Statutory Construction: Cases

Midterms

I. CHAPTER ONE—Preliminary Considerations

a. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation. There is room only for application.
 Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
b. When the law is clear, it is no susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or erroneous.
 Olivia and Hermes Pascual vs. Esperanza Pascual Bautista, et al.
c. The first and fundamental duty of the Courts is to apply the law.
 People vs. Mapa
d. The duty of the Courts is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or
pity for the accused.
 People vs. Amigo
II. CHAPTER THREE—Basic Guidelines in the Construction and Interpretation of Laws
a. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
 Socorro Ramirez vs. CA
b. “Verba Legis”
 Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Imelda Salazar
c. When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.
 Felicito Basbacio vs. Sec. of DOJ
d. In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.
 JMM Promotions and Management Inc vs. National Labor Relations Commission
and Upiano Delos Santos
 Radiola Toshiba Phil. Inc. vs. IAC
e. A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not
accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.
 Manuel De Guia vs. COMELEC
f. Between 2 statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law
should prevail.
 Elena and Bernardino Salenillas vs. CA
g. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
 B/Gen. Jose Commendador, et al. vs. B/Gen. Demetrio Camera, et al.
h. Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed.
  Lydia Chua vs. Civil Service Commission and National Irrigation Administration
 City of Manila and City Treasurer vs. Judge Amador Gomez
i. The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso haben dus est” can operate and apply only if
and when the omission has been clearly established.
 People vs. Guillermo Manantan
j. Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.
Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.
 J.M Tuason and Co. Inc. et al. vs. Hon. Herminio Mariano, Manuela and Maria
Aquial, Spouses Jose and Saturnina Cordova
III. CHAPTER FOUR—Construction and Interpretation of Words and Phrases
a. When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish
 PBA vs. IAC
 Juanito Pilar vs. COMELEC
 People vs. Hon. Judge Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon
b. When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it.
 Cecilio De Villa vs. CA
c. General terms and special terms.
 Colgate-Palmolive Phil. Inc. vs. Hon. Pedro Jimenez
d. Ejusdem Generis
 People vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson
e. Rule of “ejusdem generis” merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when
legislative intent is uncertain.
 People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr. Et al.
 Misael Vera vs. Hon. Serafin Cuevas, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk, et al.
f. The express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others
 San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
g. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is
founded or with which it is associated.
 Dra. Brigida Buenaseda, et al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier, et al.
h. Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in affirmative are
mere directory.
 Manuel Fule vs. CA
i. Use of word “may” in a statute generally connotes a permissible thing while the word
“shall” is imperative.
 Purita Bersabal vs. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador
 Jenette Marie Crisologo vs. Globe Telecom, Inc. and Cesar Maureal
j. The word “must” in a statute like “shall” is not always imperative and may be
consistent with an exercise of discretion.
 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Assoc. Inc. vs. CA
 k. A “week” means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the
week on which it begins.
 PNB vs. CA
l. Proviso
 ALU-TUCP vs. National Labor Relations Commission and National Steel
Corporation
m. The term “insulating oil” comes within the meaning of the term “insulator” and
qualifies the Manila Electric Company for tax exemption.
 Acting Commissioner of Customs vs. Manila Electric Company and Court of Tax
Appeals
n. SK election cannot be considered a “regular election” for purposes of recall under Sec.
74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
 Danilo Paras vs. COMELEC
IV. CHAPTER FIVE—Presumptions in aid of construction and interpretation
a. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by the
Court.
 Aris (Phils.) Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.
 Hon. Alfredo Lim vs. Hon. Felipe Pacquing and Assoc. Development Corp.;
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. And Dominador Cepeda, Jr. Vs. Hon. Vetino Reyes and
Assoc. Development Corp.
b. The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it.
 Jovencio and Teresita Lim vs. People
c. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
 Karen Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
d. A law should not be interpreted so as to cause an injustice.
 Carlos and Casmira Alonzo vs. IAC and Tecla Padua
e. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in
terms of the new and old laws.
 Achilles Berces, Jr. Vs. Hon. Exec. Sec. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Et al.
f. Repeals of statute by implication not favoured
 Antonio Mecano vs. Commission on Audit
g. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective statute.
 Danilo Paras vs. COMELEC
h. Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the legislative
intention so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. and the Court
of Tax Appeals.
i. Presumption against undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure.
 Cesario Ursua vs. CA
j. Subtitle of the statute as intrinsic aid in determining legislative intent.
 Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. vs. COMELEC
k. The intent of the law as culled from its preamble and from the situation,
circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.
 Florencio Eugenio vs. Exec. Sec. Franklin Drilon, Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and Prospero Palmiano
 Director of Lands vs. CA

July 28, 1997

GR No. 102858

Issue:

 W/n Land Registration Court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents in
the absence of publication in a newspaper of general circulation?

Facts:

 Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title under PD No. 1529.
 Applicant died during the pendency of this petition so his heirs as represented by their (heirs’)
aunt Josefa Abistado were substituted as applicants.
 Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for “want of jurisdiction”.
 Records show that applicant failed to comply with the provisions of Sec. 23 (1) of PD 1529
requiring the applicants to:
o Publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
o Not only in the Official Gazette. Neither one nor the other is dispensable.
o Initial hearing was only published in the Official Gazette.
 CA reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the publication in the newspaper of general
circulation was merely procedural and that failure to cause such publication did not deprive the
court of its authority to grant the application.
 Hence this appeal by certiorari.

Ruling:

 No. The Land Registration Court cannot validly confirm and register the title of private
respondents.
 There was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. The statute
itself allows no excuses and the Supreme Court has no authority to dispense such mandatory
requirement.
 The law is unambiguous and its rationale is clear.
 Where the law speaks in categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation. There is room only for application.

Decision: Application for land registration was dismissed.

 Olivia and Hermes Pascual vs. Esperanza Pascual Bautista, et al.

Mar. 25, 1992

GR No. 84240

Issue:

 W/n Art. 992 of the Civil Code exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased?

Facts:

 Don Andres Pascual died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted
or spurious children.
 He was survived by the ff.:
o Adela Soldevilla de Pascual—his surviving spouse
o 6 children of Wenceslao Pascual Sr.—his full blood brother
o 7 children of Pedro Pascual—also his full blood brother
o Acknowleged natural children of Eligio Pascual—also his full blood brother (the
petitioners herein)
o Representatives of Eleuterio Pascual—his half blood brother
 RTC denied the petitioners’ hereditary rights in the intestate estate of their uncle Don Andres
Pascual.
 CA likewise dismissed this petitioned. Hence this appeal for certiorari.

Ruling:

 Yes. Art. 992 of the Civil Code exclude recognized natural children from inheritance of the
deceased.
 Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides:
o “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father/mother, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.”
 Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but the petitioners are his illegitimate children.
 Petitioners cannot represent their father in his succession to the intestate estate of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual.
 “Illegitimate” refers to both “natural” and “spurious”.
 When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of
who may be affected even if the law may be harsh or onerous.

Decision: Petitioners cannot represent their father in inheriting from the deceased.
 People vs. Patricio Amigo
Jan. 18, 1996
GR No. 116719
Issue:
 W/n the defendant’s plea for sympathy can be accepted by the Court?

Facts:

 The accused-appellant Patrico Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the RTC.
 He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 He claims that the said penalty is too cruel and harsh and pleads for sympathy.

Ruling:

 No. The Courts cannot accept his plea for sympathy.

 Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy.
 The remedy is elsewhere—clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the
legislative.
 The duty of the court is to apply disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused.

Decision: Judgement affirmed.

 Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Ester Garcia

Sept. 25, 1995

GR No. 93833

Issue:

 W/n RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation?

Facts:

 A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro Ramirez alleging that Ester Garcia (in a
confrontation in Garcia’s office) vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a manner offensive to her
dignity and personality.
 To support her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of the event which was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation she made.
 Alleging that the act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal case
before the RTC for violation of RA 4200 entitled, “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes”.
 Trial Court granted Ramirez’s motion to quash agreeing that:
o Facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200
o Violation punished under RA 4200 refers to the—taping of a communication by a person
other than a participant to the communication.
 Upon respondent’s petition for certiorari, the CA declared the trial court’s decision null and void
stating that:
o The allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under said act.

Ruling:

 Yes. RA 4200 applies to taping of a conversation by one of the parties of the conversation.
 Nowhere in the said law is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature
of the conversation as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.
 There is no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute should be a
party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
 Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms.
 Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

Decision: Petition Denied.

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Imelda
Salazar

Mar. 3, 1992

GR No. 82511

Issue:

 W/n the Labor Tribunal committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension
and dismissal of private respondent and ordering her reinstatement with 2 years backwages?

Facts:

 Imelda Salazar was employed by GMCR as a general systems analyst.

 During the course of the company internal auditor’s investigation, it appeared that she violated
company regulation by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company’s interests.
 Consequently, GMCR placed her under preventive suspension for 1 month thus, giving her 30
days to explain her side.
 However, instead of submitting an explanation, she filed a complaint against the petitioner
company for illegal suspension which she subsequently amended to:
o Illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay damages
 After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner company to reinstate her and to pay
moral damages of P50,000.00.
 On appeal, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision but limited the
backwages to a period of 2 years and deleted the award for moral damages.

Ruling:

 No. The Labor Tribunal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.
 The wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous:
o “Any employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement...and to his full backwages.”
 Verba legis
 If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it shall be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.

Decision: NLRC resolution affirmed.

 Felicito Basbacio vs. Office of the Sec., Department of Justice

Nov. 7, 1994

GR No. 109445

Issue:

 W/n the term “unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgement of acquittal” refers to all kinds of accusation and conviction?

Facts:

 Felicito Basbacio was claiming that since he was acquitted, he is entitled for compensation
under RA 7309 Sec. 3(a) which provides:
o “Any person, who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgement of acquittal.”
 However, the Board of Claims of DOJ denied his claim because:
o Considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a
land dispute and
o The fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law,
o There was basis for finding that he was “probably guilty”.
 Petitioner contends that the language of said provision is clear and does not call for
interpretation.
 The mere fact that he was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is
already unjust in itself. Therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent
before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

Ruling:

 Yes. The said provision refers to all kinds of accusation and conviction.
 The fact that his conviction is reversed and he was acquitted is not itself proof that the previous
conviction was “unjust”.
 An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons. He may be acquitted not because he is
innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt (in which case, he may be found
civilly liable).
 When the language of the statute is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.

Decision: petition dismissed.

 JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Ulpiano Delos Santos

Nov. 22, 1993

GR No. 109835

Issue:

 W/n petitioner was still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of
the POEA (Phil. Overseas Employment Administration) to the NLRC?

Facts:

 JMM Promotions and Management Inc appealed to the NLRC which dismissed their appeal on
the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond.
 JMM contends that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in applying Art. 223 of the
Labor Code and Rule 6, sec. 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC to decisions rendered
by the POEA.
 It also insisted that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for
overseas employment because under POEA Rules:
o They are already required not only to pay a license fee of P30,000.00 but also to post a
cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of P50,000.00.
 Solicitor General also sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggests that:
o The rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and
not of the POEA.
o Appeals from decisions of the POEA are governed by the provisions of the POEA rules.

Ruling:

 Yes. The petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond.

 POEA Rules are clear that:
o In addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal (in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award) is required to perfect an appeal from a
decision of the POEA.
 In interpreting a statute (or set of rules in this case), care should be taken that every part be
given effect.

Decision: Petition dismissed

 Radiola Toshiba Phil. Inc. vs. IAC

July 18, 1991

GR No. 75222

Issue:

 W/n the levy attachment is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings commenced 4 months after
said attachment?

Facts:

 Radiola Toshiba obtained a levy on the attachment against the properties of spouses Carlos and
Teresita Gatmaytan for collection of sum of money before the Court of 1st Instance.
 3 creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of the private respondent spouses.
 The real properties are registered in the said spouses’ names and eventually, Writ of Execution
was issued and the attached properties were sold at auction with Radiola Toshiba as the highest
bidder.
 Court ordered the consolidation of ownership of Radiola Toshiba over said properties but the
respondent sheriff refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favour of Radiola Toshiba in view
of the insolvency proceedings before the RTC.
 Trial court and IAC ruled against Radiola Toshiba.

Ruling:

 No. The levy on attachment in favour of the petitioner is not dissolved by insolvency
proceedings.
 Sec. 32 of the Insolvency law provides:
o There is a cut-off period—1 month in attachment cases and 30 days in judgements
entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings,
 Sec. 79 on the other hand provides:
o For the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the
commencement of proceedings in insolvency if the claim upon which the attachment
suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor.
 Therefore, there is no conflict between the 2 provisions.
 Courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all
possible.
 Construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole statute—its every word.

Decision: Judgement of the Trial Court and IAC reversed and set aside
 Manuel De Guia vs. COMELEC
May 6, 1992
GR No. 104712

Issue:
 W/n the members of the Sangguniang Bayan be continued elected at large as interpreted by
herein petitioner, Manuel De Guia?

Facts:

 COMELEC decided, that its Reso. No. 2383 which adopts rules and guidelines in the appointment
by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangg. Bayan of municipalities in Metro
Manila Area, apply to the May 1992 elections.
 Manuel de guia—an incumbent Member of the Sangg. Bayan (Municipality of Paranaque) prays
for the reversal of the position of COMELEC insofar as it affects the municipality of Paranaque
and all other municipalities in M.Mnla.
 He claims that the 2nd provision of par. C, sec. 3, RA 7166 does not specify when the member of
their Sangg. Bayan will be elected by district.
 So, he consequently relied upon the next paragraph of the same section (par. D) to support his
view that the elected members of municipalities (mentioned in par. C) should continue to be
elected at large in the May 1992 elections.
o Read 2nd provision of par. C and par. D of sec. 3, RA 7166 (pg. 50)
 Par. D states that elective members of the Sangg Panlungsod and Sang. Bayan shall be elected
at large in accordance with the existing laws.
 But beginning in 1995, they shall be elected by district.
 Therefore, De Guia insists that elected members of Sangg. Bayan of Paranaque falls under this
category and holds that they should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular
elections.

Ruling:

 The key to open the door to what the legislature intended is its purpose or the reason which
induced it to enact the statute.
 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil/ mischief to
be suppressed.
 In this case:
o The reason for the promulgation of RA 7166 is to reduce the number of positions to be
voted for in the May 1992 synchronized elections and thereby ensuring the efficiency of
the electoral process.
 If the Court will uphold De Guia/s interpretation of the law, they would be concluding in
absurdity. Because:
 o Then there would be no reason for RA 7166 to single out the single district provinces
and the municipalities (referred to in the aforementioned paragraphs) to be
apportioned at once in 2 districts each.
 If the members of their respective sangg. Will still be elected at large as they
were in the 1988 elections.
 A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish
the purpose for which the statute was enacted should be REJECTED.

B/Gen. Jose Commendador, et al. vs. B/Gen. Demetrio Camera, et al.

Aug. 2, 1991

GR No. 96948

Issue:

 W/n petitioners may use Art. 18, C.A #408 (as amended by RA 242) as a defense?

Facts:

 Petitioners are AFP officers charged for allegedly participating in the failed coup d’ etat that took
place on Dec. 1-9, 1989.
 The charges against them were:
o Violations of Articles of War (AW) 67, AW 96 and AW 94—all crimes in relation to Art.
248 of the RPC pertaining to Murder
o These charges were referred to the Gen. Court Martial.
 At the hearing, petitioners claimed that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory
challenges against the president and members of the Gen. Court Martial.
o They invoked Art. 18 of C.A#408 for this purpose.
 However, the Gen. Court Martial ruled that peremptory challenges had been discontinued
under P.D 39

Ruling:

 Peremptory challenge was originally provided for in Art. 18 of C.A#408 (Articles of War) as
amended. It states:
o Read Art. 18 (pg. 55)
 Pres. Marcos promulgated decrees during his term:
o (1972) P.D 39—This decree disallowed peremptory challenge. It also implemented Gen.
Order No 8—which created the dissolution of the military tribunals
o (1978) P.D 1498—Embodies the modified rule on challenges under P.D 39
o (1981) Proclamation No. 2045—proclaimed the termination of martial law and revoked
Gen. Order No. 8
  With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals, P.D 39 ceased
automatically.
 Because of this, the old rule embodied in Art. 18 of C.A#408 was automatically revived and now
again ALLOWS the right to peremptory challenge.
 “When the reaon of the law ceased, the law itself ceases.”

Petition was granted; they were allowed to exercise their right to peremptory challenge.

Lydia Chua vs. The Civil Service Commission, The National Irrigation Administration

Feb. 7, 1992

GR No. 88979

Issue:

 W/n a co-terminous employee is excluded from the benefits provided under RA No. 6683?

Facts:

 RA No. 6683—provides for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization.
 Sec. 2 of said act provides those who are deemed qualified to avail benefits:
o Read sec. 2, RA 6683 (pg. 58)
 Petitioner Lydia Chua filed an application with Respondent National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) believing that she is qualified to avail the benefits.
 However, her application was denied. She appealed to the Civil Service Commission but was
likewise denied as well.
 Civil Service Commission contended that her employment is co-terminous considering her
project per appointment as funded by the World Bank was already complete and that it was
only then that her position became functus oficio.

Ruling:

 No. Petitioner is not exempt from the benefits of the said law.
 A co-terminous employee is a non-carer civil servant, like casual and emergency employees.
Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in 4 successive projects during a span of 15 years. Her record
cannot be disregarded.
 RA No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees.
 Art. 3, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution provides:
o “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
  Doctrine of Implication: ‘What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed.
 Petiton was granted.

City of Manila and City Treasurer vs. Judge Amador Gomes (of the CFI of Manila and ESSO Phil., Inc.)

Aug. 31, 1981

GR No. L-37251

Issue:

 W/n the additional ½% realty tax issued in an ordinance is valid and legal?

Facts:

 RA No. 409 (Revised Charter of Manila) sec. 64—fixes the annual realty tax at 1 ½%.
 On the other hand, RA No. 5447 (Special Education Fund Law), sec. 4—imposes an annual
additional tax of 1% (on the assessed value of real property) IN ADDTION to the real property
tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws.
o BUT the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of 3%
 The municipal Board of Manila issued Ordinance No. 7125 which imposed an additional ½%
realty tax.
o Sec. 1 (read pg. 61)
 Esso Phil. Inc., paid under protest the sum of P 16,092.69 as additional ½% realty tax on its land
and machineries located in Manila.
 They filed a complaint in the Court of 1st Instance of Manila for the recovery of said amount
because the additional 1/2% is void as it was not authorized by the city charter nor by any law.
 Trial court declared the tax ordinance void. It also ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund
to Esso the said tax.
 City of Manila and its treasurer appealed to the CA, hence this petition.

Ruling:

 P.D 464 (Real Property Tax Code), sec. 39(2) provides:

o “A city council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax of not less than ½ of 1% but not
more than 2% of the assessed value of real property.”
 Sec. 41 of the same code:
o Reaffirms the 1% tax on real property for the Special Education Fund in addition to the
basic 2% realty tax.
 The Court upheld the validity of the additional ½% tax using the doctrine of implication.
o The obvious implication in this law is that an additional ½% tax could be imposed by
municipal corporations.
  The decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside.
 Doctrine of Implication: “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a
part of it as that which is expressed.”

People of the Phil. Vs. Guillermo Manantan

July 31, 1962

GR No. L-14129

Issue:

 W/n “justice of peace” is included in sec. 54 of the Revised Election Code?

Facts:

 Defendant Guillermon Manantan was charged with violation of Sec. 54 of the Revised Election
code which states that:
o Read sec. 54 (pg. 63)
 The defense counsel cited that case of People vs. Macaraeg where it was held that:
o A justice of peace is excluded from the prohibition of sec. 54 of the Revised Election
Code.
 The defense also invoked the rule of Cassus Omissus wherein:
o “a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally.”
 Court of 1st Instance dismissed the information.
 Subsequently, the Solicitor General appealed.

Ruling:

 Yes. “Justice of peace” is included by merely substitution of terms and not omission.
 Sec. 449 of the Revised Election Code provides:
o Read sec. 449 (pg. 64)
 In this section, justices of peace were expressly included because the kinds of judges were
specified.
 In sec. 54 however, there was no need any more to include justices of peace in the enumeration
because the legislature availed of a more generic and broader term “judge”. It was intended to
comprehend all kinds of judges.
 The rule of Cassus Omissus cannot be applied in this case because it can operate only if and
when the omission has been clearly established.
 Justices of peace were not excluded or omitted but merely called by another term which is
“judges”.
 Order of dismissal was set aside and the case was remanded for trial on the merits.
JM Tuason and Co., Inc., et al vs. Hon. Herminio Mariano, Manuel Aquial, Maria Aquial, Spouses Jose
Cordova and Saturnina Cordova

Issue:

 W/n the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom are valid?

Facts:

 Manuela and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance wherein they prayed
that they be declared owners of a parcel of a land located at Marikina Rizal (now Q.C).
 This land was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to him way
back on May 1877.
 They also alleged that sometime in 1960 JM Tuason and Co., had illegally entered upon that land
and that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal.
 It was registered in the names of the defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusto
(all surnamed Tuason).
 Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT. 735 be declared void due to irregularities in the land
registration proceeding. They also asked for damages.
 JM Tuason & Co., Inc filed a motion to dismiss but the trial court denied it.
 Jan. 1967, the Cordova spouses—who had bought 11 hectares of the disputed land from the
plaintiffs were allowed to intervene in the case.

Ruling:

 Yes. OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom are considered valid.
 The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceedings which led to the issuance of the
decree upon which OCT No. 735 are the same issues raised in several civil cases of the Trial
Court.
 On appeal to the SC, the decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles
therefrom were once more upheld.
 Principle of Stare Decesis was applied: “Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.”
 OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
 Juanito Pilar vs. COMELEC

July 11, 1995

GR No. 115245

Issue:

 W/n petitioner can be considered can be considered a “candidate” despite withdrawal of

candidacy?

Facts:

 On Mar. 2, 1992—Petitioner Juanito Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangg. Panlalawigan of the province of Isabela.
 3 days after, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
 COMELEC imposed upon him the fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenses.
 Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable because he was a “non-candidate”, having
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy 3 days after its filing.
 Sec. 14 of RA 7166 provides:
o Read (pg. 73)
 He also contends that the law is clear that the “candidate” must have entered the political
contest and should have either won or lost.
 COMELEC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.

Ruling:

 Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has an obligation to file his statement of
contribution and expenditure.
 In this case:
o The law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same.
o “every candidate”—must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his
campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
 Petition was dismissed.
 Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
 People of the Phil. Vs. Hon. Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon

Feb. 20, 1996

GR No. 110898

Issue:

 W/n the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent’s
application for probation? (Despite the fact that he had appealed from the judgement of his
conviction of the trial court.)

Facts:

 Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide in the RTC of Misamis
Oriental.
 RTC appreciated in his favour the mitigating circumstances of: incomplete self-defense and
voluntary surrender.
 CA affirmed private respondent’s conviction with modifications.
 Respondent Judge Anotnio Evangelista of the RTC set the case for repromulgation.
 Private respondent filed a petition for probation.
 Isaias Valdehueza (Chief Probation and Parole Officer)—recommended the denial of Tugonon’s
application for probation on the ground that:
o By appealing the sentence of the trial court (when he could have then applied for
probation)—he had waived his right to make his application.
 However, RTC still granted Tuganon’s application for probation. Hence, this petition by the
prosecution.

Ruling:

 Yes. RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting Tuganon’s application for probation.
 Sec. 4 of the Probation Law (as amended by P.D 1990) provides:
o Read sec. 4 (pg. 77)
 Tuganon’s application is covered by the prohibition that:
o “No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgement of conviction” and that
o “The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.”
 Private respondent argues that a distinction should be made between meritorious appeals (like
his appeal despite the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction.) and unmeritorious appeal.
 However, the law is clear:
o Where the law does not make any distinction, neither should the Court.
 Cecilio de Villa vs. Court of Appeals

Apr. 8, 1991

GR No. 87416

Issue:

 W/n checks drawn from a dollar account with a foreign bank are covered by the Bouncing
Checks Law (B.P Blg. 22)?

Facts:

 Petitioner Cecilio de Villa was charged before the RTC with violation of BP Blg. 22 or the
Bouncing Checks Law.
 The check in question was executed and delivered by De Villa to private respondent.
 However, he argues that the check in question was drawn against his dollar account with a
foreign bank and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law.

Ruling:

 Yes. The check in question is still covered by the Bouncing Checks Law.
 Under BP Blg. 22:
o “Foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines, though
payable outside thereof are within the coverage of said law.”
 Petition was dismissed.
 Where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Colgate-Palmolive Philippines Inc., vs. Hon. Pedro Jimenez (as Auditor General)

Jan. 28, 1961

GR No. L-14787

Issue:

 W/n foreign exchange used by the petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and
flavours is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law and is
entitled for refund under said law?

Facts:

 Colgate-Palmolive Phil. Inc.—is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws
that is engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies.
  There are several occasions when they import various materials from abroad.
 For every importation made of these materials, petitioner pays to the Central Bank of the
Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and other charges.
 This is pursuant to RA 601, commonly known as “Exchange Tax Law”. Wherein its sec. 2
provides:
o “Foreign exchange used for payment of as payment of the cost, transportation and/or
other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of stabilizer and flavours
shall be refunded to any improper making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof
of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to
sec. 7 thereof.”
 Petitioner filed with the Central Bank 3 applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax
(P113,343.99)
 The auditor of the Central Bank refused to pass in audit its claims for refund.
 Petitioners appealed to the Auditor General but it affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the
Central Bank maintaining that:
o The term “stabilizers and flavours” refers only to those used in preparation or
manufacture of food or food products.
 Not satisfied, petitioners appealed for review.

Ruling:

 Yes. It is exempted from the 17% excise tax and is entitled for refund.
 Sec. 2 of RA 601 provides:
o Read sec. 2 (pg. 80)
 The Auditor General’s ruling was based upon the principle of statutory construction that:
o “General terms must be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general
language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute’s object and
purpose.”
 However, this is only applicable to cases where all items in an enumeration belong to or fall
under one specific class.
 In this case:
o While it is true that the words preceding the term “stabilizers and flavours” is preceded
by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products,
o It is also true that the other items following it do not belong to the same classification.
(eg. “fertilizer” and “poultry feed” and “vitamin concentrate”)
 On the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term
“stabilizer and flavours” refers only to those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental
cream.
 Courts are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general
sense.
 Decision was reversed.
 Rep. Of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson

Aug. 30, 1990

GR No. 89483

Issue:

 W/n private respondent may be investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Anti-Graft
Board, an agency of the PCGG for violation of RA 3019 & RA 1379?

Facts:

 The Anti-Graft Board (of the New Armed Force of the Philippines) received information
regarding Col. Troadio Tecson’s acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income.
 Col. Tecson was then required by the Board to submit his explanation/comment together with
his supporting evidence.
 The Board proceeded with its investigation and later on submitted its resolution recommending
that Col. Tecson be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA No. 3019 and RA No. 1379 as
amended.
 Tecson filed a motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the PCGG
set the case for preliminary investigation.
 When Tecson then filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the RTC,
PCGG filed a motion to dismiss and opposed Tecson’s petition on the ground that:
o The RTC had no jurisdiction over the Board.
 Respondent judge denied this motion and granted Tecson’s application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction. Hence, this instant petition for review.
 Tecson pointed out that the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him based on the ff.
Grounds:
o He is not one of the subordinates contemplated in E.O 1, 2, 14 and 14-A and that
o The alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means (while being Finance Officer of the
Phil. Constabulary)—are acts of his own alone and not connected with being a crony,
business associate or subordinate.

Ruling:

 Yes. The PCGG has the power to investigate Col. Tecson and cause his prosecution because he is
a “subordinate” of former Pres. Marcos.
 E.O 1:
o Created the PCGG and
o Expressed the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former Pres.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, close associates both here and abroad.
 E.O 2:
 o Freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife Imelda, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.
 Rule of EJUSDEM GENERIS is applied in this case where:
o “General words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but,
o Are to be held as applying only to persons/things of the same kind/class as those
specifically mentioned.”
 In this case:
o The term “subordinate” used in E.O 1&2 would refer to one who enjoys a close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
o This is similar to the immediate family member, relative and close associate mentioned
in E.O 1 and
o The close relative, business associate, dummy, agent or nominee in E.O 2.
 The PCGG was enjoined from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private
respondent Col. Tecson.

Misael Vera (Commissioner of Internal Revenue & Fair Trade Board) vs. Hon. Serafin Cuevas, Institute
of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Phil., Inc., and Consolidated Milk Co. (Phils.) Inc., and
Milk Industries Inc.

May 31, 1979

GR Nos. L-33693-94

Issue:

 W/n the private respondents should withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products
which do not bear the inscription required by Sec. 169 of the Tax Code?

Facts:

 Misael Vera as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ordered the plaintiffs- private
respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the
inscription required by Sec. 169 of the Tax Code within 15 days from receipt of order.
 Sec. 169 of the Tax Code provides:
o Read sec. 169 (pg. 88)
 Court of 1st instance restrained the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his agents or employees
from requiring the plaintiffs-private respondents to print on the labels of their filled milk
products (required by sec. 169).
 Declaring the Commissioner’s order as null and void and without authority in law.
 Hence, this petition for review.
Ruling:

 No. The plaintiffs-private respondents are not required to withdraw all their filled milk products
from the market and the Trial court did not err in its decision.
 Sec. 169 of Tax Code does not apply to filled milk.
 Using the specific and qualifying terms “skimmed milk” in the headnote and “condensed
skimmed milk” in the text of the cited section would restrict the general clause:
o “All milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in
part.”
 In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term “skimmed milk” under the
rule of EJUSDEM GENERIS:
o “General and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they
follow in the statute.”
 Skimmed milk is different from filled milk.
o Skimmed milk—is milk in whatever form in which the fatty part has been removed.
o Filled milk—is milk to which any fat or oil other than milk fat has been added, blended
or compounded.
 It cannot be assumed that Sec. 169 applies both to skimmed and filled milk.

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

June 22, 2006

GR No. 147749

Issue:

 W/n SPMC is exempted from the payment of 3% miller’s tax?

Facts:

 SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting of

coconut oil and other allied products.
 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed and ordered it to pay the total amount of
P8,182,182.25—representing the deficiency miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax.
o The deficiency miller’s tax—imposed on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to UNICHEM
o The deficiency sales tax—applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured
products.
 SPMC appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals the denial of its protest to the said assessments.
 The CTA cancelled SPMC’s liability for deficiency manufacturer’s tax on the sales of corn and
edible oils but upheld the Commissioner’s assessment for the deficiency miller’s tax.
  SPMC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. SPMC continued to argue that it should be
exempted from miller’s tax.

Ruling:

 No. The SPMC is not exempt from tax exemption.

 The exempting clause of Sec. 168 of the Tax Code provides that:
o The tax exemption is applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra
by-products and desiccated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient
or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the
factory or by the miller himself.
 SPMC’s situation was not within the ambit of the exemption and because of this, it was subject
to the 3% miller’s tax imposed under Sec. 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
 Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does
not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed
therein.
 The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Valera

471 SCRA 715

Dra. Brigida Buenaseda, et al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier, et al.

Sept. 21, 1993

GR No. 106719

Issue:

 W/n the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working
on the offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of
administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees?

Facts:

 Petitioners Dra. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III and others seek to nullify the order of the
Ombudsman, directing their preventive suspension.
 Questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed by the
private respondents to the Ombudsman against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
  Respondents argue that under RA No. 6770, sec. 24, Ombudsman has such power of issuing
preventive suspension and has been contemplated by the Constituion. Particularly, Art. 11, sec.
13(8) which provides:
o Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such functions or duties as may
be provided by law.
 On the other hand, the Solicitor general and the petitioners invoked sec. 13(3) of the
Constitution which provides:
o That “The Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function and duty
to: direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.”
 Hence, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension himself.

Ruling:

 Yes. The Ombudsman has such power to issue a preventive suspension himself.
 Sec. 13 (3) of the Constitution—referred to “suspension” as a punitive measure.
o All the words associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases. (eg. removal, demotion, fine, censure)
o The word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words which it is
associated.
 The rule of Associated Words (Noscitur a sociis)
o Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is
found or with which it is associated.
 Sec. 24 of RA 6770—is a procedural, not a penal statute.
 Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions should be given such interpretation
that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution.
 Petition was dismissed.
 Manolo Fule vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals

June 22, 1988

GR No. L-79094

Issue:

 W/n stipulation of facts not signed by the petitioner nor by his counsel can be admissible as
evidence?

Facts:

 Manuel Fule was convicted of violation of B.P Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) by the RTC of
Lucena City on the basis of:
o Stipulation of facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the
pre-trial conference.
 The stipulation of facts was not signed by the petitioner nor by his counsel.
 However, petitioner waived his right to present evidence and submitted a memorandum
confirming the stipulation of facts.
 Respondent Court of Appeals upheld the stipulation of facts and affirmed the judgement of
conviction.

Ruling:

No. An unsigned stipulation of facts is inadmissible as evidence.

 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, sec. 4 provides:

o Read (pg. 98)
 The rule is mandatory.
o Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directional.
 In this case:
o The use of the term “shall”—further emphasizes its mandatory character which means
that
o It is imperative and operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.
 The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the
Rules, renders the stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence.
 Purita Bersabal vs. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador

July 21, 1978

GR No. L-35910

Issue:

 W/n the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time a memorandum on time would
empower the Court of First instance to dismiss an appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute?

Facts:

 Purita Bersabal was required by the Court of 1st Instance pursuant to RA 6031 (which amended
the Phil. Judiciary Act of 1948) to submit her memorandum.
 However, she failed to submit it on time. Because of this, the court of 1st Instance dismissed her
appeal.

Ruling:

 No. Court of 1st instance cannot dismiss an appeal for mere failure to submit a memorandum on
time.
 RA 6031 provides:
o Read (pg. 100)
 The word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion
while the word “shall” is imperative.
 In this case:
o Submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties so they may choose to
waive it.
o Memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are not essential requirements. They may be
submitted and/or made only if so requested.
 Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case on the basis of available evidence
and records transmitted to it.
 Order of the respondent judge was set aside and was directed to decide the case on the merits.
 Jenette Marie Crisologo vs. Globe Telecom, Inc., and Cesar Maureal (VP for Human Resources)

Dec. 16, 2005

GR No. 167631

Issue:

 W/n despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the appellant (as as a petition for review on
certiorari), the Supreme Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals?

Facts:

 Petitioner was an employer of the respondent company. When she was promoted, she became
entitled to an executive car.
 In April 2002, when she was separated from the company, she filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal and reinstatement.
 Upon pendency of her petition, respondent company filed with the RTC an action for recovery of
possession of the motor vehicle.
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied by the court.
 She then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and a motion for issuance of writ of
prohibition.
 Respondent company filed a motion to declare defendant in default which was granted by the
trial court and was allowed to present its evidence.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but again, it was denied. Trial court held:
o That the respondent company have the right of possession over the subject motor
vehicle and
o That Jenette Crisologo should pay the respondent company—damages in the form of
unpaid daily rental, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
 Petitoner then filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
 But again, it was denied by the SC for being the wrong remedy under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

Ruling:

 Yes. The SC may refer the case to the CA.

 Under Rule 56, sec. 6 (par. 2) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended:
o Read (pg. 103)
 And also under both sec. 5(f) and 6 stating:
o Read footnotes (pg. 103)
 The term “may” was used—denoting discretion on the part of the Court in dismissing the appeal
or referring the case to the CA.
 Motion for reconsideration was granted and case was referred to the CA. Petition reinstated.
 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association Inc., vs. Court of Appeals

Aug. 7, 1997

GR No. 117188

Issue:

 W/n the LGVH’s failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Sec. 46 of the
Corporation Code had the effect to automatically dissolve the said corporation?

Facts:

 LGVHAI is an association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was
registered with the Home Financing Corp., as the sole homeowners’ association in the said
subdivision. Its first president was Victorio Soliven.
 Sometime in 1989, when Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI, he had been informed by
the head of the legal department of HIGC that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved
because:
o It did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and
o There was non-user of corporate charter bec. HIGC had not received any report on the
association activities.
o This resulted in the registration of the South Association with the HIGC.
 Officers of the LGVHAI filed a complaint with the HIGC, questioning the revocation of LGVHAI’s
certificate of registration without due notice and hearing. They also prayed for the cancellation
of the certificate of registration of the North & South Associations.
 Private respondents obtained a favourable ruling from the HIGC Hearing Officer.
 South Association appealed to HIGC’s Appeals Board but it was dismissed for lack of merit.
 In turn, South Association appealed to the Court of appeals where it affirmed the resolution of
the HIGC Board. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari of the South Association.

Ruling:

 No. LGVHAI’s failure to file its by-laws within prescribed period of Corporation Code do not
automatically dissolve said corporation.
 Sec. 46 of the Corporation Code provides:
o Read (pg. 106)
 Taken as a whole, sec. 46 reveals legislative intent to attach a directory and not mandatory
pertaining to the word “must”.
 This rule out the mandatory compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws “within 1
month after receipt of official notice”.
 The word “must” in a statute, like “shall” is not always imperative and may be consistent with an
exercise of discretion.
 Petition was dismissed.
 PNB vs. Court of Appeals

May 17, 1993

222 SCRA 134

Issue:

 W/n petitioner bank complied with the requirement of weekly publication of notice of extra-
judicial foreclosure of mortgages?

Facts:

 Petitioner bank extra-judicially foreclosed the private respondent’s mortgages due to their
failure to pay the obligation. It has also won as the highest bidder at the auction sale.
 Final deed of sale was issued in favour of the petitioner bank and it later sold said lots to 3rd
persons.
 Notice of Sale of said foreclosed properties were published on Mar. 28, Apr. 11, and Apr. 12,
1969.
o Mar. 28—Friday
o Apr.11—Friday
o Apr. 12—Saturday
 Sec. 3 of Act. No. 3135 requires that:
o “The notice of auction sale shall be published once a week for at least 3 consecutive
weeks.”
 Evidently, the petitioner bank failed to comply with this requirement.

Ruling:

 Yes. PNB failed to comply with the requirement of weekly publication.

 In Concepcion vs. Zandueta and Moreno, Phil. Law Dictionary, 2nd ed:
o A “week” means a period of 7 consecutive days without regard to the day of the week
on which it begins.
 In this case:
o 1st week should be reckoned from (Mar. 28-Apr.3)
o 2nd week should be counted from (Apr. 4-Apr. 10)
o The first day of the 3rd week should not have begun on Apr. 11, 1969.
 Clearly, this cannot be equated with compliance in law.
 Auction sale of mortgages property was deemed void and of no legal effect.
 ALU-TUCP vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and National Steel Corporation

Aug. 2, 1994

GR No. 109902

Issue:

 W/n petitioners are properly recognized as “project employees” rather than “regular
employees”?

Facts:

 Petitioners filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary
benefits with the NLRC.
 Labor Arbiter declared the petitioners “regular project employees—who shall continue their
employment as such for as long as such project activity exists.”
o But they are entitled to the salary of a regular employee.
o It also ordered payment of salary differentials.
 Both parties appealed to the NLRC because of this decision.
o Petitioners argued that they were regular and not project employees.
o On the other hand, private respondent claimed that petitioners are project employees
as they were employed to undertake a specific project (NSC’s Five-Year Expansion
Program)
 NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision that petitioners were project employees but it set
aside the award to the petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of
legal and factual basis.

Ruling:

 Yes. Petitioners are “project employees” and not “regular employees”.

 The Proviso of Art. 280 states:
o Read Proviso (pg. 113)
 Petitioners claim that their more than 6 years of service to NSC should qualify them as
regular employees. However, this has no legal basis. This more than 6 years of service does
not legally dissolve their status as project employees.
 2nd par. Of Art. 280 of the Labor Code providing that:
o An employee who has served for at least 1 year shall be considered a regular
employee
o This related to “casual employees” and not to “project employees”.
 A proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the
provision to which it is attached and not to other sections thereof.
 o Unless the legislative intent is to restrict/qualify not only phrases immediately
preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions of the statute or the statute itself
as a whole.
 Petition was dismissed.

Acting Commissioner of Customs vs. Manila Electric Co. For Tax Exemptions and Court of Tax Appeals

June 30, 1977

GR No. L-23623

Issue:

 W/n the insulating oil in question comes with the meaning of the term “insulator”?

Facts:

 Manila Electric Co., claims that it is exempt from the special import tax not only by virtue of Sec.
6 of RA 1394 but also under par.9, Part 2.
 Sec. 6 of RA 1934—exempts from said tax equipments and spare parts for use in industries,
while
 Par. 9, Part 2—expressly exempts insulators from all taxes of whatever kind and nature.
 It then made reference to the franchise of Manila Electric Co.

Ruling:

 Yes. The term “insulating oil” comes within the meaning of the term “insulator”.
 Insulating oils of the type imported by petitioner are used for cooling as well as for insulating.
When used in oil circuit breakers, they are required to maintain insulation between the contacts
inside the tank and the tank itself.
 Therefore, the insulating oil in question comes within the meaning of the term “insulator”. This
qualifies the Manila Electric Co., for tax exemption.
 Danilo Paras vs. COMELEC

Nov. 1996

GR No. 123169

Issue:

 W/n SK election can be considered a regular local election?

Facts:

 Petitioner Danilo Paras is the incumbent Punong Baranggay who won during the last regular
election in 1994.
 A petition for his recall as Punong Baranggay was filed by the registered voters of the baranggay.
 COMELEC resolved to approve the petition. It scheduled a petition signing and set the recall
election.
 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition which was well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. COMELEC however, deferred the recall election because of the
petitioner’s opposition.
 Petitioner argued that Sec. 74(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) states:
o “No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official’s assumptionto
office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election.”
 Petitioner also cited Associated Labor Union vs. Letronado-Montejo where:
o The Court considered the SK election as a regular local election.
o Hence, no recall election can be had.

Ruling:

 No. SK election cannot be considered a “regular election”.

 “Regular Election”—must be confined to the regular election of elective local official. Sec. 2(2) of
Art.9-C of the Constitution enumerates the only local elective officials deemed recognized:
o Read sec. 2 (pg. 117)
 A regular election—refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of
suffrage, not otherwise disqualified by law and who are registered voters. One of the
requirements for the exercise of suffrage is that:
o The person must be at least 18 years of age.
 Under the law, SK includes youth (with ages ranging from 15-21). They include many who are
not qualified to vote in a regular election.
 Therefore, SK elections (whether local or national) cannot be considered as regular election.
 Aris (Phils.) Inc. Vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), et al.

Aug. 5, 1991

GR No. 90501

Issue:

 W/n sec. 12 of RA 6715 (amending Art. 223 of the Labor Code) is valid and constitutional?

Facts:

 Private respondents were employees of the petitioner Aris Phils., Inc. They filed a protest action
against the management concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental
and hazardous.
 Because of these actions, they were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations.
 They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner with the NLRC.
 Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the private respondents and upon the pendency of the
petitioner’s appeal, they move for the issuance of writ of execution (pursuant to sec. 12 of RA
6715)
 Sec. 12, RA 6715—allows the execution of pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a
decision of a Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee.
 The challenged portion provides:
o Read sec. 12 (pg. 120)

Ruling:

 Yes. The challenged portion is constitutional.

 The Solicitor General contended that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
 Basically, the State in the exercise of its permanent police power:
o May authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating
a dismissed or separated employee.
o Since that saving act is designed to stop (although temporarily) a continuing threat of
danger to the survival or even the life of a dismissed or separated employee and his
family.
 Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.
 A doubt even if well-founded, does not suffice.
 Petition was dismissed.
 Hon. Alfredo Lim vs. Hon. Felipe Pacquing and Associated Development Corporation

Jan. 27, 1995

GR No. 115044

Teofisto Guingona, Jr. And Dominador Cepeda, Jr. Vs. Hon. Vetino Reyes and Associated Development
Corporation

Jan. 27, 1995

GR No. 117263

Issue:

 W/n PD 771 is unconstitutional and violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of
the Constitution?

Facts:

 On June 18, 1949—The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress. Sec. 18 of the
charter provides:
o Read sec. 118 (pg. 122)
 Jan. 1951—E.O No. 392 was issued which:
o Transfers authority to regulat Jai-Alais from local government to the Games and
Amusement Board (GAB)
 June 1953—Congress enacted RA 954 entitled, “An Act to Prohibit Certain Activities in
Connection with Horse races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), and to Prescribe Penalties for
its Violation” Its provisions relating to Jai-Alai are:
o Read sec. 4 & 5 (pg. 123)
 Sept. 1971—Ordinance No. 7065 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila entitled:
o “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor to Allow and Permit the Associated Development
Corporation to Establish, Maintain and Operate a Jai-Alai in the City of Manila Under
Certain Terms and Conditions and for Other Purposes.”
 Aug. 1975—P.D 771, issued by Pres. Marcos, in its sec. 3:
o Expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.
 Oct. 1975—PD 810 was promulgated. It was entitled:
o “An Act Granting the Phil. Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a Franchise to Operate,
Construct and Maintain a Fronton for Basque Pelota and Similar Games of Skill in the
Greater Manila Area.”
 May 1987—E.O No. 169 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino (by virtue of Art. 18, Sec. 6 of the
Constitution) which:
o Expressly repealed PD 810 and revoked and cancelled the franchise granted to Phil. Jai-
Alai and Amusements Corporation.
  May 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai but the government and the GAB intervened invoking
PD 771 which:
o Revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities
including Jai Alai issued by local governments.
 ADC then assailed its validity.

Ruling:

 No. PD 771 is constitutional.

 All laws—including PD 771 are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled
by this Court.
 Art. 18, sec. 3 of the Constitution provides:
o Read sec. 3 (pg. 124)
 There is nothing on record to show that PD 771 has been repealed, altered or amended.
 Petition was dismissed.

Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim vs. People of the Phil., the RTC of Q.C, the City Prosecutor of Q.C and
Wilson Cham

Issue:

 W/n PD 818 (which amended Art. 315 of the RPC) is constitutional?

Facts:

 PD 818 amended Art. 315 of the RPC by:

o Increasing the penalties for Estafa committed by means of bouncing checks.
 Its constitutionality is being challenged in this petition for certiorari for being violative of the:
o Due process clause
o The right to bail and
o The provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment (enshrined under the
Constitution).

Ruling:

 Yes. PD 818 is constitutional.

 To justify a law’s nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of Constitution.
 The burden of proving the invalidity of a law is on those who challenge it.
 In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption
of PD 818’s constitutionality.
 Karen Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines

Aug. 21, 1997

GR No. 94723

Issue:

 W/n Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Sec. 8 of RA 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposit Act),
as amended can be made applicable to a foreign transient?

Facts:

 Greg Bartelli is an American tourist who coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion (then a 12-
year old girl) to go with him to his apartment.
 He detained Karen for 4 days and was able to rape 4 times.
 Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained in the Makati Municipal Jail.
 Criminal cases for serious illegal detention and 4 counts of rape and a corresponding civil case
for damages with preliminary attachment were filed against Bartelli.
 However, Bartelli escaped from jail.
 For the meantime, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment and a notice of
garnishment was served to China Banking Corporation (where Bartelli maintains a dollar
account).
 China Banking Corp., invoked Sec. 113 of central bank circular 960—to the effect that Bartelli’s
dollar deposits are exempt from attachment.
 Judgement by default was against Bartelli and he was ordered to pay Karen and her parents
moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit. The corresponding writ of
execution was also issued.
 China Banking Corp., and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution
on the strength of the provision of Central bank Circular 960:
o Read sec. 113 (pg. 128)

Ruling:

 No it cannot be made applicable to foreign transients.

 Supposing that Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 is applicable to a foreign transient:
o Injustice would occur especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like Bartelli.
 In case of doubt of interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
 Petition was granted.
 Carlos Alonzo and Casmira Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tecla Padua

May 28, 1987

GR No. L-72873

Issue:

 W/n a written notice is necessary in this case?

Facts:

 5 brothers and sisters inherited in equal shares a parcel of land from their deceased parents and
registered in the Registry of Deeds in Tarlac.
 March 1963—Celestino Padua transferred his undivided shares to Carlos and Casmira Alonzo by
way of absolute sale (P550.00)
 April 1964—his sister, Eustaquia Padua, sold her own share to the same vendee in an
instrument denominated “Con Pacto de Retro Sale” (P440.00)
 Carlo and Casmira Alonzo occupied 2/5 of the area of the lot representing the portions sold to
them. They subsequently enclosed this area with a fence.
 In 1975—their son, Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the
enclosed area.
 Feb. 1976—Mariano Padua (one of the 5 co-heirs) sought to redeem the area sold to the
Alonzos. However his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American
citizen.
 May 1977—Tecla Padua (another co-heir) filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption claimed by her brother.
 Trial Court also dismissed this complaint on the ground that:
o Their right had lapsed because of not having been exercised within 30 days from notice
of the sales in (1963 & 1964)
o Although there was no written notice, actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs
satisfied the requirement of the law.
 Respondent Court reversed the trial court’s decision and declared that a written notice is
required and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. No particular form was
required.

Ruling:

 No. A written notice is not necessary.

 The other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales
made in 1963 & 1964 wherein no written notice was presented.
 It is therefore unlikely that the respondents were unaware of the said sales made by their
brother and sister.
  To require a written proof of such notice would be in favour of the respondent’s false claim of
ignorance.
 A law should not be interpreted so as to cause injustice.
 Petition was granted.

Achilles Berces, Jr. Vs. Hon. Executive Sec. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al

Feb. 21, 1995

GR No. 112099

Issue:

 W/n reviewing officials are authorized to order a stay of execution?

Facts:

 Petitioner Achilles Berces, Jr., filed 2 administrative cases against Mayor Naomi Corral with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay for abuse of authority and/or oppression and dishonesty.
 Sangg. Panlalawigan of Albay ruled in favour of the petitioner and ordered the suspension of
Mayor Corral.
 Mayor Corral appealed the decision to the Office of the President under Sec. 67(b) of the Local
Government Code and prayed to stay execution.
 Office of the President ordered the stay of execution of the Sangg. Panlalawigan in order to
prevent undue prejudice to public interest.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari
and prohibition.

Ruling:

 Yes. The President is authorized to stay the execution of the appealed decision.
 Admin. Order No. 18 provides:
o Read adm. Order 18 (pg. 133)
 Admin. Order No. 18—authorizes the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at
any time during the pendency of the appeal.
o Petitioner claimed that this has been repealed by the Local Government Code.
 Sec. 68 of the Local Government Code states that:
o Read (pg. 133)
 Petitioner also invoked the repealing clause of Sec. 530(f) of the Local Government Code:
o Read (pg. 134)
 However, the Court held that the aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Admin.
Order 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended
to be repealed.
  Such repeal is only through implication and such kind of repeal is not favoured.
 In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior
law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws.
 In this case:
o The provisions of sec. 68 of the Local Government Code and Admin. Order 18 are not
inconsistent. In fact, the 2 laws must be read together.
o There is nothing in the provisions that deprives the reviewing officials the authority to
order a stay of the appealed decision.

Antonio Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

Dec. 11, 1992

GR No. 103982

Issue:

 W/n the enactment of Admin. Code of 1987 (E.O 292) operates to repeal the Revised Admin.
Code of 1917?

Facts:

 Petitioner Antonio Mecano was a Director of the NBI. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from
(Mar.26, 1990-Apr.7,1990) of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses
amounting to a total of P40, 831.00.
 He claimed for reimbursement of the said amount from COA.
 However, COA Chairman (Eufemio Domingo) denied his claim on the ground that:
o sec. 699 of the Rev. Admin. Code has been repealed by the Admin. Code of 1987 and
that
o The same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Admin. Code of 1987.

Ruling:

 No. Admin. Code of 1987 does not repeal Rev. Admin. Code of 1917.
 The repealing clause of sec. 27, Book 7 of the Admin. Code of 1987 states:
o Read (pg. 136)
 The new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the Old Code.
This situation makes the new Code fall under the category of implied repeal.
 Repeals by implication are not favoured and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended.
 Petition was granted and the respondent was ordered to give due course to petitioner’s claim
for benefits.
 Danilo Paras vs. COMELEC

Nov. 1996

GR No. 123169

Issue:

 W/n a recall election can still be held?

Facts:

 Petitioner Danilo Paras is the incumbent Punong Baranggay who won during the last regular
election in 1994.
 A petition for his recall as Punong Baranggay was filed by the registered voters of the baranggay.
 COMELEC resolved to approve the petition. It scheduled a petition signing and set the recall
election.
 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition which was well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. COMELEC however, deferred the recall election because of the
petitioner’s opposition.
 Petitioner argued that Sec. 74(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) states:
o “No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official’s assumption to
office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election.”
 Petitioner also cited Associated Labor Union vs. Letronado-Montejo where:
o The Court considered the SK election as a regular local election.
o Hence, no recall election can be had.

Ruling:

 No. Recall at this time is no longer possible.

 The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
o Read sec. 74 (pg. 138)
 The evident intent of par. (a) is:
o To subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office.
 Par. (b) construed together with par. (a)—merely designates the period when such elective
official may be subject of a recall election.
 In interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective statute.
 In this case, although the Court declared that SK election cannot be considered a “regular
election, it held that recall election is no longer possible.
o Because of the limitation stated in Sec. 74(b)
o Considering that the next regular election involving baranggay office concerned is
barely 7 months away.
 Petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., and Court of Appeals

Apr. 18, 1989

GR Nos. 28502-03

Issue:

 W/n Esso Standard Eastern Inc., is entitled for a refund of its overpaid income tax?

Facts:

 Esso overpaid its income tax and was accordingly granted a tax credit in this amount by the
Commissioner on Aug. 1964.
 However, Esso’s payment of its income tax for 1960 was found to be short.
 Commissioner wrote to Esso demanding payment of the deficiency tax together with interest .
 Esso paid under protest contending the computation of interest. It claimed that the interest was
more than that properly due and that it should not have been required to pay it.
 Esso asked for a refund.
 Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the claim for refund.
 Esso appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals and said court ordered the Commissioner to pay Esso
of its refund claim as overpaid interest.
 Hence, this appeal by the Commissioner.

Ruling:

 Yes. The Court is right when it ordered Esso’s refund claim.

 The Government already have in its hands the excess payment and having received it by
mistake, it unquestionably belongs to Esso and that the government has an obligation to return
it.
 Because of this, it was neither legally nor logically possible for Esso to be considered a debtor of
the Government. A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results.
 Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the legislative intention
so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.
 Petition for review was denied.
 Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals

Apr. 10, 1996

GR No. 112170

Issue:

 W/n the use of a different name belonging to another in isolated transaction falls within the
prohibition of CA No. 142?

Facts:

 Atty. Francis Palmones (the petitioner’s counsel) wrote the Office of the Ombudsman requesting
that he be furnished a copy of the complaint against the petitioner.
 Atty. Palmones asked his client Cesario Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the
Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez had to attend some personal
matters.
 Since Ursua was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman, he was reluctant to personally
ask for the document.
 Perez told him that he could sign Perez’s name if ever he would be required to acknowledge
receipt of the complaint.
 When he arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman he used the name “Oscar Perez” when he
signed the visitor’s logbook and when he acknowledged the receipt of the copy of the
complaint.
 Loida Kahulugan, Chief of the Administrative Division, learned that the person who introduced
himself as “Oscar Perez” was actually the petitioner Cesario Ursua. She immediately reported
the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly
charged.
 Petitioner alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from
his registered name in the local civil registry. He also argued that no document from the local
civil registry was presented to show his registered name which was actually a necessary ground
for his conviction.
 Trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as
amended. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Ruling:

 No. The use of a different name belonging to another in an isolated transaction does not fall
within the prohibition of CA No. 142.
 The enactment of CA No. 142 as amended was made primarily to:
o Curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names
and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade.
 Its purpose is to:
 o Penalize the act of using an alias name unless such alias was duly authorized by proper
judicial proceeding and recorded in the civil register.
 An “alias” is—a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually in addition to his real name by which he is registered the first time.
o Therefore, the use of a different name belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign/indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition
to his real name (from that day forth)
o Does not fall within the prohibition of CA No. 142 as amended.
 Presumption against undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure.
 Judgement was reversed and set aside. Petitioner was acquitted.

Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. vs. COMELEC, Jesus Delfin, Alberto and Lorna Pedrosa

Mar. 19, 1997

GR No. 127325

Issue:

 W/n RA 6735 includes or covers initiative on amendments to the constitution?

Facts:

 RA 6735 is an act entitled: “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriate Funds Therefor.”
 It was contended whether said act covers initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so,
o Is the Act as worded, adequately covers such initiative?

Ruling:

 No. Said Act does not cover adequately such initiatives.

 While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative
and Referendum,
o There is no subtitle provided for initiative on the Constitution.
 Such silence simply meant that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
National and Local laws.
 Had the Congress intended for said Act to fully provide the implementation of the initiatives on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided a subtitle therefor.
 Title and Subtitle can be used as intrinsic aid in determining legislative intent.
Florencio Eugenio vs. Exec. Sec. Franklin Drilon, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and Prospero
Palmiano

Jan. 22, 1996

GR No. 109404

Issue:

 W/n failure to develop a subdivision can justify the non-payment of amortizations by a buyer
under land purchase agreements entered into prior to the enactment of PD 957?

Facts:

 Palmiano purchased on instalment basis 2 lots in the E&S Delta Village from Eugenio and his co-
owner/developer.
 NHA ordered Eugenio to cease and desist from making further sales of lots in said village or in
any project owned by him due to the complaints for non-development.
 Palmiano filed a complaint against the petitioner alleging that:
o The petitioner resold one of the 2 lots to the spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo and
that
o He suspended payment of his amortizations because of petitioner’s failure to develop
the village.
 He prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot
to him.
 Commission Proper of the HSRC ordered petitioner to:
o Complete the subdivision development and to
o Reinstate private respondent’s purchase contract over one lot.
 Respondent Exec. Sec. on appeal affirmed this decision.
 Petitioner claims that the Secretary erred in applying PD 957 in concluding that the non-
development of the E&S Delta Village justified private respondent’s non-payment of his
amortizations.
 He also avers that inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered in 1972 (prior to the
effectivity of PD 957 in 1976)—said law cannot govern such transaction.

Ruling:

 Yes. Failure to develop a subdivision constitutes legal justification for the non-payment of
amortizations by a buyer.
 PD 957 entitled: “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree” is to be given
retroactive effect
o So as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
 PD 9577 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law.
  It was enacted to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
manipulations of unscrupulous subdivisions and condominiums.
 Such intent is clearly expressed in its preamble.
 The intent of the law as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.

Decision: petition dismissed.