I.

INTRODUCTION
Honestly, Emmanuel Levinas’ Totality and Infinity is not an easy read. After
scanning the contents of the book I borrowed from seminarian Eoin, I decided and settled
to read the Section III of the book. It is entitled Exteriority and the Face. In order for me to
further specify the scope of my inquiry by reading and reflecting on the Section B entitled
Ethics and the Face encompassing pages 194 to 219. Pages 212 to 216 caught my attention
and my interest when I finally laid my eyes on the content of The Other and the Others and
The Assymetry of the Interpersonal. I therefore chose these parts of the book to make my
understanding of Levinas deeper and clearer.
I divided this paper into specific parts that tries to expound how Levinas’
explanations. Let me now start with how I understood Levinas’ idea of the face of the Other.

II. THE FACE OF THE OTHER

Levinas’ presentation of the idea of the face was quite unique and well-presented and
he was able to made it clear when he said that, “The face in its nakedness as a face presents
to me the destitution of the poor one and the stranger; but this poverty and exile which
appeal to my powers, address me, do not deliver themselves over to these powers as givens,
remain the expression of the face”.1 Here, he was able to establish the idea of the face as “naked”
and “destitute”. Where can we then find this “naked” and “destitute” presentation of the face?
Levinas emphasized how a person can discover the face in the poor and the stranger. The poor on
its poverty visibly expresses the face as well as the stranger on its exile. These expressions of the
face are trying to talk to me, telling me something and addressing me.
Not only did Levinas emphasized the presence of the face of the Other in the poor
and the stranger, he also tried to further say that: “The Other who dominates me in his
transcendence is thus the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, to whom I am obligated”.2
In this sense, the encounter with the Other will bring forth with it transcendence. In this
transcendence, the Other dominates the I. The widow and the orphan are both expressions

1 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans.

Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 213.

2 Ibid., 215.
of the same face that I see in the Other. Seeing the face of the Other through the face of the
poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan does not end in just looking at it. Instead,
there’s a sense of obligation and responsibility that is born in the experience of seeing the
face of the Other. By this, I would like to move on to the third part of this paper.

III. RESPONSIBILITY FREEDOM & SERVICE

The question now is what will be the response that will happen when the face of the
Other expresses itself to the I? Levinas has a direct answer to this question when he said,
“To hear his destitution which cries out for justice is not to represent an image to oneself,
but is to posit oneself as responsible, both as more and as less than the being that presents
itself in the face. Less, for the face summons me to my obligations and judges me. 3 It can
therefore be said that the destitution of the poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan
does not only appear visually, but it can also be heard through its crying out for justice. This
destitution is not only for the I to look at, but this challenges the I to be responsible. This
responsibility does not mean that the I is considered as more than the Other because in truth,
the I can be considered as less than the face of the Other. The reason for this is that it is the
face of the Other that summons the I for its obligation or responsibility. The Other does not
only summon the I for obligation but at the same time, the Other also judges the I.
Levinas continued to look at the Other, the I and the responsibility of the I to the
Other by saying that: “It is my responsibility before a face looking at me as absolutely
foreign…that constitutes the original fact of fraternity. 4 Here, it is clear that the I need to
realize that the face of the Other considers him/her as absolutely foreign or also as a stranger.
This instance of the face of the Other looking at the I as a stranger will give eventually give
the I its responsibility to start constituting fraternity or brotherhood in other words. Levinas
will further emphasize fraternity and I will later try to expound on it later at the fifth part of
this paper.
Going back to the idea of the destitution of the face, Levinas tells us that: “More, for
my position as I consists in being able to respond to this essential destitution of the Other,

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 214.
finding resources for myself”.5 Through this statement, Levinas was able to underline that
in choosing to respond to the destitution of the Other, the I will be able to find resources for
himself/herself. These resources that the I will be able to find would benefit both
himself/herself and the Other as well.
Levinas also related the relationship of the Other and the I to monotheism when he
said, “Monotheism signifies this human kinship, this idea of a human race that refers back
to the approach of the Other in the face, in a dimension of height, in responsibility for oneself
and for the Other. 6 Here we can find the role of monotheism as a force that emphasizes
fraternity or human kinship. In the setting of fraternity or human kinship, the I can indeed
realize the responsibility for himself/herself as well as the responsibility for the Other.
The responsibility of the I to the Other is also connected to freedom: “This is why the
relation with the Other, discourse, is not only the putting in question of my freedom, the
appeal coming from the other to call me to responsibility…”7 If the I and the Other begins
to relate with each other, specifically when the former responds to the call or the appeal of
the latter to be responsible, then the freedom of the I will be put to question.
After putting the freedom of the I in question, Levinas expounds by saying, “The
being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so precisely by appealing to me with its
destitution and nudity—its hunger—without my being able to be deaf to that appeal. Thus
in expression the being that imposes itself does not limit but promotes my freedom, by
arousing my goodness”.8 In this sense, the Other expresses and imposes itself by its appeal
using its destitution, nudity and hunger (as poor, stranger, widow and orphan) for the I to
be able to respond without deafness but full attention. Hence, the Other promotes the
freedom of the I by arousing the latter’s goodness. The I and the Other are now ready to be
a we and this idea will be further expounded through the next part of this paper.

IV. THE “WE” AND THE THIRD PARTY

5 Ibid., 215.

6 Ibid., 214.

7 Ibid., 213.

8 Ibid., 200.
 Let us now look at how Levinas tried to clear out the meaning of “we” as well as the
third party: “To be we is not to "jostle" one another or get together around a common task.
The presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, a presence of the third
party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks at us)…”.9 First, Levinas tried to point
out what “to be we” is not. Two or more persons trying to do a common task and trying to
jostle or to push one another does not instantly constitute a “we”. Instead “to be we” must
first include the I and the destitute face/infinity of the Other. Second, “to be we” must also
include the presence of the whole humanity that looks at the I and the Other. The whole
humanity can be then considered as the third party. The I, the Other and the third party will
then constitute the “we”.
To furthermore emphasize the relationship of the Other and the third party, Levinas
points out that: “The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal. His equality within
this essential poverty consists in referring to the third party, thus present at the encounter,
whom in the midst of his destitution the Other already serves”.10 The Other, as the poor and
the stranger does not present itself beyond or below but an equal. The Other (even though it
experiences destituteness and poverty) still serves the third party or the whole of humanity
who is present in the encounter of the I and the Other. Now that the “we” is established, we
can now look at how Levinas looks at fraternity.

V. FRATERNITY
Levinas’ idea of the human race and fraternity is artistically pointed out when he
said, “It is stated as a kinship of men. That all men are brothers is not explained by their
resemblance, nor by a common cause of which they would be the effect, like medals which
refer to the same die that struck them. The very status of the human implies fraternity and
the idea of the human race”.11 It is often understated that fraternity can refer to the kinship
(being relatives by blood or having a common nationality) of men (and women). On the
other hand, Levinas tried to step further by stating that all men (and women) are brothers

9 Ibid., 213.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 214.
(and sisters) not only because of a commonality that’s present or relative in us (kinship by
blood, by gender, by nationality, by physical appearance, by skin color and other
similarities). Instead, he cemented the idea that being a human is already an implication that
everyone is in fraternity with one another. This further emphasizes the real idea of what
human race really is.
Society and fraternity also holds a great place in the philosophical ruminations of
Levinas: “Fraternity is radically opposed to the conception of a humanity united by
resemblance, a multiplicity of diverse families… and which, across the struggle of egoisms,
results in a human city. Society must be a fraternal community to be commensurate with the
straightforwardness, the primary proximity, in which the face presents itself to my
welcome”.12 The deeper meaning of fraternity was exposed in the statement above.
Fraternity is not merely constitutive of the resemblance another human being has with the
other or that a person belongs to a family wherein the kinship can be traced as connected.
The physical similarities or familial ties that human beings possess cannot constitute
fraternity because they are the same reason why we fight each other. Those who are not
similar to us physically or those who do not belong to the same family we have are
considered outsider. These differences build up our ego which continues in struggling to
fight the egoism of others as well. Human cities are really built not to form a fraternity but
a division. Levinas therefore suggests that a society must be more than a normal setup but a
fraternal community that is straightforward and near to one another. This nearness or
proximity that the community has is important so that the face can present and express itself.
Upon experiencing the presentation and the expression of the self, the I can then welcome
the face of the Other and continue to build a harmonious community built in the foundations
of fraternity.

VI. CONCLUSION
Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophical exploration of the face of the Other as expressed by the
poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan is very inspiring and challenging specially for a
seminarian like me. Being able to be given this opportunity to divulge on the richness of Levinas’

12 Ibid.
ideas made me realize the importance of the role of the Other as the one giving me the chance
exercise my responsibility and freedom to be able to respond and be of service to those who are
really in need. It is now hard for me to unsee and unhear the voices and cries of the Other by
continuing to pretend to be blind or deaf. It is really an eye-opening endeavor to look at the
importance of the Other to be able to find out the real essence of the I. I found out that it is not
enough for me to just be an egoistic I but must also extend myself in helping the Other for me to
discover the real meaning of what “to be we” is all about. I must not also only confine myself to
my relationship with the Other but must embrace the presence of the third party, or the whole of
humanity to be able to experience fraternity. I’m a Filipino seminarian but this must not limit my
understanding of humanity because in truth, I’m a part of the human race that continues to struggle
in finding out what it must prioritize as its endeavor.
Reading a part of Emmanuel Levinas’ “Totality and Infinity” brought me headache,
but more than that, it also brought me hope and inspiration to further discover the I inside
of me through the presence of the Other. My aspiration of being a future SVD missionary
priest will be of naught if I will not be able to find the Infinity through the Other. I continue
to hope and pray that God will help me for me to help the Other and to finally be able to
understand what the true essence of charity and fraternity.