Attempted Rape - Bartolome Vs People
Attempted Rape - Bartolome Vs People
Attempted Rape - Bartolome Vs People
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape
and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of
lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with
the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted
rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.
The Case
This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the conviction for attempted rape of the petitioner by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union (RTC), and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordering him to pay moral damages of ₱20,000.00
to AAA,2 the victim.
Antecedents
The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving
different victims. At arraignment, he pleaded not guiltyto the respective informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 2388
Attempted Rape
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, along the
Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar,Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation commenced the
commission ofrape directly byovert acts, to wit: While private complainant AAA, an unmarried
woman, fifteen (15) yearsold, was sleeping inside the tentalong Bangar-Luna Road, the said
accused remove her panty and underwear and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching
her vagina and breast with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the
accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was
not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in
resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning, along the
Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar, Province of La
Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touch the vagina of
[BBB]4 against the latter’s will and with no other purpose but to satisfy his lascivious desire to
the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
x x x [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of
plastic wares and glass wares in different municipalities around the country. On December 20,
1993, Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in
Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. From Libsong East, Lingayen,
Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney owned by
Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver)
and a sales boy by the name of "Jess".
Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they
parked in front of Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two
tents were fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to
Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.
On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep.
Less thanan hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her.
Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was
divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or
she’ll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas
fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not
totell the incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek
help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to wake him up.
Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private
parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her hands wereshaking. When she finally
entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning.
Later still, while they were on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB asked the people around
where they can find the municipal building. An old woman pointed to them the place.
In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where
they met a policeman by the name of "Sabas".
They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to the
police station where he personally confronted his accusers. When Norberto’s wife, Belinda,
arrived at the police station, an argument ensued between them.
On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 o’clock in the morning, the police investigator ordered
the complainants to return at6:00 o’clock in the morning. Norberto and Belinda were still able to
bring AAA and BBB home with them and worked for them until December 30, 1994, after which
they were sent back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective sworn
statements against Norberto.
The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was presented in the assailed
decision of the CA,7 as follows:
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the story.
The accused maintains that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against him.
On the date of the alleged incident, there were many people around who were preparing for the
"simbang gabi". Considering the location of the tents, which were near the road and the
municipal hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention the fact
that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them. He
believes that the reason why the complainants filed these cases against him was solely for the
purpose of extorting money from him.
After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6, 2000
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No.
2388 and acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 2389,8 to wit:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the
accused NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized in Article
335 in relation with (sic) Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code respectively.
With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS PRISION MAYOR
as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the victim AAA the
amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.
With regard to the crime ofACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) MONTHS
ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the
victim BBBthe amount of ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two cases is counted in
his favor.
SO ORDERED.9
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of attempted
rape despite the dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite the fact that
BBB did not testify.
On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for
attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness
charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the insufficiency of the evidence,10 holding thusly:
In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and inconsequential as to dent,
even slightly, the overall integrity and probative value of the prosecution's evidence insofar as
AAA is concerned.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty
lower by two (2) degrees" prescribed by law for the consummated felony. In this case, the
penalty for rape if it had been consummated would have been reclusion perpetuapursuant to
Article 335 of the Revised Penalty Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The penalty
two degrees lower than reclusion perpetuais prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be the
medium period of prision mayorin the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty nextlower to that prescribed for the
offense which in this case is prision correccionalin any of its periods.
We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of ₱20,000.00 by way of moral
damages against the accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral damages may be awarded without
the need of proof or pleading since it is assumed that the private complainant suffered moral
injuries, more so, when the victim is aged 13 to 19.
Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the accused argues that
there is not enough evidence to support such accusation. BBB did not testify and neither her
sworn statement was formally offered in evidence to support the charge for acts of
lasciviousness.
In this case, the evidence adducedby the prosecution is insufficient to substantiate the charge of
acts of lasciviousness against the accusedappellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of
lasciviousness is the sworn statement of BBB to the effectthat the accused-appellant likewise
molested her by mashing her breast and touching her private part. However, she was not
presented to testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw the accused touching the private
parts of BBB, there was no testimony to the effect that suchlascivious acts were without the
consent or against the will of BBB.11
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CA’s decision was not in accord with law or with
jurisprudence, particularly:
I. In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the alleged victim;
and
II. In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues that
AAA still continued working for him and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the alleged
attempted rape in the early morning of December 21, 1994, thereby belying his commission of
the crime against her; that he could not have undressed her without rousing her if she had gone to
sleep only an hour before, because her bra was locked at her back; that her testimony about his
having been on top of her for nearly an hour while they struggled was also inconceivable unless
she either consented to his act and yielded to his lust, or the incident did not happen at all, being
the product only of her fertileimagination; that the record does not indicate if he himself was also
naked, or that his penis was poised to penetrate her; and that she and her mother demanded from
him ₱80,000.00 as settlement, under threat that she would file a case against him.12
On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA
that cast doubt on her veracity.
In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,13 the Court reviews only questions of law. No
review of the findings of fact by the CA is involved. As a consequence of thisrule, the Court
accords the highest respect for the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn
from its factual findings, particularly when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial experience has
shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in the best position to decideissues of credibility of
witnesses, having themselves heard and seen the witnesses and observed firsthand their
demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying under exacting examination. As such, the
contentionsof the petitioner on the credibility of AAA as a witness for the State cannot
beentertained. He thereby raises questions of fact that are outside the scope of this appeal.
Moreover, he thereby proposes to have the Court, which is not a trier of facts, review the entire
evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the Defense.
Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of law of
whether or not the petitioner’s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such thatthey faced each
other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted
attempted rape, the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted and punished him. Based on
the information, supra, he committed such acts "with intent of having carnal knowledge ofher by
means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal
knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said
offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and
prejudice of said offended party."
There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this
own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Lamahang,14 the Court, speaking through the eminent
Justice Claro M.Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt acts would constitute anattempted
felony, to wit:
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the
execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act
objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the
deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished
by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. x x x x.
"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material
damage iswanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained,
but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the
necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related,
by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith,
they must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts
susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which
show an innocent aswell as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves
for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for
appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the
intention must be ascertainedfrom the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid
regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of
the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in
requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission of
the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be such that,
withoutthe intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless."15
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we have to
determine the law on rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the
crime he was convicted of. That law was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which
pertinently provided as follows:
Article335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxxx
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge
isdefined simply as "theact of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,"16 which
explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other
words, rape is consummated once the peniscapable of consummating the sexual act touches the
external genitalia of the female.17 In People v. Campuhan,18 the Court has defined the extent of
"touching" by the penis in rape in the following terms:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or
grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s
vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the
penis indeedtouched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are
required to be "touched" bythe penis, are by their natural situsor location beneath the mons
pubisor the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration
beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of
the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majoraor the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer
convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin
skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia
majorais the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majoramust be entered for rape to
be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. xxxx
Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubisof the pudendum is
not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of
the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendumby the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [Bold
emphasis supplied]
It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita,19 the Court clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriñia20
whereby the offender was declared guilty of frustrated rapebecause of lack of conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party, was a stray decisionfor not
having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore,
rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a
frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Codeare that: (1) the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not
produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the offender attains his
purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment all
the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done
by him.21
Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt
actsfor purposes of the attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada:22
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense. The raison d’etrefor the law requiring a direct overtact is that, in a majority of
cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being
equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the
crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is.It is necessary that the
overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the
last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the
acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the
commission of the felony directly by overt actswithout the offender performing all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by
the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a
clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is
beyond the sphere of criminal law,23 that showing must be through his overt acts directly
connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape withoutsuch overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape,
must show that his overt acts, should his criminalintent be carried to its complete termination
without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape,24 for, as succinctly put in
People v. Dominguez, Jr.:25 "The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had
been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the
penis into the vagina, before the interruption."
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with
his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended
his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances thatrape, and no other,was his intended
felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards
her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double
interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not
permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily,
his felony would not exclusively be rapehad he been allowed by her to continue, and to have
sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit
to have her yield to him)26 could also be ultimate felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did
not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly
connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no
connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts
would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony.27 His preparatory acts could
include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the
other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that
evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a
rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Codefor as long as they
remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could
determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent really was.28
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of
lasciviousness?
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is
the offender’sintent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable,
but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness.29 Attempted rape is committed,
therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female.30 Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.31
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
consummated whenthe following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits
any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of
lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the
offended party is deprived ofreason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party
is under 12 years of age.32 In that regard, lewdis defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous;
it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on
a wanton manner.33
The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on
top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the
information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was
guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her
vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence
showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her
deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and
lust for her.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own
declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good
illustration of this can be seen in People v. Bugarin,34 where the accused was charged with
attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, "did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of
Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the
undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however,
[he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Rape by
reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned
complainant push[ed] him away." The accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness
because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the actdescribed," and the intent to have
sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also
pointed out that the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual
intercourse."35
Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of
lasciviousness, is punished with prision correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances,
prision correccional is imposed in its medium period, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the penalty should come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than
prision correccionalwhich ranges from one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court
fixes the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two
(2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the maximum.
In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender violates her
chastity by his lewdness.1âwphi1 "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission."36
Indeed, Article 2219, (3), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in acts of
lasciviousness to recover moral damages.37 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of
the record, decrees that ₱30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages.38 In addition, AAA
was entitled to recover civil indemnity of ₱20,000.00.39
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to impose interest
as a part of the damages in crimes and quasidelicts. In that regard, the moral damages of
₱20,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until
full payment.40
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 38-49; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. Delos Santos (deceased), and
concurred in by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a Member of the Court).
2 The real name of the offended party is withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610
(Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act); Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004); and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC effective November 15, 2004 (Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children). See also People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 421-423.
3 Rollo, p. 51.
4 The real name of the offended party is alsowithheld for the reason stated in note 2.
9 Id. at 57-58.
10 Supra note 1.
11 Id. at 47-49.
12 Id. at 19-23.
15 Id. at 705-707.
16 People v. Orita,G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 105, 113, citing Black’s
Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 193.
17 People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-876, November 16, 2001, 369 SCRA 179, 202.
18 G.R. Nos. 129433, March 30, 2000, 329 SCRA 270, 280-282.
22 G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62, 94-95.
23 I Feria & Gregorio, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, First Edition (1958),
Central Book Supply, Inc., Manila, p. 29., to wit:
24 Id. at 78-79.
25 G.R. No. 180914, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 134, 158.
26 Article 338 of the Revised Penal Codedefines simple seduction as the seduction of a
woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen
years of age, committed by means of deceit.
28 I Feria & Gregorio, supra note 23, at 78-79, which opines that equivocal preparatory
acts remain unpunished unless the Revised Penal Codepenalizes them (e.g., conspiracy
and proposal to commit a felony in certain cases (Article 8, Revised Penal Code); mere
possession with intent to use of instruments or implements adaptable for the commission
of counterfeiting (Article 176, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code); and possession of
picklocks or similar tools adapted to the commission of robbery (Article 304, Revised
Penal Code).
29 People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 152589 and 152758, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 328,
333.
31 People v. Dadulla,G.R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 432, 443; citing
People v. Collado, G.R. Nos. 135667-70, March 1, 2001, 353 SCRA 381, 392.
33 Id. at 94.
34 G.R. Nos. 110817-22, June 13, 1997, 273 SCRA 384, 401.
35 Id.
37 Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
xxxx
38 People v. Dominguez, Jr., supra, note 25, at 164-165.
39 Id.
40 People v. Maglente, GR. No. 201445, November 27, 2013, 711SCRA142, 161; People
v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 45.