Hybrid Threats and Asymmetric Warfare:

What to do?
Stockholm 14-15 November, 2017
at
the Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden

Col (ret) Karl Hickman

Swedish Defence University
Dr Mikael Weissmann
Swedish Defence University
Dr Niklas Nilsson
Swedish Defence University
Dr Sascha-Dominik Bachman
Bournemouth University
Dr Håkan Gunneriusson
Swedish Defence University
Per Thunholm
Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)

Conference proceeding
February 2018

Funded by:

Grant No: F16-1240:1

Co-funding has been received from the Swedish Armed Forces

1
 The conference was organised by

Land Operations Section, Tactical Warfare Division, Dept. of Military Studies

Swedish Defence University (SEDU)

in collaboration with

Centre for Conflict, Rule of Law and Society, Bournemouth University

Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), SEDU

Funded by:

Grant No: F16-1240:1

Co-funding has been received from the Swedish Armed Forces

Organising committee

Principal Investigator:
Dr. Mikael Weissmann, Assoc. Prof. in War Studies (military operations), Land Operations
Section, SEDU.

Project Coordinator, Sweden:

Dr. Niklas Nilsson, Assistant Professor in War Studies, Land Operations Section, SEDU.

Project Coordinator, UK:

Dr. Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Assoc. Prof. in Law, Bournemouth University, UK

Dr. Håkan Gunneriusson, Head of research & deputy head of Land Operations Section, SEDU

Per Thunholm, Senior Analyst at the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), SEDU

2
Hybrid Threats and Asymmetric Warfare:
What to do?

The international security environment has seemingly departed from a post-cold war
period of everlasting peace and has instead evolved into a volatile and increasingly
grey area of war and peace. Security challenges arising from both hybrid wars and
hybrid threats are high on security agendas in Sweden and Europe as well as
internationally. However, despite the attention there is a lack of research that
addresses how such “new” wars and threats should be handled. While studies do
exist on specific issues, a comprehensive approach to how hybrid wars and threats
are to be handled is still lacking. This is particularly the case when it comes to the
sharing of experiences between states. This workshop constituted a first step
towards developing such a comprehensive approach.

The workshop’s aim was to be a bridge across disciplinary boundaries as well as

between researchers and practitioners within and outside Sweden; integrating each
group’s extensive experiences and knowledge into a coherent whole. Besides
producing and disseminating new knowledge, the intention of the workshop was to
establish a foundation for long-term collaboration; the first step in the creation of a
European Network on Hybrid Warfare Capabilities that can work across borders and
link state of the art of research and practice.

Although mainly a scientific workshop, a number of practitioners were invited, with a

mix of presentations by academics and practitioners. This was intended to foster
innovative and reflective discussions across the academic-practitioner divide. The
workshop also aimed to develop new ideas associated with hybrid threats/warfare in
order to facilitate future cooperation

These proceedings include a summary of the key points made by the presenters,
along with conclusions and policy recommendations derived from the ensuing
discussions. Conference programme and a list of abstracts for the papers and
presentations can be found in the appendix.

3
 Summary of key points from the proceedings

SESSION 1: The role of the armed forces

Modelling hybrid warfare: a generic and holistic approach

Patrick Cullen, NUPI

• Academic analysis as to what constitutes Hybrid Warfare has yet to reach

any consensus, although earlier definitions were too focused on non-state
actors and kinetic means.

• There is general agreement that Hybrid Warfare does include both multiple
and synchronised threats that aim to target state vulnerabilities at different
levels of intensity over time:

Hybrid warfare in the mind of the Swedish officer: a multiple

duality view of tactics and operational art
Michael Gustafson, SEDU

• Swedish Officer training is based on the 2015 curriculum and does not
include Hybrid Warfare training.

4
 • A survey of different officers demonstrated a wide variance in
understanding of what Hybrid Warfare was and how relevant it should be
for different parts of the Armed Forces.

• Perhaps most worryingly, none of those surveyed questioned whether the

current model of Hybrid Warfare was correct.

Hybrid threats and warfare today and tomorrow: bringing the

army (back) in
Mikael Weissmann, SEDU

• Hybrid Warfare blurs the distinction between civilian and combatant and
both demands and permits all activities deemed necessary to achieve
success. This could include full spectrum capabilities, including long
distance weapons and Special Forces. The concept of strategic Key Terrain
is also important, with increasingly potent Anti-Access Area Denial
(A2AD) systems used to protect or threaten these areas.

• Whether the threat today can be described as peer vs peer or as superior vs

inferior is, in the context of Sweden, dependent on whether Sweden
operates alone or as part of a coalition.

• The role for the military in Hybrid Warfare will be varied, spanning the
tactical to the strategic levels and including policing functions alongside
more traditional military ones.

Mission Organised Constructs to counter Hybrid Threats

Scott Moreland, Naval Postgraduate School

• Hybrid Warfare is being used by various actors who do not believe in a

rules based world order to achieve strategic symmetry with western states.
They believe that they have both the opportunity and an imperative to do so.

• Hybrid Warfare capabilities include: the movement of conventional forces;

nuclear force intimidation, economic and energy pressure; propaganda and
disinformation, and cyber disruption and destabilisation. These capabilities

5
 have been used as shaping instruments to create the conditions for
conventional military intervention.

Session 1 Conclusions:

• Rather than searching for consensus in defining and describing Hybrid

Warfare, it is more fruitful to instead consider how Hybrid Warfare targets
state vulnerabilities and how states should best organise themselves to meet
the threat. Specifically:

o States should conduct continual self-assessments to understand

their current vulnerabilities.

o States should enhance current threat assessments to understand

how Hybrid Warfare capabilities are targeting those
vulnerabilities (or not).

SESSION 2: Cyber in a hybrid context

Theory of Strategic Culture – a tool to explain Russian cyber

threat perception?
Martti J. Kari, University of Jyväskylä

• The determinants of Russian Strategic Culture include history, geopolitics,

ideology and religion.

• Elements of Strategic Culture in Russia include:

o Authoritarian Rule.
o A sense of vulnerability.
o Threat Perception.
o A messianic mission to save Europe.

6
 o A sense of being a Great Power.
o A Clausewitzian approach and a belief in the utility
of force.
o The concept of being permanently in conflict.
o The use of asymmetric capabilities to conduct
Hybrid Warfare.

• Russia believes that cyber threats to Russia are increasing and

that they are not as technically capable as western states in
this domain. This threat perception often leads to the
establishment of offensive (hybrid) capabilities and activity
(for example, perceived meddling in the Russian 2006
election may have led to the alleged Russian meddling in the
US 2016 election).

Estonian defence league cyber unit as a hybrid national security

actor
Rain Ottis, Tallinn University of Technology

• The Estonian Defence League was described as a useful tool in countering

Hybrid Warfare threats.

• By drawing capability and talent from across Estonian society, whilst

deliberately making assessment of the totality of that capability very
difficult, the Estonian Defence League could serve as a useful example to
other nations looking to expand their capabilities.

The silicon hat hacker: using reinforcement learning in hybrid

warfare
Wayne Dalton, South African Military Academy

• Can we use machines with humans to reduce our vulnerability to hybrid

threats? Machine learning, particularly the ability to analyse and learn from
‘big data’, has now matured to the point where machines can now
outperform humans in a number of helpful tasks. This will:

7
 o Allow humans to become more efficient and to be free to conduct
more empathetic activities instead.
o Drive consensus faster in detecting and attributing Hybrid
Warfare activity.
o Enhance cyber resilience by reducing cyber vulnerabilities.
o Offer the chance to overmatch Hybrid Warfare capabilities.

Session 2 Conclusions:

• Individual states should adopt a progressive approach when building the

capabilities necessary to counter hybrid threats, starting at the Joint level
before moving to an Interagency and then Comprehensive Approach that
also includes the private sector.

• In terms of states working together, multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping

operations offer valuable lessons, including:

o The importance of shared understanding, agreed Measures of

Effectiveness and an agreed approach under unified command.
o Demonstrating the proven ability of UN organisations such as the
UNDP and the OCHA to interface and coordinate together.
o The utility of having a Joint Mission Analysis Centre.
o The utility of the EU Operations Centre as a possible
coordinating body.

• If deterrence fails, then detection and attribution of Hybrid Warfare activity

is extremely important in determining when and how states can respond.

• If action to counter Hybrid Warfare is taken to protect another state, then

the role of the Host Nation as the sovereign actor cannot be underestimated.
As sovereign nations acting within their territories, Host Nations will also
be able to undertake activity that supporting states will probably not be able
to.

• States should not underestimate and should instead seek to exploit the good
will and significant capabilities within their civilian and private sectors.

8
 SESSION 3: Russia’s neighbours

Cyber Component of Asymmetric Warfare: The Georgian

Experience
Marina Malvenishvili, Chief specialist of development and foreign affairs section,
Georgian Cyber Security Bureau, Ministry of Defence of Georgia

The August 2008 war against Georgia by the Russian Federation combined cyber and
conventional attacks against governmental, media and financial institutions.
Moreover, the increasing dependence on ICT clearly demonstrated that Georgia’s
national security could not be protected without the provision of cybersecurity.

In the period after 2008, Georgia started to develop these cybersecurity capabilities
and improve its IT resilience through:

• Establishment of a relevant institutional framework, policy and legal base

• Creation of national CERT
• Establishment of a Cyber Security Bureau under the Ministry of Defence of
Georgia
• Improved public awareness and the establishment of an educational base
• Capacity building of staff and the implementation of software and hardware
solutions
• Establishment of international cooperation with NATO members and
partner countries, as well as enhanced public-private partnership

Hybrid War and the Abkhazian Case

Kakhaber Esebua, Deputy Head of Defence System Analysis Division, Defence
Planning and Development Department, Department of Defence of Georgia

• Russian “Gybrid Warfare” uses the normal Russian approach but with the
elements used in different intensities. They are different portions of the
same pie chart, used like a graphic equaliser but still with the traditional
Russian aim of striking deeply over a broad front:

9
 Dimensions Actors Actions (operations)
History and myth Academia Documentaries
Religion Church Historical Literature
Economy State/Private Local and International
Military Army, Militia, Security Pressure
Information Service, Private Military Direct, covert actions
Cyber Companies
Media
Diplomatic

SESSION 4: Russia and Hybrid Warfare

Key Note: Understanding Russia: military capability, reforms and

threat perceptions
Daivis Petraitis, Independent Defence Analyst, Lithuania.

• The Russian Government arguably bases its thinking around four ‘Russian
truths’:

o ‘War is eternal’.
o War is fought by the state and not (just) the military of a state.
o ‘You fight your way, I fight mine’.
o Victory does not require the capture or occupation of
territory…’you have a territory, you have a problem … you have
the king, you have the territory’.

• In completing its last ‘Zapad’ exercise this year, Russia was able to test all
three of its strategic exercise objectives:

o The conduct of a sudden attack.

o The ability to defend and then terminate a conflict.
o Wide scale state defence employing all the forces of the state;
with the ability to escalate up to nuclear war in case of failure.

10
 • Besides its existing brigades, Russia is also moving towards re-establishing
a divisional level within its Armed Forces as a possible framework for the
use of its combat brigades in larger scale operations. The new Russian
Defence Management Centre is the main state command and control centre,
allowing Russia the ability to analyse any situation and run operations
continuously.

Asymmetric Measures in the Russian Security Strategy

Katri Pynnöniemi, University of Helsinki and National Defence University

• Some of the key concepts in the latest Russian National Security Strategy
include sovereignty, independence and state and territorial integrity.

• Threats to Russian National Security include ‘direct and indirect possible

harm to the national interest’.

• From a Russian government perspective, the various colour revolutions are

seen as regime changes organised by outside forces. The free flow of
information championed by the West is also seen as information warfare
and as part of a geopolitical struggle.

• A Russian asymmetric approach is characterised by flexibility and various

asymmetric measures united by a common goal and actions, aimed at
reducing the threat and eventually preventing it. The approach is defensive
but includes both preventative and ‘active’ measures.

Hybrid Warfare – short or middle range theory?

Håkan Gunneriusson, SEDU

• Hybrid Warfare says more about the West than it does about Russia. Russia
plays on the lack of desire on the part of western nations to engage in
existential conflict due to their unwillingness to sacrifice their high standard
of living.

11
• Western countries accept and even facilitate Russian ‘tactical truths’
because they choose not to call out disinformation as it would hurt their
economic rationality. Meanwhile, Russia uses reflexive control to paint the
West as weak.

• Where is the Western threshold in the context of conflict and legal/illegal

activity?

•
• Russian disinformation is an interactive process that requires both the actor
and the audience. Putin is an artist and we (the western states) are the
consumer!

• In a sense, we are in an era of post-modern warfare, where war is only war

if both sides say so. ‘War’ is therefore reduced to a matter of opinion.

12
The logic of Russian asymmetric warfare
Peter Mattson, SEDU

• Russia adopts asymmetric means because it has to.

• Its methods include technological means, will power, moral authority and
organisational ability. The dimensions within which these methods operates
vary:

o Positive or negative.
o Short or long duration.
o Low or high risk.
o Discrete or integrated.
o Material or psychological.

Russian Hybrid Warfare in Georgia: lessons learned

Niklas Nilsson, SEDU

• Russia continues to exert economic leverage on Georgia today through the

reopening of trade. Georgia is less vulnerable in the energy sector as 90
percent of the gas consumed comes from Azerbaijan.

• Politically, Russia can also use South Ossetia and Abkhazia as levers with
Georgia. On the softer side, NGOs are also used by Russia to facilitate
Russian-Georgian links.

• Russia aims to debunk the idea of Georgia as a beacon of democracy and to

instead paint it as a traditional post-Soviet country. It also seeks to suggest
that links with the West are damaging to Georgia. In particular, Russia plays
on scepticism about whether the West will really ‘deliver’.

• Currently, the picture in Georgia is one of increasing vulnerability. This

may not be the reality but there is an increasing perception that this is the
case, with increasing numbers susceptible to the messages described above.

13
Session 4 Conclusions:

• Ukraine perhaps shows the limits of Russian Hybrid Warfare: once Western
actors actively called out hybrid activity and named Russia as the
aggressor, it became possible to apply real countermeasures (primarily in
the form of economic sanctions).

• Seeking to ‘fight’ the results of Hybrid Warfare in a reactive manner plays

to the strengths and not the weaknesses of the hybrid opponent. Instead,
western nations should seek to retain the initiative and should continue to
play to their very significant – perhaps even overwhelming - strengths (for
example economic). They should also recognise and focus on the Centres of
Gravity and vulnerabilities of hybrid opponents when countering the hybrid
threat.

• Western nations should develop a more robust Command and Control

structure to deal with transnational Hybrid Warfare. This should include
partnering with organisations (like the EU) that have the ability to
coordinate international responses to the threats, even if they remain
dependent on national mechanisms for delivery.

14
 SESSION 5: Hybrid war and threats: the legal grey area

Key Note: Propaganda (as a component of hybrid warfare) and

accountability

Anthony Paphiti, Brig (rtd) UK Army

• Propaganda is information, especially information of a biased or misleading

nature. It is used to promote a political cause or point of view and to change
perceptions. Misinformation is false or misleading information which is
passed on in good faith. Disinformation is information known to be false
and wilfully disseminated.

• Propaganda is an integral component of military deception and a critical

tool of hybrid warfare. This fact is illustrated by recent developments in
Libya, Syria and Iraq, as well as historical examples.

• A battle for the narrative is an essential component of hybrid warfare. Its

objectives are multi-faceted: the “home” population; the enemy’s military
and the enemy’s civilian population; and wider audiences of friendly
nations from whom it is intended to garner international support.

• Media plays an increasingly important role in conveying government

propaganda messages in pursuit of a military objective.

• Journalists can be embedded into military headquarters to control the

information flow in return for force protection, coincidentally exploiting the
journalistic pressure for a scoop.
• The pressure of 24-hour news channels and social media has arguably made
it less likely that journalists will scrutinise unofficial sources and verify the
facts contained in reports received from them. This, in turn, makes it easier
to push out a false or misleading narrative through the media.

• In time of conflict, the media tend to support their government’s line (“it’s
better to be viewed as a foot soldier for Bush than a spokeswoman for Al

15
 Qaeda “, Irene Briganti, Fox News spokeswoman). The question is, how far
should this go?

• To maintain credibility and integrity, media must scrutinize political

statements and hold decision makers accountable.

• The legal provisions for countering propaganda are weak – the ICCPR
prohibits propaganda for war, but most countries have entered reservations
to this provision, citing freedom of expression. The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court in practice only prohibits propaganda
promoting genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. By contrast,
this falls far short of the sort of provisions in domestic laws to cover e.g.
hate speech and support for terrorism.

• There is a need for increased coordination between Western organizations

on strategic communication.

• People frequently rely on misinformation/disinformation even after it has

been retracted. This is a phenomenon known as “the continued-influence
effect of misinformation”.

• People tend to continue to believe media statements that they have heard
even when those statements have been retracted; ... unless people are
suspicious about motives surrounding the events in question.

• The best way to counter propaganda is to tell the truth and demonstrate that
this is indeed the case.

Beyond “passportisation”: when legal grey areas leave the door

open to interventionism and rewriting post-1945 principles on
international peace and security
Noelle Quenivet, UWE Bristol

• Russia’s practice of “passportization” is more than a policy – it is an

important geopolitical tool for creating a buffer zone. In doing do, Russia is
taking advantage of ambiguities in post-1945 international law by

16
 reinterpreting legal grey areas and changing customary international law by
practice.

• In Georgia, the provision of passports to residents in Abkhazia and South

Ossetia allowed Russia to claim a right to protect nationals abroad and
support these regions in declaring independence from Georgia. In other
words, Russia has created legal ‘facts’, allowing it to claim the right to
intervene in other states.

• Notably, however, these practices are not new and have been applied also
by Western actors in a number of cases. This has attracted far less publicity
in the West.

The use of force in an asymmetric conflict is not only limited to a

soldier’s right of self-defense
Mark Maxwell, Deputy Legal Counsel, US Africa Command

• Asymmetric warfare highlights the importance of legally distinguishing

between self-defence and the scope of violence a soldier can use under the
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

• Self-defence is a natural law concept – we can protect our right to life at

anytime, anywhere. States have different definitions of how broad this right
of self-defence is, but it is based on direct threat and scopes and defines the
right to use force by the soldier to negate the threat(s). When acting in self-
defence, the legally authorized amount of force is limited.

• LOAC, however, allows states to assign soldiers the right to kill persons
who do not present direct threats if identified as combatants. In asymmetric
warfare, threats emerge among those who appear to be civilians. The
concept of a civilian taking a “direct participation in hostilities” is important
because it allows soldiers to target and kill those committing or preparing
hostile or warlike acts against the State’s war efforts.

• It is important to make this distinction because most liberal democracies

cannot send troops into conflict with only the right of self-defence: soldiers
need a clear understanding under the LOAC as to what status a civilian
takes when that civilian is taking direct participation in hostiles. As one
example, the LOAC defines proportionality very differently than its

17
 definition within self-defence, giving the soldier much more discretion in
using force against a civilian’s hostile or warlike acts.

• Civilians directly participating in hostilities -- DPH -- can also be targeted

under the concept of self-defence but this type of threat is limited to the
soldier’s person or that of the soldier’s unit. However, violence inflicted
based on the status assigned under LOAC versus that of self-defence
profoundly changes the narrative of the conflict. Targeting someone under
DPH is an offensive measure while self-defence is defensive in nature.

• It is important to understand the grey area between these concepts of law;

and between the status of soldiers and the enemy combatants they are
fighting, including civilians taking direct participation in hostilities.

Hybrid Warfare and Lawfare – the use of law as a weapon in the

context of hybrid warfare
Sasha Bachmann, Bournemouth University

• The concept of hybrid warfare is not new as a concept of warfare but serves
as a new platform that allows the discussion of threats beyond the concepts
of war, peace and kinetic warfare. The definition of Hybrid warfare should
remain open as a means to discuss other non-kinetic methods such as
lawfare and information operations, both of which have the potential to
become fully fledged new warfighting domains.
• Lawfare is a warfighting domain on its own. Lawfare refers to the use
and/or abuse of the rule of law in a defensive and offensive capacity to
achieve operational success without the need to employ kinetic methods of
warfighting. There is no operational lawfare unit at NATO level but there
are some member states which have such offensive/defensive capabilities.
• Russia is essentially mirroring the West when it comes to lawfare – arguing
that they were responding to lawfare threats posed by the West.

Session 5 Conclusions:

• Is there a need to address the problem of communicating with actors that

will never recognize the law, such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and others? Should
this be done and if so how?

18
 • While these actors can be assigned the status of belligerents and thereby
targetted, they exist worldwide and need to be addressed through broader
approaches. We need to find ways to address the problem of sovereign
states allowing violence on their territories according to different unified
definitions of status. It is legally difficult to counter insurgent ideology.
Some organizations can operate under the radar without consequences
since hostile actions cannot be connected to them. Soldiers need training to
know that they are exercising the status assigned to them by the state.
Otherwise, we risk prolonging the war.

SESSION 6: Total defence cooperation

Deterrence through resilience: NATO, the nations and the

challenges of being prepared
Guillaume Lasconjarias, NATO Defence College

• We need to understand how NATO shifted from countering HW to enhance

resilience. The shift from countering hybrid threats and warfare to
enhancing resilience can nevertheless be questioned. From the Alliance
perspective, how did we slowly evolve from hybrid threats to resilience,
which at first glance seem to be very different from NATO’s core tasks?
The answer perhaps lies in the notion that the long-existing separation
between defence and security has vanished, blurring responses and ensuring
that they are not sufficiently holistic. For NATO, the countering of hybrid
threats has largely been limited to “civilian preparedness”.

• The journey from dealing with hybrid threats to instituting resilience

mirrors the current evolution of NATO, and is also reflected by the EU’s
parallel course. The need to strengthen defence capabilities both at home
and on Europe’s frontline calls for a more comprehensive approach that has
been more evident since 2014. Despite this, the main critique is that rather
than going from strategic intention into the elaboration of ways and means,
progress has been the other way around. First responses have been
hampered by improvisation, with the emphasis on ad hoc solutions using
existing conventional capabilities.

19
 • If we really want to develop a deterrent against hybrid threats, we cannot
only focus on “hardware” and “fixing” things. Because hybrid warfare
entails a strong ‘battle for the narrative’, one of the future battlefields is our
populations and elite’s mindset and the harnessing of a new defensive spirit.

NATO and Hybrid Warfare

Hans Andersen, Allied Command Transformation, Virginia

• NATO: HW is not new. What is new is that it has moved from the
operational to the strategic level, underpinned by new dimensions such as:
globalization; complex geostrategic environment; advanced technologies
(cyber); and information demand.
• Russia is always inside the western OODA-loop by being swift in its
decision making. NATO needs an agreement between its member states to
mitigate the organisation’s long decision processes.

• What is Hybrid Warfare? Characteristic include:

o Part of an overall Strategic Plan

o Highly integrated (synchronized)
o Combination of conventional and unconventional means
o Overt and covert activities, military, paramilitary, irregular and
civilian actors
o Directed at an adversary’s vulnerabilities
o Complicating decision making
o Across the full DIMEFIL spectrum
o Creating ambiguity and denial
o Both State and Non-State actor
o Employed in conflict and confrontation that fall short of armed
conflict.
o Globalization and technological advances has led to increased
vulnerabilities.
o Increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks
o Far reaching complex propaganda and disinformation campaigns
o Targeted and coordinated political and economic pressure.
o Moved to the Strategic Level.

20
 • The 3 pillars of NATO response vs hybrid: 1) Prepare, 2) Deter, 3) Defend.

• The EU is important for NATO as dealing with hybrid threats needs to be

part of a collective effort.

Special Forces and hybrid scenarios: “Diplomat warriors” in small states and
medium powers
Njord Wegge, NUPI

• Future warfare scenarios increasingly focus on how conventional and

unconventional measures might be applied together. Special Operation
Forces (SOF) have a particularly important role in different Hybrid Warfare
scenarios in states of a small or middle power size.

• Small/medium size states like Norway and Sweden can, and should consider
to develop SOF designated to counter warfare also in the political, societal
and diplomatic domain. Such a development might demand the
development of new legal mandates and involve parts of the emergency and
contingency apparatus.

• Possibilities for life-time careers as SOF should be investigated and new

career opportunities for the age 40+ should be developed.

Session 6 Conclusions:

• Deterrence against hybrid threats requires a focus on the population’s and

elite’s mindset and the harnessing of a new defensive spirit.
• NATO needs swifter coordination mechanisms to take control of the OODA-
loop.
• Effective collaboration between EU and NATO is essential in efforts to
counter hybrid threats.
• SOF should be considered an important component in a wide range of
hybrid scenarios in small states.
• Find ways to make life-time careers as SOF possible.

21
 Appendix

Conference Programme

Tuesday, Nov 14

0840-0850 Introductory remarks, Col. Ronny Modigs, Head of the

Department of Military Studies, Swedish Defence
University
0850-0900 Welcome remarks by Mikael Weissmann, Swedish
Defence University

SESSION 1: The role of the armed forces

0900-1040 Presentations:
1. Modelling hybrid warfare: a generic and
holistic approach
Patrick Cullen, Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs (NUPI)
2. Hybrid warfare in the mind of the
Swedish officer
Michael Gustafson, Swedish Defence
University
3. Hybrid threats and warfare today and
tomorrow: bringing the army (back) in
Mikael Weissmann, Swedish Defence
University
4. Adapting mission organizational constructs
to enhance civil-military coordination to
counter hybrid threats
Scott Moreland, Center for Civil-Military
Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, United
States

Chair: Håkan Gunneriusson

1040-1110 Coffee break

22
SESSION 2: Cyber in a hybrid context

1110-1225 Presentations:
1. Theory of strategic culture – a tool to
explain Russian cyber threat perception?
Col. Martti J. Kari, University of Jyväskylä,
Finland
2. Estonian defence league cyber unit as a
hybrid national security actor
Rain Ottis, Tallinn University of Technology,
Estonia
3. The silicon hat hacker: using reinforcement
learning in hybrid warfare
Wayne Dalton, Stellenbosch University, South
Africa

Chair: Niklas Nilsson

1225-1325 Lunch

SESSION 3: Russia’s neighbours

1325-1425
Cyber component of asymmetric warfare: the Georgian
experience Marina Malvenishvili, Chief specialist of
development and foreign affairs section, Cyber Security
Bureau, Ministry of Defence of Georgia

Hybrid war and the Abkhazian case

Kakhaber Esebua, Deputy chief of division, defence
system analysis division, Defence Planning and
Development Department, Ministry of Defence of
Georgia

Discussion

Chair: Niklas Nilsson

1425-1455 Coffee break

23
SESSION 4: Russia and hybrid warfare

1455-1720 KEY NOTE: Understanding Russia: military

capability, reforms and threat perceptions
Daivis Petraitis, Independent Defence Analyst,
Lithuania

Presentations:
1. Asymmetric measures in the Russian
Security Strategy
Katri Pynnöniemi, University of Helsinki and
National Defence University, Finland
2. Hybrid warfare – short or middle range
theory?
Håkan Gunneriusson, Swedish Defence
University
3. The logic of Russian asymmetric warfare
Peter Mattson, Swedish Defence University
4. Russian hybrid warfare in Georgia:
lessons learned
Niklas Nilsson, Swedish Defence University

Chair: Mikael Weissmann

Wednesday, Nov 15

SESSION 5: Hybrid War and Threats: the legal grey area

0845-1045 KEY NOTE: Propaganda (as a component of

hybrid warfare) and accountability
Anthony Paphiti, Brig (rtd) UK Army. One
of the founding members of the British Army
Prosecuting Authority.

Presentations:

24
 1. Beyond Passportisation: when legal
grey areas leave the door open to
interventionism and rewriting post-
1945 principles on international peace
and security
Noelle Quenivet, UWE Bristol, United
Kingdom
2. The use of force in an asymmetric
conflict is not only limited to a soldier’s
right of self-defense
Mark Maxwell, Deputy Legal
Counsel, U.S. Africa Command,
United States
3. Hybrid warfare and lawfare –
the use of law as a weapon in the
context of hybrid warfare.
Sascha Dov Bachmann,
Bornemouth University, United
Kingdom

Chair: Håkan Gunneriusson

1045-1115 Coffee break

SESSION 6: Total defence cooperation

1115-1230 Presentations:

1. NATO and Hybrid

Warfare
Hans Andersen (LtCol),
Allied Command
Transformation, ACT,
Virginia
2. Deterrence through
resilience: NATO, the
nations and the

25
 challenges of being
prepared
Guillaume Lasconjarias,
NATO Defence College,
Rome, Italy
3. Special forces and hybrid
scenarios: “Diplomat
warriors” in small states
and medium powers
Njord Wegge, Norwegian
Institute of International
Affairs (NUPI)

Chair: Per Thunholm

1230-1245 Conclusion

26
 Abstracts

Session 1

Modelling hybrid warfare: a generic and holistic approach

Patrick Cullen, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

The verdict on hybrid warfare (HW) is clear. Despite an unsettled

debate over the utility of the term, its conceptual boundaries and
proper definition, a growing trans-Atlantic consensus from actors
including NATO and the European Union is nevertheless in
agreement that HW represents a security problem that must be
addressed. This chapter, based on research conducted in the
Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC)
Countering Hybrid Warfare project, moves beyond definitional
debates to provide a security policy-oriented conceptual framework
for understanding the whole of government/society security puzzle
posed by HW. It discusses HW in generic terms by focusing on its
exploitation of ambiguity and manipulation of its opponent’s response
thresholds, HW’s emphasis on attacking its opponents at its seams
(legal, organizational, etc.), and its creative use of non-military
instruments of power. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
challenges HW poses for warning intelligence, and recommendations
for mitigating these concerns.

27
Hybrid warfare in the mind of the Swedish officer: a multiple
duality view of tactics and operational art
Michael Gustafson, Swedish Defence University
Understanding hybrid warfare is challenging because it comprises among other
dimensions threats not belonging to the traditional military domain. Nevertheless,
traditional military capabilities are said to exist in hybrid warfare, in parallel with
irregular warfare: concepts such as guerrillas, terrorists, criminality and a dominant
use of information and cyberwarfare. This article examines standpoints among
Swedish officers studying at the two-year higher staff education regarding tactics and
operational art in so-called hybrid warfare. The study is a sociological mapping of
statements inspired by Pierre Bourdieu field theory, addressing the question of “How
can field theory explain contemporary military thought on tactics and operational art
in hybrid warfare?”.

The results show that military views on hybrid warfare can be distributed as a field
with opposite opinions of the same challenge. This field can be expressed in the
following way; a larger group of officers stated preferences for infantry unit concepts
in a blended military and civilian context. A smaller group argued preferences to
ranger unit concepts in a mainly military context. Even more varied thought was
expressed by a smaller, group of officers, highlighting mechanized unit concepts in a
regular warfare context. Finally another group preferred mechanized tactics and
operation in a blended military and civilian context. Also with in each tactical type
Different views also appeared within each tactical type. A multiple duality of views
can thus be argued to exist in this field, with a potential of shaping different
preconditions for collaboration, comprehensive approaches, leadership, planning and
execution of operations.

Hybrid threats and warfare today and tomorrow: bringing the

army (back) in
Mikael Weissmann, Swedish Defence University
The aim of this article is to outline what the hybrid/asymmetric threats and warfare
scenarios are for Sweden today and tomorrow. It is argued that Sweden needs to
prepare for and act against asymmetric warfare and hybrid warfare scenarios (alleged
on‐going and in the future, violent and nonviolent). The focus is on the role and
challenges of the Swedish army, who are arguably a key target/actor hybrid warfare
scenarios.

28
The paper will focus on 1) how the threats are perceived by the Swedish armed forces
in general and the army in particular, 2) what can the army do, and 3) what should the
army be able to do (and not do)? To make the picture as comprehensive as possible,
the study combines analysis of official discourse in official documents, including
doctrines and the ongoing public debates among pundits and experts, with qualitative
and structured interviews with army officers. The focus in the interviews will be on
operationalisation: what CAN the army do, what SHOULD the army be able to do,
what should it NOT BE ABLE TO DO, and HOW does it get to where it want to be?

Adapting mission organizational constructs to enhance civil-

military coordination to counter hybrid threats
Scott Moreland, Center for Civil-Military Relations, US Naval
Postgraduate School
Hybrid threats exploit operational, informational, and legal ambiguities and
vulnerabilities across all domains. National organizations and regional security
consortiums, including NATO and the European Union, seek more effective
responses to these increasingly difficult challenges. The comprehensive approach is
an important conceptual framework for ‘whole of society’ security cooperation.
Although not uniformly defined or perfectly understood, the basic principles of a
comprehensive approach can be successfully applied to current and future operations
involving military, civilian, and private sector components.

Hybrid threats depend on our perceived lack of agility, flexibility, and resolve.
Contemporary missions - including peacekeeping, cyber security, and maritime
security - have developed modestly effective models for the practical application of a
comprehensive approach; these can be adapted and applied to counter hybrid threats.
Through existing and evolving organizational models, collective capabilities must be
better coordinated via mutual trust and understanding, enhanced interoperability, and
unassailable transparency.

29
 Session 2

Theory of strategic culture: a tool to explore russian cyber threat

perception?
Col. Martti J. Kari, University of Jyväskylä, Finland
The interest in cyber warfare has generated the need for theoretical tools to research
cyber threats and our responses to these threats. This paper reviews how the Cold War
theories on the use of nuclear weapons, such as zero- sum game theory, theory of
strategic culture and deterrence theory, can explain state behaviour in a cyber
environment. I argue in this paper that the theory of strategic culture is suitable for
exploring and explaining Russia’s cyber threat perception. The theory of strategic
culture seeks to identify factors which are characteristic of decision making and state
practice; and to study how and why these factors influence the state´s decision making
and practices. Factors influencing the strategic thinking of a state, i.e. determinants of
strategic culture might for example be historical, geopolitical, religious or ideological.
Elements of Russian strategic culture, including a sense of vulnerability, the idea of
Russia as besieged fortress, the mythology of permanent war and technological
inferiority can also be identified in Russia’s cyber threat perception.

Estonian defence league cyber unit as a hybrid national security actor

Rain Ottis, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

Estonian national defence relies on a combination of a professional military,
conscription-based reserve component and a volunteer organization called Defence
League (Kaitseliit). In 2011 the Defence League gained a new capability in the form
of the Cyber Unit (CU), which focuses on the cyber security aspects of national
defence. While the term Hybrid Threat has received ominous and negative undertones
in recent years, the Defence League in general and the CU in particular can serve as
positive examples of Hybrid Actors in the context of national defence. This paper
provides an overview of the role of the CU in Estonia and discusses its properties and
capabilities against the backdrop of hybrid warfare.

30
The silicon hat hacker: using reinforcement learning in hybrid
warfare
Wayne Dalton, Computer Information Systems Department, Faculty
of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, South Africa
Computers today can learn things, on their own. 20 years ago, computers were
capable of mastering human-like behaviour, but needed a lot of human expertise to
guide their performance. Today, advances in machine learning have made it possible
for computers to master very complex problems without relying on the encoding of
human expertise into their algorithms. Recently, machine learning has successfully
enabled computers to learn things that their human programmers themselves are
unable to do; like discover new molecules that might lead to new drugs (Markoff,
2012).
Computers are also vulnerable to being exploited by hostile third-parties for a wide
range of reasons, including cybercrime and cyber warfare. This endangers the safety
and security of individuals, corporations and nation states in ways that are hard to
protect against using conventional methods. Some companies have proverbially “set
a thief to catch a thief” by employing large numbers of ethical hackers and other
professionals to “pen test” their own critical infrastructure. Their goal is finding and
fixing vulnerabilities in their systems before hostile attackers can exploit them.

This paper proposes that a computer can, in a self-sufficient and proactive manner,
determine whether critical infrastructure is vulnerable to known cyber security
exploits. The goal would be to remedy these exploits before anyone else can make use
of them. The “silicon-hat hacker” is a machine-learning program that can explore and
exploit vast quantities of data and consequently make high-confidence predictions on
the existence of security exploits. This paper introduces the reader to reinforcement
learning and how it might be used in cyber security. Finally, the paper will propose an
architectural framework on how to accomplish this application of reinforcement
learning to cyber security. In hybrid warfare, the complementary collaboration
between Man and Machine will enhance capability and ultimately security and peace.

31
 Session3

Cyber Component of Asymmetric Warfare: Georgian

Experience Marina Malvenishvili, Chief specialist of development
and foreign affairs section, Cyber Security Bureau, Ministry of
Defence of Georgia
In August 2008, Russia perfectly demonstrated its doctrinal vision of warfare in the
information age. Large-scale cyber-attacks against Georgia, conducted simultaneously
with the kinetic war, presented the first application of the new “Russian hybrid” –
mutually supporting efforts of information, cyber and kinetic operations. The
Georgian case is significant in that it was the first instance where cyber means were
used in direct connection with and in and support of major military operations as part
of a state to state conventional war. This makes Russia’s cyber-attacks against
Georgia a unique case in the cybersecurity sphere. Russia, for the first time in history,
tested Georgian cyber capabilities, using numerous attacks against both the public and
private sectors. Importantly, the preparation for war started not in August, but months
and even years earlier. Georgia has always been in Russia’s “sphere of privileged
interests”.

Hybrid War and the Abkhazian Case

Kakhaber Esebua, Deputy chief of division, defence system analysis
division, Defence Planning and Development Department, Ministry
of Defence of Georgia

Hybrid Warfare has dozens of definitions and most of them are contradicting. The
purpose of this paper is not to define the term in general but to talk about its Russian
version. Hybrid Warfare is quite similar to the Russian notion of regular war; it
consists of exactly the same components. The difference is that those components are
employed in significantly different proportions and intensity. For a better
understanding of Russian warfare we need to define (1) the dimensions (battlespaces)
of Russian warfighting; (2) the actors employed; and (3) the actions (types of
operations) conducted. Usually, the battlespaces of Russian warfare are: History and
Myths, Religion, Economy, Military, Information and Cyber. War is fought in all
those dimensions either simultaneously, in combinations, or alone, depending on the
environment or the desired end state. Russian warfare is highly flexible and there are

32
no clear lines between its different forms – Hybrid and conventional. Hybrid is a
comparably new type of Russian warfare, which is partially based on the concept of
the Soviet Deep Battle. It means that Russia is operating in the entire depth of the
enemy defence but not only in the military but other dimensions as well. The so-called
Gerasimov Doctrine, which is widely seen as a bible of Russian Hybrid War is also
talking about multidimensional war and underlines that this is not a Russian invention.
Indeed, Hybrid War is neither entirely Russian, nor did it begin in Donbass. This
paper analyses Russian Hybrid Warfare during the conflict in Abkhazia in the 1990s,
which is still widely referred to as a separatist conflict. Yet in reality, it was an
instance of Russian Hybrid Warfare against Georgia.

Session 4

Asymmetric measures in the Russian Security Strategy

Katri Pynnöniemi, University of Helsinki and National Defence
University, Finland

Since the 2014 Crimean operation, Western military analysts have reviewed Russian
military thinking in an attempt to both distinguish novel features and traditional
patterns in the Russian ways of war. This research has drawn attention to concepts of
‘nonlinearity’, full-spectrum war, an ‘asymmetric approach’, and more recently to
‘strategic deterrence’. Two of these concepts appear in the National Security Strategy,
namely the asymmetric approach and strategic deterrence. In fact, the strategy ties
these two concepts together in a way that tells a lot about the Russian approach to
conflict. The ‘asymmetric approach’ has a rich history in Western military thought. [1]
What I argue here is that its current usage in the Russian context can be traced to
lessons drawn by the retired army general and the President of the Academy of
Military Science, Makhmut Gareev after Russia’s “five day war” with Georgia. The

[1]
B. H. Liddlell Hart, Strategy: Second Revised Edition, NY: Penguin
Books, 1991.

33
paper will discuss the evolution of this ‘asymmetric approach’ in the national security
strategy (2009 and 2015).

Hybrid warfare – short or middle range theory?

Håkan Gunneriusson, Swedish Defence University
What is new about Russian hybrid warfare is that the West EU/NATO accepts the
narrative that Russia is not at war in Ukraine. There are several reasons for this but
one important thing to understand is that it is more about the West than about Russia.
Russia is using reflexive control so that the West opts out from calling out Russia as a
warring party in Ukraine. Why so? Because in a globalized Post-Cold War world
there is no economic rationality in waging an existential war; and certainly not against
a locally strong adversary that also possesses nuclear weapons and gives the
impression of standing its ground if push comes to shove. Stating that Russia is at war
with Ukraine would lead the West to act in accordance with the convention against
War of Aggression. This would escalate the conflict and no one is interested in this
outcome.

Yet there is more to this than Russia’s relative strength and the West’s focus on
economic rationality. Each of these factors can be seen in the terms of Fernand
Braudel as a Courte Durée (that Russia’s relative military might will equal that of the
West) and a Moyenne Durée (that the West’s positivistic economic pursuit might one
again become balanced by a more autonomous political rationality). However, there is
further a current change in the perception of singular truth in society, which makes the
interpretation of war and the relativisation of war easier. This is not a temporary
(Courte) change.

The Logic of Russian Asymmetric Warfare

Peter Mattson, Swedish Defence University
Correlation of forces has always had a significant importance in Russian military
thinking. In comparison to American military economy and power, Russia is not even
close to being superior. Russia cannot meet the overwhelming American military
capabilities with its own military weakness. This explains why the Russian military
strategic logic includes asymmetric objectives, means and methods. Asymmetry is to
do something different than one’s adversaries in order to exploit an opponent´s
weaknesses and to use one’s own capabilities in a smart way to maximize own

34
strength. In Russia, all national power domains are coordinated under a military
command in the National Defense Management Center (NDMC). The asymmetric
approach can be used on the political-strategic, military-strategic and operational
levels, or as a combination of all of them. Asymmetry can include different methods,
technologies, values, organizations, time separation, or a combination of some of
them. Strategic vulnerabilities usually include national leadership, the elite of the
administration, as well as some strategic infrastructure.

Russian hybrid warfare in Georgia: lessons learned

Niklas Nilsson, Swedish Defence University
This paper shows how Russia has established a range of pressure points vis-à-vis
Georgia that have incrementally circumscribed the Georgian government’s political
room for manoeuvre, both internationally and domestically. These pressure points
have included: the use of military force or the threat thereof; leveraging geopolitical
realities on the ground as means to exert diplomatic pressure; and the exploitation of
economic dependencies. They have also encompassed subversive elements, including:
co-optation and subversion aimed at inserting agents of influence in Georgia’s
political elite and society; cyber-attacks; and a concerted effort in the informational
sphere to promote a narrative of Georgia that is favourable to Russian interests, both
in the country itself as well as among its key partners in the West.

Georgia stands out as a particularly important case study of Russia’s deployment of

hybrid tactics. The country’s longstanding conflict with Russia has made it a target of
the full spectrum of hybrid tactics that Russia currently deploys in Ukraine and
elsewhere. In fact, Georgia can be said to have functioned as a testing ground for
many of these tactics, making Georgia’s experience relevant far beyond the confined
regional context.

35
 Session 5

Propaganda (as a component of hybrid warfare) and

accountability
Anthony Paphiti, Brig (rtd) UK Army.
From ancient Greece to Syria, the use of deception has been a key component of
military strategy. Sun Tzu summed it up, in the Art of War, when he said that “All
warfare is based on deception”.

Within the realm of deception sits the concept of information operations or, more
colloquially, propaganda. Of all the forms of hybrid warfare, propaganda ops are,
perhaps, one of the most effective, as they may be used to change the perceptions of
both friend and foe. In the former case, to win support for a cause. In the latter case, to
confuse and sow seeds of doubt and fear.

In the Second World War, the allies used deception to great effect to protect the plan
for the Normandy landings (operation OVERLORD) from being discovered, and
employed a number of deception ops (Operation BODYGUARD) to disguise their
real intent. As Churchill remarked at the Tehran Conference, in November 1943, “In
wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of
lies”.

In more recent times, we have seen how disinformation and half-truths have won
nations support for war in Iraq, Kosovo, Libya and Syria. On all of these occasions,
the media and political establishment has played its part in disseminating the
narrative. No one has been taken to task for some of the egregious claims made, for
example, in the case of propaganda promoting WMD in Iraq.

In Syria, in the battle for East Aleppo, it became evident eventually that the reports
being broadcast every evening by western media lacked independence, as their
sources were Nusra jihadist activists within the militant-held part of the city. Images
of children were used to win the sympathies of world viewers, and social media was
employed to great effect to promote fake news or skew the truth. The truth had
become a casualty. Propaganda had had a major impact on perceptions from outside
Syria and wooed the famous and the powerful to the Islamists’ cause: Islamists who
were proscribed terrorist organizations listed by, inter alia, the United States and
United Kingdom.

36
Where leaders, be they military or political, press a narrative for war, or journalists
promote reports which they know or believe to be from a partisan and proscribed
terrorist source, whether or not intentionally to support that biased narrative, is there
any legal accountability? Does the law – international or domestic – make propaganda
for war an offence, or is that a step too far and one which offends the right of freedom
of expression and a free press?

The answer, it seems, is that there are few legal constraints on propaganda which falls
short of incitement, or aiding and abetting etc. genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity, where the intent required in relation to a consequence of the narrative is
that the person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the
ordinary course of events. In spite of the palpable bias in some quarters of the media,
it is doubtful that any journalist has crossed that Rubicon. Which means that the use
of propaganda remains a key tool of hybrid warfare.

Beyond passportisation: when legal grey areas leave the door open
to interventionism and rewriting post-1945 principles on
international peace and security
Noelle Quenivet, UWE Bristol, United Kingdom
By exploring Russia’s activities from the fall of the Soviet Union until the present
day, this paper examines how Russia uses nationality (understood in a wide sense of
the term) as a political, economic, and cultural tool to justify expansionism. Russia, so
it seems, is using grey areas in international law to implement a policy whose legal
implications are in breach of the key principles of the UN Charter relating to
international peace and security. It is argued that the policies and tools (e.g. conferral
of nationality, support for the right of self-determination, protection of nationals
abroad, etc.) developed and used by Russia are not necessarily unlawful per se; they
can indeed in some instances be justified under international law as they fall within
the grey areas of international law. That being said, the situations created as a result of
this policy are often unlawful (e.g. recognition of a State that is part of the territory of
another State, occupation and annexation, etc.). The paper concludes that Russia, by
using its ‘nationals’ abroad and legal grey areas, is attempting to rewrite the rules
carefully crafted post-1945, thereby allowing for interference in neighbouring States
to become an established international custom.

37
The use of force in an asymmetric conflict is not only limited to a soldier’s right
of self-defense

Mark Maxwell, Deputy Legal Counsel, U.S. Africa Command,

United States
There is a disturbing confusion among soldiers and their leaders in an asymmetric
environment of what is the difference between the scope of authority to use lethal
force under individual self-defence and the scope of authority to use lethal force under
the law of armed conflict (LOAC). From the moment of a soldier’s induction into the
military, he or she is trained on the use of force in individual self-defence scenarios.
Soldiers are also trained on what force can be used under LOAC. Although the two
concepts – individual self-defence and LOAC -- might result in the use of force to kill
or wound an enemy belligerent, they are two very different authorities. On the one
hand, self-defence is tailored to protect the soldier from harm posed by a threat. The
enemy’s threat can be neutralized by a soldier’s force that is proportional to the
enemy threat; so if the enemy is threatening the soldier’s life or limb, then lethal force
would be appropriate and authorized. But if the threat is something lesser than life or
limb, than the corresponding force should be lesser. Individual self-defence is
defensive: again, it responds to a threat. The use of force under LOAC, on the other
hand, is the State giving the soldier the right to be its agent so that the State can win
the armed conflict. The State’s grant of authority to the soldier under LOAC is to kill
individuals who have been given the status of an enemy belligerent. Historically, an
enemy belligerent is a member of the enemy’s military. In the modern-day
asymmetric environment, the enemy is often a civilian – or an individual pretending
to be a civilian – who takes a direct participation in hostilities. The civilian steps out
of his protective status as a civilian and decides to become an enemy belligerent by
taking direct participation in hostilities; that is, he can be targeted under LOAC, even
if he is not a threat to the individual soldier.

In many scenarios, the soldier is able to use lethal force under both under both
concepts: individual self-defence and LOAC’s civilians taking direct part in
hostilities. But the degree of force under each concept is profoundly different. For
example, a civilian takes part in hostilities by shooting at a soldier. After shooting, the
civilian drops his weapon and starts to run away. There is real dispute if a soldier can
shoot the civilian under the concept of individual self-defence; the threat posed by the
civilian has evaporated. However, there is no issue under LOAC: the soldier can shoot
the civilian because the civilian has taken the status of an enemy belligerent. So the
degree of force might be different depending on which authority the soldier applies;
but also, there are scenarios where both concepts do not overlap. For example, an
aggrieved father of an innocent victim attacks a soldier out of remorse – the soldier’s

38
right to respond falls squarely under individual self-defence. To the other extreme, a
civilian helping to place an improvised explosive device (IED) in a road used by
civilians is taking direct participation in hostilities. The intent of the IED is to prevent
governance by funnelling civilians away from government-provided services.
Friendly forces are not in the area, so individual self-defence is not applicable;
however, LOAC concepts of targeting still apply and the civilian can be lethally
targeted; it is part of the military’s mission accomplishment to the win the conflict.

Understanding both concepts have three long-term advantages that will assist both the
nation and military to navigate the use of force in these type of asymmetric conflicts.
First, on a strategic level, it would help educate the Nation and its polity who are
sending troops into harm’s way that there are delineations between defensive
measures, which a soldier always possesses under self-defence, and offensive
measures, which will allows the soldier to win the nation’s armed conflict. Second,
on an operational level, it would compel militaries to train and educate their military
force on the conceptual difference between the defensive use of force under individual
self-defence – which is inherent - and the offensive use of force under LOAC – which
is granted by the State to the individual soldier; this training will solidify the soldier’s
understanding of what force he or she is able to use under both concepts. In turn and
thirdly, on a tactical level, this training would help the soldier understand both his
limits and the expanse of his authority to use force on the battlefield.

Hybrid Warfare and Lawfare – the use of law as a weapon in the

context of Hybrid Warfare.
Sascha Dov Bachmann, Bornemouth University, SEDU and
CEMIS, Stellenbosch University
Hybrid Warfare is an old, multifaceted method of war where different actors, state and
non-state, aim to reach their political or military goals by using a mix of conventional
and non-conventional, or irregular, methods, as well as kinetic and non-kinetic means.
Hybrid Warfare has become increasingly sophisticated and deadly (often involving
cyberwarfare, propaganda and non-state adversary), and the methods used has a long
history of successful employment. Similarly, Lawfare (the use of law as a weapon) is
defined as “the strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military
means to achieve an operational objective”. Lawfare therefore encompasses both
affirmative as well as malicious use and has a goal of manipulating law by changing
legal paradigms (from

39
https://www.academia.edu/34320799/Briefing_paper_Lawfare_in_Hybrid_Wars_The
_21st_Century_Warfare).

Session 6

From Countering Hybrid Threats to Developing Resilience: New (shifting)

Priorities for NATO?

Guillaume Lasconjarias, NATO Defence College, Rome, Italy

For NATO, the Ukraine crisis has been called a “wake-up call” redefining not just the
relationships to Russia but the whole idea of living in a Europe free and at peace. To
deal with security challenges emanating from its Eastern and Southern neighborhood,
NATO has adopted the concept of “hybrid warfare”, designing the combination of
means that could undermine a government’s and nation’s ability to properly protect
and rule over its population. Because these threats tackle domains that are outside the
purely defensive area of responsibility, there’s a need of a holistic response. For
NATO, countering of hybrid threats has therefore been extended to increasing
“civilian preparedness”, packaged in the rejuvenated concept of resilience. For the
Allies, it underlines the enduring ability to keep functioning in the face of internal or
external change. This “resilience pledge” has been endorsed at the Warsaw summit in
July 2016 which further proves the slow shift from countering hybrid threats and
warfare to enhancing resilience.

Special forces and hybrid scenarios “Diplomat warriors” in small

states and medium powers
Njord Wegge, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
Future warfare scenarios increasingly focus on how conventional and unconventional
measures might be applied together in what has been labelled “Hybrid Warfare”. In
such scenarios an opponent tries to reach his political goals through the synchronized
use of different instruments of power tailored to vulnerabilities within the whole of
society, while not going above what has traditionally been described as the threshold
of war (e.g. a NATO article V scenario).

40
This research project investigates the potential role of Special Operation Forces (SOF)
in Hybrid warfare scenarios in states of a small or middle power size. Based on
research on the advantages of SOFs in future hybrid warfare scenarios, combined with
insight into two relevant cases, Norway and Sweden, potential new roles of SOFs in
Hybrid Threat scenarios will be analysed.

The Project concludes by first by supporting the idea that small/medium size states
like Norway and Sweden can, and should, develop SOFs designated for warfare also
in the political, societal and diplomatic domain; while secondly also pointing out that
such a development might demand development of new legal mandates and a
reorganization of parts of the emergency and contingency apparatus.

41