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8............................................. This article corresponds to the equal

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America, which declares that
“no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws”. Professor Willis dealing with this clause
sums up the law as prevailing in the United States in regard to it
in these words:
“Meaning and effect of the guaranty.— The guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws. It
forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification which
rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. ‘It merely
requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be
treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.' ‘The inhibition
of the amendment ... was designed to prevent any person or class
of persons from being singled out as a special subject for
discriminating and hostile legislation.' It does not take from the
states the power to classify either in the adoption of police laws,
or tax laws, or eminent domain laws, but permits to them the
exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and nullifies what they do
only when it is without any reasonable basis. Mathematical nicety
and perfect equality are not required. Similarity, not identity of
treatment, is enough. If any state of facts can reasonably be
conceived to sustain a classification, the existence of that state of
facts must be assumed. One who assails a classification must carry
the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
basis.”2
9. Having summed up the law in this way, the same learned
author adds: “Many different classifications of persons have been
upheld as constitutional. A law applying to one person or one
class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or
reason for it.” There can be no doubt that Article 14 provides one
of the most valuable and important guarantees in the Constitution
which should not be allowed to be whittled down, and, while
accepting the statement of Professor Willis as a correct exposition
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of the principles underlying this guarantee, I wish to lay

particular emphasis on the principle enunciated by him that any
classification which is arbitrary and which is made without any
basis is no classification and a proper classification must always
rest upon some difference and must bear a reasonable and just
relation to the things in respect of which it is proposed.
11.......................................... while examining it, two principles have
to be borne in mind: (1) that a law may be constitutional even
though it relates to a single individual, in those cases where on
account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to
him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be
treated as a class by himself; (2) that it is the accepted doctrine of
the American Courts, which I consider to be well-founded on
principle, that the presumption is always in favour of the
constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him
who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of
the constitutional principles. A clear enunciation of this latter
doctrine is to be found in Middleton v. Texas Power and Light
Company (248 US 152) in which the relevant passage runs as
follows:
“It must be presumed that a legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed
to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based upon adequate grounds.”
18. We are familiar with the expression “police power” which is in
vogue in the United States of America. This expression simply
denotes that in special cases the State can step in where its
intervention seems necessary and impose special burdens for
general benefit. As one of the Judges has pointed out, “the
regulations may press with more or less weight upon one than
upon another, but they are designed not to impose unequal or
unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as
little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good5”. It
need not be emphasized that the principles underlying what is
known as police power in the United States of America are not
peculiar to that country, but are recognized in every modern
civilized State. Professor Willis dealing with the question of
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classification in exercise of police power makes the following

observations:
“There is no rule for determining when classification for the
police power is reasonable. It is a matter for judicial
determination, but in determining the question of reasonableness
the Courts must find some economic, political or other social
interest to be secured, and some relation of the classification to the
objects sought to be accomplished. In doing this the Courts may
consider matters of common knowledge, matters of common
report, the history of the times, and to sustain it they will assume
every state of facts which can be conceived of as existing at the
time of legislation. The fact that only one person or one object or
one business or one locality is affected is not proof of denial of the
equal protection of the laws. For such proof it must be shown that
there is no reasonable basis for the classification.”

CharanjitLal Chowdhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41

7. All legislative differentiation is not necessarily discriminatory.
In fact, the word “discrimination” does not occur in Article 14.
The expression “discriminate against” is used in Article 15(1) and
Article 16(2), and it means, according to the Oxford Dictionary,
“to make an adverse distinction with regard to; to distinguish
unfavourably from others”. Discrimination thus involves an
element of unfavourable bias and it is in that sense that the
expression has to be understood in this context. If such bias is
disclosed and is based on any of the grounds mentioned in
Articles 15 and 16, it may well be that the statute will, without
more, incur condemnation as violating a specific constitutional
prohibition unless it is saved by one or other of the provisos to
those articles. But the position under Article 14 is different. Equal
protection claims under that article are examined with the
presumption that the State action is reasonable and justified. This
presumption of constitutionality stems from the wide power of
classifi-cation which the legislature must, of necessity, possess in
making laws operating differently as regards different groups of
persons in order to give effect to its policies. The power of the
State to regulate criminal trials by constituting different courts
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with different procedures according to the needs of different parts

of its territory is an essential part of its police power (ofMissouri v.
Lewis3). Though the differing procedures might involve disparity
in the treatment of the persons tried under them, such disparity is
not by itself sufficient, in my opinion, to outweigh the
presumption and establish discrimination unless the degree of
disparity goes beyond what the reason for its existence demands
as, for instance, when it amounts to a denial of a fair and impartial
trial. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Article 14 provides no
further constitutional protection to personal liberty than what is
afforded by Article 21. Notwithstanding that its wide general
language is greatly qualified in its practical application by a due
recognition of the State's necessarily wide powers of legislative
classification, Article 14 remains an important bulwark against
discriminatory procedural laws.

KathiRaningRawat v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123

5. The provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have come up
for discussion before this Court in a number of cases, namely,
ChiranjitLalChowdhuri v. Union of India1, State of Bombay v. F.N.
Balsara2, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar3,
KathiRaningRawat v. State of Saurashtra4, LachmandasKewalram
Ahuja v. State of Bombay5 and QasimRazvi v. State of Hyderabad6
and Habeeb Mohamad v. State of Hyderabad7. It is, therefore, not
necessary to enter upon any lengthy discussion as to the meaning,
scope and effect of the article in question. It is now well
established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does
not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.
In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two
conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification
must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of
the group and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The
classification may be founded on different bases; namely,
geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like.
What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis
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of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is

also well established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14
condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also
by a law of procedure. ………………………………….

Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955SC 191

26. It is now well-settled that the State can make a reasonable

classification for the purpose of legislation. It is equally well-
settled that the classification in order to be reasonable must satisfy
two tests: (i) the classification must be founded on intelligible
differentia and (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation
with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in
question. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the
object itself should be lawful. The object itself cannot be
discriminatory, for otherwise, for instance, if the object is to
discriminate against one section of the minority the discrimination
cannot be justified on the ground that there is a reasonable
classification because it has rational relation to the object sought to
be achieved.
27. What can be reasonable classification for the purpose of
determining compensation if the object of the legislation is to
compulsorily acquire land for public purposes?
28. It would not be disputed that different principles of
compensation cannot be formulated for lands acquired on the
basis that the owner is old or young, healthy or ill, tall or short, or
whether the owner has inherited the property or built it with his
own efforts, or whether the owner is politician or an advocate.
Why is this sort of classification not sustainable? Because the
object being to compulsorily acquire for a public purpose, the
object is equally achieved whether the land belongs to one type of
owner or another type.
29. Can classification be made on the basis of the public purpose
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for the purpose of compensation for which land is acquired? In

other words can the Legislature lay down different principles of
compensation for lands acquired say for a hospital or a school or a
Government building? Can the Legislature say that for a hospital
land will be acquired at 50% of the market value, for a school at
60% of the value and for a Government building at 70% of the
market value? All three objects are public purposes and as far as
the owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether it is one
public purpose or the other. Article 14 confers an individual right
and in order to justify a classification there should be something
which justifies a different treatment to this individual right. It
seems to us that ordinarily a classification based on the public
purpose is not permissible under Article 14 for the purpose of
determining compensation. The position is different when the
owner of the land himself is the recipient of benefits from an
improvement scheme, and the benefit to him is taken into
consideration in fixing compensation. Can classification be made
on the basis of the authority acquiring the land? In other words
can different principles of compensation be laid if the land is
acquired for or by an Improvement Trust or Municipal
Corporation or the Government? It seems to us that the answer is
in the negative because as far as the owner is concerned it does
not matter to him whether the land is acquired by one authority
or the other.
30. It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or
another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired. If the
existence of two Acts could enable the State to give one owner
different treatment from another equally situated the owner who
is discriminated against, can claim the protection of Article 14.
31. It was said that if this is the true position the State would find
it impossible to clear slums, to do various other laudable things. If
this argument were to be accepted it would be totally destructive
of the protection given by Article 14. It would enable the State to
have one law for acquiring lands for hospital, one law for
acquiring lands for schools, one law acquiring lands for clearing
slums, another for acquiring lands for Government buildings; one
for acquiring lands in New Delhi and another for acquiring lands
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in Old Delhi. It was said that in many cases, the value of the land
has increased not because of any effort by the owner but because
of the general development of the city in which the land is
situated. There is no doubt that this is so, but Article 14 prohibits
the expropriation of the unearned increment of one owner while
leaving his neighbour untouched. The neighbour could sell his
land and reap the unearned increment. If the object of the
legislation is to tax unearned increment it should be done
throughout the State. The State cannot achieve this object piece
meal by compulsory acquisition of land of some owners leaving
others alone. If the object is to clear slums it cannot be done at the
expense of the owners whose lands are acquired, unless as we
have said the owners are directly benefited by the scheme. If the
object is to build hospitals it cannot be done at the expense of the
owners of the land which is acquired. The hospital, schools etc.
must be built at the expense of the whole community.
32. It will not be denied that a statute cannot tax some owners of
land leaving untaxed others equally situated. If the owners of the
land cannot be taxed differently how can some owners be
indirectly taxed by way of compulsory acquisition? It is urged
that if this were the law it will tie the hands of the State in
undertaking social reforms. We do not agree. There is nothing in
the Constitution which debars the State from bettering the lot of
millions of our citizens. For instance there is nothing to bar
the State from taxing unearned increment if the object is to deny
owners the full benefit of increase of value due to development of
a town. It seems to us, as we have already said, that to accede to
the contentions of the appellant and the States would be
destructive of the protection afforded by Article 14 of the
Constitution. The States would only have to constitute separate
acquiring bodies for each city, or Division or indeed to achieve
one special public purpose and lay down different principles of
compensation.
33. In P. VajraveluMudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector Madras there
were two Acts under which the land of an owner could be
acquired. The land could have been acquired for various schemes
under the Land Acquisition Act, referred to as the Principal Act,
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in the judgment, and the Amending Act [The Land Acquisition

(Madras Amendment) Act, 1961]. This Court observed:
“The land could have been acquired for all the said purposes
under the Principal Act after paying the market value of the land.
The Amending Act empowers the State to acquire land for
housing scheme at a price lower than that the State has to pay if
the same was acquired under the principal Act.”
The Court examined various justifications for the classifications
which were put forth by the State, and then concluded:
“From whatever aspect the matter is looked at, the alleged
differences have no reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved. It is said that the object of the Amending Act in itself
may project the difference in the lands sought to be acquired
under the two Acts. This argument puts the cart before the horse.
It is one thing to say that the existing differences between persons
and properties have a reasonable relation to the object sought to
be achieved and it is totally a different thing to say that the object
of the Act itself created the differences. Assuming that the said
proposition is sound, we cannot discover any differences in the
people owning lands or in the lands on the basis of the object. The
object is to acquire lands for housing schemes at a low price. For
achieving that object, any land falling in any of the said categories
can be acquired under the Amending Act. So, too, for a public
purpose any such land can be acquired under the Principal Act.
We, therefore, hold that discrimination is writ large on the
Amending Act and it cannot be sustained on the principle of
reasonable classification. We, therefore, hold that the Amending
Act clearly infringes Article 14 of the Constitution and is void.”
34. In Balammal v. State of Madras3 in which the facts are
substantially similar, the Board constituted under the Madras City
Improvement Trust Act (Madras Act 16 of 1945), was authorised
by virtue of Section 71, with the previous sanction of the
Government, to acquire land under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 for carrying out any of the purposes of the
Act which included town Expansion Scheme (This Section 71 is
equivalent to Section 59 of the Improvement Act). For the purpose
of acquiring land for the Board under the Land Acquisition Act,
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1894, Section 73 provided inter alia, that the said Act shall be
subjected to the modifications specified in the Schedule (This
Section 73 corresponds to Section 61 of the Improvement Act). The
Schedule to the Act provided for modification in the Land
Acquisition Act for certain specific purposes. The Madras Act of
1945 as replaced by the Madras City Improvement Trust Act
(Madras Act 37 of 1950) made an important change inasmuch as
the result was that by the change persons whose lands were
compulsorily acquired under the Madras Act 37 of 1950 were
deprived of the right to the solatium which would be awardable if
the lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. In this
connection this Court observed:
“But, in our Judgment, counsel for the owners is right in
contending that sub-clause (2) of clause 6 of the Schedule to Act 37
of 1950, insofar as it deprived the owners of the lands of the
statutory addition to the market value of the lands under Section
23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act is violative of the equality clause
of the Constitution, and is on that account void. If the State had
acquired the lands for improvement of the town under the Land
Acquisition Act, the acquiring authority was bound to award in
addition to the market value 15% statutory under Section 23(2) of
Land Acquisition Act. But by acquiring the lands under the Land
Acquisition Act as modified by the Schedule to the Madras City
Improvement Trust Act 37 of 1950 for the Improvement Trust
which is also a public purpose the owners are, it is claimed,
deprived of the right to that statutory addition. An owner of land
is ordinarily entitled to receive the solatium in addition to the
market value for compulsory acquisition of his land, if it is
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, but not if it is acquired
under the Madras City Improvement Trust Act. A clear case of
discrimination which infringes the guarantee of equal protection
of the law arises, and the owners of the lands which are
compulsorily acquired must on the decisions of this Court, be
deemed invalid.”
After reviewing some earlier cases, the Court held:
“We therefore, hold that clause 6, sub-clause (2) of the Schedule,
read with Section 73 of Madras Act 37 of 1950 which deprives the
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owners of the statutory right to solatium at the rate of 15% on the

market value of the lands, is invalid, and the owners of the lands
are entitled to the statutory solatium under Section 23(2) of the
Land Acquisition Act in consideration of compulsory acquisition
of their land.”

Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500

17. In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar15 this Court

considered the interplay of the doctrines of equality and
classification and held‡: (AIR p. 547, para 11)
“5. … It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the
purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of
permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that
are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that
that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought
to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be
founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to
objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there
must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object
of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the
decisions of [Supreme Court] that Article 14 condemns
discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of
procedure.”
Speaking for the Court, S.R. Das, C.J. enunciated some principles,
which have been referred to and relied on in all subsequent
judgments. These are: (AIR pp. 547-48, para 11)
“11. … (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates
to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances
or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that
single individual may be treated as a class by himself;
(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who
attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the
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constitutional principles;
(c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds;
(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and
may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is
deemed to be the clearest;
(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the
court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge,
matters of common report, the history of times and may assume
every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of
legislation; and
(f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions
on the part of a legislature are to be resumed (sic presumed), if
there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding
circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the
classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the
presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of
always holding that there must be some undisclosed and
unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or
corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.”

18. In Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India16 the Court observed that
Article 14 ensures to every person equality before law and equal
protection of the laws. However, the constitutional code of
equality and equal opportunity does not mean that the same laws
must be applicable to all persons. It does not compel the State to
run “all its laws in the channels of general legislation”. It
recognises that having regard to differences and disparities which
exist among men and things, they cannot all be treated alike by
the application of the same laws. “To recognise marked
differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard practical
differences and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless
logic.”†† (SCC p. 103, para 23) The legislature must necessarily, if
it is to be effective at all in solving the manifold problems which
continually come before it, enact special legislation directed
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towards specific ends limited in its application to special classes of

persons or things. “Indeed, the greater part of all legislation is
special, either in the extent to which it operates, or the objects
sought to be attained by it.”††† (SCC p. 103, para 23) At the same
time, the Court cautioned against the ready-made invoking of the
doctrine of classification to ward off every challenge to the
legislative instruments on the ground of violation of equality
clause and observed: (SCC pp. 103-04, paras 24-26)
“24. … The equal protection of the laws is a ‘pledge of the
protection of equal laws’. But laws may classify. And, as pointed
out by Justice Brawer, ‘the very idea of classification is that of
inequality’. The Court has tackled this paradox over the years and
in doing so, it has neither abandoned the demand for equality nor
denied the legislative right to classify. It has adopted a middle
course of realistic reconciliation. It has resolved the contradictory
demands of legislative specialisation and constitutional generality
by a doctrine of reasonable classification. This doctrine recognises
that the legislature may classify for the purpose of legislation but
requires that the classification must be reasonable. It should
ensure that persons or things similarly situated are all similarly
treated. The measure of reasonableness of a classification is the
degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated.
25. … A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons or
things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. There
should be no discrimination between one person or thing and another, if
as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is
substantially the same. This is sometimes epigrammatically
described by saying that what the constitutional code of equality
and equal opportunity requires is that among equals, the law
should be equal and that like should be treated alike. But the basic
principle underlying the doctrine is that the legislature should
have the right to classify and impose special burdens upon or
grant special benefits to persons or things grouped together under
the classification, so long as the classification is of persons or
things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
legislation, so that all persons or things similarly situated are
treated alike by law. The test which has been evolved for this purpose
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is—and this test has been consistently applied by this Court in all
decided cases since the commencement of the Constitution—that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes certain persons or things that are grouped together from
others and that differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the legislation.
26. … We have to be constantly on our guard to see that this test
which has been evolved as a matter of practical necessity with a
view to reconciling the demand for equality with the need for
special legislation directed towards specific ends necessitated by
the complex and varied problems which require solution at the
hands of the legislature, does not degenerate into rigid formula to
be blindly and mechanically applied whenever the validity of any
legislation is called in question. The fundamental guarantee is of
equal protection of the laws and the doctrine of classification is
only a subsidiary rule evolved by courts to give a practical content
to that guarantee by accommodating it with the practical needs of
the society and it should not be allowed to submerge and drown
the precious guarantee of equality. The doctrine of classification
should not be carried to a point where instead of being a useful
servant, it becomes a dangerous master, for otherwise, as pointed
out by Chandrachud, J., in State of J&K v. TrilokiNath Khosa17 ‘the
guarantee of equality will be submerged in class legislation
masquerading as laws meant to govern well-marked classes
characterised by different and distinct attainments’.
Overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or an anxious and
sustained attempt to discover some basis for classification may
gradually and imperceptibly deprive the guarantee of equality of
its spacious content. That process would inevitably end in
substituting the doctrine of classification for the doctrine of
equality: the fundamental right to equality before the law and
equal protection of the laws may be replaced by the overworked
methodology of classification. Our approach to the equal
protection clause must, therefore, be guided by the words of
caution uttered by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of J&K v. TrilokiNath
Khosa17: (at SCC p. 42, para 57)
‘57. Mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions are false to
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our egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward

classifications plainly promoting relevant goals can have
constitutional validity. To overdo classification is to undo
equality.’ ”
(emphasis added)
19. In LIC of India v. Consumer Education & Research Centre18 the
Court reiterated the abovenoted principle in the following words:
(SCC pp. 502-03, para 30)
“30. … The doctrine of classification is only a subsidiary rule
evolved by the courts to give practical content to the doctrine of
equality, overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or anxious
or sustained attempt to discover some basis for classification may
gradually and imperceptibly erode the profound potency of the
glorious content of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution. The overemphasis on classification would inevitably
result in substitution of the doctrine of classification to the
doctrine of equality and the Preamble of the Constitution which is
an integral part and scheme of the Constitution. Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India19 ratio extricated it from this moribund and put its
elasticity for egalitarian pathfinder lest the classification would
deny equality to the larger segments of the society. The
classification based on employment in government, semi-
government and reputed commercial firms has the insidious and
inevitable effect of excluding lives in vast rural and urban areas
engaged in unorganised or self-employed sectors to have life
insurance offending Article 14 of the Constitution and socio-
economic justice.”

Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287

DISCRIMINAITON
Discrimination
71. We also have to consider the submissions made on behalf of
Respondent 1 that the denial of allotment to major sons of
agricultural land would amount to hostile discrimination as in
earlier cases it had been granted.
72. Unequals cannot claim equality. In Madhu Kishwar v. State of
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Bihar57 it has been held by this Court that every instance of

discrimination does not necessarily fall within the ambit of Article
14 of the Constitution.
73. Discrimination means an unjust, an unfair action in favour of
one and against another. It involves an element of intentional and
purposeful differentiation and further an element of unfavourable
bias; an unfair classification. Discrimination under Article 14 of
the Constitution must be conscious and not accidental
discrimination that arises from oversight which the State is ready
to rectify. [Vide Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra58, and
Video Electronics (P) Ltd. v. State of Punjab59.]
74. However, in Vishundas Hundumal v. State of M.P.60 and Eskayef
Ltd. v. CCE61, this Court held that when discrimination is glaring,
the State cannot take recourse to inadvertence in its action
resulting in discrimination. In a case where denial of equal
protection is complained of and the denial flows from such action
and has a direct impact on the fundamental rights of the
complainant, a constructive approach to remove the
discrimination by putting the complainant in the same position as
others enjoying favourable treatment by inadvertence of the State
authorities, is required.

State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639

18. It is well-settled law that Article 14 forbids class legislation,

however, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the
purpose of legislation. Therefore, it is permissible in law to have
class legislation provided the classification is founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that
are grouped together from others left out of the group and that
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differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be

achieved by the statute in question. Law also permits a
classification even if it relates to a single individual, if, on account
of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him, and
not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a
class by himself. It should be presumed that the legislature has
correctly appreciated the need of its people and that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds. There is further
presumption in favour of the legislature that legislation had been
brought with the knowledge of existing conditions. The good faith
on the legislature is to be presumed, but if there is nothing on the
face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice
of the court on which the classification may reasonably be
regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be
carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some
undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain
individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating
legislation. The law should not be irrational, arbitrary and
unreasonable inasmuch as there must be nexus to the object
sought to be achieved by it. (Vide Budhan Choudhry v. State of
Bihar2 and Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar3.)

A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation v. B. Narasimha

Reddy, (2011) 9 SCC 286
16. ..................................It must therefore now be taken to be well
settled that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because any†
action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of
equality. The doctrine of classification which is evolved by the
courts is not paraphrase of Article 14 nor is it the objective and
end of that article. It is merely a judicial formula for determining
whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary
and therefore constituting denial of equality. If the classification is
not reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions referred to
above, the impugned legislative or executive action would plainly
be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Article 14 would
be breached.
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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Ajay Hasia v. Khalid MujibSehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722

The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and
16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination.
…………………… it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic
or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to
truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would
be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept
with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed,
cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits.
From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to
arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn
enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the
other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an
act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according
to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative
of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public
employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16
strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and
equality of treatment.

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3

Ajay Hasia v. Khalid MujibSehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722:
The content and reach of Article 14 must not be confused with the
doctrine of classification. Unfortunately, in the early stages of the
evolution of our constitutional law, Article 14 came to be
identified with the doctrine of classification because the view
taken was that that article forbids discrimination and there would
be no discrimination where the classification making the
differentia fulfils two conditions, namely, (i) that the classification
is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of
the group; and (ii) that that differentia has a rational relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislative or
executive action. ……………………..In E.P. Royappa v. State of
Tamil Nadu this Court …………..pointed out that that article has
highly activist magnitude and it embodies a guarantee against
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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arbitrariness.(16)

This extract is taken from D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1

SCC 305, at page 316 :
10. The scope, content and meaning of Article 14 of the
Constitution has been the subject-matter of intensive examination
by this Court in a catena of decisions. It would, therefore, be
merely adding to the length of this judgment to recapitulate all
those decisions and it is better to avoid that exercise save and
except referring to the latest decision on the subject in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India1 from which the following observation
may be extracted: (SCC pp. 283-84, para 7)
“[W]hat is the content and reach of the great equalising principle
enunciated in this article? There can be no doubt that it is a
founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which
rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And,
therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or
lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to
truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would
be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept
with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned
within traditional and doctrinaire limits.... Article 14 strikes at
arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of
treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well
as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or
nonarbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding
omnipresence....”
11. The decisions clearly lay down that though Article 14 forbids
class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the
purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of
permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled viz. (i)
that the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii) that that
differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be
achieved by the statute in question (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v.
Justice S.R. Tendolkar2). The classification may be founded on
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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differential basis according to objects sought to be achieved but

what is implicit in it is that there ought to be a nexus i.e. causal
connection between the basis of classification and object of the
statute under consideration. It is equally well settled by the
decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination
not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.
12. After an exhaustive review of almost all decisions bearing on
the question of Article 14, this Court speaking through
Chandrachud, C.J. in In re Special Courts Bill, 19783 restated the
settled propositions which emerged from the judgments of this
Court undoubtedly insofar as they were relevant to the decision
on the points arising for consideration in that matter. Four of them
are apt and relevant for the present purpose and may be
extracted. They are: (SCC pp. 424-25, para 72)
“* * *
(3)The constitutional command to the State to afford equal
protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention
and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need
not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion
of persons or things. The courts should not insist on delusive
exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of
classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it
is not palpably arbitrary.
(4)The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that
the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within
the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made
available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It
only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation,
and there should be no discrimination between one person and
another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their
position is substantially the same.
* * *
(6)The law can make and set apart the classes according to the
needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by
experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.

(7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational,
that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or
characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped
together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or
characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the
legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped
together from others and (2) that that differentia must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
* * *”

13. The other facet of Article 14 which must be remembered is that

it eschews arbitrariness in any form. Article 14 has, therefore, not
to be held identical with the doctrine of classification. As was
noticed in Maneka Gandhi case1 in the earliest stages of evolution
of the constitutional law, Article 14 came to be identified with the
doctrine of classification because the view taken was that Article
14 forbids discrimination and there will be no discrimination
where the classification making the differentia fulfils the
aforementioned two conditions. However, in E.P. Royappa v. State
of T.N. it was held that the basic principle which informs both
Article 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination.
This Court further observed as under: (SCC p. 38, para 85)
“From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to
arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies;
one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the
whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is
arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to
political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of
Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public
employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16
strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and
equality of treatment.”
14. Justice Iyer has in his inimitable style dissected Article 14 in
Maneka Gandhi case1 as under at SCR p. 728: (SCC p. 342, para 94)
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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“That article has a pervasive processual potency and versatile

quality, egalitarian in its soul and allergic to discriminatory
diktats. Equality is the antithesis of arbitrariness and ex cathedra
ipse dixit is the ally of demagogic authoritarianism. Only knight-
errants of ‘executive excesses’ — if we may use current cliche —
can fall in love with the Dame of despotism, legislative or
administrative. If this Court gives in here it gives up the ghost.
And so it is that I insist on the dynamics of limitations on
fundamental freedoms as implying the rule of law: Be you ever so
high, the law is above you.1”
Affirming and explaining this view, the Constitution Bench in
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid MujibSehravardi held that it must, therefore,
now be taken to be well settled that what Article 14 strikes at is
arbitrariness because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily
involve negation of equality. The Court made it explicit that
where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both
according to political logic and constitutional law and is,
therefore, violative of Article 14. After a review of large number of
decisions bearing on the subject, in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza6
the Court formulated propositions emerging from an analysis and
examination of earlier decisions. One such proposition held well
established is that Article 14 is certainly attracted where equals
are treated differently without any reasonable basis.
15. Thus the fundamental principle is that Article 14 forbids class
legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of
legislation which classification must satisfy the twin tests of
classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from
those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have
a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute
in question.
16. As a corollary to this well established proposition, the next
question is, on whom the burden lies to affirmatively establish the
rational principle on which the classification is founded correlated
to the object sought to be achieved? The thrust of Article 14 is that
the citizen is entitled to equality before law and equal protection
of laws. In the very nature of things the society being composed of
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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unequals a welfare State will have to strive by both executive and

legislative action to help the less fortunate in the society to
ameliorate their condition so that the social and economic
inequality in the society may be bridged. This would necessitate a
legislation applicable to a group of citizens otherwise unequal and
amelioration of whose lot is the object of State affirmative action.
In the absence of doctrine of classification such legislation is likely
to flounder on the bed rock of equality enshrined in Article 14.
The Court realistically appraising the social stratification and
economic inequality and keeping in view the guidelines on which
the State action must move as constitutionally laid down in Part
IV of the Constitution, evolved the doctrine of classification. The
doctrine was evolved to sustain a legislation or State action
designed to help weaker sections of the society or some such
segments of the society in need of succour. Legislative and
executive action may accordingly be sustained if it satisfies the
twin tests of reasonable classification and the rational principle
correlated to the object sought to be achieved. The State, therefore,
would have to affirmatively satisfy the Court that the twin tests
have been satisfied. It can only be satisfied if the State establishes
not only the rational principle on which classification is founded
but correlate it to the objects sought to be achieved.The State,
therefore, would have to affirmatively satisfy the Court that the
twin tests have been satisfied. It can only be satisfied if the State
establishes not only the rational principle on which classification
is founded but correlate it to the objects sought to be achieved.
This approach is noticed in RamanaDayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India7 when at SCR p. 1034 (SCC p. 506), the
Court observed that a discriminatory action of the Government is
liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the
Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based
on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational,
unreasonable or discriminatory.

D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, at page 318

11. In MalpeVishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 2

Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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SCC 1 this Court emphasised the need for social legislations like
the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so
as to be just to law. “The law ought not to be unjust to one and
give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of
the society.” (SCC p. 22, para 29)
Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, (2010) 12 SCC 740
Principles applicable to Article 14
38. Article 14 reads:
“14. Equality before law.—The State shall not deny to any person
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India.”
The first part of Article 14, which was adopted from the Irish
Constitution, is a declaration of equality of the civil rights of all
persons within the territories of India. It enshrines a basic
principle of republicanism. The second part, which is a corollary
of the first and is based on the last clause of the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, enjoins
that equal protection shall be secured to all such persons in the
enjoyment of their rights and liberties without discrimination of
favouritism. It is a pledge of the protection of equal laws, that is,
laws that operate alike on all persons under like circumstances25.
39. Article 14 of the Constitution incorporates concept of equality
and equal protection of laws. The provisions of Article 14 have
engaged the attention of this Court from time to time. The
plethora of cases dealing with Article 14 has culled out principles
applicable to aspects which commonly arise under this article.
Among those, may be mentioned, the decisions of this Court in
CharanjitLal Chowdhury68, F.N. Balsara69, Anwar Ali Sarkar70,
KathiRaning Rawat71, LachmandasKewalram Ahuja72, Syed Qasim
Razvi73, Habeeb Mohamed74, KedarNath Bajoria75 and innovated to
even associate the members of this Court to contribute their V.M.
Syed Mohammad & Co.76 Most of the above decisions were
considered in Budhan Choudhry77.
40. This Court exposited the ambit and scope of Article 14 in
Budhan Choudhry77 as follows: (SCC p. 193, para 5)
“5. … It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of

permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that
are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii)
that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification
may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or
according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary
is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification
and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well
established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14
condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also
by a law of procedure.”
41. In Ram Krishna Dalmia49, the Constitution Bench of five Judges
further culled out the following principles enunciated in the
above cases: (AIR pp. 547-48, para 11)
“11. … (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates
to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances
or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that
single individual may be treated as a class by himself;
(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who
attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the
constitutional principles;
(c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds;
(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and
may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is
deemed to be the clearest;
(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the
court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge,
matters of common report, the history of the times and may
assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the
time of legislation; and
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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(f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions
on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing
on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought
to the notice of the court on which the classification may
reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of
constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding
that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for
subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or
discriminating legislation.”
42. In Ram Krishna Dalmia49, it was emphasised that: (AIR p. 548,
para 11)
“11. … the above principles will have to be constantly borne in
mind by the court when it is called upon to adjudge the
constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory
and violative of the equal protection of laws.”
43. Having culled out the above principles, the Constitution Bench
in Ram Krishna Dalmia49, further observed that the statute which
may come up for consideration on the question of its validity
under Article 14 of the Constitution may be placed in one or other
of the following five classes: (AIR pp. 548-49, para 12)
“12. … (i) A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to
whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the
classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of
the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding
circumstances known to or brought to the notice of the court. In
determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court
has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably
regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes
such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the
group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether
the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a
particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or
things. Where the court finds that the classification satisfies the
tests, the court will uphold the validity of the law.
(ii) A statute may direct its provisions against one individual
person or thing or to several individual persons or things but no
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be

deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of
common knowledge. In such a case the court will strike down the
law as an instance of naked discrimination….
(iii) A statute may not make any classification of the persons or
things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it
to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons
or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the
question of the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court
will not strike down the law out of hand only because no
classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to
the Government to make the selection or classification but will go
on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any
principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by
the Government in the matter of the selection or classification.
After such scrutiny the court will strike down the statute if it does
not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of
discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or
classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the
delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the
Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or
things similarly situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is
inherent in the statute itself. In such a case the court will strike
down both the law as well as the executive action taken under
such law….
(iv) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or
things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it
to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the
persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply but may at
the same time lay down a policy or principle for the guidance of
the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such
selection or classification….
(v) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things
to whom their provisions are intended to apply and leave it to the
discretion of the Government to select or classify the persons or
things for applying those provisions according to the policy or the
principle laid down by the statute itself for guidance of the
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such

selection or classification. If the Government in making the
selection or classification does not proceed on or follow such
policy or principle … that in such a case the executive action but
not the statute should be condemned as unconstitutional.”
44. In Vithal Rao30, the five-Judge Constitution Bench had an
occasion to consider the test of reasonableness under Article 14 of
the Constitution. It noted that: (SCC p. 506, para 26)
“26. … the State can make a reasonable classification for the
purpose of legislation [and] that the classification in order to be
reasonable must satisfy two tests: (i) the classification must be
founded on intelligible differentia, and (ii) the differentia must
have a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by
the legislation in question.”
The Court emphasised that in this regard object itself should be
lawful and it cannot be discriminatory. If the object is to
discriminate against one section of the minority, the
discrimination cannot be justified on the ground that there is a
reasonable classification because it has rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved.
45. The constitutionality of the Special Courts Bill, 1978 came up
for consideration in Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re25 as the
President of India made a reference to this Court under Article
143(1) of the Constitution for consideration of the question
whether the “Special Courts Bill” or any of its provisions, if
enacted would be constitutionally invalid. The seven-Judge
Constitution Bench dealt with the scope of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Noticing the earlier decisions of this Court in
BudhanChoudhry77, Ram Krishna Dalmia49, C.I. Emden78, Kangshari
Haldar79, Jyoti Pershad57 and Shri Ambica Mills Ltd.80, in the
majority judgment the then Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud,
inter alia, exposited the following propositions relating to Article
14: (Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re25, SCC pp. 424-26, para 72)
“(1) * * *
(2) The State, in the exercise of its governmental power, has of
necessity to make laws operating differently on different groups
or classes of persons within its territory to attain particular ends in
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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giving effect to its policies, and it must possess for that purpose
large powers of distinguishing and classifying persons or things
to be subjected to such laws.
(3) The constitutional command to the State to afford equal
protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention
and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need
not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion
of persons or things. The courts should not insist on delusive
exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of
classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not
palpably arbitrary.
(4) The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that
the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within
the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made
available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It
only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation,
and there should be no discrimination between one person and
another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their
position is substantially the same.
(5) By the process of classification, the State has the power of
determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of
legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.
This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some
inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of
well-defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal
protection on the ground that it has no application to other
persons. Classification thus means segregation in classes which
have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties
and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does not
mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily.
(6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the
needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by
experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the
classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.
(7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational,
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or

characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped
together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or
characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the
legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped
together from others, and (2) that that differentia must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
(8) The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the
object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that
there must be a nexus between them. In short, while Article 14
forbids class discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing
liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number
of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges
sought to be conferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it
does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation,
provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense
abovementioned.
(9) If the legislative policy is clear and definite and as an effective
method of carrying out that policy a discretion is vested by the
statute upon a body of administrators or officers to make selective
application of the law to certain classes or groups of persons, the
statute itself cannot be condemned as a piece of discriminatory
legislation. In such cases, the power given to the executive body
would import a duty on it to classify the subject-matter of
legislation in accordance with the objective indicated in the
statute. If the administrative body proceeds to classify persons or
things on a basis which has no rational relation to the objective of
the legislature, its action can be annulled as offending against the
equal protection clause. On the other hand, if the statute itself
does not disclose a definite policy or objective and it confers
authority on another to make selection at its pleasure, the statute
would be held on the face of it to be discriminatory, irrespective
of the way in which it is applied.
(10) Whether a law conferring discretionary powers on an
administrative authority is constitutionally valid or not should
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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not be determined on the assumption that such authority will act

in an arbitrary manner in exercising the discretion committed to
it. Abuse of power given by law does occur; but the validity of the
law cannot be contested because of such an apprehension.
Discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power.
(11) Classification necessarily implies the making of a distinction
or discrimination between persons classified and those who are
not members of that class. It is the essence of a classification that
upon the class are cast duties and burdens different from those
resting upon the general public. Indeed, the very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality.
(12) Whether an enactment providing for special procedure for
the trial of certain offences is or is not discriminatory and violative
of Article 14 must be determined in each case as it arises, for, no
general rule applicable to all cases can safely be laid down. A
practical assessment of the operation of the law in the particular
circumstances is necessary.
(13) A rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within
the purview of Article 14 as any rule of substantive law and it is
necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to
avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and for
defence with like protection and without discrimination.”
46. In Nergesh Meerza29, the three-Judge Bench of this Court while
dealing with the constitutional validity of Regulation 46(i)(c) of
the Air India Employees’ Service Regulations (referred to as “the
AI Regulations”) held that certain conditions mentioned in the
Regulations may not be violative of Article 14 on the ground of
discrimination but if it is proved that the conditions laid down are
entirely unreasonable and absolutely arbitrary, then the
provisions will have to be struck down. With regard to due
process clause in the American Constitution and Article 14 of our
Constitution, this Court referred to Anwar Ali Sarkar70, and
observed that the due process clause in the American Constitution
could not apply to our Constitution. The Court also referred to
A.S. Krishna81 wherein VenkataramaAyyar, J. observed: (AIR p.
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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303, para 13)

“13. … The law would thus appear to be based on the due process
clause, and it is extremely doubtful whether it can have
application under our Constitution.”
47. In D.S. Nakara20, the Constitution Bench of this Court had an
occasion to consider the scope, content and meaning of Article 14.
The Court referred to earlier decisions of this Court and in para
15, the Court observed: (SCC pp. 317-18)
“15. Thus the fundamental principle is that Article 14 forbids class
legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of
legislation which classification must satisfy the twin tests of
classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from
those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have
a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute
in question.”
48. In E.P. Royappa38, it has been held by this Court that the basic
principle which informs both Articles 14 and 16 are equality and
inhibition against discrimination. This Court observed in para 85
as under: (SCC p. 38)
“85. … From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to
arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies;
one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the
whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is
arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to
political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of
Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public
employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16
strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and
equality of treatment.”
Court’s approach
49. Where there is challenge to the constitutional validity of a law
enacted by the legislature, the Court must keep in view that there
is always a presumption of constitutionality of an enactment, and
a clear transgression of constitutional principles must be shown.
The fundamental nature and importance of the legislative process
needs to be recognised by the Court and due regard and
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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deference must be accorded to the legislative process. Where the

legislation is sought to be challenged as being unconstitutional
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court must
remind itself to the principles relating to the applicability of
Article 14 in relation to invalidation of legislation. The two
dimensions of Article 14 in its application to legislation and
rendering legislation invalid are now well recognised and these
are: (i) discrimination, based on an impermissible or invalid
classification, and (ii) excessive delegation of powers; conferment
of uncanalised and unguided powers on the executive, whether in
the form of delegated legislation or by way of conferment of
authority to pass administrative orders—if such conferment is
without any guidance, control or checks, it is violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. The Court also needs to be mindful that a
legislation does not become unconstitutional merely because there
is another view or because another method may be considered to
be as good or even more effective, like any issue of social, or even
economic policy. It is well settled that the courts do not substitute
their views on what the policy is.

Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682

LIST OF JUDGMENTS
1. KathiRaningRawat v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1952 SC 123
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3
9. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid MujibSehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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10. D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305

11.
12. Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 287
13. Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali (2010) 12 SCC 740
14. Subramanian Swamy v. CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682
15.
16.
17.

GROUNDS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY LITIGANTS

Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. BrojoNathGanguly, (1986)
3 SCC 156
that the power conferred by Rule 9(i) was arbitrary and uncanalized
as it did not set out any guidelines for the exercise of that power and
that even assuming it may not be void as a contract, in any event it
offended Article 14 as it conferred an absolute and arbitrary power
upon the Corporation.

Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305

the Act and the Order are violative of the provisions of Article 14 of
the constitution inasmuch as their avowed object is to promote
arbitrarily the interests of some newspaper at the expense of others.
They contend that inequality is writ large in the provisions of the Act
and of the Order and that there is no reasonable classification or basis
or any rational relationship between the restrictions imposed and the
objects sought to be achieved. According to them, while the
established newspapers will be hardly affected by these provisions
those that are endeavouring to come up will be hampered in their
progress.

The decision denying them exemption is contrary to Section 21(3)

which does not countenance any classification and that the
classification adopted is based on no nexus to the object of the Act.

Shri Rama Sugar Industries Ltd. v. State of A.P., (1974) 1 SCC 534
Section ARTICLE 14 Bench
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REPLY TO GROUNDS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY LITIGANTS