Decline of Muslims in Science and

Technology
The contributions of Islamic scientists and technologists in the varied fields of knowledge were
fascinating and are discussed in the various histories of science [1]. These contributions, using mainly
the medium of Arabic, were made by a wide variety of individuals — Muslim and non-Muslim — living in
a multinational and multiracial society.

The introduction of efficient and extensive means of transportation facilitated the expansion of trade
and the movement of people and ideas. These advances in transport and trade gave force to the
universal precepts of Islam by facilitating the transfer of knowledge within the Islamic world; and also to
the widely different cultures of India, China and Europe.

The locus of scientific creativity in the Muslim world was not fixed. Centre of considerable scientific
activity flourished at different times and were generally closely associated with the seat of power.
During the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, the capitals of the Islamic world attracted scholars and
scientists. In modern parlance, there was a brain drain to Damascus and Baghdad. Once the center of
power moved to Cairo, Spain, Persia (Mongolian period) and Istanbul, the flow of scientists followed
there.

During the first centuries of Islam, the rulers pursued policies which promoted rationality,
communications, trade and economic prosperity. These policies increased the demand for science and
technology. Almost every aspect of life — from agriculture to health and prayers — depended on some
scientific or technical activity.

The decline, which set in after a combination of internal and external circumstances and conditions,
caused a decrease in the demand for science and technology.

FACTORS BEHIND THE DECLINE OF ISLAMIC SCIENCE

AFTER THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY[1]

Science Thrives Only in Affluent Societies

The Thesis of Ibn-Khaldun

At the time when scientific communities in Europe were on the increase, all the regions of Islam were
witnessing the decline of science and of scientific communities. This phenomenon is discussed by Ibn-Khaldun
in more than one chapter in his Introduction (al-Muqaddimah)[3] He discusses the factors which are essential
to the flourishing of the sciences and the other professions, and the factors which lead to their decline. One
chapter carries the title: `That the Professions are Perfected and Become Plenty when the Demand for them
Increases.' [4] He says that if a profession is in great demand, people will try to learn it, whereas if there is no
demand for a profession it will be neglected and will disappear. `There is here another secret, and it is that the
professions and their perfection are demanded by the state, which is the greatest marketplace for the
professions', and the needs of the state are so great that the demands of private individuals are too small in
comparison, which means that when the state declines all professions decline as well. Another chapter carries
the title: `That Regions which Approach a Ruinous State will Become Devoid of the Professions.' [5] When a
region becomes weakened, loses its affluence, and its population decreases, the professions will diminish,
because they can no longer be afforded, until they finally disappear. He devotes a special chapter to the
sciences under the title: `That the Sciences Increase with the Increase in Prosperity and with the Greatness of
Civilization in a Region.' [6] But when the prosperity of these cities and their civilization decreased and when
their population was dispersed, that carpet, with all that was on it, was completely folded and science and
learning were lost in them and moved to other regions of Islam. He remarks that during his time (the second
half of the fourteenth century), the rational sciences in the Maghrib and in Al-Andalus were diminishing
because prosperity in these regions was at a low level, whereas in the Eastern regions of Islam, especially in
Persia and beyond to Transoxania, the rational sciences were the rational sciences were flourishing because of
the prosperity of these regions and the stability of their civilization.

The Wrong Diagnosis – I - The Theologians

From the nineteenth century, some writers have suggested that the decline of science in Islam was caused by
the negative attitude of Muslim theologians. Thus Sachau says, `The fourth century (Islamic calendar) is the
turning point in the history of the spirit of Islam. But for al-Ash`ari and al-Ghazali, the Arabs might have been a
nation of Galileo’s, Kepler’s, and Newton’s [7] Speaking about al-Ash`ari, E.G. Browne compared the
destructiveness of his influence to that of Genghis Khan and Hūlāgū. [8] A similar point of view is adopted by
George Sarton, who labels the views of al-Ash`ari and Al-Ghazali as scholasticism, which ‘were obstacles to the
progress of science in the Middle Ages.[9]. Sarton says that until the sixteenth century, developments in
science were taking place both in the East and the West, but after that time Western science began to grow at
an accelerated pace, while Eastern civilization remained at a standstill, or even deteriorated. He concludes
that the essential difference between East and West is that the latter overcame scholasticism, while the
former did not.

It is true that the divergence between Islam and the West in science continued to increase after the sixteenth
century, but the assumption that the opposition of theologians to science was the cause of this, cannot be
supported. The real causes are both political and economic, as was demonstrated by Ibn Haldon; the decrease
of interest in the rational sciences and the continued interest in the study of the religious sciences are
unrelated. The former was a symptom of the economic weakness of the Islamic states and of their decreasing
political power. Had there been a need for science and technology, as was the case during the Golden Age of
the Islamic Empire, the rational sciences would have continued to progress without interruption. In Islam,
there was no single religious authority that controlled the whole educational system, and this left the system
free and not dominated by orthodoxy. The rise of scientists and the flourishing of the rational sciences in the
Golden Age reflected the prosperity of the empire and its strength, and the large number of mathematicians,
astronomers, physicians, engineers and other kinds of scientists was in response to the needs of society and of
the empire in that period. It conformed to the law of supply and demand.

It is not our purpose here to defend the theologians. It should be pointed out, however, that the debate which
took place between them and the philosophers was not over the rational sciences. From the beginning, the
study of mathematics, astronomy, medicine, alchemy and the other sciences was greatly encouraged, and it
was mostly undertaken by scholars who were non-philosophers and non-theologians themselves. The Golden
Age of science took place at the same time as the debate between theologians and philosophers was taking
place. The study of the rational sciences was not affected by such a debate, since the pursuit of these sciences
was independent from both the theological and the philosophical studies. To illustrate our statement, let us
take the reins of al-Mammon and of al-Mutawakkil. Al-Ma'mun (813-833) was a staunch supporter of the
Mu`tazilites and the rational sciences flourished during his reign. Contrary to him, al-Mutawakkil (847-861)
was, according to one orientalist, [10] `of the strictest orthodoxy and fanatical in his orthodoxy...'. During his
time `the forces of orthodoxy began to gather momentum', and the orthodox theologians , whose front was
led shortly later by al-Ash`arī,put up an organized front against the Muctazilites But, with his `orthodoxy and
fanaticism',, al-Mutawakkil like al-Ma'mun `was a patron of science and scholarship and reopened the Dar al-
Hickam, granting it fresh endowments. The best work of translation was done during his reign... He was a
generous patron of scientific research... The best work of Dar al-Hikma was done under him, for by that time
experience told, and Hunayn was surrounded by well-trained pupils.'

The Wrong Diagnosis – II -The Madrasa System

In a similar line of thinking, the decline of the rational sciences in Islam is attributed by some writers to the
fact that the madrasa system which flourished after the founding of the Nizāmiyya Madrasa in Baghdad by
Nizām al-Mulk. in 459/1067 favoured the study of theology and law.[11] But the study of the rational sciences
in Islam was always undertaken independently, and the theological studies were not usually undertaken under
the same teachers or at the same institutions. Astronomy and mathematics were pursued mostly in the
observatories, within a community of mathematicians and astronomers, where a specialized library was
available and observational instruments were in constant use. The medical sciences were studied, as they
should be, in the medical school of a bīmāristān (hospital). The other sciences were studied under individual
renowned scientists, most often patronized by the rulers, to whom students travelled from the far realms of
Islam. The existence of these individual renowned teachers constituted what may be called a college of
professors within a certain large city or a region. Let us not forget also the libraries and the academies, like Dār
al-Hikma in Baghdad, which were devoted to research and to the study of the rational sciences. Most of the
madrasas, on the other hand, were established by persons in power or by pious and wealthy individuals who
endowed a part of their wealth to a waqf which supported the school. The purpose was always religious, and
the studies were naturally mainly those of law and theology. It can be said therefore that the madrasa was
mainly a college of theology and law, and it was, according to recent studies, the forerunner of the college
system in Western universities.[12] But the universities which appeared in the West and which comprised
several colleges for theology, law, arts and sciences, and medicine, did not develop in Islam in the same
period. This is due to the fact that the madrasas which were supported by the waqf system, and with them the
study of law and theology, continued to exist without interruption, whereas the centres for the study of the
rational sciences, which were dependent on the strength and the prosperity of the state, deteriorated and
ceased to exist with the decline of the Islamic states, and for this reason scientific knowledge did not keep in
line with the quick advances of science in Europe after the Scientific Revolution. In the period preceding this
revolution it was possible to speak about the achievements of Muslim scientists and compare them to those of
medieval Europe. Advances in both areas were parallel and there was not a significant difference between
them. But after the new discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton and the fall of the old systems of
knowledge, the university in the West became the centre of the new scientific activities. For the Scientific
Revolution which took place in Europe to have happened in Islam at the same time, there would have to have
been in existence at that time in history an efficient system of communications between members of the
scientific communities in both cultural areas. But such a system did not exist; there were no Islamic
universities which comprised all branches of knowledge, and the Islamic scientific community was almost non-
existent. It was only in modern times that universities on the model of the European ones started to appear in
the Islamic countries. Some of the older universities, such as al-Azhar, which followed the madrasa system and
were devoted to the study of Islamic law and theology, have only recently introduced science, engineering and
medicine into their curricula.

Factors behind the Decline of Muslim Power and Prosperity

The Nature of the Land

Most of the core Islamic countries, or the lands of the Islamic Middle East, are composed of arid or semi-
arid lands with some scattered inhabited lands and large uncultivated or desert areas.[13] Taking the
lands of the early Islamic empire, excluding Spain, the inhabited area did not exceed one quarter of the
total, the rest being barren or desert lands. Even the inhabited areas are mostly dependent on irrigation
for their cultivation, since the rainfall in most of the areas is not sufficient to support agriculture. This
ecology of the Middle East meant that its most productive agriculture was confined mainly to the basins
of the great rivers of the Nile, the Euphrates and the Tigris. But the harnessing or utilization of the
waters of these rivers could not be attempted by individuals, and this job had been undertaken since the
days of the ancient civilizations of Egypt and Babylonia by the strong central governments. Also in the
first centuries of the Islamic empire, during the Umayyads and the Abbasids, the caliphs and the
governors of the provinces gave great attention to the construction and the maintenance of the
irrigation systems. And it is well known that an agricultural revolution took place in the first centuries of
the Islamic empire. When the central government was weakened or disappeared, the irrigation works
were neglected, and when, in addition, these works were destroyed by the Mongol invasions, as had
happened in Iraq in the thirteenth century, agricultural lands became arid or turned into marshes and
the whole econom The Nomads
Another result of the ecology of the Middle East is that the semi-arid nature of the region, and the
decline and the destruction of its irrigation systems, resulted in a phenomenon which is also peculiar to
it. There existed throughout the history of the civilizations of the area, nomadic tribes who utilized the
peripheral lands as pastures for animal breeding. The nomadic tribes always affected the stability of the
central government and the economy of the region. When the central government was strong and the
economy was prosperous, the nomads were usually kept under control. Whenever the central
government was weakened, the nomadic tribes would prevail and influence or dominate the various
individual governments in the region causing further disorder and anarchy. With the destruction of the
irrigation works and the transformation of irrigated lands into pastures or marshes, the nomads
increased the areas under their immediate control, and thus the decline of civilization was further
accelerated. This process of the conversion of irrigated lands into arid or marsh lands and the
encroachment of nomads into previously settled areas led also to the depopulation of Iraq and Syria
from the thirteenth century until the modern era.

Natural Disasters

Another important phenomenon in the social and economic history of Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the
Middle Ages was the drastic depopulation caused by natural disasters.[14] In 968, the low level of the
Nile caused a terrible famine which resulted in the death of about 600,000 people. Similar famines
followed. One terrible famine, which was caused also by a low level of the Nile, lasted seven years
between 1066 and 1072. Peasants deserted their villages and agricultural production was diminished
severely. These famines heralded the beginning of a series of natural disasters which resulted in the
depopulation of Egypt. In 1201 and 1202 a terrible famine was followed by plague and large numbers of
people died. In many villages only empty houses remained; and in some quarters in Cairo all the
inhabitants died. This was one of the major demographic disasters which befell Egypt in the Middle
Ages.

However, the greatest catastrophe in the Middle Ages was the plague of 1347, 1348 and 1349, which
was known in Europe as the Black Death and which swept across the Islamic world and Europe.
Thousands died every day, and the population of Egypt, Syria and Iraq was diminished by one third. The
Black Death was followed by a series of plagues which continued into the nineteenth century. It was
estimated that between 1363 and 1515 alone, sixteen epidemics occurred in Egypt and fifteen in Syria.

These recurring famines and plagues were instrumental in diminishing agricultural production. Death
wiped out a large proportion of peasants and domestic animals. Industry collapsed with the deaths of
great numbers of skilled workers. This also had adverse effects on the administration and the
government. The Mamelukes no longer had sufficient resources to maintain their military organization.
This led to instability, corruption and oppression which helped further to accelerate the economic
decay.

The Geographical Location and the Geography of the Region

The geographical factor made Iraq, Syria and Egypt the targets of continuous external attacks,
aggression or intervention from the First Crusade in AD 1006 until modern times. Geographical location
gave a prime strategic asset to some countries such as Japan and the British Isles, since their insular
location offered protection from overland invasion. The geography of Europe and its location in the west
protected it also from similar invasions. Europe's landscape was much more fractured, with mountain
ranges and large forests separating the scattered population centres in the valleys, and its climate varied
considerably. This had minimized the possibility that the continent could be overrun by an external force
like the Mongol hordes.[15] In contrast, Iraq, Syria and Egypt were central between East and West and
their flat geography made them vulnerable to external invasions from both sides.

The Crusades

Between 1096 and their final defeat in 1291 no fewer than seven Crusades were mounted against the
Arab lands; one Crusade was mounted against Constantinople. The first three (1096, 1147, 1189)
focused on Syria, including Palestine. The Fourth Crusade (1204) pillaged Constantinople, while the Fifth,
Sixth and Seventh Crusades (1218, 1244, 1250) were directed against Egypt. The last one (1270) was
directed against Tunisia.

Palestine, especially Jerusalem, was considered holy for the three religions of Judaism, Christianity and
Islam. The declared object of the Crusades was to occupy the Holy Land, especially Jerusalem, and to
replace the native Muslim population by a Latin one. During the conquest, the Muslim population of the
captured Syrian towns was annihilated by mass slaughter, and was replaced by the members of the
invading armies and those who accompanied them, such as adventurers, merchants and pilgrims.

There were also other motives behind these wars. Around AD 1000, the population of Europe was
growing, whereas that of the Islamic world was on the decline. The population of Europe was estimated
at 38.5 million while that of the Islamic lands did not exceed 12.5. Some historians are of the opinion
that `the Crusades were essentially an early experiment in expansionist imperialism, motivated by
material considerations with religion as a psychological catalyst.' [16]

The period of the Crusades was one of growth on all fronts in Western Europe. There was a growth in
population and in production. The growth in profits led to the accumulation of capital and this
stimulated all who engaged in trade, notably the members of the Italian commercial and banking
houses.[17] The Crusades offered huge opportunities for the expansion of the great maritime cities of
northern Italy — Venice, Pisa and Genoa. The conquest, and the concessions given to these cities,
allowed the establishment of Italian colonies in the towns of the Syrian coast.[18] These colonies
flourished under the Crusaders' rule, and they survived under the Muslim re-conquest and developed a
considerable trade both for export and import. They were instrumental in the transfer of the
manufacturing technologies of some Near Eastern industries and the establishment of these industries
in Italy. There came a time when the process was reversed and the Italian products of these industries
started to be exported to the Near East. This was probably the chief permanent effect of the Crusades in
the Near East.[19]

The efforts to confront and oust the Crusaders, which lasted for two centuries, sapped the local
economies and weakened the Arab urban centres. This enormous task required formidable military
strength which could not be provided by Syria alone, with its limited human and economic resources. It
was only through the unity of Syria and Egypt under the Ayyubids and the, Mamelukes, and through the
military system that was adopted, that the Crusaders were finally defeated and expelled.

The Mongols

In the middle of the thirteenth century, and while the core Islamic lands were still busy with the
expulsion of the Crusaders, another terrible invasion came from the East. Genghis Khan united the
nomadic tribes of Mongolia and launched a devastating assault against the Eastern Islamic lands. By
1220/1221 Samarkand, Bukhara and Khwārizm fell into their hands and were cruelly devastated. In
1221, they crossed the Oxus River and entered Persia. Genghis Khan died in 1227. In the middle of the
century, a new plan to conquer all the lands of Islam as far as Egypt was entrusted to Hūlāgū, who
marched with an army numbering 200,000 men according some Arabic sources. [20] In February 1258
Baghdad fell into their hands. The Abbasid caliph al-Musta`sim was killed and the caliphate was
abolished. This marked the end of a remarkable era in Islamic civilization.

The most disastrous effect of the Mongol invasion was depopulation. The capture of Baghdad and
several towns was followed by horrible massacres. The number of inhabitants who were slaughtered in
Baghdad after its conquest according to Arabic sources ranged between 800,000 and 2 million; non-
Arabic sources give lower figures, but it probably exceeded 100,000. [21] There were massacres in every
other city. It is beyond doubt that the conquest of Iraq by the Mongols was a demographic catastrophe.
Many towns remained desolate, and there was carnage in the countryside too. According to Rashid al-
Din, most of the towns on both sides of the Euphrates were devastated and destroyed.[22]

Under the Ilkhanids, there was a general and progressive decline of Iraq's population [23] The decrease
of the population of Iraq and the consequences of the Mongol conquest were so catastrophic that Hamd
Allah al-Qazwini observed that `there can be no doubt that even if for 1,000 years to come no evil befall
the country, yet it will not be possible completely to repair the damage and bring back the land to the
state in which it was formerly.[24] Modern research has revealed that the population of the province of
Diyala, including Baghdad, had declined from 870,000 in AD 800 to 60,000 after 1258.

Immediately after the fall of Baghdad, the Mongols continued their march and overtook Syria and
according to their plan, they were heading towards Egypt which was threatened also with annihilation
and destruction. The Mamelukes realized the immensity of this danger, and they stood up to the
challenge. In the battle of `Ayn Jālut in Palestine, in 1259, the Mongols were defeated decisively, and
their tide was checked. The Mamelukes gradually wrested all of Syria from Hulāgu and his successors.
The last encounter in this era between the Mongols and the Mamelukes took place in 1304 when
Ghazan,

who was already converted to Islam, was defeated. The final expulsion of both the Crusaders and the
Mongols from Syria was achieved at the same time.

Timur (Tamerlane, ruled 1370-1405) followed in the footsteps of Genghis Khan in ruthlessness, and in
conducting worldwide conquests. Although he was a Muslim and claimed that his campaigns were made
in the name of Islam, yet they inflicted all the horrors of barbarian devastation on the Islamic world. In
1400-1401 he invaded Iraq and Syria and sacked and pillaged Baghdad, Aleppo and Damascus. His spoils
from Damascus included the learned men and the artisans whom he took back with him to his capital in
Central Asia. This was a further blow to the civilization of the region

The Capitulations

The core Islamic lands did not encounter a frontal military assault from the West similar to that of the
Crusades until the nineteenth century. But during the intervening period, they were penetrated and
invaded economically in an indirect and a more insidious and damaging manner. Even when the Muslims
were victorious following the expulsion of the Crusaders, the Italian maritime cities which established
their presence during the Crusaders occupation of the Syrian coast continued their presence and
activities in Egypt and Syria under the Mamelukes, with damaging economic effects for both Egypt and
Syria. The Ottoman sultans adopted even more harmful policies. Immediately after the capture of
Constantinople in 1453, the Genoese in that city were given trading privileges. These privileges and
immunities, which were given to foreign non-Muslim trading communities living in Muslim cities, came
to be known as the Capitulations. The word means submission, surrender and subordination, which is
contrary to sovereignty and independence. The Ottoman sultans thought that these concessions to
foreigners would benefit the empire's economy. In 1535, the French secured commercial concessions in
the empire, in addition to other important privileges. The English Levant Company acquired comparable
privileges in 1580.[25] In Persia, Shah Abbas I, who was a powerful ruler, acted in a similar manner. He
granted the English East India Company similar commercial concessions. These concessions granted by
Muslim rulers gave Europeans the opportunity to gain control over a large share of the economic life of
Islam.
With the declining power of the Ottoman Empire, the Capitulations were confirmed and extended to
give foreign powers non-commercial concessions as well, such as the right of foreigners to have their
own consular courts, and the right to guard Christian holy places. In the Levant, France was granted the
right to protect all native Latin Catholics. Russia and Britain claimed similar protective rights over other
sectors of the native population.

The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of European imperialism led by Britain. Although British
goods were invading the Ottoman Empire, yet Britain exerted powerful pressure on the Ottoman Empire
and forced it to abolish the system of state monopolies. In 1838, an Anglo-Turkish treaty was signed
giving Britain and the European powers the right to trade in the empire in return for a duty of 3 per cent
only.[26] This treaty, known as the Commercial Code, deprived the Ottoman government of its revenue
from state monopolies. It opened the door for the foreign economic domination of the empire. Cheaper
European goods invaded the markets, and the local industries were virtually destroyed. The Ottoman
economy declined into that of a satellite in its relationship with Europe, supplying it with raw materials
which were Manufactured in Europe and then sold back in the empire.[27]

The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire

Coping with Overextension, Sustained Crusade and the Cultural Barrier

When the Ottomans were on the rise, they were always keen to encourage economic activities in the
new areas which were added to their empire. In the new cities, all the trades and crafts were
established as an important support for the military effort.[28] During the sixteenth century, the
Ottomans were the superior military power. Their artillery and armaments were unchallenged.[29] The
Ottoman and Islamic civilization in general developed unaided until it reached the point where it could
not develop any longer without a great new advance or a revolution in science and technology. The
Ottomans were a great power as long as their gunpowder technology was superior. Gunpowder
technology was developed by the Islamic civilization from the thirteenth century until the end of the
sixteenth, Nothing of significance in this technology was borrowed from the West. We can even safely
say that, in general, Islamic technology in the sixteenth century represented the best that was known in
that age. This is illustrated in the mechanical engineering books of Taqi- al- Din, who flourished at the
end of the sixteenth century in Istanbul, and who established also the advanced Istanbul observatory
which was the last one in Islam. In that same age, an English traveller in Syria was studying why people
in England were under the impression that the Turks were superior to people in the West.[30]

The Ottomans lost their advantage in military technology after the sixteenth century, and their economy
and their science and technology did not advance beyond medieval standards. In Europe, things began
to change dramatically. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the emergence of a European
economy on a large scale. The geographical discoveries brought to Europe great riches from the New
World and from the newly discovered trade routes with India and the Far East. Other internal factors
were behind the economic progress of local trade and industry. The fertility of the land in Europe and
the growth of population were among the factors behind this economic growth.

By about the middle of the nineteenth century, the population of the Ottoman Empire was barely 17
million.[31] This included more than 5 million in the European part which was more of a liability, 6
million in Anatolia and Istanbul, 2-3 million in Egypt, about 1 million in each of Syria and Iraq, and 2-3
million in North Africa. The population of Western Europe in this same period was about 190 million
which is more than 11 times the population of the Ottoman Empire.[32] And with Russia and Eastern
Europe the total was 274 million or more than 16 times the size of the Ottoman Empire. Each of the
following West European countries was larger than the Ottoman Empire in population: Great Britain
(28.9 million), France (36.5), Spain and Portugal (19.7), Italy (23.9), Germany (31.7), and Austro-Hungary
(31.3).

In face of this growing prosperity and power of Europe, the Ottoman Empire was to falter, and to turn
inward. The Ottoman army, however well administered, became increasingly unable to maintain the
lengthy frontiers without enormous cost in men and money; and the Ottoman Empire, unlike that of the
Spanish, Dutch, and the British later, did not bring much in the way of economic benefit. By the second
half of the sixteenth century, the empire was showing signs of strategic over-extension,[33] with a large
army stationed in central Europe, an expensive navy operation in the Mediterranean, troops engaged
against Persia, in North Africa, the Aegean, Cyprus, and the Red Sea, and reinforcements needed to hold
the Crimea against a rising Russian power.

An important element in the decline was the cultural barrier which existed between Christian Europe
and the Ottomans and which isolated the empire from the revolutions which took place in science and
technology. This resulted also in a hostile relationship with Europe, which was considered as a
continuation of the Crusades and which sapped the energy of the empire.

The gap between the levels of development continued to increase, and when the Ottomans realized in
the nineteenth century the need to modernize, it was not as much the forces of reaction which delayed
the reforms, but the obstacles which were created by the Western powers.

The Future of Islamic Science

After the Second World War, most Islamic lands became independent once again, but the scars of
long colonial rule remained. These are evident in the further fragmentation of Islamic and Arabic
countries into smaller states, in the injustice and oppression inflicted against the Palestinians, in the
destructive invasion of Iraq, in the renewed activities to strengthen the cultural barrier between the
West and Islam and to distort the image of Islam, in the current sectarian and ethnic feuds and
devastating civil wars within some countries. in the economic and political dominance of foreign powers,
and in the cultural domination exemplified in the use of foreign rather than national languages in higher
education.

But despite all the adversities and obstacles facing the Islamic lands, the future holds hope and promise.
These lands have been the cradle of some of the richest civilizations ever known. Science appeared in
the Nile Valley, Syria and Mesopotamia. It continued uninterrupted over thousands of years, reaching its
peak during the Islamic period. It flowed on incessantly, and the wide gap of today started only since the
Industrial Revolution, less than 200 years ago. Thus there is a solid substratum to the civilization of the
Muslim world, which has indigenous and inherent cultural traditions and customs, deeply rooted in the
peoples of the area. In addition, there are the crafts and industrial skills inherited over thousands of
years. These inherited skills proved their importance in the wake of independence and after the Second
World War, when some Islamic countries started to industrialize and thousands of workshops and
industrial plants were established in all Muslim cities. Craftsmen in even the smallest machine shops
were able to manufacture the most delicate modern machinery, in no way inferior to imported or
imitated versions.

In approaching modern science and technology, we must remind ourselves of those lessons of history
that help us to look to the future. For history shows that there is nothing in the content of any part of
science, or indeed of technologies high or low, that cannot be nurtured and developed by any people of
any type of culture. Almost no society or set of cultural conditions is hostile: on the contrary, almost all
the great groups of mankind have throughout the ages made significant contributions to the common
heritage of knowledge and techniques. Among the foremost of them are the peoples of Islam.

Once we realize that the content of science and technology finds no cultural barriers, we arrive at
another lesson of history. It has been established that in the past, as now, science and scientists flourish
in large communities and linguistic groups rather than small, in affluent areas better than in poor.
During historic times, science has indeed flourished only when an empire or a nation became mighty
and rich, because it depends on the infrastructure provided by the existence of affluence. This is amply
demonstrated throughout Islamic history.

The Islamic world is rich in human resources, and some areas are rich in petroleum and other natural
resources. This is fortunate because the future of science in Islamic countries depends upon the
successful utilization of a combination of these two ingredients. Development in all fields within a
community depends significantly on the scientific size, which is itself proportional to the size of the
population and the gross national product.

Individually, most of the oil-rich countries are small in size. Each cannot by itself create an effective
science and technology, or an independent industrial economy. Similarly, those Muslim countries which
are endowed with human resources lack the capital essential for the development of science and
technology and, indeed, for their general development.

Though most individual Islamic states now realize the importance of science and technology for their
future development, and though some have achieved considerable success along this road, future
progress in all Muslim countries, rich or poor, depends on the extent of economic co-operation and
integration among them on a regional basis.

Bibliography

[1] This paper is a revised version of the Epilogue to Science and Technology in Islam, Part II, UNESCO, 2001, edited
by Ahmad Y. al-Hassan, with Maqbul Ahmad and Albert Zaki Iskandar as co-editors. A first version was published in
Islam and the Challenge of Modernity, edited by Sharifa Shifa Al-Attas, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, pp. 351-389. Related
papers by the author on this general theme are the following: ‘Science and the Islamic World ” in Sience and the
Factors of Inequality, edited by Charles Moraze, UNESCO, 1979, pp. 214-225; ‘Science and Technology in Islam’ in
Cultures, vol. VII, No. 4, UNESCO, 1980, pp. 89-89; “Some Obstacles Hindering the Advance of Science and
Technology in the Arab Countries,’ in The Islamic World and Japan, Tokyo, 1981; “L’Islam et la science”, La
Recherche, Paris, 1982, and in the Epilogue to Islamic Technology, an illustrated history, by Ahmad Y. al-Hassan
and Donald Hill, UNESCO and CUP, 1986.

[2] Notably in Science and Technology in Islam,. Parts I and II, being Volume IV of The Different Aspects of Islamic
Culture, edited by Ahmad Y. al-Hassan and Maqbul Ahmad and Albert Zaki Iskander as co-editors, UNESCO, 2001.

[3] Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, fifth offset reproduction, Beirut, 1984

(Arabic edition).

[4] Ibn Khaldūn, ibid., p. 403.

[5] Ibn Khaldun, ibid., p. 403.

[6] Ibn Khaldūn, ibid., p. 434.

[7] Sayili, The Observatory..., op. cit., p.408.

[8] E. G. Browne, Literary History of Persia, 1, 1908, New York, Krieger, 1975, I, p. 626.

[9] G. Sarton, Introduction..., op. cit., I, pp. 28-29.

[10] De Lacy O'Leary, How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 168-169.

[11] Sayili, The Observatory..., op. cit., pp.414-415.

[12] George Makdisi,`On the Origin and Development of the College', in Islam and the West, Articles in Islam and
the Medieval West, ed. by Khalil I. Semaan, New York, 1980, pp. 26-49.

[13] Nikki R. Keddie, `Socioeconomic Change in the Middle East since 1800: A Comparative Analysis', Chapter 24 in
The Islamic Middle East, ed. by A. L. Udovitch, Princeton, The Darwin Press, 1981, p.762.

[14] E. Ashtor, A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages, London, 1976.
[15] Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Fontana Press, London, 1988, p, 21.

[16] Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, London, 1977, p. 150.

[17] Jacques Bernard, `Trade and Finance in the Middle Ages 900-1500', article 7 in The Fontana Economic History
of Europe — The Middle Ages, edited by Carlo Cipolla, Collins/Fontana, London, 1977, pp. 274-275.

[18] Jacques Bernard, ibid., p.292.

[19] Bernard Lewis, The Arabs..., op. cit., p. 153.

[20] Ibn Kathir, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya, Beirut, 1982, Arabic edition, XIII, p.200.

[21] Abd al-`Aziz al-Duri, 'Baghdad', in Encyclopaedia of Islam, I, p.902.

[22] The recent invasion of Iraq and its destruction is reminiscent of the Mongol invasion of the 13th century, but
with more disastrous results

[23] Ashtor, A Social and Economic History..., op. dt., p.253.

[24] Al-Qazwīnī, Hamd Allah. The geographical part of Nuzhat al Qnlub, composed

in AD 1340, was published in two volumes: 1. Text ed. by Guy le Strange. 2. English translation by le Strange,
Leiden, Brill, 1915, p.34.

[25] William McNeil, The Rise of the West, Chicago, 1963, p.614.

[26] P. Mansfield, A Histoy of the Middle East, London, Viking, 1991, p. 57.

[27] B.S. Turner,Weber and Islam, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 133.

[28] Halil Inalcik, `The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy', in Studies in the Economic
History of the Middle East, ed. by M. A. Cook, Oxford, 1970, pp. 207-218.

[29] John Francis Guilmartin Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys, Cambridge, 1974, p. 255.

[30] Henry Maundrell, A Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem, Beirut, Khayat, 1963, p.196.

[31] Charles Issawi, `The Area and Population of the Arab Empire', in The Islamic Middle East, ed. A. L. Udovitch,
op. dt., pp. 389-390.

[32] Elias Tuma, European Economic History, Palo Alto, 1971, p.202.

[33] Paul Kennedy, The Rise..., op. dt., p. 13