1. Sargasso Construction & Development Corporation/Pick & Shovel, Inc.

,/Atlantic
Erectors, Inc. (Joint Venture) v. Philippine Ports Authority, 623 SCRA 260 (2010)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Sargasso Construction and Development Corporation, Pick and Shovel,

Inc. and Atlantic Erectors, Inc., a joint venture, was awarded the construction of Pier 2
and the rock causeway (R.C. Pier 2) for the port of San Fernando, La Union, after a
public bidding conducted by the defendant PPA. In a letter dated October 1, 1992 of Mr.
Melecio J. Go, Executive Director of the consortium, plaintiff offered to undertake the
reclamation between the Timber Pier and Pier 2 of the Port of San Fernando, La Union,
as an extra work to its existing construction of R.C. Pier 2 and Rock Causeway for a price
ofP36,294,857.03.

Defendant replied thru its Assistant General Manager Teofilo H. Landicho who
sent the following letter dated December 18, 1992Notice of Award signed by PPA
General Manager Rogelio Dayan was sent to plaintiff for the phase I Reclamation
Contract in the amount ofP30,794,230.89 and instructing it to "enter into and execute the
contract agreement with this Office" and to furnish the documents representing
performance security and credit line.

At its meeting held on September 9, 1994, the Board decided not to approve the
contract proposal, as reflected in the following excerpt of the minutes taken during said
board meeting.It appears that PPA did not formally advise the plaintiff of the Board’s
action on their contract proposal. As plaintiff learned that the Board was not inclined to
favor its Supplemental Agreement, Mr. Go wrote General Manager Agustin requesting
that the same be presented again to the Board meeting for approval. However, no reply
was received by plaintiff from the defendant.

On June 30, 1997, plaintiff filed acomplaintfor specific performance and damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila alleging that defendant PPA’s unjustified
refusal to comply with its undertaking, unnecessarily leading to the delay in
theimplementation of the award under the August 26, 1993 Notice of Award, has put on
hold plaintiff’s men and resources earmarked for the project, aside from effectively tying
its hands in undertaking other projects for fear that plaintiff’s incapacity to undertake
work might be spread thinly and it might not be able to function efficiently if the PPA
project and other projects should require simultaneous attention.

Defendant PPA thru the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
filed itsAnswerwithCompulsory Counterclaim contending that the alleged Notice of
Award has already been properly revoked when the Supplemental Agreement which
should have implemented the award was denied approval by defendant’s Board of
Directors.After trial, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff.On
August 22, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision reversing the trial court’s
decision and dismissing petitioner’s complaint for specific performance and damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a contract has been perfected between the parties which, in turn,
depends on whether or not the general manager of PPA is vested with authority to enter
into a contract for and on behalf of PPA.

HELD:

The contract was not perfected because the general manager of PPA is not vested
with authority.

Petitioner contends that the existence of "Notice of Award of Contract and

Contractor’s Conforme thereto," resulting from its negotiation with respondent, proves
that a contract has already been perfected, and that the other documents enumerated
under the amended Rules and Regulations implementing P.D. 1594 are mere physical
representations of the parties’ meeting of the minds; that the "Approval of Award by
Approving Authority" is only a "supporting document," and not an evidence of perfection
of contract, and which merely "facilitates the approval of the contract; "that PPA is bound
by the acts of its general manager in issuing the Notice of Award under the doctrine of
apparent authority; and that the doctrine of estoppel, being an equitable doctrine, cannot
be invoked to perpetuate an injustice against petitioner.

On the matter of entering into negotiated contracts by government-owned and

controlled corporations, the provisions of existing laws are crystal clear in requiring the
governing board’s approval thereof. Contracts to which the government is a party
aregenerally subject to the same laws and regulations which govern the validity and
sufficiency of contracts between private individuals.

A government contract, however, is perfectedonly upon approval by a competent

authority, where such approval is required. The contracting officer functions as agent of
the Philippine governmentfor the purpose of making the contract. There arises then, in
that regard, a principal-agent relationship between the Government, on one hand, and the
contracting official, on the other. The latter though, in contemplation of law, possesses
onlyactual agency authority. This is to say that his contracting power exists, where it
exists at all,only because and by virtue of a law, or by authority of law, creating and
conferring it. And it is well settled thathe may make only such contracts as he is so
authorized to make.

Flowing from these basic guiding principles is another stating that the government
is bound only to the extent of the power it has actually given its officers-agents. It goes
without saying then that, conformably to a fundamental principle in agency, the acts of
such agents in entering into agreements or contracts beyond the scope of their actual
authority do not bind or obligate the Government.

The moment this happens, the principal-agent relationship between the

Government and the contracting officer ceases to exist.It was stressed that...the
contracting official who gives his consent as to the subject matter and the consideration
ought to be empowered legally to bind the Government and that his actuations in a
particular contractual undertaking on behalf of the government come within the ambit of
his authority. On top of that, the approval of the contract by a higher authority is usually
required by law or administrative regulation as a requisite for its perfection.

Under Article 1881 of the Civil Code, the agent must act within the scope of his
authority to bind his principal. So long as the agent has authority, express or implied, the
principal is bound by the acts of the agent on his behalf, whether or not the third person
dealing with the agent believes that the agent has actual authority. Thus, all signatories in
a contract should be clothed with authority to bind the parties they represent.P.D. 857
likewise states that one of the corporate powers of respondent’s Board of Directorsis to
"reclaim... any part of the lands vested in the Authority." It also "exercise[s] all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law." On the other hand, the law merely
vests the general manager the "general power... to sign contracts" and "to perform such
other duties as the Board may assign..."

Therefore, unless respondent’s Board validly authorizes its general manager, the
latter cannot bind respondent PPA to a contract.The Court completely agrees with the CA
that the petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that the respondent’s
general manager possessed such actual authority delegated either by the Board of
Directors, or by statutory provision.

The authority of government officials to represent the government in any contract

must proceed from an express provision of law or valid delegation of authority. Without
such actual authority being possessed by PPA’s general manager, there could be no real
consent, much less a perfected contract, to speak of. It is of no moment if the phrase
"approval of higher authority" appears nowhere in the Notice of Award. It neither justifies
petitioner’s presumption that the required approval "had already been granted" nor
supports its conclusion that noothercondition (than the completion of fendering of Pier 2
as stated in the Notice of Award) ought to be complied with to create a perfected
contract.Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, the contract without need for any
express reference thereto;more so, to a purported government contract, which is imbued
with public interest.

2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HENRY T. GO G.R. No. 168539, March 25,

2014

FACTS:

Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was
herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.

The present case is an offshoot of the Supreme Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile,
he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding
probable cause.

The information was filed against respondent. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 28090. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan issued an order, directing the prosecution
to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused respondent considering that accused is a private person and the
public official, Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased and not an
accused in the case.

The prosecution alleged that the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction over
the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion
for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private
person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.

Respondent filed a motion to quash the information against him on the ground
that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the Sandiganbayan, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with
whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was
capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.

Respondent also claims that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before
the Sandiganbayan for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side
Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present
case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091.

In that case, the Sandiganbayan granted respondent's motion to quash the

Information on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said Sandiganbayan Resolution before the
Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 168919.

In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, the Supreme Court denied the
petition finding no reversible error on the part of the Sandiganbayan. The SC Resolution
became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that the
Supreme Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.

ISSUES:

1. May respondent, a private person, be indicted for conspiracy in violating

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information?

2. May the SC’s ruling in G.R. No. 168919 be applied to the instant case to cause
the quashal of information against respondent?

RULING:

1. Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does
not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.

The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge
of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g)
of R.A. 3019. 14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section
3 (g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have
acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances
exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case
where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone. S

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for

conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they
are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any
of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have
been said, done or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual
actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more
conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.

The legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike,
which constitute graft or corrupt practices," would be frustrated if the death of a public
officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public
officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of
conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is
factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy
against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where
respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

2. No. Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, respondent already
posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation in
Criminal Case No. 28091. Respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well
settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative
relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

In this case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing
his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 28090 only came after the Sandiganbayan issued an Order requiring the
prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case
involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More
importantly, the Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public
officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said
public officers.

In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the
Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done.

Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the
Sandiganbayan is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case
involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

3. SM Land v BCDA (G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015)

FACTS:

SM Land, Inc. submitted an unsolicited proposal to develop Bonifacio South

Property. Respondent BCDA, under the current presidency of Casanova, however,
terminated the competitive challenge on the following grounds: a) SMLI’s offer was
incompatible with public interest and, therefore, void; b) the whole process that lead to
the issuance of a Certificate of Successful Negotiation was highly irregular, citing a
dubious process that lead to the naming of SMLI as the original proponent given the fact
that another developer has submitted a proposal to develop the land in question two
months before SMLI.

BCDA also submitted that the Joint Venture Selection Committee’s

recommendation and BCDA’s Boards approval using competitive challenge, instead of
the usual public bidding process, are themselves questionable. BCDA also submitted that
the government stands to lose P13 B in the agreement.

In this MR, respondent argued that BCDA and SMLI do not have a contract that
would bestow upon the latter the right to demand that its unsolicited proposal be
subjected to a competitive challenge. Assuming arguendo the existence of such an
agreement between the parties, respondents contend that the same may be terminated by
reason of public interest.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not there was a perfected contract between the parties;

2) Whether or not BCDA may terminate the same by reason of public interest.

HELD:

1) Yes; 2) No.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

(1) There was a valid agreement between the parties. The elements of a valid
contract were all present:

a) Consent. In the case at bar, when SMLI submitted the first Unsolicited Proposal
to BCDA on December 14, 2009, the submission constituted an offer to undertake the
development of the subject property. BCDA then entered into negotiations with SMLI
until the BCDA finally accepted the terms of the final unsolicited proposal. Their
agreement was thereafter reduced into writing through the issuance of the Certification of
Successful Negotiations where the meeting of the parties’ minds was reflected.

b) Cause. The cause of the agreement in the case at hand is their interest in the
sale or acquisition and development of the property and their undertaking to perform their
respective obligations, among others, as reflected in the Certificate of Successful
Negotiations and in the Terms of Reference (TOR) issued by BCDA.

c) Object. Here, when the BCDA Board issued the Certification of Successful
Negotiations, it only accepted SMLI’s Unsolicited Proposal and declared SMLI eligible
to enter into the proposed JV activity. It also “agreed to subject [SMLI]’s Original
Proposal to Competitive Challenge.”

(2) This agreement is the law between the contracting parties with which they are
required to comply in good faith. Verily, it is BCDA’s subsequent unilateral cancellation
of this perfected contract which this Court deemed to have been tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. BCDA could not validly renege on its obligation to subject the unsolicited
proposal to a competitive challenge in view of this perfected contract, and especially so
after BCDA gave its assurance that it would respect the rights that accrued in SMLI’s
favor arising from the same.

Collateral Issues:

a) On Public Bidding v Competitive Challenge. Public bidding may generally be

more preferred than a competitive challenge for reasons explained in the dissent.
However, there must be a careful balance between what is best for the government and
what is fair to the persons it deals with. Otherwise, any and all unsolicited proposal can
be cancellable, despite its acceptance, by the mere allegation that straight bidding is what
public interest so requires. Worse, the government can very well ignore, at will, its
contractual obligations by invoking that familiar mantra––public interest.

b) On the argument on perceived government losses and alleged dubious

proceeding. The alleged adverse economic impact on the government, in finding for
SMLI, does not constitute, under the premises, a valid cause for the reversal of the
assailed Decision. The ruling did not award the project in petitioner’s favor but merely
ordered that SMLI’s proposal be subjected to a competitive challenge.

Consequently, any alleged disadvantage the government would suffer is

speculative at most as there is no final award for the project as of yet. Respondents harp
on the alleged dubiousness of the proceeding that led to the perfection of the agreement,
but to rule now that irregularities marred the actions of BCDA’s board and officers, as
respondents would have us believe, would be tantamount to prematurely exposing its
former officers to potential administrative liability without due process of law. If
respondent would insist on such argument, it could have at least shown that the proper
disciplinary cases have been initiated as evidence that BCDA reasonably believed that its
previous officers indeed deviated from lawful procedure.

c) On whether or not estoppel can be invoked against the state. Respondents

cannot also find solace in the general rule that the State is not barred by estoppel by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As jurisprudence elucidates, the doctrine is
subject to exceptions, viz: Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not
be invoked except [in rare] and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where
they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the
public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those
special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.

Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or

capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and
subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals.

DISPOSITIVE: Decision affirmed; MR denied with finality.

4. ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO CAPALLA, et al. v. THE HONORABLE

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. Nos. 201112, 201121, 201127, and 201413, 13
June 2012,

A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the
contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material
amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute a
denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.
FACTS:

Pursuant to its authority to use an Automated Election System (AES), the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) posted and published an invitation to apply for
eligibility and to bid for the 2010 Poll Automation Project.

COMELEC awarded the contract for the project to respondent Smartmatic-TIM.

Thereafter, COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of
an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local
Elections (AES Contract, for brevity). The contract between the COMELEC and
Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the goods
listed in the contract.” In said contract, the Comelec was given until December 31, 2010
within which to exercise the option.

In a letter, Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Cesar Flores (Flores), proposed

a temporary extension of the option period to buy the PCOS machines until March 31,
2011. The COMELEC did not exercise the option within the extended period. Several
extensions were given for the COMELEC to exercise the OTP until its final extension on
March 31, 2012. On March 29, 2012, the COMELEC issued a resolution resolving to
accept Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31,
2012.

Archbishop Capalla, et al. thus assailed the validity and constitutionality of the
COMELEC Resolutions for the purchase of the subject PCOS machines as well as the
Extension Agreement and the Deed of Sale covering said goods mainly on the ground
that the option period provided for in the AES contract between the COMELEC and
Smartmatic-TIM had already lapsed and, thus, could no longer be extended, such
extension being prohibited by the contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the unilateral extension of the option period which Smartmatic-
TIM granted to COMELEC and which the latter accepted constitutes circumvention of
the law on public bidding.

HELD:

It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that an instrument must be

construed so as to give effect to all the provisions of the contract. In essence, the contract
must be read and taken as a whole. While the contract indeed speciacally required the
COMELEC to notify Smartmatic-TIM of its OTP the subject goods until December 31,
2010, a reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties
are given the right to amend the contract which may include the period within which to
exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period,
provided that the contract is still effective.

Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it

involves procurement by a government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties
are governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA 9184. In this jurisdiction, public
bidding is the established procedure in the grant of government contracts. The award of
public contracts, through public bidding, is a matter of public policy. The parties are,
therefore, not at full liberty to amend or modify the provisions of the contract bidded
upon.

A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions

of the contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute substantial or
material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would
constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.

The determination of whether or not a modification oramendment of a contract

bidded out constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the contract, when taken
as a whole, would contain substantially different terms and conditions that would have
the effect of altering the technical and/or financial proposals previously submitted by the
other bidders. The modifications in the contract executed between the government and
the winning bidder must be such as to render the executed contract to be an entirely
different contract from the one bidded upon.

Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not previously
available to the other bidders. Admittedly, the AES contract was awarded to Smartmatic-
TIM after compliance with all the requirements of a competitive public bidding.
Although the AES contract was amended after the award of the contract to Smartmatic-
TIM, the amendment only pertains to the period within which the COMELEC could
exercise the option because of its failure to exercise the same prior to the deadline
originally agreed upon by the parties.

5. EFREN G. AMIT, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL

OFFICE NO. VI, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), and THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, Respondents. G.R. No. 176172, November 20,
2012

FACTS:

The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit on the Multi-Purpose

Drying Pavement (MPDP) project conducted by the Department of Agriculture (DA).
COA discovered that eleven (11) government employees were allegedly responsible for
ghost projects and misappropriation of public funds. Thus, COA administratively charged
them before the Ombudsman including petitioner Efren Amit who was a Senior
Agriculturist of the DA whose functions include the approval of MPDP project
documents.

The Ombudsman found all the officials so charged guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty for conspiring in the falsification of documents to facilitate the disbursement
and misappropriation of the funds intended for the MPDP projects. In some of the
vouchers, the signatures of certain officials were forged. It was also discovered that the
vouchers and checks for the MPDP project were released without proper authorization to
certain beneficiaries. The Ombudsman concluded that the employees conspired with one
another to facilitate the disbursement and misappropriation of funds intended for the
MPDP project.

Amit appealed to the CA. The CA denied the petition and ruled that Amits
approval of the documents in question is not merely ministerial. Amit moved to
reconsider the denial of his petition but the CA denied the motion. Hence, the present
petition.

ISSUE:

Is Amit liable for falsification of documents and misappropriation of public

funds?

HELD:

First, Amit's acts did not result from a mere failure to exercise the necessary
prudence in complying with the proper procedure. The performance of the complained
acts was discretionary on his part. Amit's acts were done willfully and deliberately. Amit,
for instance, inexplicably signed the issue slips despite his alleged knowledge that these
documents were unnecessary.With Amit's signing of the documents, however, the
immediate release of the funds was facilitated.

Second, the Ombudsman's finding of conspiracy reveals the crucial role which
Amit played in the commission of fraud with other officials. Amit's role in the committed
irregularities shows his concurrence although based on circumstantial, not direct,
evidence with the other officials objective to defraud the government. The irregularities
will not see their fruition if Amit and the other officials involved in the fraud did not
consent to its implementation by making it appear that there were valid requisitions,
deliveries, inspections, pre-auditing and approval of the vouchers and checks paid to the
contractors/suppliers. These acts pointed to one (1) criminal intent with one participant
performing a part of the transaction and the others performing other parts of the same
transaction to complete the whole scheme, with a view of attaining the object which they
were pursuing.
 Third, Amits defense the alleged reliance on the acts of his subordinates in good
faith is simply unacceptable. Public office is a public trust and public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead
modest lives.

Fourth, Amit did not wholly rely on the acts of his subordinates. As earlier
mentioned, he performed functions using independent judgment. Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. As differentiated from simple
misconduct, in grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. Corruption as an element
of grave misconduct consists in the officials unlawful and wrongful use of his station or
character [reputation] to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary
to duty and the rights of others.

DENIED.