G.R. No.

206379 November 19, 2014

CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION* and REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Subject of this disposition is the petition for revievv' on certiorori filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court which seeks to review, reverse and set aside the August 31, 2012
Amended Decision1 and the February 20, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120208, involving a complaint for falsification and
misrepresentation.

Initially, the Court denied the petition in its July 10, 2013 Resolution3 for failure of the
petitioner to show any reversible error in the challenged amended decision as to
warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction. (Rollo, p. 101.)

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and on October 23, 2013, the Court
granted the said motion and set aside the July 10, 2013 Resolution. In the same
October 23, 2013 resolution, the Court reinstated the petitionand required the
respondents to file their comments thereon. On January 23, 2014, the private
respondentfiled her Comment. On February 7, 2014, the petitioner filed her Reply to
Comment. (Rollo, p. 110)

The Facts:

On May 14, 1992, petitioner Cecilia Pagaduan (Pagaduan) filed a notarized complaint
with the Civil Service Commission-Regional Office No. 2 (CSC-RO II)in Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan, against respondent Rema Martin Salvador (Salvador), newly appointed
Municipal Budget Officer at that time, charging her with the administrative offenses of
falsification and misrepresentation. Pagaduan alleged that Salvador did not actually
possess the necessary budgeting experience required by her position; and that
although she indicated in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS)that she performed book
keeping and accounting functions for Veteran's Woodworks, Inc. (VWI) from August 1,
1990 to February 15, 1992,she was never in fact employed by the said entity. 4 Salvador
on the other hand, claimed that she had been employed by Alfonso Tuzon (Tuzon),
whom the Board of Directors of VWI had granted full management, direct supervision
and control of VWI's logging operations. She explained that her namedid not appear in
the employees' payroll because Tuzon's office was independent from VWI's original
staff.5

Subsequently, on October 19, 1994, Pagaduan filed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Tuguegarao City(MTCC), a criminal charge against Salvador for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 in relation to Article 171(4) of the
Revised Penal Code in making false statements in her PDS, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 15482.

On May 22, 2000, a decision6 on the administrative complaint was rendered by the
CSC-RO II, holding Salvador liable only for Simple Misconduct and imposing the
penalty ofone (1) month suspension, after ruling that her act was a mere error of
judgment.

Unsatisfied, Pagaduan filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied.
She then appealedto the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which found the appeal to be
without merit, ruling that she had no standing to file the appeal as she was not the party
aggrieved by the CSC-RO II decision. The CSC also approved Salvador's qualification
as Municipal Budget Officer because her experience in VWI was a "related field." 7

Pagaduan ceased her pursuit and did not move for a reconsideration or appeal. Thus,
on January 21, 2002, the CSC-RO II issued the order, stating that its May 22, 2000
decision had attained finality. Salvador then served the penalty of one (1) month
suspension.8

Later, on October 22, 2008, the MTCC rendered a decision9 in Criminal Case No.
15842, finding Salvador guilty of falsification of public documents. Salvador did not
appeal and then applied for probation. Her application was granted and she was placed
under probation for a period of one (1) year.

Thereafter, Pagaduan filed a second administrative complaint against Salvador, this

time for the offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Salvador
submitted the required counter affidavit, raising the defenses of res judicata, forum
shopping, and double jeopardy on account of the finality of the decision in the first
administrative complaint for falsification. After finding a prima faciecase in the second
administrative complaint, Salvador was formally charged. To answer the charges
against her, she adopted her defenses inher counter-affidavit and submitted documents
to support her cause.

On January 12, 2010, the CSC-RO II rendered a decision,10 finding Salvador guilty of
the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude because of
her conviction for falsification before the MTCC, and imposing the penalty of dismissal
from the service with all its accessory penalties. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, REMA MARTIN SALVADOR is hereby declared

guilty of CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE and is meted
the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH ALL ITS ACCESSORY
PENALTIES.11

Aggrieved, Salvador moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Salvador
appealed to the CSC, which rendered a decision12 on March 1, 2011 reversing and
setting asidethe decision of the CSC-RO II and exonerating her of the charge. She was
sternly warned to be more cautious and prudent in accomplishing public documents.
The CSC ruled that the criminal offense of falsification of public document did not per se
involve moral turpitude, following the Court's pronouncement in Dela Torre vs.
COMELEC,13 citing Zari vs. Flores.14 The CSC stated that since the liability of Salvador
in the first administrative complaint was lowered to Simple Misconduct, the crime
ascribed to her could not be said to have been attended with inherent baseness or
vileness or depravity.15 The dispositive portion of the March 1, 2011 CSC Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review (appeal) filed by Rema Martin Salvador is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated January 12, 2010 issued by Civil
Service Commission Regional Office (CSCRO) No. II finding her guilty of Conviction of
a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude and meting upon her the penalty of dismissal from
the government service with all its accessory penalties is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Thus, appellant Rema Martin Salvador is EXONERATED of the charge of
Conviction of Crime Involving Moral Turpitude levelled against her. She is STERNLY
WARNED to be more cautious and prudent in accomplishing public documents. 16

Pagaduan moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on June 1, 2011.
Hence, an appeal was made to the CA which ruled that following precedents, a
conviction for falsification of public document constituted the offense of conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude.17 The gravity of Salvador's falsification was highlighted
by her commission of the same in her PDS, which was no ordinary contract.18 Thus, on
February 28, 2012 the CA disposed in this wise: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Decision of the Commission dated 1 March 2011 and its Resolution promulgated 3
June 2011 affirming the same are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Consequently,
the Decision ofthe Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 2 of Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, dated 12 January 2010, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.19

Salvador then filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 28, 2012 CA
Decision.20 On August 31, 2012, in a turn-around, the CA granted her motion and
issued the assailed Amended Decision,21 reversingand setting asideits previous
decision and reinstated the March 1, 2011 CSC decision. It agreed with the findings
ofthe CSC that the act of falsification committed by Salvador did not involve moral
turpitude as it was a mere error of judgment on her part. The dispositive portion of the
Amended Decision reads:

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is

GRANTED, such that Our Decision dated 28 February 2012 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDEand in view thereof, the Decision and Resolution of public respondent Civil
Service Commission dated 01 March 2011 and 01 June 2011 respectively, are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.22

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FINALLY EXONERATED
RESPONDENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE OF CONVICTION OF A
CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE BY FINDING THE FALSIFICATION
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN HER PERSONAL DATA SHEET AS ONLY
A SIMPLE MISCONDUCT WHICH DOES NOT AMOUNT TO MORAL
TURPITUDE.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT APPLYING IN THE INSTANT
CASE THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN THE CASE OF TEVES VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN WHICH SPECIFICALLY CATEGORIZED THE CRIME OF
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT FOR WHICH RESPONDENT WAS
CONVICTED AS A CRIME WHICH INVOLVES MORAL TURPITUDE.

III. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED IN

GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION IN NOT AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE CSC-ROII WHICH DISMISSED FROM THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE OFFENSE OF
CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.23

In this case, the substantive issue for resolution is whether or not Salvador was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the procedural issues
of res judicataand forum shopping were raised by the respondent.

The Ruling of the Court

As previously recited, this petition arose from the second administrative complaint filed
by Pagaduan against Salvador. The first administrative complaint was for the offenses
of falsification and misrepresentation, where the CSC-RO II found her to be liable for
simple misconduct only. The CSC decision affirming the said CSC-RO II decision
became final and executory, and Salvador served the penalty of one (1) month
suspension.

Meanwhile, the October 22, 2008, MTCC decision24 in the criminal case filed by
Pagaduan against Salvador, finding the latter guilty of the crime of falsification of public
document, attained finality as Salvador did not appeal. By reason of the said conviction,
Pagaduan filed the second administrative complaint for the offense of conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude.

Before discussing the substantial aspect of the case, the issues on the procedural
aspect shall first be addressed.

In her Comment,25 Salvador invoked res judicataand forum shopping in arguing that the
second administrative case was already barred by the prior administrative case against
her. It was her contention that both cases involved the same parties, the same facts and
issues, although with different causes of action.26

The principle of res judicatais applicable either by way of "bar by prior judgment" or by
"conclusiveness of judgment." Here, Salvador's defense was res judicataby
conclusiveness of judgment. In Borra v. Court of Appeals,27the Court stated that:

Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question

has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by
a court of competent jurisdiction.The fact or question settled by final judgment or order
binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-
interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and
unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled
fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same
parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only
the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment. [Emphasis supplied]

Contrary to Salvador's contention,however, there appears to be no identity of issues

and facts in the two administrative cases.1âwphi1 The first case involved facts
necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The second
one involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue in the
first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second case. The only fact to consider
in the second administrative complaint is the fact ofconviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. It must be borne in mind that both administrative complaints were based on
different grounds. The grounds were separate and distinct from each other and entailed
different sets of facts.

Corollarily, Pagaduan cannot be liable for forum shopping. The established rule is that
for forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same
essential facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of actions, subject
matter, and issues.28 It exists where the elements of litis pendentiaare present, namely:
(a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in
both actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicatain the other.29 Since no res judicata exists, no
forum shopping either exists in this case.

Now on the substantial issue, Pagaduan avers that Salvador was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude - a sufficient ground for dismissal from government service. On
the other hand, Salvador argues that the falsification she committed did not involve
moral turpitude. In resolving the issue of whether Salvador was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, the existence of only two elements is necessary: (1) the
conviction of a crime, which conviction has attained finality; and (2) the crime for which
the accused was convicted involves moral turpitude. There is no dispute as to the first
element, leaving Us to determine the presence of the other.

Moral turpitude has been defined aseverything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; anact of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, 30 contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.31 Not every criminal act, however,
involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that the Court has to determine as to what
crime involves moral turpitude.32 Salvador was convicted of falsification of public
document. The MTCC found that she made an untruthful statement in a narration of
facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful intent.33 While Salvador invoked good faith
as a defense, the MTCC was not convinced, stating that good faith could not be made
to depend solely on the self-serving statement of the accused. It must be supportedby
other independent evidence.34 To the MTCC, Salvador miserably failed to clearly show
the presence of good faith. More specifically, the trial court stated:

She alleged that she honestlybelieved she was employed with VWI because Alfonso
Tuzon is the operations manager of VWI. Second, she was responsible in the
preparation of the payroll sheets of VWI.

However, the following circumstances negate the existence of good faith:

1. Accused was not included in the list of employees of VWI as shown in Exhibits
"G", "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", and "G-4," "J" and its sub-markings and "K" and its sub-
markings;

2. Accused was not in the payroll of VWI as shown in Exhibit "L";

3. Accused received her salary from Rodolfo Quiambao and not from VWI;

4. Rodolfo Quiambao, who is not a VWI employee, issued directives to the

accused;

5. Accused never went to the VWI office at Magapit, Lallo, Cagayan;

6. Accused never had any VWI identification card;

 7. Accused had no contract of employment with VWI; and finally,

8. Rodolfo Quiambao worked personally with Alfonso Tuzon and not with VWI.

These circumstances were known to the accused. Despite knowledge of these facts,
accused stated in her PDS that she was employed with VWI, thus, she perverted the
truth. Said act constitutes malice on her part negating her claim of good
faith.35 [Emphasis supplied] Granting arguendothat Salvador had no criminal intent to
injure a third person, the same is immaterial as such intent is not an essential element
of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the
falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons,
it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling
consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice
caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes
immaterial.36

Salvador did not appeal from the said judgment and, instead, filed an application for
probation which was granted.1âwphi1 It has been held that an application for probation
is an admission of guilt.37 Logically then, when Salvador applied for probation, she
admitted the making of an untruthful statement in her PDS. In Lumancas v. Intas, 38 the
Court held that "the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement
under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the
government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately
connected with such employment."39 The filing of a PDS is required in connection with
the promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal
obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of
false statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position. 40

As early as 1961, in the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,41 the Court disbarred a
lawyer on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having
found that the said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public
documents. Similarly, in In Re - Attorney Jose Avanceña,42 the said lawyer was
disbarred from the practice of law due to a conviction by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the crime of falsification of public
documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin,43 the Court reiterated that
the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and good
morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.44

Following the Court's disposition in the aforecited cases, the CSC and the CA therefore
erred in reaching a conclusion to the contrary, especially that Salvador's conviction for
such crime already attained finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador merely
committed a mere error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was involved. Their
position was based on the finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in the first
administrative complaint. That could not a valid basis because, as earlier pointed out,
the second case was separate and distinct from the first one.

Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the Court to determine what crime
involved moral turpitude, it ruled that Salvador's commission of the crime of falsification
of public document did not involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the CA strayed
away from the settled jurisprudence on the matter. It will beabsurd to insist that
Salvador committed a mere error of judgment when the very basis of the second
administrative charge against her was a final judgment of conviction where the trial
court found otherwise.

Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public
document is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case. The Court does not have to look
beyond what is simply apparent from the surrounding circumstances.

Finally, Salvador argues that her conviction and eventual discharge from probation
presents another administrative case to be filed against her because to do so would
defeat the purpose of the Probation Law45 which was to erase the effect of conviction
and to restore civil rights that were lost or suspended. Suffice it to state that probation
does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the penalty
imposed. While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human
material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon, probation does not obliterate the
crime for which the person under probation has been convicted. The reform and
rehabilitation of the probationer cannotjustify his retention in the government
service.46 Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused, and
not his administrative liabilities, if any. The Court once ruled in the case of Samalio vs.
Court of Appeals47 that:

Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the principal
penalty imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if the administrative case
had been decided earlier than the criminal case, still the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal could not have been suspended by the grant of probation.As petitioner himself
contends, the criminal action is separate and distinct from the administrative case. And,
if only for that reason, so is administrative liability separate and distinct from penal
liability. Hence, probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case, not its
administrative dimension.48 [Emphases supplied]

All told, if there is no compelling reason to deviate from what has already been
established, settled principles and jurisprudence should be respected. To do otherwise
would only create confusion and instability in our jurisprudence.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that a PDS is a public Document49 required of a
government employee and official by the CSC. It is the repository of all information
about any government employee or official regarding his personal background,
qualification, and eligibility. Government employees are tasked under the Civil Service
rules to properly and completely accomplish their PDS,50 in accordance with the
constitutional principle that public office is a public trust, thereby enjoining all public
officers and employees to serve with the highest degree or responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency.51 Only those who can live up to such exacting standard deserve
the honor of continuing in public service.52 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the August 31, 2012 Amended Decision53 and the February 20, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120208 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The February 28, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals is UPHELD
and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chaiorperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion or the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, but it opted not to file any
comment. In its Explanation filed on September 29, 2014, it mentioned that a
comment was attached thereto but none was attached. (Rollo, pp. 257-265)
1
Rollo, pp. 5-10; Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with
Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.
2
Id. at 11-12.
3
Id. at 101.
4
Id. at 69.
5
Id. at 47.
6
Id. at 47-50.
7
Id. at 70.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 38-46.
10
Id. at 52-56.
11
Id. at 56.
12
Id. at 57-61.
13
327 Phil 1144 (1996).
14
183 Phil 27 (1979).
15
Rollo, p. 60.
16
Id. at 61.
17
Id. at 81.
18
Id. at 85.
19
Id. at 86-87.
20
Id. at 67-88.
21
Id. at 5-10; Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with
Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.
22
Id. at 9.
23
Id. at 27-28.
24
Id. at 38.
25
Id. at 214-230.
26
Id. at 218.
27
G.R. No. 167484, September 9, 2013, 705 SCRA 222.
28
Catayas v. CA, G.R. No. 16660, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 291, 295.
29
Id.
30
PAL v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123294, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 18, 41-42.
31
RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court v. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 366,
371.
32
Teves v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009, 587 SCRA 1, 12; citing
Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 1144, 1150-1151 (1996).
33
MTCC Decision, rollo, p. 43.
34
Id. at 45.
35
Id. at 45-46.
36
Fullero v. People, 559 Phil. 524, 542 (2007).
37
Palo v. Judge Militante, 263 Phil. 315, 321 (1990).
38
400 Phil. 785 (2000).
39
Id,, citing Inting v. Tanodbayan, 186 Phil. 343, 348 (1980).
40
Id. at 799.
41
111 Phil. 569, 570-571 (1961).
42
127 Phil. 426, 429 (1967).
43
Supra note 31.
44
Id. at 371.
45
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
46
Dimapilis-Baldoz v. COA, G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013.
47
494 Phil. 456 (2005).
48
Id. at 468.
49
Fullero v. People, supra note 36.
50
Miel v. Malindog, 598 Phil. 594, 608 (2009).
51
Id. at 607-608.
52
Duque III v. Veloso, G.R. No. 196201, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 676, 682.
53
Rollo, pp. 5-10; Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with
Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.