Separate Opinions corporation must, be always within the character limits.

corporation must, be always within the character limits. What the Corporation Law has granted stockholders
may not be taken away by the corporation's by-laws. The amendment is further an instrument of oppressiveness
TEEHANKEE, CONCEPCION JR., FERNANDEZ and GUERRERO, JJ., concurring: and arbitrariness in that the incumbent directors are thereby enabled to perpetuate themselves in office by the
simple expedient of disqualifying any unwelcome candidate, no matter how many votes he may have.
I As correctly stated in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio, the Court is unanimous in its judgment granting
the petitioner as stockholder of respondent San Miguel Corporation the right to inspect, examine and secure However, in view of the inconclusiveness of the vote, we sustain respondent commission's stand as expressed
copies of the records of San Miguel International, inc. (SMI), a wholly owned foreign subsidiary corporation of in its Orders Nos. 450 and 451, Series of 1977 that there are unresolved and genuine issues of fact" and that it
respondent San Miguel Corporation. Respondent commissions en banc Order No. 449, Series of 19 7 7, has yet to rule on and finally decide the validity of the disputed by-law provision", subject to appeal by either
denying petitioner's right of inspection for "not being a stockholder of San Miguel International, Inc." has been party to this Court.
accordingly set aside. It need be only pointed out that:
In view of prematurity of the proceedings here (as likewise expressed by Mr. Justice Fernando), the case should
a) The commission's reasoning grossly disregards the fact that the stockholders of San Miguel Corporation are as a consequence be remanded to the Securities and Exchange Commission as the agency of primary
likewise the owners of San Miguel International, Inc. as the corporation's wholly owned foreign subsidiary and jurisdiction for a full hearing and reception of evidence of all relevant facts (which should property be submitted
therefore have every right to have access to its books and records. otherwise, the directors and management to the commission instead of the piecemeal documents submitted as annexes to this Court which is not a trier
of any Philippine corporation by the simple device of organizing with the corporation's funds foreign subsidiaries of facts) concerning not only the petitioner but the members of the board of directors of respondent corporation
would be granted complete immunity from the stockholders' scrutiny of its foreign operations and would have a as well, so that it may determine on the basis thereof the issue of the legality of the questioned amended by-
conduit for dissipating, if not misappropriating, the corporation funds and assets by merely channeling them into laws, and assuming Chat it holds the same to be valid whether the same are arbitrarily and unreasonably applied
foreign subsidiaries' operations; and to petitioner vis a vis other directors, who, petitioner claims, should in such event be likewise disqualified from
sitting in the board of directors by virtue of conflict of interests or their being likewise engaged in competitive or
b) Petitioner's right of examination herein recognized refers to all books and records of the foreign subsidiary
antagonistic business" with the corporation such as investment and finance, coconut oil mills cement, milk and
SMI which are which are " in respondent corporation's possession and control" 1, meaning to say regardless of
hotels. 5
whether or not such books and records are physically within the Philippines. all such books and records of SMI
are legally within respondent corporation's "possession and control" and if nay books or records are kept abroad, It should be noted that while the petition may be dismissed in view of the inconclusiveness of the vote and the
(e.g. in the foreign subsidiary's state of domicile, as is to be expected), then the respondent corporation's board Court's failure to affair, the required 8-vote majority to resolve the issue, such as dismissal (for lack of necessary
and management are obliged under the Court's judgment to bring and make them (or true copies thereof votes) is of no doctrine value and does not in any manner resolve the issue of the validity of the questioned
available within the Philippines for petitioner's examination and inspection. amended by-laws nor foreclose the same. The same should properly be determined in a proper case in the first
instance by the Securities and Exchange Commission as the agency of primary jurisdiction, as above indicated.
II On the other main issue of the Validity of respondent San Miguel Corporation's amendment of its by-
laws 2 whereby respondent corporation's board of directors under its resolution dated April 29, 1977 declared The Court is unanimous, therefore, in its judgment that petitioner Gokongwei may run for the office of, and if
petitioner ineligible to be nominated or to be voted or to be elected as of the board of directors, the Court, elected, sit as, member of the board of directors of respondent San Miguel Corporation as stated in the
composed of 12 members (since Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio Herrera inhibited herself from taking part dispositive portion of the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio, to wit: Until and after petitioner has been given a
herein, while Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino upon submittal of the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio decided "new and proper hearing by the board of directors of said corporation, whose decision shall be appealable Lo
not to take part), failed to reach a conclusive vote or, the required majority of 8 votes to settle the issue one way the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission deliverating and acting en banc and ultimately to this
or the other. Court" and until ' disqualified in the manner herein provided, the prohibition in the aforementioned amended by-
laws shall not apply to petitioner," In other words, until and after petitioner shall have been given due process
Six members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Santos, Abad Santos and De Castro,
and proper hearing by the respondent board of directors as to the question of his qualification or disqualification
considered the issue purely legal and voted to sustain the validity per se of the questioned amended by-laws
under the questioned amended by-laws (assuming that the respondent Securities and Exchange C commission
but nevertheless voted that the prohibition and disqualification therein provided shall not apply to petitioner
ultimately upholds the validity of said by laws), and such disqualification shall have been sustained by
Gokongwei until and after he shall have been given a new and proper hearing" by the corporation's board of
respondent Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately by final judgment of this Court, petitioner is
directors and the board's decision of disqualification she'll have been sustained on appeal by respondent
deemed eligible for all legal purposes and effects to be nominated and voted and if elected to sit as a member
Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately by this Court.
of the hoard of directors of respondent San Miguel Corporation.
The undersigned Justices do not consider the issue as purely legal in the light of respondent commission's Order
In view of the Court's unanimous judgment on this point the portion of respondent commission's Order No. 450,
No. 451, Series of 1977, denying petitioner's "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the ground that "the
Series of 977 which imposed "the condition that he [petitioner] cannot sit as board member if elected until after
Commission en banc finds that there (are) unresolved and genuine issues of fact" 3 as well as its position in this
the Commission shall have finally decided the validity of the disputed by-law provision" has been likewise
case to the Solicitor General that the case at bar is "premature" and that the administrative remedies before the
accordingly set aside.
commission should first be availed of and exhausted. 4
III By way of recapitulation, so that the Court's decision and judgment may be clear and not subject to ambiguity,
We are of the opinion that the questioned amended by-laws, as they are, (adopted after almost a century of
we state the following.
respondent corporation's existence as a public corporation with its shares freely purchased and traded in the
open market without restriction and disqualification) which would bar petitioner from qualification, nomination 1. With the votes of the six Justices concurring unqualifiedly in the main opinion added to our four votes, plus
and election as director and worse, grant the board by 3/4 vote the arbitrary power to bar any stockholder from the Chief Justice's vote and that of Mr. Justice Fernando, the Court has by twelve (12) votes unanimously
his right to be elected as director by the simple expedient of declaring him to be engaged in a "competitive or rendered judgment granting petitioner's right to examine and secure copies of the books and records of San
antagonistic business" or declaring him as a "nominee" of the competitive or antagonistic" stockholder are illegal, Miguel International, Inc. as a foreign subsidiary of respondent corporation and respondent commission's Order
oppressive, arbitrary and unreasonable. No. 449, Series of 1977, to the contrary is set aside:
We consider the questioned amended by-laws as being specifically tailored to discriminate against petitioner 2. With the same twelve (12) votes, the Court has also unanimously rendered judgment declaring that until and
and depriving him in violation of substantive due process of his vested substantial rights as stockholder of afterpetitioner shall have been given due process and proper hearing by the respondent board of directors as
respondent corporation. We further consider said amended by-laws as violating specific provisions of the to the question of his disqualification under the questioned amended by- laws (assuming that the respondent
Corporation Law which grant and recognize the right of a minority stockholder like petitioner to be elected Securities and Exchange Commission ultimately upholds the validity of said by laws), and such disqualification
director by the process of cumulative voting ordained by the Law (secs 21 and 30) and the right of a minority shall have been sustained by respondent Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately by final judgment
director once elected not to be removed from office of director except for cause by vote of the stockholders of this Court petitioner is deemed eligible for all legal purposes and effect to be nominated and voted and if
holding 2/3 of the subscribed capital stock (sec. 31). If a minority stockholder could be disqualified by such a by- elected to sit as a member of the board of directors of respondent San Miguel Corporation. Accordingly,
laws amendment under the guise of providing for "qualifications," these mandates of the Corporation Law would respondent commission's Order No. 450, Series of 1977 to the contrary has likewise been set aside; and
have no meaning or purpose.
3. The Court's voting on the validity of respondent corporation's amendment of the by-laws (sec. 2, Art. 111) is
These vested and substantial rights granted stockholders under the Corporation Law may not be diluted or inconclusive without the required majority of eight votes to settle the issue one way or the other having been
defeated by the general authority granted by the Corporation Law itself to corporations to adopt their by-laws (in reached. No judgment is rendered by the Court thereon and the statements of the six Justices who have signed
section 21) which deal principally with the procedures governing their internal business. The by-laws of any the main opinion on the legality thereof have no binding effect, much less doctrinal value.
The dismissal of the petition insofar as the question of the validity of the disputed by-laws amendment is The decision of this Court on that appeal by the government from the order of dismissal, holding that said appeal
concerned is not by an judgment with the required eight votes but simply by force of Rule 56, section II of the did not place the appellants, including Absalon Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and concurred in by six
Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which provides that "where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, Justices as against three dissenters headed by the Chief Justice, promulgated way back in the year 1952, has
or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on re-hearing no decision is reached, long become the law of the case. It may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently
the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court ...." The end result is that the Court has thereby interpreted by this same Tribunal Even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. Our recent interpretation of the
dismissed the petition which prayed that the Court bypass the commission and directly resolved the issue and law may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an oldone finally and conclusively determined. As already
therefore the respondent commission may now proceed, as announced in its Order No. 450, Series of 1977, to stated, the majority opinion in that appeal is now the law of the case. (People vs. Pinuila)
hear the case before it and receive all relevant evidence bearing on the issue as hereinabove indicated, and
resolve the "unresolved and genuine issues of fact" (as per Order No. 451, Series of 1977) and the issues of The doctrine of the law of the case, therefore, has no applicability whatsoever herein insofar as the question of
legality of the disputed by-laws amendment. the validity or invalidity of the amended by-laws is concerned. The Court's judgment of April 11, 1979 clearly
shows that the voting on this question was inconclusive with six against four Justices and two other Justices
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., and Fernandez, JJ., concur. (the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fernando) expressly reserving their votes thereon, and Mr. Justice Aquino
while taking no part in effect likewise expressly reserved his vote thereon. No final and conclusive determination
Guerrero, J., concurred. could be reached on the issue and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56, section 11, since this special civil
action originally commenced in this Court, the action was simply dismissed with the result that no law of the
TEEHANKEE, CONCEPCION JR.,
case was laid down insofar as the issue of the validity or invalidity of the questioned by-laws is concerned, and
FERNANDEZ and GUERRERO, JJ., concurring: the relief sought herein by petitioner that this Court by-pass the SEC which has yet to hear and determine the
same issue pending before it below and that this Court itself directly resolve the said issue stands denied.
This supplemental opinion is issued with reference to the advance separate opinion of Mr. Justice Barredo
issued by him as to "certain misimpressions as to the import of the decision in this case" which might be b) The contention of Mr. Justice Barredo that the result of the dismiss of the case was that "petitioner Gokongwei
produced by our joint separate opinion of April 11, 1979 and "urgent(ly) to clarify (his) position in respect to the may not hereafter act on the assumption that he can revive the issue of the validity whether in the Securities
rights of the parties resulting from the dismissal of the petition herein and the outline of the procedure by which and Exchange Commission, in this Court or in any other forum, unless he proceeds on the basis of a factual
the disqualification of petitioner Gokongwei can be made effective." milieu different from the setting of this case Not even the Securities and Exchange Commission may pass on
such question anymore at the instance of herein petitioner or anyone acting in his stead or on his behalf, "
1. Mr. Justice Barredo's advances separate opinion "that as between the parties herein, the issue of the validity appears to us to be untenable.
of the challenged by-laws is already settled" had, of course, no binding effect. The judgment of the Court is
found on pages 59-61 of the decision of April 11, 1979, penned by Mr. Justice Antonio, wherein on the question The Court through the decision of April 11, 1979, by the unanimous votes of the twelve participating Justices
of the validity of the amended by-laws the Court's inconclusive voting is set forth as follows: headed by the Chief Justice, ruled that petitioner Gokongwei was entitled to a "new and proper hearing" by the
SMC board of directors on the matter of his disqualification under the questioned by-laws and that the board's
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro reserved his vote on the validity of the amended by-laws, pending hearing by "decision shall be appealable to the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission deliberating and
this Court on the applicability of section 13(5) of the Corporation Law to petitioner. acting en banc and ultimately to this Court (and) unless disqualified in the manner herein provided, the
prohibition in the aforementioned amended by-laws shall not apply to petitioner."
Justice Fernando reserved his vote on the validity of subject amendment to the by-laws but otherwise concurs
in the result. The entire Court, therefore, recognized that petitioner had not been given procedural due process by the SMC
board on the matter of his disqualification and that he was entitled to a "new and proper hearing". It stands to
Four (4) Justices, namely, Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero filed a separate reason that in such hearing, petitioner could raise not only questions of fact but questions of law, particularly
opinion, wherein they voted against the validity of the questioned amended by-laws and that this question should questions of law affecting the investing public and their right to representation on the board as provided by law
properly be resolved first by the SEC as the agency of primary jurisdiction ... 1 — not to mention that as borne out by the fact that no restriction whatsoever appears in the court's decision, it
was never contemplated that petitioner was to be limited to questions of fact and could not raise the fundamental
As stated in said judgment itself, for lack of the necessary votes, the petition, insofar as it assails the validity of
questions of law bearing on the invalidity of the questioned amended by-laws at such hearing before the SMC
the questioned by-laws, was dismissed.
board. Furthermore, it was expressly provided unanimously in the Court's decision that the SMC board's
2. Mr. Justice Barredo now contends contrary to the undersigned's understanding, as stated on pages 8 and 9 decision on the disqualification of petitioner ("assuming the board of directors of San Miguel Corporation should,
of our joint separate opinion of April 11, 1979 that the legal effect of the dismissal of the petition on the question after the proper hearing, disqualify him" as qualified in Mr. Justice Barredo's own separate opinion, at page 2)
of validity of the amended by-laws for lack of the necessary votes simply means that "the Court has thereby shall be appealable to respondent Securities and Exchange Commission "deliberating and acting en banc and
dismissed the petition which prayed that the Court by-pass the commission and directly resolve the issue and "untimately to this Court." Again, the Court's judgment as set forth in its decision of April 11, 1979 contains
therefore the respondent commission may now proceed, as announced in its Order No. 450, Series of 1977, to nothing that would warrant the opinion now expressed that respondent Securities and Exchange Commission
hear the case before it and receive all relevant evidence bearing on the issue as hereinabove indicated, and may not pass anymore on the question of the invalidity of the amended by-laws. Certainly, it cannot be
resolve the 'unresolved and genuine issues of fact' (as per Order No. 451, Series of 1977) and the issue of contended that the Court in dismissing the petition for lack of necessary votes actually by-passed the Securities
legality of the disputed by-laws amendment," that such dismissal "has no other legal consequence than that it and Exchange Commission and directly ruled itself on the invalidity of the questioned by-laws when it itself could
is the law of the case as far as the parties are concerned, albeit the majority of the opinion of six against four not reach a final and conclusive vote (a minimum of eight votes) on the issue and three other Justices (the Chief
Justices is not doctrinal in the sense that it cannot be cited as necessarily a precedent for subsequent cases." Justice and Messrs. Justices Fernando and Aquino) had expressly reserved their vote until after further hearings
(first before the Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately in this Court).
We hold on our part that the doctrine of the law of the case invoked by Mr. Justice Barredo has no applicability
for the following reasons: Such a view espoused by Mr. Justice Barredo could conceivably result in an incongruous situation where
supposedly under the law of this case the questioned by-laws would be held valid as against petitioner
a) Our jurisprudence is quite clear that this doctrine may be invoked only where there has been Gokongwei and yet the same may be stricken off as invalid as to all other SMC shareholders in a proper case.
a final and conclusive determination of an issue in the first case later invoked as the law of the case.
3. It need only be pointed out that Mr. Justice Barredo's advance separate opinion can in no way affect or modify
Thus, in People vs. Olarte, 2 we held that the judgment of this Court as set forth in the decision of April 11, 1979 and discussed hereinabove. The same
bears the unqualified concurrence of only three Justices out of the six Justices who originally voted for the
"Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal More specifically, it means that validity per se of the questioned by-laws, namely, Messrs. Justices Antonio, Santos and De Castro. Messrs.
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in Justices Fernando and Makasiar did not concur therein but they instead concurred with the limited concurrence
the same case continues to he the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the of the Chief Justice touching on the law of the case which guardedly held that the Court has not found merit in
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. ... the claim that the amended bylaws in question are invalid but without in any manner foreclosing the issue and
as a matter of fact and law, without in any manner changing or modifying the above-quoted vote of the Chief
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions
Justice as officially rendered in the decision of April 11, 1979, wherein he precisely "reserved (his) vote on the
properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once
validity of the amended by-laws."
its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and authority to alter
or modify Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G. R. No. L-15548, October 30, 1962).
4. A word on the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Pacifico de Castro attached to the advance separate opinion pass on such question anymore at the instance of herein petitioner or anyone acting in his stead or on his behalf.
of Mr. Justice Barredo. Mr. Justice De Castro advances his interpretation as to a restrictive construction of The vote of four justices to remand the case thereto cannot alter the situation.
section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, ignoring or disregarding the fact that during the Court's
deliberations it was brought out that this prohibitory provision was and is not raised in issue in this case whether It is very clear that under the decision herein, the issue of validity is a settled matter for the parties herein as the
here or in the Securities and Exchange Commission below (outside of a passing argument by Messrs. Angara, law of the case, and it is only the actual implementation of the impugned amended by-laws in the particular case
Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz, as counsels for respondent Sorianos in their Memorandum of June 26, of petitioner that remains to be passed upon by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and on appeal
1978 that "(T)he disputed By-Laws does not prohibit petitioner from holding onto, or even increasing his SMC therefrom to Us, assuming the board of directors of San Miguel Corporation should, after the proper hearing,
investment; it only restricts any shifting on the part of petitioner from passive investor to a director of the disqualify him.
company." 3
To be sure, the record is replete with substantial indications, nay admissions of petitioner himself, that he is a
As a consequence, the Court abandoned the Idea of calling for another hearing wherein the parties could controlling stockholder of corporations which are competitors of San Miguel Corporation. The very substantial
properly raise and discuss this question as a new issue and instead rendered the decision in question, under areas of such competition involving hundreds of millions of pesos worth of businesses stand uncontroverted in
which the question of section 13(5) could be raised at a new and proper hearing before the SMC board and in the records hereof. In fact, petitioner has even offered, if he should be elected, as director, not to take part when
the Securities and Exchange Commission and in due course before this Court (but with the clear understanding the board takes up matters affecting the corresponding areas of competition between his corporation and San
that since both corporations, the Robina and SMC are engaged in agriculture as submitted by the Sorianos' Miguel. Nonetheless, perhaps, it is best that such evidence be formally offered at the hearing contemplated in
counsel in their said memorandum, the issue could be raised likewise against SMC and its other shareholders, Our decision.
directors, if not against SMC itself. As expressly stated in the Chief Justices reservation of his vote, the matter
As to whether or not petitioner may sit in the board if he wins, definitely, under the decision in this case, even if
of the question of the applicability of the said section 13(5) to petitioner would be heard by this Court at the
petitioner should win, he will have to immediately leave his position or should be ousted the moment this Court
appropriate time after the proceedings below (and necessarily the question of the validity of the amended by-
settles the issue of his actual disqualification, either in a full blown decision or by denying the petition for review
laws would be taken up anew and the Court would at that time be able to reach a final and conclusive vote).
of corresponding decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission unfavorable to him. And, of course, as
Mr. Justice De Castro's personal interpretation of the decision of April 11, 1979 that petitioner may be allowed a matter of principle, it is to be expected that the matter of his disqualification should be resolved expeditiously
to run for election despite adverse decision of both the SMC board and the Securities and Exchange and within the shortest possible time, so as to avoid as much juridical injury as possible, considering that the
Commission "only if he comes to this Court and obtains an injunction against the enforcement of the decision matter of the validity of the prohibition against competitors embodied in the amended by-laws is already
disqualifying him" is patently contradictory of his vote on the matter as expressly given in the judgment in the unquestionable among the parties herein and to allow him to be in the board for sometime would create an
Court's decision of April 11, 1979 (at page 59) that petitioner could run and if elected, sit as director of the obviously anomalous and legally incongruous situation that should not be tolerated. Thus, all the parties
respondent SMC and could be disqualified only after a "new and proper hearing by the board of directors of said concerned must act promptly and expeditiously.
corporation, whose decision shall be appealable to the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission
Additionally, my reservation to explain my vote on the validity of the amended by-laws still stands.
deliberating and acting en banc and ultimately to this Court. Unless-disqualified in the manner herein provided,
the prohibition in the aforementioned amended by-laws shall not apply to petitioner." Castro, C.J., concurs in Justice Barredo's statement that the dismissal (for lack of necessary votes) of the
petition to the extent that "it assails the validity of the amended by laws," is the law of the case at bar, which
Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
means in effect that as far and only in so far as the parties and the Securities and Exchange Commission are
BARREDO, J., concurring: concerned, the Court has not found merit in the claim that the amended by-laws in question are invalid.

I reserved the filing of a separate opinion in order to state my own reasons for voting in favor of the validity of Antonio and Santos, JJ., concur.
the amended by-laws in question. Regrettably, I have not yet finished preparing the same. In view, however, of
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
the joint separate opinion of Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, the full text of which
has just come to my attention, and which I am afraid might produce certain misimpressions as to the import of As stated in the decision penned by Justice Antonio, I voted to uphold the validity of the amendment to the by-
the decision in this case, I consider it urgent to clarify my position in respect to the rights of the parties resulting laws in question. What induced me to this view is the practical consideration easily perceived in the following
from the dismissal of the petition herein and the outlining of the procedure by which the disqualification of illustration: If a person becomes a stockholder of a corporation and gets himself elected as a director, and while
petitioner Gokongwei can be made effective, hence this advance separate opinion. he is such a director, he forms his own corporation competitive or antagonistic to the corporation of which he is
a director, and becomes Chairman of the Board and President of his own corporation, he may be removed from
To start with, inasmuch as petitioner Gokongwei himself placed the issue of the validity of said amended by-
his position as director, admittedly one of trust and confidence. If this is so, as seems undisputably to be the
laws squarely before the Court for resolution, because he feels, rightly or wrongly, he can no longer have due
case, a person already controlling, and also the Chairman of the Board and President of, a corporation, may be
process or justice from the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the private respondents have joined with
barred from becoming a member of the board of directors of a competitive corporation. This is my view, even
him in that respect, the six votes cast by Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Santos, Abad Santos, de Castro and this
as I am for a restrictive interpretation of Section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, under which I would
writer in favor of validity of the amended by-laws in question, with only four members of this Court, namely,
limit the scope of the provision to corporations engaged in agriculture, but only as the word agriculture" refers
Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero opining otherwise, and with Chief Justice Castro
to its more stated meaning as distinguished from its general and broad connotation. The term would then mean
and Justice Fernando reserving their votes thereon, and Justices Aquino and Melencio Herrera not voting,
"farming" or raising the natural products of the soil, such as by cultivation, in the manner as is required by the
thereby resulting in the dismissal of the petition "insofar as it assails the validity of the amended by- laws ... for
Public Land Act in the acquisition of agricultural land, such as by homestead, before the patent may be issued.
lack of necessary votes", has no other legal consequence than that it is the law of the case as far as the parties
It is my opinion that under the public land statute, the development of a certain portion of the land applied for as
herein are concerned, albeit the majority opinion of six against four Justices is not doctrinal in the sense that it
specified in the law as a condition precedent before the applicant may obtain a patent, is cultivation, not let us
cannot be cited as necessarily a precedent for subsequent cases. This means that petitioner Gokongwei and
say, poultry raising or piggery, which may be included in the term Is agriculture" in its broad sense. For under
the respondents, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, are bound by the foregoing result, namely,
Section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, construed not in the strict way as I believe it should, because
that the Court en banc has not found merit in the claim that the amended by-laws in question are invalid. Indeed,
the provision is in derogation of property rights, the petitioner in this case would be disqualified from becoming
it is one thing to say that dismissal of the case is not doctrinal and entirely another thing to maintain that such
an officer of either the San Miguel Corporation or his own supposedly agricultural corporations. It is thus beyond
dismissal leaves the issue unsettled. It is somewhat of a misreading and misconstruction of Section 11 of Rule
my comprehension why, feeling as though I am the only member of the Court for a restricted interpretation of
56, contrary to the well-known established norm observed by this Court, to state that the dismissal of a petition
Section 13(5) of Act 1459, doubt still seems to be in the minds of other members giving the cited provision an
for lack of the necessary votes does not amount to a decision on the merits. Unquestionably, the Court is
unrestricted interpretation, as to the validity of the amended by-laws in question, or even holding them null and
deemed to find no merit in a petition in two ways, namely, (1) when eight or more members vote expressly in
void.
that sense and (2) when the required number of justices needed to sustain the same cannot be had.
I concur with the observation of Justice Barredo that despite that less than six votes are for upholding the validity
I reiterate, therefore, that as between the parties herein, the issue of validity of the challenged by-laws is already
of the by-laws, their validity is deemed upheld, as constituting the "law of the case." It could not be otherwise,
settled. From which it follows that the same are already enforceable-insofar as they are concerned. Petitioner
after the present petition is dismissed with the relief sought to declare null and void the said by-laws being denied
Gokongwei may not hereafter act on the assumption that he can revive the issue of validity whether in the
in effect. A vicious circle would be created if, should petitioner Gokongwei be barred or disqualified from running
Securities and Exchange Commission, in this Court or in any other forum, unless he proceeds on the basis of a
by the Board of Directors of San Miguel Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission sustain the
factual milieu different from the setting of this case. Not even the Securities and Exchange Commission may
Board, petitioner could come again to Us, raising the same question he has raised in the present petition, unless such injunction being required, all that petitioner has to do is to take his time in coming to this Court, and in so
the principle of the "law of the case" is applied. doing, he would in the meantime, be allowed to run, and if he wins, to sit. This would, however, be contrary to
the doctrine that gives binding, if not conclusive, effect of findings of facts of administrative bodies exercising
Clarifying therefore, my position, I am of the opinion that with the validity of the by-laws in question standing quasi-judicial functions upon appellate courts, which should, accordingly, be enforced until reversed by this
unimpaired it is now for petitioner to show that he does not come within the disqualification as therein provided, Tribunal.
both to the Board and later to the Securities and Exchange Commission, it being a foregone conclusion that,
unless petitioner disposes of his stockholdings in the so-called competitive corporations, San Miguel Corporation
would apply the by-laws against him, His right, therefore, to run depends on what, on election day, May 8, 1979,
the ruling of the Board and/or the Securities and Exchange Commission on his qualification to run would be, Separate Opinions
certainly, not the final ruling of this Court in the event recourse thereto is made by the party feeling aggrieved,
as intimated in the "Joint Separate Opinion" of Justices Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero,
that only after petitioner's "disqualification" has ultimately been passed upon by this Court should petitioner, not TEEHANKEE, CONCEPCION JR., FERNANDEZ and GUERRERO, JJ., concurring:
be allowed to run. Petitioner may be allowed to run, despite an adverse decision of both the Board and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, only if he comes to this Court and obtain an injunction against the I
enforcement of the decision disqualifying him. Without such injunction being required, all that petitioner has to
do is to take his time in coming to this Court, and in so doing, he would in the meantime, be allowed to run, and As correctly stated in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio, the Court is unanimous in its judgment granting
if he wins, to sit. This would, however, be contrary to the doctrine that gives binding, if not conclusive, effect of the petitioner as stockholder of respondent San Miguel Corporation the right to inspect, examine and secure
findings of facts of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions upon appellate courts, which should, copies of the records of San Miguel International, inc. (SMI), a wholly owned foreign subsidiary corporation of
accordingly, be enforced until reversed by this Tribunal. respondent San Miguel Corporation. Respondent commissions en banc Order No. 449, Series of 19 7 7,
denying petitioner's right of inspection for "not being a stockholder of San Miguel International, Inc." has been
Fernando and Makasiar, JJ., concurs. accordingly set aside. It need be only pointed out that:

Antonio and Santos, JJ., concur a) The commission's reasoning grossly disregards the fact that the stockholders of San Miguel Corporation are
likewise the owners of San Miguel International, Inc. as the corporation's wholly owned foreign subsidiary and
DE CASTRO, J.: concurring: therefore have every right to have access to its books and records. otherwise, the directors and management
of any Philippine corporation by the simple device of organizing with the corporation's funds foreign subsidiaries
As stated in the decision penned by Justice Antonio, I voted to uphold the validity of the amendment to the by-
would be granted complete immunity from the stockholders' scrutiny of its foreign operations and would have a
laws in question. What induced me to this view is the practical consideration easily perceived in the following
conduit for dissipating, if not misappropriating, the corporation funds and assets by merely channeling them into
illustration: If a person becomes a stockholder of a corporation and gets himself elected as a director, and while
foreign subsidiaries' operations; and
he is such a director, he forms his own corporation competitive or antagonistic to the corporation of which he is
a director, and becomes Chairman of the Board and President of his own corporation, he may be removed from b) Petitioner's right of examination herein recognized refers to all books and records of the foreign subsidiary
his position as director, admittedly one of trust case, a person already controlling, and also the Chairman of the SMI which are which are " in respondent corporation's possession and control" 1, meaning to say regardless of
Board and President of, a corporation, may be barred from becoming a member of the board of directors of a whether or not such books and records are physically within the Philippines. all such books and records of SMI
competitive corporation. This is my view, even as I am for restrictive interpretation of Section 13(5) of the are legally within respondent corporation's "possession and control" and if nay books or records are kept abroad,
Philippine Corporation Law, under which I would limit the scope of the provision to corporations engaged in (e.g. in the foreign subsidiary's state of domicile, as is to be expected), then the respondent corporation's board
agriculture, but only as the word "agriculture" refers to its more limited meaning as distinguished from its general and management are obliged under the Court's judgment to bring and make them (or true copies thereof
and broad connotation. The term would then mean "farming" or raising the natural products of the soil, such as available within the Philippines for petitioner's examination and inspection.
by cultivation, in the manner as in required by the Public Land Act in the acquisition of agricultural land, such as
by homestead, before the patent may be issued. It is my opinion that under the public land statute, the II
development of a certain portion of the land applied for as specified in the law as a condition precedent before
the applicant may obtain a patent, is cultivation, not let us say, poultry raising or peggery, whch may be included On the other main issue of the Validity of respondent San Miguel Corporation's amendment of its by-
in the term "agriculture" in its broad sense. For under Section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, construed laws 2 whereby respondent corporation's board of directors under its resolution dated April 29, 1977 declared
not in the strict way as I believe it should, because the provision is in derogation of property rights, the petitioner petitioner ineligible to be nominated or to be voted or to be elected as of the board of directors, the Court,
in this case would be disqualified from becoming an officer of either the San Miguel Corporation or his own composed of 12 members (since Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio Herrera inhibited herself from taking part
supposedly agricultural corporations. It is thus beyond my comprehension why, feeling as though I am the only herein, while Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino upon submittal of the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio decided
members of the Court for a restricted interpretation of Section 13(5) of Act 1459, doubt still seems to be in the not to take part), failed to reach a conclusive vote or, the required majority of 8 votes to settle the issue one way
minds of other members giving the cited provision an unrestricted interpretation, as to the validity of the amended or the other.
by-laws in question, or even holding them null and void.
Six members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Santos, Abad Santos and De Castro,
I concur with the observation of Justice Barredo that despite that less than six votes are for upholding the validity considered the issue purely legal and voted to sustain the validity per se of the questioned amended by-laws
of the by-laws, their validity is deemed upheld, as constituting the "law of the case." It could not be otherwise, but nevertheless voted that the prohibition and disqualification therein provided shall not apply to petitioner
after the present petition is dimissed with the relief sought to declare null and void the said by-laws being denied Gokongwei until and after he shall have been given a new and proper hearing" by the corporation's board of
in effect. A vicious circle would be created if, should petitioner Gokongwei be barred or disqualified from running directors and the board's decision of disqualification she'll have been sustained on appeal by respondent
by the Board, petitioner could come again to Us, raising the same question he has raised in the present petition, Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately by this Court.
unless the principle of the "law of the case" is applied.
The undersigned Justices do not consider the issue as purely legal in the light of respondent commission's Order
Clarifying therefore, my position, I am of the opinion that with the validity of the by-laws in question standing No. 451, Series of 1977, denying petitioner's "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the ground that "the
unimpaired, it is nowfor petitioner to show that he does not come paired, it is now for petitioner to show that he Commission en banc finds that there (are) unresolved and genuine issues of fact" 3 as well as its position in this
does not come within the disqualification as therein provided, both to the Board and later to the Securities and case to the Solicitor General that the case at bar is "premature" and that the administrative remedies before the
Exhange Commission, it being a foregone conclusion that, unless petitioner disposes of his stockholdings in the commission should first be availed of and exhausted. 4
so-called competitive corporations, San Miguel Corporation would apply the by-laws against him. His right,
We are of the opinion that the questioned amended by-laws, as they are, (adopted after almost a century of
therefore, to run depends on what, on election day, May 8, 1979, the ruling of the Board and/or the Securities
respondent corporation's existence as a public corporation with its shares freely purchased and traded in the
and Exchange Commission on his qualification to run would be, certainly, not the final ruling of this Court in the
open market without restriction and disqualification) which would bar petitioner from qualification, nomination
event recourse thereto is made by the party feeling aggrieved, as intimated in the "Joint Separate Opinion" of
and election as director and worse, grant the board by 3/4 vote the arbitrary power to bar any stockholder from
Justices Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, that only after petitioner's "disqualification" has
his right to be elected as director by the simple expedient of declaring him to be engaged in a "competitive or
ultimately been passed upon by this Court should petitioner not be allowed to run. Petitioner may be allowed to
antagonistic business" or declaring him as a "nominee" of the competitive or antagonistic" stockholder are illegal,
run, despite anadverse decision of both the Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission, only if he
oppressive, arbitrary and unreasonable.
comes to this Court and obtain an injunction against the enforcement of the decision disqualifying him. Without
We consider the questioned amended by-laws as being specifically tailored to discriminate against petitioner Miguel International, Inc. as a foreign subsidiary of respondent corporation and respondent commission's Order
and depriving him in violation of substantive due process of his vested substantial rights as stockholder of No. 449, Series of 1977, to the contrary is set aside:
respondent corporation. We further consider said amended by-laws as violating specific provisions of the
Corporation Law which grant and recognize the right of a minority stockholder like petitioner to be elected 2. With the same twelve (12) votes, the Court has also unanimously rendered judgment declaring that until and
director by the process of cumulative voting ordained by the Law (secs 21 and 30) and the right of a minority afterpetitioner shall have been given due process and proper hearing by the respondent board of directors as
director once elected not to be removed from office of director except for cause by vote of the stockholders to the question of his disqualification under the questioned amended by- laws (assuming that the respondent
holding 2/3 of the subscribed capital stock (sec. 31). If a minority stockholder could be disqualified by such a by- Securities and Exchange Commission ultimately upholds the validity of said by laws), and such disqualification
laws amendment under the guise of providing for "qualifications," these mandates of the Corporation Law would shall have been sustained by respondent Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately by final judgment
have no meaning or purpose. of this Court petitioner is deemed eligible for all legal purposes and effect to be nominated and voted and if
elected to sit as a member of the board of directors of respondent San Miguel Corporation. Accordingly,
These vested and substantial rights granted stockholders under the Corporation Law may not be diluted or respondent commission's Order No. 450, Series of 1977 to the contrary has likewise been set aside; and
defeated by the general authority granted by the Corporation Law itself to corporations to adopt their by-laws (in
section 21) which deal principally with the procedures governing their internal business. The by-laws of any 3. The Court's voting on the validity of respondent corporation's amendment of the by-laws (sec. 2, Art. 111) is
corporation must, be always within the character limits. What the Corporation Law has granted stockholders inconclusive without the required majority of eight votes to settle the issue one way or the other having been
may not be taken away by the corporation's by-laws. The amendment is further an instrument of oppressiveness reached. No judgment is rendered by the Court thereon and the statements of the six Justices who have signed
and arbitrariness in that the incumbent directors are thereby enabled to perpetuate themselves in office by the the main opinion on the legality thereof have no binding effect, much less doctrinal value.
simple expedient of disqualifying any unwelcome candidate, no matter how many votes he may have.
The dismissal of the petition insofar as the question of the validity of the disputed by-laws amendment is
However, in view of the inconclusiveness of the vote, we sustain respondent commission's stand as expressed concerned is not by an judgment with the required eight votes but simply by force of Rule 56, section II of the
in its Orders Nos. 450 and 451, Series of 1977 that there are unresolved and genuine issues of fact" and that it Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which provides that "where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion,
has yet to rule on and finally decide the validity of the disputed by-law provision", subject to appeal by either or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on re-hearing no decision is reached,
party to this Court. the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court ...." The end result is that the Court has thereby
dismissed the petition which prayed that the Court bypass the commission and directly resolved the issue and
In view of prematurity of the proceedings here (as likewise expressed by Mr. Justice Fernando), the case should therefore the respondent commission may now proceed, as announced in its Order No. 450, Series of 1977, to
as a consequence be remanded to the Securities and Exchange Commission as the agency of primary hear the case before it and receive all relevant evidence bearing on the issue as hereinabove indicated, and
jurisdiction for a full hearing and reception of evidence of all relevant facts (which should property be submitted resolve the "unresolved and genuine issues of fact" (as per Order No. 451, Series of 1977) and the issues of
to the commission instead of the piecemeal documents submitted as annexes to this Court which is not a trier legality of the disputed by-laws amendment.
of facts) concerning not only the petitioner but the members of the board of directors of respondent corporation
as well, so that it may determine on the basis thereof the issue of the legality of the questioned amended by- Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
laws, and assuming Chat it holds the same to be valid whether the same are arbitrarily and unreasonably applied
Guerrero, J., concurred.
to petitioner vis a vis other directors, who, petitioner claims, should in such event be likewise disqualified from
sitting in the board of directors by virtue of conflict of interests or their being likewise engaged in competitive or TEEHANKEE, CONCEPCION JR., FERNANDEZ and GUERRERO, JJ., concurring:
antagonistic business" with the corporation such as investment and finance, coconut oil mills cement, milk and
hotels. 5 This supplemental opinion is issued with reference to the advance separate opinion of Mr. Justice Barredo
issued by him as to "certain misimpressions as to the import of the decision in this case" which might be
It should be noted that while the petition may be dismissed in view of the inconclusiveness of the vote and the produced by our joint separate opinion of April 11, 1979 and "urgent(ly) to clarify (his) position in respect to the
Court's failure to affair, the required 8-vote majority to resolve the issue, such as dismissal (for lack of necessary rights of the parties resulting from the dismissal of the petition herein and the outline of the procedure by which
votes) is of no doctrine value and does not in any manner resolve the issue of the validity of the questioned the disqualification of petitioner Gokongwei can be made effective."
amended by-laws nor foreclose the same. The same should properly be determined in a proper case in the first
instance by the Securities and Exchange Commission as the agency of primary jurisdiction, as above indicated. 1. Mr. Justice Barredo's advances separate opinion "that as between the parties herein, the issue of the validity
of the challenged by-laws is already settled" had, of course, no binding effect. The judgment of the Court is
The Court is unanimous, therefore, in its judgment that petitioner Gokongwei may run for the office of, and if found on pages 59-61 of the decision of April 11, 1979, penned by Mr. Justice Antonio, wherein on the question
elected, sit as, member of the board of directors of respondent San Miguel Corporation as stated in the of the validity of the amended by-laws the Court's inconclusive voting is set forth as follows:
dispositive portion of the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio, to wit: Until and after petitioner has been given a
"new and proper hearing by the board of directors of said corporation, whose decision shall be appealable Lo Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro reserved his vote on the validity of the amended by-laws, pending hearing by
the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission deliverating and acting en banc and ultimately to this this Court on the applicability of section 13(5) of the Corporation Law to petitioner.
Court" and until ' disqualified in the manner herein provided, the prohibition in the aforementioned amended by-
laws shall not apply to petitioner," In other words, until and after petitioner shall have been given due process Justice Fernando reserved his vote on the validity of subject amendment to the by-laws but otherwise concurs
and proper hearing by the respondent board of directors as to the question of his qualification or disqualification in the result.
under the questioned amended by-laws (assuming that the respondent Securities and Exchange C commission
Four (4) Justices, namely, Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero filed a separate
ultimately upholds the validity of said by laws), and such disqualification shall have been sustained by
opinion, wherein they voted against the validity of the questioned amended by-laws and that this question should
respondent Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately by final judgment of this Court, petitioner is
properly be resolved first by the SEC as the agency of primary jurisdiction ... 1
deemed eligible for all legal purposes and effects to be nominated and voted and if elected to sit as a member
of the hoard of directors of respondent San Miguel Corporation. As stated in said judgment itself, for lack of the necessary votes, the petition, insofar as it assails the validity of
the questioned by-laws, was dismissed.
In view of the Court's unanimous judgment on this point the portion of respondent commission's Order No. 450,
Series of 977 which imposed "the condition that he [petitioner] cannot sit as board member if elected until after 2. Mr. Justice Barredo now contends contrary to the undersigned's understanding, as stated on pages 8 and 9
the Commission shall have finally decided the validity of the disputed by-law provision" has been likewise of our joint separate opinion of April 11, 1979 that the legal effect of the dismissal of the petition on the question
accordingly set aside. of validity of the amended by-laws for lack of the necessary votes simply means that "the Court has thereby
dismissed the petition which prayed that the Court by-pass the commission and directly resolve the issue and
III
therefore the respondent commission may now proceed, as announced in its Order No. 450, Series of 1977, to
By way of recapitulation, so that the Court's decision and judgment may be clear and not subject to ambiguity, hear the case before it and receive all relevant evidence bearing on the issue as hereinabove indicated, and
we state the following. resolve the 'unresolved and genuine issues of fact' (as per Order No. 451, Series of 1977) and the issue of
legality of the disputed by-laws amendment," that such dismissal "has no other legal consequence than that it
1. With the votes of the six Justices concurring unqualifiedly in the main opinion added to our four votes, plus is the law of the case as far as the parties are concerned, albeit the majority of the opinion of six against four
the Chief Justice's vote and that of Mr. Justice Fernando, the Court has by twelve (12) votes unanimously Justices is not doctrinal in the sense that it cannot be cited as necessarily a precedent for subsequent cases."
rendered judgment granting petitioner's right to examine and secure copies of the books and records of San
We hold on our part that the doctrine of the law of the case invoked by Mr. Justice Barredo has no applicability Justice and Messrs. Justices Fernando and Aquino) had expressly reserved their vote until after further hearings
for the following reasons: (first before the Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately in this Court).

a) Our jurisprudence is quite clear that this doctrine may be invoked only where there has been Such a view espoused by Mr. Justice Barredo could conceivably result in an incongruous situation where
a final and conclusive determination of an issue in the first case later invoked as the law of the case. supposedly under the law of this case the questioned by-laws would be held valid as against petitioner
Gokongwei and yet the same may be stricken off as invalid as to all other SMC shareholders in a proper case.
Thus, in People vs. Olarte, 2 we held that
3. It need only be pointed out that Mr. Justice Barredo's advance separate opinion can in no way affect or modify
"Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal More specifically, it means that the judgment of this Court as set forth in the decision of April 11, 1979 and discussed hereinabove. The same
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in bears the unqualified concurrence of only three Justices out of the six Justices who originally voted for the
the same case continues to he the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the validity per se of the questioned by-laws, namely, Messrs. Justices Antonio, Santos and De Castro. Messrs.
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. ... Justices Fernando and Makasiar did not concur therein but they instead concurred with the limited concurrence
of the Chief Justice touching on the law of the case which guardedly held that the Court has not found merit in
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions
the claim that the amended bylaws in question are invalid but without in any manner foreclosing the issue and
properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once
as a matter of fact and law, without in any manner changing or modifying the above-quoted vote of the Chief
its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and authority to alter
Justice as officially rendered in the decision of April 11, 1979, wherein he precisely "reserved (his) vote on the
or modify Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G. R. No. L-15548, October 30, 1962).
validity of the amended by-laws."
"The decision of this Court on that appeal by the government from the order of dismissal, holding that said
4. A word on the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Pacifico de Castro attached to the advance separate opinion
appeal did not place the appellants, including Absalon Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and concurred in by
of Mr. Justice Barredo. Mr. Justice De Castro advances his interpretation as to a restrictive construction of
six Justices as against three dissenters headed by the Chief Justice, promulgated way back in the year 1952,
section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, ignoring or disregarding the fact that during the Court's
has long become the law of the case. It may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently
deliberations it was brought out that this prohibitory provision was and is not raised in issue in this case whether
interpreted by this same Tribunal Even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. Our recent interpretation of the
here or in the Securities and Exchange Commission below (outside of a passing argument by Messrs. Angara,
law may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an oldone finally and conclusively determined. As already
Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz, as counsels for respondent Sorianos in their Memorandum of June 26,
stated, the majority opinion in that appeal is now the law of the case." (People vs. Pinuila)
1978 that "(T)he disputed By-Laws does not prohibit petitioner from holding onto, or even increasing his SMC
The doctrine of the law of the case, therefore, has no applicability whatsoever herein insofar as the question of investment; it only restricts any shifting on the part of petitioner from passive investor to a director of the
the validity or invalidity of the amended by-laws is concerned. The Court's judgment of April 11, 1979 clearly company." 3
shows that the voting on this question was inconclusive with six against four Justices and two other Justices
As a consequence, the Court abandoned the Idea of calling for another hearing wherein the parties could
(the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fernando) expressly reserving their votes thereon, and Mr. Justice Aquino
properly raise and discuss this question as a new issue and instead rendered the decision in question, under
while taking no part in effect likewise expressly reserved his vote thereon. No final and conclusive determination
which the question of section 13(5) could be raised at a new and proper hearing before the SMC board and in
could be reached on the issue and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56, section 11, since this special civil
the Securities and Exchange Commission and in due course before this Court (but with the clear understanding
action originally commenced in this Court, the action was simply dismissed with the result that no law of the
that since both corporations, the Robina and SMC are engaged in agriculture as submitted by the Sorianos'
case was laid down insofar as the issue of the validity or invalidity of the questioned by-laws is concerned, and
counsel in their said memorandum, the issue could be raised likewise against SMC and its other shareholders,
the relief sought herein by petitioner that this Court by-pass the SEC which has yet to hear and determine the
directors, if not against SMC itself. As expressly stated in the Chief Justices reservation of his vote, the matter
same issue pending before it below and that this Court itself directly resolve the said issue stands denied.
of the question of the applicability of the said section 13(5) to petitioner would be heard by this Court at the
b) The contention of Mr. Justice Barredo that the result of the dismiss of the case was that "petitioner Gokongwei appropriate time after the proceedings below (and necessarily the question of the validity of the amended by-
may not hereafter act on the assumption that he can revive the issue of the validity whether in the Securities laws would be taken up anew and the Court would at that time be able to reach a final and conclusive vote).
and Exchange Commission, in this Court or in any other forum, unless he proceeds on the basis of a factual
Mr. Justice De Castro's personal interpretation of the decision of April 11, 1979 that petitioner may be allowed
milieu different from the setting of this case Not even the Securities and Exchange Commission may pass on
to run for election despite adverse decision of both the SMC board and the Securities and Exchange
such question anymore at the instance of herein petitioner or anyone acting in his stead or on his behalf, "
Commission "only if he comes to this Court and obtains an injunction against the enforcement of the decision
appears to us to be untenable.
disqualifying him" is patently contradictory of his vote on the matter as expressly given in the judgment in the
The Court through the decision of April 11, 1979, by the unanimous votes of the twelve participating Justices Court's decision of April 11, 1979 (at page 59) that petitioner could run and if elected, sit as director of the
headed by the Chief Justice, ruled that petitioner Gokongwei was entitled to a "new and proper hearing" by the respondent SMC and could be disqualified only after a "new and proper hearing by the board of directors of said
SMC board of directors on the matter of his disqualification under the questioned by-laws and that the board's corporation, whose decision shall be appealable to the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission
"decision shall be appealable to the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission deliberating and deliberating and acting en banc and ultimately to this Court. Unless-disqualified in the manner herein provided,
acting en banc and ultimately to this Court (and) unless disqualified in the manner herein provided, the the prohibition in the aforementioned amended by-laws shall not apply to petitioner."
prohibition in the aforementioned amended by-laws shall not apply to petitioner."
Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
The entire Court, therefore, recognized that petitioner had not been given procedural due process by the SMC
BARREDO, J., concurring:
board on the matter of his disqualification and that he was entitled to a "new and proper hearing". It stands to
reason that in such hearing, petitioner could raise not only questions of fact but questions of law, particularly I reserved the filing of a separate opinion in order to state my own reasons for voting in favor of the validity of
questions of law affecting the investing public and their right to representation on the board as provided by law the amended by-laws in question. Regrettably, I have not yet finished preparing the same. In view, however, of
— not to mention that as borne out by the fact that no restriction whatsoever appears in the court's decision, it the joint separate opinion of Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, the full text of which
was never contemplated that petitioner was to be limited to questions of fact and could not raise the fundamental has just come to my attention, and which I am afraid might produce certain misimpressions as to the import of
questions of law bearing on the invalidity of the questioned amended by-laws at such hearing before the SMC the decision in this case, I consider it urgent to clarify my position in respect to the rights of the parties resulting
board. Furthermore, it was expressly provided unanimously in the Court's decision that the SMC board's from the dismissal of the petition herein and the outlining of the procedure by which the disqualification of
decision on the disqualification of petitioner ("assuming the board of directors of San Miguel Corporation should, petitioner Gokongwei can be made effective, hence this advance separate opinion.
after the proper hearing, disqualify him" as qualified in Mr. Justice Barredo's own separate opinion, at page 2)
shall be appealable to respondent Securities and Exchange Commission "deliberating and acting en banc and To start with, inasmuch as petitioner Gokongwei himself placed the issue of the validity of said amended by-
"untimately to this Court." Again, the Court's judgment as set forth in its decision of April 11, 1979 contains laws squarely before the Court for resolution, because he feels, rightly or wrongly, he can no longer have due
nothing that would warrant the opinion now expressed that respondent Securities and Exchange Commission process or justice from the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the private respondents have joined with
may not pass anymore on the question of the invalidity of the amended by-laws. Certainly, it cannot be him in that respect, the six votes cast by Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Santos, Abad Santos, de Castro and this
contended that the Court in dismissing the petition for lack of necessary votes actually by-passed the Securities writer in favor of validity of the amended by-laws in question, with only four members of this Court, namely,
and Exchange Commission and directly ruled itself on the invalidity of the questioned by-laws when it itself could Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero opining otherwise, and with Chief Justice Castro
not reach a final and conclusive vote (a minimum of eight votes) on the issue and three other Justices (the Chief and Justice Fernando reserving their votes thereon, and Justices Aquino and Melencio Herrera not voting,
thereby resulting in the dismissal of the petition "insofar as it assails the validity of the amended by- laws ... for
lack of necessary votes", has no other legal consequence than that it is the law of the case as far as the parties It is my opinion that under the public land statute, the development of a certain portion of the land applied for as
herein are concerned, albeit the majority opinion of six against four Justices is not doctrinal in the sense that it specified in the law as a condition precedent before the applicant may obtain a patent, is cultivation, not let us
cannot be cited as necessarily a precedent for subsequent cases. This means that petitioner Gokongwei and say, poultry raising or piggery, which may be included in the term Is agriculture" in its broad sense. For under
the respondents, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, are bound by the foregoing result, namely, Section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, construed not in the strict way as I believe it should, because
that the Court en banc has not found merit in the claim that the amended by-laws in question are invalid. Indeed, the provision is in derogation of property rights, the petitioner in this case would be disqualified from becoming
it is one thing to say that dismissal of the case is not doctrinal and entirely another thing to maintain that such an officer of either the San Miguel Corporation or his own supposedly agricultural corporations. It is thus beyond
dismissal leaves the issue unsettled. It is somewhat of a misreading and misconstruction of Section 11 of Rule my comprehension why, feeling as though I am the only member of the Court for a restricted interpretation of
56, contrary to the well-known established norm observed by this Court, to state that the dismissal of a petition Section 13(5) of Act 1459, doubt still seems to be in the minds of other members giving the cited provision an
for lack of the necessary votes does not amount to a decision on the merits. Unquestionably, the Court is unrestricted interpretation, as to the validity of the amended by-laws in question, or even holding them null and
deemed to find no merit in a petition in two ways, namely, (1) when eight or more members vote expressly in void.
that sense and (2) when the required number of justices needed to sustain the same cannot be had.
I concur with the observation of Justice Barredo that despite that less than six votes are for upholding the validity
I reiterate, therefore, that as between the parties herein, the issue of validity of the challenged by-laws is already of the by-laws, their validity is deemed upheld, as constituting the "law of the case." It could not be otherwise,
settled. From which it follows that the same are already enforceable-insofar as they are concerned. Petitioner after the present petition is dismissed with the relief sought to declare null and void the said by-laws being denied
Gokongwei may not hereafter act on the assumption that he can revive the issue of validity whether in the in effect. A vicious circle would be created if, should petitioner Gokongwei be barred or disqualified from running
Securities and Exchange Commission, in this Court or in any other forum, unless he proceeds on the basis of a by the Board of Directors of San Miguel Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission sustain the
factual milieu different from the setting of this case. Not even the Securities and Exchange Commission may Board, petitioner could come again to Us, raising the same question he has raised in the present petition, unless
pass on such question anymore at the instance of herein petitioner or anyone acting in his stead or on his behalf. the principle of the "law of the case" is applied.
The vote of four justices to remand the case thereto cannot alter the situation.
Clarifying therefore, my position, I am of the opinion that with the validity of the by-laws in question standing
It is very clear that under the decision herein, the issue of validity is a settled matter for the parties herein as the unimpaired it is now for petitioner to show that he does not come within the disqualification as therein provided,
law of the case, and it is only the actual implementation of the impugned amended by-laws in the particular case both to the Board and later to the Securities and Exchange Commission, it being a foregone conclusion that,
of petitioner that remains to be passed upon by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and on appeal unless petitioner disposes of his stockholdings in the so-called competitive corporations, San Miguel Corporation
therefrom to Us, assuming the board of directors of San Miguel Corporation should, after the proper hearing, would apply the by-laws against him, His right, therefore, to run depends on what, on election day, May 8, 1979,
disqualify him. the ruling of the Board and/or the Securities and Exchange Commission on his qualification to run would be,
certainly, not the final ruling of this Court in the event recourse thereto is made by the party feeling aggrieved,
To be sure, the record is replete with substantial indications, nay admissions of petitioner himself, that he is a as intimated in the "Joint Separate Opinion" of Justices Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero,
controlling stockholder of corporations which are competitors of San Miguel Corporation. The very substantial that only after petitioner's "disqualification" has ultimately been passed upon by this Court should petitioner, not
areas of such competition involving hundreds of millions of pesos worth of businesses stand uncontroverted in be allowed to run. Petitioner may be allowed to run, despite an adverse decision of both the Board and the
the records hereof. In fact, petitioner has even offered, if he should be elected, as director, not to take part when Securities and Exchange Commission, only if he comes to this Court and obtain an injunction against the
the board takes up matters affecting the corresponding areas of competition between his corporation and San enforcement of the decision disqualifying him. Without such injunction being required, all that petitioner has to
Miguel. Nonetheless, perhaps, it is best that such evidence be formally offered at the hearing contemplated in do is to take his time in coming to this Court, and in so doing, he would in the meantime, be allowed to run, and
Our decision. if he wins, to sit. This would, however, be contrary to the doctrine that gives binding, if not conclusive, effect of
findings of facts of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions upon appellate courts, which should,
As to whether or not petitioner may sit in the board if he wins, definitely, under the decision in this case, even if
accordingly, be enforced until reversed by this Tribunal.
petitioner should win, he will have to immediately leave his position or should be ousted the moment this Court
settles the issue of his actual disqualification, either in a full blown decision or by denying the petition for review Fernando and Makasiar, JJ., concurs.
of corresponding decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission unfavorable to him. And, of course, as
a matter of principle, it is to be expected that the matter of his disqualification should be resolved expeditiously Antonio and Santos, JJ., concur
and within the shortest possible time, so as to avoid as much juridical injury as possible, considering that the
matter of the validity of the prohibition against competitors embodied in the amended by-laws is already
unquestionable among the parties herein and to allow him to be in the board for sometime would create an
obviously anomalous and legally incongruous situation that should not be tolerated. Thus, all the parties
concerned must act promptly and expeditiously. # Separate Opinions
Additionally, my reservation to explain my vote on the validity of the amended by-laws still stands. TEEHANKEE, CONCEPCION JR., FERNANDEZ and GUERRERO, JJ., concurring:
Castro, C.J., concurs in Justice Barredo's statement that the dismissal (for lack of necessary votes) of the I
petition to the extent that "it assails the validity of the amended by laws," is the law of the case at bar, which
means in effect that as far and only in so far as the parties and the Securities and Exchange Commission are As correctly stated in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio, the Court is unanimous in its judgment granting
concerned, the Court has not found merit in the claim that the amended by-laws in question are invalid. the petitioner as stockholder of respondent San Miguel Corporation the right to inspect, examine and secure
copies of the records of San Miguel International, inc. (SMI), a wholly owned foreign subsidiary corporation of
Antonio and Santos, JJ., concur. respondent San Miguel Corporation. Respondent commissions en banc Order No. 449, Series of 19 7 7,
denying petitioner's right of inspection for "not being a stockholder of San Miguel International, Inc." has been
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
accordingly set aside. It need be only pointed out that:
As stated in the decision penned by Justice Antonio, I voted to uphold the validity of the amendment to the by-
a) The commission's reasoning grossly disregards the fact that the stockholders of San Miguel Corporation are
laws in question. What induced me to this view is the practical consideration easily perceived in the following
likewise the owners of San Miguel International, Inc. as the corporation's wholly owned foreign subsidiary and
illustration: If a person becomes a stockholder of a corporation and gets himself elected as a director, and while
therefore have every right to have access to its books and records. otherwise, the directors and management
he is such a director, he forms his own corporation competitive or antagonistic to the corporation of which he is
of any Philippine corporation by the simple device of organizing with the corporation's funds foreign subsidiaries
a director, and becomes Chairman of the Board and President of his own corporation, he may be removed from
would be granted complete immunity from the stockholders' scrutiny of its foreign operations and would have a
his position as director, admittedly one of trust and confidence. If this is so, as seems undisputably to be the
conduit for dissipating, if not misappropriating, the corporation funds and assets by merely channeling them into
case, a person already controlling, and also the Chairman of the Board and President of, a corporation, may be
foreign subsidiaries' operations; and
barred from becoming a member of the board of directors of a competitive corporation. This is my view, even
as I am for a restrictive interpretation of Section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, under which I would b) Petitioner's right of examination herein recognized refers to all books and records of the foreign subsidiary
limit the scope of the provision to corporations engaged in agriculture, but only as the word agriculture" refers SMI which are which are " in respondent corporation's possession and control" 1, meaning to say regardless of
to its more stated meaning as distinguished from its general and broad connotation. The term would then mean whether or not such books and records are physically within the Philippines. all such books and records of SMI
"farming" or raising the natural products of the soil, such as by cultivation, in the manner as is required by the are legally within respondent corporation's "possession and control" and if nay books or records are kept abroad,
Public Land Act in the acquisition of agricultural land, such as by homestead, before the patent may be issued. (e.g. in the foreign subsidiary's state of domicile, as is to be expected), then the respondent corporation's board
and management are obliged under the Court's judgment to bring and make them (or true copies thereof It should be noted that while the petition may be dismissed in view of the inconclusiveness of the vote and the
available within the Philippines for petitioner's examination and inspection. Court's failure to affair, the required 8-vote majority to resolve the issue, such as dismissal (for lack of necessary
votes) is of no doctrine value and does not in any manner resolve the issue of the validity of the questioned
II amended by-laws nor foreclose the same. The same should properly be determined in a proper case in the first
instance by the Securities and Exchange Commission as the agency of primary jurisdiction, as above indicated.
On the other main issue of the Validity of respondent San Miguel Corporation's amendment of its by-
laws 2 whereby respondent corporation's board of directors under its resolution dated April 29, 1977 declared The Court is unanimous, therefore, in its judgment that petitioner Gokongwei may run for the office of, and if
petitioner ineligible to be nominated or to be voted or to be elected as of the board of directors, the Court, elected, sit as, member of the board of directors of respondent San Miguel Corporation as stated in the
composed of 12 members (since Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio Herrera inhibited herself from taking part dispositive portion of the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio, to wit: Until and after petitioner has been given a
herein, while Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino upon submittal of the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio decided "new and proper hearing by the board of directors of said corporation, whose decision shall be appealable Lo
not to take part), failed to reach a conclusive vote or, the required majority of 8 votes to settle the issue one way the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission deliverating and acting en banc and ultimately to this
or the other. Court" and until ' disqualified in the manner herein provided, the prohibition in the aforementioned amended by-
laws shall not apply to petitioner," In other words, until and after petitioner shall have been given due process
Six members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Santos, Abad Santos and De Castro,
and proper hearing by the respondent board of directors as to the question of his qualification or disqualification
considered the issue purely legal and voted to sustain the validity per se of the questioned amended by-laws
under the questioned amended by-laws (assuming that the respondent Securities and Exchange C commission
but nevertheless voted that the prohibition and disqualification therein provided shall not apply to petitioner
ultimately upholds the validity of said by laws), and such disqualification shall have been sustained by
Gokongwei until and after he shall have been given a new and proper hearing" by the corporation's board of
respondent Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately by final judgment of this Court, petitioner is
directors and the board's decision of disqualification she'll have been sustained on appeal by respondent
deemed eligible for all legal purposes and effects to be nominated and voted and if elected to sit as a member
Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately by this Court.
of the hoard of directors of respondent San Miguel Corporation.
The undersigned Justices do not consider the issue as purely legal in the light of respondent commission's Order
In view of the Court's unanimous judgment on this point the portion of respondent commission's Order No. 450,
No. 451, Series of 1977, denying petitioner's "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the ground that "the
Series of 977 which imposed "the condition that he [petitioner] cannot sit as board member if elected until after
Commission en banc finds that there (are) unresolved and genuine issues of fact" 3 as well as its position in this
the Commission shall have finally decided the validity of the disputed by-law provision" has been likewise
case to the Solicitor General that the case at bar is "premature" and that the administrative remedies before the
accordingly set aside.
commission should first be availed of and exhausted. 4
III
We are of the opinion that the questioned amended by-laws, as they are, (adopted after almost a century of
respondent corporation's existence as a public corporation with its shares freely purchased and traded in the By way of recapitulation, so that the Court's decision and judgment may be clear and not subject to ambiguity,
open market without restriction and disqualification) which would bar petitioner from qualification, nomination we state the following.
and election as director and worse, grant the board by 3/4 vote the arbitrary power to bar any stockholder from
his right to be elected as director by the simple expedient of declaring him to be engaged in a "competitive or 1. With the votes of the six Justices concurring unqualifiedly in the main opinion added to our four votes, plus
antagonistic business" or declaring him as a "nominee" of the competitive or antagonistic" stockholder are illegal, the Chief Justice's vote and that of Mr. Justice Fernando, the Court has by twelve (12) votes unanimously
oppressive, arbitrary and unreasonable. rendered judgment granting petitioner's right to examine and secure copies of the books and records of San
Miguel International, Inc. as a foreign subsidiary of respondent corporation and respondent commission's Order
We consider the questioned amended by-laws as being specifically tailored to discriminate against petitioner No. 449, Series of 1977, to the contrary is set aside:
and depriving him in violation of substantive due process of his vested substantial rights as stockholder of
respondent corporation. We further consider said amended by-laws as violating specific provisions of the 2. With the same twelve (12) votes, the Court has also unanimously rendered judgment declaring that until and
Corporation Law which grant and recognize the right of a minority stockholder like petitioner to be elected afterpetitioner shall have been given due process and proper hearing by the respondent board of directors as
director by the process of cumulative voting ordained by the Law (secs 21 and 30) and the right of a minority to the question of his disqualification under the questioned amended by- laws (assuming that the respondent
director once elected not to be removed from office of director except for cause by vote of the stockholders Securities and Exchange Commission ultimately upholds the validity of said by laws), and such disqualification
holding 2/3 of the subscribed capital stock (sec. 31). If a minority stockholder could be disqualified by such a by- shall have been sustained by respondent Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately by final judgment
laws amendment under the guise of providing for "qualifications," these mandates of the Corporation Law would of this Court petitioner is deemed eligible for all legal purposes and effect to be nominated and voted and if
have no meaning or purpose. elected to sit as a member of the board of directors of respondent San Miguel Corporation. Accordingly,
respondent commission's Order No. 450, Series of 1977 to the contrary has likewise been set aside; and
These vested and substantial rights granted stockholders under the Corporation Law may not be diluted or
defeated by the general authority granted by the Corporation Law itself to corporations to adopt their by-laws (in 3. The Court's voting on the validity of respondent corporation's amendment of the by-laws (sec. 2, Art. 111) is
section 21) which deal principally with the procedures governing their internal business. The by-laws of any inconclusive without the required majority of eight votes to settle the issue one way or the other having been
corporation must, be always within the character limits. What the Corporation Law has granted stockholders reached. No judgment is rendered by the Court thereon and the statements of the six Justices who have signed
may not be taken away by the corporation's by-laws. The amendment is further an instrument of oppressiveness the main opinion on the legality thereof have no binding effect, much less doctrinal value.
and arbitrariness in that the incumbent directors are thereby enabled to perpetuate themselves in office by the
simple expedient of disqualifying any unwelcome candidate, no matter how many votes he may have. The dismissal of the petition insofar as the question of the validity of the disputed by-laws amendment is
concerned is not by an judgment with the required eight votes but simply by force of Rule 56, section II of the
However, in view of the inconclusiveness of the vote, we sustain respondent commission's stand as expressed Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which provides that "where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion,
in its Orders Nos. 450 and 451, Series of 1977 that there are unresolved and genuine issues of fact" and that it or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on re-hearing no decision is reached,
has yet to rule on and finally decide the validity of the disputed by-law provision", subject to appeal by either the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court ...." The end result is that the Court has thereby
party to this Court. dismissed the petition which prayed that the Court bypass the commission and directly resolved the issue and
therefore the respondent commission may now proceed, as announced in its Order No. 450, Series of 1977, to
In view of prematurity of the proceedings here (as likewise expressed by Mr. Justice Fernando), the case should hear the case before it and receive all relevant evidence bearing on the issue as hereinabove indicated, and
as a consequence be remanded to the Securities and Exchange Commission as the agency of primary resolve the "unresolved and genuine issues of fact" (as per Order No. 451, Series of 1977) and the issues of
jurisdiction for a full hearing and reception of evidence of all relevant facts (which should property be submitted legality of the disputed by-laws amendment.
to the commission instead of the piecemeal documents submitted as annexes to this Court which is not a trier
of facts) concerning not only the petitioner but the members of the board of directors of respondent corporation Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
as well, so that it may determine on the basis thereof the issue of the legality of the questioned amended by-
laws, and assuming Chat it holds the same to be valid whether the same are arbitrarily and unreasonably applied Guerrero, J., concurred.
to petitioner vis a vis other directors, who, petitioner claims, should in such event be likewise disqualified from
TEEHANKEE, CONCEPCION JR., FERNANDEZ and GUERRERO, JJ., concurring:
sitting in the board of directors by virtue of conflict of interests or their being likewise engaged in competitive or
antagonistic business" with the corporation such as investment and finance, coconut oil mills cement, milk and This supplemental opinion is issued with reference to the advance separate opinion of Mr. Justice Barredo
hotels. 5 issued by him as to "certain misimpressions as to the import of the decision in this case" which might be
produced by our joint separate opinion of April 11, 1979 and "urgent(ly) to clarify (his) position in respect to the
rights of the parties resulting from the dismissal of the petition herein and the outline of the procedure by which b) The contention of Mr. Justice Barredo that the result of the dismiss of the case was that "petitioner Gokongwei
the disqualification of petitioner Gokongwei can be made effective." may not hereafter act on the assumption that he can revive the issue of the validity whether in the Securities
and Exchange Commission, in this Court or in any other forum, unless he proceeds on the basis of a factual
1. Mr. Justice Barredo's advances separate opinion "that as between the parties herein, the issue of the validity milieu different from the setting of this case Not even the Securities and Exchange Commission may pass on
of the challenged by-laws is already settled" had, of course, no binding effect. The judgment of the Court is such question anymore at the instance of herein petitioner or anyone acting in his stead or on his behalf, "
found on pages 59-61 of the decision of April 11, 1979, penned by Mr. Justice Antonio, wherein on the question appears to us to be untenable.
of the validity of the amended by-laws the Court's inconclusive voting is set forth as follows:
The Court through the decision of April 11, 1979, by the unanimous votes of the twelve participating Justices
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro reserved his vote on the validity of the amended by-laws, pending hearing by headed by the Chief Justice, ruled that petitioner Gokongwei was entitled to a "new and proper hearing" by the
this Court on the applicability of section 13(5) of the Corporation Law to petitioner. SMC board of directors on the matter of his disqualification under the questioned by-laws and that the board's
"decision shall be appealable to the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission deliberating and
Justice Fernando reserved his vote on the validity of subject amendment to the by-laws but otherwise concurs
acting en banc and ultimately to this Court (and) unless disqualified in the manner herein provided, the
in the result.
prohibition in the aforementioned amended by-laws shall not apply to petitioner."
Four (4) Justices, namely, Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero filed a separate
The entire Court, therefore, recognized that petitioner had not been given procedural due process by the SMC
opinion, wherein they voted against the validity of the questioned amended by-laws and that this question should
board on the matter of his disqualification and that he was entitled to a "new and proper hearing". It stands to
properly be resolved first by the SEC as the agency of primary jurisdiction ... 1
reason that in such hearing, petitioner could raise not only questions of fact but questions of law, particularly
As stated in said judgment itself, for lack of the necessary votes, the petition, insofar as it assails the validity of questions of law affecting the investing public and their right to representation on the board as provided by law
the questioned by-laws, was dismissed. — not to mention that as borne out by the fact that no restriction whatsoever appears in the court's decision, it
was never contemplated that petitioner was to be limited to questions of fact and could not raise the fundamental
2. Mr. Justice Barredo now contends contrary to the undersigned's understanding, as stated on pages 8 and 9 questions of law bearing on the invalidity of the questioned amended by-laws at such hearing before the SMC
of our joint separate opinion of April 11, 1979 that the legal effect of the dismissal of the petition on the question board. Furthermore, it was expressly provided unanimously in the Court's decision that the SMC board's
of validity of the amended by-laws for lack of the necessary votes simply means that "the Court has thereby decision on the disqualification of petitioner ("assuming the board of directors of San Miguel Corporation should,
dismissed the petition which prayed that the Court by-pass the commission and directly resolve the issue and after the proper hearing, disqualify him" as qualified in Mr. Justice Barredo's own separate opinion, at page 2)
therefore the respondent commission may now proceed, as announced in its Order No. 450, Series of 1977, to shall be appealable to respondent Securities and Exchange Commission "deliberating and acting en banc and
hear the case before it and receive all relevant evidence bearing on the issue as hereinabove indicated, and "untimately to this Court." Again, the Court's judgment as set forth in its decision of April 11, 1979 contains
resolve the 'unresolved and genuine issues of fact' (as per Order No. 451, Series of 1977) and the issue of nothing that would warrant the opinion now expressed that respondent Securities and Exchange Commission
legality of the disputed by-laws amendment," that such dismissal "has no other legal consequence than that it may not pass anymore on the question of the invalidity of the amended by-laws. Certainly, it cannot be
is the law of the case as far as the parties are concerned, albeit the majority of the opinion of six against four contended that the Court in dismissing the petition for lack of necessary votes actually by-passed the Securities
Justices is not doctrinal in the sense that it cannot be cited as necessarily a precedent for subsequent cases." and Exchange Commission and directly ruled itself on the invalidity of the questioned by-laws when it itself could
not reach a final and conclusive vote (a minimum of eight votes) on the issue and three other Justices (the Chief
We hold on our part that the doctrine of the law of the case invoked by Mr. Justice Barredo has no applicability Justice and Messrs. Justices Fernando and Aquino) had expressly reserved their vote until after further hearings
for the following reasons: (first before the Securities and Exchange Commission and ultimately in this Court).
a) Our jurisprudence is quite clear that this doctrine may be invoked only where there has been Such a view espoused by Mr. Justice Barredo could conceivably result in an incongruous situation where
a final and conclusive determination of an issue in the first case later invoked as the law of the case. supposedly under the law of this case the questioned by-laws would be held valid as against petitioner
Gokongwei and yet the same may be stricken off as invalid as to all other SMC shareholders in a proper case.
Thus, in People vs. Olarte, 2 we held that
3. It need only be pointed out that Mr. Justice Barredo's advance separate opinion can in no way affect or modify
"Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal More specifically, it means that
the judgment of this Court as set forth in the decision of April 11, 1979 and discussed hereinabove. The same
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in
bears the unqualified concurrence of only three Justices out of the six Justices who originally voted for the
the same case continues to he the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
validity per se of the questioned by-laws, namely, Messrs. Justices Antonio, Santos and De Castro. Messrs.
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. ...
Justices Fernando and Makasiar did not concur therein but they instead concurred with the limited concurrence
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions of the Chief Justice touching on the law of the case which guardedly held that the Court has not found merit in
properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once the claim that the amended bylaws in question are invalid but without in any manner foreclosing the issue and
its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and authority to alter as a matter of fact and law, without in any manner changing or modifying the above-quoted vote of the Chief
or modify Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G. R. No. L-15548, October 30, 1962). Justice as officially rendered in the decision of April 11, 1979, wherein he precisely "reserved (his) vote on the
validity of the amended by-laws."
"The decision of this Court on that appeal by the government from the order of dismissal, holding that said
appeal did not place the appellants, including Absalon Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and concurred in by 4. A word on the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Pacifico de Castro attached to the advance separate opinion
six Justices as against three dissenters headed by the Chief Justice, promulgated way back in the year 1952, of Mr. Justice Barredo. Mr. Justice De Castro advances his interpretation as to a restrictive construction of
has long become the law of the case. It may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, ignoring or disregarding the fact that during the Court's
interpreted by this same Tribunal Even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. Our recent interpretation of the deliberations it was brought out that this prohibitory provision was and is not raised in issue in this case whether
law may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an oldone finally and conclusively determined. As already here or in the Securities and Exchange Commission below (outside of a passing argument by Messrs. Angara,
stated, the majority opinion in that appeal is now the law of the case." (People vs. Pinuila) Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz, as counsels for respondent Sorianos in their Memorandum of June 26,
1978 that "(T)he disputed By-Laws does not prohibit petitioner from holding onto, or even increasing his SMC
The doctrine of the law of the case, therefore, has no applicability whatsoever herein insofar as the question of investment; it only restricts any shifting on the part of petitioner from passive investor to a director of the
the validity or invalidity of the amended by-laws is concerned. The Court's judgment of April 11, 1979 clearly company." 3
shows that the voting on this question was inconclusive with six against four Justices and two other Justices
(the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fernando) expressly reserving their votes thereon, and Mr. Justice Aquino As a consequence, the Court abandoned the Idea of calling for another hearing wherein the parties could
while taking no part in effect likewise expressly reserved his vote thereon. No final and conclusive determination properly raise and discuss this question as a new issue and instead rendered the decision in question, under
could be reached on the issue and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56, section 11, since this special civil which the question of section 13(5) could be raised at a new and proper hearing before the SMC board and in
action originally commenced in this Court, the action was simply dismissed with the result that no law of the the Securities and Exchange Commission and in due course before this Court (but with the clear understanding
case was laid down insofar as the issue of the validity or invalidity of the questioned by-laws is concerned, and that since both corporations, the Robina and SMC are engaged in agriculture as submitted by the Sorianos'
the relief sought herein by petitioner that this Court by-pass the SEC which has yet to hear and determine the counsel in their said memorandum, the issue could be raised likewise against SMC and its other shareholders,
same issue pending before it below and that this Court itself directly resolve the said issue stands denied. directors, if not against SMC itself. As expressly stated in the Chief Justices reservation of his vote, the matter
of the question of the applicability of the said section 13(5) to petitioner would be heard by this Court at the
appropriate time after the proceedings below (and necessarily the question of the validity of the amended by- settles the issue of his actual disqualification, either in a full blown decision or by denying the petition for review
laws would be taken up anew and the Court would at that time be able to reach a final and conclusive vote). of corresponding decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission unfavorable to him. And, of course, as
a matter of principle, it is to be expected that the matter of his disqualification should be resolved expeditiously
Mr. Justice De Castro's personal interpretation of the decision of April 11, 1979 that petitioner may be allowed and within the shortest possible time, so as to avoid as much juridical injury as possible, considering that the
to run for election despite adverse decision of both the SMC board and the Securities and Exchange matter of the validity of the prohibition against competitors embodied in the amended by-laws is already
Commission "only if he comes to this Court and obtains an injunction against the enforcement of the decision unquestionable among the parties herein and to allow him to be in the board for sometime would create an
disqualifying him" is patently contradictory of his vote on the matter as expressly given in the judgment in the obviously anomalous and legally incongruous situation that should not be tolerated. Thus, all the parties
Court's decision of April 11, 1979 (at page 59) that petitioner could run and if elected, sit as director of the concerned must act promptly and expeditiously.
respondent SMC and could be disqualified only after a "new and proper hearing by the board of directors of said
corporation, whose decision shall be appealable to the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission Additionally, my reservation to explain my vote on the validity of the amended by-laws still stands.
deliberating and acting en banc and ultimately to this Court. Unless-disqualified in the manner herein provided,
the prohibition in the aforementioned amended by-laws shall not apply to petitioner." Castro, C.J., concurs in Justice Barredo's statement that the dismissal (for lack of necessary votes) of the
petition to the extent that "it assails the validity of the amended by laws," is the law of the case at bar, which
Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur. means in effect that as far and only in so far as the parties and the Securities and Exchange Commission are
concerned, the Court has not found merit in the claim that the amended by-laws in question are invalid.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
Antonio and Santos, JJ., concur.
I reserved the filing of a separate opinion in order to state my own reasons for voting in favor of the validity of
the amended by-laws in question. Regrettably, I have not yet finished preparing the same. In view, however, of DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
the joint separate opinion of Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, the full text of which
has just come to my attention, and which I am afraid might produce certain misimpressions as to the import of As stated in the decision penned by Justice Antonio, I voted to uphold the validity of the amendment to the by-
the decision in this case, I consider it urgent to clarify my position in respect to the rights of the parties resulting laws in question. What induced me to this view is the practical consideration easily perceived in the following
from the dismissal of the petition herein and the outlining of the procedure by which the disqualification of illustration: If a person becomes a stockholder of a corporation and gets himself elected as a director, and while
petitioner Gokongwei can be made effective, hence this advance separate opinion. he is such a director, he forms his own corporation competitive or antagonistic to the corporation of which he is
a director, and becomes Chairman of the Board and President of his own corporation, he may be removed from
To start with, inasmuch as petitioner Gokongwei himself placed the issue of the validity of said amended by- his position as director, admittedly one of trust and confidence. If this is so, as seems undisputably to be the
laws squarely before the Court for resolution, because he feels, rightly or wrongly, he can no longer have due case, a person already controlling, and also the Chairman of the Board and President of, a corporation, may be
process or justice from the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the private respondents have joined with barred from becoming a member of the board of directors of a competitive corporation. This is my view, even
him in that respect, the six votes cast by Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Santos, Abad Santos, de Castro and this as I am for a restrictive interpretation of Section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, under which I would
writer in favor of validity of the amended by-laws in question, with only four members of this Court, namely, limit the scope of the provision to corporations engaged in agriculture, but only as the word agriculture" refers
Justices Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero opining otherwise, and with Chief Justice Castro to its more stated meaning as distinguished from its general and broad connotation. The term would then mean
and Justice Fernando reserving their votes thereon, and Justices Aquino and Melencio Herrera not voting, "farming" or raising the natural products of the soil, such as by cultivation, in the manner as is required by the
thereby resulting in the dismissal of the petition "insofar as it assails the validity of the amended by- laws ... for Public Land Act in the acquisition of agricultural land, such as by homestead, before the patent may be issued.
lack of necessary votes", has no other legal consequence than that it is the law of the case as far as the parties It is my opinion that under the public land statute, the development of a certain portion of the land applied for as
herein are concerned, albeit the majority opinion of six against four Justices is not doctrinal in the sense that it specified in the law as a condition precedent before the applicant may obtain a patent, is cultivation, not let us
cannot be cited as necessarily a precedent for subsequent cases. This means that petitioner Gokongwei and say, poultry raising or piggery, which may be included in the term Is agriculture" in its broad sense. For under
the respondents, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, are bound by the foregoing result, namely, Section 13(5) of the Philippine Corporation Law, construed not in the strict way as I believe it should, because
that the Court en banc has not found merit in the claim that the amended by-laws in question are invalid. Indeed, the provision is in derogation of property rights, the petitioner in this case would be disqualified from becoming
it is one thing to say that dismissal of the case is not doctrinal and entirely another thing to maintain that such an officer of either the San Miguel Corporation or his own supposedly agricultural corporations. It is thus beyond
dismissal leaves the issue unsettled. It is somewhat of a misreading and misconstruction of Section 11 of Rule my comprehension why, feeling as though I am the only member of the Court for a restricted interpretation of
56, contrary to the well-known established norm observed by this Court, to state that the dismissal of a petition Section 13(5) of Act 1459, doubt still seems to be in the minds of other members giving the cited provision an
for lack of the necessary votes does not amount to a decision on the merits. Unquestionably, the Court is unrestricted interpretation, as to the validity of the amended by-laws in question, or even holding them null and
deemed to find no merit in a petition in two ways, namely, (1) when eight or more members vote expressly in void.
that sense and (2) when the required number of justices needed to sustain the same cannot be had.
I concur with the observation of Justice Barredo that despite that less than six votes are for upholding the validity
I reiterate, therefore, that as between the parties herein, the issue of validity of the challenged by-laws is already of the by-laws, their validity is deemed upheld, as constituting the "law of the case." It could not be otherwise,
settled. From which it follows that the same are already enforceable-insofar as they are concerned. Petitioner after the present petition is dismissed with the relief sought to declare null and void the said by-laws being denied
Gokongwei may not hereafter act on the assumption that he can revive the issue of validity whether in the in effect. A vicious circle would be created if, should petitioner Gokongwei be barred or disqualified from running
Securities and Exchange Commission, in this Court or in any other forum, unless he proceeds on the basis of a by the Board of Directors of San Miguel Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission sustain the
factual milieu different from the setting of this case. Not even the Securities and Exchange Commission may Board, petitioner could come again to Us, raising the same question he has raised in the present petition, unless
pass on such question anymore at the instance of herein petitioner or anyone acting in his stead or on his behalf. the principle of the "law of the case" is applied.
The vote of four justices to remand the case thereto cannot alter the situation.
Clarifying therefore, my position, I am of the opinion that with the validity of the by-laws in question standing
It is very clear that under the decision herein, the issue of validity is a settled matter for the parties herein as the unimpaired it is now for petitioner to show that he does not come within the disqualification as therein provided,
law of the case, and it is only the actual implementation of the impugned amended by-laws in the particular case both to the Board and later to the Securities and Exchange Commission, it being a foregone conclusion that,
of petitioner that remains to be passed upon by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and on appeal unless petitioner disposes of his stockholdings in the so-called competitive corporations, San Miguel Corporation
therefrom to Us, assuming the board of directors of San Miguel Corporation should, after the proper hearing, would apply the by-laws against him, His right, therefore, to run depends on what, on election day, May 8, 1979,
disqualify him. the ruling of the Board and/or the Securities and Exchange Commission on his qualification to run would be,
certainly, not the final ruling of this Court in the event recourse thereto is made by the party feeling aggrieved,
To be sure, the record is replete with substantial indications, nay admissions of petitioner himself, that he is a as intimated in the "Joint Separate Opinion" of Justices Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero,
controlling stockholder of corporations which are competitors of San Miguel Corporation. The very substantial that only after petitioner's "disqualification" has ultimately been passed upon by this Court should petitioner, not
areas of such competition involving hundreds of millions of pesos worth of businesses stand uncontroverted in be allowed to run. Petitioner may be allowed to run, despite an adverse decision of both the Board and the
the records hereof. In fact, petitioner has even offered, if he should be elected, as director, not to take part when Securities and Exchange Commission, only if he comes to this Court and obtain an injunction against the
the board takes up matters affecting the corresponding areas of competition between his corporation and San enforcement of the decision disqualifying him. Without such injunction being required, all that petitioner has to
Miguel. Nonetheless, perhaps, it is best that such evidence be formally offered at the hearing contemplated in do is to take his time in coming to this Court, and in so doing, he would in the meantime, be allowed to run, and
Our decision. if he wins, to sit. This would, however, be contrary to the doctrine that gives binding, if not conclusive, effect of
findings of facts of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions upon appellate courts, which should,
As to whether or not petitioner may sit in the board if he wins, definitely, under the decision in this case, even if
accordingly, be enforced until reversed by this Tribunal.
petitioner should win, he will have to immediately leave his position or should be ousted the moment this Court