MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. Rodelio Alberto and Enrico Alberto Reyes, Respondents

6/3/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 664
G.R. No. 194320. February 1, 2012.*
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs.

RODELIO ALBERTO and ENRICO ALBERTO REYES,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; A witness

may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned from
others either because said witness was told or read or heard those
matters.—Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only
to those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness’ own
perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters
which he or she merely learned from others either because said
witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the
truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the
hearsay rule.
Same; Same; Same; Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony
or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence
applies to written, as well as oral statements.—As discussed in
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, 357 SCRA 249 (2001), “Hearsay is not
limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral
statements.” There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule
under the Rules of Court, among which are entries in official
records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides: Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
792
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malaya Insurance Co., vs. Alberto
stated. In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, 606 SCRA 444 (2009), this

Court reiterated the requisites for the admissibility in evidence,
as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records,
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016b1d79d1bf3cc3a7d1003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by
the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must
have been acquired by the public officer or other person
personally or through official information.
Same; Same; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Requisites for the Application
of the Res Ipsa Loquitur.—In the case at bar, aside from the
statement in the police report, none of the parties disputes the
fact that the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi
Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it.
Respondents, however, point to the reckless driving of the Nissan
Bus driver as the proximate cause of the collision, which
allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence on record. And
assuming that this allegation is, indeed, true, it is astonishing
that respondents never even bothered to file a crossclaim against
the owner or driver of the Nissan Bus. What is at once evident
from the instant case, however, is the presence of all the
requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. To
reiterate, res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies
where evidence is absent or not readily available. As explained in
D.M. Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that the
defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. As mentioned above, the
requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the
following: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.
Civil Law; Subrogation; Words and Phrases; Subrogation is
the substitution of one person by another with reference to a lawful
claim or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights
of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or
securities.—As explained in Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. v. Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation, 601 SCRA
793
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 793
96 (2009): Subrogation is the substitution of one person by

another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is
substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt
or claim, including its remedies or securities. The principle covers
a situation wherein an insurer has paid a loss under an insurance
policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to the
insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by
the policy. It contemplates full substitution such that it places the
party subrogated in the shoes of the creditor, and he may use all
means that the creditor could employ to enforce payment. We
have held that payment by the insurer to the insured operates as
an equitable assignment to the insurer of all the remedies that
the insured may have against the third party whose negligence or
wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not
dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of contract. It
accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the
insurance claim. The doctrine of subrogation has its roots in
equity. It is designed to promote and to accomplish justice; and is
the mode that equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a
debt by one who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, ought to
pay.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Francisco J. Farolan for petitioner.
Rafael N. Cristobal for respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Ca se
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45, seeking to reverse and set aside the July 28, 2010
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its October 29,
2010 Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Malayan Insurance
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 1626. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara
Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan
Castillo and Franchito N. Diamante.
2 Id., at pp. 2930.
794

Co., Inc. (Malayan Insurance). The July 28, 2010 CA

Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated
February 2, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51 in

Manila.
The Fa cts
At around 5 o’clock in the morning of December 17,

1995, an accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and
Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving four (4) vehicles, to
wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit with
plate number NYS 381; (2) an Isuzu Tanker with plate
number PLR 684; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with plate
number PDL 297; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant with plate
number TLM 732.4
Based on the Police Report issued by the onthespot
investigator, Senior Police Officer 1 Alfredo M. Dungga
(SPO1 Dungga), the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the
Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side
shortly before the vehicular incident. All three (3) vehicles
were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when
the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear
portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of
the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two
vehicles were shoved forward and the front left portion of
the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion
of the Isuzu Tanker.5
Previously, particularly on December 15, 1994, Malayan
Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy No. PV02500220
in favor of First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation
(the assured), insuring the aforementioned Mitsubishi
Galant against third party liability, own damage and theft,
among others. Having insured the vehicle against such
risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint dated
October 18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the
assured amounting to PhP 700,000.6
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 6470. Penned by Presiding Judge Gregorio B. Clemeña, Jr.
4 Id., at p. 17.
5 Id., at pp. 1718
6 Id.
795
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 795

Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights

and interests of the assured by operation of law upon its
payment to the latter, Malayan Insurance sent several
demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto (Alberto)
and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the registered owner and
the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring

them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured. When
respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan
Insurance was constrained to file a complaint for damages
for gross negligence against respondents.7
In their Answer, respondents asserted that they cannot
be held liable for the vehicular accident, since its proximate
cause was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver.
They alleged that the speeding bus, coming from the
service road of EDSA, maneuvered its way towards the
middle lane without due regard to Reyes’ right of way.
When the Nissan Bus abruptly stopped, Reyes stepped
hard on the brakes but the braking action could not cope
with the inertia and failed to gain sufficient traction. As a
consequence, the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the
Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the
vehicle in front of it. The Nissan Bus, on the other hand,
sideswiped the Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing damage to the
latter in the amount of PhP 20,000. Respondents also
controverted the results of the Police Report, asserting that
it was based solely on the biased narration of the Nissan
Bus driver.8
After the termination of the pretrial proceedings, trial
ensued. Malayan Insurance presented the testimony of its
lone witness, a motor car claim adjuster, who attested that
he processed the insurance claim of the assured and
verified the documents submitted to him. Respondents, on
the other hand, failed to present any evidence.
In its Decision dated February 2, 2009, the trial court, in
Civil Case No. 9995885, ruled in favor of Malayan
Insurance and declared respondents liable for damages.
The dispositive portion reads:
_______________
7 Id., at p. 18.
8 Id., at pp. 1819.
796

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

against defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the following:
1. The amount of P700,000.00 with legal interest from the time of
the filing of the complaint;
2. Attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 and;
3. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.”9
Dissatisfied, respondents filed an appeal with the CA,

docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 93112. In its Decision dated
July 28, 2010, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision
of the trial court and ruled in favor of respondents,
disposing:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal

is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision dated 2 February
2009 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint dated 18
October 1999 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.”10
The CA held that the evidence on record has failed to

establish not only negligence on the part of respondents,
but also compliance with the other requisites and the
consequent right of Malayan Insurance to subrogation.11 It
noted that the police report, which has been made part of
the records of the trial court, was not properly identified by
the police officer who conducted the onthespot
investigation of the subject collision. It, thus, held that an
appellate court, as a reviewing body, cannot rightly
appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and
unidentified document, much less accord it evidentiary
value.12
Subsequently, Malayan Insurance filed its Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that a police report is a prima
facie evidence of the facts stated in it. And inasmuch as
they never questioned the presentation
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 6970.
10 Id., at p. 25.
11 Id., at p. 22.
12 Id., at p. 24.
797
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 797

of the report in evidence, respondents are deemed to have

waived their right to question its authenticity and due
execution.13
In its Resolution dated October 29, 2010, the CA denied
the motion for reconsideration. Hence, Malayan Insurance
filed the instant petition.
The Issues
In its Memorandum14 dated June 27, 2011, Malayan

Insurance raises the following issues for Our consideration:
I
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN REFUSING ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE POLICE REPORT SINCE THE POLICE
INVESTIGATOR WHO PREPARED THE SAME DID NOT
ACTUALLY TESTIFY IN COURT THEREON.
II
WHETHER THE SUBROGATION OF MALAYAN INSURANCE
IS IMPAIRED AND/OR DEFICIENT.
On the other hand, respondents submit the following

issues in its Memorandum15 dated July 7, 2011:
I
WHETHER THE CA IS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE OF MALAYAN INSURANCE TO
OVERCOME THE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED TO
ESTABLISH THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENTS.
II
WHETHER THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
MALAYAN INSURANCE ARE SUFFICIENT TO CLAIM FOR
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.
_______________
13 Id., at p. 88.
14 Id., at pp. 99107.
15 Id., at pp. 110115.
798

III
WHETHER THE SUBROGATION OF MALAYAN INSURANCE
HAS PASSED COMPLIANCE AND REQUISITES AS
PROVIDED UNDER PERTINENT LAWS.
Essentially, the issues boil down to the following: (1) the

admissibility of the police report; (2) the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a claim for gross negligence; and (3) the
validity of subrogation in the instant case.
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.

Admissibility of the Police Report
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the
presentation of the police investigator who prepared the
police report, said report is still admissible in evidence,
especially since respondents failed to make a timely
objection to its presentation in evidence.16 Respondents
counter that since the police report was never confirmed by
the investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as

part of the evidence on record.17
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify
only to those facts which the witness knows of his or her
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the
witness’ own perception.18 Concomitantly, a witness may
not testify on matters which he or she merely learned from
others either because said witness was told or read or
heard those matters.19 Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of
what the witness has learned. This is known as the
hearsay rule.20
_______________
16 Id., at p. 101.
17 Id., at p. 113.
18 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 36.
19 D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357
SCRA 249, 253254.
20 Id., at p. 254.
799
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 799

As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA,21 “Hearsay is

not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general
rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written,
as well as oral statements.”
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under
the Rules of Court, among which are entries in official
records.22 Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
“Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty

by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.”
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,23 this Court reiterated

the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an
exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records,
thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it
was made by the public officer in the performance of his or
her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him or her stated, which must have been acquired by
the public officer or other person personally or through
official information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is

admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the
police investigator who prepared it was not presented in
court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately
proved.24
Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the onthe
spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in the
performance of his duty. However, what is not clear is
whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge
of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third
requisite is lacking.
_______________
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 G.R. Nos. 162243, 164516 & 171875, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA
444, 525; citing Africa v. Caltex, 123 Phil. 272, 277; 16 SCRA 448, 452
(1966).
24 Id., at pp. 525526.
800

Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the

police report’s presentation in evidence; thus, they are
deemed to have waived their right to do so.25 As a result,
the police report is still admissible in evidence.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Malayan Insurance contends that since Reyes, the
driver of the Fuzo Cargo truck, bumped the rear of the
Mitsubishi Galant, he is presumed to be negligent unless
proved otherwise. It further contends that respondents
failed to present any evidence to overturn the presumption
of negligence.26 Contrarily, respondents claim that since
Malayan Insurance did not present any witness who shall
affirm any negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo
truck before and after the incident, there is no evidence
which would show negligence on the part of respondents.27
We agree with Malayan Insurance. Even if We consider
the inadmissibility of the police report in evidence, still,
respondents cannot evade liability by virtue of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. The D.M. Consunji, Inc. case is quite
elucidating:
“Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of

the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the
doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere
fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the
instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which

recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in
this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed,
and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will
not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that
it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
_______________
25 Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. COMFAC Corporation,
G.R. No. 163915, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 519, 524.
26 Rollo, p. 105.
27 Id., at p. 113.
801
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 801

means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or

in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks
for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury
may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality
which caused the injury complained of was under the
control or management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if those who
had its control or management used proper care, there is
sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s
want of care.
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e.,
that necessary evidence is absent or not available.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the
theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality
which causes the injury either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and
that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely
upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine
permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of
the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured

person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge
of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should
know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the
defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff
complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has
said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory
that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine
is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show
that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of
defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power.
Accordingly, some courts add to the three prerequisites for
the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further
requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply,
it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or
means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that
the party to be charged with neg
802

ligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for

explanation of the accident.
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are
present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down
from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he
was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting
to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive
control and management of appellant. It has a safety
engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman
and others who are in complete control of the situation
therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur
therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant
or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a
position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa
loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence
is absent or not readily available, provided the following
requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a
building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the
first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa

loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction
site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that
likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is
also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to
the appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite
is also present. All the requisites for the application of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x
x x.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for
the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since
it “proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which
befell respondent’s husband.”
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of
the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is
presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites
for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case of all the elements,
803
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 803

the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption

or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such
as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is
not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the
presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant
of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for
the application of the doctrine has been established.”28
In the case at bar, aside from the statement in the police

report, none of the parties disputes the fact that the Fuzo
Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant,
which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it.
Respondents, however, point to the reckless driving of the
Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the collision,
which allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence on
record. And assuming that this allegation is, indeed, true,
it is astonishing that respondents never even bothered to
file a crossclaim against the owner or driver of the Nissan
Bus.
What is at once evident from the instant case, however,
is the presence of all the requisites for the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur. To reiterate, res ipsa loquitur
is a rule of necessity which applies where evidence is
absent or not readily available. As explained in D.M.
Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that the

defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff
has no such knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to
allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the
proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish
negligence.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence; and (3) the
_______________
28 Supra note 19, at 257260; citations omitted.
804

injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary

action or contribution on the part of the person injured.29
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not
have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless
someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was
under the exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if
respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the
Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was selfserving
and totally unfounded. Finally, no contributory negligence
was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant.
Consequently, all the requisites for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a
reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of
respondents.
It is worth mentioning that just like any other
disputable presumptions or inferences, the presumption of
negligence may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence
to the contrary. It is unfortunate, however, that
respondents failed to present any evidence before the trial
court. Thus, the presumption of negligence remains.
Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for
Malayan Insurance’s adverted failure to prove negligence
on the part of respondents.
Va lidity of Subroga tion
Malayan Insurance contends that there was a valid
subrogation in the instant case, as evidenced by the claim
check voucher30 and the Release of Claim and Subrogation
Receipt31 presented by it before the trial court.
Respondents, however, claim that the documents presented

by Malayan Insurance do not indicate certain important
details that would show proper subrogation.
As noted by Malayan Insurance, respondents had all the
opportunity, but failed to object to the presentation of its
evidence. Thus, and as We have mentioned earlier,
respondents are deemed to have
_______________
29 Id., at p. 259.
30 Rollo, p. 106, Exhibit “D.”
31 Id., Exhibit “E.”
805
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 805

waived their right to make an objection. As this Court held

in Asian Construction and Development Corporation v.
COMFAC Corporation:
“The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence

renders it admissible, and the court cannot, on its own,
disregard such evidence. We note that ASIAKONSTRUCT’s
counsel of record before the trial court, Atty. Bernard Dy, who
actively participated in the initial stages of the case stopped
attending the hearings when COMFAC was about to end its
presentation. Thus, ASIAKONSTRUCT could not object to
COMFAC’s offer of evidence nor present evidence in its defense;
ASIAKONSTRUCT was deemed by the trial court to have waived
its chance to do so.
Note also that when a party desires the court to reject
the evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a
timely objection and it cannot raise the objection to the
evidence for the first time on appeal. Because of a party’s
failure to timely object, the evidence becomes part of the
evidence in the case. Thereafter, all the parties are
considered bound by any outcome arising from the offer of
evidence properly presented.”32 (Emphasis supplied.)
Bearing in mind that the claim check voucher and the

Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt presented by
Malayan Insurance are already part of the evidence on
record, and since it is not disputed that the insurance
company, indeed, paid PhP 700,000 to the assured, then
there is a valid subrogation in the case at bar. As explained
in Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. v. Pioneer Insurance and
Surety Corporation:
“Subrogation is the substitution of one person by another with

reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted
succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim,

including its remedies or securities. The principle covers a
situation wherein an insurer has paid a loss under an insurance
policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to the
insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by
the policy. It contemplates full substitution such that it places the
party subrogated in the shoes of the creditor, and he may use all
means that the creditor could employ to enforce payment.
_______________
32 Supra note 25.
806

We have held that payment by the insurer to the insured

operates as an equitable assignment to the insurer of all the
remedies that the insured may have against the third party
whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. The right of
subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any
privity of contract. It accrues simply upon payment by the
insurance company of the insurance claim. The doctrine of
subrogation has its roots in equity. It is designed to promote and
to accomplish justice; and is the mode that equity adopts to
compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who, in justice,
equity, and good conscience, ought to pay.”33
Considering the above ruling, it is only but proper that

Malayan Insurance be subrogated to the rights of the
assured.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
CA’s July 28, 2010 Decision and October 29, 2010
Resolution in CAG.R. CV No. 93112 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February
2, 2009 issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 9995885
is hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Mendoza, Reyes** and PerlasBernabe, JJ.,

concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Note.—Generally, witnesses can testify only to those

facts derived from their own perception. A recognized
exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying
person’s declaration made under the consciousness of an
impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.

(People vs. Salcedo, 645 SCRA 248 [2011]).
——o0o——
_______________
33 G.R. Nos. 18088081 & 18089697, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA
96, 141142.
** Additionqal member per Special Order No. 1178 dated January 26,
2012.
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MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. Rodelio Alberto and Enrico Alberto Reyes, Respondents

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6/3/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 664

G.R. No. 194320. February 1, 2012.*

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; A witness

792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Malaya Insurance Co., vs. Alberto

stated. In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, 606 SCRA 444 (2009), this

VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 793

Malaya Insurance Co., vs. Alberto

96 (2009): Subrogation is the substitution of one person by

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Co., Inc. (Malayan Insurance). The July 28, 2010 CA

February 2, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51 in

At around 5 o’clock in the morning of December 17,

VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 795

Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights

the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring

796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

Dissatisfied, respondents filed an appeal with the CA,

“WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal

The CA held that the evidence on record has failed to

VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 797

of the report in evidence, respondents are deemed to have

In its Memorandum14 dated June 27, 2011, Malayan

On the other hand, respondents submit the following

798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Essentially, the issues boil down to the following: (1) the

The petition has merit.

the investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as

VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 799

As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA,21 “Hearsay is

“Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty

In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,23 this Court reiterated

Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is

800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the

“Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of

of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which

VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 801

means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or

accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured

802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for

first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa

VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 803

the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption

In the case at bar, aside from the statement in the police

Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that the

804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary

Respondents, however, claim that the documents presented

VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 805

waived their right to make an objection. As this Court held

Peralta, Mendoza, Reyes** and PerlasBernabe, JJ.,