G.R. No.

190161 October 13, 2014

ANITA N. CANUEL, for herself and on behalf of her minor children, namely:
CHARMAINE, CHARLENE, and CHARL SMITH, all surnamed CANUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, EDUARDO U. MANESE, and KOTANI
SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Facts

On July 14, 2006, Nancing R. Canuel (Nancing) was hired by respondent Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) as Third Assistant Engineer for its foreign principal,
respondent Kotani Ship management Limited (Kotani), to be deployed on board the
vessel M/V North Sea (vessel) for a period of twelve (12) months, with a basic salary of
US$640.00 a month. He underwent the required pre-employment medical examination,
4

and was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician. Thereafter, he joined
5

the vessel and commenced his work on July 19, 2006. 6

On February 20, 2007, Nancing figured in an accident while in the performance of his
duties on board the vessel, and, as a result, injured the right side of his body. On March
7

5, 2007, he was brought to Shanghai Seamen’s Hospital in Shanghai, China where he

was diagnosed to have suffered "bilateral closed traumatic hemothorax." On March 12,
8

2007, Nancing informed his wife, herein petitioner Anita N. Canuel (Anita), about the
accident and his confinement. On March 24, 2007, he was medically repatriated and
9

immediately admitted to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital under the care of a team of medical
doctors led by Dr. Benigno A. Agbayani, Jr., Magsaysay’s Medical Coordinator. Due to 10

his worsening condition, Nancing was placed at the hospital’s intensive care unit on April
8, 2007. He eventually died on April 25, 2007. Nancing’s death certificate indicated the
11 12 13

immediate cause of his death as acute respiratory failure, with lung metastasis and r/o
bone cancer as antecedent cause and underlying cause, respectively.

On May 23, 2007, Nancing’s widow, Anita, for herself and on behalf of their children,
Charmaine, Charlene, and Charl Smith, all surnamed Canuel (petitioners) filed a
complaint against Magsaysay and Kotani, as well as Magsaysay’s Manager/President,
14

Eduardo U. Manese (respondents), before the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC), docketed as NLRC-OFW Case No. (M)-07-05-01423-00, seeking to recover
death benefits, death compensation of minor children, burial allowance, damages, and
attorney’s fees.

In their defense, respondents denied any liability and contended that while Nancing died
of acute respiratory failure, the real cause of his death, as shown in the autopsy
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation, was "moderately differentiated
andenocarcinoma, pneumonia and pulmonary edema, lung tissue" or lung cancer. The 15

said illness is not work-related per advise of their company doctor, Dr. Marie Cherry Lyn
Samson- Fernando, hence, not compensable. 16

The LA Ruling

In a Decision dated December 27, 2007, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of
17

petitioners and thereby ordered respondents to pay them: (a) the aggregate sum of
US$72,000.00 consisting of US$50,000.00 as death benefits, US$21,000.00 as death
compensation for the three minor children (US$7,000.00 each), and US$1,000.00 for
burial expenses; (b) illness allowance from March 5, 2007 to April 25, 2007; (c)
_100,000.00 as moral damages; (d) _100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (e) 10% of
the total award as attorney’s fees. 18

The LA found that Nancing’s death on April 25, 2007 occurred during the term of his
twelve-month employment contract. Moreover, the evidence on record supports the
19

conclusion that his demise was caused by the injury he sustained in an accident while
performing his job on board the vessel. Hence, his death was the result of a work-related
injury that occurred during the term of his employment. Corollary thereto, the LA
20

disregarded respondents’ contention that lung cancer, a non-work related illness, caused
Nancing’s death as it was apparent that it was the injury he sustained while working on
board the vessel that triggered the deterioration of his resistance against the said illness
or any other affliction that he may have had. 21

At odds with the LA Ruling, respondents appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

Respondents’ appeal was denied by the NLRC in a Decision dated April 30, 2008.
22 23

The NLRC ruled that while respondents correctly argued that Nancing’s death did not
occur during the term of his employment pursuant to Section 18 of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) as
his employment was deemed terminated after his medical repatriation, still, it cannot be
doubted that his death was brought about by the same or similar cause or illness which
caused him to be repatriated. Thus, it sustained the findings of the LA that petitioners
24

are entitled to receive compensation for Nancing’s death. It further affirmed the award of
25

damages and attorney’s fees in petitioners’ favor but found respondents not liable for
sickness allowance and burial benefits since the same were already paid by
respondents. 26

Dissatisfied, respondents sought reconsideration but were denied by the NLRC in a

27

Resolution dated June 18, 2008, prompting them to elevate the case to the CA on
28

certiorari.
29

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA found that the NLRC Ruling was tainted with
30

grave abuse of discretion and, thus, rendered a new judgment dismissing petitioners’
complaint for death benefits. Citing the case of Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v.
31

Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer Anthony S. Allas (Klaveness), it held that the
32

death of the seafarer after the termination of his contract is not compensable, even if the
death is caused by the same illness which prompted the repatriation of the seafarer and
the termination of his contract.
33

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration therefrom was denied by the CA in a

34

Resolution dated October 30, 2009, hence, the instant petition.

35

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible
error in holding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
petitioners’ complaint for death benefits.
Petitioners claim that the death of Nancing after his repatriation is compensable because
it was the accident he suffered on board the vessel that triggered his traumatic
hemothorax, eventually leading to his acute respiratory failure, the immediate cause of
36

his death.37

Echoing the CA, respondents aver that since the Nancing’s employment contract was
deemed terminated when he was medically repatriated on March 24, 2007, petitioners
are not entitled to death and other benefits. They also maintain that Nancing died of lung
38

cancer which is not a work-related illness.39

The Court’s Ruling

The terms and conditions of a seafarer’s employment are governed by the provisions of
the contract he signs with the employer at the time of his hiring. Deemed integrated in his
employment contract is a set of standard provisions determined and implemented by the
POEA, called the "Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels," which provisions are considered to be the
minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino
seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels. 40

The provisions currently governing the entitlement of the seafarer’s beneficiaries to death
benefits are found in Section 20 of the 2000 POEASEC.

Part A (1) thereof states that the seafarer’s beneficiaries may successfully claim death
benefits if they are able to establish that the seafarer’s death is (a) work-related, and (b)
had occurred during the term of his employment contract, viz.:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of
Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US
dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four
(4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphases
supplied)

Part A (4) of the same provision further complements Part A (1) by stating the "other
liabilities" of the employer to the seafarer’s beneficiaries if the seafarer dies (a) as a
result of work-related injury or illness, and (b) during the term of his employment, viz.:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

xxxx

4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related
injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:

a. The employer shall pay the deceased’s beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the
seafarer under this Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the
Philippines at employer’s expense except if the death occurred in a port where local
government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case
death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in
accordance with the master’s best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall
communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of seafarer’s remains.

c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippines currency
equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at
the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Integral as they are for a valid claim for death compensation, the Court examines this
case according to the above-stated dual requirements.

First Requirement:

The Seafarer’s Death Should Be Work-Related.

While the 2000 POEA-SEC does not expressly define what a "work related death"
means, it is palpable from Part A (4) as above-cited that the said term refers to the
seafarer’s death resulting from a work-related injury or illness. This denotation
complements the definitions accorded to the terms "work-related injury" and "work-
related illness" under the 2000 POEA-SEC as follows:

Definition of Terms:

For purposes of this contract, the following terms are defined as follows:

xxxx

11. Work-Related Injury – injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in
the course of employment.

12. Work-Related Illness – any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an

occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set
therein satisfied. (Emphases supplied)

Given that the seafarer’s death in this case resulted from a work-related injury as defined
in the 2000 POEA-SEC above, it is clear that the first requirement for death
compensability is present.

As the records show, Nancing suffered a work-related injury within the term of his
employment contract when he figured in an accident while performing his duties as Third
Assistant Engineer at cylinder number 7 of the vessel on February 20, 2007. The 41

foregoing circumstances aptly fit the legal attribution of the phrase "arising out of and in
the course of employment" which the Court, in the early case of Iloilo Dock & Engineering
Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, pronounced as follows:
42

The two components of the coverage formula – "arising out of" and "in the course of
employment" – are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied;
however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is
unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an
uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of
the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. The words "arising
out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character,
while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which
the accident takes place.

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of
employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where
the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in
doing something incidental thereto. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
43

That Nancing was suffering from lung cancer, which was found to have been pre-existing,
hardly impels a contrary conclusion since – as the LA herein earlier noted – the February
20, 2007 injury actually led to the deterioration of his condition. As held in More Maritime
44

Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, "[i]f the injury is the proximate cause of [the seafarer’s] death or
45

disability for which compensation is sought, [his] previous physical condition x x x is

unimportant and recovery may be had for injury independent of any pre-existing
weakness or disease," viz.:

Compensability x x x does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing
at the time of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or
aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the arduous
nature of [the seafarer’s] employment had contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if
indeed it was pre-existing at the time of his employment. Therefore, it is but just that he
be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in order for an employee to recover
compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he
received the injury, or that he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his
employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of
his employees, he takes them as he finds them, and assumes the risk of having a
weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly
normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for
which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is
unimportant and recovery may be had for injury independent of any pre-existing
weakness or disease. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
46

Clearly, Nancing’s injury was the proximate cause of his death considering that the same,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, triggered the following sequence of events:
(a) Nancing’s hospitalization at the Shanghai Seamen’s Hospital where he was
47

diagnosed with "bilateral closed traumatic haemothorax"; (b) his repatriation and
48

eventual admission to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital; and (c) his acute respiratory failure,
49

which was declared to be the immediate cause of his death. 50

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, it cannot be seriously disputed that the first requirement
for death compensability concurs in this case.

Second Requirement:

The Seafarer’s Death Should Occur During The Term Of Employment.

With respect to the second requirement for death compensability, the Court takes this
opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is that the seafarer’s death should occur
during the term of his employment, the seafarer’s death occurring after the termination of
his employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a work-related injury or
illness constitutes an exception thereto. This is based on a liberal construction of the
2000 POEA-SEC as impelled by the plight of the bereaved heirs who stand to be
deprived of a just and reasonable compensation for the seafarer’s death, notwithstanding
its evident work-connection. The present petition is a case in point.
Here, Nancing’s repatriation occurred during the eighth (8th) month of his one (1) year
employment contract. Were it not for his injury, which had been earlier established as
work-related, he would not have been repatriated for medical reasons and his contract
consequently terminated pursuant to Part 1 of Section 18 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC as
hereunder quoted:

SECTION 18. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

xxxx

B. The employment of the seafarer is also terminated when the seafarer arrives at the
point of hire for any of the following reasons:

1. when the seafarer signs-off and is disembarked for medical reasons pursuant to
Section 20 (B)[5] of this Contract.

The terminative consequence of a medical repatriation case then appears to present a

rather prejudicial quandary to the seafarer and his heirs. Particularly, if the Court were to
apply the provisions of Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC as above-cited based on a
strict and literal construction thereof, then the heirs of Nancing would stand to be barred
from receiving any compensation for the latter’s death despite its obvious work-
relatedness. Again, this is for the reason that the work-related death would, by mere legal
technicality, be considered to have occurred after the term of his employment on account
of his medical repatriation. It equally bears stressing that neither would the heirs be able
to receive any disability compensation since the seafarer’s death in this case precluded
the determination of a disability grade, which, following Section 20 (B) in relation to
51

Section 32 of the 2000 POEA-SEC, stands as the basis therefor.

52

However, a strict and literal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC, especially when the
same would result into inequitable consequences against labor, is not subscribed to in
this jurisdiction. Concordant with the State’s avowed policy to give maximum aid and full
protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, contracts of labor, such as the 2000 POEA-SEC, are deemed to be so
53

impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavoured
in favor of the laborer. The rule therefore is one of liberal construction. As enunciated in
54

the case of Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC: 55

The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the
protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board
ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must [therefore] be construed and applied fairly,
reasonably and liberally in their favor [as it is only] then can its beneficent provisions be
fully carried into effect. (Emphasis supplied)
56

Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court is thus brought to the recognition that
medical repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the
2000 POEA-SEC. Accordingly, the phrase "work-related death of the seafarer, during the
term of his employment contract" under Part A (1) of the said provision should not be
strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have
precisely occurred during the term of his employment. Rather, it is enough that the
seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have
occurred during the term of his employment. Taking all things into account, the Court
reckons that it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer and
his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if
the laborer’s death was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had
harbored for his master’s profit, then it is but proper that his demise be compensated.
Here, since it has been established that (a) the seafarer had been suffering from a work-
related injury or illness during the term of his employment, (b) his injury or illness was the
cause for his medical repatriation, and (c) it was later determined that the injury or illness
for which he was medically repatriated was the proximate cause of his actual death
although the same occurred after the term of his employment, the above-mentioned rule
should squarely apply. Perforce, the present claim for death benefits should be granted.

To quell any confusion, it is but fitting to make clear that a liberal construction of Section
20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC as above-discussed would not offend the Court’s ruling in
Klaveness, which was inaccurately relied upon by the CA to justify its decision. The
57

inaccuracy so recognized stems from the glaring factual and legal variance between
Klaveness and the present case. Upon careful scrutiny, the seafarer in Klaveness was
not medically repatriated but was actually signed off from the vessel after the completion
of his contract. He was subsequently diagnosed to have urinary bladder cancer, which
was not proven to be work-related, and died almost two (2) years after the termination of
his contract of employment. Hence, since the employment contract was terminated
without any connection to a work-related cause, but rather because of its mere lapse,
death benefits were denied to the seafarer’s heirs. In contrast, the seafarer in this case
was medically repatriated due to a work-related injury which resulted to his death a
month after his confinement in a local hospital. Again, were it not for said injury, the
seafarer would not have been medically repatriated and his employment contract, in turn,
terminated. By these circumstances, it is clear that the termination of the employment
contract was forced upon by a work-related cause. As alluded earlier, it would then be
antithetical to the State’s policy on labor to deprive the seafarer’s heirs of death
compensation despite its palpable work-connection. Based on the foregoing, it is, hence,
apparent that the Court’s pronouncement herein would not conflict that in Klaveness.
Truth be told, the defining parameter in workers’ compensation cases should be the
element of work-relatedness which was clearly absent in the "contract-completion"
situation in Klaveness. To reiterate, if the death is work-related, as herein ascribed, then
58

the seafarer’s heirs should not be denied compensation.

To reinforce the point, a survey of previous Court rulings wherein death compensability
had been denied the heirs of the seafarer actually demonstrates the significance of the
work-relatedness element in workers’ compensation cases. For instance, in Gau Sheng
Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, the illness of the seafarer therein, who was terminated based on
59

mutual consent, was found to be non-compensable since he died of chronic renal failure
which was not listed as a compensable illness. Likewise, in Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil
Shipping Corp., the Court denied the claim for death compensation because the
60

seafarer therein was repatriated due to an eye injury but subsequently died of a stroke,
which was not listed as a compensable illness under the POEA-SEC. Death
compensation was also denied to the claimants in Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping
Services, Inc., since no evidence was offered to prove the cause of the termination of
61

the contract of employment, whereas it was found that the seafarer therein died three (3)
years after his disembarkation of an illness which was not shown to have been
contracted during his employment. An identical ruling was rendered in Prudential
Shipping and Management Corp. v. Sta. Rita, wherein the seafarer in said case was
62

repatriated due to umbilical hernia but died one (1) year after of cardiopulmonary arrest,
which was not, however, established as work-related. Similarly, death compensation was
denied the claimants in Ortega v. CA, considering that the seafarer therein died of lung
63

cancer which was not found to be work-related.

Meanwhile, on the opposite end of the jurisprudential spectrum, the Court, in a number of
cases, granted claims for death benefits although the seafarers’ death therein had
occurred after their repatriation primarily because of the causal connection between their
work and the illness which had eventually resulted in their death.

In the 1999 case of Wallem Maritime Service, Inc. v. NLRC, the death benefit claims of
64

the heirs of the seafarer who had died after having been repatriated on account of
"mutual consent" between him and his employer was allowed by the Court because of
the "reasonable connection" between his job and his illness. As pertinently stated in that
case:

It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or
acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is
enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development
of the disease and in bringing about his death.

It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of Faustino Inductivo’s
employment had contributed to the aggravation of his illness — if indeed it was pre-
existing at the time of his employment — and therefore it is but just that he be duly
compensated for it. It cannot be denied that there was at least a reasonable connection
between his job and his lung infection, which eventually developed into septicemia and
ultimately caused his death. As a [utility man] on board the vessel, he was exposed to
harsh sea weather, chemical irritants, dusts, etc., all of which invariably contributed to his
illness.

Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have
been in perfect condition or health at the time he contracted the disease. Every
workingman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer
is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and
assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee’s
1âwphi1

death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee
is unimportant and recovery may be had therefor independent of any pre-existing
disease. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
65

Later, the Court, in Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC – a sickness
66

and permanent disability claims case decided under the auspices of the 1984 version of
the POEA-SEC (which, unlike the present standard contract, only requires that the illness
of death occur during the term of the employment whether work-related or not) –
significantly observed that:

Even assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his employment,
this still would not deprive him of compensation benefits. For what matters is that his
work had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in
bringing about his eventual death. Neither is it necessary, in order to recover
compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect health at the time he
contracted the disease. A worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his
employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he
takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the
proximate cause of the employee’s death for which compensation is sought, the previous
physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said
death, independently of any pre-existing disease. (Emphases and underscoring
67

supplied; citations omitted)

The Court similarly took into account the work-relatedness element in granting the death
benefits claim in Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo, a 2010 case decided
68

under the 1996 POEA-SEC which operated under parameters identical to the 1984
POEA-SEC. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of that ruling:

It was established on record that before the late Lutero Remo signed his last contract
with private respondents as Cook-Steward of the vessel "M/T Captain Mitsos L," he was
required to undergo a series of medical examinations. Yet, he was declared "fit to work"
by private respondents’ company designated-physician. On April 19, 1999, Remo was
discharged from his vessel after he was hospitalized in Fujairah for atrial fibrillation and
congestive heart failure. His death on August 28, 2000, even if it occurred months after
his repatriation, due to hypertensive cardio-vascular disease, could clearly have been
work related. Declared as "fit to work" at the time of hiring, and hospitalized while on
service onaccount of "atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure," his eventual death
due to "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease" could only be work related. The death due
to "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease" could in fact be traced to Lutero Remo’s being
the "Cook-Steward." As Cook-Steward of an ocean going vessel, Remo had no choice
but to prepare and eat hypertension inducing food, a kind of food that eventually caused
his "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease," a disease which in turn admittedly caused his
death.

Private respondents cannot deny liability for the subject death by claiming that the
seafarer’s death occurred beyond the term of his employment and worsely, that there has
been misrepresentation on the part of the seafarer. For, as employer, the private
respondents had all the opportunity to pre-qualify, thoroughly screen and choose their
applicants to determine if they are medically, psychologically and mentally fit for
employment. That the seafarer here was subjected to the required prequalification
standards before he was admitted as Cook-Steward, it thus has to be safely presumed
that the late Remo was in a good state of health when he boarded the
vessel. (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
69

More recently, in the 2013 case of Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated v. Candava, also
70

decided under the framework of the 1996 POEA-SEC, the Court pronounced that the
seafarer’s death therein, despite occurring after his repatriation, remains "compensable
for having been caused by an illness duly established to have been contracted in the
course of his employment." 71

Thus, considering the constitutional mandate on labor as well as relative jurisprudential

context, the rule, restated for a final time, should be as follows: if the seafarer’s work-
related injury or illness (that eventually causes his medical repatriation and, thereafter,
his death, as in this case) occurs during the term of his employment, then the employer
becomes liable for death compensation benefits under Section 20 (A) of the 2000 POEA-
SEC. The provision cannot be construed otherwise for to do so would not only transgress
prevailing constitutional policy and deride the bearings of relevant case law but also
result in a travesty of fairness and an indifference to social justice.

For all these reasons, the Court hereby grants the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 19, 2009 and the
Resolution dated October 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104479
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated April 30, 2008 of the
National Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice