Francisco vs.

House of Representatives
Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under
the Constitution.

Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme
Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
a. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
b. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of
the controversy.

2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

a. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
 phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
b. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or
amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

a. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
b. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Baker vs. Carr

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that decided
that redistricting (attempts to change the way voting districts are delineated) issues present justiciable questions, thus
enabling federal courts to intervene in and to decide redistricting cases. The defendants unsuccessfully argued that
redistricting of legislative districts is a "political question", and hence not a question that may be resolved by federal
courts.

Background
Plaintiff Charles Baker was a Republican who lived in Shelby County, Tennessee, and had served as the mayor
of Millington, Tennessee, near Memphis.[1] The Tennessee State Constitution required that legislative districts for
the Tennessee General Assembly be redrawn every ten years according to the federal census to provide for districts of
substantially equal population (as was to be done for congressional districts). Baker's complaint was that Tennessee had
not redistricted since 1901, in response to the 1900 census.
By the time of Baker's lawsuit, the population had shifted such that his district in Shelby County had about ten times as
many residents as some of the rural districts. The votes of rural citizens were overrepresented compared to those of
urban citizens. Baker's argument was that this discrepancy was causing him to fail to receive the "equal protection of the
laws" required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant Joe Carr was sued in his position as Secretary of State for
Tennessee. Carr was not the person who set the district lines – the state legislature had done that – but was sued ex
officio as the person who was ultimately responsible for the conduct of elections in the state and for the publication of
district maps.
The state of Tennessee argued that the composition of legislative districts was essentially a political question, not a
judicial one, as had been held by Colegrove v. Green, a plurality opinion of the Court in which Justice Felix
Frankfurter declared that "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket." Frankfurter believed that relief for legislative
malapportionment had to be won through the political process.

Decision
The decision of Baker v. Carr was one of the most wrenching in the Court's history. The case had to be put over for
reargument because in conference no clear majority emerged for either side of the case. Associate Justice Charles Evans
Whittaker was so torn over the case that he eventually had to recuse himself for health reasons. The arduous decisional
process in Baker is often blamed for Whittaker's subsequent health problems, which forced him to retire from the Court
in 1962.[3]
The opinion was finally handed down in March 1962, nearly a year after it was initially argued. The Court split 6 to 2 in
ruling that Baker's case was justiciable, producing, in addition to the opinion of the Court by Justice William J. Brennan,
three concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions. Brennan reformulated the political question doctrine, identifying
six factors to help in determining which questions were "political" in nature. Cases that are political in nature are marked
by:

1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;" as an

example of this, Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers, arguing that cases involving
such matters would be "political questions"
2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;"
3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;"
4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government;"
5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;"
6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question."
Justice Tom C. Clark switched his vote at the last minute to a concurrence on the substance of Baker's claims, which
would have enabled a majority which could have granted relief for Baker. Instead the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the District Court.
The large majority in this case can in many ways be attributed to Justice Brennan, who convinced Potter Stewart that the
case was a narrow ruling dealing only with the right to challenge the statute. Brennan also talked down Justices Black
and Douglas from their usual absolutist positions to achieve a compromise.

Dissent by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan

Frankfurter, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, dissented vigorously and at length, arguing that the Court had cast
aside history and judicial restraint, and violated the separation of powers between legislatures and Courts.[5] He wrote:
Appellants invoke the right to vote and to have their votes counted. But they are permitted to vote and their votes are
counted. They go to the polls, they cast their ballots, they send their representatives to the state councils. Their
complaint is simply that the representatives are not sufficiently numerous or powerful.
Aftermath

Having declared redistricting issues justiciable in Baker, the court laid out a new test for evaluating such claims. The
Court formulated the famous "one person, one vote" standard under American jurisprudence for legislative redistricting,
holding that each individual had to be weighted equally in legislative apportionment. This affected numerous state
legislatures that had not redistricted congressional districts for decades, despite major population shifts. It also
ultimately affected the composition of state legislative districts as well, which in Alabama and numerous other states
had overrepresented rural districts and underrepresented urban districts with much greater populations.
This principle was formally enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims (1964). The Court decided that in states with bicameral
legislatures, as had Alabama, the state in this suit, both houses had to be apportioned on this standard. This voided the
provision of the Alabama Constitution which had provided for two state senators from each county and similar
provisions elsewhere. (Similarly, the Tennessee Constitution had a provision that prevented counties from being split
and portions of a county being attached to other counties or parts of counties in the creation of a legislative district. This
was overridden under the principle of basing districts on population. Today counties are frequently split among districts
in forming Tennessee State Senate districts.) "One person, one vote" was first applied as a standard
for Congressional districts. State legislatures were supposed to redistrict according to changes in population but many
had not for decades.
Baker v. Carr and subsequent cases fundamentally changed the nature of political representation in the United States,
requiring not just Tennessee but nearly every state to redistrict during the 1960s, often several times. This re-
apportionment increased the political power of urban areas with greater population and reduced the influence of more
rural areas.[6] After he left the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren called the Baker v. Carr line of cases the most important
in his tenure as Chief Justice.

Nixon vs. United States

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993),[1] was a United States Supreme Court decision that determined that the
question of whether the Senate had properly tried an impeachment was a political question and could not be resolved in
the courts.

Background
The Chief Judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Walter Nixon, was convicted
of committing perjury before a grand jury but refused to resign from office even after he had been incarcerated. Nixon
was subsequently impeached by the US House of Representatives, and the matter was referred to the Senate for a vote
on Nixon's removal. The Senate appointed a committee to hear the evidence against Nixon and later report to the body
as a whole. The Senate then heard the report of the committee and voted to remove Nixon from office. Nixon
contended that this did not meet the constitutional requirement of Article I for the case to be "tried by the Senate."

Decision
The majority opinion (the court's decision was unanimous, but four separate opinions were published) held that the
courts may not review the impeachment and trial of a federal officer because the Constitution reserves that function to
a coordinate political branch. Article I. Sec. 3 of the Constitution gave the Senate the "sole power to try all
impeachments." Because of the word "sole" it is clear that the judicial branch was not to be included. Furthermore,
because the word "try" was originally understood to include factfinding committees, there was a textually demonstrable
commitment to give broad discretion to the Senate in impeachments.
Furthermore the Framers believed that representatives of the people should try impeachments, and the Court was too
small to justly try impeachments. Also, the judicial branch is "checked" by impeachments so judicial involvement in
impeachments might violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court further ruled that involving the judiciary would prevent finality without clear remedy and bias post-
impeachment criminal or civil prosecutions, which the Constitution explicitly allows.
Justices White, Blackmun and Souter concurred but voiced concern that the Court was foreclosing the area for review.
While they found that the Senate did all that was constitutionally required, they were concerned that the Court should
have the power to review cases in which the Senate removed an impeached officer summarily without a hearing, or
through some arbitrary process, such as "a coin toss."
An important feature of this case is how it diverges from Powell v. McCormack. In Powell, a grant of discretionary power
to Congress was deemed to be justiciable because it required a mere "interpretation" of the Constitution.