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia
for dangerous drugs require that they were intended for introducing any dangerous drug into the
body

HELD:
YES. The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12 of RA No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control
by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body;
and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. There is no evidence showing that the aluminum
foil, tube, and lighters found in the petitioner's house were fit or intended for introducing any
dangerous drug into the body. The prosecution did not bother to show that there were traces
of shabu on any of these alleged drug paraphernalia. In fact, it appears that the only evidence
that the prosecution offered to prove this charge is the existence of the seized items by
themselves. For the prosecution's failure to prove that the items seized were intended to be used
as drug paraphernalia, he must also be acquitted of the charge under Section 12 of RA No. 9165.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
WITNESSES ARE NOT EXPECTED TO REMEMBER EVERY SINGLE DETAIL OF AN
INCIDENT WITH PERFECT OR TOTAL RECALL

People of the Philippines V. Cristy Dimaano y Tipdas

G.R. No. 174481. February 10, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
On November 13, 2002, Non-Uniformed Personnel Bilugot was detailed as frisker at the initial
check-in departure area of the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal 1. At around 3:45 a.m., a woman
arrived, placed her luggage at the x-ray machine, and passed through the walk-through metal
detector. The woman was then frisked by NUP Bilugot.

NUP Bilugot felt a hard object bulging near the woman's buttocks. 12 Asked what the object was,
the woman replied that it was a sanitary napkin, explaining that she was having her monthly
period. Suspicious, NUP Bilugot requested the woman to accompany her to the ladies' room. NUP
Bilugot informed SPO2 Ragadio of the hard object and the latter then accompanied the woman
and NUP Bilugot. The woman and NUP Bilugot proceeded to the ladies' restroom while SPO2
Ragadio waited outside. CAIHTE

NUP Bilugot then asked the woman to remove her panties. On the panties' crotch was a panty
shield on top of a sanitary napkin, but under all of these was a plastic sachet. Seeing a white
crystalline substance similar to "tawas," NUP Bilugot asked the woman what the plastic sachet
contained. The woman allegedly replied that it was "shabu." NUP Bilugot asked the woman further
as to who owned the shabu, but the woman answered that she was just asked to bring it. NUP
Bilugot then seized the plastic sachet and, together with the woman, went out of the ladies' room.
NUP Bilugot turned over the plastic sachet to SPO2 Ragadio.

SPO2 Ragadio requested the woman for her airline ticket, revealing the woman's name to be
"Cristy Dimaano." Together with NUP Bilugot, SPO2 Ragadio brought Dimaano to the
Intelligence and Investigation Office of the Philippine Center for Aviation and Security, 2nd
Regional Aviation Security Office. According to SPO2 Ragadio, he and NUP Bilugot wrote their
respective initials on the two sachets. Dimaano was brought to the PDEA office at NAIA. Later
on, upon examination, the sachets’ contents tested postitive for shabu.

Waiving her right to testify in court, Dimaano instead filed a memorandum and argued that the
prosecution failed to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She specifically alluded to the
conflicting testimonies of NUP Bilugot and SPO2 Ragadio as to the number of sachets allegedly
obtained from her person.

NUP Bilugot testified in court that she obtained from Dimaano only one (1) plastic sachet. On the
other hand, SPO2 Ragadio recalled receiving two (2) plastic sachets from NUP Bilugot. This
discrepancy, according to Dimaano, casts doubt as to the identity of the specimen allegedly
obtained from her. There was a break in the chain of custody of the seized drugs, which warranted
her acquittal.

In addition, Dimaano assailed the prosecution's failure to present in court the airline ticket bearing
her name. She argued that this failure disproved the factual allegation that on November 13, 2000,
she was supposed to board an airplane to transport methamphetamine hydrochloride.

RTC convicted Dimaano of attempted to transport shabu. Her conviction was affirmed by the CA
on appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not mere discrepancy in the testimonies as to the number of sachets obtained from
accused-appellant is fatal to the prosecution of the crime.

HELD:
NO. Despite the discrepancy in the testimonies as to the number of sachets obtained from
accused-appellant, there is evidence that NUP Bilugot marked two plastic sachets. The Forensic
Chemist who subjected the specimen to chemical analysis, reported that he received two plastic
sachets. Having marked two plastic sachets, NUP Bilugot confirmed that she obtained those two
sachets from accused-appellant. This corroborates SPO2 Ragadio's testimony that he received
two sachets from NUP Bilugot, which were further placed inside a plastic. NUP Bilugot may not
have remembered the contents of the sachet she seized from accused-appellant. Still, "witnesses
are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall." That
NUP Bilugot candidly stated in open court that she could not remember the contents of the sachet
suggests that she was telling the truth and was not rehearsed.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
A CERTIFICATION THAT THE ACCUSED IS NOT A LICENSEE TO HOLD FIREARM IS
DISPENSABLE IN ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS

Luis Benedict E. Flores V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 219154. September 2, 2015
Notice

FACTS:
Police operatives received a tip that an unidentified person was seen roaming inside the public
market. The police operatives immediately proceeded to the public market. As they searched the
area, they noticed petitioner, armed with a .45 caliber pistol, approaching them. They demanded
petitioner to put his pistol down, but the latter refused. A scuffle ensued until petitioner was
subdued by the police operatives. Petitioner's pistol was seized and marked, while petitioner was
arrested and brought to the police station. Petitioner Luis Benedict E. Flores was charged with
violation of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294 or Illegal Possession of Firearms. Petitioner
denied the charge and asserted that the evidence against him was planted.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a certification from the PNP that the accused is not a licensee to hold firearm is
an indispensable requisite to constitute illegal possession of firearms.

HELD:
NO, a certification from the PNP to the effect that petitioner is not a licensee for the possession
of any firearm is not indispensable.

Illegal possession of firearms is committed when the holder thereof: 1) possesses a firearm or a
part thereof; and 2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.

With respect to the first element, the prosecution presented the pistol alleged to have been in
petitioner's possession. Petitioner's denial could not prevail over the arresting police operatives'
direct, positive and categorical assertion. Moreover, petitioner could not attribute any malicious
motive on the part of the police operatives for them to falsely testify against him. The second
element was also established since the certification is not indispensable especially in this case
when petitioner admitted during pre-trial that he has no license to carry a firearm. Said stipulation
constitutes judicial admission which "may be controverted only upon a clear showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no admission was made." Petitioner failed to controvert
his admission.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VIOLATION OF GUN BAN UNDER COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 7764, IN RELATION TO SEC. 261 OF BP Blg. 881

Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 209387. January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner arrived at the Cebu Domestic Port on May 11, 2007 to go home to Iloilo. He left his
luggage with a porter to buy a ticket. About fifteen minutes went by before he could secure the
ticket while his luggage was left sitting on the floor with only the porter standing beside it. Then
he entered the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine. The machine operator
detected firearms inside petitioner’s bag. After consenting to the manual inspection of his luggage,
the port baggage inspector found firearms and ammunitions, among others. Thereafter, Police
Officer Abregana was called to inspect petitioner's bag, to which petitioner again consented.
When asked if he had with him proper documents for the firearms, petitioner replied in the
negative. As a result, two informations were filed against petitioner: one charging him with
violation of RA 8294 for illegal possession of firearms while the other charging him for violation of
the Gun Ban under COMELEC Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881. The trial court acquitted him from the charge of violation of RA 8294 but convicted him
of the other crime charged against him.

In the instant petition, petitioner Dela Cruz raises the defense that the firearms were planted inside
his bag by the porter or any person who had possession of his bag. Moreover, he contends that
his constitutional right against unwarranted searches and seizure was violated by the airport
security personnel.

The respondent, on the other hand, argues that there was a valid waiver of petitioner’s right to
unreasonable search and seizure, thus warranting his conviction. Petitioner was caught
in flagrante delicto and the firearms were seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of
Cebu, a common seaport security procedure. Petitioner also voluntarily gave his consent to the
search.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Gun Ban under
COMELEC Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

HELD:
YES, the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Gun Ban under COMELEC
Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The elements for a violation of the Gun Ban are the following."1) the person is bearing, carrying,
or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election
period; and, 3) the weapon is carried in a public place. This court also ruled that under the
Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or she has a written authority to possess a
firearm is on the accused. The prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for violation of
the Gun Ban. The firearms were found inside petitioner's bag. Petitioner did not present any valid
authorization to carry the firearms outside his residence during the period designated by the
Commission on Elections. He was carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a
public place.

Therefore, the lower courts correctly convicted the petitioner of the crime charged.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
PERSONS CONVICTED OF OFFENSES PUNISHED WITH RECLUSION PERPETUA, OR
WHOSE SENTENCES WILL BE REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA SHALL NOT BE
ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE

People of the Philippines V. Godofredo Comboy y Cronico

G.R. No. 218399. March 2, 2016
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Godofredo Comboy y Cronico (Comboy) was convicted of two (2) counts of
the crime of Statutory Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Rape. There were five (5) Informations
filed against him charging of raping his minor biological daughter, AAA.

There were two separate times when AAA, who was sleeping beside her brother BBB, suddenly
woke up with her father, Comboy, already on top of her, and the latter's penis already inside her
vagina. On the second time, Comboy told AAA not to make any noise so as not to disrupt the
sleep of the other members of their family. After the two incidents, Comboy did not stop. Thus,
AAA, while again sleeping beside her brother, woke up with her father already on top of her and
in the process of removing her underwear. However, BBB was also awakened by the commotion.
BBB then reported the matter to their stepmother. AAA also finally had the courage to report the
foregoing incidents. AAA was then examined by their Municipal Health Officer.

For his part, Comboy interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. las actually in Bicol but he was
staying with his common-law spouse. He further averred that AAA fabricated the accusations
against him as she was angry with him and his common-law spouse. He also presented his
brother Juan (Juan) who corroborated his claims.

The RTC found Comboy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape and
one (1) count of Attempted Rape. It did not lend credence to Comboy's defenses of denial and
alibi in light of AAA's clear and categorical testimony which was corroborated by the medical
findings. Comboy appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling in toto.

Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the decision of
the lower courts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua be eligible for parole?

HELD:
NO, persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, also known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed upon Comboy in Crim. Case Nos. T-5006 and T-5009, it
is noted that Section 3 of RA 9346 provides that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended."

Pursuant thereto, and in accordance with Section 2 of the same law, he must be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, for each count of Qualified
Rape. Furthermore, in view of prevailing jurisprudence, where the penalty for the crime committed
is death, which, however, cannot be imposed upon Comboy because of the provisions of RA
9346, the Court hereby increases the damages awarded to AAA as follows: (a) P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, (b)P100,000.00 as moral damages, and (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Thus, Comboy does not have eligibility for parole.

 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
COURTS CAN CORRECT THE PENALTY IMPOSED ON A DECISION DESPITE THE
FINALITY OF DECISIONS IF IT IS OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF PENALTY PRESCRIBED BY
LAW

Roger Allen Bigler V. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 210972. March 2, 2016
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Roger Allen Bigler was charged with the crime of Libel before the RTC for allegedly
maligning his former spouse, private respondent Linda Susan Patricia E. Barreto. On November
25, 2003, the RTC convicted petitioner and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for a period of 1 year, 8 months, and 21 days to two 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days. Petitioner
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 13, 2004, which was, however, denied on
May 22, 2006, for being filed 2 days beyond the prescribed 15-day period reckoned from the
promulgation of the RTC order on January 27, 2004. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration,
but was denied on March 8, 2011. Aggrieved, he filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

On May 16, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto, holding that petitioner’s filing of his
Motion for Reconsideration was made out of time, thus, rendering the guilty verdict against him
final and executory. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied on
January 21, 2014.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can correct the penalty imposed on a decision despite the finality of
decisions

HELD:
YES. The court can correct the penalty imposed on a decision despite the finality of decisions.

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Nonetheless, the
immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and
prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

In the present case, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional,
as maximum.
Therefore, the court can correct the penalty imposed on a decision despite the finality of decisions
because it is outside the range of penalty prescribed by law.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

Nelson Teñido y Silvestre V. People of the Philippines

G. R. No. 211642. March 9, 2016
Reyes, J.

FACTS:
Appellant Nelson Teñido y Silvestre (Teñido) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery in the manner, date and circumstances stated in the criminal information
accusing him and his co-accused, Rizaldo Alvarade y Valencia (Alvarade).

Aurora Guinto (Guinto), a neighbor of the private complainant, Lolita Enriquez (Enriquez) saw two
men trying to enter the house of one Mary Amor Galvez. Failing to open the said house, the two
transferred to the house of Enriquez. They went to the side of the house where the store was
located and entered by destroying the screen door. The two thereafter came out carrying a
square-shaped box and went into an alley. Since the premises of Enriquez's house were well-
lighted, she recognized the two men to be Teñido alias Dolphy or Pidol and Alvarade alias Bukol.
Moreover, according to Enriquez, when they discovered that the door of the store was opened
and the lawanit (chicken wire) covering the wall of the store was detached, she found out that
there are items that were missing.

Meanwhile, Teñido interposed denial and alibi. He denied any involvement in the robbery.

RTC found the appellant guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's
findings. Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:
Was the Indeterminate Penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum penalty to
eight (8) years of prision mayor medium, as maximum penalty, properly imposed upon the
accused for the crime of robbery he committed?

HELD:
NO, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and jurisprudence, the Court must modify the
penalty imposed by the CA upon the accused.

The penalty for robbery in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house committed by breaking
a wall, where the value taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender does not carry arms under Article
299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the RPC, is prision mayor. In view of the absence
of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty becomes prision mayor in its medium
period in accordance with Article 64, paragraph 1 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the range of the penalty now is prision correccional in any of its periods as
minimum to prision mayor medium as its maximum.

The penalty imposable upon Teñido should thus be anywhere between six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years, as minimum, and eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, as
maximum. Applying the foregoing, the maximum penalty imposed by the CA should be modified
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period. Although the minimum
penalty imposed by the CA is within the aforesaid range of penalty, the Court deems it proper to
modify the same in consonance with a jurisprudence involving a robbery case with identical
circumstances wherein the minimum prison term imposed was four (4) years, two (2) months, and
one day (1) of prision correccional.

Hence, the Court properly modified the Indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum penalty to eight (8) years of prision mayor medium, as maximum
penalty,
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
THE INTENT OF R.A. NO. 9344 IS THE PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF A CHILD IN
CONFLICT WITH THE LAW EVEN IF HE/SHE HAS ALREADY EXCEEDED THE AGE LIMIT
OF 21 YEARS, SO LONG AS HE/SHE COMMITTED THE CRIME WHEN HE/SHE WAS STILL
A CHILD

People of the Philippines V. Roberto Hidalgo

G.R. No. 203313. September 02, 2015
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Roberto Hidalgo (Roberto), his sixteen-year-old son Don Juan Hidalgo (Don Juan), and Michael
Bombasi alias "Kabayan" (Bombasi) was charged of three counts of rape against AAA, who at
that time was only 13 years old.

In her testimony, AAA testified that she was hired by the spouses Roberto and Vivian Hidalgo as
a house helper and nanny of their child Joshua. She recalled that after putting Joshua to sleep at
around 8:00pm of 30 January 2000, she herself slept in sofa bed near where Joshua was
sleeping. While sleeping, she was awakened when Roberto and Bombasi tied both of her hands
at her back. She also noticed that a handkerchief was already tied in her mouth. Thereafter, both
men turned her around, touched her body and started to take her clothes off. Roberto took her
shorts and panty off and went on top of her. He then inserted his penis inside her vagina while
kissing and touching her. After satisfying his lust, he got off from AAA. Thereafter, Bombasi took
his turn and inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina while continuing to touch her body. Finally,
Don Juan went on top of AAA and kissed her shoulders and lips. Thereafter, he inserted his penis
inside AAA's vagina. During the whole time she was being raped by the three accused, AAA
pleaded for Roberto to stop what was happening but her pleas fell to deaf ears. Roberto even
shook her head from left to right while Joshua laughed at her side while she was being touched.
After satisfying their sexual desires, the three accused untied her and threatened to cut off her
tongue and kill her family in case she would tell them what happened. When they left the house,
she untied the handkerchief on her mouth and put her clothes on. After a while, Vivian arrived.
She caught AAA crying and asked her what was wrong. AAA, afraid to reveal what happened,
just asked Vivian for permission to go home. For fear that the three accused would make true of
their threats, it took AAA almost one month to file a case and submit herself to medical
examination.

The trial court found conspiracy among the accused. It ruled that the confederated acts of the
three accused as active participants in helping one another subdue AAA and thereafter taking
turns in having carnal knowledge of her indicated a common purpose. On the other hand, it
considered the special mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Don Juan.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the trial court. It ruled
that the three accused conspired to rape AAA but disregarded the qualifying circumstance that
Roberto acted as a guardian of AAA, in the absence of sufficient proof. Further, the appellate
court did not consider the other aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, night
time and ignominy due to the fact that these were not alleged in the three sets of information filed
against the three accused.
Only accused-appellant Roberto filed his appeal and assigned as error on the part of the Court of
Appeals when it: (1) gave full faith and credence to the private complainant's testimony; and (2)
ruled that conspiracy was established and found the accused-appellant liable for three (3) counts
of simple rape. Roberto relies upon the failure of AAA to specifically point out the overt acts
committed by him which would indicate that there was a conspiracy in raping her. He insisted that
the testimony was too broad and general to indicate a common purpose in committing the crime
of rape.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9344 still applies even if the minor accused was no longer a minor when
he was convicted.

HELD:
YES. With the passage of R.A. No. 9344 known as "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" on
28 April 2006, the provision on retroactivity applies insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a
felony. This is despite the fact that the accused is no longer a minor at the time his conviction is
promulgated. The intent of R.A. No. 9344 is the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with
the law even if he/she has already exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long as he/she
committed the crime when he/she was still a child. He/she shall be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with R.A. No. 9344 in order that he/she
is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community.

The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction is not material. What is important is that the offense was committed when the accused
was still of tender age. While Don Juan is not an appellant in the present case, the Court
concluded that there was a need to correct the penalty that was imposed, thus, applying ISLAW,
the penalty to be imposed on Don Juan will be within the range of prision mayorfrom six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, as minimum penalty, to 14 years, eight (8) months and 1
day to 17 years and four (4) months of prision temporal in its medium period, as maximum penalty
in each of the three counts of rape.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE SHALL STILL BE APPLIED EVEN IF THE CHILD IS ALREADY
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME OF HIS CONVICTION

Ryan T. Mascardo v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 218657; September 9, 2015
NOTICE

FACTS:
Petitioner Ryan T. Mascardo, a sixteen (16)-year-old minor, was charged with the crime of rape
by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. He committed an
act of sexual assault by inserting his hand and/or finger, an object into the genital of AAA, seven
(7) years of age. AAA and Mascardo are second cousins.

AAA was outside the house of Mascardo when the latter called the victim to their store. Once
inside the store, Mascardo forced AAA to sit on his lap and tied her right leg to a nearby cabinet
with a plastic string. Mascardo pulled down AAA's short pants and inserted his right forefinger
twice into AAA's vagina. AAA tried to throw stones at Mascardo to stop him. After assaulting AAA,
Mascardo removed the string tied to AAA's leg and warned AAA not to tell her parents or there
would be a family feud. AAA ran away. CCC, AAA's father, first learned of the incident when AAA
told him that, "kinalikot ni Ryan ang pepe ko." On that same day, CCC and AAA went to the
Children's and Women's Desk of the Police Station.

Mascardo denied the charges against him and the defense presented evidence recounting a
different version of events. He claimed that the charges against him could be attributed to the fact
that AAA's family was envious of Mascardo's family plus the two families also had issues
regarding the payment of the electric bill as they shared a single electric meter.

The RTC promulgated its Decision finding Mascardo guilty. However, the sentence imposed upon
him is in the meantime suspended. Mascardo appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision,
the appellate court affirmed Mascardo's conviction but with the modification. The appellate court
lastly ordered the remand of the case to the court of origin to effect Mascardo's confinement in an
agricultural camp or other training facility.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the offender, being a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, be entitled
with suspension of sentence.

HELD:
YES, suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the child is already eighteen years of
age at the time of his conviction. This rule is in line with the rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law and the Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness (Republic Act No. 9344).

Suspension of sentence is proper under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344. However, the benefits of a
suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only
until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-seven (27) years old. Be that as it may, to give meaning
to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law
should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as
he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the
right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she
is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The
age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of
tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance
with Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
R.A. NO. 9344: SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE IS ONLY UNTIL THE MINOR REACHES THE
MAXIMUM AGE OF 21

People of the Philippines V. Vergel Ancajas and Allain Ancajas

G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
AAA, nineteen (19) years old, is a household help of the spouses Constantino and Elvira Cueva.
One day, on her way to her parents' house, she met appellants Vergel and Allain Ancajas who
wanted to go with her but she refused. They suddenly held her hands but she was able to get free
from their hold. She shouted for help and struggled to be freed from their hold but appellant Allain
covered her mouth with a handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in the stomach which
caused her to lose consciousness. Upon regaining her consciousness, she noticed that she was
only wearing her t-shirt as her bra, panty and maong pants were on her side. She felt pain all over
her body. Her vagina hurt and it was covered with blood. Her panty and maong pants were also
stained with blood. She went back to her employers' house and told them that she was raped by
appellants.

On the other hand, appellants strongly denied the accusation and interposed the defense of alibi.
They both claimed that they were not at the crime scene where AAA's alleged rape happened as
they were somewhere else. Moreover, appellants claim that based on AAA's testimony, the
element of carnal knowledge was not established since she claimed to be unconscious, hence,
she would not know the act allegedly done to her; that she only believed that they had carnal
knowledge of her because she felt pain on her vagina.

The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Vergel and Allain guilty of the crime of rape
and was sentenced with reclusion perpetua. Allain was only 17 years old, a minor, at the time of
the commission of the crime. The RTC ruled on the issue of appellant Allain's minority by saying
that the penalty imposed upon the two accused is reclusion perpetua which is a single indivisible
penalty and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the said penalty should be applied
and imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of minority. The RTC
further said that the benefits of a suspended sentence shall not apply to appellant Allain because
he is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, citing Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-
18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is
already 18 years of age or more at the time the judgment of conviction was rendered.

HELD:
YES, although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is
already 18 years of age or more at the time the judgment of conviction was rendered, however,
such suspension is only until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section
40 of RA No. 9344.

The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to Section 38 of RA No. 9344.
Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40 is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we
have extended the application of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to
the legislative intent of the said law.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare
of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance
with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive
member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility pursuant
to Section 51 of RA No. 9344.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ITEM TAKEN IS INVOLVED IN AN
INVESTIGATION IS AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Jackson Padiernos y Quejada v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 181111. August 17, 2015
Brion, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners Jackson Quejada Padiernos, Jackie German Roxas, and Rolando Javate Mesina were
charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of P.D. No. 705
or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. The Information alleged that petitioners took away
the truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and
forfeiture. According to the prosecution, a DENR Officer (DENRO) approached a truck loaded
with lumber. When said DENRO asked for the lumber’s supporting documents and the truck driver
and helpers failed to present any, the DENRO reported the matter to the police and then
proceeded to the DENR office to report the same. The police officers decided to transfer the truck
and the lumber to the police station. While they transfer the lumber, the truck was parked and
guarded by police officers. On the 2nd day of the transfer, petitioners, together with the accused
Santiago Castillo and Eddie Gatdula, arrived at the place where the truck was being held in
custody. Castillo, who claimed ownership of the truck, agreed with the DENROs and the police
officers to bring the truck to the police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina who
volunteered to drive the truck; while Padiernos asked the DENRO where the seized lumbers were.
Mesina started the engine and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got onboard at the
front of the truck, while the DENRO group also got onboard at the back of the truck and the two
police officers follow on a motorcycle. Then, Mesina increased the truck’s speed, leaving behind
their policemen escorts who chased the truck and fired three warning shots. Eventually, the police
officers decided not to pursue the truck and simply reported the incident to the Philippine Army
stationed within the route of the truck. The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber
machine gun and flagged down the truck. According to the defense, Santiago requested Mesina
to drive his truck, to which the latter initially refused because he knew that the truck had been
engaged in illegal activities. Mesina eventually agreed after being reassured by Santiago that he
would take care of everything and that there was no problem with the truck. Santiago also asked
Mesina to fetch Roxas to accompany them. Upon reaching Roxas, Santiago requested him to
drive his truck, but, like Mesina, he turned him down because he had already heard of the truck’s
apprehension. Roxas eventually relented upon Santiago’s assurance that there was no problem
with the truck. On their way to the truck, they came upon Padiernos, who had been waiting in the
shed for a ride, and upon learning that the three would be going to the place he would be going
to, hitched a ride with them.

The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had
been used in the commission of the offense. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of
petitioners, holding that while the lumber had already been unloaded and placed in police custody,
the truck still served as the essential link to the discovery of the loaded undocumented lumber,
and is thus material in proving the commission of the offense. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not knowledge of the accused that the item taken is under investigation is an element
of obstruction of justice.
HELD:
YES. Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed by any
person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the
following acts: altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or
object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence
in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation
of, or official proceedings in criminal cases.

Mesina admitted that he knew the truck's involvement in illegal activities as it had been previously
loaded with lumber that was confiscated. According to Mesina, Roxas also initially refused to go
with them because he already heard the news of the truck's apprehension. Roxas admitted that
he only agreed to join Santiago and Mesina, after being assured that there was no problem with
the truck.

Padiernos' demeanor after the army flagged them down establishes his knowledge of the truck's
involvement with the seized lumber. Padiernos uttered bad words at the DENROs, saying they
had no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. This testimony, together with his close
association with the other petitioners, destroys his flimsy defense of denial. The RTC's findings
during its ocular inspection of the truck also prove that the petitioners deliberately drove the truck
to Nueva Ecija despite evident knowledge of the policemen's warning shots, tapping, and the
DENROs shouting for help from the back of the truck.

Clearly, these testimonies, the petitioners' admissions, and the findings of the trial court negate
the petitioners' defense of denial of their intent to take the truck and their knowledge of the truck's
involvement in an illegal activity. The unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA - such
as the petitioners' close association with each other, their flimsy defense of denial of their intent
to take away the truck, and the totality of their acts showing their common design to take the truck
- lead us to conclude that the petitioners had indeed mutually conspired with one another to take
away the truck to suppress it from being used as evidence in the criminal investigation or
proceeding for violation of P.D. 705.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
NON-REMITTANCE OF GSIS AND PAG-IBIG FUND PREMIUMS IS CRIMINALLY
PUNISHABLE AND IS A MALUM PROHIBITUM

Datu Guimid P. Matalam V. People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 221849-50. April 4, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam (Matalam) was found guilty of non-remittance of the
employer's share in Government Insurance System and Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-
IBIG Fund) premiums. The Office of the Ombudsman charged Matalam, Regional Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform-Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (DAR-ARMM),
with the commission of crimes under "Section 52 (g) of Republic Act No. 8921, otherwise known
as the [Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)] Act of 1997, and Section 1, Rule XIII of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7742.

According to the Prosecution, Matalam, Lawi, and Unte were the officers involved in the collection
and remittance of accounts to the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund and, thus, were accountable for the
non-remittance. Matalam and his co-accused failed and/or refused to remit the required
contributions without justifiable cause despite repeated demands.

On the other hand, Matalam, claimed that his co-accused Lawi and Unte were responsible for
remitting the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund government contributions. When asked why he did not
sanction Lawi and Unte upon their failure to comply with his directive, Matalam said that he did
not have time to do so because he had numerous pending tasks at that time.

In the Joint Decision, the Sandiganbayan found Matalam guilty of the crimes charged. It found
Matalam guilty of non-remittance of the employer's share of Pag-IBIG Fund premiums.

Hence, this is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Joint Decision and Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not non-remittance of GSIS and PAG-IBIG Fund premiums criminally punishable.

HELD:
YES, non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is criminally punishable.

When an act is malum prohibitum, "it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not
the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated."
In ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, we discussed the difference between acts mala prohibita and mala
in se: The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum prohibitum. "An act
which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial." In
contrast, crimes mala in se concern inherently immoral acts. The non-remittance of GSIS and
Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum prohibitum. What the relevant laws punish is the failure,
refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable cause in remitting or paying the required contributions
or accounts.
In this case, petitioner failed to prove a justifiable cause for his failure to remit the premiums. The
Court cannot subscribe to petitioner's defense that the funds for the remittances were not directly
credited to DAR-ARMM but to the account of the Office of the Regional Governor of the ARMM,
which had the obligation to remit to the various line agencies of the ARMM the specific amounts
provided to them.

Hence, the accused, for not remitting premiums in the GSIS and PAG-IBIG Fund, is criminally
liable.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
SEARCH WARRANT MUST CONFORM STRICTLY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR ITS ISSUANCE

Honesto D. Ogayon V. People of the Philippines

GR No. 188794. September 2, 2015
Brion, J.

FACTS:
Police officers proceeded to Ogayon’s house in order to seize shabu and drug paraphernalia
allegedly kept in the premises as indicated in the search warrant. Upon reaching Ogayon’s house,
the police team noticed several persons inside a nipa hut located nearby so they suspected that
a pot session was about to be held. They restrained two of the five persons and immediately
proceeded to Ogayon’s house. They introduced themselves as police officers and handed a copy
of warrant to Ogayon, who allowed them to conduct the search. Some members of the police
team searched the comfort room located about five meters away from Ogayon’s house. They
found an object wrapped in a piece of paper with blue prints that fell from the wooden braces of
the roof. It turned out that the paper contained two (2) small, heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets that the police team suspected to contain shabu. They also found four (4) disposable
lighters, one (1) knife measuring six inches long, used aluminum foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil,
a “Dorco” blade, and live ammunition for an M-16 rifle. The police team thereafter arrested Ogayon
and two other persons. The two (2) plastic sachets seized tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hrydrochloride or shabu.

Ogayon denied any knowledge of the prohibited drugs. He asserted that prior to the search, he
was asleep in his house and his wife woke him up because several policemen and barangay
officials came to his house. He claimed that the police team did not present any search warrant
before conducting the search and it was only during the trial that he saw a copy of the warrant.

RTC convicted Ogayon violation of unlawful possession of illegal drugs and of drug paraphernalia.
He appealed to CA questioning the validity of search warrant for lack of transcript showing that
the issuing judge conducted an examination of the applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
CA, however, upheld the validity of the search warrant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not noncompliance with the constitutional requirements for securing a search warrant
renders said warrant invalid.

HELD:
YES. A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for its issuance;
otherwise, it is void. In the case at bar, the warrant was not properly issued. Section 5, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court provides that “[t]he judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statement together with the affidavits submitted”. Apart from the statement
in the search warrant itself, nothing in the records of this case indicating that the issuing judge
personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence of depositions
and transcripts of the examination was already admitted; the application for the search warrant
and the affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself, could not be found in the records.
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite examination
was made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant was
derived. Based on the lack of substantial evidence that the search warrant was issued after the
requisite examination of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the search warrant is null
and void, making the search also not valid, thus, Ogayon must be acquitted.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DOES NOT APPLY DURING THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION

Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) V. Hon. Orlando C. Casimiro, in his

capacity as Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Fidel C. Cu, Carmelita B. Zate, and Mary Lou S.
Apelo
G.R. No. 206866. September 2, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
The instant case arose from a Joint-Affidavit filed by petitioner PDIC, through its duly-authorized
officers, Alexander N. Dojillo and Israel A. Bandoy, charging private respondents of the crimes of
Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials, defined and penalized under RPC and Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Specifically, private respondents were being sued in the following
capacities: (a) Cu (together with members of his family) as the 85.99% owner of Bicol
Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI); (b) Zate as Chairman/President of BDBI; and (c) Apelo as a
former employee of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted as the Bank Officer-In-
Charge that examined BDBI's books and records as of September 30, 2001, and as one of the
assistants of Bank Officer-In-Charge Evangeline C. Velasquez in connection with the Reports of
Examination of BDBI's books and records as of August 31, 2000 and October 31, 2002.

Gomez averred that in the course of her employment with BDBI, she does not know of any official
or legitimate transactions that would warrant BDBI to disburse the aforesaid amounts in favor of
Apelo. However, speaking from personal experience, Gomez noticed that Cu would always
receive an "advance warning" about a surprise examination on BDBI by BSP. During such time
and until the actual arrival of the BSP examiner, Cu would instruct BDBI employees on how to
cover the possible findings/exceptions of the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI. In addition, Cu
shall deliver cash in BDBIs vault in order to make it appear that the cash listed in the books reflect
the actual cash in vault; and after such examination, Cu will take the cash he delivered to BDBFs
vault and return it to the source.

In view of Gomez's revelations, PDIC decided to file the instant criminal complaint against private
respondents.

In his defense, Cu denied having ordered or instructed Gomez to make such deposits to Apelo's
bank account. He pointed to the lack of evidence to prove that Apelo was aware or made aware
of any alleged bank deposits made to her bank account, thus, negating the charge of Direct
Bribery against her and Corruption of Public Officials against him. For her part, Zate likewise
denied the allegations hurled against her, countering that Gomez's statements should not be
relied upon for being unfounded.

The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman
found that while it may be said that certain amounts were indeed deposited to Apelo's bank
account, there is no proof that Apelo subsequently withdrew the same. In this regard, the
Ombudsman opined that unless it can be shown that Apelo made such withdrawals, it cannot be
declared with certainty that she received monetary consideration from Cu and Zate in exchange
for the advance information relative to impending BSP examinations conducted on BDBI. The
Ombudsman found Gomez's affidavit showing Apelo as the source of the "advance warnings"
received by Cu in connection with the BSP examinations to be inadmissible in evidence for being
hearsay.

ISSUE:
Whether or not technical rules of evidence applies during the preliminary investigation.

HELD:
NO. It was error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez's affidavit as
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory
nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the
course of its proceedings. In this case, assuming arguendo that Gomez's statements, as written
in her affidavit are indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same,
considering that she was a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI - a high-
ranking officer that may be privy to delicate transactions such as the purported "under-the-table"
deal involving private respondents. In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the
elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute
certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare
suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
AN INFORMATION NEED ONLY STATE THE ULTIMATE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE
OFFENSE

People of the Philippines V. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), Jessie Castillo, Melencio

Arciaga and Emerenciano Arciaga
G.R. No. 160619, September 9, 2015
Jardeleza, J.

FACTS:
An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan against Jessie Castillo charging him with
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, in relation to the alleged illegal operation of the Villa
Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. According to the Information, Castillo,
while in the performance of his official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits
to his co-accused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the Villa
Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) and
permit from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), to the undue injury of the residents
and students in the area who had to endure the ill-effects of the dumpsite's operation.

Following the dismissal by the CA of the administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct also in
relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite, Castillo moved to dismiss the Information on the
ground that the same does not charge an offense. He claimed that a public officer may only be
held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 if he caused undue injury to the
government or any private person. He argued that the Information must state the precise amount
of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify, specify, and prove the alleged injury to
the point of moral certainty.

The Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Castillo. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether an Information alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury
must state the precise amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify, specify,
and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral certainty.

HELD:
NO, it is not required that an Information alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence
of undue injury must state the precise amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as
identify, specify, and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral certainty.

The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally informed of the facts
and the acts constituting the offense charged. An Information need only state the ultimate facts
constituting the offense and not the finer details of why and how the crime was committed.

As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by Castillo to the
Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the applicable laws, rules, and
regulations; the undue injury being residents and students were made to endure the ill-effects of
the illegal operation. The details required by the Sandiganbayan are matters of evidence best
raised during the trial; they need not be stated in the Information.
Therefore, for purposes of informing Castillo of the crime charged, the allegation on the existence
of unwarranted benefits and undue injury under the Information suffices.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
DIRECT EVIDENCE IS NOT THE SOLE MEANS OF ESTABLISHING GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, BECAUSE CIRCUMSTANTIAL, INDIRECT OR PRESUMPTIVE
EVIDENCE, IF SUFFICIENT, CAN REPLACE DIRECT EVIDENCE

People of the Philippines V. Randy Bañez y Baylon, et al.

G.R. No. 198057, September 21, 2015
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
On October 8, 1999, at 5:00 a.m., eyewitness Dominador Marcelino was plowing outside his
house when he heard the victim Sevino Baylon shouting, "I have no fault!" He then saw accused
Rufino Felix striking Baylon with an iron bar while accused brothers Randy and Ramil Bañez were
holding each of the latter's arms behind his back. The brothers thereafter dragged Baylon to
Ramil's house, which was merely thirty (30) meters away. Later that day, Marcelino was asked to
go to the house of Kagawad Marquez regarding the incident he witnessed earlier. Baylon's lifeless
body was discovered the following morning near Ramil's house.

An Information was filed indicting Felix and the Bañez brothers for the murder of Baylon. Felix,
however, remained at large. After the trial, the RTC convicted both accused Randy and Ramil
Bañez of murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of superior strength.

Randy and Ramil Bañez seeks the reversal of the ruling of the lower courts which found that the
prosecution was able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the mere basis of
circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt
on the mere basis of circumstantial evidence.

HELD:
YES, the prosecution was able to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the mere
basis of circumstantial evidence

Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because
circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can replace direct evidence. Said
reliance on circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
which, to warrant the conviction of an accused, requires that: (a) there is more than one (1)
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all these circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the crime.

Here, there exist sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to the Bañez brothers as among the
ones responsible for Baylon's death. The prosecution was able to establish that: (1) the house of
accused-appellant Randy Bañez was burned just a few hours before the incident; (2) Baylon
shouted, "I have no fault!" when Rufino hit him with an iron bar, while the Bañezes held his arms;
(3) the accused thereafter brought Baylon to the house of Ramil Bañez; and (4) Baylon's lifeless
body was discovered the following morning near Ramil's house.
Therefore, both the RTC and the CA correctly convicted accused Randy and Ramil Bañez of the
crime of murder.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NOT THE OCCASION FOR THE FULL AND
EXHAUSTIVE DISPLAY OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE. BEING MERELY BASED ON
OPINION AND BELIEF, A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE DOES NOT REQUIRE AN
INQUIRY AS TO WHETHER THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SECURE A CONVICTION.
HENCE, THE VALIDITY AND MERITS OF A PARTY'S DEFENSE OR ACCUSATION, AS
WELL AS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONIES AND EVIDENCE, ARE BETTER
VENTILATED DURING TRIAL PROPER THAN AT THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
LEVEL

PCGG vs. Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez

G.R. No. 194159. October 21, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J:

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution which dismissed the affidavit-complaint of
petitioner PCGG charging individual respondents Don M. Ferry, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Rolando M.
Zosa, Cesar C. Zalamea, Ofelia I. Castell, Rafael A. Sison, Rodolfo M. Cuenca, Manuel I. Tinio,
and Antonio R. Roque for allegedly violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019, for lack of probable cause.

Galleon made a request for guarantees from DBP to cover its foreign borrowings for the purpose
of acquiring new and secondhand vessels. In an evaluation memorandum dated August 27, 1979,
the DBP itself already raised various red flags regarding Galleon's request, such as the following:
(a) its guarantee accommodation request covers 100% of its project cost, which is in excess of
DBP's normal practice of financing only 80% of such cost; (b) its net profit margin was
experiencing a steady decrease due to high operating costs; (c) its paid-up capital is only P9.95
Million; and (d) aside from its proposal to source the increase in equity from the expected profits
from the operations of the vessels to be acquired, Galleon has not shown any concrete proof on
how it will be funding its equity build-up. Despite the foregoing, DBP still agreed to grant Galleon's
request under certain conditions (e.g., increase in paid-up capital, placement of adequate
collaterals), which were eventually not complied with. Further, when Galleon's arrearages and
obligations skyrocketed due to its failure to service its debts, DBP, instead of securing its interest
by demanding immediate payment or the foreclosure of the collaterals, granted Galleon further
accommodations in the form of foreign currency loans and release of certain collaterals. As a
result of the foregoing, among other things, Galleon's total obligations to DBP ballooned all the
way to P2,039,284,390.85, while the collaterals securing such obligations were only valued at
P539,000,000.00 as of March 31, 1984. Further, Galleon's paid-up capital remained only at
P46,740,755.00 as of June 30, 1981.

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the
accommodations extended by DBP to Galleon were in the nature of behest loans, which then led
to the filing of criminal cases against individual respondents, who were high-ranking officers
and/or directors of either Galleon or DBP, as evidenced by the various documents on record.
Specifically, Cuenca, Tinio, and Roque were Galleon stockholders and were its President,
Executive Vice-President and Treasurer, and Corporate Secretary, respectively. On the other
hand, the following individual respondents exercised official functions for the DBP during the time
it extended Galleon the aforesaid accommodations: (a) Ferry as DBP Vice Chairman and Acting
Chairman; (b) Tengco as DBP Board Member, Supervising Governor, and Acting Chairman; (c)
Zosa as DBP Supervising Governor and Chairman of the Loan Committee; (d) Zalamea as DBP
Chairman; (e) Castell as DBP Executive Officer and Manager of the Industrial Projects
Development III; and (f) Sison as DBP Board Member and Acting Chairman. As may be gleaned
from the documents on record, it appears that each of these high-ranking officers and/or directors
of DBP had a hand in recommending the approval and/or the actual approval of the series of
accommodations that DBP granted in favor of Galleon, which constituted the behest loans
received by the latter during the regime of the late President Marcos.

In view of the accusations that they were involved in the grant of behest loans, Roque, Zalamea,
Tengco, and Castell merely denied liability by maintaining that they had no participation in such
grant. Suffice it to say that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated during the trial
proper. On the other hand, Ferry, Zosa, Cuenca, Tinio, and Sison miserably failed to debunk the
charges against them by not filing their respective counter-affidavits despite due notice.

In a Resolution, the Ombudsman found no probable cause against private respondents and,
accordingly, dismissed the criminal complaint against them. It found that the pieces of evidence
attached to the case records were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the individual
respondents, considering that the documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of
executive summaries and technical reports, which are hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative
value. Aggrieved, the PCGG moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an Order.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the technical rules on evidence applies in a preliminary investigation.

HELD:
NO. A preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there
is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged
should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the prosecution's evidence. The presence and absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits. Hence, the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.

Here, It was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG's findings contained in the
Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-
serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature
of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course
of its proceedings.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
FAILURE OF A LAWYER TO INDICATE IN HIS OR HER PLEADINGS THE NUMBER AND
DATE OF ISSUE OF HIS OR HER MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WILL SUBJECT
THE LAWYER TO THE PRESCRIBED FINE AND/OR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

People of the Philippines V. Jesus A. Arrojado

G.R. No. 207041. November 9, 2015
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
In an Information, herein respondent Arrojado was charged with the crime of murder. Respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information filed against him on the ground that the investigating
prosecutor who filed the said Information failed to indicate therein the number and date of issue
of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by
Bar Matter No. 1922 (B.M. No. 1922) which was promulgated by this Court via an En Banc
Resolution dated June 3, 2008. Herein petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition to respondent's
Motion to Dismiss contending that: (1) the Information sought to be dismissed is sufficient in form
and substance; (2) the lack of proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and
signed the Information should not prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges against
persons who have violated the law; and (3) and administrative edict cannot prevail over
substantive or procedural law, by imposing additional requirements for the sufficiency of a criminal
information.

RTC dismissed the Information without prejudice. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but the trial court denied it. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with
the CA. CA denied respondent's petition and affirmed the questioned RTC Orders. Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to indicate MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a valid ground to dismiss
an information.

HELD:
NO, the failure to indicate MCLE Certificate of Compliance is not a valid ground to dismiss an
information. In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by
a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her
MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane Resolution, dated January 14,
2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the
counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory Resolution,
the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or
her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to
the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
FAILURE TO FIRST FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE RTC ORDER WHICH
DENIED THE MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION IS FATAL TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Lucita Tiorosio-Espinosa V. Honorable Presiding Judge Virginia Hofileña-Europa

G.R. No. 185746. January 20, 2016
Jardeleza, J.

FACTS:
Private respondent Necefero Jovero filed an action for damages against Spouses Pompiniano
Espinosa and petitioner Lucita Tiorosio-Espinosa alleging that the Spouses Espinosa maliciously
filed several cases for theft, estafa and perjury against him for the sole purpose of vexing,
harassing and humiliating him. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Jovero. Spouses
Espinosa appealed the decision of the RTC. Necefero Jovero moved for execution pending
appeal. Spouses Espinosa moved to stay the execution pending appeal which the RTC denied.
Spouses Espinosa filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which the CA dismissed outright for
failure of the petition to state when the assailed order was received. In their motion for
reconsideration, the Spouses Espinosa alleged that they filed said petition on time as their
previous counsel received the assailed order on October 4, 2007, attaching as proof a certified
photocopy of postal registry return card. They explained that the return card was not yet available
with the RTC at the time they filed the petition for certiorari, and that they disclosed this fact to the
CA in the petition with an undertaking to submit it as soon as it was available. CA denied the
motion for reconsideration. This time, it cited Spouses Espinosa’s failure to file a motion for
reconsideration.

Herein petitioner Lucita Tiorosio-Espinosa filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC to
appeal the CA’s dismissal of the case arguing that the motion to stay execution filed with the RTC
was in fact a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to first file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order which denied
the motion to stay execution fatal to a petition for certiorari.

HELD:
YES, the failure to first file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order which denied the motion
to stay execution is fatal to a petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari before a higher court
will generally not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This is because a motion for
reconsideration is not only the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure but also it allows the lower
court a chance to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the case.

In the present case, contrary to the finding of the CA, the Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay
execution is, in fact, a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order which granted Necefero
Jovero’s motion for execution pending appeal. Although not captioned as a "motion for
reconsideration," Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay execution directly challenged the RTC’s
order of execution pending appeal. Therefore, the Spouses Espinosa has already complied with
the requirement of first filing a motion for reconsideration before availing of a petition for certiorari.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
A JUDGE IS AUTHORIZED TO IMMEDIATELY DISMISS THE CASE ONLY IF THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD CLEARLY FAILS TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE

Vinson D. Young V. People of the Philippines

GR No. 213910, February 3, 2016
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Accused- petitioner in the present case are Vinson D. Young aka Benzon Ong and Benny Young
aka Benny Ong.

Members of PNP conducted surveillance operations at Jaguar KTV, owned by Vinson and Benny.
During the operation, they observed that its customers paid P6,000.00 in exchange for sexual
intercourse with GROs, or P10,000.00 as “bar fine” if they were taken out of the establishment.
PNP members acting as poseur customers handed P15,000.00 worth of marked money to the
“mamasang” / manager of Jaguar in exchange for sexual service. The rest of the team raided
Jaguar resulting to multiple arrests, seizure of sexual paraphernalia, recovery of the marked
money and rescue of 146 women and minor children. A criminal complaint for violation of Sections
4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208 was filed against petitioners.

Vinson and Benny denied ownership of Jaguar.

RTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. Respondent People, through OSG, filed
petitioner for certiorari, however, OSG’s failure to file MR was a fatal infirmity warranting the
petition’s outright dismissal. CA found that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, thus, it
ordered reinstatement of the information. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied;
hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge is authorized to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
does not establish probable cause

HELD:
YES. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes a judge to immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause – that is
when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. The evidence on record herein
does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence of probable cause against petitioners.
Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the prosecution was able to establish
a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections
6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208. As it appears from the records, petitioners recruited and hired the AAA
Group and, consequently, maintained them under their employ in Jaguar for the purpose of
engaging in prostitution. In view of this, probable cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest.
Moreover, the Court notes that the defenses raised by petitioners, particularly their disclaimer
that they are no longer the owners of the establishment where the sex workers were rescued,
are evidentiary in nature — matters which are best threshed out in a full-blown trial. Thus, the
proper course of action on the part of the RTC was not to dismiss the case but to proceed to
trial.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
THE AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT THE STATE IN APPEALS OF CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

Malayan Insurance Company V. Piccio

G.R. No. 203370. April 11, 2016
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This involves a case charging Philip Piccio, et.al, of thirteen (13) counts of Libel for purportedly
posting defamatory articles/statements on the website www.pepcoalition.com that besmirched the
reputation of the Yuchengco family and the Yuchengco Group, including herein petitioners.
Respondents filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the
residence or principal office address of petitioners was admittedly at Quintin Paredes Street,
Binondo, Manila, and not in Makati City where the case was filed. The motion to quash was
granted. On appeal, the CA noted that while petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, the Appellants'
Brief was filed only by the private prosecutor, and not by the OSG as required by law. The grant
of the motion to quash was sustained and the appeal was dismissed. Hence, this petition for
review to the SC where petitioners argue that the CA erred in denying the appeal due to lack of
the OSG's authorization.

ISSUE:
Is the lone appeal of the private complainant without OSG’s authorization enough to elevate the
case to a higher court?

HELD:
NO, the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA
is vested solely in the OSG. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code provides that the Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines and that it shall represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings. Here, the notice of appeal was filed by the private complainant
without the authorization from the OSG. There being no authorization given, the appeal was
rightfully dismissed by the CA. It was settled that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on
the criminal aspect representing the People. The People are therefore deemed as the real parties
in interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. Hence, the dismissal by the CA of the appeal was
proper.

Thus, the petitions are denied.

 OTHER SUBJECTS
AN AMPLE PROOF THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED HAS NO USE IF THE
PROSECUTION IS UNABLE TO CONVINCINGLY PROVE THE OFFENDER'S
IDENTITY

People of the Philippines V. Jonel Vargas y Ramos

G.R. No. 208446. April 6, 2016

FACTS:
Herein accused appellants JONEL VARGAS Y RAMOS, JERIENALD VILLAMERO Y
ESMAN, ARMANDO CADANO @ MANDO, JOJO ENORME @ JOJO, RUTHER GARCIA
@ BENJIE/LOLOY, AND ALIAS TABOY were accused of shooting and killing the son of
Elias Magbanua running towards the store where I was then buying cigarettes and I
noticed that he had bloodstains on his back. They were convicted by the RTC based on
the testimony of an eyewitness, Adolfo. In his sworn statement, Adolfo said that he saw 6
persons running after the bloodied victim. Of the 6 accused, only Vargas and Villamero
were arrested. However, during his testimony. Adolfo said he only saw 2 persons running
after the victim. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence this appeal.

Twelve days after the shooting of the victim, the lone eyewitness mentioned details of
what he saw: six people running after the victim. Nothing in such detail referred to the
identity of the culprit. The lone witness clearly said he could not remember who shot the
victim. Two years thereafter, he came with the testimony that only two not six chased the
deceased. And he saw the person who shot the victim. DTCSHA

ISSUE:
Whether or not an identification based on inconsistent sworn statement and testimony of
an eyewitness is reliable.

HELD:
NO. Great care should be taken in considering the identification of the accused especially,
when this identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally
depends on the reliability of the identification. In his Sworn Statement, Adolfo mentioned
six (6) individuals involved in the crime but that he could not remember who shot the victim.
In his testimony however, the number of participants were reduced to two, who
conveniently were the only two individuals arrested in connection with the crime. Adolfo
also remembered seeing Jonel shoot the victim. When serious and inexplicable
discrepancies are present between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness
and her testimonial declarations with respect to one's participation in a serious imputation
such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness' account.
There is no other evidence in this case aside from the testimony of the lone eyewitness
which directly implicates appellants to the crime. The inconsistent statements could not
be dismissed as inconsequential because the inconsistency goes into the very
identification of the assailants, which is a crucial aspect in sustaining a conviction. A
successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the
identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample
proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to
convincingly prove the offender's identity. It is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly
keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence.
Acquittal, therefore, is in order.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE WHEN THE FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE
CARE IS NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT TO THE LAYMAN.

Carlos Borromeo V. Family Care Hospital, Inc. and Ramon S. Inso, M.D.
G.R. No. 191018. January 25, 2016
Brion, J.

FACTS:
Carlos Borromeo lost his wife Lillian when she died after undergoing a routine appendectomy.
The hospital and the attending surgeon submit that Lillian bled to death due to a rare, life-
threatening condition that prevented her blood from clotting normally. Carlos believes, however,
that the hospital and the surgeon were simply negligent in the care of his late wife. At the request
of the petitioner, Lilian's body was autopsied by Dr. Reyes. Based on the autopsy, the petitioner
filed a complaint for damages against Family Care and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence.
During the trial, the petitioner presented Dr. Reyes as his expert witness.

RTC found the respondents liable for medical negligence. RTC applied the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, holding that a patient's death does not ordinarily occur during an appendectomy. On
appeal to the CA, the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA denied the
applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because the element of causation between the
instrumentality under the control and management of Dr. Inso and the injury that caused Lilian's
death was absent; the respondents sufficiently established that the cause of Lilian's death was
DIC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not res ipsa loquitor is applicable when the failure to observe due care is not
immediately apparent

HELD:
NO. The petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden of evidence
onto the respondent. Res ipsa loquitur, literally, "the thing speaks for itself;" is a rule of evidence
that presumes negligence from the very nature of the accident itself using common human
knowledge or experience.

The application of this rule requires: (1) that the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent; (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) that the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution from the injured person.
The concurrence of these elements creates a presumption of negligence that, if unrebutted,
overcomes the plaintiff's burden of proof.

This doctrine is used in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.

The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the defendant's alleged failure
to observe due care is not immediately apparent to a layman. These instances require expert
opinion to establish the culpability of the defendant doctor. It is also not applicable to cases where
the actual cause of the injury had been identified or established.
 OTHER SUBJECTS
M/V "DON MARTIN" VOY 047 and its cargoes of 6,500 sacks of imported rice V. Hon.
Secretary of Finance et al.
G.R. No. 160206. July 15, 2015
Bersamin, J.

(BERSAMIN CASE)
(NO SUBSTANTIAL CONTENT)

People of the Philippines V. Mario Tomampo y Remandiman

G.R. No. 213219. September 23, 2015
NOTICE

FACTS:
This notice concerns the case, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO TOMAMPO Y
REMANDIMAN: G.R. No. 213219

After careful review of the case records, this court resolves to dismiss the appeal of accused-
appellant Mario Tomampo y Remandiman for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in
the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2013 as to warrant the exercise
of this court's appellate jurisdiction.

The imposable penalty for the crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A in relation to
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua. 2 Accused-appellant is not
eligible for parole in Criminal Case No. 4678 pursuant to Act No. 4103, known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.

In line with current jurisprudence, interest at the rate of 6% per annum should be imposed on
all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, this court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the September
25, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CEB CR HC No. 01029 and AFFIRMS the
Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2013 with MODIFICATION in that all damages
awarded shall be subject to 6% legal interest per annum from the finality of this judgment until
its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.