FOC~FlAPCTBEHHbIR I{OMHTET

110 HCJ1OSrlb3OBAHIHO ATOMHOfl 3HEPFHH CCCP

State Commiittee for Using the Atomic Energy of USSR

ABAPHH HA. 'EPHOBMlJlbCKOfl A3C.

H EE IIOCJIE)1•CBHH
THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL AES AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

HH•)opM a1•HR, flo~rOTOBJ~eHxaR AVIR COBe~laHHR

aHcnep~?oB MArAT3
(25--29 aeryc'ra 1986 r. BEHA)

Data prepared for the

International Atomic Energy Agency
Expert Conference
(25-29 August 1986, Vienna)

WORKING DOCUMENT FOR CIIERNOBYL

POST ACCIDENT REVIEW MEETING
HOT FOR PUBLICATION

Anryer
1986Sr.
TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NE-40
AUGUST 17, 1986
 OtTE•S

Introduction

1. Descripticn of the Qhernobyl' ~AES with RPlvK-1000 Reactors

2. Chronology of the Development of the Accident

3. Analysis of the Process of Development of the Accident on a ?'.~t~heatical

Model
4. Causes of the Accident
5. Initial Measures to Increase Nuclear Power Plant Safety with REM Reactors

6. Preventing Development of an, Accident and Reducing Its Consequences

7. ?.n~itoring Radioactive Contamination of the Environmrent and the Health of

the Population
8. Rem dt~ions for Increasing the Safety of Nuclear Power Engineering

9. Developmrent of Nuclear PRm~er Engineering in the USSR

 The information presented here is based on conclusions of the
Governme~nt Cczmmiss ion on the causes of the accident at the fo~urth unit of
the Qhernobyl' Nuclear PowJer Station and was prepared by the following

experts employed by the USSR State Commission Commnittee on the Use of Atanic

Energy:

Abagyan, A. A. Mysenkov, A. I.
Asmlov, V. G. Pavlovskiy, 0. A.

Gus'kova, A. K. Petrov, V. N.
Denin, V. F. Pikalov, V. K.

Ii'in, L. A. Protsenko, A. N.
Izrael', Yu. A. Ryazantsev, Ye. P.
Kalugin, A. K. Sivintsev, Yu. V.
Konviz, V. S. Sukhoruchkin, V. K.
Kuz'znin, I. I. Tokarenko, V. F.

Kuntsevich, A. D. Khirulev, A. A.

Legasov, V. A. Shakh, 0. Ya.

M~aterials obtained fram the following organizations were used in

preparing the information: The 0 V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy,
V

the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Powr Ecpuilz1_nt, the

V. G. Khl.opin Rdiumi Institute, the S.*Ya. Zhuk "Hydrodesign" Institute, the

AUl-Union Scientific Research Institute on Nuclear Power Stations, the

Institute of Biophysics, the Institute of Applied Geophysics, the State.

Committee on Nuclear Energy, the State Committee on hydrcireteorology

 2
Ministry of Health, the State Carinittee on Nuclear Safety, the Ministry of
Defense, the Main Fire Protection Administration of the Ministry of Internal

Affairs and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

 INTRODUCTIO•I

An accident occurred at the fourth unit of the Chiernobyl' Nuclear Power

Station on April 26, 1986, at 1:23 AM with damge to the active zone of the

reactor and part of the butilding in which it was located.

TIhe accident occurred just before stopping of the powerplant for

scheduled maintenance during tasting of the operating imodes of one of the
trbo~gerierators. The powr o~tpuit of the reactor suddenly increased
sharply, which led to damage to the reactor and discharging of part of the
radioactive products accunmulated in the active zone into the atnsphere.

The nuclear reaction in the reactor of the fourth puerplant stopped in

the process of the accident. The fire which broke out was extinguished, and

Soperations were begun for containing and eliminating the consequences of the

accident.

The popalation was evacuated from areas immediately adjacent to the

area of the nuclear power plant and fran a zone with a radius of 30 kmn

around it.

In view of the extr•r character of the accident which occurred at

Cherrobyl', an operations gr~oup headed by Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R.

N. I. Ryzhkov was organized at the Politblxo• of the Oz CPSU (Central

Ca~inittee of the Cammunist Party of the Soviet Union) for coordinating the

activity of ministries and other gouierrxnt departments in eliminating the

consequences of the accident and rendering aid to the population. A

'Goveriet Cariission was fonrme and entrusted with studying the causes of
 2

the accident and carrying ou.t the necessary emergency and reconstruction
me~asures. The necessary scientific,. technical and econaomic capabilities and
resources of the country were provided.

Representatives of MrAGATE were invited to the USSR and given the.

o~portunity to familiarize themselves with the state of affairs at the

Qheznobyl' Nuclear Pc~rplant and measures for overcoming the accident.

They informed the world catuunity about their asses•Tent of the situation.

The goverr~ts of a number of countries, many goverretal, social and

private organizations and individual citizens fram various countries of the

w~rld appealed to various organizations of the USSR with proposals

concerni~ng participation in overcoming the after-effects of the accident.

Somre of these proposals were accepted.

In the thirty years of its development, nuclear power engineering has

occupied an essential place in wo~rldwide p~er production and, on the whole,

has displayed high levels of safety for man and the environmrent. One cannot

imagine the future of the world econamy without nuclear power. However, its
further development ruist be accarpanied by still greater efforts on the part

of science and engineering for ensuring its operational reliability and

safety.

The accident at Chernobyl' was the result of coincidences of several

events of low probability. The Soviet Union draws the proper conclusions

from this accident.

 3
Rejecting nuclear power sources wo~uld require a considerable increase
Sin prcduction and combuastion of organic fuels. This would steadily increase

the risk of hiuman diseases and t~he loss of water-and forests due to the '
continuous passage of harmful chemical substances into the biosphere.

The development of the world' s nuclear power resources brings with it,
in addition to gain in the area of the energy supply and the preservation of

natural resources, dangers of an international character.* These dangers

include transfers of radioactivity across borders, especially in large-scale

radiation accidents, the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons and the

danger of international terrorism, and the specific danger of nuclear

installations under conditions of war. All this dictates the fundame~ntal

necessity of deep international cooperation in the field of develoumnt of

*nuclear power systems and ensuring of their safety.

Such are the realities.

The saturation of the n•dz world with potentially dangerous

industrial processes, in significantly intensifying the effects of military

operations, places the question of the senselessness and unacceptability of

war under modern conditions on a new plane.

In a speech on Soviet television on May 14, M. S.*Gorbachev stated:

'flie indispitable lesson of (2hernobyl' for us lies in the fact that under

conditions of further expansion of the scientific and technical revolution,

questions of the reliability of equipment and its safety and questions on
 4
discipline, order ard organization take on primary importance. The
strictest requirements are needed everywhere.

Furthermo~re, we consider it necessary to nave toward a serious

deepening of cooperation within the framework of the International Agency on

Atomnic Energy."
 CHAPTER 1i. DESCRPTION OF THE CHERNOBYL' NUCL.EAR POWqER ST~ATION
"WITH RBK-1OOO REACTORS

1.1 Design Data

The planned poe of the Qiernobyl's Po• Station (ChAES), was 60140,
and cn January 1, 1986, the power of four units of the AES was 4000140. The

third and fourth units belong to the second phase of the ChAES and to the

second generation of these Nuclear Power Stations (AFS).

1. 2 Description of the Reactor Installation (RU)

of the Fourth Unit of the ChAES

The basic design features of RBMK reactors are as follows:

1) vertical channels with the fuel and the heat-transfer agent, which
penmit local reloading of fuel with a working reactor;

2) fuel in the form of bundles of cylindric fuel elemnts of uraniumt

dioxide in zirconiu~m shell tubes;

3) a graphite mo~derator between channels;

4) a low-boiling heat-transfer medium in the forced circulation

rrcirculation mo~de (KMFTs) with direct feeding of steam to the turbine 0

These design decisions in combination condition all the basic features

of the reactor and the AES, both advantages and shortcomings. The

advantages include: the absence of reactor vessels, which are awkward to

produce on the powerplant maxizmum capacity and on the production base; the

absence of a complex and expensive steam generator; the possibility of

~cntnosreloading of fuel and a good neutron balance; a flexible fuel

cycle, which is easily adapted to variations in the fuel market conditions;

 2

the possibility of nuclear superheating of the steam; high thernodynamnic

reliability of the thermal equipent and viability of the reactor due to the

controlling of the flow rate for each channel separately, uonitoring of the

integrity of the channels, m~nitoring of the parame~ters and radio activity

of the heat-transfer medium of each channel and replacemrent of damaged.

channels while running. The shortcomiings include: the possibility of the

developme~nt of a positive void coefficient of reactivity due to the phase
change in the heat-transfer agent which deten es the transient neuilronic

behavior; high sensitivity of the neutron field to reactivity disturbances

of different kinds, necessitating a complex control system for stabilizing

the distribution of the release of energy in the active zone; complexity of

the inlet-outlet piping system for the heat-transfer agent of each channel;

a large amtount of thermnal energy accu.mulated in the metal structures, fuel

elements and graphite block structure of the reactor; slightly radioactive

steam in the turbine.

The PBMK-1000 reactor with a power of 3200 • (thermal) (Fig. 1) is

equidpped with two identical cooling loops; 840 parallel vertical channels

with heat-releasing assemblies (TVS) are connected to each loopo.

A cooling loop has four mteain parallel circulation pxrps (three working

pumps feeding 7000 t/h of water each with a head of about 1.5 MWa, and one

back-up pump).

Thie water in the channels is heated to boiling and partially

evaporateso The water-steam mitue with an average steam content of 14% by

imass is bled thrcugh the top part of the channel and a water-steam line into

two horizontal. gravity separators. The dry steam (with a mocisture content

less than 0.1%) separated in them passes fram each separator at a pressure
 3

of 7 MPa in two steam lines into two turbines with a poer of 500 F•
• (electrical) each (all eight steam lines of the fou.r separators are jointed

by a commo~n "ring"1 ), and the water, after mixing with steam codeste, is
fed by 12 down pipes into the intake collector of the mrain cooling pumps.

Condensate of the steam exhausted fram the tuirbines is returned by feed

water pumps through separators into the top part of the down pipes, creating

underheating of the water to the saturation temerature at the mrain cooling

pump inlet.

The reactor as a whole is made up of a set of vertical channels with

fuel and the heat-transfer mediumn built into cylindric apertures of graphite

column~s, and top and bottczm protective plates. A light cylindric housing

•(casing) encloses the space of the graphite block structure.

SThe block structure consist of graphite blocks with a sqaecross

section with cylindric apertures along the axis assembled into columnus. The

block structure rests on the bottomi plate, which transmits the weight of the

reactor to a concrete shaft.

About 5% of the reactor power is released in the graphite from slowing

down of neutrons and absorption of gamma quanta°. For reducing the thermal

resistance and preventing graphite oxidation, the block structure is filled

with a slouwly circulating mixture of helium and nitrogen, which serves at

the same time for monitoring the integrity of the channels by mreasuring the

humnidity and temerature of the gas.

There are spaces under the bottom and over the top plates for placing
~hat carrier pipes on routes f rom the separator drums (BS) and distributing

collectors to each channel.

 4

A robot - a loading and unloading machine (RZM) - after remval of the

appropriate section of the plating and after being mroved to the coordinates
of the channel links with its head, balances its pressure with the pressure

of the channel, unseals the channel, removes the burned-cat (fuel elemnts
(TVE) and replaces then with a fresh one, seals the channel, uncouples

itself and transports the irradiated TIVS to a holding tank. I•iile the PZM

is connected to the cavity of the channel ('lK), a small flow of pure water

passes fran it through a thermo~hydraulic seal into the TK, creating a

"barrier" to the penetration of the RZM by hot, radioactive water from the

The system for control and protection (SUZ) of the reactor is based on
movement of 211 solid absorber rods in specially isolated channels cooled

with water of an independent duct. The system provides: automatic

adjustmnt to a specified power level; a rapid reduction of the power level

adjustmnt to by both rods of automatic regulators (AR) and rods of manual

regulators (RR) according to malfunction signals fram the basic equipmnt;

emrgence interruption of the chain reaction by emergency protection (AZ)

rods according to signals of dangerous deviations of the parameters of the

un~it or malfunctions of the equipment; campensation for reactivity

variations in beating up and arergence at p::•r; regulation of the

distributicn of the release of energy over the action zone.

RBMK reactors are equipped with a large number of independent control

systans, which are being moved into the active zone at a rate of 0.4 in/s in

functioning of the AZ.* The low rate of mo~vement of the control systn is
caested for by the large number of systems.
 5
The SUZ includes subsystans for local automatic control (LAR) and local
emrgency protection (IAZ). Both operate according to signals of ionization

chamrbers inside the reactor. The LAR autanatically stabilizes the

fundamental hanrmziics of radial-az~iruithal distribuition of the release of

energy, while the L.AZ provides emrgency protection of the reactor against

exceeding the specified power of channel cartridges in reactor individual

areas. Shortened absorber rods (USP) introduced into the zone fran the
bottom (24 rods) are included for controlling the power fields along "the

height of the reactor.

 6

The RBMK(-1000 reactor includes the follc•_ng basic monitoring and

control systemis in addition to the SUZ:

1) a systen for physical mtonitoring of the field of the release of

energy along the radius (rmore than 100 channels) and the height (12

channels) by means of direct charging pickups;

2) a start-up monitoring system (neutron flux monitors, start-up

fission chambers) ;

3) a systsn for mo~nitoring the water flow rate along each channel with

ball flov~reters;

4) a systen for monitoring the integrity (K03) of the fuel elements

based on ireasuring the short-tine activity of volatile fission products in

water-stea lines (PVK) at the outlet fran each channel; the activity is

detected sequentially in each channel in appropriate optirmum energy ranges

('"windcws") with a photamultiplier, which is mo~ved fram one PVK to another

by a special carriage;

5) a system for monitoring the integrity of the channels (KrsTK) by

nreasuring the humiidity and the tenperature of. the gas flowzing in the

channels.

All the data pass to a cctputer. The information is given out to the

operators in the form of deviation signals, indications (on call) and data

of recorders.
The EB•4-1000 power units operate primarily in a base-load mrode (at

constant power output).

 7

. In view of the great power of the unit, a full autczmatic shut-dow~n of

the reactor occurs only if indicators of the poer level, pressure or water
level in the separator pass beyond acceptable limits, in a case of a general.

oat-off of electric current, disconnection of two turbogeneators or two

main cooling pup at once, a drop in the feedwater flowi rate by a factor of

umre than 2, or full cross-sectioned rupture of the main outlet pipeof

cooling pumps with a diamreter of 900 iram° In other cases of equipment

failures, only an automatic controlled reduction in power (to a level

corresponding to the powr of the equipment which has recai~ned in' operation)

is envisaged.

1.3. Basic Physical Characteristics of the Reactor

The RBMK(-1000 nuclear poe reactor is a heterogeneous thermal channel

reactor, in which uraniumn dioxide weakly enriched in regard to uranitun-235

O isused as fuel, graphite is used as moderator and boiling light water is

used as the heat-transfer medJium. The reactor has the following basic

characteristics:
Thermal power 3200 ?4W

Fuel enrichet 2.0%

Uraniumn mass in a cartridge 114.7 kg

Numiber/diameter of fuel 18/13.6 mm

elements in 'IVS
Depth of fuel burnup 20 MW day/kg

Coefficient of non-uniformity of 1o48

release of energy along the
radius
Coefficient of non-uniformity of 1.4
release of energy along the
he~ight
 8

Calculated maximum power of 3,250 kW

channel.:
Isotopic composition of
unloaded fuel:
uraniwn-235 4.5 kg/t
uraniizn-236 2.4 kg/t
plutonium- 239 2.6 kg/t
plutoniun-24 0 1.8 kg/t
plutonium-24 1 0.5 kg/t
Void reactivity coefficient 2.0 x 10- /vol.% steam
at a working point

Fast power reactivity coefficient -0.5 x10- /Y4

at a working point

Coefficient of epantion fuel

temperatu~re coefficient
Coefficient of expantion graphite 610- /°C
temperatu~re coefficient

Miniu~mi "weight" of rods of StJZ, .*K 10.5%

Effectiveness of rods of RR, AK 7.5%
Effect of replaca~ent (on the average) 0.02%
of the burnup TIVS with fresh

An iirportant physical characteristic from the point of view of control

and safety of the reactor is a value called the operating reactivity irargin.

The operating reactivity margin me~ans the specific number of SUZ rods

plunged into the active zone which are in a region of high differential
efficiency. It is determined by recalculation for fully suhmerged SUZ rods.

The value of the reactivity ma~rgin for PBMK-1000 reactors is generally

accepted as 30 RR rods. In this case, the rate of introduction of a
negative reactivity in functioning of the AZ anrounts to 1 "•"u/s ("c" is the

proportion of delayed neutrons), which is sufficient for cc•estion for

positive reactivity effects.
 The character of the dependence of the effective breeding coefficient
the density of the heat-transfer medium in RBMK reactors is determined to
a great degree hy the presence of absorbers of different kinds in the active

zone. In initial charging of the AZ, which includes abcut 240 boron-
ccitaining additional absorbers (DP), dehydration results in a negative.

reactivity effect.

At the same tire, a snail increase in the steam content at ncrminal

puwer with a reactivity margin of 30 rods results in an increase in

reactivity ( =2.0 x 10- /vol.% steam).

For a boiling water-graphite reactor, the basic parameters which define

its ability to properly operate and safety in the regard to thermal

equipment are: the temrperature of the fuel elemrents, the margin before the

a crisis of heat trans feroccurs, and the graphite temiperature.

A set of ccmuter codes which maikes it possible to conduct opeating

*calculations on station computers for ensuring plant reliability of thermal

equipment of the powrplant in a nmode of continuous reloading of fuel at any

position of the cut-off and control valves at the inlet to each channel has

been developed for RBJ4K reactors. Thus the possibility of determining the

physical parameters of the reactor at variable frequency of the adjustment

of channel flow rates and different control criteria (based on eighter

outlet steam quality or on the margin of the critical power) and also as a

function of the throttling of the active zone is provided.

For defining the fields of the release of energy over the active zone

of a reactor, indications of the physical monitoring system, based on

•m~easurements of the neutron fluw along the radius and height of the active
 10
zone taken inside the reactor, are used. In addition to ind.ications of the
physical mronitoring systen, data characterizing the ca• sition of the
active zone and the energy generation of each TK, the arrangement of the

regulating rods, the distribition of water flow rates along channels of the
active zone and readings of gages of the pressure and temperatuire o f the

heat-transfer medium~ re also entered into the station ccxtm~ter. As a result

of calculations by the PRIZMA program performed periodically by the
comrputer, the operator receives infonrmation on a digital printing device in

the form of a cartogram of the active zone, which indicates the type of

loading of the active zone, the arrangement of regulation rods, the network

of the arrangement of pickups inside the reactor, and the distribution of

power levels, water flow rates, reserves up to critical powers and reserves

up to the mnaxixr~m acceptable thermral loads on the fuel elements in regard to

each fuel channel of the reactor. The station computer also cariputes the
ov'erall thenzal power of the reactor, the distribution of flc• rates of the

steam-water mixture amrong the separators, the integral generation of power,

the steam content at the outlet fram each TK and other paramreters necessary

f or mronitoring and controlling the installation.

 11

Tne experience of operation of active RBM'K reactors indicates that with

Sthe means for monitoring and control* available on these reactors, ma~intain-

irq temperature conditions of the fuel and the graphite and reserves before
a crisis of convective heat transfer at an acceptable level causes no

difficulties.

1.4. Safety Assurance Systn (Figs. 2 and 3)

1. 4.1. Protective Safety Systems

The systen for emergency cooling of the reactor (SAOR) is a protective

safety systemn and is intended for providing elimination of the residual

release of heat by praript feeding of the required amount of water into

reactor channels in accidents accampaiied by disruption of coooling of the

active zone.

Such accidents include: ruptures of large-diarreter KM'~PTs pipelines,

ruptures of steam lin~es, and ruptures of feedwater pipelines.

The system for protection against an excess of pressure in the main

heat carrier duct is intended for providing an acceptable pressure level in

the duct due to removal of steam into a perforated sprayer tank for its

condensation.

The syst~n for protection of the reactor space (RP) is intended for

ensuring that an acceptable pressure is not exceeded in the RP in an

emergency situation with rupture of one operating channel due to removal of

the steam-gas mixture fraom the RP into the screen of steam-gas discharges of

the sprayer tank and then into the sprayer tank with sinuitaneous
I extinguishing of the chain reaction with the AZ facilities. The SAOR and
 12

the system for cooling the reactor space can be used for introducing the•
appropriate neutron absorbers (salts of boron and He).

1.4.2 Localizing Safety Systems

TIhe system for localization of accidents (SIA) realized on the fcurth

unit of the ChAES is intended for localizing radioactive discharges in

accidents with unsealing of any pipelines of the reactor cooling duct except

the PVK pipelines, the top tracts of the operating channels and that part of

the dauwn pipes w~hich is located in the separator drumn compartment, and

pipelines for steam-gas discharges fran the RP.

The imain component of the localization system is a system of airtight

ccxnpartments, including the following campar•rents of the reactor division:

- tightly packed cells arranged symmetrically in relation to the

reactor axis and designed for an excess pressure of 0.45 M~a:

-tr•ts
car of separator group collectors (RGK) and bottam water

lines (NVK); these carat~ ts do not permit an increase in excess pressure

above 0.°08 M~a according to the conditions of strength of components of the

reactor structure and are designed for this value.

Ccra• ts of tightly packed cells and the steam distributor corridor

are connected to the water space of the perforated sprayer condensation

device by steam outlet channels.

The cut-off and sealing armature system is intended for providing

air-tightness of the zone of localization of accidents by cutting off

ommu~nicating lines connecting the sealed and unsealed oca;rtpa•_ntso

 13
The bubbling condensation device is intended for condensation of steam
Sfo~rme:

- in the process of an accident with unsealing of the reactor contour;

- in functioning of the ma~in safety valves ((PK);

- in leaks throuigh the GPK in a normal operating mo~de.

1. 4.3. Security Safety Systems

The AES Power Supply

Electric power users at an ABS are divided into three grouaps, depending

on the requirements placed on the reliability of the pcwer supply:

1) users who cannot permit interruption of the feed for fractions of a

)second up to a few seconds under any conditions, including conditions of a

total disappearance of alternating current voltage from •Drking and back-up

transformrers for system needs, and who require the obligatory presence of a

power supply after functioning of the reactor AZ;

2) users who can accept a poer interruption of tens of seconds up to

tens of minutes under the sane conditions and require the obligatory

presence of a power supply after functioning of the reactor AZ;

3) users who do not require the presence of a powr supply in condi-

tions of a disappearance of voltage fram •Drking and back-up transfor•_rs

for syst~n needs and in a normal nodel of operation of the unit can permit

interruption of the supply for the tine of transfer fram a working to a

back-up transfozrmer for system needs.

 14
1.4.4° Controlling Safety Systess

Controlling safety systemis are intended for autczratic engagement of

devices of protective, localizing and security safety systsns and for

mronitoring of their operation0

10•4.5. The Radiation Mo~nitoring Syst•

The AES radiation mo~nitoring system is a canponent (subsysta~n) of the

AES autumted control systen and is intended for collection, processing and

display of information concerning the radiation situation in capr• ts of

the AES and in the external enviroi~t, the condition of operating

facilities and ducts, and irradiation doses to personnel in accordance with

active norms and legislation.

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 16

The region of the Belorussian-Ukrainian Alluvial Plain as a whole is

characterized by a lcpopulation density (before the beginning of

construction of the Chernobyl:' AES,. the average population density in the

region in question was approx~imately 70 people per kmn).

At the beginning of 1986, the total population in a 30-kilameter zone

around the AES anounted to about 100 thcusand people, of whan 49 thousand

lived in the city of Pripyati, located west of the three-kilareter sanitary-

protection zone of the AES, while 12.5 thousand lived in the regional

center, the city of Chernobyl', located 15 Jun to the southeast of the AES.

1.5.*2. Description of the AES Areas and Its Structures

The first phase of the Chernobyl' AES, ccxriposed of t pwer• units with
RB1K-l000 reactors, was bailt in the period of 1970-1977, and construction

of two power units of a second phase was completed at the sane site by the

,end of 1983,

Construction of another t•D power units with reactors of the same kind

(the third phase of the AES) was begun 1.5 Jun southeast of this site in

1981.

To the southeast of the AES site, right in the valley of the Pripyati
2 ; the pond
R~iver, a wrater cooling pond was bailt with an area of 22 kin

provides cooling of turbine condensers and other heat exchangers of the

first four power units. The nomrmal retaining level of water in the cooling
pond was adopted as 3.5 in below the grading mark of the AES site°
 17

Two high-capacity cooling tmwers (a hydraulic load of 100 thousand mn/h

each), whiich can operate parallel with the cooling pond, are being bu~ilt as

part of the third phase of the AES.

To the west and north of the site of the first and Second phases of the
AES is the area of the construction base and the supply department.

1.5.3. Data or, the N.miber of Personnel at the AES

Site During the Accident

There were 176 duty operating personnel and, also, other workers of

various shops and repair services at the site of the first and second phases

of the Chernobyl' AES on the night of April 25 and 26, 1986.

In addition, 268 construction workers and assemiblers were working on

the night shift at the site of the third phase of the AES.

1.5.*4. Information Aboat the Equipmnt at the Site Which Operated

Together With the Damaged Peactor and Abouit the Equipment

Used in the Process of the Overccoming the Accident

Construction of the Chernobyl' AES is carried out in phases, which each

consist of two power units and have special water purification systers

commocn to the two units and have special water purification systens ocrmmcn
 18
to the two units and auxiliary structures and the industrial site which

- storage for liquid and solid radioactive wastes;

- open distributor devices;
- gas equipmnt;
- back-up diesel generator power plants;
- hydraulic engineering and other structures.

The storage for liquid radioactive wastes, built as part of the second

phase of the AES, is intended for collection and temporary storage of liquid

radioactive wastes arriving in operation of the third and fourth units and

for collection of water fram operational flushing and its recovery for

reprocessing. Liquid radioactive wastes pass from the mrain housing by

pipelines laid on the bottom level of a scaf fold, while the solid
radioactive wastes come to the storage by the top corridor of the scaffold

by electric trucks.

A nitrogen-oxygen station is intended for satisfying the needs of the

third and fourth units of the AES.

The gas equipment is irade up of caipressor, electrolysis, heliwn and

argon tank equipment intede for providing the third and fourth units of

the AES with campressed air, hydrogen, helium and argon. Receivers for

storing nitrogen and hydrogen are located in open areas.

A back-up diesel poer plant (RDES) is an independent emergency source

of electric pcower for systa~is inportant to the safety of each unit. Three

diesel generators with a unit power of 5.5 !4 were installed on each RDES of
the third and fourth units. Intermrediate and base diesel fuel dept, pump f ;
 19
transfers of fuel, and emrgency fuel and oil drainage tanks are included
for ensuring operation of the PDES.

The source of the technical water supply for the third and fourth units

is the cooling pond.

The water of the circulation pump house, which is unified for the third

and fourth units, is fed into a delivery tank, from which it passes by

gravity flow into the turbine condensers.

Separate water i'rks of the third and fourth units are included for

supplying technical water to iimportant users who require an uninterrupted

water supply. A back-up power supply fram diesel generators is available

for these water works.

All four poer units of the first and second phases and auxiliary
systems and industrial area facilities involved with their nrmz~al operation

were working on April 25, 1986.

 20
CHAPTR~ 2. CHRO)NOLOGY OF THE DEVELDP•? OF THE ACCID•I

The Chernobyl' Powerplant No. 4 was put into operation in December,

1983. By the tine of stropping of the plant for a mediumr repair, which was

planned for April 25, 1986, the active zone contained 1659 TVS with an.
average kburnup of 10.*3 14J day/kg, 1 DP and 1 unloaded channel. The main
part of the TVS (75%) were cartridges of the first loading with a burnup of

12-15 •5 day/kg.

Tests of turbogenerator No.* 8 in a runout xtode with the auxiliary

consmmption load only internal needs ware planned just before stopping. The

purpose of these tests was to experime~ntally verify the possibilities for

using mechanical inertia energy of the rotor of a turbogenerator discmn-

nected fram steam supply, in order to generate electricity for auxiliary

nr~tors what may be required if the turbogenerator is disconnected fran an

electric grid. This mo~de is used in one of the subsystems of the high-speed
7:systsn for emrgency cooling of the reactor (SAOR). With the proper order

of perfozrmce of the tests and additional safety measures, the performance

of tests of this kind on a •rking AES was not prohibited.

Such tests had already been performed previously at this station. It

was established at that time that the voltage on the generator busses drops

mach before. the nechanical (inertia) energy of the rotor in running down.

In the tests scheduled for April 25, 1986, the use of a special systan to
c•ntrol regulator of the magnetic field of the generator, which was to have

eliminated this shortcaning, was planned. Hc•ever, the "Working Program of

Tests for Turbogenerator No. 8 of the Chernobyl' AES" in accordance with
 21
which the tests were to have been conducted was not prepared and approved in
the proper way.

The quality of the program proved low; the section on safety measures
included in it was ca•sed purely as a matter of form. (It pointed out
only that in the process of tests, all switching is done with the

authorization of the station shift director; in case of development of an

emergency situation, all personnel nu~st act in accordance with local-

instructions; and just before the beginning of the tests, the test leader -

an electrical engineer, who is not a specialist on reactor installations -

brief s the watch on duty.) In addition to the fact that the programs
essentially included no additional safety measures, it prescribed

disengaging the system for emergency cooling of the reactor. This meant
that throughout the period of the tests, i.e.*, about 4 hours, the safety of
•the reactor appears to have been lowered significantly.

.• On the strength of the fact that the proper attention was not devoted•
to the safety of these tests, the personnel were not ready for them and did

not kniow about the possible dangers. In addition, as one will be able to
see from what follows, personnel deviated from carrying out the program,
thereby creating the conditions for development of an emergency situation.

The personrel started to reduce the power output of the reactor, which

had been operating at naninal parameters, at 1:00 AMIon April 25, and at
1:05 PM turbogenerator No. 7 (TG No. 7) was discneted from the grid at a

reactor therma1 output of 1600 •. The electric powar supply for the
 22

auxiliaries (4 main cooling pumps, 2 feed water piups) was transferred to

the busses of turbogenerator No. 8.

The SAOR was disengaged fran the KMTs at 2:00 PM in accordance with

the test program. However, taking the unit cut of operation was delayed
according to a request from the dispatcher centre. Operation of the plant

continued at this timre with a disengaged SAOR in violation of the

regulations.

The turbogerierator was continued at 11:10 PM. In accordance with the

test program, "the runout of the generator with a load of the plant

auxiliaries was to be conducted at a reactor power of 700-1000 M' (thermal).

Ikcwever, with disengagement of the LAR (Local automatic control) system,
which was necessary for operation of the reactor at a low power cutpmit, the

operator was not able to eliminate the imbialance of the mreasurement part of

the AR (autaratic regulator) which developed quickly enough. As a result,

the power dropped to a level below 30 Y, (thermal). Only by 1:00 AM on

April 26, 1986, did the personnel manage to stabilize it at a level of 200

MW (thermal). In connection with the fact that "contamination" of the

reactor continued during this period, further raising of the power was
rendered difficult due to the small operating reactivity margin, which was

substantially below the required level by this nument.

Nevertheless, it was decided to perfonn the tests. At 1:03 and 1:07

AM, tw• more main coding pnrps, one f ran each side were engaged in addition
to the six pumps which had been operating, so that after the end of the

experirent, in which focur pumps were to operate to support the runout mo~de
 23

.of operation, four purps w•ld remain in the forced circulation loop (1TPT)
reliable cooling -of the active zone..

Since the reactor powr and, consequently, the hydraulic resistance of

the ai~ive zone and the KM'rs were substantially below the planned level and

all the eight pumps were in operation, the total flow rate through the
reactor increased to (56-58) x 10 m/h and the rate in regard to an

Individual pump increased to 8000 rn3 /h, which is a violation of the

operating regulations. Such a mode of operation is prohibited due to danger

of interruption of the pump operation and the possibility of development of

vibrations of the mrain feed water lines as a result of cavitation.

SConnection of the additional pumps and the increase in the water flow rate

through the reactor caused by this resulted in a decrease in steam

.other
generation a drop in the steam pressure in the separators and changes in
parameters of the reactor.* The operators tried to maintain the

following basic reactor paramreters manually: the steam pressure and the
*water level in the separators howver, they were not able to accaiplish this

fully. Dips in stea pressure by 0.5-0.6 MdPa and dips in the water level

below the emergency poi.nt were observed in the separators during this

period. In order to avoid shutdown of the reactor under such conditions,

personnel blocked the emergency protection signals in regard to these

pa~raxeters.

Meanwhile the reactivity of the reactor continued to drop slowly. At

1:22:30 AM, the operator notice on the printout of the program for quick
evaluation of the reactivity margin reserve that the operating reactivity
 24

mairgin was at a value requiring shutd~mn of the reactor. Nevertheless, thi-s

did rnot stcp the pesneand the tests began.

At 1:23:04, the shuitdown control valves (SRK) of turbcgenerator No. 8

%•re closed. The reactor continued operating at a po• of about 200 *W

(thermal). The available emrgency protection for closing the SRK of the
two turbogenerators No. 7 had been disengaged during the afternoon of April

25, 1986) was blocked in order to have the possibility of repeating the
test, if the first attemt proved unsuccessful. Thus another departure had

been made from the testing program, which did not envisage blocking the

emrgency protection of the reactor with respect to disengagement of twD

turbogenerators.

A slow increase in power began some time~ after beginning of the test.

S At 1:23:40 the shift manager of the; plant gave the command to press

pishbatton AZ-5, on a signal fran which all control rods and energency
protection rods are inserted into the active zone.* Tne rods went dron,

although impacts were heard, and the operator saw that the absorber rods

stopped without reaching the bottomi ends.* Then he cut off the servodrive
coupli~ngs, so that the rods fell into the active• zone by their own weight.

According to the evidence of witnesses who ware outside the fourth

plant, two explosions were heard, one after another, at 1:24; some kind of

bot fragments and sparks flew up above the fourth plant, some of which fell

on the roof of the turbogenerator roan and started a fire.

 25
CHAPTrER 3. ANALYSIS OF THE PROJCESS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

The "Skcala" cent~ralized monitoring system (STsK) of the RBIK-1O0O

reactor includes a program for diagnostic recording of paramreters (DREG),
according to which several hundred analog and discrete paramreters are

examined and stored periodically with a specified cycle (the mininumi cycle

timre is 1 s).

In connection with performance of the tests, only those paramreters

which were imp~ortant frum the point of view of analysis of the results of
the tests being perfonrme were recorded with high frequency. Therefore,
reconstruction of the process of development of the accident was performred

by calculation on a mathematical model of the power unit with the use not

only of printouts of the DREG program but also of readings of instruments

and the results of questioning of personnel.

An integral mathemtical model of a .power unit with an RBMK-1000

reactor, realized by crm.iter in real time, was used for providing

accelerated analysis of variations and versions of the eiergency situation

in question. Dependences of reactance on the steam content and inovreent of

the absorber rods were defined according to results of calculations on

distribu.ted, including three-dinensional, neutron-physics nodels.

In calculation reconstruction of the process of develoriment of the

accident, it was extremely inportant to make sure that the mathemtical

 26

mo~del of the power unit accurately describes the behavior of the reactor
and the other equ~ipment and systsns under. just those conditions making up

the situation just before

the breakdowvn. As already mentioned in the previous section, the reactor

was operating in an unstable manner after 1:00 AM on April 26, 1986, and
the operators were introducing "disturbances" into the control object

practically continuously for stabilizing its parameters, This made it

possible to caipare actual data recorded with adequate reliability by

recording devices to data optained in nu~merical sinulation for quite a

large time interval under various effects on the reactor installation. The
camparison results proved quite satisfactory, which attests to the adequacy

of the mnathematical model and the real object.

In order to present the effect of prehistory on the character of

development of the accident more clearly, we shall analyze the calculation

data beginning fran 1:19:00 AM, i.e., 4 minutes before the beginning of the
test with rundown of the TB (Fig. 4.o). This moment is convenient in that

the operator began one of the operations for replenishment of the separator
dnrums (the second since 1:00), which introduced strong disturbances into

the regulation object. At this Imgment, the DREG program recorded the

positions of rods of all three AR; i.e., the initial conditions for the

calcutlation were clearly recorded.

The operator began replenishment of the separator drums to avoid

allowing a dip in the water level in then. He succeeded in maintaining the
level in 30 s, having increased the flow rate of feedwater by a factor of
more than 3.* The operator apparently decided not only to maintain'the
water level but to raise it.* Therefore, he continued increasing the water
 27

.flowrate, and it exceeded the original fl1w rate by a factor of 4 in just

alout a minu.fte.

As soon as colder water fran the separating dnrums reached the active
zcne, steam generation decreased noticeably, causing a decrease in the
volumretric steam content, which resulted in mzuvement of all the AR rods

u~rard. In about 30 s they ererged at the top ends, and the operator was

forced to "help" them with manual control rods, thereby reducing the

operating reactance reserve. (This operation was not recorded in the

operation log, b.1t it w•i~td have been imp~ossible to maintain powr at a

level of 200 • withc~t it.) The operator, having mxuved the manual rods

up, achieved recampensation, and one of the groups of AR rods was l•_red
by 1.8 in.
* The decrease in steam generation led to a sr~all pressure decrease.

After about a minute, at 1:19:58, a high-speed reduction device (B1RU-K),

through which steam surpluses were released into the condenser, was closed.

This promoted saTe decrease in the rate at which the pressure was dropping.

However, the pressure continued to drop slowly up to the beginning of the

test.* It changed by more than 0.5 M~a during this period.

A printout of the actual fields of releases of energy and the

positions of all the regulation rods was obtained on the "Skala" STsK at

1:22:30. An attex• has been made at "tying together" the calculated and

recorded neutron fields by just this mmrnt.

. The overall characteristics of the neutron field at this ntzment r

as follows: it was practically arched in a radialazinuthal direction and

druble-peaked, on the average, in regard to height, with a higher release

 28

of energy in the top section of the -active zone. Such a field distribution
is

quite natural for the situation of the reactor: a depleted active zone,
almo~st all the regulation rods up, a volumretric steam content significantly

higher in the top part of the active zone than at the bottom, contamuination
'3;
with Xe higher in the central parts of the reactor than in the peripheral

parts.

The reactance reserve amouanted to a total of rods at 1:22:30.

%Thisvalue was at lease two time lower than the mnin/mumm acceptable reserve

established by technical operating regulations. The reactor was in an

unusual, nonregulation condition, and for evaluating the subsequent
developmrent of events, it w-as extremely inportant to determine the

differential efficiency of rods for regulation and emergency protection in

real neutron fields and the fission characteristics of the active zone.
Numerical analysis indicated high sensitivity of the error in determining

the efficiency of the regulation rods to the error in reconstruction of the

vertical field of releases of energy. If one takes into account in

addition that at such lcow p• levels (about 6-7%), the relative field

m~easurement error is substantially higher than under nominal conditions,

the need for analyzing an extremely large number of calculation versions to

ascertain the reliability or inaccuracy of some version becames clear.

The reactor paramreters were closest to stable for the time period in
question by 1:23, and the tests began. A minute before this, the cperator
sharply reduced the feedwater flow rate, which occasioned an increase in

the water temperature at the inlet to the reactor with a delay eqal to the
 29

W~in~of passage of the heat-transfer mediumi fran the separator drums to the
reactor.

At 1:23:04 the operator closed the SRK of TG No. 8 and began rundmwn of the

turbogenerator. Due to the decrease in the flc• rate of steam from the

separator drums, its pressure began to increase slightly (at a rate of 6

kcPa/ s, on the average). The total water flow rate through the reactor

began to drop due to the fact that four of the eight GTsN were working off

the turbogenerator wh~ich was "running down."

The increase in the steam pressure, on the one hand, and the decrease

in the water flawj rate through the reactor and also in the feedwater supply

to the separator drums, on the other, are competing factors which det~erne
the volume~tric steam Content and, consequently, the pow~er of the reactor,

•It should be emhasized in particular that in the condition at which the

reactor arrived, a small change in the power results in a situation where

the volumetric steam content, which directly influences reactance, increase

many tines more sharply than at nominal power. The comipetition of these

factors led in the final analysis to a powr increase. Just this situation

could be the cause for pressing button AZ-5.

Pushbutton AZ-5 was pressed at 1:23:40. Insertion of energency

protection rods began. By this time, the AR rods, in partially

catpensating for the previous increase in powar, were already located in

the bottan part of the active zone, while the work of personnel with an

I unacceptably low~ operating reactance reserve resulted in a situation where

atial all the other absorber rods were located in the top section of

the active zone.

 30
Under the conditions which, had been created, the disruptions permitted

by the personnel resulted in a significant decrease in

the efficiency of the emergency protection. The total positive reactance

developing in the active zone began to increase. After 3 s the puwer
eceeded 530 •, and the runaway period came to be nuich less than 20 s.
'The positive steam effect of reactance prairted deterioration of the

situation. Only the Doppler effect partially ccrested for the reactance

introduced at this time.

The continuing decrease in the water fl• rate through the operating

channels of the reactor under conditions of an increase in puwer led to

intense steam forma~tion and then to a crises of convective heat transfer,

heating up of th•e fuel, its disintegration, rapid boiling of the heat~-

transfer agent, into which particles of disintegrated fuel were falling, a

sharp increase in pressure in the operating channels, rupture of the

channels and a thermal explosion, which destroyed the reactor and part of

the structural components of the building and led to the release of active

fission products into the environment.

Disintegration of the fuel was simuilated in the mathematical mrodel by

a sharp increase in the effective heat-transfer surface area, where the

specific release of energy in the fuel exceeded 300 cal/g. At just this

tine, the pressure in the active zone increased to the extent that a sharp
deraein the water flow rate fran the G~sN occurred (the check valves
closed). This can be seen clearly both fram results obtained on the

mathemtical model and fran measurement results recorded by the DREG

prcgram. Rupture of the operating channels alone led to partial
 31

.them
reconstruction of the flow rates from-the GTsN, althouigh water passed from

into the reactor

space as well as into the surviving channels.

The steam formation and the sharp temperature increase in the active

zone created the conditions for steam-zirconiumn and other exthermnic

chemical reactions. Witnesses observed their appearance in the form of

fireDrks of flying hot and gl~ing fragments.

A mixture of gases containing hydrogen and carbon monoxide capable of

thexrma! expl.osion in mixing with air oxygen was formed as a result of these
reactions. This mixing could occur after unsealing of °the reactor space.
 32
CHAPTER 4. CAUSES OF THE A•CID•T

As the analysis presented above demonstrated, the accident at the

fouirth unit of the ChAES belongs to the class of accidents involved with

introduction of excess reactance. The design of the reaction installation

included protection against accidents of this type with consideration for

the physical features of the reactor, including the positive steam

coefficient of reactance.

The technical protection facilities include systems for control and

protection of the reactor against a power excess and a decrease in the

runaway period, blocking and. protection against mralfunctions or switching

~of the equipment and systems of the power unit, and a systen for emergency

•ooling of the reactor.

Strict rules and an order for conducting the operating process at the

AE, defined by power unit operating regulations, were also inclnded in

addition to the technical protection facilities. Requiremnts concerning

the unacceptability of a decrease in the operating reactance reserve below

30 rods are amo~ng the nost rules.

In the process of preparing for and conducting tests of a

turbogenerator in a rundown mo~de with a load of syst•n auxiliaries of the

unit, the personnel disengaged a number of technical protection devices and

violated the ixrportant conditions of the operating regulations in the

section of safe perfonimance of the operating process.

'fle table presents a list of the xmost dangeruus violations of

operating conditions ccmnnitted by personnel of the fourth unit of the

ChAE.
 33

Results
No. Violation
1 Decrease in the Attempt to gat cut Emergency protection
operareactance of "iodine pit" of reactor proved
reserve ineffective
significantly below
the acceptable value

2 Power dip below Operator error in Reactor proved to be

value envisaged by disengagement of LAR in hard-to-control
testing program state
3 Connection of all Fulfilluent of T•perature of heat-
GTsN to reactor with requi~reents of transfer mnedium of
exceeding of flow; testing program KMPTs camne close to
rates established by saturation
regulations in temperature
regard to ind.ividual
GrsN
4 B locking of reactor Intention to repeat L~oss of possibility
• . protection on signal experimnt with of automnatic
for shutdow~n of two disengagement of TG shutd~n of reactor
TG if necessary
5 Blocking of Attemt to conduct Protection of
protection in regard tests despite reactor in regard to
to water level and unstable operation thermal paramreters
steam pressure in of reactor was disengaged
separator drwn
....6 Disengagement of Atterpt to avoid Loss of possibility
syst~n for false response of of reducing scale of
protection against SAOR during accident
znxzuitheoretical perforuance of
failure testing
(diserngage•nt of"
SAOR)

The basic motive in the behavior of the personnel was the attempt to
ccznplete the tests more quickly. Violation of the established order in

preparation for and performance of the tests, violation of the testing

program, itself and carelessness in control of the reactor installation

attest to inadeguate understanding on the part of the personnel of the

 34

features of accarplishitent of operating processes in a nuclear reactor and

to their loss of a sense~ of the danger.

The developers of the reactor installation did not envisage the

creation of protective safety systems capable of preventing an

accident in the presence of the set of premeditated diversions of technical

protection facilities and violations of operating regulations which

occurred, since they considered such a set of events inpossible.

An exrrly inprobable cumbination of procedure violations and

operating conditions tolerated by personnel of the power unit thus was the

original cause of the accident.

The accident took on catastrophic dixrens ions in connection with the

fact that the reactor was brought by the personnel to a condition so

contrary to regulations that the effect of a positive reactance coefficient

on the power buaild-up was intensified significantly.

 35

A decision has been made to reset terminal breakers of control rods on

working nuclear power plants with RBMK reactors such that in the outermost

position all rods are inserted into the core to a depth of 1.2 m. This
mreasure increases the response efficiency of protection and precludes the
possibility of the multiplication properties of the core fram increa~ing in

its lower part when the rod mo~ves fram the upper end piece. At the samre

timre a numnber of absorber rods constantly in the core increases to 70 - 80;

this reduces the steam void effect of reactivity to an allowable value.

This is a temporary mreasure and in the future it will be replaced by

converting RBM reactors to fuel with initial enrichment 2.4% and placing
additional absorbers in the core which ensure that positive coastdcn of

•reactivity nct exceed mrore than one beta for any change in coolant density.

A numnber of additional signallers of the cavitation reserve of reactor

coolant pumps and an automatic system for comiputing reactivity, reserve with

output of an emergency reactor shutdown signal when the reserve drops below
a given level are being installed. These mreasures have a somewhat adverse

effect on economtic irdicators of nuclear power plants with PBMK(, bat

guarantee the necessary safety."

In addition to technical ireasures organizational ones to strengthen

plant discipline and increase operating quality are being inplemented.
 36
6.* PP•VIING DEVE.OPMT%OF AN ACIDEN AND REDUCING ITS COS•tJC

6.1 Fire Fighting on a Nuclear Powter Plant

Tne primary task after a reactor accident was to control the fire a

As a result of explosions in the reactor an ejection of core fragments

heated to high temerature onto the rooves of certain buiildings of reactor

section services, the deaerator, stack and turbine roan more than 30 fires

were started. Due to damage to individual oil lines, short circuits in

electrical cables and intense thermal radiation fran the reactor fire foci

were formed in the turbine roan above TG No. 7) in the reactor roan and the

partially destroyed ca•a~ ts adjacent to it.

At one hour 30 minutes, fire fighting units for nuclear pcwer plant

protection fran the cities of Pripyat' and Chernobyl. arrived.

Due to the direct threat of the fire spreading over the cover of the

turbine roan to the adjacent third unit and its rapid intensification,

primary mreasures were directed at eliminating the fire in this sector.

Fires arising within ccaarztrents were fought using fire extinguishers and

inside stationary fire cranes. By 2 hours 10 minutes xiost of the fires had

been p.it c~t on the roof of the turbine roan and by 2 hou~rs 30 minutes on

the roof of the reactor building. By 0500 the fire had been pat out.

6.2 Estimating fuel condition after the accident

 37
Th¶e accident led to partial destruction of the reactor core and
ccztplete destruction of its cooling system. Und5er these conditions, the

state of the environment in: the reactor shaft was determined by the

following processes:

- residual heat release of the fuel due to decay of fission products

- beat release due to different chenical reactions taking place "in the
reactor shaft (hydrogen ccbition, graphite and zirconium oxidation, etc.);

- heat discharge fron the reactor shaft due to its cooling by flcaws of
atiospheric air through holes formed in sealed (before the accident) shells

su~rroundi~ng the core.

S To solve the problen of preventing accident development and linmiting

its consequences, during the first hours after the accident major efforts

were devoted to estimating the fuel state and its possible change as time
passed. To do this, the folluwing analyses had to be done:

- estimate possible scales of melting (due to residual heat release) of

fuel in the reactor shaft;

- study processes of the interaction of molten fuel with reactor

structural materials and reactor shaft materials (metals, concrete and so

forth);
 38

- estimate the possibility of imelting of construction materials of the

reactor and the shaft due to heat release from the fuel.

Initially cumputations were done to estimate fuel state in the reactor

shaft with allowance for leakage Df fission products (PD) depending on tn

since the accident began.

Study of the dynamics of PD discharge fram the reactor during the first

few days after the accident she that the fuel terperature change as tine

passed was nonumonotonic. It can be assumed that there were several stages

in the temperature mode of the fuel. The fuel heated up at the instant of

explosion. Temperature estimation fran the amount of relative leakage

(fraction of the isotope discharging fran the fuel fran its total content in

the fuel at a given point in tine) of iodine radionuclides she that the

effective tesperature of the fuel remaining in the reactor building after

the explosion was 1600 - 1800 K. During the next several dozen minutes,
fuel temiperature dropped due to release of heat to the graphite 'structure

ad reactor structures. This led to a drop in leakage of volatile PD fran

the fuel.

Here it was considered that the amount of PD discharge fran the reactor

shaft was determined during this time mainly by processes of graphite

conbustion and associated processes of migration of finely dispersed fuel

and PD introduced into the graphite by the accident explosion in the

reactor. Subsequently, the teiperature of the fuel due to residual heat

release began to rise.• As a result, leakage of volatile radionuclides

(inert gases, iodine, tellurium, cesium) fran the fuel increased. With the
 39
subsequent temperature increase of the fuel leakage of other so-called
r~nnvolatile radionuclides began. By 4 - 5 May, the effective temperature of

the fuel r~nining in the reactor unit stabilized and then began to drop.

The results of theoretical analyses of fuel state a-re sh• in Fig. 5

which lists results which characterize residual radionuclide content in the

fuel and also the temperature change of the fuel with allowance for leakage

of PD fram it depending on the time~since the accident began.

Cariputations soe

- maximrum fuel temperature cannot reach its mrelting point;

- the PD &rerges onto the fuel circuits in batches; ,this can lead only

to local heatup on the fuel-envirorment bo~undary.

The PD escaping fran the fuel fall on structural and other materials

surroundina the reactor in the reactor unit according to condensation and

precipitation temeratures of the fuel. Here radionuclides of kxyto and

zenon escape fram the reactors unit almo~st comipletely, the volatile PD

(iodine, cesiumi) to sarae extent and the others remain almost entirely within

the reactor building.

Thus the energy of the PD is dissipated throughout the volume of the

reactor unit.
 40
As the result of these factors mielting of the medium surrounding the
fuel and fuel mrovement beccame of i• "probability.•

6 .3. Limuiting the Accident Consequences in the Reactor Core

Thie potential of concentrating part of the molten fuel and establishing

conditions for fo~nation of critical mass and a self-containing chain

reaction required measures against this danger. In addition, the destroyed

reactor was a source of emissions of a large amount of radioactivity into

the enviroritent.

Inuediately after the accident, an attempt was made to redace the

temerature in the reactor shaft and prevent canbustion of the graphite

structure using emergency and auxiliarxy feedwater pumps to supply water to

the core space. This attempt was unsuccessful.

Immediately one of tio decisions had to be made:

- Localize the focus of the accident by filling the reactor shaft with

heat discharging and filtering materials;

- Allow cambustion processes in the reactor shaft to end naturally.

The first option was taken since in the second the danger of
radioactive damage to considerable areas with the threat to the health of
the popul~ations of large cities arose.
 41
A grouip of specialists in military helicopters began to drop boron
ccrp•~d, dolcimite,. sand, clay and lead onto the damiaged reactor.* Fram ..

27 April to 10 May aln~st 5000 tons of materials were dropped, most fram

28 April through 2 May. As a result, the reactor shaft was covered by a

layer of loose mass which intensely absorbed aerosol particles. By 6 May,

the discharge of radioactivity" ceased to be a major factor, having dropped

to several hundred and by the end of the mronth dozens of curies per hour.

At the sane timre,• the problem of reducing fuel heatup was solved. To reduce

temperature and oxygen concentration nitrogen fran a compressor station was

sent into the space under the reactor shaft.

By 6 May, the temperature increase in the reactor shaft stopped and

began to drop due to formtion of a stable convective .air flow through the
core into the free atmosphere. As insurance against extremely inprobable

(but possible during the first few days after the accident) failure of the

lower tier of structures, it was decided to immediately establish an

artificial heat discharge horizon under the building foundation in the fonn

of a flat heat exchanger on a concrete slab. By the end of June the planned

wo~rk was finished.

Experience shuwed that the decisions made were primarily the right

onles.

Fram early May the situation had largely stabilized. Destroyed parts
of the reactor building were in stable positions. The radiation situation

following decay of the short lived isotopes inproved. The exposure rate was
single roentgens per hour in carqatrents under the reactor, in the turbine
' roan and control panel cauipaxrtents. Escape of radioactivity franthe unit
 42
into the atmosph1ere was due mainly to wind entrainmrent of aerosols. The
radioactivity of the releases did not exceed dozens of curies per day.

Tenperature conitions in the reactor shaft were stable.* Maxinmum

temperatures of various sections were several hundred degrees C with a
steady trend tmwards drop~ping at a rate of roughly 005 degrees C per day.

The lower slab of the reactor shaft had been preserved and fuel was
localized mainly (roughly 96%) in the reactor shaft an in coipartients of
steam water and lcwer steam service lines.

6.4 Measures at First-Third Blocks.

The following mreasures were taken on the first - third blocks after the
accident on the fourth block:.

- The first and second blocks were shut dc~n at 0113 hours and 0213
hours on 27 April;

- The third block which was closely connected to the damaeged fourth
block but hardly suffered at all from the explosion was shut down at 0500

hou~rs on 26 April;

- First - third blocks were prepared for prolonged cold shutdown;

- The nuclear power plant equipment following the accident was shifted
into the cold reserve state.

The first - third blocks and power plant equipmrent ware checked by on-
duty personnel.
 43
Considerable radioactiave contamination of equipment and carar~ ts
of the first-third pcwer plant blocks was caused by entry of radioactive

substances thorugh the ventilation system which continued to operate for

scxme tine after the accident.

Individual sections of the turbine roan had major radiation levis since
it was contaminated through the destroyed roof of. the third block.

A govermet ccxtmittee was assigned to organize decontamination and

other operations on the first - third units. The objective was to prepare
the units for startup and operation.

Decontamination was done using special solutions. Their composition

was selected with allowiance for the material to be washed (plastic

ccxicud, steel, concrete, various coatings), the nature and level of

Ssurface contamination.

After decontamination, gairma radiation levels dropped by a factor of

10-15. Padiation dose rate for ca•a~ ts of the first and second units

in June was 2-10 xzR/hr.

Final decontamination and stabilization of the radiation situation on

the first - third units can be ensured only after completing decontamination

on the nuclear p•e plant grounds and mothballing the damaged unit.

6.*5 Monitoring and Diagnostics of the Condition of the Damaged Unit.

Diagnostic mreasurements made it possible to solve the foUloing main

problems:

- establish reliable mo~nitoring of fuel movement;

 44

- determine contamination scales on terrain adjacent to the power

plant;

- estimate scales of damage arnd carry out dosimetry within the unit,
determine the potential for working in undamaged carmpa~rtments;l

- determine distribution of fuel, fission products and others to

generate raw data for design of mothballing facilities.

Among primary mreasuremnts mo~nitoring of reactor state fran the air was

set up together with estimations of the radiation situation on the plant and

around it. Radiation mreasuremnts, photographs of the damaged reactor

b.2ilding and its canponents in infrared radiation were done fran helicopters

and the chemical canposition of gases discharged from the reactor shaft was
analyzed; a numnber of other measurements were also taken. After it was

established t~hat canpartments and equipmnt had survived in the lowr part

of the reactor building, it became possible to take initial measurements and

install emrgency monitoring instruments. First mreasuring instnruents to

mreasure neutron flux, ganmr radiation dose rt, temperature arid thermal

flow were set up in the drained pressure suppression pool. Temperature

mleasuring equipment was set up oh a redundant basis. Evaluation of the

situation in the pressure suppression pool showed the absence of any

immediate danger of structures melting through. This confirned the safe

conditions for work to establish a l•_r protective slab.

The overall neasurarnt strategy was as follows:

- Dosimetric arid visual reconnaissance within the damaged unit;

 45
- Radiametric and visual observation fram helicopters;
-Measurement of the most jirportant parameters (radioactivity,

temperature, air flow~) in surviving structures and accessible ccxrpartm-nts.

Primary mreasurement efforts at the initial stage were directed at*

checking possible movement of fuel downward.

Solution of diagnostic problemns becamie complicated for the following

reasons:

- The regular measurement syst~n had campletely failed;

- Readings fran sensors which may have survived were not accessible to

personnel;

- Information on the state of caompaxrtents and the radiation situation

• in them a limited.

At the next stage locations of fuel discharge fran the reactor shaft in

the building had to be determined and its temperature and heat cutpit

conditions estimated.

To solve this problen, traditional dosixretric mrethods were used, and

surviving pipelines for delivering rreasurerent probes were opened. As a

result, fuel distribution within the building was largely established.

Th temperature in canpartrents under the reactor did not exceed 45

deg~rees C beginning in June; this indicated good heat output.

?.~nitoring and diagnostic methods were refined with a~llowance for this

k information.
 46
6.6 Decontamination of the Nuclear Power Plant Site

During the accident radioactive materials were discharged over the

plant grounds and fell onto the roof of the turbine roan the roof of the
third unit, and metal pipe supports.

The groutnds of the plant, walls, and rooves of the buildings had

considerable contamination due to precipitation of radioactive aerosols and

radioacative dust. Contamination of the ground was non-uniform.

To reduce dispersion of radioactive dust on the grounds, roof of the

turbine roam building and shoulders of roads were treated with different

polymrerizing solutions to stabilize upper soil layers• and preclnde dust

formation.

To establish conditions for comprehensive decontamination operations,

the grounds of the nuclear power plant were divided into individual zones.

Decontamination in each zone was done as follows:

- removal. of trash and contaminated equipment fran the grounds;

- decontamination of rooves and outside building surfaces;

-remval of 5-10 an of soil and hauling it in containers to the solid

waste storage pit of the fifth unit;

- placement of concrete slabs on the ground, if necessary, or clean

soil;

- covering slabs and unconcreted grounds with fil forming c ounxdso

 S47
As a result of corpleted measures, the total gawrma background in the.
area of the first unit was reduced to 20-30 nmR/hr. This: residual background

was due mainly to external sources (damnaged unit). This indicates the
relative efficiency of decontamination of grounds and buildings.

607 Lo~ng Tenn Mothballing of the Fourth Unit

Mothballing of the fourth unit should ensure normal radiation

situations on the surrounding territory and in the air as well as prevent

escape of radioactivity into the envi~rorment.

 48
To mothbal1 the unit the folloin'g structures shcould be erected.

(Figs. 6 - 8):

- outside protective walls along the perimeter;

- inside concrete dividers in the turbine roan between the third and

the fourth units, in unit "V" (Cyrillic alphabetical equivale~nt our

"C") , and in the deaerator along the turbine roan and on the side

of the barrier near the tank "SAOR";

ietal divider in the turbine roan betwen the second and third
m

ounits;

- protective cover over the turbine roan, and in addition the central
ball and other reactor carparbrents should be sealed, the -barrier

near the tank "SAOR" and compartments of the northern GTsN for

mothballing the barrier concreted, and protection established

against radiation on the reactor unit side0

The thickness of the protective concrete walls is 1 m and greater

depending on designs and the radiation situation.

'flere are two versions in the ventilation outline:

-open configuration with air purification using aerosol filters and

discharge into the atnosphere through the existing pipe of the

ventilation center ;
 49
- Closed configuration with heat discharge in a heat exchanger
loc~ated in the upper part of the vented volumre, while mra~intaining a

partial vacuum in the bu~ilding volumre which is ensured by exhaust

of air from the upper part of the volurre and its discharge through

filters and pipe into the atmosphere.

The aforemntioned operations are carried out as follows.

1. On the grouLnds adjacent to the unit the surface layer of soilis removed

on local sections using a special technique.

2. The grounds are concreted with the surface leveled; this allows self-
propelled cranes and other equipment to nove easily.

•3. The rooves and walls of the building are decontaminated.

Special polymer adhesive pastes of varied compositions are used in

areas with high radiation.

4. After the site is cleaned up and concreted mretal franes of protective

walls are installed and subsequently concreted.

5. As walls are erected work is done to set up the main structures which

ensure canplete mothballing the the fourth unit.

6.8. Decontamination of the 30-km zone

land returning it to econamic activity
 50
Major radioactive contamination of areas adjacent to the nuclear power
plant made it necessary to make a number of extrem decisions regarding .the

establistment of controlled zones, evacuation of population, prohibition or

limitation on agricultural use of soil and so forth.

A decision was made to introduce three controlled zones: special, 10

and 30 kin. Strict dosimretric monitoring of transport was set up and

-decontamination points deployed in them. On zone boundaries the %orkers

were transported fran one mode of transport to others to reduce transfer of

radioactive substances.

The radiation situation within the 30-km zone will continue to change,

especially in regions with a high gradient of contamination levels.

Radionuclides will be dramatically redistributed over landscape elements

according to relief characteristics. The question of re-evacuation of

population can be posed only after the radiation situation has stabilized

'over the entire territory of the contaminated zone: burial of the fourth

block, decontamination of the nuclear power plant site, and stabilization

of radioactivity in areas with elevated contamination level.

Beginning in June a complex of hydraulic facilities began to be built

to protect ground water and surface water in the vicinity of the Qhernobyl

plant fran, contamination, including:

- antifiltration wall in the soil along the partial perimeter of the

nuclear power plant site and drawdown "flls;

- curtain of the coolant pond;

-cutoff drainage curtain on the right bank of the Pripyat' ;

 51
- intercepting drainage curtain in. the southwestern sector of the
~nuclear powJer plant;

- drainage water purification facilities.

By this time, based on carpleted estimates of the situation with

regard to contamination of the soil-vegetative cover of the 30-]in zone,

special agritechnical and decontamination measures were developed 'and

iirplemented which made it possible to return the contaminated earth to"

agrocultural use. These rreasures included: changing the traditional

methods of working the soil in this region, use of special catpositions to

suppress dust formation, changing methods of harvesting and handling the

harvest and so forth.

7.?bioigradioactive contamination of the

cenvironmrent and the health of the poptalation

7.1. Estimating amcunt, coaposition and dynamics of fission product

release fran the damged reactor.

The following results were used as raw data for this estimate:

-systemnatic studies of radionuclide coaposition of aerosol sanples

collected above the damaged power plant unit fran 26 April 1986;

-aerogatmaphotography of the nuclear puwer plant region;

- analysis of precipitation sazrples;

 52
- systematic data from national i•ather station measurements.

Discharge of radionuclides coutside the damaged block of the Chernobyl

plant was a long term process consisting of several stages.

In the first stage dispersed fuel from the damaged reactor was

discharged. The radionuclide at this stage of escape corresponded roughly

to their catpositiohi in the irradated fuel, buit enriched with volatile

nuclides of iodine, telluriumn, cesium, and inert gases.

In the second stage, fran 26 April thruigh 2 May 1986, the magnitude

of discharge outside the damaged unit decreased due to mreasures taken to

prevent burning of the graphite and to filter the discharge. During this

period radionuclide composition in the discharge was also near their

cat•Dosition in the fuel. At this stage finely dispersed fuel was

discharged fram the reactor by, a flow of hot air and by graphite canbustion

products.
The third stage of discharge is characterized by rapid increase in the

miagnitude of fission product escape beyond the reactor unite In the

predniat entrainmrent of volatile components was observed, in particular,

iodine, and then the radionuclide composition again approached their

conposition in the irradiate fuel (on 6 May 1986)o

This was due to heating of the fuel in the core to temperatures

exceeding 17000C by residual heat release. As a result of the temnperature

dependent migration of fission products and chemical transformations of

uranium oxide fission products leaked fran the fuel matrix and were

entrained in aerosol form on graphite cambustion products.

The last, fourth stage which began after 6 May was characterized by a
rapid drop in discharge (Table 1). This was the result of special" nasures

which had been taken, formation of higher melting canpounds of fission

 53
prodcts as a result of their interaction with int~roduced materials,
stabilization andsubseqent drop in fue~l tem~perature.

-- Nuclide composition of the discare is shon in Table 2.

In air andl precipitation~ samp~les fission products were found in the
form of irnvdual radionuclides (mainly volatile) and in fuel particle
ciosition. In this case, particles (associates) wer fon with
inra od ntent of ind.ividual radionuclides (Cs, Ibi, and so forth) forms

by migration of fission products in the fuel in materials of the backfill

and structutres, and sorption on surfaces.

Total discharge of fission products (without radioactive inert gases)

was rcihy 50 regacuries; this corresponds roughly to 3.*5% of thetoa

amout of radionuclides in the reactor at the timre of the accident. These
data were cap.ted for 6 May 86 with allowance for radioactive decay.

Discharge of radioactive materials was essentially comleted by this timze.

26.04 0 12
27.04 1 4.0
28.04 2 3,4
29.04 3 2,6
$0.O4 4 2,0
O1.OS 5 2,0
02.05 6 4,0
03.05 7 5.0
04.05 S 7,0
05.05 9 3,0
06.05 10 0,1
09.05 14 "'0,01
23.05 28 20.10.4

Table 1. Daily d~ischarge q of radioactive substances into the a~msphere

from the dama~ged unit (without radioactive inert ga~ses*)

Headinqs: column 1 - date; colimn 2 - tiae after accident, days; co1xmi 3 -

q, Iregacuries**
S* - error in estimating discharge + 50%.* It is determined by the error

of dosirretric instrumrents, radiaretric mreasurements of radionuclide

car~osition of air and soil sanples, and also by the error caused by

averaging, precipitation .over the area. ______ _

 54

** - values of q we~re capted on 6 M.ay 86 with allowance for

radioactive decay (at the tiue of release 26 Apr 86 activity was 20 22
negacuries). See Table 2 for the camposition of the discharge°
 55
Tal 2. Estimation of radionuclide ca•sition of release fran -danaged

•.i of Cherrcbyl nuclear pc• plant*.

ColumnI 1 - Nuclide **; columns 2 and 3 - activity of release, megacu~ries;

coltmn 4 - percentage of radioactivity discharged fram the reactor by 6 May

86. Coli~n 4, line 1 - possibly up to 100.

i r5 45 Do3aMouoo,-o 100
e •m Kv 0.15 -
* K-- 0.9 "
p.111I 4.5 7.3 20
S3'~1r 4 1,3 15
0 •€,0.15 0.5 10

•,,0.45 3.0 2.3

"•7., 0.45 3.8 3.2
I, 'Ru 0.6 3.2 2.9
tSAR.K 0.2 !1.6 2.9

I dn• Ha

.
*•(
0.5
0.4
0.45
4.3
2.8
2.4
5.6i
2.3
2.R
*•5 0,25 2.2 4.0
•"'Sr 0.015 0.22 4.0
;"ru 0.l.tO"' O,8.10"' 3.0
'l."O~~l-r O.O'• 3.0
•-r.0,2.10°. 1.10"3,
•• P r 0,02 0.14 3.0
•• 2 ru 0,3.10" 2.10'• 3,0

* - estimate error + 50%, see remarks to Table 1 for explanation.

** - data are cited for activity of main radionuclides measured in

radiaietric analyses.

**- total release by 6 May 86.

 56
Tn~e ccaposition of radionuclides in the accident release roughly
corresponded to their •~osition in the fuel of the damaged reactor,

differing fra it by the increased content of volatile iodine, telluriumi,

cesiun and inert gases.

7.2. Mo~nitoring systan

At the tiie of the accident the regular systan of meteorological,

radiation and sanitary-hygienic monitoring began to operate according to

the emergency plan. As soon as the scale of the accident became clear the
monitoring system, began to expand by enlisting additional groups of

specialists and equipment. During the first few days after the accident

primary attention was focused on immediate problems of radiation, sanitary-

hygienic and medical-biological monitoring.

At the same time the monitoring system began to expand with

consideration of long term problems. Organizations from Goskamgidrar~t of

•the USSR, the Ministry of Health of the USSR and union republics, the

academies of scie~nces of the USSR, Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, the

GKAE of the USSR, Gosagropran and others were involved in its formation°
Specialized medical facilites in Moscc•' and Kiev w~ere enlisted to

treat irradiated individuals.

Together with fonnation of the monitoring systen a program of
radioecological, medical-biological and other scientific problems of

estimation and prediction of the effect of ionizing radiation on man, flora

and fauna was set up and began to be executed.

The primary tasks of mronitoring waere:
 57
- estimating the possible level of internal and external irradiation
of Chernobyl power plant personnel, the population of the Pripyat'

and the 30-kmn zone;

- estimating possible .level of irradiation of the population in

number of regions outside the 30-kin zone, with a level of

radioactive contamination which could exceed allowable limits;

- development of recamme~ndations for n~asures to protect population

and personnel fram irradiation above established limits.

These recarrrendations include:

-evacuation of population;

- prohibitition of limitation on use of food products with increased

content of radioactive substances;

- recammrendations for behavior of the population in houses and in

open terrain.

To solve these initial problems systenatic monitoring of the following

was done:

- Gammna radiation level in contamination regions;

 58
- concentration of biologically significant radionuclides in the air
and water of reservoirs, in particular those used for drinking

water supply;

- density of radioactive contamination of' the soil and vegetation and

its rad~ionuclide comp~osition;

- content of radioactive substances in food products, in particular

iodine-131 in milk;

- radioactive contamination of special clothing, personnel clothing

and footwear, transport resources and so forth;

- accmu~lation of radionuclides in the internal organs of individuals

and so forth.

7.33 Main characteristics of radioactive

contamination of the atmo~shere
and locale, pos~sible ecological consequences.

Radioactive contamination of the envirorm~nt as a result of the

accident at Chernobyl unit No. 4 was determined by the dynamics of

radioactive release and weather conditions.

The raedioactively contaminated airstream spread initially in the

western and northern sectors, during the two or three days following the
accident in the northern sector, from 29 April for several days in the
southern sector. The contaminated air m~asses then spread great distances

over the territory of the Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, and the RSFSRo
 59
On 27 April the height of. the stream exceed 1200 mn, the radiation level in
Sit at a distance of 5 -. 10 km fram the accident site was 1000 rrR/hr.. The .

stream and radioactive trace which formd were regularly photographed by

aircraft of the Goskaidraret equipped with sampling, roentgenczmetric, and

g~mi~spctrametric equipment, and in the network of weather stations.
Fission products as well as products of induced activity Np-239 and

Cs-134 were detected in the air samples.

The main zones of terrain contamination following the accident formd

in the westerm northwestern and northeastern directions fram the power

plant, and on a smaller scale in the southern direction. Radiation levels

near the nuclear power plant exceeded 100 mR/hr, in the western trace

.maxin~mi radiation levels 15 days after the accident were 5 mR/hr at a

distance of 50 - 60 kmn fran the accident zone (zaxirimum distances), in the
Inorth at a distance of 35 - 40 kmn. In Kiev radiation levels early in Mlay

reached 0.5 - 0.8 mR/hr.

In the near zone of the trace plutonium isotopes (their propagation in
the locale was insignificant) were identified (in addition to those

nentioned above). In this zone fractionation of the isotopes was not

significant, but in the far trace radioactive products were greatly

enriched by isotopes of tellurium, iodines, and cesium.

Integration of contaminated areas made it possible to detennine the

total activity of precipitated radioactive materials (outside the site).

In the zone of near and far precipitation in the European part of the USSR

it was ronghly 3.5% ( see section 7.1) of the total activity of the fission

products and activity accumuilated in the reactor (in the near trace roughly

1.5 - 2%).
 60
Addition of the activity of radionuclides precipitated in the near
trace and deteniine by taking soil samples yielded a close value, i.e.

fram 0.8 - 1.9%.

Levels of contamination by plutoniun isotopes in the afor•renetioned

zones are not decisive fran the point of view of decontamination efforts

and making econamic decisions.

Information on radioactive contamination of rivers and reservoirs wa~s

obtained by regular analysis of water samples fram the Pripyat' 0 Irpan',

and Teterev rivers and the Dneprovsk water supply. Beginning fram 26 April

1986 water samples ware taken over the entire water area of the Kiev

reservoir.
The highest concentrations of iodine-131 were found in the Kiev
reservoir on 3 May 1986, i.e. 3 x 10-8 curies per liter. It mu/st be 'noted

that the spatial distribotion of radionuclides in the water was

characterized by great nonunifomnity.

Monitoring of radionuclide content in botton sed~iments of reservoirs

both inside and outside the 30-kmn zone was set up fram the first few days

of the accident. The radionuclide concentration in bottan sed~iments in

isolated sections of the Kiev reservoir adjacent to the accident region

during the second 10 days of June was 10-7 - 10-6 curieslkg, in the water

10-10 cuxies/l•

Irradiation of marine organisns in the Kiev reservoir did not

seriously affect the population level. Significant radiation influence on

the marine eco system can occur only in the coolant pond of the O• Inby

nuclear power plant.

Water ecosystans which inhabit the cooling pond of the Chenobl

nuclear pow~er plant ware exposed to the greatest radiation burdens, For
saetypes of water plants, dose rate of internal irradiation was 10
 61
|rad/hr, and near the bottomn of the cooling pond the level of external
Firradiation was 4 rad/hr (at the end of May 1986).

According to estimates of specialists levels of irradiation Up to 10-2

rad per day do not noticeably affect ground eeiszt•. Within the

30-lin zone arouind the Chernobyl nuclear power plant higher irradiation
levels were observed in isolated sections contaminated by radioactive

fallout. This can lead to a noticeable change in the state of

radiosensitive types of plants in these areas.

Irradiation levels outside the 30-lin zone the kilareter, zone around

the Chernobyl nuclear power plant cannot dramatically affect species

composition of plant and animal ccrmn2ities.

These results are of a preliminary nature. The study of the

consequences of the Qhernobyl accident on living organisms and ecosystans

Scontinues.

7.4. Irradiation doses to the popullation

in the 30-kin zone around the

nuclear power plant.

Analysis of radioactive contamination of the environn~t in this zone

made it possible to estimate real and predictable irradiation doses to the

population of cities, towns, villages and other population centers.

Based on these estimates decisions were made to evacuate the

pcpflation of Pripyat' and a num~ber of other population centers.* A total

of 135,000 individuals were evacuated.

These and other mreasures made it possible to prevent irradiation of

Sthe population above the established limits.
 62
Radiological consequences for the population in the next few decades
•_re estimated. These consequ.ences will be insignificant against a

background of natural malignant and genetic diseases.

7.5.o Data on irradiation of power plat

and emergency service personnel.

Treatment.

As a result of participation in accident control imeasures during the

first few hours after the accident same individuals fran amng plant

personnel received high doses (greater than 100 ..ber) and also burns fram

fighting fires. First aid was rendered to all those affected. By 0600

•hairs on 26 April 1986 108 individuals had been hospitalized and during

that day another 24 fran among those examined. One patient died at 0600

hours on 26 April 1986 f ran severe burns and one individual fran aimong
t~hose working on the damaged unit was not found. His work site may have

•been in the zone of debris and high activity.

Eased on criteria of early diagnosis acdopted in the USSR, byj the start

of the first 36 hours individuals were selected for jimmediate

hospitalization for wham developrent of acute radiation sickness (OLB) was

predicted with greatest probability° Clinical facilities in Kiev near the

accident site and a specialized hospital in bscow wer selected for

hospitalization in order to provide a max/numa am~ount of assistance and

competent analysis of observation results.

During the first two days 129 patients were sent to Moscow. Fran

ax~ng then, during the first three days 84 were diagnosed as having OLE of
II - IV degree of severity and 27 as having OLB of degree I. In Kiev, 17
individuals were diagnosed as having OLE of degree II - IV, and 55 with OLE

of degree I.
 63
Detailed infonnation on m~ethods and results of treating these patients
*s given in the appendix.
The total number of those whx• died frat, b~rns and OLB among personnelI

at the beginning of July was 28. .Among the population there was no one who

had received high doses leading to QLB.

8. Eeccznuend~tions for increasing the

safety of nuclear power engineering.

B.1. Scientific and technical aspects.

A consultation committee for coordination of scientific research in

the field of nuclear plant safety approved in 1985 a "list of priority

efforts" which is the foundation for planning of exp~erimtental and

theoretical research on the safety of nuclear power plant engineering in

*~USSR aimred at nore detailed validation of safety requirements,

estimiation of the actual safety of nuclear facilities and bringing this

_level for nuclear power plants started before 1975 into agresent with

established requirements.

After the accident at the ahernobyl plant a revision and evaluation of

the state of experimental and theoretical research on ensuring nuclear

power plant safety were done and mreasures outlined and expand, inprove and

itniyit.
Theoretical programs for analysis of nuclear pauwer plant safe behavior

in all possible transition and accident mrodes, including those for which it

is not design are being iiproved and the modelling systems and complexes

S developed.
 64
The search continues to expDand on the possibility of buiilding reactors
with passive safety systens, so-called reactors .with "internally inherent"

safety, with cores which cannot fail during any accidents.

Research will be intensified on quantitative-probabilistic analysis of

safety, analysis of risk fram nuclear power, development of conceptual and
methodological principles Of optimizing radiation safety and comparing the

radiation hazard with other types of hazards fram industrial activity°

8.*2. Organizational-technical measures

The system of supervision and standard doc.ments which exist in the USSR

encompasses all mai questions of ensuring nuclear power plant safety and
continues to be inproved. Under the aegis of Gosataeergonadzor, a
consolidated list and plan for development of rules and regulations in the
0
field of nuclear power which coordinates and directs the activity of all

the depa~rtments in development and systemization of a corresponding

scientific and technical docu.mentation was ccompiled in 1985 in the USSR.

Carparison of existing Soviet docu~ments on questions of design and

ope-ration of nuclear power plants with foreign analogs does not reveal any

fudretal differences. Existing standard requirements associated with

safety for t!he nost part do not require re-examination. However their

practical inplerantation requires mo~re careful monitoring. Quality of

training and re-training of personnel mast be raised, mocnitoring of the

quality of equipment, installation, and startup efforts by buailders and

designers and their responsibility for subsequent efficiency and safety of

nuclear power plants in operation must be intensified.

After the accident at the Chernoby'i nuclear power plant organizational

mreasures to increase power plant safety were irrplemented. They can be

divided into two stages.

 65
The first stage which, was carried out through detailed scientific and
•technical analysis of the course of the accident fran results of initial

infoimiation from the site relates to working nuclear power plants with .~4

type reactors and includes operational n~asures in working nuclear power

plants with RBMIK developed primarily to preveiit the conditions which
inimediatel~y preceded the accident.

The second~ stage, i *e. measures developed frcn the results of

scientific and technical analysis of the course of the accident, included

measures to increase safety of all types in nuclear power plants.

These measures will ensure safe operation of nuclear power plants with

PRMK type reactors.

For nuclear power plants with other types of reactors previous
/
measures to increase safety associated mainly with new advances in science

and technology, operating experience, capabilities for diagnosis of the

condition of netals in piping and equipment, and devices for autamatic

:control of industrial processes are scheduled for ixrplementation.

To increase the level of management and responsibility for the

development of nuclear power and improve operation of nuclear power plants

an All-Union Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering was formed.

A host of measures to intensity goveriet supervision of safety in

nuclear power has been outlined.

8.*3. International mreasures

The Soviet Union, which contribu~tes its share to international efforts

in nuclear power safety and which is guided by the desire to further

strengten internationa safety, in light of the Chernobyl accident, ct

Sforward with in~itiatives for establishing an international program. for safe

development of nuclear powr and expansion of international cooperation in

 66
this area. These suggestions were set forth by the General Secretary of

the CC CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev, on 14 M'ay and 9 June 1986.

The international system for safe developmnt of nuclear power is a

systai• of international legal documents, international organizations and

structures, and also organizational measures and activities to protect the

health of the pcpulation and the enviroi~t within the franrework of

peaceful use of nuclear pc•r. Establishmant of this system could be

supported by international agreemnts, participation in corresponding

international conventions, additional accords, iimplementation of joint

coordinated scientific programs on problems of nuclear safety, exchange of

scientific and technical information, and establishment of international

data banks and equipment necessary for safety purposes and so-forth.
With the direct participation of international organizations funds

could be created for rendering ihrrediate assistance, including immrediate

support with the necessary special mediical preparations,• dosiuetric and

diagnostic equipment and instrents, supply of foodstuffs, fodder, and

other material aid. A systan of operational warning and supply of

information in the case of a nuclear power plant accident, in particular

one with transnational co seqences, nmist be set up.

Treatment of the problem of material and psychological damage in

accident cases also merits attention.

There is another aspect of nuclear safety, the prevention of nuclear

terrorism. The exrr importance of the problem derives fram this, i.e.

develcpment of a reliable systen of iresures to prevent nuclear terorian in

any of its manifestations.

A major role in establishing the international system for safe
developmrent of nuclear power will be played by the M•@~'E.
 ... 67

SAt present it can be. noted with satisfaction that initial steps have
* already been taken to iznplement suggestions relating to estab~is~et of

the international system for safe developmnt of nuclear. power. Efforts

have begun on preparation for concluding two international conventions
"Operation warning of a nuclear accident" and "Assistance in the case of

nuclear accidents and radiological emergency situations". Quiestions of

expanding international cooperation, in particular research programs of the

MAGATE on nuclear safety are being actively discussed.

Initiatives orn establishing an international system for safe

developmnt of nuclear power are closely associated •r'ith probl•r of

detente and nuclear disarmnament. The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear

power plant has again demronstrated the danger of uncontrolled nuclear power

and highlighted the destructive consequences to which its military use or

*a age to peaceful nuclear facilities during military operations could

lead. In addressing and solving problems of safe use of nuclear power it

,•wold be absurd to develop me~ans and mrethod3s of its most dangerous and

inhuman use at the sane time.

9. Developmnt of nuclear power engineering in the USSR

Due to continued development of nuclear power engineering a reduction

in the increase of consuzrption of organic fuel by thermal power plants in

the European part of .the country is outlined by the energy program of the

USSR. The amount of fuel oil in electric power generation should be cut in
half. The nuclear power will cover most of the increased consumption of

electricity by the national econamyj. axixmu~m possible use of nuclear fuel

for centralized heating and industrial heat supply and establis1rent of
B nuclear-industrial ccnplexes are planned.
 68
The Soviet Union is a pioneer in the use of nuclear power for peaceful
purposes. The first nuclear power plant in the world with a pressure tube

uraniumn-graphite reactor has been operating for 32 years. The program for
building so-called demnstration power reactors for nuclear power plants

with relatively mrall electrical capacities which implemented at the time

made it possible to select the most pramising of these for further

development and improvement.
The existence of three types and oud~ifications of nuclear reactors

which have been. adopted in the USSR for building up nuclear r

capacities allows great flexibility and reliability of energy supply, and

mach nore catplete utilization of nuclear fuel resources; it also matches

the characteristics of developmnt of the power machinery, construction base

to a satisfactory degree.

Nuclear power plants under construction in the USSR use reactors of

types VVER, RBM, and EN. The first two are thermoneutron reactors with

cooling water.* N are fast neutrton breeder reactors with sodiumn coolant
:currently being built for industrial trials of designs which have been

adopted and gradual development of a closed fuel cycle with plutonitm~ fuel

on this foundation in the futulre.

The basis of nuclear power engineering in the USSR is nuclear power

plants with VVER and R•M reactors. Installed capacities in the Soviet

Union have reached almost 30 million kilowatts. Soviet nuclear powr

plants are distinguished by high operational readiness. Utilization factor
of installed power in a nuclear power plant has been rather high over the

last few years.

According to the "Main trends in econamlic and social development of
the USSR for 1986 - 1990 and through the year 2000" continued development
of nuclear powr engineeering in the European part of the USSR and in the
 69
Urals is planned. In 1985 nuclear power plants generated approximately 170
•billion kilowatt hours of electricity and by the year 2000 this will

increase by a factor of 5 - 7.
This development will allowj nuclear power plants to occupy first place

in terms of new capacities in power systems of the European part, having

elimninated the construction of new thermal power plants using organic fuel

to cover increases in the base part of the load curve.

Develozrent of nuclear sources of heat supply based on high

temiperature gas cooled reactors is underway in the USSR. Construction of

safe plants with these reactors will make it possible to generate high

temperature heat for a number of industrial technologies.

The Soviet Union is actively involved ina international cooperation in

the field of nuclear power engineering and collaborates in agencies and.

carmnittees of the United Nations, the MAGATE, the 1{•REK, and others.

hNuclear power engineering in the USSR is developing in close cooperation

with CI4EOI• countries.

 LIST OF .ABBREVIMTIONS

AZ - emergency protection
AZ-5 - signal to insert all, regulating rods and emergency
protection rods into the active zone
AN - Academy of Sciences
AR - autma~tic regulator
AS - nuclear station
AES - nuclear power station
~- fast breeder reactor
BRU-K - high-speed reduction device
ES - water-steam separating drumn
BSSR Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
I
-

GKAE - USSR State Committee on the Use of Atamic Energy

Gosagropram - USSR State Agro-industry Ctmlittee

Gosatamenergonadzor - USSR State Carmnittee on Safe Perfom~iance
of Operations in Atanic Power Engineering
Goskaridzrmet - USSR State Catnmittee on Hydrameteorology and
Monitoring of the Environment

GPK - nain safety valves

GI'sN - main circulation pum

DP - additional absorber
DREG - diagnostic recording of parameters (program)
KGO - monitoring of seal of shells

IMPrs - repeated forced circulation duct

KTsTK - monitoring of the integrity of channel pipes

IAZ - local emrgency protection

• LAR - local automatic regulation

MAC~tTE- International Atanic Energy Agency

 , --2--

Minzdrav SSSR - USSR Ministry of Public Health

MIREK- World Energy Congress
NVK - bottan water lines
CLB - acute radiation s~ickness
CON - United. Nations
PVK - steam-water lines
PD - fission products
PEN - electric feeder pu.mp
REMK - high-power channel reactor
RGK - distribution group collector
RZM - unloading-loading machine
RDES - back-up diesel power plant
RP - reactor space
RR - manual regulator
RSFSR - Russian Soviet Federated. Socialist Republic

RU - reactor installation

SAOR - system for emergency cooling of the reactor

SIA - accident localization systsn
SM SSSR - USSR Council of Ministers
SRK - stopper-regulating valves
SUZ - system for control and protection
5EV - Council for Mutual Economic Aid
TVS - beat-releasing assembly
TG - turbogenerator
TK - operating channel
USP - shortened absorber rods
 --.-
3--
USSR - Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Rep.ublic
ChAES - Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station

ELM - canpter
 LIST OF BASIC •UIPMEN OF. THE MAIN' HOUSING OF THE AES

It~n
No. Equyipment or Product Measurement Unit Num~ber
Units Mass per
in Power
Tons Unit

1 graphite lining set 1850 1

2 "S" systen net~al coponents "126 1
3 'OR" systen netal carlponents "280 1
4 "Ye" syst~n iretal camponents "450 1
5 "KZh" system mretal canponents " 79 1
6 "L" systen rretal canponents " 592 1
7 "D" systerm ietal capnents " 236 1
8 Water-steam separating drum item 278 4
9 TsVN-6 Main Circulation Pump 67 8
10 GTsN electric mo~tor " 33 8

11 DU-800 main cut-off gate valve " 5.7 8

12 intakes collector " 41 2
13 delivery collector " 46.0 2
14 distribution group collector " 1.3 44
15 bottan water lines (NVK) set 400 1
16 steuwter lines (PVK) " 450 1
17 J•J-300 down pipelines "16 1
17a DU-800 pipelines of MPTs duct " 350 1
18 unloading-loading machine (RZM) " 450 1
19 central roam traveling crane Q 50/10 tf item 121 1
20 GrsN roan traveling crane Q 50/10 tf " 176* 1
21 forced-ventilation fan U 3.5 30

22 exhaust fan " 3.5 50

 -2-

23 organized leak water tank iten 1.4 2

24 organized leak water heat exchanger ""00o2 2
25 scheduled preventive maintenance vessels "25 4
26 metal components and pipelines of accident

containmrent zone set 270 1

27 NVK c~rtet check valves "2.5 11
28 accident containment systsn overflowi valve iten 2 8

29 accident containmrent system condensers "3.7 36

30 container car "146 1

31 crane in UPAIK (gas activity reduction

systemi) ccnpartment Q30/5 tf 45 1

pipelines of carbon steel set 1170 1

pipelines of stainless steel set 760 1

32 K-500-65/3000 turbogenerator set itsn 3500 2

33 SPP-500 steam superheater separator "15 8

34 lw•-pressure preheater "37.5 4

35 first extraction condenser pump units "2.5 6

36 machine roan traveling crane 0 125tf "211 1
pipelines of carbon steel set 3825 1

pipelines of stainless steel "1300. 1

37 gas stripper itan 4.5 2
 o U 4

n'LN -m .

1±1 I~~_r • - --

Ne. 1. PamJpes noM? w~opnyctT A3)C c P6MK-IOOO (C •onoAoleano~mam)m

sno
L_. 1 '_-d..,-: _____ ____

_ _-..J I

.O Fig.
1-
2. Schematic diagram of system for
reactor; 2 - steam separators; 3 -
pump; 5 - pressure header; 6 - suppre/
umps for cooling malfunctioning holf
emergency cooling of the reactor:
suction header; 4*- main circulation
pool; 7 - SAOR v•nssela; 8 - SAOR
ece•9 - hea c.•rhiges; fU
 0 0 h ~~~~contaiment zone) . .......

C PI3MK.IO0O
PA."P1L3 110 PF£AKT0PIIOrMY OTJIIfEII~fHII1 A3IC

:JouoinKSuI~IHIE4I
|c€001

_ _ _ _ _ _ .. I _• ____

rLL'LI7-JiJi
_______________________________
L•

3
 8"1". IC

I-

0 5 IO

cays
I'HC. 5. IIJMeCItIIHC ;iKI1113l10C1I'I Ii TeMIli'iplIyju 8 r~sIlJilngl
1I0 DJX'MeIII
Fig. 5. Variation of fuel activ'Ity and temperature in time
 unit un it unit
|! j•oK Ill 6nox I\" 6uiom
}
p

metal
divider

urial structure

[j•
divider • • 1Co14epyxzzMn
3os b• Zone of
pa~pyw~emu•
conc:r e te Y¥KUMdestruct ion
Sc'robu~ p&at TenwHre~
c1*KSJ OCH1 MNa.-Nm4rp
of foundation
Oc~omH.,a • co~epyxwIM structures
. foundation structure

P~c. 6. CxeMa 3&XOpoHeHKR rnHepro6noxa N. 4. rOpH3OlrTaanbHbzA puape3 o~oro

543 B2PHaHTO8 IL'pOeiCZ'T
Fig. 6 Diagram of burial of power unit No. 4. HIoriZontal Sections
of one version of the plan.

"71.30

510 35
• 0 001 1.00h.j 34,00 %•0 o,oo0

?MC. 7. CxeMi 58ZopoHS)•eRu )epro6floKf N- 4. flonepe'O4Wfl pa~pes omoro In u'-

Fig. 7. Diagram of burial, of power unit No. 4. Cross sectionl of

one version of the plan

Pxc. 8. CxeMa 3aXOpOHeH•R 3Hepro6JnoKca N- 4. O6LwtHA BH.• O:IHOFO H3 BapHEHTOB
rrpoei-aa

Figs 8. Diagram of burial of power unit NOo. 4. Overall view

of one version of the plan.
 CONTENTS

cooled
waterRBMK graphite moderated reactors and the
experience1.ofChannel
Appendix operating reactors.

Appendix 2. The design of the reactor plant.

Appendix 3. Cleaning up after the accident and decontamination -

Appendix 4. Evaluating the amount, composition, and dynamics of the •_

discharge of radioactive substances from the damaged reactor.
Appendix 5. Atmospheric transport and radioactive contamination of the
atmosphere and ground.
Appendix 6. Expert evaluation and forecasting of the radioactive and
environmental situation in the region of the radiation track of the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (aquatic ecosystems).

Appendix 7. Medical and •biological problems

 Appendix 1
PRESSURE-TUBE WATER COOLED GRAPHITE REACTORS AND EXPERIENCE

IN OPERATING RBMK REACTORS

 - --
1. Pressure-tube water-cooled graphite reactors and experience in

operating RBMK reactors.

1.1 Pressure-tube water-cooled graphite reactors use normal wate~r as
the heat carrier and graphite as the moderator. The distinguishing
features of pressure-tube reactors are: the absence of a pressurized body,
the relative simplicity of design, the broad potential for channel-by-

channel testing and regulation, the capability of reloading fuel in a

working reactor, the flexibility of the fuel cycle, and the almost

unlimited potential for increasing power on the basis of standard

structural elements.

The first power producing reactor in the USSR was a pressure-tube

type, the water-cooled graphite reactor of the First AES with an electric

power of 5 mW, which as started in June 1954 in the city of Obninsk near

Moscow.

The experience accumulated in building and operating the First AES was
used in designing the Beloyarsk AES (1964, 300 MW).

Further development of the water-cooled graphite reactors in the USSR

resulted in the creation of a powerful pressure-tube boiling water RBMK

reactor with an electric power of 1000 MW which, along with the VVER-IO000

reactor, became the basic reactor for high power atomic power engineering

in the USSR.

Start up of the RBMK-IO00 reactor at the Leningrad AES in 1973 started

the series of this type of reactor.

The broad program for building RBMK-IO00 reactors unveiled in the

1970s made it possible to put on line 14 operational

 -2-
Table 1.1

Ta6:•ua 1.1I

• Aex~pw eCKA• uot~ioem (•T)L4 I000 1500

Ten•ona MO~HOO b (MB?)(&)• 3200 4800

flapa:de•'pu napa nepeA (

Aa~e~ie (xrc/cx 2 ) 65 6•5

Te~nepayp (°C) 280 280

KEY: (1) CharacteristiCs

(2) RBMK-1I000

(3) RBMK-1500
(4) Electrical power (MW)

(5) Thermal power (MW)

(6) Steam productivity (T/hr)

(7) Steam parameters in front of the turbines:

pressure (kgf/cm )
temperature ( C)
 -3-
reactors from 1973 through 1985 (four each at the Leningrad (LAES),
Kursk (KAES), and Chernobyl AES (ChAES) and two reactors at the

Smolensk AES (SAES) with a total established elecric power of 14 GW.

Improvements aimed at increasing reliability and safety were

introduced into each new reactor generator.

The acquired knowledge and experience in operating energy units

with RBMK-IO00 reactors revealed their hidden reserves and made it

possible, based on this reactor, to begin designing an even more

powerful reactor-the RBMK-1500 reactor with an electric power of 1500

MW, which in 1983 was placed on line at the Ignalinsk AES and by,

early 1985 had exceeded its designed power.

Pressure-tube reactors have advantages which facilitate solution

of problems to ensure their safety.

These advantages include:

- ease of organizing individual testing of the condition of fuel

elements, fuel assemblies and the integrity of the pressure-tubes;

- the capability of real time replacement of fuel assemblies

which have lost their hermetic seal without shutting down the

reactor;
- reduction of the danger of the consequences of explosions of
the tubes of the first loop due to an increase in the number of

circulation loops and a corresponding reduction in the diameter of

the pipelines; and

- a design potential for increasing the unit power of the
reactor without complicating the emergency cooling system for the

active zone.
 - -3a-
On the other hand, certain specific features inherent to pressure-
tube graphite reactors cooled by boiling water require fundamentally
new solutions in developing safety support systems. The features

primarily include:
 -4-

- the large steam volume in the cool~ing .loop, which greatly

moderates the rates of pressure drop in the heat carrier with

accidental rupture of the pipelines;

- the possibility of manifestation of a positive steam effect, of

reactivity, which greatly determines the behavior of the neutron

power of the reactor with accidents associated with disruptions in

the circulation of the heat carrier through the active zone; and

- the large volume of thermal energy accumulated in the metal

structures and the graphite lining of the reactor, which determines

the drop in the thermal power after operation of emergency shielding.

The basic technical-characteristics of AES with RMBP type

reactors are cited in Table 1.1

 -5-
1.2. Presently, the total operating time of RBMK reactors as
part of AES is approaching 100 reactor-years.

Based on an analysis and correlation of the experience in

operation,a constant effort is underway to modernize individual

subassemblies of the reactor and to improve reactor setting systems

and their modes of operation. A whole complex of measures aimed at

increasing the reliability and safety of operation of the AES has

been developed and introduced as a result. The most important

measures are the following:

- modernization of the design of the shut-off and regulating

valves, the ball sensors of the flow rate meters, and the cut off
plugs in the fuel channels;

-optimization of the layout of the pipelines for steam and

water communications and the discharge steam pipes for the drum-

separators;
improvement in the intrabody devices in the drum-separators;

- improvement in the main circulation pumps and their back-up

systems;
- introduction of predicting programs for real-time calculations
and programs for emergency recording of the condition of the

equipment and for diagnosing the condition of technological systems;

- development and introduction of a system for local automatic

regulation (LAR) and local emergency shielding CLAZ) which operate

from intrazone sensors;

- justification and test operation in one of the units of heat
releasing cartridges with an initial enrichment of 2.4%; and
 - 5a -
- development of a system for discharge of residual heat releases,

which makes it possible to perform long-term continuous repairs of

equipment and subassemblies in the reactor.

These and other measures realized in energy units

 -6-
have ensured reliable and safe operation of. AES with RBMK reactors,

certain results of which are illustrated in Table 1o2, where the

production of electric power at AES for 1981-1985, inclusively, and
the established power utilization factor (KIUM) for 1985 are

presented.

Table 1o2

Operational indicators of AES with RBMK-1O000

fli.sen
r w .. ~ (' ~ Ac i~~4

Yc~axoe•s.•eH MO•IOCTh 00 20
Hia 01.01.86 U• 00 00400r0

,q140,0 rr,,A, 82,4 108,6 2•3,4

K•MsaZ985r., %( 84 79 83 76
 - 6a -

KEY: (1) Indicators

(2) LAES
(3) KAES

(4) ChAES

(5) SAES
(6) Installed power on 1 January 1986, MW
(7) Electricity production for 1981-1985, billions of kW hours

(8) KIUM for 1985, %

The maximal values of KIUM for 1985 were reached at the fourth unit of

the LAES of 91%, at the second unit of the ChAES of 90%, and at the first

unit of the LAES of 87%.

Correlation of the operational experience and the performed scientific
research and development works revealed certain ways to increase the

effectiveness of power producing units with RBMK reactors, including:

increasing the power of the operating energy units, improving
and optimizing the modes of operation of the unit, introduction of

automatic shielding of the reactor and technological equipment, improving

the conditions for performing repairs on the reactor 9 and increasing .the

repair suitability of its individual subassemblies°

 -7-
As everyone knows, the extreme parameters which limit the power of the

RBMK reactors are: fuel temperature, the temperature of the graphite lining

and the metal structures, and the reserve to heat exchange crisis in the
fuel channels. These parameters in the existing reactors are below the

maximum permissible. For instance, with a nominal fuel power of the

reactor, the maximal power of the fuel channel is approximately 2600 kW

with a permissible of 3000 kW, a maximal temperature of the graphite lining

of 923 0 K (650 0 C) with a permissible value of 10230 K (750 C), a maximal

temperature of the metal structures of 5730 K (300c C) with an permissible

of 623K (350• C), and a reserve to heat exchange crisis of no less than

1.35. The basic equipment in the machine hall of the energy units with an
RBMK-1O00 reactor (the turbine generators, block transformers, deaerators,

and condensate and replenishment pumps) also have a power reserve of

approximately 10%.
The identified reserves made it possible to justify the possibility of

the energy units operating at a high power level and the full-scale tests

conducted of a number of energy units at a power up to 107% of the nominal

power confirmed such a possibility.

 Appendix 2

2. Reactor Plant Design

The reactor is intended to generate dry saturated steam at 70 kgf/cm-2

(about 7 MPa). The unit consists of the reactor itself with monitoring,

control, and protection system, piping, and equipment for the controlled

circulation loop (KMPTs).

2.1 Reactor

The RBMK power reactor is a homogeneous thermal neutron channel

reactor in which the moderator is graphite, while the heat transfer agent

is light water and a steam-water mixture circulating through vertical

channels crossing the core.

The reactor's core (1) is shaped like a vertical cylinder 11.8 min

equivalent diameter 11.8 m and 7 m high (cf. Figure 1). It is surrounded

on the sides and ends by graphite reflectors 1 and 0.5 mnthick

respectively. The core consists of process channels (TK) with fuel

assemblies (TVS), graphite moderator, channels with neutron-absorbing

control rods, and monitoring system sensors. Parts of the channels located

in the core are made of zirconium alloy. The graphite block structure

consist of blocks assembled into columns with axial, cylindrical openings

in which the
 - la-
process control channels are set. Process channels, are placed in 1661*
square-lattice cells at 250-mm intervals. Control/safety system channels
(211 pc) are arranged in the same way as process channels in the central

openings of the block structure (Channel layout is diagrammed in Figure

2.1a)

* First-generation LAES, KAES, and ChAES reactors have 1, 693 TVS's and

179 SUZ channels,

 P~ c4-az Cu4.e.r~
'~ £A~~

""Ocb peaXTOPaJ'

I.

I 3

oe 0.

YZ •g. 2.1 *o4

2
 41D° 41,.

CLD 61~~

S
a S

I.

S Q m • •O e

QoO • I •o •. . . . .• i

-ftc3 2.1.
 The graphite block structure is in a hermetically sealed cavity- .
(reactor space RP), formed by cylindrical enclosure (2) and the metal

structure's upper (4) and lower (3) slabs. ro prevent graphite oxidation
and improve heat transfer from the graphite to the process channels, the

reactor space is filled with a mixture of helium and nitrogen with a

volumetric composition of 85-90% He and 15-10% N2. To prevent a possible

helium leak from the RP, the inner cavities of the metal structure and the

space surrounding the enclosure are filled with nitrogen at a pressure

higher than that in the RP at 50-100 mm H20 (about 0.5-1.0 kPa).

The process control channels are set in routes welded onto the metal
structure (5).• The top and bottom metal structures and the circular water-

filled vessel surrounding shell of annular tank (6), act as biological

shield for the areas surrounding the reactor. The heat transfer agent,
water, is carried downward by individual pipes to each individual channel.
Ascending and washing the fuel elements, water is heated and partially

evaporated, and the steam-water mixture is also removed from the top of the

channels by individual pipes.

The nuclear fuel is recharged without reducing reactor output by

fueling machines (RZM)o

In steady-state operation, the rate at which fuel is recharged at

rated output is 1-2 cartridges per day.
 -3a -
The reactor is fitted wi~th a control/safety system (SUZ) .and a. process
monitoring system which issues information on the status of the active
core, the performance of individual assemblies, and required signals to the

SUZ and the emergency signalling system.

 -4-

Main Reactor Characteristics

Heat transfer agent flow rate through reactor 37.6 x 103

Steam pressure in separator, kgslcm2 70

Pressure in grouped pressure headers, kgs/cm2 82.7

Average steam content at exit from reactor, % 14. 5

Heat transfer agent temperature, oC

at entry 270

at exit 284

Maximum channel power with regard for 10%

power bias, kV 3,000

Heat transfer agent flow rate in maximum-

power channel tonne/hr 28

Maximum steam content at exit from channel, % 20.1

Minimum reserve to critical power 1025

Core height, mm 7,000

Core diameter, mm 11,800

Process lattice spacing, mm 250x250

Number of process channels 1,661

 -5-

2.1.1 Cartridge and Fuel Element Design

The RBMK-lOO0 reactor's fuel cartridge consists of the following components

(cf. Figure 2.2):

- two fuel element assemblies (TVS) 1;

- carrier rod 2;
- shank and end cap (3), (4);
- nuts (5);
Cartridge length 10,015 mm.

The fuel element assembly consists of 18 rods, shell, and 18 clamping

rings.

The cartridge's fuel element consists of can (6), fuel column (7),

spring lock (8), plug (9), and end caps (10).

The can and end parts are made of zirconium alloy with 1% niobium

(alloy 110). The lock is made of zirconium alloy Ts2M. The fuel element

can diameter is 13.6 mm; its minimum thickness, 0.825 mm.

The fuel is pellets of sintered uranium oxide. Pellet diameter --

11.5 num; height -- 15 mm. To reduce thermal expansion in the fuel column,
pellets on the ends have spherical indentations. The average mass of fuel

in an element is 3,600 g; minimum pellet density -- 10.4 g/cm3; diamnetral

clearance between fuel and shell -- 0.18-0.38mmi.
 -Sa -

The fuel elements are sealed by contact butt-welding an end cap onto

one end of the casing tube and a plug on the other end.

The original medium under the can is helium at -1 kg/cm2 (0.1 MPa).

The fuel column is held in the element by a spring lock with a compressive

force of about 15 kg.

--6--
Figure 2.2

ۥ2. "

AAe

e
 Figure 2.2a

i t1m5

&
I~o
 -8-
The framework consists of a central tube 15 mm in diameter with walls
1.25 mm thick, one end lattice (11) and 10 spacer lattices (12). The

central tube and end lattice are made of zirconium alloy with 2.5% niobium
(alloy 125); the spacer lattices, of stainless steel.

The central tube is connected by two expanders to the end lattice to

prevent axial play in the connection and so that the lattice can turn

relative to the tube. For orientation and to prevent the TVS's from

turning relative to one another, the shell tubes have special grooves.

Spacer lattices are attached every 360 mm on the central tube. Each
lattice is fastened by inserting the projecting end of the central sleeve

into two grooves on the tube so that it can move along the tube if there is

slight azimuthal play.

A spacer lattice is assembled from individual shaped cells (12 cells

on the outside and 6 on the inside row), a central sleeve and a cover rim.

Lattice parts are connected by spot contact welding.

The opening in the lattice for the fuel element is 13.3 mm in

diameter. The lattice rim has projections which facilitate loading the
cartridge into the channel. The diameter along the rim projections is

about 78.8 mm.

Cells are made of tube with 0.35-mm-thick walls; the central sleeve is

a tube with 0.5-mm-thick walls; the rim, a tube with 0.3-mm-thick walls.
 -8a -
Fuel elements are attached to the end lattice by clamping rings made

of stainless steel. The fuel elements are permanently attached, since

clamping rings are deformed when the elements are attached.

The designs of the two TVS's are identical.

 .- 9-
Figure 2.3
RBM-K Process Channel

Watre
Supply
 1O-
-.
When the cartridge is assembled, an end cap, two TVS's, and shanks•

which are held by a nut are assembled on the central rod. The nut is

locked by a pin.

Two types of cartridges are installed in the reactor: a working

cartridge and a cartridge to monitor energy release (across the core's

radius). The latter differs from the working cartridge in the design of

the carrier rod. It is hollow and consists of tube with an outside

diameter of 12 mm and a wall thickness of 2.75 mm and plugs made of

zirconium alloy (alloy 125), a steel-zirconium adapter, and an extension

tube made of stainless steel.

2.1o2 Process Channel

(Figure 2.3)

The process channel is intended to hold TVS's with nuclear fuel and to

organize the flow of heat transfer agent. The channel housing is a welded

structure consisting of a middle and ends. The middle (2), made of

zirconium alloy (Zr + 2.5% No) is a tube with inside diameter of 88 tmm and

wall thickness of 4 mm; top (1) and bottom (5) ends are made of corrosion-

resistant tube (steel 08Kh18NIOT). The middle is joined to the ends by

special steel-zirconium transition pieces (3, 4).

 -lQa -

The corrosion-proof steel/zirconium alloy transition, pieces are .,

produced by diffusion vacuum-welding (Figure 2.3 a).

The transition pieces were designed to obtain programmed

configurations and a stressed state in the joint area to guarantee strength

and reliability under operating conditions. The interior of the joint is

made of zirconium
 ~ ~*:~*
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 -.
12-
alloy; the outer cover is made of corrosion-proof steel. During diffusion
welding, a thin layer of products of mutual diffusion forms on the contact
surface of the parts to be joined. The quality of the diffusion weld *is

monitored by ultrasonic defectoscopy and metallography. As part of the

process channels, the transition piece undergo helium seal and hydrostatic

testing.

Channel tubes and zirconium transition piece parts are joined by

electron beam welding. To increase corrosion properties, the welded joints

are subject to additional hardening and heat treatment.

Steel transition piece parts are connected to the top and bottom of

the process channel by argon welding. An aluminum metallization coating is

applied to the outer surfaces of steel channel parts to protect them from

corrosi on.

Graphite split rings 20 mm high are set in the middle to improve heat

release from the graphite module to the channel. These rings are set along

the top of the channel tight against one another so that the side of every

other ring is in direct contact either with the tube (7) or with the inside

surface of a block (6), and so that their ends touch.

Minimum gaps between the ring and channel -- 1.3 nmn -- and between the
ring and the block -- 1.5 •are determined to prevent the channel from

becoming wedged in the stack due radial thermal shrinkage during reactor

operation.
 -12a-
The channel housing in, the reactor is set in pipe routes (3, 4) welded

to the top and bottom of. the support structure (Figure 2°4)°
 PROCESS CHANNEL

.. °.'° i'. "-'-, I..

-jj ' .. -

["H"IIF H -:. 'I

" ... -.

• ': " • ... ..

" -'CO• ': ''' :
hr;L. ~ ""'"N
 -13-
It is firmly attached in the bottom route by a collar and a thin argon•
arc weld (1). The bottom of the housing is welded to the metal work route

channel through a bellows compensator (2), which makes is possible to

compensate for the difference in TK and metal work thermal expansions and

provides reliable reactor space seal. The channel housing is rated for 30

yr of trouble-free operation. However, if necessary, a defective channel

housing may be removed from an inoperative reactor and replaced with a new

one,

The cartridge with fuel elements (5) is set inside the channel on a

suspension support (6) which keeps it in the core and permits a spent
cartridge to be replaced by the RZM without stopping the reactor.

The suspension support is fitted with a plug (7) which is set in a

holder in the upper route. The plug hermetically covers the route space

with a ball lock with a packing gland. Depressurization processes during

fueling are performed remotely with the RZM.

2.1.3 Control Channels (Figure 2.4)

The channels are intended to hold control rods and energy release
sensors and ionization chambers. The middle of the channel (3) is made of
zirconium alloy (Zr + 2°5% No) and is a tube with outside diameter of 88 nmn
and wal1 thickness of 3 mm. The top (1) and bottom (4) ends are made of

corrosion-proof tube (steel 08Khl8NIOT). The middle is connected to the

end tubes by steel-zirconium adapters similar to

 •-14-
those of the process channels. The channels are firmly attached to the

upper tube route by a collar and thin weld; to the lower• route through a
bellows compensator. SUZ channels have caps (5) at the top for attaching
actuators and to feed cooling water to the channel. Graphite sleeves (6)

are mounted on the channel to ensure required temperatures in the graphite

stack. The bottom of the channel has a constrictor to ensure that the

channel is completely filled with water.

Placing the control channels in graphite stacks separate from process

*channels guarantees their safe keeping and, consequently, the working

*capacity of the control members they contain during emergencies due to

process channel ruptures.

2.1.4 Reactor Metal Structure

(Figure 2.1)

The biological shielding vessel (6) is a cylindrical, round-section

tank with outside diameter 19 m and inside diameter 16.6 m made of

30-mm-thick low-alloyed plate steel in perlite class IOKhSND. The interior

of the tank is divided into 16 vertical hermetically sealed compartments

filled with water, from which heat is removed by the cooling system.
 -14a-
The upper metal structure (4) is a cylinder 17 mnin diameter, 3 mn

high. The upper and lower slabs of the cylinder are made of steel 1OKhNIM

40 mmv thick are welded to the side rim by hermetic welds and to each other
through vertical stiffeners° Pipe routes (5) for the process channels and

control channels are welded into openings drilled in the top and bottom

plates. The space between the tubes is filled

 -15-
with serpentine (a mineral containing bound crystal water). The metal

structure is mounted on 16 roller supports attached at the projection of

the circular side biological shielding block, and it absorbs forces from

the weight of the loaded channels, the central hall floor and piping from
the upper steam-water and water lines.

The lower metal structure (3), 14.5 m in diameter and 2 m high, is

identical to the upper in design. The structure iAs loaded by the graphite

stacking which is set on it along with support assemblies and lower water

lines. The number and arrangement of the lower pipe routes for process and

control channels welded to the upper and lower bottom of the metal
structure are the same as those in the upper metal structure. Its internal

cavity is filled with serpentine. The support structure on which the lower
metal work is set consists of plates with stiffeners 5.3 m high (7) which

cross along the center of the reactor.

The cylindrical shell (2) is welded, and has an 14.52-in inside

diameter; it is 9.75 in high and made of 16-mm-thick IOKhNIM plate steel.

The shell has a lens compensator to compensate for longitudinal thermal

expansion. The shell and the lower and upper metal structure form the

closed reactor space.

The metal structure of the upper span (8) in the central hall has an

opening for installation of process and special channels. The opening is

covered by removable flooring (9) consisting of separate slabs. The floor
 -15a-

provides the the central hail with biological shielding from radiation and
with thermal insulation. The slab floor consists of upper and lower
 -16-
slabs and blocks resting on process and control channels routes. Slabs and

blocks constitute the metal works which are filled with iron-barium-
serpentine aggregate (ZhBCTsK).

Air is sucked from the central hall through openings in the floor into
ventilation ducts. The floor cools the air and eliminates the possibility

of radioactive effluence into the central hall from steam-water line areas.

2.1.5 Graphite Block Structure (Figure 2.1)

Graphite. block structure (1) is set on the lower metal works inside

the reactor space. It is a vertical cylinder consisting of 2,488 pieces in

columns assembled from graphite blocks with a density of 1.65 g/cm3. The

blocks are in the shape of parallelipipeds with a cross section of 250 x

250 mm and are 600 mm high. The stacking weighs 1,700 tonnes. Holes 114
rnmin diameter are made along the axis of the blocks to form routes in the

columns for process and control and monitoring channels. Each graphite

column is set on a steel support plate (1) which in turn rests on a liner

welded to the upper plate of the lower metal works. The graphite block

structure is kept from moving radially by bars placed in the peripheral

columns of the side reflector. The bottom of the rod is welded to the

support liner; the top is joined by a flexible connection to the pipe route

welded to the lower plate of the upper metal works. A reflector block

cooling channel is set into the hollow bar, which is made of corrosion-
proof steel 08Khl8NIOT pipe. Heat released in the stacking is removed

primarily
 -*17-
to process channels and partially to SUZ channels. The presence of a solid
contact ring in the channels and the fact that the ring-channel and block-
ring spaces are filled with helium-nitrogen mixture ensures that structure

temperature will be kept below 700 oC.

The maximum temperature zones for the graphite blocks are found in the

blocks' ribs; the minimum, on the outside surface of the vertical holes in

which the process and other channels are located. Blocks halfway up the

central part of the core have the highest temperature.

The greatest temperature drop for the rib-inside surface of the

opening occurs in the block with the process channel and is about 150 oC.

2.1o6 Biological Shielding

The biological shielding of Reactor No. 4 at the Chernobyl AES was

designed in accordance with current USSR requirements, "Regulations for

Radiation Safety NRB-76" and "Health Regulations for Designing and

Operating AES SP-AES-79."

The intensity of the doses in terms of external exposure in the

central hall and service areas adjacent to the reactor shaft does not
exceed 2°8 x 10-2 mSv/hr (2.8'•iw'/hr). During recharging, when a spent

TVS is removed through the flooring of the central hall, the intensity of

gamma radiation near the RZM quickly increases to 0°72 mSv/hro In the
lower waterline area below the reactors, the shielding ensures a reduction
 -17a -
in neutron flow density to levels at which there will be no noticeable

activation of piping and structures. Entry into this space is possible

only when the reactor is inoperative.

Shielding from emissions from the heat transfer agent in the primary

loop piping and equipment makes it possible

 -18-
to perform repair and adjustment operations, e.g. adjustment of heat,.

transfer agent flow rate in individual channels using the multipurpose

fitting mounted on group collectors, repair of GTsN electric motors, etc.

Thermal radiation release is reduced to levels at which the temperature of
the metal support structure (upper, lower, container) and reactor shell

does not exceed 300 oC, which makes it possible to used low-alloyed steel.

The flow of fast neutrons with energy above 0.1 MeV to the reactor

shell and metal works plates close to the core has not exceeded 10

neutrons/cm2 in 30 years of operation.

The shielding developed was implemented as follows (Figure 2.1).

Steel blocks (10) (lower, 200 mm thick; upper, 250 mm thick) are

mounted on each graphite column between the 500-mm-thick end reflectors and

the upper and lower metal works. These steel blocks are intended to reduce

fast neutron flow to the load-bearing metal structure and to reduce energy

release in it,

The space between pipes in the upper and lower metal works is filled
with serpentine (3, 4), which made it possible to reduce the length of

process channels and overall building dimensions°

A shield (reactor room floor) is set above the steam-water lines. Its

middle -- floor plate (9) -- is a set of blocks resting on the tops of the
 -18a-
pipe routes. These blocks are made~of ZhBCTsK. The-total thickness of

this shield is 890 mm. The upper floor protects the central hall from

radiation from the reactor, from piping with radioactive heat transfer

agent and, together with the RZM container, helps reduce radiation

intensity during
 -19-
removal of a spent TVS. The. periphery of the upper span (8) comprises

metal ducts 700 mm high filled with iron grit (86% by mass) with

serpentine.

Radially, the side reflector consists of 4 graphite blocks with an

average thickness of 880 mm. The circular vessel with water (6), located

outside the reactor shell, reduces radiation flow to the walls of the
reactor shaft (11) which are filled with structural concrete (density 2.2

tonne/m3, wall thickness 2,000 mm). The space between the vessel and the
reactor shaft walls is filled with ordinary sand (12)o

Table 2.1 presents the thickness and composition of the shielding.

materials for the RBMK reactor in primary directions from the core.

Table 2.1
Thickness of Shielding Materials (from the Center of the Core), mm

Ma~ea7I Ea~~1e~ @|
3D, ,!. o3~q i @)n
500 500 880

MeTa.Xo~oECTpyX), iW 290 240 45

•)Iac•D• ¢neHTE•Ta
ce
1800
1140
40 40 30
1300
"'")TIe=ol(ers (4.0i TA 3)
890
•i0o
 -19 a-

kEY: (I)Material
(2) Direction

(3) Upward
(4) Downward
(5) Radial
(6) Graphite (reflector) mm

(7) Steel (shielding plates and sheet of metal structure), m

(8) Serpentite back filling (1.7 T/m3), mm
(9) Water (an annular tank), ~mn
(10) Steel (metal structures), mm
(11) Sand (1.3 T/m3), mm
(12) Heavy concrete (4.0 T/m3), mm

(13) Structural concrete (2.2 T/m3), xm

 -20-

Figure 2°5 Arrangement of safety plug in process channel

1 - Steel sleeve; 2 - Spiral steel plug; 3 - Channel pipe; and 4 -

Serpentine fill.

Figure 2.6 Arrangement of protective sleeves around the upper reflector:

1 = Graphite sleeves; and 2 - Steel shielding block; 3 - Graphite
reflector° .
 -21-
The intensity of the radiation stream in channels filled With gas
(temperature-sensor channels, neutron flow detector channels, ionization
chamber channels) or ineffective shielding (steam-water mixture in a
process channel) is reduced by installing protective steel or graphite

plugs in these channels (Figure 2.5). The annular gap between channels and

guide tubes are covered with protective sleeves (Figure 2.6).

Gas piping passing through protective structures is bent (Figure 2.1,

item 13).

To prevent neutron and gamma radiation streams, as well as to reduce

activation of structures in the sub-reactor area, displacers in SUZ

channels are filled with graphite (Figure 2.17, 2.30).

 -22-

2.2 Controlled Circulation Loop

(Fig. 2.6)
The MPTs loop is intended to supply water to the process channels and

to rei3ve the steam-water mixture formed in it as a result of heat removal

fram the TVS, followed by separation of steam frau it.

It consists of two autoncmcus loops, operating in parallel and similar

in arrangement and equipment makeup. Each loop remves heat fran half of

the reactor fuel cartridges. The loop includes: two steam drums (10=2,600

ramn), dcwnpipes (325 x 16) , four main circulating pumnps (GTsN), G~sN intake
D
pipes (10=900 rmu); G~sN pressure headers (I•=9O0 rmu); grouped distribution

headers (RGK) (325 x 15 ura) with nulitipurpose valves; waterlines (57 x 3.5

amu); process channels; steam-water lines (76 x 4 ram). (IKMPTs fitting

diagram, fig. 2.7)

Water fran the intake header (1) travels over four pipes to the main

circulation pumips (G~sN) (2).

Under normal operating conditions at rated power, three of the four

G]~sNs are running; the fourth is in reserve. After the Gi~sN, water at
270 cC and 82.7 kgf/an2 travels over pressure pipes on which are installed

consecutively a check valve, stop gate valve, and throttle valve, to the

GrsN pressure header (3), fram which it travels over 22 pipes to grouped
distribation header (4) at whose entry check valves are installed,, and then

over individual waterlines (5) to the entry to the process channels (6).
 -23-

Flow rate through each process channel is set using mualtipurpose valves on
the basis of flow meter readings. Moving along process channels, water,
washing the fuel elements, is heated to saturation temperature and partially
(14.5% on the average) evaporated. The steam-water mixture at 284.5 cC and
70 kgf/an2 (about 7 1"la) travels over individual steam-water pipes to

separators (8), wh~ere it is separated into steam and water. To maintain a

uniform level, the separators are connected by cofferdams. Saturated steam

moves through steam headers to turbines. Separated water at exit from the

separators is mixed with feed water, and at 270 cC (which ensures the
required margin in terms of GTsN suction head), travels to the intake header
over 12 down pipes (from each separator).

The temperature of the water sent to the intake header depends on the

steam-generating capacity of the reactor plant. As steam-generating

capacity drops, temperature rises slightly due to changing ratios between

the amounts of water collected fram the drumns at 284 oC and feed water at

165 cco If reactor output drops, flow rate over the KMPTs loop is adjusted

by throttle-adjusting valves so that the temperature level at the GrsN

intake ensures the required positive suction head.

 a.24-..

* 2.3~Special Control Channel Cooling Loop

A special autoncuuus circulation loop was created. To cool control

channels,• energy-release sensors, and startup ionization chamrbers and to

cool the side reflector. Water is circulated by gravity, i.e. because of

the difference in the levels of the upper (service) and low~er (circulation)

tanks. Cooling water at 40 oC fram the upper tank travels through the

header over individual pipes to the channel caps, and moving downward,
removes heat from then, itself heating to a tanperature of 65 cC. Then it

travels through gully water drainage heaer to heat exchangers, where it is

cooled to 40 cC and collected in the lower tank, fram which it is pumped to

the upper tank. Average water flow rate through the control channel equals

4 m3/hr, pressure at the channel heads is 3.5 kgf/ an (excess). Flow rate

through each channel is set with nrualtipurpose valves according to flow mreter

readings.
 -25-

2.4 Gas oop

Under normal operating conditionsF the helium-nitrogen mixture travels

at a flowj rate of 200-400 nmn3/hr at pressure at entry of 50-200 xrm H20
excess (0°5-2.0 kPa) to the reactor space over pipes passing through the

lower metal works. It is remo~ved through pipes in the process channel

integrity monitoring system and special channels which r~mve gas from the

pipe routes of the upper netal works. Then the gas mixture passes through

the condenser and the three-stage cleaning system. It is throttled and

returned to the reactor space. The gas is circulated by canpressors.o

The gas cleaning system consists of catalytic reactors, cleaning and

drying modules, and deep-cleaning systemnnmdules.°

The H2 is hydrogenized in the catalytic reactor at about 160 oC,

forming water vapor and CO) is burned to C02, releasing heat. The reaction

takes place in the presence of a platinum catalyst in an oxygen medium.

Fron the catalytic reactor, the gas, passing through coolers and a

dehumidifier, travels to a cleaner-dryer, which is made up of zeolite and

mechanical filters. Through adsorption, C02, H3, C2 and water vapor are

remo~ved from the helium-nitrogen gas, which then goes to deep cleaning. The

imuirities remainin'g in the gas are remo~ved in this unit by fractionatiOno

 -26-

(this page is blank)

 -27-

2.5 Fundaxental Data on Physics

The RBMK nuclear power reactor is a heterogeneous thermal neutron

channel reactor in which uranium oxide weakly enriched with U235 is used as

fuel; graphite as moderator; and boiling light water as heat transfer agent
(anreactor characteristics appear in table 2.3).

The development of the reactor was based on experience designing and

many years' operating uraniumn-graphite channel reactors in the USSR.

Therefore, methods of neutron-physics analysis tested in working units were

the basis for developing a procedure for neutron-physics analysis of the

RBMK reactor. There are two basic stages in the research on reactor

physics:

a) Calculation of an elemntary core cell and preparation for full-

scale calculation of the core;

b) Complete calculation of the reactor with regard for the detailed

structure of the core.

Programs which permit calculation of the three-d~imnsional energy

distribution of neutrons in a rualtigroup approximation in a nultizone

cylindrical celi, as well as in a cell with cluster fuel element

arrangement, were used for design engineering calculations in the first

stage. Parameters such as uranium burnup depth, fuel isotope com'position,

and channel power as a function of tirre, rates of reactions with isotopes

incorporated into the cells, along with other
 -27a-
characteristics, were determined. Most of the calculations were done for a
one-dinensional cell with parameters averaged in terms of height:.- ,Constants
for calculation on the basis of the reactor schedule are prepared in the

form of a polynamial
 -28-

equation for the relationship between 1urnup and pow~er for varicus average
heat transfer agent density in tenms of reactor height.

In the second stage, the reactor is cat~letaJly calculated with regard

for burnup distrilbution over core channels, actual SUZ rod decay, and the

actual power of the equaipment. Large-scale status calculations are

performed according to a twoV-d~imensional t•gop program with regard for

actual distribution of the field in terms of the reactor height, obtained

frcmn upper-level sensorS. If necessary, the reactor is calculated with a

threedirnional program.

When the R•kI-I000 reactor was designed, as well as when already

constructed units were operated, in addition to analytical research, a great

deal of attention was given to experimental checks and precise definition of

the calculating procedures used. Critical RE• stands which rtodel frapments
of the reactor' s core were designed and camdissioned. At present there is

an extensive program of experiments to study the neutron physics

characteristics of the REMK-1000's -andthe REBK-1500's core both on the
stands and in working units with these reactors.

A systan for "continuous" refueling during reactor operation was

created for maximum fuel cycle econoay. Psimival of spent fuel and refueling
fuel during reactor operation at the assigned power is accomplished by the

fueling machfine (RZM). When the reactor attains steady-state operating mo~de

(continuous fuel imode), all reactor

 -28a-

characteristics stabilize, and the: fuel. ren~ved fram the reactor's core has
approxlmately constant burnup depth, the magnitude of which is determined by

fuel enriciet replenisher, as •ii as by the assigned

 -29-

numnber of control rods introduced into the zone necessary to form the
optimnum energy release field over the radius and height of the reactor. The

reactivity ma~rgin for RBkIK-I000 reactors is 1.5+1.8% (30+36 rods). Fuel

burnup depth at 2% replenishme~nt with U235 is P=22o*3 M4•-day/kg. Note that,

because construction materials with lowi absorption sections and a high heat

transfer agent steam content are used, the fuel discharged from the

RHMK-1000 reactor during continuous refueling is close in terms of

fissionable isotope content to enrichment plant durrps, which virtually

eliminates the need for further processing for return to the fuel cycle.

When the RBMK-1000 was designed, a great deal of attention was given to

substantiating channel and fuel element working capacity.

The main parameters which determine the limit thermal load for the

channel and the fuel element are critical channel po~wer Ncrc (when this

level is reached a boiling crisis develops on the surface of the fuel

elerrents, causing overheating of the fuel elerrent can),

 -30-

"p
and maxixtum permissible linear load on the fuel elemnt (when. this is

exceeded, the oxide fuel melts.)

N(L
To evaluate the anticipated 'N and •in the reactor, probability

method of deteni'ig possible deviations was used. This procedure accounts

for varicus factors which affect limit .a and •t, including the accuracy

with which overall reactor power is measured and maintained and its

distribution over the core (coefficient for nonuniformity across the core

radius K(t and along the height F•, as well as over the fuel elemnt in the
cartridge J•g, which determine mnaximum design channel power Nm~ and
linear load on the fuel element It was believed that randan.
deviations in maxiimum power fran the miost probable value, Nmcm, follow a

normal distribution. Limit channel power is determined fram the equation

where (J• is the standard error in detrinn and maintaining channel power.

In accordance with the Gaussian distribution curve, the probability of

a channel with maxicmum power (freshly fueled channel in the plateau zone)

exceeding NiiTK will equal (1-O.9987)=O.0013.

Similarly, the limit linear load on the. fuel element

•j))
whereO3c is the standard error in determining and maintaining linear fuel

element p•°
 -31-

On the basis of calculations and operating experience, the following ihitial

values are used to evaluate• Ni and qlnrl:

Along with economiic and technological indicators, the core' s dynamic

characteristics are of particular importance, especially fran the standpoint

of operating• safety. The so-called steam reactivity coefficients is of

special significance. Excperinental radiation at operating REMK units, as

well as analytical studies, sho that coefficientc'~is positive at design

core para1eters in stable conditions and reaches 2x10-6 units per percent of

steam by' volume.

However, the set of equipmnt developed to control the R&'K reactor

includes a system to ensure reliable compensation for possible energy

release field instabilities due to positive reactor feedback in tenns of
steam content. Specifically, the control!/safety system (SU32) includes local

autamatic adjustmnt (LAR) and local protection (IAZ) subsystemis. Both

operate from signals fram the ionization chambers inside the reactor. The
LAR autaclatically stabilizes the primary harmo~nics of the radial-azimuthal

distribution of energy release, while the LAZ ensures protection against

exceeding the assigned cartridge power in its individual regions. To adjust

the upper-level fields, there are truncated USP absorber rods (24) which are

to be introduced into the zone fram below.

 -31a-
Besides improved reactor mo~nitoring and control equipment, there axe

other me~ans for. iniproving •the dynamic characteristics of the RBMK reactor' s

core.
 -32-

These include:
Increasing replenisher fuel enrich~t to 2.4-3.*0% and,
correspndnly, the depth of fuel 1urnup, which makes it possible to reduce
the steam effect to almost zero;
Increasing the uraniumi charge to reactor channels by using fuel
com~positions with increased U content.

Calculations of the effects and reactivity coefficients due to a change

in mo~derator and fuel teniperature, as well as the size of the "fast" powr
reactivity coefficient are shown in table 2.3

Calculations and exeimrents show that the "fast" power reactivity

Scoefficient when the reactor operates at rated paramreters is negative and

close to zero.

Table 2.3
Main Neutron-Physics Characteristics of the PBMK-1000 Reactor

Fuel enriclret 2.0%

Uraniuzm mass in a cartridge 114.7 kg

Numrberldiameter of fuel 18/13.6 zun

elements in T1'S
Depth of fuel burnup 20 dyk
Coefficient of non-unifonmity of 1.48
release of energy along the
radius
Coefficient of ron-unifonnity of 1.4
release of energy along the
height
 -33-
Table 2.3 Cont.

Calaculated maximum powaer of 3,250 JG

channel.
Isotoic cxziposition of
unloaded fuel:
uranium-235 4.5 kg/t
uraniumn-236 2.4 kg/t
plutonliwr-239 2.6 kg/t
pl~utonium~-240 1.8 kg/t
plutcnitn-241 0.5 kg/t
Void reactivity coefficient 2.0
at a working point
Fast pr reactivity coefficient -0.5 x 10- /?4
at a working point
Coefficient of epantionl fuel -1.2 x1 o-/ °c
ten~erature coefficient
Coefficient of expantion graphite
t•erature coefficient
Min~imum "weight." of rods of SUZ, 'K 10.5%
Effectiveness of rods of PR, AK 705%

Effect of replacerent (on the average) 0°02%

of the t~rnup TVS with fresh
 -34-
(This page is blank.)
 -35-
2.*5.1 Main Data on Reactor Thermal Physics

2.5.1.*1 Parameters Defining the Thernotechnical Working Capacity of the

Reactor

The main paramreters which define the working capacity and safety of the

boiling water-graphite reactor in the thermal engineering sense are:

elenent fuel temperature, graphite block structure tem~perature, and margin

to channel power at which a heat exchange crisis begins.

The hydrodynamnic stability of fuel channels in a RPBMK-1000 boiling

water-graphite reactor is usually not a linmiting factor, since hydrodynamic

instability usually occurs at channel powers greater than those at which a

heat exchange crisis occurs.

Exerimental studies performed during design confirmed this conclusion

and showd that rated parameters for RBMK-1OOO reactor operation lie in the

hydrodynamnic stability zone.

If the permissible fuel temperature is surpassed or a heat exchange

crisis occurs, an individual fuel element may fail. However, after it is

replaced, the reactor's working capacity is restored.

 -36-

WCalculations of the criticality margins and determination of the

eleinmie1nt fuel temperature in P34K-type reactors at stable powier

levels are performe using statistical probability methods, and the status
of the core of these reactors during operation is n~nitored on the basis of

these same methods.

In transient and emergency modes, when parameters change rapidly, it is

reasonable to assume that the probability, that the definitive thermal

engineering parameters will exceed the limnit values is higher than during

operaticn at stable pcwer levels. As experimental data and operating

experience with boiling water-graphite reactors show, a znurentary heat

. Iexchange crisis1 , and a 'rise in teuperature beyond permissible for stable

mo~des in these reactors will not cause the TVS 's to fail.

The criticality margin and maxinuim fuel temiperature in transient and

emrgency modes for boiling water-graphite reactors are determined frau

current average values of parameters affecting these values.

2.*5.1.2 Thernophysical Characteristics in Stable Reactor Operating

The makeup of the P34K reactor' s core depends on the operating period.

The initial operating period for these reactors is characterized by the

presence in the core of channels with fuel which has a low burnup depth and
Slarge number of additional
 -37--

absorbers required to ca•este for excess reactivity. As the fuel is

burned up, the load on the core varies continuously. In this transient
period, the channels in the reactor core contain fuel at various burnup
depths, additional absorbers of varying efficiency, and channels filled with

water. The transient period of reactor operation ends after all or a~most
all of the additional absorbers are reioved fran the core and are replaced

by. new fuel cartridges. The reactor is operated further in continuous

refueling mo~de, when the fueling machine replaces spent cartridges with

fresh one.

A reactor operating in continuous refueling mo~de can be represented as

a system consisting of so-called "periodicity" cells. Each "peribdicity"
cell consists of channels filled with fuel cartridges with at various burnup

depths. At any given nrarent, different channels have different powers, but

the total pcwer of all channels in the "periodicity" cell remiains nearly

constant.
 -38-

The PB&MK reactor' s design provides the possibility of adjusting water•

flow rate over the fuel channels during a fuel operating period by changing

the level at which the xmltipu~rpose valves installed at entry to each

channel are opened during reactor operation. Channel-by-channel adjustment
of water flow rate is provided to ensure sufficient margins to heat exchange

crisis in the mo~st thermally stressed core channels when the total water
flow rate through the reactor is mo~derate. The flow rate of water through

the channels is adjusted during an operating period on the basis Of readings

fran a flow meter mounted at entry to each reactor channel to a level

deternined by calculation to ensure requied steam content at exit fran the

channel or the required margin to heat exchange crisis in a given channel.

The possibility of measuring and adjusting water flow rates in each

EEBMK reactor fuel channel is a distinguishing feature of these reactors and

ensure redistribution of water flow rates if reactor po•_r ~and the energy

release field across the core radius change.

 -39-

According to the thiernzra analysis algorithmi for the PBMK reactors, the
distribution of water flowi rates over core fuel channels is calculated by
ordinary iterative method using the total characteristics of circulating
pumps and the dow path• of the circulation loop.

To determine the overall hydraulic characteristics of individual

structural elenents and fuel channel in the reactor, experinents were

conducted on special mo~del stands and on half-scale fuel channel simrulator

stands for a reactor with a thermal capacity to 6 M4J.

The equations for calculating relative hydraulic resistance factors for

a buindle of rods washed by a tic-phase flc• takes the form:

for the actual volumetric steam content in a channel:

and for the ph~ase slippage coefficient:

 -40-

where
G

is circulation rate, • daily voluimetric steam content.

Figure 2.*6 is a chart comparing experiretal values for pressure drop

at the heated part of the full-scale stand and calculations. The graph

shows that the calculation technique satisfactorily describes experimrental.

data and can be used in thermal calculations for reactors.

If the thenma~l power of each fuel channel and the water flow rate

tb•gh it are knw, critical channel power, Ncr, minirmmi margin to heat

exchange crisis, Kz, the probability of a channel entering a heat exchange

crisis mode, R, and the probability of crisis-free operation of all core

channels, H, are calculated.

Functions for calculating critical P3'MK fuel channel power were

detennined as a result of analysis and processing of experinental material

on a beat exchange crisis in srooth bundles of heated rods and in bundles of

rods with heat exchange intensifiers. Experimrents were conducted on stands

with varicos (including full-scale) gecinetries

 -41 -

1)

Figure 2•8. A comparison of the experimental and calculated values

of the hydraulic resistance of a full scale testbench: 0 are the
experimental values and--are the calculated values°~
I•Y: 1) Measured pressure differential, kgf/cm2
2) Calculated pressure differential, kgf/cm2
 -42-

Wof bundles at heat transfer agent paraneters close to working reactor

pa~rameters.
The equation for calculating critical heat flow, in fuel channels

wit~x~at heat exchange intensifiers takes the form:

w~here @ (a)is the relative distribution of energy release along the channel' s

height;

O •r is the coordinate of the crisis site, m;

water heating to saturation at entry, kJ/kg.
is

A set of calculating programs which was developed makes it possible to

perform a thermal calculation of an RBKM reactor operating with continuous

refueling regardless of the position of the munltipurpose valves at entry to

each "periodicity" cell channel. Thus it is possible to determine the

theretal engineering pa~rareters for the reactor at various per-channel flow

rate adjustment rates, various adjustment laws (on the basis of exit steam

cotent or on the basis of margin to critical power), and at various levels

of core pre-throttling.
The results of the calculation of the effect of channel fl• rate

.with
adjustment rate on the thenrml engineering parameters of an R•4
an electric output of 1,000 •
reactor
(RBMK-1000) with continuous refueling

As the equaations shown there show,

appear in Figure 2.*9.
 -43-

4325 i4

t ~2 .
9acmo mc pe2•.,,,pOAQ,.,LpaCXO(

Fig° 2.9 Peactor paramters as a function of per-channel flow rate

adjustment:

1 - GTsN head
2 - Heat transfer agent f1low rate (Gp);

3 - Thberma1 content at entry;

4 - Steam content at exit;
5 - Tena engineering reliability (H).
 -44-

if the rate at which the flow rate of each channel is adjusted increases,
param~eter H, which describes the thermal engineering reliability of the
core, rises, and this increase is mocre noticeable if the rate of adjustrent
doubles over the fuel operating period. A further increase in adjustment

rate does not cause a significant increase in H. On the basis of

calculations perfonrme during the planning of the PBMK-1000 reactor

operating with continuous refueling, a double adjustment was used for water

flow rate through each fuel channel over the operating period of a fuel

cartridge.

To perform a thermal calculation of a reactor operating in the

transient (fram the standpoint of TVS overload) operating period, a

mathemiatica! mo~del was developed to allow distribution of water flow rates

and margins to heat exchange crisis in core channels with regard for the

specific characteristics of each individual reactor channel. The reactor

core in this case is represented as a systemi consisting of channels filled

with fuel cartridges with various burnup depths and with additional

absorbers of any type. The distribution of energy release over reactor

channels is determined either as a result of physical calculation for the

subject core status and the position of the control rods or is sent to the

reactor developed by a special autamated cannunications system fram

operating power units with RBMK reactors.* As a result of calculating

reactors for a given core status and energy, release distribution over

reactor channels, the optimum distribution of water flow rates in channels

ard the hydraulic profiling of the core required to ensure this are

determined°
 -45-

In operating 1BMK reactors, criticality margins and fuel temperature

regime are monitored by a special program (PREZMA) using a resident
computer. •he temperature regime of the graphite block structure is
monitored by thernocouples placed across the radius and along the height of

the structure.

The distrilution of energy release in the reactor core is calculated

using readings from a physical monitoring systen based on measurements of

neutron fuel across the radius and along the height of the core taken

directly in the reactor. In addition to physical nonitoring system

readings, the comiputer also receives data describing the makeup of the core,

the energy output of each fuel Channel, the position of control rods, the

distribution of water flow rates in core channels, and heat transfer agent

pressure and tenperature sensor readings. As a result of calculations with

the PRIZMAi program perfonmed regularly by the catputer, the operator obtains

information on a printer in the forms of core cartograms which indicate the

type of core fill, the position of control rods, the network of. sensors

inside the reactor, the distribution of powers, water flow rates,

criticality margins and margins to permissible thermal loads on fuel

elements for each reactor fuel channel. Criticality margins and margins to

limit permissible thermal loads are calculated using statistical probability

methods with regard for error calculating the energy release field along the
reactor height and radius, errors in calculating formulas and the precision

with which technological parameters for installing the instrumentation and

autcirition systen are measured and maintained.
 -46-

The resident conputer also calculates the reactor' s total thermal p•e, the •..
distribution of steam-and-water mixture flow rates in separators, integral
energy outpat, steam content at exit from each fuel channel and other

paramteters required to mo~nitor and control the plant.

Whnthe reactor Operates at stable power levels, and when power is

raised or lowered, the operator monitors and controls the energy release

field across the radius and along the height of the core, using readings

fram physical monitoring system sensors. If the field deviates fran the

assigned value by a certain anrmunt, a light signal is activated on a special

display. At the same tire, signalling is provided if sensor signals exceed

given absolute values for margins to limit permissible thermal loads on fuel

elemrents (Kg). The operator also nunitors and controls distribution of f low
Srates in core fuel channels. Flow rates are distributed on the basis of

:calculating the criticality nmargins (Kz) in fuel channels on an external

•campuiter and with the PRIZMA program on the resident ccmruter.

The temperature regimre of graphite block structures in operating RBMK

reactors is monitored using thezmocaiples mounted at the corners of graphite

blocks at various points along the structure. In addition to direct

measurements of graphite temperature at structure support points, the PRIZMA

program can be used to calculated maxirnmu (in terms of height) graphite

temperature near any reactor fuel channel. Graphite temperature is

calculated on the basis of tbrvcnle readings and the distribution energy
release over the core volume calculated with the PRIZMA~program.
 -47-

The taeature of the 1BMK reactors' graphite block structure is adjusted

by changing the composition of the gas mixture in the structure

(nitrogen+helium). At present, on the basis of experience operating•

drimestic water-graphite reactors, maxinun graphite temperature at which the

structure will not burn up in the absence of water vapor has been set at

750 oc.
Experience operating RBEMK reactors showis that, given the mo~nitoring and
adjustmrent equipzment available on these reactors, there is no difficulty

maintaining the temperature behavior of fuel and graphite and margins to

heat exchange crisis at the pernissible level when pow~er is at stable

levels.o
 -48-

For section 2.5.1 Basic Data on Reactor Theniophysics

Notation G - flow rate, kg/sec; S - Cross section area, sq. m; d -

diree, m; g - gravitational acceleration, rn/sec-sec; x - mass steam

content;
- density, kg/cu m; p - pressure, kgf/sq an; q - th~erm1 flow~ density,
kW/sq.m; W - velocity, mn/sec.

K pse~ey 2.5.1I.
OcHOmB~ue •aiR~e nO ?TenAo~03Re :pea~ropa

Ycrxo~Mse odo3Ha~euz•

0- pacxo•t, ic/c;
S - nl3Iu•~ nonepe~oro cee, 2

d-.;aeweTp, u;
•-ycxopee~e B UoAe To~emA, -/ceR ;

•- iaacco•o naoco~ep~ e;

Po- 0aTse e, Kro;

, 'N- cR:o..cT,, si/C.

 -49-
Subscripts
ci, - heated;
(g) - hydraulic;
-p critical;

I - water at saturation line;

I/ - steam at saturation line.

/ - mona Na •s Eac~meza;
1/ a Ba J•N Bac~~ ,o
 -50-

206 Unit Process Flow Diagram

The process flow diagram is a single-loop scheme based on the modular..

principle of a double unit: reactor - tw.D turbines without transverse steam
and feedwater connections.
The power unit operates according to the following schem (cf. Figure

2.1.0) :
The controlled circulation loop' s heat transfer agent (water) travels
over 325 x 16-nam diameter downpipes fran the lower part of the steam
separator at 265 oC and 69 kgf/sq an to the main circulation pun~s' (GTsN)

1026 x 63 inn diameter intake header. The main circulation pwups send the
water to the 1046 x 73 flir diameter pressure header and then along 325 x 16

itnn diameter pipes to 22 grouped distribution header (tGK). Fran the rGK,
lower waterlines (NVK) 57 inn in diameter individually carry water to reactor

fuel channels.

The steam-and water mixture formed in the reactor travels along steam-

and-water lines (PVK) 76 am in diameter to be divided among four steam

separators to produce saturated steamL to run. the turbine.

Steam is bled fran the upper part of each separator along 14 steam

bleed tubes 325 x 19 mnn in diameter to two steam headers 426 x 24ramt in

diameter, which are then connected to one header 630 x 25 mmn in dimee.

Fresh steam travels over four pipes 630 x 25 inn in diameter to the

turbines in the machinery room (two pipes per turbine).

TEJ1I]OBA2q'/AII
nPKHHI.I,4I bHA5I
GXEMA
3HIEPi"O5JIOKA
Wr2A 3V•uf
Di~o I
 -51-
Steam discharge devices are located at the steam line area before the

turbines'• main steam gate •valves (GPZ): eight mcain relief valves ((PK) with
a throughput of 725 tonne/hr, fuur fast-action turbine condenser reducers

(BRU-K) with a capacity of 725 tonnes of steam per hour (twQ per turbine

set), and six fast-action reducers for internal needs (BRU-SN). The purpose
and operating mode for these devices is described in section 2.7.

The steam spent in the tulrbine, is condensed in the condensers. The

condensate fran the condensers, 100% distilled, is sent by condensate pumps

through low-pressure heaters to a 7.6-atm deaerator (2 deaerators per

turbine). Frcun the deaerator, feedwater at 165 oC is pumiped by five

electric feed p~m~ps, one of which is a backup, travels to steam separators,

where it is mixed with the circulating heat transfer agent.

The primary reactor process systems besides the controlled circulation

loop include the following:

- kE~rgency reactor cooling systsn (CAOP);

- KMPTs blowown and afterheat system (CP and R);

- Gas loop;
- Fuel can seal mo~nitoring system (KGO);

- Holding tank water .cooling and treatmnt systen;

- Scheme "D" biological shielding tank water cooling systen;
- SUJZ channel cooling systen;
- Intermediate reactor section loop;
- Process channel integrity monitoring system (KTsTK).
 -52-

M~rs Loop
The controlled circulation loop is intended for continuous delivery to
the reactor' s fuel channel of heat transfer agent which renoves heat

generated in the reactor and. for generation of the steam-and-water mixture

and its separation to obtain saturated steam to run the turbine.

The MPTs loop consists of two indepnet, identical loops, each of

which cools the corresponding part of the reactor. All loop equipment is

arranged symmetrically to the reactor' s transverse axis. Each circulation

loop includes:

- 2 steam separators;
- Cofferdamns between steam separators for water and steam2;
-Dcwnpipes;

- Intake header;
- GTsN intake pipes;
- 4 main circulation pumps (3 working, one backup);
- GrsN pressure pipes with fittings;
- Pressurized header;
-Cofferdam between G~sN intake and pressure headers with fitting;
-Group distribution header (iGK);

- Lower waterlines;
- R~eactor fuel channels;
- Steam-and-waterlines.
Drwnpipes, RGK, and water- and steairlines are made of stainless steel
O8KhlSNIlOT. Pressurized and intake collectors and G~sN pipes
S -53-
are made of carbon steel 330E with a surface boildup of steel lCL473N6 fran
Creisot-ILoire of France.
)

Cheical Cunosition of IQ4PTs Materials

-- n- n O - Te..e.....e o n S m o -" . * - .

K~e~eco - 1,2 0,4

c.,2 'oo35 8,5- 18-."

0,7 *0o0o -o.,6

•.•3p 201. 13 ii,10",5E 203:o50

ocL,473N enes 05 *•O5 s e 0 5 5 .5 5 Z.s -e . "

08 epIa.OT 20n'Tu ar10,E4.

6 2
0000 55$5 - I -

.~eJc 350 15,0 188000 426 17 2I6 5143 -

| eC S|| |m1 m eseme1e|| --- e m cee--| N e s e || s s ||osse sil eenI es --

| - soso

Stress-Strain Properties of Materials

 -53.--

A relief valve., throttle valve, stop valve with rertote ccntrol electric
drive, and~a measuring memibrane are installed sequentially on the pumps'

pressure piping0 The presence of stop valves ci the pumps' intake aid
pressure pipes makes it possible to sideline a puzp" for repair while the

loop is operating.
The throttle valve makes it possible to keep the GrsN' s capacity in the

stable unit operation zone from 5,500 to 12,000 cu rn/hr in transient nodeso

Between the intake and pressurized collectors

 -54-
is a cofferdam 750 mm in diame~ter intended to ensure natural circulation in
the loop if a pump stops. The cofferdam has a check valve which prevents

ovIerflowM fram the pressurized collector to the intake collector in romnal

system operating mo~de and a stop valve which is normally open in all

The outlet branches of the pressure header have flowM l~imiters in case

of piping rupture. During pre-startup flushings, m~echanical filters are

attached to tbsp. The pipe supplying water to the RSK have mianual stop

valves. In normal conditions, these gate valves are open and sealed and are

closed only during repair of the MPTs system. The IGK has check valves,

past which (in the direction of flowM) waterlines distribuate water fran the

FGK to individual reactor channels.

IMPs Blowcwn and Afterheat Cooling System
The blowdon and afterheat cooling system is intend~ed for tie

•following:
- In rated mocde -- to cool bluwdon water fram the MPTs system before
cleaning, after which the water is heated before it is returned to the MPTs

systen;
- In shut-down cooling mo~de -- to remo~ve heat fran the KMP~rs;

- In startup mocde -- to cool systen bluwc~n water before cleaning,

after which it is heated before return to the systen and to discharge

unbalanced waters fram the loop when it is heated.

The blc3,• and afterheat cooling system includ~es a regenerator, large

and small blca'n precoolers, 2 consumption pumps, piping and fittings.
 -55-

2.o6.1 Gas Loop. Condenser and Filter Unit

To prevent oxidation of graphite and improu'e heat transfer from the

graphite to the process channel, the spaces betwe~en graphiite blocks and

block structure sleeves are filled with a nitrogen-helium mixture (20 volo

N2 and 80 vol. % He). Impurities are renoved and the nitrogen-helium balance

maintained in the gas mixture by a helium cleaner (OG).

In nonrmal mode, the gas loop systan operates as followis. The nitrogen-

helium mixture leaving the apparatus passes through the •rsTK systeni, where
the temiperature of each channel is checked and the overall humidity of the
mitue being pumped is monitored.

Then the mixture travels to the condenser and filter unit°

The condenser and filter unit for the gas loop is intended to condense

water vapor entering the nitrogen-helium mixture when the reactor channels

are depressurized and to r~sve iodine vapors from the gas mixture.

The system is based on the 2 x 100% principle 0 i.e. it consists of two

independent subsystens, one of which is the working systen; the other, the

backup.o

The nitrogen-helium mixture travels fran the RP to the condenser. The

condensate is removed fram the condenser through a hydroseal to inte~ite

tanks for drainage water through a permanently open repair valve.

 -56-

Service water travels to the condenser

at a pressure exceeding that of the steam-gas mixture, both in rated

and in zemegency mo~des.

After the condenser, the gas mixture has about 100% humidity. If it is
not immediately sent to the filter, the ncisture may condense, which wsuld

cause the filter to fail.

Therefore, before the gas mixture is sent to the filtering columrn, it

•is dried in the electric heater section.

In the coluitn, solid particles and iodine aerosol are reimved from the

mixture.
The filtering colu~nm is rated to clean 1,000 cu m per hr of gas

mixture. After the filtering coltmni, the gas mixture, depending on gas loop
Soperating conditions, goes eihrto theinaehdrofteelm

cleaner' s ccmpressors or to the activity suppressor (UiPAK).

Each of the two subsystans is laid out in individual baxes, which makes
it possible to repair equipme~nt in one subsystem while the other is
operating.

2.6.2 KTSTK System

The KTsTK systen houses sensors to mo~nitor channel integrity. The
RTsTK is intended for:
 -57-

- group monitoring of the humidity, of the gas bled fran the graphite
block structure and piuped through the system;

- determination of reactor channel damage;

- blocking dissemination of moisture frca a damaged channel to adjacent
cells;
- dryi~ng the reactor' s graphite block structure.
The integrity of channels in a working reactor is monitored by

measuring the temperature of the gas pumed in the spaces betw•n the

channels and the graphite structure (routes). To increase the amount of

water vapor in the gas being pumrped, its temerature is increased, and this

is recorded by therrocouples n~.nmted in group channels. The reactor' s

graphite block structure, with the channels permeating it, is divided into

26 zones, each of which contains up to 81 channels.

Pulse tubes from channel routes in each zone lead to the correspndn

gopvalve in this zone. Each of the 26 group channels is identified by

the sane numter as the reactor zone corresp•n to it o

Outlet branches of a valve are connected by tubes to ventilation and

increased suction headers of the K!sTK system. Both these hedes are
connected to the reactor' s process gas loop, thus closing the KTsTK system

into the reactor' s process ventilation syste.

Switching a valve gate can change the anount of gas mpaed through
inpulse tubes leading to a given valve by connecting it either to the
ventilation system or to the increased suction system.
 -58-

2.6.3 Heliumi cleaner

The heliu~m cleaner is intended to remove oxygen, hydrogen, ammonli~ml,
water vapor, carbon mronoxide, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrogen from the
gas mixture circulating in the closed loop through the BR4 apparatus and.

reduce them to a concentration which permits normal reactor operation.

•The gas mixture is contamiinated if mroisture enters the block structure

cavity through defects in process channels; then this mroisture partiafly

decomposes due to radiolysis into hydrogen and oxygen, which, reacting with

carbon, forms carbon m~onxide and carbon dioxide gas. Hydrogen, canbining

with the graphite, forms miethane; with nitrogen, ammonium

The primary specifications for the helium cleaner are:

1. Aiount of mixture at 293 K and 101,325 Pa

(760 mmn Hg) , cu rn/sec (cu rn/br) 0.0833-0.264
(300-950)
2. Pressure at cleaner inlet, MPA (amu Hg) 0.003 (300)

3. Camposition of uncleaned mixture, % (vol.)

Nitrogen 20
oxygen 0.3
Methane 0.1

0.07
CArbondioxid
0.02
Carbon dinoxide
0.1

Hydrogen 0.6

Chlorine Trace

Helium IPmn.
 -59-

4. Pressure at exit fram cleaner, M~a (rmu Hg) 0.005 (500)

5. Temperature at exit fran cleaner, K (deg C) 308+/-10 (35+/-10)

6. Cleaned mixture canposition, % (vol.) :

Nitrogen 10
oxyen 0.01i
Methane Trace
Azmmnium Trace

Carbon dioxid~e and monoxide 0,01

Hydrogen 0.°02

Helium Rein.

7. Second~ary producs required:

Liquid nitrogen, u rn/se (c rn/hr) 0.039 (140)

Gaseous nitrogen, cu mn/se (cu rn/br) 0.097+/-0.104

Gaseus oxygen, cu n/sec (cu mn/hr) 0.0042 (15)

Cooling water, cu ni/sec 0.0056 (20)

8. Length of working life, yr 1.5

9. Length of startup period, sec (hr) 57,600 (16)

10. Timce to first major overhaul, hr (yr) 43,800 (5)

110 Service life, yr /30

 S~auu~q
esa~ u ~ peuTse• ur•.8-TAode •o ppu•

uo~sAS 5uz~too iaxum• u•A uo.• • Due To~uoD 999"

*sBtr4;t; pxze '6ui.dld '•rx uoTsu•dx'e ' s•6twpx ;wet

'scijrd uo.r.T~n,gx.o dooI Btw.rOOO :;•ummi.nbe Btxe'Iro; ell1 sepnTotr, uBosAB equL

e~t&z~. q~UT~T~ • Ui ST (aIl'•To

XXMu m
1 ~) Btr9spx• ;et-&nrdx'4 etz-,

U•sAS 6u1.TooD MEu•t BU. TaTS TIOmOTOx o g '9"

*

• S&JI.;;T;. pun B;d•.d 's~xaeup ;•sti 'sc1ind jo s•s•.suoo pu 8TdTOU.•u.d

%00t x r eq4• peseq sI. u~s~s eu• "sIau•~ sssoord Aq p~ ir; u-eds
uoz• eswsete ;•-i tmnp•s.sz Aq pse'4q s~euumto sseoo.ad pue s~juw. B6~p. cq

u2'4aSA u0T_4,u-•zSe~L VXX 6UTT0C.

oo x (t'2MBU•TP
.TVOH IeTh• :.u-dS 1,'9"*

-09-
 -60a-

The following requirerents are imposed on the system:.-

- To maintain the assigned tenperature in St]Z, ID, D1E ard KO0 channels in all
unit .operating modes (startu, operation to power, shut-down, distutrbance of

normal operating procedure, emergencies) ;

- To maintain assigned water quality standards in terms of chenical

comosition aid specific activity.

•e systen is a circulation loop operating on gravity, i.e. water flowjs through

channels due to the difference in the level of the upper and ictuer t~anks.
 -61-

Water fran t~he upper, so-called emergency water supply, tank travels over
piping with a nominal diameter (ND) of 400 nun to the pressure collector and is

distributed to channels.

The capacity of the elergency tank is set to ensure rated flow rate through

channels for 6 minutes when pimaps are no~t %Drking.

Cooling water fran the pressure header enters a channel fran above,

mo~ves down along the central tube and ascends along the annular gap

betwe the center and outer tubes to the KO00 drainge collector. There are
tw• drainage headers (ND=200).

Water from the drainage header travels over piping (ND=400) to the systan' s
heat exchangers. Water fran the KOO drainage header cales to this sane
pipe. (This header is connected to a cat• pipe (ND~=I50) before entry to

the pipe (NI=4 00).) A throttling device which elimiinates the siphon in the KO0

drainage headers is mo~unted on the common pipe (ND=I50).

There are six heat exchangers to cool the circulating wrater past the reactor.

Past the heat exchangers, water travels over pipe (ND=400) to the circulation

tank below water level. The flow slows in the circulation tank and conditions

for efficient removal of hydrogen from the water are created., A description
of the method for ensuring safe hydrogen concentration in the tank appears in

section 2.7.
 -61a-

Saxe of tIe water frcxm the emergency supply is constantly discharged in

overflow pipes to the circulation tank° This water represents the difference

betwe.n pumip capacity and SUZ, 1D, DKE, and KOO channel thrcubt. .If two

pums are i•rking in the system, overflow proceeds along piping (ND=150) ; if
th~ree pumps are working, along piping (ND=300)o
 -62-
The systen has focur pumps to supply water fram .tbe circulation tank to the

emrgency supply tank. Toof these are working pumps; bwo are backups.Th
first backup pump is activated autma~tically; the second baku purp is

switce on by the operator if necessary.

The pumps are poee fran a category lB reliable supply net with diesel

generators.

To maintain the requaired water quality in the loop, there is costant bypass

treatment at 10 cu rn/hr.

2.6.7 Intei~ite Reactor Area Loop

The~ interwediate reactor area loop is intended to prevent radioactive mredia

fram entering service water fran the heat exchange equipmrent of systems with

radioactive heat transfer agents if their iup•enetrability is disrupted. This

is achieved because pressure in the intermediate loop is below the pressure

of the service water.

The loop is a closed system including an expansion tank, pumps, heat

exchangers, and stop, safety, and control fittings. The loop's pimps supply

cooling water to the heat exchange equipment in the reactor area systems,

and remove heat from it. This heat is then absorbed by intenite loop heat

exchangers cooled by service water. The expansion tank maintains stable

piu operation, filling, replenishmient and car!0ensation for a change in the

volune of intenrediate loop heat transfer agent. For secondary reactor

systems which are at higher elevations and for which cooling water cannot be
 -63-

supplied by primary loop circulation pumps, there are pressure-boosting pumps

which feed water to steam separator sazrpler heat exchangers and to the
reco' s fueling machine.
Regular or cont•n~i treatment of water in the intebrm iate reactor area

loop with special water treatment plants is not necessary. The quality of

the intermiediate loop water is determined by saupling. If the chloride

content is exceeed or the nimei 's pH exceeds established norms, the water in
the intenrediate loop is purified by exchanging water in the system.

Intermediate loop conswrers are the reactor blowcown and afterheat cooling
systen, the system which organizes leaks fran the fitting equipment, GrsN

sealing water chillers, the helitmi cleaner, and chemical monitoring, samler
heat exchangers.

2.6.8 Water Regime

The reliability, safety, and econamy of fuel elerent operation, and normal

radiation condition at an AES are determined by the water-chemical

regime of the prixrry aid secondary loops.

The following reguirenents are imposed on the system' s water-chemical regine:

- Peduce entry of contamination into the reactor core;

- Preventing water-containing impurities fran building up on the core

elemets.
The PBMK uses a neutral water regime withuut suppression of water radiolysis
and withouit introduction of corrective additives to adjust pio
 -64-

Quality of the heat transfer agent in the loop by Goct 95743-79 must follow
requirements.

-pH -6.5 -8.0

- electroconductivity less than 1.0microSi/cm.

- impurity less than 10 microgram equivilant/kg

- Si acid less than 100 microgram/kg

- chloride + chloride ions less 100 micrgram/kg

- iron oxides less than 100 microgram/kg

copper oxides less than 20 microgram/kg

- oxygen - 0.05 -0.1 milligram/kg

- oil less than 200 microgram/kg

Feedwater must follow requirements below:

- pH -7.0

- electroconductivity less 0.1 microSi/cm

- ion oxides less than 10 microgram/kg

- oxygen 0.03 milligram/km

At the time of the operation of the nuclear power plant, all the time must be

organized, required chemical regime of the coolant in loop of circulation.

The radioactive water

must be cleaned before repeated use or dumping.
Radioactive water transported to the special water purification station
 -64a-

wh ic h
consists of a number of components. Components can be selected on the main
and support components.
The main components of the special water purification system are:

- Bypass cleaning of the blowoff water from the loop:

- Purification of water of the spent fuel storage
- Purification of the water of the control roads cooling system.
 "-65-

- Gully water treatment;

- Organic seepage treatment;
- Washing water and loosening water treatment;
- Treatment of deactivating solutions for the controlled circulation
loop;
- Treatment of bubbling pond water.
- Auxiliary SVO units include:
- Preparation of recovery solutions;
- Perlite preparation and precoat;
-Charging filters;

- Pumping tars to KhZhTO;

- Preparation of deactivating solutions;
- Reuse of deactivating solutions;
- Equipment deactivation.
These units, in addition to the MPTs loop blowdown water bypass

treatment plant and the bubbling pond water treatment plant are located in

block, "B" on axes 35-41 at elevations 0.00; 6.00; and 12.50, and are

intended for 2 blocks.

The MPTs loop blowdown water bypass treatment plants are located in

block "A" and block "B". The bubbling pond water treatment plants and the

plant which pre-treats drainage waters with mechanical filters are located

in the VSRO block.

2.6.9 KMPTs Blowdown Water Bypass Treatment Plant

 -65a-
The plant is intended .for bypass treatment of circulating ioop blowdown
water to remove products of corrosion and dissolved salts. The plant is

the primary means by which loop water quality is maintained to prevent

deposits on fuel elements and ensure continuous KtMPTs operation. It can

remove fragmentary nonvolatile radioisotopes from the loop, reduce induced

act iv ity
 -66-

and, most important, reduce radioactive contamination of steam and

condensate-feed routes. Each block has its own independent plant.

The plant is rated to treat 200 tonne/hr of loop water. This capacity
is based on the extent of blowdown in terms of products of corrosion and

make~s it possible to maintain standardized MPTs loop water indices. In

stable modes, the plant's capacity may be lower. In transient modes, if
pressure is no greater than 16 kgf/sq.cm, products of corrosion built up in

stable regime can be removed by the KMPTs deactivating solution treatment

plant, which makes it possible to ensure design MPTs loop blowdown in terms

of products of iron corrosion during reactor startup and shut-down cooling.

Elements in the system:

1. Mechanical ionite filter - 1
2. Combined action ionite filter - 2
3. Trap filter - 1
•4. Moisture trap - 1
 -66a-

2.7 Main Block Equipment

Reactor

The steam-generating plant at the station uses a series-built

RBMK-IO00 power reactor. The reactor and its technical characteristics are

described in section 2.2.

Turbine
The mechanical drive for the TVV-5OO-2U3 AC generator is a

K-500-65/3000 high-speed turbine with underground condenser.

 •67-

MaiR Design Characteristics for the turbine set appear in the following

table:
 Oc~osnue pacqe?1*e XapaKTepI~c!TMxi ?ypoarperaTa npMse~eK•

No'• Item. t nit of Measure _Amount

• .Haxue.o•.1ox Y&Ia.epwoCTb j. ReA. iia
---- __+_
_ __... _+ ....5 e.e..
-----.
....- '--.. e .e= .....
.......
S .... 5
---
Sc se .
O.
.._5en
. = --
. ..
1. - Maximum turbine
Ka,ccwwj~b~aR output,
UO04OCTb MW MW

Rated turbine output, net M

r.
2 HOW .,sematoM•O b510
Rated fresh steam flow rate, +including fresh steam flow rate to
3. Pacxo£ c~eiereo napa 2nd stage 29
PaCXOA, csexero napa tonne/hr
Mx. fresh steam flow rate, including to 2nd stage
4. PacxoA cieeero napa
uaRcM•&AbHP., DJCAD'ZBA
pacxoA cse~ero napa Ha 20
InFial s'•am pressure kff•cm2 abs.

Initial steam bempera ~ure

6. Ha••••~~~~ napa 0C 280,4
7. Hai~s.J~bNM~ B.a ,•OCT• paLeper&u 0,5
Potable water •eat ngeprte
8. Te~1epaeya no~orpesa O
Design pressure in condensor

KoH~emca~ope. /+ • .00
Type of steam distributionu /m abs.

Turbine design diagram

II. p1CTMBsHaR cxe~a
KOHCO 2l•I4I•+2I!iD
•ructural formula for-regeneration
12. C•yIC•ypiaR •po~'a cxe•.
pezO, b•Ii -'if 5 LP+P
Numb et o regenerative steam b~~ ÷~fs
13. •Iwc~o pezre~epa•iiaimPCx
o?5opo napa •T c,
_Speed
•. 14. •aci'o~a ipa~ei o/x, 3000
Turbine central heating lead (in'termediate loop curve 160/80°C)

,ypogMm •rpa4•ix DTpo~ ?ou- Gcal/hr

11 " oro a .rj~0 /80 oC) raa'.,,/ "

672
 "TexJ1Wecxa& xapax~epiic~uxa K~o)eIxca~opa
o.Amount of steam to be condensed (per condenser)
16. KO•_ebCT9~o. ,!ex~c _peai-
ru uapa IfaOI.iE•H tonne /hr 441,105
£•ooling water temp. at condenser entry
f7. Te~cepaTypa oxnaA8•0Se~
DoAld Ha isxo~e a IoH,~eH-
caTop o 18
4!•umberoof cooling water passes

3OAM T 2
•oollngsurf ace
19. I•Oepx~ioCm ox~a•AeH(At 12150
-Hydraulic condenser resiLstance
20. rs~pa~nHec~coe conlpoTXI- o
zieme KoHAenca~opa M.3•.CT.
neenflee ein nfl we - en teeweorn meecee wecen

(•7 b
 :68-

Steam Separator

The RBMK-IO00 steam separator is intended to produce dry saturated

steam from a steam-and-water, mixture.

The separator is a horizontal, cylindrical vessel with elliptical

bottom with manholes 400 mmn in diameter.

The steam-and-water mixture comes to the separator over 432 PVK

branches which are arranged in the cylindrical part of the lower half of
the separator, four rows on each side. The kinetic energy of the steam-

and-water mixture is suppressed and the steam rough-separated by recoil

plates inside the separator.

Then the steam, passing over a submerged plate, is sqparated in the

steam space, and, crossing a perforated ceiling plate, exits through 14
steam branches arranged at the upper generatrix of the separator.
 -68a-
Steam pressure in the separators is monitored by 4 connecting pipes onl the
housing of each separator and 24 connecting pipes for connecting water

gages 0
 •69-

The separator is mounted on five supports; the middle support is

fixed, the rest are sliding guides.

The materials in the primary steam separator assembly units and parts

separator are:
a) Shell and bottom - steel 330E + IC 473 B (clad steel), Creusot-
Loire, France (see section 2 for composition and properties);

b) Steam bleed pipes - steel 330E;

c) Mixture feed pipes and loop water downpipes -- clad steel: steel
330 steel + IC 473 B;
d) Interior separator devices - steel IC 473 B.

RBMK-IO00 reactor steam separator technical data:

- Steam-generating capacity, t/hr - 1,450

- Saturated steam pressure, kgf/sq.cm:

- Working - 70
- Rated - 75
- Steam humidity at exit from separator - no more than 0.1%
- Steam temperature, deg C - 284.5
- Feedwater pressure at entry to the steam separator, kgf/sq.cm - 71
- Feedwater temperature, deg C - 165
- Loop water flow rate, tonne/hr - 9,400
- Steam-and-water mixture flow rate, tonne/hr - 9,400
- Average steam content in steam-and-water mixture
going to separator - no more than 15.4%
 -69a- •
- Steam separator level adjustment drop from rated, mm, no more .than +/- 50
- Effective water supply in separator with possible level position 100
nun below nominal, at least 51 Cu m.
 -70-

- Steam separator service life, yr - 30

- Steam separator weight: dry, t - 280
- In working condition, t - 394
- During hydrotesting, t - 439
- Main steam separator dimensions:
Length, mm - 30.984
Inner housing diameter, num - 2,600
Minimum base metal° wall thickness, mmn - 110

Deaerator
The deaeration plant is a deaerator consisting of a deaerator tank and

two deaeration columns. The deaeration tank has three supports; the two

outer supports are sliding rollers which permit for the deaerator to expand

during heating; the middle one is fixed to restrict horizontal movement of

the central part of the deaerator and to permit its vertical movement. The

deaerator's working pressure is 6.6 kgf/sq.cm; temperature, 167.5 deg C.

During hydrotests (when completely filled with water) it weighs 204 tonnes.

Main Circulation Pump

The pump is a centrifugal, vertical single-stage unit. The shaft has

a double end seal with supply of a small amount of sealing water to keep

the heat transfer agent from leaking into the space.

 -70a-
Main pump characteristics:
- Capacity - 8000 cu rn/hr
- Head - 200 m H20
- Temperature of heat .transfer agent being pumped - 270 deg. C
 .- 71-

- Pressure at pump intake - 72 kgf/sq.cm

- Minimum permissible positive suction head - 23 m
- Power per pump shaft - 4,300 kW
- Electric motor power - 5,500 kW

The unit consists of a tank, cavity, and electric motor.

The pump tank is welded of steel 15Kh2MFA and is coated inside with

anticorrosive surface coating. It supports the hollow part of the pump and

connects it with a socket sealed by a gasket. The recess contains the

shaft and rotor, guide, lower hydrostatic bearing, 0 ring and upper thrust-
guide bearing, which are~in the housing. The pump's design permits partial

or total replacement of its cavity.

Water is pumped to the hydrostatic bearing from the commnon pressure

header through a hydrocyclone.

The thrust-guide bearing has a circulating lubrication system with oil

filtration and cooling from the auxiliary oil system of each pump.

The pump permits continuous operation at flow rates from 5,500 to

12,000 cu rn/hr. Pump heating and shut-down cooling is permitted at a rate

of 2 deg C/mmn.
 0 -71a-
Feed Pump
An electric pump assembly is used to ensure supply of feedwater from

deaerator to steam separators.

The electric pump assembly is a three-stage unit with unilateral

arrangement of rotors and prerotation propeller, hydraulic pivot, slit-type

end seals and sliding bearings with forced lubrication. Cold condensate

(t=40 deg. C) is delivered to the pump seals.

 -72-

The amount of mechanical impurities in the condensate being delivered

should not exceed the amount of mechanical impurities in feedwater, both in

terms of weight and in terms of volume.

Main assembly characteristics:

- Capacity - 1,650 Cu rn/hr

- Head - 84 kgf/sq.cm
- Feedwater temperature - 169 deg. C
- Pressure at pump inlet - 9 kgf/sq. cm
- Minimum permissible position suction head - 15 m H20

- Power per pump shaft - 4,200 kW

- Service water flow rate - 36.5 cu rn/hr
- Oil flow rate - 3.5 cu mn/hr
- Cold condensate flow rate - 21 cu rn/hr
- Electric motor power - 5,000 kW

Condensate Pumps
Condensate is carried from the condensor through the low-pressure

heater system to deaerators by condensate pumps I and II.

Condensate pump I is an electric pump Unit -- centrifugal, vertical,

double-housing sectional type -- with interchangeable prerotation propeller

and end seal: packing gland and end.

 -72a-
Main unit characteristics:

- Capacity - 1,500 cu rn/hr

- Head - 12 kgf/sq.cm
- Pressure at inlet, no more than - 0.2 kgf/sq, cm

- Condensate temperature - to 60 deg. C

- Minimum permissible positive suction head, at least 2.3 m H20
 -73-

- Power to pump shaft - 615 kW

- Condensate flow rate to end seal - 3 cu mn/hr
- Cooling water flow rate to pump bearings - 1.5 cu rn/hr
-. Electric motor output - 1,000 kW
- Assembly weight - 24,560 kg

Condensate pump II is an electric, centrifugal, horizontal spiral pump

with bilateral inlet prerotation propeller. The end seals come in two

interchangeable versions:

- End seal for continuous operation;

- Packing gland seals for startup and adjustment 0

Main assembly characteristics:

- Capacity - 1,500 cu rn/hr

- Head - 240 kgf/sq. cm
- Inlet pressure, no more than - 15 kgf/sq, cm
- Condensate temperature - to 60 deg. C
- Minimum permissible positive suction head, at least - 22 rnH20
- Electric motor output - 1,600 kW
- Assembly weight - 10,335 kg

Piping
Pressurized and intake collectors for the KMPTS (ND=800) and piping
(ND=800) to and from the GTsN are made of carbon steel 330E with a surface

buildup of steel iC 473 B supplied by Creusot-Loire of France0

 -73a-
KMPTs pipe with diameter up to 300m
nii s made of stainless steel grade

O8Kh1BN1OT. Reactor auxiliary system piping is made of carbon steel.

Condensate-feedwater conduit piping Is made of steel 20.

 -74-

Fresh steam piping is made of steel 17 GS.

Fueling Machine
The most important requirement imposed on the RBMK reactor is that it

operate with a minimum number of shutdowns. Therefore, it can be refueled

and certain emergency situations eliminated in an operating reactor without

reducing output. This is done by a special fueling machine (RZM) which

performs the following operations:

- Reloads TVS in operating reactors and reactors shut down to cool;

- Tests the passability of the process channel route with a gauge
which simulates a standard cartridge;
- Seals the process channel with a plug (process or emergency);
- Mechanically eliminates certain emergency situations.

Fuel is reloaded into a working reactor at working process channel

parameters.

The fueling machine performs five operations per day to refuel process

channels in a working reactor without reducing its output and at least 10

operations to refuel channels in a shutdown reactor.

The machine's main components are a crane, container, two

interchangeable pressure housing (one on the machine, the other in the

repair zone), a truss, process equipment, guidance system, and controls.
 o --74a-
The machine's operating principle in a working reactor is as follows.
 -75-

The RZM, which is filled with condensate at 30 deg. C Is butted

against the channel to be refueled. Pressure in the pressure housing is
set equal to the pressure in the process channel, and the channel is
depressurized. Condensate is pumped from the pressure housing at a flow
rate of 1 cu rn/hr. Cold condensate blocks penetration of steam and hot

water from the process channel to the RZM. After removal of the spent
cartridge, the channel is sealed and pressure in the pressure housing
brought to atmospheric. The machine separates from the channel and moves
to the next site to remove spent cartridges.

The RZM has two systems for precise guidance to the process channel:
optical.-TV.(main) and contact (backup) in case visibility is lost due to
steam from the channel.

The optical-TV system makes it possible to visually observe the image

of the end of the process channel cap through a TV or eyepiece and to match
the circumference of the process channel cap to the viewfinder's
circumference by small movements of the bridge and carriage. The RZM's
contact guidance system is a pneumoelectromechanical device intended to
guide the RZM to the channel axis by means of direct mechanical contact
between the system and the side of the process channel cap,

The RZM is controlled from the operator's area which is behind the end
wall on the reactor side of the central hall.
 .75a-
In addition, the RZM's cabin has a crane travel control panel.

The central hall has the following machine service areas: 1. Stopping

point - a zone in the central hall intended to stop the machine during
reactor refueling.
 -76-

2. Training stand, intended for:

- Adjusting and checking machine mechanisms;

- Filling the pressure housing with condensate;

- Simulating standard refueling;
- Charging a fresh cartridge into the housing;
- Deactivating the inner space of the housing.
- The training stand has appropriate equipment to perform these
operations.

3. Spent cartridge receiver to receive the gauge.

4. The repair zone is intended for replacement of a pressure housing

which has malfunctioned. It is located in the central hall near the
training stand. A completely assembled spare pressure housing is always in
the zone.

The safety system equipment is described in section 2.9.

 -77-

2°8 The. Reactor Control and Safety System

The control and safety system of an RBMK reactor makes it possible to:

monitor the level of neutron power of the reactor and the period of its

increase under any operating conditions, namely from 8 times 10exp-12 to

lo2 N nominal;

startup of the reactor from a down condition to a specific level of

power

automatic control of the power of the reactor at a specific level and

changing a specific level of power;

manual (from the control panel) adjustment of the distribution of

energy release over the active zone and control of reactivity to compensate

for burnout, poisoning, and so forth;

automatic stabilization of the radial-azimuthal distribution of energy

release in the reactor;

preventive protection, namely a rapid controlled reduction in reactor

power to safe levels: AZ-I = 50% N nominal, AZ.-2 = 60% N nominal;

 -77a-

emergency protection in the event of an accidental change in reactor

or generation unit parameters (AZ-5)

The control and safety system includes (a diagram is given in

Figure 2.11):

neutron flux sensors with devices (mounts) for setting them in the

reactor

reactivity controls (absorbers) with actuator mechanisms which move

.the controls within the reactor channels

the system's instrumentation, which converts information from the

neutron flux sensors and generates digital signals for subsequent

processing in the system's logic components and analog signals for

indicating and recording reactor parameters;

 - - - S - a * * ~0 a

S
.5
I Isp.
S
S 9*.a,
S
I r - - - C - a S - - - a -

~I
S

'S
L - a a
~cu
a a - - - -~
. u~iF
T
S S
I -
if 1
msutpgt ..... Ei~
... J
I I
I I
I -I- -
* I
* *,gfmua e
S
* gummum. MS
S
I 'I
I S Aons U,
*
I I
m~u
** S

[
0
I I
I 6
*
I
* a ale

;~~i ::
S

rn
III
Id

2.11

0
 "-79-

-the components of the control and safety system's logic system, which
implements specific control and safety algorithms and processes digital
signals from the instrument and actuator components of the system, from
cormmand instruments at the operator control panels, from the automation
system of the generation unit, and other systems; processing generates
commands to shift the control rods under normal and emergency conditions,
adjust the power level, change operating conditions, and trigger alarms and
signals;

the actuator equipment of the control and safety system, which'

controls the servodrives of the actuator mechanisms of the system on the
basis of instructions from the system's logic components;

display instruments for indicating and recording reactor and control

and safety system parameters at the reactor operator panel and board;

2o8oi. The Location of the Primary Equipment of the Control and

Safety System

Neutron flux sensor mounts are installed in the following places:

24 1K mounts in the water shielding tank around the reactor, including

16 mounts with KNK-53M working ionization chambers (RIK mounts) and
8 mounts with KNK-56 (PIK) startup, ionization chambers;
 - 79a -

4 mounts with KNT-31 fission chambers (KD) are lowered into the
reflector channels during the startup period and are removed after the PIK

sensors are operating properly;

in the center holes of the TVS (?) are 24 intrareactor sensors with

KTV-17 type fission chambers.

All of the system's 211 actuator mechanisms are mounted on control and

safety system channels in the reactor. The servodrives of the mechanisms

are channel type drives. The locations of the control rods are indicated

by means of a synchro sensor mounted in the servodrive and a synchro

receiver (rod position indicator) mounted on the control system mimic panel

on the operator's board. The extreme positions of a rod

 -80-

are indicated by means of limit switches which include upper and lower end
lights built into the corresponding position indicators.

The instrumentation of the actuator component of the control and

safety system is located in the control and safety system room behind wall

Ts 3 and includes:

a control panel for the RR-3 and USP servodrives;

a board of control units for the AR servodrives, which consists of

three panels with separate BKS units;

a control bay for the LAR (type BA-86) servodrives, which includes

12 sections;

a servodrive temperature monitoring bay,

Three panels with components of the AR rod synchronization system are

installed in room BShchU-N.

The components of the instrumentation portion of the system are

located in a separate section of the BShchU-N control board and consist of

individual control and safety system electronic instruments mounted on

19 panels of the electronic instrument board and two LAR-LAZ bays with

electronic components made as plugin sections.

 -80a-

A set of indicators and recorders are mounted on the reactor operator

panel and board.

The logic components of the control and safety system are also located

in the BShchU-N room.

The reactor's alarm system, which includes sound alarms and light
alarms located on the reactor operator's board, involves the use of

equipment contained in SSZ cabinets in the BShchU-N room.

The controls (switches, buttons, and so forth), which the operator

uses to control the rods, vary reactor output, change operating modes, and

so forth, are located on the operator's panel.

 -81-

2.8.2 Neutron Flux Monitoring

Under startup conditions (8 times lOexp-12 to 3 times lOexp-7 N

nominal), neutron flux is monitored on four independent measurement
channels with KNT-31 fission chambers. The sensitivity of a chamber to
neutron flux is 0.25 pulses/I/square centimeter. Secondary electronic
instruments (ISS.ZM count rate meters with KV.ZM stages), which run off the
fission chambers, are used to determine neutron flux density on a
logarithmic scale and reactor rideup time. The output information of these
channels is displayed on indicators on the operator panel and may be
recorded from a channel of the operator's choice.

At intermediate power levels of 3 times l~exp-8 to 5 times lOexp-2 N

nominal, neutron flux is monitored by means of signals from four KNK-56
startup current ionization chambers characterized by enhanced sensitivity
to neutron flux (4 times l~exp-13 A/1f(square centimeters per second). In
order to reduce the influence of the gamhma-background, the chambers'
channels are surrounded by lead shields. Additional compensation for the
gamma background is provided by adjustment of the negative supply voltage
for the chambers' compensation electrodes. The signals of these chambers
and secondary instruments (UES.13 emergency protection amplifiers with KVo2
log taking stages) are used to determine neutron flux density on a
logarithmic scale and reactor rideup time and to generate signals for
reducing rideup time to the warning and alarm points. The output
information of these channels is displayed on gauges on the operator panel,
while information from any one channel may be recorded by the tape of a
recorder at the operator's board.
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1. range of power
instrumnts withmonitoring on a logarithmic scale by means of ISS. ZI
KNT-31 chambers
2. range of power monitoring on a logarithmic scale by means of UZS,13
(AZSP) instruments with KNK-56 chambers (with lead)
3. range of power monitoring by means of ARMI instruments with KNK-56
chambers
4. range of power monitoring by means of 1 (2) AR instruments with KNK-53M
chambers
5. r~ange of power monitoring on a logarithmic scale by means of UZS-13
(AZSR) instruments with KNK-53M chambers
6. range of power monitoring on a linear scale by means of a recorder with
a PRU and KN4K-53M chamber
7. range of power monitoring on a linear scale by a KSVP recorder at the
operator's board with. IKK-53M chambers
8. range of power monitoring by LAR channels with KNYo.17 chambers

Figure 2.12. Neutron Flux Monitoring Ranges

 -83-

Digital warning and alarm signals on the reactor rideup period are
processed in the safety logic circuitry.

Neutron flux is monitored and recorded on a linear scale in the 8 to

lOexp-8 to 1.0 nominal range by means of two KNK-53M ionization chambers
with a neutron flux sensitivity of 1.45 times lOexp-14 A/I/(square

centimeter/sec). A KSVP 4 high resistance multirange recorder is used as a

secondary instrument.

Reactivity is measured by means of an ERTA-01 reactimeter which has 10

reactivity measurement ranges within limitsof 0.01 to 5 betas. The

reactimeter is used to monitor the neutron flux (output) of the reactor
along with a gauge at the operator's panel with a scale switch and a
special recorder on the operator's board is used to record reactivity. The
reactimeter channel operates according to signals from two KNK-53M
ionization chambers.

2.8.3. Automatic Reactor Power Control

The system includes three identical sets of AR automatic average

reactor power controllers. Each AR set includes four ionization chambers
situated around the reactor, and the information from these chambers is
used to move four AR control rods in sync. A control signal is generated
by means of adding the relative deviations of power from a specified level
generated in four separate measurement channels. This principle makes it
 =-83a -

possible to keep the automatic controller functional if one instrument

channel or its instruments should fail.

The instrumentation of all three automatic controller sets is the

same.

The use of measurement channels of different sensitivities makes" it

possible for these sets to operate in different ranges, namely a low power

range of 0.5 to 10% nominal and a working power range of 5 to 100% nominal.
The low power range includes one ARM automatic controller (ZAR);
 -84-

in the working power range there are two automatic controllers (lAR and
2AR).

The sensor and part of each automatic controller measurement channel

are also used as a power overshoot safeguard channel: four AZMM channels in

the low power range and eight AZM channels in the working range

respectively.

A diagram of the control and safety system is given in Figure 2.11.

The signals of the sensors in each channel are correlated by means of

a KrTo5 corrector. The corrected signal is compared with a reference

signal from a ZdM.M5 output set point device which is commron for one set of

four channels. A discrepancy signal proceeds to a UZM.11 power emergency

safeguard amplifier and a USO.l0 deviation signal amplifier. If a

discrepancy signal should reach the warning and alarm set points, the

UZMo11 amplifier will generate warning and alarm signals respectively for

further processing in the safeguard logic circuitry. In the USO.lO

amplifier, whose gain is controlled by a power set point device, a relative

power deviation signal is generated. Information on power deviations at

places monitored by the sensors is displayed on a discrepancy indicator on

the control panel and to a certain extent makes it possible for the
operator to monitor energy release differentials in the reactor. The output
signals of the USO.lIO amplifiers of the four channels are sunned in a

USM.12 amplifier, and data on average power deviations are transmitted to

 -84a-.

an automatic controller activation indicator on the control panel. Signals

proceed from the output of the summing amplifier to a control rod
synchronization system employed to make the movement of the control rods
synchronous. The instruments of the synchronization system generate relay
power control actions. The synchronization system generates a signal of
the average position of the rods of a given automatic controller and
signals of the deviations of the positions of specific control rods from
the average.
 -85-

The average power deviation signal (from the output of the UJSM.l12
amplifier) and rod deviation signals are used to generate commnands to*
remove and insert automatic control rods into the zone. These signals are
transmitted via BKS.40 power control units to control the servodrive of a
control rod.

One of the working range controllers is activated, while the other is

on "hot standby". This controller will be activated automatically in the
event that the first controller shuts off automatically due to
malfunctions. In order to ensure "shock free" activation of the backup
controller (no rod. movement), a KrU.4 automatic corrector is used to
maintain zero unbalance at the output of its summning amplifier.

The control and safety system provides for identical set point values
from the power set point devices in the working range with an accuracy of
at least 0.5% N nominal. The set point values of the sensor are kept in
sync by means of a BSP.36 unit and a logic circuit on the basis of the
principle of stopping the set point device whose set point value has run

ahead in the direction of the variation of the set point values.

The operator can control the set point values of the set point devices
by means of keys on his control panel. The working rate of change of set

point values is no greater than:

0.0075% of N nominal per second in the 0.5 to 1% N nominal range;
0°0125% N nominal per second in the 1 to 6% N nominal range;
 -85a-

0.15% of N nominal per second in the 5 to 20% N nominal range;

0.25% of N nominal per second in the 20 to 100% nominal range;
Under emergency conditions the set values of the working set poin't

devices will decrease automatically at a rate of 2% N nominal per second.

A button on the operator's panel may be used to reduce set point values in

an emergency.

The automatic controllers maintain reactor power with an accuracy of

at least + 1 relative to a specific level in the 20 to 100% N nominal range

and of at least + 3% in the 0.5 to 20% N nominal range.

 -86-

In addition to the functional monitoring incorporated in certain units

of the system, the functioning of the measurement channels of the working
range automatic controllers , including the neutron flux sensors, is
continuously monitored, The BT.37 unit compares the output signals of
similar channels, and the comparison is made with the signals of channels
adjacent with respect to the locations of the sensors around the reactor.
If the signal of a channel differs from those of both adjacent channels by
an amount which exceeds possible differences in the reactor, the channel in

question will be considered malfunctioning by the logic circuitry. This

type of monitoring is employed at steady power levels and is automatically
halted in accident safety modes and transient operation modes.

In the operation of the working range automatic controllers, the ARM

rods may be involved in an overcompensation mode of an activated
controller. In this case, when the rods of an activated controller move to
an intermediate terminus corresponding to 75 to 100% insertion of the rods,
the ARM rods will automatically move downward, and when the first rods move
to an intermediate terminus corresponding to 25 to 0% insertion, the ARM
rods will automatically move up.

The LAR-LAZ, or local automatic control and local safety system, is

included to stabilize the distribution of energy release in the reactor.
The LAR system is designed on the basis of the principle of independent
control of power in twelve local reactor zones by means of twelve control
 -86a-

rods. Data from two KTV.17 chambers situated in the active zone of the LAR
rod at a distance of 0.63 meters from the rod are used to control LAR rods.

A KTV.l7 chamber is a current ionization chamber with a coating of

sensitive elements with a composition of U235 whose design includes a

protective electrode for the purpose of reducing legitimate signal leaks.

Negative voltage is applied to the collector electrode from a BP.119 power

supply.
 -87-

Voltage of the same amplitude and polarity as that applied to the central
collector electrode is applied to the protective electrode. In the process
the protector and collector electrodes are under the same potential and

leakage currents are minimized. The KTV.17 chamber has three sensitive
elements distributed over the height of the active zone.

The LAR is put into an automatic mode in the power generation range

after the required distribution of energy release has been ensured on the
basis of information from the SFKRE system. Prior to activation, the
output signals from the LAR zones are compensated by means of correctors
included in the system. Subsequently, the LAR, by maintaining specific
power values in each of twelve zones prior to activation, stabilizes energy
distribution in the reactor. The LAR system maintains overall power with
an accuracy at least as good as that of a traditional medium power
automatic control system. The LAR system also has significant advantages
in transient modes, because it not only makes it possible to vary and
control overall power, but also eliminates power unbalances caused by local
technical perturbations.

At present, the LAR is the basic automatic power control system in the
10 to 100% N nominal generation range. A automatic average power control
system is used as a backup system which is automatically activated in the
event of failure of the LAR.
 -87a-

The LAR system, which consists of 12 physically independent local

controllers, is characterized by a high level of viability. In the event

that several zones malfunction, the system as a whole will remain operable.

Signals from each chamber are corrected by means of a KT current

corrector. After it leaves the corrector, part of the signal is sent to

the LAZ (local emergency safety system) channel, which generates power

overshoot alarm and warning signals; part of the signals from each of two
chambers of an LAR zone are summed in a USO amplifier, which generates a

signal of the relative deviation of power in an LAR zone. If this

deviation exceeds specific levels, the flip flop generates signals to move
the LAR control rod of the zone in question.
 -88-

The rate of movement of the LAR control rods has been reduced to 0.2 meters
per second for the purpose of not exceeding the maximum permissible rates

of introduction of positive reactivity (Nuclear Safety Regulations) when

twelve LAR rods are moved simultaneously (0.07 Ibf/s).

A feature which limits the continuous extraction of automatic control

rods to eight seconds has been incorporated in the design.

In the event that a power overshoot warning signal appears in one of

the LAZ channels of a zone, removal of the LAR rod is automatically

prevented. In the event that power overshoot alarm signals appear in both

channels of an LAZ zone, two LAZ rods are inserted into the active zone

until at least one AZ signal disappears. In the process the average output

of the reactor is reduced by means of automatic reduction of the set point

values of the power set point devices at the working rate of change.

The withdrawal of more than eight to ten RR-AZ or USP rods in the
event of any malfunction (operator panel, control and safety system logic,

SP control power units, and so forth) is prevented by a "power lock"

system. The power lock system automatically determines the number of rods
to whose power control armature circuits has been applied voltage to remove

the rods. If this number Is greater than 8 to 10, the circuit from the
control power source is automatically broken, and no rods may be removed
from the zone. There are three power lock channels which operate on the

principle of "a2 out of 3" voting logic.

 Emergency Protection of the Reactor

Emergency protection of the reactor is effected by the automatic

insertion of all (except for the USP) absorber rods from any initial

vertical position into the active zone.

24 control and safety rods evenly distributed over the reactor are

selected from the RR-AZ rods and put into an emergency protection mode by
means of a special selection circuitry included in the logic bays. In the

process of starting' up the reactor, 24 safety rods are the first to be

raised to VK; the removal of any other rods from the active zone is

prohibited prior to the raising of the safety rods; and the raising of the

safety rods is automatically monitored and signalled.

 -89-

The reliability of accident safeguards and the reliability of manual

control of the reactor are ensured by 6 independent groups of 30 to 36
control rods evenly distributed over the reactor. Each control and safety
rod is moved by its own servodrive controlled by a separate power and logic
unit. The rods are combined into six groups on the basis of providing
power supplies for the servodrives and control units and the layout of the
control units. The failure of one or even several servodrives is
insignificant when there are a total of 187 present. The failure of
several independent groups is practically impossible. Because every
control and safety rod is surrounded by rods of other groups, a "sick" rod
will always have several "healthy" neighbors.

The design of the actuator mechanisms of the control and safety system
ensures automatic insertion of all (except for the USP) rods into the
active zone in the event of power failure. The reliability of emergency
protection is ensured by functional redundancy (redundant monitoring
channels) for each parameter and hardware redundancy (redundant signal
processing channels).

Due to the fact that nuclear power plants with RBMK reactors make such
a great contribution to total power supplies and that down time must be
minimized, the designers of accident safety systems took a differential
approach to emergency situations in the reactor and generation unit. There
are several categories of emergency protection, depending on the nature of
the situation:
 -89a-

emergency protection with total reactor shutdown: AZ-5 emergency

protection until the emergency is taken care off: AZ-5

preventive controlled reduction of reactor output at an increased rate

to safe levels: AZ-3, AZ-2, AZ-l; safe levels of output for different

emergency situations and the rates of preventive output reduction have been

calculated and determined experimentally.

 -90-

The most serious accident safety condition , AZ-5, involves the

insertion of all the control rods (except for the USP) into the active zone
to the bottom ends. This condition occurs if:

output increases to 10% more than nominal;

a decrease in the period to 10 seconds, a reduction and increase in
level in the BS of any half;

a reduction in feed water flow

an increase in pressure in the BS of any half
an increase in pressure in the PPB room, BS, or NVK
an increase in pressure in the reactor space
a reduction in the level of the control and safety system cooling tank
a reduction in water flow into the control and safety system channels
shutoff of two turbogenerators or one turbogenerator operating alone
the shutoff of three or four operating main circulation pumps in any
pump station
if voltage disappears in the inhouse power supply or if conditions
AZ-i, AZ-2, or AZ-3 have been declared and cannot be handled either by
means of the controls (AZ-5 button, KOM switch) on the operator panels and
a number of other power plant rooms

In the event of an. emergency power overshoot recorded by side measurement

channels, a partial AZ-5 condition is declared in which control rodS are no
 S-90a-

longer inserted in the active zone once the original reasons for the
condition have disappeared (that is, when power has returned to the proper

level). This makes it possible to keep the generator unit in operation if

the power overshoot signals were due to power unbalances and the emergency

situation can be corrected by a quick partial reduction in total reactor

output. The same applies to transient modes of reactor operation and when

significant local perturbations occur. A partial AZ-5 condition is short

term; if a large number of control rods are inserted into the zone during

the condition, the reactor will be completely shut down, as in an AZ-5

condition.
 ~.91-

An AZ-3 condition is declared in the event of an accidental load

shedding by two turbogenerators or one operating alone.

An AZ-2 condition is declared (reduction in N to 50%) in the event

that:

one of two turbogenerators shuts down

one of two turbogenerators accidentally sheds its load

An AZ-i condition (reduction in N to 60%) is declared if:

one of three operating main circulation pumps in any pump station

shuts down

there is a reduction in water flow in the KM4PTs

there is a reduction in feed water flow

there is a reduction in the water level in the BS

when the switch to close all the throttle and control valves of the

DRK is thrown

In conditions AZ-l, 2, and 3 reactor output is automatically reduced

at a rate of 2% nominal to levels of 60, 50, and 20% by the engaged

automatic power control system. Emergency rates of power reduction are

provided and the operation of the reactor is stabilized at a safe output

level by means of automatic engagement of additional control rods in an

emergency protection mode. Signals which initiate conditions AZ-l, 2, and

3 and AZ-5 are for technical reasons generated in the process automation

system.
 .-91a-

The generation of an emergency protection signal with respect to any

parameter takes place when two or more sensors of the four installed

operate. For technical reasons, the logic component of emergency

protection consists of two independent sets of hardware. Individual

switches. for each parameter are installed to take off the protection during

tests. The introduction of protection is indicated and recorded by the

SKALA STsK. The safety system includes alarms which announce the operation

of the system, the reasons for its activation, and safety equipment

malfunctions.
 Figure 2.13 illustrates the structure of the system on the basis of
process parameters.

AZ-3, 2, and 1 conditions, if reactor output is greater than the safe

level for these situations, and the actuator algorithm for conditions AZ-5,
3
g 2, and 1 are implemented in the control and safety system's logic.

The reliability of the accident safety system with respect to

excessive increases in nuclear power plants and reactor power and declaring
condition AZ-5 is ensured by functional redundancy (the presence of. at

least three monitoring channels with its own sensors for each channel) and
hardware redundancy (parallel processing of digital signals by several

independent channels).

Condition AZ-5 is declared for when reactor rideup time decreases to

below 10 seconds and is recorded by at least two channels out of three:

In the AZSP startup range from 4 times l~exp-7 to 5 times lOexp-2 N

nominal;
in the ASZP working range from lOexp-5 to 1.2 N nominal,

Each power increase rate emergency protection system channel consists

of AZS.13 rate emergency protection amplifiers with a separate KV.2 log

taking scale and a KNKo56 current ionization chamber with a lead shield on
 -92a-

the channel at which it is installed (in the startup range) and a KNK-53M
current ionization chamber (in the working range).
 .D•z•.te,•ue
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 An AZ-5 condition is declared for power overshoot protection: in the
low power range: from 0.005 to 0.1 N nominal, when power exceeds nominal by
0.5% and is recorded by at least two power overshoot protection channels

out -of four; in the working power range: from 0.06 to 1.2 nominal, when the

power overshoot is 10% of nominal and is recorded by two of eight emergency

power protection channels; in the process there should be an emergency

signal in at least one channel of each of two groups consisting of four

emergency power safety channels.

Each power safety channel consists of a UZM4.11 power safety amplifier;

ionization chamber: a KNK-56 in the AZMM channel and a KNK-53M in the

AZM channel;

a BP.39 measurement channel power supply;

a KrT.5 chamber current corrector

A group of four power safety channels has a common ZdM.5 power set

point device; one set point device in the AZMM (low power range and two set
point devices in the AZM (working power range). The ionization chamber,

chamber power supply, chamber current corrector, and power set point device

are at the same time part of the measurement channel of the automatic

controller of a corresponding range.

The presence of eight power safety channels in the generation range

with sensors evenly distributed around the active zone makes it possible to

p royvide
 -.94a-

protection from overall power overshoots and monitor and protect the
reactor from local power overshoots.

A coincidence circuit for signals from two independent groups (of four

power safety channels) with an alternating sensor configuration reduces the

probability of unjustified reactor shutdowns in the event of a malfunction

in one channel or malfunction of the commnon component of a group, namely

the power set point device. In the process dangerous malfunctions of the

emergency safety system are prevented by the fact that the measurement and

logic components of the system were designed on the following principle:

any malfunction of a unit or channel is equivalent to an emergency signal

in this channel.
 -95-

This design makes it possible to replace any unit in a channel for repairs
or maintenance when the reactor is generating power, which is particularly
important for RBMK reactors operating in a continuous fuel transfer mode.

The power overshoot protection system is always ready to operate,

while the low power protection system can be stopped by the operator by
means of a switch on the panel after the end of its working range has been
reached.

Preventive reductions in power are effected by an activated automatic

control system, namely the local automatic controller, lAR or 2AR, or by
means of an automatic reduction in the set point values of the power set
point devices upon AZ-3,2, or 1 signals.

When the set point value of a set point device is reduced, power
unbalance (deviation) signals are generated in the measurement component of
the automatic controller. When an activated automatic controller generates
unbalance signals of plus or minus 1%, the rods of this controller will
move, while the PK-AZ rods will move upon unbalance signals of plus or
minus 2.5%. Initially two groups of six rods will move downward, and then,
when they reach the lower terminus, the corresponding rods of the next two
PK-AZ groups will move downward upon an unbalance signal of plus or minus
2.5%. Only one group of six PK-AZ rods will move up. Plus or minus ?°5%
signals are generated in the KrU.4 unit of the average power automatic
controller upon signals from the sunning amplifier.
 .-95a-

If a preventive AZ-3,2, 1 power reduction is effected by an activated

local automatic controller, relative unbalance signals of plus or minus 2%

generated in the flip flop unit of the local automatic controller will

cause the local safety rods of the appropriate local automatic control zone
to move. Removal of the local safety rods from the zone is permitted only

after the local automatic control rods have been removed to the VK.

If the set point value of the set point device of an activated

automatic controller does not drop at an emergency rate or no automatic
controller has been activated or if an automatic controller shuts off in

the process of reducing power and an alternate has not been activated,

AZ-3,2, and 1 conditions automatically turn into AZ-5 conditions.

 2.9 The Reactor's Process Monitoring System

The reactor's process monitoring system provides the operator with

visual and written information on the values of the parameters which define

the operation of the reactor and the condition of its parts, namely process

channels, control channels, reflector cooling channels, thegraphite

stacking, metal structures, and so forth.

The process monitoring system includes the following systems:

-- individual channel monitoring of the flow of heat transfer agent

through process and control channels

--temperature monitoring of the graphite stacking and metal structures

-- monitoring the integrity of the channels on the basis of the

temperature and moisture content of the gas flowing over them on the

outside

-- physical monitoring of energy release (SFKRE)

-- the "Skala" centralized monitoring system

Data from KIP systems is gathered and processed by the Skala

centralized monitoring system9 while information on the most critical

 -96a-

parameters is gathered and processed by individual instruments or self

contained systems (the KtsTK, SFKRE, KGO).

The extent of monitoring in the reactor is as follows:

-- measurements of process channel flows: 1661 check points

-- flow measurements in control channels: 227 check points

. -- measurements of in metal structure and biological shield

temperatures: 381 points

-- measurements of the graphite stacking and blocks: 46 points

-- measurements of energy release by radius and height: 214 points

-- measurements of gas temperature:-2044 points

-- measurements of heat transfer agent radioactivity: 1661 points

 2.9.1. HEAT TRANSFER AGENT FLOW MONITORING
Flow in all reactor channels is measured by means of tachometric ball flow
meters. The flow meter includes a primary ball transducer, a magnetic
Induction transducer, and transistor components. Flow meters with a
measurement range of up to 50 cubic meters per hour are used to measure
flow in process channels, while meters with ranges of up to 8 cubic meters
per hour are used in the control channels.

Process channel flow meters measure the flow of a medium with a

temperature of 20 to 285C and a pressure of up to 10 megapascals, while
control channel flow meters measure medium with temperatures of 20 to B0C
and pressures of 5 megapascals.

The basic error of the flow meters is 1,5%. The flow meters have a
positive systematic error due to temperature, which is determined by a high
temperature flow meter tester and is adjusted for automatically by means of
introducing appropriate correction factors to measurement results in the

Skala system.

The lag of the flow meter does not exceed 6 seconds.

Heat transfer agent flow in each process and control channel is

monitored by a computer system. The values of channel flows are compared
with set point values specified on the basis of the characteristics of the
channels and their location in the reactor. The set point values may be
changed if there is a change in the operational mode of the reactor,
 -97a-

If heat transfer agent flow goes outside the limits defined by the set
point values, the computer system will issue a shutoff signal to the.

channel mimic panel and the group shutoff mimic panel; a shutoff notice

will appear on the teletype, and the control and safety system will be

locked on if water flow in the control channel is below limits.

The primary and magnetic induction transducers should be diagnosed on

a. regular basis and decisions should be made as to whether they may be used

further or replaced on a preventive basis.

 -98-

The primary transducer should be diagnosed by taking oscillographs of

signals from the magnetic induction transducer, determining signal

amplitude and period ratios, and comparing the values of the ratios with

set criteria. The magnetic induction transducer is diagnosed periodically

by means of checking the resistance of its magnetic coil.

 -99-

2.9.2 TEMPERATURE MONITORING

The temperatures of the graphite stacking and metal structures are

monitored by means of commercially manufactured KhA thermoelectric cable

transducers.

A thermocouple assembly (BT) is used to monitor the temperature of the

graphite stacking and the upper and lower metal plates..

Thermocouple assemblies are placed on'the longitudinal and transverse

axes of the reactor in 17 cells situated at the joints of the corners of

the graphite blocks. 12 trizonal assemblies are used to measure the

temperature of the graphite stacking (four of which are in the reflector),

while 5 bizonal assemblies are used to measure the temperature of the base

and upper shielding plates.

A thermocouple assembly includes thermoelectric cable transducers and

a bearing structure consisting of a biological shielding plug, graphite

sleeves, and connecting tubes. See Figure 2.36.

In the trizonal assemblies the working junctions of the thermoelectric

transducers are situated in the central section of the active zone and 2800

millimeters below and 2700 millimeters above the central zone. The

transducer is built around a cable with an outside diameter of 4.6

millimeters with a sheath made of a carbonization resistant high nickel
 -99a-

alloy. The cable has four strands with magnesial insulation, and has two
chromel and 2 alumel thermoelectrodes formed into a single working

junction. Thus, each thermoelectric transducer includes two thermocouples

with a commnon working junction.

The systematic component of graphite stacking temperature measurement

error due to internal heat release in the elements of the thermocouple

assemblies may reach 2.2% of measured temperature and is taken into account

by means of adjustments to measurement results in the Skala system.

S
 - - -

#100-•

Figure 2.36. A thermocouple assembly

1. tube
2. rod
3. graphite sleeve
I 4. chromel-alumel
thernmoelIectri c
transducer

2
4

PMC. 2.36. DJt~ox ?epMotlap

1 -- :Jpy~a, 2 -- cep~@Wb.

3 - rpaQKTOaroa laryrma.

4 -. xp;oMentbu-anroMeJ~eau~f
tepHonfeopSOlo&a5AO

100O
 -101-

The heat lag of the assembly is acceptable and amounts to 90 seconds,

which is much lower than the heat lag of the graphite stacking, which.
sometimes reaches 30 to 40 minutes.

In bizonal thermcouple assemblies the working junctions of the

thermocouples are situated at the levels of the upper and lower plates.

The temperatures of other metal structures are monitored by means of

cable chromel alumel thermoelectric transducers built around a thermocouple
cable 4 millimeters in diameter and inserted into sealed steel sleeves
(Figure 2.37). The sleeves both protect the thermocouples and serve as
guide elements in monitoring hard to reach places. The temperatures of
metal structures are monitored for the purpose of determining their
condition under static and transient conditions.

In the upper and lower metal structures, which are very complex
structures which include a large number of structural members under high
temperature stresses, there may be as many as 30 checkpoints. The outside
surfaces of the process and control channels, the edges of the structural
members, roller supports, expansion joints, and upper and lower plates are
monitored.

The temperature of the reactor vessel is monitored on a single

generatrix at four points by height. The bearing metal structure is
 -lOla-

monitoredat six points on a single radius. The bottom sides of the beams
in the ceiling of the central room are monitored at eight points.

In addition, the temperature of the water in the biological shielding

tanks is monitored by means of chromel alumel thermoelectric transducers

with heads at 16 points (Figure 2.38).
Io I

aI

8 a
J

Ftgure 2.37 A dimensional drawing of a chrome1 alumel cable thermocouple

0.

gQ
 0

W,
£

0.

60 S
.

Figure 2.38 A dimensional drawing of a chromel alumel thermocouple

with a
head
 •-1I04-

Six cable chromel alumel thermoelectric transducers installed at

benchmarks are used to monitor water temperature at the control channel

drain.

156 chromel alumel thermoelectric transducers are used to monitor

water temperature in the reflector cooling channels.

The temperature instruments used are classified as low lag

instruments; the heat lag of cable thermocouples is approximately 5

seconds, but when they are installed in an additional protective sleeve for

measuring the temperature of metal bearing structures, the heat lag is

approximately 60 seconds.

Instrument error is approximately 2% of the measurement range.

Temperature information is periodically printed out by the SKALA

system and any parameter may be called for by code on the SKALA's digital
display and backup group instruments.
 -105-

2.9.3. PROCESS CHANNEL INTEGRITY MONITORING

The process channel integrity monitoring system (KTsTK) is part of the

reactor Ventilation system and is generally designed to solve the following

problems:

find leaky reactor channels

ventilate the reactor space

A diagram of the process channel integrity monitoring system is given

in Figure 2.39.

The operation of a process channel integrity monitoring system is

based on measuring the parameters of gas (temperature and moisture content)

as it circulates through the graphite stacking in gas lines formed by the

graphite stacking and the process channels.

Temperature is individually monitored, while moisture content is

collectively monitored.

Temperature is measured by means of short chromel copel thermoelectric

transducers mounted on each pulse tube of the system.
 - 105a -
Information on temperature signals is transmitted from the
thermocouples to the SKALA system for processing, which in turn, after;

determining the channel or group of channels in which temperature exceeds

the set point, transmits a signal to a channel mimic panel located on the

generation unit control board.

Moisture alarms are used to monitor moisture in 26 zones and determine

wet zones. The moisture alarm consists of 8 moisture sensors and an eight

channel moisture measurement unit. The sorption type sensitive element of

the moisture sensor is designed to operate at temperatures of 40 to lOOC

and relative humidities of 50 to 100%o,

 ..U .

- o6- ""

a •
I
41 .!

° O
0 U.8"
o* ,j l

- . . • -° •

K rpynno30o~r
IJ~au8Ey

Figure 2.39.
installation of The
the process
chromel channel integrity monitoring
copel thermoelectric system
transducer (a) and
(b) Key: 1.
reactor 2. process channel 3. pulse tubes 4. panel 5. transducer 6. call
device 7. digital reader 8. Skala system 9. channel mimic panel 10.
moisture panel 11. moisture alarm 12. group valve 13. moisture sensor 14.
gas blower
 -107-

Relative humidity can be set at intervals of 5%. When the moisture alarm
operates, it transmits signals to the SK.ALA system, which displays them on

a moisture panel located on the unit control board.

A hygrometer which includes a sorption type primary transducer, a

measurement unit, and a recorder, is used to continuously monitor gas

moisture content in the reactor space over a range of 0 to 100%.

The bellow cavities of the control and safety system channels are

drained and the temperature of the drainage piping is measured in order to

improve the reliability of determining process and control channel

integrity.

The moisture which appears in the reactor space during a leak will

evaporate, and by condensing on the nearest "cold" control channels, will

partially settle in the bellow .cavity and later run down into the drainage

piping. In the process the temperature of the drainage piping, which runs

through the bottom water line room and has the same temperature if there

are no leaks, will drop, a fact which will be recorded by a thermocoupleo~

Where to look for leaks is determined by the readings of the

thermocouplesb which yield temperature values approximately lOOC lower than

the temperature of the bottom water line room.
 -107a-

Temperature measurements are taken on 126 control channel drain lines

and are periodically printed out by the SKALA system.

 -108-

2.9.4. MONITORING THE FUEL CAN FOR LEAKS

The design philosophy and physical characteristics of a nuclear power

plant with RBMK reactors (channel type reactors with boiling heat transfer

agents) determine the structure of the system for identifying and locating

leaky fuel cans during the operation of the reactor.

Fuel cans are checked for leaks by a system which includes:

-- a sample taking system for monitoring the activity of gaseous

fission products in the separated steam of each separator drum, which makes

it possible to make continuous observations of the condition of the fuel

elements of the fourth part of the fuel element assembly in the active

zone.

-- a non-sample channel by channel system for periodically checking the

total gamma activity of the heat transfer agent in each steam and water

line, the secondary electronic component of which is used to compensate for

the signal background in order to isolate the contribution of the gamma

activity of fission products leaking out of leaky fuel elements.
 -I09-

2.9.5. MONITORING THE MULTIPLE FORCED CIRCULATION LOOP

The multiple forced circulation loop is monitored to determine its

condition and the operation of its~basic components, namely the separator
drums, the main circulation pumps, and the intake and pressure collectors.
Monitoring involves checking level and pressure in the BS, the temperature

of the metal of the BS, the surge tanks, the flow and pressure of the main
circulation pumps, and the flow of steam from the drum and feed water into

the drum.

Platinum resistance thermometers which measure the temperature of the

heat transfer agent are used to determine the cavitation condition of the
intake collectors. Pressure is monitored in the intake and pressure
collectors of the main circulation pumps.

The flow of water through the main circulation pumps is measured by

means of a differential pressure gauge with a constrictor to generate a

pressure differential. The parameters of the multiple forced circulation
loop are monitored by the SKALA system.
 .- 110-

2.9.6. THE SK.ALA CENTRALIZED MONITORING SYSTEM

The SKALA integrated automated centralized monitoring system is designed to

monitor the primary equipment of the generation units of nuclear power

plants with RBMK-IO00 reactors and to perform calculations and logic

analysis of the operating conditions of the units and provide processed

information to plant operators and staff. Figure 2.40 illustrates the

structure of the system and its ties to other systems (the control and

safety system, the process channel integrity monitoring system, and so

forth).

The primary system is a two processor computer system which can

...receive information from the plant and output information to displays by

means of any of its processors (functional redundancy).

Information on the condition of the generation unit is transmitted

from process monitoring system sensors via individual channels or VK by the

operator to reading and digital instruments, mimic panels, channel mimic

panels, and individual deviation panels and is recorded by recorders,

teletypes, and fast printers. An operator can get the information he needs

from the system by means of a set of input and output devices. The system

has its own control system to manage its operation.

The basic technical characteristics of the system are given below:

1. extent of monitoring: 7200 analog signals and 6500 digital signals

 I OF~hEKT ,Me, #F, .,ee = ,rI*p/Pi
I!
I

• ,2 . 40 •mrnrnnplg!:iH cxePI~a .cUemeMui ,o~,a

/~cAazjeA 7~'r e~e~//e4,%~ie reeez'/-ie~.,
/4 Awj /Y~o 74'90 ~
Z. ~2A~W2e~' 7~'r co//ec6ve ~ ~$

A012 44a4 / ~e4&prJ

O~Z4

r~r ec~e/V'q~ C6?~ ~ ~

cAz44e4
 -112-

signals received: from chromel aluminum and chromel copel

thermoelectric
platinum and copper resistance thermometers

tachometric ball flow meters

sensors: differential pressure gauges with a standardized 0 to 5

milliamp
output, synchro sensors, flip flop sensors, the SFKRE independent

system,
and signals of the average position of the control rods

2. Monitoring periods:

mass parameters 1 to 5 minutes

analysis parameters 30 minutes

Functions:

Measuring parameters input via collective and individual data

reception channels and upon calls from staff to collective, individual, and

digital reading instruments.

Indicating the condition of machinery, valves, aggregates, and process

parameters on mimic panels, MTK, collective deviation panels, and control

and safety system panels.

Monitoring the deviations of directly measured and calculated

parameters and outputting the results to data displays and recording them.
Periodic process calculations at the request of the staff;
 -112a-

Periodic printout of any measured or calculated process parameters at

the request of the staff and recording the prehistory and development .of an

emergency.

4. Mean time until failure:

monitoring functions 1 times lOexp4 hours

calculation functions 2 times l0exp3 hours

5., power consumption 95 kilowatts

 -113-

-ENERGY RELEASE (SFKRE)

The Purpose and Composition of the SKFRE

The SKFRE is designed to measure and record signals from energy

release monitoring detectors which characterize energy release in the

reactor. By providing primary processing of signals from the energy

release detectors and comparing them with preset limit values, the SFKRE

gives recommnendations to the operator for energy release distribution

control. The light and sound alarms issued by the SFKRE are used tO
balance energy release distribution. The interface between the SFKRE and

the computer of the SKALA system is used to provide additional adjustment

of energy release. The computer uses signals from the energy release

detectors, the results of physical analyses, and other necessary

information for periodic calculations and recordings of power and safety

factors for each fuel element canister and to calculate a number of other

canister and reactor parameters.

The SFKRE's recording potentiometer is used for online monitoring of

the thermal output of a reactor from the minimum monitorable level to ...
nominal. The potentiometer records the total current from the energy

release detectors over the radius of the reactor and has a scale calibrated
in megawatts (a scale of 0 to 4000 megawatts). A backup instrument is used

for the same purpose.

 -1 13a -

With respect to functional purpose the SFKRE may be divided into three
systems: a system for physical monitoring of the distribution of energy

release over the radius of the reactor, a system for physical monitoring of

the distribution of energy release over the height of the reactor, and an

auxiliary system for periodic followup calibration of the detectors.

 -114-

The SFKRER is designed to measure and record the signals of 130

intrazone detectors for monitoring energy release over the radius of the

reactor, preliminary processing of these signals, transmission to the

computer of the SKALA system, comparing the signals with three, set levels,
and providing light and sound alarms when energy release in the canisters
equipped with detectors goes off limits. The limi~t values of the output of
canisters with energy release detectors are determined by the computer of
the SKALA system so as to balance energy release and ensure the safety of
the canister in question and its neighbors..

The SFKREV .is designed to measure and record signals from 12 intrazone

seven section detectors for monitoring energy release over the height of
the reactor, for preliminary processing of these signals, transmitting them

to the SKALA computer, comparing the signals with three set levels, and
providing light and sound alarms when local energy release levels in
canisters adjacent to the detectors go off limits. Limit signal values for.
individual sections are determined by the SKALA computer so as to stabilize
axial distributions of energy release and ensure the safe operation of the
canisters without going over maximum permissible local heat loads.

The auxiliary system (SPD) is designed for periodic followup

calibration of the energy release detectors and to determine fuel can
output calculation errors for the SKALA computer.
 -114a-

The SFKRER includes 130 radial energy release detectors, energy

release monitoring instruments, a recording potentiometer (SKFRE power

recorder), a backup reading instrument, and instrument displays.

 "-115-

The SFKREV .includes 12 seven section detectors for monitoring energy

release over the height of the reactor, energy release instruments, and
energy release instrument displays.

The instruments are modular in design and are serviced by one commnon

multichannel recorder which utilizes a digital recorder to record detector

signal values exceeding limit values, overshoot time, and the coordinates

of the detectors.

Figure 2.2a illustrates the configuration of the radial and height

energy release detectors and control and safety system rods used to-monitor

and control energy release in the reactor. For the purpose of monitoring

and controlling energy release distribution, the reactor's designers

included about 310 mounts and containers with dry bearing tubes (sleeves)

in their centers. 130 of them are designed to hold radial energy release

detectors, 48 are designed to hold local automatic control and safety

system detectors, and at least 130 are left free (power scanning

containers) and are used for periodic followup calibration of the

detectors. These containers are placed next to the containers with the
radial detectors.

The instruments and multichannel recorder are placed in the unit

control board. The energy release light alarms are located on .the
SUZ-SFKRE mimic panel on the operator's board. A unit which activates the
 -l15a-

light alarms on the mimic panel on commuands from the energy release
monitoring instruments is included in the SKALA system°
 -116-

The SFKRE's power recorder is located on the operator's board, and a

backup instrument is located on the operator's panel. The energy release
monitoring displays are located on the operator's board.

The SPD includes DKER type calibration detectors, triaxial calibration

fission chambers, a ring ionization chamber, and instruments.

Calibration detectors are moved in and out of the reactor by means of

the crane in the central room. The instruments may be located in the
central room or the crane operator's room in the central room.

Radial Energy Release Detectors

Radial energy release detectors are kept in dry central zirconium

bearing sleeves with inside diameters in the active zone of the reactor of

6.5 millimeters located along the axis of a container (over their entire
length). The design of a radial detector is illustrated in Figure 2.4.1. A
radial detector consists of a sensitive element in a sealed housing 4 made
of corrosion resistant steel with an outside diameter of 6 millimeters, a
sealed connector assembly, a cable line in a sealed protective housing, and
biological shielding components. The housing of the detector is filled
with an inert gas (argon) to protect the casing of the sensitive element

from corrosion.
 A-A
a

4K3P.
 --118-

The total length of the detector is 16167 millimeters and the length
of the sensitive element is 8500 millimeters.

A beta emission detector with a silver emitter 5 is used as the

sensitive element. It is a high temperature KDMS(S) cable with an outside

diameter of 3 millimeters, a middle strand of silver 0.65 millimeters in

diameter, a sheath of corrosion resistant steel, and magnesium oxide

insulation 0.8 millimeters thick. The cable is manufactured by an

industrial technology used for high temperature cables and thermocouples.

The sensitivity of the detector is approximately 5 times l~exp-20 Aper

square centimeter per second per neutron per meter of length. The maximum

current of the sensitive element at nominal reactor power is about 15

microamperes. The maximum temperature of the sensitive element of the

detector is greater than that of the heat transfer agent in the container

due to radiation heating and amounts to approximately 350C.

The average ratio of the power of an un-burnt out can with an energy

release detector to the current of an un-burnt out detector is 0.2

megawatts per microampere. The variations of this ratio for each detector

due to its individual sensitivity and neutron spectrum are taken into
account by means of periodic calibrations of the detectors during the

operation of the reactor. The mean square variation of the sensitivity of

a detector to neutron flux is 4%, according to experiment data. At the

same time, the mean square variation of the sensitivity of a detector to

can power is greater and amounts to 6%, which can be explained by

 -119-

This effect may be taken into account on the basis of measured

distributions of spectrum characteristics over the reactor, but in
practice, a method involving direct periodic calibration of each detector

on the basis of the power of each fuel can and scanning containers with

hollow central sleeves in an operating reactor by means of DKER type beta

emission detectors or triaxial fission chambers has been adopted.

The mathematical and experimental relationship of the neutron flux

sensitivity detector to the integral current of a detector is a quite

effective measure of neutron fluence which is quite independent of the

neutron spectrum or the temperature of the detector 0

The ratio of the power of a can with a detector to neutron flux

density at the point of installation of the detector depends on the

integral energy generation of the can Eio

During the operation of the reactor can power is calculated by the

formula

where Ktp• is the individual calibration factor of the ith detector and Ji

is the current of the ith detector,

When a detector in a burnt out can is replaced,, the current value of (I )

in the SKALA computer is changed by changing the integral current of the
 * ~-118aa-

differences in the neutron spectrum among different cans with radial energy

release detectors.
 -11ga-

detector stored in the computer's memory. Calculations have shown that the
error associated with the use of formula 1 in replacing a burnt out
detector with a fresh one does not exceed 1%. In general the experience of
operating RBMK reactors has shown that the aforementioned allowance for the
burnout of detectors and cans does not lead to errors greater than 1% in
determining energy release in the reactor.
 -120-

The radial energy release detector (without its cable line) is

installed in the center sleeve of the container by means of the crane~in
the central room. Cable lines are laid when the reactor is built.

Malfunctioning detectors may be replaced when the reactor is down or when

it is going after they are disconnected from the cable lines.

The detector is designed to have the same service life as the fuel

can. Radial detectors have proven to be highly reliable in RBMK reactors.

According to service records, the average mean time to failure of a

detector is 9.7 times lOexp4 hours.

A radial energy release detector is considered to have failed if:

-- the emitter breaks and there is no current at the emitter's

connector

-- the readings of the detector are rejected by the SKALA computer when

it is performing calculations on the Prizma program.

-- the sensitivity of the detector drops, allowing for burnout, by more

than 15% between calibrations

-- rapid fluctuations in the signals of a detector which do not occur

with adjacent detectors

 -120a-

-- a drop in the resistance of the detector's insulation below 1O00

kiloohms

Height Energy Release Detectors

12 detector assemblies evenly distributed over the active zone of the

reactor in the radial distribution plateau region are used to monitor

energy release distribution by height. Each assembly includes seven beta

emission detectors with silver emitters made in the form of KDMS(S) cable

like those of-the radial energy release detectors. These detectors are

evenly distributed, over the height of the reactor°

 -121-

Each sensitive element (section) is a coil of the same cable with an

outside diameter of 62 millimeters and a height of 105 millimeters. The

total length of cable in the coil is 2.6 meters. The centers of the upper
and lower sections are offset from the boundaries of the active zone

towards the center by 500 millimeters.

The design of a height energy release detector is illustrated in

Figure 2.42. Seven sensitive elements are enclosed in a dry sealed sleeve
made of corrosion resistant steel and mounted in a channel similar to that
S designed to hold the control rods. On the outside the sleeve is codled

I with a layer of running water 7 millimeters thick with a temperature of no*

more than 70C when it leaves the reactor. Along the axis of the sleeve is

a center tube designed for periodic calibration of the detector sections by

means of a triaxial fission chamber which can be shifted vertically over

the detector. In the idle position the fission chamber may be left in the
center tube of the detector, because its sensitive space will lie below the

lower boundary of the reactor's active zone.

The sensitive elements are connected by high temperature KNMS(S)

cables to sealed connectors located at the outlet from the sleeve into the
central room. The same cable, which is enclosed in a protective sheath

made of corrosion resistant steel, connects the sensitive elements by the

Iconnectors to an outside terminal.
noise immunity.
The cables are routed so as to optimize
In particular, one may not lay detector cables and the

power cables of the control rod drives together.

 -J.2la-

The inside of the sleeve is filled with a mixture of argon and helium
in order to reduce radiation heating of the detector; as a result, the

maximum temperature of the sensitive element will not exceed 150C.

 tOl
0

-S

Fic. 2 .4•OHCTpy•IIUI .PK3B. Tpyda; 3-yBcTDMTe.7Th3Ue •.'e•cuT•.

*I-xadeAL; 2-repMeTlPIff
122
 - 122- A

Figure 2.42 The Design of the Height Energy Release Detector

Key: 1. cable 2. sealed tube 3. sensitive elements
 -.123-

In order to shield the space above the reactor from the ionizing
radiation of the active zone and the steam and water lines of the reactor,

the detector is equipped with two steel shielding plugs situated in the top

part of the sleeve. In addition, there is a special sh~ielding cap in the

top part of the detector which at the same time serves to protect the

connectors of the detector from mechanical damage.

When the reactor is operating at nominal power, the currents of

individual sensitive sections may vary from several microarmps to 15

microamps, depending on the location of the section in the active zone.

The design of the detector assembly and panel makes it possible to

replace a detector when the reactor is running or shut down. Detectors are
replaced by remote control by means of the central room's crane, Cables

must be laid during the construction of the reactor and can be replaced

only when the reactor is shut down.

During the operation of the reactor, signals from each section of the

detector are used to calculate neutron flux density at the place where it

is installed:

where n is neutron density, vO is 2200 meters per second, Kgplj Is the

individual calibration factor of the ith section of the jth detector,
xi(D)(Iij) is a correction factor for emitter burnout which depends on the
 -123a-

integral current of the ith section of the jth detector lij and is

identical to that used for a radial energy release detector, and Jij is the

current of the ith section of the jth height energy release detector.
 -124-
The service life of a height energy release detector is assumed to be

two and a half years. The experience of operating RBMK reactors has shown
that these detectors are satisfactory in terms of reliability. The average

mean time until failure of a height energy release detector, according to

service records, is 4.0 times lOexp4 hours.

A height energy release detector is assumed to have failed in the

following cases: -- there is a reduction in the sensitivity of a

section of more than 15% between calibrations, allowing for burnout.

-- rapid fluctuations in the signals from a section not present in the

readings from other sections -- a reduction in the resistance of a section's

insulation below 100 kiloohms.

Energy Release Monitoring Instruments

The Purpose and Composition of the Instruments

Energy release monitoring instrumentation is physically made in the

form of four bays which contain basic functional units and control and

testing equipment. The instrumentation also includes displays for checking

energy release distribution in the reactor, a recorder, and a reading

instrument for monitoring the thermal power of the reactor, a control panel

for alarm set points, switching equipment, and digital indicators of the
coordinates of a detector called by the display, and equipment for testing

and adjusting the basic functional units.

 -125-
Energy release monitoring instrumentation may be divided into two
groups on the basis of its purpose: SFKRER and SFKREV equipment. The basic

functional units of the groups differ in design: the first group includes

two measuring instruments, while the second includes one.

All three measuring instruments are serviced by one multichannel

recorder which employs a digital printer to record detector output signals

which exceed safe limits, excess time, and the coordinates of the detector.

The measuring instruments perform the basic functions of generating

data signals and online monitoring of- energy release distribution in the
reactor. These functions are performed separately for each radial and'

height energy release detector by components of the system (instrumentation

lines). SFKRER instruments can process signals from 130 radial detectors

mounted in the reactor and an additional 14 radial detectors can be hooked

up (a total of 144 instrument lines'). An SFKREV instrument can process

signals from 12 seven section height energy release detectors (84

instrument lines), but it can handle signals from 12 eight section

detectors (a total of 96 instrument lines).

Detector signals proceed to the inputs of individual amplifiers with

controlled negative feedback, which in turn convert detector currents (the
input signals)into DC voltage signals (output signals). These signals

proceed to the inputs of an online energy release distribution monitor

(alarm device), to the inputs of a switching device (displays), to a

detector signal averaging device, to the inputs of the SKALA computer, and,
 -1 25a -

by way of the contacts of actuator signal relays, to a multichannel

recorder.

The alarm device compares the output signals of detectors with the

specified limit values of these signals.

 -126-

The comparison is carried out at three levels (alarm thresholds), called

"too lo", 'wa rning", and "alarm". In the event that detector output

signals deviate from the aforementioned levels, the appropriate alarms will
be activated in the energy release monitoring instruments and on the

SUZ-SFKRE mimic panel blinking colored warning lights will be activated. A

green light means that detector signals are equal or less than the "too

low" level. The absence of light means that a detector signal is above the

"too low" level but below the "warning" level, that is, is normal. A red
light means that the detector signals are equal to or higher than the

"warning" level, but have not yet reached the "alarm" level, while a

blinking red light means that the signals have reached or surpassed the
"alarm" level. In this case, a sound alarm will be activated in addition

to the blinking red light.

In order to provide a clear presentation of information, the SUZ-SFKRE

mimic panel is made in the form of a model of the horizontal section of the

reactor, where the control rod position indicators and detector alarm
elements are installed. The location of the position indicators and alarm

elements on the mimic panel corresponds to the location of the control rods
and detectors in the radial plane of the reactor. The SFKRE displays make
it possible for an operator to get a clear view of the area where a
detector signal deviation occurred, use the signal to determine whether to

move the control rods up or down, making it possible to correct this

deviation9 and select the necessary rod for this purpose.

 --126a-

In addition, the SFKRER equipment provides the possibility of changing

the "too low" and "warning levels" by as much as 15% in either direction
for all the detectors simultaneously from the reactor operator's panel,

which makes it possible for the operator to determine areas where energy

release is close to the limit ahead of time.

 -127-

The SFKRER instrumentation includes two operational modes, namely a

mode of comparison of the output signals of the radial detectors with
floating levels (thresholds) of "too low" and "warning" alarms and fixed
levels (thresholds) of "alarm", and a mode of comparing the output signals

of the radial detectors with fixed thresholds for all three levels.

In the first mode, the "too low" and "warning" levels for each

detector will vary proportionally to the mean arithmetic value of the

output signals of the detectors, that is, in proportion to current reactor

power, while the "alarm" level will be fixed at a level chosen on the basis

of operational requirements. When the mean arithmetic values of the output

signals of a detector reach some specified limit value (a specific level of
power at a given phase of reactor operation), the "too low" and "warning"

thresholds will be fixed (limited) and the SFKRER instrumentation will

automatically switch to the second mode.

SFKREV instruments operate in a mode of comparing the output signals

of the height detector sections with floating thresholds for all three

alarm levels, that is, carry out only relative monitoring of energy release

distribution by height of the reactor. Alarm thresholds for each height

energy release detector will vary in proportion to the mean arithmetic

values of the signals of the sections of a given detector.

To check the serviceability of the detectors, the instrumentation

includes devices which make it possible to determine the resistance of the

 -128-

insulation of any detector by a method of •connecting an additional resistor

(100 kilometers) to the input circuit of an individual amplifier In the
instrument line. The relative reduction in the output signal of the
detector can be used to determine the resistance of the insulation
mathematically: L?•/v

where U is the output signal of the detector prior to the connection of the
resistor and U' is the output signal of the detector after the resistor has
A A

been connected.

The Basic Technical Data and Characteristics of the Instruments

The maximum output signal value of the individual amplifiers of the

instrument lines is 5 volts, and signal polarity is negative. The range of
control of the conversion factors of the individual amplifiers is 0.26 to

0.78 volts per microamp. The input resistance of the amplifiers is no

greater than 100 ohms.

The basic relative input signal conversion error, in percentage

points, is no greater than:

where Jmax = 19 microamps, or the maximum value of input current,•3Is the

current value of input current in microamps.
 -128a-

The maximum capacitance of the detector and the cable line should not
exceed 0.05 microfarads,

The load resistance on the output terminals of the amplifiers should

be at least 2 kil~ohms.

The instruments can output eight detector signals to M1830A reading

instruments simultaneously: one of 130 output signals of the radial

detectors and seven output signals from the sections of a selected height

detector.
 -129-

Calls to the reading instruments are made by means of the switching

devices, which remember the address of a radial or height detector in.
reactor channel coordinate code.

The instruments generate signals equal to the mean arithmetic values

of radial detector signals (reactor power signals). and output it to a

reading instrument (scale of 0 to 100 microamps) and a recording instrument

(scale of 0 to 100 microamps, 10 seconds to cover the scale). In the

instruments adjustments may be made to signal mean arithmetic values to

allow for the absence of signals at the inputs of some of the amplifiers.

The basic relative error of average signal generation, given an individual

amplifier output signal amplitude of at least 2.5 volts and 70 to 130

averaged signals, does not exceed plus or minus 0.5%?•

The instruments generate four power signals, one for each quarter of the

reactor, equal to the mean arithmetic value of the output signals of the

radial detector of a corresponding quarter, which are output to 4 reading

instruments.

For each height detector, it generates a signal equal to the average

arithmetic value of the output signals of its sections. Adjustments may be

made to the mean arithmetic values to account for the absence of signals at

the inputs of certain amplifiers. Basic relative averaging error, given

signal amplitudes of at least 2.5 volts and 4 to 8 averaged signals, does

not exceed plus or minus 0.5%.

 -129a-

A fixed "'alarm" threshold is set in each instrument line to monitor

the radial distribution of energy release in the reactor:

 -130-

V - "U

along with a "warning" threshold which varies in proportion to reactor

power:

and a "too low" threshold which varies in the same way:

wh~ere Kphii is the gain factor of the amplifier of the comparison unit of
the ith instrument line which can be adjusted continuously from 0.6 to 2.5

deltaab is the gain factor of the "alarm level %" divider, which can be
adjusted discretely in percentage points from the nominal level from 0 to

100%, U1O0 is voltage corresponding to the nominal level of reactor power

and can be adjusted continuously within a range of 1 to 5 volts, deltanp is

the relative "warning" level and can be adjusted continuously within a

range of 0.65 to 1.25, deltaza•¶ is the relative "too low" level, which can

be adjusted continuously within limits of 0.65 to 1.25, and U(overhead bar)

is the mean arithmetic value of the output signals of the radial energy

release detectors.
 -131-

The instruments make; it possible for an operator to change the

"warning" and "too low" levels by as much as 15% in either direction in

percentage points simultaneously.

The instruments make it possible to limit the "warning" and "too low"

thresholds at the levels:

(lgJrr-= *=i'op.,t..
The limit levels Uogr.np and Uogr.zan (warning and two low) can be
adjusted continuously within a range of 1 to 5 volts.

Alarm thresholds which vary in proportion to the mean arithmetic value

of the output signals of a height energy release detector are set in each
instrument line of a jth height energy release detector:

-- Ual arm" - K•j " I

-- "iwarningi" 3aq~j u-.. U
 } 131a-

t00 low" where Kphiij is the gain factor of the amplifier of the
--...

comparison unit of the ith instrument line of the jth height energy release

detector and can be adjusted continuously within a range of 0.6 to 2.5.

 -132-

b~e~taab, bJs~tnp, and..b•-t-ezan are the respective alarm levels and can be
adjusted continuously within a range of 0.75 to 1.85
U~overhead bar)j is the mean arithmetic value of the output signals of

the sections of the jth height energy release detector.

The gain factors Kphii and Kphiij are calculated to set alarm

operation thresholds in the instrument lines by the SKALA computer in every

online run performed with the Prizma program. The other parameters in

formulas (5-7) and (10-12), which define alarm operation thresholds, are

either set constants or the current values of averaged signals. Gain

factors must be adjusted in accordance with the new calculated values in

all cases where set values and newly calculated values vary by 5% or more

in even one instrument line.

Given detector output signal levels of at least 2.5 volts, basic

relative alarm operation error does not exceed plus or minus 2 percent.

The calculated mean time until failure of an instrument line is at

least 15,000 hours. The service life of the instrumentation is at least

six years.
 -133-

2.9.8. Special Operating Software for the Reactors at the Chernobyl Plant

I. functions performed and the structure of calculations

The special software for the Chernobyl reactors is designed to perform

the following functions: -- calculate power in each fuel can -- calculate

the power safety factor standing between a critical heat removal situation

in each can -- calculate the temperature of the graphite in the active zone

-- calculate reactor power by a heat budget method -- calculate steam content

at the outlet of each channel -- calculate the thermotechnical reliability

of the reactor -- calculate the energy output of each can and the reactor
-- calculate settings for the energy release detectors in the active zone of

the reactor -- calculate several characteristics of height energy

distribution -- calculate the effective reserve of reactivity -- devise

recommendations for controlling water flow through process channels

-- calculate general reactor parameters, namely the coefficient of radial

unevenness of energy release distribution, power distribution, and flow

rates for reactor halves, drum separators, and so forth. -- devise

recommendations with respect to process channel transfers

This last job is done by an outside computer center and the results

are transmitted to the nuclear power plant on a communications line

together with the results of neutron physical analyses.

 -134-

The other functions are performed by the plant's SKALA computer using

the multifunctional Prizma program.

Initial data for the Prizma program include:

-- the signals of the energy release detectors inside the reactor's active

zone -- signals from the control rod position indicators -- signals from the

flow meters of each reactor channel, water temperature in the pressure

collectors, pressure in the drum separators, feed water flow, and so forth;

-- signals from the thermocouples used to measure the temperature of the

graphite -- the results of neutron physical analysis of energy release

distribution

2.9.8.1. Calculation Schedules and Accuracy

Basic calculations are performed with the Prizma program once every

five to ten minutes. The energy output of each can and the change in the

sensitivity of detectors due to burnout of emitters and fuel are calculated

once a day.

The accuracy of calculations of the relative power of each can is

approximately 3%. At the Chernobyl Plant this accuracy was confirmed by a

special experiment which involved comparing the results of can power

calculations and measurements taken with a calibration detector 0

 -235-

2.9.8.2. Basic Analytical Formulas

Calculations of power in each fuel can constitute the basic analytical
component of on line data processing in the SKALA centralized monitoring
system. The procedure for this calculation uses the results of neutron

physical analysis of energy release distribution and the readings of

intrareactor detectors as initial data.

The results of neutron physical calculations of energy release

distribution, namely the powers of each fuel can q(O)pi, i = 1, 2,...,Ntvk

(Ntvk is the number of fuel cans in the reactor) are adjusted when fuel

transfers are made in the process channels by the formula

}7(., )

in which the correction factors ~t, which differ for different types of

transfers, are defined in tables in relation to the distance R between the

channel in question and the channel where the transfer is underway and the

energy output of the can being unloaded and the can being loaded (E and E'

respectively). The correction factors were obtained on the basis of a

mathematical analysis of transfers according to the neutron physical

analysis program. The aforementioned correction is made in the plant

computer directly prior to a transfer or inmmediately after it.
 -l.35a-

Energy release distribution is calculated by the following formulas.

An empirical correction is made to the results of neutron physical

analysis of energy release distribution to allow for the change in the
power of each can due to movement of the control rods:

f"j 11
 -.136-

where the coefficients •pc defined in the table depend on the distance Rik
between the ith can and the kth rod and the depth of insertion of the kth
rod at the moment the calculation was made (h'kc) and the moment
corresponding to the time when neutron physical calculations were made.
The correction factors were obtained on the basis of a mathematical
analysis of the effect of rod movement on can power using the neutron
physical analysis program.

The signals of the intrareactor detectors are converted into the

quantities

where N•is the number of serviceable detectors, Krpj is the calibration

factor of the jth detector, and'L) %j• are coefficients which allow for

the burnout of the emitter of the detector and fuel in the channel
containing the detector.

For containers with detectors the following ratios are calculated

the radial azimuthal distribution of which can be approximated by the.

formula

...j e. o/,/,
 -.137-

for all cans in the reactor. In this formula Zi and Yi are the coordinates
of the ith can, j•(Zi •f) is a system of radial azimuthal functions.

The coefficients ae are determined by the smallest squares method. This

approximation makes it possible to allow for possible deformations of
energy release distribution due to transient xenon and temperature

processes and the component of neutron physical analysis error due to

random variations of the physical characteristics of the cans and other
elements of the active zone and the methodological error of neutron
physical analysis.

For cans with detectors the following quantities are calculated:

The readings of the jth detector or the position indicator of the control
rod located in the vicinity of this detector are considered unreliable if

oz

whereX is a quantile of normal distribution corresponding to a specific

probability that an unreliable measurement will be taken

=jv/( -y.
 - -13 7a -

The readings of these detectors are not used in calculations and

information on them is automatically printed out for staff use.

 -138-

Finally the power of each can, including those with detectors, is

calculated by the formula

jRI:

Sunuation is carried out over the four detectors closes to the ith can,
The weighting factors f•are determined by means of solving a system of

four linear equations written to minimize calculation error. The values of

these coefficients depend on the distance between the can and the detector,

the statistical characteristics of the quantities Vj, and detector

calibration error.

At the same time that the power Wi of each can is calculated, the

dispersion Di of the error of this value is also calculated.

Safety Factor Calculations

The maximum permissible power of an RBMK reactor can is considered the

power at which the probability for a can to be in a critical heat removal

situation will reach a certain value which will be constant over time and

identical for all cans. According to this definition, the power safet

factor for the ith can is equal to

 -138a-

where Wi is can power, Wkrihis the can power at which a heat removal crisis

will occur. Wkri is determined from tables on the basis of water flow
through the channel, pressure in the separator drum, and water temperature

in the pressure col lector•

•Ca: - w~ {x. ;
.Th,,)- )r•
 -139-

is the quantile of normal distribution corresponding to a specific

probability that a can will suffer a heat removal crisis; Di is the
dispersion of the relative error of determination of can power Dtpl is the
dispersion of the relative error of determination of critical can power
(methodological) Dtp2 is the dispersion of the error of determination of

reactor power Dtp3 is the dispersion of the determination of Wkp due to

flow, pressure, and temperature, measurement errors.

Graphite Temperature Calculations

0Graphite temperature is calculated on the basis of calculations'of can

power, data on the height distribution of energy release, and signals from
thermocouples installed in the graphite stacking.

Graphite temperature is calculated for every kth joint of the graphite

columns on the basis of the following formula:

where .. ~t'is the average temperature of the heat transfer agent in the
reactor'
 --140-

Wi(k) is the power of the can in the channel adjacent to the kth joint

mn is the number of such joints

• LL()is a cefintwhich allows for the effect of channels

containing different objects on heat abstraction from the graphite

(fuel, absorbers, control rods)

S is the relative density of h'eutron flux at the level where the

thermocouples are located

is the factor of proportionality between the signals of the

thermocouples and power determined by the smallest squares method.

Very abnormal thermocouple readings are discarded.

Calculating Intrazonal Detector Settings

The setting of a radial monitoring detector is calculated by the

fo rmul1a:

-IWE
 -140a-

where is the signal of the jth detector, Wi is the power of the ith can
located in area wj near the jth detector (this area is a square of five by
five reactor cells, at the center of which is the jth detector), and~i

the relative stipulated power of the ith can, and C is a normalizing

constant corresponding to a specific maximum can power.

 -141-

The setting of a height monitoring detector is calculated so that a

specific maximum linear load on the fuel elements in the cans closest to
the detector Is not exceeded.

On the basis of the calculated settings, the computer calculate and

prints out, on request, the gain factors of the amplifiers Qf the
comparison units of the monitoring instruments, which are then set in the
instruments.

Calculations of Effective Reactivity Reserves

The effective reactivity reserve on the control rods is calculated by

the formula

where Ck is the relative "weight" of the rod depending on its type, Npc is
the number of control rods, PKL2) is a quantity proportional to the height
distribution of absolute neutron flux density at the location of the kth
rod calculated using calculated can power values and height monitor
detector readings averaged over the reactor.
 -142-

2.9.9. Display of Information *on Calculation Results

All calculation results may be printed out on a printer at the request

of the
channels with the highest can power, the 60 channels with the highest
graphite temperatures, and the 60 channels with the lowest safety factors.

The printer automatically gives the time and the coordinates of a down
detector, the rejection constant, the time and coordinates of the channel,
and power (if out of limits).

The channel mimic panel indicates the channels in which power is above
the set point given by the operator and channels whose safety factors are
below those set by the operator, and so forth.

The values of any calculated quantity may be output to a digital

reader on request.
 -143-

2.10 Safety Assurance Systems

2.10.1. Protective Safety Systems

2.10.1.1. The Reactor Emergency Cooling System

The reactor emergency cooling system (Figure 2.43) is a protective

cooling system and is designed to provide for the removal of residual heat

release (after the chain reaction has been suppressed) by means of the

timely delivery of the required amount of water into the reactor channels

during accidents accompanied by disruption of the active zone's cooling

•system.

Such accidents include breaks in the large diameter piping of the

multiple forced circulation loop, breaks in the fresh steam lines, and

breaks in the feed water lines.

In addition, the emergency cooling system may be used for emergency

delivery of water into reactor channels in situations which do not involve

piping breaks but make it impossible to deliver water by standard systems

(for example, steaming of the PEN and APEN).

The designers of the emergency cooling system took into account the
•following requirements which the system must meet:
 -143a-

1. It should deliver water to the affected and unaffected halves of

the reactor at rates which are at least those indicated in Figure 2.44 so
as to prevent meltdowns, massive overheating, and unsealing of the fuel
elements.

2. The system should be automatically activated on a maximum design

emergency signal, which should distinguish the affected half from the
unaffected half and be generated when the following symptoms are present:

a) an increase in pressure in the rooms containing multiple forced

circulation loop, piping (a sign that a pipeline has broken);
L1 rizzii..1 __ _ __ __ _

,,-u- .,c
34_0Ye " . • V .~V~ a -• •~ l m ,,alaalp l ,=, IPt•
• - •

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f .IIIO'UShIAM m ~ o *auor,
I- m ozamn-o i m,• a '•,.n o .ano .vpm Z-lo p l -nw i

coo 2. 67o¢ea/'4c/ed" Aai '/2.4,,,z, . cdp

 .... I I I • I ri L li I I I | i
J . . I II I l l IH

flomi'~.Arn Paozod SOe3M S cz&,Aud~~'t, ,,O,,O&iNU A~'Okfl7OPt~ Z'AI/ A7M'/A'~' OA2PIILV

S

ico N
Aer
7.O '4,

80
80

45
•X
-
/ keci4~ ,;~
Md? t'~, 96~ - I - I m m u I &ii -i•

i9~Z/fl 0 A 'eiuL 40 60 . 0 ix.,- -- ,.'

,, .o UjMJdAc a.,Pue5Oc

I[i
o :O 1,o 60 80 100 120 f80 14,0 160
SnoD/7oO2c1 A'ro~eA'rno~0o ,g %00 p,#
c~ccc/e38- lip! PaJPblSe
O•Pf/enoo £o ,onpv6o, ,4 3O•'O~Mf
o OO•#
!
 -146-

b) when it coincides with one of the following two signals

-- a reduction in the level of the steam separators of the affected

half of the reactor;

-- a reduction in the pressure differential between the pressure

collector of the main circulation pump and the steam separators of the

affected half of the reactor.

3. Its speed should be such that any interruptions in the delivery of

o water to the affected half of the reactor in the event of a maximum design
Semergency should not last longer than 3.5 seconds.

4. Reductions in water flow to the reactor channels due to

unproductive discharge through the site of the break into the room should

not occur.

5. The system should perform its safety functions regardless of any

failures unrelated to the initial event of the following elements of the

system: active or passive elements with moving mechanical parts.

6. The system should consist of several independent channels

(subsystems) and should be effective even if any one channel (subsystem)

h fails.
 - 146a -

7. Nitrogen should be kept from getting into the reactor from the
system's tanks when they are emptied.

8. The emergency cooling system should perform its role even if a

maximum design emergency coincides with an internal power failure.

In accordance with the initial requirements listed above, the system

consists of three independent channels (subsystems), each of which has a

capacity of at least 50% of that required.

 -147-

Each channel (.subsystem) includes a fast acting part and a long term
cooling part.

The fast acting part delivers the required amount of water to the

channels of the affected half of the reactor during the initial phase of an

accident.

The fast acting parts of two system channels (the tank parts) consist

of a system of tanks (filled with water and nitrogen under pressure of 10.0
megapascals) connected by piping and collectors to the forced multiple

circulation loop RGK.

A Du 400 valve, which makes it possible to obtain the required flow

into the affected half of the reactor in 3.5 seconds, is used as a fast

acting valve to activate the tank part of the system. The power supply for

the valves is classified in the highest category of reliability, and is

provided by storage batteries (See Section 2.7.3)

Each of two tank parts consists of 6 tanks with volumes of 25 cubic

meters each. The total initial volume of water in one tank part is about

80 cubic meters, while it contains about 70 cubic meters of nitrogen. Each

tank part ensures a water flow into the affected half of the reactor of at

least 50% of requirements for at least 100 seconds. The duration of the

system's operation depends on the extent of heat transfer agent leakage

from the forced multiple circulation loop during an accident.

 -. 147a-

The tanks are configured syrmmetrically so as to reduce the. collector

effect during discharge.

Nitrogen is kept from entering the reactor from the tanks by means of
automatic closure of two sequentially installed valves on piping from the

tank portions to the RGK upon receiving a minimum level signal.

The fast acting part of the third system channel is a unit for

delivering water from the PEN, which provides a flow of at least 50% of

that~required into the affected half of the reactor.

 -.148-

In the event that a maximum design emergency coincides with an

internal• power failure, the flow of water from the PEN should be maint~ained

for 45 to 50 seconds by operating the PEN off the turbogenerator.

Backup power for the actuators of the fast acting valves is provided

by independent noninterruptible supplies (batteries).

The long term cooling part cools both the affected and unaffected

halves of the reactor. It should be activated as soon as the fast acting

part of the system ceases to operate.

The long term cooling parts of each channel consist of two groups of

pumps:

cooling pumps for the affected half of the reactor

cooling pumps for the unaffected half of the reactor

The pump part for cooling the affected half of the reactor consists of

two parallel connected pumps and delivers water at a rate of about 500 tons
per hour, that is, no less than 50% of requirements during a maximum design

emergency for the affected half.

 -148a-

Intake water is provided by the bubbling tank of the accident

containment system and is cooled by industrial water mna heat exchanger
installed on the commnon intake line of the two pumps and is delivered to

the collectors of the system through pressure piping.

Flow restrictor inserts are installed on the pressure piping of the

pumps and are designed to ensure the stable operation of the pumps during

emergencies characterized by sharp drops of pressure in the circulation

loop of the reactor when a pipeline breaks (flow ig limited by the

ebullition of water in the narrow section of the insert).

 -149-

The pump part for cooling the unaffected half of the reactor includes
one pump and provides a flow of about 250 tons per hour, that is, at least

50% of that required for the unaffected half in a maximum design emergency.

Intake water is taken from pure condensate pumps and is fed to the

collectors of the tank part downstream of the fast acting valve through

pressure piping.

The flow limiter inserts in the pressure piping perform the same role

that they do in pumps for cooling the affected half of the reactor.

Backup power for the electric motors of the pumps and the valve

actuators is provided by diesel generators.

2.10.1.2.-The System for Guarding Against Overpressure in the Main

Heat Transfer Agent Loop

The system is designed to keep pressure under control in the loop by

means of removing excess steam into a bubbling tank, where it is completely

condensed. It includes pulse safety devices and a system of piping and

collectors to remove the steam into the bubbling tank of the accident
containment system. The pulse safety device consists of pulse valves and

main safety valves.

 -149a-

The system meets the following basic requirements:

-- ensures that overpressure in the loop will not exceed working

pressure by more than 15%, allowing for a single failure of any active or

passive element in the system with moving mechanical parts.

 -150-

-- is characterized by high operational reliability when pressure in

the ioop reaches the operation set points

-- has highly reliable main safety valves which close promptly once the

closure set points are reached

-- has the required service life under cyclical dynamic loads

accompanying the operation of the main safety valves -- provides for the

entry of steam into the water of the bubbling tank at speeds close to the
speed of sound, even if only one main safety valve operates (This is
required for shock free steam condensation).

Figure 2.45 illustrates the design of a system for collecting steam

from the main safety valves in the bubbling tank.

The system consists of eight main safety valves with a total capacity

of 5800 tons per hour at nominal pressure in the loop, that is, a capacity

equal to the nominal steam capacity of the reactor plant.

Each main safety valve with a capacity of 725 tons per hour is
controlled by means of a direct action pulse valve (arm plus weight type)

equipped with an solenoid type actuator for opening and closing it.
 -150a-

Steam is discharged from the main safety valve into the bubbling tank

below the water -level through submerged nozzles with outlet diameters of 40
millimeters each (1200 nozzles in all).

In order to prevent the formation of a vacuum in the discharge piping,

and as a consequence, the ingress of water into them, and to ensure shock

free condensation of possible small leaks of steam through closed main

safety valves, steam air ejectors are used.

 CHICTfEMh crBpocv i •1 OT""rnK 6 5cr.fCC.-6npsoW~p

IL . At,'. 2.45

Fig. 2.45 Steam Dumping system from GPK into pressure suppression pool.
 .152-

Steam dumping systems are equipped with:

- monitor of the absence of water level in BB headers;

- monitor of the temperature conditions of the outside pipe surface

behind each GPK and pipes within the pressure suppression pool.

In the normal operating mode of the unit the GPK are closed and the

system is in the waiting mode.

The system automatically engages only when the pressure in the MPTs
loop exceeds the following values:

- 76 kgs/cm2 - 1 GPK triggers

- 77 kgs/cmi2 - 2 GPK trigger;

- 78 kgs/cm2 - 1 GPK triggers;

- 81 kgs/cm2 - 4 GPK trigger.

Operating personnel can also force GPK open from BShchU and RShchUo
 -152a-

The main components of the system which protects the loop frori-excess
pressure were experimentally checked on test stands during development.
The system as a whole underwent comprehensive testing for agreement with

design indicators during startup operations.

2.10.1.3. System for protecting reactor space (RP) from excess pressure.

The system is designed to ensure that allowable pressure in the RP is

not exceeded in an emergency with rupture of one fuel channel due to escape

of the gas-steam mixture from the RP into the steam-gas dumping compartment

of the pressure suppression poo~l and then into the pressure suppression

pool itself.

The system satisfies the following main requirements:

 -153 -

- Ensures the pressure in the RP is not exceeded by more than 1.8

kgs/cm2 (ABS) for a total transverse rupture of one fuel channel

with allowance for single failure in the passive element system

* with moving mechanical parts (active elements absent in the

system);

- Prevents water from the steam-gas dumping compartment of the

pressure suppression pool from reaching the RP in the maximum

conceivable accident;

-Reliably isolates the RPfrom theatmosphere.

Figure 2.46 shows a schematic of the system which protects the reactor

space from excess pressure.

The reactor space is permanently connected to the steam-gas dumping

compartment of the pressure suppression pool of the emergency localization

system by eight pipelines Du 300 (four pipes above and four pipes below the
RP which are then combined into two Du 600 pipes).

Each of the Du 600 pipes leads into its own stage of the compartment

and is immersed 2 m below the water level, i.e. in the normal operating
mode of the block the reactor space is cut off from the atmosphere by a
hydraulic seal 2 m high. .
 -153a-

The height of the vertical sections of steam dumping pipes Du 600 from
the reactor to the water level in the compartment exceeds 28 mn; for this

reason pipe Du 600 which combines four pipes Du 300 below the RP is

specially raised to mark 28.8 and then drops into the compartment.

This design is necessary to prevent water or the steam-sir mixture

from the compartment from entering the RP in accidents with rupture of

KMPTs piping up to MPA.

The volume of water in the compartment is selected and maintained such

that it is enough to fill the steam dumping pipes in the aforementioned

situation with some reserve.

,0

1~

_____U - -
- S..
flit
-ill
II. -
-
_ - - -
II;1 - - - -

-
- - - - -
- - 'LI
- -
.. 'a. * piy ~nJ...-.F
T1~F~1.

5'A'1/2
Puc~ 2.46 Cucme#tu 3Cuiumb, ,0f7 0", npe8~vweHuI.' dt?
4
~gure 2.46C System for protecthe RP from excess ~ressure0
 -155-

Check (relief) valves which allow steam to be dumped from the -

compartment into the pressure suppression pool and which prevent backflow
are used as an additional second barrier which prevents water or the steam-

air mixture from the compartment from reaching the RP.

To prevent monitored spread of solid radioactive discharges throughout

the water volume of the pressure suppression pool the gas-steam dumping

compartment is reliably (by three barriers) cut off from the water volume

of the pressure suppression pool during rupture of TK.

When the pressure in the RP rises to 1.2 kgs/cm2 (ABS) the hydraulic
seal in the compartment is forced out and the g~as-steam mixture enters the

compartment through the steam dumping pipes. When the pressure in the
space above the water in the compartment reaches 1.1 kgs/cm2 (ABS) check
(relief) valves open and the gas-steam mixture enters the steam

distribution lane, and from there through steam dumping pipes to below the

water level of the pressure suppression pool. Steam formed in the RP

during TK rupture first condenses completely in the water volume of the

compartment and after its accumulating capacity is exhausted in the

pressure suppression pool. As it bubbles through the water layer in the

compartment in the pressure suppression pool gas from the RP cools and is
kept in the spaces of the accident localization zone from which it is

released into the atmosphere by the hydrogen removal system after required

holding and purification.

 -155a-

Maximum pressure in the RP at all accident stages does not exceed 1.~8
kgs/cm2 (ABS),

The protection system is equipped with the following:

- monitoring of pressure (rarefaction) in the RP;

- monitoring of the level in the steam-gas dumping compartment;

- reliable drainage of steam dumping pipes.

 -156-

Monitoring of technological parameters and control of active system

components (cutoff fittings) are done by operators from BShchU and RShchU.

2.10.2. Localizina safety systems.

The accident localization system (SLA) on the four blocks of the

Chernobyl power plant is designedto localize radioactive emissions during

accidents with failure of the seals of any piping of the reactor cooling
system, except for the piping of the steam-water service lines (PVK), the

upper runs cf the fuel channels and that part of the downcomers of the drum

type steam separators. Figure 2.47 shows a schematic of the system.

2.10.2.1. System of sealed compartments

The main component of the localization system is the system of sealed

compartments which includes the following compartments of the reactor

section:

- sealed volumes (items 1 and 2 on Fig. 2.47) arranged symmetrically

relative to the reactor axis and designed for a gauge pressure of

0.45 MPa;

- RGK-NVK compartments (items 3 and 4) also symmetrical relative to

the reactor axis and-separated from one another by the reactor

support
crosspiece with Ieaks of total area 5 m2. In terms of strength
conditions of reactor structural elements these compartments
prevent pressure from rising above 0.08 MPa and are designed for
this quantity. All components of the reactor loop are concentrated

in the sealed volumes and compartments of the RGK-NVK. The system

is designed for an accident with damage to these elements;
 0

Ao 1O 9 166 q

7f Nc
-• - ' ' '•F -- 4 --

Poe. 2,47 flpuHl4UnUWAaR CXIV• CUCmei'1& RoKW7~u~auU ....

Figure 2.47. Schematic of localization system

 -158-

- the compartment of the steam distribution lane. (item 5);

- the compartment of the two story pressure suppression pool -

condensation device (BKU), some of which is filled with water (item

7) and the remai~nder with air (item 8).

The sealed compartments are interconnected by valves of three

types:

- check valves (item 9) mounted in the openings of the overlap which

separates the RGK-NVK compartment and the steam distribution lane;

- relief valves (item 10) mounted in the openings of the overlap

which separate the air space of the pressure relief tank and the

sealed volumes;

- check valve panels (item 11) mounted in barriers which separate the

steam distribution lane and sealed volumes.

The compartments of the sealed volumes and steam distributing lane are

connected by steam discharge channels to the water volume of the pressure

suppression pool = condensation device (item 17).

During normal operation the system of sealed compartments and the

pressure suppression pool - condensation device operate in the waiting

mode.
 -158a-

In emergency situations the system works as follows. With loss of -

integrity of the reactor loop component in one of the sealed volumes

boiling coolant begins to enter it. Steam formation leads to pressure rise

in the accident compartment. The check valves of the panels which connect

the accident half of the sealed volume to the steam distributing lane (item

11) open when the pressure in them changes to exceed 0.002 MPa. When the

pressure in the accident half of the volume reaches

 ,-159-

a value sufficient to discharge the liquid column from the steam discharge
channels, a steam-air mixture begins to enter both stages of the
condensation device at the same time. As it boils through the water layer.

the steam condenses and air collects in the air volume of the condensation
device compartment; when the pressure there exceeds 5 kPa, relief valves

open which connect the air space of the condensation device compartment to

the nonaccident sealed volume, and some of the air flows into this volume.

Thus its volume in an emergency is used to reduce pressure in the accident

half of the sealed volume. During this emergency check valves (item 9)

remain closed.

If the seal of the reactor loop fails in the "RGK-NVK" compartment the

pressure rise in it leads to opening of the check valves which connect the

RGK-NVK compartments and the steam distributing lane (for pressure change

exceeding 0.02 MPa). The steam-air mixture front he lane travels through

the steam dumping channels into the water volume of the center part of the

condensation device located under the steam distribution lane. The

pressure raise in the air space of the condensation device causes the

relief valves to open which connect the air space of the condensation

device to two sealed volumes. Under conditions of this emergency situation

the spaces of the two sealed volumes are used to reduce pressure in the
accident compartment, and the valves of the panels (item 11) remain closed0
 -159a-
All sealed compartments of the system except for the BKU are .lined with a
shell of steel VSTZKP2 4 mm thick and are checked for local and integral

seal. The BKU is lined with a shell of steel O8Khl8NIOT 4 nmm thick.
Results
 -160-

of computations of pressure change in sealed compartments in an accident

with rupture of the pressure header of the GTsN (Du 900 mm) in a sealed

volume and in an accident with rupture of distributing group header ('Du 300

mm) in the RGK-NVK compartment are shown in Figs. 2.48 and 2°49

respectively. As the graphs in these figures show the gauge pressure in

the accident sealed volume does not exceed thernaximum allowable value 0.25

*MPa, and the gauge pressure in the accident RGK-NVK compartment does not

exceed the maximum allowable value 0.08 MPa.

The system operates under conditions of a single failure of any

passive element with moving parts (no active elements in the system).

2.10.2.2. Penetrations, doors

i• To prevent escape of radioactivity from sealed compartments the sealed

~arrier of the emergency localization system (walls, overlaps) at the site

~'fits intersection with piping or electrical cable is equipped with a

special sealed penetration.

Piping penetrations are designed to react to a jet emerging from a

pipeline when it fully ruptures. Here the integrity of the penetration is

not violated.

The designi of the penetrations makes it possible to check their

integrity
 -'160a-

both during installation anbd operation. The penetrations ensure ihtegrity

at a gauge pressure in the emergency localizations compartments up to 45

kPa, temperature up to 150oC and relative humidity up to 100%.

 A.c&ewaA CNENa

d
!•.!.'7.
i I
•/.. r

•1,//. !. I•.
'V

I I i

44
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.- / I I -'_

L
9.9 II

-4 I 4 I 4-4 5-I - I - I - I - I - S S ~-4 -

b
.00
m I ~- ~- I - I - - I - I - - - - ~ - - - - I - A - I - I - I- D- 1- 4- 5 - I - 1 £

.t 'U '00 rSO

Figure 2.48. Pressure change in compartments of block 2 of the SAES and

the four blocks of the Ku AES and Cher ith rupture of a pressure

headeo
 PD,

7.ff(Q¶
\ \ I•I II Il1 '
B
/iS4'/
\1 II I
III II ilI m m
i

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+1~1~121~ r A I IL LL•
r LLLL ,I
V

-I- t1 t

I I II l71//K,,,..- J-
-Ir +- t -f I*~1
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~I1 , -iIJ -~u

g . . .
-I
. • .
II
.; . . =

\ \llll I I J///,/.• 9.~T 1- - I- t--1 I

I I -A
( -4-i- 1-4-4-4-
I I
.LU
• lII=". ..w
dr. . -_, -4 -*-~t I -i
• ! jJ•

'141
-, --

t
F 1 T 1-1 I - • - .- t-- • -.. - -I - -_4-
A ~vI I~

• .,',.-.-" .- 1-.-\-l---:j.'[" "- - - - -'

-'i•.."

I
AV
w " ,| .. ..
I I I
-,.- -
..
- . - . -
I
$ -0 $0. fO0I eso c;c
Figure 2.49. Pressure change in compartments of block 2 of the SAES and

four blocks of the Ku AES and Chernobyl plant with rupture of RGK.
 -163-

Sealed pipe penetrations designed to carry "hot" pipelines are-

equipped with a water or air cooling system to prevent overheating of

concrete at the penetration site.

The sealed doors are designed to allow access of personnel to

compartments of the emergency localization zone with the reactor shutdown

and to ensure integrity of the compartments of the emergency localization

zone with the reactor operating.

The sealed doors of the BKU ensure the required seal and operating

capacity after any emergency situation, including MPA.

2.10.2.3. Cutoff and sealing fittings.

The s~ystem of cutoff and sealing fittings is designed to ensure that

the emergency localization zone is sealed by cutting off service lines

which connect sealed and unsealed compartments.

The design of the system is based on the following main principles':

- all service lines which intersect the sealing loop and which should
be closed at the time of the accident to prevent escape of

radioactive materials from sealed compartments are equipped with

three successive cutoff elements;

 -163a-

- each pipeline not directly connected to the primary loop or the

space of the sealed compartments is equipped with one cutoff

element located outside the sealing loop;

 -164-

- The location of the isolation valves which seal the compartments

under emergency conditions is fixed on the BShchU (safety panel)

and the RShchU from which they are remote controlled of necessary

by the operator;

- the drives of the cutoff fittings mounted on a single line are

powered from independent sources of category lA reliable power

supply system.

Special quick acting (10 - 15 s) isolating valves and check

valves are used as cutoff and sealing fittings for the emergency

localization compartments.

A preoperational check is carried out at the valve

manufacturer's.

The isolating fittings are checked during power plant

operation only with the unit shut down. All isolating valves are
checked. Tests include checking serviceability and integrity.

Valves are closed automatically on maximum conceivable

accident signals.

The system of cutoff and sealing fittings is designed such

that any single failure in the system not lead to disruption of its

functions.
4
 164a-

2.10.2.4. Pressure suppression poo!. - condensation device.

The pressure suppression pool - condensation device is designed Ec•

condense steam formed:

- during an accident with loss of reactor loop integrity;

- when the main safety valves trigger;

- in case of leaks through the GPK under normal operating conditions.

 -165-

In design terms the pressure suppression pool - condensation device- is a

two story reinforced concrete volume lined inside with a metal liner. The
volume of the condensation device on each story is divided by longittdnJ

buihas into four lanes and by transverse bulkheads into three

caipar•tents: two side (under sealed volwmes) and center (under the steam
distribution lares). The transverse and longitudinal walls of the pressure

suppr'ession pool have the necessary openings for water and air. The lowr

part of each story of the condensation device is filled with water. The

thickness of the water layer on each story is 100 ram. The total water
volume on both stories is 3200 m3, the volume of the air space 3700 m3.

Steanm enters the water volume~ of the condensation device through steam

du~mping channels arranged uniformly over the entire area of the sealed

volumres and a steam distributing lane. Each steam dumping chanx~l is built

in the form of a block of the pipe-in pipe type which ensures simrultaneous

and uniform delivery of steam to both stories of the condensation device.

The number, diameter, and spacing of the steam distribution pipes and

distance under the water surface were determ~ined by tests on a large scale

nmodel and ensure comp~lete steam condensation in the water volume of the
condensation device, uniform heating of it and rapid pressure drop in the

emergency sealed ccarpar mnt during accidents with loss of integrity of the

reactor loop.
 -165a-
The upper story of the condensation device is equipped with the
necessary number of special vertical overflcw pipes with a diameter of 800
nmm (Fig. 2.47, item 28). The overflow pipes are designed to maintain the

necessary level on the upper story and equalize pressure in the air spaces

of both stories of the condensation device.

 -166-

The water levels on both stories of the condensation device,-

temperature and chemical camposition of the water are constantly monitored.
The required chemical camposition of the water is ensured by a bypass

purification unit.

The localization system also includes a system for discharging heat

fran the BKU and sealed canpartmnts and a hydrogen removal system.

Heat is removed from the sealed compaxtrnts of the localization

system by twzo systems:

10o Sprinkler-cooling system;

2. Surface type condensers located in the steam distribution lane.

The sprinkler-cooling system is designed to do the folluwing:

- cool alA purify water in sealed volumes and the air space of the
condensation device both during nomnal operation and in an accident;

-shutdown cooling of the water volume of the condensation device.

The main ccrDonents of the sprinkler-cooling system are shown in Figure

2.*47.* Water is collected fram the condensation device and sent
 -166a-

over three legs. of piping (each of which, ensures 50% .of-systan capacity) to
heat exchangers (item 15) where it is cooled by service water and

subsequentiy through pimps (item 14) to all systema consumers:

- to ejection coolers (itemn 12) mrounted in sealed volumes;

- to nozzles (itemn 13) located in the air volumre on both stories of the

condensation device.
 -167-

The ejection coolers, a component part of the sprinkler-cooling system,

are designed to circulate air in sealed volumes, cool it and remve

radioactive aerosols and steam fram it.

Air is collected fram the upper (bottest) part of the sealed volum~es,

cooled by water jets, and sent to the lower part of the volumes. After

contact with the air the cooling water is returned to the condensation
device. The ejection coolers wrork continuously both during normal

operation and accidents.

The nozzles of the sprinkler system located in the air space of the

condensation device, spray the cooling water, mix and cool the air.* The
pressure gradient on the nozzles is achieved by installing choke washers on

cooling water feed headers. The nozzles operate continuously both during

normal operation and an accident.

Surface type condensers (item 16) irouted in the steam distribution

lane are designed to renvve hea't fram sealed carpartrents during an

accident with loss of reactor loop integrity by condensing sare of the

steam entering the steam distributing lane. Service water is the cooling

medium. During normal operation the surface type condensers operate in the
waiting mocde and are engaged on MPA signal.
 -16 7a-
The serviceability of the system is tested on a large scale model

during developmrent.

The systen begins to operate during a single failure of any active or

passive compnent with mo~ving parts.

 -168-

2.10.2.5. Hydrogen reoval system (SUV)

The systemi is designed to generate partial vacutmi in euergency

localization catipartmrents, to m~easure the concentration of hydrogen which

mnay enter these caripartirnts with uncontrolled leaks from the KMPTs, and

also under condlitions of dump~ing steam fram the GPK( and during accidents

associated with rupture of KMPTs pipelines, and removal of hydrogen whe it

is found.

During normal operation of the block hydrogen can enter SLA

caratiets w;ith coolant leaks with a magnitude of 2 t per hour and with
possible steam leaks through closed safetyj valves.

Hydrogen can also enter under conditions of short term discharge of

steam when the GPK triggers and under piping rupture conditions.

The largest amo~unt of hydrogen can enter the caprtrets under 1V•A
conditions (hydrogen which has accumsalated in the coolant and also formed

during the accident due to radiolysis and reaction of zirconium with

water). The total influx of hydrogen under these conditions is shown in

Fig. 2.50.
 -168Sa-

With the existing standard of the l~er limit of hydrogen explosibility

in air - 4% (by" volume), 0.2% (by volune) was adopted in the design as the

reference value. To naintain this concentration under least favorable

conditions 800 m3/hr air must be exhausted fram the SLA cauatrets. This

flow rate was also adopted for all other operating conditions of the block.

The SUV (Fig. 2.*51) includes the following: electric heater, contact

apparatus, condenser, moisture separator, circulator.

 Oi,• nn nn .. . . ... - - " • 1 -- m• iN - - I I i in

iiii
,'T
,•oe•.C, nne/,,• • •, $'/•e•.,,,ue .•.e,,us.,,luu .#'e,/,,•.

/
- S
° •0"
..
*" "s-,•,yJ'm,•,ue -
A• .jw €v*e,,, o;ou,'#•]•

I'PD *In regard with

requirements, part of
reacted Zr less than
09 -112 inlet volume in the room
1% of th eightof
- H2 inlet, restored in the coolant before accident cladding offuel"
0
2 from Zr + 11 0 reaction*
-12inlet

o• bhe water affected group header

I 3 12 from radiolisis
H
channels. This figure
4 -Summary hydrogen influx I presented with 3
IO reacted (for a mar~gin)

I!
!
!
S
o
I

0
3Dt T

i I 7, I-
*1. !0 I

o
!
0
II I I

! ID* O
O
i

O
I•I

•I 0 0 -
8

*0
0 0
. I ' o
S' .10 I2I4 4*
n I nn u n

--- P~c.2.50 I n • n

Ik °
Figure 2.5O° Influx of 112 into ~~ •r•,cy localization
oaiaincmpr~et c•m•to
 -170-

This equiipment is divided into three subsysta~s, each located in a separate

volume. There is a backup of the active element - circulator in each
subsystem. The protective-cutoff fittings are located in the individual

volumres. A 3 x 100% backup principle is provided.

The gas-air mixture in the rated mode passes through the electric

heater, contact apparatus (in the presence of hydrogen), condenser,

moisture separator and by mreans of the circulator it is discharged into the

atmsphere through the filter station.

On the DPA signal the protective-cutoff fittings close and the SL'V

equipnent is turned off. After 2 - 3 hours (as hydrogen accumualates) the

operator opens the protective-cutoff fittings and turns on the SUV

circulators. Control is effected from the SUV panel. The post-accident

operation configuration of the SUJV is identical to operation in the rated*

mo~de, how'ever the mixture is duirped through the radioactivity suppressioii

unit. In addition the mixtcure can recirculate.

If necessary (according to gas analyzer readings) intensified exhaust

fran any SLA car~aartient can be set up by turning on the backup circulator

or backup subsystem.
 -170Qa-

Nitrogen feed is provided to flush the SUV equipment and extinguish

fires.

The hydrogen concentration in all SLA ca•xtets is automatically

xronitored on a continuous basis by the gas analyzers. Forced signalling

(acoustic and light) regarding a hydrogen concentration rise in SLA

ccpar-•arnts appears on the SUV and BShchU - 0 panel. In addition test

rmeasuremrents of hydrogen concentration in SCLA cara~ts by manual

samling using chramatographs is possible. Flc• ate, temperature and

radioactivity are measured in the hydrogen remval system itself. All

readings appear on the SUV panel.

• 6 WMVI Yjinrir,-iU~t NOUOPoaflrl. 41 t 14 LE.T
"A

DORCUCTDIR N2 rIOJIrUCTEMA A'3

4~5 N1

- UJFtE~Dflwje ~

~ g4~~IffA4F'1ir

Figure 2.51. Hydrogen removal system.

 -171-

The control and mron~itoring system is executed over three~ independent

channels. Power is supplied to SUV equipmnt fran the power supply sources

of the corresponding safety subsystems.

Cooling water is sent from the sprinkler-cooling system to the SUN

condensers.

2.10.3. Support safety systems.

2.*10.3.1. Electric power supply system for power plant in-house needs

Power plant in-house consu~mers are divided into the following groups

depending on requirements imtposed on power supply reliability:

- first group - constrners which do not permit interruption of the

power supply or allow interruption of. the power supply f ran fractions of a

second to several seconds under any conditions, including complete

disappea~ranc• of AC voltage fran working and backup transformers for in-

house needs and which require that power be available after triggering of

reactor AZ;

- second group - consumrers who allow interruption of poe supply fran

dozens of seconds to dozens of minutes under the same conditions and
 -171la-

which require that power be available after triggering of reactor AZ;

- third group - consuxirs which do not require that power be available

under conditions of disappearance of voltage from working and backup

transfo~rers for in-house needs and during nonrmal block operation which

allow interruption of powr supply for the period of transition frca,

working to backup trans~former for in-house needs.

There are two independent power supply sources which back up one

another to supply const~s of in-house power plant needs; normal working

and backup power fran working and backup transfonLers for in-house needs.
 -172-

There is additional power fran a third independent emergency source for

constmers of the first and second groups.

The following are provided as emrgency power supply sources:

a) storage battery with static converters for consumers of the first

group;

b) auta~tic diesel generators for consumers of the second group.

Figure 2.52 shows a diagram of in-house needs.

2.10.3.2. Schematic of in-house needs of 6 kV consume~rs of the third

group.

The consumers of the third group include reactor coolant pumps (GTsN),

feedwater pimps (PN), the first and second condensate extraction pumps

(1•I, IqN2), mechanisms of auxiliary systems of the reactor and turbine roan

and other systens which allow normal. operation of the block.

There cire 6 kV and 380/220 V, 50 Hz networks which are used to supply

electricity to consnes of the third group in the nuclear power plant;

%,rking and backup transformers for in-h•s needs are installed for this
 -172a-'

pulrpose.

Six kV in-house consumrers of the unit during normal operation are

supplied fram two working transformers for ik-house needs of 63 MV each,

voltage 20/6.3 - 6.3 kV with two split windings. The in-house transforn~r
is closed coupled between two series connected breakers to the generator

voltage circuits of the unit. Two working sections of 6 kV each for

supplying in-house consumrers of the unit are connected to each unit

transfonrer for in-house needs.

 B--' 11
It

"ePu deo

tebld
Ut

Sml.dd6

r,. ia d
I.!Z -- I

!i H_
*MbeI..|l pa0.BMI
II ' A I! F---J
I
I
l*'m- O~e
Si 6 lO 'I
I1
=0-,.a., (SE
II I
I I I
,-.- , I _1"_,. II . . j-I

I I I
I ., eI,,w I,..i

•..-I • -- Il •,.•... ,,_• I I, lI "--" p"Il

e.g-. -1
U
3d
I -- " -ii -. --- I
L _. LB.Misuuw BJ O •P•le J~(t ~• Jt --

Figure 2.52. Diagram of in-house needs of the fourth block

of the
Chernobyl power plant.
0
 -173-

The presence of two breakers in the circuit of each generator ma~kes it

possible to use the working transformers for in-house needs to start and
stop the block in case of malfunctions in the generator circuit, maintain

electricity supply for in-house needs when the block is shut down for

technical reasons, and also for all types of electrical accidents in the

unit above the generator breakers, in particular short circuit in the unit

transformers.

The circuit with two breakersimakes it possible to use rundown of the

turbogenerator to supply power to feedwater pumps which ensure water supply

to the reactor zone for the first 45 seconds fram the start of a mnaiinuumi
conceivable accident in case of loss of power for in-house needs from the

high voltage network. Separate rundown of turbogenerators is ensured by

turning off the 20. kV breakers fram the unit transformer side.

In this case the voltage on the generator chan~ges in proportion to its

rpm by connecting a turbogenerator of a special "rundown unit" to. the

excitation regulator which keeps rotor current constant on the generator

when frequency, drops.

The rudw unit is engaged on the mnaxirmum conceivable accident and the

turbine check valve fit signal.

 -17 3a-

The unit transfonrers for in-house needs are backed up by a 63 MVA

backup transfoz~r connected by an overhead line to the 330 kV ORU.

The 6 kV constumers of teach turbogenerator are connected to the

conrresponding sections of the unit transfonrnr for in-house needs and the

consumers of the reactor section and general unit cons-imers are distribated

uniformly between sections of the two unit transformers for in-house needs;

electric mo~tors of mechanism~s which back up one another are connected to

different sections.
 -174-

2.10.3.3. Emergency power supply system

Power is supplied to consumers of the first and second groups from the

emergency power supply network for which self-containedsources, i.e.

storage batteries with static converters and diesel generators are used as
power supply sources in addition to working and backup transformers.

Consumers of the first and second groups are divided into two

consumers of plant safety configurations and "general unit consumers' who

require that power be available even in complete cutoff of in-house power

plant needs.

2.10.3.4. Schematic diagram of 0.4 kV emergency power supply system of the

first group and DC networks of the safety systems

Consumers of the first group of safety systems include cutoff fittings

of the emergency localization system and hydrogen removal system, quick

acting valves and gates on lines of the reactor emergency cooling system

(SAOR), and emergency system automatic protective and monitoring devices.

There are three independent power supply sources (storage battery with

static inverter converters, 6 kV and 0.4 kV sections for in-house needs) to

supply electricity to the consumers of the first group of each

 -174a-

subsystem. The DC panel of the safety subsystem (ShchPTS) is powered from

a rectifier connected to a 0.4 kV emergency power supply section of the

second group of the NNBS, and when voltage disappears on this section from

a storage battery operating in the "buffer" mode.

 -175-

The AC 0.4 kV cons~x of the first group are connected to the 0.4 kV
section of the NNAS which is powered fram the DC panl via static inverter

converters.

During normal unit operation nrnitoring, automatic and control devices

of the corresponding safety subsystem are connected to the DC panel

(ShchPT'S) and the 0.4 kv section (•NNAS)of each subsyst~n, and under

conditions• of the mnaxinu~m conceivable accident an additional load is

connected, i.e. electric drives of the SAOP slides and valves and emergency

localization system. To prevent overloading of the inverter converters

above allowable limits by the starting currents of the electric drives of

the slides the latter are connected by stages on the MP'A signal.

2.10.3.5. Confi~gu~ration of the general unit emrgency power supply 004 kV

network of the first group and direct current

The general unit constm~rs of the 0.4 kV" emergency power supply network

of the first group include the "SKAIA" system, SUZ, dosinetric rronitoring,

the KIP equipment and autamatic reactor systems, turbines and generator,
and the quick acting reducing valves.

There are two general unit emergency power supply systens to supply
power to const~s of the general unit emergency power supply and DC
 -175a-

network; each of the units includes: power supply sc~rces-storage battery

and static invere converters, DC panel (ShchPT), 0.4• kV emergency power

supply system, of the first group (NNA), the six kV and 0.4 kV in-1~use

supply section.

S
 -176-

The DC panel (ShchPT) of each general unit emergency power supply unit
is supplied from a rectifier connected via 6/0.4 kV transfonner to the 6 kV
emergency power supply section of the second group, and when voltage"

disappears on this section fram a storage battery operating in the "buiffer"

morde.

The 0.4 kV consumrers of the first group are connected to the NNA
sections via thyristor switching devices TKYeO. The NNA sections are

supplied via static inverter converters from the ShchPT.

Each cons•e of the general unit enegency power supply network hres
two power supply sources. Either the netvwork or another inverter converter

is used as the second source.

For con-slmers which do not allow a power supply interruption longer

than 10 - 20 ins ("SKALW", SUZ) the transfer to th reserve power supply

source is done by a thyristor switching commnutation device TKP which allows

transfer of consumer power supply from one source to another in 10 is. For
conszrrs who allow poe supply interruption up to 100 - 200 ins, relay

contactor switching devices are provided.

Devices with technological backup (feeder "A" and "B", "SKALY", 1000 Hz
converters and 400 Hz "SKALY", AZ panel sets and so forth), are
 .- 176a-

supplied from one of the emrgency power supply units.

Devices without t~chnological backup (YJP devices, automatic units,

control devices and so forth) are supplied with power fram the two

enrgency power supply units.

DC consumers (protection, signalling panels and so forth) are supplied

from two DC panels.

 -177-

Pow.er is switched fram one panel to the other manually.

2.10.3.6. Schanatic of 6 kV and 0.4 kV emergency power supply in-house

needs of the second group

Consume~rs of the second group of safety systemns include rechanisrns of

the reactor emergency cooling system and the accident localization system.

General unit consumers of the second group include nechanimns of

auxiliary turbogenerator systerts and selected reactor plant systens (plant

loop, cooling systen of the fuel cooling pond, .the flushing and shutdowh

cooling syst~n and so forth).

There are three 6• kV and 0.4 kV emergency power supply sections

(according to the nunrer of safety subsystems) to supply power to consulters

of the second group. General unit consumers are distributed by sections of

safety subsystsns.

5500 kW diesel generators were installed as a self-contained power

source for the 6 kV energency power supply sections on the IV unit of the
Chernobyl power plant. The start tine of the diesel generators was 15

seconds.
 - 17 7a-

The diesel generators were loaded in stages. The start time~ of- each
stage was 5 seconds. The diesel generators (GD) with1 step load pickup are
started autamatically on the M•A (ma~xiimzm conceivable accident) signal and

on the current cutoff siqnal. -

Whene one of these signals is generated catnmands are sent by the

automatic start circuit of the DG with step load pickup to

 -178-

- DG start;
- disconnect both section breakers which connect the working 6 kV in-
house needs section to the emergency power supply section;

- disconnect the load on the 6 kV emrgency power supply section

("clear the section");

- prohibit AVR mrechanisms connected to this emergency p•ier supply

section.

After turning of the DG and connecting it to the section the breakers

of the in-house needs mrechanisms are autamatically engaged in stages after
5 seconds according to the adopted stepped load pickup giaph (Fig. 2053).

Depending on the incomi~ng signal the circuit autanatically carries out

stepped connection of corresponding rrechanisms necessary, in M'PA or when in-

house consumers are cut off fran power.

For 0.4 kV conswmers of the second group there are 0.4 kV sections of

the safety systans (NNBS) and 0.4 kV general unit sections independent of

Each section is powered fran, the corresponding 6 kV section of the

safety system via the 6/0.4 kV transforner.

 -178a-

The numiber of 0.4 kV. NSS sections correspond~s to the number of- plant
safety subsystems.

The 6/0.4 kV erergency power supply transfon~rs of the second group

are an undetachable stage of the load on the diesel generators.

There is no mutual backup between the 6 kV and 0.*4 kV sections since

the consr~ s themselves have a backup.

2.10.4. Safety control systems

The safety control systems are designed for autmmatic engagement of

devices of the protective localizing and support safety systems and

onaitoring of their operation.

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 -179-

Each of the three safety subsyst~r•s has its ow;n imideperident control
safety system (USE).

The USE forms the M2A signal when the pressure rises in the PPB

cczrparti•_nt, in the N~VK carparnt or in the BS departmnt to 5 kPa with

confirmation of a level drop in the BS to 700 nm from the ncnia level or

a drop in the gradient between the pressure header of the GrsN and the BS

to 0.5 i,~a.

To increase reliability, all three USE are buiilt independently of one

another, i *e, each USE has its own equipme~nt arnd power supply, individual
cciar~rets for equipmnt and cable routes.

To form the pressure rise signal there are four transducers each in the

PPB, ES, and NVK ccgTpartments. A signal is formed when two or more

transducers trigger.

The level drop signal in the PS and the signal which indicates a

pressure gradient drop between the pressure header and the BS is forxred

when any of these tw• transducers trigger.

The MPA signal is formed for each half of the reactor indepenidently°
 -179a-

Wnen the MPA signal appears the USB generates uc~tpcit actions to- switch
the corresponding valves of the safety systan, and to turn on the diesel

generators and mrechanisns for step load pickup.

 -180-

The design provides for the possibility of reuote control of the safety
system; for this reason control switches for each USE are zmunted on panel

EShchU-0.

In this case the emergency half is selected autcartically; to do this

an information part independent of the USE consisting of an emergenc5-

protection shaping circuit is used for technological reasons.

To mrr~itor serviceability of the USE there is light-accustic signalling

of instrxment malfunction.

The safety systen is monitored. and controlled fram safety panels

located in the zone of the operational BSchchU loop and on the backup

control parnel.

The •zr control el~nnts of the SAOR, the SLA, the safety system

valves, the devices wtich monitor SAOR water fl1w rate into the reactor and

others are located on the safety panels.

Figure 2.*54 shows a structural diagram of the USE.

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2.54
Figure 2.54, Structural diagram of the USB
 •-182-

2.11.* Other systems important for safety

2.11.1. MPflTs loop

The M.PTs loop and its main parts axe described in sections 2.6 and 2.7.°

2.11.2. SUJZ channel cooling system

The SUZ cooling system is designed to ma~intain temerature conditions

of these channels, control elements and SUZ servo drives.

The system performs the following functions:

- maintains a temperature of 40 0 C at the cooling water input into the

control channels;

- discharges 28 .1 MW of heat fram the channels of the control elements

and SUZ servo drives;

- enures cooling of the channels of the control elei•_nts and SUZ

servo drives by' a nantinal flow rate for abouit 6 minutes When the pumps are

not: operating;
 -182a-

- maintains an explosion-proof hydrogen concentration under all-

operating conditions;

- mnaintains the necessary quality of water cooling the channels and

SUZ servo drives;

- ensures emrgency protection of the reactor when problems occur in

the cooling system.

These functions are performe~d with alluw-nce for a single failure in

the system of an active or passive carponent with mo~ving or mechanical

*parts.m

Figure 2.55 shc~s a schemtic of the SUZ channel cooling systai.

The system is a circulation loop which operates by gravity

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 •-183-

Figure 2.55. Schematic of the channel cooling systei• of the SUZ, IKD_,KE,

and~ KOO.

Legend: 1 - reactor; 2 - SUZ, KD, DKE channels; 3 - KO0 channels; 4 - SUZ

heat exchangers; 5 - drain tank; 6 - circulation tank; 7 - SUZ pumps; 8 -

SUZ emergency tank; 9 - bypass purification unit; 10 - filters.

 -184-

Water fromi the upper emergency reserve tank flows by gravity into the
pressure (distributing) header and is distributed through the channels.
The channels contain camponents of the reactor Protection and control

syst~n, sleeves with fission chamibers ad energy release monitoring

transducers. Some of the channels are used to set up a flow of water which

cools the graphite of the side reflector.

As it passes through the SUZ channels, the water of the cooling loop

gives off heat to the service water and the system heat exchanger.
Depending on the service water timperature and the degree of fouling of the

heat exchanger surface. two heat exchangers ensure heat discharge with two

in. reserve.

Following the heat exchangers water flows into .the lower tanks of the

system. A level which ensures stable operation of pumps under stationary

and transient conditions is automatically maintained in the tanks. The

total volume of the lower tanks makes it possible to accept the entire

volume of water in the system with the pumps stopped.

Fcur pumips are used to feed water fran the lower tanks to the emergency
reserve tank. The outpat of each pum is roughly 700 t/hr with a head of

roughly 0.9 ?~a. Two of themn are working, two are backup°
 -184a-

Measures are provided to reduce the probability of all pums failing

for a carmon reason (pumps are located in different ccirpartnents, have

irdependent ixwer sources, and so forth).

The capacity of the w~orking pu.mps exceeds the capacity of the cooling

system; therefore sara of the water is continually dumped into the lower

tanks of the systemn fran the emrgency reserve tank (the level in the

erergency reserve tank is kept at the overflow mark).

Hydrogen is released from the water of the SUZ. cooling system due to
radioilysis in the reactor core.
 n:...-185-
TO preclude formation of an explosive -hydrogen concentration the space

above the water- in the upper and lower tanks is constantly vented with

monitoring of hydrogen content of the water in the SUZ cooling systeim and

the space above the water in the system tanks.

The emrergency reserve water tank is linked to the atmo~sphere by four

breather pipes fram its upper points. In addition the space above the water

in the tank is continuously flushed with compressed air. During a failure

ir, the comipressed air feed system, the space above the water is vented by

ejecting air by mreans of debalanced water which is continually dumped from

the emtergency reserve tank into the lower tanks through an overfl• pipe.

When the system stops all water f ran the emrergency reserve tank drains into

the lokier tanks.

The l~r tanks of the system are constantly flushed with comipressed
air; air ejected f ran the erergency reserve tank also flows into then. In

addition since the tan is under a slight vacuum, air from. the compartment

flows into them through a special line with a valve. Negative pressure in

the tanks and discharge of air supplied for flushing are acconplished by a

speci.al tank vent system.

When any of the flushing (vent systems) fail, those still in operation

maintain a safe hydrogen concentration.

 -185Sa-

To maintain the necessary quality, water in the cooling syst~n is

constantly purified. Water is supplied for purification frau the pressure

header of the pumps and is returned to the lower tanks.

When failures occur in the cooling system (drop in the level in the

emergency reserve tank, decrease of water flow rate), signals for emergency

reactor shutdown are formed.

Mk~nitoring of technological parame~ters and control

 . 186-

of the SUZ channel cooling system are accomplished by operator personnel

fram the BShchU.

The system was fully checked during startup operations and unit

operation.

2.11.3. Purge and shutdown cooling system

The purge and shutdown cooling system (SPiR), Fig. 2.56, is designed to

cool the KMP~s purge water collected for purification with subsequent

heating before returning to the KMPrs under nominal conditions; and for

reducing the temerature of the KMPrs water to the required level in the

shutdo• cooling mode.

In the nanin'al mode KM'~PTs coolant at a rate of 200 t/hr (100 t/hr fram

each KMP'Ts loop) under the GTsN head is sent to the regenerative heat

exchanger, where it is cooled fran 285 to 68 degrees C by discharging heat

to the cold backf low, and then further cooled by water of the closed cooling
water system in a purge supercooler down to 50cC and is sent to the loop

water purification system. As it passes through the regenerative heat

exchanger in the opposite direction the purified water is heated fran 50 to

69oc and returned to the steam separators through mixers on feedwater
pipelines. It should be noted that either of the tio supercoolers in the

SPiR can be operating in this mode.

 -186 a-

In the unit shutdown cooling mocde the SPiR reduces the water
temperature in the KMPTs fran 180oC to the value required by unit repair

conditions. Circulation is accomplished over the steam separator - shutdown

cooling pumps - large supercooler - steam separators route. The SPiR can

also be used to discharge residual reactor heat when power to satisfy in-

house unit needs fails. The operating configuration in this mode is the

sane as in the shutdown cooling irode.

 -187-

Figure 2.56. Schemtic of pu~rging and shutdown cooling systain

Legend: 1 - reactor; 2 - steam separator; 3 - intake header; 4 - reactor

coolant pump; 5 - pressure header; 6 - regenerative heat exchanger; 7 -

shutdown cooling pumps; 8 - purge superheaters; 9 - unit for purifying the

water of the reactor circulation loop; 10 - purge and feed water mixers°
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 '-188-

2.11i.4. Gas loop system

Figure 2.*57 show~s a schematic of the system.

In the nominal mo~de the gas loop system operates as follows: a

nitrogen-helium mixture leaving the reactor miasonry passes through the

system which nnnitors the integrityT of the fuel channels (KTsTK) where the

temerature is monitored channel by channel ~and the mo~isture content of the

nitrogen-helium mixture is monitored group by group.

As it passes through the KrsTK system the mixture travels through the

condensers, heaters and filters in which iodine vaporous precipitate to the

intake of the helium purification unit caripressor where the hydrogen,

oxygen, mrethane, carbon dioxide gas, carbon monoxide and anionia are renoved

fram the mixture down to the concentration which allowqs normial reactor

operation.
 I6

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 -190-

¢eext
ut•£Z Radioactive argon-41 is removed in holding tanks.

Following the purification system the mixture is returned to the

reactor masonry. A hydraulic sea! which prevents the pressure rising aboe

an allowable level, i.e. ~above 1 - 3 kPa is moKunted on the mixture inlet

line into the masonry..

To reduce heliumn leaks from the reactor masonry into the reactor

steelwork, nitrogen (99.9999% pure) is supplied at a pressure of 2 - 5 kPa.

There is a hydraulic seal on the feed pipeline.

The gas loop system is capable of purging the reactor masonry with

nitrogen. Here the nitrogen, is released through the activity suppression

system.

In the gas loop system fl•:3 rates, impurity concentration, mo~isture

content, temperature and pressure of the nitrogen-helium mixture are

mreasured and radiation is imonitored. All readings appear on the gas loop

panel.

Valves and• equipmnt are controlled fram the gas loop panel.
 -190a-

2.11.5. The cooling pond cooling system

The cooling pond cooling system is designed to maintain temperature

conditions of the water heated by residual heat release fram spent fuel in

the ponds under all conditions, including caomplete loss of power to in-

house consu~mers of the unit. The system keeps water temperature in the

ponds:

Sunder normal operating conditions not greater than 50•Z, at mnaximumx

residual heat output of 1800 kW;;

- with simuiltaneous unloading of 5% of fuel assemlies fran emergency

channels into the pond - not greater than 700C; in this case residual heat

output in the pond is not greater than 3000 kW.

 -191-

- wh•en heat dissipation ceases due to disruption of normal operating

conditions or loss of power to the system (a rise in water temiperature not

greater than roughly 80oC in 20 hours from the start of termination of heat

dissipation)

During this tine neasures should be taken to restore system operation o

Water quality in the spent fuel cooling ponds is maintained by a bypass

pu~rificatiorn system.

Measures are provided to elimnate the possibility of accidental

evacuation of the cooling ponds.

Measures are also provided to vent the air space above the basins.

Figure 2.58 shows a schenatic of the cooling pond cooling system.o

The ponds are cooled over a closed loop. Water heated in basins by,

residual heat release travels from the upper parts of the pond to the heat

exchangers where it gives up its heat to the service water. Required heat

release is ensured by, a single heat exchanger with a second in reserve.

After passing through the heat exchangers, water is returned to the pond by

one of two pum~ps with a capacity of roughly 160 m3/hr with a head of roughly

20 mn water colunn (second pumip in reserve).

 -191la-

Tne cooling water return and collecting pipes are designed such that
when they fail the level in the ponds does not drop below a nnrm

allowble value.

There is an overflow in each of the ponds to prevent overfilling.

To preclude formation of an explosive hydrogen concentration,

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 . 193-

It is continuously vented in the space above the ponds (air collected

from the central roam is sucked in). When the pond vent system fails, the

flowi section of the openings which connect the cooling ponds to the central

roam is such that they can be regarded as a comipartnent with a volume of

40, 000 m3 which is vented by an independent venting system.

Pond water is purified over a loop independent of the cooling system.

The follco.ing are mo~nitored:

- water level in the ponds;

- water temperature in the ponds;

- cooling water flow rates and so forth.

The system is controlled and its technological parame~ters irnitored by

operator personnel fram the BShchU.

The system was comprehensively checked for agreement with design

indicators during startup operations and unit operation.

 -19 3a-

2.11.6. Ejection-cooling unit

The ejection-cooling irit (Fig. 2.59) is designed to dissipate heat

fram the sealed volume canpartzrent.

The ejection-cooling unit for each of the two sealed volumes consists

of four groups of coolers mocunted at the 5.0 mark in the GPsN tank

comp~artrrent. A group consists of four coolers. The capacity of one cooler

is 2500 m3/hr. Each group is filled with air independently. In terns of

water the coolers arc divided into two independent subsystems of eight

coolers each and are connected to the different pump systems of ithe SOS.

Air at maximu~m temperature is collected f ran the upper zones the

downcacer shafts by four pipes, sent to

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 -195-

to each group of coolers where is cooled using water jets in summrer to 35CC,
in winter to 18cC, and is sent to GTsN tank ccapartment. The cooled air
dissipates heat from plant equipment and accidental coolant leaks. To

preclude en~trainment of dispersed mo~isture with air there are separators at

the cooler outpat. Ejection coolers not only cool air and rexrove excess

moisture fram it, but also rexrove aerosols, including radioactive iodine.

The ejection-cooling system is campact and does not include active

elements which require servicing or control during operation.

2o11.7. Radiation ironitoring~system

The radiation monitoring system of a nuclear power. plant is a camponent

part (subsystem) of the automiated control system of the power plant and is

designed to collect, process and output data on the radiation situation in

ccznprtments of the power plant and in the external environmrent, the status

of process media and loops, on expoosure of personnel and individuals in the

population according to current standards and legislation.

The entire radiation mo~nitoring system is divided into two systems:

the radiation profess monitoring (RL'K) system and the radiation dosimcetric

monitoring system (SPDK).

 -195a-

The purpose of the radiation process mo~nitoring is to optimize

technological processes and also monitor the condition of protective.

barriers on radionuclide propagation paths.

The purpose of the radiation dosinetric monitoring system is to nonitor

radioecological factors engendered by nuclear power plant operation and

ultimately to determine internal and external radiation doses received by

personnel and individuals in the population.

 -- 196-

External dosinetric monitoring is separated fram the radiation

dosimetric monitoring system; the former makes it possible to determine:

- activity and nuclide composition of radioactive substances in

a~spheric air;

- monitoring the gamma radiation dose rate in the locality;

- monitor radioactive fallout;

- monitor ground water activity in test wells;

- determine content of radioactive substances in soil, plants, locally

produced fodder, in foodstuffs and sc forth.

Figure 2.60 shows a structural diagram of the SFEDK.

The following are used for radiation mocnitoring:

1) a complex of AKD06 gear which includes detection units and

devices, data processing equipment, units for mo~nitoring contamination of

surfaces by radioactive substances, units and dosimeters for nontoring
irradiation of power plant personnel;
 .- 196a-

2) individual portable, carried instruments;

3) laboratory equipment and instrum~ents.

The structure of radiation mronitoring consists of an information-

measuring systanL with a large number of concentrated data sources and

receivers set up in a radial-annular configuration; detection units with

data collector and processor UNO-06R are linked radially to units for local

indication of set values being exceeded.

The UNO-06R are linked to one another and the data exchange and

mornitoring device (UNO-O1R) over annular cariuncations lines.

The AKB06 also allc's continuous monitoring of readings

- ..... ~. C- - . . ~ - - -. ...- ~ -. .- -

CSICI'Mbl CPK

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m~I

II~am~•1oIlw~llm Ulblim IMA11b

mm~te S M

-j
1~j( ~?i~ ~O
iThAD. ,Th
 •-198-

of detection units and devices, transmission of information over all

channels to the comnputer, output of signals regarding component part.

malfunction, and control of isolating valves mounted on sanpli~ng line•s.

Data display devices (displays, consoles, signalling units) are located

on the radiation monitoring panel.

The detection units which make up the AKRB-06 make it possible to

me~asure the follc•.ing:

- intensity Gf ganua radiation exposure dose in the range fran 10-5 -

103 R/hr (BD•-41, BDt43-41-0l, UDt•3-42, UJDM-4l-02);

- volu~metric activity of gamma emitting nuclides in liquid process

mredia and loops in the range 5 x 10-11 - 10-3 curies/i (IJDZhG-04R,

UDZhG-05R, UJDZhG-14RI) ;

- volurretric activity of iodine vapors in air in the range 10-11-

10-6 curies/l BDAB-06) ;

- volumretric activity of aerosols with a dispersed phase containing

beta emitting nuclides in the range 10-13 - 10-9 curies/•I (BDAB-05);
 .-198Ba-

- volume~tric beta activity of inert gases in air and process media ir±
the ranges 10-9 - 1.4 x 104 curies/• (YDG•B-08) and 10-5 - 0.3 curies/.l
(UDGB,-05-01) ;

- the activity of long lived beta aerosols in gas aerosol releases

into the vent pipe in the range 3 x 10-14 - 3 x 10-10 curies/,•;

- activity, of short lived beta active aerosols in gas aerosol releases

into the vent pipe in the range 1.5 x 10-12 - 1.5 x 10-8 curies/i.;

- activity of beta active inert gases in gas aerosol releases into the
vent pipe in the range 8 x 10-9 - 8 x 10-5 curies/4;

- activity of gammia active gas vapors in gas aerosol

 -199-

releases into the vent piPe in• the range 3 x 10-13 - 3 x 10-10 curi'es/j.

Gas aerosol releases into the vent pipe are monitored by radiometers
RKS-03-01 and R1KS-2-02. Air flow rate in the vent pipe is measured by a

partial flc•ieter at the base of a metal-polymer sensing element.

Measuremnt data results are compater processed.

For each unit of the nuclear power plant the total number of protection

units is 490, of which roughly 400 measurnennts are taken in process

c •rtets where personnel may be located on a permanent or limited .bas is.

Surface contamination mronitoring units warn personnel when established

contamination threshold levels are exceeded:

- skin of the h~and~s by beta active substances in the range 10 - 2000

beta particles/ (min.cri2) (RZG-05-01, SZB-03, SZB-04);

- skin of the body or priggery protective clothing by beta active

substances in the range 50 - 2000 beta particles/ (min.cmi2) (RZB-04-04) ;

 •-199a-

- transport when leaving the nuclear power plant in order to detect

objects for detailed examination by other means for gamma radiation in the

range 2.78 x 10-2 - 0.278 microroentgens/s (RZG-05);

- personnel when leaving the nuclear power plant for protection and
subsequent detailed examination of the subject for gammla radiation in the

range 1.4 x 10-2 - 0.14 microroentgens/s (RZG-04-O1).

Devices which mo~nitor personnel irradiation doses constantly n~nitor

external irradiation. To do this the following are mostly used:

- individual dosimetric film badges to measure integral gamma

radiation exposure doses in the range 0°05 - 2 R at energy 0.1 - 1.25 MeV

....(IFtJ-l),.
 C-

-200-

- thermolui.miinescent dosimeter sets to measure x-ray and ganma

radiation exposure dose in the energy range 0.06 - 1.25 MeV with mreasurement

limits 1.0 - 1000 R, 0.1 - 1000 R (KDTr-02);

- Dosineters-signallers of the intensity of gamma radiation exposure

dose in the range 0.1 - 9.9 R/hr. There are also a num~ber of dosimeter

modifications with similar characteristics.

The instuent for recording internal hiuman irradiation allows

measurement of the content of radioactive nuclides cesium-137 and cobalt-60

uniformly distributed in the h~mian organimn and iodin-131 in the thyroid

gland (MSG-01). Also s~nconductor DGDK type detectors are used at the
nuclear power plant with corresponding analysis and processing equipment

which makes ii possible to identify a number of other radionuclides in the

himan organism.

The pool of portable and carried instnzments constitutes a wide range

of dosimeters and radiczmeters, for example:

- to measure ganima and x-radiation dose rates in the energy range 15

kev - 25 •V with measurement ranges 0.1 microroentgens/s - 11 roentgens/s
 -200a-

- to measure equivalent neutron dose rates fram 0.*05 - 5000 micro

ber/s (KDK-2) ;

- for express n~asurenants of individual sample activities (beta

radiareter RKB4-1) with range 2 x 10-12 - 10-7 curies/l;

- for measuring volun~tric activity of nuclides in liquids, gases, in

air for alpha, beta and ganima radiation in different energy ranges (RZhS-05,

IGA-01, N!KS-01, and others).

External dosimetric monitoring is done in the region of the nuclear

power plant to a radius of about 35 kfl. It is done by the exter~ial

dosimet•ry service of the nuclear power plant and is designed to obtain

information necessary to estimate inter--al and external irradiation doses to

:individuals in the population.

 -201-

Monitoring equipmnt is located at 38 stations which include integral

gamma dosimeters, cells for collecting atmospheric precipitation and also

seven suction units.

Sarples are analyzed using semiconductor detector, spectrometers and

analyzers with xnicrocanputers.

The radiation situation in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant is

predicted using, microcaters from data on releases into the atmsphere

Throuigh the vent pipe of the nuclear power plant and automatic mreasurement

of weather paramreters.
2.11.8. AES management centers
AES management is performed on two levels:

- plant level

- unit level
(see Figure 2.61 the fundamental management layout of the plant).

Management of all of the devices which ensure the safety of the AES is

performed at the unit level.

Plant management level

Real-time management of an AES at the plant level is performed from a

central control panel (TsShchU).

At the plant level the operational personnel are responsible for:

- managing the electric equipment of the main circuit for electrical

connections (circuit breakers for the 750 kV lines, the unit transformers,
the autotransformers and others, circuit breakers for the 20-kV generators,

circuit breakers for the 330-ky autotransformers, and circuit breakers for
the 6-ky and 300 kV reserver transformers s.n.);

- distribution of the active and reactive power; and

 sShchU /[I
.sPhase ,7L . z
/Chernobyl AES

rt

ro
0•

ro

•LIIl power unit

0
I3

III
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unit
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I
I

bU III power
 -203-
- coordination of the work of the operational personnel stationed at:
the unit control panel and at individual structures of the commercial site.

Keys for controlling the above cited circuit breakers are provided at

the central control panel, as well as sound and light signaling of an

emergenc~y and breakdown and light signaling of the status of the

commutation devices (the circuit breaker is open or closed) on a graphic

panel.
The devices for relay protection, accident preventing automatic.

devices, and telemechanics are located in the buildings of the relay panels
of the corresponding distribution devices (ORU): ORU-750 kV and ORU 330 kV.

Devices built on the basis of integral microcircuits are used for

relay protection of the 750 kV lines. These devices can troubleshoot

individual channels and make it possible to perform tests.

Series produced electromechanical relays are also used in the devices

for controlling the relay protection and the accident preventing automatic

devices.
Unit management level

Management of technological objects and structures included in that

particular energy unit is performed at the unit level:

- the reactor with the support installations (GTsN; PN; APN and

others);

- turbine generators with auxiliary equipment;

- operational and reserve power sources s.n. and others; and
- individual structures of the commercial site: diesel power plants,

commercial water supply pumps, and others.

Management of the cited equipment is performed from the unit
 -204-
control panel (BShchU), whichincludes the panel and a control panel. The
operational circuit of the BShchU is divided into management zones:

- reactor management;

- steam generator management; and

- turbine, generator and s.n. power source management.

The work spaces of the operators- the control panels are positioned in
the operational circuit of the SChchU:

- for the senior reactor management engineer;

- for the senior unit management engineer; and

- for the senior turbine generator management engineer.

The control panels include:

- management equipment

- system testing instruments;

•- calling devices and indicator complexes from the "SKALA" centralized

control system; and

-conmmunication equipment.
The panel of the operational circuit of the SCHchU includes:

- the mimic pahel of the reactor;

- the mimic panel of the SUZ;

- the graphic panel of the thermotechnical and electrical parts of the

unit;
- individual instruments of the test system; and

- signaling systems.
The basic volume of the parameters are controlled by the "SKALA"

central control system (STsK).

 -204a-
The most important parameters requ~ired for correct performance of
technological processes are also controlled by individual instruments.

These include the reactor power, the pressure and level in the BS, the

flow rate of steam after the BS, the flow rate of the replenishment water
into the BS, and measurements of the SFKRE and SUZ and others.
 .-205-
Power supply to the BShchU and the "ISKALAI STsK. is implemented from a

reliable power system in such a way that if the s.n busbars are shut off,

the operator does not lose information about the status of the

technological parameters.

Technical systems for controlling technological protection and testing

systems are positioned in the operational circuit of the BShchU.

Overall operational management of the unit is performed from a

dispatcher post equipped with a telephone and a loudspeaker.

The zone of the operational circuit of the BSHchU is also provided

with special panels - safety panels (PB) for each of the three safety

subsystems, to which management and testing of the reserve s.n. power

sources (diesel generators) and systems for emergency cooling of~the

reactor and localization of the accident) are shifted.

A reserve control panel (RShchU) is provided for shutting down the

reactor and maintaining it in a subcritical state when it is impossible to

perform this operation from the BShchU.

The operational circuit of the RShchU includes a control panel,

operational circuit panels, and safety panels.

An AZ-5 button, an SUZ coupling cut off key, a signaling panel and

others are installed on the control panel. Recorders of the neutron power,

the pressure in the BS, and so on are installed on the panels of the

operational circuit. The PB RShchU panels are analogous to the PB BShchU

panels.
For a number o,f technological systems which are not associated with
the basic technological process, local control panels are provided for: the
 -205a-
gas loop, the special water purification; radiation control systems; for
installations for sorptive purification of ejector gases, and turbines.
 -206-
Local panels are also provided for a number of units of the basic
technology (GTsN, PEN, APEN, and others), which are delivered in a complex

with the equipment.

 -207-
2.12 Operating regimen of the reactor and block-

2.12.1 Normal operating modes

The operating regimens of the reactor and block may be characterized

as normal operating regimens and transitional regimens during equipment

downtime. Normal operating modes are startup and shutdown of the block,

operation of the block at power-producing capacity, reactor cooling

regimens during equipment maintenance (maintenance regimens).

Startup and shutdown of the reactor

The startup of the power block with an RBMK reactoir is conducted with

operating reactor coolant pumps , with "sliding" pressure and with a free
water level in the separators. The required anticavitation supply during

coolant pump suction is provided by reducing the output by the restricting

control valves that are mounted on the head of the pumps. The continuous

control of cooling water consumption is carried out in this mode over all

of the fuel channels of the core and by this token assures the safety of

the reactor. Heating of the block is conducted under "sliding" pressure in

the separators, i.e. the pressure is not constant, but rises as the

temperature increases.

Injection of the circulation loop during the startup and heating of

the block is carried out by emergency injection pumps.

The capacity of the reactor during startup and heating is maintained

on the average at a level of 2-3% of nominal value. Additionally, thermal
 -207a-

capacity of individual fuel channels due to unequal distribution of energy

release along the core may comprise up to 6% of nominal.

 -208-

It is permissible to conduct increases in reactor capacity and heat

the circuit using one, two, and three operating reactor coolant pumps on
each side of the reactor, having a capacity of 6,000-7,000 cubic meters. per

hour each. With such a capacity, the reactor coolant pump has the capacity
of controlling water consumption through each of the fuel channels, as well
as assuring an adequate supply prior to pump cavitation. With a 2-3%

reactor capacity from nominal capacity, heating of the circulation loop is

carried out until a temperature of about 200 degrees Celcius. The heating

rate of the circuit is about 10 degrees C per hour and is limited by

temperature stresses in metal structures of the reactor.

At a pressure of 2-4 kg per square cm the heating of the deaerators is

Vacuum is initiated in the condensers of the startup turbine at a

pressure of about 15 kgs per square cm in the separators. After vacuum is•
reached, the turbine is jolted and accelerates. Synchronization of the

turbogenerator and connection with the network is usually accomplished when

pressure in the condensers is about 50 kgs per square cm. Continued

increase in parameters until nominal values is achieved parallel with

increase in the electric load.

Figure 2.62 gives an example of the changes of basic parameters of a

reactor installation from the moment the reactor is brought to a minimally

controlled capacity level, and until synchronization and connection of the

turbogenerator into the network.

 -208a-

Regular shutdown and cool down of a power block with an RBMK reactor

is conducted when reactor coolant pumps are in operation. Prior to cool

down the capacity of the reactor is reduced to the level of residual heat

release, while the

 P, W!Y
1 T "* -

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TIP~e ) h~~ir

PMC.-2.6.2. K,•exei~e napalex:o• p:eac~op np~m Iycie:

Figure 2.6.2. Changes in reactor parameters during startup:
1. Water temperature (T) in the circulation loops of the reactor;

2. Pressure (P) in the separators;

3. Thermal capacity of the reactor (N).

I
 -2 10-

turbogenerators of the block are switched off the network and are stopped.
When reactor capacity is reduced to 20%, capacity of the operating reactor

coolant pumps must be reduced to 6,000-7,.000 cubic meters per hour. Cool
down of the circulation loop to a temperature of 120-130 degrees C is

carried out by a gradual decrease of pressure in the loop via a controlled

release of steam from the separators into the turbine condensers or the

industrial condenser. For a more thorough cool down a special cooldown

system is utilized that consists of pumps and heat exchangers.

As during heating, the factor that limits the cooldown rate are the

temperature stresses in the reactor's metal structures. Since during

cooldown the rate of temperature reduction in the circuit is determined

primarily by the extent of discharge of steam from the separators, then

maintaining the rate of cooldown at a given level is not a complex problem

in this mode.

Operation of the block at power-generating capacity

When the block is operating at power-generating capacity, reactor

safety is achieved by maintaining the guide parameters within allowable

limits.

Until a capacity of 500 MWt(t) the circulation of heat carrier through

the reactor is achieved by the reactor coolant pumps that operate at a

capacity of 6,000-7,000 cubic meters per hour. At a capacity of 500
MWt(t), the capacity of the reactor coolant pumps is increased to 8,000

cubic meters per hour as a result of opening of the DRK (expansion

unknown). At capacities above 500 MWt(t) and up to nominal levels the
 -210a-

block operates with a steady capacity of the reactor coolant pumps.-When

capacity is increased above 60% from nominal no less than three reactor

coolant pumps must be in operation on each side of the reactor. Hydraulic

profiling of the core of anRBMK reactor is carried out in a way so that

upon getting to nominal capacity, the DRK would be fully open, with the

total
 -211-

consumption through the reactor being equal to 48,000 cubic meters per
hour.

Maintenance modes

The principal requirement for carrying out inspections or maintenance

of any of the reactor's equipment is the assurance of reliable cooling of
the core during this period. At the same time, the construction of the
reactor and organization of maintenance regimens much be such that all of

the equipment of the circulation loop be assured of maintenance.

From the point of view of conducting maintenance operations, the

entire circulation loop is broken down into four areas: pressure section
from the pressure valves of the reactor coolant pumps to the channel
pressure damper valves, the fuel channel tracts from the ZRK to the
separators, separators and downcomner pipelines to the suction gate valves
of the reactor coolant pumps, and the section between the suction and
pressure gate valves, which includes circulation pumps and appropriate
equipment.

Maintenance of equipment and pipes that are situated in the section

between the suction and pressure reactor coolant pump gate valves does not
present any difficulty, and in principle, could be carried out when the
reactor is in operation.
 -21la -

For this purpose the pressure and suction slide valves on the -
pipelines of this particular GTsN must be closed, and after draining the

heat carrier, the GTsN itself and the sectors of the pressure and suction

pipelines adjacent to it up to the slide valves are accessible for

maintenance. Circulation of heat carrier through the reactor in this

instance is carried out by other reactor coolant pumps of the given

circulation loop.

In order to carry out maintenance on the structural elements of fuel

channels, the heat-carrying assembly is removed from the channel that is

being serviced, the ZRK mounted at the channel inlet is closed, the level
of water in the separators is lowered below the notch marking the water and

steam commnunications
 --212-

of this channel into the body of the separator. Cooling of the remaining
channels of the core is carried out either under forced or under natural
circulation of the heat carrier.

In order to service separators, downcomiers and suction gate valves, or

the suction gate valves of the reactor coolant pump, the pressure gate
valves of the reactor coolant pump are closed, and the level in fuel
channels is dropped. In order to conduct a danger-free cooling of the core
during such modes, the connection of a special servicing vat to a pressure
collector of the reactor coolant pump is foreseen; this vat is used to feed
the channels and the steam that forms in them is evacuated into the,
separators. In order to be able to examine and service the separators, a
system for suctioning steam from the separators into a technological
condenser has been foreseen.

When servicing pressure equipment of the section, this section, due to

the fact that the ZRK is closed, is cut off from the core, while the
removal of residual heat is done by water that is fed into the channels by
the separators. Such a cooldown regimen of the fuel channels (bubbling
cooling regimen) was studied during the design of the reactor, using
special test benches. Experimentally it was shown that when damper-control
valves are shut, a reliable cooling of fuel channels is assured with
bubbling cooling when the following requirements are fulfilled:

-- the level of water in the circulation loop is above the notch mark
of the steam-and-water communications (PVK) in the separator;

-- atmospheric pressure in the separator;

 -212a-

-- capacity of residual heat release in the fuel assembly is no-higher.

than 25 kWt;

-- water temperature in the separator is not below 80-90 degrees

Celsius, in order to avoid hydraulic shocks in the PVK pipes.

The most complicated maintenance procedure is servicing of the channel

flowmieters and the ZRK. In order to carry out this operation, used are
 -213-

2.12.2. Transition modes involved with equipment failures

In view of the high unit power of RBMK boiling water - graphite

reactors and their relatively high importance in power sYstems, the system

for control and protection (SUZ) of these reactors in malfunctions of

individual types of equipment includes a rapid, controlled decrease in

power at a predetermined rate to safe levels. Emergency protection of

three types (AZi, AZ2, and AZ5) operates on signals of malfunctions of the

operating equipment.

The following algorithm for operation of emergency protection measures

has been realized in the SUZ of active RBMK-1000 reactors:

- AZI functions in stopping one of six main circulation pumps, a

decrease in the feedwater flow rate on a decrease in the level in the

separators. At the AZl signal, the reactor power decreases to a 60% level;
- AZ2 functions in an emergency discharge of the load or stopping of

one of two operating turbogenerators. The reactor power drops to a 50%

level at the AZ2 signal.

In other emergency situaitons involved with equipment failures,

emergency protection AZ5 operates; in functioning of AZ 5, an uncontrolled

reduction of power occurs up to full shutdown of the reactor.

A mathematical model of the installation, including equations of

kinetics, hydrodynamics and heat transfer and a description of algorithms
of operation of the equipment and systems for automatic regulation of the
 -213a-
AES parameters,-has been developed for studying the malfunction conditions

of power units with

 -214-

RBMK reactors. The comparison of results of calculations with data on

individual dynamic modes which occur at working AES which was performed
later indicated that the mathematical model which had been developed

satisfactorily describes the dynamics of the Power unit. Transition modes

involved mainlywith the transfer to natural circulation of the heat-

transfer medium were studied on special test models.

The experience of operation of active power units indicated that the

measures and means envisioned fully ensure the safety of the RMBK reactor

under all conditions involved with equipment failures.

A great deal of research was done for substantiating the safety of

reactor operation under conditions of a decrease in power in functioning of

emergency protection AZ 5, since the occurrence of this mode is accompanied

by deep changes in operating parameters: in particular, a decrease in the

water level in the separators.

The behavior of basic reactor parameters in a transition mode in

functioning of protection AZ5 is shown in Fig. 2.63.

The loss of power for system auxiliaries is one of the most severe

emergency s~tuations in a power unit. In loss of power for system

auxiliaries, circulation of the heat-transfer medium through the active

zone at the beginning of the malfunction is provided by GTsN which are
running down, after there is only natural circulation. The transition
 -2 14a -
*process in a loss of power for system auxiliaries of a unit is shown in

Fig. 2.64.

One can see in the figure that in the initial stage of the
 -215-
process, the rate of the drop in~the water flow rate is somewhat higher
than the rate of the decrease in thermal power of the reactor, which leads

to a brief increase in the steam content and a decrease in reserves before

a crisis of convective heat transfer. More detailed research indicated

that the decrease in reserves before the crisis even in the channels under
the greatest thermal stress in this mode is slight and is Safe for the

reactor, since at the beginning of a malfunction, the reactor is cooled

reliably due to circulation created by the GTsN which are running down.

The GTsN running down have a noticeable effect on the level of

circulation of the heat-transfer medium through the reactor only in the

first 30-35 s of the transition process. After this cooling of the active

zone is effected due to natural circulation. The stability and intensity

of natural circulation depend to a great extent on a whole series of

factors, such as the design of the circulation duct, the behavior of the
pressure in the duct, variation in the feedwater flow rate and temperature,

etc.

Experimental research on conditions of natural circulation were

performed both on thermotechnical testing units - models of the reactor

circulation duct - and directly on working reactors on the Leningrad and

Kursk AES. The reliability of cooling of the active zone in natural
circulation in both stationary and dynamic modes with preservation of a

constant pressure in the circulation duct was established on the testing

units and confirmed on the reactors. In stationary modes, tests Were

conducted on working
 2
kgf /cm

-D, sa • • • _

0 40 £O 30 •iO .5O 60 ;P0 •) Bpe•,,c

O time, s

Piie. 2.E 3. flo~e;•e1e nSapa.eTpOs peaK~opa B pe~.re cpa~aT•Ba• A35:

I - •po wo•,ocm (N );
2 - ?eflAo~aR UOH0CTb (0Q );
3 - pacxo•, mzm A~on~oR no• (0 );
4 - )I3ueHeli~e waccosoro ypomsx. ns cenlap:aTOpex (•H);
5 - Aaa~e~we 3s cenapai•'op:x C?).
Fig. 2.6.3 Beha~vior of reactor pa~rameters under condition of AZ5
fun't ioning :

1. neutron power (N) ;

2. thermal power (Q);
3. circulating water flow rate (u);
4. variatiLon bf mass "level in separators CAH)
5. pressur in separators (P).
P•ee 2.6.4. flose~e1~e napa~e~pos peax~opa s pezwe o~ecTo'~Ea•1
CO6OTBem~Oc ix 6noxa.
O•o3HaTexe•. n'pxse~e~e Ha pHO. 2.63

Fig. 2.6o4 Evaluation of the reactor parameters

during onsite power losso
Legend shown in Fig° 2.63
 -218-

reactors at powers of 5 and 10% of the nominal power; disengagement of the

GTsN was performed at powers of 25 and 50% of the nominal in dynamic modes.

With a decrease in pressure, which can be caused, for example, by opening

and subsequent poor closing of safety valves, boiling up of the heat-

transfer medium in the drop, expansion of the level in the separators and,

as a result, loss of the steam-water mixture form the duct. It was

established on a testing unit that with a decrease in pressure to a certain

level, partial loss of the steam-water mixture and water from the duct does

not result in a decrease in the level heap or interruption of circulation

of the heat-transfer medium. flverheating of the fuel elements of an

experimental channel was observed only with a decrease in pressure in the

separators below 35 kgf/cm.

For ensuring reactor safety in a loss of power for system auxiliaries

of the power unit and a deep pressure drop, the system for emergency

cooling of the reactor is engaged and feeds water to the fuel channels.

The safety of conditions of natural circulation on power units with

RBMK reactors has been confirmed by accidents which have occurred under

real conditions at working AES. For example, a full loss of power for

system auxiliaries occurred at unit I of the Kursk AES in January, 1980.

Readings of thermocouples of thermometric fuel cartridges and a flowmeter

installed at the inlet to one of the fuel channels of the reactor were
recorded during the transition process. No temperature increase of the
fuel
 -218a-
element shells was recorded throughout the transition processd, and the
recorded flow rate through the channel in natural circulation was at least
 -219-
20% of the flow rate which occurred at nominal power. The standard system

for monitoring the airtightness of the fuel element shells recorded no

increase in the activity of the heat-transfer medium when the reactor

subsequently went on power. Experimental data on conditions of natural

circulation were summarized and compared to results of calculations by the

calculation programs which have been developed. In view of the good

agreement of the results, predictive calculations were preformed'and

indicated the possibility of stable and safe operation of RBMK power units

in a natural circulation mode at power levels up to 35-40%.

Protection of the reactor in relation to a decrease in the feedwater

flow rate and the level in the separators ensures safe operation of these

power units at all power levels. Along with introduction of protection

systems, disengagement of the GTsN in performed in functioning of the AZ5

emergency protection according to the decrease in the feedwater flow rate

with a time lag. This is done for reducing the magnitude of the~level drop

in the separator and preventing cavitation failure of the GRsN, i.e., for

providing optimum conditions for development of stable natural circulation.

The safety of disengagement of the GTsN and cooling of the reactor in a

mode of natural circulation, as indicated above, has been confirmed by

numerous experiments and by the experience of AES operation.

Figure 2.65 shows the calculated transition process in full

instantaneous stoppage of the feedwater flow.
 -219a-
Reactor safety in malfunctions in the feedwater supply system has also

been confirmed by the experience of operation of active RBMK power units,

 -2 20-

kgf/1cm2
AHHP£

0 Wo 20 ,30 ~40 50 60 7'0 ao Bperi,c

pM¢. 2.;5 flep:exoAH•iT;o, ript f•po flOJHouM'•Dei-oMupex• eH•o pac-

xo~a J1Ta~TeT8bHOR 5O£1.
O~o3Ha'le39x np~se~e• xa pwo.82

Fig. 2.6.5 Transition process in full instantaneous

inter.ruption of the flow of feedwater.
The legend is shown in Fig. 2.6.2
 --221-
List of' Abbreviations

AZ - Protection
AZM - AZ for working power range

AZMM - AZ for low power range

ASCP - AZ for speed in startup range

AZS R - AZ for speed in working range

AR - Automated regulator

ARM - AR for low-power range

AES - Atomic power plant

BA-86 - Servodrive control automation module

BVRK. - Servodrive control contact relay module

BKS - AR servodrive control power module

BP - Power supply module

BP. 119 - LAR-LAZ sensor power supply module

BP.38 - Ionization chamber power supply module

BP..39 - Ionization chamber power supply modul~e

BP.30OM - Fission chamber power supply module

BPP - Program module

BS - Drum separator

BSP - Synchronous movement module for LAR-LAZ

BT - LAR-LAZ trigger module

BT-37 - AR trigger module

BUSP - LAR servodrive control module

BUT - Thyristor rectifier control module

BShchU-N - Control panel module, inoperative portion

 -221la-
BShchU-O- - Control panel module, operative portion

VK - Upper limit switch

VU - BUSP input circuits
 -222-

GUI - BUSP control impulse oscillator

GTsN - Main circulation pump
DPol - Rod position sensor
DRK - Throttling-actuator valve
ZRTA - Reactimeter
1K - Ionization chamber
IM - Actuator
ISSo ZM - Count rate meter
K - Coupling power supply switch
KV.2 Output stage

KVo3M - Output stage

KD Fission chamber

KtVo17 - Triaxial chamber for LAR-LAZ

KMPTs - Controlled circulation loop
KNK-56 ©Startup range IK

KNK-53M - Working range IK

KNT=31 - Fission chamber
KOM - Coupling disconnect key
KT - Current corrector for AR-AZ
KSVP - Recording potentiometer
KUT - Thyristor control key
LAZ - Local AZ
LAR - Local AR
NVK - Lower waterlines
NK - Lower limit switch
 -222a-
OV. - Excitation winding

PIK .- Startup ionization chamber

PK - Overcompensation

PK-AZ - PK in AZ modes
 -223-

PO - Operator's panel
PPB - Pressure-tight box
PS - Warning signal
RIK - Working ionization chamber
RPU - Backup control panel
RR - Manual control rod
S - Synchronizer
SI US - Individual rod control scheme
SSS AR - AR rod synchronization system
SUZ - Control/safety system
STsK SKALA - Central monitoring system
SChS -Counter

TA - Process automation
TVS - Fuel assembly
TEZ - Typical replacement element
UZM - Power level protection amplifier
UZC - Speed protection amplifier
USMo 12 - Summing amplifier
USO - LAR-LAZ deviation signal amplifier
USO.'10 - USO for AR
US P - Truncated absorber rod
Ts Z - Central hall
ShchO - Operator's console
ShchEP - Electronic instrumentation console
 -223a-

EMT - Electromagnetic brake coupling

Nnom - Rated power level

•) - Reactor reactivity
~- Percentage of delayed neutrons
 Appendix 3

ELIMINATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT AND

SHUT-DOWN
 3. Eliminating the consequences of, the accident and shut-down.
3.1 The progress and prospects for shutting-down the first, second,

and third units and their reentry into operation.

Contamination of the surfaces of the equipment and spaces of the AES

basically took place through the ventilation system, which continued to

operate in the fourth unit for some time after the accident, and due to

dispersion of the radioactive dust from the territory of the plant. The
individual horizontal sectors of surfaces of the machine hall had the
highest level (up to 10f5 - particles/cm /min), since it was contaminated

for a long period of time through the collapsed roof.

* The rate of the dose off'- radiation in the contaminated spaces of the

first and second units on 20 May 1986 was 10-100 mr/hr and that in the

machine hall - 20-600 mr/hr.

The composition of the solutions for decontamination was selected with

consideration of the material being washed off (plasticized substances,

steel, concrete, different coatings) and the nature and level of surface

contamination.

Spray decontamination was widely used during the wash down with the

use of washing machines and fire hydrants and some of the spaces were

washed manually by swabbing pith rags impregnated with decontaminating

*solutions. A steam ejection method and a method for dry decontamination

using polymer coatings were also used.

 -1a-
Testing of the processes of. decontamination was performed through

direct
 -2-
measurement of the gamma background radiation from the washed surfaces and
a "smear" technique. As a result of the decontamination, the levels of

contamination of the surfaces of the spaces and equipment were reduced to

those standards set in Radiation Safety Standards (N•B)-76 and OSP 72/80:

for the serviced spaces - 2O000J- particles/(cm 1min);

for the semiserviced spaces - 8000k - particles/cm /min).

After decontamination the levels of the r-radiation for spaces in the

first and second units was 2-l0mr/hr.

3.2 Progress and prospects for decontaminating the AES site

During the accident radioactive material was ejected into the

territory of the plant, and also fell on the roof of the machine hall, the

roof of the third unit and on the metallic supports of the pipe.

The territory of the plant, the walls and roofs of the building also

had substantial contamination due to settling of the radioactive aerosols

and radioactive dust. However, the total ganuma-background radiation in the

territory created by radiation from the destroyed fourth unit substantially

exceeded the level of radiation from the contaminated territories and

buildings. It should be noted that the level of contamination of the

territory was uneven.

The shoulders of the roads were treated wi~th rapidly polymerizing solutions ....

in order to reinforce the upper layers of the soil and to eliminate-dust

formation. This was done to reduce the scatter of radioactive

contamination in the form of dust in the territory and on the roof of the

building of the machine hail.

In order to deactivate the territory, the AES was divided into zones

based on a condition of complex operations.

The sequence for performing operations in each zone is determined

 -3-
proceeding from
- the necessity for personnel to work on objects inside the zones;-

-the principle "from dirty to clea~n" and with consideration of the

"wind rose;" and

-the necessity of subsequent support of operations to restart the

units.

The decontamination in each zone was performed in the following order:

-removal of refuse and contaminated equipment from the territory;

-decontamination of the roads and external surfaces of buildings;

-removal of a 5-10 cm thick layer of soil and its transport to the

containers in the burial facility (the solid waste storage facility of the
fifth unit);

-when necessary, laying concrete plates or filling in with fresh

soil;

-coating of plates and territory not covered by concrete with a film

forming material; and

-limiting access to the treated territory.

 -3a-
The daily rate of treated sites was up to 15,000-35,000 m As a result of
the completed measures, it was possible to reduce the total background

gammna radiation in the region of the first unit to 20-30 mr/hr, where this

residual background radiation is basically caused by external sources,

which points to the high effectiveness of decontamination of the territory

and the buildings. However, a substantial improvement in the radiation

situation in the entire territory of the AES, especially in the regions of

the third and fourth units, is possible only after closing the destroyed

reactor.

3°3 Progress and prospects for decontaminating the 30-kilometer zone

and its return to agricultural pursuits.

The formation of radioactive traces after a one-time ejection is

completed after approximately a year. In
 -4-
this period there is a substantive redistribution of radionuclides in
regional elements in accordance with the features of the relief. The most
intensive redistribution of radioactivity (secondary transfer) occurs in

the first 3-4 months after ejection, especially during the occurrence of
active biological and atmospheric processes (growth, development, and
disappearance of plants, rains and winds). The poorly attached part of the

radioactive materials settled on the surface of the soil and vegetation is

greatly subjected to redistribution. In coniferous forests such

redistribution is completed only after .3-4 years (after full renewal of the

•needles).

In light of the cited reasons, the radioactive situation within the

30-kilometer zone will continue to greatly change for 1-2 years, especially

in regions with a high gradient of contamination levels.

Therefore, the measures being conducted to decontaminate the populated

points will generally only lead to a temporary improvement of the radiation

situation.

All of this makes it possible to conclude that reevacuation of the

population may be conducted only after stabilizing the radiation situation

in the entire territory of the contaminated zone (after ce~'sation of
ejections from the reactor, decontamination of the commnercial sites, and

consolidation of the radioactivity in the territory with a high level of

contamination). The fastest stabilization of the situation will be

achieved in regions of the zone with the low differential in the levels
 -4a -

of contamination (for instance, in. sectors of the northern and. southern.

projections of the track.

Reliable information about the concentrations of long-lived

radionuclides (strontium 90 and cesium 137) in the soils and vegetation

grown in them must be available for solving the issues of the possibility

of soil sampling is presently being completed

 -5- @ o
in all the fields of the collective and state farms of the region.
Cartograms of contamination of the agricultural lands by the cited

radionuclides will be compiled upon completion of sample analysis.

Other radionuclides which are part of the contamination (zirconium-90,

niobium-95, ruthenium-103 and 106, cerium-141 and 144, cesium-134,

barium-140, and strontium-8g), make up more than 90% of the total activity
and cannot in the future be limiting factors due to their short half-life

or low accessability for absorption from the soil-by plants°

There is a fundamental possibility for returning the contaminated

lands to agricultural use. General organizational and technological
principles have been developed for farming in such conditions and many

recommendations for individual directions have also been developed. Since

the agricultural conditions of the forest area are quite specific, while

the nature of the radioactive contamination is not yet well studied,

evaluations may be given only upon receipt of specific data0 Therefore,

the following are required for realizing the capability of returning the

land to agricultural use:

(a) restructuring of specialized forms in accordance with the levels

of contamination of the territory for land use; elimination of the

production of foodstuffs which go directly for human consumption, primarily
production of foodstuffs, for planting, for technical purposes, and feed
for livestock; B
 -5a-
(b) implementation of special measures aimed at rigid fixing and

consolidation of the radionuclides in a form inaccessible for plants for a

period of time with subsequent plowing under by introducing sorbents (a

clay suspension, zeolites) into the upper contaminated soil layer; and

(c) implementation of special decontamination measures by removing

the contaminated surface of the soil directly be mechanical means from

sodded sectors or after consolidation

 -6-
by chemical agents (SKS-65 gp latex, emulsion).

The measures to include the lands in the agricultural cycle will be

differentiated in time and level of contamination of the territory.

In the evacuation zone and in the rigid control zone, the agricultural

harvesting operations are being conducted in the conventional order with

consideration of special measures developed jointly with the State

Agricultural Industry of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and the Ministry

of Health of the USSR.

With respect to the surface contamination of vegetation and soil, the

basic special specifications on the organization and technology for

performing operations are reduced to the following for 1986:

(a) to reduce to a minimum the mechanical treatment of soils with

increased dust formation;

(b) grain and industrial crops will be harvested by direct combining

and will be used regardless of the level of actual contamination of

production (after curing in warehouses) for food purposes, for feed, for

planting, and for industrial processing; and

Cc) anOb~o.atory specification is application to the fields after

harvesting-pi~i~+grasses and winter crops of lime, mineral fertilizer,

and sorbents, which increase the fertility of the soil and reduce the entry

of radionuclides into agricultural production.

 -6a-
In solving the issue about the fate of contaminated forests, one must . .

proceed from their well known absorptive role in forest-steppe and steppe

regions as an accumulator and storer of moisture.

Investigations also showed that in conditions of radioactive

contamination, the forest is also an accumulator of radioactive substances,

first in the crowns, and then in the bedding. Radionuclides consolidated

in the bedding will long be excluded from the radiation chains.

Therefore, today, the opinion of the majority of specialists, the most

expedient method for dealing with contaminated forests is to intensify the

fire fighting service.

 -7-
.To date, based on.the evaluations of the situation with respect to
contamination of the soil and vegetation cover of the 30-km zone, special

agrotechnical and decontamination measures have been developed and are

being implemented which will make it possible to begin returning the
contaminated lands to the national economy. This complex of measures

includes a change in the traditional systems for working soils in this

region and the use of special compounds for dust suppression, changing the
harvesting methods and the processing of. the harvest, etc0

The level of radioactive contamination of living quarters and

buildings in the agricultural region within the 30-km zone fluctuates

widely. The typical construction materials are bricks, wood (boards), both

painted and unpainted, with different states of the paint, shingles and

roofing tin.

Decontamination was performed by spraying the surface at a

decontaminating solution rate of 10-15 1/mt. Automatic spraying stations

were used for the treatment.

As a result of the decontamination, the radiation dosage rate from the

buildings was reduced to background radiation levels for this particular

region, the/- contamination basically did not exceed lO000J-particles/(cm"

mai).

After washing off the buildings, the radioactive contamination of the

soil near the walls was increased by a factor of 2-2o5 and therefore9 the
 -7a-
soil along the walls was turned over or was removed by bulldozers and

transported away.
 -8-
Decontamination of transport systems was performed by spraying and by
steam ejection methods using the above cited solutions.
 Appendix 4

EVALUATION OF THE QUANTITY, COMPOSITION and DYNAMICS OF E0JECTION OF RADIO-

ACTIVE SUBSTANCES FROM THE DAMAGED REACTOR

 Appendix 4
-1-
4. Evaluation of the Quantity, Composition and Dynamics of Ejection

of Radioactive Substances from the Damaged Reactor

4.1. The volume of radioactive substances ejected from the reactor,

The results of aerial gamma photography of the region of the Chernobyl

AES and the territory of the country, performed by UNKhV from Soviet Air

Force helicopters and from helicopters assigned to the State Committee on

Hydrometerorology which were flown from 1 May through 25 June 1986 were

used as the primary information for evaluating the volume of radioactive

substances ejected from the damaged reactor.

In order to determine the reserve of radionuclides, data from the

aerial gamma photography were plotted on the terrain map, isodose lines

were drawn and areas calculated which were included by these curves. The

results of the evaluations of the recording for 26 July 1986 are cited in

absolute and relative values in Table 4.1,

It follows from the data in this table that the total radioactivity of

the fission products ejected from the damaged reactor and settled on the

soil in the 30-km zone is 8-14 MCi. Analysis of the acquired results

showed that by the time the intensive ejection of fission products from the
reactor had halted on 6 July 1986, the volume of radionuclides in the 30-km

zone was approximately 20 MCio It should be especially noted that more

than half of all of this activity is located in a zone with ?)20 mr/hr in
 Q -la-
a surface area which is a total of 17% of the contaminated territory and
includes the territory of the Chernobyl AES. According to the results of

an analysis of the aerial gamma photographs of the State Committee for

Hydrometerorology, beyond the special zone the activity of radionuclides

settled to the soil is 10-30 MCi. It follows from an analysis of the data

that the total activity of radionuclides ejected from the damaged reactor

into the environment does not exceed 50 MCi, i.e., is approximately 3-4% of
the total activity of the fission products in the reactor of the fourth

unit of the Chernobyl AES on 6 May 1986.

 -2-

.•,;,from the damaged reactor,._we.•- performed by specialists from the

Khlopin Radium Institute. Based on scanning by a collimating detector from

a helicopter which flew over the commercial site at an altitude of 300 m,

analysis of the samples in the 30-km zone, and the use of the correlations

between the gamma-activity of Ce and the•-activity of Pu, the volume of

fuel located in these zones was determined. These values are somewhat

higher than those acquired from data an analysis of the isodoseso The

relative values of distribution of the fission products on the commercial

site and on the roof of the Cher~nobyl AES are shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Evaluation of the Volume of radionuclides in

the 30-km zone of the Chernobyl AES region on 26 May 1986.

KEY: (1) Order number

(2) Zone with r, in mr/hr

(3) Area km

(5) Absolute, MCi

(6) Relative, %
(7) Total:
 P.MP/4
c3oi.~ c I AXHB.OCT61b

1 P >20 870 58 63.,0

2 IO< P(•20 480 o0,8-1,4 IO,2
3 5<P(I0 1100 1.;.1,7 10,8
4 3 <P(5 2780 1,3.-2,2 16,0
HTOr'O . 1 5230 8+1I4 I00, 0
 3

JA" 23
Ns 43
0
.A'a 3
0,2 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,2" 001 0,5 ,3
0,3 0,4 0,45 0,51 0,8 0,5 0,2 O,1 0,05 0 0
0,3 0,37 0,5 0,8 0 0,3 0,15 0,05 0,03 0 0
0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,6,5 0,55 0,42 0,351 0,22 0, I6 O,1O
0,5 0,6 0,8 0,85 0,7 o,55 ' 674z 0,37 0,25 0,I5 0,09
T .~. . .
I I - -
* i

I
i
.1 ~_____ I
0,55 *1
ii
0,37~ 0,25 0,15
~.i. 10,2510,310410410,310.2510.18101510110 08100,09
04
_____ UI
rd?41
I. __________ __________
I

.WE 9 .A'17E8

Fig. 4.1. Relative distribution of J'-radiating fission products at

the commercial site of the Chernobyl AES

4.2. The composition of the fission products (PD) of uranium and

other radionuclides ejected from the damaged reactor.

The primary information for evaluating the composition of

radionuclides ejected from the damaged reactor are the radiometric

investigations of samples of aerosols and soil samples performed by the

Khlopkin Radium Institute and the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in

the period from 6 through 30 May 1986. These data showed that the
composition of the fission products (with the exception of gaseous fission
products, such as I. Te, and Cs) ejected from the damaged reactor are close

to the composition of the fission products in the fuel in the reactor

itself. The averaged data from soil and grass cover investigations in the
 ,-3a -
region from 1.5 to 30 km from the reactor especial~ly ~attests tolthis.•
These data are presented in Table 4.2.

An investigation of dozens of soil samples for content of transuranium

elements based on alpha-radiation was performed in the 30-km zone. The

radioactivity of the samples was 2-2000 Bq/g and was caused by 90% 2 •Cm.

Approximately 10% of the alpha-radioactivity is associated with

 -4-
Table 4.2

Data fromi radiometric measurements of soil samples on 17 May 1986 on the

northern track of the fallout within the 30-km zone

KEY: (I) Radi onucl ide

(2) Specific activity

(3) Sample content, %

(4) Content in radiated reactor fuel, %

(5) Bacquerel units/g•

(6) Ci/km •
* - 1 Ci = 3o7'10 aBecquerel units

Pa~oy- Y~e.,bHa•' 8KTHSHOCTIZ1 Co,~eai•HM CoeKH~ J

" Top8, %

141 Ce 3,2.I03 5,1.102 15,8 18,3

32e3,4.102 5,4.101 1,7 0,22
13Ii 3,I.I03 5,i.i02 15,8 2,8
103 Ru 3,5.I03 5,e.i02 17,3 21,4
I0o6Lu 9,6.i02 1,5.i02 4,6 16,9
1 34Cs I,6. I03. 2,5. I02 7,7 4,5
'3Cs I,7.I03 2,7.102 5,3 ~3,4
95 T, 4.I03 6,4.I02 19,8 23,0
I403a 1,. 0 2,9.102 9,0 9,6
 -5-

Table 4.3

Composition of radionuclides in a soil sample from 8 May

1986 at a
distance of 1.5 km from the reactor.

KEY: (1) Nuclide

(2) Specific activity, 10 Becquerel units/g
(3) •- radioactive nuclide
Note: 1 Becquerel unit =2.71"•/Ci.

HyKA
I I |x~• I CTII H

95 Zr 36
' 0 3 R,,
1,7
I3I1 6,3
1401a 2I
28
17
23 9Np
6,4

=•
aXTH~e
-• @0,13

flpiwe~ai~e: I 5Bc a 2,7'I0"II jt..

 -6-

Table 4.4

Radionuclide composition of'C-radiators in air and certain reference

relations of the nuclides,

KEY: (1) Nuclide

(2) Activity in air, Ci/1

Table 4.5

Radionuclide composition of a-radiators in soil samples and certain

reference relations of the nuclides,

KEY: (1) Nuclide

(2) Soil activity, Ci/sample

 -'" TasAH1.~a 4.4
?a,•oiy-nHr COCTSB ,.-M31ly~aTe.•e; B Bo3•,yxe M
He~oTopue pen~ep~ue OTHOWeHMA-HyY.J•MVnOB

iiyic•xn AXTx4BHocTb
ci:;
H • 239______
2394244pe 239.20p

238.p. 3.1IO-14 4.I0-4

2 3 9 p• 2,2. 10"4 2,9.I0 7,O-4 ,5
240p1. 3. 0"14 4.10O"
2 42 Cm 6,7.10-13 8,7.I0-3

•lO l••l Ic
i144 242. 239.,240.•=

npo~a

2,5. i0"10 3,5. 10-2 0,72

I,8.I0"I0
2 4 2 Cm,
?,I.IO"9

6
 -7-

Table 4.6

Radionuclide composition ofc(-radiators in soil samples based on

measurements form the Khlopkin Institute of Radium

KEY: (1) Nuclide

(2) Activity, Bqlhr

Tampa 4.6

3 odpa3max no~m no •a i3:,epei~zI ?14AH

 -8-

Table 4.7

Radionuclide composition of aerosols at an altitude of 200 mn, Bqfl.

KEY: (1) Measurement data

(2) Nuclides

H• 09.05.86 11 °05.86 13o05.86 24.05.86

e 5 Zr 8,9 10 0,68 0,06

••5,8 II 1,2
9•1o 3,8- -

°Qc16 7,5 0,28-

103Ru 36 31 0,94 1,2
S58 45 1,O 0,6
'32Te 23 8,5 0,19
'37Cs -2,0 0,37 0,1

l•BI0 4,8B
14La12 5,6 0,23 -

t'"Ce 6,0 8, 4 0,4! 0,2

'"C[e -8,0 , 4! 0,4
 -9-

Table 4.8
Radionuclide composition of aerosols at an altitude of 3 m,9 in Bq/1.

KEY: (1) Nuclide

(2) Concentration on 12 May 1986 at points.

Ta~mraa 4.8

Pa~oHy . coc~aZ a•.pOooAe2 •a coO~e 3 M, Ei/az

H•• • IKoI~eH•TpaI•_ 12.05 o86 , TOmc2XC•-

3 10 8 9
Zr 44 795 393 1,8
-9,8 3,7 2,0
•o3Ru 155 67 196 1,3
131 195 100 1,0 2,9
' 32Te 42 24 0,25 0,2
t• 7,5 2,8 2,4 1,8
€L 7,5 4,4 2,3 1,2
+•e6,0 3,0 1,3
'•Ce -6,6 2,8 -
 -10-
Table 4.9.

Concentration of radioactive aerosols on 22 May 1986 at an altitude of

3 mn, in Bq/1.

KEY: (1) Nuclide

(2) Point of Measurements

Ta~,ma 4.9

a~po3 o3e.•
22.05.86 Ha B3OOTe 3 ?A,

23 43 73

9r 1,7 1,8 4,1

•S• 2,0 2,1 3,7
1~R•
,O 1,2 29,2
406Ru O,6 0,9 10, 0
£3ZTe -. 1,3 1,3
*1375
Cs-0,19 0,9.
1'B
,1 0,5 " ,1
0°, 6 1,7 1,7
'"C~e 1",1 1,6 2,3
1•e
,O 1,5 3,4
 -11-
isotopes with masses of 238, 239, and 240. The radioactivity of ¢Pu is

approximately 40-70% with respect to the sume of the radioactivities of the

•JPu and •Pu nuclides.

Soil samples in the direction of the south-north ejection at the end of the

sector with the contaminated forest in the 1.5-km radius may be considered
as having relatively greater concentration of transuraniums. The results

of the analysis of this sample taken on 8 May 1986 from the surface near a
road are presented in Table 4.3. The total value of the =d'-radiation of

the sample
is 1.3'10• Bq/g.

The radionuclide composition of thec(-radiators in air samples

(filters) and soil samples based on data from measurement by the Kurchatov

Institute of Atomic Energy are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and from

data from the Khlopin Radium Institute, in Table 4.6

Investigation of the aerosol composition of air samples (with pumping

through a filtering fabric) also attests to the presence of transfer with

airborne dust of both volatile and slightly volatile chemical elements

without expressed fractionation, with the exception of iodine, ruthenium

and tellurium. The aerosol samples were taken at an altitude of 200 m

above the damaged reactor and at an altitude of 3 m above the earth at 10

fixed points on the commercial site. Table 4°7 presents the results of
measurements of aerosols at an altitude of 200 m, while Table 4.8 presents

those from an altitude of 3 m. Points 3 and 10 of Table 4°8 are related to

 -1la-
the northern direction from the building of the Chernobyl AES, while points

8 and 9 are related to the southern. All four points are positioned on a
line which passes approximately 150 m east of the damaged reactor (see Fig.

4.1).

Data from Table 4.7 attest to the abrupt reduction in the specific
activity of the aerosols after 6 May 1986, which points to the dynamics of

ejection of fission products from the damaged reactor in time. Until

7 May 1986 the reactor was a source of elevated ejection of radionuclides,

while after 6 May 1986, it ceased to be such a determining factor in the

formation of aerosol radioactivity above the commercial site.

This formation began to be determined by the processes of dust formation

and secondary wind transfer of radionuclides over the site as a whole

(Table 4.9).

The concentration of radioactive aerosols at an altitude of 200 mnwas

the same as at an altitude of 3 mn(May 9 and May 11 data for the 200 mnand.
May 12 data for the 300 in altitude). After May 12 the concentration of the
aerosols at an altitude of 200 m were reduced by approximately a factor of

100, while at an altitude of 3 in over the commercial site, they were

altered little thereafter. This is evident from a comparison of data in

Table.4.8 and data in Table 4.9. The latter presents the results of an

identification of the concentrations of aerosols at an altitude of 3 mn

above the commercial site performed on 22 May 1986 at points disposed

relatively closely to the points indicated in Table 4.8 (see Fig. 4.1).

The presence of "hot" particles, primarily enriched with a single type

radionuclide, was revealed in the compositions of the air and fallout

samples. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 cite the results of measurements of the

composition of radionuclides of such particles. As is apparent, there are

particles which contain essentially only Cs or Ce. There is a 10-time

increase in the content of 1V'Ba as compared with the theoretical value.

4.3. Dynamics of ejection of radionuclides from the damaged reactor.

Materials from systematic investigations of the radionuclide

composition of samples of aerosols collected over the fourth unit of the

 -12a -
Chernobyl AES from 26 April 1986 were used as the primary information for

revealing the dynamics of ejection of radionuclides from the damaged

reactor. The results of such investigations are presented in Table 4.10

and Figure 4.2.

Analysis of these data led to the conclusions that the ejection of

radionuclides beyond the damaged unit of the Chernobyl AES are

 Table 4.10
Relative content of radionuclides in air above the Chernobyl

AES, •,%*

KEY: (1) Nuclides

(2) Relative content Sof radionuclides in fuel on 26 April 1986.
• )P(Ai )•A)00%, where A. is the activity of the i radionuclide;

rounded data are cited°

 -13] A - Ta6.ma 4.10

0THOCzTe•mnoe co~le~za~e p~~~7

ai0 CD

[y i

9 3Zr 4,4 6,3 9,3 0,6 7,0 20 3,6

95 NV• 0,6 0,8 9,0 1,3 8,2 18 3,8
MgO 3,7 2,6 2,0 4,4 2,8 3,7 3,9
mJ• 2,1 3,0 4,1 7,2 6,9 14 3,9
'06Ru 0,8 1,2 1,1 3,1 1,3 9,6 2,1
•J•5,6 6,4 5,7 25 8,2 19 2,3
1 ÷Te 40 31 17 .45 15 8,6 6,4
'3C$ 0,4 0,6 0,6 1,6 0,6 - 0,6
S 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,9 - ,1
37 s
•' - - 1,4 3,7 1,3 2,2 0,4
S3,2 4,1 8,0 3,3 13 12 3,8
d*oLa II 4,7 15 2,3 19 17 4,0
'41Ce 1,4 1,9 7,6 0,9 6,4 I5 3,6
'•C 1,6 2,4 6,I 5,I II 3,4
'/Nd 1,4 1,7 2,5 - 2,1 5,4 1,4
•p 23 3,0 II 0,6 2,8 6,8 56,7

,.,,o- o.o" .,o ,.o;

p~a~o~zyx.a; n•i~e~em oxpyremwe =amwe.

13
 -14-
Table 4-d1 -
The values ofQ*) which characterize the output of nonvolatile fission

1 4 1 Ce for the period

products relative to 131 in an example of 5Zr an d

from 26 April through 13 May 1986o

KEY: 1) Date

in air
in fuel,

A is the activity of the radionuclide

Initial ejection

26.04 I
11 32
29.04 2,0 8,0
02.05 1,2 18,3
03.05 105 85,3
04.05 3,8 5,2
05.05 1,8 3,I
08.05 26 51
11.05 23 37
I3.05 13 22

ia _ [AcQIJ)/A(i)] I 3TO•.Ze
= Z--r"'w; 1d•lCe ;
A -aiTrnHOCTm pa~aomj~m~aa

flep~o~a•.•imfl 3poc .
 '•K 4O.0,- - -

--- - a ///

Fi.4.. Prcnae faciiy frdincidsinteinta2sml

FigE 4.2 Percentage of activity ofrdouldsi.teiiilsml

15
 I
0

J C.#'f-./, BS- 9B
N ~~"LI' ~
de .95- .9, 38
frLJU ".,•
7,

K
4-.

'5- /
(a
~5;9 4o 0(15 574'o 0,f~
4~TT YtT 1 ~
s~2~6
2z; I-,/ ,6
~,) dr4~2f
dr) d- o

Fig. 4.3. Percentage of radionuclides in the "hot" particles fractionated

in Kierich solutions with densities of 4,2; 3.0; 2.0; and 2.0 g/cmn from

sand and dust samples (# 16-LPD) (Tr. Note: "L" is unknown; PD is fission

products.)
Content of cesium-IY,. and cesiurn-g37(total) in (a) 5.OX0a0" g/g and (c)

-q
1o4 x10 g/g°

16
 .-17-
extended during the process which consists of several stages. The dynamics
of the process of ejection are very convexly characterized by the data in
Table 4.11, in which the dimensionless values of the iodine-131-normed

ejection of nonvolatile fission products in time are presented.

Mechanical ejection of dispersed fuel occured in the first stage as a

result of the explosion in the reactor. The composition of the

radionuclides of this stage of ejection approximately corresponds to the

composition of the fission products in irradiated fuel, but is enriched

with volatile nuclides of iodine, tellurium and cesium.

In the Second stage from 26 April through 2 May 1986 the power of the

ejection beyond the damaged unit was reduced ,due to measures undertaken to

put out the graphite fire and to filter the substances coming from the

active zone. In a first approximation, the reduction in the ejection power

in this period may be represented by

Q(t') = Qoe (41

where Q0 is the ejection power immediately after the explosion

Curies/24-hour period) and
•T' is the time after the start of the accident (24-hour periods).

In this period the composition of the radionuclides in the ejection is

also similar to their composition in the fuel. In this stage there was a

transfer of the finely dispersed fuel directly from the reactor by a steam
of hot air and the graphite combustion products.
 -=17a-
The third stage of the discharge is characterized by a rapid rise in the

radionuclide discharge dose beyond the reactor unit. In the initial part
of this stage, transfer of the volatile components, especially iodine,
dominates, and then the composition of the radionuclides again approaches

their composition in the irradiated fuel (on 6 May 1986). The discharge
power of the fission products in the third stage in a first approximation

may be described by the expression

 Tadmpa
Pe3yximTaTu IsMepeaz2 ?YO•OCT1 BMdpoca 13 peaz~opa 4.12
io~emm sanaca B od•,na~e no a~aax.•3a irlpo Bo3,'Xa

OTdOpa OTOOpa aET'BEO CT$ :Budpoca, Sanaca

Bo3•'a,1Pcy'rz ~ B od~axe•

09.05 18.30 54"10-10 12800

11.05 13.15 38.10-1° 8700
13.05 13.15 2.io-1° 42o•)
22.05 0930i 05.I0-I.i0 60
19.05 13.15oso

23.05 09.30 0,02-10-I0 20

24.05 09.30. 1.10-I0 100
25.05 09.30 °3. IO-I 300
26.05 09.30 0,2.10-IO 20
27.05 09.30 0,2.I01O 20
28.05 09.30 0,2"10-1O 20
29.05 09.30 0,1'IO-1O 1O
30.05 13.00 2.10-102 )
01.06 09.30 0,2.10-10 20
02.06 17.00 0,25'I0-I0 25
03.06 14.30 O,12.1O-I0 12
04.06 09.30 0,08"I0-I0 8
05.06 09.30 0,12'I0-10 12
06.06. 09.301)

O)
T60p flpo133o0mLIcZ BHe m.ze~a,
•) amne c~epeiw c pesy.7TTaTa7m I3Mepeml2 INCTI~7a •Kcnep•-
MeHTaJn•EOf de TeopoAorU.

m•'• 0T60p rpodM R0oI~eHTpaztm1

y~e~e~e rrpo~e~en B m~eBHoe
Hy•7oBBpeYR. 370 oyCycIoBAo
13-3a-os~e~mo• 3a-
ZIA~eUHOCTI B CB,.K3Z C pa00T2• ia n•omazce A3C.
fl)oocxe •oz•
18
 .- 18a-
Results of measurements of the discharge dose from the reactor and

evaluation of the excess in the cloud from air sample analyses.

KEY: (1) Sample date

(2) Sample time

(3) Specific activity of air, C/i/

(4) Discharge dose

(5) Evaluation of the excess in the cloud

Cl/km
*) Sampling was performed without a loop, which led to a reduction in

the concentration of nuclides.

**) Data are collated with the results of measurements by the

Experimental Meteorology Institute.

***) The sampling is performed during the day. This caused an
increase in the concentration of nuclides due to the higher dust

content associated with operations at the AES site.

****) After the rain.
 -19-

whereo• = (6-8) XlO•' t/hr.

Such a discharge character is apparently caused by heating of the fuel

in the active zone to a temperature above 20oVC due to residual heat

liberation. Here, there was a leak of the fission products from the

uranium dioxide and their transfer either in aerosol form or in the

graphite combustion products (graphite particles) as a result of the

temperature-dependent migration of the fission products and the possible

carbidization of the uranium dioxide.

The last - the fourth stage, began after May 6 and is characterized by

a rapid reduction in the output of the fission products from the fuel and
an essential halt in discharge (table 4.13), which was the result of the

special measures taken and the formation of harder-to-melt compounds of the

fission products as a result of their interaction with the introduced

materials.

Basic conclusions:
1. The total discharge of radioactive substances (without

radioactive noble gases) was approximately 50MCi, which corresponds to 3.5%

of the total volume of radionuclides in the reactor at the moment of the

accident. These data were calculated on 6 May 1986 with consideration of

radioactive decay.
 -19a-
2. The composition of the radionuclides in the emergency ejection

approximately corresponds to their composition in the fuel of the damaged

reactor: differing from it only in an increased content of volatile iodine

and tellurium.
3. Correlated quantitative information about the change in the

discharge dose in time and the composition of the radionuclides discharged

from the damaged reactor is cited in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 and in Fig. 4.4°
 Table 4.13
Daily discharge q of radioactive substances into the atmosphere from

the damaged unit (without the radioactive noble gases)

~a~a Bpe,,nocIOec.3e
_______a a~ap•, CyT q. L,'
26.04 0o ) 12
27.04 I 4,0
28.04 2 3,4
29.04 3 2,6
(1) Date
30.04 4 2,0
(2) Time after the accident, days
01.05 5 2,0
(3) q MCI
02.05 6 4,0
03.05 7 5,0
04.05 8 7,0
05.05 9 8,0
06.05 10 0,I
09,05 14 = 0,01
23.05 28 20.10-6

r~pzBe~eHo 2Ha~e3~e c y~eTOM pacna.~a n~a B.05.86.

3 XdOYWSHT 3¢poca a0TUBEOCTh COCT~a..La 0A
20-22 LI~.
COCTaB •¢poca CM. • Tara7. 4.14.

•o•~~cz n6pmoBo, pa•IEoL~eTpxTec~x Z3M8epe• pao~u -

BorO cocTa3a npoO 3o3lyxa Z no•, a Ta~e nlorpe~ocTLD, oOycAo3-

pao~aa (•~poc 26.04.86 coCTaaL7I = 20.u a 3TOT.?O:.!8T ape-

AerHm). COCTaB •dpoca C:b1. 3 Ta..7. 4.14.
20
 .- 2Oa-
(1) Initial discharge

The value is cited with consideration of the decay on 6 May 1986o The
activity was 20-22 MCi at the moment of discharge. For the composition of

the discharge see Table 4.14.

*) The error of evaluation is 50%. It is determined by the error

rates of the dosimetric instruments, the radiometric measurements of the

radionuclides composition of the air and soil samples and by the error rate

caused by averaging fallouts by site.

**) The values, of q are calculated on 6 May 1986 with consideration

of radioactive decay (the discharge of 26 April 1986 was •20 MCi at that
moment in time). For the composition of the discharge products, see Table

4o14.
 -- &. -l-

cQI Table 4.14

Radionuclide composition of the discharge of the damaged unit of the

ax)Ar•c . •pomemo•
8RaxoCTH,
26.04.86 06 .05.86•) i3 pee..c~opa Ha 06.05.86, %
1 S3 y1 5 45 oozoo O
85 0,15 -"
85 -0,5--

1 3 Ii 4.5 7,3 20
132 4 1,3 15
134 0,15 0,5 1O
137 0,3 I 13
990,45 3 2,3
950,45 3,8 392
103 0,6 3,2 2,9
• 46 0,2 1,6 2,9
S0,5 4,3 5,6
141 0,4 2,8 2,3
144 0,45 2,4 2,8
89 0,25 2,2 4,0
900,015 0,22 4,0
239 2,7 1,2 3,2
238 o,z.io-3 o,8.io-.33
239 o,i.io44_,

241 0,02 0.I4-"

242 O,3. IO- 2. IO-6-
242 3. IO- 2,1.10-2--
O •or~Ipe=•ocT oneim - ±- 50%, o6ac~euze N =pmeqa~z
ICTdA{. 4.13.
•) Oi:apmzn Dudpoc I, 06.05.8B6.
•s)nz~~e• as~ no a8~ oTz3!OT OCHOm• pax!O.7ozoB,
z~uepe:•x pI pa~oz.Ae rpwecxz a~xSax.7~
 -2la -

KEY: (1) Nuclide

(2) Discharge activity, MCi
(3) Percentage of activity discharged from the reactor on 6 May

1986 %
(4) Possibly to 100
*) Evaluation error is ±50%, explanation in the note to Table

4o13.
**) Total discharge by 6 Ma~y 1986.
***) Data are cited based on the activity of the basic radionuclides

measured during radiometric analyses.

 r 4.4

CyM~ap~aR •o~e

109
aKTHI3HOA
/SKMDI4oc'rh
peaKcToP8
U ('p)

iO6
U~SI~~Rt~ nufSPOC ga npeSIe3I~
peaKTOP8
(~)
m peaKTopa
To'Iq KOC~b
x4 ottesHK ±_50%

101

Tlepfol0a~a..nfl~ufl
Bu~poC 26.04

CL )
iLal'a

30.04 05.05 10.05 15.05 20.05

 .- 22a-
KEY: (1) Total activity in-the active zone of the reactor.

(.2) Total discharge beyond the reactor

(3) Evaluation precision '±50%

(4) Initial discharge, 26 May 1986

(5) Activity, Ci

(6) Date
 Appendix 5

ATMOSPHERIC TRANSFER AND RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION

OF THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE TERRAIN

 -1-

Appendix 5
5. ATMOSPHERIC TRANSFER AND RADIOACTIVE

CONTAMINATION OF THE ATMOSPHERE AND TERRAIN

5.1 Formation of the basic source of contamination - the cloud and gas
stream as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

As a result of the accident, a significant volume of the radionuclides

accumulated in the reactor during its operations was ejected beyond the

plant.
At the time of the accident a cloud was formed, which subsequently

formed a radioactive track in the terrain in the western and northern

directions in accordance with the meteorological conditions for transfer of

air masses. Then, for an extended period a jet of gaseous, volatile, and
aerosol products continued to leak from the accident zone. The strongest

jet was observed for the first 2-3 days after the accident in a northerly
direction, where the radiation levels on 27 April reached 1000 mr/hr and on

28 April, 500 mr/hr at a distance of 5-10 km from the accident site (at an

altitude of 200 in). The altitude of the jet on 27 April, based. on aircraft
data, exceeded 1200 in in a northwesterly direction at a distance of
approximately 30 km from the accident site, where the radiation levels were
approximately 1 mr/hr. On subsequent days the altitude of the jet did not

exceed 2-0-400 in.

 -la -

Portions of the contaminated air masses (clouds and portions-of the jet-of
radioactive products)were propagated according to the wind directions to

great distances in the territory of the USSR.

 -2-
Based on the results of gamma-spectral analysis the following fission
products accumulated in the reactor were identified in the air samples:Zr
C ,5 Ie"' , Te ,,R 3 , Ru , Ba
La# , , andNd , as well as isotopes of directed activity: Np2 3 5

and Cs'B4

A characteristic feature of the identified radioactive products in the

atmosphere is their enrichment with iodine and cesium radionuclides. Table

5o1 rites the calculated coefficients of fractionation (enrichment) of the

radionuclides relative to zirconium-95 based on the results of an analysis

of the samples of atmospheric aerosol in the first days after the accident

in the near zone.

5°2 Meteorological conditions for propagation of

the radioactive products from the AES

On 26 April 1986 the region of the AES was in a low gradient baric

field with a slight wind of varying directions. At an altitude of 700-800

m and 1.5 km the area of the AES was on the southwestern periphery of a

high pressure region with transfer of air masses in this layer to the

northwest at a rate of 5-10 in/sec. This is confirmed by data from

measurements of the levels of radiation and radioactive fallout along the

trajectories of propagation of the air particles at an altitude of 0°7 and

1.5 km (Figures 5.1 to 5.3).
 -•2a -
Further propagation of the air particles in the 0.7-1.5 km layer which
departed the AES region on 26 April 1986 occurred in a northwesterly
direction with a subsequent turn to the North.

•1n the near-earth layer of air on 26 April, the further transfer of

the air masses occurred to the west and northwest with outlet
 -3-
of the air particle propagation trajectory on 26 and 27 April into regions
on the Polish border, which is confirmed by data from measurements of

radioactive fallout. On subsequent days, from the 27 through the 29 of

April, based on data from aircraft measurements, the transfer of the

radioactive products in the near-earth layer of air at an altitude of 200 m

took place in northerly and northeasterly directions from the AES.

The meteorological conditions from 26 April through 29 April 1986 for

the propagation of air masses in .the region of the AES essentially

determined the basic zone of the formed near-by radioactive fallout in the
northwestern and northeastern directions from the AES. This is confirmed

by aircraft measurements of the distributions of radiation levels in the

terrain in the near zone, which were taken in subsequent days.

Subsequently, the slight discharge of radioactive products from the

AES zone and their transfer continued primarily in a southerly direction up

until 7-8 May 1986, causing radioactive fallout in a southerly direction.

5.3 Radioactive contamination in the region of the AES

and evaluation of the total volume of radioactive products which

settled in the near zone

A zone of near-by radioactive fallout was formed as a result of the

meteorological conditions for propagation of radioactive products in the
atmosphere and their deposition on the surface form 26 April through 30

April 1986. Aerial gamma photography of the distribution of the radiation

levels in the terrain has been regularly performed from 29 April 1986
 -3a -
through the present. The chart of .distribution of the levels of radiation

on the terrain on 29 May 1986 is shown in Figure 5.4.

 Based on data about the distribution of the gamma-radiation dose rate

in the terrain at different moments in time, the total volume of

radioactive products settled in the near zone of the radioactive track, was

evaluated.
'Table 5.2 cites the results of integration of the sites limited by
different isolevels of dose rate (in units of r/hr m ), as well as the

total volume of radioactive products in the near track (beyond the

commercial site of the AES and up to a distance of 80 kin), expressed in

units of energy liberation (MeV/sec) and in units of activity (Ci).

The following radionuclides were identified in the near zone of the

formed track of fallout in the period from 10 to 30 days after the
acidnt M~ ,. .t• tj TI* lit Ru103 RuO(• hq5
acdn: M- , Zr-95, Ce , Ce , I , Te +I , Ru , Ru ij
B+La
Ba , csl ,s 3 1 , Sr" 1 Sr-90, and Y . Plutonium isotopes

were detected on the earth's surface.

Based on data about the densities of terrain contamination in

different zones of the track, the volumes of individual radionuclides which

settled in the near zone of the track were evaluated in a comparison with
the dosage rate on "D" + 15 (Table 5.3),

5.4. Radioactive contamination of the atmosphere

and terrain of Soviet territory

A zone of radioactive fallout was formed from 26 April through 5 May
1986 in the territory of the USSR and beyond its confines according to the

meterological transfer conditions.

 -5-
The volume of. radioactive products which settled in the European part of

the USSR was approximately 1.2.10 (r/hr) m or 4.0R, 10 MeV/sec. Thus,

the total volume of fallout in the near and far zones is approximately 7.0~X
10 MeV/sec on 5 May 1986 or approximately 3% of the total energy liberation
of the radioactive products in the rector for this time.

The radioactive products entered the near-earth layer of the

atmosphere at different times for different points depending on the

meteorological transfer conditions.

Table 5.4 shows that change in the concentrations of certain

radionuclides at a permanently manned observation point of the grid run by

the State Committee on Hydrometeorology (Goskomgidromet) (Baryshevka,

approximately 140 km to the southeast from the AES).

Figures 5.5 and 5.6 cite the results of identification of individual

radionuclides in the near-earth layer of air at the Berezina preserve at a

station for comprehensive background radiation monitoring located 120 km

northeast of the city of Minsk.

Fallout of radioactive products from the atmosphere were tested in the

Goskomgidromet grid using plotting boards exposed for several days.

Table 5.5 presents observation data from Kiev and Kaliningrad.

 "-6-

5.5 Radioactive contamination of rivers and bodies of water.

Information about radioactive contamination of rivers and bodies of
water is acquired by performing isotopic analysis of one-liter water

samples withdrawn from the surface level on a regular basis (every 1-3
days) at the mouths of the Pripyat, Teterev, Irpen, and Desna Rivers and at

the Dneprovsk water intake (Vyshorod). Water samples were taken throughout

the Kiev reservoir and during special ship-borne inspections beginning on

26 April 1986.

It is established as a result of the investigations that the

radioactive contamination of the waters of rivers and bodies of water

occurred primarily as a result of fallout of aerosols to the surface. of the

bodies-of water and then due to run-off from contaminated spillways (there
was essentially no rain in this region in May). The initial results of0

identification of the content of radioactive substances in the inspected

bodies of water are cited in Table 5.6.

Table 5,7 cites the maximal concentrations for the observation period,

beginning from 1 May 1986, in different water basins.

The highest concentrations of Iodine-131 in the Kiev reservoir in the

region of the Dneprovsk water intake were observed on 3 May. They are

explained by fallout of radioactive aerosols onto the surface of the Kiev

reservoir and by the contaminated waters from the Pripyat River reaching

this section.
The total beta-activity of the water in the Dnepr River in the region
of the "Kiev" weather station was in a range of (1-5)X, I0 Ci/1 for the
period 13-22 May 1986. 0
d
 -- 7-
5.6 Plutonium contamination of the atmosphere and terrain.
Investigations of plutonium isotope contamination were performed using

a special vehicle for taking air, soil, and grass samples on the ring-broad
around the Chernobyl AES beyond the limits of the 30-km zone (May 1986).

The results of the analysis are cited in Table 5.8. As is evident

from the table, the concentration of plutonium in the air is below the
-Si
allowable (the maximal permissible concentration of Z•uis 3X10 Ci/1)

at all sampling points.

Table 5.9 cites data about the density of plutonium contamination of
the soil and grass at different points.
 T8a~wu• 5.1I

(paXU)~oHxpo- 1,23 1,03 0,84 5,22 2,21 I,? 5,64

KEY: (1) Radionuclide

(2) Fractionation coefficient

Ta~nM1a 5.2

SKoAM~eOTBo peuroa•- •OflA OT cwa••

c€ie~a ,198&. (P/4ac).z uor~o 8HepzoB-
Ha c~ne~e AeJ~eHHR psAO-
aKTxHB~C nlpo~yK-
ToB 3 3oHe p~eax-

11.05 ?,9.io• 3,3o1o1? I,2.Io• 1,6

KEY: (1) Track survey date, 1986

(2) Integral (r/hr) m

(3) Volume of radioactive products in the track

(4) Percentage of the total energy liberation of the radioactive
products in the reactor zone at that particular time, %

(5) MeV/sec

(6) Ci

-8
 TaOzmta 5.3

Psa, o- 95Z,, I4Ice 144Ce 13I1 132Te '0 3 Ru I 06 Ru I40Ba

Ha CJIeAe, 1,8.105 1,7.I06 1,3.106 1,3.106 2,5.I05 1,5.106 5,7.I05 9,1.105

Ku

KoJIIPecr- 1,5 I,? I,0 5,1 5,0 1,4 0,8 1,4

88 3 30- "
HepO•R-
I.

8 9 sI.
13? Cs 905p, ROJDI4OCTDO

0,6 1,9 1,2 0,85 0,85 1,4

KEY: (1) Radionuclide
(2) Volume in the track, Ci

(3) Percentage of the volume in the reactor zone, %

(4) Total volume

 Ta•nrna 5.4

, ,og~A 9 Zr,-i I0
26-27.04 3,2. 1-12
27-28.04 5,7,10"15
28-29.04 2,4.10-13 2,7.10-I4 2,4.,I0"I4 5,4o10-I4
29-30.04 2,2.10"1I 1,6.10-12 2,I.10-12 8,4.I0"12
30.04-01.05 8,3.1iO"9 2,2.I0" 9 5,7.I0-9 2.10-9
1-2.05 I,l.IO"9 1,9.10-IO 8,7.10"I0 5,5.10"IO
2-3.05 2,5.I0-If 4,I.IO-II 4,5.10"II I,I.IO-If
3-4.05 3,I.IO"nII I,I.ZOII 1,2.IO"II 5,I.IO-2
4-5.05 I,6.I0"nII g.iO-I2 8,7.1O-In2 1,4.IO-12

KEY: (1) Ci/m

(2) Sample date

I0
 Tadati~a 5.5

..... . = .. . . . ..

Jl8Ta 0750p8 CVI'I&. lr.Kajrnlivaj• ~

ku/wv2 . c~wI4i4 r.Kuen
95 I4040D 3 95s 1 ?C~s
I986r, 31 I0.9ZTg
26-27/.04 2,0.I0-2 3,8.10o. 3,8.I0-3 2,3. I0- 3
27-26.04 4,6 6,3.10-2 2,'/.102 IOI-
28-29.04 1,9. I0- 1,9.10-3 1,3.10-3 1,1.10-3 4,9 5,I.10- 2 3,8.I0-2 8,4.10"2
29-30.04 6,6.I0-2 6,4.I0"3 2,3. I0- 7,8. I0-3 10,5 1,3.10"2 1,6.10-2 1,.0-
'.-a 30.04-01.05 2,5 7,1.10"I 8,3.10-1 9,6.10-2 2.10-1 1,1.I0-2 4,3. I0- 3 4o.0-
I
1-2.05 10,3 3,2 6,0.10-1 3,2.10-1 I,6. I0-I -2.10-23,.0-
2-3.05 '2,6 8,6.10"1 5,7.10-1 9,2.10-2 4.10-2 1,3.1I0-2 4,3.10-3~ 9,2. I0"4
3--4.05 3,3.10- 1 2,2.10"1 2,5.10-I I,I.IO"2 2,4.10-2 7,3.I0-3 7,5. Io" .1-
4--5.05 7,8.10-1 i,0.I0"I 2,2.10"1 2,3.10-2. 1,6.10-2 3,8.10-3 1,0.10- 2 7,3;I0*4

KEY: (1) Sample date

(2) Ci/km days Kiev

(3) Ci/km days
Kal iningrad
 -12--
Ta•.nxx.•a 5.6

BoAoe MHATa& ( _ , PajuI~oHVKHU, (•I0~ Kx/a 3 )

p.flp~nRb, (
1.05.86 80 25 18 5,6 1,6 0,6

KEY: (1) Body of water and sample date

(2) Radionuclides (10== Cl/rn ) Tambaxza 5.7
(3) Pripyat River

Bo~oeM ,~a'ra KOHI~eHTp8L~1R, IO~ K~

ua~cK~a.AbHO~
xox4eHTpa1~(H HOA-131 ~ ~

p. flpxnruTb•, 42
120
m
Rxescxoe 3o~o•a-
3 ua•!
17 20
28•

KEY: (1) Body of water

(2) Maximal concentration observation date (7) 3 May
(3)Concentration, 10 C/i/ (8) iodine=131

(4) Pripyat River (9) barium-140

(5) 5 May (10) zirconium-•95

(6) Kiev Reservoir

12
 -- '3--

Concentration (C) of the total of plutonium isotopes in air (Ci/m ) at an

altitude h= 1..5 m

Ta6~zxa 5.8
Xo~exTpa•R c~~hfk H3•oflo5o nZAyToH (C)
53=o3m!~yxe (KIi/a) us I =.,5M

As~a 3 O~Op8 OT HCTO'mMa

19.05.86 100 z• z) 0,48.10-14

20.05.86 72 0,35. I0"in4
I05~icB• 0,75.I0-15
21.05.86 48 iw.OB•
.60 0,39. i0-i4

55 RWCC 0,21. 1O-14

45 0,85. 10"14
- a-

U 35 0,17.10"14
45 0,7/0. I0"15

KEY (1) Sample date

•(2) Distance from source

(3) C, Ci/m

(4) km SSW
(5) km ENE
(6) km NNE
(7) km W
(8) km WSW
(9) km SW
 V~a_

Density of the surface, contamina~tion of the surface layer and individual

gr-asses by the total of the plutonium isotopes

Ta•n•z~ 5.9
flLiOTHOCTb flo~eI~XHOCTH01'O 8ar3•H8)tRfl D0BeXHOCTH0OO
CJoR M OTAe~zbH0 TI~BBH CyJ•iR M3OT01lO0 flJ~yT1OHMR

20o05.86 loS KM CC• l,3.lIo-I 3,6.1o-1°

21.05.86 48 • CC 2,3.I0-"9 5,lI.O0"
2.2.05.86 55 z• 3 I,6. I0-9 3,3.I0-9

KEY: (1) Sample date

(2) Distance from source
(3)C>• Cl/rn (Tr. note:
is density of gra'ss contamination)
, Ci/m~(Tr, note: is density of surface contamination)

(5) km NNE
 ?wc. S.~
TPhL~OflI ~S2J~ uemi LA h~VTB 0.7 b
0? ?AU~n~ CPO~OI
.-. OTZSI *6.0*.
~-0?a3~ 27.0*
4~0?1S~ 27.O~

TRAJECTORIES OF AIR PARTICLES AT AN ALTITUDE OF 0.7 KM FROM DIFFERENT TIMES

TRAJECTORIES OF AIR PARTICLES FROM AN ASSIGNED POINT TO OZ (MOSCOW TIME) 26

APRIL 1986 NEAR THE SURFACE OF THE EARTH AT.AI TiTmn:..
 time) 30 APRIL 1986.

0? 03 '1 (RICK) •O.O•.8;

"----" 1,5 KMW

/ "" "•' Near the surface of the earthi and at altitudes of:
~1

a..'
H- .. O

*SestSfUPh
 1• *
'"-4.

0)l i qI l

1:_

Pnc. 5,4. 1Pocnpceieietue yporn~ofl "por',,Iwotn tnf *ecmrOCTM. wp/q 29.05.P6 r.

Distribution of the radiation lievels in the terrain, mr/hr, 29 May 1986.

 pKof~3

I April
TOT- •. May
3 Sample date

I 9 5 2r

O.I:.d• .- •. )
2U6 2'8 o 2 1 • • IO 12 ,f4 ]•6 1i0
•o22 •4 AamTdosa~

•nc , .TNeT~nf lRm~OCTh pu pauw~oivyv.Ion I311

M B aTMOC~O~pfOM
E0311yLO 1U8 CTBi~fUKE •DOiiOnOrO MOflMTOflIUfI'a 8 EO[O3RHJWCKM B3,
Specific activit~y (•Ci/m3 ) of 13I1 Zr radionuclides in the air at the

backcqround rdlatlorn monito~1a• stat,•or •t the Berezina Presewo •Po

 pt~. 0

500

KEY: (1)-•,ee eE, ~ r~m

(2) April
10
(3) May
00
1 (4) Sample date

O.1I
Ii; [8 2b 22 24 AaTa oTdO8Q

' ec. 5.6. Yjs ,nf aRTNDRoc• 3 pBARoNyRAKRoD I3 7o•

(•u/ta") ii i3409 SaTMoC•fJp-
liON BO3J~XOX US CTanRQH 4Jo~oBoro MONMTOpMHIS U Eepo3MRICROM F13. "

Specific activity (t'Ilm ) of "3Cs and Cs radionuclides in air at the

background radiation monitoring station at the Berezina Preserve.
 Appendix 6
EXPERT EVALUATION AND PREDICTION OF THE RADIOECOLOGICAL

CONDITIONS OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE REGION OF THE

RADIATION TRACK FROM THE CHERNOBYL AES (THE WATER

ECOSYSTEMS)
 -1-

Appendix 6
6. Expert evaluation and prediction of the radiological conditions of

the natural environment in the region of the radiation track of the

Chernobyl AES (water ecosystems).

For a number of reasons, the water medium plays a special role in

determining the scales and potential consequences of radioactive

contamination. Radioactive substances at the site of a water intake as a

result of run off enter bodies of water, where redistribution and

accumulation of radionuclides occur in such components as the bottom

sediments, water vegetation, and in fish. This leads to °additional

irradiation of both water organisms, and man, who is linked by the food

chain with the hydrosphere.

From the very first days of the accident testing was set up of the

content of radionuclides in the water and bottom sediments, both directly

inside the 30-km zone adjacent to the Chernobyl AES, and beyond it. As a
result of the processes of sedimentation, the basic part of the

radioactivity entering the water medium rather quickly entered the bottom
sediments, whose radionuclide concentration is higher than the activity of

the water by a factor of 2-4 (Table 6.1). According to experimental data

acquired by the Nuclear Research Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of

Sciences (IYal AN UkrSSR). the Vernadskii Institute of Geochemistry and

Analytical Chemistry of the USSR Academy of Sciences (GeoKhl AN SSSR), and

the All Union Scientific Research Institute for Atomic Power Plants
(VNIIAES), the spatial distribution of radionuclides in the water medium is

characterized by substantial nonuniformity. The maximal concentrations of

 - la -
the radionuclides are observed directly in the cooling pond of the
Chernobyl AES, where the total activity of the water and the bottom.
sediments reaches values on the order of 10 Ciut and 10 Ci/kg,

respectively. The concentration of artificial radionuclides in the Kiev

reservoir and in the rivers which flow into it is much lower (by a factor
of 1o• -1o'4 ).
The time dynamics of the radionuclides may be broken down into three
 Table 6.1I
Specific activity (Cl/kg) of bottom sediment samples in June. 1986 (10-20

June 1986) (based on data from IYaI AN UkrSSR. GeoKhl AN SSSR. and VNIIAES)

'-po(Ioo•- 127.-95 • -95 Cc -I41 Ce-I44 •)c-I4O Lo. -i40 Rw-I03 Cs-i34 C$S-137 1-131
• _x 2 t,INmii I.. ... ....

flpYA ,I I" 2"03 3I "I"IO4"I" 6"04 4I" .05 I, IO

3l, l ifmei e

KEY: (1) Sampling point

(2) Cooling pond of the Chernobyl AES

(3) Pripyat River

(4) Dnepr River

characteristic stages. In the first stage (through May, 1986) the
level of radioactive contamination was basically determined by short-

lived radionuclides, primarily iodine-131. In mid-May the

concentration of iodine-131 in the drinking water was n*lO0qCi/JX

which was somewhat higher than the safe permissible concentration in

accordance with NRB-76 (NRB is Radiation Safety Standard) (2-10 times

that in the Pripyat River). However, by early June the iodine-131

content in the river water was reduced by more than or order of

-±0
magnitude (approximately n-lO Ci/I).
In the second stage, as the iodine-131 decays, the comparitively

short-lived radionuclides, such as strontium-89, zirconium-95,

niobium-95, cesium-141, ruthenium-103, barium-140, and lanthanum-140,

begin to noticeably contribute to the formation of artificial

radioactivity. The concentration of these radionuclides in the

-.. 7 fC
second ten days of June was '-10 Cu/, in the water and 10- -10 Ci/kg

in the bottom sediments of the Kiev Reservoir and 10 Ci/•. in the

water and 10 -10- Ci/kg in the bottom sediments of the Pripyat

River.

In the third stage after decay of the iodine-131 and other

relatively short-lived radionuclides, the basic significance in the

formation of artificial radioactivity will be taken over by the long-

lived radionuclides, such as cesium-137, cesium-134, and

strontium-90. In the second ten days of June the concentration of

cesium-137 in the water of the Dnepr River was
10 •Ci/I and was 10- Ci/kg- in the bottom sediments. The

concentration of cesium-137 in the cooling pond of the Chernobyl AES

 -3a- .
and the Pripyat River was noticeably higher (by a factor of 10• -lJ).
The concentrations of strontium-9O in the river waters were basically
-II -to
changed in a range of 10 -10 Ci/t. Considering the long half
life (approximately 30 years) further reduction in the activity of

cesium-137 and strontium-g0 in the bodies of water will occur quite

slowly.
Based on experimental data about the distribution of

radionuclides in the components of the water ecosysterD evaluations

were performed of the doses of radiation of water organisms with

consideration of the geometrical

 -4-
characteristics of the hydrobionts.
Calculations of the radiation doses from gammna radiators were
performed with consideration of the disseminated radiation
accumulation factor. The following dose components were evaluated:

external radiation from the watev. bottom sediments and organisms

which have accumulated radionuclides and internal radiation from

incorporated radionuclides. The results of calculations based on

data for June 1986 and a prediction of the rate of the absorbed dose
for June 1987 are presented in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2.

Analysis of the evaluations of additional doses of irradiation

of hydrobionts attests to the following:

- Hydrobiata living directly in the cooling pond will endure

the greatest doses. The natural level of external radiation is 4.3
rad/hr on the average near the bottom and the level of internal
radiation for water plant reaches 10 rad/hr. Bottom dwellers, roe
and the young of phytophylic species of fish which multiply and feed

in the thicket of water vegetation will suffer the greatest doses.

The effects of long-term radioactive radiation, both direct and

indirect, may be expected for these organisms.

-Doses of radiation for organisms which populate the rivers of

the contaminated zone (the Pripyat River and others) are much
lower(by approximately a factor of X) as compared with cooling pond

inhabitants.
- The dose stress for hydrobiota living in the Dnepr River in
terms of order of magnitude are similar to the natural background

radiation,
 -4a -

exceeding it for individual hydrobionts by a factor of 5-10.

- Analysis of the contributions of radionuclides to the total

radiation dose shows that the basic dose forming nuclides at the
present time are comparatively short-lived elements: zirconium-95,
niobium-95, cesium-141, barium-140, lanthanum-140, strontium-89,

ruthenium-10• and
 -5-
so on, whose contribution to the total radiation dose for the
majority of the components of the water ecosystem exceeds 70-80%. At
the present time, the contribution of long-lived cesium isotopes.
(cesium-137 and cesium-134) to the total dose does not exceed 4-5%.
This means that as the short-lived radionuclides decay, the radiation

dose of the water organisms will gradually be reduced and a reduction

in the dose stresses for the majority of hydrobionts by a power of

magnitude may be expected by the 1987 growing season for essentially

the entire contaminated territory, including the cooling pond. After

this, a relative stabilization of the additional dose stress on water

organisms may be expected, since by 1987 it will be basically

determined by long-lived radionuclides, such as cesium-137 and

stronti um-gO.
When speaking about potential biological effects of ionizing

radiation, it should be remembered that individual groups of living

organisms display enormous differences in resistance to the effect of

radioactive radiation.

Of the hydrobionts, the most vulnerable link are the fish, the

commercial varieties of which are the final link in the accumulation

of radionuclides in the food chain from the water ecosystem to man.

It is common knowledge, that the radiation dose rate for fresh-water

fish in natural conditions varies in a range of 0o007-0.023 mrad/hr,

Experimental investigations to evaluate the effect of low doses

on fish showed that a dose rate below 0.4 mrad/hr (4 rad/year) causes
no negative consequences for the vital activity of the fish..-
 -6-
In a range of up to 40mrad/hr (365 rad/year) there are a

variety of disruptions to the function of the organs, but on the

whole,. the radioecological resistance is preserved at the population
and organism level. A further increase in the threshold of
irradiation to above 140 mrad/hr (3.5 rad/day) may have a negative
impact on the population level and cause a decline in individual,

more radioactive-sensitive species.

As initial predictive evaluation show, the radiation doses of a

majority of water organisms in the Kiev Reservoir (0.1-1.0 mrad/hr)do

not go beyond the limit of doses at which radiation damage to the

populations occurs.. The radiation doses of fish in the Pripyat River

(buoy #204) are approximatel~y 50 mrad/hr,. i.e., a negative effect of

radiation on the hemogeniG. immune. and reproductive systems is

possible. Of the listed effects• the most significant will be the

genetic effects - the negative effect on the reproductive cells.
The coolant pond of the Chernobyl AES had the highest doses of

radiation of the hydrobionta (up to 5 rad/hr in a number of sectors)

which will lead to a noticeable radiation effect on the water

ecosystem, primarily on the fish society.

The proposed evaluation of the radloecological conditions of the

bodies of water is preliminary and must be further refined with

consideration of the following information:

- the dynamics of entry of the radionuclides into the bodies of

water from the surface, especially in the periods of the autumn rains

and the spring floods;

 -6a -

-the time dynamics and spatial distribution of radionucl~ides in

hydrobionta, especially in commercial species of fish;

- refinement of the species make-up, the nature of migrations,

the spectra of feeding, and the ecological and physiological

parameters of the water organisms;

 ~Table 6.2
Calculated evaluations and prediction of es of irradiation of water
organisms (mrad/hr) in the region of the radiation track of the Chernobyl

AES (10-20 June 1986)

B o A 06•w I Bneuniee o65uy~etiee I Bnreiue o •'ei~

01e 30o1W ' lot AoIn1VC oTe- 5 i30of•l pactelinl I8KToH{ '• a
1 I JIUeHHRpta
flp•-oxcs~uesb'eqA&C t I 0 ( 2 )1 1e 4300 (300)1 10000 (I000)1 1000 (I00) 1 ,500 (50)

Pewsfpn i (6yRl 204)1 0,I (0,009) 140 (3,3) 1 110 (15) 1 12 (2) I 6 (0,8)
Pewa ,lerip "o 1 1 1 I
(Kn, I' CP , 0,002 (0,0002) , 0,3 (0,025) , 1,0 (0,2) , 0,1 (0,015) I 0,04 (O,01)

,ECTSCYSHnIRmf PJP'eKx-I2 ! 0,000I.-0,006 I 0,002..0,02 1 0,08.-0,2 I0,002..0,016 1 0,003-0,005

ouw •. 1 1 1 I 1

'B cwo~lwax - npornos na flub 196B7 rojas

 .- 7a -

KEY: (1) Body of water ..

(2) External irradiation

(3) Internal irradiation

(4) from the water

(5) from bottom sediments

(6) water plants

(7) plankton

(8) fish

(9) Coolant pond of the Chernobyl AES

(10) Pripyat River (buoy #204)

(11) Dnepr River (Kiev 9 Institute of Hydrobiology (Tr. note: possible

expansion of the acronym "1GB") of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of

Sciences)
(12) Natural background radiation
., *In parenthesis - prediction for June, 1987.
 --8-
- physico-chemical forms of existence of radionuclides- in

components of the water ecosystem; and

- refinement of the basic hydrological parameters and ways .to
transfer radionuclides in water ecosystems (the coolant pond -

Pripyat River - Kiev Reservoir - .and the Dnepr River).

In a scientific and practical sense, the following problems are

of noticeable radioecological interest:

- evaluation of the mechanisms of potential radioecological
effects with long-term (chronic) effects of small doses of radiation

by artificial radionuclides and

evaluation of the mechanisms of secondary ecological effects

which form as a result of the nonidentical effect of the radiation

factor on the ecological characteristics of species. A nonidentical

weakening (or strengthening) of the species with radioactive

contamination will lead to changes in the interaction between species

and, as a result of this, to changes in the structure of the

ecosystem. Among examples of secondary effects of radioactive

contamination are the increase in the population of harmful organisms

in the active sit in the contaminated sectors of the near-water

ecosystems, change in the self-cleaning capability of bodies of

water, and others.

Organization and performance of long-term comprehensive

radioecological investigations both within the 30-km zone and beyond

it are required to solve the listed issues.

 Figure 6ol

Calculated evaluations and predictions of irradiation doses of water

organisms in the radiation track of the Chernobyl AES (10-20 June 1986),

•0

-itIg196 re,;
ec~eT~eHI~f ~ - n~o~Ho3 H8
- •cTecTBe•rul( •,•a•exH•t! •e•!;
 -9a -
KEY (1) mrad/hr
(2) Dnepr River (Kiev 1GM AN Ukr SSR)

(3) Pripyat River (buoy 204)

(4) Coolant pond Chernobyl AES

(5) natural background radiation

(6) prediction for 1987

1. external irradiat~ion from water

2. external irradiation from bottom sediment.

3. internal irradiation of water plants

4. internal irradiation of plankton

5. internal irradiation of fish

Russian document - Appendix 7, PART I ..(pgs. 1-20)
-l-

Appendix 7. Medical and Biological Problems

Table of Contents

7o1 Data on Operating and Emergency AES Personnel Subjected to Radiation:

Magnitudes of Doses Received and Health Consequences.

Treatment Practice .......................... ....... , . . .. .. ......... .2

7.1.1 First Information on the Accident and Actions of Medical

Personnel ..................................... *** o, ........... 2

7.1o2 Principles of Diagnostics and Prognostication in the Specialized

7o1o3 Extent of Biophysical Investigations and Assessment of the

Primary Damaging Factors and Dosage Levels,..... .. ... ... .. ... .... ..... .7

7,1o4 Hematologic and Cardiologic Investigatory Procedures in

Assessing the Sickness Prognosis and External Radiation Dosage Levels20

7o1.5 Preliminary Assessment of Certain Biochemical and Irmmunologic

Tests in Accidental Irradiation, .. ,.,,,................................ .25
 -la-

7.1.6 Skin Changes and Their Role in the Resulting Sickness......... 32

-7.1.7 Treatment Procedures and Preliminary Assessment of Their

Effectiveness.............**. . *****. . 35

Conclusion.............. * . . . 47

7.2 Data on the Radiation Dosage Magnitudes for the Population of the

Thirty Kilometer Radius Around the AES and in Individual Areas of the
European Section of the USSR, Accident Radiation Consequences... ......... 50

7.2.1 Introduction...... ................................ .... 5

7.2.2 Radiation Levels for Citizens of Pripyat' from the Time of the

Accident Until Evacuation..................................... .52

7.2.3 Doses of Radiation on the Population in a Thirty-Kilometer

Radius around ChAES.......... . . .. . .. . 55

*7.2.4 Accident Radiation Consequences at ChAES for the Population of

Isolated Regions of the European Portion of the USSR ................. 67

7.3 Organization of Medical Examinations of the Population of the Regions

Surrounding Chernobyl AES........87.. ... *. .

 .i•b-

7.4 Long•Term Programs for Medical and Biological Observation of the

Population and Personnel ........ 0 .................................... . ...
0 89
 -- 2-

7.1 Data on Operating and Emergency Personnel of the AES Subjected to

Radiation: Magnitudes of Doses Received and Health Consequences.

Treatment Practice.

7.1.1 First Information on the Accident and Actions of Medical Personnel

The medical and sanitation unit servicing the AES, received

information concerning the accident at the plant 15 minutes after its

occurrence (02 hours 26 April 1986).

Assistance to the first 29 victims, .independently evacuating the

accident site, was ordered in the first 30-40 minutes by the intermediate

medical personnel on duty at the public health center. The victims

discarded contaminated clothing and shoes before entering the public health

center. In connection with the expressed primary reaction, they were

quickly sent to the hospital when sanitation processing and the first

medical examination were conducted.

Over the next 4 hours first aid teams administered assistance to the

victims: they were taken from the area of the plant site, primary sanitary

processing was conducted at the decontamination center and victims with a

primary reaction (nausea, vomiting) were transported to the hospital.

Persons in satisfactory condition were sent home, and on the next morning
26 April 1986 were actively called for examination. At 06 hours on the
morning of 26 April, 108 persons were hospitalized, and over the course of
the day-oanother 24 of those examined.

One victim at 06 hours on the morning of 26 April 1986 died from

severe burns and one person from the number of personnel on duty at the

time was not discovered. It is possible that his work station was located

in the area of the collapse and high activity.

 -3-

Twelve hours after the accident, a specialized team arrived and was
sent to work, comprising physicists, radiology therapeutists and hematology
lab workers. Thirty-six hours after the accident, they examined at the
MSCh base in the hospital and ambulatorily nearly 350 persons and performed

approximately 1000 blood analyses (at least 1-3 for each victim over the

first 36-48 hours). Ambulatory written charts were completed with

indication of the clinical manifestations after the accident, complaints of

the victims, number of leukocytes and leukocytaric formula.

Based on the criteria of early diagnosis adopted in the USSR: times

and expression of primary general and local (skin) reaction, expression of

lymphopenia and neutrophils leukocytosis over the first 36 hours, persons

sent for emergency hospitalization where those for which the development of

acute radiation sickness (OLB) with the greatest probability had been
prognosticated. To provide maximum assistance and competent subsequent

analysis of the results of examinations, the clinical facilities in Kiev

and a specialized hospital in Moscow were chosen as hospitalization.

The specialized hospital in Moscow received 129 patients over the

first two days, of which over the first three days, 84 were defined as OLB

patients of stages II-IV of severity and 27--stage I OLB which indicates

the adequacy of primary classification.

 The diagnosis of stage II-IV OLB was established over the first three

days. To refine the diagnosis to stage I OLB, a longer observation period

was usually necessary (to 1-1.5 months) 0

In all, there were 203 persons recognized-as OLB patients.

No victims of OLB were discovered among the population.

 -4-

7.1.2 Principles of Diagnostics and Prognostication in the Specialized

Hospital

The primary diagnostic and prognostic criteria for determining the

conditions for admitting patients and choosing methods of treatment,

including indications for bone marrow transplants, decontamination, etc.,

were determined over the first 3 days of their stay in the hospital.

The criteria for classifying the patients over the first days were

clinical and clinical-laboratory based on actual experience and

recommendations of other international centers on radiology.

The time and severity of the primary general (vomiting) and local
(hyperemia and edema of the skin and mucosa) reactions were demonstrative

over the first hours to the first three days. The expression of
lymphopenia was evaluated quantitatively according to days of observation,
and based on it the average dose of overall uniform radiation was

tentatively estimated. The possible radiation dose of bone marrow was

determined according to a direct method of counting aberrations in the bone

marrow cells.

Over the first 10-14 days, in addition to this, the times of

manifestation and degree of thrombocytopenia, dates of revelation and

expression of leukopenia and granulocytopenia were established as severity

criteria. Quantitative assessment of the dose on the bone marrow was

performed with regard to the number of dicentrics in the cultures of

peripheral blood lymphocytes stimulated with FGA.

 -4a-

The dynamics of skin change over the period from the first days to two

weeks were semiquantitatively evaluated according to accepted clinical

parameters.

The totality of these criteria developed by Soviet scientists made it

possible to evaluate the prognosis:

 -5-

- general clinical course of the disease;

- dynamics of the blood chart;
- possible degree of affectation of isolated sections of the skin

and mucosa.

The average dose of uniform radiation of bone marrow with gamma

radiation or its equivalent could be approximately evaluated to a known.

degree from individual biological parameters.

The course of the sickness and its possible outcome, being defined on

the initial, days from indicated prognostic criteria, later satisfactorily

coincided with this prognosis in its manifestation.

Four stages according to criteria adopted in USSR were isolated with

regard to severity of OLB bone marrow and intestinal syndrome.

Cases of sickness with a brief latent period (to 6-8 s) expressed by

an early (in the first 1/2 hour) primary reaction (vomiting, headache,

increased body temperature) were designated as extremely severe (Stage IV).

The number of lymphocytes for the first 3-6 days was less than

100/microliter. On the 7-9th days, enteritic phenomena were manifest. The

number of granulocytes in 7-9 s •.mSOO/microliters,

thrombocytes--•40,OOO/microliters--from 8-10 s. Profound overall

poisoning, fever, affectation of the mouth and salivary glands were noted.

The sickness included such affectations for 20 persons of the number of

those treated as the specialized hospital.
 -Sa -

A dose of more than 6 GR (to 12-16 GR) of general uniform radiation

equivalent in biological effect in hemogenesis was determined for 18

victims,

For 17 patients the accident was lethal on the days +10 up to days
+50. These persons were burned over 40-90% of the body surface, and for

the majority they were extremely severe, practically fatal, even without

regard to other clinical OLB clinical syndromes.

 -6-

For two patients of this group, the radionuclides level in the

organism was the highest (see Section 7.1.8). Two more patients with stage

IV severity died on days +4 and +10 at the hospital in Kiev from combined

thermoradiation damage.

A total of 23 persons~was diagnosed as victims of stage Ill OLB. The

approximate dose of overall gamma radiation was 4.2-6.3 GR. Criteria for
determining OLB of this degree of severity were the times of development of

an expressed reaction of 30 min.--1 hour (vomiting, headache, subfebrile

body temperature converting to skin hyperemia). Lymphopenia at 3-6 s,

200-100 cells/microliter. The latent period lasted 8-17 days. Epilation

was typical. The number of thrombocytes dropped to _4OOOO/microliter on

the 10-16th days, neutrophils <'10000/microliter (8-20th days). Fever,

infectious complications, bleeding were expressed at the height of

sickness. This stage of severity was diagnosed at the specialized hospital

in 21 persons, at the hospital in Kiev, in 2 persons. Seven persons died

over the first two days to seven weeks. Of them, the number of persons

with severe skin damages significantly aggravating their condition and

largely predetermining a lethal outcome, was six.

Criteria for diagnosing stage II OLB were: development of a primary

reaction over 1-2 hours; lymphopenia at times of 3-6 s of the order of

500-300 cells per microliter. The length of the latent period is up to

15-25 days. Neutrophils decreased in 20-30 s to 1000 cells per microliter,

thrombocytes in 17-24 s--to 40000 per microliter. At the height, there
 - 6a -

were concrete infectious complications and weakly expressed indications of

bleeding. Moderate acceleration of SOE--to 25-40 nim/hr.

 -7-

At the specialized hospital and at the hospitals in Kiev, affectations

of this degree of gravity were determined in 53 persons (a level of 2-4 GR

equivalent in biologic effect. There were practically no persons with

burns significantly aggravating their condition.

The dosage level in patients with stage I acute radiation sickness

according to cardiologic data was from 0.8 to 2.1 GR. There were no

persons with skin damages considerably aggravating the clinical pattern of

the disease. Criteria for diagnosing Stage I OLB were: presence of

primary overall reactions at periods after 2 hours from the moment of

exposure, absence of a general skin response, latent period length of 30

days, reduced number of lymphocytes on the first days to 600-1000 cells per

microliter, leukocytes in 8-9 s--to 4000-3000 per microliter, and at the

height of sickness--to 3,500-1,500, thrombocytes to 60,000 to 40,000 per

microliter (25-28) days, moderate SOE acceleration. These criteria

evaluate the degree of severity of bone marrow syndrome. Data of a

systematic clinical and laboratory examination over the course of 1-1/2

months (with regard to the length of the latent period and the presence of

data on the frequency of chromosomal aberrations in the blood and bone

marrow lymphocytes) were quite considerable for this group of patients.

7.1.3 Extent of Biophysical Investigations and Assessment of the

Primary Damaging Factors and Dosage Levels
 Dosimetric monitoring was conducted for all entering the reception
room by means of accepted Soviet devices recording .external emission from

the body
(RUP, SRP-68-O1,
AKTINIYa, TISS and others). This made it possible to
assess dosage rate distribution about the body (region of the thyroidH

gland, chest, back, hands, feet, legs, etc.) and to determine readings for

repeated sanitary
 -8-

treatment and decontamination of the skin. The dosage rate recordable by

the instrument, was due to incorporation of radionuclides and partially,
residual contamination of the persons' skin. The use of smears and

washings using moistened tampons and aluminum filters (screens) during

measurements make it possible to roughly estimate the contribution of

radionuclides incorporated in the body and applied to the skin to emission

from the body. The first determinations, examination and questioning of

the patients in receiving confirmed that the majority of them, in addition

to the effect of extraneous gamma-beta-radiation, had had direct contact
with beta-gamma-active nuclides, and in somie cases, these nuclides b~ad

entered the organism.

Though for the majority there was a combination of two or three of the
indicated factors, for the victims, the foremost was external gamma-beta-

radiation on the entire body and additionally greater irradiation of the

skin relative to weakly penetrating radiation. The curves plotted of the

decay of radioactive substances contained in te patients' urine samples

already for the first two days after the accident, certified the presence

of radionuclides in the victims' organism with half lives of 185-190 hours

or about 8 days, most frequently iodine isotopes.

The patients were carefully and repeatedly washed and placed in wards.
Potassium iodide was continuously administered already from the first days
(0.25 two times a day). Burns and oropharyngeal syndrome observed over

these periods was initiated and continued for a major portion of the
patients. Special diagnostic procedures of both general clinical and
 -Sa -

biophysical nature were developed to refine the possible dosage level and

nature of exposure.
 -9-
Instrumentation and methodical provision for biophysical investigations was

provided by a complex of procedures and devices.

1. To measure iodine-131 level in the thyroid gland, a scintillation

counter (64x64 mm) placed in a lead collimator was used. Emission

collimation was done in such a way so as to intercept photo emission from

the person's body, and to isolate only that emission resulting from the

thyroid gland. Measurements was taken in a narrow hole (about 364

keV--iodine-131 peak). Evaluation of the addition to the reading from

iodine-131 incorporated in the blood circulating through the area of the

neck was done by measuring the iodine-131 level in the patient's forearm.

Calibration was done by means of a spot iodine-131 source situated in the

patient's neck phantom.

2. To measure the level of radioactive substances in urine samples,

the biosubstrate analyzers BIO-1 and SICh 2.1 were used. The first
facility has a high volume scintillation counter, and the second device

employes a detector based on a drift-type semiconductive detector, These

facilities were used to measure gamma radiation from samples of sectional

material. The facilities were calibrated by means of certified gamma

radiation sources in geometry approximating the real as closely as

possible.

3. To measure the activity incorporated in the organism of persons,

the SICh 2°2 devices and a semiconductive detector with local shielding
were utilized. The first device employs a high volume scintillation
detector, and the second--semiconductive detector based on pure germanium.
The facilities were calibrated by means of human body phantoms,
 -10-

made from standard containers filled with calibrated solutions of various

radioactive substances.

4. Multichannel amplitude analyzers (memory size to .8000 channels)

were used to assemble and analyze the resulting gamma spectra. The

spectrometric circuit of the devices was assembled from high-resolution

spectrometers produced by the "Nokiya" (Finland) and R T (USA) firms.

Spectrometric data acquired in all these facilities were recorded on

magnetic carriers.

To establish the level of total alpha-activity of transplutoniom

elements in the victims' exreta, urine samples were studied for 10 of the

patients under different conditions of exposure. In all cases, no

plutonium was discovered in the urine (sensitivity of the method is 0.2

decays/mm., of a 500 ml sample).

For three victims, for which the level of alpha-active radionuclides

in the urine upon entering the hospital (28 April 1986) was 2.0, 0.67, 0.1

nCurie per 0.1 ml urine, diagnostic testing was conducted using pentatsin

accelerating the release of plutonium from the organism. No effect from

triple administration of the drug was detected in any instance.

In studying the organs of the one fatality (beta and alpha-active

radionuclide content upon entering the clinic on 27 April 1986, was 1.5

nCurie per 0.1 ml urine), the total alpha-activity of transpiutonium

elements was detected only in the lungs in the amount less than or equal to
 - ~a -

3.4 nCurie/organ and trace quantities--in the urinary bladder. The

analysis of bone tissue is not completed.

Aipha-spectrometry of luna samples detected approximately 90%

curium-242 and approximately 10% plutonium and americium. At such

plutonium
content level (combined with transplutonium elements) and low release
constant of it from the organism, the level of nuclide release with the
urine is below the sensitivity of the determination procedure being used.

Simultaneously with primary dosimetric monitoring by means of gamma-

radiometers, to assess levels of radioactive contamination, immediately

after admission, blood and urine samples were taken for biophysical studies
(measurements of the total activity and gamma-spectrometric readings). The

studies of comprehensive activity were conducted in a biophysical

laboratory by means of precision radiometers, and the isotopic composition

in the samples in question was determined by means of a gamma-spectrometer

based on a pure germanium semiconductive detector.

One to two days after the victims were admitted to the hospital, the
radio iodine level was determined for them in the thyroid using the "Gamma"

gamma radiometer (Hungarian manufacture). On subsequent days, these

studies were repeated several times (from 4 to 6) to obtain data on the

half-lives of radio iodine from the th~yroid gland. Collective results of

reading of the levels of radio iodine content for the period from 29 April
to 6 May 1986 (day +3 to day +lO)indicate that for the major portion of the

victims (94%), the content of radioactive iodine in the thyroid gland on 29

April 1986 was less than 50 microCurie, and for 6% of those studied, these
levels were 2-4 times higher (Fig. 7.1.1 and 7.1.2).

Several days after hospitalization, when the levels of residual

superficial contamination were close to background, the major portion of

the victims (with the exception of persons in extremely critical
 .- la-

condition), was examined with Sigh stationary instruments (human emission

spectrometers). Peaks of more than 20 different radionuclides were noted

in the gamma emission spectra originating from their organism, but the
primary
 -12-

radionuclides determining the dosage of victims' internal radiation were

131-I, 132-I, 134-Cs, 137-Cs, 95-Nb, 144-Ce, 103-Ru and 106-Ru. Typical

emission spectra are given in Fig. 7.1.3 and 7.1.4.

For all the fatalities, during autopsy, samples were taken of various

organs and tissues for subsequent determination of the radionuclide level

in them (up to 35 samples per person, including 17 samples for various lung

sections, Fig. 7.1.5). Preliminary results of determining the content of

individual radionuclides for five victims which died on the 17th to 19th
days from acute radiation sickness were obtained. A typical chart of

.The
sample analysis in relative units per 1 g tissue is given in Fig. 7.1.6.

emission spectra resulting from the human body, varied in

individual observations.

Analysis of data and assessment of individual doses of radiation of

individual organs and tissues continue. Only in one instance with maximum

RV level in the organism is the contribution of internal irradiation

considered in early clinical manifestation of respiratory and intestinal

tract organ damage.

Results of Biosubstrate Investigation for Sodium-24.

The first samples of biosubstrates (urine and blood) were collected 27

April 1986 at 15 hours. They were spectrometered for emitted photon

radiation. The resulting photon spectrum was quite complex. However, the

Wline 1274 keV (sodium-22, half-life of 2.6 years) having 99.95% yield and
 -12a-

the line 1368 keV and 2754 keV (sodium-24,,half-life of 15 hours), having
99°87 and 99°99% quantum yield, respectively, were not detected.
 qI$I~UIILIVr.uu Ln

I S(uwJo•)]uai• Re.•e91) (Thyroid Gland) I

•. .'0•-a. KOWIO• Thl.0O lll•/0eT.• 1! Nub~ of Stu'dies: 7V , .
vaepeuu Co3~epI~1I1
0 0 0

! ' Levels Measured. .

• e- o
"8'''1 R4'I8 20 MRK -- 87 Les'•Lhan'2('mierdCl~rfe "-87%

:'0 .~ •. Menee 50 wtI•w-94% Less" than 50; rn1'roCUrte - 94%

* . '100-150 MKKN I0 iO0-.-so micrlbCUrtie '1"" %' " -,..'s%"..

°O • m• • Q, -4
• " ........
... ' . doznee 200 wd•J.-0.5% (I ,ejr'jneil) a.b..i.Z.OicroC•,ire
.. 0.5% (1 Person)

0' I ! 0 0
I .. • ... .. *.*. .0 ... . . e.. . . .

e
I !;
a. I , I.
.. *'

' . *** .. . . 0 • 0•..... .

!Q
*I
8
*!

*I
S
0...O o

. .

*.0 • * * I

:1I••e
. Mi c r o . C J r
I
200 !~~~KT~ID Ch,?1K

-~_ t 150
-~-

10 1uu
JUU 150
 +.. ./. .. igure 1.1.2. Results of Measuring radio iodine activity on 6 .May 1986
1' Pie. 7.1.2. Pe~y~z~hTan N3MepH~feirwnn•Boc'm jx.wowo~ua 6 Ma 1986 rota
•* .j. ". n ¶Onw~jnu31.a ,p.rfnern (Thyroid Glanl). "0..
-•;........ i cOnIqcCTnO ,jII.i.iA: 104, Total numnber ofi Studies: 104.

,,'.,•. ' i : }leMepflhml CO)Op(IIInIIlIIR? Levels Measured': " -. ":1 ! :

*. . , irlIteO10px -,9O Less than 1.0 !M•.cro:CUrie-90%o

S........ 2 0: 50 5,qU-,2.10-2'-,Micro-c~ri.e - 5.2%o

"* !..*i*

0 ! .... J ..." '. .. I* . . ... . . ..

o • I I• ..

-I . ;. iI. S"
• , ~. ... I" '". . ..
* •' UI'

. . . .0..,.. . • + '•,' 0 o 9 I
•0i ;
- a * .I . .. . .. .. . .. "- . -- ,..I . . ...

I
osog,. .
0 . 0". : ' ' '
.... .. I..
.......... ,I _ :. ...... g-e + ~i
............--- ".-. * - --
00.1 ... .
,, I 0.. . :... ;' ;.. . :. " : ;
,*, ; l +
* • | .0 . - 1. 00

... ,...... ...,...,..,.0,... L........ .: . . " . .. . ."*' .!0 . " .

0. ;*~.~ .. .. .. .. - i. - .........
Ac l t I....e
a , o.- ,;' . . i " ' ' ° ' "' r
,... . .--~'L ... .,.20. . ......... . .. 40..
0." I . 0• . 00
 S .S S
e , • S

Augmented four-fold alocd ' 3 r*':,oru•o viwpi'wrza

2]. IffPJ.#Mo & .4*A.•* nloY • 1• Cr.,-f) j.-.'•,;:.'Zr t'- -•: r'or'm~ ;r : •-oJe
Ii "- . . . . . .
iHcr e~,J•:_!e¢.:,rLt d.¶ot: •-...•?'n,•, ic ©c':out qz.ctar@ 1p3' r.N • Tnc",- ai- c~l,:Jm Er.€
I I... S

I • 4

• ,° ,. S I a
. j..-.. .-- ' .. - _--_- - I - ,_
Fig. 7.1.3. Photon emission spectTurn of "ieorpb -ti-ec-'-. ,
•mixture of radionucli~ded. P'iegr~'~' .I-I--
[ :semiconductive d~etect~or:.withl i6P,u.ijL•
4 .... __ _.__.
... _ L.
, ; ~cm sensitive cavity. Etter~y aranget gileater• -. ---- -.. ..
SI
S .
thane.. :.*' .O
S

I;
. ,
S : I , 'S " . " t
S. " I - '

IPO
In...

q~)
~S.S
0..
0
U
a
t

.0
S t~
*H~ C
bO ' *45*1
Iii * . . .. &..o - .
r-I * ~6
S-I
d~ 4',
.1
II
'4
, I - -U.. ~.*i '.e~*
'If S .• I... . sq.
.d . ... . .: ..;
3~i 4~J~iS * I
**
it
.'.. 4"- I% - * i
o I I " '" •I U;
I -.. . ., 9 ~
~ I.U * 4 * - *.a.......8....; ' * •
'is
~,%
'.'~ ~eq*
I *' * i j
a''.. I me
.~ #SI PS', ' I.
~0 6*
a •. :o •

• I
 I-. "'
f0-....
L'•? Everywhere in spectrum augmen tofl along y

w - r

....... r.1..4., Cncurp lotoNxoro £.2.J7•.,n.

Ilo~moem=,e Pmopuopnpouawoig Cede PsSuo~r.auaou.
ic" o o RlAEEKEIrODBH1 NUI 0Co3eoa •3deoeo I•-pNUA e 1cT3,?
~j".'.~u 2Cc p""ommSrrIicIE I.:... -
tr*~*
I * I
I Fi.711 Photon emis•io• s'pectrum" of
*itn'•orporated. mixture of ra
nucltdes.
... J.. -- "-i-''''
IIo Pur• * g . -- :. .. a•.•.:...
gerznanium semicon wied•
t~h . . ... J...,J... ....... .......
.26ngem le s 'lO0O keV."
e'nihianery
•surface. °
a :-!.
. .1 .- . ' '
* I
- ..-
o 0 "
o.
, I

. I
I. I.

I
o
'°
I 0
a.. 0 *o.

S.

* ; :' " I I "

. . . . ..
• '- " l lt, : 0 S

* S:

A oll~e
..
h
-.. 8
 MPTEPHP::J1r H38 J1E KHX
Fig. 7.1.5. Sampling diagram of sectional lung tissue.

t88

-- 09

k 4

I?
 Fig. sampiing
lung 7.1., Di ciagram)
ribut4.oD'.in of-ra dionucldes
p•..•.7. 1.•. rer1aive sabout Mean
unites). the vic.tims'
valves arelun$ iccta rf
Pacpe~ze•aeRe FmL.uA'7•,ou ao .aentm ziocrpuer (c,. ©,.,• e@~op. wpo8 a-r•..)
(OmIoc 3IT.•• eW P ,z'wrsm). yl•R IN CbW
e•",M~lq 3WRN.M.

Ue=uII.-234

6.22 sCe.i•m-.34 OX

ooz --io.c
d m -- . ..
I i• .1 4 15 S 6 7
iodine-131
. . . . .

-I - "13 "Sample
Ou9.' DmO 110 Cli,:,0
number
I1o~ accoring to chat
U,.':~I
L2 0.5C
r~. 3~

S2
-[ A 7fflvm
3 4
A

15
l |

5
•

£7" C 9 It'
-

11
-
12 13
I .

same as aove
z iocon ium-95

2.h
v1
I
riTh$ .~o'~n~-~4O

. 2o"•-4 latau 10
a• ov e

1 2:3 4 15 IL
5 67 .' I '2 '' 3 io.v'-• n.L'., no~ r•
YUcpsd-144 cerium-l44 same as above

£|Ilp~..447 cerium_1 4 1.same as above

same as above
I8
 -19-

Measurements were made by means of a semiconductive detector with 60

cubic cm sensitivity cavity. Estimated activity of iodine-131 in these

samples was 0.5 microCurie/ml, and activity of the cesium isotopes

(cesium-137 and cesium-134) was 0.1 microCurie/mi.

The line 511.0 keV present in the spectrum has insignificant area and

corresponds to annihilation emission due to the line 1597 keV

(lanthanum-140).

Thus, approximately 35 hours after the accident, there were no

significant data certifying neutron irradiation of the victims.

Estimates of the Total Activity of Iodine-131 and Cesium-134, 137

Isotopes Entering the Victims' Organism (Two Victims Having the Highest

Radionuclide Level in the Organism)

According to primary results of urine and blood sample analysis,

samples were collected certifying that those indicated persons have the

highest internal radioactive contamination.

The activity of the urine samples was 0.5 microCurie/ml (iodine-131).

and 0.1 microCurie/ml (cesium-134, 137) for one victim and 0.2

microCurie/ml (iodine-131) and 0.07 microCurie/ml (cesium-134, 137) for

another victim. According to spectrometric data for urine and blood

samples, it may be concluded that these isotopes yield nearly 90% of the

absorbed dose of internal irradiation.

 -19a-

The total activity according to preliminary evaluations was nearly 30

mCurie iodine-131 and 10 mCurie cesium isotopes for one victim and 12

mCurie iodine-131 and 4 mCurie cesium isotopes for the second victim.
 -20-

Preliminary estimates of the dosage loads of internal irradiation of

the entire body made for iodine-131 and cesium-134, 137, were nearly 4 Sv
(400 REM)--for the first victim and nearly 1.5 Sv (150 REM)--for the

second.

Spectrometry of the blood and urine samples, and also direct

spectrometry of the entire body and thyroid gland certify that entrance
internally of radionuclides for the remaining victims is at a much lower

level (tens and hundreds of times less).

These data are preliminary. Spectrometric data is recorded on

magnetic carriers and is being processed.

7.1.4 Hematologic and Cardiologic Investigatory Procedures in

Assessing the Prognosis of Sickness and the Dosage Level of Overall

External Irradiation

The hematology lab examined all persons exposed to ionizing radiation

in fault conditions and hospitalized at the specialized clinic.

Investigations of the morphologic composition of peripheral blood at the

specialized hospital were made daily for 1-1/2 to 2 months (quantity of

erithrocytes, leukocytes, reticulocytes, leukocytaric formula, quantity of

thrombocytes, hemoglobin content, SOE).

For some, cellular composition of the bone marrow was analyzed once
every 7-14 days (or more frequently according to special instructions).
 -20a-

Based on the resulting data, the course of bone marrow syndrome was

predicted, which later was well confirmed by actual manifestations of acute

radiation•d/
 -21-.

sickness for victims, including satisfactory coincidence with preliminary

classification by degree of severity and ranges of exposure doses.

Graphs were compiled for each patient, which presented the dynamics of

bone marrow syndrome with regard to the change in the number of

nieutrophils, thrombocytes and l~ymphocytes.

Cytogenetic analysis was performed for 154 persons. Peripheral blood

and bone marrow taken from the victims at various time intervals after
exposure (from 1.5 days to 6 weeks) served as studied material.

Lymphocytes of peripheral blood and bone marrow were cultivated at 37

degrees C in medium 199 containing antibiotics, FGA and

5-bromodesoxyuridine (10-20 micrograms/ml) for 50-67 hours. Cytogenetic
analysis was conducted in 50 first mitosis cells (preliminary results). To

identify first mitosis cells, differential dyeing of sister chromatids was

used.

The dosage was estimated from the number of dicentrics based on 100

cells. Each tricentric, quadricentric and pentacentric was considered as

2, 3 and 4 dicentrics, respectively. To calculate the dose, the dose-

effect curve was used for dicentrics (most accurately the accountable

aberrations) derived while studying patients with acute leukosis in

remission which sustained therapeutic relatively uniform total gammia

radiation in doses of 1.5-5 GR: Y=(10.79+200)XD+(5.16+O.51)XD (subscript

2) where Y--dicentric frequency (per 100 cells) and D--dose (GR). It was
indicated that the radiosensitivity of peripheral blood lymphocytes for
 .- 21A-

patients with acute leukosis in remission and of heal~thy donors after" gamma

radiation in vitro at a 4 GR is approximately identical.

 -.22-

Irradiation uniformity was evaluated by comparing the observed-

distribution of dicentrics by cells with the theoretical Poisson
distribution. It is common knowledge, that in case of relatively uniform

exposure, cell dicentric distribution is subordinate to Poisson's law, and

in case of irregular irradiation--deviates considerably from Poisson-type.

Cytogenetic analysis has allowed evaluating the absorbed dose for

victims.

* For almost all Victims, exposure was relatively uniform: the cell
dicentric distribution was subordinate to Poisson's law or deviated little
from the theoretical distribution. The severity of bone marrow syndrome
was prognosticated from the most informative hematologic index--the number

of peripheral blood neutrophils in dynamics (at various time intervals

after irradiation). For this, the expected neutrophil curve was plotted

for the dose calculated from the number of dicentrics, and it was compared
with the real curve observed for each specific individual. Preliminary

analysis showed that for uniform exposure, the neutrophil curves for the

majority of victims in the cell number reduction phase coincide well with

the prognostic curve. Upon irregular irradiation, neutropenia was less

profound than at the same level of chromosomal aberrations in the instance

of uniform exposure. Figs. 7.1.7 and 7.1.8 present exemplary results of

cytogenetic study and the peripheral blood neutrophilic curve for patient
D. The prognostic curve is designated as a dotted line, and the real
curve--solid line. According to Fig. 7.1.8, both curves quite

satisfactorily coincide with regard to time of onset of neutropenia and the

degree of its expression.
 'e41 t ZŽ
Ilpo
71.7
Va3~ObLMI4bI1 £A[~O~5~O
/4. ~fberf4,t d4~ -si
1AC&O A8[PPAHTI4b!1 i&tTOi-~1
(~z
(e~z V.)

I.,v,+ AW•tw1PwIO3- 1
.•O3& rIo KT•PMIt,.
LM3,+
(9.4..A rp I TKI. PACt'PLflt•[WWL LM~tNI<PMKO! 110

10t OBUIiu[
PI,I¶ S&&ITh0MhflP

p+a ,',%IpI -"AKT

o,-N ,

23
 2porxHo3poBe.Hke TR•.CT)4 KoC.T.8,.Oo3ro!eoro cm.v.%ob'.a '1O p3J

* ,l. O•y'i,•ei~e OTH0CMTB.7bX0 pa~o,,ep•,-oe (pacnpen~e~e-

o.~bxo~
O ~Mwe H..%uex~pH~ou flo L,.IBTK&.M Do•,.VmAeT'cA 3&KOac o'aCCH), 2"-
3a, pacC,.xTa.,i8.R 110 zMLueH'rpH~a, COCTa~AqeT ,,~,3 Pp. Ib'Hxmpo,.
o~o3.Ha~Jexa npoPXOCTKL~ecKm.a KpM~a.,, M8Tpg
•P $!oD .,Ae O.TOCwre..'ib-

Fig. 7.1.8. Prediction of the severity of bone marrow syndrome

from the results of cytogenetdc investigation of lymphocytaric
cultures stimulated with FCA
I•,0 Patient D. Exposure is relatively uniform (cell dicentric distri-
1~,Dbution follows Poisson's law). The dose .calculated from dicentrics
is 3.3 CR. The dotted line indicates the prognostic neutrophil
curve for relatively uniform gamma radiation at 3.5 CR dose,
the solid line--neutrophil curve observed for the patient.

• / /

- I
I (.
0,0-p

im after eIoue(a•
 -25-

Results of cytogenetic investigation, were used to select persons

needing allogenic bone marrow or embryonal liver cell transplants. For
patients on which transplantation was performed, °cyotgenetic control Of the

survival effectiveness of the transplant was carried out..For this

purpose, bone narrow punctates and peripheral blood and bone narrow

lymphocytaric cultures stimulated with FGA were studied periodically. When

cells were transplanted from a donor of the opposite sex, .the sex

chromosomes were used as markers, and when cells were transplanted from

donors of the same sex -- radiation induced marker chromosomes were used
(symmetrical interchromosomal exchanges,. non-dicentric inversions).

7oi.5. Preliminary Assessment of Certain Biochemical and Immunologic Tests

in Accidental Exposure

The list of tests for biochemical observation corresponded to that

adopted in the Soviet Union for clinical labs and included nearly 35

parameters characterizing the primary metabolic processes, and 16 tests of

the status of the blood coagulation system (Table 7.1.1.)..

Results of the determinations were compared with. the control and

normal values, and also with the dynamics of the index for a given patient
(see exemplary record of the dynamics of indices for Patient S. in Table

7o1.2). Immunologic tests and the directions of investigations are given

in the composite Table 7o1.3. In addition to the main labs of the

specialized hospital, various other institutions around the country were

involved, Specialists from the U.S. participated in efforts at typing the
 -25A-

antigenic structure of lymphocytes and release of the graft --

haploidentical bone marrow from T-lymphocytes.

Table 7,1.1 Taffx.ta 7.1.1
flepeae• N EOWUqeCTDO TecTOB, ZCUIOJ:bOBE1flX
List and Number of Tests for Patient Studies
z~.o~c~e.~o~aI1 nocTpa~a~.•, .-

I. 0• de~zox -. I471 26. rAn~osa.

glucose
- -1850.
Overall protein
2. A•md0 z - 1491
Albumin Reberg ts
28. Bpew• csep~~aiz
Protein fractions - 0.
- 750 Bo~o~d coagulation time
4. Moqeu•Ha
urea 29. BpeM• IPOBOTe~~eN - 10
5. RpeaTrt - 1505 Circula ~ion Time
30. BpeM pelaLI H•auK - 395
6. moea• c~ - 38
uric acid 31 ecalcification tie
7. Xo.~ecTep•H o~wR- 1014 TeCT - 290
Overall cholesterol Autocoagulation test
8.B Iz yr6E od0k-98 32. llporpoMd~oB mi•eicc-516
OverI1 blirubin Prothrombin index
9. BZAgpydnH C3.R3amHE-982 33. Iiiei~c pe~pa•a - 234
Retraction index
ond ed•billirubin
•o. 34, CM6pH~oreH - 430
Fibrinogen
- 889 35. •SpMOTEeCKJA
I2. kra~blirbi a.KTiZBHOCTL - 357
- 889 Fibrinolyti•c activity
12. •• 36. 1Iapa~oaryJI=mzoErue
- 256 TecT•(3TaSoO•O•) - 676
14. assium Paracoagulation tests (ethanol)
I4. e3o -102 37. Tpoido~oe •pes• - 240
Thrombin time
- 5 38, PenTva3Hoe •pewi - 80
Reptylase time
16 hjosphorus - 1335 39., Upo•.Yx'r •erpaan,i,,,-
•Op~s orei~a -
17. Alate
XcaT - 1335 Fibrinogen degredation products
As ate 40. A•TIa3po~aH~oe Bpe•a
18. a-AMAza~a -- 673 pe~a• •- 142
a -Amyl as e
TacTMsoDoe •pe•a - 210
Aa~a -- 5 t t t
Pructo so-l-monophospha.t e aldose •42. Pr~ t iTV0• f•° as in- •

Antithrombin-3

Gamma-GTP
23. AUr - 961
LDG
24. Eao-•epuexT •/I2 68zs =-enzyme LDGI` 2

25. @oc~a~asa mezo~ma•-977 A~lkaline phosphatase

26
 Tad~nviu 7.1.2
RapTa JLH8MK]RM 6OoxmMleIcKHX ,loltasaTeJ~eR
%3.V.I.
CnMeiU1, K., 0.. ., C.BO..
LAs-f•'IAwafirst ?Ohvo
pj e•.
•aTafloc.Ty!Lefme 26 anpe•I986 r.
AJ~arwo3: Ocrp~an nytqeneau dOAe3H

•a a .MCCe~fleoDhMR • 4 = (j)S±•.04':28.04':29.04:2.05 :7.05:II.05•I3.05:I4.05:I5. :I6.05:I7.05118.05:I9.0

I 3 :4 :5.: 6 :7:8 :9 :10 . II . 12:.13 . I4I.•

0gu•l deno.K. 62-82• VI 56 70 79 61 61 59 53 56 65 47 5 -
k. 35--52 z/ 33 31 26 24 24 27 32 32vtR1e
-Ao40• 52 26 20 20 2'7 22 23 27 18173 I8 II i'.1
*CaT AO4 E 57 28 9 I5 26 I6 27 23 151I8 32 435•4
RgK io 170 ME I600 143 I70 380 89 89 26 -:28 :
A•P~o 460 ME 282 233 326 266 160 65 352
43o-eplaeWT rlJJ~ o 280 ME 133 89 I50 162 21I
1 o-e ,)z•.e, L •,. II

CoU]eteT .7.- 0-I40 20400 160

Mo'tei~da 25-8,3
2 4,9 9,8 10,0 10,7 14,5 22,7 23,4 27,7 8,3 '
rQ"Ol
 •ac•. •. t.z /l

I : 4 :5 :6 :. 7 :, 8 : 9 :10O:1II :I2 : 13 : I4r:J-

... M ,cro,,ou~r.j
94 74 104 124 180 142 154 200 265 285 348 no
3,7 2,6 4,0 3,6 2,3 1,5 2,2 2,0

1,9 I,?, 1,85 1,9

~3,2--5,6 waoim/,n 3,9 3,85 4,2 4,1 4,6 3,8 4,4 2,8 2,0 2,0 it?,• '
I8,3 I?,I 31,3 29,8 33,2 41,0 38,8s•8(
9,6 I0,3
BunpmIn Ao 5,0 • /•A6,8 I0,8 13,2 25,8 26,7 31,3 4,0 30,1 ',•

5,0 4,0 4,1 3,8 3,22.1,'t•

•a~p=R 139-453 haao•,/, 134 136 140 142 I50 I52IW•
•MA4•Q•/i
 Tadimia 7.1.3
Ocutomnlie Rahnpaa~nneM Mt 'ec'rlI MMoy~orlm~ecloro MccA~e1oBatMq
a
.Tpynua:Tinipo-llo~ndop :T~mrpo- :OcnO- :Onpe~te- :Onpe~ue- :AKTMIBa-
¶M- :Hcc~neJo- :KOHrpOniL:
:KpODR :DBHlue :J1OHOpOD:1~aH~e :6oli,vle- :?neHile :JleHme :wta :DtUIKe :3a 1rpM- :.
:n pe- :no an- :•s '~c-:no •pRT-:fM~e KM :Cydno- :z~onnenT-:IqmiTe~a :M3oceR- :z~A~e- :
rpnia do, mi,
nx :syc- :TareHaM:Aa poA-:pOtxTap-:oT T-.JI :nyai•w :panMR :T-axTuBn-:cw~anARa-:IweM KM:
(,) .4•aKTop~cncT.
•- :
.cTheR .:JraM an- .rpi ral.:A M?40
,A.MKOB
:HH/ .TffreHaJW .noiteu .TrOn
.H-M yo- .no•
O

.r~odyAM- .:
lo•• .11M
l•
.no •pwT-
.potmTap-:
m

m
lA : /• :no •• *H :TJ'iHii .: :HOB * : /_ IMm Xw-- :'
•* : . .:~./•
na) .epecaj. A,. _ •: ,,e.pa• M
:ArH
.* / .:((o/.(o , , •N)
I I i i I • i II I '

13 nponec-llpR OT- B nep~o~t rpeztuo- fludop Y .ncex flpn ne-

Tnxemie dozi,- 3ceM
5es nepnuen BceM
BceM Od 3a.- ce peme- CyTCT-. BOccTal- Io•M- i.ypca iie- do.,imwx _ecta~iue
ifle HysEJaDTrrc
n nepeca~ie CTYUi o- (isO 115 oll- BM11 cofl-.Ho~eRMm TeJzbHo 'ieiw no C nepeAM- XBO He-
R0CT1IOFO MO3- ICX111 poca 0 MecTM~o-KpOBeT- I pa3 B floKa36J1• BaR4M51I COEM.
nlepecaj- ro .torto-nopeiut Hel~eJI
°eIE CT8J!MO-' . ~TOE K'poBM Mozra H
110 Mepe raInloM-
pa3I3MT• •1eHTmlr'1O--
'Tp8JIc•- ro KOCT--
~3MO1HI•X ROFO
peaiuI •osra.
- if
IUo cneit. I7o nolta-
ne wyrvwnunecH IlOlKa3a- 3aHKRM I
Snpeca.zKe ! pa3 B ite-

/•tme peuner
ii

- -
-lCT~nemHL ntopae-e
 -29 a-
Key: (1) Patient group; (2) Blood- group and rhesus factor; (3) antigen

typing according to HLA system; (4) donor selection form relatives

according to blood groups and HLA antigens; (5) erithrocytaric antigen*

typing; (6) KM release from T-L in haploidentical grafts; (7) determination

of lymphocyte subpopulations; (8) determination of A, M, C immunoglobulin

levels; (9) T-Activin immrunity activation; (10) isosensitization study;

(11) Monitoring KM adaptation according to erithrocytaric chimera after HA;

(12) critical patients needing bone marrow transplant; (13) critical

patients not requiring bone marrow transplant; (14) patients of an average

degree of severity; (15) patients with slight degree of damage; (16) all

without exceptions; (17) all during first days -of hospitalization; (.18) all

compulsorily; (19) according to special indices; (20) when examining the

question of a transplant; (21) in the absence of a compatible donor

according to HLA; (22) during recovery of hemogenesis, once a week;

(23) accoiding to indications once a week; (24) presumably once a week;

(25) course of treatment chosen according to indications;-(26) for all

patients with blood component transfusions according to the degree of

transfusion reaction development; (27) in case of ABO noncompatible bone

marrow and haploidentical bone marrow.

 -30-

Biochemical examination of critical patients -and patients with average

degree Qf severity was done daily. Stage I and II patients were examined

twice a week according to this same scheme.

The number of analyses performed during observation of one critical

patient, was nearly 800, and for a stage I patient -- on the order of 200
analyses.

The data are in the process of being analyzed. Brief preliminary

information is given below.

Biochemical investigations of the critical victims 36-48 hours after

exposure revealed expressed hyperamylasemia and hyperamylasuria. The

multiplicity of exceeding the norm corresponded to damage severity and

reached 10-100-fold overstatement of the norm in the most affected group.

For patients with extensive radiant burns, high creatinine kinase

levels were. determined a day after exposure. Enzyme activity in isolated

cases exceeded the norm by a factor of 10-20. Parallel with these changes,

a moderate increase in aspartate amino transferase was revealed.

During the observation period (especially at the height of sickness)

quite expressed changes in the protein spectrum were noted; hypoproteinemia

and hypoalbuminemia.

Seven to 10 days after exposure, for many there were considerable

shifts in a range of biochemical tests and enzymes certifying the

disturbance of renal function; hyperfermenemia (aspartate and
alaninaminotransferase, alkaline phosphatase, lactate dehydrogenase), and
 -30A-

also hyperbi~lirubinemia with manifestation of a fraction of direct

bilirubin.
 -31-

Disturbances in kidney function: for the critical patients was manifest

by a significant increase in creatinin level (3-4 times greater than the

norm).

Certain special studies were made, the results of which are being

analyzed (determination of hydroperoxides, succinoxidismutase, malonic

dialdehyde, ceruloplasmin, alphatocoferrol and erithrocyte peroxide

hemolys is).

In studying hemostasis of victims initiated 5 days after the accident,

plasma procoagulants activation was observed and maintained during

development of profound thrombocytopenia which is confirmed by readings of

the autocoagulation test.

On the 10th day, sharply positive paracoagulation tests were noted for

the majority of the victims. The fibrinogen and antithrombin IIl levels

dropped. The prothrombin index continued to decrease to the fourth week of

sickness; the drop in K-dependent factor of the prothrombin complex was

most apparent.

At the beginning of the month all coagulation indices for the

overwhelming majority of patients approximated the normal. In spite of

clinical assumptions about the presence of DVS syndrome, there was no

laboratory confirmation of typical dynamics in any case.

Immunologic investigation was used mostly in typing and selecting bone

marrow transplant donors.
 -31a_
Irrmunologic selection and control of blood group and Rh factor (more-

than 200 persons) made it possible to more adequately

 • -32-
provide transfusion therapy (erithrocyte administration). For a limited
group of patients, typing was done according to erithrocytaric anti~gens

(TABLE 7.1.3).

Isosensitization to tissue antigens was evaluated by organizing an

indirect Kumbs test, lymphocytotoxic reaction, aggregate hemagglutination.

In isolated cases, the l~ymphocyte subpopulations were determined by various

techniques. The overall volume of studies for assessing microdestructive

processes in the nervous system was performed by means of neuroimmunologic

cellular serum tests.

Bacteriologic investigation of environmental microbial dissemi,~ation

was used widely under various conditions of patient confinement.

Inoculations were made of blood, excrement, urine, from mucosa of the mouth

and throat, wound surfaces. The level in the blood of certain

antibacterial preparations and antibiotics was quantitatively assessed.

Results are in the process of being analyzed.

7.1.6. Skin Changes and Their Role in the Outcome of Sickness.

Characteristics of the reaction of the skin and mucosa in this

situation involved the presence of several variants of affection, sometimes

simultaneously present for the same patient.

- superficial propagated, primarily found on the body parts

unprotected by clothing;
 -32A-

- limited to areas of primarily direct contact with beta-garmm~a-

emi~tting sources (wet clothing or shoes contaminated with

technological solution application of dust or contact with

contaminated objects);
 -33-

- damages to the skin and mucosa, mouth and throat, intestine from
relatively uniform gamma radiation in doses exceed threshold fbr

the indicated tissues.

Radiation damage of the skin (beta-burns) over more than 1%. of the

body surface were observed in 48 persons.

The contribution of radiation damage of the skin to the overall

clinical syndrome of OLB with its considerable aggravation was determined

by the extent and depth (stage) of damages. In this case, for certain

patients (14 persons), skin damages were practically incompatible with

li fe.

The clinically manifested extent of skin damages for the majority of

victims sustained some dynamics over time and was characterized by the

manifestation of several, at least two-three erythema "waves" and

subsequent skin changes.

Primary skin erythema detectable the first and second days after

exposure, was nota reliable enough criterion for predicting the subsequent

course in view of its instability and the absence of reliable methods for
quantitative evaluation of its expression.

In regard to the extent and expression of the primary wave of erythema

on the days from the end of the 1st to the 3rd week, 8 persons are isolated
with almost total skin damage (from 60 to 100% of gross area). Cutaneous
hyperemnia for them was accompanied by edema; bubbles and erosions (erosive
 -33a-

ulcerous dermatitis) developed early. All these people died on days:15 to

24. They had critical and extremely critical hemogenetic damage and

radiation intestinal syndrome. However, we feel it is expedient to again

stress that these patients sustained radiation skin damage incompatible

with life.
 -34-

Damage extending over 30-60% of the body surface was revealed in 12

cases until the end of the third week. For the majority of them (7

persons), the severity of bone marrow syndrome was evaluated as extremely

critical; for three, as critical; for one, average severity.• The number of

deaths in this group was 9.

For six victims, skin damages could be evaluated as i'ncompatible with

life (extent greater than 50%, earlier formation .of extensive erosive

ulcerous surfaces). These six persons died; for one skin damage was the
primary cause of death (death on the 48th day) under wholly restored

peripheral blood chart. Endogenic intoxication for this patient caused the

development of toxic edema and terminal coma.

Skin damage with total area to 30% at day 21 was observed for 21

persons. Of them, for 6 victims serious aggravation of the overall

condition can be considered due to both the extent (25-30%) and severity of

skin damage, with early development of erosive ulcerous changes. Bone

marrow damage in this patient group varied from extremely critical to mild.

There were no fatalities in this group due to skin damage.

On days 36-45 (.6-8 weeks), i.e., in the period of total or almost.

total recovery of hemogenesis, the previously altered skin covering had

recovered. Simultaneously, unexpectedly late, new changes arose on

previously unaffected sections in the form of bright erythema with edema.

The gross area of damage rose accordingly: pre-evaluated at 25-30%, it

reached 90-100% of the body surface. On the areas of previously altered

skin, sometimes edema again intensified,

 -35-

the dimensions of areas of healing ulcers and erosions increased. For

certain victims with such "late" skin damage -- there were practically no

skin changes on the early days (up to 3 weeks).

On days 36-45, the most typical were damages in the area of the crura
and thighs. The patients noted the appearance (or intensification) of

pains in the legs -- to the point of being unable to stand. Phenomena of

lymphostasis and edema of the more distal "focus" of the skin damage (e.g.,

edema of the ankles in erythema on the crura) were observed, as well as an

overall response in the form of increased body temperature, sleep

disturbances and so on.

Recovery of skin damage by the 50-6.0 day was primarily ended. It

proceeded as a type of dry and moist desquamation according to the degree

of damage. By this time for many patients, erosions and superficial ulcers

were epithelialized.

The absence of active epithalization by this time for large areas

(20-25 square cm) was evaluated as an indication for surgery.

7.1.7 Treatment Procedures and Preliminary Assessment of Their

Effectiveness

Treatment procedures tested in daily practice were used for

individual syndromes of acute radiation sickness.

The primary directions in treatment were: prophylaxis and

treatment of infectious complications and blood cell substitute

therapy in connection with bone marrow syndrome, detoxification

 -35a-

therapy and total parenteral feeding; in connection with exte~nsive

burns, oropharyngeal and intestinal syndromes, intensive correction

of aqua-electrolyte exchange for patients with intestinal syndrome

and toxicoseptic status due to burns and agranulocytaric infections.

 -36-

The dynamics of primary manifestations and treatment methods

are illustrated in clinical charts (Fig. 7.1.9 and 7.1.10)-.

Treatment of Bone Marrow Syndrome: a) Maintenance and substitute

therapy. All patients with stage II or greater bone marrow syndrome
were located in their own ordinary hospital rooms equipped with

provisions for aseptic management of the patients: sterilization of

the air with UV.lamps; strict observance by personnel of hand

washing upon entry and exit from the room, obligatory use of

individual gowns found in the room,.masks, covering shoes with

slippers soaked with antiseptic, changing the patient's linen once a
day. The regime of relatively simple aseptic confinement of
patients by specially trained personnel was provided at the earliest 0•
times for the entire hospital. Bacterial contamination indices were
monitored. Paper linen and clothing for the personnel were used.
This regime provided low microorganism level in the air -- no more
than 500 colonies per cubic meter.

The food was ordinary; raw vegetables and fruits and canned

products were excluded.

The effectiveness of such aseptic conditions was clearly

demonstrated, as this was conducted earlier by us (A. Ye. Baranov et

al., 1978, 1982), by the absence of exogenic bronchopulmonary
infections (pheumonias) for patients with acute radiation sickness
of stages II-III. S
 -36a-

All stage II-IV patients of bone marrow syndrome were prvvided

prophylaxis for endogenic infections with biseptol and nystatin,

initiated after 1 or 2-3 weeks before the development of

agranulocytaric
I *
ql I I

6OnbHOI) To. H. Palipnt N' 18•

*
I 1 i .I •J.] II - -- 1 . 0 Jr l I In f # I I. IIII Af l -

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nlrrx~oaaet

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no..u Kn~u

ii|llnUll i _m

l_ ___,__ __l__ __lI -E. !1~i(AI- 0 & i,/ I I!

 AZEUo f..o
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FJ~r~r.•. At,..p e i 9PI i ___________ i i e p uri ______-_i________1_i____I ______. ____._, _______"_ _
- - ,,-' •,,, -i l I 1 i 11 i Ii i I I I I • I i i i I I I II I i I .Eli a-[] ]T •T
• .- ,,-•--,
J• •.J•• •.•
• •; •L•• ] • j .•-;• ,•,,..• .• j-•• •• r • •, J • • • • j •.

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d[ TlUr 9IF-9ll _
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. -. . .. .• .-l II

1 ¶1 J 1 ,t ff EE' Ih 2 3-1 l i-]I l i

,I• I aa m i .. i

I i |
- - . I-I-I-I-4--I-,I-I
Ig
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If
. I I A I Va a 11,111 a I EIaIIIvIaIEIPifI
I-I;4~I-I-I~-,-U~I-a-,-i-,-i-,--4--,-~t- vIiaIrII~IfI - v-i,- a ......... I*
dfinSadlJ Ad I Ia |I a ll#lflflll#lf'lrll" .,nm*u,•- ruf.llvl•.l•,-it-hPiPlrlf.l¢'f'l
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" " UN9kfte "I$ •i~S6" I e e •. • i",
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69 i ......
 -- 39-
infections. The comparative effectiveness of the two versions for
initiating selective intestinal decontamination is being evaluated.

In case of agraniulocytaric fever, two or three wide spectrum

antibiotics from the group of aminoglucosides (gentamycin,
amicasin), cephalosporins (kefsol, sephamesin, sephobid) and

semisynthetic penicillins with antipyocyaneus activity

(carbenicillin, pipracyl) were administered intravenously. In at

lest half of the cases, such antibiotic prescription terminated

fever. In the case of an absence of an effect over a°24-48 hour

period, intravenous gamma-globulin, supplied by Sandos was widely

used to treat this group of victims. Gamrua-globulin (sandoglobulin)

was administered in 6 g doses every 12 hours 4-5 times.

The practice of "early'3 experimental prescription of

amphotericin B was conducted if agranulocytaric fever was not

arrested within the first week by the indicated antibiotics combined

with intravenous administration of gamma-globulin.

In this situation, acyclovir used in treating herpes infections

(nearly one-third of the patients occasionally has sever herpes

simplex of the face, lips and oral mnucosa), was widely used for the
first time to treat patients with acute radiation sickness with good

effect. Acyclovir was not used prophylactically. A salve

containing acyclovir yielded a positive effect in treating viral
infections of the skin.
 -39a-

This regime of primary experimental antibacterial, anti.fungal

and antiviral treatment was highly effective .-- such that there were
practically no fatalities due to infection in patients with bone

marrow acute radiation sickness, even of the severe and extremely

severe stage
 -40--

(without burns). In addition, upon autopsy of patients who died•

from affections other than to the bone marrow, there were definite
indications of bacterial or niycotic septicemias.

In life and posthumously, epidermal staphylococcus was

inoculated from the blood most frequently for the dead patients.

Its role as a pathogen of terminal septicemias, is being studied in

regard to this antibacterial regime.

Several patients with stage IV bone marrow syndrome had acute

diffuse interstitial pneumonia accompanied by rapid development of

hypoxemia incompatible with life. The bacterial and mycotic nature

of the pneumonia was not confirmed at the autopsies. Most

frequently, acute radiation pulmonitis had occurred, with possible

activation of cytomegaloviruses.

Definite success in treating this patient group with severe

acute radiation sickness was realized by wide utilization of fresh

donor platelets. The platelets were obtained by 4-fold

thrombocytapheresis from individual donors. Indication for platelet

infusion was initiated hemorrhaging or a drop in platelet level

below 2O,000/microliter. Platelets obtained from one donor (an

average of nearly 300 x lOexp9 platelets) were usually used for one
infusion. Platelet infusion was repeated every 1-3 days. The

platelets, like other blood components, before infusion were exposed

to 1500 rads in an ordinary gamm~a-therapeutic device. This allowed

prophylaxis of secondary illness.

 -40a-

The high effectiveness of platelet transfusions performed

according to these principles is confirmed not only by the absence

of life-threatening hemorrhagia even for patients with long-term

(more than 2-4 weeks) and severe thrombocytopenia (less than 5-10

thousand/microl iter),
 -41-

but also the absence in general of any symptoms of hemorrhagivag in

the majority of patients.

Organizing the acquisition of the necessary amount of platelets

at the prescribed time in the period of greatest thrombocytopenia at

once for tens of patients, required major efforts of the blood

service. There was no deficit of platelets. In addition, sometimes

there was even extra due to the impossibility of accurately planning

the demand a day or two in advance. In connection with this, a

technique for freezing both allogenic and autologic thrombocytes

which were then used at the necessary time with high effectiveness,

was widely employed for the first time.

There were no cases of the development of nonsusceptibility to

platelet transfusions in connection with alloimmunization.

On the average, 3-5 infusions of platelets were required when

treating one patient with stage III severity of bone marrow

syndrome.

Leukocytes for treating agranulocytaric infectious

complications were not used.

The demand for erithrocytes was much higher than expected, even
for patients with stage II-Ill acute radiation sickness

uncomplicated by radiation burns in connection with the development

of early and expressed anemia.
 -41a-

b) Bone marrow transplant. The first group of patients ?with

irreversible myelopoetic damage in which spontaneous recovery was

practically not expected, was selected over the first three days

after exposure. Diagnosis of irreversible myelodepression was made

according to guidelines developed earlier based on such criteria, as

time of onset of vomiting

 -42-

number of peripheral blood lymphocytes and estimate of absorbed dose from

the number of aberrations in bone marrow cells taken 36 hours after

exposure.

On subsequent days (from the 4th to the 9th), according to these

criteria and also from the dosage estimate according to chromosomal

aberrations in the lymphocyte culture, peripheral blood, the degree of

myelopoetic damage was refined and a group of persons was conclusively

formed, who, in regard to the extremely severe (possibly irreversible)

affection of myelopoesis (dose of 6 GR or more), were indicated for bone

marrow transplant. At these times, the American specialists headed' by

Professor Robert Gale, actively participated in the work.

Transplantation was done only from close relatives (natal brothers and

sisters or parents) identical (6 cases) and haploidentical according to HLA

(4 cases) or haploidentical plug one common antigen in the second haplotype

(3 cases). Typing, in view of the urgency of transplantation, was done

only according to A, B and C loci. In the instance of transplanting

haploidentical bone marrow, removal of T-lymphocytes -- T-depletion -- was

done for secondary disease prophylaxis.

Special difficulty in selecting HLA appropriate donors involved the

need to determine HLA fenetin for most of the patients, namely over the
first 1-3 days after exposure, so long as the number of lymphocytes did not

drop to very low numbers.

 -42a-

Major organization difficulties occurred in connection with the need

for quickly summoning and studying a large number of potential related

donors. In this situation, 113 donors were checked.

 -43-

In the final calculation, only 13 allogenic bone marrow transplants

were performed from the 4th to the 16th day after exposure. In six cases
with extremely. severe damage to the skin and intestine and extremely"

unfavorable prognosis was human embryonal liver cell transplantation

performed.

In general, it may be said that bone marrow transplantation was not a

decisive method of treatment in this emergency situation. All seven

patients, where in view of the specially intense exposure, stable

adaptation of the donor bone marrow could have occurred, died earlier (on

the 9-19th day after TKM) from radiation damage to the skin and intestine.

At the same time, for the remaining six patients which had no skin and
intestinal damage incompatible with life, only temporary or partial

adaptation of the donor bone marrow occurred, apparently, in view of the

fact that transplantation immunity of these patients was not fully

suppressed by exposure. In spite of the poor (inadequate or incomplete or

lost) myeloid function of the transplant, for all these patients, some or

other disturbances were observed, which may be due to the reaction of the

host vs. transplant or transplant vs. host reaction. In two cases, these

reactions could have facilitated the lethal outcomes -- from a renal or

pulmonary insufficiency syndrome not identified according to genesis and

from pyocyanic septicemia, unexpectedly developed on a background of a

normal number of neutrophils.

 Retrospective analysis of the initial section of the neutrophilic
curve for all six patients allows doubt in the irreversibility of
myelopoetic damage for them. Adaptation, even temporary, of the grafts and
the development of associated immunologic conflicts, evidently indicates

the negative influence both on recovery of myelopoesis, and on the severity

of the course of the disease as a whole (two died).
 -44-

Thus, experience of allogenic, bone marrow transplant in-.this -radiation

accident makes it possible to draw two important conclusions for future

treatment in regard to this procedure:

- in radiation accidents, there is always a very small fraction of

persons, for which allogenic bone marrow transplant is absolutely

indicated and may clearly be useful;

- in reversible damage of myelopoesis caused by doses of gross gamma

radiation of the order 6-8 GR, adaptation of the transplant is

possible; however, such adaptation will. always be unfavorable in a

therapeutic regard and even dangerous to life, in view of the high

risk of secondary disease.

The latter conclusion is principally new, since it was previously felt

that allogenic bone narrow transplant yields no negative effects in case of

inadequate radiation conditioning of the recipient in the zone of limited

exposure doses.

Radiation Skin Damage Treatment

Considering the major, and, in a number of cases, the determining role of

local radiation damage in the gross clinical syndrome (intoxication, pain),
their treatment played a large part in therapeutic measures,
 ....
_-44a- .....

Basic modern methods of detoxification,-as well as disaggregan•, anti-

infective and symptomatic therapy were employed; hemo- and plasmosorption,

plasmapheresis were performed, direct anticoagulants, drugs improving"

microcirculation (rheopolyglucine, neohemodes, troxevasin,, trental,

solkoseryl) were used.

 -45-

Local treatment procedures corresponded to the stage and severity of

damage: early on bactericidal and analgesic antlinflammatory aerosols were

used, with the Soviet-manufactured preparation lioxanol offering immediate

relief. Moistening bandages based on tanning solutions with bactericidal

properties (baliz) were used. Smear bandages with derivatives of

hydrocortisone based on propolis and wax with direct action antiseptics and

antibiotics, were used later.

Treatment of Oropharyngeal Syndrome

The primary methods of treating severe radiation mycocytes involved

mechanical removal of a huge quantity of rubbery mucus accumulated in the
nasopharynx, washing off this mucus and irrigating erosive surfaces with

solutions of mycolytics with antiseptics,

Experience shows that mycolytic preparations and employment techniques

for rapid and reliable elimination of mucus from the cavity of the mouth,

entrance to the mouth and nasopharynx require special refinement.

Treatment of Intestinal Syndrome

The primary procedure for treating intestinal syndrome was total

paraenteral feeding with intensive adjustment of the volume of nutritional

liquid and electrolytes, which in this case, proved highly effective.

Experience showed that a major supply of ready mixtures

 .- 45a-

for parenteral feeding must be on hand if indication of specialized aid to

patients with severe radiation damage to the intestine, mouth and throat is

proposed.
 -46-

In conclusion, it may be noted that each patient with stage IIH-IV

severity of bone marrow syndrome usually accompanied by radiation burns,

required individual round-the-clock nursing by highly qualified and

specialized intensive care nurses to accomplish the indicated therapy. At

the cost of efforts, which naturally are possibly only in peacetime, such

specialized nursing stations were organized for each victim with stage

III-IV OLBo

On the whole, the effectiveness of treatment may be assessed as wholly

satisfactory: in the group of persons with stage II OLB (dose of 2-4 GR),

there was not one death. Fatalities among those with stage III and. IV
severity of OLB in 19 cases could be due only to severe damages over 50-90%

of the body surface incompatible with life, which, in turn were of stage

II-IV degree of severity.

 -47-

Among the operative and emergency personnel participating in

operations on 26 April 1986 at Chernobyl AES, 203 patients with acute
radiation sickness (OLB) were established. Its clinical mnanifestations
(syndromes), degree of severity and outcomes were diverse. All patients
were recognized opportunely and treated at qualified institutions around

the country.

Of the 22 patients with extremely severe OLB, 19 died. In 14 cases,

the fatal outcome was defined by severe radiation and thermoradiation
damage to the skin on a background of profound hemogenetic suppression, and
for a portion of the patients, damage to the alimentary..canal.

Of the 23 patients with severe bone marrow syndrome, 7 died, in 6

cases, the outcome of the diseasewas also determined by the presence of

disseminated severe radiation burns of the skin with expressed gross

intoxication accompanying them.

Among the patients of stage I and II severity, not one died.

Clinical recovery for the majority occurred toward the close of 2

months from the day of the accident. Thirty persons are now hospitalized

and recovering.

The primary damaging factor for all victims was the relatively uniform
influence of gamma-beta-radiation at. a dose exceeding 1 GR according to

biologic criteria, and for 35 of them, more than 4 GR

 '-47a-

(to 12-16 GR)o

For 50 persons, major portions of the skin's surface and part of the
face, and mucus nasopharynx and gastrointestinal tract sustained additional

beta radiation. Radiation damage to extensive portions of the skin (up to

50-90%) were the leading among the causes for severity of the general state
 o-48-

of patients and defined the mechanism of primary fatal complications

(cerebral edema, toxic encephalomyelopathy, renal and liver failure,
myocardial damage). /

For individual patients in the range of maximum external gamma

radiation (approximately 8 GR), the terminal period was characterized by

the development of pulmonitis and expressed respiratory failure.

For practically all victims, without apparent association with the

presence and severity of OLB, entrance into the body of a complex mixture
of nuclides, primary iodine, cesium, zirconium, niobium and ruthenium

isotopes, was discovered. However, their quantity and the dosage level for

all, with the exception of one patient, were below the clinicall~y

significant for direct effects. The level of iodine isotopes in the

thyroid gland for 94% of the victims did not exceed 50 microCurie over the

first 10 days from the moment of the accident.

Experience gained previously allowed timely and relatively complete

assessment of the prognosis for the disease for the overwhelming majority,

and proper determination in the first day of indications for urgent

hospitalization, over the first three days -- a rational volume of medical

assistance, and later -- achieving definite therapeutic results.

In the process of intensive clinical observation and active

therapeutic measures, a great volume of information was accumulated which

is now being processed.
 -48a-

Preliminary results are reduced to several primary statements. -

1o The fundamental principles of diagn~osis and prognostic criteria of the

course of the disease previously developed with regard to bone marrow

syndrome were justified.

 -49-

2. Disseminated beta damage of the skin for a major portion of the

patients defining the severity and outcome of the disease, played a

determining aggravating bole in this emergency situation.

3. Among the therapeutic measures, in accordance with the structure and

syndromology of damage, of primary importance were measures on

prophylaxis and treatment of complications associated with the

advanced, but reversible hemogenetic depression, decontamination

therapy and local treatment of skin damage.

4. The nature of (relatively shallow, but very wide-spread beta-

dermatites) primarily demanded conservative therapy and only in rare

cases (at this time, for 5 persons), surgery.

5. Bone marrow transplant was indicated (dose of more than 6 GR) and

possible (absence or weak expression of other factors for an

unfavorable outcome), only for a quite limited contingent (13 persons).

In view of those factors and due to retention of capabilities, though

gradual and partial reparation of natural resources, the effectiveness

of transplantation was low.

6. Dynamic observation has been organized for all patients, which will

later define the completeness of their rehabilitation and the need for

therapeutic and prophylactic measures.

 .I-

-50-

7.2 DATA ON THE RADIATION DOSE MAGNITUDES OF THE POPULATION

WITHIN A 30-KM RADIUS AROUND THE AES AND IN VARIOUS

REGIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PART OF USSR: RADIATION CONSEQUENCES

OF THE ACCIDENT

7.2.1 Introduction
Measures were taken immediately after the accident to implement

continous operative control of the radiation situation parameters, both on

the territory of the Chernobyl AES, as well as in populated sites in the

vicinity. Special attention was given to the city of Pripyat', with a

population of about 45,000, consisting primarily of AES personnel and their

dependents. Based on the data of the developing radiation situation, the

extent and volume of dosimetric control significantly rose over time. To

implement this, over 7,000 subdivisions of radiation laboratories, health

stations, as well as many groups of radiation safety specialists, a large

number of scientists and practical institutions and organizations were

activated.

The primary and most important tasks of radiation control were:

-- to evaluate the possible level of external and internal radiation

of the Chernobyl AES personnel, the residents of the city of Pripyat', and
people that were then evacuated from the 30-km zone, with the purpose of
finding individuals in need of medical assistance;
 -50a-
--- make an estimate of the possible level~s of radiation of the
population in the areas of increased-radioactive contamination within the
30-km-zone, in order-to make-a decision concerning the need ....-
 -51-
for a complete or partial evacuation, or the development of appropriate-
temporary recommendations concerning food and daily activity in the given
region;

-- eliminate the distribution of' radiactive matter from the

contaminated regions via contact, as well as the use of good products

containing radionuclfides above the recommended magnitude.

In order to solve the above problems, a systematic control was

implemented for the following:

-- the levels of gamma radiation over the entire area of European USSR

through use of aerial and ground radiation checks;

C

-- the concentration and radionucltide composition of radioactive

substances in the air at various points of the 30-=km zone, primarily at

sites where efforts were being conducted to eliminate the consequences of

the accident and removal of the personnel, as well as outside the 30-km

zone in populated areas where increased radiation levels were noted;

-- density of radioactive contamination of the soil and vegetation and

the radionucl~ide composition of this contamination;

-- content of radionucl~ides in water supply reservors, as well as in

water used by the commercial food products network;

 -5la -

-- content of iodine radionucleides that make up the principal dosage

of internal radiation during the initial period after the accident,
collecting in the thyroid gland of the population that had been~evacuated
from the 30-km zones and living in the areas having an increased level of

gamma-background;

-- levels of radioactive contamination of safety clothing or personal

clothing, and shoes, external and internal surfaces of transport conveyances

within the boundary of the affected zones (determined on the basis of types

of efforts and the radiation conditions in existences), at airports,

railroad and bus terminals.

 7.2.2. LEVELS OF EXTERNAL RADIATION OF THE POPULATION OF THE
CITY OF PRIPYAT' FROM THE POINT OF THE ACCIDENT TO
THE POINT OF EVACUATION

From the start of the accident at the 4th unit and during the fire

that followed it, the wihd carried radiactive products, bypassing the city

of Pripyat'. Subsequently, when the height of discharged products from the

damaged reactor had been substantially reduced, due to the fluctuation of

the wind direction in the above-ground layer of air, the radioactive flare

covered the territory of the city during certain time intervals, and slowly
contaminated it. Until 21:00 26 April 1986, the magnitude of exposure to

gamma radiation on individual streets of the city, measured at a height of

1 m above the earth's surface, was within 14-140/mR per hour.

Subsequently, the radiation situation in the city began to worsen. By

7:00 on 27.04.86, in the area closest to the AES (Kurchatov Street),

the magnitude of exposure to gamma-radiation reached 180-600 mR/h, and on

other streets, 180-200 mR/h. The worsening trend of the radiation

situation in the city during 27.04.86 continued until 17:00, i.e. until

the complete evacuation of the population was carried out, the radiation

was •~-•540 mR/h, and in the area of Kurchatov Street, 720-1,000 mR/h.

Evacuation of the population was begun at 27.04.86, at 14:00.

Figure 7o2•.1 shows data for the changing radiation situation in

different areas of the city of Pripyat° from the moment of the accident
until the evacuation was completed. The exposure dose of gamma-radiation

during this time period was 5.9; 7oi; and 20.3•at points 1, 2, and 3
 -52a-
respectively. By 6 May the levels of, radiation-in the city of Pripyat'
were reduced approximately by a factor of 3. Rough estimates make it.
possible to assume that the external dose of gamma-
 - *

.. "-........[
. ., .•°,.
t. O'
! ll I Il "II
' .-
" .
a, •

.. ", 'r
•" 'o

* eI "
•" I

. ,,
- .. . :

•I i , .

i., 'ta:.

Figure 7.2.1. Dynamics of the change of dosage magnitude in open

areas of the city of Pripyat' during the first 4 days

after the accident.

 -54-

ganima-radiation from the passing cloud of discharge matter and during the-.
first hours after the accident was close to 10-15 R.

Evaluation of the levels of radiation received by the city's

population was conducted based on the presumed behavior regimen on 26 and

27 April and the data received from individual dosimeters of radiation

safety personnel and emergency teams.

Immediately after the start of the accident, the population of the

city of Pripyat' received the recommendation to maximally limit the time

spent outdoors, and not to open windows. On 26 April any type of open air

activity was forbidden at all children's facilities in the city. In

addition, iodine was distributed at all the children's facilities. Thus,

residents that stayed primarily indoors during the daytime period on 26 and

27 April had received a 2-5 fold lesser effect of gamma-radiation in

comparison to the levels taken on the street. Taking into account the

above data) there is a basis to assume that the majority of Pripyat's

population had received a probable level of radiation with a magnitude of

1.5-5.0 rads of garmma radiation and 10-20 rads of beta-radiation on the

skin.
 -55-

Consequently, the evaluations that were conducted show that the-

potential levels of external radiation exposure of the residents of
Pripyat' were significantly lower than those that may cause any type of

direct changes with respect to health. The subsequent medical examinations

of the residents of Pripyat confirmed this conclusion.

Measurement of iodine isotopes in the thyroid glands of people

evacuated from the city of Pripyat' to the nearby areas of the Polesskiy
rayon showed that 97 percent of the 206 persons examined showed an iodine

content in the thyroid that was less than 30 rads. Here a positive role

was played by the iodine given for prophylactic reasons, as well as. the

limits issued for the use of milk from cows kept privately.

The potential level of radiation due to inhaled iodine could also be

judged on the basis of measurement data for iodine content in the thyroid

glands of 20 Pripyat' residents that were evacuated to the city of Belaya

Tserkov', where use of products contaminated by radioactive substances was

absolutely non-existent. Based on measurements conducted on 7 May 1986,

the majority of examined individuals can show an effect of 1.5-25 rads in

the thyroid gland.

7.2.3. RADIATION DOSAGES OF THE POPULATION WITHIN THE 30-KM

ZONE AROUND THE CHERNOBYL AES

Based on analysis of the radionucleide composition of radioactive fallout at

various points in the 30-km around the Chernobyl

 -56-

AES, an evaluation was conducted of the dynamics of the decay in time of the
magnitude of the dose of external gamma-radiation from the earth's surface.
This relationship is shown in Figure 7.2.2 by a solid line, while dots
indicate actual measurement values of the dosage magnitude in the area in

relative units. A rather good correlation of the estimated curve and the
experimentally derived data made it possible to conduct specific extrapolation

evaluations both the greater time periods (a year and longer) after the

accident,.as well as the period during which the discharge cloud passed.

Estimates worked on a specially developed computer program, after appropriate

corrections for actually observed magnitudes of the parameters under analysis

made it possible to get the following corrlelations betweeR the magnitude of

the gamma-radiation dosage on the site on the 15th day after the accident

(R gamma, 15 mR/h) and the dosage of external radiation from the radioactive

cloud (D cloud, R), the dosage from radioactive fallout at different times

after the accident (D fallout, R), as well as the dosage of internal

radiation of the thyroid gland in children (D thyroid gland, rad) due to

inhalation and use of contaminated cow's milk:

D cloud (10-30 kin) = (0.28-0.07) . R gamma, 15

D fallout (7 days) = 0.7 . R gamma, 15
D fallout (1 month) = 1.2 .R gamma, 15
D fallout (1 year) = 2.5 . R gamma, 15
D fallout (50 years) = 8 . R gamma, 15
D thyroid gland (inh.) = 10 . R gamma, 15
D thyroid gland (? per?) = 1000 . R gamma, 15
 -56a-

The last value is for an instance when no limit has been made on th• issue

of contaminated cow's milk,

 -57-

18 .. 31" ' !I
3
a

Ii4 1h!
t,. CVII.

Figure 7.2.2, Changes in magnitude

of ganina-radiation doses
rn open areas in the path of the Chernobyl AES

radioactive fal lout.

 -58-

which *isnaturally possible only in zones with a very low level of:
vegetation contamination by iodine-131.

In addition to the estimated magnitudes of external radiation dosages

of the human body by the fallout cloud and internal radiation of the

thyroid gland of children due to inhalation of iodine isotopes, Table

7.2.1. gives a comparison of the dosage magnitudes of external radiation of

people in some populated areas of the 30-km zone around the Chernobyl AES.
These magnitudes are calculated with the aid of the correlations given

above, and the actual values of dosages received, based on the measurements

of the garmma-radiation dosage magnitudes on the site. (see Figure 7.2.3.).

Table 7.2.1.

Estimated values of radiation dosages of people in some populated

areas in the 30-km zone around the Chernobyl AES.

1) Populated area, KN
2) Distance from Chernobyl AES mR/hr '°D"°- ,
3) Magnitude of dose per cloud, R
4) Dose from cloud fallout, R
5) Dose from fallout in thyroid gland of children, rads
6) Dose from fallout over 7 days, R
Estimated / s.r-"

Eace~IeH• •e OT ZO3• Ea o~zaa miT.ze- HX• •a"CyT.?

.C•.ristogolov a
b•CToroAo3~Xa 5,5 12 I0 120 8,4 3,2
Ae,,eD 9 25 7 250 17 IO
'hernobyl
leoB~•I .8 1,2 80 5,6 3,D
Pyu z 22 8 0,6 80 ,622
Orevichi
0pe•r 29 2,5 0,2 25 1,8 4,4
m•
 -58a-

Analysis of the data in this table indicates that within limitsof 2,

the estimated and experimental values of the dosages coincide, which made
it possible to conduct similar estimates for the entire 30-km zone around
the: Chernobyl AES during the first days after the accident; this was based

on the available data for the radiation situation that had formed. These
calculations are shown in Table 7.2.2., which shows
 -59-

6~- ~- I

--..........
• I.

* a - .* -

8.. .........
.• .. .o....o... ..
ai.
A.
* -- l;li;Z
N

lpaflpff

i
a,
S II
L, c~*r.

Figure 7°2°3° The dynamics of change of the magnitude of the

gamnma'radiation dosage in open areas for some

populated areas in the 30-km zone 0

 -60-

generalized data for 71 population points in this zone, and indicates the -
estimated range of dosages of external gamma-radiation in open areas.

A sufficiently broad range (within an order of two) of changes in the

dosage magnitude for each zone within the Chernobyl AES is tied to the
significant lack of uniformity of the radioactive contamination of tI~e area

in the various sections of the resultant pattern of the accident's fallout

(see Appendix 5). Based on similar estimates and taking into account the

continuing release of gases and aerosols in the accident zone during the

first days after the event, a conclusion was formed concerning the wisdom

for additional evacuation of residents from the area of the accident.

During the first days after the accident, 90,000 people were evacuated from
the 30-km zone around the Chernobyl AES. Taking into account 45,000 people

moved on 27 April from the city of Pripyat', the total fiaure of evacuees

reached 135,000.

The carrying out of this extreme measure made it possible to assure

that the majority of the population received a dose of external gamma-

radiation from the discharge cloud and radioactive fallout that did not

exceed 25 rem, and only some populated areas that ended up in more heavily
contaminated areas of the radioactive pattern (the village Tolstyy Les,

Kopachi, and some others), did the radiation fallout dosage in people reach

30-40 rem.However, even with these magnitudes of-external radiation, the

human body has no danger for acute, direct somatic effects• in persons who

had received radiation. Maximum estimates of the collective dosage of

radiation of the evacuated population (see Table 7.2.3) result in the

collective dosage magnitude of radiation in people on the order of

 -60a-

1.6 million of human remo .Taking into account the magnitude of spoultaneous

morbidity
 -61-

Table 7.2.2. Estimated dosages of external radiation of farming

population(*) within the 30-km zone around Chernobyl AES, rem

Distance from Number of populated Dosage of external radiation from

Chernobyl AES, areas fallout for the period of

km 7 days 1 month 1 year

I -- .
5 1
-

3-/ 5 6-8D
?-IO 4 IO-6O 16-130
5 6-80
3-7 2-0
10-:[5 IO 1,2-75 1 1,2-75
10-15
2-120425
15-20 16 0,3-•5 1 0,3-25
15-20
0,5--40 19
in5-
20-25 2D 0,4-,35 20 0,4-35
20-25
0,6-60 312
25-30 16 OI-I2 16 0,1-12
25-3D
0,2-20 044
S ~ S -

(*) These estimates were derived taking into account the activity regimen of
the farming population and the safety coefficients that are provided by

village-type structures. For city conditions, these values will be

lower approximately by a factor of 2.

 -62-

Table 7.2.3 Estimated values of collective dosages of external

radiation of the evacuated population.

Region around Population, Collective dosage,

Chernoby AES thousands of people millions of people, rem
 -63-

due to cancern over the 70-year period will result in'•14,000 cases for
114,000 evacuated persons; additional morbidity tied to the accident
fallout from the Chernobyl AES, will increase natural morbidity from

cancerr( among those receiving radiation by less than 2.0 percent.

More precise data on the radionucleide composition of the contaminated

surface of the soil and the nature of decrease in the dosage magnitude of
the gamma-radiation on the site (see Figure 7.2.2.) will make it possible

to make corrections in the expected values of external radiation dosages in

the populations and the determine the possible date for returning the

people to their permanent residence site.

k Since the problem reactor remained a strong source of radioactive

Sfallout into the atmosphere for a comparatively long time (8-10 days), the

picture concerning the contamination of natural features in the

environment, both for the level of activity, and the radionucleide

composition had a complex nature due to the changingmeteorologic conditions

over time, the height and intensity of the discharge. In particular, the
formation of abnormally high local contamination of individual sections of

the territory were observed. There were also difficults in establishing a

certain typical radionucleide compasition of the radioactive emittants in

*the air and at the contaminated territory. Thus, for example, the content

of Iodine-131 varied in air and soil samples from 8 to 40 percent, while

cesium-137 ranged from 1 to 20 percent. This complicated forecasts of the

possible level of radiation of the population as a result of radioactive

Sproducts that entered the organism.
 Nevertheless, there is a ,basis for confirming with sufficient
assurance that at the given stage, inhaled radionucleides do not have to

be considered *for those people living

 -64-

along the radioactive trace that had been formed. This is confirmed by
data, in accordance to which the air activity within the 30-km zone
(Chernobyl, Zorin, Skazochnyy settlement, Pripyat) comprised (TYPIST: See
how this is typed on orig. p 64 top) 10ot2.to 10-44- Curie/l for the total

beta-activity radionucleides during the period from 3 May to 3 July. Table

7.2.4 shows an example of the relative contribution of gammna-active

radionucleides in air samples taken at various populated areas around the

Chernobyl AES.

Thus, for the population living in the contaminated area and using

locally produced products, the main source of internal radiation *are

~oactive substances contained in these products. Without question,

Woactive substances entering the organism by inhalation during the time

the cloud passed should be removed from the calculations. But as will be

shown below the resultant internal radiation dosages are substantially

lower than those from use of contaminated products.

During the first stage after the accident (rQ2 months), iodine

entering the organism chieflY via milk from milk-producing, pasture-fed

cattle was the principal radionucleide for measurable dosages, with the

human thyroid gland being the critical organ that gets maximal dosages.

The situation indicated above predetermined the extent and the

direction of radiation monitoring and medical examination of the
i lation. Using teams from the specialist institute of the USSR Ministry

5ealth (Minzdrav), the content of iodine in thyroid glands of people

evacuated from the 30-km zone was tested, and was also tested in the
residents of a number of populated areas in Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR,
and RSFSR, where increased
 -65-
Table 7.2.4 Relative content of gamma-releasing radionucleides in aerosol
air samples (TYPIST: Columns will be listed left to right; I will number
cols. 1-4 for ease)

Col 1: Date sample taken Col 2: Place sampled Zorin, Pripyat,

Skazochnyy settlement, CHernobyl Col 3: Total gamma activity of sample,

Curie/L Col 4: Relative content of radionucleides, %

(TYPIST: Last line is a note) NOTE: Line drawn through indicates that in

the given sample the radionucleide was not identified.

 Tsdnma 7.2.4

OTnOCwTo•lnOo COJ•O piaitO r a•-w3,iy~airxt• ISJotH~fy1U!WOf

apo~3oJI1rn npodax Do3iryxa
13 S

C -%- ' J

laTa Cymmpna • OTIIOCMTOJINOO COJ~o~Ie3Io paJImo~fy1Uon,

fn~o~U, I1 I TII 4 3 AI 7Ba
! 40! !- I44r *f5 95 R0.

4.05 3Opmi 1,5.10-13 20,0 - 4,0 - 5,0 I2,0 - 8,0 20,0 30,0 -n I,O
3.06 r.llpwnnm 4o0-IO0 - 1,2 0,8 1,I 2,5 I1,2 T2,I I9,2 26,1 19,1 6,7 -
3.06 n/JKCea•o'u 6i0-I13 0,46 3,9 7,7 I8,8 27,9 3,5 3,2 17,0 2,0 4,9 4,6 -
3.06 'lopnodiw~r 4,0i0-I12 5,9 0,8 1,6 3,7 5,0 II,2 9,0 18,6 22,9 II,7 9,6 -

llpinowmio: UlXOlpoer ylcasuaoT, .T!o B ,iannoft npodle Fnoyumour. no muOnTr~mmpo~an.

II
 "-66-...
levels of radiation were recorded, but the need to take 'the decisioh to

evacuate was absent. Special attention was given to the children segment
of the population, who as a group with an increased radiation risk..*This

is due to the fact that the accumulated dose of radiation in the thyroid
gland, with an equal content of radioiodine is 8-2 times higher in children

aged 2-14 years than in an adult. In addition it should be noted that the
share of milk products is substantially higher in the diet of children.

Whenever possible, along with tests of iodine content in the thyroid

gland, selective determinations were made of the content of other

radionucleides in the organism on the basis of active secretions (urine,

feces), as well as evaluated the potential entry of other radionucleides

into the organism, using data for isotopic composition of contaminated soil

and food products. During the time period after the accident, a direct
determination of radioiodine was made in a large number of residents,

including almost 100,000 children. Practically the entire group of

children (up to age 15) was examined, as well as part of the adult

population that were evacuated from the 30 km zone, and other populated

areas located along the trace of the radioactive cloud and where increased

radiation levels were registered. It is necessary to note that the

population segment indicated above ate locally produced food, including
milk and milk products for 9-10 days until the moment of evacuation
(4-5 May); the specific share of these food products is significant in this

part of the region.

Measurement results showed that for a majority of people evacuated

from the 30 km zone, the dosages in the thyroid gland derived from
radioactive substances in locally produced foodstuffs is significantly
lower than those that may cause some sort of changes in the state of

health.
 -67-
The sufficiently high dosages that were sometimes observed in thyroid

glands of individuals apparently occurred in some instances due to

uncontrolled use of milk from privately owned cows, even though the health

services put into effect a ban on the use of whole milk having a
radioiodine content above -W.OJO -7 Curie!]. This requirement was

strictly carried out within the framework of the centralized milk delivery

system. Additional measures were subsequently made for rigid control over

the sale and use of milk from cows that were privately owned.

As a preventive measure, the entire group of children from the 30 km

evacuation zone was moved under general orders, to su~mmer health facilities
in the country. Constant medicalsupervision was set over children'whose

estimated radiation dosage in the thyroid could exceed 30 rem prior to

complete removal of iodine isotopes.

7.2.4 RADIATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHERNOBYL AES

ACCIDENT FOR THE POPULATION OF INDIVIDUAL REGIONS

OF THE EUROPEAN PART OF USSR

As was indicated in the preceding chapters of the report, the

Chernobyl AES accident's radioactive discharge had an effect not only on

the radiation situation near the plant, but also at significant distances

from it. Figures 7.2.4 and 7.2.5 show changes over time of the magnitude
of the gamma-radiation dosage in open areas in certain oblast (county)

centers of UkrSSR, BSSR, and RSFSR, that were 100 to 1,000 km away from
Chernobyl AES. The figures show that practically in all of the populated

areas
 -68-

Figure 7.2.4 The dynamics of change of the magnitude of the-

gamma-radiation dosage in open areas for oblast
(county) centers in UkrSSR (a), and BSSR
(b), located near the Chernobyl AES.
 rl --.. . ,• ,,- -- , I ol .• •

5F
,•1 L................................
".............-.'-J-''
: - uezM r;'!g• - -'

2'. - ..- . . . .t ]. l .M .-

I........... ,' .......

I- J• . . i. .• ":,

*• I ' . I

* II

f
6

I...
'4-

~1L • : :* .o.. |; a :1R(41t

2'.

z S~
I.
a 0*
~1 • •'I •*f . ,
~
I
•O Il1
a * q
I
I *.~

Puc. 7.2.4. •zMXza~ H3exexH.A No~(oc~b ,Ao3) r~8~4-

ax{~3A C,- aox~TR~~HC) AAOJaT~.

6 C..WW~
 -69-

Figure 7.2°4 Dynamics of change in the magnitude of gammna-radiation

dosage in open areas for some oblast (county) centers

in UkrSSR (a) end RSFSR (b).
 ID

711|].1:--. .....
- . . i * • • . * g • I

,.- _ - ..... NIcmet* CS8orn. :

i
! S j =-
i
" F * p.
..................... ; ...... . w
- -u
5
4 4. 0 i , -
a'

i,

! . . , 9 .. * . . . 'a,' '
I I. *~

* 4 .. a.•

t. .. -. .1
2 t" -. .~a -5~.
iewubnaa.Sd& CL "

zeI
'I I1 2 1.1

li . 9 + "

: * "9"• • _-- .. •. ... .-

21 -1-'- "" ."-

I
d
6": _ __ _ ___ _ ___
.__• • l ! I- 9 . , -

a U Um 46 S
'I, ~

P~c. 'Z2.5. ~via~~xa v.3)~Ie~iexKR MO~OCT)~ AO~ rL'C~S~

O~J1B~T)r~ ?.ZexpOD YCCP (a) H PC~C? (i).

___ CL _________
 -70-

the magnitude dosage of external ganmna-radiation exceeded by severa.• times

the natural radiation background levels that are typical for this
particular zone of European USSR (8-12 mkR/h, thick line in the figures).

After averaging numerous measurement results for gamma-radiation dosages in

open areas within the administrative boundaries of the oblasts, it was

possible to select 10 of them (see table 7.2.5) that had maximum levels of

radiation effects of the accidental discharge on the population.

As data in Table 7.2.5 shows, the average values of external radiation

of people for the oblasts for 1986 does not exceed (taking into account the

activity regimen of the population) 1.5 rem, and 5 rem over 50 years. This
confirms the complete lack of danger of the resultant levels of external

gamma-radiation from the accidental discharge for the health of the

population living outside the 30 km zone around Chernobyl AES. A somewhat

more complex situation arises when evaluating internal radiation dosages of

people as a result of entry of radionucleides into the human organism

together with contaminated, locally produced foodstuffs.

Prior to the Chernobyl accident, in USSR as well as in other

countries, only the allowable annual intake of radioactive substances in

conjunction with food was rated. An allowable concentration of nucleides

in drinking water (NRB-76) was also set. The content of nucleides in

individual types of food products was not regulated. In case of an

accident, a norm had been set for a critical product (cow's milk), as well

as for the important nucleide when an accident occurs -- iodine-131. In

the radiation situation that existed prior to the accidents the content
levels of strontium-90, cesium-137, and other nucleides in any type of
 .- 70a-

foodstuffs was many times lower than those levels that .could reach -the

established levels of
 -71-

Table 7.2.5 .Radiation levels and predicted values of external:

radiation dosages in the population in 10 oblasts that have

experienced the highest radioactive contamination by the

Chernobyl AES discharge products

Oblast (county) Mean magnitude Radiation dosage Radiation dosage

of radiation of the population over 50 years, rem

dosage for the in 1986, rem

oblast,

"D"+ 15, mr/h villagecity v illage c i ty

Gomel (.)
Kiev (*)
Bryans k

Zhitomir

Mogil1ev

Orlov

Chernigov

Tul1a

Cherkassk

Bres t

(*) Outside the 30-km around Chernobyl AESo

 ; °

Ta~.'~a 7.2.5

Yp~3H P~am I npon~o3Iie~e DOefl• •o3

3oesepro ozqe rao•evie oa10H

3a s~'aCT-

oo~aaTH •om- Haceaie•.x B 1986r., 50 AeT, o~

O~ACT• HOCT• aO3••e
na, A" + I5, .
MP/•ac. .cea~cioe ropci~oe cex~cxoe' ropo~cioe

T'o?,e.• c~a 0,83') 1,39 0,74 4 ,7 2,5

K~e~cy.• 0 , 4 4 x) 0,74 0,40 2,5 I,4
t;••ca•0,30 0,50 0,27 .1,7 0,92
Za~ow-pc•a 0,20 0,34 0,18 1.2 0,63
M~orvze~cx•a 0,15 .0,25 0,14 0,86 0,46
O~'o~c~.a• 0,I4 0,24 0,I3 0,8I 0,44
qe~ro~ci• 0,14 0,28 0,12 0,78 0,42
Ty~n~cnaJ 0,12 0,20 0,1I 0,67 0,37
t~e~acc•a 0,091 0,I5 0,082 0,52 0,28
]Bec•ca~ 0,081 0,14 0,c773 0,46 0,25

30-~L 3O~ BO2~~T ~A3C.

7Io~
0
 -72-

of the annual intake of nucleides via food. These norms were base•,on the.
fact that individual groups of the population that received the most
radiation should not get an annual radiation that exceeded 0.5 rem, while

for critical organs in the 2nd group (that included the thyroid in
particular) no more than 1.5 rem. In addition it was set that the given
dosages of radiation should not be exceeded via any combination of

radiation effects, i.e. due to both external and internal radiation

(inhalation, intake with food and water). The set norms were calculated

for an unconditional and complete prevention of indirect specific radiation

consequences (radiation sickness, cataracts, radiation burns, affecting

hemogenesis, reduction of immune reaction). In addition, the set norms

which had been set substantially below levels that are capable of causing

the reactions indicated above are derived from the need to limit the risk

of the occurrence of remote radiation effects -= cancer and genetic

disorders. For a limited part of the population, Regulation NRB-76

(0°5 rem for the entire body) corresponds to the upper probability limits

of the occurrence of cancer at a level of 50-500 additional cases per

1 million population annually. Prior to the accident at Chernobyl AES, the

actual radiation levels of the population from food and water were ten

times and hundreds of times below the set norms.

After the accident, there was a need for rapid resolution of issues
relating to the inspection and prohibition of using specific types of food

products. Since at first the principal danger was iodine-131 that came to
human beings during the spring-summer period primarily with milk, as well
as leafy greens. Regulations were put into effect irmiediately after the
accident concerning the allowable content of iodine-131 in milk and milk
products (cottage cheese, sour cream, cheese, butter), as well as in edible

leafy greens. Regulations were calculated so that radiation in the thyroid

gland of children (critical organ for iodine-131) would not exceed 30 rem.

This condition was observed having an allowable content of iodine-131 in

milk at a level up to 1 .x10 -7 Curie/l. A similar regulation was

introduced in England in 1957 during the Windscale accident. Regulations

were also introduced for the allowable content of iodine-131 in meat, fowl,

eggs, berries, and medicinal herbs. Data was received in the second half
of May which showed that due to the decay of iodine-131, an increasing role

•in contamination of meat and other types of food was played by cesium-137
and cesium-134; data was also received concerning the presence of rare

isotope elements -- cerium-144, ruthenium-t06, zirconium-95, barium-140,

.lanthanum-140, cerium-141, ruthenium-103, niobium-95. To a large part,

these along with cesium, were found in edible greens (1 X10 -6 Curie/kg

and higher). During the entire month of May high concentrations of iodine

remained in milk products in many places. During this period, in order to

carry out large scale efforts to control and inspect food products, there
was need to set regulations that allowed monitoring with the use of the

most uncomplicated equipment, i.e. regulate the total content of beta-

activity. These norms were confirmed by USSR Minzdrav on 30 May 1986.

They supersede the earlier regulations of 8 and 12 May, and list a broader

number of products, reflecting the changes in the radiation situation that

were in effect by the end of May. The allowable radiation dosage of the
 -73a-

entire body and the internal organs for which the norms have been
calculated is 5 rem.

In the first days and weeks after the accident, the principal activity
in food products was exemplified by the presence of iodine-131. It

appeared in the the milk of cows that were kept in pasture 2-3 days after
 --74-

the accident. In the south of Belorussia its level reached 10 -6 C~urie/i.

The milk of cows kept in stalls remained considerable more pure. Similar

and even higher levels of contamination, up to 10 -5 Curie/i were noted in"

leafy plants.

As we know, during the migration of radionucleides, from the first

link, i.e. the fallout itself and the soil, and until the last link, the

human organism, depending on the physico-chemical properties of the

nucleide and a number of other factors (soil composition, amount and

duration of atmospheric precipitation, the composition of the farm animal

diet and so forth), the radionucleides separate, reducing the content of
some nucleides and accumulating others. For this reason, a most complete
composition of nucleides may be recorded in food products that had been

contaminated from the surface, i.e. those that directly absorb nucleides

contained in the atmosphere and which settle from the air. Such products
include lettuce, dill, coriander, tea and so forth. As an example, table

7.2.6 shows the composition of nucleides discovered in representative

plants from areas close to the Chernobyl AES, and contaminated from the

surface.

Conversely, in a number of other products, to which radioactive

substances arrive through biologic barriers, the composition of

radionucleides is substantively reduced. Thus, in the beginning and middle

of May, only cesium and iodine-131 isotopes were discovered in meat, while

by the end of May and in June, practically only cesium-137 and cesium-134

(at a ratio of 2:1). Also, the content of radioactive cesium in meat

~(beef) is sufficiently high, at a level of 10 -8 to 10 -7 Curie/kg.
 -74a-

The exceeded levels in food that were in effect in May regulations are

shown by data in Figure 7,2.7°

 -75-

Table 7.2.6 Content of radionucleides in certain plant products

in the vicinity of the Chernobyl AES

Name Sample taken at Date taken Nucleide Content, Curie/kg

Clover Chernobyl 26 Ma~y Cerium-144

Ceriumn-141
lodine-131

Ruthen iurn-103

Rutheni um-t06

Barium-140

Cesium-134
Cesium-137

Zirconium-95

Niobium-95

Lanthanum-140
 Ta~.7z.L .7.2.6
Co;n•el:mie paoi~yX.ao3 a ,EeKoT'opx p:acTzTer~m.x
flpo.~x:,ax Ddz•3E K4,2C

HaD~eHo~a~tfe ,OT6O~pa OT.o I .L K.!r .

X.7leBep 26ia 2.104

ltep•-I4I I,4.'o--
J~o.-I3I I,3.I0--
I,2.1o-6
P•Temr•-I06
7 ,9.I0-?
Lap-140 0
6,7.10-7
3,2'I0-"
lie 3z-I34
fle~zf-137 2,5oI0=?
li•oHL-95 I,5.I0"6
2,0.I0"
ZaHa.H'-I40
-4 I. .1

"/5co.
 -76-

Table 7.2.7 Agricultural products in which radioactive contamination

was discovered that exceeded allowable levels.

Republic Oblast Product and its share (%),in excess of regulations

Meat Milk and Edible Veget- Berries Fish

milk greens ables

products

BelorussianMinsk
SSR Gomel

Brest
Mogilev

Grodno

RS FS Tul1a
Bryansk

Kal uga

Kursk

Orlov

Ukra i nian Kiev

SSR

NOTE: Dash "-" indicates absence of data.

 Tamp~na 7.2 .7
Sce~czoxo3AcTse~ok m~z• B ROTOpO2
•wo oHap~yze~o n Bue~mee •onyjcTmoro 10~o
aKT•HoIro 3.•:3eH•H

0*
-
!
Pecny.uua !0zacT• HeCOOTheTCTEyn~aA HO•IAPM
!
1•¢0 - I MOA0-
3e,,'eE5'
CTO- oBo•
•ro•
~p~a

Joa•

I0 5
CCP To~e~cKaR
40 30 15 90
I0 50 5 3.
Mori~e~c~aR 20 10. D

Pp ecxa• 5
Ib
- . d - I- -4-

,PC•CP Ty.'ILcKaA I5
-

E~c~az 30
20
30
Qpxo3c~a~ I0

J -- . -

KC
Ee~cc~aA -10 20 - ~20

fl;~e'~a~rHe: ~-" - ~a.i*r~e OTCyTCTB7DT.

76c.
 .- 77-

As was stated above, monitoring of milk contamination by iodine-131

indicated that in many areas of' USSR, BSSR and RSFSR in May-June 1986, the
concentration of this nucleide in milk exceeded the set standards (O.1l mk

Curie/l). Having analyzed the levels of soil, plant, and milk sample

contamination and having tied them to the magnitude of the garima-radiation

dosage in the locality, it was possible to evaluate the potential

concentrations of iodine-131 in milk in the various regions of the country.

Such an example is given in Table 7.2.8., where reported levels of milk

sample contamination by iodine-131 are shown for 10 oblasts, based on data

for the mean magnitudes of external gamma-radiation dosage for the oblast,
in comparison with magnitudes actually noted in May 1986. Information for

the other regions of European USSR, with a population of about 75 million

(see Figure 7.2.6) were similarly handled. Figure 7.2.6 and the table

given below show 11 regions (4 on the territory of UkrSSR, 2 in BSSR, and 5

in RSFSR) that were of interest either from the point of view of

sufficiently high levels of radioactive contamination, or from the point of

view of the large population living in them.

Evaluation of radioactive consequences for the population of these

regions from external gamma-radiation from radionucleides that fell in the

area is shown in Table 7.2.9. As the table shows, the expected mean values

for the regions of the external radiation dose for humans in 1986 was
generally below the annual dosage limit for individuals in category B
(limited part of the population), in accordance with NRB-76. The

collective radiation dose for this part• of the country's population will

make up 8.6 million person/rem in 1986, and during the 50 year period after
 . o77a-

the accident, 29 million person/reinso For comparison, let us note that the.

annual aggregate
 -78-

Table 7.2.8 Comparison of estimated and actually recorded leyels

of milk contamination by iodine-131 in May 1986 in
10 oblasts that experienced the highest amount of.
radioactive contamination due to the accidental

discharge of the Chernobyl AES, mkC/l.

Area Estimated levels Actual measurements

Gomel

Kiev
Bryansk

Zhitomir
Mogil1ev

Orlov

Cherni gov

Tul1a

Cherkassk

Brest
 Ta~nLam 7.2.8

Cpa.•eHxe paC•T•X I •T~e~ Hadmae)mx 7poB~efl

3arp•3Eern. M~oxa ibo•o-I3I m Mae I986r. 3 10 o•.•c-
4 z•x, no.zmepIn~mxo. •moe pa~noa~TzafoM 3arp•3-
•eHmo ,',O 4 xTa.,, •a~aaoro 3•poca WC.•O IDC3z/,,-

roMe.7ThclcaA 0,2-14 O• 02-I 0

Kze~c•c. 0,06-7?,3
01•~a•D04..5,0 0,02-I,~3
•, • o~czm.•0, 03.-3,3
Mo~rv-deB c~a: 0 02-2,5 0,02-2,0
OWzo~c•a.• 0,02-2,3 0,01--0,8
'•••oc.: 0,02-2,3
TyJc~a. 0,02..2,0 0,06-6;5
•ep~ac c•.• 0,01-1,5
Bec~c•a O,01-i ,3 0,2-9,0

78 o
 -79-

Figure 7.2.6 Popula~tion numbers in separate regions of

European USSR (in millions)

1. City population

2. Village population

3. Ukraine

4. Belorussia

5. Central

6. Western

7. Eastern

9. South-eastern
10. e+-western

11. Moldavia

12. Bryansk Oblast

13. Kalinin Oblast

14. Kaluga, Smolensk,Tula Oblasts

15. Orlov, Kursk, Lipetsk Oblasts.
 9-

?~ic.7".2.E6AkiCAeHHOCTb I.aceAe)-I,1 -
B O'TAeAb~.4IX per~'1oNax
EBpon~e•cKo• 4'rTi CCCP
,,• &lUbdI. ~
c

S /0 ~I I'. i3 •+4 S

79oa.
 -80-
Expected dosages of external radiation for "-
Table 7.2.9
population in individual regions of European USSR

Region Population, Dosage for 1986, Aggregate dosage,

in millions rem/year 10 6 person/reins

Village City for 1986 over 50 *yrs

Central. UkrSSR
Western UkrSSR

Eastern UkrSSR

South UkrSSR
S-E BSSR

•N-W BSSR

Moldavian SSR

Bryansk Oblast

Bryansk Oblast

Kaliningrad Obl.

Kalinin, Tula,

Smolensk Obl.

Orlov, Kursk,

Lipetsk Obl.

Total:
 Ta.m= 7.2.9

O~zae~~e •o,. aHe=:ero oy.o'ei.• ,,aceae~u

oT.~e.,':X pern•o~oB EBi:,ne2cao2 ,:IacTZ CCCP

w F
•l3a •I986Ir. KOw~neXTDHaA .•o3a,
?erzoE Eaoe.7eH. .1. ~
w..•• cexscioe oK0- 3a 1986 •3a 50
1"onl ,,IGT
I _ _ __I _ _
I__ -- -- h •

LteETp.•acTL yccP 13,6 0,27 0.15 2.75 9,31

•3.ana. .lacTL YCCP 8.3 0,067 0,036 0,44 1.47
BOCTOq.qaCTL YCCP 14,5 0,077 0,041 0.75 2,52
l~,a.,aT YCCP 14.4 0,045 0,024 0,73 2,47
2,9 0,98 0,52 6,94
CeB .-.3anma,.BCP 7,0 0,094 0,050 0,47 I',58
Mouga c•aA CC? 4,1 0,084 0,045 0,27 0,92
I,5 0,50 0,27 0,44 1,49
0,8 0,012 0,003 0,006 0,02

4,0 0,12 0,064 0,32

eKa.,yI.K
' b 1,08?
3,4 0,14 0,075 0,35

Boero: 74.5 - I - _8,6 129,0

B80
 -81-

dosage from natural background radiation for the given number of people
will comprise 10 million person/reins, i.e. it is comparable to the annual

dosage from the accidental discharge in 1986. In 50 years the dosage~ from
natural background will be almost '15 times higher than a corresponding

dosage from the Chernobyl AES accident. As a result, the calculated

figures, based on the concept of linear limitless relationship "dosage-

effect", an increase in the number of instances of additional deaths from

cancer will make up less than 0.05 percent in relation to the death rate
due to spontaneously arising cancer (about 9.5 million cases over 70 years)

among the given population segment.

Risk of death and estimates of morbidity cases involving curable types.

of cancer and non-malignant growth in the thyroid among people who consumed

milk contaminated by iodine-131 was estimated on the basis of the following

original data:

-- actual concentration of iodine-.131 in cow's milk or estimates of

its content, evaluated according to the magnitude of the gamma-radiation

dosage on the site;

-- population number, with sex and age breakdown;

-- age relationship of milk consumption, dosage coefficients and death

risk coefficients, risk of curable case of thyroid glands on the basis of

NKRZ data, NK DAR QON, and materials by Soviet authors.

Generalized data for concentration levels of iodine-131 in cow's milk

for the regions under question are shown in Figure 7.2.7. The figure shows
 ~-81a-

that in a number of oblasts in UkrSSR, BSSR and RSFSR, the concentration of

iodine-131 in individual samples exceeded the set standards by 20-100 times

and even higher (thick line in the figure). Due to the fact that milk sold

through the centralized system had a concentration of no higher than 0.1

mkC/l, it was decided that such milk can be used by the entire city

populations of these areas and the major part of the village population.

For the remaining small segment of village

 -82-

Figure 7.2.7. Concentration of Iodine-131 in cow's milk (in mkC/l).

(TYPIST): See numbers on orig. page).

1. Ukraine

2. Belorussia

3. Central

4. West

5. East

6. South

7. South-east

8. Northwest

9. Moldavia

11.Bryansk Oblast

12. Kaluga, Smolensk,

Tula Oblasts

13. Orlov, Kursk,

Lipetsk Oblasts
 3t3
P•c. '7.2.7." Ko HLIe.HTP au~-i~
B MOqO K~ KOpOB

82 •-
 -83-

village population it was presumed that in some cases, where consumption of

milk having an iodine-131 concentration in excess of the allowable levels,

it was not possible to implement this. Such an assumption made it possible

to conclude that in a number of the areas more highly contaminated by

iodine-131, the maximum estimated dosages of internal radiation of the

thyroid in humans could reach hundreds of rads.

Comparison of the extent of death risk due to radiation received in

the thyroid, which was conducted on the basis of estimates of individual

and aggregate human radiation dosages, with the risk occurring over.,30

' years after entry of iodine-131 into the human organism, and the.~risk of
death due to spontaneously occurring thyroid cancers over the same period

of time (about 150,000 cases), this comparison showed that additional

deaths from iodine-131 makes up about 1 percent and practically does not

increase death rate indicators in the regions under examination.

The given estimates are based on the concept of the limitless linear

relationship "dosage-effect", a concept that is accepted by a majority of

countries in the world. This concept is based on the theoretical

understanding of the carcenogenesis mechanism, on the collective data for

the "dosage-effect" concept for instances with higher radiation dosages, as

well as on the principle of making decisions for the sake of human beings,
i.e. the inalienable assurance of man's safety in the area of small dose

radiation. It is no accident that the lead MKRZ publication on the

problems of radiation safety (MKRZ publication 26, No 30) indicates:"Use of
 .-83a-

the linear extrapolation method, based on data for the frequency ofzeffects

occurring at high dosages makes it possible to evaluate the maximal risk...

However, the more careful the assumption concerning the linearity, the more

necessary to take into account the fact that this may result in the
overestimation of radiation risks..." Thus, the magnitudes shown in the
given section of the report should be viewed as the "upper"1 estimates for.

radiation consequences among the

 -84-

population of the European USSR, located within-the accidental discharge

activity from the Chernob~yl AES.

In addition to iodine-131 in the current year, and in particular in

subsequent years, it is necessary to make note of other radionucleides that

contaminate locally produced food products and water supply sources.

Potential levels of food contamination in the near-term and long-term

should be viewed separately for the principal nucleides and types of food
products.

Ruthenium-106, cerium-144 and other rare nucleides make a noticeable

impact only in products that can be surface-contaminated (leafy greens,

vegetables, and to a lesser degree, berries, mushrooms and honey), since

these nucleides are practically not assimilated from soil to plants, and

from plants to humans. The biological significance of this entire group of

radionucleides in such products does not exceed 10-20 percent. The

subsequent role of rare- elements in the contamination of foodstuffs will

universally make asubstantial drop and will have no practical

significance.

Cesium-137 and cesium-134 are the main biologically significant

radionucleides which (not counting strontiumi-90) have been the main

contaminators of meat, milk, vegetables and other products since the middle
of June. The source for the contamination to-date Qf plant and animal
products has been the air. The grain and potato crops in fall 1986 can be
expected'to be relatively clean; there will not be a great deal of cesium

by air, and soil contamination will not be able to play a role as yet.
 -84a-

Contamination of products by cesium in. subsequent years will be -

substantially different for areas that lie near the Chernobyl AES, where
the soil type is different. Since frorr the Polessie soils (alluvial•
plain), which are poor in humus, cesium enters plants 10 times and even
 -85-

100 times higher than from other types of soils, the Polessie regions can
expect relatively stable and high levels (almost at the current) of

cesium-137 in food products in subsequent years.

Preliminary, purely speculative estimates of the contamination levels

of food products by cesium isotopes show the following: having a

radioactive fallout density for cesium-137 on the earth's surface equal to

1 Curie per square kilometer and with the consumption of locally produced

foodstuffs, the magnitudes of individual radiation dosages for the entire

body as a result of peroral ingestion by the organism in the area of

Ukrainian and Belorussian Polessie will be (taking into account additional

radiation of the organism by cesium-134) 0.70,'0.34, and 3.3 rem for the
first and second years, and 70 years respectively. In this instance the

aggregate human radiation dosages, taking into account the agricultural

products actually produced on 1 square kilometer on the territory of these

regions in UkrSSR and BSSR, the dosages for the same periods of time will
be 120, 58, and 570 person/reins. For the other territories of the nation,

with considerably lower levels of cesium transmission from soil to

agricultural products, the corresponding magnitudes of aggregate radiation

dosages for the population will be 120, 36, and 170 person/reins. Taking
into account that the overall amount of cesium-137 that was discharged into

the atmosphere and fell on the earth surface after the Chernobyl AES
accident is estimated to be 1.0 . 10 Curries (see sections 4 and 5), and

taking into account that 10% of the discharged cesium isotopes fell on
the Ukrainian and Belorussian Polessie, the aggregate dosage •f radiation

for the population for a 70 *year period after

 -86-

the accident will make up 2.1. 10 person/reins. This may result $n an

additional death rate from cancer that does not exceed 0.4% of the natural
death rate from malignant growths. Further data for the actual
coefficients for the transmission of cesium along the food chain, under the

specific conditions of the contaminated regions will make it possible to

make corrections in the given estimates, and to reduce given figures.

To-date, the data concerning the content of strontium-9O in food is

limited, and insufficient for making corrective data estimates. In time,

it is possible that this nucleide will be significant, along with

cesium-137. The content of strontium-90 for products in diet from the 1987

harvest will apparently be reduced overall. In the area of the Polessie

soils, the reduction in.the role of strontium-90 in comparison to

cesium-137 will be more significant. However, predictions concerning its

content in food in subsequent years will be possible only after a complete

study of the content of strontium-9O in contaminated areas of RSFSR,

UkrSSR, and BSSR.

Thus, it will be possible to make a correct estimate of the dosages

per population that consumes locally grown food products contaminated by

cesium-137 and strontium-90 only after establishing actual coefficients for

radionucleide transfer along the food chains for the given regions. These
efforts, which are being activated by various scientific sub-branches of

the nation will make it possible to develop recommendations for the most

optimal methods, from the point of setting dosage loads per person, to
conduct agricultural work in the areas that are contaminated by

radioactivity.
 -87-

7.3 ORGANIZATION FOR CARRYING OUT MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS

OF THE POPULATION AROUND THE CHERNOBYL AES REGIONS.

Following the accident, 84,000 people were evacuated from the city of

Pripyat' and the Chernobyl area, which included 18,350 children. In

addition, in a number of populated areas in the Kiev and Zhitomir oblasts,

additional evacuations were carried out.

In order to provide medical assistance to the evacuees during the

first days after the accident, 450 brigades that included doctors, nurses,

laboratory technicians and dosimetrists were called upon, and who were
provided transport vehicles. Overall (taking into account the changes

depending on the radiation situation) 1,240 doctors, 920 nurses, 360

doctors-lab technicians and 2,720 lab technicians having a middle-school

education, 720 medical school upperclassmen, as well as a large group of

associations from NIl (National Research Institute) were called to serve.

After (initial) health processing, all evacuees were examined by

doctors with a mandatory dosimetric monitoring and laboratory blood test.

When necessary, the tests were repeated.

All persons evacuated from the 30 km zones, when it was necessary to

evaluate any deviations in the state of health, were hospitalized in

special units that were created at central regional hospitals.

In order to provide medical care for workers that were taking part in

eliminating the after effects of the accident, a polyclinic with

 -87a-

4 around-the-clock first aid brigades was, set up in the city of Chernobyl,

at the central regional hospital.

 -88-

Special attention was given to the examination of children from the 30

km zones, as well as random examination of children living in populated
areas that adjoined the 30 km zone (about 100,000 children were examined in

all).
 -89-

7.4 LONG-TERM PROGRAMS FOR MEDICAL AND BIOLOGIC MONITORIC.

OF THE POPULATION AND PERSONNEL

Long-term programs are being set up to conduct medical and biologic

observations of the population and personnel.

The set of measures intended to provide medical care to persons who

have experienced radiation effects as a result of the Chernobyl AES

includes: -- compiling a list of all persons who have experienced the

effects; -- grouping those who have experienced radiation in order to
determine the volume of required medical assistance; -- measures for
organizing and carryirrg out medical assistance at the necessary volume.

The purpose of the list was to study the potential after effects of

radiation on the entire group of persons affected in order to provide

purposeful medical observation, one that meets the expected effects for the

given range of dosages.

It is planned to analyze the effects of low dosage overall external

radiation using stochastic effect criteria (infectious morbidity, morbidity

and death rate due to malignant growths, birth rate, condition of the

newborns), and neuro-psychiatric aspects of the reaction to the situation.

Special analyses will be made of the function of the thyroid gland,

and in the long-term frequency of adenomas and malignant growths will be

studied.

All study efforts will be conducted on the basis of the dynamic

characteristics of the background level of the parameters indicated above
 - 89a-

within the regions where those under observations originate, as well as the

evacuation sites. In determining the volume of observations, the intention

is to base it on
 -90-

international and domestic recommendations concerning potential biologic

effects (NKDAR, MKRZ, etc.).

Serving as criteria for monitoring the general state of health will be

data from examinations by therapists and the expanded clinical analysis of

blood. All women will examined by a gynecologist, and children by a

pediatrician, including data concerning physical development, in accordance

with regulations issues in USSR. Within the dosage range that presumes

even a minimal risk of thyroid gland disfunction, this examination will be

supplemented by special dynamic observation of the thyroid gland by an

endocrinologist, and with the use of hormones, thyroxine, triothyroxine,

thyreotropic hormones, etc.

Taking into account the risk levels for death rate from cancer as a

result of radiation effects, it will be also possible to evaluate the

increase in frequency due to radiation (from fractions of a percent to

several percent) only by having data for a very large quantitative

population sample.

As a result of the above, all persons who currently live, who came

temporarily, the organized units who were called to work at the accident

site, and subsequently their children and grandchildren, and persons who

were evacuated from the contaminated regions are subject to registration.

In order to develop this registration list, plans have been made for
registration and dosimetric charts, which will be filled out for each

person under observation.

 -90a-

The registration map includes the following information:.last name,

first name, patronimic, passport data (series and number of passport, or
birth certificate, date document was issued); date of birth, place of

birth, sex, nationality, place of residence, where located during the

exposure period, duration of

 -91-

exposure, anamnnesistic data concerning the state of health, pregnancy at

the start of the exposure (time pregnant in weeks), pregnancy occurring

after the start of the exposure, data for the child at the conclusion-*of
pregnancy, causes of death (adults, children, newborns), measures taken

(hospitalization, iodine treatment).

The dosimetric chart will record the healthful character of the region

and the degree of radiation effects on man (contamination of clothing,

shoes, skin surfaces prior to and after deactivation, in mkR/h).

The chart will include data concerning iodine-131 content in the

thyroid gland; which is the dosimetric parameter for clinical examination

of persons undergoing a check, as well as data on individual dosimetry

(measurement of biosubstrata, using a SICh (not further identified) and

other instruments.

The registration and dosimetric charts will be filled out by local

health care authorities. The filled out charts will be sent to the

Ministries of Health of the republics and USSR Minzdrav. Parallel to

filling out the registration charts, all data will be entered in a

registration journal which will be permanently kept at the observation

locale.

Grouping of persons exposed (or who could be exposed) as a result of

the accident at the Chernobyl AES on 26.04.86, and who require the

appropriate medical assistance will be based according to dosage level for

the entire body and the thyroid gland. All dosages shown are for adults;
 -91a-
for children up to three years of age, as
well as for pregnant womein, must
be reduced by a factor of ten, as compared
to adults.
 ./
./

//
I ~Frequence of examinations will be determined on the basis of i~itial.
examination results and evaluation of the dosage level. Preventive and

protection measures (iodine treatment, evacuation, limited intake of

radioactive substances by the orga'nism via inhalation and ingestion) are

being considered..-

The extent of these examinations will be supplemental to the

*dispensary clinic observation done for the entire population of the

country.

The program anticipates increasing the. necessary number of specialists •

from different professional branches. The outlay of time, technical 0

/
equipment and algoriths, software and calculations using the computer will...

be.@Val!iated in carrying out the set tasks. Clinical data willi be

interpreted in the light of materials for the dynamics of environmental •...
.contamination, the characteristics of the isotopic composition,, and the '

conduct of iodine treatments. It is anticipated that simulation models and

research forecasts will be developed for the expected variants of remote

effects of a stochastic nature (oncologic effects9 genetic effects) for the

next 30 years and throughout a lifetime (50 years).

This type of an emergency situation presents an opportunity for the

prospect of collecting and accumulating data with respect to oncologic and

genetic aspects of morbidity of the population.

* ~The programs under preparation will take into account the experiences :
of other nations (the Three Mile Island program; the MAGATE conference in

Yugoslavia and others). "

'1I