Pollo Vs Constantino-David

12/31/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 659
G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.*
BRICCIO “Ricky” A. POLLO, petitioner, vs.

CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID,
DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA,
DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III
ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Privacy; The right

to privacy has been accorded recognition as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.—The
right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction
as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of
the 1987
_______________
* EN BANC.
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http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000160a89804b35b609289003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/103
Constitution, which provides: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Right to Privacy; The Civil Service Commission (CSC) had
implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they
have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send
or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor
the use of the computer resources using both automated or human
means.—The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put
its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in
anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means. This
implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that
the computer resources were used only for such legitimate
business purposes.
Same; A search by a government employer of an employee’s
office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct.—A search by a government
employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth
Circuit, it was held that where a government agency’s computer

use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic
content and in addition expressly provided that employees do not
have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency
information systems and technology, the government employee
had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and
contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence found
during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in
prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant
employee’s computer hard drive was first remotely examined by a
computer information technician after his supervisor received
complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and
distributed non-work-related e-mail messages throughout the
office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used
his computer to access the prohibited websites, in contravention of
the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy
191
disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative

investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured by
the police department. The initial remote search of the hard drive
of petitioner’s computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless
searches was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a
public employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long
as any search is justified at inception and is reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Substantial Evidence; Well-settled is
the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), are accorded not only respect but
even finality if such findings are supported by substantial

evidence.—Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of
quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only
respect but even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable
minds might conceivably opine otherwise.
CARPIO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Right to Privacy; View that the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) regulation declaring a no-privacy expectation on the use of
government-owned computers logically follows from the statutory
rule that government-owned property shall be used “solely” for a
public purpose.—Any private use of a government property, like
a government-owned computer, is prohibited by law.
Consequently, a government employee cannot expect any privacy
when he uses a government-owned computer because he knows he
cannot use the computer for any private purpose. The CSC
regulation declaring a no-privacy expectation on the use of
government-owned computers logically follows from the statutory
rule that government-owned property shall be used “solely” for a
public purpose.
Same; View that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) office
regulation denying CSC employees privacy expectation in
“anything they create, store, send, or receive in the computer
system” is constitutionally infirm insofar as the regulation
excludes from its ambit the three CSC commissioners solely by
reason of their rank, and not by reason of the confidential nature
of the electronic data they generate.—The CSC office regulation
denying CSC employees privacy expectation in “anything they

create, store, send, or receive in the computer system,” although
valid as to petitioner Briccio Pollo, is constitutionally infirm
insofar as the regulation excludes from its ambit the three
192
CSC commissioners solely by reason of their rank, and not by

reason of the confidential nature of the electronic data they
generate.
Bersamin, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Right to Privacy; View that the right to privacy involved
herein is the petitioner’s right to informational privacy in his
workplace, specifically his right to work freely without surveillance
or intrusion.—At the outset, I state that the right to privacy
involved herein is the petitioner’s right to informational privacy
in his workplace, specifically his right to work freely without
surveillance or intrusion.
Same; View that even without Office Memorandum (OM) No.
10, Series of 2002 being issued by respondent Karina Constantino-
David as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the
employees of the Commission have a reduced expectation of privacy
in the workplace.—Even without Office Memorandum (OM) No.
10, Series of 2002 being issued by respondent Karina
Constantino-David as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
the employees of the Commission, including the petitioner, have a
reduced expectation of privacy in the workplace. The objective of
the issuance of OM No. 10 has been only to formally inform and
make aware the employees of the Commission about the
limitations on their privacy while they are in the workplace and

to advise them that the Commission has legitimate reasons to
monitor communications made by them, electronically or not.
Same; View that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable
expectation of privacy in respect of the communications created,
stored, sent, or received after office hours through the office
computer, as to which he must be protected.—I hold, instead, that
the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in
respect of the communications created, stored, sent, or received
after office hours through the office computer, as to which he must
be protected.
Same; View that the validity of the seizure of the files should
be limited to the need for determining whether or not the petitioner
unjustly utilized official resources of the Commission for personal
purposes, and should not extend to the reading of the files’
contents, which would be violative of his right to privacy.—Thus, I
vote to uphold the legality of OM No. 10. I hasten to add, to be
very clear, that the validity of the seizure of the files should be
limited to the need for determining whether or not the petitioner
unjustly utilized official resources of the Commission for personal
purposes, and
193
should not extend to the reading of the files’ contents, which

would be violative of his right to privacy.
Same; View that although the right to privacy is referred to as
a right to be enjoyed by the people, the State cannot just sit back
and stand aside when, in the exercise of his right to privacy, the
individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment of the

national interest.—I adhere to the principle that every man is
believed to be free. Freedom gears a man to move about
unhampered and to speak out from conviction. That is why the
right to privacy has earned its worthy place in the Bill of Rights.
However, although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to
be enjoyed by the people, the State cannot just sit back and stand
aside when, in the exercise of his right to privacy, the individual
perilously tilts the scales to the detriment of the national interest.
Same; View that the ruling about the decreased expectation of
privacy in the workplace may generate an unwanted implication
for employers in general to henceforth consider themselves
authorized, without risking a collision with the Constitutionally-
protected right to privacy, to probe and pry into communications
made during work hours by their employees through the use of
their computers and other digital instruments of communication.
—I apprehend that the ruling about the decreased expectation of
privacy in the workplace may generate an unwanted implication
for employers in general to henceforth consider themselves
authorized, without risking a collision with the Constitutionally-
protected right to privacy, to probe and pry into communications
made during work hours by their employees through the use of
their computers and other digital instruments of communication.
Thus, the employers may possibly begin to monitor their
employees’ phone calls, to screen incoming and out-going e-mails,
to capture queries made through any of the Internet’s efficient
search engines (like Google), or to censor visited websites (like
Yahoo!, Facebook or Twitter) in the avowed interest of ensuring
productivity and supervising use of business resources. That will
be unfortunate.
Same; View that a recognition of the limitations of man as a

being needful of some extent of rest, and of some degree of personal
space even during work hours, is most essential in order to fully
maximize the potential by which his services was obtained in the
first place.—Although the interests of capital or public service do
merit protection, a recognition of the limitations of man as a being
needful of some extent of rest, and of some degree of personal
space even during work hours, is most essential in order to fully
maximize the potential by which his services was obtained in the
first place. The job should not own him the whole time he is in the
workplace. Even while he remains in the workplace, he must be
allowed to preserve his own identity, to
194
maintain an inner self, to safeguard his beliefs, and to keep

certain thoughts, judgments and desires hidden.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ponciano R. Solosa for petitioner.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This case involves a search of office computer assigned
to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the
service. The employee’s personal files stored in the
computer were used by the government employer as
evidence of misconduct.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1
dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution2 dated February 29,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by
petitioner Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings
conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which
found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and penalized him with
dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist
of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-
Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division
(PALD) under the “Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na”
program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned
letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson
Karina Con-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 63-83. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with
Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of this Court)
and Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok concurring.
2 Id., at p. 85.
195
stantino-David which was marked “Confidential” and sent

through a courier service (LBC) from a certain “Alan San
Pascual” of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by
the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the
CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which
documents marked “Confidential” are left unopened and
instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was
given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,
Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to
ask from you personally if it is just alright for an employee of your
agency to be a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a
pending case in the CSC. I honestly think this is a violation of law
and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your
attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of the Mamamayan
muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who
have pending cases in the CSC. The justice in our govt system will
not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly
because our perception of your clean and good office is being
tainted.
Concerned Govt employee3
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four

personnel with background in information technology (IT),
and issued a memo directing them to conduct an

investigation and specifically “to back up all the files in the
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and
Legal divisions.”4 After some briefing, the team proceeded
at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon
City. Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team
informed the
_______________
3 Id., at p. 306.
4 Id., at p. 305.
196
officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia

Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite
(Director Unite) of Chairperson David’s directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers
at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was
witnessed by several employees, together with Directors
Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At
around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to
petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the
office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of
computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC
Chair. The text messages received by petitioner read:
“Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the
PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of the Chairman. If you can
make it here now it would be better.”
“All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the
chair.”
“CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also
informed about this.
“We can’t do anything about … it … it’s a directive from chair.”
“Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint”; “ill
send a copy of the memo via mms”5
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was

leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just
get a lawyer. Another text message received by petitioner
from PALD staff also reported the presence of the team
from CSC main office: “Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa
kuarto natin.”6 At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the
investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the
computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the
purpose of preserving all the files stored therein. Several
diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the
hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to
Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were
examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It
was
_______________
5 CA Rollo, p. 56.
6 Id.
197
found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing

files copied from the computer assigned to and being used
by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents,
were draft pleadings or letters7 in connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On
the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the
Show-Cause Order8 dated January 11, 2007, requiring the
petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his
explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from
notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from
petitioner’s personal files, Chairperson David made the
following observations:
“Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or

documents that are related to or connected with administrative
cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the
CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other
tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are
for and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as
respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to the
inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly,
deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse
and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel
agency of the government tasked to discipline misfeasance and
malfeasance in the government service. The number of pleadings
so prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely
engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it with seeming
regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and
certainly against common human experience, to believe that the
person concerned had engaged in this customary practice without
any consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13

above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees. That these draft
pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo
invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible
or had a hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer
of origin was within his direct control and disposition.”9
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the

person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which
had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and
neither is he “lawyering”
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 21-24.
8 Id., at pp. 20-25.
9 Id., at p. 25.
198
for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials

of conducting a “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully
copied and printed personal files in his computer, and
subsequently asking him to submit his comment which
violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted
that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer
done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January
8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the files
in his computer were his personal files and those of his
sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is
not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and
printing as these would violate his constitutional right to

privacy and protection against self-incrimination and
warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though
government property, the temporary use and ownership of
the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR)
is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of
ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As to
the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not
actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a
formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In
view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from
his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible as
evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”10
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.
07038211 finding prima facie case against the petitioner
and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner
was directed to submit his answer under oath within five
days from notice and indicate whether he elects a formal
investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of the
URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days
preventive suspension effective immediately
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 55-62.
11 Id., at pp. 26-33. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David and
Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in ruling that
a prima facie case existed against petitioner while Commissioner Cesar D.

Buenaflor dissented [see Memorandum (OCOM-C Memo No. 14, s. 2007,
CA Rollo, pp. 431-434).
199
upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of

Resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For
Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the
formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an
illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC
Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people with
pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found
in his computer were prepared not by him but by certain
persons whom he permitted, at one time or another, to
make use of his computer out of close association or
friendship. Attached to the motion were the affidavit of
Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who entrusted his own files to be
kept at petitioner’s CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado, the
latter being Atty. Solosa’s client who attested that
petitioner had nothing to do with the pleadings or bill for
legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty.
Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner contended that the
case should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question
raised in the criminal complaint he filed before the
Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom petitioner
believes had instigated this administrative case. He also
prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed
on him. In its Resolution No. 07051912 dated March 19,

2007, the CSC denied the omnibus motion. The CSC
resolved to treat the said motion as petitioner’s answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition13
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-
Cause Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated February
26, 2007 as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or total absence of
jurisdiction. Prior to this, however, petitioner lodged an
administrative/criminal complaint against respondents
Directors Racquel D.G. Buensalida (Chief of Staff, Office of
the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A.
_______________
12 CSC records, pp. 71-l to 71-n. Chairperson Karina Constantino-
David and Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in
the denial of the omnibus motion while Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor
reiterated his dissent.
13 CA Rollo, pp. 2-19.
200
Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman,

and a separate complaint for disbarment against Director
Buensalida.14
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing
from the CSC setting the formal investigation of the case
on April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an
Urgent Motion for the issuance of TRO and preliminary
injunction.15 Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing

conference scheduled on April 30, 2007, the CSC reset the
same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of
petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-
hearing conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed
with the formal investigation ex-parte.16 Petitioner moved
to defer or to reset the pre-hearing conference, claiming
that the investigation proceedings should be held in
abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by the CA.
The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the pre-
hearing conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning
on the consequences of petitioner and/or his counsel’s non-
appearance.17 This prompted petitioner to file another
motion in the CA, to cite the respondents, including the
hearing officer, in indirect contempt.18
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.
07113419 denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the denial
of his motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the
designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard G. Jimenez. The
hearing officer was directed to proceed with the
investigation proper with dispatch.
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 288-294, 321-325.
15 Id., at pp. 336-340.
16 Id., at p. 373.
17 Id., at pp. 376-378.
18 Id., at pp. 388-392.
Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in denying the
motion while Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor dissented stating that

based on his dissenting position, any subsequent proceedings in this case
is of no moment since the initiatory proceedings was in violation of a
person’s fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution. (Id., at p. 465.)
201
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and

upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed
to have waived his right to the formal investigation which
then proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.
071420,20 the dispositive part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the

Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A. Pollo
GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act
6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE with all its accessory penalties, namely,
disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, cancellation of civil service eligibilities and bar from
taking future civil service examinations.”21
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search

conducted on petitioner’s computer, the CSC noted the
dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of
this case where the government as employer invades the
private files of an employee stored in the computer
assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial
investigation of possible misconduct committed by said

employee and without the latter’s consent or participation.
The CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the United
States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of
O’Connor v. Ortega22 as authority for the view that
government agencies, in their capacity as employers,
rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and
seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the
“probable cause” or warrant requirement for search and
seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more recent
case of United States v. Mark L. Simons23 which declared
that the federal agency’s computer use policy foreclosed
any inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the
part of its em-
_______________
Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in ruling that
petitioner is guilty as charged while Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor
maintained his dissent.
21 Id., at p. 618.
22 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
23 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
202
ployees. Though the Court therein recognized that such

policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondent’s
legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the
computer was installed, still, the warrantless search of the
employee’s office was upheld as valid because a

government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless
search pursuant to an investigation of work-related
misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its
inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as
benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was
using in the regional office in view of the CSC computer use
policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee
cannot assert any privacy right to a computer assigned to
him. Even assuming that there was no such administrative
policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of
petitioner’s computer successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace
as enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC
stressed that it pursued the search in its capacity as
government employer and that it was undertaken in
connection with an investigation involving work-related
misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant
requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of
admissibility of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC
then ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports
the charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation
of R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave
infractions justified petitioner’s dismissal from the service
with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum24 filed in the CA, petitioner moved
to incorporate the above resolution dismissing him from the
service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal

via a Rule 43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he likewise
prayed for the inclusion of Resolution No. 07180025 which
denied his motion for reconsideration.
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 560-585.
Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in the denial
of the motion for reconsideration while Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor
reit-
203
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed

the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA
held that: (1) petitioner was not charged on the basis of the
anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a
fact-finding investigation was conducted and the results
thereof yielded a prima facie case against him; (2) it could
not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in
petitioner’s computer and later confiscating the same,
Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a
judge in view of the CSC computer policy declaring the
computers as government property and that employee-
users thereof have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
anything they create, store, send, or receive on the
computer system; and (3) there is nothing contemptuous in
CSC’s act of proceeding with the formal investigation as
there was no restraining order or injunction issued by the

CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing that—
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS IRREGULARITY AND
BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT ANONYMOUS
COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN
TRUTH AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY
PROVIDED UNDER 2nd PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC
RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO
THE ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND
COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE MEMORANDUM
NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM SIGNED
_______________
erated his dissent under his “Addendum to the Dissenting Position Under
OCOM-C Memo No. 14, S. 2007”. (Id., at p. 720.)
204
SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND

NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING
THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL
RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE
MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL AND
ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007 AND
THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING THEREOF
FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION LIMITING THE DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE INVOLVING AND TAINTED
WITH PERSONAL HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT
COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCLUDING
THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS
PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF OM. 10 s. 2002. AND
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT
ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW ARGUMENTS, ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS
FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION ON THE 2
MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND INCORPORATE CSC
RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC

RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID
NOT RULE LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR URGENT MOTION TO
RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.26
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the

search conducted on his office computer and the copying of
his personal files without his knowledge and consent,
alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to
privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in
this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unrea-
_______________
26 Rollo, p. 19.
205
sonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of

the 1987 Constitution,27 which provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be

seized.”
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all

searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches
and seizures.28 But to fully understand this concept and
application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it
is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of
pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court
declared in People v. Marti:29
“Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against

unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935
Charter which, worded as follows:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” (Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court
may turn to the pronounce-
_______________
27 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. Nos. 157870,
158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, citing Ople v. Torres,
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169.
28 Joaquin Bernas, S.J., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A

COMMENTARY, 2003 ed., p. 162.
29 G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 57.
206
ments of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State

Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.”30
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US

Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner
in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to
privacy and constituted a “search and seizure.” Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using
the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area.
In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was
further noted that the existence of privacy right under
prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a
person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).32
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable
expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US
Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth
Amendment rights with regard to an office at union
headquarters that he shared with other union officials,
even as the latter or their guests could enter the office. The
Court thus “recognized that employees may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by

police.”
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a
government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of
O’Connor v. Ortega34 where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega,
who was employed by a state hospital, claimed a violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials
investigating charges of mismanagement of the psychiatric
residency program, sexual harassment of female hospital
employees and other irregularities involving his private
patients under the state medical aid program, searched his
office and seized personal items from his desk and filing
cabinets. In that case, the
_______________
30 Id., at p. 63.
31 389 U.S. 437 (1967).
32 Id.
33 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968).
34 Supra note 22.
207
Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose

Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for
the government instead of a private employer.”35 A
plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct
analysis has two steps: first, because “some government
offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public
that no expectation of privacy is reasonable”, a court must
consider “[t]he operational realities of the workplace” in

order to determine whether an employee’s Fourth
Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where an
employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an
employer’s intrusion on that expectation “for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be
judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances.”36
On the matter of government employees’ reasonable
expectations of privacy in their workplace, O’Connor
teaches:
“x x x Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices,

desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in
the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office
practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The
employee’s expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context
of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave
free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and
personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually
entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the
workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related
visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that
others—such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual
visitors, and the general public—may have frequent access to an
individual’s office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that
“[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the
government does not disappear merely because the government
has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as
employer,” x x x but some government offices may be so open
to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of

privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work
environments in the public sector, the question of whether
an employee has
_______________
35 Id., at p. 717.
36 City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, U.S. 2010, June 17, 2010.
208
a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on

a case-by-case basis.”37(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases,

the US Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortega’s Fourth
Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the
hospital officials infringed “an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider as reasonable.” Given the
undisputed evidence that respondent Dr. Ortega did not
share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees,
kept personal correspondence and other private items in
his own office while those work-related files (on physicians
in residency training) were stored outside his office, and
there being no evidence that the hospital had established
any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees
from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or
file cabinets (although the absence of such a policy does not
create any expectation of privacy where it would not
otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a
reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and

file cabinets.38
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search
conducted by hospital officials was reasonable, the
O’Connor plurality decision discussed the following
principles:
“Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals simply
concluded without discussion that the “search…was not a
reasonable search under the fourth amendment.” x x x “[t]o hold
that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by
[public employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards
governing such searches…[W]hat is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must
determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable
to the search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness
applicable to a particular class of searches requires “balanc[ing]
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” x x x In the case of
searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance
the invasion of the
_______________
37 Supra note 22 at pp. 717-718.
38 Id., at pp. 718-719.
209
employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the

government’s need for supervision, control, and the
efficient operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant
whenever the employer wished to enter an employee’s office, desk,
or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt
the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome.
Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon
supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar
with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other
circumstances in which we have required warrants, supervisors in
offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of
investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related
searches are merely incident to the primary business of the
agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant
requirement would conflict with the “common-sense realization
that government offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter.” x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions
by public employers is the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the
public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers
were required to have probable cause before they entered an
employee’s desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office
correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of
probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory
context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve
a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable
cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by

public employers for the purpose of securing state property. x x x
To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency,
therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter
employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted
pursuant to an investigation of work-related employee
misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they
have an interest substantially different from “the normal need for
law enforcement.” x x x Public employers have an interest in
ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient
manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from
the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-
related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases,
public employees are entrusted with tre-
210
mendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct

or incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can be
severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore, public
employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public
employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that
the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient
manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause requirement
for searches of the type at issue here would impose
intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in
correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need
for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will
be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage
to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest.

xxx
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the “special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement make the…probable-
cause requirement impracticable,” x x x for legitimate,
work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as
investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of
reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of
government employers to ensure the efficient and proper
operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions
upon the privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that
public employer intrusions on the constitutionally
protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be
judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the
inception and the scope of the intrusion must be
reasonable:
“Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a
twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the…
action was justified at its inception,’ x x x; second, one must
determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place,’” x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a
supervisor will be “justified at its inception” when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a

noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a
needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope
when “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the
objectives of the search
211
and not excessively intrusive in light of …the nature of the

[misconduct].” x x x”39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment

without a hearing on the factual dispute as to the character
of the search and neither was there any finding made as to
the scope of the search that was undertaken, the case was
remanded to said court for the determination of the
justification for the search and seizure, and evaluation of
the reasonableness of both the inception of the search and
its scope.
In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs”
authorize warrantless searches involving public employees
for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a
balancing test under which government interests are
weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither
probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are
related to law enforcement.40 O’Connor was applied in
subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy
rights in the workplace. One of these cases involved a
government employer’s search of an office computer, United
States v. Mark L. Simons41 where the defendant Simons,
an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing
materials containing child pornography. Simons was
provided with an office which he did not share with anyone,
and a computer with Internet access. The agency had
instituted a policy on computer use stating that employees
were to use the Internet for official government business
only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically
prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall
understand that the agency will periodically audit, inspect,
and/or monitor the user’s Internet access as deemed
appropriate. CIA agents instructed its contractor for the
management of the agency’s computer network, upon
initial discovery of prohibited internet activity originating
from Simons’ computer, to conduct a
_______________
39 Id., at pp. 719, 722-725.
40 Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, C.A. (Md), December 2, 2009.
41 Supra note 23.
212
remote monitoring and examination of Simons’ computer.

After confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded
pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files on
the hard drive of Simon’s computer were copied from a
remote work station. Days later, the contractor’s
representative finally entered Simon’s office, removed the
original hard drive on Simon’s computer, replaced it with a
copy, and gave the original to the agency security officer.

Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and searched
Simons’ office in the evening when Simons was not around.
The search team copied the contents of Simons’ computer;
computer diskettes found in Simons’ desk drawer;
computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive
diskettes; videotapes; and various documents, including
personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to
suppress these evidence, arguing that the searches of his
office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and
Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme
Court ruled that the searches of Simons’ computer and
office did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the
first search warrant was valid. It held that the search
remains valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant
requirement because evidence of the crime was discovered
in the course of an otherwise proper administrative
inspection. Simons’ violation of the agency’s Internet policy
happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this does
not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests
of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons’ office
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard
announced in O’Connor because at the inception of the
search, the employer had “reasonable grounds for
suspecting” that the hard drive would yield evidence of
misconduct, as the employer was already aware that
Simons had misused his Internet access to download over a
thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard
drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search,

and the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while
Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of
privacy with regard to the files in his computer.
213
“x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth

Amendment, Simons must first prove that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x x
x And, in order to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy,
Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is
one that society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x
xx
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons’
computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because,
in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet.
Additionally, we conclude that Simons’ Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated by FBIS’ retrieval of Simons’ hard drive from
his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
with regard to the record or fruits of his Internet use in
light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated
that FBIS would “audit, inspect, and/or monitor”
employees’ use of the Internet, including all file transfers,
all websites visited, and all e-mail messages, “as deemed
appropriate.” x x x This policy placed employees on notice that
they could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity

would be private. Therefore, regardless of whether Simons
subjectively believed that the files he transferred from the
Internet were private, such a belief was not objectively reasonable
after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet
use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS’ actions in remotely searching and
seizing the computer files Simons downloaded from the Internet
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his office. x x x Here,
Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As
noted above, the operational realities of Simons’ workplace may
have diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However,
there is no evidence in the record of any workplace practices,
procedures, or regulations that had such an effect. We therefore
conclude that, on this record, Simons possessed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an employee’s
supervisor entering the employee’s government office and
retrieving a piece of government
214
equipment in which the employee had absolutely no expectation of

privacy—equipment that the employer knew contained evidence
of crimes committed by the employee in the employee’s office. This
situation may be contrasted with one in which the criminal acts of
a government employee were unrelated to his employment. Here,
there was a conjunction of the conduct that violated the

employer’s policy and the conduct that violated the criminal law.
We consider that FBIS’ intrusion into Simons’ office to retrieve
the hard drive is one in which a reasonable employer might
engage. x x x”42 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous

Drugs Board43 which involved the constitutionality of a
provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office with certain offenses, have also recognized the fact
that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in
the workplace.
“The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is

the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing,
which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves
as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement.
The employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large
extent circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency
in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement
upon such privacy has been upheld.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the analysis and principles announced in

O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address
the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer
files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC
_______________
42 Id.
43 Supra note 27 at pp. 432-433.
215
Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on

petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances
to consider include “(1) the employee’s relationship to the
item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate
control of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether
the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the
item.” These factors are relevant to both the subjective and
objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we
consider the two questions together.44 Thus, where the
employee used a password on his computer, did not share
his office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had
a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that
space and items located therein must comply with the
Fourth Amendment.45
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to
prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy either in his office or government-issued computer
which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege

that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not
share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and
not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he
allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to
prevent other employees from accessing his computer files.
On the contrary, he submits that being in the public
assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have
visitors in his office like friends, associates and even
unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his
computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He
described his office as “full of people, his friends, unknown
people” and that in the past 22 years he had been
discharging his functions at the PALD, he is “personally
assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting
cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report,
Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism,
Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly
had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the
_______________
44 U.S. v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, C.A.10 (Okla.), April 3, 2007, citing
United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998).
45 U.S. v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184 C.A.9 (Mont.), January 30, 2007.
216
office as a paying customer.”46 Under this scenario, it can

hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of
privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of

allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective
expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is
negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of
office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 “Computer Use
Policy (CUP)” explicitly provides:
POLICY
1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service
Commission and may be used only for legitimate business purposes.
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist
them in the performance of their respective jobs.
3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at
any given time.
xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the
Commission shall not have an expectation of privacy in anything
they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement
shall select and assign Users to handle the confidential examination
data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy
in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer
through the Internet or any other computer network. Users
understand that the CSC may use human or automated means
to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not
a personal property or for the exclusive use of a User to whom
_______________
46 CA Rollo, pp. 42, 61.
217
a memorandum of receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or

operated by other users. However, he is accountable therefor and
must insure its care and maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for
safeguarding their passwords for access to the computer system.
Individual passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or given to
others. Users shall be responsible for all transactions made using
their passwords. No User may access the computer system with
another User’s password or account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to
the computer system or to encode particular files or messages does
not imply that Users have an expectation of privacy in the material
they create or receive on the computer system. The Civil Service
Commission has global passwords that permit access to all
materials stored on its networked computer system regardless of
whether those materials have been encoded with a particular User’s
password. Only members of the Commission shall authorize the
application of the said global passwords.
x x x x”47 (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put

its employees on notice that they have no expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on
the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the
use of the computer resources using both automated or

human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections
may be done to ensure that the computer resources were
used only for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant
in determining whether an employee’s expectation of
privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a
workplace privacy policy.48 In one case, the US Court of
Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a state
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 440-443.
48 Biby v. Board of Regents, of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln,
419 F.3d 845 C.A.8 (Neb), August 22, 2005.
218
university employee has not shown that he had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files
where the university’s computer policy, the computer user
is informed not to expect privacy if the university has a
legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is
specifically told that computer files, including e-mail, can
be searched when the university is responding to a
discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner
employee thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth
Amendment rights when university officials conducted a
warrantless search of his computer for work-related
materials.49
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness

of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, we
answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted
in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint
addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in
the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly “lawyering” for
individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson
David stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received
several text messages from unknown sources adverting to certain
anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO
IV) such as, staff working in another government agency, “selling”
cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all done during office
hours and involved the use of government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any
verifiable leads and details sufficient to warrant an investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it
pinpointed the persons and divisions involved in the alleged
irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities
happening in CSCRO IV and its effect on the integrity of the
Commission, I decided to form a team of Central Office staff to
_______________
49 Id.
219
back up the files in the computers of the Public Assistance and

Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x50
A search by a government employer of an employee’s

office is justified at inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.51 Thus,
in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth
Circuit, it was held that where a government agency’s
computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with
pornographic content and in addition expressly provided
that employees do not have any personal privacy rights
regarding their use of the agency information systems and
technology, the government employee had no legitimate
expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his
office computer, and therefore evidence found during
warrantless search of the computer was admissible in
prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the
defendant employee’s computer hard drive was first
remotely examined by a computer information technician
after his supervisor received complaints that he was
inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-
related e-mail messages throughout the office. When the
supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his
computer to access the prohibited websites, in
contravention of the express policy of the agency, his
computer tower and floppy disks were taken and examined.
A formal administrative investigation ensued and later
search warrants were secured by the police department.
The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioner’s
computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless searches

was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a public
employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long
as any search is justified at inception and is reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the
first place.52
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on
petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and
scope. We quote with
_______________
50 CA Rollo, p. 639.
51 U.S. v. Thorn, 375 F.3d 679, C.A.8 (Mo.), July 13, 2004.
52 Id.
220
approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its

actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines
established by O’Connor:
“Even conceding for a moment that there is no such

administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully
passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American
authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued
the search in its capacity as a government employer and
that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the

inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that
a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for
parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the
Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it
was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was
found to be furtively engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for
parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a
highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt
upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-
judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in
fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of
administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but
must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not
have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the
Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date
that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned
regional office. That it was the computers that were
subjected to the search was justified since these furnished
the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely
starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence.
Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files,
that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a
button, necessitated drastic and immediate action.
Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause

requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-
related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission
effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent
manner. Officials and some
221
employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the

vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion.
In addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through
text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of
files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless
search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way,
vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of
the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer
aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by
going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees.
Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search
are deemed admissible.”53
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right

to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument
invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence
under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is
also untenable considering the recognition accorded to
certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees
in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention
that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the

present case does not involve a criminal offense like child
pornography. As already mentioned, the search of
petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable
ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would
yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation
being conducted by CSC as government employer of such
misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This
situation clearly falls under the exception to the
warrantless requirement in administrative searches
defined in O’Connor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous
Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila54 involving a
branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was investigated on the
basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was
consuming his working hours filing and attending to
personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and
utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by
NBI agents. The team was able
_______________
53 CA Rollo, pp. 611-612.
54 A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA
361.
222
to access Atty. Morales’ personal computer and print two

documents stored in its hard drive, which turned out to be
two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC

of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty.
Morales’ computer was seized and taken in custody of the
OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with
order to the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein.
The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating
Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge
against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel
who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive
statement affirming the charges against Atty. Morales,
along with other court personnel also charged in the same
case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales should be
found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held
that while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the
exacting standards required of every court employee, the
Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal
computer against him for it violated his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court
found no evidence to support the claim of OCA that they
were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent
of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter immediately filed an
administrative case against the persons who conducted the
spot investigation, questioning the validity of the
investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure. And as
there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings,
retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of
Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the
Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him
for insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at

bar because, unlike the former which involved a personal
computer of a court employee, the computer from which the
personal files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property
the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and
monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item
seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and
circumstances under American Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007
on Computer Use Policy, failed
223
to establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the office computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from
the office computer of petitioner are admissible in the
administrative case against him, we now proceed to the
issue of whether the CSC was correct in finding the
petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from
the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-
judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only
respect but even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally
reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.55
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a

substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and
documents stored in his office computer, as well as the
sworn affidavits and testimonies of the witnesses it
presented during the formal investigation. According to the
CSC, these documents were confirmed to be similar or
exactly the same content-wise with those on the case
records of some cases pending either with CSCRO No. IV,
CSC-NCR or the Commission Proper. There were also
substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with
the CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the
CSC found the explanation given by petitioner, to the effect
that those files retrieved from his computer hard drive
actually belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and
Solosa whom he allowed the use of his computer for
drafting their pleadings in the cases they handle, as
implausible and doubtful under the circumstances. We hold
that the CSC’s factual finding regarding the authorship of
the subject pleadings and misuse of the office computer is
well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:
_______________
55 Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166, December 16, 2005, 478
SCRA 210, 230, citing Rosario v. Victory Ricemill, G.R. No. 147572,
February 19, 2003, 397 SCRA 760, 766 and Bagong Bayan Corp., Realty
Investors and Developers v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 61272, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 107.
224
“It is also striking to note that some of these documents were

in the nature of pleadings responding to the orders, decisions or
resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to them such
as a petition for certiorari or a motion for reconsideration of CSC
Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof knowingly and
willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the
interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the Commission.
Worse, the appearance in one of the retrieved documents the
phrase, “Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo,” lends
plausibility to an inference that the preparation or drafting of the
legal pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable motivation.
Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply doing
the same for the money—a “legal mercenary” selling or purveying
his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved
from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he
was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of
the said computer. More significantly, one of the witnesses,
Margarita Reyes, categorically testified seeing a written copy of
one of the pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of
the respondent. This was the Petition for Review in the case of
Estrellado addressed to the Court of Appeals. The said
circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly
undermining the interest of the Commission, his very own
employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the
Commission to believe that the documents were the personal files
of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa,
who incidentally served as his counsel of record during the formal
investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself executed a
sworn affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this contention of the

respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution witness,
Reyes, who testified that during her entire stay in the PALD, she
never saw Atty. Solosa using the computer assigned to the
respondent. Reyes more particularly stated that she worked in
close proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa,
whom she personally knows, was using the computer in question.
Further, Atty. Solosa himself was never presented during the
formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that the
same constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of weight and
credence. The same is true with the other supporting affidavits,
which Pollo submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention
of the respondent, it evinces the fact that he was unlawfully
authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him
for official purpose, not only once but several times gauging by the
number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the interests
of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting as
225
a principal by indispensable cooperation…Or at the very least, he

should be responsible for serious misconduct for repeatedly
allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and the electricity,
to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially
intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing
of the appellant that the line appearing in one of the documents,
“Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo,” was a private
joke between the person alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado,
and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything more
sinister. The same is too preposterous to be believed. Why would
such a statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the
computer assigned to the respondent, unless he had something to
do with it?”56
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC

should not have entertained an anonymous complaint since
Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires
a verified complaint:
Rule II – Disciplinary Cases

SEC. 8. Complaint.—A complaint against a civil service
official or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in
writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.
However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining
authority, the complaint need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is
obvious truth or merit to the allegation therein or supported
by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person
complained of may be required to comment.
x x x x”
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The

administrative complaint is deemed to have been initiated
by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot
inspection and search of the files stored in the hard drive of
computers in the two divisions adverted to in the
anonymous letter—as part of the disciplining authority’s
own fact-finding investigation and information-gathering—
found a prima facie case against the petitioner who was

then directed to file
_______________
56 CA Rollo, pp. 616-617.
226
his comment. As this Court held in Civil Service

Commission v. Court of Appeals57—
“Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of

E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be
initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the
appropriate disciplining authority, even without being
subscribed and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the
disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction
over Dumlao was validly acquired.” (Emphasis supplied.)
As to petitioner’s challenge on the validity of CSC OM

10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant consideration.
The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order
having been issued solely by the CSC Chair and not the
Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of
Commissioner Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already
explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the
Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflor’s previous memo
expressing his dissent to the actions and disposition of the
Commission in this case. According to Chairperson David,
said memorandum order was in fact exhaustively

discussed, provision by provision in the January 23, 2002
Commission Meeting, attended by her and former
Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the
Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue a
Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP
being for internal use of the Commission, the practice had
been to issue a memorandum order.58 Moreover, being an
administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or
which regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not the
public, the CUP need not be published prior to its
effectivity.59
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the CA in affirming the CSC’s ruling that
petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses
_______________
57 G.R. No. 147009, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 394, 401.
58 Rollo, p. 299.
59 See Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 535; 146 SCRA 446, 454
(1986).
227
justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate

penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties,
pursuant to existing rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is

DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and
Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Brion, Peralta, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes

and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., I join the opinion of J. Bersamin.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I join the concurring and
dissenting opinion of Justice Bersamin.
Bersamin, J., Please see Concurring & Dissenting
Opinion.
Del Castillo, J., No Part.
Abad, J., I join Justice L. Bersamin’s concurring and
dissenting opinion.
Sereno, J., I concur but share J. Carpio’s concerns.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I concur with the Court’s denial of the petition.
However, I file this separate opinion to (1) assert a
statutory basis for the disposition of the case, and (2)
articulate the exception to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) office regulation denying expectation of privacy in
the use of government computers.
First. The CSC’s computer use regulation, which opens
to access for internal scrutiny anything CSC employees
“create, store, send, or

228
receive in the computer system,” has a statutory basis

under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Section 4(2) of the Code mandates that “[g]overnment x x
x property shall be x x x used solely for public
purposes.”1 In short, any private use of a government
property, like a government-owned computer, is prohibited
by law. Consequently, a government employee cannot
expect any privacy when he uses a government-owned
computer because he knows he cannot use the computer for
any private purpose. The CSC regulation declaring a no-
privacy expectation on the use of government-owned
computers logically follows from the statutory rule that
government-owned property shall be used “solely” for a
public purpose.
Moreover, the statutory rule and the CSC regulation are
consistent with the constitutional treatment of a public
office as a public trust.2 The statutory rule and the CSC
regulation also implement the State policies, as expressly
provided in the Constitution, of ensuring full disclosure of
all government transactions involving public interest,3
maintaining honesty and integrity in the public service,
and preventing graft and corruption.4
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantees
of privacy and reasonable search are unavailing against
audit inspections or internal investigations for misconduct,
as here, of electronic data stored in government-owned
property such as computing, telecommunication, and

other devices issued to civil servants. These
_______________
1 Presidential Decree No. 1445. Section 4(2) provides in full:
“Government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public
purposes.”
2 Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution provides: “Public office is a
public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.”
3 Section 28, Article II of the Constitution provides: “Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.”
4 Section 27, Article II of the Constitution provides: “The State shall
maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.”
229
constitutional guarantees apply only to searches of devices

privately owned by government employees.
Second. The CSC office regulation denying CSC
employees privacy expectation in “anything they create,
store, send, or receive in the computer system,”5 although
valid as to petitioner Briccio Pollo, is constitutionally
infirm insofar as the regulation excludes from its ambit the
three CSC commissioners solely by reason of their rank,
and not by reason of the confidential nature of the

electronic data they generate.
Office regulations mandating no-privacy expectation
such as the CSC regulation in question cannot justify
access to sensitive government information traditionally
recognized as confidential. Thus, insulated from the
reach of such regulations are Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings, internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and
other collegiate courts, draft decisions of judges and
justices, executive sessions of either house of Congress,
military and diplomatic secrets, national security matters,
documents relating to pre-prosecution investigations by
law enforcement agencies and similar confidential
matters.6 The privilege of confidentiality covering these
classes of information, barring free access to them, is
grounded on the nature of the constitutional function of the
public officials involved, coupled with considerations of
efficiency, safety and comity interests since disclosure of
confidential information jeopardizes decision-making,
endangers lives and undermines diplomatic dealings, as
the case may be.
_______________
5 The rule under CSC Memorandum No. 10, series of 2002, provides:
No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the
Commission shall not have expectation of privacy in anything they create,
store, send or receive in the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement
shall select and assign Users to handle the confidential examination of
data and processes.

6 Under Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002, 384 SCRA 152, 188), these are also beyond the reach of the constitu-
tional right to information.
230
The CSC, as the government’s “central personnel

agency,”7 exercises quasi-judicial functions in “[r]ender[ing]
opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service
matters.”8 The CSC’s internal deliberations on
administrative cases are comparable to the internal
deliberations of collegial courts. Such internal deliberations
enjoy confidentiality and cannot be accessed on the ground
that an audio of the deliberations is stored in a
government-owned device. Likewise, draft decisions of CSC
commissioners that are stored in government-issued
computers are confidential information.
By providing that “[u]sers except the Members of the
Commission shall not have an expectation of privacy in
anything they create, store, send, or receive in the
[government-owned] computer system,” the CSC regulation
creates a new, constitutionally suspect category of
confidential information based, not on the sensitivity of
content, but on the salary grade of its author. Thus, a
glaring exemption from the CSC’s own transparency
regulation is “anything x x x create[d], store[d], sen[t], or
receive[d]” in the commission’s computer system by the
three CSC members. As the new category is content-neutral
and draws its confidentiality solely from the rank held by
the government official creating, storing, sending and

receiving the data, the exemption stands on its head the
traditional grounding of confidentiality—the sensitivity of
content.
The constitutional infirmity of the exemption is
worsened by the arbitrariness of its rank-based
classification. The three CSC commissioners, unlike the
rest of the lower ranked CSC employees, are excluded from
the operation of the CSC’s data transparency regulation
solely because they are the CSC’s highest ranking officers.9
This classification fails even the most lenient equal
protection analysis. It bears no reasonable connection with
the CSC regulation’s avowed purposes of “[1] [p]rotect[ing]
confidential, proprietary information of
_______________
7 Constitution, Article IX(B), Section 3.
8 Executive Order No. 292, Book V, Title I, Chapter 3, Section 12(5).
9 Aside from its three commissioners, the CSC has two assistant
commissioners and twelve divisions in its central office, including an office
for legal affairs. The CSC also maintains 16 regional offices.
231
the CSC from theft or unauthorized disclosure to third

parties; [2] [o]ptimiz[ing] the use of the CSC’s [c]omputer
[r]esources as what they are officially intended for; and [3]
[r]educ[ing] and possibly eliminat[ing] potential legal
liability to employees and third parties.”10 The assumption
upon which the classification rests—that the CSC
commissioners, unlike the rest of the CSC’s thousands of

employees, are incapable of violating these objectives—is
plainly unfounded.
The only way by which the CSC commissioners, or for
that matter, any of its employees, can constitutionally take
themselves out of the ambit of the CSC’s no-privacy
regulation is if they (1) invoke the doctrine of
confidentiality of information, and (2) prove that the
information sought to be exempted indeed falls under any
of the classes of confidential information adverted to above
(or those comparable to them). Sensitivity of content, not
rank, justifies enjoyment of this very narrow constitutional
privilege.
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petition.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
I render this concurring and dissenting opinion only to
express my thoughts on the constitutional right to privacy
of communication and correspondence vis-à-vis an office
memorandum that apparently removed an employee’s
expectation of privacy in the workplace.
Indispensable to the position I take herein is an

appreciation of the development and different attributes of
the right to privacy that has
______________
10 CSC Memorandum No. 10, series of 2002, enumerates these as its

objectives.
232
come to be generally regarded today as among the valuable

rights of the individual that must be given Constitutional
protection.
The 1890 publication in the Harvard Law Review of The
Right to Privacy,1 an article of 28 pages co-written by
former law classmates Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis,
is often cited to have given birth to the recognition of the
constitutional right to privacy. The article was spawned by
the emerging growth of media and technology, with the co-
authors particularly being concerned by the production in
1884 by the Eastman Kodak Company of a “snap camera”
that enabled people to take candid pictures. Prior to 1884,
cameras had been expensive and heavy; they had to be set
up and people would have to pose to have their pictures
taken. The snap camera expectedly ignited the enthusiasm
for amateur photography in thousands of people who had
previously not been able to afford a camera. This
technological development moved Warren and Brandeis to
search for a legal right to protect individual privacy.2 One
of the significant assertions they made in their article was
the declaration that “the common law secures to each
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others,”3 said right being merely part of
an individual’s right to be let alone.4
While some quarters do not easily concede that Warren

and Brandeis “invented” the right to privacy, mainly
because a robust body of confidentiality law protecting
private information from disclosure existed throughout
Anglo-American common law by 1890, critics have
acknowledged that The Right to Privacy charted a new
path for American privacy law.5
_______________
1 4 Harvard Law Review 193.
2 Richards, Neil M. and Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:
Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.
96 (2007), pp. 128-129.
3 Supra, note 1, p. 198.
4 Id., p. 195; Warren and Brandeis adopted the “right to be let alone”
language from Judge Thomas M. Cooley’s 1888 treatise The Law of Torts
29 (2d ed. 1888).
5 Richards and Solove, op. cit., p. 125.
233
In 1928, Brandeis, already a Supreme Court Justice,

incorporated the right to be let alone in his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States,6 viz.:
“The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much

broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of
his feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that only a
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be

found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone ̶ the most
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as
evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such
intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.” [emphasis
supplied]
In 1960, torts scholar William Prosser published in the

California Law Review7 his article Privacy based on his
thorough review of the various decisions of the United
States courts and of the privacy laws. He observed then
that the “law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of
invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which
are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have
almost nothing in common except that each represents an
interference with the right of the plaintiff, in the phrase
coined by Judge Cooley, ‘to be let alone.’ ”8 He identified the
four torts as: (a) the intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion
or solitude, or into his private affairs; (b) the public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff;
(c) the publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in
the public eye; and (d) the appropriation, for the
defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.9
_______________
6 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7 48 California Law Review, No. 3 (August 1960), p. 383.
8 Id., p. 389.
9 Id.; see also Richards and Solove, op. cit., pp. 148-149.
234
With regard to the first tort of intrusion upon seclusion

or solitude, or into private affairs, Prosser posited that
there was a remedy when a person “intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns” in a manner that
was “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”10 The second
and third torts established liability when the publicized
matter was highly offensive to a reasonable person and was
not a legitimate concern of the public—if it involved
disclosure of embarrassing private facts—or placed another
before the public in a false light.11 Lastly, the tort of
appropriation afforded a relief when a person adopted “to
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another.”12
In the 1977 landmark ruling of Whalen v. Roe,13 the US
Supreme Court expanded the right to privacy by
categorizing privacy claims into two, namely: informational
privacy, to refer to the interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters; and decisional privacy, to refer to the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.
All US Circuit Courts recognizing informational privacy
have held that this right is not absolute and, therefore,
they have balanced individuals’ informational privacy

interests against the State’s interest in acquiring or
disclosing the information.14 The majority of the US Circuit
Courts have adopted some form of scrutiny that has
required the Government to show a “substantial” interest
for invading individuals’ right to confidentiality in their
personal information, and then to balance the State’s
substantial interest in the disclosure as against the
individual’s interest in confidentiality.15This balancing test
was developed in United States v. Westinghouse16 by using
the
_______________
10 Restatement of Torts 2d §652B (1977) (Prosser was also a reporter of
the Second Restatement of Torts).
11 Id., §652D-§652E (1977).
12 Id., §652C (1977).
13 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
14 Gilbert, Helen L., Minors’ Constitutional Right to Informational
Privacy, The University of Chicago Law Journal (2007), pp. 1385-1386.
15 Id., p. 1386.
16 638 F2d 570 (3d Cir 1980).
235
following factors, to wit: (a) the type of record requested; (b)

the information it did or might contain; (c) the potential for
harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (d) the
injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the
record was generated; (e) the adequacy of safeguards to
prevent unauthorized disclosure; (f) the degree of need for

access; and (g) the presence of an express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable
public interest militating toward access.17
Decisional privacy, on the other hand, evolved from
decisions touching on matters concerning speech, religion,
personal relations, education and sexual preferences. As
early as 1923, the US Supreme Court recognized decisional
privacy in its majority opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska.18 The
petitioner therein was tried and convicted by a district
court, and his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the Nebraska, for teaching the subject of reading
in the German language to a ten-year old boy who had not
attained and successfully passed eighth grade.19 In
reversing the judgment, Justice McReynolds
_______________
17 Id., p. 578.
18 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
19 The criminal information was based upon “An act relating to the
teaching of foreign languages in the State of Nebraska,” approved April 9,
1919, pertinent portions of which provide:
Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any
private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to
any person in any language other than the English language.
Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught
as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully
passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued
by the county superintendent of the county in which the child resides.
Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject
to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one
hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in the county jail for any period not
exceeding thirty days for each offense.
Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from
and after its passage and approval.
236
of the US Supreme Court pronounced that the liberty

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment “denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.” Justice McReynolds elaborated
thusly:
“Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools

conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves
thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and
honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere
knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be
regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked
upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this
language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their

children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.”
In Griswold v. Connecticut,20 the US Supreme Court

resolved another decisional privacy claim by striking down
a statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives by
married couples. Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion,
declared:
“By Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, the right to educate one’s

children as one chooses is made applicable to the States by the
force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer v.
Nebraska, supra, the same dignity is given the right to study the
German language in a private school. In other words, the State
may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of
freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or
to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right
to read (Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143) and freedom of
inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach (see Wiemann v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195)—indeed, the freedom of the entire
university community. (Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
249-250, 261-263; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112;
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369). Without those peripheral
rights, the specific
_______________
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
237
rights would be less secure. And so we reaffirm the principle of

the Pierce and the Meyer cases.
xxxx
“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of
contraceptives, rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum
destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot
stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this
Court, that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307). Would we allow the police to search
the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”
One of the most controversial decisional privacy claims

was dealt with in Roe v. Wade,21 by which the US Supreme
Court justified abortion in the United States on the
premise that:
“This right of privacy x x x is broad enough to encompass a

woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The
detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman
by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct
harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.

There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for
it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All
these are factors the woman and her responsible physician
necessarily will consider in consultation.
xxxx
“Although the results are divided, most of these courts have
agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough
to cover the abortion
_______________
21 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
238
decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject

to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as
to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life,
become dominant.”
In the Philippines, we have upheld decisional privacy

claims. For instance, in the 2003 case of Estrada v.
Escritor,22 although the majority opinion dealt extensively
with the claim of religious freedom, a right explicitly
provided by the Constitution, Justice Bellosillo’s separate
opinion was informative with regard to the privacy aspect
of the issue involved and, hence, stated:
“More than religious freedom, I look with partiality to the

rights of due process and privacy. Law in general reflects a
particular morality or ideology, and so I would rather not foist
upon the populace such criteria as “compelling state interest,” but
more, the reasonably foreseeable specific connection between an
employee’s potentially embarrassing conduct and the efficiency of
the service. This is a fairly objective standard than the compelling
interest standard involved in religious freedom.
“Verily, if we are to remand the instant case to the Office of the
Court Administrator, we must also configure the rights of due
process and privacy into the equation. By doing so, we can make a
difference not only for those who object out of religious scruples
but also for those who choose to live a meaningful life even if it
means sometimes breaking “oppressive” and “antiquated”
application of laws but are otherwise efficient and effective
workers. As is often said, when we have learned to reverence each
individual’s liberty as we do our tangible wealth, we then shall
have our renaissance.”
Relevantly, Article III, Section 3 of the 1987

Constitution embodies the protection of the privacy of
communication and correspondence, to wit:
“Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and

correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
x x x x”
_______________
22 A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003, 408 SCRA 1.
239
Yet, the guarantee in favor of the privacy of

communication and correspondence is not absolute, for it
expressly allows intrusion either upon lawful order of a
court or when public safety and order so demands (even
without a court order).23
In its 1965 ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut,24 the US
Supreme Court declared that the right to privacy was a
fundamental personal right; and that the enumeration in
the Constitution of certain rights should not be construed
as a denial or disparagement of others that have been
retained by the people,25 considering that the “specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights had penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that helped give them
life and substance.” Accordingly, an individual’s right to
privacy of communication and correspondence cannot, as a
general rule, be denied without violating the basic
principles of liberty and justice.
The constitutional right to privacy in its Philippine
context was first recognized in the 1968 ruling of Morfe v.
Mutuc,26 where the Court affirmed that:
“The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition

independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: “The concept of limited government
has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short
of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in

all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector—protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual—has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age
—industrialization, urbanization, and organization—operate to
narrow the area of privacy
_______________
23 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, 1986 Ed., p.
191.
24 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25 Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
26 G.R. No. L-20387, 22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968.
240
and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to

maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.”
Morfe v. Mutuc emphasized the significance of privacy

by declaring that “[t]he right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom.”27 The description hewed very
closely to that earlier made by Justice Brandeis in
Olmstead v. United States that the right to be let alone was
“the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.”28
It is elementary that before this constitutional right may

be invoked a reasonable or objective expectation of privacy
should exist, a concept that was introduced in the
concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in the 1967 case Katz
v. United States,29 no doubt inspired by the oral argument30
of Judge Harvey Schneider, then co-counsel for
_______________
27 Id., citing Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467
(1952).
28 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
29 389 U.S, 347, 350-351 (1967).
30 The transcript of Judge Schneider’s oral argument in part provides:
Mr. Schneider: x x x We think and respectfully submit to the Court that whether or
not, a telephone booth or any area is constitutionally protected, is the wrong initial
inquiry.
We do not believe that the question should be determined as to whether or not, let’s
say you have an invasion of a constitutionally protected area, that shouldn’t be the
initial inquiry, but rather that probably should be the conclusion that is reached after
the application of a test such as that we propose are similar test.
Now, we have proposed in our brief and there’s nothing magical or ingenious about our
test.
It’s an objective test which stresses the rule of reason, we think.
The test really asks or opposes the question, “Would a reasonable person objectively
looking at the communication setting, the situation and location of a communicator
and communicatee -- would he reasonably believe that that communication was
intended to be confidential?”
We think that in applying this test there are several criteria that can be used.
Justice William J. Brennan: So that parabolic mic on the two people conversing in the
field a mile away might—
Mr. Schneider: Absolutely.
241
petitioner Charles Katz. Since the idea was never

discussed in the
_______________
xxx
We think that if a confidential communication was intended and all the other aspects of
confidentiality are present, then it makes no difference whether you’re in an open field or in the
privacy of your own home.

We would submit to the Court that there are factors present which would tend to give the
Courts, the trial courts, and ultimately this Court, some guidelines as to whether or not
objectively speaking, the communication was intended to be private.

xxx
Mr. Schneider: x x x
I believe the following factors at least should be included in an analysis of this problem.
One, what is the physical location?
In other words, where did the conversation take place?

Was it in a situation where numerous persons were present or whether just a few people
present?
I think that bears on the issue.
I think the tone of voice bears on the issue.

I think that you can have a communication for example in your house which almost everyone
would see all things being equal would be confidential.
However, if you use a loud enough voice, I think you destroy your own confidentiality.
xxx
Mr. Schneider: x x x
We feel that the Fourth Amendment and at the Court’s decisions recently for a long time, I
believe, have indicated that the right to privacy is what’s protected by the Fourth Amendment.
We feel that the right to privacy follows the individual.
And that whether or not, he’s in a space when closed by four walls, and a ceiling, and a roof, or
an auto-mobile, or any other physical location, is not determined of the issue of whether or not
the communication can ultimately be declared confidential.

xxx
Justice John M. Harlan: Could you state this Court tested this as you propose?
Mr. Schneider: Yes, we propose a test using in a way it’s not too dissimilar from a
tort, that tort reasonable man test.
242
briefs, Judge Schneider boldly articulated during his oral

argument that “expectations of privacy should be based on
an objective standard, one that could be formulated using
the reasonable man standard from tort law.”31 Realizing
the significance of this new standard in its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Harlan, in his own way,
characterized the reasonable expectation of privacy test as
“the rule that has emerged from prior decisions.”32
Justice Harlan expanded the test into its subjective and
objective component, however, by stressing that the
protection of the Fourth Amendment has a two-fold
requirement: “first, that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’.”33 Although the majority opinion in Katz v.
United States made no reference to this reasonable
expectation of privacy test, it instituted the doctrine that
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What

a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”34
_______________
We’re suggesting that what should be used is the communication setting
should be observed and those items that should be considered are the tone of
voice, the actual physical location where the conversation took place, the
activities on the part of the officer.
When all those things are considered, we would ask that the
test be applied as to whether or not a third person
objectively looking at the entire scene could reasonably
interpret and could reasonably say that the communicator
intended his communication to be confidential. x x x
(emphasis supplied.)
31 Winn, Peter, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy” Test, 2008.
32 Id.; see the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-351 (1967).
33 Concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States,
supra.
34 Katz v. United States, supra; writing for the majority, Justice
Stewart made the following pronouncement:
xxx. In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment
problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase “con-
243
In the 1968 case Mancusi v. DeForte,35 the US Supreme

Court started to apply the reasonable expectation of
privacy test pioneered by Katz v. United States and
declared that the “capacity to claim the protection of the
Amendment depends not upon a property right in the
invaded place, but upon whether the area was one in which
there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion.”36
II
Bearing in mind the history and evolution of the right to
privacy as a Constitutionally-protected right, I now dwell
on whether the petitioner, a public employee, enjoyed an
objective or reasonable expectation of privacy in his
workplace, i.e. within the premises of respondent Civil
Service Commission, his employer.
At the outset, I state that the right to privacy involved
herein is the petitioner’s right to informational privacy in
his workplace, specifically his right to work freely without
surveillance or intrusion.37
I find relevant the doctrine laid down in O’Connor v.
Ortega,38 where the US Supreme Court held that a person
was deemed to have a lower expectation of privacy in his
workplace. The decrease in ex-
_______________
stitutionally protected area.” Secondly, the Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional “right to privacy.”
That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds
of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often
have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the
Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of

governmental invasion. But the protection of a person’s general
right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like
the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the
law of the individual States.
35 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
36 Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court.
37 In Whalen v. Roe, supra, note 13, p. 599, the Court advanced the
principle that the right to information privacy has two aspects: (1) the
right of an individual not to have private information about himself
disclosed; and (2) the right of an individual to live freely without
surveillance and intrusion.
38 480 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1987).
244
pectation of privacy was not similar to a non-existent

expectation, however, for the US Supreme Court clarified:
“Given the societal expectations of privacy in one’s place of

work expressed in both Oliver and Mancusi, we reject the
contention made by the Solicitor General and petitioners
that public employees can never have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their place of work. Individuals
do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they
work for the government, instead of a private employer.
The operational realities of the workplace, however, may
make some employees’ expectations of privacy
unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor, rather
than a law enforcement official. Public employees’
expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file

cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the
private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office
practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. xxx
An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by
supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees.
Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow
employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences,
consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is
the nature of government offices that others—such as
fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the
general public—may have frequent access to an
individual’s office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that
‘[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches
by the government does not disappear merely because the
government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in
its capacity as employer,’
but some government offices may be so open to fellow
employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is
reasonable.
xxxx
“Balanced against the substantial government interests in the
efficient and proper operation of the workplace are the privacy
interests of government employees in their place of work, which,
while not insubstantial, are far less than those found at home or
in some other contexts. As with the building inspections in
Camara, the employer intrusions at issue here “involve a
relatively limited invasion” of employee privacy. Government
offices are provided to employees for the sole purpose of
facilitating the work of an agency. The employee may
avoid exposing personal belongings at work by simply

leaving them at home.” [emphasis supplied]
245
For sure, there are specific reasons why employees in

general have a decreased expectation of privacy with
respect to work-email accounts,39 including the following:
(a) Employers have legitimate interests in monitoring the workplace;40
(b) Employers own the facilities;
(c) Monitoring computer or internet use is a lesser evil compared to
other liabilities, such as having copyright infringing material enter
the company computers, or having employees send proprietary
material to outside parties;
(d) An employer also has an interest in detecting legally incriminating
material that may later be subject to electronic discovery;
(e) An employer simply needs to monitor the use of computer
resources, from viruses to clogging due to large image or
pornography files.41
In view of these reasons, the fact that employees may be

given individual accounts and password protection is not
deemed to create any expectation of privacy.42
Similarly, monitoring an employee’s computer usage
may also be impelled by the following legitimate reasons:
(a) To maintain the company’s professional reputation and image;
(b) To maintain employee productivity;
(c) To prevent and discourage sexual or other illegal workplace
harassment;
_______________
39 Tan, Oscar Franklin B., Articulating the Complete Philippine Right to Privacy in
Constitutional and Civil Law: A Tribute to Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Carpio,
Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 82, No. 4 (2008), pp. 228-229.
40 Id., citing Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical
Analysis, 13 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 77, 95 (2003).
41 Id., citing Matthew Finkin, Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy: The United
States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 474 (2002).
42 Supra Note 6, p. 228.
246
(d) To prevent “cyberstalking” by employees;

(e) To prevent possible defamation liability;
(f) To prevent employee disclosure of trade secrets and other
confidential information; and
(g) To avoid copyright and other intellectual property infringement
from employees illegally downloading software, etc.43
Even without Office Memorandum (OM) No. 10, Series

of 2002 being issued by respondent Karina Constantino-
David as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the
employees of the Commission, including the petitioner,
have a reduced expectation of privacy in the workplace. The
objective of the issuance of OM No. 10 has been only to
formally inform and make aware the employees of the
Commission about the limitations on their privacy while
they are in the workplace and to advise them that the
Commission has legitimate reasons to monitor
communications made by them, electronically or not. The
objectives of OM No. 10 are, needless to state, clear in this

regard.44
_______________
43 Ciocchetti, Corey A., Monitoring Employee Email: Efficient
Workplaces vs. Employee Privacy,
<http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001
dltr0026.html#8.> Last visited on June 14, 2011; citing Terrence Lewis,
Pittsburgh Business Times, Monitoring Employee E-Mail: Avoid stalking
and Illegal Internet Conduct)
<http://www.pittsburgh.bcentral.com/pittsburgh/
stories/2000/05/22/focus6.html>.
44 Rollo, p. 98.
O.M. No. 10 provides:
OBJECTIVES
Specifically, the guidelines aim to:
● Protect confidential, proprietary information of the CSC from theft
or unauthorized disclosure to third parties;
● Optimize the use of the CSC’s Computer Resources as what they are
officially intended for; and
● Reduce, and possibly eliminate potential legal liability to employees
and third parties.
247
III
Unlike the Majority, I find that the petitioner did not

absolutely waive his right to privacy.45 OM No. 10 contains
the following exception, to wit:
Waste of Computer Resources. x x x

xxxx
However, Users are given privileged access to the
Internet for knowledge search, information exchange and
others. They shall be allowed to use the computer
resources for personal purpose after office hours provided
that no unlawful materials mentioned in item number 7
and 8 are involved, and no other facilities such as air
conditioning unit, video/audio system etc., shall be used
except sufficient lights. [emphasis supplied]
Thereby, OM No. 10 has actually given the petitioner

privileged access to the Internet for knowledge search,
information exchange, and others; and has explicitly
allowed him to use the computer resources for personal
purposes after office hours. Implicit in such privileged
access and permitted personal use was, therefore, that he
still had a reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis
whatever communications he created, stored, sent, or
received after office hours through using the Commission’s
computer resources, such that he could rightfully invoke
the Constitutional protection to the privacy of his
communication and correspondence.
In view of the petitioner’s expectation of privacy, albeit
diminished, I differ from the Majority’s holding that he
should be barred from claiming any violation of his right to
privacy and right against unreasonable searches and
seizures with respect to all the files, official or
_______________
45 Id., p. 99; O.M. No. 10 states:

Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in
anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the
Internet or any other computer network. Users understand that the CSC
may use human or automated means to monitor the use of its Computer
Resources.
248
private, stored in his computer. Although I concede that

respondent David had legal authority and good reasons to
issue her order to back up the petitioner’s files as an
exercise of her power of supervision, I am not in full accord
with the Majority’s holding for the confiscation of all the
files stored in the computer. The need to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to the State’s regulation
may not be filled by means that unnecessarily and broadly
sweep and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.46
I hold, instead, that the petitioner is entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the
communications created, stored, sent, or received after
office hours through the office computer, as to which he
must be protected. For that reason, respondent David’s
order to back up files should only cover the files
corresponding to communications created, stored, sent, or
received during office hours. There will be no difficulty in
identifying and segregating the files created, stored, sent,
or received during and after office hours with the constant
advancement and improvement of technology and the
presumed expertise of the Commission’s information

systems analysts.
Nonetheless, my concurrence with the Majority remains
as regards the petitioner’s administrative liability and the
seizure of the remainder of the files. I am reiterating, for
emphasis, that the diminution of his expectation of privacy
in the workplace derived from the nature and purpose of a
government office, actual office practice and procedures
observed therein, and legitimate regulation.47 Thus, I vote
to uphold the legality of OM No. 10. I hasten to add, to be
very clear, that the validity of the seizure of the files should
be limited to the need for determining whether or not the
petitioner unjustly utilized official resources of the
Commission for personal purposes, and should not extend
to the reading of the files’ contents, which would be
violative of his right to privacy.
_______________
46 Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, note 20, citing NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288 (1964).
47 O’Connor v. Ortega, 25 480 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1987).
429
I adhere to the principle that every man is believed to be

free. Freedom gears a man to move about unhampered and
to speak out from conviction. That is why the right to
privacy has earned its worthy place in the Bill of Rights.
However, although the right to privacy is referred to as a
right to be enjoyed by the people, the State cannot just sit
back and stand aside when, in the exercise of his right to

privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the
detriment of the national interest.
In upholding the validity of OM No. 10, I also suppose
that it is not the intention of the Majority to render the Bill
of Rights inferior to an administrative rule. Rather,
adoption of the balancing of interests test, a concept
analogous to the form of scrutiny employed by courts of the
United States, has turned out to be applicable especially in
the face of the conflict between the individual interest of
the petitioner (who asserts his right to privacy) and the
Commission’s legitimate concern as an arm of the
Government tasked to perform official functions. The
balancing of interest test has been explained by Professor
Kauper,48 viz.:
“The theory of balance of interests represents a wholly

pragmatic approach to the problem of First Amendment freedom,
indeed, to the whole problem of constitutional interpretation. It
rests on the theory that is the Court’s function in the case
before it when it finds public interests served by
legislation on the one hand and First Amendment
freedoms affected by it on the other, to balance the one
against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the
greater weight shall be placed. If on balance it appears
that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is
of such a character that it outweighs the abridgment of
freedom, then the Court will find the legislation valid. In
short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis
that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even
those stated in the First Amendment, and that they may be
abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and

important interest.” (emphasis supplied.)
_______________
48 Cited in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-27833,
April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 899.
450
The Court has applied the balancing of interest test in

Alejano v. Cabuay,49 where it ruled that the substantial
government interest in security and discipline outweighed
a detainee’s right to privacy of communication. The Court
has elucidated:
“In Hudson v. Palmer, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an

inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy inside his cell.
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily lose
many protections of the Constitution, thus:
‘However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy
many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that
imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of
many significant rights. These constraints on inmates, and
in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are
“justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system.” The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a
practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of “institutional
needs and objectives” of prison facilities, chief among which
is internal security. Of course, these restrictions or
retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that,
under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are

factors in addition to correction.’
“The later case of State v. Dunn, citing Hudson v. Palmer,
abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made no distinction as to
the detainees’ limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the
considerable jurisprudence in the United States holding that
inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a
substantial government interest such as security or
discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete
censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening
the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v.
Dunn:
‘[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth
Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible
with the close and continual surveillance of inmates
and their cells required to ensure institutional
security and internal order. We are satisfied that
society would insist that the prisoner’s expectation of
privacy always yield to what must be considered a
paramount interest in institutional security. We
believe that it is accepted by our society that “[l]oss of
freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of
confinement.” ’
_______________
49 G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 188, 211-214.
251
xxxx
“Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the

opening and reading of the detainees’ letters in the present case
violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The
letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the
folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same
purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection
of contraband.
xxxx
“In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and
prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the
constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted
prisoners, U.S. courts “balance the guarantees of the
Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison
administrators.” The deferential review of such regulations
stems from the principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials
to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously
hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to
adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration.” [emphasis supplied]
Much like any other government office, the Commission

was established primarily for the purpose of advancing and
accomplishing the functions that were the object of its
creation.50 It is imperative, therefore, that its resources be
maximized to achieve utmost efficiency in order to ensure
the delivery of quality output and services to the
_______________
50 The Civil Service Commission was conferred the status of a

department by Republic Act No. 2260 as amended and elevated to a
constitutional body by the 1973 Constitution. It was reorganized under PD
No. 181 dated September 24, 1972, and again reorganized under
Executive Order no. 181 dated November 21, 1986. With the new
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), the Commission is constitutionally
mandated to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the Civil Service. Also, as the central
human resource institution and as adviser to the President on personnel
management of the Philippine Government, the Civil Service Commission
exists to be the forerunner in (1) upholding merit, justice and fairness; (2)
building competence, expertise and character; (3) ensuring delivery of
quality public services and products; (4) institutionalizing workplace
harmony and wellness; and (5) fostering partnership and collaboration.
www.csc.gov.ph/mandate and mission. Last visited on July 13, 2011.
252
public. This commitment to efficiency existed not solely in

the interest of good government but also in the interest of
letting government agencies control their own information-
processing systems.51 With the State and the people being
the Commission’s ultimate beneficiaries, it is incumbent
upon the Commission to maintain integrity both in fact and
in appearance at all times. OM No. 10 was issued to serve
as a necessary instrument to safeguard the efficiency and
integrity of the Commission, a matter that was of a
compelling State interest, and consequently to lay a sound
basis for the limited encroachment in the petitioner’s right
to privacy. But, nonetheless, Justice Goldberg’s concurring

opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut52 might be instructive:
“In a long series of cases this Court has held that where
fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be
abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory
statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a
proper state purpose. Where there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling (Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524). The law must be shown ‘necessary, and not
merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy.’” (McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 186)
Even assuming that the anonymous tip about the

petitioner’s misuse of the computer proved to be false, i.e.,
the petitioner did not really engage in lawyering for or
assisting parties with interests adverse to that of the
Commission, his permitting former colleagues and close
friends not officially connected with the Commission to use
and store files in his computer,53 which he admitted, still
seriously
_______________
51 Regan, Priscilla M., Legislating Privacy (Technology, Social Values,
and Public Policy), The University of North Carolina Press, 1995, p. 186.
52 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53 Rollo, pp. 96-97; Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Affidavit executed by
Ponciano R. Solosa narrated the following:
4. That I have also requested Ricky who is like a son to me having

known him since he was eighteen (18) years old, to keep my personal files
for safekeeping in his computer which I understand was issued thru
Memorandum Receipt and therefore for his personal use;
253
breached, or, at least, threatened to breach the integrity

and efficiency of the Commission as a government office.
Compounding his breach was that he was well informed of
the limited computer use and privacy policies in OM No.
10, in effect since 2002, prior to the seizure of his files in
January of 2007. The Court should not disregard or ignore
the breach he was guilty of, for doing so could amount to
abetting his misconduct to the detriment of the public who
always deserved quality service from the Commission.
IV
As early as in Olmstead v. United States,54 Justice

Brandeis anticipated the impact of technological changes to
the right to privacy and significantly observed that—
“x x x time works changes, brings into existence new conditions

and purposes.” Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and
invention have made it
_______________
5. That this affidavit is issued to attest to the fact that Mr. Pollo has nothing
to do with my files which I have entrusted to him for safekeeping including my
personal pleadings with the LTO and PUP, of which I have been the counsel on
record and caused the preparation and signed thereof accordingly.
Also, paragraph 5 of the Affidavit executed by Eric N. Estrellado mentioned the
following:
8. That I deny what was indicated in CSC Resolution No. 07-0382 under item
13 and 14 that Ricky Pollo is earning out of practicing or aiding people
undersigned included, the truth of the matter the statement made “Epal, kulang
ang bayad mo.”, was a private joke between me and my counsel and friend Atty.
Solosa. That item 14 was my billing statement with the law firm of solosa [sic] and
de Guzman. Ricky has nothing to do with it. These private files but was intruded
and confiscated for unknown reasons by people who are not privy to our private
affairs with my counsel. That these are in the CPU of Ricky, as he would request
as in fact Atty. Solosa himself requested Ricky to keep files thereof thru flash
drive or disk drive;
54 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brandeis, Olmstead v. United States, supra
Note 6.
254
possible for the government, by means far more effective than

stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet. Moreover, “in the application of a
Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been
but of what may be.” The progress of science in furnishing the
Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with
wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in
the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring

unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. xxx”
In this era when technological advancement and the

emergence of sophisticated methodologies in terms of the
science of communication are already inexorable and
commonplace, I cannot help but recognize the potential
impact of the Majority’s ruling on future policies to govern
situations in the public and private workplaces. I
apprehend that the ruling about the decreased expectation
of privacy in the workplace may generate an unwanted
implication for employers in general to henceforth consider
themselves authorized, without risking a collision with the
Constitutionally-protected right to privacy, to probe and
pry into communications made during work hours by their
employees through the use of their computers and other
digital instruments of communication. Thus, the employers
may possibly begin to monitor their employees’ phone calls,
to screen incoming and out-going e-mails, to capture
queries made through any of the Internet’s efficient search
engines (like Google), or to censor visited websites (like
Yahoo!, Facebook or Twitter) in the avowed interest of
ensuring productivity and supervising use of business
resources. That will be unfortunate.
The apprehension may ripen into a real concern about
the possibility of abuse on the part of the employers. I
propose, therefore, that the ruling herein be made pro hac
vice, for there may be situations not presently envisioned
that may be held, wrongly or rightly, as covered by the
ruling, like when the instrument of communication used is
property not owned by the employer although used during

work hours.
As a final note, let me express the sentiment that an
employee, regardless of his position and of the sector he
works for, is not a slave of
255
trade expected to devote his full time and attention to the

job. Although the interests of capital or public service do
merit protection, a recognition of the limitations of man as
a being needful of some extent of rest, and of some degree
of personal space even during work hours, is most essential
in order to fully maximize the potential by which his
services was obtained in the first place. The job should not
own him the whole time he is in the workplace. Even while
he remains in the workplace, he must be allowed to
preserve his own identity, to maintain an inner self, to
safeguard his beliefs, and to keep certain thoughts,
judgments and desires hidden. Otherwise put, he does not
surrender his entire expectation of privacy totally upon
entering the gates of the workplace. Unreasonable
intrusion into his right to be let alone should still be
zealously guarded against, albeit he may have waived at
some point a greater part of that expectation. At any rate,
whenever the interest of the employer and the employee
should clash, the assistance of the courts may be sought to
define the limits of intrusion or to balance interests.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the petition, subject to
the qualification that the petitioner’s right to privacy
should be respected as to the files created, stored, sent or

received after office hours; and to the further qualification
that the decision be held to apply pro hac vice.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—While it is doctrinal that the right against

unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by
implication cannot be presumed. (Silahis International
Hotel, Inc. vs. Soluta, 482 SCRA 660 [2006])
——o0o——
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12/31/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 659

G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.*

BRICCIO “Ricky” A. POLLO, petitioner, vs.

Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Privacy; The right

Constitution, which provides: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be

Circuit, it was held that where a government agency’s computer

disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative

even finality if such findings are supported by substantial

denying CSC employees privacy expectation in “anything they

CSC commissioners solely by reason of their rank, and not by

limitations on their privacy while they are in the workplace and

should not extend to the reading of the files’ contents, which

individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment of the

Same; View that a recognition of the limitations of man as a

maintain an inner self, to safeguard his beliefs, and to keep

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under

stantino-David which was marked “Confidential” and sent

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four

and issued a memo directing them to conduct an

officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia

Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was

found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing

“Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or

any consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the

for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials

printing as these would violate his constitutional right to

a prima facie case existed against petitioner while Commissioner Cesar D.

upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of

on him. In its Resolution No. 07051912 dated March 19,

Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman,

injunction.15 Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing

motion while Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor dissented stating that

In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and

“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the

On the paramount issue of the legality of the search

investigation of possible misconduct committed by said

ployees. Though the Court therein recognized that such

employee’s office was upheld as valid because a

service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal

By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed

there was no restraining order or injunction issued by the

SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND

RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC

Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the

sonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of

“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all

“Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against

28 Joaquin Bernas, S.J., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A

ments of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State

In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US

reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by

Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose

consider “[t]he operational realities of the workplace” in

“x x x Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices,