Seldi Rar PDF

Anti-Corruption
Reloaded
Assessment of Southeast Europe

Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI) is an anti-corruption and good governance
initiative created by CSOs from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. SELDI contributes to a dynamic civil society in the region, capable of participating
in public debate and influencing policy and decision-making process in the area of anti-corruption and good
governance. The initiative established a coalition for the development and endorsement of a regional CSO strategy
and action agenda and carries out good governance monitoring. SELDI raises public awareness and advocates
reformist policies through Regional Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Policy Forums.
This report provides a civil society view of the state of corruption and anticorruption in Southeast Europe. It
has been prepared by the SELDI Secretariat (Center for the Study of Democracy) after extensive consultations
with SELDI partners, and is based on nine national Corruption Assessment Reports. The report also reflects the
findings of the Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) in the SELDI countries. Dr. Alexander Stoyanov and Alexander
Gerganov from Vitosha Research, Bulgaria, have provided the methodological guidance and coordination of the
CMS implementation. SELDI would like to acknowledge the comments to the drafts of the report contributed by
Mr. Alain Servantie, Member, SELDI Advisory Board, Ms Sabine Zwaenepoel, Senior Rule of Law Co-ordinator, DG
Enlargement, European Commission, and Mr. Florian Fichtl, former World Bank Officer in Bulgaria and Turkey.
SELDI would like to thank the numerous national public anticorruption organizations from the region, which
have provided comments to the national Corruption Assessment Reports.
SELDI coalition founding members and contributors to this publication are:

Albanian Center for Economic Research (ACER), Albania
Center for Democratic Transition (CDT), Montenegro
Center for Investigative Reporting (CIN), Bosnia and Herzegovina
Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies (CLDS), Serbia
Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Bulgaria
Forum of Civic Action FORCA Pozega, Serbia
House of Europe (HoE), Albania
Institute Alternative (IA), Montenegro
Institute for Democracy ‘Societas Civilis’ Skopje (IDSCS), Republic of Macedonia
Instituti Riinvest, Kosovo
Kosovo Law Institute (KLI), Kosovo
Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC), Republic of Macedonia
Ohrid Institute for Economic Strategies and International Affairs, Republic of Macedonia
Partnership for Social Development (PSD), Croatia
Regional Anticorruption Initiative (RAI) Secretariat, Bosnia and Herzegovina
“Syri i Vizionit”, Kosovo
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Turkey
Editors: Dr. Ognian Shentov, Ruslan Stefanov, Boyko Todorov
This publication has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this
publication are the sole responsibility of the SELDI initiative and can in no way be taken to reflect the views
of the European Union.
2014, Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI)

cubn;d; Creative Commons License
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
ISBN: 978-954-477-221-5
Center for the Study of Democracy

5 Alexander Zhendov Str., 1113 Sofia
tel.: (+359 2) 971 3000, fax: (+359 2) 971 2233
[email protected], www.csd.bg, www.seldi.net
contents
Executive Summary................................................................................................11
Introduction.............................................................................................................25
1. Corruption Levels in Southeast Europe......................................................29

1.1. CMS methodology..................................................................................29
1.2. Experience with corruption...................................................................31
1.3. Attitudes towards corruption................................................................34
1.4. Assessments of the corruption environment......................................35
2. Anticorruption Policies and Regulatory Environment............................39

2.1. National anticorruption strategies.......................................................39
2.2. Assessment of the regulatory environment for anticorruption.......44
2.2.1. Changes to national anticorruption policies...........................44
2.2.2. Specialised anticorruption laws................................................48
2.2.3. Other relevant legislation..........................................................49
2.3. Recommendations..................................................................................53
3. Institutional Practice and Enforcement of the Law..................................55

3.1. Specialised anticorruption institutions...............................................56
3.2. Legislature and party funding.............................................................61
3.3. National audit institutions....................................................................64
3.4. Integrity of the civil service...................................................................67
3.5. Law enforcement.....................................................................................69
4. The Judiciary in Anticorruption...................................................................75

4.1. Governance of the judiciary..................................................................76
4.2. Integrity and accountability..................................................................82
4.3. Specialised anticorruption courts........................................................88
5. Corruption and the Economy........................................................................91

5.1. Business environment and informal economy...................................91
5.2. Government budget and redistribution..............................................96
5.3. Public procurement..............................................................................100
5.4. Recommendations................................................................................ 111

6. Civil Society in Anticorruption.................................................................. 113

6.1. NGOs in the SELDI area: sectoral highlights.................................... 113
6.2. Some anticorruption initiatives.......................................................... 115
6.3. Governments and NGOs: foes or friends?........................................ 117
6.4. Integrity of non-profit governance..................................................... 118
6.5. Recommendations................................................................................122
7. International cooperation...........................................................................125
7.1. Compliance with international anticorruption standards.............126
7.2. Foreign assistance.................................................................................131
7.3. Recommendations................................................................................133
Methodological appendix: corruption monitoring system.......................135
Annex: Executive Summary in SELDI National Languages.......................147
Bibliography..........................................................................................................235

List of figures
Figure 1. Common corruption-related vulnerabilities

in Southeast Europe............................................................................26
Figure 2. Structure of the Corruption Monitoring System Indexes..............29
Figure 3. Corruption pressure and involvement in corruption....................31
Figure 4. Explicit and implicit corruption pressure........................................32
Figure 5. Resilience to corruption pressure.....................................................32
Figure 6. Corruption pressure and acceptability
of corrupt behaviour...........................................................................33
Figure 7. Involvement in corruption – types of bribes...................................33
Figure 8. Involvement in corruption with or without
corruption pressure.............................................................................34
Figure 9. Corruption activities and pressure –
citizens’ involvement in corruption transactions...........................34
Figure 10. Acceptability of corruption................................................................35
Figure 11. Awareness (identification) of common
corruption practices............................................................................35
Figure 12. Susceptibility to corruption...............................................................35
Figure 13. Likelihood of corruption pressure....................................................35
Figure 14. Feasibility of policy responses to corruption..................................36
Figure 15. Estimates of the corruptness of public officials –
regional average...................................................................................36
Figure 16. Estimates by the public: most and least corrupt
occupations (country differences).....................................................36
Figure 17. Estimates of the corruptness of the government
and ministers........................................................................................39
Figure 18. Corruption profile of Croatia.............................................................42
Figure 19. Level of completion of the measures
of the Montenegrin anticorruption strategy....................................43
Figure 20. Estimates of the corruptness of political leaders............................45
Figure 21. Trend in the sentencing of bribery in Bulgaria...............................46
Figure 22. Convictions by type of corruption-related offence,
2009 – 2012, Croatia.............................................................................46
Figure 23. The equilibrium of anticorruption policies.....................................47
Figure 24. Corruption profile of Serbia...............................................................48
Figure 25. Corruption profile of Macedonia......................................................48
Figure 26. Corruption profile of Bulgaria...........................................................49
Figure 27. Corruption profile of Albania............................................................57
Figure 28. Corruption profile of Bosnia and Herzegovina..............................58
Figure 29. Corruption profile of Kosovo.............................................................59
Figure 30. Corruption complaints received by Montenegrin
government bodies in 2012.................................................................60
Figure 31. Corruption profile of Turkey..............................................................61
Figure 32. Estimates of the corruptness of parliaments and MPs..................61
Figure 33. Corruption profile of Montenegro....................................................63
Figure 34. Estimates of the corruptness of national audit institutions
and the tax administration and officials..........................................65
Figure 35. Reports, additional reports and appeal applications submitted
to the prosecution by the Turkish Court of Accounts....................67
Figure 36. Estimates of the corruptness of customs
and customs officers............................................................................67

Figure 37. Performance index of selected Croatian municipalities................68

Figure 38. Share of civil servants and public employees in Macedonia........69
Figure 39. Estimates of the corruptness of the police and police officers ��69
Figure 40. Estimates of police and customs corruption:
Bulgaria compared to EU-27..............................................................70
Figure 41. Discontinued proceedings vs new cases in Bulgaria.....................71
Figure 42. Number of persons sentenced for bribery and abuse
of office in Bulgaria..............................................................................71
Figure 43. Annual numbers of corruption-related
indictments, Croatia............................................................................71
Figure 44. Number of unresolved corruption-related criminal
charges in Kosovo................................................................................72
Figure 45. Estimates of the corruptness of the prosecution
and public prosecutors.......................................................................76
Figure 46. The map of unholy alliances: separation of judicial
and prosecutorial governance...........................................................77
Figure 47. Assessment by the public of the fairness
of courts in Bulgaria............................................................................78
Figure 48. Estimates by the public of the corruptness
of the investigation and investigating officers................................80
Figure 49. Estimates by the public of the corruptness of courts, judges,
lawyers and administration officials in the judiciary....................82
Figure 50. Estimates by the public of corruption among judges
in Bosnia and Herzegovina................................................................84
Figure 51. Sentencing in Bulgaria: fewer effective and more
suspended sentences...........................................................................84
Figure 52. Proliferation of bribery among police and judges in Bulgaria
(how often do the police/judges accept bribes, %)..........................84
Figure 53. Estimates by the public of corruption
among judges in Croatia.....................................................................85
among judges in Macedonia..............................................................86
among judges in Montenegro............................................................87
Figure 56. Conviction rates for general public office crimes
and crimes by magistrates in Serbia.................................................87
Figure 57. Organisational chart of the Croatian criminal
justice structure “USKOK Vertical”..................................................88
Figure 58. How business in Southeast Europe justifies the payment
of bribes to officials..............................................................................91
Figure 59. Performance of SELDI countries in the indicator
“Irregular payments and bribes” of the Global
Competitiveness Report.....................................................................92
Figure 60. Share of businesses stating bribery is frequent in dealing
with courts, BiH compared to Southeast Europe
and Europe and Central Asia............................................................92
Figure 61. Level and practical efficiency of corruption
in the Bulgarian business sector........................................................93
Figure 62. Problems encountered in doing business:
Bulgaria compared to EU-27..............................................................93
Figure 63. How tax evasion is justified by Kosovo business...........................95
Figure 64. Origins of bribe offers in the business-government
transactions in Macedonia.................................................................95

Figure 65. Businessmen considered most corrupt in Turkey..........................96

Figure 66. Performance of some SELDI countries in the index
of the Open Budget Survey................................................................97
“Wastefulness of government spending”
of the Global Competitiveness Report..............................................97
Figure 68. Shares of discretionary and non-discretionary
government spending in Bulgaria....................................................98
Figure 69. Share of public and implicit public debt
in the Croatian GDP............................................................................98
Figure 70. Discretionary vs. non-discretionary spending
in the Croatian national budget........................................................98
“Diversion of public funds” of the Global
Competitiveness Report...................................................................101
Figure 72. Share of various types of public procurement
procedures in four SELDI countries, 2012......................................101
Figure 73. Economic losses due to irregularities in public
procurement in Albania, 2012, (in 000 ALL)..................................102
Figure 74. Corruption in public procurement:
Bulgaria compared to EU average...................................................103
Figure 75. Number of announced public procurements
in Bulgaria by type of procedure....................................................103
Figure 76. Number and share of all announced public
procurements in Bulgaria by type in 2013.....................................104
Figure 77. The escalating corruption-bureaucracy-corruption
cycle of EU funds management in Bulgaria..................................105
Figure 78. Share of tender procedures in Macedonia
with only one bid submitted, 2013..................................................108
Figure 79. In Serbia, fewer procurement contracts
at an increasing value.......................................................................109
Figure 80. Justifications for the use of negotiations
for public procurement in Serbia, 2012........................................... 110
Figure 81. The sustainability index for NGOs in the SELDI countries........ 114
Figure 82. NGOs in Montenegro are considered the most
successful institutions in anticorruption....................................... 116
among the following groups............................................................ 119
Figure 84. Change in public estimates of corruption among
NGO representatives in the SELDI area......................................... 119
Figure 85. Trust in NGOs in Albania................................................................ 119
Figure 86. Public opinion of the raison d’être of NGOs in Macedonia........121
Figure 87. NGOs in Macedonia report corruption
in their own ranks.............................................................................121
Figure 88. Public attitudes towards the transparency
of NGOs in Macedonia.....................................................................121
Figure 89. Public trust in NGOs in Serbia........................................................122
Figure 90. Trust and distrust of the European Union
in some SELDI countries...................................................................125
Figure 91. The triangulation principle: ensuring
the sustainability of anticorruption reforms.................................126
Figure 92. EU funding for anticorruption per capita
of the population (€), 2007 – 2012....................................................131

Figure 93. Share of anticorruption funding

in total EU pre-accession assistance...............................................131
Figure 94. Share of anticorruption and judicial reform
assistance in overall EU assistance to Croatia...............................131
Figure 95. EU rule of law assistance to Kosovo...............................................132
List of tables
Table 1. Number of convicted for crimes against justice in Albania..........83

Table 2. Estimates by the public of corruption among
the institutions of governance in Albania.......................................83
the institutions of governance in Kosovo........................................86
the institutions of governance in Turkey.........................................87
Table 5. Transparency and CSO participation in the review
process of UNCAC in Bulgaria........................................................127
Table 6. Compliance of legislation in Serbia with some
international anticorruption instruments.....................................129
Table 7. Status of implementation of GRECO third round
evaluation recommendations on Turkey........................................130
List of boxes
Box 1. A model for monitoring anticorruption reforms............................41

Box 2. Proper diagnosis is half the cure: the case for smart
anticorruption policies........................................................................44
Box 3. How organised crime subverts law enforcement...........................70
Box 4. Procurement in the Bulgarian energy sector................................104
Box 5. Irregularities in the distribution of EU funds in Bulgaria..........105
Box 6. Oiling the wheels: collusion between ministers
and businessmen in Croatia............................................................106
Box 7. Dealing with high level corruption in Kosovo..............................107
Box 8. Sample criminal referrals on public procurement
related charges by the Macedonian State Commission
for Prevention of Corruption...........................................................108
Box 9. Procurement irregularities in Montenegro...................................109
Box 10. Best anticorruption practices by Bosnian NGOs.......................... 115
Box 11. Clean politics in Turkey: an initiative............................................. 116
Box 12. Kosovo’s Government Strategy for Cooperation
with Civil Society 2013 – 2017.......................................................... 118
Box 13. Government millions for private media
in Republika Srpska..........................................................................120
Box 14. The pitfalls of commercialising non-profits in Bulgaria..............120
Box 15. Allegations of corruption in the TI chapter Croatia.....................121
Box 16. CIPE: a global anticorruption leader...............................................132

List of abbreviations
AL Albania
ALL Albanian Lek
BAM Bosnia and Herzegovina Convertible Mark
BG Bulgaria
BGN Bulgarian Lev
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
CSD Center for the Study of Democracy
CMS Corruption Monitoring System
CSO civil society organisation
CVM Co-operation and Verification Mechanism
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo
EURALIUS European Assistance Mission to the Albanian Justice System
GCR Global Competitiveness Report
GRECO Groupe d’Etats contre la corruption – Group of States
against corruption
HR Croatia
KV Kosovo
ME Montenegro
MK Macedonia
MPs Members of Parliament
NGO non-governmental organisation
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSD Partnership for Social Development
RS Serbia
RSD Serbian Dinar
SEE South East Europe
SELDI Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity
TI Transparency International
TL Turkish Lira
TR Turkey
UNCAC United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USKOK Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta –
Croatian Bureau for Combating Corruption
and Organized Crime
Executive Summary
C
orruption in Southeast Europe has been in the news, in the focus of
public debate, and on the policy agenda of national and international
institutions so often and for so long that its scrutiny hardly needs
to be justified. It is precisely because it has proven to be such an
intractable issue that innovative approaches to its understanding – and hence
its reduction – are warranted. The EU accession prospects for the countries in
the region – though distant – provide an enabling framework for action but
it is local stakeholders, and in particular civil society who can bring about
sustained progress in anti-corruption. The Southeast Europe Leadership for
Development and Integrity (SELDI) has made the in-depth diagnosing and
understanding of corruption and governance gaps in the region one of its
main priorities, as a requisite condition for its advocacy of knowledge-driven
anticorruption policies. This SELDI report fits in the development and
implementation framework of the emerging regional anticorruption policy
and infrastructure as exemplified by the SEE2020 Strategy’s Governance
Pillar run by the Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative.
Being the result of collaboration within SELDI, this report is innovative in

both its method and its process. It is the result of the application of a system
developed by SELDI in the early 2000s for the assessment of both corruption
and anticorruption, tailored to the social and institutional environment of
Southeast Europe.1 The victimisation survey-based approach employed by
the Corruption Monitoring System used in the report provides a unique data-
driven assessment of anticorruption progress in the region since 2001. The
2013 – 2014 round of assessment – the findings of which are summarised
in this report – is a rare case in international monitoring practice whereby
the same issues and the same region are revisited after a little more
than a decade. The assessment has compared the national legislation and
institutional practice in a number of areas critical to anticorruption efforts:
regulatory and legal framework, institutional prerequisites, corruption in the
economy, the role of civil society and international cooperation. The report
provides a civil society view and policy assessment while its findings and
recommendations have been consulted with national and regional public
institutions.
The assessment of the national institutional and legal aspects making

corruption in the region possible is not intended as a comprehensive inventory
of regulations and practices in all countries but rather emphasises some of
the priority issues relevant to potential efforts of stemming common sources
of corruption in Southeast Europe (SEE). The report provides a model for
reporting on anticorruption progress by civil society in SEE.
1
(SELDI, 2002).
12 Anti-Corruption Reloaded
MAIN FINDINGS
Overall assessment Despite some important achievements – mostly with respect to the stabilisa
tion of democratic institutions, the adoption of laws in key anticorruption
areas, a reduction in petty bribery and growing public intolerance
of corruption – anticorruption and good governance reforms are not
consolidated, corruption among elected politicians and judges seems to be
increasing and the enforcement of anticorruption legislation is haphazard.
Anticorruption policies and institutions in the region will benefit immensely
from the adoption of regular and accurate victimisation-survey based tool for
measuring corruption and the rate of progress in good governance, similar
to the special Eurobarometer on anticorruption, UNODC’s SEE monitoring
of corruption and organised crime, and the Corruption Monitoring System
employed by this report.
Prevalence of corruption The experience with corruption – in other words, the involvement of members
in Southeast Europe of the public in corruption transactions – in SEE is very high. Even in Turkey
and Croatia, where levels of administrative corruption are lowest in the
region, about 8-9% of the population report having given a bribe in the last
year. Such levels of experience with corruption are well beyond the average
levels registered by the Eurobarometer surveys in the EU.2 This shows that
administrative corruption is a mass phenomenon and cannot be confined to
single cases of corrupt officials.
Corruption pressure and involvement in corruption Substantial differences between countries with a com-
mon historical background show that different paths of
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social, economic and institutional development render
differing results. Overall, except for Bulgaria, the chang-

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es since the previous SELDI rounds of CMS diagnostics
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(2001 and 2002) for all countries are positive; progress,
however, has been slow and uneven.

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Corruption pressure from officials is the main factor
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that statistically influences the level of involvement.
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Most of the countries where both involvement and

pressure are high are also characterised by low resil-
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ience to corruption pressure (most of the respondents
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ience could not be considered the main factor to reduce
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corruption, it reflects the prevailing social attitudes to
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ety and authorities in increasing anticorruption aware-

ness. In this respect the role of civil society is crucial as
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. it is in a position to evaluate results and lead the public
pressure for change.
2
Indicators for experience with corruption used in the Eurobarometer surveys have slightly
different content as they refer to direct experience and cases when respondents have witnessed
cases of bribery. For more details, please refer to (TNS Opinion & Social, February 2014).
Executive Summary 13
Anticorruption policies Overall, the SELDI countries have adopted the better part – more importantly
and legislation the logic and approach – of international anticorruption standards in their
national legislations. Statutory quality, however, continues to be a problem.
Frequent and inconsistent changes to laws have resulted in procedural and
statutory complexity and contradictory interpretation by courts.
All countries have adopted some kind of strategic document containing their
overall approach to tackling corruption. Though there are some differences
among the countries, the implementation of these documents is generally
hampered by insufficient resources and commitment at the senior government
level. A further problem across the region has been the designing of strategies
in a way to address all possible aspects of corruption. Instead of prioritising,
these documents became all-embracing; with respect to anticorruption,
strategic has come to signify simply exhaustive.
As regards policy priorities, there have been two significant changes in the
approach to anticorruption – a shift of attention from petty corruption (that of
traffic police or public sector doctors) to grand (that of members of parliament
or ministers) and criminalisation of a wider array of abuses of public office.
Achieving impact in terms of punishing grand corruption though remains
limited at best. The key challenge for anticorruption policies in the region is
to close the implementation gap, and keep up with the shifting manifestations
and forms of corruption while maintaining regulatory stability and avoiding
overwhelming the judiciary with frequent changes.
The findings of SELDI monitoring emphasise the significance of public

support for the success of anticorruption policies. Trust by the public in
government and the effectiveness of policy are joined in a kind of virtuous
circle: higher shares of people who are optimistic about the feasibility of
anticorruption success are correlated with lower corruption levels. Conversely,
more prevalent corruption goes hand in hand with increased pessimism
about the prospects of anticorruption.
Institutional practice and In Southeast Europe, the earlier emphasis on harmonising national legislation
enforcement of the law with international standards in anti-corruption has been gradually giving
way to a focus on enforcement under increasing EU and local civil society
pressure.
A shortcoming that is common to all SELDI countries is the compromised

autonomy of the various oversight and law enforcement bodies. Some
degree of interference by elected politicians – members of parliament or
government ministers – in the work of the civil service is typical. Further,
none of the SELDI countries has an adequately functioning complaints
management mechanism in the public administration. Most have instituted
an anticorruption body that is expected to receive complaints from the
public. Another deficiency that is shared is the shortage of reliable and
publicly accessible data on the performance of government institutions,
especially as relates to anticorruption. Information and statistics are either
not collected, not available to the public, or gathered so haphazardly as not
to allow monitoring and analysis.
One of the key issues related to the design of specialised national

anticorruption institutions in the region is how to combine preventive and
repressive functions. Typically, the SELDI countries have tried to have their
anticorruption institutions do both, although repression is by far the lesser
aspect of their work. Most of the tasks of these bodies are related to some form
of supervision and control, usually of the national anticorruption strategies
and there is little evidence that they have had any significant influence on the
governments’ legislative agenda. The establishment and functioning of such
institutions has been plagued by a number of difficulties:
• High as corruption might have been on the governments’ agendas, it was

not feasible to create institutions with extraordinary powers that would
somehow affect the established balance of power. The typical compromise
is for these agencies to be attached to the executive branch and given
supervisory powers which, however, are usually limited to requiring other
government agencies to report on the implementation of the anticorruption
tasks assigned to them.
• Such agencies had to be careful not to duplicate powers already conferred
to other oversight bodies (e.g. national audit institutions or law enforcement
agencies).
• Most were provided with limited institutional capacity – budget, personnel –
despite declared intentions to the opposite.
As regards the legislature, parliaments in the region do not rank high in the
public trust and this unenviable position is not without its reasons. Codes of
ethical behaviour are rare and unenforced; lobbying regulation is even rarer;
only recently have procedures for lifting immunity from prosecution started
to be introduced, albeit timidly; wherever there is an anticorruption body
in parliament, it is typically to supervise some executive agency, rather than
deal with corruption among members. An issue of significant concern in the
SELDI countries is the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns.
Most countries have implemented GRECO’s recommendations on party
funding but a number of problems – such as anonymous donations, vote
buying (or voter bribing), insufficient capacity to audit party finances and
limited powers to enforce sanctions – persist.
The present state of the civil service corresponds to the transitional nature of
the SEE countries and the lack of adequate legal and institutional traditions
as well as to chronic underfunding. Despite some differences among the
countries, the need to facilitate managerial and organisational development
within the civil service is common to most. The culture of “control” of the
administration instead of managing its work through motivation is what
obstructs both enhanced professionalism and reduced corruption. One of the
main findings in the report is the mutual reinforcement between competence
and integrity. Typically, whenever the anticorruption credentials of a given
government department are questioned, it is also found to be wanting in terms
of institutional capacity. Conversely, any gain in professionalism has also led
to improvement in integrity. Thus, the challenge in the region is how to make
transparency and accountability essential characteristics of the civil service
while also enhancing its professionalism. Quite often, it is poor management,
obscure criteria and inadequate division of powers and responsibilities that
hamper reform and undermine government authority.
The anticorruption role of law enforcement agencies in the region needs to

be understood against the background of the constantly expanding range
of incriminated corruption-related practices which risks channelling a
disproportionate number of cases to law enforcement and the prosecution.
The anticorruption role of law enforcement agencies in Southeast Europe is
further compromised by their high vulnerability to corruption, especially
by organised crime. The police forces in most SELDI countries have units
specialising in countering organised crime operations; these units are also
expected to work on anticorruption. Accommodating these two functions
into one body is warranted mostly by the use of corruption by organised
crime but also by the need for special investigative methods in uncovering
sophisticated corruption schemes – expertise that is usually vested in the anti-
organised crime departments. These units are, however, typically embedded
in the larger police force or the ministries of interior which deprive them of
the institutional autonomy that is required for a specialised anticorruption
institution.
The judiciary In Southeast Europe the strong focus on ensuring judicial independence has
in anticorruption not been balanced by equally strong requirements for accountability. Without
adequate checks and balances judicial self-governance has spiralled out of
control, and has turned into corporatism with all the associated corruption
risks. An overemphasis on formal electoral independence became a typical
example of the cure turning into the disease – instead of ensuring a balance
to the executive power, self-governance perpetuated clientele-type relations
between magistrates and special interests. Today, the judiciary in SEE has been
as effectively captured as the other branches of power. Once emancipated from
public scrutiny and the political factors that brought about such arrangements,
there are today few checks on the rent-seeking by magistrates.
Not surprisingly, the public does not hold the judiciary in particularly high
esteem. SELDI’s Corruption Monitoring System finds that magistrates are
considered among the most corrupt public officials in the region. the absence
of transparency and accountability is arguably a significant factor in such
assessments. In all SELDI countries, there has been a tangible deterioration of
the assessment of the spread of corruption among magistrates since 2001.
The capacity of the judiciary in the region to enforce anticorruption legislation,

especially as regards political corruption, has been undermined by a number
of problems that have exerted their influence cumulatively:
• Constitutional issues, primarily related to restoring the balance between

independence and accountability of the judiciary;
• The complexity of the criminal prosecution of perpetrators of criminal
offences of corruption, especially at the political level;
• Overall insufficient capacity and the related issues of low professionalism,
excessive workload, and resulting backlog of cases, case management,
facilities, etc.
An important finding of this SELDI round of corruption monitoring that

is relevant to the judicial role in anticorruption is the lack of feedback
mechanisms that allow the public and policy makers to evaluate both
the integrity of the judiciary and its effectiveness in applying criminal
anticorruption laws. In none of the SEE countries is there a reliable, systematic

and comprehensive mechanism for collecting, processing and making
publicly available statistics on the work of the courts and the prosecution,
in particular on corruption cases.
Corruption and In Southeast Europe, the outstanding considerable involvement of govern

the economy ments in the economy generates a number of points of potential conflict
between public institutions and business; in turn, this creates corruption
risk. The risk is particularly high in the area of privatisation and in public
procurement and concessions heavy industries such as energy and health
care. Further, business overregulation – mostly concerning registration,
licensing and permit regimes – continues to generate various barriers to
market entrants and higher costs of doing business although some countries
in the region have made substantial progress in tackling business obstacles.
Yet, oversight and compliance administrations still distort markets through
focusing overwhelmingly on control and penalties without proper risk and
cost-benefit evaluation. This is particularly true of customs administrations
across the region, which are still seen as effective means for pressure on
businesses. This either drives entrepreneurs in the informal sector or compels
them to resort to bribery. In a downward spiral this then justifies further
regulation and administrative barriers.
The variety of circumstances that occasion corruption in the interactions of

business and public officials illustrate the difficulty anticorruption policies
face as they need to take a multitude of factors under consideration. When
initiated by business, corrupt practices can be divided into two main
categories – avoiding extra costs and gaining unfair advantage. In the
first group are the kickbacks necessitated by poor or excessive regulation,
individual or institutional incompetence, etc.; in the second are various types
of fraud – tax evasion, VAT fraud, smuggling, non-compliance with health
and safety standards, etc.
In Southeast Europe, government procurement is one of the main channels

through which corruption affects the economy. Corruption risk in this
area is associated with a number of deficiencies: insufficiently transparent
procedures, large share of non-competitive procedures, weak oversight and
ineffective judicial review (given judicial corruption), etc. Although more
than a decade ago a SELDI study found that the countries in the area had
made recent progress in strengthening the legal framework of the process
and its harmonisation with the EU acquis, public procurement continues to be
among the weakest aspects of public governance. Realities have not changed
much since as well-conceived rules are circumvented by corrupt politicians
and well connected businesses. Institutional fragmentation does not allow
effective implementation of public procurement rules.
Civil society Non-governmental organisations in Southeast Europe are among the most
in anticorruption important driving forces in anticorruption. They are, however, still a long
way from translating public demands into effective advocacy for policies,
and from standing up to corruption due to a number of shortcomings. Their
contribution depends in no small measure on being capable of both serving
as watchdogs and engaging government in anticorruption reforms. Still,
there is a lack of formal mechanisms for engaging civil society by national

governments in the region, as well as lack of administrative capacity
and clear vision and understanding of the potential of CSOs in the field
of anticorruption. Over-reliance on international, including European
financing, and the lack of national policies for nurturing vibrant civic
sectors in Southeast Europe, compromise the sustainable impact of local
anticorruption champions.
Resilience to corruption pressure Although NGOs in the SELDI area have managed
to establish some international public-private
BNPOHUIPTFQSFTTVSFEJOUPCSJCJOH
partnerships, these were not transformed into effective

"MCBOJB partnerships with national government institutions as
.BDFEPOJB well. The key to making partnering successful has been
,PTPWP the capacity to enter into various relations with state
.POUFOFHSP institutions, both complementary and confrontational.
4FSCJB One way, for example, of reconciling cooperation with
#VMHBSJB performing a watchdog function, has been to enhance
$SPBUJB
the professionalism of NGO monitoring of corruption
#PTOJBBOE
)FS[FHPWJOB and anticorruption policies.
5VSLFZ
The effectiveness of NGOs in addressing the issues of
#SJCFECFDBVTFQSFTTVSFE /PBOTXFS good public governance in SELDI countries depends to
%JEOPUCSJCF EFTQJUFQSFTTVSF a great extent on their capacity to maintain their own
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. governance in order. The risk of capturing of NGOs by
special interests and corrupt public officials or elected
politicians stems from the opportunity to exploit a number of vulnerabilities
of the non-profit sector in the region:
• absence of mandatory procedures for transparency;

• ineffective control of compliance with financial regulations;
• lack of auditing culture;
• low level of self-regulation and coordination of efforts.
Countering civil society capture as part of national anticorruption efforts in

Southeast Europe should be on the top of the reform agenda in the region.
International International institutions and foreign partner countries have played an

cooperation important role in the anticorruption developments in Southeast Europe.
Given the extreme partisanship in domestic politics, international
commitments facilitate the adoption of reform policies that might otherwise
have been shunned by national politicians. Progress reports by the European
Commission, EU funding for reforms and twinning arrangements are crucial
international influences on the national anticorruption agendas in most SEE
countries. Although anticorruption is one of the main elements of the EC
progress reports, they are received locally in different ways – countries with
clearer accession prospects pay much more and detailed attention to the
reports’ findings, while in Turkey, for example, reports generally receive
less attention.
International involvement, however, also brought with itself the risk of

unrealistic expectations for quick fixes which in turn could prompt the
adoption of superficial and ad hoc measures. Conditionality and most of the
incentives affect primarily the executive branch agencies, while the judiciary,
parliaments and other concerned public and private institutions were not
sufficiently involved. The sustainability of international engagement was
bolstered by the broadening of the range of involved local stakeholders to
include civil society, media, professional associations, trade unions, etc. This
broadening of the domestic interlocutors of international partners has had the
effect of empowering isolated reformist politicians or political groups but also
various non-government actors and encouraging public demand for reforms.
Continuing and building on this engagement would be crucial to the leverage
the EU has in the region. For this to happen, a government-to-Brussels
connection is not sufficient. The engagement by international partners of
reformist politicians and parties needs to be supported – and verified – by
civil society in a kind of trilateral cooperation.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The experience of SELDI countries in tackling corruption since 2001

demonstrates that solving the corruption challenge in the region would
require sustained efforts on many fronts and the involvement of all local
and international stakeholders over the long term. The current report
provides a number of recommendations to achieve further progress in
limiting corruption. Among these, three key areas need to be prioritised
by countries in the region and at the European level in order to achieve
breakthrough in the mid-term:
Feasibility of policy responses to corruption: Effective prosecution of corrupt high level politicians
public estimates and senior civil servants is the only way to send a strong
and immediate message that corruption would not be
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPO
tolerated. Bringing crooked politicians to justice has

5VSLFZ
proven very effective in strengthening anticorruption
$SPBUJB
.POUFOFHSP
measures in Croatia and Slovenia, for example. Success

,PTPWP
in this direction would require also international
#PTOJBBOE
support, including the involvement of EU member states
)FS[FHPWJOB
4FSCJB law enforcement.
#VMHBSJB
.BDFEPOJB An independent corruption and anti-corruption
"MCBOJB monitoring mechanism needs to be introduced on
national and regional level in order to provide robust
$PSSVQUJPODBOOPUCFTVCTUBOUJBMMZSFEVDFE data and analysis and integrate both corruption
$PSSVQUJPODBOCFTVCTUBOUJBMMZSFEVDFEPSFSBEJDBUFE
diagnostics and anticorruption policy evaluation.
%POhULOPX/PBTOXFS
The mechanism should be implemented through
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. national and/or regional civil society organisations
and networks, and should be independent of direct
national government funding. It should serve as a vehicle for opening
up administrative data and enhancing public access to information. Data
allowing the tracking of public procurement, concessions, the enforcement
of conflict of interest legislation, state aid, budget transfers, the annual
performance reports of oversight and compliance agencies, etc., should
be made publicly available in a database format, thus allowing big data
analysis and the use of monitoring tools.
Critical sectors with high corruption and state-capture risks, such as

the energy sector, should be addressed with priority. The other priority
measures include:
• increasing competition in public procurement;

• improving the corporate governance of state owned enterprises;
• transparent management of large-scale investment projects;
• enhancing the accountability and independence of energy regulatory
authorities.
International partners, and primarily the European Commission, should

engage directly civil society organisations in the region. This is essential for
several reasons: a) for internationally supported reforms to become sustainable,
they need to gain wider public acceptance and CSOs are indispensable for
this to happen; b) involvement of CSOs is a way of guaranteeing that the
accountability of governments to donors and international organisations
does not take precedence over accountability to local constituencies;
c) the effectiveness of international assistance would be enhanced if it utilises
the monitoring and analytical skills and advocacy capabilities of CSOs;
d) a direct engagement would have the added benefit of preventing civil
society being captured by the clientelistic networks of unreformed and often
corrupt public administrations.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Policies and legislation
• Define national anticorruption efforts in terms of policy related to

quantifiable goals and milestones rather than simply measures or
legislation. This would entail setting specific targets to be achieved and
selecting appropriate intervention methods. These targets should be
quantified as much as feasible.
• Prioritise certain sectors, types of corruption and methods of intervention
and pilot different approaches before rolling out full blown measures.
Corruption is a broad concept, related to various and varying types of
fraud which cannot be addressed simultaneously in an effective way.
• Policies need to be informed. While some effort has been made in the
national anticorruption strategies to estimate previous results, none
of the SELDI countries has a sustainable mechanism of evaluation of
anticorruption policies. At the very least, this requires: a) reliable and
regular statistics about anticorruption efforts (investigations, prosecutions,
administrative measures, etc.); b) regular monitoring and analysis of
the spread and forms of corruption in the various public sectors. The
monitoring should be independent and/or external to the country, involve
civil society and incorporate the basic components of non-administrative
corruption monitoring systems, such as SELDI’s CMS.
Anticorruption institutions and enforcement of the law
• Introduce a feedback mechanism for the enforcement of anticorruption

policies. The mechanism could be based on innovative new instruments
made more readily available in recent years, such as the Integrated
Anticorruption Enforcement Monitoring Toolkit developed by the Center for
the Study of Democracy and the University of Trento. It allows policy
makers to assess corruption risks in a given government institution and
the effect of the corresponding anticorruption policy, identifying the
highest impact solutions.
• The institutional capacity of the relevant government bodies – particularly
the specialised anticorruption agencies and oversight agencies such as
the national audit institutions – including their budgets, facilities and
personnel need to be aligned with the wide remit these institutions are
given. Alternatively, they should design more narrow annual or mid-term
programmes, which prioritise interventions.
• National audit institutions should also have their institutional leverage
strengthened, including the powers to impose harsher sanctions. Both
auditees and national parliaments should be obligated to follow up on
the reports of these institutions. The national audit institutions should
also be mandated to audit the management of EU funds where these are
administered by national authorities. As performance audit work is at a very
early stage, they should develop their capacity to carry out more of these.
• Further measures are needed to ensure that recruitment to the civil service
is merit based and not dependent on political party affiliation.
• The anticorruption work needs to be shared more evenly among
government bodies. Expanding the range of statutory incrimination
should be balanced by enhanced capacity in all public bodies to address
corruption in their ranks through administrative tools instead of “buck-
passing” responsibility to police and prosecution. General public
administration bodies should act as gatekeepers of the criminal justice
system by dealing with as many corruption cases as their administrative
powers allow them. At the very least, this entails the creation of effective
complaints management mechanisms.
• The forfeiture of illegally obtained assets in corruption cases is an
anticorruption tool the application of which should be expanded. While
special care needs to be applied to balance the rights of the accused with
the interests of public good – especially in an environment of often corrupt
public administrations – wealth confiscation following criminal convictions
is an important deterrence which is still underutilised in SEE.
Judiciary
• Countries where the majority of the judicial self-governing bodies are not
elected among magistrates should adopt reforms increasing their voting
power. Countries that have not, should adopt the “one magistrate – one
vote” principle.
• Ensure that the election of the judicial quota is as representative as
possible, including judges from first instance courts. Carefully review, and
if needed reconsider, the compatibility of the position of court chairperson
with membership of the judicial self-governing bodies.
• In countries where both the prosecution and the courts are governed by
the same body, two colleges – for the prosecutors and for judges – need to
be separated within this body. Prosecutors and judges, respectively, would

only be elected to these colleges.
• Abolish or reduce to a minimum the role of government ministers
(typically of justice) in judicial self-governing bodies, especially as
regards decisions on disciplinary procedures.
• Magistrates should be prioritised in the mechanism for verification of
asset declarations.
• The independence and capacity of judicial inspectorates should be
strengthened to allow them to step up inspections.
• Introduce feedback mechanisms for the enforcement of anticorruption
policies with respect to magistrates. These mechanisms are substantially
deficient or practically missing in all SELDI countries; their absence
sabotages the repression aspect of anticorruption policies and renders
further incrimination of corruption useless. A possible best practice
to be replicated – although it is still underdeveloped – is Kosovo’s
Platform of Anticorruption Statistics, designed by an NGO. Such a
mechanism should include regular information about: disciplinary
and administrative and criminal measures in the public service and
the judiciary; the various aspects of criminal prosecution, including
indictments and convictions/acquittals, and sentences by the various
types of corruption offences.
Corruption and the economy
• Reduce to a minimum and review annually state aid policies as they create
considerable corruption risks. Introduce in advance strict enforcement of
EU state aid rules, and develop the capacity of national independent state
aid regulators to enforce the rules.
• Improve the enforcement of anti-monopoly legislation in order to promote
free enterprise and competition. Apply special care and review regularly
concentration in sectors which are heavily regulated and face licensing
and other restrictions, thus creating a risk of collusion between larger
competitors and politicians.
• Countries that have not done so should establish institutional links
between the management of assets and liabilities of all public finances,
including state-owned companies, in order to mitigate financial risks
and enhance the government´s credibility in public finance management.
State-owned enterprises should meet stringent corporate governance
and reporting requirements (e.g. OECD rules), on par with publicly
traded companies. These enterprises should publish online quarterly
reports.
• Introduce liability and sanctions for contracting authorities who fail to
submit reports on public procurement in continuity, reports on violations
of anticorruption regulations or submit incorrect or incomplete data.
• Define a legal and institutional framework for the management and control
of contracts concluded by public-private partnerships.
• Improve oversight of procurement by large public procurers (state-owned
enterprises and utility companies) to maximise the efficiency and reduce
irregularities.
• Adopt policies to reduce the share of public procurement tenders with
only one bidder and enhance competition. Publish in online searchable
data-base format the complete documentation on public procurement pre-
notices, notices, bids, contracts, and any addendum thereof.
• EU candidate countries that do not have one should establish decentralised

implementation systems for EU funds to provide the appropriate legal
and administrative framework for the transfer of responsibilities for the
implementation of the EU funded programmes. Oversight should remain
centralised and independent of implementation bodies.
• Introduce the concept of value-for-money in the evaluation of public
procurement contracts.
Civil society
• Enhance the capacity of civil society organisations to monitor and report

on corruption and anticorruption, including the ability to collect and
collate primary information on the operation of government institutions,
skills for the measurement of the actual proliferation of corruption and in
the analysis of data, institutional evaluation and report writing.
• Conflict of interest legislation should include non-profit institutions,
especially where they are funded via government administered
programmes, such as national budget, EU funds, etc.
• Rules and regulations for public funding – both by central and local
governments – of non-profit organisations should be clear and transparent.
Only NGOs registered in the public benefit should be allowed to receive
public funding, and should respectively meet more stringent reporting
and disclosure requirements.
• The European Union and other donor agencies should consider a larger
share of funding for good governance programmes implemented in
collaboration between civil society organisations and public institutions.
These programmes should have explicit requirements against the capture
of NGOs by special interests. It should be noted that achieving impact
requires longer-term (10 years and above) sustained commitment.
• The civil society sector needs to provide for its own self-regulation. At
the minimum, this involves adopting codes of conduct with aspirational
standards. They should also find more and better ways of organising
coalitions of interest.
• NGOs need better understanding of the need to be transparent and
accountable. This includes undergoing regular auditing, disclosure of
financial statements, explicit and transparent corporate governance
procedures, and measures against capture by special interests.
• The non-EU member countries of SEE would be well advised to learn from the
body of knowledge and expertise contained in the EU Anticorruption Report.
This would provide them with valuable insights with respect to the evaluation
of the spread of corruption and the design of anticorruption policies.
International cooperation
• Foreign assistance programmes need to better reflect the findings of

international and independent domestic evaluations. For this to be
achieved, assistance programmes need to be made more responsive and
flexible, including a shorter time lag between design and delivery.
• International anticorruption assistance to national governments should
envisage a stronger role for civil society. This includes the involvement of
NGOs as implementation partners, monitors and resource organisations,
especially in the evaluation of the impact of assistance projects.
• The effectiveness of assistance needs to be periodically evaluated through

impact assessment methods. In addition to providing a value-for-money
measure – especially when there has been public funding involved – this
would allow successful programmes to be sustained while unsuccessful
to be discontinued. It is imperative that this assessment be independent
and that it utilises the expertise of civil society organisations.
• Assistance needs to encourage cross-country programmes on common
issues, such as trans-border crime. The Bulgarian experience in public-
private cooperation in the analysis of the linkages of organised crime and
corruption should be utilised across the region.
• European Commission regular reports’ preparation and findings should
be better embedded in local policy-making by drawing more heavily upon
local civil society and business community.
Introduction
C
orruption in Southeast Europe has been in the news and on the
policy agenda of national and international institutions so often
that its scrutiny hardly needs to be justified. However, it is precisely
because it has proven to be such an intractable issue that innovative
approaches to its understanding – and therefore its reduction – are justified.
Today corruption is frequently referred to as a “global concern”; less frequently

understood is that it is also originated by factors which do not recognise
national borders. This is especially true in Southeast Europe (SEE) where a
number of interconnected common causes – armed conflicts, transborder
crime, communist legacy, low level of development – have conspired to turn
bribery and abuse of public office into a systemic problem for the countries
in the region. In addition, there are also a number of factors that the SEE
countries share without these being regional in nature: rapid modernisation
and the ensuing shift in social structures, both internal (rural-urban) and
international migration, ethnic minorities that are coextensive with the poor
sections of the population, etc.
It is also often said that these countries are “in transition”; democracy and
market economy are most frequently mentioned in this respect. What is not
always appreciated is how broad and deep is the social makeover that they
have undergone. SEE has suffered a period of political, social, economic and
other upheaval which is inimical to compliance with official law and causes
the proliferation of “micro” ethics which seem just only in specific contexts.
The unsettling of established mores, loyalties and identities has hampered the
shaping of sustained reformist constituencies which would demand better
public governance. The general problem for a society that intends to reorder
its entire mechanism of governance is where the reformist drive would come
from. If corruption has become the dominant mode of transaction in public
life, how would an alternative political force that receives the trust of a
critical mass of citizens be built?
“Reform” has become an overused term, which is partly due to failure to

appreciate that genuine reforms – anticorruption in particular – entail costs;
the key consideration, therefore, is how these costs are to be distributed and
borne. In an environment where patron-client relations are well embedded,
no political agent wants its clients affected which leads to impasse and stalling
reforms. Thus, talk of the costs of reforms is shunned by both national
government and international partners, while the benefits are celebrated.
Acknowledging this would help find a truly reformist constituency which is
what the anticorruption efforts in SEE need today.
In this context, policies hoping to upset entrenched special interests cannot be

delivered through traditional bureaucracies alone. High level of partisanship
in SEE prevents reformist politicians from mustering the type of public
support needed to make anticorruption efforts successful. For this to happen,
broad public coalitions need to be formed both within the countries, and
region-wide. It is often wrongly assumed that anticorruption efforts would
be opposed only by corrupt politicians and bureaucrats but somehow

automatically supported by the general public. Corruption flourishes – or
diminishes – not just because of the legal framework or government law
enforcement but also in a social and cultural environment the informal
rules and sanctions of which are sometimes more effective than those of law
enforcement. Any anticorruption programme in the SEE countries needs to
ensure that it is tailored to these local social networks in a way that makes
them receptive to reformist policies.
Figure 1. Common corruption-related vulnerabilities A further feature of corruption in SEE that warrants
in Southeast Europe cooperation between government, including inter
national institutions, and NGOs is that it has turned
Privatisation course that bred corruption into a typical development problem for these countries.
Institutionalised corruption distorts the economy,
creates sharp inequalities, prevents the modernisation
Difficulties attracting foreign investment
of the education system and public healthcare, affects
social programs, diminishes the public's trust in
Environments favourable to organised crime government institutions and breeds disillusionment
with reforms in general. All this makes corruption a
typical development concern. Development problems,
Sizeable grey economies however, are rarely amenable to administrative
solutions but require partnerships between government
and business, between NGOs and public institutions in
High unemployment exacerbated by the global economic crisis
order to complement enforcement and prevention, to
combine government policies and civic involvement, to
Source: (SELDI, 2013). create shared value.
In the past decade, both the nature of corruption and the anticorruption
agenda in Southeast Europe have changed. Political corruption has replaced
petty bribery both as the dominant concern of national and international
reformists and as the cause of most social and economic damage. The
earlier emphasis on harmonising national legislation with international
standards has now been substituted by a focus on its enforcement. Statutory
quality, however, continues to be a problem. Frequent and inconsistent
changes to laws have resulted in procedural and statutory complexity and
contradictory interpretation by courts. Complexity, however, is not a friend
of good governance: it has the same effect as opacity. Furthermore, “the rules
mainly focus on restrictions and prohibitions, to the detriment of public
disclosure and transparency, which curtails their effect.”3
The Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI)4

has made the in-depth understanding of these changes one of its main
priorities, as a requisite condition for its advocacy of knowledge-driven
anticorruption policies. To this end, in the early 2000s, SELDI developed a
civil society centric public-private cooperation model for the assessment of
both corruption and anticorruption, tailored to the social and institutional
3
(GRECO, 2014, p. 4).
4
The SELDI countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. The designation “Kosovo” is without prejudice
to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the
Kosovo declaration of independence. Тhe official denomination for “Macedonia” used in EU
documents remains “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. As the current report is
not an official EU document, SELDI partners have unanimously agreed to use the shorter
and accepted in the country name “Macedonia”.
Introduction 27
environment of Southeast Europe. Such a combined evaluation allows policy

makers and civil society to identify the correspondence – or, more often the
absence of it – between anticorruption intentions and outcomes in terms of
reduced corruption. Using this model, in 2002 SELDI carried out the first
regional measurement of the proliferation of corruption and evaluation of
institutional performance in the SEE countries.5 The 2013 – 2014 round of
assessment – the findings of which are summarised in this report – is a rare
case in international monitoring practice whereby the same issues and the
same region are revisited after a little more than a decade.
The evidence of progress is clear: two SELDI countries are now EU members;
settlement of transborder conflicts has allowed both economic growth
and the stabilisation of democratic institutions; important legislative
developments have taken place, including the adoption of laws in key areas
such as conflict of interest and asset declarations. The Corruption Monitoring
System – SELDI’s tool for measuring the proliferation of corruption – indicates
that there is enhanced public sensitivity towards corruption. Nevertheless,
“despite the positive efforts of establishing the regulatory and institutional
base for countering corruption, including the establishment of specialised
anti-corruption agencies, which are being introduced in the majority of the
countries in the region, significant problems persist, especially with regard to
the practical implementation of the existing legal framework and institutional
enforcement.”6
This report compares the national legislation and institutional practice in

a number of areas critical to anticorruption efforts: regulatory and legal
framework, institutional prerequisites, corruption in the economy, the role
of civil society and international cooperation. The coverage of the national
institutional and legal aspects making regional corruption possible is not
intended as a comprehensive inventory of regulations and practices in
all countries but rather emphasises some of the priority issues relevant to
potential efforts of stemming common sources of corruption in SEE.
Being the result of collaboration within SELDI, the report is innovative in

both its method and its process. SELDI is distinguished from the other region-
wide initiatives as being the first NGO-led effort to encourage public-private
cooperation as an instrument for regional development. It complements
existing international programmes in the following ways:
• By ensuring a leading role of civil society in establishing regional public-

private anticorruption partnerships. This complements the exclusively
intergovernmental nature of the other initiatives.
• By integrating policy design and diagnostics developed specially for the
institutional, political and social environment of SEE.
• By providing institutional links (through its NGO network mobilisers) to
existing national efforts starting or already underway in the participating
countries. Most of these national programs are implemented in cooperation
between civil society and public institutions.
5
(SELDI, 2002).
6
(SELDI, 2013, p. 5).
1 Corruption Levels in Southeast Europe
1.1. CMS methodology summarise the most important aspects of corruption

behaviour patterns. The main indicators of the CMS
describe corruption as a social phenomenon using
Significant efforts have been invested by governments, three groups of sub-concepts:
NGOs and international institutions in scaling
back corruption in Southeast Europe. Where these • experience,
efforts have had success it should be attributed • attitudes, and
partly to an increased body of knowledge about the • perceptions.
manifestations, underlying causes and incidence
of corruption in a transition environment. The EU Figure 2. Structure of the Corruption Monitoring
approach in this respect has also been changing. While System Indexes
earlier priority had been given to input indicators
(regulations, procedures, etc.) focus now has shifted Assessments
Experience based Attitude based of the corruption
to output indicators (actual impact). Member states corruption indexes corruption indexes environment
have also contributed to understanding corruption indexes
and recommending action through the mechanism
of peer reviews. Still, “identifying anti-corruption
progress remains largely arbitrary. Corruption […] is Corruption
Awareness Likelihood of
(identification of ) corruption
an evolving concept. Understanding corruption and pressure
corruption pressure
obtaining reliable information about its dynamics are
crucial to the implementation of successful prevention
and control policies.”7 It is with this purpose in mind
Acceptability
that SELDI developed its Corruption Monitoring System Involvement in
corruption
(tolerance) of
Corruptness of
officials
(CMS).8 Designed by the Center for the Study of corruption
Democracy, the CMS has been recognised by the UN as

a best practice in corruption monitoring. Introduced at
a time when corruption measurement was confined to Susceptibility to
Feasibility of
policy responses
public perceptions, the CMS transformed monitoring corruption
to corruption
by introducing a measure of the victimisation of
individuals by corrupt officials accounting for their
direct experience with various corruption patterns. The CMS gauges the principal empirical manifestations
It allows assessments to be made about the dynamics of administrative corruption patterns. In terms of
of proliferation of corruption behaviour patterns definition, administrative corruption includes the
(prevalence of corrupt transactions) in a society. The extension of benefits (money, gifts, and favours) by
CMS methodology ensures comparability of data across citizens in exchange for services they obtain by public
countries and registers the actual level and trends of officials. The experience aspect of administrative
corruption, as well as the public attitudes, assessments corruption contains two indicators:
and expectations in relation to corruption.
• Involvement in corruption captures the instances
The major outputs of CMS are the Corruption Indexes. 9
when citizens make informal payments to public
They are based on surveys included in the CMS and officials. The concrete questions used to gather
information about this indicator are victimisa-
7
Center for the Study of Democracy, 2007. tion questions and reflect experience during the
8
For more information, please refer to (Center for the Study of preceding year. The index summarises citizens’
Democracy, 2002) and (Center for the Study of Democracy, 1998,
pp. 61-94).
reports and divides them into two categories:peo-
9
Every index is based on the aggregation of data from several vari- ple without corruption experience (have not given
ables (research questions). See further the Methodological Appendix. bribes) and people with corruption experience
(have given bribes at least once during the preced- citizens’ assessments of the acceptability for
ing year).10 members of parliament or government as well as
• Corruption pressure reflects instances of initiation civil servants at ministries, municipalities and
of bribe seeking by public officials: directly by mayoralties to take gifts, money, favours or receive
asking for an informal payment or indirectly by a free lunch (“get a treat”) in return to solving
implying that an informal payment would lead to a someone’s problems.
positive (for the citizen) outcome. CMS results have • Susceptibility to corruption reflects the tendency
shown that pressure has been a decisive factor of the respondents to react in two hypothetical
for involvement. Most corruption transactions situations – one involves being in the role of an
occur after the active solicitation of payments by underpaid public official and accepting or denying
officials. a bribe that was offered; the other situation asks
about giving a bribe to a corrupt public official, if
Direct involvement in corruption transactions is one had a major problem to solve and was asked
accompanied by the prevalence of specific attitudes explicitly for a bribe in cash. Declaring the denying
towards corruption and corruption behaviour and by of a bribe in both situations is interpreted as the
perception of the spread of corruption in society. Ideally, respondent being not susceptible to corruption,
low levels of involvement in corruption would be paired while accepting/giving a bribe in both is interpreted
with negative attitudes towards corrupt behaviour and as susceptibility, while giving/taking a bribe in one
perceptions that corruption is rare and unlikely. This of the situations and not in the other is defined as
does not mean that perceptions and attitudes directly “mixed behaviour”.
determine corruption behaviour of citizens. Rather
they could influence behaviour to a certain degree The experience with corruption and the attitudes
but essentially express the general social and political towards corruption, as well as the general current
atmosphere in society related to corruption. sentiment and level of trust towards public institutions
in society determine the public’s assessment of the
The indexes capturing different aspects of attitudes corruptness of the environment. These perceptions are
towards and perceptions of corruption included in the summarised in the following indexes:
CMS are:
• Likelihood of corruption pressure is an index
• Awareness (identification) of corruption is an measuring expectations of citizens of the likelihood
index accounting for the level of understanding of of facing corruption pressure in their interaction
citizens as to what constitutes corruption behaviour. with public officials. Overall, this is an index gauging
The index differentiates between three categories of perceptions of the corruptness of the environment.
awareness: high (citizens who identify all or most Corruption theory11 considers that people would
of the common corruption behaviour patterns be more likely to “use” corruption patterns if they
as corruption), moderate (many of the common assess the environment is intrinsically corrupt.
corruption practices are identified but some forms • Corruptness of officials is an index reflecting
of corruption are classified as “normal behaviour”), perceptions of the integrity reputation of different
low (few corruption patterns are identified as groups of public officials; it thus constitutes an
corruption). estimate by the public of the corruptness of the
• Acceptability (tolerance) of corrupt behaviour. various public services. The interpretation of this
While awareness captures the knowledge component, index is specific, as it is an assessment of attitudes
acceptability of corruption captures tolerance (or lack of citizens towards public officials rather than a
of tolerance) towards corruption. It summarises measure of the prevalence of corruption in the
respective offices. The added value of this index
10
Over the years the wording of questions has been preserved in is that it helps identify sectors most affected by
order to ensure comparability of data. However, calculation
methodology has been modified. Prior to 2013 indexes were corruption or being least trusted by the public.
calculated based on a normalisation procedure and their values • Feasibility of policy responses to corruption is an
ranged from 0 to 10. While this is a standard procedure, it has
created difficulties in the concrete interpretation of index values.
indicator capturing the “public thinking” about
To overcome this difficulty the aggregation procedure has been policy responses to corruption. More specifically it
modified and uses direct recoding of response groups. This evaluates potential public trust in the government’s
makes it possible to position respondents into distinct and directly
interpretable categories referring to different aspects of corruption
behaviour patterns. See further the Methodological Appendix. 11
See (Rothstein, 2007:3).
Corruption Levels in Southeast Europe 31
willingness and/or capacity to tackle corruption, levels registered by the Eurobarometer surveys in
as well as the potential support for anticorruption the EU.12 This shows that administrative corruption
policies. is a mass phenomenon and cannot be confined to
“single cases” of corrupt officials.
• For Bulgaria a longer time series of CMS indexes
is available, including data collected since 1999.
1.2. Experience with The lowest levels of involvement for Bulgaria
corruption have been registered in 2010 (about 10%) and have
gradually increased since then. There has been a
sharp increase since then, which can generally be
Corruption pressure and involvement are based on the explained by the unstable political situation in the
actual experiences of citizens from the SELDI countries country in 2013 – 2014, including the change of 3
with corruption. The corruption pressure index reflects successive governments and wide public discontent
how often citizens were asked directly to pay a bribe by and protests. Developments in Bulgaria suggest
a public official and how often the public official did not that EU membership in itself is not enough to lead
ask directly, but indicated that he/she expected a bribe. to sustained reduction in corruption but efforts
Regardless of whether such pressure was experienced need to be integrated into public institutions,
in isolated contacts with public officials only or in most and results should be sustainable already before
of the contacts a person had with the public officials accession.
of the country, these cases are considered victims of • Observed levels of administrative corruption lead
corruption pressure. to the conclusion that it is systemic and should be
regarded as a specific characteristic of the mode
Even isolated cases of one of the three forms of bribery of operation of public institutions. Substantial
during the preceding year are considered as corruption differences even between countries with a common
incidents (involvement in corruption). It should be historical background show that different paths
noted that not everyone who had been involved in of social, economic and institutional development
corruption during the preceding year would report render differing results.
experiencing pressure by officials. Such cases, where
involvement in corruption took place without pressure, Figure 3. Corruption pressure and involvement
are interpreted as initiation of the transaction by the in corruption
citizens themselves.
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The CMS 2014 results in Figure 3 show the corruption
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pressure and the involvement in corruption for the year
preceding the CMS implementation (2013). Countries .POUFOFHSP

are sorted by the share of respondents reporting involve

ment in corruption transactions, starting from the #VMHBSJB

highest share of people involved in actual transactions 4FSCJB

(39% of the population in Albania) to the lowest share

(9% in Turkey). The ordering with regard to corruption .BDFEPOJB

pressure is very similar, with only Turkey and Bulgaria
,PTPWP
changing their ranking by one position if the ordering
is done according to corruption pressure. The value of #PTOJBBOE

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• Experience with corruption (involvement of citizens

in corruption transactions) in the SELDI countries Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
is very high. Even in Turkey and Croatia, where
levels of administrative corruption are lowest in the Indicators for experience with corruption used in the
12
region, about 8-9% of the population reports having Eurobarometer surveys have slightly different content as they
refer to direct experience and cases when citizens have witnessed
given a bribe in the preceding year. Such levels of cases of bribery. For more details, please refer to (TNS Opinion &
experience with corruption are well beyond average Social, February 2014).
• Overall, with the exception of Bulgaria, the changes implicit, while explicit pressure is not so common.
since previous SELDI rounds of CMS diagnostics Another country where the explicit pressure is almost
(2001 and 2002) for all countries are positive. as high as the implicit is Turkey, where 12% of citizens
However, they are not considered satisfactory by report cases of implicit pressure and 10% report they
governments, the business sector and citizens. were asked explicitly.
Progress has been slow and uneven.
Corruption pressure is the main factor that statistically
The two components of corruption pressure – percent- influences the level of involvement. Still, pressure does
age of the population who were asked directly for a not necessarily mean that a citizen would give a bribe.
bribe and the percentage who were not asked directly, The share of respondents who experienced pressure
but the officials managed to show they expected to re- but did not give a bribe is presented in Figure 5. Most
ceive a bribe are shown on Figure 4.13 It is not surprising of the countries with high corruption involvement
that most often the officials ask for a bribe indirectly, and pressure are also characterised by low resilience
indicating that they expect it without asking explicitly. to corruption pressure (most of the respondents who
Still, in a lot of the cases this is done directly (explicitly) were asked for a bribe gave one). There are, however,
which comes to show that bribery is considered more or some exceptions, most notably Bulgaria which is one of
less a normal scenario. the top three countries in terms of corruption pressure
and actual transactions, but in terms of resilience ranks
The highest levels of explicit pressure have been together with less corrupted countries like Croatia
observed in Albania (28%) and Bulgaria (26%). In and BiH. Macedonia rises to second rank in terms of
Montenegro and Serbia the pressure is more often respondents who yield to pressure. The high resilience
in Turkey explains why actual corruption transactions
Figure 4. Explicit and implicit corruption pressure are less common than even in Croatia, regardless of
the higher pressure (13.3% pressure in Turkey, while
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPOXIPIBWFCFFOBTLFEEJSFDUMZBOEJOEJSFDUMZ
GPSBCSJCF NPOFZ HJGU GBWPS
JOUIFQSFDFEJOHZFBS
only 9.8% in Croatia).

"MCBOJB Data also show that resilience to pressure is substantially
higher in less corrupt environments (e.g. Turkey
compared to Albania). However, this does not make
#VMHBSJB
resilience a factor to reduce corruption; rather it reflects
the overall atmosphere in society.
.POUFOFHSP

Figure 5. Resilience to corruption pressure

4FSCJB
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"MCBOJB
.BDFEPOJB .BDFEPOJB

,PTPWP

,PTPWP .POUFOFHSP
4FSCJB
#VMHBSJB
#PTOJBBOE

)FS[FHPWJOB $SPBUJB
)BWFCFFOBTLFEGPSBCSJCF #PTOJBBOE
SFHBSEMFTTPGIPXFYBDUMZ )FS[FHPWJOB
5VSLFZ UPUBMGPSDPVOUSZ
5VSLFZ
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HJGUPSGBWPVS
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. Base: respondents
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. who experienced corruption pressure.
Although there are different possible reasons for

Implicit and explicit pressure do not add up to the total pressure
13
percentage, because very often respondents experienced both the variations in resilience across the countries, the
types of pressure during the year. attitudes towards corruption indicators provide one
possible explanation – the lower the acceptability Figure 7. Involvement in corruption – types of bribes
of corruption as part of the environment, the higher
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPOXIPIBWFHJWFONPOFZ HJGUPSEPOF
resilience would be. In other words, if more people BGBWPVSUPBOPîDJBMJOUIFQSFDFEJOHZFBS
think that corruption is acceptable, more of the citizens

pressed for bribes are likely to yield and be involved "MCBOJB

in actual corruption transactions (Figure 6).
.POUFOFHSP

Figure 6. Corruption pressure and acceptability

of corrupt behaviour #VMHBSJB

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"MCBOJB
4FSCJB
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4FSCJB
,PTPWP .BDFEPOJB .BDFEPOJB

#VMHBSJB
$SPBUJB ,PTPWP
#PTOJBBOE

)FS[FHPWJOB
#PTOJBBOE

)FS[FHPWJOB
5VSLFZ

$SPBUJB
(BWFBUMFBTUPOFUZQF
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(BWFDBTIUPBOPîDJBM
PGSFTQPOEFOUTDPOTJEFSJOHDPSSVQUJPOBDDFQUBCMF 5VSLFZ (BWFBHJGUUPBOPîDJBM

%JEBGBWPVSGPSBOPîDJBM
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
Cross-country comparisons show that there are some
major differences between the countries in terms of dealing with public officials are probably a complex
the most common means of bribery (Figure 7).14 combination of various factors such as:
While in Albania money is by far the most often used • corruptness of the environment (if everyone is
means of bribery (34% compared to 20% giving gifts and considered corrupt, people might try to bribe
17% doing favours), in most of the SELDI countries gifts without pressure);
are given more often than money – Montenegro (26% • levels of corruption pressure (if the pressure is
gave gifts, 20% gave money), Serbia (22% gave gifts, 13% declining very fast, the citizens might try to initiate
gave money), Kosovo (16% gave gifts, 13% gave money), the transaction themselves in particular if they have
Croatia (8% gave gifts, only 4% gave money). Other done or asked for something undue);
countries like Bulgaria and Turkey are characterised • effectiveness of law enforcement (if law enforcement
by relatively similar shares of respondents who gave is effective or the punishment is very severe, people
money, gifts, or did favours. might avoid offering bribes themselves, without
indication that these bribes are expected and would
In some cases transactions are admittedly initiated be accepted by the official).
by citizens themselves: they were not pressed by
the public officials (neither explicitly, nor implicitly), The full distribution of experiences with corruption
but still gave a bribe (money, gift or a favour). Such pressure and reaction to it are presented in Figure
active involvement is most common in Bulgaria 8 and Figure 9. Missing information (no answers,
(5.5%) and Montenegro (5.1% of the population), but – refusals to answer) are informative as well, as higher
interestingly – also present in the low corruption percentage of such answers (as in Kosovo or in Bosnia
countries like Croatia and Turkey (3.3% and 2.6% and Herzegovina) might indicate reluctance of the
respectively). The reasons for such a strategy in respondents to admit they were pressed for a bribe
or involved in such transactions. This might be an
indication of general fear of prosecution among the
14
“Money, gifts and favours” transactions do not add up to the total
involvement percentage, because very often respondents were population if their answers are revealed.
involved in different types of bribery at the same time.
Figure 8. Involvement in corruption with or without • High levels of administrative corruption usually
corruption pressure coincide with higher levels of acceptability
(Albania) and vice-versa (Turkey, Croatia). Still,
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPO XIPIBWFHJWFOBCSJCF
XJUIPSXJUIPVUDPSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSF
there are exceptions from this pattern (e.g. Bulgaria,
Bosnia and Herzegovina), where the lower relative

acceptability comes against the backdrop of higher

levels of administrative corruption. This normally

breeds resignation, distrust of public institutions,

and high potential for protest.

Figure 10. Acceptability of corruption
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4FSCJB
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#VMHBSJB
Figure 9. Corruption activities and pressure – citizens’
$SPBUJB
involvement in corruption transactions
#PTOJBBOE

)FS[FHPWJOB

5VSLFZ Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
/PDPSSVQUJPO

4FSCJB BDUJWJUJFTBOE • Higher levels of awareness of corruption (Bosnia and

QSFTTVSF
Herzegovina) are not directly linked to lower levels

.POUFOFHSP "DUJWFCSJCFSZ

(BWFBCSJCF of administrative corruption (Turkey). Awareness

XJUIPVUQSFTTVSF
.BDFEPOJB reflects to a large extent the internal political debate

1BTTJWFCSJCFSZ
on corruption and governance and the exposure

,PTPWP (BWFXJUI

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of the public to awareness raising on the issue.

$SPBUJB 3FTJMJFODFUP Countries in which debate has been more intensive
DPSSVQUJPO
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#VMHBSJB CFJOHQSFTTFE
but this does not directly translate into reduction of

"WPJEJOH
corruption behaviour.

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)FS[FHPWJOB
/PBOTXFS

"MCBOJB Figure 11. Awareness (identification) of common

corruption practices

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Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. BMM IJHI
NBOZ NPEFSBUF
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1.3. Attitudes towards #VMHBSJB
corruption .POUFOFHSP

"MCBOJB
5VSLFZ
Attitudes towards corruption reflect people’s mind-set .BDFEPOJB
with regard to corruption transactions. The CMS includes ,PTPWP
three attitudes indexes: acceptability, awareness of and
susceptibility to corruption. The overall conclusions )JHIMFWFMPGBXBSFOFTT .PEFSBUFMFWFMPGBXBSFOFTT
from the three attitudes indexes that could be made are -PXMFWFMPGBXBSFOFTT
as follows: Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
• Regarding susceptibility to corruption the CMS data 1.4. Assessments of

show that citizens in countries with similar rates the corruption
of administrative corruption have substantially
different structure of predisposition to corruption environment
behaviour (e.g. Croatia and Turkey). The highest
susceptibility is observed in Albania, followed Assessments of the corruption environment (percep
by Kosovo and Macedonia. The relatively lower tions of corruption) are not a good proxy for measuring
susceptibility in Bulgaria for example (lowest after the prevalence of corrupt practices and the level of
Turkey) indicates (together with low acceptability) corruption. Rather they show the attitude of citizens
the integrity of the citizens which could explain towards the governance model and are a form of political
why a large share of citizens who were pressed evaluation of the current government. This explains why
for bribes did not give any in these countries. assessments of the corruption environment in a country
A factor in this respect, especially regarding are usually much more negative and widespread than
Bulgaria, is the role of civil society: the most the actual count of corruption transactions.
intensive anticorruption campaign started in
1998 and was implemented by CSD-led Coalition More than half of the population of SELDI countries
2000.15 Still, the very high corruption pressure believe they live in a highly corrupt environment
in Bulgaria, combined with the low tolerance in which it is highly likely to encounter corruption
and susceptibility to corruption, seems the most pressure when contacting public officials (Figure 13).
probable explanation for the highest share of mixed The highest percentage of the expected corruption
behaviour among the SELDI countries. People pressure is found in Bulgaria and Kosovo, where more
get forced to compromise on their principles by than 90% of the participants in the survey believe
an overwhelmingly corrupt environment. At the pressure to be likely. The smallest percent is in Croatia,
same time, countries like Albania and Kosovo face but even there 2/3 of the population (64%) perceive
steep challenges in their anticorruption drive, as pressure to be likely. This shows that corruption is
high administrative corruption is coupled with perceived as a serious problem in the whole region
lower levels of awareness and higher levels of despite the relatively lower levels of prevalence in
acceptance. Turkey, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Figure 12. Susceptibility to corruption Figure 13. Likelihood of corruption pressure
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPOUIBUXPVMEHJWFBOEPSBDDFQU PGUIFQPQVMBUJPODPOTJEFSJOHDPSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSFiWFSZMJLFMZu

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#VMHBSJB

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$SPBUJB
4VTDFQUJCMFUPDPSSVQUJPO .JYFECFIBWJPS
/PUTVTDFQUJCMFUPDPSSVQUJPO
Nearly three quarters of the population in Albania
(73%) consider corruption inevitable and systemic
and do not think that it can be substantially reduced.
The highest percentages of people who are optimistic
about the feasibility of anticorruption policies are in
Croatia (53%) followed by Montenegro, Kosovo and
Turkey (46-47% respectively). Such a finding shows that
http://www.anticorruption.bg
15
higher levels of corruption prevalence go hand in hand
with increased pessimism about the effectiveness of Figure 16. Estimates by the public: most and least
anticorruption policies. corrupt occupations (country differences)

The perception that all or most public officials are corrupt
predominates in Southeast Europe. As an average for the

region, government ministers and custom officers are

perceived as the most corrupt public officials, together

with political party leaders and members of parliament.

Perceived as least corrupt are teachers, journalists,

university professors and investigation officers. Sectors

perceived as most corrupt are the highest levels of the

$VTUPNTPîDFST .JOJTUFST +PVSOBMJTUT 5FBDIFST

Figure 14. Feasibility of policy responses
.POUFOFHSP
.BDFEPOJB
"MCBOJB
5VSLFZ
$SPBUJB
4FSCJB
#VMHBSJB
#J)
,PTPWP
to corruption
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5VSLFZ

$SPBUJB
.POUFOFHSP
,PTPWP
executive, law enforcement institutions and revenue
#PTOJBBOE
collection agencies (most notably customs). This is just
)FS[FHPWJOB
4FSCJB another indication that political corruption in most
#VMHBSJB countries of the region is a common and far from
.BDFEPOJB adequately addressed problem. Citizens clearly believe
"MCBOJB that positions of power are at the top of the corruption
pyramid, calling for strong action against political
$PSSVQUJPODBOOPUCFTVCTUBOUJBMMZSFEVDFE corruption.
$PSSVQUJPODBOCFTVCTUBOUJBMMZSFEVDFEPSFSBEJDBUFE
***
%POhULOPX/PBTOXFS
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. CMS results have shown that the main factors influen
cing corrupt behaviour of citizens in SEE countries
Figure 15. Estimates of the corruptness of public are rooted in the interactions between citizens and
officials – regional average officials. Corruption pressure appears to be the most
potent factor that pushed people to engage in corrupt
0îDJBMTQFSDFJWFEBTNPTUDPSSVQUPOBTDBMFGSPNUP XIFSFJT
i"MNPTUOPPOFJTJOWPMWFEuBOEJTi"MNPTUFWFSZCPEZJTJOWPMWFEu transactions. Attitudes and perception have minor
importance but tend to follow the overall dynamics of
.JOJTUFST
$VTUPNTPîDFST corruption prevalence and determine the likelihood
1PMJUJDBMQBSUZBOE
DPBMJUJPOMFBEFST of success of anticorruption efforts. Results show that
.FNCFSTPGQBSMJBNFOU achieving success in terms of bringing corruption
-PDBMQPMJUJDBMMFBEFST levels close to EU average is likely to require massive
+VEHFT
and sustained efforts in the next two decades. The
0îDJBMTBUNJOJTUSJFT
5BYPîDJBMT case of Bulgaria shows that progress is reversible,
1VCMJDQSPTFDVUPST and anticorruption efforts should be sustained over
1PMJDFPîDFST extensive periods of time. The case of Croatia indicates
.VOJDJQBMDPVODJMPST that strong conditionality before accession gives
.VOJDJQBMPîDJBMT
results but the anticorruption drive and institutional
-BXZFST
%PDUPST mechanisms need to be sustained and further
"ENJOJTUSBUJPOPîDJBMT
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*OWFTUJHBUJOHPîDFST
6OJWFSTJUZPîDJBMT
PSQSPGFTTPST The predominant public attitude towards corruption
+PVSOBMJTUT
in the region is negative. In many countries this goes
5FBDIFST
hand in hand with relatively high levels of involvement

in corruption transactions: corruption has evolved into
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. a necessary evil and this tends to discourage public
confidence in the ability of government to enforce Unstable and controversial effects of government
anticorruption policies. Some of the countries, like actions can be clearly illustrated with the case of
Albania and Kosovo face considerable challenges Bulgaria: annual implementation of the CMS has shown
in countering corruption, and would require wide an uneven marginal progress (reduction) with respect to
ranging reforms. In others there is still fear among administrative corruption in the period 1999 – 2013.17
the population to disclose corruption attitude and However, the 2014 round of diagnostics registered
experience, which hampers civil society activities serious deterioration and has seen prevalence return
in countering corruption. Data suggested that low to levels even higher than those observed in 2001 –
administrative corruption in parts of the region, 2002. Despite the introduction of the Cooperation and
notably Turkey, Macedonia, and to some extent Serbia Verification Mechanism the country has regressed,
could be related to less political freedom and even fear which points to the complexity of tackling systemic
of repression. and political corruption, as well as the importance
of political and judicial leadership in the country for
In the period since 2001 – 2002 (the first regional achieving progress.
implementation of the SELDI CMS) most countries
have registered progress16 with respect to most CMS In all countries future anticorruption efforts will need to
dimensions (indexes): lower levels of corruption deal with a major challenge: the magnitude of prevalence
pressure and involvement in corruption, lower of administrative corruption (even in countries where
tolerance, lower susceptibility, increased resilience, etc. it is relatively low) makes it practically impossible for
In view of the initial level of corruption prevalence, law enforcement to identify and prosecute offenders.
however, this progress could be considered marginal. In addition, as CMS results show, oversight institutions
There has not been an anticorruption breakthrough in and law enforcement are also among the primary
any of the countries in the region. targets of corruption.
The dynamics of corruption indexes for each country has been

16
included in the country profiles in Chapters II and III. See also

(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002).
17
In the period 1999 – 2003, CMS diagnostics in Bulgaria has been
implemented on a quarterly basis.
2 Anticorruption Policies and
Regulatory Environment
H
aving taken a measure of the levels of held accountable for the delivery of the strategic in-
proliferation of corruption and understood tentions but it found it difficult, if at all possible, to
the experiences and attitudes of the public enforce the implementation of the provisions on the
with respect to it, it is appropriate to turn other branches of power. The independence – at least
to an evaluation of the intentions of governments and nominally – of the judiciary, the complicated politics
the tools they employ to tackle corruption – in other of national parliaments made the task of governments
words, the policies. Looking into the experience of difficult at best.
Southeast Europe is all the more instructive as their
regulatory regimes with respect to corruption have Another issue was the continuity in the relevance and
been particularly dynamic since they had to respond implementation of the strategies across election cycles,
to a multitude of factors and balance a number of beyond the lifetime of the government that has adopted
considerations: them. Unlike a policy, which is expected to change with
the change of government, anticorruption strategies
• the magnitude of the problem in their countries: were designed for the longer term and were expected to
a multifaceted practice that afflicts all levels and weather the political winds. The highly partisan politics
sectors of the national system of governance; of the countries of Southeast Europe, however, made
• corruption often responds to pressure by changing such continuity unlikely. While some permanence of
form and moving to other social loci instead of intention was maintained, each successive government
disappearing; wanted to affirm its own anticorruption credentials by
• gradual changing of the understanding of its causes adopting some consequential document. Corruption
and effects;
• recommendations from foreign partners and inter Figure 17. Estimates of the corruptness of the
national institutions. government and ministers18

,PTPWP

2.1. National "MCBOJB

anticorruption

#PTOJBBOE
strategies )FS[FHPWJOB

#VMHBSJB

The anticorruption strategy as a government tool first 4FSCJB

appeared in Southeast Europe in the late 1990s and
early 2000s as a response to a growing awareness of .BDFEPOJB

the severity and spread of corruption. The purpose
of strategies was to demonstrate intentions for reform $SPBUJB

(commonly referred to as “political will”) and to guide

efforts over the long term and across election cycles. 5VSLFZ

Many expectations were associated with these strate- .POUFOFHSP

gies but they also encountered a number of structural
.JOJTUFST (PWFSONFOU 0îDJBMTBUNJOJTUSJFT
difficulties. The first was constitutional. Adopted and
implemented mostly by the executive, albeit on occa- Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
sion through wider consultations, the strategies often
had significant implications for the other branches
18
For public officials the scale is from 1 to 4, where 1 is “Almost no
one is involved” and 4 is “Almost everybody is involved.” For the
of state power – the judiciary, legislature – as well as institutions the scale is from 1 – “Not proliferated at all” to 4 –
for the private sector, media, etc. The executive was “Proliferated to the highest degree.”
had become – by the 2000s – an electoral campaign crime among law enforcement agencies. Furthermore,
issue almost everywhere in Southeast Europe which it focuses on three main approaches: preventive,
tended to water down the commitment to strategic sanctioning and raising awareness.
pledges.
In the context of strengthening the preventive ap-
A further design problem was the intention to have the proach to corruption, the strategy sets as a short term
strategies address all possible aspects of corruption. priority for the creation of new legal framework on
Instead of prioritising, these documents became all- whistleblowers as well as the establishment of an
embracing; with respect to anticorruption, strategic implementing agency. The new legislation aims to
has come to signify simply exhaustive. Further, narrow down and make more detailed the existing
in being general and comprehensive, the national legislation by extending it to public employees and
strategies have become hardly distinguishable. There is private entities. Managing public complaints are seen
little, if any, national specifics in them to reflect national as a crucial element in the fight against corruption in
circumstances in the generation and manifestation of the new strategy. Among other measures, the strategy
corruption. also foresees an overall assessment of the anticorrup-
tion legislation and the institutions in charge of imple-
Arguably, the most significant drawback of these menting it, and corruption proofing of legislation – a
strategies is that they never became policies. The practice which will be used for the first time in Alba-
language of the documents – “strengthening integrity” nia. Systematic risk analyses, corruption trends, effec-
or “enhancing awareness” – was understandably tiveness of anticorruption measures and monitoring
general which was thought to be compensated by their of their implementation are foreseen as future steps to
being translated into specific actions. The action plans be taken with regard to the fight against corruption. In
that followed the strategies, however, rarely sought to addition, anticorruption policies by local governments
establish targets – x% reduction of corruption or y% of are seen as a priority.
improvement of public services – or even some kind
of benchmarks but were instead lists of “measures.” Bosnia and Herzegovina was a relative latecomer as
While a policy is a combination of an intended outcome regards anticorruption strategies. Efforts on planning
with appropriate means, measures were standalone strategic anticorruption interventions started in
actions, the completion of which was the sole criterion the mid-2000s with measures being integrated in
of achievement. Thus, the evaluation of the strategic development and anti-crime strategies. The latest
approach to corruption was done in terms of percentage applicable document – the Strategy for the Fight against
of actions implemented, instead of corruption actually Corruption – was adopted in 2009 with a timeframe of
reduced. 5 years. With the Strategy about to expire, out of 81
planned measures only 8 (9.8%) have been completed
A commendable feature of all strategies in the SELDI in full, 57 (70.4%) have been partially completed
countries was their attempt at an assessment of the and 16 (19.8%) have not been implemented.19 This
state of corruption in the respective country. These has affected some key reforms efforts such as such
evaluations, however, hardly venture beyond a fact- the preparation and adoption of the Program of
finding of the sectors that are worst hit to try to analyse Modernisation of the Public Administration aimed toward
the underlying social, economic, cultural or other strengthening of the civil service at the BiH level.
factors fuelling corruption. The backlog is mostly due to the late establishment
of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and
In Albania, the latest Anti-Corruption Strategy 2014 – Coordination of Fight against Corruption which is
2017 was prepared with the technical assistance of charged with carrying out the strategy. The strong
the OSCE Presence in Albania, and is much shorter autonomy which the entities that constitute BiH enjoy
and simpler than the previous one. The drafting of the means that they also pursue their own anticorruption
strategy underwent several consultation meetings with policies. At the end of 2013, the National Assembly
international experts, civil society and the private sector. of Republika Srpska adopted the Strategy of Fight
The specific objectives and implementation procedures against Corruption covering the period 2013 – 2017;
will be defined in the action plans of the line ministries, following its adoption, a corresponding action plan
other state bodies and independent institutions. The is expected. For the first time, this strategy requires
strategy gives special attention to the harmonisation of
statistics and track records on corruption and organised 19
(Transparency International BiH, 2014, p. 15).
Anticorruption Policies and Regulatory Environment 41
public sector bodies to prepare integrity plans as a least theoretically, the specific nature of the Bulgarian
mechanism for enabling legal and ethical quality of action in the anticorruption domain. The responsibility
work of governmental bodies. The administration for its coordination lies with the General Inspectorate
of the implementation process of the Strategy and and the Commission for the Prevention and Combating
its action plan will be in hands of the Commission of Corruption, operated by the Inspectorate. As with
for Monitoring of Implementation of the Strategy, a some of the other strategy documents in the SELDI
government level body in Republika Srpska. In the countries, this one claims to introduce a “unified
Federation of BiH, the General Framework of the FBiH approach” to anticorruption policy. Few other policies
Government for Fight against Corruption was adopted in need this kind of integrative aspect but with corruption
May 2012 and covers the period until the end of 2014. it is justified by the diverse areas and bodies involved
The Framework is an example of the wide ranging, in its delivery.
comprehensive and ambitious nature of the strategies
in Southeast Europe – it covers a range of legislative Due to the unstable political environment, lack of
measures, activities to be implemented by public coordination and delays in implementation, the
administration institutions, measures for the judiciary publication of the action plans has been sporadic so
and law enforcement agencies, involvement of the far – at central government level such are available for
public in fight against corruption. the period of July 2011 – July 2012, for August 2012 –
December 2012, as well as for October – November
The centrepiece policy document with regard to 2013. This fact alone, leaves a considerable gap in the
anticorruption policy in Bulgaria is the 2009 Integrated Bulgarian anticorruption policy. Since the adoption
Strategy for Prevention and Countering Corruption and of the Strategy, anticorruption measures have been
Organised Crime. The Strategy, though vague in its missing for a substantial period of time without any
commitments, attempts to set general direction and justification. The availability of associated indicators
recommendations for limiting the spread and impact for each anticorruption measure also varies, leaving
of corruption and organised crime on multiple levels a considerable portion of measures without a base to
of governance (central, regional and local), while also be assessed against. So far, a total of 119 indicators
including the business sector and civil society in the are produced, leaving 78 measures with no indicators
process. While the Strategy fails to provide feasible (from a total of 197 measures across all action plans).
incentives for implementation, the elaboration of action Overall, there is no clear indications of how the action
plans and audit reports of implementation increases, at plans, more specifically their measures and associated
Box 1. A model for monitoring anticorruption reforms
In 2006, the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) in Bulgaria, developed a comprehensive model for
the monitoring of the anticorruption policies of governments. Specifically, it contained a set of indicators
for the assessment of the implementation of Bulgarian government’s 2006 – 2008 Strategy for Transparent
Governance and for Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption. The model evaluates several groups of outcomes
of anticorruption policies:
• The first set of indicators reflects the adequacy, effectiveness, timeliness, and implementation progress of
policy measures.
• The second group of indicators evaluates the social environment factors directly affecting the level of
corruption and governance transparency – involvement in corrupt practices, attitudes to corruption and
the value of integrity, trust in government institutions, etc.
• A third group of indicators show the effect of policies. These evaluate public service delivery and
are of greatest value in assessing the effectiveness of anticorruption policies and the prevention and
counteraction of corruption.
Albeit being formally adopted by the government, this model has not yet been implemented.
Source: (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2006).

indicators, should impact the general anticorruption are taken as indicators of success. As in the other
environment and contribute to the implementation of countries, the strategy is all-embracing – central
the Strategy; this is further confirmed by the available and local government, civil society and media, law
reports on implementation. enforcement and judiciary, the civil service and
international cooperation are all “priority” sectors. An
Croatia’s anticorruption strategy has been in place area of particular concern is the accuracy of the asset
since 2008 and sets a number of broad objectives for declaration data from public officials, given the huge
the widest possible range of public services, from the discrepancies in the amount of the wealth that officials
administration of justice to education. It is transformed declare and what they really own. Issues of conflict of
into specific measures through an action plan updated interest and political appointments, such as those in
annually; the most recent (2013) updates include stronger governing boards of public institutions, are also part
monitoring of compliance with conflict of interests of the list of issues which call for immediate action. The
and asset declarations legislation. Since the adoption strategy lists a set of anti-mafia laws, such as the Law
of the strategy, the action plans have downplayed on Confiscation of Assets, as necessary to include best
preventive measures, highlighting instead corruption practices like reversed burden of proof and extended
repression through prosecution, sanctioning, etc. All confiscation. Cash registers, and the completion and
concerned government authorities in the country are implementation of the Public Procurement Law are seen
required to monitor regularly the implementation of as priorities because it is evident that most losses from
the action plan accompanying the strategy, assess the corruption happen in forging of tenders.
risks of corruption and take appropriate measures.
Although the risk assessment is one the main tasks of
the Committee for Monitoring the Implementation of Addressing low level of trust in public institutions –
Measures for the Suppression of Corruption, there are political, judiciary and the administration – remains the
no documents or data available on the reports made by main priority in building a credible state that functions in
the Committee on this topic. In the Strategy and Action the public interest. Failing to properly tackle this challenge
Plan of the Tax Administration for Fighting Corruption, the puts in jeopardy all efforts to obtain full international
Ministry of Finance has the task of determining risk recognition and internal legitimacy.
areas at all levels. However, the Ministry of Finance
publishes no data on risk assessment connected with Kosovo Anticorruption Strategy 2012 – 2016
corruption.
Figure 18. Corruption profile of Croatia In Macedonia two strategic documents of 2011 –
the State Programme for Prevention and Repression of
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPO
Corruption and the State Programme for Prevention and

(BWFBCSJCF
Reduction of Conflict of Interests – are combined to form

a single vision. Again, these cover the entire range of
8FSFBTLFEUPHJWF
BCSJCF public sectors – from law enforcement to education
$PSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSF and sports. There is an attempt to introduce some

QSFDFJWFEBTiMJLFMZu degree of prioritisation in the action plans of the two
/PUUPMFSBOUPG
DPSSVQUQSBDUJDFT state programmes by designating the various actions
)JHIMZBXBSFPG /" “first” or “second” priority, while still not being clear
DPSSVQUJPOQBUUFSOT whether this concerns significance or sequencing.
1FPQMFTVTDFQUJCMF

Anticorruption is also part of the measures envisaged
UPDPSSVQUJPO
in the two-page Program for Fight against Corruption of

the Ministry of Justice (mostly outlining the Ministry’s

tasks with respect to anticorruption legislation and
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. ratifications), the government’s Annual Working Program
and the Strategy for Reform of Public Administration
In Kosovo, the Strategy and Action Plan for the 2010 – 2015.
years 2012 – 2016 guide the operations of the Anti-
Corruption Agency and other relevant institutions. The currently applicable anticorruption strategy for
It is a pertinent example of the issue noted above – Montenegro covers the period 2010 – 2014. It seeks to
percentage of completed activities rather than results state the priorities for a clampdown on corruption,
mostly related to improvement of parliament’s control the fight against corruption and organised crime. The
function, criminal prosecution and international Agency is to be established by January 2016.
cooperation. It also lists areas vulnerable to corruption,
such as political parties financing, conflict of interest, In Serbia, a new Anticorruption Strategy was adopted
free access to information, public procurement, state in July 2013, for the period 2013 – 2018. The proclaimed
property, urban planning, education, health sector, objective of the Strategy is to reduce corruption to the
civil society, media and sport, etc. – again, the longlist lowest possible level, as it is “an obstacle to economic,
of sectors. It also lists some 40 laws as relevant to social and democratic development”. The Strategy
anticorruption. In order to make it more concrete and stresses that corruption may lead to a drop in public
functional, an Action Plan for implementation of this confidence in the democratic institutions, and that it
Strategy for the period 2013-2014 was adopted. It defines also creates uncertainty and instability of the economy,
priorities in prevention of corruption at the political and which is reflected, inter alia, in lower investments.
international level, areas of particular risk, prevention As with the other countries, the Serbian strategy
of corruption in law enforcement bodies, with an addresses practically all public sectors and seeks to
impressive range of 109 objectives and 230 measures for analyse the situation and provide some more or less
their achievement. general recommendations. In order to specify the
recommendations and measures, in addition to the
Figure 19. Level of completion of the measures of the Strategy, the Ministry of Justice has prepared a fairly
Montenegrin anticorruption strategy detailed Action plan which operationalises the Strategy
by defining measures, activities, time frame, responsible
government bodies, indicators (again, mostly actions
$PNQMFUFE
to be taken rather than results achieved) and required

resources for each of the numerous priorities. The
implementation of the strategy is expected to move
1BSUJBMMZDPNQMFUFE
away from the hands-on approach so valuable for
political ratings towards an institutional building
/PUDPNQMFUFE process that would enhance the anticorruption capacity
of implementing institutions.
Source: Bulletin of the Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative, July 2013. The current national strategy and action plan for
preventing corruption in Turkey was adopted in
Besides these documents, the government of January 2010. It was drafted by a government appointed
Montenegro has adopted an Action Plan for Chapter 23 in Executive Board but with no appropriate participation
the EU negotiations (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) of civil society. According to the Strategy Plan of
which contains two sections – for prevention and Enhancing Transparency and Strengthening the Fight against
suppression of corruption. Concrete preventive actions Corruption, corruption is defined as the infraction of
refer to the institutional framework for fight against rules and laws in order to achieve illegal objectives. The
corruption; improvement of the system of reporting on Strategy Plan states that corruption should not be taken
assets of public officials; improvement of internal rules as a solely legal issue; the socioeconomic dimensions
of procedures in state bodies, particularly with regard of corruption should also be taken into account when
to the appointments and internal control; improvement planning measures to combat against corruption. There
of political parties financing system; insurance of is a working group for each of the 10 anticorruption
effective implementation of free access to information measures, and the reports of these groups have been
rules; improvement of control in public procurement. submitted to the Committee of Ministers; as of June 2014,
According to the Action Plan, the government intends the publication of the results was still pending. While
to establish an Anticorruption Agency. The Agency pointing that the strategy “incorporates important
will combine and expand the existing competences preventive provisions and addresses the issue of
of the Directorate for Anticorruption Initiative, the political corruption,” a March 2012 evaluation report
Commission for Prevention of Conflict of Interest as by OECD’s SIGMA found that “implementation of the
well as competences of the State Election Commission Strategy appears to have slowed down.”20
in the area of control of financing political parties and
election campaigns, and the competences of the National
Commission for the Implementation of the Strategy for 20
(SIGMA, 2012, p. 6).
2.2. Assessment of legislative framework. Anticorruption laws have been

the regulatory no exception. Such speed came at a cost, mainly in
terms of effective enforcement, particularly as law
environment enforcement and the courts struggled to keep up
for anticorruption with the changes. “Frequent, unexpected and opaque
changes in policies and laws restrict mechanisms
of effective democratic control on the part of the
Overall, the SELDI countries have adopted the better government, undermine trust in public institutions,
part – more importantly the logic and approach – of the and can easily be misused to the benefit of corporate
international anticorruption standards in their national interests and corrupt political actors.”21
legislations. Their statutory laws should now be able
to deliver results in reducing corruption. This section As regards priorities, there have been two significant
looks into the genesis of the anticorruption provisions changes in the approach to anticorruption – a shift of
and seeks to identify shortcomings to be addressed. attention from petty corruption (that of traffic policemen
or public sector doctors) to grand (of members of
parliament or ministers) and criminalisation of a wider
2.2.1. Changes to national array of abuses of public office.
anticorruption policies
While petty graft is widespread but straightforward
Arguably, the most notable feature of the laws in the (small cash for a simple, usually one-off illicit
SELDI countries has been their pace of change. A service), high level corruption is complex not only for
single law could be amended dozens of times a year, investigation and prosecution but also in that it occurs
amounting to hundreds of amendments in the overall among shades of grey, i.e. is often borderline illegal.
Box 2. Proper diagnosis is half the cure: the case for smart anticorruption policies
Anticorruption policymaking is often seen as a tough act requiring considerable political courage since it is
expected to upset entrenched and powerful interests. Understanding the incentives architecture of corrupt
transactions, however, allows policymakers to achieve tangible impact with safe and precision interventions.
The slashing of illegal alcohol imports to Bulgaria is a case in point.
In the late 1990s, smuggling in the Balkans had become

such a common practice that only a severe law enforcement
crackdown was thought capable of restraining it. An in-
depth look into what drove smugglers and legal traders .BSLFUTJ[F
suggested a better approach. A comparison between
-FHBMBMDPIPM
customs data on imports and the results of market JNQPSUT
research, carried out by the CSD, showed that before 1998
only 8-10% of imported liquor sold in the country was
taxed. Following advocacy by CSD and legitimate traders,
the way imported alcohol was taxed was amended. Prior
to 1998 the excise duty on spirits was determined on the basis of declared value, i.e. it was entirely dependent
on the declared import price which in turn rationalised the spread of value-related fraudulent schemes. The
change of policy had excise duty on spirits determined by alcohol content (“proof”) alone. In this changed
situation, the risk return trade-off to the importer drastically shifted in favour of the legal activity. There was
no longer an incentive for bribery to avoid payment or reduction of customs duties. As a result, the share of
legally imported alcohol increased more than seven times in three years to reach almost 80% in 2000.
Source: (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002a).
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2009, pp. 72-3).

21
Most complex cases do not actually involve anyone legislation in order to provide criminal sanctions for
charged for the crime of corruption, but for some other the largest possible range of corrupt practices and to
crimes – tax evasion, trading in influence, etc. This has introduce the European and international standards.
required legislators to take an equally sophisticated The SELDI countries have criminalised the bulk of the
approach to defining and sanctioning new and complex mandatory corruption offences under UNCAC, and
types of illegal practices. In Southeast Europe, this shift some have introduced criminal liability for the non-
of attention has not been warranted by any explicit mandatory offences (e.g. corruption in the private sector
reference to the damage done by the various types of or trading in influence).
corruption but is rather related to concerns about the
low level of trust in political governance.
A public official or responsible person who solicits or
Figure 20. Estimates of the corruptness accepts a bribe, or who accepts an offer or a promise of a
of political leaders22 bribe for him/herself or another in return for performing
within or beyond the limits of his/her authority an official
#VMHBSJB
or other act which should not be performed, or failing to

perform an official or other act which should be performed
"MCBOJB

shall be punished by imprisonment from one to ten years.
#PTOJBBOE Article 293 of the Croatian Criminal Code
)FS[FHPWJOB

4FSCJB
Whoever accepts a gift or other advantage to use his official
or social position or influence to intercede for performance
,PTPWP
or failure to perform an official act, shall be punished by
$SPBUJB
imprisonment of three months to three years.

Article 366 of the Serbian Criminal Code

.BDFEPOJB

.POUFOFHSP

In early 2012, the Albanian government amended some

5VSLFZ
legislation relating to corruption. The amendments
were firstly in the Criminal Code covering cases of
1PMJUJDBMQBSUZBOEDPBMJUJPOMFBEFST
-PDBMQPMJUJDBMMFBEFST
bribery by foreign public officials and introducing
harsher sentencing for corruption in the private sector.
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. In the same year, the parliament passed constitutional
changes that restricted the immunity of high-ranking
The incrimination of a wider range of corruption- public officials and judges. The latter have been
related practices has been a worldwide trend and the warranted by cases where immunity has served as a
SELDI countries have been no exception. Criminal law barrier for the prosecution of high level public officials
is expected to have a most direct impact on corruption and judges. Despite these changes, however, not much
and is among the most important anticorruption tools a has changed concerning investigations, prosecution,
legal system employs. Although the term “corruption” is or convictions.24 The government has proposed new,
rarely defined in the legislation of most of the countries rather drastic changes. First, the Ministry of Justice has
in the region – it is a concept of policy rather than law23 – tabled a draft law with amendments to the Law on the
their criminal laws include a number of provisions Prevention and Fight against Organised Crime (better known
aimed at sanctioning various corruption related as anti-mafia law) to include corruption within its scope.
offences. In the last few years, most of the countries have Under it, corruption offenses are to be investigated by
focused their efforts on amending the relevant criminal the Courts of Serious Crimes. The current law aims
to prevent and fight organised crime and trafficking
22
For public officials the scale is from 1 to 4, where 1 is “Almost no mainly through the investigation of the wealth of a
one is involved” and 4 is “Almost everybody is involved”. For the suspect. The proposed changes would extend the anti-
institutions the scale is from 1 – “Not proliferated at all” to 4 –
“Proliferated to the highest degree”.
mafia provisions to individuals suspected for all kinds
Article 5 of UNCAC, for example, associates anticorruption
23
policies with practices rather than laws. (U.S. Department of State, 2013d).
24
of corrupt affairs. More specifically, the prosecution prevent and fight corruption and organised crime,
and the police, on their own initiative or on notification and reform the judiciary including conflict of interests
from third parties, would be able to investigate the and related issues. Since the adoption in 2008 of the
assets and wealth of individuals suspected for engaging first conflict of interest law, a number of weaknesses
in corruption. Family members and relatives of the hampering its effective implementation have been
suspects are also included in the draft amendments. revealed. In an attempt to address these weaknesses,
These have been justified by referring to the fact that the law has been subject to several amendments (in
anticorruption has been identified as a priority and as 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013), some of which introduced
such should be given “more importance,” corruption radical changes in the system of government bodies
should be taken more “seriously” and it should be involved in its implementation.25
punished “more heavily.” It should be noted that
these potential changes have been questioned by the Figure 21. Trend in the sentencing of bribery in Bulgaria
OSCE Presence in Albania, the US Office of Overseas

Prosecutorial Development Assistance and training,

and also EURALIUS, the European Assistance Mission

to the Albanian Justice System. The latter, for example,

has advised that a threshold for the briberies that

are to be sent to the Serious Crimes Court should be

introduced.

In May 2014, a revised Law on the Right to Information

on Official Documents was drafted, which introduced

administrative sanctions and procedures for the
examination of complaints to the Commission for the 6QUPNPOUIT 'SPNNPOUITUPZFBS
'SPNUPZFBST 'SPNUPZFBST
Right to Information and Personal Data Protection. 'SPNUPZFBST 'SPNUPZFBST
Amendments to the laws on asset declaration and 'SPNUPZFBST 'SPNUPZFBST
conflict of interest were proposed in April 2014, aiming Source: National Statistical Institute.
to strengthen the competencies of the High Inspectorate
of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of In Croatia, the legal environment for anticorruption has
Interests. been particularly dynamic in the last couple of years.
Dozens of changes with relevance to anticorruption
A key development in Bosnia and Herzegovina was have been made annually to laws regulating conflict
the introduction of protection for persons who decide of interest, public procurement, electoral campaign
to report corruption related offences. Although finance, criminal procedure law, civil service law, State
with significant delay, the Law on Whistleblowers Judicial Council, etc. In November 2011, the Croatian
was adopted in December 2013 on the state level. At Parliament passed a new Criminal Code which came into
the level of Federation of BiH, the Law on Protection force on January 1, 2013. It introduced harsher penalties
of Persons Reporting Corruption was adopted in late for corruption crimes.
December 2013. In Republika Srpska, the Strategy for
Fight against Corruption defines the issue of protection Figure 22. Convictions by type of corruption-related
of “so called whistleblowers,” or persons reporting offence, 2009 – 2012, Croatia
irregularities or suspect on corruption in public
institutions. 0íFSJOHB#SJCF

In the past few years, one of the focal points of the "DDFQUJOHB#SJCF
anticorruption policy debate in Bulgaria has been the *MMFHBM*OUFSDFTTJPO

regulation of conflict of interests. Conflicts of interests
"CVTFPG0îDFBOE
and incompatibilities regarding persons occupying 0îDJBM"VUIPSJUZ

public positions have always been a potential source

of corruption and illegal practices. Since Bulgaria’s
EU accession, the European Commission through the Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics.
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism has been
monitoring and has reported regularly on efforts to This is further developed in section 2.2.3.2. below.
25
The criminal procedure law had been amended a statements. As regards asset forfeiture, civil society
number of times in the last five years in an attempt to has been active in addressing some issues regarding
make proceedings against corruption more effective. the Law on the Confiscation of Illegally Acquired Assets.
These were, however, criticised by judges. In February The amendment which extends the competences for
2013, the Minister of Justice presented to parliament confiscating such assets does not address the assets
the final draft of changes on the Law on Courts and illegally acquired since the end of the 1998 – 1999 war,
the Law on the State Judicial Council. According to this in a way legitimizing those acquired in the after-war
draft, the President of the Supreme Court would have period. Another important policy improvement has
an obligation to submit an annual report to parliament, been the amendment of the Law on Financing of Political
although the latter would not decide on the report, but Parties, which now determines the level of fines that shall
just acknowledge it. According to the draft of the Law be applicable in case of violations, and also puts more
on the State Judicial Council, the declarations of assets pressure on the political parties to make their finances
of judges would not be made public online, however more transparent and publish updated statements.
they would have to be available to public 8 days after
the official request, which can be submitted by anyone. During the last three years set of changes to anti
Although the judges saw it as a threat to their security corruption policies in Macedonia were made as a result
and independence of the judiciary, the government of the recommendations by GRECO. The country had
greeted the changes and the new Law on Courts and in total 13 recommendations for improvements in the
Changes and amendments to the Law on the State Judicial incrimination and transparency of party funding, most
Council were adopted. of which required changes to national anticorruption
policies. The 2011, amendments to the Criminal Code
Figure 23. The equilibrium of anticorruption policies eliminated the condition that bribery occurs when
there is performance or omission to perform an official
Repression act which is within the scope of the official’s duties.
(cirminalisation), Instead, the amendment considered bribery (both,
law enforcement active and passive) all acts and omissions in the exercise
of the functions of a public official, whether or not they
are within the strict scope of the official’s duty. Also,
the amendments reformulated the offence of bribery of
Prevention
foreign public officials in similar terms to that of bribery
of domestic public officials (the additional elements of
(incentives,
“nudge” – type proof formerly contained in the offence of bribery of
policies)
foreign officials were eliminated). A further significant
policy change was the criminalisation of corruption
Kosovo sought to tackle corruption by creating task in the private sector. The amendments to the Criminal
forces and trying to improve the legislation and the Code have also introduced the offence of active trading
mechanisms of enforcement, however, with very in influence. This enabled that corrupt acts cover, the
little real effect. One such effort was, for example, the tangible and intangible character of the advantage, the
creation of a Task Force on Anti-Corruption composed direct or indirect commission of the offence, and third
of prosecutors and police officers under the Special party beneficiaries. In order to abolish the require
Prosecution Office in Kosovo. The Task Force was ment of dual criminality, amendments have been
mandated by the Prime Minister but “the decision itself introduced to the Criminal Code to extend jurisdiction
interfered with the independence of investigations and to anyone who commits an act of bribery or trading
prosecutions. The overall results of the Task Force have in influence abroad, irrespective of the offender’s
been minimal, almost a year and half from its set up.”26 nationality, country of residence or any other relation
One key policy development has been the amendment with Macedonia.
of the Law on Financing of Political Parties, which was
acceptable as it was, but now determines the level of Since 2010, the Montenegrin Criminal Code has been
fines that shall be applicable in case of violations, and amended three times, including amendments to the
also puts more pressure on the political parties to make criminal offences of bribery, illegal influence, insider
their finances more transparent and publish updated dealing, fixing the outcome of a tender. These amend
ments were influenced by the necessity to harmonise
(KIPRED, 2011, p. 6).
26
national practice with international standards, as well
as to introduce new criminal offences defined as the provision of the 3rd Judicial Reform Package in July
corruption. Anticorruption can also be expected 2012, the scope of the definition of bribery in article
from the July 2013 amendments to the Constitution 252 of the Turkish Penal Code has been expanded and
which strengthened the independence of the re-regulated. On the other hand, with the 4th Judicial
judiciary by reducing political interference in the Reform Package that was adopted by the parliament in
appointment of prosecutors and high level judicial the first half of 2013, the sentence for civil servants who
officials. Amendments introduced new procedure of rig public tender bids were decreased from 5-12 years to
the appointment and dismissal of the President of 3-7 years. If no public harm has been done, the penalty
the Supreme Court, Supreme State Prosecutor and is reduced to 1-3 years.
prosecutors, the composition and competences of the
Judicial Council, the election and dismissal of judges
of the Constitutional Court. The very procedure for 2.2.2. Specialised anticorruption laws
their appointment is more transparent and merit-
based, which should contribute to less corruption risk Two SELDI countries have had experiences in enacting
in appointments and judicial proceedings. laws that seek to control corruption, in addition to all
the other provisions in the criminal law and other
In addition to adopting a new Anticorruption Strategy pieces of legislation.
and Action Plan, the government of Serbia which took
office in mid-2012 put fight against corruption very Kosovo adopted its first Law on the Suppression of Corrup
high on its agenda. One of its first moves was to reopen tion under the United Nations Interim Administration
investigations on about 20 major privatisation cases in Kosovo, setting the groundwork for the legislative
where more or less serious allegations of corruption work against corruption. It introduced important good
have existed for years (this was also a requirement governance concepts such as “Legal acts resulting from
by the EU). A notable development has been the corruption are null” and compensation for persons
compliance with the recommendations of the October whose interest have been damaged by corrupt acts of
2012 report by GRECO extending the incrimination to officials. In 2009, this law was later replaced by the Law
private sector bribery, abolishing some dual criminality on Anti-Corruption Agency which constituted the Agen-
requirements, extending the offence of active and cy, including the way in which it conducts its prelimi-
passive bribery in the public sector to cover all acts/ nary investigations.
omissions in the exercise of the functions of a public
official, whether or not within the scope of the official’s In Macedonia, the Law on Prevention of Corruption was
competence, etc. enacted in April 2002. The law regulates the measures
for prevention of corruption in the exercise of power,
Figure 24. Corruption profile of Serbia public authorisations, official duty, and measures for
prevention of conflict of interests, prevention of corrup-
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Figure 25. Corruption profile of Macedonia
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In the past few years, the government in Turkey has UPDPSSVQUJPO
enacted the 3rd and the 4th Judicial Reform Packages,
which concerned certain amendments that directly
affects the prosecution of bribery and bid rigging. With Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
law envisaged creation of an independent anti-corrup- persons that can make a complaint. It is not intended to
tion institution – the State Commission for Prevention include citizens, but only public administration officials
of Corruption – which is competent for implementation and employees in the private sector. Besides this,
of the measures and activities envisaged in the law. The another novelty would be the establishment of a public
law also defines corruption as misuse of office, public entity that will be in charge of the implementation of
authorisation, official duty and position for the purpose this legislation.
of gaining any benefit for oneself or others.
With significant delay, the Law on Whistleblowers was
There were several main justifications for adoption of adopted in Bosnia and Herzegovina December 2013
the law. For instance, prior to the adoption of the Law at the state level. At the level of Federation of BiH, the
on Prevention of Corruption, there were no independent Law on Protection of Persons Reporting Corruption was
institutions for prevention and repression of corruption. adopted in late December 2013. In Republika Srpska,
Moreover, there was no system of mutual and horizontal the Strategy for Fight against Corruption defines the issue
inter-institutional control (system for national integrity) of protection of “so called” whistleblowers, or persons
and there was an evident lack of engagement from the reporting irregularities or suspect on corruption
civil society and media in raising public awareness, inside public institutions. According to the Law, the
and significant parts of the national legislation had not Agency for Prevention of Corruption and Coordination
yet been harmonised with international anticorruption of Fight against Corruption shall assign a status of a
standards. whistleblower to a person reporting corruption within
30 days from the date of report being filed. Supervision
over implementation of the Law is trusted to the
2.2.3. Other relevant legislation Administrative inspection office within the Ministry
of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the
2.2.3.1. Protection of whistleblowers Agency that is obligated to annually publish a special
list of institutions where corruption was reported
What makes corruption frustratingly difficult to at, including information on suffered damage and
uncover and punish is its latent nature. Both sides in a corrective measures proclaimed.
corrupt transaction have an incentive of not reporting
it. Encouraging the “blowing of a whistle”, especially In Bulgaria, effective administrative arrangements
by civil servants and officials becomes crucial in for whistleblowing are not yet in place. The Administra
prosecuting bribery and other misconduct. While tive Procedure Code and the Law on Prevention and
legislation protecting persons who report cases of Ascertainment of Conflict of Interest contain provisions
corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources on the protection of whistleblowers’ identities, while
from recrimination is essential, it also needs to be the Criminal Procedure Code requires citizens, and
combined with practices encouraging an organisational specifically public servants, to report crime, however, no
culture which equates reporting with integrity. adequate steps were taken to strengthen the protection
of whistleblowers. Recommendations for legislative
The Albanian the whistleblowing legislation complies
with international best practice standards and the 2006 Figure 26. Corruption profile of Bulgaria
law provides adequate protection of whistleblowers
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the legislation was designed with the intention to take (BWFBCSJCF

into consideration the complaints of all citizens. The 8FSFBTLFEUPHJWF
enforcement of the law is, however, uneven and there BCSJCF
have been a considerable number of cases when there $PSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSF

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address this and strengthen the preventive approach to
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corruption, in 2014 the Albanian government started UPDPSSVQUJPO
the drafting of new legislation on whistleblowers and
their protection in both the public and private sectors.
The amendments intend to narrow down the range of Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
measures on regulating lobbying and whistleblowers The Law on Civil Servants and State Employees intro-
protection remain on Bulgarian anticorruption agenda. duced to Montenegro the institute of protection for
whistleblowers. Such servants/employees must be
In October 2013, the proposal of the Act on the Protection adequately protected against all forms of discrimi-
of Whistleblowers was done and sent to the Croatian nation, as well as regarding their rights related to
Parliament for the further discussion. The proposal their office. The very fact that they have reported for
includes protection of the rights and rehabilitation of corruption must be held as secret in terms of their
whistleblowers, the introduction of the Ombudsman anonymity. In the event of dispute arising from the
for the protection of whistleblowers and misdemeanour violation of any right of civil servant/state employee,
and criminal provisions. the burden of proof is on the body that issued the
decision violating those rights. Amendments to the
The Kosovo law defines a whistleblower as “any Code of Criminal Procedure in 2013 introduced a new
person, who, as a citizen or an employee reports in criminal offense for those who fire the employee who
good faith to the respective authority within public reported corruption, with a sentence of up to three
institution at central or local level, institutions, public years of imprisonment.
enterprises or private for any reasonable doubts about
any unlawful actions”. The law does provide protection As of July 2014, in Serbia there is no specialised law
for whistleblowers (which is also in large part covered on whistleblower protection, although a draft is in
by the Law on the Protection of Witnesses), however, there the pipeline. There are some provisions in the law
are some shortcomings. One example is the ambiguity establishing the Anti-Corruption Agency and in the
as to how reporting of such cases should be done. procedural rules of the Agency.
Article 6, on the delivery of information, states that
“a whistleblower shall submit information about the In Turkey there is a Witness Protection Act. However,
unlawful actions to the official person dealing with for the whistleblower to be fully protected from
reported wrongdoings or to any other supervisor”. This any prosecution, the crime in question needs to be
creates some ambiguity as to what the person should sentenced by at least ten years of imprisonment or
do in cases when they want to report their superiors the crime in question needs to be part of an organised
for corruption. Other criticism of this law has been that crime, which is to be sentenced by at least two years of
its language is too general and it does not specify the imprisonment. As evidenced by interviews and media
mechanisms for safe whistleblowing. watch, whistleblowers who inform the authorities
about corrupt acts by their superiors, have been faced
The existing legislation in Macedonia sets some with threats and mobbing. As a result, whistleblowers
provisions for whistleblower protection. As of mid- could lose their jobs or face relocation within the public
June 2014, there were still no direct provisions administration.
guaranteeing direct and comprehensive protection
for the whistleblowers. However, this shortcoming 2.2.3.2. Regulation of conflict of interest
is expected to be overcome as a draft law has been
published and has entered in parliamentary procedure. Corruption in the SELDI countries, especially in the
The amendments will provide a legal definition of the legislative process, occurs most often when officials
term whistleblower (article 54b) and the mechanisms attempt to influence decision making, regulations,
for his protection (article 64d). There are also several tender awards, etc., in their own favour. While the use
provisions for indirect protection. For instance, of various types of proxies to siphon off public funds is
under the principle of equality, Article 4 of the Law growing, the majority of corrupt elected officials and
on Prevention of Corruption envisages that “everyone, civil servants still prefer to have some type of personal
without suffering any consequences, shall have the control over the illegal proceeds (accounts, property,
right to prevent or to report an action which represents etc). In such cases, provisions in the law which preclude
a misuse of office, public authorisations, official duty potential conflict between a person’s interests (stakes
and position and serves for achievement of personal in companies, ownership of property, etc) and his or her
benefits or causes damage to others”. The same law public office are required to prevent corruption. Conflict
provides indirect support through the principles of of interest legislation in the SELDI countries sometimes
publicity and liability, as well as in the sections on goes beyond this definition and covers practices such
relief of the obligation to keep classified information, as acceptance of gifts, money or services for performing
protection of collaborators to justice and witnesses. civil servants’ duties.
Amendments to the Law on Conflict of Interest in as well as any external payments, received from
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina were adopted activities outside their official employment (reasons
by both Houses of Parliament of BiH at the end of for such activities and the employer/sponsor, who has
2013. Largest change is related to the institution in paid them) during the previous year. This law lists
charge for implementation of the law. Instead of the the incompatibilities, but all relevant norms related
Central Elections Commission which was previously to conflicts of interests are found in the Law on the
charged with implementation, it is now to be overseen Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest. There
by a commission appointed by the two parliamentary are no specific rules on conflicts of interest applicable
houses, while at least one third must be representatives to public procurement officials but these are explicitly
of opposition parties. Law was further amended in a asked to disclose potential conflicts of interest in each
part related to sanctions. Previously, the law prescribed public procurement case. According to the Law on
that persons who violated the law are non-eligible to be Public Procurement, public procurement officials should
nominated for any elected position, executive position declare that they have no private interest within the
and/or counsels in period of four years from the date meaning of the Law on Prevention and Ascertainment
of the violation. In addition, violators could have been of Conflict of Interest as regards the respective public
fined. Changes provide that the new Commission may procurement they work upon. Also, officials may not
decree a seizure of up to 50% of net monthly salary be “related persons", within the meaning of the law,
and may also submit a proposal for dismissal from to a bidder or a participant in the procedure or with
duty and an invitation to quit duty. Adoption of these subcontractors appointed by him/her, or to members of
amendments was challenged by a number of members their management or control bodies.
of parliament, noting that suggested constitution of
the Commission is not providing necessary level of In an attempt to address weaknesses identified in
independence, which would ensure effectiveness in its the legislation, the law has been subject to several
work. They find that the Commission might be a subject amendments (in 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013), some of
to political influence through such elected members that which introduced radical changes in the system of
would disable decision making process. The Delegation government bodies involved in its implementation.
of the European Union in BiH also expressed its concern The 2010 amendments established the Commission for
over this issue. Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflict of Interest
to replace the previous decentralised implementation
of the law.27 The establishment of conflict of interest
can serve as grounds for dismissal from pubic office
as well.
$POóJDUPGJOUFSFTU
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QBSUJDJQBUJPOT Commission have concerned mainly junior public
officials or had to do with conflicts of interests at
local and regional level (e.g. mayors). The number of
investigations regarding elected politicians has been
very limited and these cases are moving particularly
slow into their final decisions, with too little publicly
In Bulgaria the main legal provisions are contained in available information. Furthermore and indicative of
the Law on the Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflict the integrity of the Commission, its former Chair was
of Interest. There are a number of specific laws and charged with criminal breach and violation of his
regulations that reflect the specifics regarding certain duties in the period December 2012 – July 2013, found
persons – Law on Civil Service, Labour Code, Law on guilty and sentenced by a first instance court to 3.5
Public Procurement, Law on Local Self-Government and years imprisonment. A further problem in the work of
Local Administration as well as various internal ethical the Commission is its accountability. The Commission
regulations on conflict of interest and assets disclosure. is required to submit to parliament an annual report
According to the Law on the Civil Service, all civil but it is for information only; thus there is no effective
servants, upon starting employment are required to oversight of its work.
declare their property possessions to the appointing
authority. By April 30th of each year, civil servants For an evaluation of the operation of the Commission, please
27
are also required to declare property possessions, refer to section 3.1.

In Croatia, the Conflict of Interest Prevention Act with prevention of conflict of interest. In the Law on
regulates the matters related to conflict of interest and Prevention of Conflict of Interests, the offence is defined as
incompatibilities among elected and senior appointed a “conflict between the public authorisations and duties
officials. The law regulates the prevention of conflicts with the private interests of the official, where the official
between private and public interests in public office, has a private interest which impacts or can impact on
the filing and contents of a report on the financial the performance of his/her public authorisations and
situation of an official, the process of checking the duties” (article 3). The State Commission for Prevention
data from these reports, the period of duties for public of Corruption is competent for its application. The law
officials under the law, selection, composition and is an example of a broad understanding of the concept
jurisdiction of the Commission for the Resolution of of conflict of interest as it provides that officials, while
Conflicts of Interest and other issues of importance to performing their duties, cannot be driven by personal,
the prevention of conflicts of interest. The rest of the family, religious, political or ethnic interests, pressures
legal provisions, aside from provisions regulating the or promises from their superiors; they must also not
organisational structure of the commission, almost accept or request benefits in return for performing his/
exclusively deal with the property of public officials. her duties, exercise or acquire rights by violating the
Most of the sanctions in the law, as well as monitoring principle of equality before the law, etc. – provisions
and reporting mechanisms are tied to the declaration of about more straightforward forms of corruption.
assets and not to conflict of interest per se. Instruments
for declaration and monitoring of the actual interests The Montenegrin Law on Prevention of Conflict lists the
of the officials are insufficient and weak with no public officials that must act in accordance with its provisions,
control or public participation in the process, which as well as their obligations in terms of reporting changes
is in contradiction with the General Administrative in their assets while holding public office. Significant
Procedure Act and/or Criminal Proceedings Code according improvement in this regard was introduced by the
to which public bodies should to act upon the citizens’ latest amendments to the law, giving the Commission
request for procedure, or upon citizens’ report on for Determining and Prevention of Conflict of Interest
suspicion of crime. Sanctions for conflict of interest competence to check the validity of data provided
are minor, limited to financial fines and reprimand, or by the officials in their reports on assets and income,
“publishing of the Commission’s Decision”, and they to conduct proceedings and issue decisions on the
do not represent any serious obstacle to the conflict of violation of the law (both as a first and second instance
interest. The law does not clearly regulate differences authority since it decides on requests for review of first
between the incompatibilities and conflict of interest, instance decisions); give opinions on the existence of
or among apparent, potential and actual conflict of conflict of interest; determine the value of gifts (the
interest. law states that public officials may not receive gifts);
initiate amendments to laws; submit a request for
The Kosovo Law on the Prevention of Conflict of Interest initiation of misdemeanour procedure to the regional
in the Discharge of Public Function adopts all the misdemeanour authorities.
mechanisms that should prevent conflict of interest,
but the implementation is mostly based on reporting by In Serbia, provisions regarding the conflict of interest
some third party. The Anti-Corruption Agency needs are contained in the Law on the Anticorruption Agency.
to be further empowered to keep track and registry of Although in the narrow sense the fight against
the private interests of public officials, and to be able to corruption is not the main purpose of these provisions,
act on cases of conflict of interest. the law prevents certain mechanisms of corruption. For
instance, there is a provision stipulating that a public
Provisions relating to conflict of interest in Macedonia official cannot also be a consultant to legal entities, thus
were initially incorporated in the already mentioned preventing the mechanism whereby a legal entity makes
Law on Prevention of Corruption of 2002. Later on, in 2007 payments to a public official through consultancy fees.
a Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interests was enacted, in Likewise, the provisions on the obligation to report
order to provide more detailed provisions for prevention property to a certain extent eliminate the possibility for
of conflict of interest. Also, certain provisions on conflict an official to significantly increase his property during
of interest prevention can be found in the Law on Public his term in office. As regards the coverage of the law, a
Procurement and Law on Lobbying. The provisions of the very large number of public officials are covered. On
Law on Prevention of Corruption, although largely replaced one hand, this is actually a shortcoming because the
by the Law on Prevention of Conflict on Interests, still deal Anticorruption Agency must invest a large share of its
resources in the creation and maintenance of a database The assessment of the anticorruption legislation carried
on public officials. On the other hand, some decision- out by SELDI reveals the following gaps that need to be
makers are not covered by this law, such as advisors addressed:
to the prime minister and deputy prime ministers, as
well as advisors to ministers. The law also prohibits 1. Define national anticorruption efforts in terms of
a public official from owning a controlling stake or policy related to quantifiable goals and milestones
holding managerial positions in a commercial company. rather than simply measures or legislation. This would
Similarly, it is prescribed that public officials cannot sit entail setting specific targets to be achieved and
on the management of public enterprises, although it selecting appropriate intervention methods. These
is not clear exactly about what kind of conflict these targets should be quantified as much as feasible.
target, since public enterprises, at least according to the 2. Prioritise certain sectors, types of corruption
law, work in conformity with the public interest. These and methods of intervention and pilot different
provisions do not apply to members of parliament. approaches before rolling out full blown measures.
Corruption is a broad concept, related to various and
As regards the penal provisions, penalties are too varying types of fraud which cannot be addressed
mild. The first penalty, a confidential caution not simultaneously in an effective way.
disclosed to the general public, constitutes practically 3. Countries that have not introduced whistleblower
the first step after it has been established that a public protection legislation should do so.
official has violated the law. The second penalty – the 4. Policies need to be informed. While some effort has
public announcement of a decision that this law has been made in the national anticorruption strategies
been violated for elected public officials and a public to estimate previous results, none of the SELDI
announcement of a recommendation to resign for other countries has a sustainable mechanism of evaluation
types of public officials – is the most serious penalty. of anticorruption policies. At the very least, this
requires: a) reliable and regular statistics about
As regards conflict of interests, in Turkey there is no anticorruption efforts (investigations, prosecutions,
specialised legislation. There is, however, Article 13 of administrative measures, etc.); b) regular monitoring
the Regulations on Principles of Ethical Conduct for Public and analysis of the spread and forms of corruption in
Officials regulates and controls matters on conflict of the various public sectors. The monitoring should be
interest. Also, according to the Civil Servants Law, public independent and/or external to the country, involve
officials have a personal responsibility to prevent civil society and incorporate the basic components of
cases that would lead to conflict of interest; they are non-administrative corruption monitoring systems,
responsible to act cautiously about potential cases and such as SELDI’s CMS.
immediately inform their superiors in case there is
one. The Civil Servants Law also state the disciplinary The effectiveness of anticorruption policy should be
penalties for such issues. For instance, if a public official evaluated with the use of the following indicators:
personally benefits financially from a property of the
state, the amount is to be taken out of his/her salary. • Number of draft laws and other regulatory docu-
ments related to anticorruption / number of adopted
laws and other regulations;
• Number of initiated, completed, suspended or ter-
2.3. Recommendations minated corruption-related criminal investigations
and number of persons accused;
• Number of indictments and number of persons
Overall, the SELDI countries have adopted the better indicted;
part – more importantly the logic and approach – of • Number of initiated, completed, suspended or
the international anticorruption standards in their terminated corruption-related court proceedings;
national legislations. All have some kind of strategic • Number of convictions and acquittals, types and
document containing their overall approach to tackling severity of the penalties imposed and number of
corruption. As regards their anticorruption laws and persons convicted;
regulation, the key challenge now is to keep up with • Number of corruption-related complaints filed/
the shifting manifestations and forms of corruption number of inquiries conducted/number of officials
while maintaining regulatory stability and avoiding sanctioned for involvement in corrupt practices (by
overwhelming the judiciary with rapid changes. government body).
3 Institutional Practice and
Enforcement of the Law
I
n the SELDI countries, the 1990s and early 2000s An additional consideration that is shared among all
were the period when significant parts of their SELDI countries is the compromised autonomy of the
regulatory landscape had been fundamentally various oversight and repression bodies. All countries
reshaped, especially the regulations on the integrity report one degree or another of interference by elected
of public governance. It was only when the bulk of the politicians – members of parliament or government
best international standards had been adopted in the ministers – in the work of the civil service.
national legislation, that it was realised that to achieve
their intended effect, laws and regulations need a While all SELDI countries had one form or another of
delivery mechanism that does not distort their initial compliance control bodies at the central government
intention. The widely shared conclusion now is that the level – national audit institutions, asset declarations
legislation is adequate but its effective enforcement vetting bodies, various other supervisory institutions –
remains an issue of concern. Thus, during the few report effective mechanisms for internal integrity
past decade it had become increasingly obvious to management within the bodies of central and local
governments and other stakeholders that to assess any government and other public bodies.
policy or regulation irrespective of the experience of its
implementation and its effect is meaningless, and could In the SELDI countries, the enforcement of integrity
even be counterproductive. legislation needs to cover a wide range of practices
contained in the concept of corruption: from the
The range of government institutions that are relevant small cash bribe to doctors and traffic policemen to
to the maintenance of integrity standards in public the sophisticated process of manipulating a law to
governance is quite broad; in fact, all public sector bodies the advantage of a party donor. In practice this entails
one way or another need to uphold these standards. In managing repressive responses in a way that does not
the SELDI countries – with high corruption prevalence – congest the criminal justice system. However, none
this presents a double challenge: in terms of policy, this of the SELDI countries has an adequate complaints
means designing a policy framework that harmonises management mechanism in the public administration
the roles and powers of all relevant institutions; it also as a first step to dealing with corruption. Most countries
means that to make a tangible dent in corruption, have an anticorruption body that is expected to receive
governments need to build the institutional capacities complaints from the public. Complaints are then either
of a fairly large number of bodies. referred to law enforcement and prosecution and/
or used for analyses of corruption practices. There
If there is one leading conclusion that has emerged in is little evidence, however, that these agencies add
the course of the studies carried out for this report, any significant value – neither as an intermediary
it is the mutual reinforcement between competence between the public and the prosecution (if anything,
and integrity in the institutions of government. this detracts trust from law enforcement agencies),
Typically, whenever the anticorruption credentials of nor as anticorruption think tanks. Furthermore, there
a given government body are questioned, it is also seem to be no policies or guidance on complexity
found to be wanting in terms of institutional capacity. management of suspected corruption offences in the
Conversely, any gain in professionalism has also led public administration – an automatic sorting of cases
to improvement in integrity. A number of intervening according to criteria (usually severity and complexity)
factors ensure the linkage between the two – higher which allows certain types of cases to be addressed
levels of remuneration, higher motivation of staff, locally by internal management, thus referring fewer
higher premium on employment in that particular cases to the (rather expensive) criminal justice system.
body, exposure to contacts – including international –
and knowledge, better career opportunities, etc. A deficiency that is shared in all SELDI countries is
As a result, a certain institutional momentum is the shortage of reliable and publicly accessible data
gained that raises the opportunity costs of graft; a on the performance of government institutions,
virtuous circle is then entered that further roots out especially as relates to anticorruption. Information
corruption. and statistics are either not collected, not available to
the public, or gathered so haphazardly as not to allow public institutions, across all three branches of
monitoring and analysis. Without such information no power, and thus necessitating a coordinating and
government can make a credible claim that it conducts unifying body to tie all these aspects together.
an anticorruption policy of any kind. This is mostly due • The need to concentrate expertise: the design of
to lack of demand from policy makers; anticorruption anticorruption policies requires significant input
policies are mostly limited to broadening the scope of from monitoring of the spread of corruption and
incriminated practices and the designation of various analysis of policy options.
awareness and training activities as “prevention” – • There was a need to maintain a high level of public
neither of which relies on much evidence. awareness of the significance of anticorruption
which such agencies could achieve.
The Integrated Anticorruption Enforcement Monitor-
ing Toolkit, developed by the CSD and the University One of the key issues facing the design of a specialised
of Trento, is intended to address precisely such gaps. It national anticorruption institution is how to combine
will integrate corruption victimisation data – such as preventive and repressive functions. Typically, the
provided by SELDI’s CMS – with a measurement of the SELDI countries have tried to have their anticorruption
enforcement of anticorruption policies. The toolkit will institutions do both, although repression is by far
assess corruption risk in a given government institu- the lesser aspect of their work. Most of the tasks of
tion and the effect of the corresponding, if any, policy these bodies are related to some form of supervision
that seeks to reduce it. This will allow anticorruption and control, usually of the national anticorruption
policy making to enter a mature phase by equipping it strategies.
with a feedback mechanism.
The establishment of such institutions, however, has
been plagued by a number of difficulties, which the
SELDI countries have not been particularly successful
3.1. Specialised at solving:
anticorruption
• Constitutional considerations. High as corruption
institutions might have been on the governments’ agendas,
it was not feasible to create institutions with
The establishment of specialised anticorruption insti- extraordinary powers that would somehow affect
tutions in the SELDI countries has been warranted on the constitutionally established balance of power.
several grounds: Besides, extraordinary powers would defeat the
very purpose it has been created for – uphold
• It reflected the level of seriousness with which good governance. On the other hand, such an
corruption was viewed as a government priority institution could be neither ad hoc (this would
and served to reassure the public and international undermine claims that corruption is a high priority
partners of the commitment of the government to issues) nor permanent (because of constitutional
anticorruption. considerations). The typical compromise is for these
• Given the wide spread of corruption, affecting agencies to be attached to the executive government
significantly law enforcement bodies, it was and given supervisory powers which, however,
warranted to create an anticorruption body “from are usually limited to requiring other government
scratch” thus ensuring that it would not be easily agencies to report on the implementation of the tasks
captured by existing corrupt networks. This assigned to them by the national anticorruption
reasoning has come as response – as the analysis in strategies.
this report shows, not a very convincing one – to the • Such agencies had to be careful not to duplicate
conundrum facing countries of high corruption: how powers already conferred to other oversight bodies
is a corrupt system of governance to be reformed (e.g. national audit institutions or law enforcement).
when it can only be done by way the same system of • Most were provided with limited institutional
governance? capacity – budget, personnel – despite intentions to
• Such institutions were required by the fact the opposite.
that corruption is a broad concept that entails • These agencies were often promoted as having
interventions in a number of public sectors, through the powers to set the government’s anticorruption
a variety of policies spanning the whole range of policy. There is little evidence, however, that they
Institutional Practice and Enforcement of the Law 57
had any significant influence on the government’s government level mandated to determine the country`s
legislative agenda. anticorruption agenda.
A much discussed aspect of the work of anticorruption The Commission for the Prevention and Combating of
agencies is their role as coordinating bodies. On Corruption is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister
the hand, this is justified given the broad range of and Minister of Interior and has the mandate to take
institutions involved in anticorruption. On the other, decisions on the course of the Bulgarian anticorruption
concerns about “coordination and cooperation” fail to policy. The Commission is supposed to analyse
appreciate that government institutions are by their corruption and conflict of interests and propose
nature bureaucratic structures that are expected to policies to counteract them; it is also expected to
strictly follow rules and procedures. Such concerns carry out corruption proofing of legislation. In theory,
are indicative of either overlaps or gaps; in other its functions seem considerable and come close to a
words, either of duplicating legal provisions or lapses comprehensive body for anticorruption policy. The
in policies. It is not through the good will and extra establishment of 28 regional anticorruption councils is
effort of the senior managers of public institutions that a positive development, especially in the context of the
effective governance would be achieved. Compatibility very low regional engagement with anticorruption.
and complementarity should be built into government
policies that collate the various anticorruption aspects In practice, however, the Commission lacks the necessary
and institutions; institutional coordination will then capacity to perform its functions effectively. This is
follow by default. apparent in its coordination of the implementation of the
Integrated Strategy for Prevention and Countering Corruption
In Albania, although there is no typical specialised and Organised Crime, where it proves very difficult to
anticorruption agency, there is a National Coordinator integrate the various action plans and implementation
for Anti-Corruption – the Minister of State for Local reports into a strong, synergetic approach against
Government – who coordinates the anti-corruption corruption. The Commission`s obligation to present
activities of government and independent institutions results of its work in the form of annual reports is
at the central and local level. Furthermore a network performed inconsistently – the last available report is
of focal points was established in all line ministries for 2011 but cannot be accessed despite being available
and independent institutions, which will monitor and on the official webpage.
guide the relevant officials in the implementation of
the Anti-Corruption Strategy and report to the National The Centre for Prevention and Countering Corruption
Anti-Corruption Coordinator. and Organised Crime (known under its Bulgarian
acronym BORKOR) is a specialised anticorruption body,
Figure 27. Corruption profile of Albania established at the Council of Ministers in 2010 to assess,
plan and develop preventive anticorruption measures.
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPO
Its main tool is software which aims at identifying

(BWFBCSJCF
weak spots and developing “network measures against

corruption”. For the period of existence of BORKOR its
8FSFBTLFEUPHJWF
BCSJCF efforts have been focused on acquiring a “cyber-system
$PSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSF of the type V-Modell XT” claimed to be “a unique
QSFDFJWFEBTiMJLFMZu
highly-technological instrument without analogue in
/PUUPMFSBOUPG
DPSSVQUQSBDUJDFT the world” to be used in developing anti-corruption
)JHIMZBXBSFPG /" measures following the identification of environments
DPSSVQUJPOQBUUFSOT
conducive to crime.
1FPQMFTVTDFQUJCMF
UPDPSSVQUJPO

The lack of results and clarity in its mission statement
has drawn repeated criticisms from civil society and

the media. With a spending of BGN 10.3 million (over
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. €5 mln) between 2011 and 2013,28 the Centre has also
been criticised for unjustified spending of public money.
Bulgaria has no independent institution to focus ef-
forts, make proposals and drive action against corrup- (Център за превенция и противодействие на корупцията и
28
tion. Still, there are several institutions at the central организираната престъпност, 2014).
The number of personnel is considered excessive with a supervision of the implementation of the strategy, the
total of 155 employees (40 permanent and 115 tempora Agency is expected to receive and process corruption-
rily relocated from other administrative structures). related complaints, including those submitted online.
Management has also been controversial: two directors Initial civic activity does not seem to have been
have so far been replaced – one dismissed on the significant – in 2012 it received 75 complaints online,
grounds of unsatisfactory results and the other without mostly related to the work of custom officers, health
any justification. According to media publications, this and education employees and public administration.31
situation almost led to a decision to close the Centre As with some other SELDI anticorruption bodies, it is
in the autumn of 2013.29 In July 2014, the Ministry of expected to refer complaints to the prosecution and use
Interior withdrew its staff seconded in BORKOR and the information for analyses of the prevalent corrupt
debates about closing the Centre were reopened. practices.
In January 2013, one year after the Consultative Council Figure 28. Corruption profile of Bosnia and Herzegovina
asked BORKOR to prepare and implement a model in
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPO
the area of public procurement, BORKOR published its

first interim report, which identified corruption risks, (BWFBCSJCF

and listed numbers of vulnerable areas without naming 8FSFBTLFEUPHJWF
them (at least they were not named in the publicly BCSJCF

available version of the report). $PSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSF

QSFDFJWFEBTiMJLFMZu
/PUUPMFSBOUPG
One of the exotic ideas, launched by BORKOR in DPSSVQUQSBDUJDFT
the beginning of 2014 was the intention to require )JHIMZBXBSFPG /"

DPSSVQUJPOQBUUFSOT
all politicians and high-ranking civil servants to
1FPQMFTVTDFQUJCMF
declare their personal relationships. In addition, the UPDPSSVQUJPO
current chairman of the Centre has already revealed
his intention to discard the cyber model and to turn
BORKOR into a kind of complaints clearinghouse – Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
receiving the complaints and referring them to the
competent authorities. A plan was also revealed to scan The Croatian government’s Committee for Monitoring
for corruption all public procurement tenders within the Implementation of Measures for the Repression
the government investment program. of Corruption was envisaged as an operative and
coordinative body which reports to parliament. In
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Agency for the addition to coordinating the implementation of the
Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Anticorruption Strategy and the accompanying Action
Fight against Corruption was established in 2009 Plan, the Committee is supposed to evaluate the risks
but the management was appointed with a two year of corruption and propose measures (again, as in the
delay in August 2011; its budget was only approved in other countries, „measures” rather than „policies” is
June of 2012 allowing it to establish premises (the US the preferred term) for prevention and better inter-
Department State describes the budget as “minimal”).30 institutional cooperation. It is technically supported by
The Agency appointed its first civil servants in April an “Independent Sector” at the Ministry of Justice.
2013 (15 out of the foreseen 29 positions); thus, four years
after it had been legally inaugurated, the Agency is still The Committee does not seem to be a step forward in
not fully operational. The delay in forming the Agency terms of institutional response. There had been similar
led to the delay in the implementation of the Strategy for arrangements before – previous governments had had
the Fight against Corruption because the majority of the the same body but some of its members were prosecuted
measures depend on the capacity of the Agency. The for corruption, thus defeating its very purpose. There are
Global Integrity Report 2010 finds that appointments in no publicly available reports of behalf of the Committee
the Agency were made according to political criteria and on the implementation of measures for the suppression
it could thus “be concluded that removal also would be of corruption. It has had no specific agendas, or other
based on similar criteria.” Besides coordination and the managerially relevant documents.
29
(Медиапул, 2013). (Agencija za prevenciju korupcije i koordinaciju borbe protiv
31
30
(U.S. Department of State, 2013b, p. 19). korupcije Bosne i Hercegovine, 2012, p. 9).
The National Council for Monitoring Anti-Corruption Figure 29. Corruption profile of Kosovo
Strategy Implementation is a body of the Croatian
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPO
Parliament whose assignment is to evaluate and assess

the implementation of the Anticorruption Strategy. (BWFBCSJCF
Although it is envisaged to have a supervisory function, 8FSFBTLFEUPHJWF

it can suggest improvements to certain institutions but BCSJCF
cannot enforce them. There are no examples indicating $PSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSF

QSFDFJWFEBTiMJLFMZu
that decisions of the Council have changed or improved /PUUPMFSBOUPG
any operation or effort against corruption. It has DPSSVQUQSBDUJDFT
published 3 reports since 2006, the last being issued in )JHIMZBXBSFPG
DPSSVQUJPOQBUUFSOT
2010. This means there has been a gap in monitoring
1FPQMFTVTDFQUJCMF
the implementation of the Strategy since 2010. UPDPSSVQUJPO

The mandate of the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency
is focused on detecting and investigating corruption Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
cases, on efforts to prevent and combat corruption and
increase public awareness. The Agency is expected institution (e.g. in the Post and Telecommunications
to analyse the causes of corruption, control potential of Kosovo). A further weakness is the “low quality of
incompatibilities with public office, including the information the Agency sends to the prosecutors
commercial activities by officials, enforce restrictions resulting in most of them being rejected by prosecutors
regarding the acceptance of gifts related to the for further actions. […] General Auditor also found
performance of official duties, monitor assets, and serious problems in the Agency such as the failure
enforce restrictions on contracting entities participating to register its inventory; violation of employment
in public tenders. While its preventive work is well procedures, employees received per diems while
resourced (one of its departments is entirely focused officially on vacation, etc.”35
on that, including a division concentrating on assets
monitoring and one on conflict of interest and gifts), In Macedonia there is a State Commission for Preven
its specialisation in combating corruption through tion of Corruption which functions as a specialised
repressive means is less so. Repressive tasks are anticorruption institution. The commissioners are
concentrated in the second division, which – besides elected by parliament for a four-year professional
a range of other legal tasks – deals with the Agency’s mandate and with the right for one re-appointment.
investigative activities. This means that of the overall Commission’s powers are fairly typical for the SELDI
staff in the Agency only a few are directly engaged countries in that they cover policy making, oversight,
in combating actual corrupt behaviour. “This small monitoring, training and awareness. Its policy
number of staff also have limited experience in function includes the design of the State Programme for
investigative work. As for most employees within the Anticorruption (the national anticorruption strategy);
[Agency], their background is that of lawyers with it also prepares opinions on draft laws relevant for
some experience in courts of law: none of them has a the prevention of corruption. Nominally, its oversight
specific police-related background.”32 powers are quite broad, and include control of the
finances of political parties and the monitoring of asset
The main achievement of the Agency is the process declarations of public officials. As regards political
of disclosure of assets: over 90% of officials fulfilling parties, in its own admission further legislative
this obligation. However, “the Agency has been able changes are needed for the Commission “to be able to
to verify only 20 per cent of the reports received from adequately discharge its functions in terms of direct
public officials due to capacity constraints,”33 while insight into the financial and material work of these
other observers noting that it is “showing minimal entities.”36 Additionally, it is not clear whether its
results.”34 The best evidence for the deficiencies in coordination with the State Audit Office covers the
this function is that most public officials, especially issues of party funding, which would be crucial for
members of parliament, hold a second job in a public effective control.
(FRIDOM, 2010, p. 27).

32
35
(Task Force on European Integration, 2012, pp. 19-20).
33
(Transparency International, 2011, p. 5). 36
(State Commission for Prevention of Corruption of Macedonia,
34
(KIPRED, 2014, p. 7). 2011, p. 18).
The Commission is expected to register and monitor Figure 30. Corruption complaints received by
the assets and the change in assets of elected officials. Montenegrin government bodies in 2012
It conducts random verification of asset declarations

which could be said to have a preventive anticorruption
%JSFDUPSBUFGPS
"OUJDPSSVQUJPO
effect. The effectiveness of this function is undermined,
*OJUJBUJWF
however, by the lack of registry of elected and appointed 4UBUF1SPTFDVUPShT
0îDF
officials and the capacity of the Commission to go
beyond checking of formal compliance. Generally, its
1PMJDF%JSFDUPSBUF
institutional capacity – its powers are enforced by seven .JOJTUSZPG)FBMUI

commissioners and 18 staff – is quite inadequate for its $VTUPNT"ENJOJTUSBUJPO
broad mandate. The Commission also files requests to .JOJTUSZPG&EVDBUJPO
the public prosecutor’s office for criminal proceedings BOE4QPSU
in cases where evidence exists for wrongdoing. No

analysis is available of the follow-up on these requests Source: Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative Bulletin, July 2013.
or the outcomes of instituted prosecutions, in order
to assess the effectiveness of this function. The EC’s to exercising public authority susceptible to developing
evaluation is that these “rarely lead to successful corrupt conduct, and, should the examination outcome
prosecutions.”37 As of November 2013, the Commission turn out to indicate a need, to undertake measures to
“had not filed any misdemeanor charges based on the eliminate those irregularities and their consequences,
complaints it received.”38 as well as to institute proceedings in order to determine
the responsibility and to sanction the persons who have
In Montenegro, for the past 13 years the government caused or contributed to them.
has formed several specialised anticorruption bodies.
Among these, the Directorate for Anti-Corruption A key preventive action by the Agency has been the
Initiative, established in 2001, is the main one. It is provision of information and advice relating to the
entrusted with raising awareness and conducting introduction of integrity plans in a large number of
corruption research; it is also responsible for public institutions in Serbia. Its function of overseeing
the adoption of the international anticorruption the enforcement of conflict of interest regulations
standards in Montenegro (including cooperation with requires that the Agency establishes information
GRECO, UNCAC, etc.). The Directorate does not have exchange protocols with a number of other agencies –
policymaking powers, which undermines its overall Business Registers Agency, Tax Police, Central
standing. It has no internal management document, Securities Depository, etc. The European Commission’s
which is indicative of low institutional capacity. 2013 evaluation stresses the role of the Agency with
One of its responsibilities is cooperation with other respect to the financing of political parties and electoral
government authorities in dealing with complaints that campaigns, but only 3 – 4% of the Serb public believe it is
the Directorate receives from the public. In 2012, the capable of complete control of the financing of political
Directorate has received a total of 85 complaints that parties;39 it also “lacked efficiency in publishing required
have been forwarded to the competent state authorities reports, such as reports on political party financing.”40
for further action. Even though it initiated proceedings against and filed
a number of misdemeanour charges against political
The Anticorruption Agency of Serbia is a public body parties that have not submitted reports on the costs of
accountable to the National Assembly. It has a range their election campaigns, “the Agency inefficiency is
of competences most of which are preventive. These best seen through the fact that none of those subject to
entail the identification of occasions and situations that criminal proceedings for corruption by other organs
offer incentives for corrupt behaviour and the design were identified by the Agency to have any conflict of
and establishment of mechanisms aimed at eliminating interest or committed any crime of corruption.”41
corruption-inducing conditions before they lead to
corrupt actions. The objective of its monitoring and The Serbian government also has an advisory body – the
oversight competences is to examine whether the existing Anti-Corruption Council – which is expected to analyse
environment already contains irregularities with regard
39
(UNDP Serbia, December 2013, p. 37).
37
(European Commission, SWD(2013) 413 final, p. 41). 40
(U.S. Department of State, 2013e, p. 18).
38
(U.S. Department of State, 2013c, p. 17). (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014a, p. 30).
41
corruption patterns in the country based on complaints survey of corruption. The working groups have also
received by citizens. Individual complaints are used for suggested the establishment of comprehensive tracking
analysis and referred to the relevant institutions. Despite of data on corruption, a need that this SELDI report has
having drafted many reports on the most important identified as applicable to all SELDI countries.
corruption cases in Serbia “few of the criminal complaints
filed by the Council have ever been prosecuted.”42
In Turkey, the main body at the central government 3.2. Legislature and party
level that deals with anticorruption issues is the Prime
funding
Minister’s Inspection Board. The Board has the mandate
to inspect and supervise ministries, public institutions
and other public bodies in cases of corruption. It “is It is the executive branch of government that usually
responsible for investigating major corruption cases,”43 comes under most intense scrutiny as regards corruption.
however, its capacity “is perceived as insufficient, in Legislative corruption, however, could incur even more
particular in terms of the number of staff, to ensure the significant damages if it allows a capture of the law-
required follow-up of proposals.”44 making process by special interests. Parliaments in the
SELDI countries do not rank high in the public trust
Figure 31. Corruption profile of Turkey and this unenviable position is not without its reasons.
Codes of ethical behaviour are rare and unenforced;
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPO
lobbying regulation is even rarer; only recently have

(BWFBCSJCF procedures for lifting immunity from prosecution
started to be introduced, albeit timidly; wherever there
8FSFBTLFEUPHJWF
BCSJCF is an anticorruption body in parliament, it is typically
$PSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSF
to supervise some executive agency, rather than deal
QSFDFJWFEBTiMJLFMZu
with corruption among members.
/PUUPMFSBOUPG
DPSSVQUQSBDUJDFT
)JHIMZBXBSFPG Figure 32. Estimates of the corruptness of parliaments

DPSSVQUJPOQBUUFSOT and MPs46
1FPQMFTVTDFQUJCMF
UPDPSSVQUJPO

#VMHBSJB

"MCBOJB

#PTOJBBOE
)FS[FHPWJOB
Earlier evaluation reports on Turkey had noted that
there had been “no central body in charge of developing ,PTPWP

and evaluating anti-corruption policies, inadequate
coordination of the various institutions involved $SPBUJB

in the fight against corruption and no independent
body in charge of monitoring the implementation of 4FSCJB

anti-corruption measures.”45 In 2009, the Board was
given the coordination role in the implementation of .BDFEPOJB

government’s Anti-Corruption Strategy. It is doubtful

whether the Inspection Board could fill this gap as its 5VSLFZ

role is rather technical. In fact, the current SELDI round

is addressing one of the needs identified by its working .POUFOFHSP

groups – a suggestion not followed up by any other
institution in Turkey – namely, conducting a national 1BSMJBNFOU .FNCFSTPGQBSMJBNFOU

42
(Freedom House, 2013).
43
(U.S. Department of State, 2013t, p. 35).
46
For public officials the scale is from 1 to 4, where 1 is “Almost
no one is involved” and 4 is “Almost everybody is involved”. For
44
(SIGMA, 2012, p. 14). institutions the scale is from 1 – “Not proliferated at all” to 4 –
45
(Chêne, 2012, p. 1). “Proliferated to the highest degree.”
An issue of significant concern in the SELDI countries later sentenced to 14 months in prison for repetitive
is the financing of political parties and electoral cases of bribery in relation to her position as professor
campaigns. Most countries have implemented GRECO’s at University of Zagreb.48 The commission was not
recommendations on part funding but a number of functioning from 2011 until the end of 2012, when its
problems – such as anonymous donations, voter bribing, new members were finally appointed.
insufficient capacity to audit party finances and limited
powers to enforce sanctions – persist. In February 2011, the Croatian parliament adopted
the Political Activity and Electoral Campaign Financing
The Albanian parliament has no anticorruption Act which was a step forward in adopting best
committee and the corruption and anticorruption issues international standards and better regulation of this
are dealt with by other committees such as National issue as it introduces a monitoring system over the
Security Committee. There is no comprehensive written funding of political parties, independent lists and
code of conduct for MPs. Regarding the provisions candidates and of their electoral campaigns. The
against corruption in the funding of political parties, National Elections Commission and the State Audit
the obligation upon political parties to submit detailed Office were authorised to oversee its enforcement. The
information on their annual resources and expenses was first test on this Act was Parliamentary elections 2011
introduced only in 2011. The following year templates when the National Elections Commission for the first
for financial reports to be submitted by political parties time exercised control over the financing of election
and of guidelines for the auditing of such reports by campaigns. Civil society observers concluded that
independent auditors were introduced. GRECO’s results of monitoring over the funding of political
third evaluation round was generally positive on the parties and analysis of reports submitted indicate
fulfilment of its recommendations in this regard. that the parties have made a visible progress in the
transparency of campaign funding.49
Bosnia and Herzegovina has provided an example
of a setback in the integrity of parliament. A 2002 law The regulations of the Kosovo parliament define the
regulating conflict of interest is being changed to shift rights and responsibilities of MPs, their immunity and
its oversight from the Central Elections Commission procedures for revoking it, as well as the obligations
to a parliamentary committee; thus the enforcement of that MPs have under a Code of Ethics. The Code is an
the law could be compromised as elected politicians annex to the regulation that each MP is expected to
would have to adjudicate their own cases. The move adhere to.
has been much criticised by observers and the head of
the EU delegation and the US ambassador have gone Kosovo’s law on the financing of political parties was
so far as to send a letter saying that the law should adopted in 2010. A study by the Kosovo Democratic
not be adopted because of serious concerns.47 Rules Institute has given the law a score of 6.6 out of 10.
for funding of political parties are also changing in Deficiencies are mainly related to preventive measures
a way that is opening opportunities for abuse and and reporting to the oversight body, the Central
manipulation. Limits for individual contributions Elections Commission. Results of the study show “that
made by individuals or companies are being increased, political party financing in Kosovo lacks the legal
as well as contributions from party members. The infrastructure regulating preventive mechanisms
new law allows the use of premises owned by public such as the existence of a centralised system of bank
institutions by political parties, which was not allowed transactions, a ban on cash deposits, and the existence
in the past. Further, while contributions to parties of preventive measures against the abuse of government
are made easier, the fines for breaking the law are resources.”50 Political parties do not prepare financial
decreasing. reports for the public, and their bookkeeping records
do not reflect incomes from private donations. Other
The Croatian parliament has a commission for evaluations conclude that “political parties in Kosovo
the resolution of conflicts of interest. Although its do not conform to the requirements of the law and often
regulation requires that candidates for members of the violate its principles.”51
commission should be of high integrity and reputation,
in 2008 within the USKOK and police action “Index,” 48
(Metro Portal, 2008).
the chairperson of the commission was arrested and 49
(GONG, 2011).
50
(Group for Legal and Political Studies, 2013, p. 8).
(European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, 2013).
47
(Group for Legal and Political Studies, 2013, p. 8).
51
The Macedonian parliament does not have a specia also made more severe for perpetrators of criminal
lised anticorruption committee. A Commission of offenses against elections and voting, such as the
Inquiry can be established provided twenty members criminal offence “abuse of funds for election campaign
of parliament raise an issue to determine the liability financing.” Nevertheless, in the 2011 Global Integrity
for corruption involving elected or appointed officials, Report on Macedonia, the financing of political parties
responsible persons in public enterprises and in other had the lowest score of all evaluate sectors, save for law
legal entities which dispose of public funding. As of enforcement.
April 2014, such a Commission has not been formed.
Individual members can also have recourse for an In Montenegro, the parliament established an Anti
opinion to the State Commission for Prevention of corruption Committee in 2012. It is a body for oversight
Corruption in case of suspected conflict of interest. of the executive but also examines issues and problems
in the implementation of laws relating to the fight
The two key pieces of anticorruption legislation (which against corruption and organised crime and proposes
contain some duplicating provisions) – Law on the amendments. Significantly, a member of opposition
Prevention of Corruption and the Law on Prevention of is chairing the Committee. It was granted the right of
Conflicts of Interest, including fairly detailed provisions access to confidential data without prior permission.
on conflict of interest, incompatibilities, gifts and asset Five oversight hearings have been held: on the case of
declarations – apply to members of parliament. In alleged corruption in the privatisation of the company
addition, there are parliament-specific provisions which ‘Telekom Crne Gore’, on the Prevlaka border issue
regulate the transparency of the legislative process, with Croatia, on the 2004 murder of a journalist, on
which are “fairly transparent in practice.”52 Although the alleged illegal activities and violation of state
the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament allow civil society interests regarding the issue of electricity supply to
representatives and other stakeholders to participate in the Aluminum Plant Podgorica, and on the fulfilment
the legislative processes through hearings and public of the obligations stated in the report of the Council of
debates, this remains an issue of concern. A recent Europe’s Commission against racism and intolerance of
analysis found that only part of the draft laws released February 2012.
for public review (41%) were open for consultation to
the public.53 In 2012, only 7 debates, 1 hearing and 1 Figure 33. Corruption profile of Montenegro
public discussion were held.
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPO
Macedonian law stipulates that the financing of the (BWFBCSJCF

political parties should be overseen by the State Audit
8FSFBTLFEUPHJWF
Office. The latter evaluates the annual financial reports BCSJCF
of political parties, and if it finds irregularities it is $PSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSF
QSFDFJWFEBTiMJLFMZu
obliged to refer it to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The
/PUUPMFSBOUPG
Commission for Prevention of Corruption also has a DPSSVQUQSBDUJDFT
jurisdiction in this matter, as it is mandated to assess )JHIMZBXBSFPG /"
potential criminal or misdemeanour liability in a case DPSSVQUJPOQBUUFSOT
of complaint about pressure exerted on legal entities 1FPQMFTVTDFQUJCMF

UPDPSSVQUJPO
and individuals for the purpose of raising funds for a

political party. A significant shortcoming of the laws,
however, remains the lack of obligation for donors to
political parties to report their financial contributions. Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
As regards enforcement of the legislation, “control is not
efficient and sanctions are not enforced in practice.”54 In Serbia, the applicable law allows the financing of
In the last few years, stricter penal instruments and political parties from the state budget to a considerable
new criminal offenses were introduced in the Criminal extent. Eligible private sources include membership
Code in order to achieve transparency in the funding of fees, contributions from legal entities and natural
political parties and preventing abuses. Sanctions were persons, income from promotional activities by political
parties, income from properties of political parties and
(GRECO, 2013, p. 8).
52 legacies. The fact that the law recognises as legal any
53
(Sazdevski & Ognenovska, 2012, p. 35). membership fee defined by the statute of the party has
54
(McDevitt, 2013, p. 14). brought about at least one interesting development:
party statutes often contain a provision prescribing corruption or infraction of rules. The assessment
that all the persons who hold public offices as a result of the European Commission is that “the scope of
of the membership of a party, have an obligation to pay parliamentary immunity in relation to corruption
a certain portion of their salaries to their party. Political charges is particularly wide.”56
parties are explicitly forbidden to receive funding from
public enterprises. The purpose of this provision was The legal provisions for the state budget funding of
not to protect the parties from the influence of these political parties in Turkey favours large parties since it
entities, but to protect the assets of these entities from sets a 7% threshold for eligibility of state aid. As a result,
being channelled into political parties. A potential for only three main political parties get financial aid from
illicit financing is contained in the provision of services the state treasury. These parties’ finances are provided
to political parties below market prices; cheaper almost 90% from the state treasury. The financial
advertising space in some media outlets can serve as an auditing of political parties in Turkey is done by the
illustration. Despite the fact that the law does prescribe Constitutional Court. Chairpersons of political parties
that the amount below the market price should be are obligated to hand in an annual comprehensive
considered as a contribution, the procedure of who budget report not only to the Constitutional Court, but
determines “the market terms” has not been defined. also the Supreme Court of Appeals – Prosecutor's office.
However, political parties in Turkey are not obliged to
The Turkish parliament has no standing code of publish their financial reporting. The auditing report
conduct for MPs. In 2007, the parliament established that the Constitutional Court compiles is published
a sub-committee which was supposed to establish in the Official Gazette but it does not include all the
an Ethics Committee to serve as an inspection and information. Thus, the public cannot get access to all
an adjudicating body for the ethical conduct of MPs. the auditing reports of the political parties, which
The sub-committee however, was not successful in directly obstructs transparency of political parties in
implementing such an internal body and the proposal Turkey. Election financing of political parties in Turkey
has been on standby since. is also not regulated by any legislation. The annual
budget report that is sent to the Constitutional Court
There is a legislative act (No. 3628) which bans MPs must include information on budgeting of electoral
from receiving gifts above a certain value from any campaigns. However, this section does not include
foreign person or institution. Cases of violation of records of sponsorships to individual party members or
this act are reported in the Inspection Board’s records; the candidate MPs’ expenditures during the campaign.
however, they are not open to public. For instance, in GRECO’s third evaluation round concluded that its
2009 a civic initiative has requested the Prime Minister recommendation that annual accounts of political
to reveal the value of gifts sent by US President Barrack parties include income received and expenditure
Obama during his visit to Turkey. The initiative failed incurred individually by elected representatives and
to gain access to this information but was informed that candidates of political parties for political activities
the particular gift giving was appropriate according to linked to their party, including electoral campaigning,
international diplomatic protocol.55 had not been implemented.57
The incompatibilities applicable to MPs are spelled out

in the Turkish Constitution and include concurrent jobs
in other public bodies, in corporations and enterprises 3.3. National audit
affiliated with the state, in the executive and supervisory
institutions
organs of public benefit associations, whose special
resources of revenue and privileges are provided by
law. The Constitution also regulates the parliamentary Supreme audit institutions are considered here as
immunity of MPs, which includes the provision that examples of the role general oversight bodies have in
they cannot be arrested, interrogated, detained or tried reducing corruption. The key starting consideration
unless the Assembly decides otherwise. This article in understanding their anticorruption function in the
poses many problems to the Turkish Grand National SELDI countries is that – and this applies more generally,
Assembly, given the number of official requests to but especially in countries of limited state budgets
remove such immunity of certain MPs due to alleged
56
(European Commission, SWD(2013) 417 final, p. 8).
55
(Bilgi Edinme Hakkı, 2010). 57
(GRECO, 2012b, p. 17).
and early stages of institutional development – the • Discussions of the audit institutions of the SELDI
anticorruption effect of external national audit is countries quite often invoke the issues of “coordination
achieved through a kind of “collateral benefit” to and cooperation” with other government agencies,
good governance rather than as a narrowly defined e.g. with the electoral commissions on overseeing
corruption-combatting task. Their ultimate effect is political party financing. The considerations noted
to bring about robust internal control mechanisms in the beginning of this chapter are applicable
which then make graft difficult. To this end, their most here – an appeal to more cooperation is indicative
effective tools are financial and compliance audits.58 It of some deficiency in policies and regulations. No
is that “strong financial management systems, based on amount of coordination and cooperation can make
effective financial reporting and the disclosure of any up for the lack of clarity of rules on the division of
deviations, have a dissuasive effect on those who might functions among government bodies or the absence
otherwise engage in corruption.”59 In the anticorruption of standard operating procedures in cases of cross-
strategies of the SELDI countries the national audit institutional competence.
institutions are rarely mentioned in reference to
corruption prevention (the latter mostly understood as Figure 34. Estimates of the corruptness of national
sets of awareness and training activities). It is, however, audit institutions and the tax administration
exactly in prevention that these bodies achieve their and officials60
most significant and lasting anticorruption effect. The

national audit institutions are especially valuable in "MCBOJB

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of these institutions in the SELDI countries: 5BYPîDJBMT

• Capacity: the audit institutions of SELDI countries
have insufficient budgets given their wide remit. The The Supreme State Audit of Albania was established
number of auditees is quite large which risks turning early on in 1992 as a parliamentary institution; few
audits into perfunctory checks, thus defeating their years later it was given the power to fine auditees. It
very purpose. was not before 2000, however, that its model (court
• Lack of follow-up to audit reports. National or collegiate) was determined. Currently, it audits the
parliaments pay little attention to reports from the budgets of state and local government institutions and
audit institutions and auditors have little institutional of those institutions where the state owns more than
leverage to enforce their recommendations on the 50% of the shares. It is not untypical for its audit reports
auditees. to be ignored or only given superficial attention by the
58
It will be some time before most of these institutions are capable For public officials the scale is from 1 to 4, where 1 is “Almost
60
of carrying out proper performance audits, as do some of their no one is involved” and 4 is “Almost everybody is involved”. For
experienced counterparts in Europe. institutions the scale is from 1 – “Not proliferated at all” to 4 –
(Evans, 2008, p. 3).
59
“Proliferated to the highest degree.”
government; “the Albanian Parliament pays limited the implementation and management of EU funds.
attention to [its] reports.”61 A shortcoming of the legal Given its limited budget, the obligation for the Office
regulations governing the Supreme State Audit is the to audit the finances of all political parties each year
lack of clear criteria for a dismissal of its chairperson. In “restricts the independence of the State Audit Office
late 2012 – early 2013, proposals were made to mandate in defining its work programme” and “may adversely
the Supreme State Audit to audit the use of EU funds affect its image of independence and objectivity, and
in Albania, an authority which it lacked previously. [..] also affects the freedom to use its audit resources
After several attempts of the Supreme State Audit in according to its own decisions.”66 This finding is
addressing this issue, a draft law was presented in supported by the fact that on no occasion has a party
March 2014. been penalised for violating the law on the financing
of political parties. Furthermore, “the auditors did not
As with most other SELDI countries, the key issue at establish the appropriate procedures that would lead
the Audit Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the to pointing out accountability and punishing those
follow-up on its auditing reports. Few, if any, of its that were responsible in the election campaign.”67
recommendations are implemented and auditees seem
to take little notice of these. For example, out of the 73 In Montenegro, the State Audit Institution indepen
institutions audited in 2012, only four received a clean dently decides on auditing entities; the exception are
positive report, while all others had some remarks; the financial reports of political parties, the obligation
there were no negative reports.62 Audit reports that to audit which was introduced in 2012. The Institution
find wrongdoings are expected, among other things, looks into compliance, good management, effectiveness
to trigger prosecutorial investigations but this is and efficiency of budgetary funds spending and state
often not the case. For example, during the past few property management. The current audit capacity
years the Prosecution of the Brčko district worked on of the Institution, with around 35 positions filled,
the investigation of 103 cases; only two audit reports is very limited. As with the other SELDI countries,
resulted in filing indictments against two people.63 performance audit work is at a very early stage.
Amendments to the law on the State Audit Institution
In Croatia, again typically for many SELDI countries, enhancing its financial independence have yet to be
whenever the State Audit Office finds irregularities in adopted. Even though the law on the audit of EU
the work of a certain institution, there are no penalties funds of February 2012 provides for a separate audit
foreseen by the law. The only remedy is for the state authority for EU funds, it has not yet been established
audit to refer the case to the prosecution. In privatization as a distinct body.
cases, for the example, the state audit has filed 178 cases
to relevant prosecutors but not a single investigation The Court of Accounts is the supreme auditing autho
has been initiated.64 rity in Turkey. The Court’s audit mandate “covers
4,127 public and statutory funds and resources,
The Macedonian State Audit Office is the body including municipal enterprises and state economic
responsible for auditing public institutions. The enterprises as well as European Union funds.”68
General State Auditor and a deputy are appointed While the Court has the ability to initiate and perform
by the parliament for a nine year term without the its own investigations in terms of financial audits,
right to re-appointment. The legal safeguard against due to several amendments and subsequent repeals
removal on partisan grounds is the requirement for of these amendments by the Constitutional Court,
a qualified majority in parliament in order to dismiss the Court of Accounts has not been able to conduct
the State Auditor. The resources at the disposal of any comprehensive reporting in the years of 2012
the Office are inadequate; the European Commission and 2013. In December 2013, a decision made by the
calls it “understaffed and underfunded”.65 Although Court of Accounts has revealed that it will not be able
the range of its auditees is extensive – over 1,400 to perform any audits in the next three years. This
bodies – the State Audit Office is not required to audit causes a major obstruction to its accountability and
transparency.
(SIGMA, 2013a, p. 35).
61
62
(Ured za reviziju institucija BiH, 2013).
63
(Tužilaštvo Brčko distrikta Bosne i Hercegovine, 2013). 66
(SIGMA, 2013f, pp. 40-1).
64
(Perica, 2012). 67
(Transparency International Macedonia, 2013, p. 53).
65
(European Commission, SWD(2013) 413 final, p. 41). 68
(SIGMA, 2013t, p. 5).
Figure 35. Reports, additional reports and appeal Figure 36. Estimates of the corruptness of customs
applications submitted to the prosecution and customs officers69
by the Turkish Court of Accounts

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3.4. Integrity of the civil $SPBUJB

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Reforms aimed at enhancing the integrity of the public
administration in the SELDI countries – including Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
an effective legislative framework and institutional
environment for its transparent operation – are needed complaints but produced no significant reports and
because discretionary exercise of administrative referred no cases for prosecution. It was generally con-
authority creates the greatest opportunities for sidered ineffective.”70
corruption. The challenge is how to make transparency
and accountability essential characteristics of the civil In 2013, Albania amended its civil service legislation,
service while also enhancing its professionalism. Quite which marked a step forward towards depoliticisation,
often, it is the lack of professionalism, poor management, promotion of professionalism and meritocracy. The law
obscure criteria and inadequate division of powers and came into effect in 2014, only after secondary pieces
responsibilities that hamper reform and undermine of legislation were adopted. The bylaws proposed
government authority. by the Council of Ministers cover the evaluation of
the work of civil servants in public administration
The present state of the civil service corresponds to the institutions, independent institutions, and units of
transitional nature of the SELDI countries and the lack local government, as well as the competences for
of adequate legal and institutional tradition. Despite evaluation. The evaluation will be carried out on an
some differences among the countries, the need to annual basis and will be based on achievements of a
facilitate managerial and organisational development set of objectives and professional behaviour of civil
is common to most. The culture of “control” of the servants. In addition, the Civil Service Commissioner
administration instead of managing its work is what has been given more authority.
obstructs both enhanced professionalism and reduced
corruption. The procedures for hiring people under a civil servant
status were blocked for some months until Albania
In Albania, the Department of Internal Control and obtained the status of an EU candidate country in
Anti-Corruption is a body in the Council of Ministers June 2014. Since this law was considered a hot issue in
responsible for administrative and anticorruption con-
trol in the institutions of executive power and various
ministries. It is mandated to supervise administra- 69
tive investigations related to corrupt practices com- institutions the scale is from 1 – “Not proliferated at all” to 4 –
mitted by civil servants. The Department “conducted “Proliferated to the highest degree.”
a number of its own investigations into corruption (U.S. Department of State, 2013a, p. 15).
70
Albanian politics, the government did not want to take complaints were filed 2012.74 Given, however, that the
a risk and start its adoption before the decision of EU on commissioners are working in various departments
its candidacy status. and this is not their primary but an auxiliary function,
it is not clear how independent they can be in their
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the legal regulations on the ethics work.
integrity of the civil service – codes of conduct for civil
servants, regulation of incompatibilities – are relatively The appointment and employment procedures in
well developed. In practice, however, “bribery, abuse the Croatian civil service are one of the few setbacks
of office and malpractice by civil servants are difficult in terms of the control of corruption, fight against
to prevent, punish and eradicate, since the area is not corruption, efficiency and accountability of the public
backed by explicit local political will and sufficient administration.
prosecution of corruption.”71
Figure 37. Performance index of selected Croatian
In the past five years at least 267 civil servants in 33 municipalities
state agencies had been appointed without going
through the required civil service procedure. In all )3NBOBHFNFOU
cases, appointment commissions ruled that the already
employed candidates were the best qualified among all
$POóJDUPGJOUFSFTU
applicants.72
*OGPSNBUJPO
The Bosnian case of civil service reform provides an NBOBHFNFOU
example of the perils of the introduction of formulaic
1VCMJD
reforms – elsewhere proven successful – without QSPDVSFNFOU
consideration of the local context. A proposed

amendment to the state level civil service law in
Bosnia and Herzegovina would cut in half the Source: (Podumljak, 2012).
frequency of performance evaluation of employees
in the Institutions of BiH – from every six to every In an integrity assessment of ten Croatian municipa
three months (at the other BiH levels it is done lities (Figure 37), the average scores have indicated
annually). Civil servants with two consecutive that Information Management, Conflict of Interest
negative appraisals would be fired. However, given and Human Resources Management are three major
that there is no experience in such appraisals at the obstacles in the fight against corruption and efficiency
state level, SIGMA's 2013 report concludes: „The and accountability work of the public administration.
Draft Law on Amendments to the Law on Civil Service On the scale from 1 to 5 (5 being the best), these three
in the Institutions of BiH constitutes a drastic step sectors have reached just little above 2, being evaluated
backwards in building a professional, impartial and in many subsectors as 1, meaning there are no
sustainable civil service at the State level.”73 existing measures or written procedures. The sector of
specialised institutions such as USKOK, PNUSKOK and
Croatia’s code of ethics for civil servants establishes the the USKOK Courts, situation is of even greater concern
institute of “ethics commissioner.” The commissioner is as the intention to control work of such institutions by
appointed by the head of the respective public body. the political players is even greater.
Based on a report by the commissioner, the head of
the respective government body may, considering A problem specific to the SELDI countries – but also to
the nature and severity of the violation in question, other transition countries with large public sectors – is
instigate proceedings for a breach of official duty or give the low level rent seeking from public sector workers
the concerned civil servant a written warning of his/ who are not civil servants. A large number of doctors,
her unethical conduct and express the need to comply school principals and all kinds of employees in public
with the provisions of the code of ethics. According to agencies and enterprises are in position to extort
the Ministry of Public Administration, a total of 325 money for services while being neither controlled
nor protected by a civil service status. This can be
71
(SIGMA, 2013b, p. 8). illustrated by the cases of Kosovo and Macedonia. In
72
(Center for Investigative Reporting, 2012b).
73
(SIGMA, 2013b, p. 5). 74
(Republika Hrvatska, Ministarstvo Uprave, 2012).
the latter, the number of employees regulated by a law Figure 39. Estimates of the corruptness of the police
different than that for the civil service is four times and police officers76
that of civil servants.

"MCBOJB

Figure 38. Share of civil servants and public employees
in Macedonia
4FSCJB

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In Kosovo, the 2010 Civil Service Law – which still 5VSLFZ

awaits its full implementation – envisages a limited
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range of positions that would be considered civil
servants; as a result, only 24% of public employees are Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
civil servants. The legal definitions are, however, not
very precise which “causes confusion as to whether with the low-ranking employees of police and public
support staff should be categorised as civil servants.”75 administration.”77
This indeterminate state of affairs compromises
the efforts to enhance the integrity of the public The police forces in most SELDI countries have units
administration. specialising in counter organised crime operations;
usually, these units are also expected to work on
anticorruption. Accommodating these two functions into
one body is warranted mostly by the use of corruption
3.5. Law enforcement by organised crime but also by the need for special
investigative methods in uncovering sophisticated
corruption schemes – expertise that is usually vested in
The anticorruption role of law enforcement agencies the anti-organised crime departments. These units are,
in the SELDI region needs to be understood against however, typically embedded in the larger police force
the background of the constantly expanding range of or the ministries of interior which deprive them of the
incriminated corruption-related practices. Added to the institutional autonomy that is required for a specialised
limited capacity of other government bodies to address anticorruption institution.
corruption in their own ranks, this risks channelling a
disproportionate number of cases to law enforcement In Bulgaria, despite the fact that the police enjoy stronger
and the prosecution. confidence than institutions like the parliament,
the prosecution and the courts, the public considers
The anticorruption role of law enforcement agencies corruption to be widespread in its ranks.
in Southeast Europe is further compromised by their
high vulnerability to corruption, especially by “Although in the last few years, especially after the
organised crime. In one of the most comprehensive country joined the EU in 2007, important institutional
studies published on the links between organised and legal changes have been introduced limiting police
crime and corruption in Europe, the CSD found
that the “most wide-spread and systematic forms of 76
corruption targeted by organised crime is associated institutions the scale is from 1 – “Not proliferated at all” to 4 –
“Proliferated to the highest degree.”
75
(SIGMA, 2013k, p. 46). 77
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2010b, p. 13).
Box 3. How organised crime subverts law enforcement
• Young professionals are placed in relevant security sector jobs, or special service officials and volunteers
are hired to provide early information for a fixed monthly remuneration.
• Security officials maintain contacts with crime bosses for the supposed purpose of using them as
informers. In reality, such relations grant criminals the latitude to sustain their shady activities.
• Some security officials investigate sources and channels of leakage among corrupt inferiors linked with
smugglers only in order to capture a share of the gains or to prevent such officers from further revealing
discrediting facts.
• Election-time fundraising from criminal sources in exchange for immunity from investigations is
particularly common.
• Certain private companies provide information to the special services, which, in exchange, help them
monopolise the respective business sectors.
• Leading security sector positions are occupied by inexperienced political and economic appointees.
Reshuffling at the highest levels is often followed by staff and organisational restructuring involving
expert officers and key unit directors. Often professionals of undisputed expertise are dismissed to prevent
them from interfering in the threefold relationship between the security sector, political corruption and
organised crime.
• The unofficial privatisation of official information has become a profitable business for individual security
officials. Information leaks to the media, on the other hand, are a means to sustain smear campaigns directed
by corrupt officials in certain parties or by corporate interests. The public is often unaware that abuse of
such information by those who hold it turns into racketeering of political and other public figures.
Source: (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2009, pp. 52-53).
Figure 40. Estimates of police and customs corruption: is similar to internal security structures in the US and
Bulgaria compared to EU-2778 in other EU countries. It has some functions similar to
the Inspectorate: undertaking screening inspections,

participating in the assessment of corruption risks,

participation in disciplinary proceedings, etc. The
increased capacity of the Internal Security Directorate
is evident in the statistics about its inspections. In 2011,
the Directorate succeeded to screen 728 such cases: in
475 complaints overt methods of verification were used,

#VMHBSJB &6 39.4% of which turned out to be substantiated. In 305
cases covert methods were applied and in 143 of them
Source: (TNS Opinion & Social, February 2014). initial suspicions were confirmed. This shows that when
covert operational methods are used the percentage of
misconduct at medium and senior levels, conflicts of uncovered misconduct is much higher although the
interests and corruption on both local and national verification process takes longer.80
levels of the police continue to present a serious
challenge.”79 Dealing with internal corruption in the The declining effectiveness of law enforcement is
Ministry of Interior are the Inspectorate and the Internal evident in the rising number of discontinued pre-trial
Security Directorate. The latter focuses mainly on police proceedings against the background of decreasing
abuses and is directly subordinated to the Minister number of investigations brought to court (Figure 41).
of Interior. The directorate has much wider powers
than its predecessor (before 2008) and in this respect Statistics on the sentencing of corruption-related
crimes reveal a collapse in the number of prosecuted
Responses to the questions: In your country, do you think that the
78
giving and taking of bribes and the abuse of power for personal
cases of more sophisticated forms of corruption in the
gain are widespread among the following?
79
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013b, p. 99). 80
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013b, p. 105).
Figure 41. Discontinued proceedings vs new cases it with extended assistance by delivering required
in Bulgaria files and data during its investigations. While being
a prosecutorial not a police body, it is allowed to use

special investigative methods, including undercover
operations and surveillance.

The case of USKOK is a best practice in the way its

institutional capacity – budget, personnel, profession-
alism – and its legal authority have grown in paral-
lel. The US Department of State Report 2013 finds that

it “operated effectively and independently and was
%JTDPOUJOVFEQSFUSJBM $BTFTCSPVHIUUPDPVSU sufficiently resourced”,82 and the European Commis-
QSPDFFEJOHT MFGUTDBMF
SJHIUTDBMF
sion points to its “good track record of investigations
Source: Prosecutor’s Office of Bulgaria. into allegations of high-level corruption.”83 In 2012,
USKOK had a 95% conviction rate, “successfully pros-
Figure 42. Number of persons sentenced for bribery ecuting a former prime minister, a former vice presi-
and abuse of office in Bulgaria dent, a former top level general, and other high level
officials.”84

Figure 43. Annual numbers of corruption-related
indictments, Croatia
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Source: National Statistical Institute. Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics.
early 1990s, and an increase of the number of persons The experience of Kosovo is somewhat different. Its
convicted for bribery since the mid-2000s. Special Prosecution Office has an Anti-Corruption
Task Force composed of local and international
Instructive in this context is the Croatian experience EULEX85 prosecutors, who are supported by police
with its Bureau for Combating Corruption and officers and financial experts. The Task Force with
Organized Crime (better known under its Croatian the Kosovo Ministry of European Integration finds
abbreviation USKOK),81 an institution much discussed that key weakness of the Task Force is that no prior
in the literature. It is its singular status within the research was made to assess the need of establishing a
criminal justice system, in addition to its specialisation new anticorruption mechanism, the weakness of non-
in corruption, that is of particular interest. USKOK is a coordination and non-information between local and
body of the State Prosecutor’s Office and its director is international prosecutors, since EULEX prosecutors
at the level of deputy prosecutor general. It is governed deal with high profile corruption cases, while local
by a special law that specifies the offences – a fairly prosecutors only deal with lower-ranking profile
broad range – against which USKOK is to act. Other cases. Thus, the “establishment of the task force is not
government bodies that come into evidence that an justified.”86
offence within this range might have been committed
are obligated to report to the Bureau and provide (U.S. Department of State, 2013r, p. 14).
82
83
(European Commission , COM(2014) 38 final, p. 2).
81
Not to be confused with PN-USKOK, which is the corresponding 84
(KIPRED, 2014, p. 13).
body within the national police service and established much
later. The corresponding judicial institution – the USKOK
85
The EU rule of law mission in Kosovo.
courts – are discussed in the next chapter. 86
(Task Force on European Integration, 2012, p. 20).
Figure 44. Number of unresolved corruption-related powers of anticorruption departments by

criminal charges in Kosovo establishing local level structures, allowing
them full access to operational information and

enhancing their effectiveness by introducing a
method for distinguishing between minor and
serious corruption cases.
2.2. Introduce internal monitoring mechanisms in

order to evaluate corruption pressures. Internal
monitoring could be designed and periodically
conducted to better understand the threat of

corruption in law enforcement. This would
identify vulnerable departments, positions or

regions where there are heightened risks from
Source: (KIPRED, 2014). corruption.
3. The institutional capacity of the relevant govern
The perils of placing high expectations in such ment bodies – particularly the specialised anticor
specialised units are evident in the arrest and conviction ruption agencies and oversight agencies such as
of the Head of the Anticorruption Task Force on the national audit institutions – including their
charges of corruption.87 Further, the reliance on police budgets, facilities and personnel need to be aligned
officers from the interior ministry could compromise with the wide remit these institutions are given.
the independence of this prosecutorial body. KIPRED Alternatively, they should design more narrow
goes as far as suggesting that the Task Force should be annual or mid-term programmes, which prioritise
abolished in order to “strengthen the overall mandate of interventions.
[the Special Prosecution Office] which should have the 4. National audit institutions should also have their
leading role on anticorruption and fighting organized institutional leverage strengthened, including the
crime.”88 powers to impose harsher sanctions. Both auditees
and national parliaments should be obligated to
follow up on the reports of these institutions. The
national audit institutions should also be mandated
3.6. Recommendations to audit the management of EU funds where these
are administered by national authorities. As
performance audit work is at a very early stage,
Anticorruption institutions in the Southeast European they should develop their capacity to carry out
countries require the following in order to make their more of these.
interventions effective: 5. Further measures are needed to ensure that
recruitment to the civil service is merit based and
1. Introduce a feedback mechanism for the enforce not dependent on political party affiliation.
ment of anticorruption policies. The mechanism 6. The anticorruption work needs to be shared more
could be based on innovative new instruments evenly among government bodies. Expanding the
made more readily available in recent years, such as range of statutory incrimination should be balanced
the Integrated Anticorruption Enforcement Monitoring by enhanced capacity in all public bodies to address
Toolkit developed by the Center for the Study of corruption in their ranks through administrative tools
Democracy and the University of Trento. It allows instead of “buck-passing” responsibility to police
policy makers to assess corruption risks in a and prosecution. General public administration
given government institution and the effect of the bodies should act as gatekeepers of the criminal
corresponding anticorruption policy, identifying justice system by dealing with as many corruption
the highest impact solutions. cases as their administrative powers allow them. At
2. With respect to the risk of corruption in law the very least, this entails the creation of effective
enforcement from organised crime: complaints management mechanisms
2.1. Provide adequate resources and sufficient 7. All SELDI countries have anti-money laundering/
financial intelligence agencies whose role, however,
EULEX, Summary of Justice Proceedings in May 2013.
87 in anticorruption is limited. Given that the capacity
88
(KIPRED, 2014, p. 21). to transform illegal proceeds into political clout is of
crucial significance for high level corruption, these special care needs to be applied to balance the rights
institutions can and should acquire a more central of the accused with the interests of public good –
role in investigating political corruption. especially in an environment of often corrupt public
8. The forfeiture of illegally obtained assets in administrations – wealth confiscation following
corruption cases is an anticorruption tool the criminal convictions is an important deterrence
application of which should be expanded. While which is still underutilised in SEE.
4 The Judiciary in Anticorruption
I
n the post-communist environment of some • The complexity of the criminal prosecution of per-
of the SELDI countries, initial constitutional petrators of criminal offenses of corruption, espe-
arrangements tried to ensure that the judicial cially at the political level;
branch occupied a proper balancing position • Overall insufficient capacity and the related issues
in the division of powers. The judiciary was initially of low professionalism, excessive workload and re-
heavily influenced by government and all the early sulting backlog of cases, case management, facili-
efforts were intended to make it as independent as ties, etc.
possible. The basis for this autonomy was thought to
be the creation of a self-governing mechanism through Although they do not enjoy as much room in the public
elections among magistrates. attention as elected politicians, magistrates hold the
key to proper function of any other mechanism of
The initial strong emphasis on independence has good governance – justice. In the societies of the SELDI
not been balanced by equally strong requirements countries where corruption has penetrated most social
for public accountability. For independence from and public institutions, the judiciary is no exception.
executive interference to have become the basis of The judicial branch has been plagued by a number of
profound reform it needed a critical mass of genuinely problems – excessive workload, low professionalism,
reformist electoral body – which was not in existence. poor facilities – but corruption is the one that truly
Without such body to drive the demand for openness compromises the role of the judiciary in an open society.
and integrity, the newly created institutions reflected Corruption has this effect because it undermines the key
the general situation among magistrates. Even radical prerequisite for the administration of justice – public
measures did not produce the intended effect: in trust. While other institutions of government can still
2009 – 2010, Kosovo and Serbia, for example, attempted perform some of its services in an environment of low
a mass evaluation and reappointment procedure for all trust, the effectiveness of courts is diminished with
magistrates, with mixed results at best, and possibly every drop in civic confidence. Thus, the effectiveness
with the “solution being worse than the problem.”89 of the administration of justice in Southeast Europe
should be assessed not only by the statistics on the
Thus, an overemphasis on formal electoral independence enforcement of anticorruption criminal legislation, but
became a typical example of the cure turning into the also through the broader trust the public has in the
disease – instead of ensuring a balance to the power of justice system. The measurement of this trust needs to
the executive, self-governance perpetuated clientele- accompany the evaluation of judicial performance in
type relations between magistrates and special interests. the region.90
A decade or two later, the judicial branch had been
as effectively captured as the other branches. Once The judiciaries in the SELDI countries have been at
emancipated from both public scrutiny and the political a disadvantage compared to the other branches of
factors that brought about such arrangements, there are power as they were not as engaged with the most
today no checks on the rent-seeking by magistrates. powerful factor driving good governance in the last
two decades – the process of integration with the EU.
The capacity of the judiciary in the SELDI countries Magistrates have been largely side-lined in this process.
to enforce anticorruption legislation, especially as Although the judiciaries were both criticised by the
regards political corruption, has been undermined by European Commission and provided with various
a number of problems that have exerted their influence kinds of assistance, they lacked the kind constructive
cumulatively: engagement with the EU institutions that benefited the
executive government.
• Constitutional issues, primarily related to restoring
the balance between independence and accounta
bility; 90
A set of indicators for measuring trust in the criminal justice
system has been developed in (Center for the Study of Democracy,
(Romanian Center for European Policies, 2011, pp. 186-191).
89
2011b).
An important finding of this SELDI round that is Council for European Judges stresses that members of
relevant to the judicial role in anticorruption is the the Judicial Council should not be active politicians,
absence of feedback mechanisms that allow the public in particular members of the government. The risks of
and policy makers to evaluate both the integrity of the such an arrangement have become evident in the light
judiciary and its effectiveness in applying criminal of mass dismissal of judges in Turkey.
anticorruption laws. In none of the SEE countries is there
a reliable, systematic and comprehensive mechanism Figure 45. Estimates of the corruptness of the
for collecting, processing and making publicly available prosecution and public prosecutors92
statistics on the work of the courts and the prosecution,
in particular on corruption cases. "MCBOJB

,PTPWP

4.1. Governance #VMHBSJB

of the judiciary
.BDFEPOJB

Although it has been around two decades since the #PTOJBBOE
)FS[FHPWJOB
first constitutional changes in the post-communist
countries in Southeast Europe established independent 4FSCJB

judiciaries, the governance modalities of this branch
continue to be unsettled, not least because of the effects $SPBUJB

of corruption. All countries in the region have chosen
to establish autonomous institutions – “Councils” – .POUFOFHSP

that serve as self-governing bodies for the judiciary. As
mentioned, the initial move was mostly away from the 5VSLFZ

influence of elected politicians and “the procedure for
appointment, assignment, remuneration, and removal 5IF1SPTFDVUJPO 1VCMJDQSPTFDVUPST
of magistrates was seen as a significant prerequisite for Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
their independence.”91 Among the chief justifications
and assumptions of the newly acquired constitutional Another aspect of judicial governance in the SELDI
autonomy was that it would be a tool against high- area is the lack of separation between the prosecution
level corruption and state capture. Not only did these and the courts. In some of the countries, they are both
hopes not materialise, but the judiciaries now struggle considered part of the judicial branch of power and
with the illegal capture of their own self-governing thus both judges and prosecutors are represented in
mechanism. the judicial governing body. This issue is unjustifiably
neglected as a source of bad practices, although it should
Among the key issues that continue to plague judicial be evident that especially with regard to disciplinary
self-governance is the composition of the Councils. procedures, mutual control creates risk for abuses.
In general, some of their members are elected
by parliaments, while the rest are chosen among In brief, as would be evident from the following
magistrates. Two problems remain, however: which evaluation of the individual countries, judiciaries in
of these quotas would have a majority and whether the Southeast Europe have very similar governance
the executive should hold a position on the Councils. arrangements and problems.
is For a government minister – usually of justice – to
be an ex officio member of the self-governing body In Albania, the High Council of Justice apart from
of the judiciary, typically as non-voting chair, is a being responsible for the appointment, transfer,
controversial arrangement but still exists in some SELDI removal, and education of magistrates, covers also
countries. In its Opinion No.10 (2007) on the “Council ethical and professional evaluation, as well as control
for the Judiciary at the service of society” the European
92

91
(Center for the Study of Democracy; Center for Investigative institutions the scale is from 1 – “Not proliferated at all” to 4 –
Reporting, 2012, p. 35). “Proliferated to the highest degree”.
The Judiciary in Anticorruption 77
Figure 46. The map of unholy alliances: separation based criteria exist, the lack of public information about
of judicial and prosecutorial governance the process creates an environment in which such
inappropriate influences become possible.
$SPBUJB
The state level institution governing the judiciary of
#J) 4FSCJB Bosnia and Herzegovina is the High Judicial and
.& ,7 #VMHBSJB Prosecutorial Council, an institution with jurisdiction
"-
., across the whole country. In addition to appointing
judges, court presidents and prosecutors at all levels,
5VSLFZ
it is also the institution responsible for upholding the
integrity of the judiciary, including its professionalism
and impartiality. As in some of the other SELDI
countries (e.g. Bulgaria), the Council members are
+VEHFTBOEQSPTFDVUPSTHPWFSOFEKPJOUMZ elected from among judges and prosecutors, as well
+VEHFTBOEQSPTFDVUPSTHPWFSOFETFQBSBUFMZ as (this is specific to Bosnia and Herzegovina) from
the entities of the country. Members are required to
ling and monitoring the activities of the judges of be non-partisan; they have immunity covering their
the courts of first instance and courts of appeal. decisions made in performing their official duties. The
More precisely, the Inspectorate of the Council is Council has a Disciplinary Prosecutor who deals with
responsible for assessing and verifying complaints complaints against judges or prosecutors.
against the judiciary, performing disciplinary checks
on the judges and evaluating them morally and „A commonly cited reason behind the moderate slow-
professionally. There is a second Inspectorate – at the paced progress in reforming the judicial system in BiH
Ministry of Justice – and there is considerable debate is the complex structure of the judiciary, with no single
on whether the competences and responsibilities of budget.”94 The existence of almost four autonomous
the two inspectorates overlap. Duplication is said to judicial systems, weak coordination in the fight
have brought ambiguity in specifying what distinct against corruption at the state level, slow execution of
tasks each institution is supposed to carry out and the court decisions, all undermine the anticorruption
consequently to have brought about ambiguous effectiveness of the judiciary.
and uncoordinated monitoring of the judiciary.
This has been partially overcome by memoranda In Bulgaria, the Supreme Judicial Council appoints,
of understanding between the two bodies with the promotes, demotes, transfers and removes from office
assistance of EURALIUS, the European Assistance all magistrates. The election of this collective body as
Mission to the Albanian Justice System. well as the election of the heads of the higher courts
and the Prosecutor General is subject to attempts of
“The judiciary is the weakest link in Albania’s fragile behind the scenes negotiations among political power
system of separation of powers. … The effective brokers.
independence of the judiciary is hampered by political
nominations and other forms of political inference. With “The performance of the […] Supreme Judicial
the election of president from the majority party, [..] Council and Prosecutor General […] failed to meet
appointments are even more open to political influence. the expectations for improvement in the fight against
High court and constitutional court members, as well as corruption and organised crime. The striving of
the general prosecutor, are under more political pressure politicians, business and financial groups to control the
as all presidential appointments need the consent of appointments of senior magistrates, behind-the-scenes
the parliamentary majority.”93 The need for approval political arrangements, and attempts to influence
by both Parliament and President for a nomination of judicial decisions are still a deep-rooted practice.”95
any member of the High Court, Constitutional Court,
or General Prosecutor has led to many political and Doubts about the legitimacy of the Council were raised
institutional conflicts and impasse. Furthermore, from the moment of election of its members from the
although the legal provisions for the transparency in
the appointment and evaluation of the judges on merit- 94
(Center for the Study of Democracy; Center for Investigative
Reporting, 2012, p. 34).
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014).
93 95
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013(43)).
judicial chapter and, even more so, the parliamentary law, following the leak of wiretapped conversations,
chapter. Despite the recommendations of the civil supposed by law to be destroyed after not being used for
society organisations involved in judicial reform, the criminal case they were made under and certainly
including professional associations of magistrates, for not for grounding the disciplining the magistrates
a direct election of the judicial quota based on the “one involved.
magistrate – one vote” rule and the use of electronic
voting, it was never implemented and the latest election Figure 47. Assessment by the public of the fairness
was marked by non-transparent selection of delegates of courts in Bulgaria
heavily influenced by the administrative heads of the
5IFEFDJTJPOTBOEBDUJPOTPGUIFDPVSUT
respective courts and prosecutor’s offices. The election BSFVOEVMZJOóVFODFECZQSFTTVSF
GSPNQPMJUJDBMQBSUJFTBOEQPMJUJDJBOT
of the parliamentary quota was carried out after the $PVSUTHFOFSBMMZQSPUFDUUIFJOUFSFTUT

elections of the other quotas, thus exacerbating the PGUIFSJDIBOEQPXFSGVMBCPWF
UIPTFPGPSEJOBSZQFPQMF
suspicion that positions are negotiated behind the 5IFDPVSUEFDJEFTJSSFTQFDUJWF
scenes among parliamentary parties. The vetting and PGUIFFUIOJDPSSBDFJEFOUJUZ
hearings of the nominated candidates were also formal 5IFQFSTPOGSPNBEJíFSFOUSBDFPS

FUIOJDHSPVQUIBONPTU#VMHBSJBOT
and did not fulfil their goal to ensure openness and NPSFMJLFMZUPCFGPVOEHVJMUZ
public participation in the procedure. 5IFQPPSQFSTPOJTNPSF

MJLFMZUPCFGPVOEHVJMUZ

The inaction of the Council on the allegations accompa-
nying the two unsuccessful procedures for the election Source: (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2011b).
by parliament of a constitutional justice cast significant
doubts on the work of the Council and especially on its Doubts as to the ethics enforcement capacity of the
standing committees directly responsible for counter- Council and its ability to oversee the work of the
ing corruption. judiciary through its Inspectorate continued in relation
to the institutional stalemate as regards the so far
During the latest elections to the Council, the voting failed election by parliament of a Chief Inspector of the
by representatives of the judiciary in the Council has Inspectorate of the Council.
been marked by non-transparent selection of delegates
heavily influenced by the administrative heads of the Moreover, despite some formal steps being taken (the
respective courts and prosecutor’s offices. This has been Committee on Proposals and Evaluation of Judges,
especially visible in the election of the prosecutors’ Prosecutors and Investigative Magistrates being divided
quota, where a large number of the delegates, and most into a sub-committee on judges and a sub-committee
successful candidates, were among the administrative on prosecutors and investigative magistrates), judges
heads of various offices. Legislative provisions aimed and prosecutors are still being governed by the same
at enhancing the transparency of the election of the body – the Supreme Judicial Council. The risk of abuses
parliamentary quota were introduced, including an of this arrangement was evident in case in March 2014
option for a scrutiny of candidates by scholars and when a member of the prosecutorial quota allegedly
civil society, but parliamentarians were put under no proposed a harsh disciplinary penalty for a judge in a
obligation to consider this external input. Moreover, highly controversial disciplinary proceeding.
an exclusion clause was introduced in the Law on the
Judiciary, regarding “facts from the private life of The judicial governance body of Croatia is the State
persons,” which could easily be misused to disregard Judicial Council. The Council regulates the conduct
corruption-related queries. As a result, the hearings of of judges, their appointment and career advancement,
the nominated candidates were formal and did not fulfil and appointment of the presidents of the courts, except
their goal to ensure openness and public participation for the Supreme Court. The State Judicial Council
in the procedure. consists of seven judges, two university professors
of law and two members of parliament, nominated
At the beginning of 2014, the Council received another and elected by the parliament for four-year terms,
series of criticisms after the disciplinary dismissal of and serving no more than two terms. Unlike Bosnia
one of its members, a former high ranking prosecutor. and Herzegovina and Bulgaria, there is a separate
The dismissal led to doubts about the very legality of institution of governance for the prosecution, the
the Council’s actions, since the magistrate was removed structure and election procedure of which mirrors
by a lesser number of votes than that required by that of the judiciary. The State Prosecutorial Council is
appointed by the parliament based on recommendation knowledge, skills, performance, background, financial
of the Chief State Prosecutor. As the State Prosecutor aspect, in order to facilitate the work of Evaluation
is also appointed by a parliamentary majority, based Commissions and make merit-based appointments.
on recommendation of the government, the State The Office investigates only during the application of
Prosecutor’s Office and the State Prosecutorial Council candidates; however, it does not have the responsibility
are highly dependent on the political allegiance of of investigating judges and prosecutors after their
the candidates. All of the appointment, employment appointment. There have been proposals to increase its
and career advancement procedures are controlled by permanent competences, in order for its investigators to
the Chief State Prosecutor, meaning that they can be make continual investigations of judges even after their
influenced by elected politicians. appointment to judicial positions.
Croatia’s political history related to the break-up of the An appointment and re-appointment process of judges
former Yugoslavia has influenced the governance of its and prosecutors started in February 2009 while lacking
judicial branch. “Judges appointed during and after the some basic laws. A number of problems arose from
independence war of the 1990s were often chosen on the the fact that candidates that did not pass the test were
basis of adherence to official political ideology, which allowed to do their job until the completion of re-
at that time was overwhelmingly ethno-nationalist in appointment process; as a result, a significant number
character. The legacy of this bias is still embedded in of magistrates were not re-appointed.99
the system, and while overt ethno-nationalist bias has
decreased in recent years, significant political will and The Judicial Council of Macedonia is the governing
judicial expertise will be required to address the decades body intended to ensure the independence of the
of legal decisions based on such considerations.”96 judiciary, composed of 15 members with a mandate
of 6 years with a possibility of only one re-election.
The functions of the Kosovo Judicial Council include The composition is similar to the other countries
procedures for recruitment, appointment, re-appoint (most members elected from among judges, some
ment, transfer, discipline, evaluation, promotion and by parliament and couple of ex officio members – e.g.
judges and lay judges, as well as in management and the non-voting Minister of Justice); the difference in
administration of courts, and in the development and Macedonia is that there is a quota for ethnic minorities
oversight of the judicial budget. The majority of its (“communities that do not constitute a majority in the
members are elected by parliament, while five members Republic of Macedonia”); a similar arrangement is in
elected directly from among the judiciary; Kosovo’s place in Kosovo. Despite fairly elaborate and well-
emergence as a state has determined a special feature designed procedures, however, “political involvement
of its judicial governance – the Council also includes in the election process for judges is visible. The
two international members (EULEX judges). According possibility of electing judges who did not succeed in
to the Ministry of European Integration, the election of the Academy for training of judges and prosecutors,
the Council does not meet the international standards, is seen by the public as a way to injecting political
as the majority of members should be elected by their influence in the election process of judges.”100
peers within the judiciary, thus conforming to the
Venice Commission position.97 The Ministry also states The Council appoints and dismisses judges and jury
that court chairpersons should not sit on the Council, (lay) judges; determines the end of the juridical function;
and in case he/she is elected, they should decide which appoints and dismiss presidents of courts; follows
function they want to keep.98 and evaluates the work of judges; decides for removal
of immunity of judges and proposes two members
An Office for Legal and Prosecutorial Evaluation and of the Constitutional Court from the ranks of judges.
Verification is responsible for fair implementation Magistrates enjoy protection against removal, immunity
process of the evaluation and verification of from criminal charges for decisions in verdicts and
candidates for magistrates, including an extended they may not be transferred to another court without
evaluation and verification process of information their consent; appointments are competitive. Dismissal
provided by candidates and other sources, technical grounds (“cancelation of the judicial function”) include
(in addition to the usual circumstances – retirement,
96
(Freedom House, 2013, pp. 187-8).
CDL- AD(2007)028.
97 99
(Kosovo Law Institute and Forum for Civic Initiatives, 2011).
98
(Ministry of European Intergation of Kosovo, 2012a). 100
(Romanian Center for European Policies, 2011, p. 158).
etc.) sentencing to at least 6 months of prison for criminal competence in judicial affairs should take place as
offence. The Judicial Council may remove a judge for a the ninth member of the Council but may not be its
heavy disciplinary offence and for unprofessional and president. Also, the Constitution now provides that all
non-ethical conduct (which includes poor management judges and presidents of other courts in Montenegro
of judicial proceedings, delays in verdicts, etc.). not mentioned above shall be appointed or dismissed
by the Judicial Council.
Governance of the prosecution is independent
from that of the judiciary. The Public Prosecutor of Thus, on the one hand, having in mind this
Macedonia is appointed and removed by parliament rearrangement of the structure of the Judicial Council,
while the other prosecutors are elected by the it could be expected that appointments and dismissals
Council of Public Prosecutors without limitation of of judges would be more professionalised and less
the mandate. The Minister of Justice is no longer an politicised. On the other, the selection criteria for the
ex officio member of prosecutorial council, a change appointment of judges are vague and there are no
that should be even more appropriate for the judicial clearly-defined indicators that could help determine
council (a recommendation to that effect is contained whether a certain candidate has been effective and
in the latest GRECO evaluation).101 There is an office accountable in performance of his/her judicial duty. The
of the prosecutor for organised crime and corruption criteria for the promotion of judges can also be subject
established in 2008. The latter covers the whole to arbitrary decisions, since there are no clear indicators
country and is naturally linked with the department for each criteria (for example, one of the criteria is
for organised crime and corruption from the Basic relationship with the colleagues and attitude towards
Court Skopje1. The head of this office is responsible citizens, or vocational training, without stating what
directly to the Public Prosecutor of Macedonia. kind of training would be preferred, etc.).
Montenegro amended its Constitution in 2013 which Figure 48. Estimates by the public of the corruptness of
introduced some changes in the procedure for the the investigation and investigating officers102
appointment of judges. First, political influence on
the appointment of high-level judicial officials was "MCBOJB

somewhat reduced through merit-based procedures
#PTOJBBOE
which are also more transparent. Reforms were made )FS[FHPWJOB
in the appointment and dismissal of the President of

the Supreme Court (not to be appointed by parliament 4FSCJB

any longer but by the Judicial Council), the composition
#VMHBSJB
and competences of the Judicial Council, the election
and dismissal of judges of the Constitutional Court as .BDFEPOJB

/"

well as the appointment and dismissal of the Supreme
State Prosecutor and prosecutors. These amendments ,PTPWP

are expected to bring about positive changes in the
judicial system as a whole. .POUFOFHSP

The composition of the Judicial Council was also $SPBUJB

amended. The President of the Supreme Court is now

a member of the Council, and the president of the 5VSLFZ

Council is now to be decided amongst the members 5IF*OWFTUJHBUJPO *OWFTUJHBUJOHPîDFST
of the Council, and could not be a judge or minister
of justice. There are still four judges appointed or Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
dismissed by the Conference of the Judges, but now
the Conference must ensure proportional presence of Serbia’s judiciary is governed by two bodies: the High
courts and judges. Another four members of the Council Judicial Council and the State Prosecutorial Council,
are to be appointed or dismissed by parliament, upon each having eleven members – three ex officio members
the proposal of its competent body and after a publicly
announced invitation. Finally, the minister with the
102
101
(GRECO, 2013, p. 24). “Proliferated to the highest degree.”
and the rest are nominated by various institutions branch is problematic. The President of the Council
and elected by the National Assembly (although it is the Minister of Justice and the Undersecretary of
is not obliged to elect the nominated candidates, nor the Ministry of Justice is an ex officio member of the
is there a stipulated period of time within which to Council. The Minister has powers such as determining
make the election). The process of nomination is not the agenda, the appointment of the Secretary General
particularly transparent because information on among three candidates selected by the General
candidates is not published. A process of reforming Assembly and he/she takes the ultimate decision
the corpus of judges in Serbia began in 2009, when the whether or not an investigation proposed by the Council
Judicial Council assessed all magistrates. As a result, shall be opened or not. This creates a risk of interference
a quarter of the judges lost their jobs; the decision of by the executive in the judiciary which could harm the
the Council was later contested and the Constitutional independence of the tenure of magistrates by putting
Court overturned the Council’s decision and ordered them under political pressure.
that all judges and prosecutors who had appealed
their non-reappointment be reinstated. A significant From the establishment of the Republic in Turkey, the
number of these magistrates were prevented from judiciary has been a tool for political control of society,
voting in the election of the High Judicial Council (as rather than an independent branch expected to balance
they were dismissed at the time of election). “The fact executive power. It has been claimed that a group with
that such a large number of judges and prosecutors a certain political and social agenda –the “parallel
did not participate in the elections clearly shows that state” as the AKP government names it – has, with a
the [two bodies] were not elected by all judges and clear majority, established itself within the judiciary
prosecutors, which casts doubt on the legitimacy of after the changes to the structure of the High Council.
both bodies.”103 Following the December 2013 corruption investigation
against the members of the government, more than
Evaluation of the performance of the judges is done by 2,500 judges and prosecutors have been replaced.105 It
judges of the higher courts. However, criteria for the is possible to read these developments as an attempt
evaluation are vague, as the regulation on the criteria by the government to eliminate especially the high
has still not been adopted. There is no legal ground ranking officials within the judicial system belonging
for the evaluation of the judges’ performance other to this alleged group. However, it lays bare the actual
than on professional grounds. The promotion of the core problem within the judiciary in Turkey: the current
judges to higher level courts is decided by the High judicial structure does not consider the administration
Judicial Council in a manner that is not transparent of justice for individuals and communities as a
to the public. While formally “a good system of priority.
accountability of judges was established,” it “did
not work because of the delays in the establishing of The procedure for the selection of national level
disciplinary authorities and the failure to adopt criteria judges is defined in the Law on Judges and Prosecutors.
and standards, for evaluating the first time elected The candidates have to take a written computerised
judges, and the criteria for regular assessment, which exam measuring general skills, general culture and
would apply in assessing the competence of judges. In knowledge on legal field subjects. Those who succeed
such circumstances processing corruption was slow have to take an oral examination. The Interview Board
and inefficient.”104 consists of seven members including the Undersecretary
of the Ministry of Justice as the president of the Board,
As elsewhere in the SELDI countries, in Turkey Head of the Inspection Board, Ministry of Justice
magistrates are governed by a constitutionally in Director General for Penal Affairs, Ministry of Justice
dependent body – the High Council of Judges and Director General for Civil Affairs and Ministry of
Prosecutors. It is the authority responsible for their Justice Director General for Personnel Affairs and two
appointment, promotion and removal. Following the members who are selected by the Executive Board of
referendum of 2010, the composition of the High Council the Justice Academy from among its members; thus the
of Judges and Prosecutors has changed. Currently, majority of the Board are appointed by the Ministry of
the independence of this Council from the executive Justice.
103
(Government of the Republic of Serbia, Anti-Corruption Council,
2014, p. 2).
104
(Transparency Serbia, 2013, p. 20). 105
(Hürriyet Daily News, 2014a).
4.2. Integrity and among the most corrupt public officials; the absence of
accountability transparency and accountability is arguably a significant
factor in such assessments. In all SELDI countries, there
has been a tangible deterioration of the assessment of
The hypertrophied autonomy of the judiciary in the spread of corruption among magistrates.
Southeast Europe at the expense of its accountability
was reinforced by the nature of the judicial profession Figure 49. Estimates by the public of the corruptness
whose authority is founded on its judgments being of courts, judges, lawyers and administration
unquestionable. While politicians elected by popular officials in the judiciary108
vote are not entirely averse to public scrutiny (since it is
the price for popularity), the judicial office was thought "MCBOJB

to require a much lower public profile. The risk, however,

that comes with being a closed, self-administered ,PTPWP

branch of power is what the Venice Commission calls

“the negative effects of corporatism.”106 It was such risks .BDFEPOJB

that justified a composition of judicial councils which

includes members elected by outside bodies. #VMHBSJB

4FSCJB
The risks are further exacerbated in the highly corrupt

environment of Southeast Europe, where illegal #PTOJBBOE

schemes once embedded in a judiciary could then be )FS[FHPWJOB

used with impunity by special interests – unscrupulous

.POUFOFHSP
business or politicians, organised crime, etc. It was with
these considerations that in 2012 the CSD concluded

$SPBUJB
that “legally guaranteeing the independence of the
judiciary in transition countries has ceased to be the 5VSLFZ

main focus… Instead, creating mechanisms for and
ensuring judicial accountability, has emerged as a $PVSUT +VEHFT -BXZFST
most pressing issue, as the newly gained independence "ENJOJTUSBUJPOPîDJBMTJOUIFKVEJDJBMTZTUFN
of the judiciary was not matched by putting in place Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
an adequate mechanism for accountability. As a
result, observers have noted an increase, rather than Thus, a downward spiral is accelerated: since the
a decrease, of corruption in transition countries’ attitudes of the public in Southeast Europe towards
judiciary in the 1990s, as judges now had a larger say the judiciary are rather negative, this brings additional
and more discretion within the economy.”107 incentive for judges not to consider the need to be
accountable to the public. Trust, however, is not a
The regulations of judicial conduct in the SELDI marginal consideration in the administration of justice;
countries do not mention explicitly corruption or rather, it is arguably a key precondition.109
organised crime. Rather, they deal with various
misdemeanours as well as unprofessional and unethical A positive development in Albania has been the 2012
behaviour. Formally, judges are accountable to their constitutional amendment which limited the immunity
peers, but there are few incentives for the members of of judges. Following these changes, the prosecution
the same profession to vet each other too scrupulously. can start an investigation on judges of Constitutional
Thus, there is no endogenous corporate culture in the Courts, High Courts and Courts of First Instance
judiciary to motivate it to be accountable to the public. without prior authorisation from the High Council
of Justice. The judges are, however, given immunity
Not surprisingly, then, the public does not hold the for their opinions and decisions they take when
judiciary in particularly high esteem. The findings of
SELDI monitoring are that magistrates are considered 108
106
Opinion No. 403/2006. “Proliferated to the highest degree”.
107
(Center for the Study of Democracy; Center for Investigative 109
For further analysis of the role of trust in the justice system,
Reporting, 2012, p. 36). please refer to (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2011b).
Table 1. Number of convicted for crimes against justice in Albania
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Active corruption of magistrates, prosecutors and
other officials in the judiciary 0 0 0 1 5 0
Passive corruption of magistrates, prosecutors and
other officials in the judiciary 0 0 1 0 1 0
Source: Albanian Ministry of Justice.
exercising their judicial functions. Moreover, they addition, any violations identified by the Conference,
cannot be detained or undergo inspections without the may be directed to the High Council of Justice for
authorisation of the High Council of Justice unless they disciplinary action. Until now, only judges who
are caught committing a crime or immediately after it. graduated from the School of Magistrates are required
In this case the Prosecutor General notifies the High to pass a one-semester course on Judicial Ethics before
Council of Justice which can decide upon the removal being appointed. Moreover, there is no requirement for
of this measure. the judges in office who have not graduated from the
School of Magistrates, to qualify in terms of the Code
In order to harmonise these constitutional changes of Ethics.
with the criminal procedural legislation, the Ministry
of Justice drafted in 2013 an anti-corruption package. Table 2. Estimates by the public of corruption among
In 2014, the parliament approved of these legal the institutions of governance in Albania111
changes in the Criminal Code. The changes in the
Criminal Code were followed by changes in the so Courts 4.39
called “anti-mafia” law. These two legal interventions Customs 4.33
aimed at the forfeiture of assets obtained as a result Prosecution 4.18
of corruption acts.
Tax administration 4.17
The changes are yet to be reflected in the number of The investigation 4.11
indictments which, as evident from Table 1, contrasts Government 4.01
with the evaluations of all international stakeholders National audit office 3.97
about the high incidence of corruption in the judiciary. Police 3.90
Municipal government 3.86
According to one such evaluation, “many court
hearings were held in judges’ offices, which contributed Parliament 3.85
to a lack of professionalism and opportunities for Municipal administration 3.71
corruption.”110 It is these kinds of practices that the Presidency 3.17
Code of Ethics for Judges in Albania seeks to addresses, Army 2.57
as well as issues such conflicts of interests, the court
ex parte communications, and inappropriate political Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
activity. Judges qualify based on the Code of Ethics before
being officially appointed. The code is enforced by the Albanian courts have the worst score among the SELDI
Executive Council of the National Judicial Conference countries in being believed to be the most corrupt
(the Conference is the association of all judges of courts among all other public institutions – a result that has
of first instance and courts of appeal and the Supreme not changed since the previous SELDI monitoring in
Court). As of July 2014, the Disciplinary Committee 2002.
of the Conference had not started any review, and no
judge had been reprimanded for violations of the code. The High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia
Furthermore, the Conference is a voluntary association and Herzegovina has adopted Codes of Ethics containing
of judges and has no legal authority to punish judges principles designed to provide ethical guidance for
for misconduct, thus it lacks real enforcement power. In judges and prosecutors. The Codes provide guidance
110
(U.S. Department of State, 2013a, p. 8). 111
On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being the least corrupt.
under five headings – independence, impartiality, Figure 51. Sentencing in Bulgaria: fewer effective
equality, competence and diligence, and integrity and more suspended sentences
and propriety. The Office of Disciplinary Prosecutor

within the Council is dealing with complaints against

representatives of judiciary. This Office had 1,229
complaints in 2012, the majority against judges. They

started 30 disciplinary proceedings which is the
most since its founding, while 33 proceedings were

completed.112 Acts that judges were mostly punished

for are carelessness or negligence in the performance of

official duties and unjustified delay in making decisions
or other actions in connection with the performance of &íFDUJWFTFOUFODFT 4VTQFOEFETFOUFODFT
the duties of a judge. MFGUTDBMF
SJHIUTDBMF
Source: National Statistical Institute.

Figure 50. Estimates by the public of corruption among
judges in Bosnia and Herzegovina113 the judicial profession, non-execution of other official
duties. The disciplinary penalties are official notice,

reprimand (both imposed by the respective office’s

administrative head) temporary reduction of payment,

temporary demotion in rank, disciplinary removal
from administrative manager’s office, disciplinary

removal from office (imposed by the Supreme Judicial
Council).

Figure 52. Proliferation of bribery among police

and judges in Bulgaria (how often do
the police/judges accept bribes, %)

"MXBZT

Members of the Bulgarian judiciary used to be covered

by the same immunity as MPs, the decision for the
lifting of which was taken by the Supreme Judicial

Council. After two constitutional amendments, in 2003

and 2007, now they enjoy only functional immunity. The
Constitution currently postulates that in the execution

of their office judges, prosecutors and investigative

magistrates do not bear criminal or civil liability for

their official actions or decrees, unless the act is an
intentional crime of general nature. This is theoretically

seen as good basis for strengthening the integrity and

accountability of the judiciary. In case of criminal
proceedings against a magistrate, s/he is removed from

office until the closing of the proceedings.

/FWFS

In the regulation on disciplinary liability of magistrates, %POULOPX
there are several grounds on which penalties can
be imposed for corruption-related conduct. Those 1PMJDF +VEHFT
are the violations of the Code for Ethical Behaviour of
Bulgarian Magistrates, action or inaction, discrediting Source: (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2011b).
112
Annual report about the work of the Office of Disciplinary
Prosecutor in 2012.
In practice, as seen from the report of the Council’s
113
Share of answers “Almost everybody is involved” and “Most are Committee on Disciplinary Proceedings for 2013, the
involved”. disciplining activity of the Council is still divided
between, on the one hand, some cases of sanctioning Figure 53. Estimates by the public of corruption among
violations of the Ethics Code and actions ruining the judges in Croatia115
reputation of the judiciary, and, on the other, more

cases of non-compliance with procedural deadlines
and actions, unjustifiably protracting proceedings. In
the continuing absence, as admitted by the Council’s
own Review of Disciplinary Case-Law of 2009 – 2013,
of a clear vision or generally acclaimed methodology

for determining the workload of magistrates putting

an emphasis on disciplining magistrates primarily
due to slow proceedings still steps on insufficiently
clear grounds and can potentially diverge disciplinary
efforts away from corruption-related cases. Moreover,
lack of disciplinary action in the face of serious Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
corruption allegations allows implicated magistrates
to resign without any review or penalty for their interest and/or incompatibilities. Legal provisions
suspected actions. on the role of the State Prosecutorial Council – the
governing body of the public prosecution – deal with
In Croatia, judges have immunity from detention and declaration of assets for public prosecutors as well
criminal proceedings, while prosecutors do not have as checking of declaration of assets and disciplinary
immunity from prosecution. The criminal referral measures related to the conduct of prosecutors. The
against a judge for all criminal offences prosecuted ex declaration of assets does not include declaration of
officio, should be submitted to USKOK or a competent interests, and conflict of interest related issues – aside
State Attorney. Only those bodies can ask the State from incompatibilities – are not regulated. In period
Judicial Council to lift the immunity of a judge in the 2005 – 2013, there was no clear sanctioning of the
process of deciding on a criminal charge. In addition situation of the conflict of interest or even situation
to the Law on Courts and the Law on the Judicial Council, related to the declaration of assets. In 2008, only one
the conduct of judges is regulated by a Code on case was decided by the State Prosecutor’s Office and
Judicial Ethics. Even though the conflict of interest and the case was related to incompatibility with the State
incompatibilities are not in focus of neither of those Prosecutor’s duty. In the same period, the Council has
instruments,114 the substance of the acts and articles issued 13 disciplinary sanctions to the Prosecutors,
represents instruments for prevention and suppression which indicates that such body is ineffective in
of conflict of interest and incompatibilities. Interests guiding prosecutors in the implementation of the
are not declared in the declaration of assets, therefore fundamental principles of the State Prosecutor’s duty.
the overall segment of the monitoring of the conflict Data on the cases are not clear and therefore public
of interest and prevention of conflict of interest is not control of the work of the State Prosecutors cannot be
part of established legal instruments. With the latest exercised.
changes and amendments to Law on the Judicial Council
in 2013, declarations of assets for judges were made In Kosovo, both judges and prosecutors, despite being
publicly available. The law prescribes that the State generally governed by separate councils, have the
Judicial Council shall provide access to the declarations same body dealing with matters of conduct – the Office
of assets within eight days of the submission of a written of the Disciplinary Prosecutor. The responsibilities
request. of the disciplinary prosecutors include the initiation
of investigations against judges or lay judges in
The legal and institutional framework that regulates cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe
conflict of interest and incompatibilities of public that inappropriate behaviour might have occurred
prosecutors in Croatia follows a similar logic. The and to provide recommendations and evidence in
difference is that prosecutors do not have immunity support of the disciplinary action to the Disciplinary
from prosecution, and that their family members Commission.
are not covered by the regulations on conflict of
114
Except in the case of the procedures related to appointment and 115
Share of answers “Almost everybody is involved” and “Most are
career advancement of judges. involved”.
Table 3. Estimates by the public of corruption among Figure 54. Estimates by the public of corruption among
the institutions of governance in Kosovo116 judges in Macedonia118

Government 4.36

Municipal government 4.08
Courts 3.95

Customs 3.94
Parliament 3.94
Tax administration 3.84

Prosecution 3.70
The Investigation 3.70

Municipal administration 3.54

Presidency 3.52
Police 3.46 Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.

National audit office 3.37
Army 2.24 Among the SELDI countries, Macedonia has one of
the sharpest rises in the share of the surveyed public
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. identifying judges as being corrupt (Figure 54). This
corresponds to international assessments that “political
The Kosovo Anti-Corruption Task Force is part of the interference, inefficiency, favouritism toward well
Special Prosecution and is the main mechanism in the placed persons, prolonged judicial processes, and
fight against corruption. It is comprised of five local corruption characterized the judicial system.”119
and three international prosecutors, who are supported
by thirty police officers and five financial experts. In Montenegro, there is a mechanism allowing com
The strength of this institution is that it is the only plaints to be filed by members of the public if they
institution in Kosovo specialised in anti-corruption. suspect that a certain judge is involved in corruption
The prosecutors who work in this task force are paid and have committed a criminal offence in this respect.
more than the state prosecutor. Its main weakness is Statistics on those complaints is not very detailed,
the very process that created it: as for every other policy although publicly available within the annual reports
initiative, the decision to create the task force was of the Judicial Council. For example, in 2010, 99 such
not based on research that would conclude the need complaints were submitted, only one of which actually
for a new anticorruption mechanism. The task force processed but was deemed unfounded. In 2011, 119
should not operate under the umbrella of the Special complaints were submitted, none were followed up
Prosecution, as this harms its legal capacity.117 because no grounds were found for starting a procedure;
the same was in 2012, with 75 complaints submitted and
In Macedonia, the law allows a certain amount of none processed.
executive control of the judiciary: judges have the
obligation to declare the acquisition and changes in their Similarly small is the number of disciplinary proceed
assets, and declare conflict of interest. The declarations, ings initiated by the Judicial Council on the referral
however, are not vetted by the Judicial Council but by of court chairs (3 referrals in 2010, one rejected as
the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption unfounded, one was accepted and disciplinary
since it has jurisdiction over elected and appointed measure of 20% salary decrease; one referral in 2011).
public officials. In the last available Commission report These insignificant numbers contrast with the findings
(2012), it is stated that out of the 402 cases closed, 71 of SELDI monitoring indicating an almost doubling
were in the judiciary. Nevertheless, it does not contain of the share of the public believing corruption to be
any further detail on the number of positive or negative widespread among judges.
cases, whether it is about corruption or other possible
offences, who has launched the proceedings, etc.
118
116
On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being the least corrupt. involved”.
117
(Ministry of European Integration of Kosovo, 2012). 119
(U.S. Department of State, 2013c, p. 1).
MANS, a Montenegrin NGO, “researched 333 corrup Figure 56. Conviction rates for general public office
tion cases between 2006 and 2012 and found that courts crimes and crimes by magistrates in Serbia
issued inconsistent verdicts for corruption-related

crimes. Sentences were generally severe for low- and

mid-level employees, while higher government employees
and dignitaries received suspended sentences for more
1VCMJDPîDF
serious crimes, such as abuse of office.” DSJNFT
$SJNFTCZ
US State Department Human Rights Report 2013 NBHJTUSBUFT

Figure 55. Estimates by the public of corruption among

judges in Montenegro
Source: Calculations based on “Adult Culprits of Criminal Offences
in the Republic of Serbia in 2012”, Bilten SK-12, Statistical Office
of the Republic of Serbia, 2013.

In the Serbian Criminal Code there is a specific crime

“violation of the law by judge, prosecutor or deputy
prosecutor”. As evident from Figure 56, the conviction
rate for this specific crime is far below the conviction
rates for all corruption crimes. Although not all the
crimes recorded by the indictments, based on this
article of the Code, are cases of corruption, the numbers

are indicative of the overall enforcement of integrity
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. provisions among magistrates.
A similar situation exists with respect to the enforce In Turkey, courts enjoy a much higher degree of public
ment of the Judicial Code of Ethics. The Commission confidence in their integrity than in the other SELDI
established to decide upon complaints filed in relation countries.
to the breaches of the Code, received two complaints
in 2011 (deciding that the Code was not violated) and Table 4. Estimates by the public of corruption among
no complaints in 2012. During 2013, three complaints the institutions of governance in Turkey120
were filed, one of them resulting in confirmation that
the judge actually acted against the Code, but there Customs 3.44
is no information available on further actions in this Municipal government 3.39
regard. Tax administration 3.39
Municipal administration 3.36
In Serbia, public confidence in the judiciary is
Government 3.31
undermined by a number of clear cases of the lack
of competence, much more than the perception of Police 3.28
corruption in judiciary. According to statistics collected Parliament 3.12
at the Supreme Court of Cassation, on average 20% of the Courts 3.04
verdicts of the first-instance courts are overturned. In a The Investigation 2.98
vicious circle, since the public opinion of the judiciary
National audit office 2.97
is rather negative, this brings additional incentive for
judges not think about the public as someone that Prosecution 2.89
they are accountable to. According to official judiciary Army 2.49
statistics, 48% of the cases are not decided 24 months Presidency 2.25
from their commencement – a testimony to the
consequences of no accountability. Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014.
120
On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being the least corrupt.
Although there is no general written code of ethics for established. With the establishment of PNUSKOK,
members of the judiciary in Turkey, and magistrates do the cycle of institution-building to combat corruption
not come under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ethics in Croatia was complete – the so called “USKOK
for Public Service (a body within the structure of the Vertical” was put in place.
Prime Ministry), the disciplinary provisions under the
Law on Judges and Prosecutors specify acts or behaviours Figure 57. Organisational chart of the Croatian criminal
judges should evade. These include inappropriate and justice structure “USKOK Vertical”
rude behaviour to colleagues, behaviours harming the
trustworthiness and impartiality, failure to declare JUDICIARY
Country Courts’ departments responsible for cases
assets, engaging in commercial activities incompatible under jurisdiction of USKOK
with the profession, receiving gifts and bribery.
According to the statistics published by High Council
of Judges and Prosecutors, in 2012 12 judges were STATE ATTORNEY
USKOK
removed from the profession. In 2011 and 2010, the VERTICAL
Office for Supression of Corruption and Organised
Crime (USKOK)
numbers were 6 and 2. However, there are no separate
statistics on the number of disciplinary proceedings on
corruption grounds.
POLICE
Police National Office for Supression of Corruption
and Organised Crime (PNUSKOK)
4.3. Specialised
anticorruption
4.4. Recommendations
courts
Most SELDI countries have found no reason for 1. Countries where the majority of the judicial self-
creating specialised courts dealing with corruption; governing bodies are not elected among magistrates
they apply the general criminal procedure to it. Some should adopt reforms increasing their voting power.
have specialised prosecutions and courts for organised Countries that have not, should adopt the “one
crime, which handle corruption cases; in Serbia, for magistrate – one vote” principle.
example, the Specialised Prosecutor for Organised 2. Ensure that the election of the judicial quota is as
Crime investigates and indicts corruption cases in representative as possible, including judges from
which the total material gain is over RSD 200 million first instance courts. Carefully review, and if needed
(around €1.7 million); the Kosovo prosecution has an reconsider, the compatibility of the position of court
Anti-Corruption Task Force. chairperson with membership of the judicial self-
governing bodies.
The only country that has set up a combination of law 3. Ensure that the procedures for the appointment,
enforcement and judicial structures specialised in promotion and dismissal of magistrates are as
dealing with corruption and relate crimes is Croatia. transparent to the public as the similar procedures
After the National Anti-Corruption Strategy was adopted for elected politicians.
in 2008, the Office for Suppression of Corruption and 4. The number of magistrates required to nominate a
Organized Crime (USKOK) was established as a special member of the judicial governing body needs to be
prosecutorial body within the State Prosecutor’s increased.
Office for Suppression of Corruption. Special USKOK 5. Abolish or reduce to a minimum the role of
courts (at county level) were established in four government ministers (typically of justice) in
regions (around the cities of Zagreb, Split, Rijeka judicial self-governing bodies, especially as regards
and Osijek). The mandate of these USKOK special decisions on disciplinary procedures.
court departments, created to deal with corruption 6. In countries where both the prosecution and
and organised crime, was to promptly rule in cases the courts are governed by the same body, two
under the jurisdiction of USKOK. Later on, the last colleges – for the prosecutors and for judges – need
of the special anticorruption institutions – PNUSKOK to be separated within this body. Prosecutors and
(Police USKOK), a special police department for the judges, respectively, would only be elected to these
suppression of organised crime and corruption – was colleges.
7. Countries that do not have a code of ethics for repression aspect of anticorruption policies and
magistrates should adopt one. renders further incrimination of corruption useless.
8. The independence and capacity of judicial inspecto A possible best practice to be replicated – although
rates should be strengthened to allow them to step it is still underdeveloped – is Kosovo’s Platform of
up inspections. Anticorruption Statistics, designed by an NGO. Such
9. Magistrates should be prioritised in the mechanism a mechanism should include regular information
for verification of asset declarations. about: disciplinary and administrative and criminal
10. Introduce feedback mechanisms for the enforce measures in the public service and the judiciary; the
ment of anticorruption policies, including with various aspects of criminal prosecution, including
respect to magistrates. These mechanisms are indictments and convictions/acquittals, sentences by
substantially deficient or practically missing in the various types of corruption offences.
all SELDI countries; their absence sabotages the
5 Corruption and the Economy
T
he stifling of economic growth, entrepre Figure 58. How business in Southeast Europe122 justifies
neurship and fair competition are among the payment of bribes to officials
the diverse and well documented effects of
4QFFEVQQSPDFEVSF
corruption on society and its governance.
More recent research has shown that corruption /PTQFDJñDQVSQPTFTUBUFE
exacerbates bad fiscal policy, and deficits are skewed 3FDFJWFCFUUFSUSFBUNFOU

towards discretionary spending, and away from 'JOBMJ[BUJPOPGQSPDFEVSF
socially universal goods such as healthcare and 3FEVDFDPTUPGQSPDFEVSF
education.121 The correlation between corruption and
3FDFJWFJOGPSNBUJPO
economic development is so strong that the dominance
%POhUSFNFNCFS
of the former gets a country into a vicious circle of
more corruption and less development, while when the
latter dominates it generates a virtuous circle of more Source: (UNODC, 2013w, p. 28).
growth and less need for bribery. In Southeast Europe,
the considerable involvement of governments in the regulation, individual or institutional incompetence,
economy generates a number of points of potential etc.; the second are related to various types of fraud –
conflict between public institutions and business; in tax evasion, VAT fraud, smuggling, non-compliance
turn, this creates corruption risk. with health and safety standards, etc.
A key corruption risk factor in the SELDI area is the

informal or hidden economy. The Center for the Study
5.1. Business environment of Democracy in its annual Corruption Assessment Reports
and informal has demonstrated that corruption has been the main tool
for unscrupulous businesses to stay off the record books
economy and to generate government-protected monopolies and
undue rents. “The size and scope of the hidden economy
In the SELDI area, business overregulation – mostly provide cover for large grey and black financial flows
concerning registration, licensing and permit regimes from the business sector into politics, which in turn
implementation – constantly generates various barriers influence the operation of the official economy.”123
to market entrants and higher costs of doing business.
This drives entrepreneurs in the informal sector and/or The impact of corruption on the business environment
compels them to resort to bribery. In a downward spiral in Albania is evident in the raking of corruption
this then justifies further regulation and administrative as the second most significant obstacle to doing
barriers. Experience and studies on SEE countries business after high taxes, with an average prevalence
demonstrate that businesses in the region pay most of business bribery of 15.7 percent.124 Given that small
often to speed up procedures and to avoid penalties. enterprises are around 90 percent of companies, the
The latter is related to overreliance of the authorities on fact that prevalence of bribery is higher among small
mass, punitive measures. businesses than among businesses of other sizes is
particularly worrying. It has a detrimental effect for
The variety of circumstances that occasion corruption several reasons:
in the interactions of business and public officials
illustrate the difficulty anticorruption policies face. • they are more vulnerable to increases in costs;
When initiated by business, corrupt practices can be • they are an important source of income and employ
divided into two main categories – avoiding extra
costs and gaining unfair advantage. In the first group 122
Covers Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo,
are the kickbacks necessitated by poor or excessive Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
123
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2009, p. 57).
(Pippidi, 2013).
121
(UNODC, 2013a, p. 5).
124
ment for a large number of people; Figure 59. Performance of SELDI countries in the
• SMEs have a greater potential for growth and the indicator “Irregular payments and bribes”
long run impact of corruption on these businesses of the Global Competitiveness Report129
might be even bigger.
5VSLFZ
4FSCJB
Corruption in the customs has been continuously

ranked among the highest in the country.125 The .POUFOFHSP
government expects to generate additional income .BDFEPOJB

m
equal to 1 percent of the national GDP by bringing in $SPBUJB
m
foreign monitoring of customs operations,126 which #VMHBSJB

is indicative of how much revenue it estimates is
#J)
lost through corruption. Estimates of the informal
"MCBOJB
economy in Albania are very high, generating a large
part of the country’s GDP and thus hindering fair
business competition as well as substantially reducing Source: World Economic Forum.
income generated by tax. There are no official figures
but various estimates suggest that its share has been Business in Bosnia and Herzegovina “is having hard times
revolving around 30 percent of GDP in the past 5 to survive in the difficult political environment and still
years.127 Index Mundi 2013 suggests that its share needs registration in the two state entities – Republika
might be as high as 50 percent of GDP.128 The shadow Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
economy is regarded by most businesses as one of (FBiH). In the former, the registration of firms was
their main concerns and constraints due to the unfair significantly reduced from 23 to 3 days and the price also
competition. With a share as large as 30 to 50 percent dropped to €200. But in the FBiH, the establishment of a
of the GDP, the number of unreported transactions and company is much more complicated and expensive. The
resources that go for briberies is potentially large as share of non-performing loans is also high and growing.
well, with higher incentives for informal businesses to In the second quarter of 2013 they reached 14.3%. Bosnia
bribe public compliance bodies. As of January 2014, the and Herzegovina's public sector is huge and inefficient,
government of Albania has adopted a progressive tax as many of the competences overlap or are duplicated,130
system, which might raise concerns of an increase in which creates high risks of corruption.
informal economy especially of the medium-sized (but
also large) enterprises which would prefer to declare Figure 60. Share of businesses stating bribery is frequent
less and benefit from the lower tax rate. The results in dealing with courts, BiH compared to
from the tax changes will depend to a very high degree Southeast Europe and Europe and Central Asia
on the government’s success in winning back trust,

including by delivering on anticorruption promises.

The World Bank ranked Bosnia and Herzegovina
131 out of 189 countries in the 2014 Doing Business

survey – last among the SELDI countries. It takes 11

procedures and 37 days to start a business in Bosnia

and Herzegovina, which puts it on the 174th place in
the ranking on this specific indicator. In the 2009 –

2013 period, the country introduced no reforms to #J) 4&& &$"
reduce corruption risks in the economy; in 2012, the
government replaced a required utilisation permit with Source: BEEPS At-A-Glance 2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
a simple notification of commencement of activities
and simplified process for obtaining a tax identification The hidden economy and informal employment
number. represent one of the greatest challenges in the
125
Please refer to Table 2, page 83.
129
The indicator is based on the weighted average score across
responses to a survey question inquiring how common is it for
(Doganat, “Crown Agents” 450 kontrolle në muaj, 2014).
126
firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes. The
127
(Boka & Torluccio, 2013). answers range from 1 (very common) to 7 (never occurs).
128
Index Mundi (2013), Albania Economy Profile. 130
(Marini, 2014).
Corruption and the Economy 93
economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The labour and the emergence of monopolies have pushed
market is characterised by low dynamics, high level corruption to the higher strata of administrative and
of unemployment and informal employment. In the political power, alleviating it at lower administrative
summer of 2012, the Labour and Employment Agency levels. The fact that political corruption affecting the
of Bosnia and Herzegovina announced that informal business sector is not changing is confirmed by the
employment, by their estimations, reached about perception of businesses about corruption levels and
200,000 persons.131 According to other estimates, around practical efficiency of corruption.134
34 percent of working people do not pay pension and
health insurance, and the government has no strategy Figure 62. Problems encountered in doing business:
or plan to deal with this issue.132 Bulgaria compared to EU-27

In Bulgaria 51% of the companies consider corruption

as a problem to their operation. There is almost

universal agreement among business – 94% – that

the close links between business and politics leads
to corruption. Somewhat smaller share of companies

(66%) state that the only way to succeed in business

is to have political connections. 85% of the Bulgarian
-BDLPGNFBOTPS
QSPDFEVSFTUPSFDPWFS
EFCUGSPNPUIFST
1BUSPOBHFBOE
OFQPUJTN
'BTUDIBOHJOH
MFHJTMBUJPOBOEQPMJDJFT
*OBEFRVBUF
JOGSBTUSVDUVSF
$PSSVQUJPO
"DDFTTUPñOBODJOH
SFHVMBUJPOT
5BYSBUFT
JODMVEJOHDSFEJU
3FTUSJDUJWFMBCPVS
$PNQMFYJUZPG
BENJOJTUSBUJWF
QSPDFEVSFT
and 69% of the European firms consider that bribery
and the use of connections is often the easiest way
to obtain certain public services in their country. In
Bulgaria, 71% of the respondents consider unlikely
that corrupt people or businesses would be caught or
"WFSZTFSJPVTQSPCMFNJO#VMHBSJB
reported to the police or prosecutors, higher than the "RVJUFTFSJPVTQSPCMFNJO#VMHBSJB
EU-27 average of 60%.133 &6BWFSBHF TVNPGUIFBOTXFST
WFSZBOERVJUFTFSJPVTQSPCMFN
Figure 61. Level and practical efficiency of corruption Source: (TNS Political & Social, March 2014).
in the Bulgarian business sector*
Over the last 10 years the informal economy in

Bulgaria shrunk due to various factors, including the

economic convergence with the EU, the deepening

of the credit markets, introduction of mandatory

employment contract registration in 2003 and the real-
time linking of fiscal devices with the National Revenue

Agency servers as well as performed inspections. Still,

according to CSD’s 2013 Hidden Economy Index,135 the
+BOVBSZ
0DUPCFS
%FDFNCFS
.BSDI
+VOF
/PWFNCFS
'FCSVBSZ
"QSJM
+BOVBSZ
"VHVTU
0DUPCFS
%FDFNCFS
.BSDI
0DUPCFS
share of the hidden economy in Bulgaria increased in

2013 among both businesses and the population. The
main reasons behind this development can be sought
-FWFMPGDPSSVQUJPO 1SBDUJDBMFîDJFODZPGDPSSVQUJPO
in low income, harsh labour market conditions, the
decline in the economic outlook, as well as the overall
* Note: Level of corruption: The index ranges from 0 (nobody from the public
administration is involved in corruption) to 10 (almost everybody political instability in 2013. The high unemployment
from the public administration is involved in corruption). rates are of particular concern as a risk factor providing
Practical efficiency of corruption: Thе index assesses whether corruption
pays off. It ranges from 0 (not likely at all) to 10 (very likely). incentives to more people to engage in hidden economy
Source: CMS, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013. activities. Among the results of the 2013 Hidden Economy
Index two main trends stand out:
In the business sector, the indexes for corruption
pressure and involvement in corruption have not • Increase in the incidence of hidden employment,
changed significantly in recent years. Concentration mainly due to seasonal work and semi-formal employ
ment schemes. According to CSD’s conservative
(Labour and Employment Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012).
131
132
(Federalni Zavod Za Zapošljavanje, 2013). 134
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013(43), p. 6).
133
All data from (TNS Political & Social, March 2014). (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013(42)).
135
estimates a total of BGN 245.6 mln (€126 mln) in social bribing government officials is to “speed up business-
security payments were lost from underreporting related procedures” (28.4%), although only 3.2 percent
and non-reporting of income in 2013. admit to have done so.141 As for how corruption
• Increase in public perceptions on tax evasion and discourages business activity, “some 3.3 per cent of
mild deterioration in terms of the government’s business representatives decided not to make a major
tax collection rates. The latter can be explained by investment […] due to the fear of having to pay bribes to
the deflation in certain months in 2013, as well as a obtain requisite services or permits.”142 This is especially
variety of other related economic conditions. Still, the case for smaller businesses.
tax revenue growth since 2009 has been subdued –
its year-on-year growth was below 1% in September Kosovo has improved its position in the World Bank
2013. At the same time, almost BGN 1.45bn (€743.5 Doing Business rankings moving up from the 96th spot
mln) annually is lost to VAT evasion and social in 2013 to the 86th in 2014. The greatest progress has
security contribution gaps, according to rough been achieved in the “Starting a business” category.
approximations, while the real figure could be even In this category Kosovo has moved from the 126th
higher.136 place to the 100th due to the decrease in the number of
procedures, time, and cost of registering a business.
Almost half of the business representatives in Croatia Progress related to many corruption cases and the
consider corruption to be a serious obstacle in doing environment for doing business has been made in
business, which affects the overall business climate the “Dealing with construction permits” category.
and investment decisions and results in the Croatian Construction permits red-tape has led to so much
economy being one of the most affected by cancelled corruption that anyone even associated with these
investment projects in the Western Balkans (5.6%).137 activities is perceived as highly corrupt and responsible
Starting a business was made easier in Croatia by the for the spatial planning degradation, especially in the
introduction of a new form of limited liability company capital city. It is debatable whether the removal of red-
with a lower minimum capital requirement and tape will have a positive effect; however, shortening
simpliﬁed incorporation procedures. Tax payments the time and the making the process of obtaining
were reorganised by introducing an electronic system construction permits more efficient will surely help
for social security contributions. Streamlining litigation the business environment. Improvement has also been
proceedings and transferring certain enforcement registered in the ease of registering property. Property
procedures from the courts to state agencies and disputes in Kosovo have had a devastating effect in
introducing an expedited out-of-court restructuring the economy, especially in pushing up interest rates
procedure contributed to overall improvement in as the banks take more risks due to the uncertainty
doing business in Croatia.138 The Index of Economic regarding who owns what.
Freedom concurs with the World Bank´s assessment,
stating that the business start-up process has become In 2013, businesses in Kosovo reported on average
less burdensome, taking less than 10 procedures. only 65.6 percent of their sales for tax purposes –
However, it is emphasised that obtaining necessary a 34.4 percent evasion rate.143 Research finds the main
permits takes over 200 days and costs over four times causes of informality in the economy to be factors
the level of average annual income. Despite ongoing such as fiscal morale, trust in institutions, and the
reform efforts, the labour market remains relatively cost of compliance. Trust in institutions was found to
rigid.139 In 2012, the shadow economy in Croatia was be statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
28 per cent of GDP, close to the levels of Bulgaria (31%) The discrepancy between what businesses pay in taxes
and Turkey (27%).140 and what they receive in form of public goods and
services – a discrepancy which most likely is explained
As in the other SELDI countries, business in Kosovo by corruption – is another factor for such a high rate of
claims to employ bribery mostly to overcome informality.
bureaucratic inefficiency: the lead reason it gives by for
Given the share of the public sector in the economy
136
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013(42)). in Kosovo the system is still highly vulnerable. When
137
(UNODC, 2013c)
138
(The World Bank, 2013, p. 162). (UNODC, 2013a, p. 4).
141
139
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/croatia 142
Ibid. p. 6.
140
(Schneider, The Shadow Economy in Europe, 2013, p. 4). 143
(Riinvest Institute, 2013, p. 8).
private domestic consumption and exports increase, over the period 2000 – 2010 from 34% of GDP in 2000
and businesses rely less on public contracts, corruption to 24% of GDP in 2010, measuring almost €1.7 billion
will not be such an important barrier to business. in 2010.146 The main causes of the grey economy are
considered taxes, unemployment, regulation intensity,
Figure 63. How tax evasion is justified by Kosovo bureaucracy, etc. According to the latest data from
business the State Statistical Office (Labour Force Survey, 2012),
informal employment accounts for 22.5% of total
4JODFUIFHPWFSONFOUHFUT
FOPVHIUBYFT JUEPFTOPUNBUUFS employment in the country.
UIBUTPNFQFPQMFFWBEFUBYFT
5BYFTBSFTPIFBWZUIBUUBY 5BYFTBSFTPNFUIJOH
FWBTJPOJTBOFDPOPNJD
OFDFTTJUZGPSNBOZUPTVSWJWF

XIJDIJTUBLFO
BXBZGSPNNF
Businesses in Montenegro rank corruption as the
$IFBUJOHPOUBYFTJT

*G*SFDFJWFNPOFZJODBTI “fifth most significant obstacle to doing business,

KVTUJñBCMFJOMJHIUPGUIF
VOGBJSOFTTPGUIFUBYTZTUFN
GPSTFSWJDFTSFOEFSFE
*XPVMEOPUSFQPSUJU
after high taxes, complicated tax laws, limited access

*GJOEPVCUBCPVUXIFUIFS 4JODFFWFSZCPEZ to financing and labor regulations.”147 Furthermore,
PSOPUUPSFQPSUBDFSUBJO
TPVSDFPGJODPNF
FWBEFTUBYFT
POFDBOIBSEMZCF
the “establishment of a sound business environment
*XPVMEOPUSFQPSUJU CMBNFEGPSEPJOHJU continues to be hampered by the weak rule of law and
5IFSFJTOPUIJOHCBEBCPVU
VOEFSSFQPSUJOHUBYBCMF
(JWFOQSFTFOUUBY
CVSEFOT POFDBOIBSEMZ
corruption.”148 Such conditions and perceptions are
JODPNFPOPOFATUBYGPSNT CMBNFUBYFWBEFST not encouraging for foreign or domestic investors. On
(JWFOUIFFBTZBWBJMBCJMJUZ
PGPQQPSUVOJUJFTUPFWBEFUBYFT average, 1 out of 12 (8.5%) entrepreneurs in Montenegro
POFDBOIBSEMZCMBNFUBYFWBEFST state that they had not made some investments in the
Source: (Riinvest Institute, 2013, p. 19). previous period because of fear of corruption and
organised crime.149
Macedonia has the highest rank among the SELDI
countries in World Bank’s 2014 Doing Business index. In Serbia, most studies find that the government
Nevertheless, the Macedonian business environment is intervention is ubiquitous, that barriers to business, i.e.
affected by corruption: „Investors and businesspeople costs of doing business, are substantial, and that there
have reported being solicited for bribes, particularly are two main consequences of such an arrangement:
when participating in public procurements and low level of economic freedom and breeding ground for
government projects.”144 The share of businesses corruption. The most important barriers to economic
reporting to have paid a bribe in the preceding year is activities and the most important contributing factors
double that in Kosovo – 6.5 percent.145 As in the other to the low overall ranking of Serbia are: (1) dealing with
SELDI countries, the prevalence of bribery is slightly construction permits; (2) paying taxes; (3) enforcing
higher among small businesses than among businesses contracts and resolving insolvency.150 Not only are all
of other sizes. of these obstacles government-created, but all of them
are also prone to corruption. Construction permits
Figure 64. Origins of bribe offers in the business- are a corruption risk of the investment process and
government transactions in Macedonia it discourages greenfield investments in Serbia, thus
affecting the economic growth rate. The costs of paying
taxes affects corruption in taxation as there is an
incentive to speed up the procedure – not necessarily
#VTJOFTTNBEFUIFPíFS
breaching tax regulation, but paying a bribe for tax
#ZUIJSEQBSUZPOCFIBMGPGPîDJBM
authority officials to do their job properly. Problems
1VCMJDPîDJBMNBEFJNQMJDJUSFRVFTU
related to enforcing contracts, mainly due to the
1VCMJDPîDJBMNBEFFYQMJDJUSFRVFTU
inefficient and overloaded judiciary, provide incentives
/PBOTXFS
for corruption in the judiciary. The aim of bribery is
not necessarily to get a favourable outcome, but to get
the outcome as soon as possible, without considerable
Source: (UNODC, 2013m, p. 24). delays. The same appears to be the case of resolving
As measured by the electricity consumption method, 146

(Centre for Economic Analyses, 2012).
the informal economy in Macedonia has decreased 147
(UNODC, 2013n, p. 9).
148
(European Commission, SWD(2013) 411 final, p. 3).
144
(U.S. Department of State, 2013m). (UNODC, 2013n, p. 7).
149
145
(UNODC, 2013m, p. 5). 150
(The World Bank, 2013).
insolvency, the process that is time-consuming beyond 5.2. Government budget

any reasonable standard. Furthermore, the main
and redistribution
developments in the past five years in the fields of these
major costs of doing business are not favourable, i.e. the
cost of doing business has increased. The composition of public spending and the redistribu
tion of the budget have major implications not only
In Turkey, 52% of international companies operating for the efficient and fair allocation of public funds,
in the country believe that bribery/corrupt practices but also the risks and vulnerabilities for corrupt
happen widely in business.151 In addition, 56% practices. “Public expenditure – and especially public
believe that corrupt practices have increased due to investment – is known to offer some of the best
the economic downturn. In contrast, only 2.4% of opportunities for corruption.”156
business executives surveyed in the 2013 – 2014 Global
Competitiveness Report consider corruption among the In the SELDI area, fiduciary risk is enhanced because of
truly problematic factors for doing business (compared a number of reasons which include corruption:
to tax rates with 14.8%). The same businesses executives,
however, do not seem to be trusted by the general • Large share of public spending in GDP;
public (Figure 65), which creates a unique picture of • Large share of the informal economy which, among
corruption perceptions in Turkey, with the main culprit other things, compromises revenue planning;
seen on the business side, and not on the side of the • Corruption in public procurement, which com
government. promises the value for money aspect of public
expenditure;
Figure 65. Businessmen considered most corrupt • Low transparency of the budget process and fiscal
in Turkey152 management;
• Confusion – deliberate or not – among aspects such
#VTJOFTTQFPQMF
as budgetary and extra-budgetary figures, and
.FNCFSTPGQBSMJBNFOU
between functional and administrative allocations.
.JOJTUFST
• Poor institutional monitoring, oversight and auditing.
.VOJDJQBMPîDJBMT
1VCMJDQSPTFDVUPST
Thus in these countries corruption could be associated
#BOLFST with all stages of the budget process – preparation,
%PDUPST adoption, use of funds and ex post control.
5FBDIFST
An important factor in the corruption risk associated
Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2014. with public finances is poor transparency. While some
SELDI countries have improved the level of publicity of
In 2009, the informal economy in Turkey was estimated their budget process, in a number of others there has
at 33% of the 2004 – 2005 GDP.153 More recently, been tangible backsliding (Figure 66).
however, Turkey’s Minister of Finance noted in an
article154 that informal employment in Turkey has Evidently, most SELDI countries fall into the “Some
declined by 14.5 percentage points since 2002, to 37.6% information” range associated with some corruption
in April 2013. He also added that the informal economy risk. While EU member-countries, like Bulgaria,
as a share of GDP declined by six percentage points provide much more information on the planning,
during this period, to 26.5% in 2013. This is almost in execution and evaluation of the budgetary process
line with another study, which estimates the size of to their citizens, actual accountability in terms of
the shadow economy in Turkey as 27.7% of GDP as of programme budgeting and efficiency indicators remain
2012, compared to the OECD average of 19.2%.155 underdeveloped. All the other SELDI countries are
even further back on the road to budget transparency
(Ernst & Young, 2013, p. 4).
151
and accountability.
152
Share of respondents answering “Almost everybody is involved”
and “Most are involved” in corruption.
153
(Reis, Angel-Urdinola, & Torres, 2009).
Another measure of the integrity of public finances
154
(Şimşek, 2014).
is contained in the views of private business of the
155
(Schneider, Shadow Economy in Turkey and in other OECD-
Countries: What do we (not) know?, 2012). (Isaksen, 2005, p. 4).
156
Figure 66. Performance of some SELDI countries the national budget, proper monitoring of public
in the index of the Open Budget Survey157 expenditures, and production of consistent evaluation
reports. Despite the process of budget hearings
4PNF 4JHOJñDBOU &YUFOTJWF
5VSLFZ in parliament being generally well regulated and

4FSCJB organised, doubts about the quality of the debate

have been raised, including that individual debate
.BDFEPOJB

sessions in the Committee on Economy and Finance
$SPBUJB

of the Ministry of Finance are too short to allow for
#VMHBSJB

in-depth discussion. Although parliamentary groups
#J) have the right to call for sessions with the government
"MCBOJB
including the Prime Minister, ministers are unlikely
to participate in the hearings unless there is a political
issue. Since the committee in charge of budget
Source: International Budget Partnership. approval and budget oversight is chaired by an MP of
the majority party, the opposition does not have much
composition of public spending. In this, again the influence on budget oversight. To improve the quality
performances are mixed – while Montenegro, Bosnia of budget discussions the Albanian parliament should
and Herzegovina and Albania have deteriorated, reconsider establishing a non-partisan budget office
the governments of Turkey, Macedonia, Croatia and in order to address the lack of independent analytical
Bulgaria are believed to have become more wasteful capacity for MPs, as OECD experts have advised.159
(Figure 67). With the exception of Turkey in 2013 – 2014
none of the other countries reached event half of the Controls of non-payroll expenditure are primarily
maximum score on efficiency. ex-ante voucher checking. There is very little internal
audit functionality at the ex-post stage as required by
Figure 67. Performance of SELDI countries in the international best practices. Budget institutions receive
indicator “Wastefulness of government invoices from suppliers and prepare expenditure
spending” of the Global Competitiveness documents and perform ex-ante controls. Since
Report158 “many budget institutions do not have access to the
treasury system they send expenditure documents to

5VSLFZ the relevant Treasury district office that records and
4FSCJB

performs an additional ex ante control before payment.
.POUFOFHSP
Through this practice the Ministry of Finance keeps a

strong central control on budget execution.”160
.BDFEPOJB m

$SPBUJB m In Bulgaria, the 2014 draft budget represents a mix

#VMHBSJB
of social pledges including employment, education,

#J) healthcare and regional development and a statement
"MCBOJB
for reduced administrative burden on the business.

One of its major assumptions providing for higher
&YUSFNFMZXBTUFGVM )JHIMZFîDJFOU revenues is the improved collection of VAT. This is
Source: World Economic Forum. expected to come from a reverse-charge mechanism
for VAT and stricter control over goods with higher
Some of the outstanding issues in the management fiscal risk. While these measures can improve budget
of public finances in Albania include the quality of revenues, they are unlikely to change the overall
the budget analysis, the parliamentary debate on business environment, and hence the level of hidden
economy in the country. The success of the measures
Scores out of 100. The index has four ranges according to the
157
hinges critically on the ability of the government to
amount of budget information provided to the public: 81-100
end political patronage of selected companies involved
Extensive; 61-80 Significant; 41-60 Some. Kosovo and Montenegro
are not surveyed. in VAT fraud, in particular at the local level.
158
The indicator is based on the answer of a sample of global business
executives to the question “How would you rate the composition
of public spending in your country?” with answer ranges from 1
(extremely wasteful) to 7 (highly efficient in providing necessary
159
(Klepsvik, Emery, Finn, & Bernhard, 2013).
goods and services). (Klepsvik, Emery, Finn, & Bernhard, 2013, p. 38).
160
The Bulgarian 2014 budget plan indicates growth in level political corruption, often associated with large-
discretionary government spending compared to 2013 scale infrastructure projects.
and preceding years, including slight rise in capital
expenditure, annual budget deficit expansion and a Figure 69. Share of public and implicit public debt
two-fold increase of the size of the contingency fund. in the Croatian GDP
Large part of the contingency fund will be used for
'JTDBM:FBSTm
financing investment projects at the municipal level.

The fund is part of the government’s decentralisation

program but raises transparency and accountability

issues as the contingency reserve allows for

disbursing the funds without any official rationale.

The government has set vague procedures and

criteria guidelines for the public investment program

for financing municipality projects. According to
government reports, the projects will be evaluated by *NQMJDJU1VCMJD%FCU 1VCMJD%FCU
the ministers of six departments – finance, economy,
regional development, investment, transport and Source: Ministry of Finance, Yearbooks (2008 – 2012).161
environment, together with a representative from the
National Association of Municipalities. The overall Discretionary spending over the years has been in
result has been inefficient spending of public resources, the 13.3% – 19.4% range. Criteria for awarding and
with some estimates showing that the government monitoring of certain programs, grants and support
approved some of the projects within a day, which have not been established.
clearly is insufficient for any proper evaluation of the
feasibility, let alone the quality of the project. Overall, Figure 70. Discretionary vs. non-discretionary spending
it is expected that although Bulgaria has quite high in the Croatian national budget
level of budget transparency, in 2014 the country will

have a steep rise in its budget deficit, due in part to lack
of accountability and indiscriminate discretionary

spending.

Figure 68. Shares of discretionary and non-discretionary

government spending in Bulgaria

%JTDSFUJPOBSZ4QFOEJOH
*OUFSFTU

/PO%JTDSFUJPOBSZ4QFOEJOH

Source: Croatian Ministry of Finance.162
/POEJTDSFUJPOBSZ
TQFOEJOH

%JTDSFUJPOBSZ The Croatian Fiscal Responsibility Act defines rules that
TQFOEJOH limit government spending, strengthen accountability

for the legal, functional and purposeful use of

budgetary resources and strengthen the system of
controls and supervision to ensure fiscal responsibility.

The Fiscal Policy Committee has pointed to the need
Source: Bulgarian Ministry of Finance. for the government to prepare projections of the
fiscal rules application according to the appropriate
The case of Croatia illustrates the threat to the viability methodology as an integral part of all official budget
of the budget represented by the level of the public and
implicit public debt (including issued state guarantees
Calculation of PSD researchers based on Ministry of Finance
161
and total debt of the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction data.
and Development). Failing to account for public debt 162
Calculation of PSD researchers based on data from the Ministry
impact on current spending is often indicative of high of Finance, Annual Reports of the Execution of the State Budget.
documents within the framework of the state budget delays and problems in the implementation could be
adoption procedure.163 expected – since this is a long-term reform – the problem
is that the current situation suggests that the reform has
Since Croatia has very large public spending, budget stopped and that no efforts are made to move to the next
planning over the years has become unsustainable. The steps of implementation.
government refused to accept significant reduction of
current income considering that current revenue had The Annual Report of the State Audit Institution for the
not been realised repeatedly, and had to sharply increase year 2012 – 2013 reveals the worrying degree to which
indebtedness instead. Part of the debt has been amassed its recommendations on the year-end budget report
through subsidies or state aid awarded as rescue policy (which parliament adopts as its own conclusions) are not
to state-owned enterprises. Worryingly, the share being implemented. Out of 47 recommendations, only 7
of subsidies to financial institutions and companies recommendations were fulfilled, 12 recommendations
outside the public sector varies from 9% – 20% of the were completely neglected, while the others are in the
total subsidies. This creates a clear risk of corruption early stages of implementation. This means that the
and favouritism with strong negative consequences for auditees fulfilled only 15% of the recommendations,
fair competition and economic viability. while the State Audit has found that many of the
government’s figures on the implementation of the
In Montenegro, the government has an absolute State Audit’s recommendations are not accurate. A
monopoly over the process of budget proposal develop similar situation happened the previous year, when the
ment: parliament, CSOs and other stakeholders do State Audit Institution found that more than 70% of its
not have an institutional mechanism enabling their recommendations remained unfulfilled. This suggests
participation in the decision making process. MPs that there is a systemic problem in the government’s
are left with the option of proposing amendments, attitude towards the work of the public audit, namely
advocating reallocation of the specific amounts for towards solving the problems that cause breaching
certain spending units, but not applying a systemic of the Law on Budget during the fiscal year and other
approach in reference to the analysis of the principles related laws (such as the Public Procurement Law).
governing the budget. This side-lining of the parlia
ment from the early stages of budget preparation State aid in Montenegro, although it has been
compromises the effectiveness of its participation in decreasing over the years, is still high, especially
the later stages of the budget cycle. The parliament is when compared to the average in the EU countries,
therefore placed in a situation of fait accompli: unable or the SEE countries. In 2012, it amounted to 1.14% of
to consider the principles governing the planning of GDP, which is more than double the average of the EU
the budget for the next year and unable to exercise the countries, which is 0.51%.164 Additionally, its structure
influence to the main capital budget directions or to be is problematic, since it is given almost entirely for
consulted in reference to the strategic economic policy the purposes of recovery, restructuring and sectoral
priorities. assistance, while the analysis of the effects to that aid
shows that the money was not spent in accordance
Further, lately the process of the parliament’s review with the plans of restructuring.165
of the budget proposal was to a great extent hampered
due to poor implementation of the programme – or In April 2014, the parliament of Montenegro adopted
performance – budgeting. The introduction of perfor a new Law on Budget and Fiscal Accountability. The Law
mance budgeting in Montenegro has been slow and brings several changes that are quite important for
hesitant. Although currently all spending units have the aspects of transparency and accountability in the
their programmes on paper, they still do not contain budgetary cycle:
performance indicators to monitor achievement of
programme goals. The action plan for introducing • the introduction of liability provisions – the previous
programme budgeting announced in 2007 has not been law could be breached without consequences;
adopted. Numerous deadlines for establishing full • the introduction of the budgetary inspection, as a
programme budgeting with performance indicators and new body that will carry out controls on how the
their top-down implementation in budget preparation budgetary bodies comply with the law.
and planning have been missed. Although certain
164
(Komisija Za Kontrolu Državne Pomoći , 2013).
(Croatian Ministry of Finance, 2013).
163
(Turković, 2012).
165
Consolidated government spending in Serbia, which budget performance by making growth and previous
includes central government, local and provincial year’s budget performance part of the current year’s
governments and social security funds (health, pension budget performance. After having been discussed in
and unemployment funds) is considered high, at more a parliamentary commission, the proposed law was
than 46% of GDP in 2013. From the viewpoint of economic withdrawn the night before voting as the government
classification of expenditures, spending is dominated changed its mind on the necessity of a fiscal rule. This
by mandatory spending (pensions, wages, interest, episode is telling in terms of the low stability and
social assistance, health), while nominally discretionary predictability of fiscal rules.
spending (capital expenditures, goods and services and
subsidies) is about 25% of total spending. However, After 2008, budget expenditures exceeded the planned
large part of these items is in effect also mandatory. For amounts every year by margins that were not negligible.
example, about one third of the subsidies is related to The parliament’s approval was not sought during the
agriculture, where most of the subsidies are actually year and it was circumvented in the following way:167
entitlement (for example, per hectare subsidies), and also the allowances for wage expenditures were released for
a large portion is given to the railways company for the other purposes and the Ministry of Finance exceeded
payment of wages. Regarding goods and services, the the target budget expenditures by the end of the year
most significant part are medicines purchased through as it had to make wage expenditures. The exceeding
the Health Insurance Fund, and another large part are expenditures were approved by the parliament at the end
actually wages (for government research institutes) of the year when conclusive figures for the ending year
and also large parts are communal services, electricity were submitted. Government’s breech of expenditures
and gasoline. In summary, the discretionary spending during the year without the parliament’s approval is
share is probably below 10% of the total spending, and also pointed out in the annual report of Turkish Court
the largest component is capital expenditures. of Accounts.168 While this is not necessarily linked to
corruption risks, it leads to increased opportunities for
However, the fact that there is not much room for corrupt exchanges at the highest governmental level,
discretionary spending in the budget does not mean that usually related to the large businesses and/or public
corruption risk is low. Much of discretionary spending investment projects.
is in state-owned funds (such as the Development Fund
and the Export Credit and Insurance Agency) with not
effective oversight mechanisms, state owned banks
(three have collapsed in the past several years) and state 5.3. Public procurement
owned companies (several large public enterprises and
hundreds of still not privatised companies). The level
of transparency, accountability and public oversight Procurement by government bodies and state-owned
of these institutions is much lower than in the case of companies is one of the significant corruption risk
the state budget. For example, the Development Fund areas in the SELDI countries. In the post-communist
currently has a portfolio with more than €1 billion in among them, it is privatisation that is often referred
loans issued to private companies and absolutely no to as the “original sin” from which current integrity
data is available publicly on the quality of the portfolio problems sprang. Divesting significant publicly owned
and, for example, who the major beneficiaries of these assets over short periods of time in weak institutional
“cheap loans” are. environments gave rise to a momentum of corruption
that has not been stemmed yet. “The institutions in
Within the central government budget in Turkey, charge of privatisation had been typically granted
the share of mandatory primary expenditures (non- large discretionary power that is generally seen as a
discretionary spending) grew from 47% of total hotbed of corruption. Moreover, the administrative
spending in 2008 to almost 60% in 2013.166 This leaves capacities of the privatizing agencies appeared overall
the share of discretionary spending extraordinarily weak and these institutions have practically remained
high by regional standards. under rather strong political influence despite their
nominal independence.”169 Later on, the nominally
Turkey had planned to implement a fiscal rule in
2010, which aimed at introducing anti-cyclicality to (TEPAV, 2012, p. 18).
167
168
(T.C. Sayiştay Başkanliği, 2013a, p. 14).
(International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 16).
166 169
(SELDI, 2002, p. 115).
private enterprises, in particular the largest ones, either Figure 71. Performance of SELDI countries in the
capable of inflicting significant social pressure through indicator „Diversion of public funds“
layoffs or controlling critical parts of a value added of the Global Competitiveness Report173
chain (e.g. repairs in coal fired plants), could continue
5VSLFZ
draining public resources through receiving state aid,

public procurement, etc. 4FSCJB

.POUFOFHSP
When later public procurement took over as the .BDFEPOJB

m
main channel for transferring money from the public $SPBUJB

m
into the private sector, it became the major source of
#VMHBSJB
corruption in the SELDI countries as this area typically

#J)
gives officials large discretionary power. Currently,

corruption risk in government procurement in the "MCBOJB
SELDI area is associated with a number of deficiencies:
insufficiently transparent procedures, large share 7FSZDPNNPO /FWFSPDDVST
of non-competitive procedures, weak oversight and Source: World Economic Forum.

ineffective judicial review (given judicial corruption),
etc. Although more than a decade ago a SELDI study There are a number of similarities in the institutional
found that the countries in the area had “made arrangement of public procurement in the SELDI
recent progress in strengthening the legal framework area. For example, a number of countries – Bosnia and
of the process and its harmonisation with the EU Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia – apply
Directives,”170 public procurement continues to be the so called dual-centralisation model in which public
among the weakest aspects of public governance. procurement functions are performed by two govern
ment institutions, usually termed a directorate or an
In the current SEE environment, finding solutions office and an administration or a commission. There are
to a problem in a complex system such as public also significant differences, notably in the share of the
procurement, requires identification of vulnerabilities various types of procurement procedures. Montenegro
at each stage of the cycle – pre-tendering, tendering has the highest share of open procedures in public
and post-award. “In order to implement good practices procurement, while Bosnia and Herzegovina has the
and mechanisms for enhanced performance at each lowest (Figure 72). However, these numbers should be
stage of the public procurement cycle, there is a need
for in-depth exploration of the associated risks. [..] It Figure 72. Share of various types of public procurement
is imperative, therefore, to identify the techniques procedures in four SELDI countries, 2012
used to misappropriate public funds, and look at the

various types of fraud.”171 Recent European research

into corruption and fraud in public procurement in

the EU has shown that very often public procurement

falls within the domain of “legal” corruption, i.e. high-

level understanding between politicians and large

companies, which is then pushed through the channels

of formal approval. The main risk characteristics or

red-flags associated with such public procurement
corruption have been identified as the following:172

• no published call for tenders in the official journal 4FSCJB .POUFOFHSP .BDFEPOJB #J)
and/or not all data for the call available in the /FHPUJBUFEQSPDFEVSFXJUIBOJOWJUBUJPOUPCJE
journal; /FHPUJBUFEQSPDFEVSFXJUIPVUBOJOWJUBUJPOUPCJE
• non-open procedure; 3FTUSJDUFEQSPDFEVSF 0QFOQSPDFEVSF
• single bidder. Source: (Balkan Tender Watch, 2013, p. 14).
(SELDI, 2002, p. 126).

170
173
The indicator is based on the weighted average score of the follow-
ing Executive Opinion Survey question: “In your country, how
171
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013c, pp. 13-14). common is diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or
172
(Pippidi, 2013, p. 78). groups due to corruption? (1 = very common; 7 = never occurs).”
treated with caution as data availability is not universal, corruption in public procurement.”174 Nevertheless,
and often it is exactly the most corruption ridden cases public procurement law has not been sufficiently
that are missing from data-bases. harmonised and upgraded, evident in the many
flaws and practical problems detected in its nine-year
Albania has implemented an e-procurement system implementation.175 There has been a clear regress in
which has made the process more transparent by this area in the last few years, particularly as regards
making public bids accessible for free on the Public transparency. While in 2008 there were 9,074 open
Procurement Agency website. Despite this, concerns procedures, which was around 90 percent of all
still remain about the effectiveness and the real extent procedures, in 2012, there were 6,376 advertised and
of the reduction in corruption. The 2011 report from the open procedures, which was around 30 percent of all
Procurement Advocate suggests that there are problems tenders. The cost of poor governance is evident in the
in implementing the selection criteria and, according fact that the prices in direct agreements and negotiated
to the State Audit report for data from 2011, public procedures are 20 to 60 percent higher than the prices
procurement is the sector in which the biggest abuses in the open procedures.176 Three out of five procurers
were registered. According to the latest data from 2012 think that corruption has a major influence on public
in the Supreme State Audit report, the economic cost procurements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while all
in public procurement in 2012 amounted to ALL 444.5 believe that corruption in public procurements has not
million (€3.1 mln), marking the highest level in four decreased in the last five years.177 It all results in an
years. estimated annual flow of more than BAM 700 million
(around €350 million) into private pockets.178 Further,
The institution with the highest losses through in 2012 there were a total of 2,391 annulments of
procurements for 2012 is the Ministry of Interior, public procurements with open procedures, and
with ALL 225.6 million or 50% of the total cost to one of the main reasons was because there were not
the sector. This was due to the actions of the Public enough bidders. The second reason for annulment was
Procurement Commission in violation to the tender manipulation of information in the call for bidders,
rules, disqualifying economic operators which offered where authorities sometimes deliberately ask for goods
lower bids. In total, municipalities are estimated to that are not available on the market, so that they could –
have caused approximately ALL 401 million worth after two failed open procedures – conduct negotiations
of damage to public finances. Much of the identified without tendering.
cost comes from the procurement sector as result of
violations of tender rules and slow implementation, In Bulgaria legislative developments have brought
followed by the urban sector. These sectors, together, about a level of complexity that is impeding effective
explain about 66% of the fiscal damage caused by local enforcement of the law. The e-procurement system
government. still has limited functionalities. Inspections by the
Public Procurement Agency do not cover decisions for
Figure 73. Economic losses due to irregularities in public derogations from the application of EU procurement
procurement in Albania, 2012, (in 000 ALL) legislation, nor the technical specifications of the
tenders. More importantly, however, there are doubts

about the effective enforcement of rules and the
.JOJTUSZPG*OUFSJPS
application of sanctions.
"MCBOJBO&OFSHZ$PSQPSBUJPO
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Among EU businesses, it was Bulgarian companies that
$PNNVOFPG2VLFT-JCSB[IE
mostly agreed that “in the last three years corruption
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has prevented a company from winning public tender
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or public procurement contract” – 58% in Bulgaria vs.
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174
(Center for the Study of Democracy; Center for Investigative
Source: Supreme State Audit of Albania, 2013. Reporting, 2012, p. 14).
175
(Balkan Tender Watch, 2013).
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, “the enactment of the anti 176
(Civic Association “Tender”, 2013, p. 3).
corruption legislation has equipped authorities with 177
(Center for Media Development, 2013).
the right tools and the legal framework for fighting 178
(Civic Association “Tender”, 2013, p. 3).
Figure 74. Corruption in public procurement: (25% in 2012 and 26.3% in 2013), including negotiated
Bulgaria compared to EU average procedure with and without publication of a contract
notice, which are generally considered an instrument

particularly vulnerable to fraud and corruption.

Figure 75. Number of announced public procurements
in Bulgaria by type of procedure

#VMHBSJB &6 #VMHBSJB &6

$PSSVQUJPOJOQVCMJD $PSSVQUJPOJOQVCMJD
QSPDVSFNFOUNBOBHFE QSPDVSFNFOU
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Source: (TNS Political & Social, March 2014). Source: Bulgarian Public Procurement Agency.
A kind of centralisation of corruption is discouraging According to data from the Public Financial Inspection
all but big companies from bidding in public tenders.179 Agency the volume of the public procurement
Because large enterprises have started to dominate contracts with discovered violations range from
the various public procurement markets, the number BGN 601 million in 2007 to BGN 1,488 million in 2012
of enterprises bidding has shrunk while enabling the (€308mln – €763mln).181 Another method to estimate
substitution of illegal influences on authorities by the losses could be based on the data of the latest
means of bribes with the more legal, but still often PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ecorys report on the
secret, means of lobbying or silent political pull. topic.182 If the same shares of losses, as suggested in
that report, are applied for Bulgaria and corrected with
Although the Public Financial Inspection Agency the weighted Transparency International 2013 scores,
only monitors the legality of the costs incurred, its the direct cost of corruption in public procurement
financial inspections of sectoral contracting authorities as share of the overall value of the published public
suggest certain conclusions about the contractors’ procurement contracts in Bulgaria for 2013 could be
decision-making. The capacity of the Agency to tackle assessed to be between BGN 334.1 and 506.9 million
problematic public procurement increases, but its
deterrence and prevention effects are very limited and 181
Between 3 and 8% of the government budget.
violations continue to be widespread. One reason is the 182
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). PwC estimate that for eight
constant political interference in its work in particular countries, out of the 86 corrupt/grey cases, there are 53%
on bigger public procurement contracts.180 According encountered cost overruns. The cost overruns (winning
high price of a bid meeting the technical specifications) from
to its latest report, in 2013 the Agency inspected 2,484 public procurement contracts amounted to 22% of the total
procurement tenders and found irregularities in 1,376. average budget involved. In addition, the cost increases during
Most of the violations were related to the work of implementation, delays in the implementation and overall loss
in effectiveness are also considered and assessed. As aggregated
hospitals and the procurement of medicines, food for value, the total direct public losses are estimated to be 31% of the
the patients and other hospital materials. Notable cases average case budget or 18% of the total budgets of all 86 corrupt/
also relate to road infrastructure, the energy sector, and grey cases combined (this is a different value as both large and
small corrupt/grey cases are assessed, and as they have a different
the EU funds. weight). The report also notes that out of the 18% calculated
budget volume loss from corrupt / grey public procurements in
the 8 analysed Member States, 13% of budgets’ loss involved can
An issue of concern remains the share of non-competi be attributed to corruption and clean cases generate a public loss
tive procedures among announced public procurements of 5% of their projected costs. In addition, the overall direct costs
of corruption in public procurement in 2010 for the five sectors
studied in the 8 Member States constituted between 2.9% to 4.4%
179
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2011a). of the overall value of procurements in the sector published in
180
(Stoyanov, Stefanov, & Velcheva, 2014). the EU Official Journal.
(€171mln and €260mln). The above is an approximation money (a deficiency, incidentally, that applies to all
and the value is calculated just for general reference. government spending in the SELDI area). The process
presents a kind of vicious circle – the pressure by
Figure 76. Number and share of all announced public the European Commission aims at introducing
procurements in Bulgaria by type in 2013 additional controlling mechanisms to prevent abuses,
while this strengthens the bargaining position of

the administration and increases its bureaucratic

0QFOQSPDFEVSF leverage on the citizens and business, along with the

3FTUSJDUFEQSPDFEVSF
corruption risks.
/FHPUJBUFEQSPDFEVSFXJUIPVU
BOBOOPVODFNFOU Corruption risks appear in several areas:

/FHPUJBUFEQSPDFEVSFXJUI

BOBOOPVODFNFOU PQFODBMM
• Large projects create corruption risks, similar to
1SPKFDU$PNQFUJUJPO large public procurement contracts. The online
information system for the management and
oversight of the EU Structural Instruments in
Source: Annual Report of the Bulgarian Public Procurement Agency 2013. Bulgaria presents data on the largest beneficiaries
(mostly public entities), some of them awarded 40-
Public procurement using the EU funds in Bulgaria 80 projects each.
presents a distinct subset of problems. One of the • Burdensome administrative procedures both
major shortcomings of the process is the focus placed during the application and reporting stages are also
on documentation checks, and not on the value for a factor for petty corruption.
Box 4. Procurement in the Bulgarian energy sector183
In Bulgaria, one in four public procurement contracts relates to the energy sector, which renders it one
of the biggest spenders of taxpayer money. However, 38% of all procedures for the awarding of public
procurement contracts in the energy sector for 2012 were non-competitive, encompassing the various
negotiated procedures with or without the publication of a contract notice under the Law on Public Procurement,
and negotiated procedures following an invitation under the Regulation on Small-Scale Public Procurement.
The share of non-competitive public procurement contracts in the energy sector is systematically higher
than the share of non-competitive contracts for the rest of the economy for the period 2010 – 2012 (the
non-competitive public procurement contracts in the economy ranged between 23.9% in 2010 to 25.2% in
2012). Still, it should be noted that in 2012 the percentage of contracts awarded on competitive basis in the
energy sector increased to 62%, compared to 48.1% in 2011 and 46.4% in 2010. This improvement could be
interpreted as the result of increased public scrutiny and criticism by various stakeholders.
The sector is of particular social importance, since most of the Bulgarians are energy poor – 14.4% of the
average yearly income per household is spent on energy (electricity, water, heating), according to 2013
Eurostat data. There is non-transparent formation of electricity prices, and high concentration at the
Bulgarian gas market in terms of monopoly of supply and distribution. When audited, most of these
procedures are found to contain irregularities and other abuses. The analysis of 13 inspections of energy
enterprises carried out by the Public Financial Inspection Agency over a period of four years shows that 39
violations were found in 41 cases. Most big energy projects (e.g. the Belene nuclear power plant, Tsankov
Kamak hydro power plant and the rehabilitation of facilities) can serve as examples of the misuse of public
procurement mechanisms. The failure of the checks and balances system raises legitimate concerns of
corrupt practices at all levels in the energy sector and questions government’s ability to manage large
infrastructure projects worth over €500 million.
Compiled from: (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2014); (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013(43)); (Center for the Study of Democracy,
183
2013a); (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2011a); (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2011).
Figure 77. The escalating corruption-bureaucracy- and result in missed deadlines by the beneficiaries.
corruption cycle of EU funds management • Lack of understanding of the technical aspects of
in Bulgaria the implemented projects can easily lead to misin-
terpretation of the results. Although the managing
Introduced additional
controlling mechanisms to
authorities use external experts in different areas for
prevent abuses evaluation of project applications, expert knowledge
and consultations are not readily available on all
Increased administrative and stages of the project monitoring process.
Pressure by the European reporting burden and • The pressure to achieve fast absorption in the
Commission for redistribution of time and
additional controlling resources towards reporting, 2007 – 2013 period, and at the same time to prepare
mechanisms rather than project for the next 2014 – 2020 programming period, are
implementation
other factors that need to be taken into account. The
end of programming period 2007 – 2013 was marked
by increase in the number and value of contracts,
Increased bureaucratic as well as increased payments, to compensate
Increased
corruption risks
leverage on the citizens
and business
for the initial low absorption rates. This trend,
especially when focusing on larger projects, also
Source: CSD/SELDI. presents risk factor in terms of decreased control
and corruption. In addition, in order to accelerate
• Inspections and audits, as well as imposing financial absorption some managing authorities shifted
sanctions, also present corruption opportunities. away from competitive distribution of funds to
• Public procurement contracts commissioned by EU direct contracting.184
funds beneficiaries bear similar corruption risks to
public procurement contracts in general. During the In 2008 – 2009, several cases of embezzlement of EU
recent economic crisis the value of public tenders funds led the EC to block pre-accession funding for all
fell sharply, which redirected corruption pressure seven operational programmes. EC also asked Bulgaria
towards EU-funded tenders. Another specific feature to improve its procedures for absorbing the EU funds
in the case of EU funds is the high risk of appeals and before access can be restored. Similar freezes occurred
complaints that can stop the procurement procedure in 2014.
Box 5. Irregularities in the distribution of EU funds in Bulgaria
• European Agricultural Guarantee Fund and European Fund for Rural Development: 149 cases of financial
irregularities for € 5,356,732.
• Structural Funds (European Regional Development Fund and European Social Fund): 49 cases of financial
irregularities for € 5,423,511.
• Cohesion Fund: 2 cases of financial irregularities for € 571,350.
Examples of violations and irregularities included:
• Timely investigations of the credibility of complaints in relation to the Structural and Cohesion Funds are
not initiated; rather, only planned inspections at various stages of project implementation are carried out.
• Lack of timely updates to the information entered in the records of received signals for irregularities.
• The follow-up activities and other changes in previously reported cases of irregularities are not reported
to AFCOS.
• Delays in taking measures for forced recovery of undue or overpayments, as well as unduly or improperly
utilized resources.
Source: (Дирекция АФКОС, МВР, 2011).
(Обединение „Европейски анализи и оценки”, 2012).

184
The most common irregularities in public procurement that includes the widest possible number of types of
in Croatia are related to procurement planning, assets owned by the state. The main goal of this law
delivering public procurement reports to responsible is to ensure more efficient and transparent use of state
bodies, publishing the register of public procurement assets, in order to create a new value and achieve
contracts and framework agreements on the website, greater economic benefits; whether this new system
as well as monitoring the execution of the contracts.185 of management and disposition of state assets would
As in the other former communist SELDI countries, in bring the expected results remains to be seen. Overall,
Croatia the public procurement system inherited the the public procurement process in Croatia continues
flaws of the earlier process of privatisation. Although to be opened up, including through initiatives of civil
Croatia has changed its Constitution in order to avoid society, such as the Integrity Observers’ database,
the statute of limitation in cases of privatisation,186 which contains some 50,000 public tenders and
such changes do not represent a safeguard from the 13,000 contracts which citizens and other interested
corruption and crimes in privatisation. The 2013 Act stakeholders can search freely.187
on the Management and Disposal of Assets owned by the
Republic of Croatia closed down the Asset Management In Kosovo, the legal framework on public procurement
Agency and transferred its powers to the following is generally “sufficient and allows for centralised
bodies: the State Office for State Assets Management purchasing, although some technicalities regarding
as the central body of management and disposal of the signature of the contract need to be adjusted.”188
state assets, which acquires the power of management According to the Public Procurement Regulatory
and disposal of real estates and shares in strategic Commission the annual value of public contracts in
companies; the newly established Sale Centre as a Kosovo fluctuates around €800 million.189 Businesses in
new body that acquired the power of management of Kosovo have come to take it for granted that winning
the minority shares of the state in companies which public contracts comes about as a result of some
are not declared of strategic interest for Croatia. The informal favour to the officials with vested power in
Act also defined the overall legal framework for the granting contracts in the contracting authorities.
establishment of the Central Registry of State Assets
Box 6. Oiling the wheels: collusion between ministers and businessmen in Croatia
On March 13, 2014 the State Attorney´s municipal office in Karlovac indicted Jozo Kalem, a businessman
from Rijeka and close friend of Minister of Finance Slavko Linić, and his company “RI Petrol” on suspicion
that they illegally gained 103 million kuna (€13.5 mln). Following the information that the Karlovac office
of State Attorney raised the indictment against Kalem, Minister Linić confirmed in an interview that he
was a close friend of the suspect and that Kalem was being used to smear him. Media had written about
their friendship many times before. Though Kalem´s work flourished during the war years, he achieved
a real business boom a little more than 10 years ago after his friend Slavko Linic became Deputy Prime
Minister and Head of the Supervisory Board of oil company INA in which the Croatian state is a majority
shareholder. An investigation was launched regarding the preferential position which was allegedly given
to Kalem´s company “Europetrol” in petroleum product selling and favouritism by INA. In 2010, Kalem´s
company Europetrol was mentioned in relation to favouritism by the state-owned companies Rijeka –
Zagreb Motorway and Carrier Autotrolej from Rijeka. There were allegations that lower offers from other
oil companies participating in competition were rejected because of trivial reasons, and a contract was
signed with Kalem whose offer was more expensive. However, the relevant institutions never proved these
allegations. Moreover, the State Commission for Supervision of Public Procurement rejected every objection
to the legality of the procedure, even though they themselves admitted that there were some incongruities.
Sources: (Index.hr, 2013) and (Dalje.com, 2014).
www.integrityobservers.eu
187
185
(State Audit Office of Croatia, 2014). 188
(SIGMA, 2013k, p. 59).
186
(Hrvatska Radiotelevizija, 2010). 189
(Riinvest Institute, 2012, p. 26).
The Procurement Review Body is the oversight institu In Macedonia, a number of bodies exercise the
tion in public procurement. An issue of concern is that regulatory and oversight functions with respect to
as of May 2014 it still had no full board. Parliament has public procurement: the State Appeals Commission on
not yet designated anyone on the vacant positions and Public Procurement, the Public Procurement Bureau,
appeals are being left unaddressed. In its latest annual the State Commission for Prevention of Corruption, and
work report it has found that: the State Audit Office. The State Appeals Commission
“received and resolved 658 complaints […] in 2012, a
“Legal violations and repeated irregularities by the slight decrease from 690 in 2011.”193 The Commission
Contracting Authorities are found in particular in attributed the decrease to better knowledge of
some important aspects of development of public procurement law by the public and private sectors, the
procurement procedures. Review panel in most of the publication of its decisions online and the requirement
cases has encountered irregularities during the bid for 100% e-auctions, most of them based on lowest price
evaluation process and on wrong decision making for criteria only. Compared with 2011, 4% fewer cases went
announcing the successful bidder. Violations were also to the administrative court. In 2013, the Commission
found of the Law on Public Procurement which resulted was presented with a total of 569 motions for appeals
into annulment of announcements for award of the related to public procurements.194
contract by the respective Contracting Authority or
the matter has been returned to Review Panels for re- Due to the electronic procurement system, media cam-
evaluation.”190 paigns and greater awareness of the general public,
more corruption cases are being uncovered. In 2012, for
In 2012, 82% of the cancelled procurement procedures example, the number of reported corruption related pro-
were due to the absence of competition (fewer than two curement cases more than doubled in comparison to the
valid bids or requests to participate).191 On the positive previous year: 28 cases (up from 12 in 2011); 12 persons
side, there are fewer “unjust or ill-grounded appeals to were convicted for procurement related crimes and mis-
the Procurement Review Body, which is particularly demeanours in 2012 (no convictions in 2011 and 2010).195
encouraging when taking into account the relatively
negligible effort made to provide the training for Still, competition in public procurement in Macedonia
economic operators in public procurement.”192 remains low. The average number of bids submitted in
Box 7. Dealing with high level corruption in Kosovo
A notable case of high level corruption is that of the former Minister of Transport, Post and Telecommunica
tions Fatmir Limaj, and some of its staff. EULEX has been investigating Limaj since April 2010 when police
raided the Transport Ministry and Limaj’s properties in Pristina as part of a corruption probe linked to road
tenders issued between 2007 and 2009. The public raid in 2010 was a historical point as it was the first time
a high profile figure was brought to such a position, as before they were thought of as untouchable. Having
delegated some judicial powers to the European Union Rule of Law Mission, Kosovo was thus able to engage
in more active fight against corruption at the highest levels. It took years after the raid to prepare the case
against him, and there was insufficient proof to bring a conviction.
Another notable case has been that of the mayor of Prizren, the second largest city in Kosovo. The mayor
and others were accused of misappropriating public property which was managed by Kosovo’s Agency for
Privatisation. The mayor was convicted and the case got wide attention as it was the first time a conviction
had been issued against a high ranking politician.
Sources: (Balkan Insight, 2012); (BIRN, 2013); (Balkan News Agency, 2014).
190
(Procurement Review Body of Kosovo, 2012, p. 89). 193
(SIGMA, 2013f, p. 49).
191
(SIGMA, 2013k, p. 58). 194
(Center for Civil Communications, 2014, p. 6).
192
Ibid. 195
(SIGMA, 2013f, p. 50).
Box 8. Sample criminal referrals on public procurement related charges by the Macedonian State
Commission for Prevention of Corruption
• The directors of the Agency of Civil Aviation-Skopje for abusing their official duties, causing significant
damage and creating an opportunity for obtaining for themselves and others significant property gain
while conducting public procurement procedures.
• The director of the Public Enterprise ”Geoengineering” – Tetovo, when representing and presenting the
enterprise and when conducting the procedures for public procurement has not provided proper and
legal use and protection of the means, the property of the municipality, by which a damage has been
caused on a significant scale and the possibility for obtaining unlawful property gains.
• The directors of the Health Centre Bitola, by its managing, presenting and representing the institution
and with the disposal of the funds of the Centre and conducting of the procedures for public procurement,
have not provided legal and appropriate usage and protection of the funds of the institution, by which
significant damage have been caused and have created the possibility for obtaining significant unlawful
property gains.
Source: State Commission for Prevention of Corruption, Annual report for 2012.
the 2013 tender procedures monitored (total of 160) was in order to avoid the use of transparent procedures,
2.6 and more than one third of the tender procedures submission of incorrect information by the contracting
received only one bid (Figure 78). authorities. In 2012, for example, government agencies
signed 147 procurement contracts without using
Figure 78. Share of tender procedures in Macedonia public tenders; the same year, the Commission for
with only one bid submitted, 2013196 Monitoring Public Procurement Procedures examined
649 complaints, 49 of which involved tenders of more

than €500,000. The Commission fully or partially
cancelled 213 such tenders.198

Despite the fact that half of Montenegrin citizens believe
public procurement procedures are not carried out in a

fair manner,199 the Public Procurement Administration
receives on average one complaint annually for
corruption.

'JSTURVBSUFS 4FDPOERVBSUFS 5IJSERVBSUFS 'PVSUIRVBSUFS
Public procurement has been designated by the
Source: (Center for Civil Communications, 2014). Ministry of Finance as one of the five high-risk areas
for corruption. The remit of institutions, primarily
In the fourth quarter of 2013, a total of 388 contracts the Administration for Inspection Affairs, which
of total value of around €33 million were signed by currently has only two employees – inspectors for public
means of negotiation procedures without previously procurement, is limited to contract implementation
announced calls for bids.197 control. The Public Procurement Administration’s Report
contains many statistics but not indicators for identifying
Public procurement legislation in Montenegro is largely corruption risks and for measuring real progress on
harmonised with the EU acquis. However, there are combating this phenomenon.
numerous examples of violations of basic provisions:
poor control of contract implementation, separation The State Audit Institution stated in 2011 that certain
of unique procurements into multiple smaller ones government institutions – including the Ministry of
196
Among a sample of 40 public procurement procedures imple
mented by central level contracting authorities, whose public
opening of bids took place in the period October – December 2013. 198
(U.S. Department of State, 2013, p. 29).
197
(Center for Civil Communications, 2014, p. 14). 199
(Institut Alternativa, 2012, p. 13).
Box 9. Procurement irregularities in Montenegro
In 2013, the State Commission for Control of Public Procurement Procedures issued a decision ordering
the Health Insurance Fund to repeat the evaluation of bids for 4 out of 27 parties who had participated in
the tender procedure, to the amount of €4,309,436. The Fund had to re-evaluate within 15 days the parties
covered by the tender which was issued in December 2012. Due to problems with the tender, for nearly
four months patients were not able to undergo medical procedures for thyroid problems, pregnancy and
tumours in the Clinical Centre of Montenegro.200
Inspectors for combating economic crime by order of the Municipal Prosecutor in Podgorica have inspected
procurement procedures of the Montefarm pharmacy for suspicious tenders.201 Montefarm awarded
procurement contracts to drug companies that have not been registered for this activity. According to
published data, it planned €26.5 million for drugs procurement for 2013; in these procedures, by July 2013
about 100 cases had been controversial, worth €2.5 million.
Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Foreign About 87% of all contracts are so called “large-value
Affairs and European Integration and Ministry of contracts” which have to be awarded in accordance
Health, as well as Protector of Property and Legal with strictly specified procedures, while so called “low-
Interests and Agency for Protection of Personal Data – value contracts”, where the procedure is simplified,
provided false information to the Public Procurement accounted for 13% of the contracts in 2012.
Administration. However, it is not clear whether
responsible persons in these bodies have been penalised From the anticorruption point of view, perhaps the
for the delivery of false reports. Although there have most relevant data is related to the type of procedure
been many irregularities in the implementation of which was used in the public procurement process.
public procurement procedures, in the past ten years Data shows that the share of open procedures
the police and the State Prosecutors Office brought a (as the most transparent procedure) has been rising
negligible number of criminal charges. in recent years, but it is still below 60%. Together
with restricted procedures (which also require public
In Serbia, the number of public procurement contracts announcement and invitation) the share is below 70%
has dropped significantly over the years, while the total by value. It is worrying that negotiation procedures
value has increased. The result is that the average value account for 34%, but even more worrying is that there
of the public contract has increased almost ten-fold in has practically been no improvement over the past
nominal terms over the past ten years (Figure 79). 5 years.202
Figure 79. In Serbia, fewer procurement contracts The implementation of the non-transparent negotiation
at an increasing value procedure has to be explicitly justified (Figure 80).

In almost half of the cases the grounds for direct

negotiations were supposed “technical and artistic
reasons”. In such cases, the law envisages that the
procurer has to publish its decision to directly hire
a certain company, but other companies have 8 days

to appeal this decision by claiming that they can

also supply the necessary goods or services. It seems

that other bidders were not aware of this possibility.
/VNCFSPGDPOUSBDUT "WFSBHFWBMVF<34%> The next justification is “urgency” and in these cases
MFGUTDBMF
SJHIUTDBMF
procurers have to submit their decision to the Public
Source: Public Procurement Office annual reports. Procurement Office together with the justification for
200
(Daily newspaper “Dan”, 2013). 202
A comparison of Serbia with some other SELDI countries is
201
(Daily newspaper “Vijesti”, 2013). provided in Figure 72.
Figure 80. Justifications for the use of negotiations One of the most important general criticisms by the
for public procurement in Serbia, 2012 Turkish Court of Accounts is that internal financial
control units are not established at all in some public
%VFUPUFDIOJDBMPSBSUJTUJDSFBTPOT
UIFSFJTPOMZPOFQPTTJCMFTVQQMJFS institutions and not properly established in the rest,205
%VFUPVSHFODZUIFQSPDVSFS thus violating the Public Financial Management and
XBTVOBCMFUPJNQMFNFOU Control Law which aims at aligning public finance
SFHVMBSQSPDFEVSF
governance in Turkey with that of EU. Pre-financial
&YUSBTFSWJDFTPSXPSLTBSFOFDFTTBSZ
JOBEEJUJPOUPUIFDPOUSBDU
control units do not exist. Lack of internal financial

control units within public institutions make them
/PCJETTVCNJUUFEJOUIFQSFWJPVTMZ
JNQMFNFOUFEPQFOPSSFTUSJDUFE more susceptible to misconduct in public procurement.
QSPDFEVSFT Of the more specific findings of the Court of Accounts
"EEJUJPOBMSFRVFTUTGSPNTVQQMJFST which came to the attention of the media and public
GPSSFQMBDFNFOUPGJOTUBMMBUJPO
PGFYJTUJOHNBUFSJBMT were incidents involving procurement by the electricity
company TEDAŞ,206 writing-down of social security
0UIFS
debt of a private company in return for assets,207
Source: Public Procurement Office annual report. procurement by Turkish Railway Enterprise,208
and procurement by the Housing Development
this procedure. The Public Procurement Office has Administration of Turkey.209 In addition, in a 2012
found several typical problems with such justification: report on TEDAŞ210 the Court of Accounts reports
that during the privatisation of electricity distribution
• There was no legal ground as the problem of urgency channels, a total of TL 171 million (€59.4 mln) which
was created by the procurers themselves (in 47% of was in cash accounts was not taken into account
the cases); during the valuations and eventually left to the new
• No effective competition was ensured, but only one buyers.
bidder was called (in 39% of the cases);
• Stalling of the procedure – in many “urgent” cases, In April 2014, the Turkish Treasury announced that
the formal decision was made more than two weeks it would guarantee projects costing more than TL
after the bids were opened. 1 billion (€345.8 mln). Accordingly, the Turkish state
would reimburse 85 percent of loans to companies
In Turkey, “public procurement reforms were designed involved in project tenders if the deal is cancelled due to
to make procurement more transparent and less company-related faults. The Treasury would reimburse
susceptible to political interference, including through the total amount of loans if the tender is annulled for
the establishment of an independent public procurement any other reason. The Treasury emphasised that state-
board with the power to void contracts.”203 Still, tenders owned enterprises and local administrations would not
in energy, water, transportation and communication are be eligible for the program and the guarantee would be
not regulated by the public procurement law. Further, limited to €2.2 billion annually. This new legislation is
the Public Procurement Authority has the right to likely to raise further questions about public finances
provide exemptions to public procurement tenders and the anticorruption efforts of the government, if
under TL 6.6 million in 2012 (€2.3 mln) upon requests transparency issues regarding the implementation of
from public institutions. In 2012, the Turkish State the regulation are not resolved.
Railways and in 2013 the postal services were taken out
of the provisions of the public procurement law. According to the 2012 report by the Turkish Court of
Accounts, the Ministry of EU Affairs did not provide
During 2012, the volume of public procurement in the necessary financial reports and tables for an
creased by 21% compared to the previous year, 6.2% inspection;211 thus, there has been no 2012 control
above the consumer price inflation. In 2012, 83% of all
public procurement in state economic enterprises was in 205
(T.C. Sayiştay Başkanliği, 2013b, p. 10).
transportation and communication and energy sectors, 206
(SAYDER, 2013a).
most of which were exempt from public procurement 207
(SAYDER, 2013b).
law,204 thus creating a corruption risk. 208
(SAYDER, 2013c).
209
(SAYDER, 2014).
(U.S. Department of State, 2013t).
203 210
(T.C., 2013c, pp. 22-24).
204
(T.C. Sayiştay Başkanliği, 2014, p. 88). 211
(T.C. Sayiştay Başkanliği, 2013).
on the spending of the Ministry. Also, the European • Enhance the transparency in the selection of capital
Commission has launched an investigation into expenditure projects by introducing clear guidelines
allegations that a Turkish government agency misused for planning and evaluating of public investment in
EU funds.212 The probe followed reports in Turkish this area.
media in January 2014 of tender-rigging and illegal
recruitment at the Centre for EU Education and Youth Public procurement:
Programmes in Ankara.
• Adopt policies to reduce the share of public pro-
curement tenders with only one bidder and enhance
competition.
5.4. Recommendations • Introduce liability and sanctions for contracting
authorities who fail to submit reports on public
procurement in continuity, reports on violations of
Business environment: anticorruption regulations or submit incorrect or
incomplete data.
• Streamline the environment for entrepreneurship, • Improve oversight of procurement by large public
including through continued deregulation, decreas- procurers (state-owned enterprises and utility
ing and abolishing barriers to business. companies in particular) to maximise the efficiency
• Reduce to a minimum and review annually state and reduce irregularities.
aid policies as they create considerable corruption • Make available to the public all public procurement
risks. Introduce in advance strict enforcement of EU contracts and annexes, including direct agreements.
state aid rules, and develop the capacity of national Publish in online searchable format the complete
independent state aid regulators to enforce the documentation on public procurement pre-notices,
rules. notices, bids, contracts, and any addendum thereof.
• Improve the enforcement of anti-monopoly legisla • Define a legal and institutional framework for the
tion in order to promote free enterprise and management and control of contracts concluded by
competition. Apply special care and review regularly public-private partnerships.
concentration in sectors which are heavily regulated • Require all compliance bodies to publish annual
and face licensing and other restrictions, thus creating reports on their operations and the results of their
a risk of collusion between larger competitors and inspections.
politicians. • EU candidate countries that do not have one should
establish decentralised implementation systems
Budget process: for EU funds to provide the appropriate legal
and administrative framework for the transfer of
• Countries that have not done so should establish responsibilities for the implementation of the EU
institutional links between the management of funded programmes. Oversight should remain
assets and liabilities of all public finances, including centralised and independent of implementation
state-owned companies, in order to mitigate bodies.
financial risks and enhance the government´s • Broaden the scope of e-government, specifically
credibility in public finance management. State- e-procurement and (in Croatia and Bulgaria)
owned enterprises should meet stringent corporate introduce electronic submission and reporting for
governance and reporting requirements (e.g. OECD all EU operational programmes.
rules), on par with publicly traded companies. • Provide training to judges on the technical know
These enterprises should publish online quarterly ledge of new types of fraud in the business sector,
reports. including with respect to public procurement where
• Publish a mid-year report on the implementation the technical specifications in open calls restrict free
of the budget. Detailed data on the budget should competition.
be published in online searchable format which • Introduce the concept of value-for-money in the
allows big data analysis, including at ministry and evaluation of public procurement contracts.
executive agency level.
(Hürriyet Daily News, 2014).

212
6 Civil Society in Anticorruption
T
he integrity of public governance is predict themselves and helped others emerge as social
ably an issue that preoccupies some of the entrepreneurs balancing market inefficiencies and
most active civil society organisations in the delivering services. Instead of continuing to see NGOs
SELDI countries. While NGOs started off – as gadflies and adversaries, governments, political
and this is true both in the former communist countries parties and senior administrators have adopted a more
in the area and in a country with a stable constitutional cunning approach and now rather seek to subvert their
regime like Turkey – as largely outsiders in this field, the civic nature by a silent takeover. Ironically, EU accession
improvement of their expertise on the political process provided a lot of opportunities for politicians and senior
and public services and their increased activism have administrators to capture the NGOs by channelling EU
made them into a force to be reckoned with. Now, it assistance only to clientele organisations. Foreign donors
is not uncommon “for think tanks to draft laws, for almost all left Bulgaria after 2007 with the exception
environmentalists to effectively challenge developers of Switzerland and Norway. Most of the NGOs who
or for watchdogs to cause the introduction of new emerged and sustained over the past years finance their
transparency regulations in state bureaucracies.”213 activities through research and consultancy projects
In addition to promoting reforms to anticorruption and/or volunteerism or provide paid services.
policies and regulations, NGOs have addressed the
wider context of the political culture in their countries Bulgaria also exemplifies developments with respect
by raising civic awareness and working at the grass to the legal status of NGOs registered in the public
roots level. Good governance is not a technical exercise benefit (most SELDI countries’ legislation makes the
but requires a national climate of trust and civic and distinction between public and mutual benefit NGOs).
political responsibility – precisely the issues where For example, there are many NGOs who should be
NGOs have most to contribute. registered in public benefit (i.e. parents-teachers
associations at schools), but are not (less than 20% of
Their contribution depends in no small measure on all PTAs are registered with the Ministry of Justice),
being capable of both serving as watchdogs and leaving a lot of room for corruption and conflicts of
engaging government in anticorruption reforms. interest as the level of disclosure of information is
However, “there is a lack of effectively established low or non-existent. Others, like chitalishte (a kind of
formal mechanisms for engaging civil society on the community learning centre), are subject to additional
part of the national governments in the region, as well regulation which is weaker than the public benefit
as lack of administrative capacity and clear vision and status (and again the majority of them are not
understanding of the potential of CSOs in the field of registered with the Ministry of Justice).
anti-corruption.”214
Data suggests that about 10,000 non-profit entities
report to the National Statistical Institute annually
(with many empty declarations). This should be
6.1. Civil society in the considered as an adequate upper limit of the number of
SELDI area: highlights NGOs; 75% of them hold public benefit status. Between
a quarter and 30% of all “operating” NGOs (submitting
from the sector reports to the national statistics) have reported income
from a for-profit activity. Close to half of these with
commercial activities actually have higher income
While being agents of change over the past two decades, from for-profit activities than from not-for-profit. This
non-governmental organisations have themselves suggests an increasing risk of commercializing of the
sustained significant transformation. In Bulgaria, NGOs at low transparency level (especially for NGOs
for example, watchdogs and mediators transformed in private benefit).
213
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2010a, p. 24). Croatia is in the process of changing its non-profit
214
(SELDI, 2013, p. 10). legislation. In October 2013, the Croatian government
published a draft of the Associations Act which contains Figure 81. The sustainability index for NGOs
no national classification by which to track the structure in the SELDI countries
of civic associations. In terms of anticorruption, on

the Croatian NGO scene there are only several active "MCBOJB

associations (mostly founded in in the late nineties) #J)

whose primary goal is the fight against corruption. #VMHBSJB

Otherwise, non-governmental organisations are some $SPBUJB

times used as “badges” of the government, meaning that ,PTPWP

they are included in public-private consultations bodies .BDFEPOJB

or joint working groups only if they are not too critical .POUFOFHSP

of the government or if it is not on an issue considered 4FSCJB
important by special interests. While legislation relating
to gender issues or discrimination is influenced by 4VTUBJOBCJMJUZFOIBODFE 4VTUBJOBCJMJUZJNQFEFE
NGOs, only key government stakeholders are allowed to Source: (USAID, 2013).
influence anticorruption legislation.
At the national level, there is a core of organisationally
NGOs appeared in Kosovo at the end of the 1980s and developed NGOs engaged mainly in advocacy,
beginning of the 1990s, after the fall of communism in research, monitoring and capacity building in fields
Central and Eastern Europe. Civil society developed as such strengthening of the rule of law, fight against
an important part of civil resistance against new forms organised crime and corruption, human rights and
of political oppression in Kosovo. “Humanitarian democratic standards and freedoms. This small
assistance, health care and human rights protection number of professional organisations operates against
offered by various civil movements was strongly the background of the majority of voluntary or semi-
supported by society in general and informed the most professional NGOs working at the local level mainly
important civil society activities.” Out of more than providing services to local communities.
7,000 registered NGOs in 2013, an estimated 10% are
active or partially active. About 30% of currently registered NGOs in Serbia
were founded before 1989, about 18% were established
In Macedonia, with the stabilisation of the country in during the 1990s, while the majority – 52% – were
the post 2001 conflict period, the civil society sector established after 2000.217 Notable exception are
focuses on democracy, rule of law, sustainable develop- organisations involved in social services, where as
ment, inter-ethnic relations and European integration. many as 50% of NGOs were founded before 1989.
The sector – although still not sufficiently involved – is Most non-profits are also quite small both in terms of
important in helping Macedonia towards EU member- staff – nearly two-thirds have fewer than ten active
ship, especially by upholding values such as social in- personnel – and budget – 54% have an annual budget
clusion, equality, transparency and accountability. of less than €5,000, while only 10% have an annual
budget in excess of €100,000. As far as funding sources
In Montenegro, the recent adoption of two important are concerned, they are dominated by grants and
regulations provided legal framework for NGO financing through membership fees and service fees.
participation in the policymaking processes. The Revenue structure is largely depended on the activity;
government decree on the procedures for cooperation for example, in professional associations almost
between state bodies and NGOs and the decree on 70% of revenue comes from membership fees.218
procedures for conducting public discussions were “Roughly 18,000 civil society organizations operate
adopted in 2012. The former document for the first time in Serbia, but their impact on governance and other
regulates the forms of cooperation between the public key areas is rather weak… Cooperation between civil
and civic sectors, such as provision of information, society and government institutions is still relatively
consultation, and participation in working groups. infrequent.”219
The latter document is obligatory for each government
ministry, and prescribes the procedures for involving
civil society in the design of public policies.
217
(Građanske inicijative, 2011).
215
(Forum 2015, 2013, p. 15). (Građanske inicijative, 2011).
218
(Forum 2015, 2013, p. 16).

216 219
(Freedom House, 2013).
Civil Society in Anticorruption 115
6.2. Some anticorruption anticorruption – was established. ACCOUNT now has

initiatives more than 120 members and its main goal is to speed
up anticorruption reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina
through various actions and advocacy. In 2013, they
While in the early 2000s, NGOs in the SELDI area were held debates, discussions, public hearings and trainings
“still in a process of defining their fields of interest and involving over 1,000 participants, and provided free
social role against a wide range of transition priorities legal aid to citizens who have come under corruption
and problems,”220 today anticorruption is firmly among pressure.
their key areas of engagement.
A notable anticorruption success of Bosnian civil
Civil society in Albania has focused on anticorruption society took place in 2013 when there was an attempt
by its own initiative and has, at the same time, been at changing the Law on Free Access to Information at the
prompted towards these issues by interest from state level in order to limit public access to information.
international and local donor organisations providing This proposal was fiercely criticised by civil society
funding for projects in the field. Corruption issues, organisations, media and wider public. During public
even when not being a primary focus, have still been consultations on the draft amendments the Ministry
incorporated into different project and initiatives; for of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina received 208
example, many organisations have used the general comments which now need to be considered and
framework of democratisation projects in order to deal included in the proposal.
more specifically with corruption. Anticorruption
has also been an aspect of civil society work in areas Civil society involvement in anticorruption activities
such as public administration reform, education, in Bulgaria has a long and strong track record from
judicial system, health sector, marginalised groups late 1990s and mainly associated with a few dozens
rights as well as more research oriented institutions. of NGOs involved in the CSD-led Coalition 2000.222
However, the civil society sector is “weakened by Some of the most significant achievements include
receding funds and the influence of politics on the introduction of the internationally acknowledged
civil society organisations. Critics argue that civil Corruption Monitoring System; the Corruption Assessment
society reflects the priorities of the donors leading Report – a comprehensive evaluation of the state and
to a discrepancy between public concerns and civil dynamics of corruption, developed annually through
society projects.”221 a public-private partnership; monitoring and analysis
of the hidden economy and trafficking; institutional
In the past few years, the number of civil society innovation (introduction of new institutions as the
organisations contributing to the fight against Ombudsman, introduction of new instruments within
corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina significantly existing institutions, such as the Organised Crime
increased. This process culminated in 2012 when Threat Assessments, monitoring instruments for police
ACCOUNT – a network of non-governmental organisa stops and searches, etc.); public-private partnerships
tions, institutions and individuals committed to in addressing irregularities and violations (including
Box 10. Best anticorruption practices by Bosnian NGOs
• Quarterly monitoring of the work of government bodies carried out by the Center for Civil Initiatives,
which includes compiling reports on the legislation that has been proposed and adopted, on the number
of times parliamentarians participated in discussions, their monthly or annual wages, etc.
• A survey conducted by the Association Vesta on corruption in higher education. Using the survey
findings they have prepared a list of guidelines and recommendations for anticorruption measures.
• The online magazine Žurnal, maintained by the Center for Media Development and Analyses, which in
2013 published “Who and how much steals in public procurement” – a survey of corruption in public
procurement among 300 procurers.
220
(SELDI, 2002, p. 228).
221
(Sadiku, Albania, 2010a, p. 4). 222
http://www.anticorruption.bg/
civil society observers of inspections, which prevents the high estimate of the public of NGO contribution to
corruption). anticorruption (Figure 82).
The moment when civil society in Macedonia started Figure 82. NGOs in Montenegro are considered the most
to point to the level of corruption in Macedonia successful institutions in anticorruption223
and to the need to cope with it, while at the same
time indicating numerous deficiencies in the legal 1PMJDF
regulations and the institutional framework, was the
foundation of the informal coalition Corruption-Free 1SPTFDVUJPO
Macedonia in the early 2000s. It consisted of civil
society organisations and prominent individuals and .FEJB
experts who called on the government to crack down
on high-level corruption. Following advocacy by civil /(0T
society and the international community the Law on
Corruption Prevention was adopted; the same year the
State Commission for Corruption Prevention was set
up and its first president was the then president of the Source: (Selić, 2013).
Transparency Macedonia. However, the civil society
sector failed to continue to develop the debate on Civil society participation in anticorruption raising
combating corruption and on the role and capacities of awareness campaigns has been greatly reduced
the civil society organisations in combating corruption since these types of activities are assigned to and led
with the expected intensity. During the years that by Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative. NGO
followed only a small number of organisations awareness raising campaigns cover specific areas
continued to keep corruption on their agenda, including affected by corruption such as health, customs, police,
Transparency Macedonia, Transparency International and the election process.
Macedonia, the Center for Civil Communications,
MOST, the Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis – Turkish NGOs have been active in researching the
Skopje, the Research Center for Civil Society, and the causes and effects of corruption. Surveys by the Turkish
All for Fair Trials Coalition. Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and
the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
In Montenegro, NGOs have their representatives in (TEPAV) conducted in the beginning and at the end
working groups on the EU negotiations with respect of the 2000s, analysed the household perspective on
to anticorruption, the most important are on judiciary corruption. The comparison between the studies
and fundamental rights, justice, freedom, security has been instructive: for instance, in looking at the
and public procurement. The major challenge that importance of corruption among other socioeconomic
NGOs face in these working groups and bodies issues, the TESEV results showed that 14% of the
is unequal treatment: NGO representatives lack respondents found corruption as the most important
access to documents and lack financial support for issue in 2000. On the other hand, TEPAV’s survey
participating in some activities of the working groups. results from 2009 show that this number decreased
This disadvantage is all the more regrettable, given to 3%; the public gave more importance to other
Box 11. Clean politics in Turkey: an initiative
Transparency International-Turkey has launched a campaign Clean Politics. Prior to the local elections in
April 2014, TI-Turkey requested access to the asset declarations of politicians, senior public officers, media
owners and editors-in-chief through the online petition website change.org. Creating a social media
campaign, TI-Turkey has managed to get 29 mayor candidates to declare their wealth and also sources of
election campaigning funds in order to establish and maintain a transparent, accountable legislation, public
administration and local governance system.
223
Share of the general public considering these institutions “successful in the fight against corruption.”
social issues such as inflation, economic crisis and issues on a national scale they started to increasingly
unemployment.224 focus on local government and issues of accountability,
corruption and budgeting. Thus, impactful projects
were implemented in collaboration with local
government units (mainly municipalities) were civil
6.3. Governments and society organisations were providing training and
Civil society: long-term cooperation. Partners Albania – a member
of Partners for Democratic Change International – has
foes or friends? been very active in such local scale projects; many of
their initiatives have even been taken forward from one
The engagement of civil society organisation with region to the other, thus providing almost a national
governments in the SELDI countries has been one of the coverage of local governments.
most controversial but also potentially most rewarding
aspects of their anticorruption work. While public- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the anticorruption net
private partnerships have brought about positive work ACCOUNT has signed a memorandum on
developments, they have also brought risks for NGOs. cooperation and mutual assistance with the Ministry
The key to making partnering successful has been of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Agency
the capacity to enter into various relations with state for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of
institutions, both complementary and confrontational. the Fight against Corruption. In accordance with this
One way, for example, of reconciling cooperation with memorandum they hold monthly meetings to exchange
performing a watchdog function, has been to enhance information and work out possible difficulties in their
the professionalism of NGO in monitoring of corruption work. The cooperation has resulted in the contribution
and anticorruption policies. of ACCOUNT to the adoption of the whistleblower
protection legislation and initiated the inclusion of
Although NGOs in the SELDI area have managed to anticorruption amendments to the draft Law on Public
establish some international public-private partner Procurement. Transparency International BiH also has
ships, these were not always translated into domestic memorandums of understanding with the Agency for
partnerships as well. For example, despite the fact that the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the
civil society is formally consulted when draft laws Fight against Corruption and Ministry of Security, and
and strategies are presented, there is no substantial is collaborating with the State Elections Commission
commitment to include civil society as a vital actor in in reporting of conflict of interest. The cooperation of
the process. the Center for Civil Initiatives with entity and cantonal
ministries of health has resulted in the adoption of a
A number of SELDI countries have joined the Open rulebook on prevention of corruption in 45 healthcare
Government Partnership, an international collaboration facilities. Despite these best practices, general relations
of domestic reformers “committed to making their between government authorities and NGOs in
governments more open, accountable, and responsive Bosnia and Herzegovina “are burdened by numerous
to citizens”.225 Among other things, the Partnership problems, from insufficient transparency of government
aims to bring together governments and civil society. institutions, which renders the watchdog activities of the
As a result, NGOs in some SELDI countries have been civil society more difficult, to open hostility towards the
involved in the development and implementation of media and civil society organisations, which considerably
national action plans for good governance but the complicates their overall activities and impact”.227
experience has been uneven. In Albania, for example,
“the level of cooperation and inclusiveness of civil In Croatia, there is a Council for Civil Society
society in within the [Partnership] processes […], Development established as an advisory body to the
remains at basic and sporadic level”.226 However, while government and overseeing the implementation of the
many civil society organisations in the country have National Strategy for Creating an Enabling Environment
limited capacities and resources to deal with corruption for Civil Society Development; the development of
philanthropy, social capital, partnership relations
224
(Adaman, Çarkoğlu, & Şenatalar, Hanehalkı Gözünden Kamu
and cross sector cooperation. In 2009, the Croatian
Hizmetleri ve Yolsuzluk, 2009). government adopted a Code of Consultation with the
225
http://www.opengovpartnership.org
226
(Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2013, p. 6). 227
(Transparency International BiH, 2012a, p. 3).
Box 12. Kosovo’s Government Strategy for Cooperation with Civil Society 2013 – 2017
The preamble of the Strategy points out:
“Government needs competent partners outside government who will help create effective public policies
and the implementation of effective interventions for their citizens. [….] To begin the process of genuine
cooperation, the two sectors should recognize joint values, to accept the responsibilities of certain common
issues and share their financial resources and human resources in order to achieve common goals. This
cooperation will cover the gaps of both sectors but without harming their point of strength.”
The Strategy outlines several strategic objectives:
• Ensure strong participation of civil society in drafting and implementation of policies and legislation;
• Build a system and define criteria to support financially the CSOs;
• Promote an integrated approach to the development of volunteering.
interested public in enacting laws and regulations. The the cooperation with the government as favourable,
ultimate aim of the Code is to facilitate interaction with while 40% of organisations estimated that the state
citizens and representatives of the interested public in is not interested, and that the government (at various
the democratic process, and to encourage the active levels) underestimates the importance of the role of
participation of citizens in public life. civil society in the development of society. However, a
similar number of organisations believe that the state
The Serbian government established the Office for has a positive attitude towards NGOs, either through
Cooperation with Civil Society in 2010 in order to direct support (22%) or through recognition of NGOs
provide an institutional framework for cooperation as partners (19%).228
with NGOs and a channel of communication between
the state and civil society. One of the first tasks of the
Office was writing the Strategy for the Development
of Civil Society. In addition to this Office, some 6.4. Integrity of non-profit
ministries have special units dealing with civil
governance
society, usually as part of larger units which deal
with international cooperation and EU accession.
Formally, the government is obliged to implement The effectiveness of NGOs in addressing the issues of
a public discussion on all its legislative proposals, good public governance depends to a great extent on
so in theory there is a formal mechanism to include their capacity to maintain their own governance in
civil society in decision making process. However, in order. High integrity standards are essential for civil
practice, this obligation is frequently circumvented by society organisations because of their role as the driving
using the “urgent procedure” mechanism, or by just mechanism demanding further good governance
paying lip service – draft laws are published online reforms and in changing the beliefs, expectations and
and comments are requested, but it is never published engrained behaviours of the public at large.
what comments were made, what comments were
adopted, rejected or why. It would be naïve, however, to assume that non-
governmental organisations are somehow immune to
The Law on Associations and the Law on Foundations corruption pressures. In fact, the capturing of NGOs
and Endowments in Serbia are the result of a good by special interests and corrupt public officials or
example of cooperation between civil society and elected politicians is “yet another reincarnation of the
government bodies. However, most of civil society mechanism of subversion of public governance by
(64%) characterises the total impact of the sector in the private interests.”229 The risk of such capture stems from
formulation of government policy as “inadequate,”
and only 2.5% thought that the impact of the sector 228
Serbian Civil Society Baseline Study, Civic Initiatives, 2011.
was “too large.” About 22% of organisations assess 229
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2010a, p. 27).
the opportunity to exploit a number of vulnerabilities In Albania, there have been reports of nepotism
of the non-profit sector in the SELDI countries: and corruption among a group of NGOs where the
public Agency for the Support of Civil Society was
• absence of mandatory procedures for transparency reported as involved.231 Despite the fact that the
in the sector; allegations have not been investigated or proven, this
• ineffective control of compliance with financial affects public perceptions and trust in civil society
regulations; organisations. Other allegations have been made in
• lack of auditing culture; the Albanian media about the funds dedicated to the
• low level of self-regulation. Roma community, especially those by the European
Commission, claiming that these millions of euros
Figure 83. Estimates by the public of corruption among have failed to improve the situation of the poor and
the following groups230 vulnerable community of Roma in Albania.232 Although
unproven they have managed to affect public opinion
5VSLFZ
that the organisations beneficial of these funds have
.POUFOFHSP
4FSCJB
been corrupt since they have not managed to bring
.1T
,PTPWP about a real result for the target group they were
+VEHFT
$SPBUJB intended to.
.BDFEPOJB #VTJOFTTNFO
#VMHBSJB Figure 85. Trust in NGOs in Albania
/(0
#J) SFQSFTFOUBUJWFT
"MCBOJB

*IBWFHSFBUUSVTU
(FOFSBMMZ*IBWFUSVTU
(FOFSBMMZ*EPOPUIBWFUSVTU
While the public estimates of the proliferation of
corruption among NGOs in the SELDI countries is much *EPOPUIBWFUSVTUBUBMM
lower than among public officials and government %,/"
institutions (Figure 83), the share of citizens doubtful

of their integrity has risen tangibly over the decade
(Figure 84). Admittedly, this is part of the overall trend of Source: (Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2013, p. 39).
the rising numbers of those who detect more corruption
in public life since the early 2000s; nevertheless, if NGOs There are also concerns related to the transparency
are to be at the forefront of good governance reforms in and financial reporting of civil society organisations.
their countries, they need to address their transparency Among NGOs, “69.5% declare that their financial
and accountability as a priority. information is publicly available”. While this indicator
looks relatively positive at a first glance, “almost 42% of
Figure 84. Change in public estimates of corruption the surveyed CSOs choose not to answer the question
among NGO representatives in the SELDI area about where such information can be found, while of
those who answered the question less than half offer a
5VSLFZ
valid available source.”233
.POUFOFHSP

4FSCJB
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the risk of NGO capture

,PTPWP
comes from the fact that “there is the interest-based

$SPBUJB

cooperation between the [political] parties in power

.BDFEPOJB and civil society organisations that are used by the

#VMHBSJB parties for propaganda purposes or allocation of

#J) budget funds through different funding programs for

"MCBOJB these organisations. Another specific issue in Bosnia
and Herzegovina involves considerably high budget
(Rusi & Likmeta, 2014).
231

230
232
(Top Channel TV, 2013).
involved”. 233
(Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2010, p. 20).
Box 13. Government millions for private media in Republika Srpska
The government of Republika Srpska has provided BAM 3.9 million to five daily and weekly newspapers.
More than half of this amount went to two newspapers owned by Željko Kopanja, friend and former business
partner of the RS president Milorad Dodik. “Nezavisne Novine” received BAM 1.2 million, and “Glas Srpske”
BAM 910,000. Soon after the government had allocated the bulk of the money, the campaign for the general
elections of September 2010 in BiH began. According to investigations carried out by the Sarajevo-based
Media Plan Institute, Nezavisne Novine and Glas Srpske openly sided with the ruling party of Dodik. They
reported in detail from every election rally and presented Dodik as the guardian of Republika Srpska.
Source: (Center for Investigative Reporting, 2012a).
funds that are regularly allocated to organisations In Bulgaria, a particularly sensitive issue is the receiving
collaborating based on religious and ethnic basis, of funds by quasi-NGOs established and managed by
since the nationalistic and religious rhetoric is still a high-ranking politicians and administrators and/or
propaganda means.”234 their relatives. Corruption can affect both or either
the procurement and implementation stages. In the
In the period 2007 – 2011, governments at various former case, for example, even though financing could
levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina have allocated at have been obtained through crooked procurement
least BAM 293.4 million (€15 mln) in grants to veterans, procedures or involve some form of conflict of interest,
sport organisations, humanitarian, religious and other the implementation is not necessarily affected by this
associations.235 Entity and state auditors have stated and could be carried out according to the rules and
that the allocation of public money has been conducted procedures (although quality might be affected).
without any criteria and without adequate monitoring
afterward. For example, the deputy chief auditor at the An analysis by the Croatian Government Office for
Audit Office of the BiH Institutions said that allocation Cooperation with NGOs of existing legislation finds
of money has been discretionary and varied depending weaknesses, respectively needs and ways of improving
on who is giving, and pointed out that funds are transparency in the work of civil society, oversight
available to the chairman of the Council of Ministers and transparency in spending, considering that civil
and his two deputies who have discretion to give them society are awarded annually more than a billion kuna
away without any criteria.236 (€130 mln) by public authorities in the form of grants.237
Box 14. The pitfalls of commercialising non-profits in Bulgaria
The parent-teacher association of a reputable high school in Varna decides to start a for-profit business which
could support the school in the long run. They establish a fully owned subsidiary of the association, closely
resembling the name of the school. The firm provides language courses to students formally outside the
school, but later it turns out that they enrol as “private students” and earn an official diploma as well. After
a few years of successful business and retaining profit within the firm (not distributing it to the association)
the manager of the company buys it from the association for the value of the registered capital (only not
distributed profit accounts to more than 50% of the price, not to mention the intangibles). The association
directly loses money and public benefit, but also the firm uses public property and communications at
below market prices.
Source: (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013d).
234
(Transparency International BiH, 2012a, p. 3).
235
(Center for Investigative Reporting, 2012).
(Center for Investigative Reporting, 2012).
236 237
(Vlada Republike Hrvatske-Ured za udruge, 2012).
Box 15. Allegations of corruption in the TI chapter Croatia
In the spring of 2014, several members of the general assembly of the chapter of Transparency International
(TI) challenged the legality of the election of the chapter president. The president of the chapter was
accused of falsifying records, conflicts of interest, and arbitrary expulsion of ten members who rebelled
against a hiring of staff against the rules of the association. Following the challenge, the Ministry of Public
Administration, which oversees the enforcement of the Associations Act, revoked the appointment of the
chapter president.
Source: (Matijevic, 2014).
A major deficiency is that under current legislation Figure 87. NGOs in Macedonia report corruption in their
there is no provision requiring NGOs to publicly own ranks to be:
disclose financial statements, although they are obliged
/"
to submit their financial reports to the authorised 7FSZGSFVFOU

government body. The paradox is that the government
publicly discloses all financial reports of legal persons
in Croatia, except NGO reports.
0DDBTJPOBM
'SFRVFOU

Although trust in civil society organisations in
Macedonia is not particularly high, recently there
has been a positive trend of increase. Specifically,
7FSZSBSF
associations and foundations have the trust of 59.3% of
the public, which indicates for the first time since 2006
(when it was 50.3%) trust by the majority of citizens.238 Source: (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, 2011).240
Figure 86. Public opinion of the raison d'être of NGOs This self-perception by civil society organisations
in Macedonia should be taken with some reservation since their
websites show that only a small number of them

publish their financial data and reports. Moreover,
/(0TBSFTFUVQ few organisations commission financial audits of their
CZDJUJ[FOTUPGVUIFS
UIFJSPXOJOUFSFTUT
financial operations. This gap between the perception
/(0TBSFTFUVQCZBOE Figure 88. Public attitudes towards the transparency

ñOBODFECZGPSFJHODPVOUSJFT
BOEUIFJSGPVOEBUJPOT
of NGOs in Macedonia
POMZUPTFSWFUIFN

%,/" /(0TBDUUSBOTQBSFOUMZ

BOEQVCMJTISFQPSUT
PGUIFJSXPSLBOEñOBODFT
Source: (Нурединоска, Кржаловски, & Стојанова, 2013).
/(0TBDUOPOUSBOTQBSFOUMZ
BOEEPOPUQVCMJTISFQPSUT
Research indicates that corruption in civil society is PGUIFJSXPSLBOEñOBODFT
not widespread – the majority of surveyed civil society
organisations consider it to be rare (Figure 87). The vast
%,/"
majority (90.6%) claim that their financial reports are
publicly accessible, while 73.1% have publicly accessible
code of conduct for their employees.239 Source: (Нурединоска, Кржаловски, & Стојанова, 2013).
240
“The researchers were however uncertain whether in answering
this question the respondents were able to distinguish between
238
(Нурединоска, Кржаловски, & Стојанова, 2013, p. 9). corruption, abuse of funds and duty, or money laundering,” Ibid,
(Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, 2011, p. 36).
239
p. 39.
and practices of transparency is one of the most 6.5. Recommendations

frequently debated issues in the civil society sector.
In 2007, the Civic Platform of Macedonia, one of the Non-governmental, non-profit organisations in South
leading networks that had organisations from different east Europe need to enhance significantly their capac-
sectors as its members, initiated a draft code of ethics ity to contribute to improved public governance. This
for the sector that was never adopted. Larger NGOs – applies primarily the ability to produce reporting on
which have established oversight mechanisms for anticorruption progress in public governance, espe-
their operations – supported the adoption of this code cially in the context of EU integration. This includes:
of ethics, but this initiative was not supported by the
other organisations. • Collect and collate primary information on the
operation of government institutions, especially at
Figure 89. Public trust in NGOs in Serbia the local level and where it is either not produced by
government or not disclosed publicly.
• Enhance NGO skills for the measurement of the
actual proliferation of corruption.
*IBWFHSFBUUSVTU • Enhance NGO skills in analysis of data, institutional
(FOFSBMMZ*IBWFUSVTU evaluation and report writing.
(FOFSBMMZ*EPOPUIBWFUSVTU
• The non-EU member countries of SEE would be
*EPOPUIBWFUSVTUBUBMM

%,/"
well advised to learn from the body of knowledge
and expertise contained in the EU Anticorruption

Report. This would provide them with valuable
insights with respect to the evaluation of the spread of
corruption and the design of anticorruption policies.
Source: (Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, 2013).
Funding and legal environment
In Turkey, civil society organisations are closely
monitored by the government. The main body that • Rules and regulations for public funding – both
monitors and records procedures on NGOs is the by central and local governments – of non-profit
Department of Associations of the Ministry of Interior. organisations should be clear and transparent.
The Department monitors, records and archives Only NGOs registered in the public benefit should
the establishment procedures of locally established be allowed to receive public funding, and should
organisations and international ones. It also ensures respectively meet more stringent reporting and
that NGO auditors inspect all administrative offices disclosure requirements.
belonging to associations and unions, any sort of • Where public funding is provided from the European
additional buildings as well as their accounts and Union and other multilateral institutions to national
operations when necessary. Every NGO is obligated to non-profit organisations, it should not be disbursed
provide annual auditing report that is either prepared through national governments, especially where
by an external auditing company or the internal anticorruption progress has been minimal.
auditors’ board of the association. Also, the Law on • The European Union and other donor agencies
Associations stipulates (art. 45) that “all administrative should consider a larger share of funding for
premises, buildings and annexes, all books, accounts good governance programmes implemented in
and proceedings of associations are subject to collaboration between civil society organisations
inspection at any time by the Interior Ministry or the and public institutions. These programmes should
most senior local representative of government.” In have explicit requirements against the capture of
the case that the auditors find an unusual or unlawful NGOs by special interests. It should be noted that
activity, they are obligated to take the case file to the achieving impact requires longer-term (10 years and
public prosecution office for investigation. above) sustained commitment.
Integrity
In order for their anticorruption work to have

credibility NGOs in Southeast Europe need to provide
an example of transparency and accountability. This adopting codes of conduct with aspirational stand-
includes: ards. They should also find more and better ways of
organising coalitions of interest.
• Conflict of interest legislation should include non- • NGOs need better understanding of the need to be
profit institutions, especially where they are funded transparent and accountable. This includes under
via government administered programmes, such as going regular auditing, disclosure of financial
national budget, EU funds, etc. statements, explicit and transparent corporate
• The civil society sector needs to provide for its own governance procedures, and measures against
self-regulation. At the minimum, this involves capture by special interests.
7 International cooperation
A
lthough manifested mostly locally, corrup- Criticisms in the monitoring reports by the EU and
tion has long become a global preoccupa- other foreign institutions and government have been
tion. In Southeast Europe, in particular, in- largely, although not universally, welcomed by the
ternational institutions and foreign partner media and public opinion. Continuing and building on
countries have played an important role in the anticor- this engagement would be crucial to the leverage the
ruption developments; in fact, they have become an in- EU has in the SEE countries.
dispensable factor. Their input has ranged from overall
monitoring and evaluation to institution building and Figure 90. Trust and distrust of the European Union
civil society support. in some SELDI countries

Given the extreme partisanship in domestic politics #VMHBSJB

in the SEE countries, their international commitments .BDFEPOJB

facilitate the adoption of reform policies that might .POUFOFHSP
otherwise have been shunned by national politicians.
$SPBUJB

This involvement, however, also brought with itself the

4FSCJB

risk of unrealistic expectations for quick fixes, which

5VSLFZ
in turn could prompt the adoption of superficial and
5FOEOPUUPUSVTU 5FOEUPUSVTU
ad hoc measures. In addition, conditionality and most
incentives affect primarily the executive government, Source: (TNS Opinion & Social, Spring 2013).
while the judiciary, parliaments241 and other concerned
public and private institutions were not sufficiently Placing corruption high on the agenda of international
involved. The sustainability of international engage cooperation has put the governments in the region –
ment was bolstered by the broadening of the range of especially those aspiring to membership in the EU – in
stakeholders to include civil society, media, professional an awkward position. On the one hand, they are under
associations, trade unions, etc. The SELDI format – pressure from most domestic constituencies (although
a collation of non-governmental organisations reaching this pressure differs from country to country) to
out to all concerned public and private bodies – is accelerate the coming of accession with its expected
increasingly acknowledged as the only approach immediate returns. What pro-European constituencies
capable of ensuring that foreign involvement in domestic expect to gain from membership easily outweighs
anticorruption reforms – which is well received by local concerns about the state of preparedness as benefits are
stakeholders – is sustainable in the long term. From the expected to be instant and universal, and in particular
point of view of governance reform, the SEE countries with respect to good governance. This creates an
should not be seen and referred to by the international incentive for governments to “sell” the country better
partners as unitary agents – “Montenegro aspires”, and to deal as quickly as possible with any perceived
“Croatia is capable of”; rather, the delicate balance problems in the negotiations with the Union. On the
among various reformist, anti-reformist and generally other, the Commission and member states urge the SEE
inert constituencies needs to be appreciated and their governments to address the difficult and painful issues
politics need to be nudged towards adopting and of reform before they would consider membership.
effecting improved standards of public governance.
A further consideration with respect to international
This broadening of the domestic interlocutors of involvement is that anticorruption is about upsetting
international partners has had the effect of empowering entrenched illicit interests. Effective anticorruption
isolated reformist politicians or political groups policies need to target both the delivery of public
but also various non-government actors and – most services and the support and involvement of the public.
significantly – encouraging public demand for reforms. For this to happen, a government-to-Brussels connection
is not sufficient. The engagement by international
“The judicial and anticorruption reforms promoted at high cost
241
by the EU are often undermined by the Parliaments.” (Romanian partners of reformist politicians and parties needs to
Center for European Policies, 2011, p. 23) be supported and verified by civil society in a kind of
trilateral cooperation. “A partnership triangulation social environment”243 – the Commission now sets
is possibly the shortest way to describe the formula specific governance targets the achievement of which
for the success of reforms in transition. This includes needs to be measured. It is crucial that compliance
reformist politicians, active civil society and political monitoring – as, for example, currently practiced by
and financial support from international partners.”242 GRECO, OECD and UNCAC – continues in parallel to
measuring actual institutional change.
Figure 91. The triangulation principle: ensuring
the sustainability of anticorruption reforms All SELDI countries (except for Kosovo – see below) have
become parties to the latest international anticorruption
instrument – the United Nations Convention against
International
Corruption (UNCAC). Its implementation, however,
partners remains a challenge. The assessment of the application
of the Convention in Albania is carried out by
the National Coordinator for Anti-corruption and
Department for Anti-Corruption. With respect to
the two Council of Europe conventions, GRECO
recommendations have been taken into account by the
Zone of successful
anticorruption Albanian government although their full compliance in
reforms due time has not been always successful. During the
National National first round of recommendations 2000 – 2002, Albania
governments NGOs
complied with all of the 11 recommendations made
by GRECO. In the second round, it fully complied
with 11, partially complied with 1, and did not comply
with 1, out of 13 recommendations that GRECO had
made. As of June 2014 Albania had complied with 7
and partially complied with 5 recommendations in the
third round.244
7.1. Compliance
with international
EC progress reports on BiH
anticorruption
standards 2012: Bosnia and Herzegovina has made limited progress
in addressing corruption, which continues to remain
widespread in the public sector and the public-private
One of the key modes of engagement of international interface. … Corruption continues to affect all spheres of
community has been monitoring of reforms; monitoring life, economic development and the rule of law.
itself has evolved as the countries have. Initially seen as
exclusively monitoring of compliance with international 2013: Complex connections between political actors,
anticorruption standards, it is now widely acknowledged business and the media are putting democratic institu-
to include an evaluation of policy outcomes, as tions and procedures at risk and making the detection of
practiced by SELDI’s CMS. This complementarity corrupt practices more difficult.
is especially important given what few years ago
became known “monitoring fatigue”: complaints by
country bureaucrats of the transaction costs involved As regards monitoring of compliance with EU good
in servicing too many evaluation questionnaires and governance standards, in October 2013, the Commission
expert missions. The EC has also been involved in the recommended that Albania be granted candidate status
rethinking of monitoring. From initial scepticism about with an understanding that Albania had to continue
the measurability of corruption – in the beginning of the fight against corruption and organised crime.
the 2000s it believed that: “whilst it is hard to know its Although supported by the European Commission,
extent, the persistent rumours about corrupt practices 243
(European Commission, COM (2000) 701 final, p. 17).
[…] contribute to tainting the political, economic and 244
Regional Corruption Initiative. Retrieved June 2014 from: http://
www.rai-see.org/anti-corruption-monitoring/102-anti-corruption-
(Dr. Shentov, 2008, p. 17).
242
monitoring/207-greco.html
International cooperation 127
Table 5. Transparency and CSO participation in the review process of UNCAC in Bulgaria
Did the government make public the contact details of the country focal point? No
Was civil society consulted in the preparation of the self-assessment? No
Was the self-assessment published on line or provided to CSOs? No
Did the government agree to a country visit? Yes
Was a country visit undertaken? Yes
Was civil society invited to provide input to the official reviewers? Yes
Has the government committed to publishing the full country report? Positive indications
Source: (Transparency International Bulgaria, 2011).
5 member countries245 voted against it claiming that progress reports had had tangible effect on both the
Albania had still much to do with regard to corruption public opinion and in policy debates. The subsequent
and the high levels of organised crime. In the June CVM evaluations, however, proved to be as strict – the
2014 Progress Report the Commission confirmed its January 2014 one calling developments in the country
recommendation that Albania be granted candidate “a source of concern rather than reassurance” – and
country status. have been equally welcomed by media and civil society.
With hindsight, it is evident that the loss of leverage that
Bulgaria’s monitoring by international institutions the EU had during the accession negotiations was made
peaked at the time before accession to the EU when up by greater dependence on EU aid and the related
it had to prove compliance with the standards the linkage mechanisms – boosted trade, and greater
Union had adopted. Legislative harmonisation, as in integration of various professional groups through
most of the other SELDI countries, has been generally exchanges, cooperation, etc.
straightforward.
Continued frustration, however, with respect to the
Bulgaria is the only non-OECD member in the SELDI lack of progress in Bulgaria was also evident in the 2014
area to have signed and ratified the OECD anti-bribery motion in the European Parliament for a call on the
convention. Although it has been in force in the country Commission (a motion eventually not adopted) to:
for fifteen years, there are still some outstanding issues
in its implementation: “adopt a resolute attitude towards Bulgaria and to
seriously examine whether it is even possible for Union
“Many of the recommendations have not been funds to be deployed in accordance with the rules in
implemented because Bulgaria did not adopt draft such an environment.”247
legislation or didn't advance far enough in its legislation
drafting process. […] There continues to be no foreign It also prompted an MEP to refer to a “lack political
bribery enforcement actions in Bulgaria; the Bulgarian culture”248 in Bulgaria, an unprecedented qualification.
authorities have not been aware of any allegations of
foreign bribery committed by Bulgarian individuals or Although it has long been a member of the Council of
companies.”246 Europe conventions and GRECO, Bulgaria has still not
implemented some of the Group’s recommendations
Bulgaria’s experience with having its governance both on incriminations and party funding. Some of the
integrity evaluated by the EU is instructive about outstanding issues include:
the impact of accession on monitoring. Before 2007,
there had been concerns in the EU that membership • Ensuring that active bribery and trading in influence
would diminish the impact of external assessment are construed in such a way as to unambiguously
and would preclude the Commission from putting cover instances where the advantage is intended for
sufficient pressure on the authorities. The preceding a third party.
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United

245
Amendment 16, Motion for resolution to (European Parliament,
247
Kingdom. 2014).
(OECD Working Group on Bribery, 2013).
246 248
(Focus News Agency, 2014).
• Reconsidering the practically automatic exemption Prosecution for Prosecution of Organized Crime and
from punishment granted to perpetrators of active Corruption, the State Commission for the Prevention
bribery in the public sector in cases of effective of Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Unit of
regret. the Ministry of Interior remain understaffed and
• Introducing clear criteria concerning the use of underfunded, while the State Audit Office still does
public facilities for party activity and election not have the adequate human and financial resources
campaign purposes. to efficiently perform its new functions of financial
• Making external audit of accounts of political parties supervision of political parties and election campaigns.
truly independent. As regards the judiciary, concerns were raised about
• On the sanctions for violations of the Political Parties the impartiality of judiciary and law enforcement to
Act: deal with corruption cases, especially high-level ones.
– Include natural persons, including persons in Public procurement was another fragile and corruption
charge of party accounts; prone area which has been constantly monitored by
– Broaden the range of penalties and make them the EC. The Commission has also referred to OSCE/
more proportionate and dissuasive; ODIHR concerns over misuse of state resources during
– Extend the statute of limitation for offences under the 2013 local elections and the failure of the relevant
the Act. institutions to counter them, and concluded that the
implementation of the legal framework on political
In Croatia, GRECO's second compliance report party funding remained deficient.
concluded that Croatia had implemented satisfactorily
all of the eleven recommendations contained in the
third round evaluation. As regards the implementation EC progress reports on Macedonia
of the recommendations concerning incriminations
assessed in this report, GRECO welcomed the entry 2012: Some progress was made in the area of anti-
into force, on 1 January 2013, of the new Criminal Code, corruption policy… There is a lack of analysis of corruption
which was further amended to take into account all and ways to tackle it... Overall, the legislative framework
of GRECO’s recommendations, notably as regards the is in place and capacity has been strengthened slightly,
express reference to bribery offences in cases in which but greater efforts are needed as regards implementation
the advantage is intended for third parties. of existing laws.
Insofar as the transparency of political funding is 2013: In the area of anti-corruption policy, the legislative
concerned, GRECO recalls that the compliance report framework is largely in place… A track-record of
had already concluded that all recommendations had criminal investigations, prosecutions and convictions
been complied with. Supervision over the annual by law enforcement and courts is being developed…
financial reports of political parties, independent lists However, corruption remains prevalent in many areas
and candidates has been complemented with specific and continues to be a serious problem, indicating that the
campaign finance monitoring, carried out by the State implementation of existing legislation has yet to make a
Audit Office and the State Elections Commission concrete impact and the effectiveness of existing measures
respectively, and the roles of both bodies have been has to be improved.
clarified. These institutions now appear to have
adequate authority, as well as financial and personnel
resources to be able to carry out an effective monitoring In the fourth evaluation round on Macedonia, GRECO
of campaign finances. concluded that the legal framework on corruption
prevention with respect to MPs, judges and prosecutors
Kosovo has not acceded to the international legal instru- is well developed and sufficiently covers most of the
ments in the field of anticorruption due to its status. areas of GRECO interest. However, just as in the EC
progress reports, despite the adequate legal framework
In its monitoring of Macedonia’s progress towards the effective implementation and enforcement of
accession, the EC finds that corruption continues to be a legislation remains an issue of concern. Moreover, it
serious problem. One area that has been highlighted is was noted that the current arrangements for monitor
the administrative capacity of the state anticorruption ing the content of statements on incompatibilities need
bodies which despite slight improvements remain low to be further improved. As to judges and prosecutors,
and insufficient. Key bodies, such as the Basic Public GRECO notes that they both lack public confidence and
transparency. Finally, GRECO concludes the ability of corruption offences carrying imprisonment falling
the State Commission for Prevention of Corruption to within the jurisdiction of the Basic Court.249
oversee the work of MPs, judges and prosecutors, is
hampered by budgetary and staff constraints and an As regards GRECO, Montenegro is currently in the third
evident lack of proactivity. evaluation round. GRECO commended the country
for the substantial reforms carried out with regard to
The status of implementation of UNCAC by Monte both themes under evaluation. GRECO concluded that
negro was reviewed in 2013. The review found some additional steps can be taken to strengthen internal
outstanding issues with respect to criminalisation and discipline of political parties, to regulate the use of public
law enforcement: facilities during election periods, and to enlarge the
coverage of sanctioning provisions. More importantly,
• Construe the offence of active bribery in the public it is decisive to ensure that the oversight responsibilities
sector in a way that unambiguously covers instances conferred to the State Audit Institution and the State
where the advantage is intended for a third-party Elections Commission are properly performed in
beneficiary; practice. Likewise, the “sanctioning regime remains to
• Amend, as appropriate, the legislative provision on be tested to assert its proportionality, dissuasiveness
obstruction of evidence/justice to expand the scope and effectiveness.”250
of witnesses, expert witnesses or other participants
in criminal proceedings so as to include their family The authorities in Serbia place, at least ostensibly,
members and/or close relatives; international standards and obligations in the centre
• Ensure that the domestic legislation provides for of the fight against corruption. Given that the EU
a longer statute of limitations period for minor integration has been declared to be a priority, and
Table 6. Compliance of legislation in Serbia with some international anticorruption instruments
Convention on the fight Serbian legislation is in partial compliance with the requirements of the
against corruption involving Convention. There are some gaps in implementing of several articles related to
EU officials active and passive corruption, foreign public officials, penalties, jurisdiction and
international cooperation
Convention on the protection Serbian legislation in general is in compliance with the requirements of the
of the European Communities' Convention.
financial interests
UNCAC – General provisions Serbian legal system provides good basis for the implementation of the Convention.
UNCAC – Asset recovery Serbian legislation is not in compliance with the asset recovery chapter of the
UNCAC. There are shortcomings in implementation of the Chapter’s articles
addressing prevention and detection of transfers of proceeds of crime, measures
for direct recovery of property, mechanisms for recovery of property through
international cooperation in confiscation, international cooperation for purposes
of confiscation, special cooperation and return and disposal of assets.
UNCAC – Preventive The existing shortcomings related to improved coordination and cooperation
measures of the relevant institutions at all levels and to training for the public positions
considered especially vulnerable to corruption are already been addressed with
the National Anticorruption Strategy.
OECD Convention on Serbian legislation is in compliance with this Convention and fully covers its
Combating Bribery of foreign requirements regarding the liability of legal persons, sanctions, enforcement,
public officials statute of limitations, money laundering, accounting and confiscation. The only
shortcomings are related to the offence of bribery of foreign public officials,
jurisdiction and mutual legal assistance.
Source: (Esadze & Prof. Taseva, 2014).
(Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Conven

249
tion against Corruption, 2013, pp. 7-8). (Council of Europe, SG/Inf (2014)5).
250
that EU has put anticorruption at the forefront of In Turkey, two laws meet the UNCAC requirement
the accession agenda, corruption is also at the top for preventive anticorruption measures, such as
of government’s agenda. The European Union has – the development and implementation of effective,
through the various stages of relations, firstly with coordinated anticorruption policies as well as
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, than the State establishing appropriate systems of procurement251 –
Union Serbia and Montenegro and finally with the Turkish State Tender Law No. 2886, which generally
Republic of Serbia – been pointing out the problem of applies to the sale and lease transactions of state assets;
corruption, mostly within the wider issues of the rule and Public Tender Law No. 4734, which applies to the
of law. procurement of goods and services by public entities.
Turkey has also criminalised bribing foreign public
Serbia has signed and ratified a number of international officials with the ratification, in 2000, of the OECD
anticorruption agreements. This process has been Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
developing more slowly compared to the other countries Officials in International Business Transactions. The
in the region, primarily due to the non-functional State adoption of the Law 4782 Amending Certain Laws for the
Union Serbia and Montenegro, formed in 2003, within Prevention of Bribing Foreign Public Officials in International
whose competence was the ratification of international Commercial Transactions and the enactment of the new
agreements. Criminal Code came as a result.
Table 7. Status of implementation of GRECO third round evaluation recommendations on Turkey
Theme I: Incriminations
Revise existing criminal law in order to (i) provide for comprehensive, consistent and clear partly
definitions of bribery offences; and (ii) to capture unambiguously a) promises, offers and implemented
requests for a bribe, irrespective of whether or not the parties have agreed upon the bribe; and
b) all acts/omissions in the exercise of the functions of a public official, irrespective of whether
or not they constitute a breach of duty and whether or not they lie within the scope of the
official’s competence.
Ensure that the bribery offences are construed in such a way as to cover, unambiguously, partly
instances of bribery committed through intermediaries as well as instances where the advantage implemented
is not intended for the official him/herself but for a third party.
Ensure that active and passive bribery – within or outside of the context of international partly
commercial activities – of all foreign public officials, members of foreign public assemblies, implemented
officials of international organisations, members of international parliamentary assemblies,
judges and officials of international courts are criminalised unambiguously.
Ensure that active and passive bribery – within or outside of the context of international partly
commercial activities – of foreign jurors and arbitrators are criminalised unambiguously. implemented
Criminalise active and passive trading in influence – without the requirement of a deception by partly
the influence peddler. implemented
Theme II: Transparency of Party Funding
Ensure that annual accounts of political parties include a) income received and expenditure not
incurred individually by elected representatives and candidates of political parties for political implemented
activities linked to their party, including electoral campaigning, and b) as appropriate, the
accounts of entities related, to political parties or otherwise under their control.
ensure that annual accounts of political parties provide more detailed and comprehensive not
information on income and expenditure, including the introduction of a standardised format implemented
backed up by common accountancy principles, as well as the provision of guidance to parties
by the monitoring body.
Source: (GRECO, 2012b).
(Okuyucu-Ergün, 2007).
251
7.2. Foreign assistance Figure 93. Share of anticorruption funding in total EU

pre-accession assistance
.POUFOFHSP
In addition to providing encouraging, exerting pres-
.BDFEPOJB
sure and evaluating progress, foreign partners and
,PTPWP
international organisations have also provided South-
$SPBUJB
east Europe with considerable anticorruption assist- #J)
ance. The correspondence between their policy mes- "MCBOJB
sages and the concrete financial and technical assist- 4FSCJB
ance they provide – a correspondence mostly but not 5VSLFZ
universally achieved – is of key importance to the
overall impact.
Source: (European Parliament, 2013).
Multilateral institutions provide larger amounts of
funding but aid approval and disbursement goes and European Partnership commitments, and by
through much cumbersome procedures which creates contributing to the prevention of corruption in
a time lag between need and assistance. Bilaterals, education by improving transparency, accountability
although much more flexible, have smaller funds which and social participation. Largely following recom
require more precision in what they target. mendations from the Project Against Corruption
in Albania and EURALIUS (European Assistance
With the EU, technical assistance to SEE countries has Mission to the Albanian Justice System) in 2012
been delivered for objectives that are also conditions constitutional amendments were adopted on
to be met before further integration. Thus, both restricting the immunities of MPs, judges and other
policy implications and funding are conducive to the high level officials. Following these amendments a
accomplishment of reforms. In this respect, multilateral series of cases of corrupt judges, MPs and high level
institutions differ substantially from bilateral aid officials were sent for prosecution, and some of them
agencies. have resulted in final convictions.
Figure 92. EU funding for anticorruption per capita EURALIUS was an EU funded project which brought
of the population (€), 2007 – 2012 to Albania high-level expertise to provide legal advice
and raise the capacities of the Albanian Ministry of
.POUFOFHSP
Justice and judicial institutions. EURALIUS extended
.BDFEPOJB its assistance to the reform of the internal procedures
,PTPWP of the High Council of Justice; the consolidation of
$SPBUJB the new chamber of private bailiffs; the reform of the
"MCBOJB internal structure of the Office of the Ombudsman; and
#J) the capacities of legal advisors of the Constitutional
4FSCJB Court.
5VSLFZ

Figure 94. Share of anticorruption and judicial reform
assistance in overall EU assistance to Croatia
Source: Calculated from data from (European Parliament, 2013).

One of the major technical assistance programmes

in Albania has been the EC funded Project Against 'VOETJOWFTUFE
JOKVEJDJBMSFGPSN
Corruption in Albania implemented by the Council
of Europe. It aimed to contribute to democracy and 'VOETJOWFTUFE
JOUIFñHIU
the rule of law through the prevention and control BHBJOTUDPSSVQUJPO
of corruption by enhancing the implementation of
0UIFSBTTJTUBODF
anticorruption policies and strategies in line with
GRECO and MONEYVAL (Committee of Experts on
the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures
and the Financing of Terrorism) recommendations Source: (European Parliament, 2013).
The EU has invested significant resources in assisting Figure 95. EU rule of law assistance to Kosovo252
Croatia, in its efforts to suppress corruption. Almost 1/3

of the overall contracted pre-accession funds to Croatia

(approx. €110 million) in the period 2007 – 2011 were

related to strengthening the administrative capacities

in the country linked to the fight against corruption.

In Kosovo, two of the areas of EU assistance – rule

of law and justice and home affairs – are related
to anticorruption. In particular, EU’s support to

anticorruption institutions has contributed to the

drafting of key legislation in the National Anticorruption
Framework, including laws on the Anticorruption
Agency, on declaration of assets, on conflict of interest, .MOFVSP 4IBSFPGUPUBMBTTJTUBODF

MFGUTDBMF
SJHIUTDBMF
and on political party financing and amendments to

the Criminal Code. Source: (European Court of Auditors, 2012).
The EU has so far provided Macedonia with assistance strengthening and support to civil society. According to
in the field of anticorruption both as institutional the Macedonian Central Donor Assistance Database,253
Box 16. CIPE: a global anticorruption leader
Since the early 1990s, the Washington-based Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) has been one
of the most active supporters of economic and governance reforms in the former communist countries and
in Southeast Europe in particular.
CIPE addresses both the demand side and the supply side of corruption through programmes that: mobilise
the private sector to raise anti-corruption standards and advocate for reforms; streamline regulations
and reduce implementation gaps to limit opportunities for corruption; improve corporate governance
to strengthen firm-level integrity and equip small and medium-sized enterprises to resist bribery and
meet requirements of global value chains. CIPE supports collective action by business and civil society
stakeholders in order to address the institutional sources of corruption. A key goal of collective action is to
reduce the incentives and opportunities for corruption. CIPE’s value chain/anticorruption program seeks to
incentivise mid-sized businesses to reduce corrupt practices as a means of joining global value chains.
One of the successful applications of this approach was in Bulgaria. In the mid-1990s, CIPE was among
the pioneering supporters of the Bulgarian anticorruption initiative Coalition 2000, which later inspired
the establishment of SELDI. Among other things, CIPE assisted the promotion of corporate governance
standards, the engagement of private businesses in anticorruption efforts, and advocated for institutional
reform in the privatisation process. CIPE later provided capacity building for this model to business leaders,
policy makers, and anticorruption experts from the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The emphasis
was put on identifying key lessons learned from combating corruption in Southeast Europe, and how they
can most effectively be applied in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
CIPE was also among the key early supporters of SELDI in the early 2000s. The Center has provided
guidance on mobilising businesses to back governance reform and has assisted SELDI in the advocacy of
anticorruption policies.
IPA ‘wider rule of law’ projects include, in addition to police and judicial projects, projects related to anticorruption, customs and public
252
financial management reform.

253
http://cdad.sep.gov.mk
the overall value of EU funded programmes in the field 7.3. Recommendations

of good governance and anticorruption since 2008 has
been was €7,395,133. However, the largest part of this
sum falls on the large regional project “Fight against Given the significant role international assistance plays
Organized Crime and Corruption: Strengthening the in the anticorruption efforts in Southeast Europe, it is
Prosecutor's Network”, worth €5,263,158 which was imperative that its effectiveness is enhanced. To this
implemented on a regional level (Western Balkans) end, it is needed:
by a wider international consortium. Therefore, only
part of the funding was aimed directly for capacity • Foreign assistance programmes need to better
building of Macedonian Public Prosecutors Office. reflect the findings of international and independent
Тhe overall project objective was to contribute to domestic evaluations. For this to be achieved,
improved cross-border and international judicial assistance programmes need to be made more
cooperation to investigate and prosecute cross-border responsive and flexible, including a shorter time lag
crime, with focus on organised crime and corruption between design and delivery.
in particular. • International anticorruption assistance to national
governments should envisage a stronger role for
Only recently the EU has provided direct support for civil society. This includes the involvement of NGOs
civil society organisations working on anticorruption as implementation partners, monitors and resource
in Macedonia. One of the priority areas in the 2012 organisations, especially in the evaluation of the
IPA-I call for Support to Enhancement, Sustainability impact of assistance projects.
and Development of an Active Civil Society was the • The effectiveness of assistance needs to be
fight against corruption and organised crime. This periodically evaluated through impact assessment
shows that the EU has started to consider the role of the methods. In addition to providing a value-for-money
civil society in this policy area previously reserved for measure – especially when there has been public
the government. funding involved – this would allow successful
programmes to be sustained while unsuccessful to
Anticorruption assistance by foreign partners intensi- be discontinued. It is imperative that this assessment
fied after Montenegro independence. In 2007, UNDP be independent and that it utilises the expertise of
started its anticorruption project focusing on aligning civil society organisations.
the national legal framework with UNCAC, support • Assistance needs to encourage cross-country pro
to the CSO initiatives and specialised governmental grammes on common issues – such as, trans-border
anticorruption agencies, as well as with anticorruption crime. The Bulgarian experience in public-private
research in the areas of judiciary, local self-governance cooperation in the analysis of the linkages of
and the healthcare sector. organised crime and corruption should be utilised
across the region.
USAID funded Good Governance Activity (2010 – • The role and efforts of the Regional Anti-Corruption
2013) has had a pivotal role in advancing the CSO Initiative to develop and implement measures under
monitoring capacity with respect to the judiciary and the Governance Pillar of the SEE2020 Strategy in
to strengthen the role of civil society and the private cooperation with national and regional civil society
sector as counterparts to institutions of government groups should be strengthened. The Initiative
in Montenegro. US State Department's Bureau of provides an important bridge between national
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs governments and other stakeholders in the region,
has provided capacity building for judges, prosecutors which should further be expanded.
and police officers; this was done in parallel to their • European Commission regular reports’ preparation
Criminal Justice Civil Society Programme, which has and findings should be better embedded in local
been supporting the CSO monitoring initiatives in policy-making by drawing more heavily upon local
criminal justice sector. civil society and business community.
Methodological appendix:
Corruption Monitoring System
T
he Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) tical estimates of the prevalence of the most common
was designed and developed by CSD in incidents of corruption and has diagnostic and descrip-
1998.254 Introduced at a time when corruption tive functions.
measurement was confined to public percep
tions, the CMS launched a measure of the corrup In the CMS context, corruption is conceptualised as
tion victimisation of individuals by public officials a specific type of social behaviour which includes
accounting for their direct experience with various specific forms of interaction between actors, attitudes
corruption patterns. Based on CMS diagnostics, associated with these interactions and a set of
assessments could be made about the dynamics of the perceptions which relate to the interactions (serving
prevalence of corruption patterns in a society. both as reflections of the interaction and prerequisites
which define the behaviour strategy of the actors).
The CMS methodology allows comparability of data Corruption refers to a specific group of interactions:
across countries and registers the actual level and trends the public is provided with services by government
of direct involvement in administrative corruption, institutions, in the process of which it deals with
as well as the public attitudes, assessments and officials who are employed by these institutions.
expectations relating to corruption. CMS diagnostics Corruption is described through the “principal-agent
have been applied in Bulgaria since 1998,255 in Southeast model”: members of the public (clients) interact with
Europe in 2001, 2002 and 2014,256 and occasionally in government institutions (principal) through officials
Georgia and Moldova. Some CMS concepts have also (agents); agents act on behalf of the principal who
been modified and included in the Eurobarometer defines their rights and obligations and entrusts them
surveys on corruption; this makes CMS data comparable with certain discretionary power. Corruption is an
to Eurobarometer data.257 interaction in which officials in government institu
tions (agents) abuse the discretionary power they have
been entrusted with by these institutions (principal)
in their interaction with the public (clients).
Theoretical background
This definition has two key elements which need to be
further operationalised: “abuse” and “benefit”. Both
Most academic and policy analyses on corruption should be present for certain behaviour to be categorised
usually start with the assertion that corruption is a as corruption. The relation between these concepts
multifaceted phenomenon that is difficult or impossible could be defined as a “form-content” relationship.
to measure.258 The measurement problem of multi-facet The “benefit” is the form of the transaction, while the
phenomena as corruption boils down to definition and “abuse” refers to the content of the transaction – the
operationalisation of the underlying concept. Defining type of resource that is being offered in exchange for a
what is being measured scopes the interpretations of benefit. Varieties of corruption behaviour arise because
data and the types of conclusions that could be made. of the variation in both form and content: of the benefits
that are being supplied by clients to agents and of the
The CMS is one of the possible measurement approach- types of abuse of public power are the content of the
es to corruption. Its main objective is to provide statis- exchange. The most common word used to label the
forms of corruption is “bribe.” Regarding content,
254
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 1998, pp. 64-91) variations in corruption behaviour could be numerous
255
All Corruption Assessment Reports since 1998 are available at the but they depend on what is being done, how it is done
“Anti-corruption” section of CSD’s webpage http://www.csd.bg and who is the perpetrator. In more concrete terms
256
(SELDI, 2002). the above variation in corruption behaviour could be
(TNS Political & Social, March 2014) and (TNS Opinion & Social,
257
summarised in four sub-concepts:
February 2014).
258
Summaries of discussions in this area can be found in: (Disch,
Vigeland, Sundet, Hussmann, & O’Neil, 2009); (Jain, 2001); • Form. Bribe is the common label of the private benefit
(Johnson & Mason, July 2013); (Reinikka & Svensson, J., 2003). that is being exchanged. The most common forms
of bribes include money, gifts or favours. The latter Corruption behaviour elements
could be linked to types of corruption behaviour.
It is important to note that bribes are the empirical Corruption behaviour
manifestation of corrupt behaviour but receive their
corruption load only in conjunction with the other Benefit (form) Abuse (content)
aspects of corruption.
• Type. Entrusted discretionary power can be abused Bribe
Bribe Violation
(money, Type Level
in many different ways (trading in influence, gift)
(favour) model
nepotism, clientelism, etc.).

• Level. Agents at different levels could abuse discre- Abuse Nepo- Violate Better High:
Low:
Other Admini-
tionary power and this might not always be directly of office tism law service political
strative
linked to specific clients (level).
• Violation model refers to the model of abuse of Source: Center for the Study of Democracy/Vitosha Research.
discretionary power and could be split into two
broad categories: 1) violation of existing laws and/or to the public services clients are entitled to, given the
institutional norms; 2) provision of a better service. organisation of the public service of a country.
In some societies and cultures, additional benefits
provided to agents could be regarded (by custom,
law, tradition, etc.) as normal behaviour when/if
provided services are normal or better; in such cases CMS indicators
additional benefits take the form of a tip and not the
and indexes
form of a bribe.
While the above abstract summary model of corruption The main indicators of the CMS describe corruption
behaviour could be further specified in order to list (as a social phenomenon) using three groups of concepts:
most possible variations of form and content, it is experience, attitudes, and perceptions.
important to note that form and content could easily be
used as proxies of each other. If there is a bribe, there is Information on CMS indicators is collected through a
most probably some kind of abuse; on the other hand, survey questionnaire. Indicators are first broken down
if there is an abuse, there probably is some material into survey questions and at the analysis stage the
gain. Therefore, in order to measure the prevalence information is aggregated to form the CMS indexes.
of corruption behaviour, an attempt should be made This allows for a more robust interpretation of findings
to either measure the number of bribe incidents, or and has been a way to keep findings aligned to the
the number of abuses of different types. In empirical theoretical background of the study.
terms, the easier way to “access” corrupt behaviour is
through identification of instances of bribery. Types, Over the years, two methods of aggregation have been
violation models and levels are more difficult to used by SELDI. In the 2001 – 2002 round of SELDI
observe and account for. Even when the latter is the diagnostics, as well as in the SELDI Action Agenda,259
case, there is always a possibility that a violation has a quasi-normalisation procedure was used, which
occurred without any personal benefit for the offender calculates individual respondent scores for each
(the official). respondent and “places” scores on a scale ranging from
0 (“best value” in terms of corruption) to 10 (“worst
The specific objective of the CMS is to address the value” in terms of corruption). In the 2013 – 2014
most common forms of abuse. In terms of the above diagnostics, the results of which are presented in this
classification this would be low level (administrative) report, a direct allocation of respondents into specific
corruption of all types and violation models. The (for each indicator) categories was used. Essentially,
reason for choosing such a criterion is expected both procedures render similar results, but have some
prevalence that could be registered with random sample important differences.
techniques: low level (administrative) corruption of all
types and violation models. The proxy of these abuses The advantages of the normalisation method are that
is the occurrence of bribery which is defined as benefit all indexes use the same scale and are in this way
received informally by the agent (the public official)
in the form of money, gift or favour. It is an addition (SELDI, 2013).
259
Methodological appendix: Corruption Monitoring System 137
Structure of the Corruption Monitoring System Indexes Experience-based

corruption indexes
Assessments
Experience based Attitude based of the corruption
corruption indexes corruption indexes environment
indexes Involvement in corruption
“Involvement in corruption” captures the instances

Awareness Likelihood of when individuals make informal payments to public
Corruption
pressure
(identification of corruption officials. The questions used to gather information about
corruption) pressure
this indicator are victimisation questions and reflect
experience during the preceding year. The indicator
summarises citizens’ reports and divides them into
Acceptability
Involvement in
(tolerance of
Corruptness of two categories: people without corruption experience
corruption officials
corruption) (have not given bribes) and people with corruption
experience (have given bribes at least once during the
preceding year).
Feasibility of
Susceptibility to
policy responses
corruption
to corruption
Research questions:
A13. Whenever you have contacted officials in the

Source: Center for the Study of Democracy/Vitosha Research. public sector, how often in the last year you
have had to:
comparable in terms of values. The disadvantage of
One answer on each line.
the index calculated in this way is that it is not directly
interpretable. The conclusions that can be made would 1 In all cases
be based on time series and evaluation of dynamics 2 In most of the cases
over time. However, an index of 0.5 or 5.6 does not 3 In isolated cases
directly relate to the content of questions and the 4 In no cases
specific aspects of the concept it represents. Another 9 Don’t know/No answer
disadvantage is that possibilities for statistical analysis
A13A Give cash to an official 1 2 3 4 9
of data are largely limited.
A13B Give gift to an official 1 2 3 4 9
The main advantages of the direct allocation method A13C Do an official a favor 1 2 3 4 9
(conditional recoding of variables that compose each
indicator) are two. First, results are directly interpretable Recoding procedure (new index)
in terms of content. In this way the index is more or less
“self-explanatory” and needs little input explanations as Conditional recoding divides respondents into two
to what is measured and presented. Second, the index categories:
variables provide all possibilities for statistical analyses
and tests. A limitation in this respect is that index (a) Those who have not paid bribes – includes respond-
variables are measured on weak scales (nominal). ents who have simultaneously answered with code
4 to all questions.
A comparison of results between quasi-normalisation (b) Those who have paid bribes – includes respondents
and conditional recoding calculation methodologies who have answered with codes 1, 2 or 3 to any of the
is presented below for one of the most important and three questions.
widely commented indexes: involvement in corruption
transactions. Additional categories:
(c) No contact – people who have not contacted the

administration (based on previous filter question).
(d) No answer – people who have chosen DK/NA option
to at least one of the three questions.
Final variable: aggregates (for every respondent) the
values of all questions based on the above conditional New and old involvement indexes for Bulgaria
recoding scheme. (1999 – 2014)

SPSS SYNTAX
compute NNaa13a=a13a.

compute NNaa13b=a13b.

compute NNaa13c=a13c.

recode NNaa13a NNaa13b NNaa13c(1 thru 2=3)

(sysmis=20).

count IIct= NNaa13a NNaa13b NNaa13c(3).

recode IIct (2 thru 3=1).

if (NNaa13a=9) IIct=9.

if (NNaa13b=9) IIct=9.
if (NNaa13c=9) IIct=9.

if (NNaa13a=20) IIct=20.

if (NNaa13b=20) IIct=20.
if (NNaa13c=20) IIct=20. /FXJOWPMWFNFOUJOEFY 0MEJOWPMWFNFOUJOEFY
val lab IIct 0 'Did not give bribe' 1 'Gave bribe' 20 'No Source: Center for the Study of Democracy/Vitosha Research.
contact with admin' 9 'DK/NA'.
var lab IIct 'Involvement in corruption'. Corruption pressure
Recoding procedure (old index) “Corruption pressure” reflects instances of initiation

of bribe seeking by public officials: either by directly
The index reflects the self-assessed involvement of the requesting an informal payment or by indirectly
respondents in various forms of corrupt behavior. indicating that an informal payment would lead to a
positive (for the citizen) outcome. CMS results have
This index is a function of questions (a13a, a13b, a13c), shown that pressure has been a decisive factor for
where the value codes are recoded as follows: involvement. Most corruption transactions occur after
the active solicitation of payments by officials.
Recoded (final)
Original Research question:
Label value
value
(a13ar, a13br, a13cr)
1 In all cases 10 A12. Whenever you have contacted officials
in the public sector, how often in the last year
2 In most of the cases 6.6666666
they have:
3 In isolated cases 3.3333333
4 In no cases 0
(not No contact in the 1 In all cases
System missing 2 In most of the cases
asked if) last year
Don't know/ 3 In isolated cases
9 System missing 4 In no cases
No answer
8 No contact in the last year
9 Don’t know/No answer
An average of the recoded values for all questions is
A12A Directly demanded
computed, thus the final index ranges from the lowest 1 2 3 4 8 9
cash, gift or favor
0 (no corruption transactions) to the highest possible 10
(all contacts involve corruption transactions). A12B Not demanded
i4 (Involvement in corrupt practices) = (a13ar + a13br + directly, but
a13cr)/3 showed that they 1 2 3 4 8 9
Results: expected cash, gift
or favor
IF A12 = 8 (no contact in the last year) go to A15.
Otherwise continue with A13
Recoding procedure (new index) New and old corruption pressure indexes for Bulgaria
(1999 – 2014)
Based on variables A12a and a12b.

Logic: corruption pressure has been exercised, if

respondent answers with categories 1, 2 and 3 to any

of the two variables. Respondents who answered with

category 4 to both questions have not experienced

corruption pressure.

SPSS SYNTAX

compute NNaa12a=a12a.
compute NNaa12b=a12b.

recode NNaa12a NNaa12b (1 thru 2=3).
count IPress= NNaa12a NNaa12b (3). /FXQSFTTVSFOEFY 0MEQSFTTVSFJOEFY
fre IPress.
recode IPress (2=1). Source: Center for the Study of Democracy/Vitosha Research.
fre IPress.
if (NNaa12a=8) IPress=8.
if (NNaa12b=8) IPress=8. Attitudes-based
if (NNaa12a=9) IPress=9.
corruption indexes
if (NNaa12b=9) IPress=9.
fre IPress.
val lab IPress 0 'No corruption pressure' 1 'Experienced Direct involvement in corruption transactions is accom
corruption pressure' 8 'No contact with administration' panied by the prevalence of specific attitudes towards
9 'DK/NA'. corruption and corruption behaviour and by perception
VARIABLE LABELS IPress 'Experience with corruption of the spread of corruption in society. Ideally, low levels
pressure'. of involvement in corruption would be paired with
negative attitudes towards corrupt behaviour and
Recoding procedure (old index) perceptions that corruption is rare and unlikely. This
does not mean that perceptions and attitudes directly
This index is a function of questions (a12a, a12b), where determine corruption behaviour of citizens. Rather
the value codes are recoded as follows: they could influence behaviour to a certain degree
but essentially express the general social and political
Recoded (final) atmosphere in society related to corruption.
Original
Label value
value Awareness (identification) of corruption
(a12ar, a12br)
1 In all cases 10
“Awareness (identification) of corruption” is an index
2 In most of the cases 6.6666666
accounting for the level of understanding of citizens
3 In isolated cases 3.3333333 as to what constitutes corruption behaviour. The index
4 In no cases 0 differentiates between three categories of awareness:
8 No contact in the System missing high (citizens who identify all or most of the common
last year corruption behaviour patterns as corruption), moderate
9 Don't know/ System missing (many of the common corruption practices are identified
No answer but some forms of corruption are classified as “normal
behaviour”), low (few corruption patterns are identified
as corruption).
An average of the recoded values for the two questions
is computed, thus the final index ranges from the Recoding procedure (new index)
lowest 0 (no cases of corruption pressure) to the highest
possible 10 (corruption pressure in all cases of contact). Based on questions A1B-A1K.
i3 (Corruption pressure) = (a12ar + a12br)/2 Counts identified corruption practices. Maximum score
11 = all practices identifies as corruption. Minimum
score 0 = no behavior identified as corruption.
Research question:
A1B. In your opinion, which of the following actions are examples of “corruption”?
One answer on each line
Yes No DK/NA
A Giving a gift to a doctor so that he/she takes special care of you 1 2 9
B Giving money/doing a favour to an administration official in order to win
1 2 9
a competition, concession or public procurement tender
C Using “connections” to receive a particular public service that your are
1 2 9
entitled to (by law)
D Lobbying a public official to hire a relative (family, friend) of yours 1 2 9
E Contacting a municipal councilor personally, in order to receive a permission
1 2 9
for construction
F Giving money to a police officer so that your driver’s license is not suspended 1 2 9
G Using someone’s official position for doing private business 1 2 9
H Providing confidential information acquired in public office to acquaintances
1 2 9
of yours for personal gain
I Administration officials accepting money for allowing tax evasion or tax
1 2 9
reduction
J Pre-election donations to political parties 1 2 9
K Paying additional remuneration to a lawyer who assists a defendant to stop
1 2 9
a lawsuit against him/her
Recoding: parliament or the government, as well as civil servants

1 = (values 0 thru 3) = low level of awareness of at central and local government level, to receive gifts,
corruption behavior money, favours or a free lunch (“get a treat”) in return
2 = (values 4 thru 7) = moderate level of awareness to solving someone’s problems.
3 = (values 8 thru 11) = high level of awareness
SPSS SYNTAX Research question:
COUNT
ICor = a1ba a1bb a1bc a1bd a1be a1bf a1bg a1bh a1bi a1bj A9. According to you, are the following activities
a1bk (1) . acceptable, if performed by members of the
VARIABLE LABELS ICor 'Identification of corruption' . parliament or the government?
RECODE
ICor
(SYSMIS=SYSMIS) (0 thru 3=1) (4 thru 7=2) (8 thru 11=3) 1 Acceptable
INTO ICor2 . 2 Rather acceptable
VARIABLE LABELS ICor2 'Identification of corruption 3 Rather unacceptable
(categories)'. 4 Unacceptable
EXECUTE . 9 Don’t know/No answer
A9A To accept an invitation
Recoding procedure (old index)
for a free lunch/dinner
No such index has been calculated. 1 2 3 4 9
to solve personal
problems
Acceptability (tolerance) of corrupt behaviour
A9B To resolve a personal
While awareness captures the knowledge component, problem and accept a 1 2 3 4 9
acceptability of corruption captures tolerance (or favor in exchange
lack of tolerance) towards corruption. It summarises
whether it is acceptable to the public for members of the
A9C To accept gifts for the Recoding procedure (old index)

solution of personal 1 2 3 4 9
problems This index is a function of questions (a9a, a9b, a9c,
A9D To accept cash for the a9d, a10a, a10b, a10c, a10d), where the value codes are
solution of personal 1 2 3 4 9 recoded as follows:
problems
Original Recoded (final)
Label
value value (a9ar…)
A10. According to you, are the following activities 1 Acceptable 10
acceptable, if performed by officials at
2 Rather acceptable 6.6666666
ministries, municipalities and mayoralties?
3 Rather unacceptable 3.3333333
4 Unacceptable 0
1 Acceptable 9 Don't know/No answer System missing
2 Rather acceptable
3 Rather unacceptable An average of the recoded values for all 8 questions is
4 Unacceptable computed, thus the final index ranges from the lowest 0
9 Don’t know/No answer (unacceptable) to the highest possible 10 (acceptable).
(Acceptability) = (a9ar + a9br + a9cr + a9dr + a10ar + a10br
A10A To accept an invitation
+ a10cr + a10dr)/8
for a free lunch/dinner
1 2 3 4 9
to solve personal
New and old acceptability indexes for Bulgaria
problems (2001, 2002 and 2014)
A10B To resolve a personal

problem and accept a 1 2 3 4 9

favor in exchange

A10C To accept gifts for the

problems

A10D To accept cash for the

problems

/FXBDDFQUBCJMJUZJOEFY XIPBDDFQUDPSSVQUCFIBWJPS
0MEBDDFQUBCJMJUZJOEFY
Recoding procedure (new index)
Source: Center for the Study of Democracy/Vitosha Research.
Based on variables a9 and a10.
Logic: respondents who consider any of the list of Susceptibility to corruption
practices acceptable (values 1 and 2 on a9 and a10) are
coded as “accepting”, while the others (values 3, 4 and 9) “Susceptibility to corruption” reflects the tendency of
are coded as0 “unaccepting” these practices. respondents to react to two hypothetical situations –
SPSS SYNTAX one involves being in the role of an underpaid public
COUNT official and accepting or denying a bribe that is offered,
Ix1 = A9A A9B A9C A9D A10A A10B A10C A10D (1) the other asks about giving a bribe to a corrupt public
A9A A9B A9C A9D A10A A10B A10C A10D (2) . official, if one had a major problem to solve and was
VARIABLE LABELS Ix1 'Tolerance of corruption asked explicitly for a bribe (cash). Declaring the
practices (Acceptability)'. denying of a bribe in both situations is interpreted as
EXECUTE . the respondent being not susceptible to corruption,
fre Ix1. accepting/giving a bribe in both is interpreted as
recode Ix1 (1 thru 8 = 2) (0=1) INTO Ix2. susceptibility, while giving/taking a bribe in one of
VARIABLE LABELS Ix2'Tolerance of corruption the situations and not in the other is defined as “mixed
practices (Acceptability)'. behaviour”.
Research question: val lab skl 1 'Susceptible to corruption' 2 'Not susceptible

to corruption' 3 'Mixed behavior'.
A8. Imagine yourself in an official low-paid recode skl (0=sysmis).
position and you are approached by someone
offering cash, gift or favor to solve his/her Recoding procedure (old index)
problem. What would you do:
This index is a function of questions (a8, a15), where the
One answer only.
value codes are recoded as follows:
1 I would accept – everyone does that.
2 I would accept, if I can solve his Recoded (final)
problem Original
Label value
3 I would not accept, if the solution value
(a8r, a15r)
to the problem is related with law
1 I would accept/pay 10
evasion
2 I would accept/pay, if... 6.6666666
4 I would not accept, I do not approve
of such acts 3 I would not accept/ 3.3333333
9 Don’t know/No answer pay, if...
4 I would not accept/pay 0
A15. If you had a major problem and an official 9 Don't know/No answer System missing
directly demanded cash to solve it, what
would you have done? An average of the recoded values for the two questions
is computed, thus the final index ranges from the lowest
One answer only.
0 (I would not accept/pay) to the highest possible 10
1 I would pay by all means (I would accept/pay).
2 I would pay if I can afford
3 I would not pay if I had another way (Susceptibility to corruption) = (a8r + a15r)/2
to solve the problem
4 I would not pay by any means New and old susceptibility indexes for Bulgaria
9 Don’t know/No answer (2001, 2002 and 2014)


Based on questions a8 and a15.

Categories of both collapsed to 2 options: susceptible to

corruption (1,2 and 3) and not susceptible (4). Based on

that three types of respondents are formed:

1: susceptible to corruption (would give and accept
/FXTVTDFQUJCJMJUZJOEFY OPUTVTDFQUJCMF
bribes)
/FXTVTDFQUJCJMJUZJOEFY NJYFECFIBWJPVS
2: not susceptible to corruption (would not give or

/FXTVTDFQUJCJMJUZJOEFY TVTDFQUJCMF
accept bribes) 0METVTDFQUJCJMJUZJOEFY

3: mixed behavior (would give, but not accept or the
opposite) Source: Center for the Study of Democracy/Vitosha Research.
SPSS SYNTAX
compute aa8=a8. Assessments of the
compute aa15=a15.
corruption environment
recode aa8 aa15 (1 thru 2=3).
compute skl=0. indexes
if (aa8=3 and aa15=3) skl=1.
if (aa8=4 and aa15=4) skl=2. The experience with corruption and the attitudes
if (aa8=3 and aa15=4) skl=3. towards corruption, as well as the general current
if (aa8=4 and aa15=3) skl=3. sentiment and level of trust towards public institutions
in society determine the public’s assessment of the Recoded (final)

Original
corruptness of the environment. These perceptions are Label value
value
summarised in the following indexes: (a3ar, a3br, a3cr)
1 Very likely 10
Likelihood of corruption pressure
2 Rather likely 6.6666666
“Likelihood of corruption pressure” is an index 3 Rather unlikely 3.3333333
measuring expectations of the public for the likelihood 4 Not likely at all 0
to face corruption pressure in interaction with public 9 Don't know/ System missing
officials. Overall this is an index gauging perceptions No answer
of the corruptness of the environment. In principle,
corruption theory considers that people would be more An average of the recoded values for all three questions
likely to resort to corruption patterns if they assess the is computed, thus the final index ranges from the
environment is intrinsically corrupt. lowest 0 (not likely at all) to the highest possible 10 (very
likely).
Research question:
(Likelihood of corruption pressure) = (a3ar + a3br +
A3. In order to successfully solve one’s problem a3cr)/3
is it likely or is it not likely he/she to have to:
New and old likelihood indexes for Bulgaria
(2001, 2002 and 2014)
1 Very likely

2 Rather likely
3 Rather unlikely

4 Not likely at all

A3A Give cash to an official 1 2 3 4 9

A3B Give a gift to an official 1 2 3 4 9

A3C Do a favor to an official 1 2 3 4 9


If the respondent answered 1 (very likely) or 2 (rather /FXMJLFMJIPPEJOEFY XIPUIJOLQSFTTVSFJTMJLFMZ
likely) to at least one of the three questions (A3A, A3B 0MEMJLFMJIPPEJOEFY

or A3C), then the likelihood of pressure is considered to Source: Center for the Study of Democracy/Vitosha Research.
be high, in all other cases the likelihood of pressure is
considered to be low. Corruptness of officials
compute likely = 2. Corruptness of officials is an index reflecting

if (a3a =1 or a3a =2 or a3b=1 or a3b = 2 or a3c = 1 or a3c perceptions of the integrity reputation of various
= 2) likely =1. groups of public officials; it thus constitutes an estimate
by the public of the corruptness of the various public
Recoding procedure (classical index) services. The interpretation of this index is specific, as it
is an assessment of attitudes of citizens towards public
This index was also known as “Practical efficiency of officials rather than a measure of the prevalence of
corruption.” corruption in the respective government departments.
The added value of this index is that it helps identify
This index is a function of questions (a3a, a3b, a3c), top ranking sectors affected by corruption or being
where the value codes are recoded as follows: least trusted by the public.
Research question: A4N Members of

1 2 3 4 9
parliament
A2. As you see it, how far is corruption A4O Ministers 1 2 3 4 9
proliferated among the officials
in the public sector?
Recoding procedure (old index)
One answer only.
1 Almost all officials are involved This index is a function of question (a2), where the value
2 Most officials are involved codes are recoded as follows:
3 Few officials are involved
4 Scarcely anyone of the officials is Original Recoded (final)
involved Label
value value (a2r)
1 Almost all officials are 10
involved
2 Most officials are 6.6666666
involved
This question is presented directly, as a mean value on
an inverted scale (1 becomes 4, 2 becomes 3, 3 becomes 3 Few officials are 3.3333333
2, 4 becomes 1, 9 is excluded from mean computations as involved
“user missing”). However, rather than presenting data 4 Scarcely anyone of the 0
for the officials in the public sector as a whole, more officials is involved
concrete perceptions (question A4) for the different 9 Don't know/No answer System missing
kinds of public officials (e.g. officials at ministries,
judges, public prosecutors, etc.) are presented. The final index ranges from the lowest 0 (nobody is
involved) to the highest possible 10 (almost everybody
A4. According to you, how far is corruption is involved).
proliferated among the following groups: (Corruptness of officials) = a2r
Feasibility of policy responses
1 Almost everybody is involved
2 Most are involved “Feasibility of policy responses to corruption” is an
3 Few are involved indicator capturing the “public thinking” about policy
4 Scarcely anyone is involved responses to corruption. More specifically it evaluates
9 Don’t know/No answer potential public trust in the government’s willingness
and/or capacity to tackle corruption, as well as potential
A4A Journalists 1 2 3 4 9
support for anticorruption policies.
A4B Teachers 1 2 3 4 9
A4C University officials or Research question:
1 2 3 4 9
professors
A4D Officials at ministries 1 2 3 4 9 A19. In view of corruption in (country), which of
A4E Municipal officials 1 2 3 4 9 following opinions is closer to your own?
A4F Administration One answer only.
officials in the judicial 1 2 3 4 9
1 The wide spread of corruption cannot
system
be reduced
A4G Judges 1 2 3 4 9 2 Corruption will always exist in
A4H Public prosecutors 1 2 3 4 9 (country), yet it can be limited
A4I Investigating officers 1 2 3 4 9 to a degree
A4J Lawyers 1 2 3 4 9 3 Corruption in (country) can be
substantially reduced
A4K Police officers 1 2 3 4 9
4 Corruption in (country) can be
A4L Customs officers 1 2 3 4 9
eradicated
A4M Tax officials 1 2 3 4 9 9 Don’t know/No answer
Recoding procedure (new index) The final index ranges from the lowest 0 (corruption
can be eradicated) to the highest possible 10 (corruption
Answers 1 and 2 are recoded as “1” – Corruption can be cannot be reduced).
substantially reduced or eradicated, 3 and 4 are recoded
as “2” Corruption cannot be substantially reduced, (Feasibility of policy responses) = a19r
9 remains “don’t know”.
New and old feasibility of policy responses indexes
Recoding procedure (old index) for Bulgaria (2001, 2002 and 2014)

This index is a function of question (a19), where the

value codes are recoded as follows:

Original Recoded (final)
Label
value value (a19r)

1 The wide spread of 10

corruption cannot be
reduced

2 Corruption will always 6.6666666 /FXJOEFYm%POhULOPX/PBTOXFS
exist in (country), yet /FXJOEFYm$PSSVQUJPODBOCFTVCTUBOUJBMMZSFEVDFEPSFSBEJDBUFE
it can be limited to a /FXJOEFYm$PSSVQUJPODBOOPUCFTVCTUBOUJBMMZSFEVDFE
degree 0MEJOEFY
3 Corruption in (country) 3.3333333
can be substantially
reduced
4 Corruption in (country) 0
can be eradicated
9 Don't know/No answer System missing
Annex: Executive Summary in
SELDI National Languages
Albania
Përmbledhje ekzekutive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Izvršni sažetak. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Bulgaria
Резюме. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Croatia
Izvršni sažetak. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Kosovo
Përmbledhja ekzekutive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Macedonia
Извршно резиме. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Montenegro
Rezime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Serbia
Rezime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Turkey
Yönetici Özeti. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Albania ndërkombëtar. Raporti paraqet pikëpamjet e shoqërisë

civile dhe bën një vlerësimi të politikave, ndërsa
gjetjet dhe rekomandimet e tij janë konsultuar me
institucionet publike kombëtare dhe rajonale.
Përmbledhje ekzekutive Vlerësimet e aspekteve kombëtare institucionale dhe

ligjore që lënë shteg për korrupsion në rajon, nuk kanë për
qëllim të jenë një grumbullim rregullash dhe praktikash
Korrupsioni në Evropën Juglindore ka qenë në fokusin nga të gjithë vendet, por fokusohen në disa çështje
e lajmeve, debatit publik dhe axhendës së politikës së prioritare, në shërbim të përpjekjeve për të identifikuar
institucioneve vendore dhe ndërkombëtare aq shpesh burime të përbashkëta të korrupsionit në Evropën
dhe aq gjatë sa që vështirë të mos justifikohet një Juglindore. Raporti ofron një model për raportimin mbi
studim mbi të. Pikërisht natyra problematike e kësaj progresin në luftën kundër korrupsionit të shoqërisë
dukurie justifikon përdorimin e përqasjeve inovative civile në Evropën Juglindore.
për ta kuptuar dhe më pas për ta reduktuar këtë dukuri.
Perspektivat për anëtarësim në Bashkimin Evropian për
vendet e rajonit, edhe pse të largëta, ofrojnë një strukturë
të përshtatshme për veprim. Megjithatë janë aktorët GJETJET KRYESORE
vendorë dhe veçanërisht shoqëria civile ata që mund
të sjellin progres të qëndrueshëm në antikorrupsion.
Lidershipi për Evropën Juglindore për Zhvillim dhe Vlerësimi i përgjithshëm
Integritet (SELDI) ka vendosur si një nga prioritetet e
tij kryesore, analizimin dhe të kuptuarit në thellësi të Pavarësisht disa arritjeve të rëndësishme- kryesisht në
dukurisë së korrupsionit dhe mangësive në qeverisje lidhje me stabilizimin e institucioneve demokratike,
në rajon, si kushte të domosdoshme për advokimin e miratimin e ligjeve në fushat kryesore antikorrupsion,
politikave kundër korrupsion. Ky raport është pjesë reduktimin e ryshfeteve dhe rritjen e intolerancës
e zhvillimit dhe zbatimit të politikave dhe strukturave publike ndaj dukurisë së korrupsionit- reformat
rajonale kundër korrupsion të paraqitura në shtyllën në anti-korrupsion dhe mirëqeverisje nuk janë
mbi qeverisjen në strategjinë SEE2020, drejtuar nga ende të konsoliduara: korrupsioni i politikanëve
Iniciativa Rajonale Kundër Korrupsionit. dhe gjyqtarëve duket të jetë në rritje dhe zbatimi
i legjislacionit kundër korrupsionit nuk bëhet në
Duke qenë rezultat i bashkëpunimit brenda anëtarëve mënyrë konsistente. Politikat kundër korrupsionit
të SELDI, ky raport përdor një përqasje inovative në dhe institucionet e antikorrupsionit në rajon, do të
metodikë dhe shkrim. Raporti është rezultat i zbatimit të përfitonin së tepërmi nga miratimi i një sondazhi të
një sistemi të hartuar nga SELDI në fillim të viteve 2000 rregullt të vikitimizimit prej korrupsionit për të matur
për vlerësimin e korrupsionit dhe antikorrupsionit në korrupsionin dhe progresin në mirëqeverisje, të
mjedisin social dhe institucional të Evropës Juglindore.1 ngjashëm me Eurobarometrin mbi antikorrupsionin,
Anketa mbi viktimizimin e qytetarëve që përdoret monitorimin e korrupsionit dhe krimit të organizuar
në këtë raport bazohet në metodikën e përdorur nga në Evropën Juglindore nga Zyra e Kombeve të
Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit i cili lejon për një Bashkuara për Drogat dhe Krimin (UNODC), apo dhe
vlerësim të veçantë bazuar në të dhëna mbi progresin e me Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit të përdorur në
anti-korrupsionit në rajon që nga vitin 2001. Vlerësimet këtë raport.
e 2013-2014, gjetjet e të cilave janë përmbledhur në këtë
raport, janë një rast i rrallë në praktikën ndërkombëtare
monitoruese ku të njëjtat çështje dhe i njëjti rajon Përhapja e korrupsionit në Evropën
rishqyrtohen pas pak më shumë se një dekade. Juglindore
Raporti ka krahasuar legjislacionin kombëtar dhe
praktikën institucionale në një numër fushash kritike Përvoja me korrupsionin, ose me fjalë të tjera, përfshirja
të përpjekjeve antikorrupsion: kuadrin rregullator dhe e publikut në transaksionet korruptive është shumë e
ligjor, kushtet institucionale, korrupsionin në ekonomi lartë në Evropën Juglindore. Edhe në Turqi dhe Kroaci,
dhe rolin e shoqërisë civile dhe bashkëpunimin ku nivelet e korrupsionit administrativ janë më të
ulëtat në rajon, rreth 8-9% e popullsisë raporton të
1
(SELDI, 2002). kenë dhënë ryshfet gjatë vitit të fundit. Nivele të tilla
Annex 149
përvoje me korrupsionin janë përtej niveleve mesatare rezistenca ndaj korrupsionit nuk mund të konsiderohet
të regjistruara nga sondazhet e Eurobarometrit në si faktori kryesor në reduktimin e dukurisë së
Bashkimin Evropian.2 Kjo tregon se korrupsioni korrupsionit, ai reflekton qëndrimet ekzistuese sociale
administrativ është një fenomen masiv dhe nuk mund për integritetin dhe është kryesisht rezultat i përpjekjeve
të kufizohet vetëm në raste të veçanta të zyrtarëve të të shoqërisë civile dhe autoriteteve publike për rritjen
korruptuar. e ndërgjegjësimit për luftën kundër korrupsionit. Në
këtë drejtim, roli i shoqërisë civile është i rëndësishëm
Diferencat thelbësore midis vendeve me një formim pasi ajo është në gjendje të vlerësojë rezultatet dhe të
të përbashkët historik, tregojnë se rrugët e ndryshme përfaqësojë presionin e publikut për ndryshim.
të zhvillimit shoqëror, ekonomik dhe institucional
prodhojnë rezultate të ndryshme. Në përgjithësi, me
përjashtim të Bullgarisë, ndryshimet për të gjitha Rezistenca ndaj presionit të korrupsionit
vendet kanë qenë pozitive në krahasim me raundet e
OHBBUPUÌDJMÌUIBTÌOQSFTJPOQÌSUÌQBHVBSSSZTIGFU
mëparshme të SELDI (2001 dhe 2002) ku është përdorur

4IRJQÌSJB
po i njëjti Sistem i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit. Në
.BRFEPOJB
përgjithësi ka patur progres, megjithëse ai ka qenë i
,PTPWB
ngadalshëm dhe i pabarabartë për shtete të ndryshme.
.BMJ*;J
4FSCJB
#VMMHBSJB
Presioni i korrupsionit dhe përfshirja në korrupsion
,SPBDJB
#PTOJBEIF
FQPQVMMTJTÌUÌDJMÌWFKVÌTIUÌLÌSLVBSEIFLBOÌ )FSDFHPWJOB
EIÌOÌSSZTIGFU QBSB GBWPSF EIVSBUB
HKBUÌWJUJUUÌGVOEJU

5VSRJB

4IRJQÌSJB

%IBSSZTIGFUOÌOQSFTJPO 1BQFSHKJHKF

.BMJ*;J /VLEIBSSZTIGFU QBWBSÌTJTIUQSFTJPOJU

Burimi: SELDI/CSD Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit, 2014.
#VMMHBSJB

4FSCJB

.BRFEPOJB

Politikat dhe legjislacioni kundër

,PTPWB
korrupsionit
#PTOJBEIF
)FSDFHPWJOB Në përgjithësi, vendet anëtare të SELDI kanë huazuar
1SFTJPOJ KVÌTIUÌ
,SPBDJB

LÌSLVBSSSZTIGFU
në legjislacionet e tyre kombëtare pjesën më të mirë

1ÌSGTIJSKB
të standardeve ndërkombëtare kundër korrupsionit,
5VSRJB
LBOÌEIÌOÌSSZTIGFU
dhe më e rëndësishmja, logjikën dhe qasjen e tyre.
Megjithatë, cilësia ligjore mbetet problem. Ndryshimet
Burimi: SELDI/CSD Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit, 2014. e shpeshta dhe të paqëndrueshme, kanë rezultuar në
kompleksitete procedurale dhe ligjore dhe interpretime
kontradiktore nga ana e gjykatave.
Presioni korrupsionit nga zyrtarët, është faktori
kryesor që ndikon statistikisht në nivelin e përfshirjes Të gjitha vendet kanë miratuar një lloj dokumenti
në korrupsion. Pjesa më e madhe e vendeve me nivele strategjik që përmban qëndrimin e tyre të përgjithshëm
të larta përfshirjeje dhe presioni, karakterizohen edhe për luftën ndaj korrupsionit. Edhe pse ka disa dallime
nga një rezistencë e ulët ndaj presionit të korrupsionit mes vendeve, zbatimi i këtyre dokumenteve është
(pjesa më e madhe e të anketuarve të cilëve ju është penguar në përgjithësi nga burimet dhe angazhimi i
kërkuar ryshfet, e kanë dhënë një të tillë). Edhe pse pamjaftueshëm në nivel të lartë qeverie. Një problem
tjetër në gjithë rajonin ka qenë hartimi i strategjive për të
2
Treguesit mbi përvojën me korrupsionin të përdorura në anketat adresuar të gjitha aspektet e mundshme të korrupsionit.
e Eurobarometer kanë përmbajtje pak më të ndryshme pasi ato i Në vend që të prioritizonin, këto dokumente u bënë
referohen përvojës dhe rasteve të drejtpërdrejta kur të anketuarit
kanë qenë dëshmitarë të rasteve të mitmarrjes. Për më shumë shumë gjithëpërfshirës: në lidhje me antikorrupsionin,
detaje, ju lutem referojuni (TNS Opinion & Social, Shkurt 2014). fjala “strategjike” ka marrë kuptimin e gjithëpërfshirjes.
Përsa i përket prioriteteve të politikave, ka patur Praktika institucionale dhe

dy ndryshime të rëndësishme në qasjen ndaj luftës zbatimi i ligjit
kundër korrupsionit: një zhvendosje të vëmendjes nga
korrupsioni i vogël (i policisë rrugore apo mjekëve Në Evropën Juglindore theksi që u vu në harmonizimin
në sektorin publik) në atë të madh (atë të anëtarëve e legjislacionit kombëtar me standardet ndërkombëtare
të parlamentit apo ministrave) dhe kriminalizimin në luftën kundër korrupsionit, gradualisht po i lëshon
e një game më të gjerë abuzimesh me funksionet rrugë fokusit në zbatimin e këtij legjislacioni nën
publike. Arritja e një impakti pozitiv në ndëshkimin e presionin në rritje të BE dhe shoqërisë civile vendase.
korrupsionit të madh, mbetet e limituar në rastin më të
mirë. Sfidat kryesore për politikat kundër korrupsionit Një e metë që është e përbashkët për të gjitha vendet
në rajon janë mbyllja e hendekut në zbatimin e këtyre anëtare të SELDI është kompromentimi i autonomisë së
politikave dhe vazhdimi i luftës kundër korrupsionit organeve të ndryshme mbikëqyrëse dhe ligjzbatuese.
pavarësisht ndryshimeve në manifestimet dhe format e Një farë ndërhyrjeje në çështjet e shërbimit civil nga
korrupsionit, duke ruajtur në të njëjtën kohë stabilitetin politikanë të zgjedhur, anëtarë të parlamentit apo
rregullator dhe duke shmangur ndryshimet e shpeshta ministrat e qeverisë, është e zakonshme. Gjithashtu,
në gjyqësor. asnjë nga vendet e SELDI nuk ka një mekanizëm të
menaxhimit të ankesave në administratën publike që
Gjetjet e monitorimit të SELDI theksojnë rëndësinë funksionon siç duhet. Shumica kanë krijuar një organ
e mbështetjes publike për suksesin e politikave kundër korrupsion që pritet të pranojë ankesa nga
kundër korrupsionit. Besimi i publikut tek qeveria publiku. Një tjetër mangësi që është e përbashkët, është
dhe efektiviteti i politikave kundër korrupsion janë të mungesa e të dhënave të besueshme dhe me qasje publike
lidhura në një lloj rrethi virtuoz: përqindjet më të larta për punën e institucioneve qeveritare, veçanërisht në
të njerëzve që janë optimist për mundësinë e suksesit lidhje me luftën kundër korrupsionit. Informacioni
të luftës kundër korrupsionit janë të lidhura me nivele dhe statistikat ose nuk janë mbledhur, ose nuk janë në
më të ulëta të korrupsionit. Anasjelltas, një përhapje më dispozicion për publikun, ose mblidhen në mënyrë aq
e madhe e korrupsionit shkon dorë për dore me rritjen rastësore sa nuk lejojnë monitorim dhe analizë.
e pesimizmit rreth perspektivave të luftës kundër
korrupsion. Një nga çështjet kyçe që ka të bëjë me krijimin e
institucioneve të specializuara kombëtare kundër
korrupsion në rajon, është se si të kombinohen
Fizibiliteti i politikave të korrupsionit: Si i vlerëson funksionet parandaluese dhe represive. Vendet
publiku anëtare të SELDI janë përpjekur që institucionet e tyre
antikorrupsion t’i bëjnë të dyja, edhe pse funksioni
FQPQVMMTJTF
represiv zë pjesën më të vogël të punës së tyre. Shumica

5VSRJB
e detyrave të këtyre organeve përfshin funksione të
,SPBDJB
mbikëqyrjes dhe kontrollit, zakonisht të strategjive
.BMJ*;J
,PTPWB
kombëtare kundër korrupsionit dhe nuk duket se ata
#PTOJBEIF

kanë pasur ndonjë ndikim të rëndësishëm në axhendën
)FSDFHPWJOB
4FSCJB legjislative të qeverisë. Ngritja dhe funksionimi i
#VMMHBSJB institucioneve të tilla është dëmtuar nga një sërë
.BRFEPOJB vështirësish:
4IRJQÌSJB
• Megjithëse korrupsioni mund të ketë qenë në krye
/JWFMJ*LPSSVQTJPOJOVLNVOEUFVMFUTIVNF të axhendave të qeverive, nuk ishte e mundur
/JWFMJ*LPSSVQTJPOJNVOEUFVMFUTIVNF të krijoheshin institucione me kompetenca të
/VLFEJ1BQFSHKJHKF jashtëzakonshme që do të mund të ndikonin disi në
Burimi: SELDI/CSD Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit, 2014. ekuilibrat e pushteteve. Kompromisi tipik është që
këto agjenci t'i bashkëngjiten degës ekzekutive dhe
tu jepen kompetenca mbikëqyrëse të cilat zakonisht
kufizohen vetëm në të kërkuarit agjencive të tjera
qeveritare të raportojnë mbi zbatimin e detyrave
të caktuara për to në kuadër të luftës kundër
korrupsionit.
Annex 151
• Agjenci të tilla duhej të jenë të kujdesshme për të dobët, kriteret e paqarta, ndarja jo e përshtatshme
mos duplikuar funksione që u janë dhënë organeve e përgjegjësive dhe detyrave janë ato që pengojnë
të tjera mbikëqyrëse (p.sh. institucionet kombëtare reformën dhe dëmtojnë autoritetin qeveritar.
të auditimit apo agjencitë ligjzbatuese).
• Shumica e këtyre organeve janë të pajisura me Roli antikorrupsion i agjencive ligjzbatuese në
kapacitete të kufizuara institucionale, si buxheti dhe rajon duhet të kuptohet në kuadër të zgjerimit të
personeli, pavarësisht qëllimeve të deklaruara për të vazhdueshëm të gamës së praktikave të inkriminuara
kundërtën. si korrupsion, gjë që mund të çojë në kanalizimin e një
numri disproporcional të këtyre rasteve tek organet
Përsa i përket legjislaturës, parlamentet në rajon nuk ligjzbatuese dhe prokuroria. Roli antikorrupsion
renditen lartë në besimin e publikut dhe kjo pozitë i agjencive ligjzbatuese në Evropën Juglindore
e palakmueshme nuk është pa arsye. Kodet e sjelljes kompromentohet më tej nga cënueshmëria e lartë e tyre
etike janë të rralla dhe nuk zbatohen; rregulloret nga korrupsioni dhe sidomos nga krimi i organizuar.
për lobimet janë edhe më të rralla; procedurat për Forcat e policisë në shumicën e vendeve të SELDI kanë
heqjen e imunitetit nga ndjekja penale kanë filluar të njësi të specializuara në luftën kundër operacioneve
prezantohen vetëm kohët e fundit dhe në rastet kur ka të krimit të organizuar. Këto njësi pritet gjithashtu të
një trup antikorrupsion në parlament, detyra kryesore punojnë edhe në fushën e antikorrupsionit. Përshtatja
e tij është më tepër të mbikëqyrë ndonjë agjenci të e këtyre dy funksione në një njësi justifikohet kryesisht
ekzekutivit se sa të merret me korrupsionin midis nga korrupsioni i ushtruar nga krimi i organizuar,
anëtarëve. por edhe nga nevoja për metodat speciale të hetimit
në zbulimin e skemave të sofistikuara të korrupsionit,
Një shqetësim i rëndësishëm në vendet e SELDI është ekspertizë që gjendet zakonisht në departamentet e
financimi i partive politike dhe fushatave zgjedhore. luftës kundër krimit të organizuar. Këto njësi zakonisht
Shumica e vendeve kanë zbatuar rekomandimet e janë të vendosura në zyrat qendrore të policisë apo të
GRECO-s për financimin e partive, por një numër ministrive të brendshme, gjë e cila pengon autonominë
problemesh të tilla si donacionet anonime, blerjet e institucionale të tyre, të nevojshme për një institucion
votave (ose ryshfetet ndaj votuesve), kapacitetet e të specializuar antikorrupsion.
pamjaftueshme për të audituar financat e partisë dhe
kompetenca të kufizuara për të zbatuar sanksionet, etj,
vazhdojnë të mbeten akoma. Gjyqësori në antikorrupsion
Gjendja aktuale e shërbimit civil korrespondon Në Evropën Juglindore, fokusi i fortë në sigurimin e
me natyrën tranzicionale të vendeve të Europës pavarësisë së gjyqësorit nuk është balancuar në mënyrë
Juglindore, mungesën e traditave të përshtatshme të barabartë nga kërkesa po aq të forta për llogaridhënie
ligjore dhe institucionale, si dhe fondeve vazhdimisht nga ana e tij. Mungesa e kontrolleve dhe balancave të
të pamjaftueshme. Pavarësisht disa dallimeve përshtatshme ka sjellë që vetë-qeverisja në gjyqësor të
mes vendeve, nevoja për të lehtësuar zhvillimin dalë jashtë kontrollit dhe të kthehet në korporatizëm,
menaxherial dhe organizativ brenda shërbimit bashkë me të gjitha rreziqet për korrupsionin që lidhen
civil është e përbashkët për shumicën. Kultura e me të. Theksi i tepruar në pavarësinë formale zgjedhore
“kontrollit” të administratës, në vend të menaxhimit u bë një shembull tipik i ilaçit të kthyer në sëmundje; -në
të punës së saj nëpërmjet motivimit, pengon vend që të sigurohej një ekuilibër i pushtetit ekzekutiv,
zhvillimin e profesionalizmit dhe reduktimin e vetë-qeverisja solli marrëdhënie të tipit klientelist midis
korrupsionit. Një nga gjetjet kryesore të raportit magjistratëve dhe interesave të veçanta. Sot gjyqësori
është përforcimi reciprok midis kompetencës dhe në Evropën Juglindore është kapur nga korrupsioni
integritetit. Zakonisht, kur kredencialet mbi anti- ashtu si degët e tjera të pushtetit. Dikur të kërkuar
korrupsionin në një departament të caktuar të qeverisë nga publiku dhe faktorët politikë që sollën zhvillime
vihen në pikëpyetje, edhe kapacitetet institucionale të tilla, kontrollet mbi mitmarrjet e magjistratëve janë
janë të mangëta. Anasjelltas, çdo përmirësim në tanimë të pakta.
profesionalizëm ka çuar edhe në përmirësimin e
integritetit. Pra, sfida në rajon është se si të bëjmë Nuk është surprizë që opinioni publik mbi gjyqësorin
transparencën dhe llogaridhënien karakteristikat nuk është në nivele të larta. Nga Sistemi i Monitorimit të
thelbësore të shërbimit civil duke rritur gjithashtu Korrupsionit të SELDI del se gjyqtarët janë konsideruar
profesionalizmin e tij. Shumë shpesh, menaxhimi i nga zyrtarët publikë më të korruptuar në rajon.
Mungesa e transparencës dhe llogaridhënies është e pengesave të biznesit. Megjithatë, administratat

padyshim një faktor i rëndësishëm në vlerësime të tilla. mbikëqyrëse dhe kontrolluese vazhdojnë të deformojnë
Në të gjitha vendet e SELDI ka pasur një përkeqësim të tregjet duke u fokusuar shumë në kontrollin dhe
qartë në vlerësimin e përhapjes së korrupsionit tek dhënien e gjobave pa një vlerësim të përshtatshëm të
magjistratët që nga viti 2001. riskut dhe kosto-përfitimeve. Kjo është veçanërisht e
vërtetë për administratat doganore në të gjithë rajonin,
Kapaciteti i gjyqësorit në rajon për të zbatuar të cilat shihen ende si mjete efektive për presion mbi
legjislacionin kundër korrupsionit, sidomos për sa biznesin. Një gjë e tillë, ose drejton sipërmarrësit
i përket korrupsionit politik, është dëmtuar nga një në sektorin joformal ose i detyron ata që të përdorin
numër problemesh që kanë ushtruar ndikimin e tyre ryshfetet. Kjo, si për ti përkeqësuar gjërat më tej, i
në mënyrë kumulative: hap rrugën rregulloreve të mëtejshme dhe pengesave
administrative.
• Çështjet kushtetuese, që lidhen kryesisht me
rivendosjen e bilancit midis pavarësisë dhe Shumëllojshmëria e rrethanave që mundësojnë korrup
llogaridhënies së gjyqësorit; sionin në bashkëveprimet e biznesit dhe zyrtarëve
• Kompleksiteti i ndjekjes penale për ato që kryejnë publikë, përbën vështirësinë më të madhe që politikat
vepra penale të korrupsionit, veçanërisht në nivel kundër korrupsion hasin, kjo sepse është e nevojshme të
politik; merren në shqyrtim një sërë faktorësh. Kur ndërmerren
• Kapaciteti i përgjithshëm i pamjaftueshëm dhe nga biznesi, praktikat korruptive mund të ndahen në dy
çështje të tjera që lidhen me nivelet e ulta të kategori kryesore: shmangja e shpenzimeve shtesë dhe
profesionalizmit, ngarkesën e tepruar të punës që përfitimi i një avantazhi të padrejtë. Korrupsioni i grupit
çon në grumbullimin e shumë rasteve, menaxhimi të parë vjen për shkak të rregulloreve të dobëta apo të
i këtyre rasteve, ambientet etj. tepruara, paaftësive individuale apo institucionale, etj.;
ndërsa korrupsioni në kategorinë e dytë përfshin lloje
Një gjetje e rëndësishme e këtij raundi të monitorimit të ndryshme të mashtrimit – evazioni fiskal, mashtrimi
të korrupsionit të SELDI-t që ka lidhje me rolin me TVSH, kontrabanda, jo-pajtueshmëri me standardet
e gjyqësorit në luftën kundër korrupsionit, është shëndetësore dhe ato të sigurisë, etj.
mungesa e mekanizmave të feedback-ut që bëjnë të
mundur që publiku dhe politikëbërësit të vlerësojnë si Në Evropën Juglindore, prokurimi qeveritar është një
integritetin e gjyqësorit, ashtu dhe efektivitetin e tij në nga kanalet kryesore përmes të cilave korrupsioni
zbatimin e ligjeve kundër korrupsionit. Në asnjë nga ndikon në ekonomi. Rreziku korrupsionit në këtë fushë
vendet e Europës Juglindore nuk ka një mekanizëm është i lidhur me një numër mangësish: procedurat
të besueshëm, sistematik dhe gjithëpërfshirës për jo-mjaftueshëm transparente, një pjesë e madhe
mbledhjen, përpunimin dhe nxjerrjen e statistikave procedurash anti-konkurruese, mbikëqyrje e dobët dhe
për punën e gjykatave dhe të prokurorisë, në mënyrë shqyrtim gjyqësor jo-efektiv (duke marrë si të mirëqenë
të veçantë për rastet e korrupsionit, në dispozicion të korrupsionin në gjyqësor), etj. Edhe pse më shumë se
publikut. një dekadë më parë një studim i SELDI, ka gjetur se
vendet në rajon kishin bërë përparime kohët e fundit
në forcimin e kuadrit ligjor dhe harmonizimin me atë
Korrupsioni dhe ekonomia të BE, prokurimi publik vazhdon të jetë ndër aspektet
më të dobëta të qeverisjes publike. Realiteti nuk ka
Në Evropën Juglindore, përfshirja e konsiderueshme ndryshuar shumë duke qenë se rregulloret e mira janë
e qeverive në ekonomi gjeneron disa pika konflikti anashkaluar nga politikanë të korruptuar dhe biznese
të mundshëm midis institucioneve publike dhe me lidhje. Fragmentimi institucional nuk lejon zbatimin
biznesit, gjë që paraqet risk për korrupsion. Rreziku efektiv të rregulloreve të prokurimit publik.
është veçanërisht i lartë në fushën e privatizimit, të
prokurimit publik dhe koncesioneve të industrive të
rënda, si energjia dhe kujdesi shëndetësor. Për më tepër, Shoqëria civile në luftën kundër
rregullat e tepërta për biznesin, kryesisht në lidhje me korrupsionit
regjistrimin, licencimin dhe marrjet e lejeve, vazhdojnë
të gjenerojnë barriera të ndryshme për hyrje në treg Organizatat jo-qeveritare në Evropën Juglindore
dhe rrisin kostot e të bërit biznes, edhe pse disa vende janë ndër forcat më të rëndësishme shtytëse në luftën
në rajon kanë bërë përparime të dukshme në trajtimin kundër korrupsionit. Ato, janë ende larg përkthimit të
Annex 153
kërkesave të publikut në advokim efektiv për politika Bashkëpunimi ndërkombëtar

dhe në të përballurit me dukurinë e korrupsionit për
shkak të një sërë arsyesh. Kontributi i tyre varet në masë Institucionet ndërkombëtare dhe vendet partnere të
jo të vogël në aftësinë e tyre për të shërbyer si vëzhgues huaja, kanë luajtur një rol të rëndësishëm në zhvillimet
dhe në të njëjtën kohë për të angazhuar qeverinë në e luftës kundër korrupsionit në Evropën Juglindore.
reformat antikorrupsion. Megjithatë, ka një mungesë Duke pasur parasysh ekstremizmin partiak në politikën
të mekanizmave formale për angazhimin e shoqërisë e brendshme, angazhimet ndërkombëtare lehtësojnë
civile nga qeveritë kombëtare në rajon, të kapaciteteve miratimin e reformave që ndryshe, mund të ishin
administrative , të një vizioni të qartë dhe të kuptuarit shmangur nga politikanët kombëtarë. Progres Raportet
të potencialit të OJQ-ve në fushën e antikorrupsionit. e Komisionit Evropian, financimi i reformave dhe
Mbështetja e tepërt tek ndërkombëtarët, përfshirë marrëveshjeve të binjakëzimit nga BE, janë ndikime të
këtu financimet evropiane dhe mungesën e politikave rëndësishme ndërkombëtare mbi axhendat kombëtare
kombëtare për të krijuar kushte për sektorin jo- të antikorrupsionit në shumicën e vendeve të Evropës
qeveritar në Evropën Juglindore, kompromentojnë Juglindore. Edhe pse antikorrupsioni është një nga
impaktin e qëndrueshëm të kampionëve vendorë në elementet kryesore të raporteve të KE, këto raporte
antikorrupsion. priten në mënyra të ndryshme në nivel lokal: vendet me
perspektivë të qartë për anëtarësim në BE, i kushtojnë
Edhe pse OJQ-të në rajonin e SELDI-t kanë arritur shumë më tepër vëmendje gjetjeve të raporteve, ndërsa
të krijojnë disa partneritete publike-private në Turqi, për shembull, raportet në përgjithësi marrin
ndërkombëtare, këto të fundit nuk u transformuan më pak vëmendje.
në partneritete efektive me institucionet kombëtare
qeveritare. Suksesi i partneriteteve të tilla ka të bëjë me Nga ana tjetër, përfshirja ndërkombëtare, ka sjellë
aftësinë për të ruajtur marrëdhënie të ndryshme me gjithashtu me vete rrezikun e pritjeve jo-realiste për
institucionet shtetërore, si bashkëpunuese ashtu edhe t’i rregulluar gjërat shpejt, gjë e cila mund të çojë në
konfrontuese. Një mënyrë për të qenë bashkëpunues miratimin e masave sipërfaqësore dhe ad-hoc. Vënia
dhe për të luajtur rolin e vëzhguesit në të njëjtën e kushteve dhe shumica e stimujve prekin kryesisht
kohë do të ishte rritja e profesionalizmit të OJQ-ve në organet ekzekutive, ndërsa gjyqësori, parlamentet dhe
monitorimin e politikave të korrupsionit dhe kundër institucionet të tjera publike dhe private nuk kanë
korrupsionit. qenë mjaft të përfshirë. Qëndrueshmëria e angazhimit
ndërkombëtar, u përforcua me zgjerimin e gamës së
Efektiviteti i OJQ-ve në adresimin e çështjeve që aktorëve vendorë të përfshirë siç janë shoqëria civile,
lidhen me mirëqeverisjen publike në vendet anëtare të mediat, shoqatat profesionale, sindikatat, etj. Ky
SELDI varet në një masë të madhe nga aftësia e OJQ- zgjerim i bashkëbisedimit të brendshëm të partnerëve
ve për të ruajtur mirëqeverisjen e vetë tyre. Rreziku i ndërkombëtarë, ka fuqizuar politikanë reformistë dhe
kapjes së OJQ-ve nga interesa të veçanta dhe zyrtarë grupe politike të izoluara, si dhe aktorë të ndryshëm
të korruptuar apo politikanëve të zgjedhur, buron nga jo-qeveritarë, duke inkurajuar kërkesën publike
mundësia për të shfrytëzuar një numër të dobësive të për reforma. Vazhdimi me këtë angazhim do të jetë
sektorit jo-fitimprurës në rajon: vendimtar për impaktin që BE-ja do ketë në rajon. Që
kjo të ndodhë, një lidhje qeveri-Bruksel nuk është e
• Mungesa e procedurave të detyrueshme për mjaftueshme. Angazhimi nga partnerët ndërkombëtarë
transparencë; të politikanëve reformiste, duhet mbështetur dhe
• Kontrolli jo-efektiv i zbatimit të rregulloreve verifikuar nga shoqëria civile në një lloj bashkëpunimi
financiare; trepalësh.
• Mungesa e kulturës së auditimit;
• Niveli i ulët i vetë-rregullimit dhe koordinimit të
përpjekjeve.
REKOMANDIMET KRYESORE
Lufta kundër kapjes së shoqërisë civile nga korrupsioni
duhet të jetë në krye të axhendës së reformave në rajonin
e Evropës Juglindore, si pjesë e përpjekjeve kombëtare Përvoja e vendeve të SELDI, në trajtimin e korrupsionit
në luftën kundër korrupsionit. që nga viti 2001 tregon se zgjidhja me sfidën e
korrupsionit në rajon, do të kërkojë përpjekje të
qëndrueshme në shumë fronte si dhe përfshirjen
e të gjithë aktorëve vendorë dhe ndërkombëtarë Kjo është esenciale për disa arsye: a) që reformat
për një kohë të gjatë. Ky raport ofron një numër e mbështetura ndërkombëtarisht të bëhen të
rekomandimesh për të arritur progres të mëtejshëm qëndrueshme, ato duhet të tërheqin një pranim më të
në kufizimin e dukurisë së korrupsionit. Ndër këto, gjerë publik dhe OJQ-të janë të domosdoshme në këtë
tre fushat kryesore duhet të jetë prioritet nga vendet proces; b) përfshirja e OJQ-ve është një mënyrë për të
në rajon dhe në nivel evropian, në mënyrë që të arrihet garantuar që llogaridhënia e qeverive tek donatorët
përparim në periudhë afatmesme: dhe organizatat ndërkombëtare nuk anashkalohet
për shkak të llogaridhënies tek zona elektorale
Ndjekja penale efektive e politikanëve të korruptuar vendore; c) efektiviteti i ndihmës ndërkombëtare
të nivelit të lartë dhe nëpunësve të lartë civilë është e do të rritet në qoftë se ajo përdor monitorimin,
vetmja mënyrë për të dërguar një mesazh të fortë dhe të aftësitë analitike dhe aftësitë advokuese të OJQ-ve;
menjëhershëm se korrupsioni nuk do të tolerohet. Sjellja d) një angazhim i drejtpërdrejtë do të parandalonte
e politikanëve të inkriminuar para drejtësisë ka provuar shoqërinë civile të përfshihej në rrjete klienteliste të
shumë efektive në forcimin e masave antikorrupsion administratave publike të pa-reformuara dhe shpesh
në Kroaci dhe Slloveni, për shembull. Suksesi në këtë të korruptuara.
drejtim do të kërkojë edhe mbështetje ndërkombëtare,
duke përfshirë edhe përfshirjen e shteteve anëtare
ligjzbatuese të BE.
REKOMANDIME SPECIFIKE
Një mekanizëm i pavarur i monitorimit të
korrupsionit dhe antikorrupsionit duhet të
prezantohet në nivel kombëtar dhe rajonal për të Politikat dhe Legjislacioni
siguruar të dhëna dhe analiza të qëndrueshme si dhe
të integrojë diagnostifikimin e korrupsionit dhe • Të përcaktohen përpjekjet kombëtare kundër
vlerësimin e politikave antikorrupsion. Mekanizmi korrupsionit në kuadër të politikave që paraqesin
duhet të zbatohet përmes organizatave kombëtare qëllime dhe synime të matshme, jo vetëm masa apo
dhe /ose rajonale të shoqërisë dhe rrjeteve civile dhe legjislacion. Kjo do të kërkojë vendosjen e objektivave
nuk duhet të financohet drejtpërdrejtë nga qeveria. Ai specifike që duhen arritur dhe përzgjedhjen e
duhet të shërbejë si një mjet për hapjen e të dhënave metodave të përshtatshme të ndërhyrjes. Këto
administrative dhe rritjen e aksesit të publikut objektiva duhet të matshme sa më shumë të jetë e
në informacion. Të dhënat që lejojnë gjurmimin mundur.
e prokurimit publik, koncesioneve, zbatimin e • Të bëhet prioritizimi i sektorëve të caktuar, llojeve
legjislacionit të konfliktit të interesit, ndihmën të korrupsionit dhe metodave të ndërhyrjes dhe
shtetërore, transfertat buxhetore, raporteve të qasjeve të ndryshme, para se të paraqiten masa të
performancës vjetore të mbikëqyrjes dhe të agjencive plota dhe të përfunduara. Korrupsioni është një
kontrolluese etj, duhet të bëhen publike në një format koncept i gjerë, i lidhur dhe me lloje të ndryshme
bazash të dhënash, duke lejuar kështu analizën e të të mashtrimit të cilat nuk mund të trajtohen në të
dhënave dhe përdorimin e mjeteve monitoruese. njëjtën kohë në mënyrë efektive.
• Politikat duhet të jenë të informuara. Ndërkohë
Sektorët kritike me nivele të larta korrupsioni dhe risku që disa përpjekje kanë qenë bërë në strategjitë
të kapjes së shtetit, si sektori energjetik, duhet të trajtohen kombëtare kundër korrupsion për të vlerësuar
me prioritet. Masat e tjera prioritare përfshijnë: rezultatet e mëparshme, asnjë nga vendet e SELDI
nuk ka një mekanizëm të qëndrueshëm të vlerësimit
• rritjen e konkurrencës në prokurimin publik; të politikave antikorrupsion. Minimalisht, kjo
• përmirësimin e qeverisjes së ndërmarrjeve shtetërore; kërkon: a) statistika të besueshme dhe të rregullta
• menaxhim transparent i projekteve të investimeve rreth përpjekjeve kundër korrupsionit (hetimeve,
të mëdha; ndjekjeve penale, masat administrative, etj); b)
• rritjen e përgjegjshmërisë dhe pavarësisë së Monitorim dhe analiza të rregullta të përhapjes
autoriteteve rregullatore të energjisë. dhe formave të korrupsionit në sektorë të
ndryshëm publikë. Monitorimi duhet të jetë i
Partnerët ndërkombëtarë, dhe në radhë të parë pavarur dhe/ose nga jashtë vendit, të përfshijë
Komisioni Evropian, duhet të angazhojnë shoqërinë civile dhe komponentët themelore
drejtpërdrejt organizatat e shoqërisë civile në rajon. të sistemeve jo-administrative të monitorimit
Annex 155
të korrupsionit, të tilla si Sistemi i Monitorimit të krijimin e mekanizmave efektive të menaxhimit të

Korrupsionit i SELDI. ankesave.
• Konfiskimi i aseteve të fituara në mënyrë të
Institucionet antikorrupsion dhe zbatimi i ligjit paligjshme nëpërmjet korrupsionit, është një
mënyrë për të luftuar korrupsionin dhe zbatimi
• Të futet një mekanizëm feedback-u për zbatimin i saj duhet të zgjerohet. Kujdes të veçantë i duhet
e politikave kundër korrupsion. Mekanizmi kushtuar balancimit të të drejtave të të akuzuarit
mund të bazohet në instrumente të reja të vëna me të mirën e përgjithshme. Në një mjedis, shpesh
në dispozicion në vitet e fundit, të tilla si Toolkit i të korruptuar të administratës publike, konfiskimi i
Integruar i Monitorimit të Zbatimit të Antikorrupsionit pasurisë që vjen pas dënimeve penale është një rrugë
i hartuar nga Qendra për Studimin e Demokracisë e rëndësishme parandalimi, akoma e pashfrytëzuar
(CSD) dhe Universiteti i Trentos. Kjo i lejon mirë në Evropën Juglindore.
politikëbërësit të vlerësojnë rreziqet e korrupsionit
në një institucion qeveritar, efektin e politikës Gjyqësori
përkatëse antikorrupsion dhe identifikimin e
zgjidhjeve me ndikim më të lartë. • Të miratohen reforma që rrisin fuqinë e votës të
• Të rritet kapaciteti institucional i organeve qeveritare organeve vetëqeverisëse gjyqësore në vendet ku
përkatëse, në veçanti i agjencive të specializuara shumica e organeve vetëqeverisëse gjyqësore nuk
në antikorrupsion dhe agjencive mbikëqyrëse të zgjidhen nga magjistratët. Vendet që nuk e kanë
tilla si institucionet kombëtare të auditimit, duke bërë një gjë të tillë, duhet të miratojnë parimin “një
përfshirë buxhetet e tyre, objektet dhe personeli gjyqtar- një votë”.
duhet të jenë në linjë me përgjegjësitë ligjore që iu • Të sigurohet që kuota gjyqësore të jetë sa më
është dhënë këtyre institucioneve. Përndryshe, ata përfaqësuese duke përfshirë edhe gjyqtarët nga
duhet të hartojnë programe më të shpeshta vjetore gjykatat e shkallës së parë. Të shqyrtohet me kujdes, dhe
apo afatmesme, të cilat vendosin për prioritetin e nëse është e nevojshme të rishqyrtohet pajtueshmëria
ndërhyrjeve. e pozitës së kryetarit të gjykatës me anëtarësimin e tij
• Tu jepet fuqi më e madhe institucioneve kombëtare në organet vetëqeverisëse gjyqësore.
të auditimit, duke përfshirë kompetencat për të • Të krijohen dy kolegje, një për prokurorët dhe një
vendosur sanksione më të ashpra. Të audituarit dhe për gjyqtarët në vendet ku prokuroria dhe gjykatat
parlamenti duhet të detyrohen të veprojnë sipas janë të qeverisura nga i njëjti trup. Prokurorët dhe
raporteve të këtyre institucioneve. Institucionet gjyqtarët respektivisht, do të zgjidhen vetëm nga
kombëtare të auditimit duhet të mandatohen për këto kolegje.
auditimin e menaxhimit të fondeve të BE-së kur • Të hidhen poshtë ose të reduktohet në minimum
këto të fundit janë të administruara nga autoritetet roli i ministrave të qeverisë (zakonisht të drejtësisë)
kombëtare. Meqenëse puna për auditimin e në organet vetëqeverisëse gjyqësore, veçanërisht për
performancës është në një fazë shumë të hershme, sa i përket vendimeve për procedurat disiplinore.
ata duhet të zhvillojnë kapacitetin e tyre për të kryer • Magjistrata të ketë prioritet në mekanizmin për
më shumë auditime të tilla. verifikimin e deklaratave të pasurisë.
• Të paraqiten masa të mëtejshme që rekrutimi në • Të forcohet pavarësia dhe kapaciteti i inspektorateve
shërbimin civil të bazohet në meritë dhe jo në gjyqësore në mënyrë që ti lejojë këta të fundit të
përkatësi politike. rrisin numrin e inspektimeve.
• Të ndahet puna në luftën kundër korrupsionit në • Të futen mekanizma të feeback-ut për zbatimin
mënyrë të barabartë mes organeve të pushtetit. e politikave kundër korrupsion në lidhje me
Zgjerimi i gamës së inkriminimit ligjor të korrupsionit magjistratën. Këto mekanizma janë të mangët ose
duhet të ndiqet nga përmirësimi i kapaciteteve në praktikisht mungojnë në të gjitha vendet e SELDI.
të gjitha organet publike, në mënyrë që korrupsioni Mungesa e tyre dëmton aspektin represiv të politikave
në rradhët e këtyre institucioneve të adresohet antikorrupsion dhe i bën të padobishëm inkriminimin
nëpërmjet mjeteve administrative dhe kalimit të e mëtejshëm të korrupsionit. Një praktikë e mire që
përgjegjësisë tek policia apo prokuroria. Organet mund të replikohej, edhe pse është ende e pazhvilluar,
e përgjithshme të administratës publike duhet të është Platforma e Statistikave të Antikorrupsionit në
veprojnë si rojet e sistemit të drejtësisë penale, duke Kosovë, projektuar nga një OJQ. Një mekanizëm i tillë
trajtuar aq raste korrupsioni sa kompetencat e tyre duhet të përfshijë informacion të rregullt për: masat
administrative ja lejojnë. Minimalisht, kjo përfshin disiplinore, administrative dhe penale në shërbimin
publik dhe në atë gjyqësor; aspektet e ndryshme të prokurimin publik, para-njoftimet, njoftimet, ofertat,
ndjekjes penale duke përfshirë paditë dhe dënimet/ kontratat, dhe çdo shtojcë tjetër të tij.
lirimet nga akuzat, dënimet sipas llojeve të ndryshme • Vendet kandidate të BE duhet të krijojnë sisteme
të krimeve të korrupsionit. të decentralizuara zbatimi për fondet e BE, në
mënyrë që të paraqesin kornizën e duhur ligjore
Korrupsioni dhe ekonomia dhe administrative për transferimin e përgjegjësive
për zbatimin e programeve të financuara nga BE.
• Të ulet në minimum si dhe të rishikohet çdo vit Mbikëqyrja duhet të mbetet e centralizuar dhe e
politikat e ndihmës së shtetit për shkak se kjo krijon pavarur nga organet zbatuese.
rreziqe të konsiderueshme për korrupsion. Duhen • Duhet futur koncepti i vlerës-për-para në vlerësimin
paraqitur paraprakisht rregullat e forta të zbatimit e kontratave të prokurimit publik.
të ndihmës shtetërore në BE dhe të zhvillohen
kapacitetet rregullatore kombëtarë të pavarur Shoqëria civile
ndihmëse shtetërore për të zbatuar këto rregulla.
• Të përmirësohet zbatimi i legjislacionit anti-monopol • Të rriten kapacitetet e organizatave të shoqërisë
në mënyrë që të promovohet ndërmarrja e lirë dhe civile për të monitoruar dhe raportuar mbi
konkurrenca. Duhet patur kujdes i veçantë që të korrupsionin dhe antikorrupsionin, duke përfshirë
shqyrtohet rregullisht përqendrimi i bizneseve në aftësinë për të mbledhur informacion primar për
sektorë të rregulluar së tepërmi që hasin kufizime funksionimin e institucioneve qeveritare, aftësitë
licencash dhe kufizime të tjera, duke bërë të mundur për matjen e përhapjes së korrupsionit, në analizën
riskun e marrëveshjeve të fshehta midis rivalëve të e të dhënave, vlerësimet institucionale dhe shkrimet
mëdhenj dhe politikanëve. e raporteve.
• Të krijohen lidhje institucionale ndërmjet • Legjislacioni i konfliktit të interesit, të përfshijë
menaxhimit të aseteve dhe detyrimeve të të institucionet jo-fitimprurëse, sidomos kur ato janë të
gjitha financave publike, duke përfshirë edhe financuara nëpërmjet programeve të administruara
kompanitë shtetërore, në mënyrë që të ulen nga qeveria të tilla si buxheti kombëtar, fondet e
rreziqet financiare dhe të rritet besueshmëria e BE, etj.
qeverisë në menaxhimin e financave publike, • Rregullat dhe rregulloret për fondet publike, të
në vendet që nuk e kanë ende një sistem të tillë. qeverisë qendrore dhe vendore, për organizatat
Ndërmarrjet shtetërore duhet të plotësojnë kushtet jo-fitimprurëse të jenë të qarta dhe transparente.
e rrepta të qeverisjes së korporatave dhe kërkesave Vetëm OJQ-të e regjistruara për të mirën publike
të raportimit (p.sh. rregullat e OECD-së), në të duhet të lejohen të marrin fonde publike, dhe duhet
njëjtin nivel si kompanitë publike tregtare. Këto gjithashtu të kenë kërkesa më të rrepta për raportim
ndërmarrje duhet të publikojë raporte tremujore dhe transparencë.
në internet. • Bashkimi Evropian dhe agjencitë e tjera donatore,
• Të përhapet koncepti i detyrimeve dhe sanksioneve duhet t’i kushtojnë një pjesë më të madhe të fondeve
për autoritetet kontraktuese të cilët nuk arrijnë të tyre, financimit të programeve të mirë-qeverisjes,
të dorëzojnë raportet mbi prokurimin publik në të vëna në zbatim midis organizatave të shoqërisë
mënyrë të vazhdueshme, raportet për shkelje të civile dhe institucioneve publike. Këto programe
rregullave antikorrupsion, ose paraqesin të dhëna duhet të kenë kërkesa të qarta kundër kapjes së
të pasakta ose jo të plota. OJQ-ve nga ana e interesave të veçanta. Duhet
• Të përcaktohet një kuadër ligjor dhe institucional të theksohet se arritja e një impakti kërkon një
për menaxhimin dhe kontrollin e kontratave të angazhim të qëndrueshëm më afatgjatë (10 vjet e
lidhura nga partneritetet publikë-privatë. lart).
• Të përmirësohet mbikëqyrja e prokurimit nga • Sektori i shoqërisë civile ka nevojë të sigurojë vetë-
prokuroja të mëdha publike (ndërmarrje shtetërore rregullimin e tij. Minimalisht kjo përfshin miratimin
dhe kompani shërbimesh) për të maksimizuar e kodeve të sjelljes me standardet që aspirohen.
eficencën dhe për të ulur parregullsitë. Gjithashtu shoqëria civile duhet të gjejë më shumë
• Të miratohen politika për reduktimin e tenderave mënyra dhe mënyra më të mira të organizimit të
të prokurimit publik me vetëm një ofrues dhe për koalicioneve të interesit.
rritjen e konkurrencës. Duhet publikuar në internet • OJQ-të kanë nevojë për kuptim më të mirë të nevojës
në formatin e bazës së të dhënave, ku përdoruesi për të qenë transparentë dhe të përgjegjshëm. Kjo
mund të kërkojë, dokumentacionin e plotë mbi përfshin nënshtrimin ndaj auditimit të rregullt,
Annex 157
shpalosjen e pasqyrave financiare dhe procedurave dhe organizata burimore, sidomos në vlerësimin e
të qarta dhe transparente të qeverisjes dhe masat ndikimit të projekteve të asistencës.
kundër kapjes nga interesa të veçanta. • Të vlerësohet efektiviteti i asistencës së dhënë
• Vendet e Evropës Juglindore që nuk janë anëtare të në mënyrë periodike nëpërmjet metodave të
BE janë të këshilluar të mësojnë nga njohuritë dhe vlerësimit të impaktit. Kjo do të ishte një matës për
ekspertiza në Raportin e Antikorrupsionit të BE. Kjo vlerën-për-paratë, sidomos në rastet kur kanë qenë
do t’u sigurojë atyre njohuri të vlefshme në lidhje me të përfshira fonde publike, dhe do të lejonte që
vlerësimin e përhapjes së korrupsionit dhe hartimin programet e suksesshme të vazhdoheshin ndërkohë
e politikave antikorrupsion. që të pasuksesshmet të ndërpriteshin. Është e
domosdoshme që ky vlerësim të jetë i pavarur dhe të
Bashkëpunimi ndërkombëtar shfrytëzojë ekspertizën e organizatave të shoqërisë
civile.
• Programet e asistencës të jashtme të reflektojnë • Të inkurajohen programet midis vendeve për çështje
më mirë rezultatet e vlerësimeve të brendshme të përbashkëta si p.sh krimi ndërkufitar nga asistenca
dhe ndërkombëtare të pavarura. Që kjo të arrihet, ndërkombëtare. Përvoja bullgare në bashkëpunimin
programet e ndihmës duhet të reagojnë më shpejt publik-privat për analizën e lidhjeve të krimit të
dhe të jenë më fleksibël dhe të kenë një vonesë më të organizuar dhe korrupsionit, duhet të shfrytëzohet
shkurtër midis hartimit dhe ofrimit. në të gjithë rajonin.
• Të parashikohet një rol më i fuqishëm për shoqërinë • Gjetjet e raporteve të Komisionit Evropian duhet
civile nga asistenca ndërkombëtare në antikorrupsion të përfshihen më mirë në hartimin e politikave
për qeveritë kombëtare. Kjo përfshin përfshirjen e vendore duke përfshirë më shumë shoqërinë civile
OJQ-ve si partnerë të implementimit, monitorues dhe komunitetin e biznesit.
Bosnia and ekonomiji, ulozi civilnog društva i međunarodnoj

korupciji. Ovaj izvještaj daje viđenje civilnog društva
Herzegovina i procjenu politika dok se sa državnim i regionalnim
javnim institucijama savjetovalo o zaključcima i
preporukama.
Izvršni sažetak Svrha procjene državnih institucionalnih i pravnih

aspekata koji omogućavaju korupciju u regiji nije da
bude sveobuhvatni popis propisa i praksi u svim
Korupcija u Jugoistočnoj Evropi je toliko često i toliko zemljama nego da naglasi neka prioritetna pitanja koja
dugo u vijestima, fokusu političkih debata, na dnevnom su značajna za potencijalne napore u spriječavanju
redu politika državnih i međunarodnih institucija zajedničkih izvora korupcije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi
da teško da je potrebno tražiti opravdanje za njeno (SEE). Ovaj izvještaj nudi model za izvještavanje o
pomno ispitivanje. Upravo zato što je dokazano da je to napretku u borbi protiv korupcije za civilno društvo
toliko nerješivo pitanje potrebni su inovativni pristupi u Jugoistočnoj Evropi.
njenom razumijevanju, a stoga i njenom smanjenju.
Izgledi zemalja u regiji za pridruživanje EU – iako
se čini daleko – daju osnažujući okvir za djelovanje,
ali lokalni sudionici, posebno civilno društvo, su GLAVNI ZAKLJUČCI
ti koji mogu dovesti do održivog napretka u borbi
protiv korupcije. Jedan od glavnih prioriteta Vodstva
za razvoj i integritet Jugoistočne Evrope (SELDI) je Opšta procjena
dubinsko dijagnosticiranje i razumijevanje korupcije i
propusta u upravljanju u regiji, kao potrebnog uslova I pored nekih važnih postignuća – koja se uglavnom
za zagovaranje antikorupcionih politika potaknutih odnose na stabilizaciju demokratskih institucija,
znanjem. Ovaj izvještaj SELDI-a uklapa se u okvir usvajanje zakona u ključnim oblastima borbe protiv
razvoja i provođenja novonastajućih regionalnih korupcije, smanjenju sitnog podmićivanja i sve veće
antikorupcionih politika i infrastrukture kao što je netolerancije javnosti prema korupciji – reforme u borbi
primjer stupa upravljanja u Strategiji Jugoistočne protiv korupcije i dobro upravljanje nisu objedinjeni, čini
Evrope do 2020. godine koju vodi Regionalna se da korupcija među izabranim političarima i sudijama
antikorupciona inicijativa. raste, a provođenje antikorupcionog zakonodavstva je
prepušteno slučaju. Politike za borbu protiv korupcije i
Ovaj izvještaj, kao rezultat saradnje unutar SELDI-a, je institucije u regiji će imati ogromnu korist od usvajanja
po svojoj metodi i svom procesu inovativan. Rezultat redovnog i tačnog alata zasnovanog na istraživanju
je primjene sistema koji je početkom 2000-ih SELDI viktimizacije za mjerenje korupcije i stope napretka u
izradio za procjenu korupcije i borbe protiv korupcije, dobrom upravljanju, koji liči na poseban Eurobarometar
a koji je prilagođen društvenom i institucionalnom za borbu protiv korupcije, UNODC-ovog praćenja
okruženju Jugoistočne Evrope.1 Pristup viktimizaciji korupcije i organizovanog kriminala u Jugoistočnoj
koji se zasniva na istraživanju koje primjenjuje Evropi i Sistema praćenja korupcije koji je korišten u ovom
Sistem praćenja korupcije i koji je korišten u izvještaju izvještaju.
nudi jedinstvenu procjenu napretka u borbi protiv
korupcije na osnovu podataka u regiji od 2001. godine.
Ciklus procjene u periodu 2013 – 2014, čiji su zaključci Raširenost korupcije
sažeti u ovom izvještaju, rijedak je primjer praćenja u u Jugoistočnoj Evropi
međunarodnoj praksi kojim se ponovo vraća na ista
pitanja i istu regiju nakon nešto više od decenije. Iskustvo sa korupcijom – drugim riječima, uključenost
Tokom procjene vršeno je poređenje državnog članova javnosti u korupcijske transakcije – u
zakonodavstva i prakse institucija u određenom Jugoistočnoj Evropi je na visokom nivou. Čak i u
broju oblasti koje su od kritičnog značaja za napore Turskoj i Hrvatskoj, gdje je nivo administrativne
u borbi protiv korupcije: regulatornom i pravnom korupcije najniži u regionu, oko 8-9% stanovnika je
okviru, institucionalnim preduslovima, korupciji u reklo da su dali mito prošle godine. Ovako visok nivo
iskustva sa korupcijom je daleko iznad prosječnih
1
(SELDI, 2002). nivoa registrovanih tokom istraživanja Eurobarometar
Annex 159
u EU.2 Ovo pokazuje da je administrativna korupcija

masovna pojava i da se ne može ograničiti na Otpornost na korupcijski pritisak
pojedinačne slučajeve korumpiranih zvaničnika.
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što je još važnije i logiku i pristup – u svom državnom
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zemalja, provođenje ovih dokumenata je uglavnom

onemogućeno zbog nedovoljnih resursa i riješenosti
Izvor: SELDI/CSD Sistem praćenja korupcije, 2014. godine. viših nivoa vlasti. Dalji problem u cijeloj regiji je izrada
strategija na takav način da se obuhvataju svi mogući
aspekti korupcije. Umjesto određivanja prioriteta, ovi
Korupcijski pritisak zvaničnika je glavni faktor koji dokumenti postali su sveobuhvatajući; kad je u pitanju
statistički utiče na nivo uključenosti. Većinu zemalja u borba protiv korupcije, strateški je počelo jednostavno
kojima su uključenost i pritisak veliki karakteriše niska da znači iscrpno.
otpornost na korupcijski pritisak (većina ispitanika od
kojih je tražen mito su ga i dali). Iako se otpornost ne Što se tiče prioriteta politika, došlo je do dvije
može smatrati glavnim faktorom za smanjenje korupcije glavne promjene u pristupu prema borbi protiv
ona odražava prevladavajuće društvene stavove o korupcije – promjene u skretanju pažnje sa sitne
integritetu i uglavnom je posljedica napora civilnog korupcije (saobraćajne policije i ljekara u javnom
društva i organa vlasti na povećanju svijesti o borbi sektoru) na veliku (članove parlamenta ili ministre) i
protiv korupcije. U tom pogledu, uloga civilnog društva inkriminacije šireg niza zloupotreba javnog položaja.
je od ključne važnosti jer je civilno društvo u poziciji da Ostvarivanje učinka u kažnjavanju velike korupcije
ocjenjuje rezultate i stvara javni pritisak za promjene. ipak i dalje ostaje ograničeno, u najboljem slučaju.
Ključni izazov za politike za borbu protiv korupcije u
2
Pokazatelji iskustva sa korupcijom koji su korišteni u regiji je da se popuni rupa u provođenju i da se nastavi
istraživanjima Eurobarometar su nešto drugačijeg sadržaja jer sa mijenjanjem manifestacija i oblika korupcije, a da
se odnose na direktno iskustvo i slučajeve kada su ispitanici bili
svjedoci slučajeva podmićivanja. Za više pojedinosti molimo da se pri tome održava regulatorna stabilnost i izbjegava
pogledate (TNS Opinion & Social, February 2014). opterećivanje pravosuđa sa čestim izmjenama.
Zaključi SELDI-jevog praćenja naglašavaju značaj dostupni javnosti, ili se prikupljaju tako nasumično
javne podrške za uspjeh antikorupcionih politika. da ne omogućavaju praćenje i analizu.
Povjerenje javnosti u vlast i djelotovornost politika
udruženi su u nekoj vrsti besprijekornog ciklusa: Jedno od ključnih pitanja vezanih za stvaranje posebnih
veći broj optimista po pitanju ostvarivosti uspjeha u državnih institucija za borbu protiv korupcije u regiji je
borbi protiv korupcije je u korelaciji sa nižim nivoima kako kombinovati preventivne i represivne funkcije.
korupcije. I obratno, raširenija korupcija ide ruku pod Karakteristično, u SELDI zemljama se pokušalo da
ruku sa većim pesimizmom po pitanju perspektive u antikorupcione institucije vrše obje funkcije, iako je
borbi protiv korupcije. represija daleko manji aspekt njihovog posla. Većina
zadataka ovih organa odnosi se na neki oblik nadzora
i kontrole, obično državnih strategija za borbu protiv
Izvedivost odgovora politika na korupciju: korupcije, i postoji malo dokaza da su ostvarile bilo
prema procjeni javnosti kakav značajan uticaj na zakonodavni program rada
vlasti. Brojne teškoće ometaju osnivanje i rad ovih
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.BLFEPOJKB vlasti i da im se daju nadzorna ovlaštenja koja su,
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vladinih agencija traži da izvještavaju o provođenju
,PSVQDJKBTFOFNPßF[OBǊBKOPTNBOKJUJ zadataka u borbi protiv korupcije koji su im
,PSVQDJKBTFNPßF[OBǊBKOPTNBOKJUJJMJJTLPSJKFOJUJ dodijeljeni.
/F[OBN/FNBPEHPWPSB • Takve agencije morale su biti oprezne da ne
Izvor: SELDI/CSD Sistem praćenja korupcije, 2014. godine. udvostručavaju ovlaštenja koja su već prenesena na
druga nadzorna tijela (na primjer, državne revizorske
institucije ili agencije za provođenje zakona).
Institucionalna praksa i provođenje • Većina ih je dobila ograničene institucionalne
zakona kapacitete – budžet, osoblje – bez obzira na
uvjeravanja u suprotno.
U Jugoistočnoj Evropi, raniji naglasak na usklađivanju
državnog zakonodavstva sa međunarodnim standar Što se tiče zakonodavstva, parlamenti u regiji ne
dima u borbi protiv korupcije postepeno ustupa mjesto kotiraju visoko kad je u pitanju povjerenje javnosti
fokusiranju na provođenje, pod sve većim pritiskom i ovaj nezavidni položaj nije bez razloga. Kodeksi
EU i lokalnog civilnog društva. etičkog ponašanja su rijetki i ne provode se; regulacija
lobiranja je još rijeđa; tek nedavno su se počele
Nedostatak koji je zajednički za sve zemlje SELDI-a uvoditi procedure za ukidanje imuniteta od krivičnog
je ugrožena autonomija različitih nadzornih organa gonjenja, premda bojažljivo; gdje god postoji neko tijelo
i organa za provođenje zakona. Tipično je da postoji u parlamentu za borbu protiv korupcije uglavnom
određeni stepen miješanja izabranih političara – postoji da bi nadgledalo neku izvršnu agenciju, a
članova parlamenta ili ministara u vladi – u rad ne da bi se bavilo korupcijom među članovima.
državne službe. Nadalje, nijedna SELDI zemlja nema Pitanje koje je značajno u SELDI zemljama je pitanje
odgovarajuće funkcionisanje mehanizma za upravljanje finansiranja političkih stranaka i izbornih kampanja.
pritužbama u javnoj upravi. Većina ih je uspostavila Većina zemalja je provela GRECO-ove preporuke o
organ za borbu protiv korupcije za koji se očekuje da finansiranju stranaka, ali određeni broj problema i
će primati pritužbe javnosti. Još jedan nedostatak koji dalje ostaje – poput anonimnih donacija, kupovanja
je zajednički za sve zemlje je nedostatak pouzdanih glasova birača (ili podmićivanja birača), nedovoljnih
i javnosti dostupnih podataka o radu institucija kapaciteta za reviziju finansija stranaka i ograničena
vlasti, posebno po pitanju borbe protiv korupcije. ovlaštenja za provođenje sankcija, itd.
Informacije i statistika ili se ne prikupljaju, ili nisu
Annex 161
Sadašnje stanje u državnoj službi odgovara prirodi Bez odgovarajućih provjera i ravnoteže sudsko
zemalja Jugoistočne Evrope koje su u tranziciji i samoupravljanje je izmaklo kontroli, te se pretvorilo u
nedostatku odgovarajuće zakonske i institucionalne korporativizam sa svim pripadajućim rizicima korupcije.
tradicije kao i hroničnom nedostatku sredstava. I Pretjerani naglasak na formalnoj izbornoj nezavisnosti
pored izvjesnih razlika među zemaljama, potreba postala je tipičan primjer lijeka koji se pretvara u bolest –
da se olakša upravljački i organizacioni razvoj umjesto da osigura ravnotežu prema izvršnoj vlasti,
državne službe je zajednički za većinu. Kultura samoupravljanje je produžilo odnos poput klijentele
„kontrole” uprave umjesto upravljanje radom uprave između sudaca i posebnih interesa. Danas, pravosuđe
putem motivacije je ono što spriječava poboljšanje u Jugoistočnoj Evropi je onoliko uspješno zahvaćeno
profesionalnosti i smanjenje korupcije. Jedan od koliko i ostale grane vlasti. Nakon što su oslobođeni
glavnih zaključaka u ovom izvještaju je uzajamno pomnog ispitivanja od javnosti i političkih faktora koji
jačanje kompetentnosti i integriteta. Obično kada su napravili ovakav aranžman, danas postoji nekoliko
se dovodi u pitanje osposobljenost određene državne provjera rentijerstva od strane sudaca.
službe za borbu protiv korupcije, uvijek se utvrdi da je
bez institucionalnih kapaciteta. I obratno, svako jačanje Otuda ne iznenađuje to što javnost nema posebno
profesionalnosti dovodi i do poboljšanja integriteta. visoko mišljenje o pravosuđu. SELDI-jev sistem praćenja
Stoga, izazov u regiji je učiniti transparentnost i korupcije pokazuje da se sudije smatraju jednim od
odgovornost osnovnim obilježjima državne službe, a najkorumpiranijih javnih službenika u regiji; izostanak
istovremeno ojačati i njenu profesionalnost. Vrlo često, transparentnosti i odgovornosti je nesumnjivo značajan
loše upravljanje, nejasni kriteriji i neodgovarajuća faktor u takvim procjenama. U svim zemljama SELDI-
podjela ovlaštenja i odgovornosti spriječavaju reforme a, došlo je do stvarnog pogoršanja procjene širenja
i potkopavaju autoritet vlasti. korupcije među sudijama od 2001.godine.
Uloga agencija za provođenje zakona u borbi protiv Kapaciteti pravosuđa u regiji da provedu antikorupciono
korupcije u regiji treba razumjeti u kontekstu raspona zakonodavstvo, pogotovo kad je u pitanju politička
inkriminisanih praksi koje su vezane za korupciju, a korupcija, su dovedeni u pitanje usljed brojnih problema
koji se neprestano širi, što dovodi do rizika upućivanja koji su kumulativno vršili svoj uticaj:
nesrazmjernog broja slučajeva policiji i tužilaštvu.
Uloga agencija za provođenje zakona u Jugoistočnoj • Ustavna pitanja, koja se prvenstveno odnose
Europi u borbi protiv korupcije dodatno je ugrožena na ponovno uspostavljanje ravnoteže između
njihovom visokom izloženosti korupciji pogotovo od nezavisnosti i odgovornosti pravosuđa;
strane organizovanog kriminala. Policijske snage u • Složenost krivičnog gonjenja počinilaca krivičnih
većini SELDI zemalja imaju specijalne jedinice za borbu djela korupcije, posebno na političkom nivou;
protiv organizovanog kriminala; od ovih jedinica se • Opšti nedovoljni kapacitet i pitanja vezana za nisku
očekuje da rade i na suzbijanju korupcije. Smještanje profesionalnost, pretjeranu količinu posla koja ima
ove dvije funkcije u jedan organ se uglavnom za posljedicu zaostale predmete, vođenje predmeta,
opravdava time da se organizovani kriminal koristi i objekti, itd.
korupcijom, ali i zbog potrebe za posebnim istražnim
metodama u razotkrivanju sofisticiranih obrazaca Važan zaključak ovog SELDI-jevog ciklusa praćenja
korupcije – stručnost koja je obično u nadležnosti korupcije koji je relevantan za ulogu pravosuđa u
službi za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala. borbi protiv korupcije je nedostatak mehanizama
Međutim, ove jedinice su uglavnom dio većih povratnih informacija koji omogućavaju javnosti i
policijskih snaga ili ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova kreatorima politika da ocjenjuju integritet pravosuđa
koje im oduzimaju institucionalnu autonomiju koja je i njegovu djelotvornost u provođenju antikorupcionih
potrebna jednoj instituciji specijalizovanoj za borbu krivičnih zakona. Nijedna zemlja u Jugoistočnoj Evropi
protiv korupcije. nema pouzdan, sistemski i sveobuhvatan mehanizam
za prikupljanje, obradu i stvaranje javno dostupnih
statističkih podataka o radu sudova i tužilaštava,
Pravosuđe u borbi protiv korupcije posebno o slučajevima korupcije.
U Jugoistočnoj Evropi, snažan fokus na osiguranju

nezavisnosti pravosuđa nije bio u ravnoteži sa
jednako jakim uslovima za odgovornost pravosuđa.
Korupcija i ekonomija Civilno društvo u borbi protiv korupcije

U Jugoistočnoj Evropi, značajna uključenost vlasti u Nevladine organizacije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi su među
ekonomiju stvara određeni broj mjesta za potencijalne najvažnijim pokretačima u borbi protiv korupcije.
sukobe između javnih ustanova i preduzeća; s druge Međutim, one su još uvijek daleko od prevođenja
strane, to stvara rizik od korupcije. Rizik je posebno javnih potreba u djelotvorno zagovaranje politika, i od
veliki u oblasti privatizacije i javnih nabavki i koncesija suprostavljanja korupciji, zbog niza nedostataka. Njihov
teške industrije poput energetike i zdravstvene doprinos zavisi u velikoj mjeri od sposobnosti da služe
zaštite. Nadalje, pretjerani propisi u poslovanju – koji i kao nadzorni organi i da uključe vlast u reforme
se uglavnom odnose na registraciju, licenciranje i borbe protiv korupcije. Ipak, u regiji postoji nedostatak
izdavanja dozvola – i dalje stvaraju različite prepreke službenih mehanizama za državne vlasti za uključivanje
za nove učesnike na tržištu i veće troškove poslovanja, civilnog društva, kao i nedostatak administrativne
iako su neke zemlje u regiji ostvarile značajan napredak sposobnosti i jasne vizije i razumijevanja potencijala
u rješavanju poslovnih prepreka. Ipak, uprave za organizacija civilnog društva u oblasti borbe protiv
nadzor i usklađenost i dalje narušavaju tržišta stavljajući korupcije. Pretjerano oslanjanje na međunarodno,
pretjerani fokus na kontrolu i kazne, bez odgovarajuće uključujući i evropsko finansiranje, i nedostatak državnih
procjene rizika i troškova i koristi. To se posebno odnosi politika za poticanje energičnog civilnog sektora u
na carinske uprave u cijeloj regiji, na koje se još uvijek Jugoistočnoj Evropi ugrožava održiv uticaj lokalnih
gleda kao na djelotvorno sredstvo za stavljanje pritiska pobornika u borbi protiv korupcije.
na poduzetnike. Ovo tjera poduzetnike u neslužbeni
sektor ili ih prisiljava da pribjegavaju podmićivanju. Iako su nevladine organizacije u području SELDI-a
U opadajućoj spirali ovo onda opravdava dodatno uspjele uspostaviti neka međunarodna javno-privatna
regulisanje i administrativne barijere. partnerstva ona se nisu pretvorila u djelotvorna
partnerstva sa državnim institucijama. Ključ za
Razne okolnosti koje uzrokuju korupciju u interakciji stvaranje uspješnih partnerstava je sposobnost da se
poslovnih i javnih službenika ilustruju sa kojim se uđe u razne odnose, i komplementarne i suprotstavljene,
poteškoćama suočavaju antikorupcione politike s sa državnim institucijama. Na primjer, jedan od
obzirom da je potrebno uzeti mnoštvo faktora u obzir. načina da se uskladi saradnja sa obavljanjem funkcije
Kada ih pokreće poslovanje, prakse korupcije se mogu nadzornog organa je poboljšanje profesionalnosti u
podijeliti u dvije glavne kategorije – izbjegavanje dodatnih praćenju korupcije i antikorupcionih politika od strane
troškova i sticanje nepoštene prednosti. U prvoj skupini nevladinih organizacija.
je mito koji uzrokuje slaba ili prekomjerna regulativa,
individualna ili institucionalna neompetentnost, itd.; u Djelotvnornost nevladinih organizacija u rješavanju
drugoj kategoriji su razne vrste prevara – utaja poreza, pitanja dobrog javnog upravljanja u SELDI zemljama
utaja PDV-a, krijumčarenje, nepoštivanje zdravstvenih i zavisi u velikoj mjeri od njihove sposobnosti da
sigurnosnih standarda, itd. zadrže svoje vlastito upravljanje sređenim. Rizik od
hvatanja nevladinih organizacija posebnim interesima
Javne nabavke su jedan od glavnih kanala putem kojih i korumpiranim javnim zvaničnicima ili izabranim
korupcija utiče na ekonomiju. Rizik od korupcije u ovoj političarima proizlazi iz mogućnosti iskorištavanja
oblasti je povezan sa nizom nedostataka: nedovoljno niza slabosti u neprofitnom sektoru u regiji:
transparentne procedure, veliki udio nekonkurentnih
procedura, slab nadzor i nedjelotvorna sudska revizija • nepostojanje obaveznih postupaka za transpa
(s obzirom na korupciju pravosuđa), itd. Iako je prije rentnost;
više od deset godina SELDI istraživanje pokazalo da • nedjelotvorna kontrola poštivanja finansijskih pro
su zemlje u ovom području napravile u skorije vrijeme pisa;
napredak u jačanju pravnog okvira procesa i njegovog • nedostatak revizorske kulture;
usklađivanja sa pravnom stečevinom EU, javne nabavke • nizak nivo samoregulacije i koordinacije u naporima.
su i dalje među najslabijim aspektima javnog upravljanja.
Stvarno stanje se nije puno promijenilo s obzirom Suprostavljanje zahvatanju civilnog društva kao dijela
da korumpirani političari i dobro povezani poslovi državnih napora u borbi protiv korupcije u Jugoistočnoj
zaobilaze dobro zamišljene propise. Institucionalna Evropi treba biti na vrhu dnevnog reda reforme u regiji.
iscjepkanost ne omogućava djelotvorno provođenje
propisa o javnim nabavkama.
Annex 163
Međunarodna saradnja napretka u ograničavanju korupcije. Među njima su

tri ključna područja koja trebaju biti prioritet zemalja
Međunarodne institucije i strane zemlje partneri su u regiji i na evropskom nivou kako bi se postigao
odigrali važnu ulogu u razvoju događaja u borbi protiv srednjoročni napredak:
korupcije u Jugoistočnoj Europi. S obzirom na krajnju
pristrasnost u unutrašnjoj politici, međunarodne Uspješno procesuiranje visoko pozicioniranih ko
preuzete obaveze potpomažu usvajanje donošenje rumpiranih političara i viših državnih službenika
politika reformi koje bi inače bile odbačene od strane je jedini način da se pošalje snažna i neposredna
domaćih političara. Izvještaji o napretku Evropske poruka da se korupcija neće tolerisati. Dovođenje
komisije, reforme i projekti bratimpljenja koje finansira korumpiranih političara pred lice pravde je dokazano
EU predstavljaju ključne međunarodne uticaje na kao vrlo djelotvorno u jačanju antikorupcionih mjera u
državne planove rada u borbi protiv korucpije u Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji, na primjer. Uspjeh u tom pravcu
većini zemalja Jugoistočne Evrope. Iako je borba protiv bi zahtijevao i međunarodnu podršku, uključujući i
korupcije jedan od glavnih elemenata izvještaja o učešće policija država članica EU.
napretku EK, na njih se reaguje na različite načine na
lokalnom nivou – zemlje s jasnijim izgledima za pristup Na državnom i regionalnom nivou treba uvesti
puno više i detaljno obraćaju pažnju na zaključke nezavisan mehanizam praćenja korupcije i anti
u izvještajima, dok u Turskoj, na primjer, izvještaji korupcije kako bi se obezbijedili čvrsti podaci i analiza
uglavnom dobijaju mnogo manju pažnju. i integrisali dijagnostika korupcije i evaluacija anti
korupcionih politika. Mehanizam bi trebale provoditi
Međutim, međunarodna uključenost sa sobom nosi državne, odnosno regionalne organizacije i mreže
rizik od nerealnih očekivanja za brze ispravke što sa civilnog društva, te bi trebao biti nezavisan od direktnog
druge strane može potaći usvajanje površnih i ad hoc finansiranja od strane države. Trebao bi poslužiti kao
mjera. Uslovljenost i većina poticaja utiču prvenstveno sredstvo za otvaranje administrativnih podataka i
na izvršne agencije, dok pravosuđe, parlamenati i poboljšanje pristupa javnosti informacijama. Podaci
druge zainteresovane javne i privatne institucije nisu koji omogućavaju praćenje javnih nabavki, koncesija,
bile dovoljno uključene. Održivost međunarodne provođenje zakonodavstva o sukobu interesa, državne
uključenosti podržana je širenjem opsega uključenih pomoći, prenosa budžetskih sredstava, godišnjih
lokalnih učesnika kako bi se uključili civilno društvo, izvještaja o rezultatima rada agencija za nadzor i
mediji, profesionalna udruženja, sindikati, itd. Širenje usklađenost, itd., trebaju biti dostupni javnosti u
opsega domaćih sagovornika sa međunarodnim vidu baze podataka, omogućujući tako velike analize
partnerima utiče na osnaživanje pojedinačnih podataka i korištenje alata za praćenje.
reformističkih političara ili političkih grupa, ali i
raznih nevladinih učesnika i poticanje javnih potreba Kritični sektori sa visokom korupcijom i rizicima
za reformama. Nastavljanje i nadograđivanje ove od zahvatanja države, kao što su energetski sektor,
uključenosti bilo bi od ključnog značaja za uticaj koji treba rješavati kao prioritet. Ostale prioritetne mjere
EU ima u regiji. Da bi se to dogodilo, nije dovoljno da uključuju:
postoji veza između vlasti i Brisela. Civilno društvo
u svojevrsnoj trostranoj saradnji treba da podrži – i • povećanje konkurentnosti u javnim nabavkama;
potvrdi – uključenost međunarodnih partnera • poboljšanje korporativnog upravljanja u preduzećima
reformističkih političara i stranaka. u državnom vlasništvu;
• transparentno upravljanje velikim investicionim
projektima;
• jačanje odgovornosti i nezavisnosti energetskih
KLJUČNE PREPORUKE regulatornih nadležnih organa.
Međunarodni partneri, a prije svega Evropska

Iskustvo SELDI zemalja u borbi protiv korupcije komisija, trebaju direktno uključiti organizacije
od 2001. godine pokazuje da će rješavanje izazova civilnog društva u regiji. To je bitno iz nekoliko razloga:
korupcije u regiji zahtijevati stalne napore na a) da bi reforme koje su međunarodno podržane postale
mnogim frontovima i uključivanje svih domaćih i održive, potrebno je da budu prihvaćene od šire javnosti,
međunarodnih učesnika na duži period. Trenutni a organizacije civilnog društva su neophodne da bi se to
izvještaj daje niz preporuka za postizanje dodatnog dogodilo; b) uključivanje organizacija civilnog društva
je način da se garantuje da odgovornost vlasti prema provođenja borbe protiv korupcije razvijeni od strane
donatorima i međunarodnim organizacijama nema Centra za demokratske studije (CSD) i Univerziteta
prednost nad odgovornosti prema domaćim biračima; u Trentu. Oni omogućuju kreatorima politike da
c) djelotvornost međunarodne pomoći bi se povećala ako procijene rizike od korupcije u određenoj državnoj
bi se koristili praćenje i analitičke vještine i sposobnosti instituciji i uspješnost odgovarajuće antikorupcione
zagovaranja organizacija civilnog društva; d) direktna politike tako što identifikuju rješenja koja imaju
uključenost bi imala dodatnu korist u spriječavanju najveći učinak.
da građansko društvo zahvate klijentilističke mreže • Institucionalni kapaciteti nadležnih državnih
nereformisanih i često korumpiranih javnih uprava. organa – posebno specijalizovane antikorupcione
agencije i nadzorne agencije poput državnih
revizorskih institucija, uključujući njihove budžete,
objekte i osoblje, moraju biti usklađeni sa širokim
KONKRETNE PREPORUKE nadležnostima koje su date ovim institucijama.
Isto tako, one bi trebale osmisliti uže godišnje ili
srednjoročne programe, u kojima su određeni
Politike i zakonodavstvo prioriteti intervencija.
• Državne revizorske institucije bi takođe trebale
• Definisati državne napore u borbi protiv korupcije ojačati svoju institucionalnu moć, uključujući
u smislu politike koja se odnosi na mjerljive ciljeve i ovlaštenja da nametnu strožije sankcije. Državni
prekretnice, a ne samo na mjere ili zakonodavstvo. parlamenti i oni koji podliježu reviziji treba da su
Ovo bi dovelo do postavljanja konkretnih ciljeva koji obavezni da postupaju u skladu sa izvještajima ovih
se žele postići i odabira odgovarajućih interventnih institucija. Državne revizorske institucije takođe
metoda. Ovi ciljevi trebaju biti mjerljivi koliko i treba da imaju mandat da vrše reviziju upravljanja
izvedivi. sredstvima EU-a kojima upravljaju državni nadležni
• Dati prednost pojedinim sektorima, vrstama organi. S obzirom da je rad na reviziji djelovanja u
korupcije i interventnim metodama i pokušati sa vrlo ranoj fazi, treba da razvijaju svoje kapacitete za
različitim pristupima prije nego što se počne koristiti obavljaje više takvih revizija.
u punoj mjeri. Korupcija je širok pojam, povezana sa • Potrebne su dodatne mjere kako bi se osiguralo
raznim i različitim vrstama prevara koje se ne mogu da se zapošljavanje u državnu službu zasniva na
rješavati istovremeno na djelotvoran način. zaslugama i da ne zavisi od pripadnosti nekoj
• Politike trebaju biti informisane. Dok su neki političkoj stranci.
napori učinjeni u državnim strategijama za borbu • Rad na borbi protiv korupcije treba da se raspodijeli
protiv korupcije za procjenu prethodnih rezultata, ravnomjernije među organima vlasti. Proširenje
nijedna SELDI zemlja nema održivi mehanizam za opsega zakonske inkriminacije trebalo bi biti
evaluaciju antikorupcionih politika. U najmanju u ravnoteži sa povećanim kapacitetima u svim
ruku, to zahtijeva: a) pouzdane i redovne statistike o javnim organima za rješavanje korupcije u svojim
naporima u borbi protiv korupcije (istrage, krivična redovima administrativnim instrumentima umjesto
gonjenja, administrativne mjere, itd.); b) redovno prebacivanja vlastitih odgovornosti na policiju i
praćenje i analize raširenosti i oblika korupcije u tužilaštvo. Opšti organi uprave treba da djeluju kao
različitim javnim sektorima. Praćenje bi trebalo biti čuvari krivičnopravnog sistema tako što će se baviti
nezavisno, odnosno izvan zemlje, uključivati civilno sa što više slučajeva korupcije koliko im njihove
društvo i ugraditi osnovne komponente neupravnih upravne ovlasti dopuštaju. U najmanju ruku, to
sistema praćenja korupcije, kao što je SELDI-jev podrazumijeva stvaranje djelotvornih mehanizama
sistem praćenja korupcije. upravljanja pritužbama.
• Antikorupcioni instrument čija bi se primjena trebala
Institucije za borbu protiv korupcije i provođenje proširiti je oduzimanje nezakonito stečene imovine u
zakona slučajevima korupcije. I dok je potrebno primijeniti ga
da bi postojala ravnoteža između prava optuženika
• Uvesti mehanizam povratnih informacija za i interesa javnog dobra – pogotovo u okruženju
provođenje antikorupcionih politika. Mehanizam u kojem je javna uprava često korumpirana –
bi se mogao zasnivati na inovativnim novim oduzimanje bogatstva provođenjem krivičnih osuda
instrumentima koji su lakše dostupni u posljednjih je važno kažnjavanje za primjer koje se još uvijek ne
nekoliko godina, kao što je Integrisani alati za praćenje koristi dovoljno u Jugoistočnoj Evropi.
Annex 165
Pravosuđe pregledati koncentraciju u sektorima koji su strogo

regulisani i koji se suočavaju sa licenciranjem i
• Zemlje u kojima se većina pravosudnih nezavisnih drugim ograničenjima, stvarajući na taj način rizik
organa ne bira među sudijama trebaju usvojiti od tajnih dogovora između većih konkurenata i
reforme kojima će se povećati njihova glasačka moć. političara.
Zemlje koje nemaju princip „jedan sudija – jedan • Zemlje koje to nisu učinile trebaju uspostaviti
glas” trebaju ga usvojiti. institucionalne veze između upravljanja aktivnom
• Osigurati da je izbor pravosudne kvote što i pasivom svih javnih finansija, uključujući i
reprezentativniji, uključujući sudije iz prvostepenih preduzeća u državnom vlasništvu, kako bi se
sudova. Pažljivo pregledati, a ako je potrebno i ponovo ublažili finansijski rizici i poboljšala vjerodostojnost
razmotriti, kompatibilnost pozicije predsjednika vlasti u upravljanju javnim finansijama. Preduzeća
suda sa članstvom pravosudnih nezavisnih organa. u državnom vlasništvu trebaju zadovoljiti strogo
• U zemljama u kojima tužilaštvom i sudstvom korporativno upravljanje i uslove izvještavanja
upravlja isto tijelo, treba odvojiti dva vijeća – za (npr. pravila OECD-a), dorasle javnim dioničkim
tužioce i za sudije – u tom tijelu. Tužioci i sudije će preduzećima. Ta preduzeća trebaju objavljivati
biti izabrani za ova dva vijeća. kvartalne izvještaje na internetu.
• Ukinuti ili smanjiti na najmanju moguću mjeru ulogu • Uvesti odgovornost i sankcije za ugovorne strane
vladinih ministara (obično pravde) u pravosudnim koje ne dostavljaju redovne izvještaje o javnim
nezavisnim organima, pogotovo što se tiče odluka o nabavkama, izvještaje o kršenjima antikorupcionih
disciplinskim postupcima. propisa ili koje podnose netačne ili nepotpune
• Sudije trebaju biti prioritet u mehanizmu za provjeru podatke.
izjava o imovinskom stanju. • Poboljšati nadzor nabavke velikih javnih nabavljača
• Nezavisnost i kapacitet pravosudnih inspekcija (preduzeća u državnom vlasništvu i komunalnih
inspektorata treba ojačati kako bi im se omogućilo poduzeća) kako bi se povećala djelotvornost i
da unaprijede inspekcije. smanjile nepravilnosti.
• Uvesti mehanizme povratnih informacija za • Usvojiti politike za smanjenje dijeljenja tendera
provođenje antikorupcionih politika u odnosu javniih nabavki sa samo jednim ponuđačem i
na sudije. Ovi mehanizmi su znatno manjkavi ili unaprijediti konkurenciju. Objaviti u vidu baze
praktično ne postoje u svim SELDI zemljama; njihovo podataka koju je moguće pretraživati na internetu
odsustvo sabotira represivni aspekt antikorupcionih kompletnu dokumentaciju o javnim nabavkama,
politika i čini dodatnu inkriminaciju korupcije najave, obavijesti, ponude, ugovore i bilo koje njihove
beskorisnom. Najbolja moguća praksa koju treba dodatke. Definisati pravni i institucionalni okvir za
ponoviti – iako je još uvijek nedovoljno razvijena – upravljanje i kontrolu ugovorima koje su zaključila
je kosovska platforma antikorupcione statistike, javno-privatna partnerstva.
koju je izradila nevladina organizacija. Takav • Zemalje kandidati za EU trebaju uspostaviti
mehanizam treba uključivati redovne informacije decentralizovane provedbene sisteme za EU
o: disciplinskim i upravnim i krivičnim mjerama fondove kako bi osigurale odgovarajući pravni i
u javnoj službi i pravosuđu; različitim aspektima administrativni okvir za prenošenje odgovornosti za
krivičnog gonjenja, uključujući optužnice i presude/ provođenje programa koje finansira EU. Nadzor bi
oslobađajuće presude, presude prema raznim trebao biti centralizovan i nezavisan od provedbenih
vrstama krivičnih dijela korupcije. organa.
• Uvesti koncept vrijednost-za-novac u evaluaciji
Korupcija i ekonomija ugovora o javnim nabavkama.
• Svesti na minimum i pregledati jednom godišnje Civilno društvo

politike državne pomoći jer stvaraju značajne rizike
od korupcije. Unaprijed uvesti strogo provođenje • Jačati kapacitet organizacija civilnog društva za
propisa o državnoj pomoći EU, te razviti kapacitet praćenje i izvještavanje o korupciji i borbi protiv
državnih nezavisnih regulatornih organa za korupcije, uključujući sposobnost za prikupljanje i
državnu pomoć za provođenje propisa. sređivanje osnovnih informacija o radu institucija
• Poboljšati provođenje protivmonopolskog zakono- vlasti, vještine za mjerenje stvarnog širenja korupcije
davstva u cilju promovisanja slobodnog poduzet- i u analizi podataka, evaluaciju institucija i pisanje
ništva i konkurencije. Biti posebno pažljiv i redovno izvještaja.
• Zakonodavstvo o sukobu interesa treba uključivati sadržanih u Izvještaju o borbi protiv korupcije EU.
neprofitne institucije, posebno tamo gdje se To će im dati vrijedne uvide u pogledu evaluacije
finansiraju putem programa kojima upravlja država, širenja korupcije i izrade antikorupcionih politika.
kao što su državni budžet, fondovi EU, itd.
• Pravila i propisi za javno finansiranje – od strane Međunarodna saradnja
središnje i lokalne vlasti – neprofitnih organizacija
trebaju biti jasni i transparentni. Samo nevladinim • Programi strane pomoći trebaju bolje odražavati
organizacijama koje su registrovane za dobrobit zaključke međunarodnih i nezavisnih domaćih
javnosti treba biti dopušteno da primaju javna evaluacija. Da bi se to postiglo, programi pomoći
sredstva, a svaka sa svoje strane treba ispunjavati trebaju biti prilagodljiviji i fleksibilniji, uključujući
strožije uslove za izvještavanjem i iznošenjem kraći vremenski pomak između planiranja i
podataka. isporuke.
• Evropska unija i druge donatorske agencije trebaju • Međunarodna pomoć u borbi protiv korupcije
uzeti u obzir veći udio finansiranja za programe državnim vlastima treba predvidjeti jaču ulogu
dobrog upravljanja koji se provode u saradnji civilnog društva. To obuhvata uključenost nevladinih
između organizacija civilnog društva i javnih organizacija kao provedbenih partnera, posmatrača
institucija. Ovi programi trebaju imati jasne uslove i resursnih organizacije, posebno u evaluaciji učinka
protiv zahvatanja nevladinih organizacija posebnim projekata pomoći.
interesima. Treba napomenuti da postizanje učinka • Djelotvornost pomoći treba povremeno ocjenjivati
zahtijeva dugoročnu održivu posvećenost (10 godina putem metoda procjene učinka. Osim što bi ovo
i više). obezbijedilo mjeru vrijednost-za-novac – pogotovo
• Sektor civilnog društva treba da se pobrine za vlastitu kada se radi o javnom finansiranju – to bi omogućilo
samoregulaciju. To u najmanju ruku uključuje održavanje uspješnih i obustavu neuspješnih
donošenje kodeksa ponašanja sa ambicioznim programa. Imperativ je da ta procjena bude nezavisna
standardima. Treba pronaći više i bolje načine i da koristi stručnost organizacija civilnog društva.
organizovanja interesnih koalicija. • Pomoć treba poticati programe između zemalja o
• Nevladine organizacije trebaju imati bolje zajedničkim pitanjima, kao što su prekogranični
razumijevanje potrebe za transparentnošću i kriminal. Bugarsko iskustvo u javno-privatnoj
odgovornošću. To uključuje da podliježu redovnoj saradnji u analizi povezanosti organizovanog
reviziji, objavljivanju finansijskih izvještaja, jasne i kriminala i korupcije treba iskoristiti u cijeloj regiji.
transparentne procedure korporativnog upravljanja, • Priprema i zaključci redovnih izvještaja Evropske
kao i mjere protiv zahvaćenosti posebnim komisije trebaju se bolje ugraditi u domaće kreiranje
interesima. politika uz više oslanjanja na lokalno civilno društvo
• Za zemlje koje nisu članice EU u Jugoistočnoj Evropi i poslovnu zajednicu.
bilo bi dobro da uče iz ukupnog znanja i stručnosti
Annex 167
Bulgaria туционалните практики в няколко области, които са

от съществено значение за успеха на антикорупцион-
ните реформи: регулаторна и правна рамка, инсти-
туционални предпоставки, корупция в икономика-
та, роля на гражданското общество и международно
Резюме сътрудничество. Докладът представя гледната точ-
ка и оценката на политиките на гражданското
общество в региона, като изводите и препоръките
Корупцията в Югоизточна Европа е чест предмет му са плод на консултации с националните и регио-
на медийно внимание, обществени дебати и поли- нални държавни институции.
тически инициативи от страна на националните и
международните институции. Именно поради фа- Оценката на националните институционални и
кта, че проблемът e така упорит, всеки иновативен правни фактори, които създават корупционна сре-
подход към неговото осмисляне – и следователно да в региона, няма претенции за изчерпателност по
разрешаване – заслужава внимание. Перспективата отношение на политиките и практиките във всички
пред страните от региона за присъединяване към страни, а по-скоро поставя акцент върху някои от
ЕС, макар и далечна, открива нови възможности за приоритетните проблеми, свързани с потенциал-
протиеодействие на корупцията, но същински на- ните възможности за противодействие на общите
предък в тази насока е единствено възможен чрез за Югоизточна Европа прояви на корупция. Насто-
усилия на местно ниво и по-конкретно – чрез уси- ящият доклад представлява модел за мониторинг
лията на местното гражданско общество. Сред ос- и анализ на напредъка на антикорупционните
новните приоритети на Инициативата за развитие усилия от страна на гражданското общество в Юго-
и почтеност в Югоизточна Европа (SELDI) са задъл- източна Европа.
бочената диагностика на корупцията и пропуските
в управлението в региона като необходимо условие
за формулирането на антикорупционни полити-
ки. Настоящият доклад на SELDI е част от рамката, в ОСНОВНИ ИЗВОДИ
която се разработва и прилага регионалната антико-
рупционна политика и инфраструктура, пример за
която е приоритет „Управление” в Стратегия 2020 за Обща оценка
Югоизточна Европа на Съвета за регионално сътруд-
ничество. Въпреки някои важни постижения, свързани най-
вече със стабилизирането на демократичните ин-
Докладът e резултат от съвместните усилия на члено- ституции, приемането на нормативна уредба в
вете на SELDI и използва иновативна методология и основните направления за противодействие на ко-
процедури. Той е продукт на разработената от SELDI рупцията, намаляването на т.нар. малка корупция
след 2000 г. система за оценка на корупцията и на (дребни подкупи) и повишаването на обществена-
антикорупционните реформи в специфичния та нетърпимост към корупцията, реформите в об-
контекст на Югоизточна Европа1. Използваната в до- ластта на антикорупцията и доброто управление в
клада Система за мониторинг на корупцията (СМК) Югоизточна Европа не са устойчиви. Налице е тен-
е базирана на виктимизационни изследвания и дава денция политиците и магистратите да се възприе-
възможност да се извърши уникална, основаваща се мат като все по-корумпирани, а антикорупционното
на тези данни оценка на напредъка в антикорупци- законодателство не се прилага последователно. Ан-
онните усилия в региона от 2001 г. насам. Послед- тикорупционните политики и институции в реги-
ната такава оценка, чиито резултати са обобщени в она имат нужда от въвеждането на периодичен ин-
настоящия доклад, обхваща периода 2013 – 2014 г. и струмент за измерване на корупцията и напредъка
представлява рядък пример за международен мони- в доброто управление, базиран на виктимизацион-
торинг, при който едни и същи проблеми в един ни изследвания, по подобие на специализираните
и същ регион се изследват повторно след малко изследвания на Евробарометър, на мониторинга на
повече от едно десетилетие. В сравнителен план Службата на ООН по наркотици и престъпност и на
се оценяват националното законодателство и инсти- Системата за мониторинг на корупцията, използва-
на в настоящия доклад.
1
(SELDI, 2002).
Разпространение на корупцията чрез СМК на SELDI (през 2001 г. и 2002 г.); напредъ-

в Югоизточна Европа кът обаче е бавен и неравномерен.
Корупцията е широко разпространено явление в Корупционният натиск от страна на длъжностни-

Югоизточна Европа. Дори в Турция и в Хърватия, те лица е основният фактор, който влияе статисти-
където равнището на административната корупция чески върху равнището на участие в корупционни
е най-ниското в региона, около 8-9% от население- сделки. В повечето от страните с високи равнища на
то съобщават, че през последната година са давали участие в корупционни сделки и на корупционен
подкуп. Подобни равнища на корупция далеч над- натиск е характерна слаба съпротива срещу ко-
хвърлят средните, регистрирани в изследванията рупционния натиск (повечето от респондентите, на
на Евробарометър в Европейския съюз2. Тези данни които е бил поискан подкуп, са дали такъв). Макар
показват, че административната корупция е масово съпротивата да не може да се смята за главен фак-
явление и не може да се сведе до разглеждането на тор, спомагащ за намаляване на корупцията, тя от-
единични случаи на корумпирани длъжностни лица разява преобладаващите обществени нагласи към
и тяхното преследване единствено чрез инструмен- почтеността и се възпитава най-вече чрез усилията
тите на наказателното правосъдие. на гражданското общество и компетентните органи
за изграждане на обществено съзнание за противо-
Значителните разлики в равнищата на корушция действие на корупцията.
между страните с близко историческо развитие в
Югоизточна Европа показват, че различните пътища
на социално, икономическо и институционално раз- Съпротива на корупционния натиск
витие водят до различни резултати. Като цяло, освен
ʣʢʗʖʡʠʖʝʠʘʗʟʚʤʗʟʑʟʑʤʚʣʜ
България, всички страни отбелязват положителна

ɢʝʒʑʟʚʱ
промяна от предишните диагностични изследвания
ɯʑʜʗʖʠʟʚʱ
ɭʠʣʠʓʠ
ɺʗʢʟʑɥʠʢʑ
Корупционен натиск и участие в корупционни сделки
ɴʬʢʒʚʱ
ʠʤʟʑʣʗʝʗʟʚʗʤʠʟʑʖʔ ʟʑʜʠʛʤʠʗʚʣʜʑʟʡʠʖʜʥʡʚ ɣʬʝʔʑʢʚʱ
ʣʑʖʑʝʚʡʠʖʜʥʡ ʡʑʢʚ ʥʣʝʥʔʑ ʡʠʖʑʢʬʜ
ʡʢʗʙʡʠʣʝʗʖʟʑʤʑʔʠʖʚʟʑ

ɸʬʢʓʑʤʚʱ
ɣʠʣʟʑʚ
ɢʝʒʑʟʚʱ ɸʗʢʨʗʔʠʓʚʟʑ

ɵʥʢʨʚʱ

ɺʗʢʟʑɥʠʢʑ

ɲʠʖʖʑʝʚʣʗʟʑʟʑʤʚʣʜʑ ɣʗʙʠʤʔʠʓʠʢ
ɣʬʝʔʑʢʚʱ
ɰʗʖʑʝʚʡʠʖʜʥʡ ʓʬʡʢʗʜʚʟʑʤʚʣʜʑ

ɴʬʢʒʚʱ

Източник: SELDI/Център за изследване на демокрацията,
Система за мониторинг на корупцията, 2014 г.
ɯʑʜʗʖʠʟʚʱ

ɭʠʣʠʓʠ

ɣʠʣʟʑʚ
ɸʗʢʨʗʔʠʓʚʟʑ

ɰʑʤʚʣʜ
Политики и законодателство за
ɸʬʢʓʑʤʚʱ
ʚʣʜʑʟʚʞʗʡʠʖʜʥʡ
противодействие на корупцията
ɶʩʑʣʤʚʗ
ɵʥʢʨʚʱ
ʖʑʝʚʣʑʡʠʖʜʥʡ
Страните от SELDI са въвели по-голямата част от

международните антикорупционни стандарти в
Система за мониторинг на корупцията, 2014. своето национално законодателство, като най-ва-
жното е, че възприемат логиката и подхода, залегна-
ли в тях. Качеството на законите обаче продължава
2
Индикаторите за опита, който гражданите имат с корупцията,
да е проблематично. В резултат на честите и непо-
използвани в изследванията на Евробарометър, са с малко по- следователни законови изменения са налице сложни
различно съдържание, тъй като се отнасят както до прекия процедури и разпоредби, които се интерпретират
опит на респондентите, така и до случаите, в които те са били
свидетели на даване на подкуп. Повече подробности може да противоречиво от отделните съдилища и водят до
намерите в (TNS Opinion & Social, February 2014). слабо правоприлагане.
Annex 169
Всички държави от Югоизточна Европа са приели Резултатите от мониторинга на SELDI подчертават

някакъв стратегически документ, в който е описан колко важна е обществената подкрепа за успе-
цялостният им подход в борбата с корупцията. Ма- ха на антикорупционните политики. Съществу-
кар да има известни разлики, прилагането на тези ва взаимозависимост между общественото доверие
документи в отделните страни се затруднява от лип- в управлението и ефективността на политиката: по-
сата на средства и недостатъчната ангажираност на високият дял на хората, убедени в реалистичността
висше управленско равнище. Общ недостатък е и на антикорупционните мерки, води до по-ниски рав-
стремежът със стратегиите да бъдат разрешавани нища на корупция. По-високото разпространение на
всички възможни проблеми на корупцията. Подоб- корупцията, напротив, върви ръка за ръка с повече
ни документи се стремят да бъдат всеобхватни, а не песимизъм спрямо перспективите на антикорупци-
да постигнат въздействие върху най-проблемите об- онните усилия.
ласти, което ги превръща в добър списък с всички
възможни корупционни проблеми, но не ги прави
действени политически документи. Институционална практика и
прилагане на законодателството
Що се отнася до приоритетите в антикорупционната
политика, подходът се е променил значително в два Доскорошният акцент върху хармонизирането на
аспекта – вниманието вече е пренасочено от дребна- националното законодателство с международните
та (административна) корупция (например в пътна антикорупционни стандарти в Югоизточна Европа
полиция или сред лекарите в държавните лечебни постепенно отстъпва на фокуса върху тяхното при-
заведения) към едрата (политическа) корупция (сред лагане, под натиска както на ЕС, така и на граждан-
депутатите/министрите). Все повече видове злоупо- ското общество.
треба със служебно положение се инкриминират.
Резултатите по отношение на наказването на едрата Във всички държави от SELDI е налице една и съща
корупция обаче, в най-добрия случай, са ограничени. слабост – недостатъчната независимост на надзор-
Антикорупционните политики в региона трябва да ните и правоприлагащи органи. Намесата на поли-
отговарят на основното предизвикателство да спома- тиците в работата на държавната администрация и
гат за успешното прилагане на нормативната уредба независимите органи е характерно явление. Адми-
и да са приспособими към променящите се прояв- нистрацията в държавите от SELDI не разполага с
ления и форми на корупция, като в същото време адекватно функциониращ механизъм за управление
поддържат нормативна стабилност и не затрудняват на жалбите. В повечето страни е създаден национа-
съдебната власт с прекалено чести промени. лен орган за борба с корупцията, където се предвиж-
да гражданите да подават жалби. Друг общ проблем
е недостига на надеждни и публично достъпни дан-
Осъществимост на антикорупционните политики: ни за работата на държавните институции, особено
как се оценява тя от обществото по отношение на противодействието на корупцията.
Информация и статистика или не се събират, или не
ʠʤʟʑʣʗʝʗʟʚʗʤʠʟʑʖʔ
са достъпни за обществеността, или качеството им

ɵʥʢʨʚʱ
не дава възможност за мониторинг и анализ.
ɸʬʢʓʑʤʚʱ
ɺʗʢʟʑɥʠʢʑ
ɭʠʣʠʓʠ
Един от основните проблеми, свързани с устройство-
ɣʠʣʟʑʚ

то на специализираните органи за противодействие
ɸʗʢʨʗʔʠʓʚʟʑ
ɴʬʢʒʚʱ на корупцията в региона е как да бъдат съчетани
ɣʬʝʔʑʢʚʱ превантивните и репресивните функции. Като
ɯʑʜʗʖʠʟʚʱ правило страните от SELDI се опитват да съвместят
ɢʝʒʑʟʚʱ и двете роли в антикорупционните си органи,
макар репресивната функция да е далеч по-слабо за-
ɭʠʢʥʡʨʚʱʤʑʟʗʞʠʘʗʖʑʒʬʖʗʙʟʑʩʚʤʗʝʟʠʟʑʞʑʝʗʟʑ стъпена. Повечето от задачите на тези органи се със-
ɭʠʢʥʡʨʚʱʤʑʞʠʘʗʖʑʒʬʖʗʙʟʑʩʚʤʗʝʟʠ тоят в някакъв вид надзорна или контролна дейност,
ʟʑʞʑʝʗʟʑʚʝʚʚʙʜʠʢʗʟʗʟʑ
ɰʗʙʟʑʞ
обикновено на националните им антикорупционни
стратегии, и няма сериозни свидетелства те да имат
Система за мониторинг на корупцията, 2014 г.. значимо влияние върху законодателния дневен ред
на правителствата. Създаването и функционира-
нето на подобни институции се сблъсква с редица тата й чрез мотивация не позволява да се повиши
трудности: равнището на професионализъм и да се намали
корупцията. Един от основните изводи на доклада
• Макар корупцията да е сред основните приорите- е взаимозависимостта между компетентност
ти на правителствата, е трудно да се създават ин- и добросъвестност. Типичен случай е при подо-
ституции с извънредни правомощия, които биха зрения за корупция в някоя държавна институция
могли по някакъв начин да нарушат съществува- да се открива и липса на институционален капаци-
щия баланс на властите. Типичният компромис е тет. Когато професионализмът се повиши нараства
тези служби да са към изпълнителната власт и да и добросъвестността на служителите. Така едно от
им се дават надзорни правомощия, ограничени основните предизвикателства в региона е как да се
до това да изискват от другите държавни инсти- постигне прозрачност и отчетност на държавната
туции да отчитат пред тях изпълнението на въз- администрация, като едновременно с това се по-
ложените им антикорупционни задачи. виши нейния професионализъм. В много случаи
• Специализираните органи за противодействие на реформите и авторитета на дадено управление се
корупцията трябва да не дублират правомощия- подкопават от лошо управление, неясни критерии и
та, които вече са възложени на други надзорни неправилно разпределение на правомощията.
органи (например националните органи за фи-
нансов контрол или правоприлагащите органи). Антикорупционната роля на правоприлагащите
• На повечето от тях е даден ограничен институци- органи в региона, трябва да се оценява в контекста
онален капацитет – бюджет, кадри – въпреки зая- на непрестанно разширяващия се обхват на инкри-
вените намерения за обратното. минирани практики, твърде голяма част от които
разпространени сред самите правоприлагащи орга-
Що се отнася до законодателната власт, парла- ни. Ефективността на тези институции в Югоизточ-
ментите в региона не се ползват с особено високо на Европа допълнително се намалява от уязвимостта
обществено доверие и подобно незавидно поло- им към корупционно влияние от организираната
жение не е безпочвено. Законодателните органи в престъпност. Полицията в повечето страни от SELDI
редки случаи разполагат с кодекси за етично пове- разполага със специализирани подразделения за
дение или ако имат такива не се съобразяват с тях; борба с организираната престъпност; често те са на-
в още по-редки случаи е регулирано лобирането; товарени и с противодействие на корупцията. Съв-
процедури за снемане на депутатския имунитет се местяването на тези две функции се налага не само
въвеждат, макар и плахо, едва в последните години; защото организираната престъпност прибягва до
в страните, където парламентът разполага с антико- корупция, но и защото разкриването на сложните
рупционен орган, ролята му обикновено се свежда корупционни схеми изисква специализирани мето-
до надзор върху някоя изпълнителна агенция, а не ди за разследване, на които обикновено се обучават
до противодействие на корупцията сред депутатите. служителите от отделите за борба с организираната
Сериозен проблем в държавите от SELDI е финанси- престъпност. Те обаче в общия случай са част от по-
рането на политическите партии и предизборните лицията или министерствата на вътрешните работи,
кампании. В повечето от тях са възприети препоръ- което им отнема институционалната автономност,
ките на ГРЕКО за финансиране на политическите необходима за един специализиран орган за борба
партии, но продължават да съществуват проблеми с корупцията.
като анонимни дарения, купуване на гласове (кое-
то на практика е подкупване на гласоподаватели),
недостатъчен капацитет за финансов контрол на Съдебната система в борбата
партиите и ограничени правомощия за налагане на с корупцията
санкции.
В Югоизточна Европа усилията да се гарантира не-
Състоянието на държавната администрация в зависимост на съдебната система не са балансирани
момента отразява преходния етап, на който се на- от също толкова категорични изисквания за отчет-
мират страните от ЮИЕ, като нуждата от насърча- ност на магистратите. Поради липса на адекватен
ване на управленското и организационно развитие взаимен контрол на властите, самоуправлението на
на държавната администрация е обща черта за съдебните органи в нарастваща степен излиза из-
всички държави от региона. Културата на „контрол” вън контрол като довежда до корпоратизъм, с всич-
над администрацията вместо управление на рабо- ки свързани с него корупционни рискове. В случая
Annex 171
прекаленият акцент върху формалната независи- Корупция и икономика

мост е типичен пример за решение, превърнало се
в проблем – вместо да послужи за поддържане на Значителното участие на държавата в икономика-
равновесието с изпълнителната власт, самоуправле- та в Югоизточна Европа поражда множество въз-
нието задълбочи клиентелните отношения между можности за смесване на функциите на държавни-
магистратите и различни корупционни интереси. те институции и бизнеса; това на свой ред създава
Така днес съдебната власт в Югоизточна Европа е не корупционен риск. Особено висок е корупцион-
по-малко засегната от корупция, отколкото изпъл- ният риск в областта на приватизацията и об-
нителната или законодателната. Освобождаването ществените поръчки и концесиите в сектори
от обществен контрол успява да премахне почти като енергетиката и здравеопазването. Свръхрегу-
всички пречки пред стремежа към облаги от страна лацията на бизнеса – най-вече по отношение на ре-
на магистратите. гистрацията, лицензионните и разрешителните ре-
жими – продължава да поставя различни бариери
Не е изненадващо, че обществеността няма особено пред стартиращите фирми и да увеличава фирме-
висока оценка за съдебната власт. Според Система- ните разходи, макар че някои от страните в региона
та за мониторинг на корупцията на SELDI магист- са постигнали значителен напредък в премахването
ратите се смятат за едни от най-корумпираните; на пречките пред бизнеса. Административните ор-
значим фактор за подобни оценки е липсата на гани (различните държавни и изпълнителни аген-
прозрачност и отчетност. От 2001 г. насам в страни- ции) обаче все още влияят негативно върху пазара
те от SELDI оценката за разпространението на чрез упражняването на прекомерен контрол и санк-
корупцията сред магистратите осезателно се ции без адекватна оценка на риска, и на разходите
влошава. и ползите от техните действия. Това важи в най-го-
ляма степен за митническите органи на държа-
Натрупани са редица проблеми, които значително вите в региона, които продължават да се използват
намаляват капацитета на съдебната власт в региона като средство за натиск върху бизнеса. В резултат на
за прилагане на законодателството за борба с коруп- това предприемачите биват или изтласкани в не-
цията, особено политическата корупция: формалния сектор, или принудени да прибягват до
подкупи, което на свой ред служи като оправдание
• Структурни несъответствия, свързани предимно за въвеждане на допълнителни регулации и адми-
с възстановяване на баланса между от една страна нистративни бариери.
независимостта, и от друга – отчетността и про-
зрачността на съдебната власт; Множеството потенциални корупционни ситуации
• Сложността на наказателното преследване срещу в отношенията между бизнеса и държавните служи-
извършителите на корупционни престъпления, тели илюстрират колко трудно е да се формулират
особено на политическо равнище; политики за противодействие на корупцията по-
• Обща липса на капацитет и свързаните с нея про- ради големия брой фактори, които трябва да бъдат
блеми като недостатъчен професионализъм, пре- взети под внимание. Съществуват две основни ка-
товареност с дела и съответното натрупване на тегории корупционни практики, чийто инициатор
неразрешени дела, лошо управление на делата, са фирмите – избягване на допълнителни разходи
слабо техническо осигуряване. и получаване на конкурентно преимущество по не-
почтен начин. В първата група попадат подкупите,
Важен извод за ролята на съдебната власт в противо- мотивирани от неадекватни или прекомерни регула-
действието на корупцията, който може да се напра- ции, лична или институционална некомпетентност
ви от настоящия мониторинг на SELDI е, че липсват и други подобни; към втората спадат различните из-
механизми за обратна връзка, които да позволят мами – заобикаляне на данъци, измами с ДДС, кон-
на бъдат оценявани прилагането на наказателното трабанда, неспазване на стандартите за здравослов-
антикорупционно законодателство и добросъвест- ни и безопасни условия и пр.
ността на магистратите. Нито една държава от ЮИЕ
не разполага с надежден, последователен и всеобхва- Обществените поръчки са един от основните ка-
тен механизъм за събиране, обработка и представя- нали, по които корупцията засяга икономиката на
не на обществено достъпни статистически данни за страните в Югоизточна Европа. Корупционен риск
работата на съдилищата и прокуратурата като цяло възниква поради редица слабости като недостатъч-
и във връзка с делата за корупция в частност. но прозрачните процедури, голям дял на поръчки-
те, възлагани без конкурс, неефективен съдебен кон- четаване на сътрудничеството с ролята на регулатор
трол за законосъобразност (дължащ се на корупция е професионализирането на техния мониторинг на
в съдебната власт) и пр. Въпреки че в изследване на корупцията и антикорупционните политики.
SELDI от преди повече от десетилетие се отбелязва,
че страните от региона са усъвършенствали законо- Ефективността на неправителствените организации
дателната уредба в областта на обществените по- в противодействието на корупцията зависи в голяма
ръчки и са я хармонизирали значително с европей- степен от способността им да дадат пример за добро
ското законодателство, обществените поръчки про- управление. Гражданските организации също могат
дължават да са един от най-уязвимите аспекти на да бъдат „присвоени” или „завладяни” от държавата
общественото управление. За цялото това време не чрез корупционни схеми, поради няколко фактора,
се наблюдава особена промяна, тъй като въведените подкопаващи стабилността на неправителствения
разпоредби успешно се заобикалят от корумпира- сектор в региона:
ните политици и свързаните с тях фирми. Липсата
на институционална съгласуваност не позволява • липса на задължителни процедури за прозрач-
правилата и разпоредбите в сферата на обществе- ност в сектора;
ните поръчки да бъдат прилагани ефективно. • неефективен контрол върху спазването на финан-
совите правила;
• липса на разбиране за ролята на финансовия
Гражданското общество одит;
в борбата с корупцията • слаба саморегулация и координация на усилията.
Една от най-значимите движещи сили в противодей- Борбата със присвояването/завладяването на граж-

ствието на корупцията в Югоизточна Европа са не- данското общество в рамките на антикорупционни-
правителствените организации. Редица недостатъци те усилия в страните от Югоизточна Европа трябва
обаче възпрепятстват сериозно възможностите им да се превърне в приоритетна област на реформи в
да превръщат изискванията на обществото в ефек- региона.
тивно застъпничество за конкретни политики и да се
противопоставят адекватно на корупцията. В не мал-
ка степен това зависи от способността им едновре- Международно сътрудничество
менно да осъществяват независим мониторинг
и да сътрудничат с държавните институции в Международните институции и партньорските дър-
антикорупционните реформи. Все още липсват ме- жави играят значима роля в противодействието на
ханизми, чрез които правителствата на държавите в корупцията в Югоизточна Европа. Предвид че малко
региона да ангажират гражданското общество, както реформи са консенсусни в тези страни, поемането на
и ясна визия и разбиране за потенциала на граждан- международни задължения спомага за формулира-
ските организации в областта на противодействие- не на реформи, които местните политици вероятно
то на корупцията. Техните усилия трудно могат да иначе не биха предприели. Повечето страни от ЮИЕ
доведат до траен ефект, тъй като те разчитат преко- съобразяват антикорупционната си политика с до-
мерно на международно, включително и европейско кладите на Европейската комисия, а европейското
финансиране, а в страните от Югоизточна Европа не финансиране и споразуменията за туининг съдейст-
съществува политика за насърчаване на активността ват за осъществяването й. Докладите на Европейската
на гражданския сектор. комисия за напредъка на страните акцентират върху
борбата с корупцията, но реакцията към тях варира
През последните години неправителствените ор- в отделните страни – държавите с по-ясни изгледи за
ганизации в страните от SELDI успяват да създадат присъединяване към ЕС отделят по-голямо и задъл-
няколко международни публично-частни партньор- бочено внимание на изводите и препоръките, докато
ства, които обаче не прерастват в ефективни парт- в други, като нспример Турция те не предизвикват
ньорства с държавните институции в собствените подобен отклик.
им страни. Способността да се поддържат различни
отношения с държавните органи – да се сътрудничи Възприемането на международни препоръки и
с тях, но и да им се опонира – е от ключово значение стандарти, обаче, може да предизвиква и нереалис-
за успеха на едно партньорство. Един от използвани- тични очаквания за бърза промяна на ситуацията,
те от неправителствените организации начини за съ- а това би могло да доведе до повърхностни и огра-
Annex 173
ничени мерки. Освен това, в международното анти- Трябва да се въведе независим механизъм за мо-
корупционно сътрудничество, особено що се отнася ниторинг на корупцията и антикорупцията на
до отношенията с ЕС, е ангажирана почти изклю- национално и регионално равнище, за да се осигу-
чително изпълнителната власт, докато съдебната рят надеждни данни и анализ, и да се интегрират
власт, парламентът и други институции и организа- диагностиката на корупцията и оценката на
ции не са въвлечени в достатъчна степен, въпреки антикорупционните политики. Този механизъм
че последствията от това сътрудничество пряко ги трябва да се прилага от национални и/или регионал-
засягат. Ефектът от ангажираността на международ- ни граждански организации и мрежи и не трябва да
ните и чуждестранни институции с антикорупци- се финансира пряко от правителствата на страните
онните реформи в страните от ЮИЕ се увеличава в региона. Той трябва да стане средство за отваря-
главно благодарение на по-широкото местно учас- не на административните данни и разширяване на
тие, включващо гражданското общество, медиите, обществения достъп до информация. На обществе-
професионалните организации, профсъюзите и пр. ността трябва да бъде даден достъп до бази данни,
По-големият брой местни партньори оказва двоен чрез които може да се проследяват обществените по-
ефект, като засилва авторитета на отделни рефор- ръчки, държавните субсидии, бюджетните трансфе-
маторски настроени политици или политически ри, годишните доклади за дейността на надзорните
групи, както и неправителствени организации, и и контролни органи и пр., което ще позволи задъл-
насърчава обществото да изисква реформи. Разши- бочения им анализ и да подпомогне използването на
ряването на този подход би било от решаващо зна- инструментите за мониторинг.
чение за влиянието на ЕС в региона. Международ-
ният ангажимент към реформаторски настроените Трябва да се обърне приоритетно внимание на
политици и партии трябва да бъде подкрепен, но и сектори с висок риск от корупция като енерге-
санкциониран от гражданското общество чрез фор- тиката, с фокус върху приоритетни мерки като:
ма на тристранно сътрудничество.
• повишаване на конкуренцията в сферата на об-
ществените поръчки;
• подобряване на корпоративното управление на
КЛЮЧОВИ ПРЕПОРЪКИ държавните предприятия;
• прозрачно управление на големите инвестицион-
ни проекти;
Опитът на страните от SELDI от 2001 г. насам показ- • повишаване на отчетността и независимостта на
ва, че решаването на проблема с корупцията изисква енергийните регулатори.
непрестанни усилия в няколко приоритетни направ-
ления и дългосрочен ангажимент от страна на мест- Международните партньори, и най-вече Евро-
ните и международни институции и организации. пейската комисия, трябва да ангажират пряко
Настоящият доклад дава редица препоръки за по- гражданските организации в региона. Това е не-
нататъшно ограничаване на корупцията. За да бъде обходимо по няколко причини: a) за да имат траен
постигната промяна в средносрочен план във всяка ефект реформите, ползващи се с международна под-
от страните и на европейско равнище трябва да се крепа, те трябва да получат широко обществено одо-
акцентира върху следните приоритетни области: брение, което е невъзможно без участието на граж-
данските организации; б) участието на гражданските
Ефективното наказателно преследване на ко- организации е начин да се гарантира, че отчетността
румпирани висши политици, магистрати и на правителствата пред донорите и международните
държавни служители е единственият начин да организации не измества отчетността пред местните
се отправи недвусмислено и незабавно послание за избиратели; в) ефективността на международната
нулева толерантност към корупцията. В Хърватия и помощ ще се повиши, ако се използва аналитични-
Словения например осъждането на корумпирани ят и мониторингов капацитет, както и общественото
политици има забележим ефект върху укрепване- влияние на гражданските организации; г) сътруд-
то на мерките за противодействие на корупцията. ничеството им с ЕК ще препятства въвличането на
Подобни действия трябва да бъдат подкрепени на гражданското общество в клиентелните мрежи на
международно равнище, включително и с участието нереформирани и често корумпирани държавни ад-
на правоприлагащите органи на държавите – член- министрации.
ки на ЕС.
КОНКРЕТНИ ПРЕПОРЪКИ • Институционалният капацитет на съответните

държавни органи, по-конкретно на специализи-
раните агенции за борба с корупцията и надзор-
Политики и законодателство ните агенции като органите за финансов контрол,
включително техните бюджети, материална база
• Дефинирането на национални антикорупцион- и кадри трябва да бъдат приведени в съответствие
ни политики да включва залагането на измерими с широките компетенции, които са им дадени и
постижения, а не просто „мерки” или законови на високите обществени очаквания от работата
актове. Това означава да се заложат конкретни им. Алтернативно те биха могли да разработват
резултати, които трябва да бъдат постигнати, и не мащабни годишни и средносрочни програми,
да се посочат адекватните методи за това. Резул- а мерки фокусирани към решаването на конкрет-
татите трябва да имат постижимо количествено ни приоритетни проблеми.
измерение. • Капацитетът на националните сметни палати
• Да се даде приоритет на определени сектори, трябва да бъде укрепен, включително да им бъдат
видове корупция и методи на действие и да се дадени правомощия за налагане на санкции. Под-
изпробват пилотно различни подходи, преди лежащите на финансов контрол органи и нацио-
мерките да бъдат прилагани в широк мащаб. Ко- налните парламенти трябва да бъдат задължени
рупцията е широко понятие, свързано с различ- да предприемат действия вследствие на доклади-
ни видове измами, на които не може да се проти- те на сметните палати. На последните трябва да
водейства едновременно по ефективен начин. бъде възложено да контролират и управлението
• Антикорупционните политики да се основават на фондовете на ЕС, когато те са администрирани
на надеждни данни и изследвания. Въпреки че от национални органи. В страните от Югоизточ-
са правени опити за оценка на досегашните ре- на Европа, трябва да бъде развит капацитета на
зултати в националните стратегии за борба с ко- сметните палати да одитират ефективността и
рупцията, нито една от държавите от SELDI не въздействието на функционирането на държавни
разполага с регулярен механизъм за оценка на органи, а не само да следят за спазването на фи-
антикорупционните политики. За това е необ- нансовите правила.
ходимо поне: a) надеждна и редовна статистика • Необходими са по-нататъшни мерки, за да се га-
за антикорупционните мерки (разследвания, на- рантира, че назначенията на държавните служи-
казателни дела, административни мерки и др.); тели се правят с оглед на способностите на канди-
б) редовен мониторинг и анализ на разпростра- дите, а не с партийни протекции.
нението и формите на корупцията по обществе- • Антикорупционната дейност трябва да бъде по-
ни сектори. Мониторингът трябва да е независим равномерно разпределена между държавните
и/или външен за страната, да включва участието органи. Разширяването на кръга от корупционни
на гражданското общество и основните компо- престъпления трябва да бъде подсигурено с по-
ненти на системите за мониторинг на админи- вишаване на капацитета на всички държавни ор-
стративната корупция като СМК на SELDI. гани за справяне с корупцията сред служителите
им чрез административни методи, а не като прех-
Институции за борба с корупцията и право върлят все по-голяма отговорност на полицията и
прилагащи органи прокуратурата. Администрацията би трябвало да
се стреми да разрешава възможно най-много слу-
• Да се въведат иновативни инструменти за обратна чаи на корупция с административните средства, с
връзка, каквито през последните години се съз- които разполага. Като първа стъпка това изисква
дават в по-широк мащаб, като например Интег- създаване на ефективен механизъм за управление
рирания метод за мониторинг на прилагането на на жалби.
антикорупционни мерки, разработен от Центъра • Отнемането на незаконно придобито имущество
за изследване на демокрацията и Университета в в случаите на корупция е антикорупционен ин-
Тренто. Той дава възможност на управленските струмент, чието приложение трябва да бъде раз-
екипи да извършват оценка на корупционните ширено. Въпреки че трябва да се подхожда внима-
рискове в определена държавна институция, как- телно, за да не се наруши балансът между правата
то и на ефекта от съответната антикорупционна на обвиняемия и обществения интерес, особено
политика, като идентифицира решенията с най- в среда, където държавната администрация често
голямо въздействие. е корумпирана, конфискацията на имуществото
Annex 175
вследствие на наказателен процес е важна възпи- преследване, включително повдигнати обвине-

раща мярка, която все още не се използва в доста- ния и произнесени осъдителни/оправдателни
тъчна степен в ЮИЕ. присъди, разбивка на присъдите по вид корупци-
онно престъпление.
Съдебна власт
Корупцията и икономиката
• В страните, където мнозинството членове в орга-
ните на управление на съдебната власт не се из- • Да се намалят до минимум и да се преразглеждат
бират от самите магистрати, трябва да се прием- ежегодно политиките за държавни субсидии, тъй
ат реформи, които им дават по-голямо право на като те създават значителни корупционни риско-
глас. В страните, в които още не е приет принци- ве. Да се въведе предварително строгото прилага-
път „един магистрат – един глас”, той трябва да се не на правилата за отпускане на субсидии от ЕС
приеме. и да се изгради капацитет за прилагане на тези
• Да се гарантира, че изборът на съдебната квота е правила в рамките на съответните регулаторни
възможно най-представителен, като се включат органи.
и съдии от първоинстанционни съдилища. Вни- • Да се подобри прилагането на антимонополно-
мателно да се прецени и, ако е необходимо, да се то законодателство с цел да се насърчи свобод-
преразгледа съвместимостта на поста председа- ното предприемачество и конкуренцията. Да се
тел на съд с членството в органите за управление обърне специално внимание и да се наблюдава
на съдебната власт. редовно концентрацията на икономическа власт
• В страните, където прокуратурата и съда се упра- в силно регулираните сектори, където са налице
вляват от един и същ орган, в него трябва да бъдат лицензионни и други ограничения, които създа-
обособени две отделни колегии – за прокурорите ват риск за негласни споразумения на по-големи-
и за съдиите. Прокурори и съдии да бъдат пред- те икономически субекти с политиците.
ставени само в съответните колегии. • В страните, в които липсват институционални
• Да се премахне или сведе до минимум участието връзки между управлението на активите и па-
на министри (обикновено на правосъдието) в ор- сивите на всички публични финансови средства,
ганите за управление в съдебната власт, особено включително на държавните предприятия, да
във връзка с решенията за дисциплинарни про- бъдат изградени такива, за да се повиши довери-
цедури. ето към правителството по отношение на упра-
• В механизма за проверка на имуществените де- влението на публичните средства. Държавните
кларации трябва да бъде даден приоритет на предприятия трябва да отговарят на строги из-
имуществото на магистратите. исквания за корпоративно управление и отчет-
• Трябва да се повиши независимостта и капаците- ност (напр. правилата на Организацията за ико-
та на съдебните инспекторати, за да могат те да номическо сътрудничество и развитие), наравно с
активизират дейността си. публичните акционерни дружества. Те трябва да
• Да се въведат механизми за обратна връзка относ- публикуват онлайн тримесечните си отчети.
но приложението на антикорупционните поли- • Да се въведе наказателна отговорност и санкции
тики по отношение на магистратите. Такива ме- за възложителите на обществени поръчки, ко-
ханизми или имат множество недостатъци, или ито не представят съответните отчети за тях, не
изобщо липсват в страните от SELDI; липсата им докладват за нарушения на антикорупционното
подкопава репресивния аспект на антикорупци- законодателство или представят неверни или не-
онните политики и обезсмисля по-нататъшното пълни данни.
инкриминиране на корупцията. Добра практика • Да се определи правна и институционална рамка
в това отношение, която би могла да се възпро- за управлението и контрола на договорите, склю-
изведе, макар все още да не е достатъчно добре чени чрез публично-частни партньорства.
разработена, е Платформата за антикорупционна • Да се подобри надзора върху обществените по-
статистика, разработена от неправителствена ор- ръчки на големите поръчители (държавни пред-
ганизация в Косово. Подобен механизъм следва приятия и предприятия за комунални услуги), за
да включва редовна информация за: дисципли- да се постигне максимална ефективност на рабо-
нарните, административните и наказателните тата им и да се сведат до минимум нарушенията.
мерки в държавната администрация и съдебната • Да се намали делът на търговете за обществени
система; различните аспекти на наказателното поръчки, в които участва само един кандидат,
за да се насърчи конкуренцията. Пълната доку- готрайно приложение (над 10 години).

ментация с предварителната обява, получените • Гражданският сектор трябва да се стреми да се
оферти, сключените договори и свързаните с тях саморегулира. Най-малкото, което може да се
документи, да се публикува в онлайн база-данни направи за тази цел, е да се приемат кодекси на
с възможности за търсене. поведение с високи стандарти. Гражданските ор-
• Страните – кандидатки за членство в ЕС, които ганизации трябва да търсят повече и по-добри на-
не разполагат със децентрализирани системи за чини за създаване на коалиции по интереси.
управление на фондовете на ЕС, трябва да изгра- • Неправителствените организации трябва да
дят такива, за да осигурят необходимата правна разбират необходимостта от прозрачност и от-
и административна рамка за прехвърляне на четност. Това означава редовно одитиране, пуб-
отговорностите по приложението на финанси- личност на финансовите отчети, открито форму-
рани от ЕС програми. Контролът върху изпъл- лирани и прозрачни процедури за корпоративно
нението им трябва да остане централизиран и управление и мерки, предотвратяващи корупци-
отделен от органите, отговорни за изпълнението онно влияние.
на програмите. • Държавите от ЮИЕ, които не са членки на ЕС,
• При оценката на договорите за обществени поръч- трябва да проучват в дълбочина Доклада на ЕС за
ки да се възприеме подхода „най-добро съотноше- борбата с корупцията, за да се възползват от съ-
ние цена/качество” за изразходваните средства. браните в него информация и експертни позна-
ния. От него могат да почерпят ценни познания
Гражданско общество относно оценката на разпространението на ко-
рупцията и формулирането на антикорупцион-
• Да се повиши капацитета на гражданските орга- ни политики.
низации за мониторинг на корупцията и анти-
корупцията, включително уменията им за съби- Международно сътрудничество
ране и съпоставяне на първична информация за
държавните институции, за измерване на дейст- • Програмите за чуждестранна помощ трябва по-
вителното разпространение на корупцията и адекватно да отразяват изводите на международ-
за анализ на данни, оценяване на институции и ните и на независимите вътрешни оценки за ко-
подготовка на доклади по темата. рупцията в страните от ЮИЕ. За да се постигне
• В законодателството за конфликтите на интереси това, програмите трябва да бъдат по-гъвкави, ко-
трябва да се включат разпоредби относно органи- ето означава и по-кратък период между тяхното
зациите с нестопанска цел, особено онези, което разработване и изпълнение.
се финансират по администрирани от правител- • Международното подпомагане за националните
ството програми като националния бюджет и правителства в сферата на борбата с корупция-
фондовете на ЕС. та трябва да предвижда по-значителна роля на
• Да се въведат ясни и прозрачни правила и разпо- гражданското общество. Това означава включ-
редби за публично финансиране, както на цен- ването на неправителствени организации като
трално, така и на общинско равнище, на органи- партньори и наблюдатели, особено при оценката
зациите с нестопанска цел. Право на публично на въздействието на програмите и проектите.
финансиране трябва да имат само организации- • Ефективността от подпомагането трябва пери-
те, регистрирани в обществена полза, като за тях одично да се оценява посредством методи за
трябва да бъдат въведени по-строги изисквания оценка на въздействието, особено когато става
за отчетност и прозрачност. дума за публично финансиране, тъй като това
• Европейският съюз и други донорски организа- би спомогнало за продължаването на успешни-
ции трябва да разгледат възможността за пред- те и прекратяването не неуспешните програми.
виждане на повече средства за програми за добро Необходимо е тази оценка да е независима и да
управление, които да се прилагат съвместно от използва експертния капацитет на гражданските
гражданското общество и държавните институ- организации.
ции. В тях трябва да бъдат заложени недвусмисле- • Международната помощ трябва да насърчава съз-
ни изисквания, предотвратяващи възможността даването на междудържавни програми по общи
за корупционно влияние върху неправителстве- за ЮИЕ проблеми, например трансграничната
ните организации. Трябва да се отбележи, че престъпност. Българският опит в публично-част-
ефект от подобни програми се постига след дъл- ното сътрудничество при анализа на връзките
Annex 177
между организираната престъпност и корупция- в по-съществена част от създаването на полити-

та трябва да бъде използван в целия регион. ки на местно равнище, като се разчита повече на
• Подготовката и изводите от редовните доклади местното гражданско общество и бизнес среди.
на Европейската комисия трябва да се превърнат
Croatia procjena politika, a o rezultatima i preporukama iz

izvješća konzultiralo se s nacionalnim i regionalnim
javnim institucijama.
Namjena procjene nacionalnih institucionalnih i

Izvršni sažetak pravnih aspekata koji omogućuju korupciju u regiji nije
da bude sveobuhvatni inventar uredbi i praksi u svim
zemljama, već da naglasi neke od prioritetnih pitanja
Korupcija u jugoistočnoj Europi u vijestima je, važnih za detektiraje zajedničkih izvora korupcije
u središtu javne rasprave, te na političkoj agendi u jugoistočnoj Europi (JIE). Izvješće nudi model za
nacionalnih i međunarodnih ustanova toliko često i izvještavanje o napretku u borbi protiv korupcije
toliko dugo da istraživanja i ispitivanja svih njenih civilnog društva u JIE-u.
aspekata nije potrebno opravdavati. Upravo činjenica
da se korupcija dokazano smatra toliko tvrdokornim
problemom, opravdava inovativne pristupe njezinu
razumijevanju – a time i smanjenju. Izgledi zemalja u GLAVNI NALAZI
regiji za pristupanje EU-u – iako dalekom – pružaju
mogući okvir za djelovanje, no kontinuiran napredak
u području korupcije mogu pokrenuti lokalni dionici, Sveukupna ocjena
točnije civilno društvo. Vodstvo za razvoj i integritet
jugoistočne Europe (SELDI) utvrdilo je dubinsku Unatoč nekim važnim postignućima – uglavnom
dijagnozu i razumijevanje razlika između korupcije glede stabilizacije demokratskih ustanova, donošenja
i vlasti u regiji jednim od svojih glavnih prioriteta, zakona u ključnim područjima borbe protiv korupcije,
neophodnim uvjetom za njegovo zagovaranje smanjenja podmićivanja i sve veće netolerancije
antikorupcijskih politika koje počivaju na znanju. javnosti na korupciju – antikorupcijske i reforme
Ovo izvješće mreže SELDI spada u razvojni i dobrog upravljanja nisu objedinjene. Čini se da je
provedbeni okvir regionalne antikorupcijske politike među izabranim političarima i sudcima korupcija sve
i infrastrukture u nastajanju, za što je primjer glavni češća, dok je provedba antikorupcijskog zakonodavstva
stup upravljanja Strategije JIE 2020. kojim upravlja slučajna. Antikorupcijske politike i ustanove u regiji
Regionalna antikorupcijska inicijativa. imat će iznimne koristi od donošenja redovitog
i preciznog alata istraživanja koji se temelji na
Ovo izvješće rezultat je suradnje unutar mreže viktimizaciji za mjerenje korupcije i stope napretka u
SELDI te je inovativno i metodom i procesom. Ono dobrom upravljanju, nalik posebnom Eurobarometru
je rezultat primjene sustava koji je u ranim 2000-ima o antikorupciji, UNODC-ovu praćenju korupcije i
razvila mreža SELDI za procjenu i korupcije i borbe organiziranog kriminala u JIE-u te Sustavu za praćenje
protiv korupcije, a koji je prilagođen društvenom i korupcije koji se koristi u ovom izvješću.
institucijskom okruženju jugoistočne Europe.1 Pristup
istraživanju koji se temelji na viktimizaciji, primjenjujući
Sustav za praćenje korupcije, pruža jedinstvenu procjenu Rasprostranjenost korupcije
antikorupcijskog napretka u regiji od 2001. godine koja u jugoistočnoj Europi
se temelji na podacima. Krug procjene za razdoblje
2013. – 2014. godine, čiji su rezultati sažeti u ovom Iskustvo s korupcijom – drugim riječima, uključenost
izvješću, predstavlja rijedak slučaj u međunarodnoj članova javnosti u korupcijske transakcije – vrlo je
praksi praćenja jer se nakon malo više od desetljeća visoko u JIE-u. Čak i u Turskoj i Hrvatskoj, u kojima
ponovno bavi istim problemima i istom regijom. su razine upravne korupcije najniže u regiji, otprilike
Procjenom su uspoređeni nacionalno zakonodavstvo i 8 – 9% stanovništva je prijavilo da su u prethodnoj
institucionalna praksa u brojnim područjima ključnim godini dali mito. Takve razine iskustva s korupcijom
za antikorupcijske napore: regulatorni i zakonodavni daleko su iznad prosječnih razina zabilježenih u
okvir, institucionalni preduvjeti, gospodarska korupcija,
uloga civilnog društva i međunarodna suradnja. 2
Pokazatelji iskustva s korupcijom, koji se koriste u istraživanjima
U izvješću se navodi stajalište civilnog društva i Eurobarometra, malo su drugačijeg sadržaja jer se odnose na
izravno iskustvo i slučajeve u kojima su ispitanici svjedočili
slučajevima podmićivanja. Detalje potražite u (TNS Opinion &
1
(SELDI, 2002). Social, February 2014).
Annex 179
istraživanjima Eurobarometra u EU-u.2 To pokazuje

da je upravna korupcija masovni fenomen te da se ne Otpornost na pritisak korupcije
može ograničiti na pojedinačne slučajeve korumpiranih
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pozitivne. No, napredak je spor i neujednačen.
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Pritisak korupcije i uključenost u korupciju /JTVEBMJVOBUPǊQSJUJTLV
Izvor: Sustav mreže SELDI/CSD-a za praćenje korupcije, 2014.
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Antikorupcijske politike
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Sve u svemu, zemlje mreže SELDI prihvatile su veći
dio međunarodnih antikorupcijskih standarda u svoja
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nacionalna zakonodavstva – još važnije, prihvatile su
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njihovu logiku i pristup. Međutim, zakonska kvaliteta

ostaje problematična. Česte i nedosljedne izmjene
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korupcije. Iako među zemljama postoje određene

razlike, provedbu tih dokumenata općenito ometaju
Izvor: Sustav mreže SELDI/CSD-a za praćenje korupcije, 2014. nedostatni resursi i obveze na višim razinama vlade.
Dodatni problem diljem regije predstavlja osmišljavanje
strategija na način da se bave svim mogućim aspektima
Pritisak korupcije koji potječe od službenika glavni je korupcije. Umjesto da utvrde prioritete, strateški
čimbenik koji statistički utječe na razinu uključenosti. dokumenti su postale sveobuhvatni – kad je riječ o
Većinu zemalja u kojima su visoki i pritisak i antikorupciji, strateško je počelo značiti iscrpnost.
uključenost karakterizira i niska otpornost na pritisak
korupcije (većina ispitanika od kojih je traženo mito ga Kad je riječ o prioritetima javnih politika, u pristupu
je i dala). Iako se otpornost ne može smatrati glavnim borbi protiv korupcije uočene su dvije značajne
čimbenikom smanjenja korupcije, ona odražava promjene – pomicanje pozornosti sa sitne korupcije
prevladavajuća društvena stajališta o integritetu, te (prometnog policajca ili liječnika u javnom sektoru) na
je uvelike rezultat nastojanja civilnog društva i vlasti krupnu (parlamentarnih zastupnika ili ministara) te
da se poveća antikorupcijska svijest. U tom je pogledu na kriminalizaciju šireg raspona zlouporabe položaja
uloga civilnog društva ključna jer je ono u položaju i ovlasti. No, postizanje učinka u pogledu kažnjavanja
da ocjenjuje rezultate i predvodi pritisak javnosti za krupne korupcije u najboljem slučaju ostaje ograničeno.
promjenom. Ključni izazov antikorupcijskih politika u regiji jest
poništiti nesrazmjer glede provedbe, te biti u toku s
promjenjivim manifestacijama i oblicima korupcije
uz zadržavanje regulatorne stabilnosti i izbjegavanje
zatrpavanja sudstva čestim izmjenama.
Nalazi praćenja mreže SELDI naglašavaju važnost prikupljene, nisu dostupne javnosti ili su prikupljene
javne potpore za uspjeh antikorupcijskih politika. toliko neplanski da ne omogućuju praćenje i analizu.
Povjerenje javnosti u vladu, te učinkovitost javnih
politika objedinjeni su u pozitivan niz događaja: veći Jedno od ključnih pitanja povezanih s osmišljavanjem
udio ljudi koji su optimistični u pogledu uspješnosti specijaliziranih nacionalnih ustanova za borbu protiv
borbe protiv korupcije povezan je s s nižim razinama korupcija u regiji jest kako kombinirati preventivne
korupcije. Suprotno tomu, zastupljenija korupcija i represivne funkcije. Zemlje mreže SELDI obično
podrazumijeva povećani pesimizam kad je riječ o pokušavaju da njihove ustanove za borbu protiv
izgledima suzbijanja korupcije. korupcije čine oboje, iako represija čini daleko manji
aspekt njihova rada. Većina zadaća tih tijela povezana je
s nekim oblikom nadzora i kontrole, obično nacionalnih
Izvedivost odgovora javnih politika na korupciju: strategija za borbu protiv korupcije, te postoji malo
koja je procjena javnosti dokaza da su znatnije utjecali na zakonodavnu agendu
vlade. Osnivanje i poslovanje takvih institucija otežavaju
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ustanove iznimnih moći koje bi na neki način utjecale
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"MCBOJKB su, međutim, obično ograničene na zahtjev drugim
vladinim agencijama o izvješćivanju o provedbi
,PSVQDJKBTFOFNPßFCJUOPTNBOKJUJ antikorupcijskih zadaća koje su im dodijeljene.
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/F[OBNCF[PEHPWPSB duplicirale ovlasti koje su već dodijeljene drugim
Izvor: Sustav mreže SELDI/CSD-a za praćenje korupcije, 2014. nadzornim tijelima (npr. nacionalnim revizorskim
ustanovama ili agencijama za provedbu zakona.)
• Većini je dodijeljena ograničena institucionalna
Institucionalna praksa i provođenje ovlast – proračun, osoblje – unatoč iskazanim
zakona suprotnim namjerama.
U jugoistočnoj Europi prijašnji naglasak na ujednača- Kad je riječ o zakonodavstvu, parlamenti u regiji ne
vanju nacionalnog zakonodavstva s međunarodnim zauzimaju visoko mjesto na ljestvici povjerenja javnosti,
standardima u području borbe protiv korupcije po- a taj nezavidan položaj nije bezrazložan. Kodeksi
stupno ustupa mjesto usredotočenosti na provedbu etičkog poslovanja rijetki su i ne provode se. Regulacija
u sklopu sve većeg pritiska EU-a i lokalnog civilnog lobiranja još je rjeđa; tek se odnedavno, premda
društva. bojažljivo, uvode postupci za oduzimanje imuniteta u
kaznenom postupku. Gdje god u parlamentu postoji
Sve zemlje mreže SELDI dijele jednak nedostatak, antikorupcijsko tijelo, to je zbog nadgledanja neke
tj. ugroženu autonomiju različitih nadzornih i tijela izvršne agencije umjesto rješavanja korupcije među
za provedbu zakona. Tipičan je određeni stupanj zastupnicima. Pitanje od znatnog interesa u zemljama
miješanja izabranih političara – parlamentarnih mreže SELDI jest financiranje političkih stranaka i
zastupnika ili ministara u vladi – u rad državne službe. izbornih kampanja. Većina zemalja provodi GRECO-
Nadalje, nijedna od zemalja mreže SELDI u državnoj ove preporuke o financiranju stranaka, no i dalje
upravi nema odgovarajući mehanizam upravljanja postoje brojni problemi poput anonimnih donacija,
pritužbama. Većina je osnovala antikorupcijsko tijelo kupnje glasova (ili podmićivanja glasača), nedostatnih
od kojeg se očekuje da zaprima pritužbe javnosti. kapaciteta za reviziju financija stranke i ograničenih
Dodatni nedostatak zajednički zemljama uključuje ovlasti za provođenje sankcija itd.
nedostatak pouzdanih i javno dostupnih informacija o
radu vladinih ustanova, posebice onih koje se odnose Trenutno stanje državne službe odgovara prijelaznoj
na borbu protiv korupcije. Informacije i statistike nisu prirodi zemalja JIE-a te nedostatku odgovarajućih
Annex 181
pravnih i institucionalnih tradicija, kao i kroničnim uobičajeni primjer u kojem se lijek pretvorio u bolest –
nedostatkom sredstava. Unatoč određenim razlikama umjesto da osigura uravnoteženost s izvršnom vlasti,
među zemljama, većina dijeli potrebu za olakšavanjem samouprava je produžila klijentelističke odnose između
upravljačkog i organizacijskog razvoja u sklopu državne sudaca i posebnih interesa. Danas je sudstvo u JIE-i
službe. Kultura „kontrole” uprave umjesto upravljanja podjednako zarobljeno kao i ostale grane vlasti. Nakon
njezinim radom motiviranjem ometa i unaprjeđenje što se odvojilo od pomne kontrole javnosti i političkih
profesionalizma i smanjenje korupcije. Jedan od čimbenika koji su doveli do takvih postupaka, danas se
glavnih nalaza izvješća jest uzajamno osnaživanje rjeđe provjeravaju rent-seeking koje traže suci.
stručnosti i integriteta. Uobičajeno, kad god se
preispituje antikorupcijska vjerodostojnost određenog Ne iznenađuje da javnost nema pretjerano visoko
vladinog ministarstva, utvrđen je i nezadovoljavajući mišljenje o sudstvu. Sustav mreže SELDI/CSD-a za
institucionalni kapacitet. Suprotno tomu, svaki praćenje korupcije utvrdio je da se suci ubrajaju među
napredak u stručnosti također je vodio do unaprjeđenja najkorumpiranije javne službenike u regiji. Nepostojanje
integriteta. Stoga je izazov u regiji pitanje kako ostvariti transparentnosti i odgovornosti mogu se smatrati
osnovne karakteristike transparentnosti i odgovornosti važnim čimbenikom u takvim procjenama. U svim
državne službe uz unaprjeđivanje stručnosti. Vrlo često zemljama mreže SELDI vidljivo je pogoršanje procjene
loše upravljanje, nejasni kriteriji i neprikladna podjela širenja korupcije među sucima od 2001.
ovlasti i odgovornosti sprječavaju reforme i potkopavaju
državni autoritet. Ovlast sudstva u regiji da provodi antikorupcijsko
zakonodavstvo, posebice u pogledu političke korupcije,
Antikorupcijsku ulogu agencija za provedbu zakona u oslabljena je kumulativnim učinkom brojnih problema:
regiji valja promatrati u kontekstu inkriminiranih praksi
povezanih s korupcijom čiji se raspon neprestano širi, • ustavnim pitanjima, prvenstveno povezanim s po-
čime se riskira preusmjeravanje nesrazmjernog broja novnom uspostavom ravnoteže između neovisnosti
predmeta tijelima za provedbu zakona i tužiteljstvu. i odgovornosti sudstva
Antikorupcijsku ulogu agencija za provedbu zakona • složenosti kaznenog progona počinitelja kaznenih
u jugoistočnoj Europi dodatno ugrožava njihova djela korupcije, posebice na političkoj razini
osjetljivost na korupciju, posebice od organiziranog • općenito nedostatnih kapaciteta i povezanih
kriminala. Policijske snage u većini zemalja mreže problema niske stručnosti, pretjeranog radnog
SELDI imaju jedinice specijalizirane za suzbijanje radnji opterećenja te posljedičnih zaostalih predmeta,
organiziranog kriminala. Od tih se jedinica očekuje upravljanja predmetima, sredstava itd.
da rade i na borbi protiv korupcije. Objedinjavanja tih
dviju funkcija u jedno tijelo uglavnom se opravdava Važan nalaz ovog kruga praćenja korupcije mreže
time da se organizirani kriminal služi korupcijom, SELDI, koji je mjerodavan za ulogu sudova u borbi protiv
ali i potrebom za posebnim metodama ispitivanja u korupcije, jest nedostatak mehanizama povratnih
otkrivanju sofisticiranih korupcijskih shema – riječ je informacija koji javnosti i donositeljima politika
o stručnosti koja se obično pronalazi u sklopu odjela omogućuje da ocijene i integritet sudstva i njegovu
za borbu protiv organiziranog kriminala. Međutim, učinkovitost u primjeni antikorupcijskih kaznenih
te su jedinice uglavnom dio većih policijskih snaga zakona. Ni u jednoj od zemalja JIE-e ne postoji pouzdan,
ili ministarstava vanjskih poslova koji im uskraćuju sustavan i sveobuhvatan mehanizam prikupljanja,
institucionalnu autonomiju potrebnu specijaliziranoj obrade i javnog objavljivanja statistika o radu sudova i
ustanovi za borbu protiv korupcije. tužiteljstva, posebice u korupcijskim predmetima.
Sudstvo u borbi protiv korupcije Korupcija i gospodarstvo

Snažna usmjerenost na osiguranje sudske neovisnosti u Izvanredna značajna uključenost vlada u jugoistočnoj
jugoistočnoj Europi nije uravnotežena jednako snažnim Europi u gospodarstvo stvara brojne točke mogućeg
zahtjevima za odgovornošću. Bez odgovarajućih sukoba između javnih ustanova i poduzeća što,
provjera i uravnoteženosti, sudska je samouprava zauzvrat, stvara rizik od korupcije. Rizik je posebice
izmakla kontroli te se pretvorila u korporativizam sa visok u području privatizacije te javne nabave i koncesija
svim pridruženim rizicima od korupcije. Pretjerano teških industrija kao što su energetska i zdravstvena.
naglašavanje formalne izborne neovisnosti postalo je Nadalje, prevelik broj propisa za poduzeća – koji se
uglavnom odnose na postupke registriranja, licenciranja nedostataka. Njihov doprinos uvelike ovisi o sposobnosti
i stjecanja dozvola – i dalje stvara različite prepreke da vrše nadzor, ali i da potiču vladu na antikorupcijske
sudionicima na tržištu te više troškove poslovanja iako reforme. Ipak, nedostaju formalni mehanizmi kojima
su neke zemlje u regiji postigle znatan napredak u bi nacionalne vlade u regiji angažirale civilno društvo.
rješavanju prepreka u poslovanju. No, uprave za nadzor Također nedostaju administrativni kapaciteti, jasna
i usklađenost i dalje narušavaju tržišta pretjeranim vizija i razumijevanje potencijala organizacija civilnog
usredotočenjem na kontrolu i kazne, a bez primjerene društva u polju borbe protiv korupcije. Pretjerano
ocjene rizika te analize troškova i koristi. To je posebice oslanjanje na međunarodne, uključujući europske,
istinito za carinske uprave diljem regije koje se još uvijek financije te nepostojanje nacionalnih politika za
smatraju učinkovitim sredstvom pritiska na poduzeća. poticanje aktivnih građanskih sektora u jugoistočnoj
To poduzetnike ili odvraća u neformalni sektor ili ih Europi kompromitiraju održiv učinak lokalnih prvaka
prisiljava da pribjegnu mitu. To u negativnoj spirali u borbi protiv korupcije.
opravdava nove propise i upravne prepreke.
Iako su nevladine organizacije u području obuhvaće-
Različite okolnosti koje stvaraju povod za korupciju u nom mrežom SELDI uspjele osnovati neka međunarod-
interakcijama poduzeća i javnih službenika ilustriraju na javno-privatna partnerstva, istovremeno nisu uspje-
poteškoću s kojom se susreću antikorupcijske politike le razviti učinkovita partnerstva i s ustanovama nacio-
koje u obzir trebaju uzeti mnoštvo čimbenika. Kada nalne vlade. Ključ stvaranja uspješnog partnerstva leži
ih iniciraju poduzeća, korumpirane prakse mogu u sposobnosti sklapanja različitih odnosa s državnim
se podijeliti u dvije glavne kategorije – izbjegavanje ustanovama, i komplementarnih i suprotstavljenih.
dodatnih troškova i stjecanje nepoštene prednosti. Primjerice, jedan način usklađivanja suradnje s obav-
U prvu skupinu ubrajaju se provizije uvjetovane ljanjem funkcije čuvara jest unaprjeđenje stručnosti
lošim ili pretjeranim propisima, pojedinačnom ili nevladine organizacije koja prati korupciju i antikorup-
institucionalnom nestručnošću itd. U drugoj su skupini cijske politike.
različite vrste prijevare – utaja poreza, utaja PDV-
a, krijumčarenje, neusklađenost sa zdravstvenim i Učinkovitost nevladinih organizacija u rješavanju
sigurnosnim standardima itd. pitanja dobrog javnog upravljanja u zemljama mreže
SELDI u velikoj mjeri ovisi o njihovoj sposobnosti
U jugoistočnoj Europi javna je nabava jedan od glavnih održavanja vlastitog upravljanja učinkovitim. Rizik
kanala kojima korupcija utječe na gospodarstvo. Rizik od zarobljavanja nevladinih organizacija od strane
od korupcije u ovom je području povezan s brojnim pojedinačnih interesa i s pomoću korumpiranih
nedostatcima: nedovoljno transparentnim postupcima, javnih službenika ili izabranih političara potječe od
velikim udjelom nekonkurentnih postupaka, slabim mogućnosti iskorištavanja niza ranjivosti neprofitnog
nadzorom i neučinkovitim sudskim revizijama sektora u regiji:
(imajući u vidu korupciju sudstva) itd. Iako je prije više
od desetljeća istraživanje mreže SELDI otkrilo da su • izostanka obaveznih procedura za osiguravanje
zemlje u regiji napredovale u jačanju zakonodavnog transparentnost
okvira procesa i njegovu ujednačavanju s pravnom • neučinkovite kontrole usklađenosti s financijskim
stečevinom EU-a, javna nabava i dalje je među regulativama
najslabijim aspektima javnog upravljanja. Činjenice • nepostojanja kulture revizije
se nisu mnogo promijenile jer korumpirani političari i • niske razine samoregulacije i koordinacije.
poduzeća s dobrim vezama zaobilaze dobro zamišljena
pravila. Institucionalna fragmentacija ne dopušta Suprotstavljanje zarobljavanju civilnog društva, kao
učinkovitu primjenu pravila javne nabave. dio nacionalnih nastojanja u borbi protiv korupcije
u jugoistočnoj Europi, trebalo bi biti na samom vrhu
dnevnog reda reformi u regiji.
Civilno društvo u borbi protiv korupcije
Nevladine organizacije u jugoistočnoj Europi ubrajaju Međunarodna suradnja
se među najvažnije pokretačke snage u borbi protiv
korupcije. One su, međutim, još jako daleko od Međunarodne ustanove i inozemne partnerske
provođenja zahtjeva javnosti u učinkovito zagovaranje zemlje imaju važnu ulogu u napretku u borbi protiv
politika kao i od pružanja otpora korupciji zbog brojnih korupcije u jugoistočnoj Europi. Imajući na umu
Annex 183
iznimnu pristranost u domaćoj politici, međunarodne je način slanja snažne i neposredne poruke o tome da
obveze olakšavaju donošenje reformskih politika se korupcija neće tolerirati. Privođenje nepoštenih po-
koje bi nacionalni političari inače možda odbacili. litičara pravdi pokazalo se vrlo učinkovitim u jačanju
Izvješća Europske komisije o napretku, EU-ovo antikorupcijskih mjera u, primjerice, Hrvatskoj i Slove-
financiranje reformi i twinninga predstavljanju ključne niji. Uspjeh u tom smjeru zahtijevao bi međunarodnu
međunarodne utjecaje na nacionalne planove borbe potporu, uključujući participaciju tijela za provedbu
protiv korupcije u većini zemalja JIE-e. Iako je borba zakona država članica EU-a.
protiv korupcije jedan od glavnih elemenata izvješća
Europske komisije o napretku, lokalno ih se doživljava Na nacionalnoj i regionalnoj razini treba uvesti
vrlo različito – zemlje s jasnijim izgledima pristupanja neovisan mehanizam za praćenje korupcije i borbe
EU na nalaze izvješća obraćaju mnogo više pozornosti protiv korupcije kako bi pružio jasne podatke i analize
dok, primjerice, u Turskoj izvješćima općenito pridaju te integrirao i dijagnostiku korupcije i ocjenu politike
manje pažnje. o borbi protiv korupcije. Mehanizam bi trebale
provoditi nacionalne i/ili regionalne organizacije i
Međunarodna uključenost, međutim, sa sobom je mreže civilnog društva te bi on trebao biti neovisan
donijela i rizik nerealnih očekivanja brzih rješenja o izravnom financiranju nacionalne vlade. Trebao bi
koja bi zauzvrat mogla potaknuti donošenje površnih služiti kao instrument otvaranja upravnih podataka i
i ad hoc mjera. Uvjetovanost i većina poticaja primarno poboljšanja pristupa javnosti informacijama. Podatci
utječu na agencije izvršne razine vlasti, dok sudstvo, koji omogućuju praćenje javne nabave, koncesija,
parlamenti i ostale obuhvaćene javne i privatne ustanove provedbi zakonodavstva o sukobu interesa, državne
nisu dostatno uključeni. Održivost međunarodnog pomoći, proračunskih transfera, godišnjih izvješća o
angažmana ostvaruje se uz širenje lepeze lokalnih radu agencija za nadzor i usklađenost itd. trebali bi biti
dionika kako bi se uključili civilno društvo, mediji, javno dostupni u obliku baze podataka, a time će se
stručna udruženja, sindikati itd. To proširenje domaćih omogućiti analize velikih podataka te uporaba alata za
sugovornika međunarodnih partnera utjecalo je na praćenje.
osnaživanje izdvojenih reformatorskih političara ili
političkih skupina kao i različitih nevladinih dionika Prioritet u rješavanju trebali bi imati kritični sektori
te je potaknulo javno zahtijevanje reformi. Nastavljanje s visokim rizicima od korupcije i zauzeća države,
i razvijanje ovakva angažmana bilo bi ključno za poput energetskog sektora. Ostale prioritetne mjere
utjecaj EU-a u regiji. Kako bi do toga došlo, veza uključuju:
vlade s Bruxellesom nije dostatna. Civilno društvo
treba podržati i potvrditi angažman međunarodnih • povećanje konkurencije u javnoj nabavi
partnera, reformatorskih političara i stranaka u obliku • poboljšanje korporativnog upravljanja državnim
trilateralne suradnje. poduzećima
• transparentno vođenje velikih investicijskih projekata
• povećanje odgovornosti i neovisnosti regulatornih
tijela za energiju.
KLJUČNE PREPORUKE
Međunarodni partneri, a prvenstveno Europska
komisija, trebali bi izravno angažirati organizacije
Iskustvo zemalja mreže SELDI u bavljenju korupcijom civilnog društva u regiji. Ovo je ključno zbog
od 2011. pokazuje da bi rješavanje izazova korupcije u nekoliko razloga: a) da bi međunarodno podržane
regiji zahtijevalo ulaganje stalnih napora na više fronti reforme postale održive, mora ih prihvatiti šira javnost;
te uključenost svih lokalnih i međunarodnih dionika da bi se to ostvarilo, neophodne su organizacije
tijekom dugog vremenskog razdoblja. Trenutačno civilnog društva; b) uključivanje organizacija civilnog
izvješće navodi brojne preporuke o tome kako dalje društva na način da se jamči da odgovornost vlade
napredovati u ograničavanju korupcije. Među tim prema donatorima i međunarodnim organizacijama
preporukama zemlje u regiji i na razini Europe trebale nema prednost pred odgovornošću prema lokalnim
bi odrediti tri prioritetna ključna područja kako bi se jedinicama; c) učinkovitost međunarodne pomoći
postigao srednjoročni napredak: poboljšala bi se korištenjem vještina praćenja i analize
te sposobnostima zagovaranja organizacija civilnog
Učinkovit kazneni progon korumpiranih visokoran- društva; d) izravni angažman imao bi dodanu
giranih političara i viših državnih službenika jedini prednost jer bi klijentelističke mreže nereformiranih i
često korumpiranih javnih uprava spriječio da zarobe rješenja najvišeg učinka.

civilno društvo. • Institucionalni kapacitet mjerodavnih vladinih
tijela – posebice specijalizirane agencije za borbu
protiv korupcije i agencija za nadzor kao što su
POSEBNE PREPORUKE nacionalne revizorske ustanove – uključujući
njihove proračune, prostore i osoblje treba uskladiti
s ovlastima danima tim ustanovama. Alternativno,
Politike i zakonodavstvo trebali bi osmisliti sažetije godišnje ili polugodišnje
programe koji prioritiziraju intervencije.
• Definirajte nacionalna nastojanja u borbi protiv • Također bi trebalo ojačati institucionalni utjecaj
korupcije u smislu politika povezanih s mjerljivim nacionalnih revizorskih ustanova, uključujući
ciljevima i mjerilima umjesto s jednostavnim ovlasti nametanja strožih sankcija. Subjekti koji
mjerama ili zakonodavstvom. To bi zahtijevalo se revidiraju i nacionalni parlamenti trebali bi biti
postavljanje specifičnih ciljeva koje valja postići dužni reagirati na izvješća revizorskih ustanova.
te biranje odgovarajućih metoda intervencije. Ti Nacionalne revizorske ustanove trebalo bi ovlastiti
bi ciljevi trebali biti mjerljivi u mjeri u kojoj je to i za reviziju upravljanja sredstvima EU-a kada
izvedivo. njima upravlja nacionalna vlada. Budući da je rad na
• Prioritizirajte određene sektore, vrste korupcije i reviziji radne učinkovitosti u vrlo ranoj fazi, trebalo
metode intervencije te isprobajte različite pristupe bi razviti kapacitete za provođenje više ovakvih
prije nego što objavite potpune mjere. Korupcija je revizija.
širok pojam povezan s različitim i promjenjivim • Potrebne su dodatne mjere kako bi se osiguralo da se
vrstama prijevare koje se ne mogu istodobno zapošljavanje u državnoj službi temelji na zaslugama
učinkovito rješavati. i da ne ovisi o pripadnosti političkoj stranci.
• Politike trebaju bit informirane. Dok su određena • Rad na borbi protiv korupcije treba ravnomjernije
nastojanja uložena u nacionalne strategije za borbu raspodijeliti među vladinim tijelima. Proširivanje
protiv korupcije kako bi se procijenili prethodni raspona zakonske inkriminacije trebalo bi
rezultati, nijedna od zemalja mreže SELDI nema ujednačiti povećanim kapacitetom u svim javnim
održiv mehanizam ocjenjivanja antikorupcijskih tijelima za rješavanje problema korupcije u svojim
politika. To, u najmanju ruku, uključuje: a) pouzdanu redovima s pomoću upravnih alata umjesto
i redovitu statistiku o nastojanjima koja se ulažu u prenošenja odgovornosti na policiju i tužiteljstvo.
borbu protiv korupcije (istrage, kazneni progoni, Opća tijela javne vlasti trebala bi djelovati kao
upravne mjere itd.); b) redovito praćenje i analiziranje vratari kaznenopravnog sustava te rješavati
raširenosti i oblika korupcije u različitim javnim onoliko predmeta korupcije koliko im to dopuštaju
sektorima. Praćenje bi trebalo biti neovisno i/ili se njihove upravne ovlasti. To u najmanju ruku
vršiti izvan zemlje, uključivati civilno društvo i uključuje osmišljavanje učinkovitih mehanizama za
objedinjavati osnovne sastavnice sustava za praćenje upravljanje prigovorima.
neupravne korupcije poput sustava za praćenje • Oduzimanje nelegalno stečene imovine u slučajevima
korupcije (CMS) mreže SELDI. korupcije jest alat u borbi protiv korupcije čija bi se
primjena trebala proširiti. I dok posebnu pozornost
Ustanove za borbu protiv korupcije i provođenje treba posvetiti ujednačavanju prava optužene osobe
zakona s interesima javnog dobra – posebice u okruženju
često korumpirane javne uprave – oduzimanje
• Uvedite mehanizam povratnih informacija za bogatstva nakon čega slijedi kaznena presuda važan
provođenje antikorupcijskih politika. Mehanizam se je alat odvraćanja koji se u JIE još uvijek premalo
može temeljiti na inovativnim novim instrumentima koristi.
koji su zadnjih godina postali dostupniji poput
Integriranog kompleta alata za praćenje provođenja Sudstvo
antikorupcijskih mjera (engl. Integrated Anticorruption
Enforcement Monitoring Toolkit) koji su razvili Centar • Zemlje u kojima se većina sudskih samoupravnih
za demokratske studije i Sveučilište u Trentu. tijela ne bira među sucima trebale bi donijeti reforme
Donositeljima politika omogućuje da procijene rizik kojima se povećava njihovo pravo glasa. Zemlje u
od korupcije u danoj vladinoj ustanovi te učinak kojima to nije tako trebale bi donijeti načelo „jedan
odgovarajuće antikorupcijske politike, utvrđujući sudac – jedan glas”.
Annex 185
• Pobrinite se da izbor sudske kvote bude čim re- aktivom i pasivom svih javnih financija, uključujući
prezentativniji, uključujući suce s prvostupanjskih poduzeća u državnom vlasništvu, kako bi ublažile
sudova. Pozorno revidirajte i, ako je to potrebno, financijske rizike i poboljšale kredibilitet vlade
ponovno razmislite o usklađenosti položaja pred- u upravljanju javnim financijama. Poduzeća u
sjednika suda s članstvom u sudskim samouprav- vlasništvu države trebala bi udovoljavati strogim
nim tijelima. zahtjevima upravljanja i izvješćivanja (npr.
• U zemljama u kojima isto tijelo upravlja i tužitelj- OECD-ovim pravilima), slično javnim trgovačkim
stvom i sudovima, dva kolegija – za tužitelje i za poduzećima. Ta bi poduzeća trebala objavljivati
suce – trebaju biti razdvojena unutar tog tijela. U te kvartalna izvješća na internetu.
bi kolegije bili izabrani samo tužitelji, odnosno suci. • Uvedite odgovornost i sankcije za naručitelje koji
• U sudskim samoupravnim tijelima ukinite ulogu kontinuirano ne podnose izvješća o javnoj nabavi,
vladinih ministara (uobičajeno za pravosuđe) ili je izvješća o kršenju antikorupcijskih propisa ili koji
smanjite na najmanju razinu, posebice kad je riječ o podnesu netočne ili nepotpune podatke.
odlukama o stegovnim postupcima. • Definirajte pravni i institucionalni okvir za
• Suci bi trebali imati prioritet u mehanizmu upravljanje ugovorima sklopljenim u javno-
potvrđivanja izjava o imovini. privatnom partnerstvu te za upravljanje njima.
• Trebalo bi osnažiti neovisnost i kapacitet sudskih • Poboljšajte nadzor nad nabavom velikih javnih
inspektorata kako bi im se omogućilo da pojačaju naručitelja (poduzeća u vlasništvu države i
nadzor. komunalna društva) kako biste maksimirali
• Uvedite mehanizme povratnih informacija za učinkovitost i smanjili nepravilnosti.
provođenje antikorupcijskih politika u odnosu na • Donesite politike koje će smanjiti udio nadmetanja
sudce. Tih je mehanizama u zemljama mreže SELDI javne nabave u kojima sudjeluje samo jedan ponuđač
iznimno malo ili ih uopće nema; njihovo nepostojanje i potaknite konkurentnost. U internetskom formatu
sabotira represivni aspekt antikorupcijskih politika nalik bazi podataka koja se može pretraživati
te dodatne inkriminacije korupcije čini beskorisnima. objavite potpunu dokumentaciju o prethodnim
Moguća najbolja praksa koju treba preslikati – iako obavijestima o javnoj nabavi, obavijestima o javnoj
još nije dovoljno razvijena – jest kosovska Platforma nabavi, obavijestima, ponudama, ugovorima i bilo
za antikorupcijsku statistiku, koju je osmislila kojim dodatcima postupcima.
nevladina organizacija. Takav bi mehanizam trebao • Zemlje kandidatkinje za pristup EU koje nemaju
obuhvaćati redovite informacije o: disciplinarnim i decentralizirane sustave provedbe sredstava iz
upravnim te kaznenim mjerama u javnim službama EU fondova trebale bi uvesti takav sustav kako bi
i sudstvu, različitim aspektima kaznenog progona, pružile primjeren pravni i upravni okvir za prijenos
uključujući optužnicu i presudu/oslobađajuću odgovornosti za provedbu programa financiranih
presudu, kazne za različite vrste korupcijskih sredstvima EU-a. Nadzor bi trebao ostati
prekršaja. centraliziran i neovisan o provedbenim tijelima.
• U ocjeni ugovora za javnu nabavu uvedite koncept
Korupcija i gospodarstvo vrijednosti za novac.
• Politike državnih potpora svedite na minimum i Civilno društvo

svake ih godine revidirajte jer one sadrže znatnu
opasnost od korupcije. Unaprijed uvedite strogo • Poboljšajte kapacitet organizacija civilnog društva
provođenje pravila EU-a o državnoj pomoći te kako bi što bolje provodile nadzor i izvještavale o
razvijte kapacitete nacionalnih neovisnih regulatora korupciji i antikorupciji, uključujući sposobnost
državnih potpora kako bi se pravila poštivala. prikupljanja i objedinjavanja primarnih informacija
• Unaprijedite provođenje zakona protiv monopola o radu vladinih ustanova, vještine mjerenja stvarnog
kako biste promovirali slobodna poduzeća i konku- širenja korupcije te, u analizi podataka, evaluaciju
rentnost. Posebnu pozornost obratite i redovito revi- institucija i pisanje izvještaja.
dirajte koncentracije u sektorima koji su opterećeni • Zakonodavstvo o sukobu interesa trebalo bi
brojnim propisima i suočeni s licenciranjem i dru- uključivati neprofitne ustanove, posebice kad se
gim ograničenjima, stvarajući tako rizik od dosluha financiraju iz programa kojima upravlja vlada, kao
među većim ponuđačima i političarima. što su nacionalni proračun, sredstva EU-a itd.
• Zemlje koje to nisu učinile trebaju utvrditi • Pravila za javno financiranje i propisi o javnom
institucionalne poveznice između upravljanja financiranju neprofitnih organizacija koje dolazi
kako od središnjih, tako i od lokalnih vlasti, trebaju Međunarodna suradnja

biti jasni i transparentni. Primanje javnih sredstava
trebalo bi dozvoliti samo nevladinim organizacijama • Programi inozemne pomoći trebaju bolje odražavati
registriranim u svrhu javnog dobra te bi one trebale nalaze međunarodnih i nezavisnih domaćih
zadovoljavati strože zahtjeve izvještavanja, odnosno mjerenja. Da bi se to postiglo, programi pomoći
objave. trebaju biti osjetljiviji i fleksibilniji, s kraćim
• Europska unija i ostale donatorske agencije vremenskim razmakom između osmišljavanja i
trebale bi razmisliti o većem udjelu sredstava za isporuke.
dobre programe upravljanja koji se provode u • Međunarodna pomoć nacionalnim vlastima u borbi
suradnji između organizacija civilnog društva i protiv korupcije trebala bi predvidjeti snažniju ulogu
javnih ustanova. Ti bi programi trebali navoditi civilnog društva. To podrazumijeva uključenost
izričite zahtjeve protiv zarobljavanja nevladinih nevladinih organizacija kao provedbenih partnera,
organizacija od strane partikularnih interesa. nadzornika i resursnih organizacija, posebice u
Valja napomenuti da postizanje učinka zahtijeva ocjenjivanju učinka projekata pomoći.
dugoročan (desetogodišnji i više) stalni angažman. • Učinkovitost pomoći treba periodički ocijeniti
• Sektor civilnog društva treba pridonijeti vlastitom metodama procjene učinka. To bi, uz pružanje mjere
samouređenju. To minimalno uključuje donošenje vrijednosti za novac, posebice kad su uključena
kodeksa ponašanja sa standardima kojima valja javna sredstva, uspješnim programima omogućilo
težiti. Također treba pronaći više i bolje načine kontinuitet, dok bi se neuspješni programi prekinuli.
organiziranja interesnih koalicija. Ključno je da ta procjena bude neovisna te da se
• Nevladine organizacije trebaju bolje razumjeti koristi stručnošću organizacija civilnog društva.
potrebu za transparentnošću i odgovornošću. To • Pomoć treba potaknuti međudržavne programe
uključuje redovitu reviziju, objavljivanje financijskih o zajedničkim pitanjima kao što je prekogranični
izvješća, jasne i transparentne korporativne kriminal. Diljem regije trebalo bi se iskoristiti
postupke upravljanja te mjere protiv zarobljavanja bugarsko iskustvo javno-privatne suradnje u
od strane posjedinačnih interesa. analiziranju poveznica organiziranog kriminala i
• Zemljama JIE-a koje nisu članice EU-a savjetuje se da korupcije.
uče iz skupa znanja i stručnosti sadržanih u Izvješću • Pripremu i nalaze redovitih izvješća Europske
EU-a o borbi protiv korupcije. To bi im omogućilo komisije trebalo bi bolje uključiti u donošenje
vrijedne uvide u pogledu ocjene širenja korupcije i lokalnih politika, više se oslanjajući na lokalno
osmišljavanja antikorupcijskih politika. civilno društvo i poslovnu zajednicu.
Annex 187
Kosovo gjeturat dhe rekomandimet e tij janë bërë me këshillim

të institucioneve regjionale dhe kombëtare.
Vlerësimi i aspekteve kombëtare, institucionale dhe

ligjore, që bën të mundur ekzistencën e korrupsionit
Përmbledhja ekzekutive nuk është menduar si plotësi e rregullave the praktikave
në të gjitha shtetet por thekson disa nga çështjet me
prioritet të cilat janë relevante për gjetjen e shkaktarëve
Korrupsion në Evropën Juglindore ka qenë në media, të përbashkët të korrupsionit në Evropën Juglindore
në fokusin e debatit publik, dhe në agjendën e politikë- (EJL). Ky raport ofron një model për raportimin e
bërjes e institucioneve kombëtare dhe ndërkombëtare progresit anti-korrupsion nga shoqëria civile në EJL.
aq shumë dhe për aq gjatë sa që analiza e tij nuk ka
nevojë të arsyetohet. Pikërisht për shkak që është
dëshmuar të jetë një problem i vështirë, qasje të reja
për kuptimin e tij – rrjedhimisht reduktimin – janë të GJETJET KRYESORE
domosdoshme. Perspektiva e hyrjes në BE për shtetet
e rajonit – edhe pse e largët – japin një kornizë që bënë
të mundshme veprimin, po është akterët lokal, dhe Vlerësimi i përgjithshëm
në veçanti shoqëria civile që mundet të sjellë progres
të qëndrueshëm në anti-korrupsion. Iniciative për Përkundër disa arritjeve – kryesisht në stabilitetin
Zhvillim dhe Integritet e Evropës Juglindore (SELDI) ka e institucioneve demokratike, adoptimin e ligjeve
vënë si prioritet një diagnozë të thellë të korrupsionit në fushat kyçe të anti-korrupsionit, uljen në ryshfet,
dhe boshllëkut të qeverisjes në regjion, si parakusht dhe rritjen e jo-tolerancës publike ndaj korrupsionit –
për avokim në politika anti-korrupsion të bazuara në reformat e qeverisjes dhe anti-korrupsion nuk janë
njohuri. Ky raport i SELDI hynë në kornizën e zhvillimit konsoliduar, korrupsioni tek politikanët e zgjedhur dhe
dhe implementimit të politikave dhe infrastrukturës gjyqtarët është në rritje si dhe zbatimi i legjislaturës anti-
rajonale anti-korrupsion siç pasqyrohet nga Shtylla korrupsion është jo i rregullte. Politikat anti-korrupsion
Qeverisëse e Strategjisë SEE2020 të udhëhequr nga dhe institucionet në rajon do të përfitojnë shumë nga
Iniciativa Rajonale për Anti-korrupsion. adoptimi i anketave bazuar në “viktimizim”, të cilat
janë të sakta dhe të rregullta, për të matur korrupsionin
Duke qenë rezultat i bashkëpunimit brenda SELDI, ky dhe nivelin e progresit në qeverisje të mirë, ngjashëm
raport është diqka e re si në metodë dhe në proces. Është me Euro-barometrin për anti-korrupsion, UNODC EJL
rezultat i aplikimit të sistemit të zhvilluar nga SELDI monitorimin e korrupsionit dhe krimit të organizuar, si
në fillim të viteve 2000 për matjen e korrupsionit dhe dhe Sistemin e Monitorimit të Korrupsionit që përdoret
anti-korrupsionit, i qepur për ambientin shoqëror dhe në këtë raport.
institucional të Evropës Juglindore.1 Qasja e anketimit
e bazuar në anketë të “viktimizimit” të përdorur nga
Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit që përdoret në Përhapja e korrupsionit në Evropën
raport jap një vlerësim bazuar në të dhëna të progresit Juglindore
anti-korrupsion në regjion nga 2001. Raundi i vlerësimit
2013-2014 – të gjeturat e të cilit paraqitën në këtë Përvoja me korrupsionin – me fjalë të tjera, përfshirja e
raport – është një rast i rrallë në praktikat e monitorimit publikut në afera të korrupsionit – në EJL është shumë e
ndërkombëtar ku problemet e njëjta në të njëjtin lartë. Edhe në Turqi dhe Kroaci, ku niveli i korrupsionit
regjion analizohen prapë mbas më shumë se një administrativ është më i ulëti në rajon, rreth 8-9% e
dekade. Vlerësimi ka krahasuar legjislacionin kombëtar popullsisë raporton të kenë dhënë ryshfet në vitin e
dhe praktikat institucionale në një numër të fushave fundit. Nivele të tilla të përvojës me korrupsionin janë
kritike të përpjekjeve anti-korrupsion: korniza ligjore përtej niveleve mesatare të regjistruara nga sondazhet
dhe rregulluese, parakushtet institucionale, korrupsioni e Euro-barometrit në BE.2 Kjo tregon se korrupsioni
në ekonomi, roli i shoqërisë civile dhe bashkëpunimi
ndërkombëtar. Ky raport jep një perspektivë të 2
Treguesit për përvojën me korrupsionin të përdorur në anketat e
shoqërisë civile dhe vlerësim të politikave përderisa të Euro-barometrit kanë përmbajtje pak më ndryshe pasi i referohen
eksperiencës së drejtpërdrejt dhe rasteve kur përgjegjësit kanë
parë raste të ryshfetit. Për më shumë detaje, referohu në (TNS
1
(SELDI, 2002). Opinion & Social, Shkurt 2014).
administrativ është një fenomen i gjerë dhe nuk mund

të kufizohet vetëm në rastet e zyrtarëve të korruptuar. Kundërshtimi ndaj presionit për korrupsion
OEÌSBUBRÌLBOÌQBTVSQSFTJPOQÌSLPSSVQTJPO
Dallime të dukshme në mes të shteteve me histori

4IRJQÌSJB
të njëjtë tregojnë se rrugë të ndryshme të zhvillimit
.BRFEPOJB
shoqëror, ekonomik, dhe institucional, japin rezultate
,PTPWB
të ndryshme. Në përgjithësi, përveç Bullgarisë, dallimet
.BMJJ;J
nga diagnostikat SMK (CMS) të rundeve të mëhershme
4FSCJB
të SELDI (2001 dhe 2002) për të gjitha shtetet është
#VMMHBSJB
pozitiv; progresi, sidoqoftë, ka qenë i ngadaltë dhe i
,SPBDJB
pabarabartë.
#EIF)
5VSRJB

Presioni dhe përfshirja në korrupsion
,BEIÌOÌOEÌSQSFTJPO 1BQÌSHKJHKF
FQPQVMMBUÌTUÌDJMÌWFVÌTIUÌLÌSLVBSEIFLBOÌEIÌOÌSZTIGFU /VLLBEIÌOÌ QÌSLVOEÌSQSFTJPOJU

QBSB GBWPSF BQPEIVSBUÌ
OÌWJUJOFGVOEJU
Burimi: SELDI/CSD Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit, 2014.

4IRJQÌSJB

.BMJJ;J

#VMMHBSJB

Politikat dhe legjislacioni
4FSCJB
anti-korrupsion

.BRFEPOJB
Në përgjithësi, shtetet e SELDI kanë adoptuar pjesën

më të mirë – me më rëndësi qasjen dhe logjikën – e
,PTPWB
standardeve ndërkombëtare të anti-korrupsionit në
#EIF)
legjislaturën e tyre. Kualiteti i implementimit, sidoqoftë,

1SFTJPOJ JÌTIUÌ
vazhdon të jetë problem. Ndryshime të shpeshta dhe jo

,SPBDJB
LÌSLVBSSZTIGFU
konsistence të ligjeve kanë rezultuar në kompleksitet
1ÌSGTIJSKB ligjor dhe procedural si dhe interpretime kontradiktore
5VSRJB
LBEIÌOÌSZTIGFU
nga gjykatat.
Burimi: SELDI/CSD Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit, 2014. Të gjitha shtetet kanë adoptuar ndonjë dokument
strategjik që shpjegon qasjen e tyre për ta luftuar
korrupsionin. Edhe pse ka dallime në mes shteteve,
Presioni për korrupsion nga zyrtarët ka qenë faktori implementimi i këtyre dokumenteve është i kufizuar
kryesor që statistikisht ndikon në nivelin e përfshirjes. nga resurset jo të mjaftueshme dhe përkushtimi i dobët
Shumica e shteteve ku përfshirja dhe presioni janë të i zyrtarëve të lartë shtetëror. Një problem tjetër në tërë
larta karakterizohen me kundërshtim të dobët ndaj regjionin ka qenë krijimi i strategjisë në një mënyrë që
presionit për korrupsion (shumica e të anketuarve të adreson të gjitha aspektet e korrupsionit. Në vend të
cilëve u është kërkuar ryshfet kanë dhënë). Edhe pse vënies së prioriteteve, këto dokumente janë bërë gjithë
kundërshtimi nuk mund të konsiderohet faktor kyç përfshirëse; sa i përket korrupsionit, “strategji” duket se
për të ulur korrupsionin, reflekton qëndrimin shoqëror nënkupton thjeshtë “shteruese”.
për integritet dhe është në masë të madhe rezultat i
përpjekjeve të shoqërisë civile dhe autoriteteve për Sa i përket prioriteteve të politikave, kanë ndodhur
ngritjen e vetëdijes për anti-korrupsion. Në këtë aspekt dy ndryshime të rëndësishme në qasjen ndaj anti-
roli i shoqërisë civile është kyç pasi është në pozitë për korrupsionit – bartje e vëmendjes nga ryshfeti
të vlerësuar rezultatet dhe të udhëheq presionin publik i vogël (si ai i policisë së trafikut apo mjekëve
për ndryshim. publik) në atë të madh (të anëtarëve të parlamentit
apo ministrave) si dhe abuzime më të gjëra të
posteve publike. Arritja e efektit në ndëshkimin
e korrupsionit mbetet e limituar, në rastin më të
mirë. Sfida kryesore e politikave anti-korrupsion
Annex 189
në regjion është implementimi, dhe të përcillen publike. Shumica kanë themeluar një trup anti-
ndryshimet në format e korrupsionit duke mbajtur korrupsion që pritet të pranojë ankesa nga publiku.
stabilitet rregullues dhe duke evituar mbi ngarkesën Një mangësi tjetër e përbashkët është mungesa e të
e gjykatave me ndryshime të shpeshta. dhënave të cilat janë të besueshme dhe të përdorshme
rreth punës së institucioneve qeveritare, sidomos ato që
Gjetjet e SELDI theksojnë rëndësinë e përkrahjes lidhen me anti-korrupsionin. Informatat dhe statistikat
publike për suksesin e politikave anti-korrupsion. ose nuk mblidhen, ose nuk janë të përdorshme, ose
Besimi i publikut në qeverinë dhe efektiviteti politikave mblidhen aq rëndom sa nuk mundësojnë monitorim
bashkohen në një rreth virtuoz: nivel më i madh i dhe analizë.
optimizmit e realizueshmërisë të masave anti-korrupsion
ndërlidhet me nivel më të ulët të korrupsionit. Në të Një prej çështjeve kyçe lidhur me krijimin e institucioneve
kundërtën, nivel më i madh i pesimizmit e suksesit të të specializuara kombëtare për anti-korrupsion në rajon
masave anti-korrupsion ndërlidhet me nivel më të lartë është si të kombinojmë funksione parandaluese dhe
të korrupsionit represive. Në rastin tipik, shtetet e SELDI janë munduar
që ti shtyjnë institucionet anti-korrupsion ti bëjnë të
dyja, edhe pse represioni mbërthen një pjesë të vogël
Realizueshmëria e politikave kundër korrupsionit: të punës së tyre. Shumica e punës së këtyre trupave
si e vlerëson publiku lidhet me ndonjë formë të mbikëqyrjes dhe kontrollit,
kryesisht e strategjisë kombëtare anti-korrupsion dhe
FQPQVMMBUÌT
ka pak dëshmi që ato kanë pasur ndonjë ndikim të

5VSRJB
rëndësishëm në agjendën legjislative të qeverisë. Krijimi
,SPBDJB
dhe funksionimi i këtyre institucioneve është rënduar
.BMJJ;J
,PTPWB
nga këto vështirësi:
#EIF)
4FSCJB • Sado lartë që korrupsioni të ketë qenë në agjendën
#VMMHBSJB qeveritare, nuk ka qenë e realizueshme krijimi
.BRFEPOJB i institucioneve me fuqi të jashtëzakonshme
4IRJQÌSJB që disi do ta prekte bilancin e krijuar të fuqive.
Kompromisi tipik është që këto agjensione të lidhen
,PSSVQTJPOJOVLNVOEUÌ[WPHÌMPIFUOEKFTIÌN me ekzekutivin dhe të kenë rol mbikëqyrës që,
,PSSVQTJPOJOVLNVOEUÌ[WPHÌMPIFUOEKFTIÌN sidoqoftë, janë të limituar të kërkojnë agjensione
BQPUÌ[IEVLFU
tjera qeveritare të raportojnë në zbatimin e punëve
/VLFEJ1BQÌSHKJHKF
anti-korrupsion me të cilat janë ngarkuar.
Burimi: SELDI/CSD Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit, 2014. • Këto agjensione është dashur të jenë të kujdesshme
mos të shkelin në përgjegjësitë e trupave tjerë
mbikëqyrës (p.sh. institucionet kombëtare të
Praktikat institucionale auditimit ose agjensionet e zbatimit të ligjit).
dhe zbatimi i ligjit • Shumica kanë marr kapacitet të limituar institu
cional – buxhet, personel – edhe pse ka qëllime të
Në Evropën Juglindore, theksi i mëhershëm ka qenë deklaruara në kundërtën.
harmonizimi i legjislaturës kombëtare me standarde
ndërkombëtare në anti-korrupsion, por gradualisht Sa i përket legjislaturës, parlamentet në regjion nuk
theksi po kalohet tek zbatimi i ligjit ndër presion të vlerësohen lartë në besimin publik dhe ky pozicionim i
vazhdueshëm të BE dhe shoqërisë civile lokale. paevitueshëm nuk është pa arsye. Kodet e sjelljes etike
janë të rralla dhe të pa zbatuara; rregullimet e lobimit
Një mangësi e shpeshtë tek të gjitha shtetet partnere janë edhe më të rralla; vetëm rishtazi procedurat
të SELDI është autonomia e komprometuar e trupave për heqjen e imunitetit nga prokuroria janë krijuar,
mbikëqyrës dhe të përforcimit të ligjit. Një shkallë e megjithëse jo në plotësi; kurdo që ekziston një trup
interferencës nga politikanët e zgjedhur – anëtarët anti-korrupsion në parlament, kjo ndodh kryesisht për
e parlamentit dhe ministrat e qeverisë – në punën e të mbikëqyr ndonjë agjension tjetër, e jo për tu marr
shërbimit civil është normë. Për më tepër, asnjë nga me korrupsionin e anëtarëve. Një çështje e rëndësisë
shtetet anëtare të SELDI nuk ka një mekanizëm të së veçantë në shtetet e SELDI është financimi i partive
menaxhimit të ankesave funksional në administratë politike dhe kampanjave elektorale. Shumica e shteteve
kanë zbatuar rekomandimet GRECO në financimin e Gjyqësori në anti-korrupsion

partive por një numër i problemeve – si donacionet
anonime, blerja e votës (ose ryshfeti për votë), Në Evropën Juglindore, fokusi i lartë në sigurimin e
kapaciteti jo adekuat për të audituar financat e partive pavarësisë së gjyqësorit është balancuar nga kërkesa po
dhe fuqia e limituar për zbatimin e sanksioneve, etj. – aq të forta për përgjegjshmëri. Duke mos pasur kontroll
vazhdojnë. dhe bilance të fuqive adekuat, vet-qeverisja e gjyqësorit
ka dalë jashtë kontrollit, dhe është shndërruar në
Gjendja e tanishme e shërbimit civil korrespondon “korporatizëm” me të gjithë rrezikun që e përcjell atë.
me natyrën e tranzicionit të shteteve të EJL si dhe Dhënia tepër rëndësi pavarësisë formale elektorale
mungesa e traditave ligjore dhe institucionale së është shembull i një ilaçi të shndërruar në sëmundje –
bashku me mungesën kronike të fondeve. Përkundër në vend se të balancoj fuqinë e ekzekutivit, vet-qeverisja
disa diferencave në mes të shteteve, nevoja për të krijoi relacione “klienteliste” në mes të gjyqtarëve dhe
lehtësuar zhvillimin menaxherial dhe organizativ interesave speciale. Sot, gjyqësori në EJL është kapur
brenda shërbimit civil ekziston tek shumica. Kultura njësoj sikur degët tjera të pushtetit. Pasi lirohet nga
e “kontrollit” të administratës në vend të menaxhimit vështrimi publik dhe faktorët që kanë krijuar këtë
të punës së saj përmes motivimit është çfarë pengon aranzhim, sot ka shumë pak kontroll në mit marrje nga
profesionalizmin dhe uljen e korrupsionit. Një gjyqtarët.
prej gjetjeve kryesore të raportit është përforcimi i
ndërsjellët i kompetencës dhe integritetit. Zakonisht, Nuk është befasi që publiku nuk e vlerëson shumë
kur vihen në pikëpyetje kredencialet për anti- gjyqësorin. Sistemi i Monitorimit të Korrupsionit
korrupsion të një departamenti qeveritar, vërehet po i SELDI gjen që gjyqtarët konsiderohen ndër
ashtu se ka mungesë edhe të kapaciteteve institucionale. zyrtarë publik më të korruptuar në rajon; mungesa
Në të kundërtën, çdo rritje në profesionalizëm po ashtu e transparencës dhe përgjegjshmërisë mund të
krijon rritje në integritet. Kështu, sfida në rajon është si argumentohet të jetë faktor i rëndësishëm i këtyre
të bëhet transparenca dhe llogaridhënia karakteristika vlerësimeve. Në të gjitha shtetet e SELDI ka pasur
esenciale të shërbimit civil dhe në të njëjtën kohë të rënie të prekshme të vlerësimit dhe përhapjes së
përmirësohet profesionalizmi. Shumë shpesh, është korrupsionit ndër gjyqtarë prej 2001.
menaxhimi i dobët, kritere të paqarta si dhe ndarja e
fuqisë dhe përgjegjësive që pengojnë reformat dhe ulin Kapaciteti i gjyqësorit në rajon për të zbatuar ligjet anti-
autoritetin qeveritar. korrupsion, sidomos korrupsionin politik, është zbehur
nga një numër problemesh që bashkërisht kanë pasur
Roli anti-korrupsion i agjensioneve të zbatimit të ligjit ndikim:
në rajon duhet të analizohet duke kuptuar praktikat
në rritje konstante të lidhura me korrupsionin, • Çështjet kushtetuese, kryesisht ato lidhur me
që rrezikon kanalizimin e një numri të tepruar të rivendosjen e bilancit në mes të pavarësisë dhe
rasteve tek zbatuesit e ligjit dhe prokuroria. Roli përgjegjshmërisë së gjyqësorit;
anti-korrupsion i agjensioneve të zbatimit të ligjit në • Kompleksiteti i ndjekjes penale të kryerësve të
Evropën Juglindore komprometohet nga mundësia e veprave penale të korrupsionit, veçanërisht në
prekjes të tyre nga korrupsioni, sidomos nga krimi i nivelin politik;
organizuar. Masat policore në shumicën e shteteve të • Kapaciteti në përgjithësi i pamjaftueshëm si dhe
SELDI kanë njësi të specializuara kundër operimeve të çështjet që lidhen e profesionalizëm të ulët, ngarkesën
krimit të organizuar; këto njësi parashihet të punojnë e punës të tepruar, që rezulton në grumbullimin e
edhe në masat anti-korrupsion. Mbërthimi i këtyre rasteve, menaxhimin e rasteve, pajisjet, etj.
dy funksioneve në një trup të vetëm rezulton bëhet
kryesisht për shkak të përdorimit të korrupsionit nga Gjetje e rëndësishme e këtij rundi të monitorimit
krimi i organizuar por edhe nga nevoja për metoda të të korrupsionit nga SELDI e që është relevante për
veçanta hetuese në zbulimin e skemave të sofistikuara rolin e gjyqësor në anti-korrupsion është mungesa
të korrupsionit – ekspertizë kjo kryesisht e veshur në e mekanizmave të vlerësimit që u lejon publikut
departamentet kundër krimit të organizuar. Këto njësi dhe politikë-bërësve të vlerësojnë integritetin e
janë, sidoqoftë, të mbërthyera në forcën policore apo gjyqësorit si dhe efektivitetin e aplikimit të ligjeve
ministritë e brendshme të cilat ju cenojnë autonominë kriminale anti-korrupsion. Në asnjë nga shtetet e EJL
institucionale që është e nevojshme për një institucion nuk ekziston një mekanizëm i besueshëm, sistematik
të specializuar anti-korrupsion. dhe gjithëpërfshirës për mbledhjen, shqyrtimin, dhe
Annex 191
bërjen publike të statistikave në punën e gjykatave dhe dhe harmonizimit të tij me EU acquis, prokurimi publik
prokurorisë, sidomos në rastet e korrupsionit. vazhdon të jetë ndër aspektet më të dobëta të qeverisjes
publike. Realiteti nuk ka ndryshuar shumë prej atëherë
pasi rregullat e menduara mirë janë tejkaluar nga
Korrupsioni dhe ekonomia politikanë të korruptuar dhe biznesmen me lidhje të
forta. Ndarja institucionale nuk lejon implementimin
Në Evropën Juglindore, përfshirja tejet e konsiderueshme efektiv të rregullave të prokurimit publik.
e qeverisë në ekonomi sjell numër të pikave të mundshme
të konfliktit në mes të institucioneve publike dhe
bizneseve; rrjedhimisht, kjo krijon rrezik për raste të Shoqëria civile në anti-korrupsion
korrupsionit. Rreziku është sidomos i lartë në fushën e
privatizimit dhe në prokurim publik dhe koncesionet e Organizatat jo-qeveritare në Evropën Juglindore
industrive të rënda si energji dhe mjekësi. Për më tepër, janë ndër forcat shtytëse më të rëndësishme për anti-
rregullim i tepërt i biznesit – sidomos në regjistrim, korrupsion. Ato janë, sidoqoftë, larg nga kanalizimi i
licensim, dhe leje-marrje – vazhdon të krijoj barriera kërkesave të publikut në avokim efektiv për politika
për hyrje në treg si dhe kosto më të larta të të bërit dhe për ta luftuar korrupsionin për shkak të disa
biznes edhe pse disa shtete në rajon kanë bërë progres mangësive. Kontributi i tyre varet në masë të madhe
të konsiderueshëm në trajtimin e barrierave të biznesit. nga të shërbyerit si “rojtar” dhe përfshirjen e
Prapë, administrata për mbikëqyrje dhe përputhshmëri qeverisë në reformat anti-korrupsion. Sidoqoftë,
ligjore e prish tregun duke vënë kontrolle dhe penallti ka mungesë të mekanizmit formal për të përfshirë
pa vlerësim të mirëfilltë të rrezikut dhe analizës kosto- shoqërinë civile nga qeveritë kombëtare në regjion, si
përfitim. Kjo është sidomos e vërtet për administratat dhe mungesë të kapacitetit administrativ dhe vizionit
kufitare përgjatë regjionit, të cilat ende shihen mjet të qartë për kuptimin e potencialit të OJQ-ve në fushën
efektiv për presion në bizneset. Kjo ose i shtyn e anti-korrupsionit. Mbështetja e tepërt në financa
ndërmarrësit në sektorin jo-formal ose i shtyn drejt ndërkombëtare, duke përfshirë financimin Evropian, si
ryshfetit. Në një spirale negative, kjo arsyeton pastaj më dhe mungesën e politikave për ushqimin një sektori civil
shumë rregullime dhe barriera administrative. aktiv në Evropën Juglindore, komprometojnë efektin e
qëndrueshëm të aktivistëve lokal të anti-korrupsionit.
Shumëllojshmëria e rrethanave që krijojnë korrupsion
në marrëdhëniet mes biznesit dhe zyrtarëve publik Edhe pse OJQ-të në fushën e SELDI kanë menaxhuar të
pasqyron vështirësinë që politikat anti-korrupsion krijojnë disa partneritete publiko-private ndërkombëtare,
ballafaqohen pasi që duhet të marrin parasysh një këto nuk janë transformuar në partneritete efektive po
numër faktorësh në konsideratë. Kur fillohen nga ashtu me institucionet qeveritare kombëtare. Qelës i
bizneset, praktikat e korrupsionit mund të ndahen në të bërit partneritete të suksesshme ka qenë kapaciteti i
dy kategori – mënjanimi i kostove shtesë dhe fitimi i hyrjes në disa marrëdhënie me institucione shtetërore,
avantazhit jo të drejtë. Në grupin e parë janë ryshfetet të dyja, komplementare dhe konfrontuese. Një mënyre,
të bëra të nevojshme nga rregullime të dobëta apo të për shembull, të bashkërendimit me funksionin e
tepërta, paaftësia individuale ose institucionale, etj.; “rojtarit”, ka qenë përmirësimi i profesionalizmit të
në të dytën janë llojet e ndryshme të mashtrimit – monitorimit nga OJQ-të të korrupsionit dhe politikave
evazioni fiskal, mashtrimi me TVSH, kontrabanda, anti-korrupsion.
mos-përputhshmëria me standarde të sigurisë dhe
shëndetit, etj. Efektiviteti i OJQ-ve në adresimin e çështjeve të
qeverisjes së mirë publike në shtetet e SELDI varet në
Në Evropën Juglindore, prokurimi qeveritar është një masë të madhe nga kapaciteti i tyre të mbajnë qeverisjes
nga kanalet përmes të cilit më së shumti korrupsioni e e tyre mirë. Rreziku i kapjes së OJQ-ve nga interesat
prek ekonominë. Rreziku i korrupsionit në këtë fushë e veçanta dhe zyrtarët publik të korruptuar ose
lidhet me një numër të madh mangësish: procedura politikanët e zgjedhur vjen nga mundësia e shfrytëzimit
jo-mjaftueshëm transparente, përqindje e madhe e të disa dobësive të sektorit pa-profit në rajon:
procedurave jo-konkurruese, mbikëqyrje e dobët dhe
shqyrtim jo-efektiv gjyqësor (duke marr parasysh • mungesa e procedurave të detyrueshme për
korrupsionin në gjyqësor), etj. Edhe pse para një dekadë transparencë;
studimi i SELDI gjeti që shtetet në rajon kanë bërë • kontroll jo-efektiv i përputhshmërisë me rregullimet
progres në përforcimin e kornizës ligjore të procesit financiare;
• mungesa e kulturës të auditimit; REKOMANDIMET KYÇE

• nivel i ulët i vet-rregullimit dhe koordinim i
përpjekjeve.
Përvoja e shteteve të SELDI-t në luftimin e korrupsionit
Evitimi i kapjes së shoqërisë civile si pjesë e përpjekjeve prej vitit 2001, tregon që zgjidhja e sfidës së korrupsionit
anti-korrupsion në Evropën Juglindore duhet të jetë në në rajon do të kërkonte përpjekje të qëndrueshme në
majë të agjendës reformuese në rajon. shumë fronte, duke përfshirë pjesëmarrjen e të gjithë
grupeve lokale dhe ndërkombëtare në periudhë afatgjate.
Raporti aktual, sjell një numër rekomandimesh në
Bashkëpunimi ndërkombëtar mënyrë që të arrihet progres i mëtutjeshëm në kufizimin
e korrupsionit. Mes tyre, tri zonave kyçe duhen tu jepet
Institucionet ndërkombëtare dhe shtetet e jashtme prioritet nga shtetet në rajon dhe në nivel Evropian, në
partnere kanë luajtur një rol të rëndësishëm në mënyrë që të ketë sukses në periudhën afat-mesme:
zhvillimet anti-korrupsion në Evropën Juglindore.
Duke marr parasysh besnikëritë partiake në politikën Ndjekja penale efektive e politikanëve dhe shër
e brendshme, zotimet ndërkombëtare lehtësojnë byesve civil të nivelit të lartë të korruptuar, është
adoptimin e politikave reformuese që në kundërt do të mënyra e vetme që të dërgohet një mesazh i fortë dhe
ishin shmangur nga politikanët kombëtar. Raportet e i menjëhershëm që korrupsioni nuk do të tolerohet.
progresit nga Komisioni Evropian, financimi nga BE për Për shembull, sjellja e politikanëve të korruptuar
reformat dhe marrëveshjet e binjakëzimit janë ndikime para drejtësisë ka dëshmuar të jetë shumë efektive në
thelbësore ndërkombëtare në agjendat kombëtare anti- fuqizimin e masave anti-korrupsion në Kroaci dhe
korrupsion në shumicën e shteteve të EJL. Edhe pse Slloveni. Në mënyrë që të ketë sukses në këtë drejtim,
anti-korrupsioni është një nga elementet kryesor të do të kërkohej po ashtu mbështetja ndërkombëtare,
raportit të progresit nga BE, ato pranohen ndryshe në duke përfshirë pjesëmarrjen e shteteve anëtare të BE-se
vend – shtetet me vizion të qartë të integrimit u japin dhe fuqizimin e ligjit.
më shumë vëmendje të gjeturave të raportit, përderisa
në Turqi, për shembull, raportet marrin më pak Një mekanizëm monitorues dhe i pavarur anti-
vëmendje. korrupsion, duhet futur në nivel kombëtar dhe rajonal
në mënyrë që të ofrohen të dhëna dhe analizë e fuqishme
Përfshirja ndërkombëtare, sidoqoftë, po ashtu ka sjellë dhe të integrohen të dy: diagnostikimi i korrupsionit
me vete rrezikun e pritjeve jo realiste për ndreqje të dhe politika vlerësuese anti-korrupsion. Mekanizmi
shpejta të cilat në fakt mund të sjellin adoptimin e duhet të zbatohet përmes organizatave kombëtare
masave sipërfaqësore ad hoc. Kushtëzimi dhe shumica dhe/ose organizatave dhe rrjeteve rajonale të shoqërisë
e stimujve ndikojnë kryesisht në agjensionet e krahut civile, dhe duhet të jetë i pavarur nga financimi direkt
ekzekutiv, përderisa gjyqësori, parlamenti, dhe kombëtar qeveritar. Duhet të shërbejë si një makinë për
institucionet tjera relevante publike dhe private, nuk hapjen e të dhënave administrative dhe rritjen e qasjes
përfshihen sa duhet. Qëndrueshmëria e angazhimeve publike në informata. Në dispozicion publik, në formë
ndërkombëtare është forcuar nga zgjerimi i një varg të bazës të dhënave duhet të mundësohen/ofrohen
akterësh lokal që përfshinë shoqërinë civile, media, të dhëna që lejojnë ndjekjen nga prokurimi publik,
asociacionet profesionale, bashkësitë e tregtisë, etj. koncesionet, fuqizimi i legjislaturës ndaj konfliktit
Ky zgjerim i bashkëbiseduesve lokalë partnerëve të interesit, ndihma shtetërore, transfere buxhetore,
ndërkombëtar ka pasur efektin e fuqizimit të raporte vjetore të përmbushjes dhe mbikëqyrjes së
politikanëve të izoluar reformist apo grupeve agjensioneve të pajtueshmërisë, etj., të cilat mundësojnë
politike por gjithashtu disa akterë jo-qeveritar, dhe një analizë të gjerë të dhënash dhe përdorimin e mjeteve
inkurajimin e kërkesës publike për reformë. Vazhdimi monitoruese.
dhe ndërtimi në këtë drejtim do të ishte thelbësor
për rolin e BE në rajon. Që kjo të ndodh, një lidhje Sektorët kritik me rreziqe të larta korrupsioni dhe kapje
qeveri-Bruksel nuk mjafton. Angazhimi i partnerëve të shtetit, si sektori energjetik, duhen të adresohen me
ndërkombëtar i politikanëve dhe partive reformist prioritet. Masat tjera me prioritet përfshijnë:
duhet të mbështetet – dhe verifikuar – nga shoqëria
civile në një bashkëpunim trelateral. • ngritja e konkurrencës në prokurimin publik;
• përmirësimi i qeverisjes korporative të ndërmarrjeve
shtetërore;
Annex 193
• menaxhim transparent i projekteve të mëdha për anti-korrupsion (hetime, ndjekje penale, masa
nga shkalla e investimit; administrative, etj.); b) monitorim i rregullt dhe
• rritjen e llogaridhënies dhe pavarësimin e autorite analizë e shpërndarjes së formave të korrupsionit
teve rregullatore të energjisë. në sektorë të ndryshëm publik. Monitorimi duhet
të jetë i pavarur dhe/ose i jashtëm për shtetin, të
Partnerët ndërkombëtar, fillimisht Komisioni Evro përfshijë shoqërinë civile dhe të gjithë përbërësit
pian, duhet të angazhojnë organizatat e shoqërisë elementar të sistemit monitorues jo-administrativ të
civile në rajon, në formë të drejtpërdrejt. Kjo është korrupsionit, si SMK i SELDI.
e domosdoshme për disa arsye: a) në mënyrë që
reformat e mbështetura ndërkombëtarësht të bëhen Institucionet anti-korrupsion dhe zbatimi i ligjit
të qëndrueshme, atyre ju nevojitet që të fitojnë
pranueshmëri të gjerë publike, dhe OJQ-të janë të • Të futet një mekanizëm që sjell reagimet për zbatimin
domosdoshme që kjo të ndodhë; b) përfshirja e OJQ- e politikave anti-korrupsion. Mekanizmi duhet të
ve është një mënyrë e garantimit që llogaridhënia e jetë i bazuar në instrumente të reja, krijuese, të dala
qeverive tek donatorët dhe organizatat ndërkombëtare në dispozicion rishtas, si Doracaku i Integruar për
nuk bëhet precedent për llogaridhënien në zonat lokale Monitorimin e Zbatimit Anti-Korrupsion, i zhvilluar
zgjedhore; c) efektiviteti i ndihmës ndërkombëtare do nga Qendra për Studimin e Demokracisë (CSD) dhe
të rritej nëse shfrytëzon monitorimin, aftësitë analitike Universiteti i Trento-së. Doracaku, ju mundëson
dhe aftësitë avokuese të OJQ-ve; d) një angazhim hartuesve të politikave që të vlerësojnë rreziqet e
direkt do të kishte përfitimin e shtuar të parandalimit korrupsionit në një institucion të caktuar qeveritar
të kapjes së shoqërisë civile prej rrjeteve klienteliste të dhe efektin e politikës përkatëse anti-korrupsion,
administratave publike të pa reformuara dhe shpesh të duke identifikuar zgjidhjet me ndikimin më të
korruptuara. madh.
• Kapaciteti institucional i trupave relevant qeveri
tar – në veçanti organizatat e specializuara
anti-korrupsion dhe organizatat mbikëqyrëse
REKOMANDIME SPECIFIKE si institucionet kombëtare të auditimit – duke
përfshirë buxhetet e tyre, objektet dhe personelin,
duhet të barazohen me përgjegjësitë të cilat i bartin
Politikat dhe legjislatura këto institucione. Si alternativë, ato duhet të krijojnë
më shumë programe të ngushta vjetore ose afat-
• Të përcaktohen përpjekjet anti-korrupsion në kushte mesme, të cilat ju japin prioritet intervenimeve.
të politikave të ndërlidhura me qëllime të matshme • Institucionet kombëtare të auditimit duhet po ashtu
dhe momente të rëndësishme, sesa thjeshtë me matje të fuqizojnë epërsinë, duke përfshirë fuqinë për
ose legjislacion. Kjo mënyrë do të sillte vendosjen të vendosur sanksione të ashpra. Të dy auditorët
e caqeve specifike që do duhej të arriheshin dhe dhe parlamentet kombëtare duhet të obligohen
përzgjedhjen e metodave të përshtatshme të të përcjellin raportet e këtyre institucioneve.
intervenimit. Këto caqe do të përcaktohen në mënyrë Institucionet kombëtare të auditimit duhet po
sa më të realizueshme. ashtu të mandatohen që të auditojnë menaxhimin
• Tu jepet prioritet sektorëve të caktuar, metoda të e fondeve të BE-se, të cilat administrohen nga
intervenimit dhe forma të korrupsionit, dhe të autoritetet kombëtare. Pasi që rezultati i punës
provohen qasje të ndryshme para se të ndërmarrën së auditimit është në fazën fillestare, ata duhet të
masa të plota. Korrupsioni është një koncept i gjerë, zhvillojnë kapacitete që të bartin edhe më shumë.
i lidhur me forma të ndryshme të mashtrimit të cilat • Masa të mëtutjeshme janë të nevojshme në mënyrë
nuk mund të adresohen në të njëjtën kohë në mënyrë që të sigurohet që rekrutimi i stafit civil është i
efektive. bazuar në meritë, dhe jo i varur nga përkatësia e
• Politikat duhet të bazohen në informacion. Përderisa partisë politike.
janë bërë disa përpjekje në strategjitë kombëtare • Puna anti-korrupsion duhet të ndahet në mënyrë
anti-korrupsion që të maten rezultatet paraprake, më të barabartë mes organeve qeveritare. Zgjerimi
asnjëra nga shtetet e SELDI, nuk ka mekanizëm i shtrirjes për inkriminim statutor duhet të jetë i
të qëndrueshëm për vlerësimin e politikave anti- balancuar nga një kapacitet i zgjeruar në të gjitha
korrupsion. Së fundmi, kjo kërkon: a) statistika organet publike, që të adresojnë korrupsionin në
të rregullta dhe të besueshme për përpjekjet radhët e tyre përmes mjeteve administrative, në
vend të “kalimit të përgjegjësisë” tek policia apo Statistikore e Kosovës për Anti-korrupsion, e
prokuroria. Organet e përgjithshme publike të dizajnuar nga një OJQ. Një mekanizëm i tillë
administrimit duhet të veprojnë si portier të sistemit duhet të përfshijë informata të rregullta për: masa
kriminal të drejtësisë duke u përballur me aq raste të disiplinore, administrative, dhe kriminale në
korrupsionit sa ju lejon fuqia e tyre administrative. sektorin publik dhe gjyqësor; aspektet e ndryshme
Në fund, kjo përfshin krijimin e një mekanizmi të ndjekjes penale, duke përfshirë aktakuzat dhe
efikas për menaxhimin e ankesave. dënimet/shfajësimin, dënimet nga llojet e ndryshme
• Konfiskimi i pasurisë së fituar në mënyrë të të korrupsionit.
jashtëligjshme në raste të korrupsionit, është një mjet
anti-korrupsion, aplikimi i të cilit duhet zgjeruar. Korrupsioni dhe ekonomia
Përderisa duhet të kihet kujdes i veçantë për të
balancuar të drejtat e të akuzuarit me interesat • Të zvogëlohen deri në minimum dhe të rishikohen
e të mirave publike – sidomos në një mjedis me politikat vjetore të ndihmës shtetërore, pasi që ato
administrata shpesh të korruptuara – konfiskimi i krijojnë rreziqe të konsiderueshme për korrupsion.
pasurisë, i pasuar me dënime penale, është një dënim Të bëhet paraprakisht zbatimi i rreptë i rregullave
i rëndësishëm i cili ende përdoret pak në EJL. të ndihmave shtetërore të BE-së, dhe të zhvillohet
kapaciteti i rregullatorëve të ndihmave shtetërore të
Gjyqësori pavarura kombëtare, për të zbatuar rregullat.
• Të përmirësohet zbatimi i legjislaturës anti-monopol,
• Shtetet në të cilat shumica e organeve gjyqësore në mënyrë që të promovohet ndërmarrësia e lirë
vetëqeverisëse nuk zgjedhën nga gjyqtarët, duhet dhe konkurrenca. Të aplikohet kujdes i veçantë dhe
të adaptojnë reforma që rrisin fuqinë votuese të të shqyrtohet rregullisht përqendrimi në sektorë
tyre. Shtetet të cilat nuk e kanë bërë këtë, duhet të që janë të rregulluar rëndë, dhe që përballen me
adaptojnë parimin “një gjyqtar – një votë”. licencim dhe kufizime tjera, duke krijuar një rrezik
• Duhet të sigurojnë që përzgjedhja e kuotës gjyqësore të marrëveshjeve të fshehta në mes të konkurrentëve
është sa më përfaqësuese, duke përfshirë gjyqtarë të mëdhenj dhe politikanëve.
nga gjykatat e shkallës së parë. Të shqyrtojnë me • Shtetet të cilat e kanë bërë ende, duhet të krijojnë
kujdes, dhe nëse nevojitet të konsiderojnë sërish lidhje institucionale mes menaxhimit të pasurisë
pajtueshmërinë e pozitës së kryetarit të gjykatës, me dhe borxheve të të gjitha financave publike, duke
anëtarësimin e organeve vetë-qeverisëse gjyqësore. përfshirë ndërmarrjet në pronësi shtetërore,
• Në shtetet ku të dy prokuroria dhe gjykatat qeverisen në mënyrë që të zvogëlojë rreziqet financiare
nga i njëjti trup, dy kolegje – për prokurorë dhe dhe të rrisin besueshmërinë në menaxhimin e
gjyqtarë – duhet të ndahen në këtë organ. Prokurorët financave publike nga qeveria. Ndërmarrjet në
dhe gjyqtarët përkatësisht, do të përzgjidheshin pronësi shtetërore, duhet të plotësojnë kërkesat e
vetëm nga këta kolegje. rrepta të qeverisjes korporative dhe të raportimit
• Të shfuqizohet ose të zvogëlohet në minimum roli i (p.sh. rregullat e OECD-së), në të njëjtin nivel me
ministrave qeveritar (të drejtësisë) në trupa gjyqësor kompanitë publike tregtare. Këto ndërmarrje duhet
vet-qeverisës, sidomos sa i përket vendimeve në të publikojnë në internet raporte tremujore.
procedura disiplinore. • Të futen detyrime dhe sanksione për autoritetet
• Gjyqtarëve duhet tu jepet prioritet në mekanizmin kontraktuese të cilat në vazhdimësi dështojnë ti
për verifikimin e pasurisë së deklaruar. dorëzojnë raportet për prokurim publik, raporte
• Pavarësia dhe kapaciteti i inspektorëve gjyqësorë këto për shkeljet e rregulloreve anti-korrupsion ose
duhet të fuqizohet, të ju mundësojë atyre të kur dorëzojnë të dhëna të pasakta ose të mangëta.
shpejtojnë inspektimet. • Përcaktimi i një kornize ligjore, institucionale, për
• Të futet një mekanizëm që sjell reagimet për menaxhimin dhe kontrollimin e kontratave të dala
zbatimin e politikave anti-korrupsion në lidhje me nga partneriteti publiko-privat.
gjyqtarët. Këta mekanizma janë ndjeshëm deficitar • Të përmirësohet mbikëqyrja e prokurimit nga
ose praktikisht mungojnë në të gjitha shtetet e prokuror të mëdhenj publik (ndërmarrje në pronë
SELDI; mungesa e tyre saboton aspektin e shtypjes shtetërore dhe kompanitë e shërbimeve) në mënyrë
së politikave anti-korrupsion dhe e bën inkriminim që të maksimizohet efikasiteti dhe të zvogëlohen
e mëtutjeshëm të korrupsionit të pa dobishëm. parregullsitë.
Një praktikë e mirë që mund të përsëritet – edhe • Të adoptohen politika që reduktojnë pjesën e
pse është ende e pazhvilluar – është Platforma interesit të prokurimit publik në tenderë vetëm me
Annex 195
ofertues, dhe që rrisin konkurrencën. Të publikohet ashtu duhet të gjejnë mënyra më të shumta dhe më
në internet i gjithë dokumentacioni për njoftimet të mira për organizimin e koalicioneve të interesit.
paraprake të prokurimit publik, njoftimet, ofertimet, • OJQ-të duhet të kuptojnë më mirë nevojën për të
kontratat, dhe çdo shtojcë tjetër, që mund të gjenden qenë transparent dhe llogaridhënës. Kjo përfshin
në formë të dhënash (data-bazës). nënshtrimin ndaj auditimit të rregullt, hapjen
• Shtetet kandidate të BE-se të cilat nuk kanë sistem e pasqyrave financiare, procedura të qarta dhe
të decentralizuar implementimi për fondet e BE-së, transparente për qeverisjen e korporatave, dhe masa
duhet të themelojnë një sistem të tillë në mënyrë që kundër kapjes nga grupet e veçanta interesi.
fondet e BE-së të ofrojnë kornizën e duhur ligjore • Shtetet jo-anëtare të BE-së, të EJL-së, duhet të
dhe administrative për bartjen e përgjegjësive për këshillohen që të mësojnë prej organit të njohurisë
implementimin e programeve të financuara nga BE- dhe ekspertizës, i përfshirë në raportin anti-
ja. Mbikëqyrja duhet të mbetet e centralizuar dhe e korrupsion të BE-së. Kjo do tu sillte atyre njohuri
pavarur nga organet zbatuese. shumë të vlefshme në lidhje me vlerësimin e
• Të futet koncepti i vlerës-së-parasë në vlerësimin e shpërndarjes së korrupsionit dhe hartimit të
kontratave të prokurimit publik. politikave anti-korrupsion.
Shoqëria Civile Bashkëpunimi Ndërkombëtar
• Rritja e kapacitetit të organizatave të shoqërisë civile • Programet e ndihmës së jashtme duhet të reflektojnë
për monitorimin dhe raportimin e korrupsionit dhe më mirë të gjeturat e vlerësimeve ndërkombëtare
anti-korrupsionit, duke përfshirë aftësinë për të dhe atyre të pavarura vendore. Në mënyrë që kjo
mbledhur dhe sistemuar informata primare mbi të arrihet, programet e ndihmave duhet të jenë më
funksionimin e institucioneve qeveritare, aftësitë reaktive dhe me fleksibilitet, duke përfshirë një
për matjen e përhapjes aktuale të korrupsionit dhe periudhë më të shkurtë kohore mes hartimit dhe
në analizën e të dhënave, vlerësimin institucional ofrimit.
dhe shkrimin e raporteve. • Ndihmesa ndërkombëtare anti-korrupsion për
• Legjislatura mbi konfliktin e interesit duhet ti qeveritë shtetërore duhet të parasheh një rol më
përfshijë institucionet jo-për-përfitim, sidomos ato të fuqishëm për shoqërinë civile. Kjo përfshin
të cilat financohen nga programet e administruara pjesëmarrjen e OJQ-ve si partner zbatues, monitorues
qeveritare, si buxheti kombëtar, fondet e BE-së, etj. dhe organizues të resurseve, sidomos gjatë vlerësimit
• Rregullat dhe rregulloret për financimin publik – të ndikimit të projekteve ndihmuese.
organizatat jo-qeveritare duhet të jenë të pastra dhe • Efikasiteti i ndihmës duhet të vlerësohet periodikisht
transparente – nga qeveritë lokale dhe qendrore. përmes metodave vlerësuese të ndikimit. Përveç
Vetëm OJQ-të e regjistruara, ato me përfitim publik, sigurimit të matjes së vlerës-për-para – sidomos kur
duhet të lejohen të marrin fonde publike, dhe duhet ka pasur financa publike të përfshira – kjo mënyrë
të ju përmbahen rreptësishtë kërkesave për hapje do ti mundësonte programeve të suksesshme të jenë
dhe raportim. të qëndrueshme, përderisa atyre të pasuksesshme të
• Bashkimi Evropian dhe organizatat tjera të ndërpriten. Është e domosdoshme që ky vlerësim të
donatorëve duhet të konsiderojnë një pjesë më të jetë i pavarur dhe të fut në përdorim ekspertizën e
madhe të financimit të dedikuara për programe për organizatave të shoqërisë civile.
qeverisje të mirë, të zbatuara në bashkëpunim mes • Ndihmesa duhet ti inkurajojë programet ndër-
organizatave të shoqërisë civile dhe institucioneve shtetërore në çështje të përbashkëta, si p.sh. krimi
publike. Këto programe duhet të kenë kërkesa të ndërkufitar. Përgjatë rajonit duhet të vihet në
qarta kundër kapjes së OJQ-ve nga grupe të interesit. përdorim përvoja Bullgare në bashkëpunimin
Duhet të theksohet se arritja e ndikimit, kërkon publiko-privat, gjatë analizës së lidhjeve të krimit të
përkushtim të qëndrueshëm në periudhë afatgjatë organizuar dhe korrupsionit.
(10 vite e më shumë). • Përgatitja e raporteve dhe të gjeturave të rregullta
• Sektori i shoqërisë civile duhet të sigurojë për vet- të Komisionit Evropian duhet të futet më mirë në
rregullim. Më së paku, kjo përfshin adoptimin e hartimin e politikave lokale duke nxjerrë më shumë
udhëzimeve për sjellje me standarde të larta. Ata po nga shoqëria civile lokale dhe komuniteti i biznesit.
Macedonia прашања и истиот регион се истражуваат во

период нешто малку подолг од една деценија.
Во процената се прави споредба на националното
законодавство и институционалната практика во
голем број области кои се клучни во напорите за
Извршно резиме борба против корупцијата: регулаторна и законска
рамка, институционални предуслови, корупција во
економијата, улогата на граѓанското општество и
Корупцијата во Југоисточна Европа е во вестите, меѓународната соработка. Извештајот дава проце-
во фокусот на јавната дебата и на агендата на на- на на гледиштето и политиката на граѓанско-
ционалните и меѓународните институции толку то општество, додека главните наоди и препора-
често и толку долго што навистина не треба да се ките се дадени во консултација со националните и
дава оправдување зошто толку се истражува. Ток- регионалните јавни институции.
му затоа што се покажало дека е толку нерешли-
во прашање, оправдани се иновативните пристапи Процената на националните институционални и за-
за нејзино разбирање и намалување. Изгледите за конски аспекти кои ја прават корупцијата во регио-
пристап кон ЕУ на земјите во регионот, иако далеч- нот можна не се смета за сеопфатен инвентар на регу-
ни, обезбедуваат овозможувачка рамка за дејству- лативите и практиките во сите земји, туку напротив
вање, но засегнатите страни на локално ниво и се става акцент на некои од приоритетните прашања
особено граѓанското општество се оние кои може кои се релевантни за потенцијалните напори кои
да направат одржлив напредок во борбата про- потекнуваат од заедничките извори на корупција во
тив корупцијата. Еден од главните приоритети на Југоисточна Европа (ЈИЕ). Извештајот дава модел за
Водството за развој и интегритет во Југоисточна известување за напредокот во борбата против
Европа (СЕЛДИ) беше да се направи длабинско корупцијата од страна на граѓанското општество
дијагностицирање и разбирање на корупцијата и во ЈИЕ.
празнините кои постојат во владеењето во регио-
нот како потребен предуслов за застапување на
антикорупциски политики кои се базираат на
знаење. Овој извештај на СЕЛДИ се вклопува во ГЛАВНИ НАОДИ
рамката за развој и спроведување на новата регио-
нална антикорупциска политика и инфраструкту-
ра како што е наведено во Столбот за владеење во Генерална оценка
Стратегијата на ЈИЕ2020 спроведуван од Регионал-
ната антикорупциска иницијатива. И покрај одредени важни постигнувања, главно во
однос на стабилизација на демократските институ-
Како резултат на соработката во рамките на СЕЛ- ции, усвојување на закони во клучните области за
ДИ, овој извештај е иновативен и во поглед на ко- борба против корупцијата, намалување на ситното
ристените методи и во поглед на процесот. Тој е подмитување и растечката нетолеранција на јавнос-
резултат на примената на систем развиен од страна та кон корупцијата, антикорупциските и реформите
на СЕЛДИ во почетокот на 2000-те за процена и на за добро владеење не се консолидирани, корупција-
корупцијата и на антикорупцијата, прилагоден та меѓу политичарите и судиите се чини дека се
на социјалното и институционалното опкружу- зголемува, а спроведувањето на антикорупциското
вање на Југоисточна Европа.1 Пристапот за викти- законодавство не е систематско. Антикорупциските
мизација базиран на истражување што го примену- политики и институции во регионот може да имаат
ва Системот за следење на корупцијата користен во огромна корист од примената на редовна и прецизна
овој извештај дава единствена проценка врз основа алатка базирана на истражувањето за виктимизација
на податоци за напредокот во борбата против ко- за мерење на корупцијата и стапката на напредок во
рупцијата во регионот уште од 2001 година. Про- доброто владеење, слично на специјалниот Евроба-
цената извршена во периодот 2013-2014, чии главни рометар за антикорупција, Следењето на корупција-
наоди се сумирани во овој извештај, е редок случај та и организираниот криминал во ЈИЕ од страна на
во меѓународната практика на следење каде истите УНОДЦ и Системот за следење на корупцијата (ССК),
применет во овој извештај.
1
(SELDI, 2002).
Annex 197
Распространетост на корупцијата Коруптивниот притисок од функционерите е глав-

во Југоисточна Европа ниот фактор што статистички влијае врз нивото на
вклученост. Повеќето од земјите каде и вклученоста
Искуството со корупцијата, со други зборови вклу- и притисокот се високи исто така се карактеризира-
ченоста на службените лица во коруптивни трансак- ат и со ниска отпорност на коруптивниот притисок
ции, е многу високо во ЈИЕ. Дури и во Турција и Хр- (повеќето испитаници на кои им било побарано дале
ватска, каде нивоата на административна корупција мито). Иако отпорноста не би можела да се смета
се најниски во регионот, околу 8-9% од населението како главен фактор за да се намали корупцијата, таа
изјавува дека дало мито во последната година. Такви- е одраз на доминантните социјални ставови кон ин-
те нивоа на искуство со корупцијата се многу над тегритетот и во голема мера се резултат на напорите
просечните нивоа регистрирани во истражувањата на граѓанското општество и властите за зголемување
на Евробарометарот во ЕУ.2 Ова покажува дека ад- на антикорупциската свесност. Во оваа насока, улогата
министративната корупција е масовен феномен и на граѓанското општество е клучна, зошто е во пози-
не може да се поврзе со индивидуални случаи на ко- ција да ги оцени резултатите и да биде предводник во
румпирани функционери. вршење притисок од страна на јавноста за промена.
Значителните разлики меѓу земјите со слична исто-

риска позадина покажуваат дека различните патеки Отпорност на коруптивен притисок
на социјален, економски и институционален развој
ʠʖʠʟʚʗʜʠʚʒʚʝʗʡʠʖʡʢʚʤʚʣʠʜʖʑʖʑʖʑʤʞʚʤʠ
даваат различни резултати. Генерално, освен во Буга-

ɢʝʒʑʟʚʹʑ
рија, промените од претходните процени на СЕЛДИ
ɯʑʜʗʖʠʟʚʹʑ
со дијагностиката на ССК (2001 и 2002), во сите земји
ɭʠʣʠʓʠ
се позитивни; напредокот меѓутоа е бавен и нерам-
ɹʢʟʑɥʠʢʑ
номерен.
ɴʢʒʚʹʑ
ɣʥʔʑʢʚʹʑ
ɸʢʓʑʤʣʜʑ
Коруптивен притисок и вклученост во корупција
ɣʚɸ
ʠʖʟʑʣʗʝʗʟʚʗʤʠʠʖʜʠʚʒʚʝʠʡʠʒʑʢʑʟʠʖʑʖʑʖʑʤ ɵʥʢʨʚʹʑ
ʚʖʑʝʗʞʚʤʠ ʡʑʢʚ ʥʣʝʥʔʑ ʡʠʖʑʢʠʜ
ʓʠʞʚʟʑʤʑʤʑʔʠʖʚʟʑ

ɧʑʝʗʡʠʖʡʢʚʤʚʣʠʜ ɰʗʞʑʠʖʔʠʓʠʢ
ɢʝʒʑʟʚʹʑ
ɰʗʖʑʝʗʚʡʠʜʢʑʹʡʢʚʤʚʣʠʜʠʤ

ɹʢʟʑɥʠʢʑ
Извор: СЕЛДИ/ЦПД Систем за следење корупцијата, 2014.

ɣʥʔʑʢʚʹʑ

ɴʢʒʚʹʑ
Антикорупциски политики
ɯʑʜʗʖʠʟʚʹʑ

и законодавство

ɭʠʣʠʓʠ
Генерално, земјите од СЕЛДИ го имаат усвоено по-
ɣʚɸ
големиот дел, и што е поважно логиката и приста-

ɲʢʚʤʚʣʠʜ ʚʞʒʚʝʠ
пот, од меѓународните антикорупциски стандарди

ɸʢʓʑʤʣʜʑ
ʡʠʒʑʢʑʟʠʞʚʤʠ
во нивните национални законодавства. Квалитетот
ɤʜʝʥʩʗʟʠʣʤ на законите, меѓутоа, продолжува да биде проблем.
ɵʥʢʨʚʹʑ
ʖʑʝʗʞʚʤʠ
Честите и недоследни промени во законите резул-

тирале во процедурална и законодавна сложеност и
Извор: СЕЛДИ/ЦПД Систем за следење корупцијата, 2014. контрадикторно толкување од страна на судовите.
Сите земји имаат усвоено некаков стратешки доку-

2
Индикаторите за искуствата со корупцијата користени во
мент во кој е содржан нивниот генерален пристап
истражувањата на Евробарометарот имаат малку поразлична за справување со корупцијата. Иако постојат одре-
содржина бидејќи тие се однесуваат на директното искуство дени разлики меѓу земјите, спроведувањето на овие
и случаи кога испитаниците биле сведоци на подмитување.
За повеќе детали, погледнете: (TNS Opinion & Social, February документи генерално е отежнато заради недоволни
2014). ресурси и заложба од повисоко владино ниво. Друг
проблем во регионот е изработката на стратегии на Институционална практика

начин да се адресираат сите можни аспекти на ко- и спроведување на законите
рупцијата. Наместо да се ставаат приоритети, овие
документи стануваат сеопфатни; во однос на антико- Во Југоисточна Европа, акцентот што порано бил
рупцијата, она што треба да биде стратешко почнува ставен врз усогласување на националното законодав-
да значи опсежно. ство со меѓународните антикорупциски стандарди
постепено му отстапува место на фокусот за спрове-
Во однос на приоритетите во политиката, направени дување преку зголемување на притисокот од страна
се две значајни промени во пристапот кон антико- на ЕУ и локалното граѓанско општество.
рупцијата, промена на фокусот од ситна корупција
(како во сообраќајната полиција или лекарите од јав- Заеднички недостаток на сите земји од СЕЛДИ е
ниот сектор) кон крупна (онаа на пратениците или компромитираната автономија на различните тела
министрите) и криминализација на поширока лепе- за надзор и спроведување на законите. Типично е да
за на злоупотреби на јавната служба. Во однос на каз- постои одреден степен на мешање од страна на по-
нувањето на крупната корупција, успехот во најдобар литичарите, пратениците или министрите во влада-
случај, е ограничен. Клучниот предизвик за антико- та, во работата на државната служба. Понатаму, ниту
рупциските политики во регионот е да се затвори една од земјите во СЕЛДИ немаат соодветни функ-
јазот во спроведувањето и да се продолжи со следење ционални механизми за управување со поплаките
на менливите манифестации на корупција, додека во јавната администрација. Повеќето имаат форми-
истовремено се одржува регулаторната стабилност, рано антикорупциско тело од кое се очекува дека
како и да се избегнат чести промени во судството. ќе ги прима поплаките од јавноста. Друг заеднички
недостаток е немањето веродостојни и јавно достап-
Наодите од следењето на СЕЛДИ ја нагласуваат зна- ни податоци за работата на владините институции,
чајноста на јавната поддршка за успехот на ан- особено што се однесува до антикорупцијата. Ин-
тикорупциските политики. Довербата од страна формациите и статистичките податоци не се соби-
на јавноста во владата и ефективноста на политика- раат или не се достапни за јавноста или се собираат
та се како во некој вид на магичен круг: поголем дел спорадично и не овозможуваат следење и анализа.
од луѓето кои се оптимисти во однос на успехот во
антикорупцијата се поврзуваат со помали нивоа на Едно од клучните прашања поврзани со креирањето
корупција. Спротивно на ова, пораспространетата на специјализирани национални антикорупциски
корупција оди рака под рака со зголемениот песи- институции во регионот е како да се комбинира-
мизам за изгледите на антикорупцијата. ат превентивните и репресивните функции.
Типично, во земјите од СЕЛДИ се обиделе нивните
антикорупциски институции да ги вршат обете
Колку е остварлива политиката за борба против функции, иако репресијата е далеку помал аспект од
корупцијата: оценка од јавноста нивната работа. Поголемиот дел од задачите на овие
тела се поврзани со одредена форма на надзор и кон-
ʠʖʟʑʣʗʝʗʟʚʗʤʠ
трола, обично на националните антикорупциски

ɵʥʢʨʚʹʑ
стратегии и нема многу докази дека тие имале какво
ɸʢʓʑʤʣʜʑ
било значајно влијание врз владината законодавна
ɹʢʟʑɥʠʢʑ
ɭʠʣʠʓʠ
агенда. Формирањето и функционирањето на такви-
ɣʚɸ
те институции се соочува со бројни потешкотии:
ɴʢʒʚʹʑ
ɣʥʔʑʢʚʹʑ • Колку и да е ставена корупцијата високо на влади-
ɯʑʜʗʖʠʟʚʹʑ ните агенди, не било можно да се формираат ин-
ɢʝʒʑʟʚʹʑ ституции со огромна моќ што на некој начин би
влијаеле врз веќе утврдениот баланс на моќ. Типи-
ɭʠʢʥʡʨʚʹʑʤʑʟʗʞʠʘʗʖʑʒʚʖʗʙʟʑʩʚʤʗʝʟʠ чен компромис е овие агенции да бидат приврза-
ʟʑʞʑʝʗʟʑʚʝʚʚʣʜʠʢʗʟʗʤʑ ни со извршната власт и со дадените овластувања
ɭʠʢʥʡʨʚʹʑʤʑʞʠʘʗʖʑʒʚʖʗʙʟʑʩʚʤʗʝʟʠʟʑʞʑʝʗʟʑ
за надзор, кои се обично ограничени на тоа да ба-
ɰʗʙʟʑʞɰʗʞʑʠʖʔʠʓʠʢ
раат од другите владини агенции да известуваат
Извор: СЕЛДИ/ЦПД Систем за следење корупцијата, 2014. за спроведувањето на антикорупциските задачи
кои им се доделени.
Annex 199
• Таквите агенции треба да бидат внимателни да не зголеми професионализмот. Многу често, слабото
ги дуплираат овластувањата кои веќе им се доде- раководење, нејасните критериуми и несоодветната
лени на други надзорни тела (пр. националните поделба на овластувања и одговорности се тие што
ревизорски институции или агенциите за спро- ги попречуваат реформите и го поткопуваат авто-
ведување на законот). ритетот на власта.
• Поголемиот дел од нив имаат ограничен инсти-
туционален капацитет, буџет, персонал, и покрај Антикорупциската улога на агенциите за спрове-
нивните декларативни намери. дување на законот во регионот треба да се сфатат
во контекст на постојано зголемувачкиот опсег на
Што се однесува до законодавната власт, парла- инкриминирани практики поврзани со корупција,
ментите во регионот не се високо рангирани во од- со што се ризикува да се канализираат непропор-
нос на довербата од јавноста и постојат причини за ционален број на случаи за полицијата и обвини-
оваа незавидна позиција. Кодексите на етичко одне- телството. Антикорупциската улога на агенциите за
сување се ретки и не се спроведуваат; регулативата спроведување на законот во Југоисточна Европа е
за лобирање е уште поретка; иако срамежливо дури понатаму компромитирана од високата ранливост
неодамна започнаа да се воведуваат процедури за на корупцијата, особено од организираниот крими-
отстранување на неказнивоста од кривично гонење; нал. Полициските сили во повеќето СЕЛДИ земји
каде и да постои антикорупциско тело во собрани- имаат единици кои се специјализирани за борба со
ето, типично е дека врши надзор над некоја изврш- организираниот криминал; од овие единици се оче-
на агенција, наместо да се занимава со корупцијата кува да работат на антикорупција. Сместувањето
меѓу пратениците. Прашање од значајна загриже- на овие две функции во едно тело се оправдува нај-
ност во земјите од СЕЛДИ е финансирањето на по- често со користењето на корупцијата од страна на
литичките партии и изборни кампањи. Повеќето организираниот криминал, но исто така и од пот-
земји ги имаат спроведени ГРЕКО препораките ребата за специјални истражни методи за откри-
за финансирање на партиите, но остануваат голем вање на софистицирани коруптивни шеми, експер-
број проблеми, како анонимни донации, купување тиза која најчесто се дава на одделенијата за борба
гласови (или подмитување на гласачите), недоволен против организираниот криминал. Овие единици
капацитет за ревизија на партиските финансии и меѓутоа се типично дел од поголемите полициски
ограничено овластување да се спроведуваат санк- сили или министерствата за внатрешни работи кои
циите, итн. им ја одземаат институционалната автономија што
е потребна за специјализираната антикорупциска
Моменталната состојба на државната служба од- институција.
говара на транзициската природа на ЈИЕ земјите и
недостатокот од соодветни законски и институци-
онални традиции како и хроничен недостаток на Судството и антикорупцијата
средства. И покрај разликите меѓу земјите, потреба-
та за менаџерски и организациски развој на држав- Во Југоисточна Европа, силниот фокус ставен врз
ната служба е заедничка за повеќето. Културата на судската независност не бил следен со подеднакво
„контрола” на администрацијата наместо на упра- силни барања за отчетност. Без соодветни проверки
вување со нејзината работа преку мотивација е она и балансирање, судската самоуправа излегла надвор
што попречува да се зголеми професионализмот и од контрола и се претворила во корпорација вклу-
да се намали корупцијата. Еден од главните наоди чувајќи ги и сите придружни коруптивните ризици.
во извештајот е меѓусебното зајакнување меѓу Преголемото нагласување на формалната изборна
компетенцијата и интегритетот. Типично, кога независност стана типичен пример за тоа како лекот
и да се доведуваат во прашање антикорупцискиот се претвора во болест, наместо да се обезбеди рам-
кредибилитет на дадено владино одделение, исто нотежа на извршната власт, самоуправувањето ги
така се доаѓа до сознание дека е потребно разви- задржа клиентелските односи меѓу судиите и спе-
вање на институционалниот капацитет. Спротивно цијалните интереси. Денес, правосудството во ЈИЕ
на ова, секој напредок во професионализмот, исто е ефективно зафатено од корупција како и другите
така довело до подобрување во интегритетот. За- гранки на власт. Откога се ослободи од јавното испи-
тоа, предизвикот во регионот е како да се направат тување и политичките фактори што довеле до такво
транспарентноста и отчетноста суштински каракте- уредување, денес има помалку проверки на тоа како
ристики на државната служба, а истовремено да се судиите стекнуваат корист.
Не е изненадувачки што јавноста нема високо ми- за регистрирање, лиценцирање и добивање дозво-
слење за судството. Системот за следење на корупција- ли, создава различни бариери за оние кои влегуваат
та на СЕЛДИ откри дека судиите се сметаат за најко- на пазарот и повисоки бизнис трошоци, иако некои
румпирани службени лица во регионот; отсуството земји во регионот направиле значаен напредок во
на транспарентност и отчетност е веројатно значаен справувањето со бизнис пречките. Сепак, надзорот
фактор за таквите оценки. Во сите земји од СЕЛДИ и усогласувањето сѐ уште ги искривуваат пазарите
има видливо влошување во оцената за распрос- преку претерано фокусирање на контролата и каз-
транетост на корупцијата меѓу судиите од 2001 ните без оцена на вистинскиот ризик и исплатли-
година. воста. Ова е особено вистинито за царинските уп-
рави низ целиот регион, кои сѐ уште се гледаат како
Капацитетот на судството во регионот за спроведу- ефективни средства за притисок врз бизнисите. Ова
вање на антикорупциското законодавство, особено ги води претприемачите или во неформалниот сек-
во однос на политичката корупција, е поткопан од тор или ги принудува да прибегнат кон подмиту-
голем број проблеми што кумулативно го имале вање. Потоа по принципот на опаѓачка спирала со
влијание: ова се оправдуваат дополнителните регулативи и
административни бариери.
• Уставни прашања, првенствено поврзани со
враќање на рамнотежата меѓу независноста и от- Различните околности што даваат повод за ко-
четноста на судството; рупција во интеракциите меѓу бизнисот и службе-
• Сложеноста на кривичното гонење на извршите- ните лица ја илустрираат тешкотијата со која се со-
лите на кривичното дело корупција, особено на очуваат антикорупциските политики бидејќи мора
политичко ниво; да се земат превид мноштво фактори. Кога се ини-
• Генерално недоволниот капацитет и ниската про- цирани од бизнисот, коруптивните практики може
фесионалност, претераниот обем на работа, што да бидат поделени во две главни категории, избег-
резултира во натрупување на случаи, неможност нување на дополнителните трошоци и стекнување
за справување со случаите, немање механизми, неправедна предност. Во првата група е митото
итн. потребно заради слабата или претераната регула-
ција, индивидуална или институционална неком-
Важен наод во овој круг на следење на корупцијата петентност, итн.; во втората се различни видови на
на СЕЛДИ што е релевантен за улогата на судството измама, затајување данок, измама со ДДВ, шверц,
во антикорупцијата е недостатокот од механи- непочитување на здравствените и безбедносните
зми за повратна информација што овозможува стандарди, итн.
јавноста и креаторите на политики да го евалуираат
и интегритетот на судството и неговата ефективност Во Југоисточна Европа, јавните набавки на владата
во спроведувањето на кривичните антикорупциски се еден од главните канали преку кои корупцијата
закони. Во ниту една од ЈИЕ земјите нема веродосто- влијае на економијата. Корупцискиот ризик во оваа
ен, систематски и сеопфатен механизам за собирање, област е поврзан со бројни недостатоци: недовол-
обработка и објавување на статистичките податоци но транспарентни процедури, голем дел на некон-
за работата на судовите и обвинителството, особено курентни процедури, слаб надзор и неефикасна
за корупциските случаи. правосудна ревизија (во случај на правосудна ко-
рупција), итн. Иако, пред повеќе од една деценија
студијата на СЕЛДИ откри дека земјите во областа
Корупција и економијата направиле напредок во зајакнување на законската
рамка на процесот и нејзино усогласување со зако-
Во Југоисточна Европа, извонредно значајното вк- нодавството на ЕУ, јавните набавки и понатаму се
лучување на владите во економијата создава број- меѓу најслабите аспекти на јавното владеење. Реал-
ни точки на потенцијален конфликт меѓу јавните носта не се променила многу оттогаш бидејќи до-
институции и бизнисот; за возврат, тоа создава ко- бро направените правила се заобиколуваат од стра-
рупциски ризик. Ризикот е особено висок во обла- на на корумпираните политичари и добро поврза-
ста на приватизацијата и во јавните набавки и кон- ни бизниси. Институционалната фрагментација не
цесиите во тешките индустрии, како енергетскиот дозволува ефективно спроведување на правилата за
и здравствениот сектор. Понатаму преголемата ре- јавни набавки.
гулација на бизнисот, главно во однос на режимот
Annex 201
Граѓанското општество Спротивставувањето на тоа граѓанското општество

во антикорупцијата да биде зафатено од корупција како дел од нацио-
налните антикорупциски напори во Југоисточна Ев-
Невладините организации во Југоисточна Европа се ропа треба да биде на врвот на агендата за реформи
меѓу најважната движечка сила во антикорупција- во регионот.
та. Сепак, тие се далеку од преточување на јавни-
те барања во ефективно застапување на политики
и спротивставување на корупцијата заради бројни Меѓународна соработка
слабости. Нивниот придонес зависи во голема мер-
ка од тоа колку се способни да служат и како куче Меѓународните институции и странски партнерски
чувар и за ангажирање на владата во антико- држави одиграле важна улога во развојот на антико-
рупциските реформи. Сепак, постои недостаток од рупцијата во Југоисточна Европа. Земајќи ја предвид
формални механизми за ангажирање на граѓанско- екстремната партизираност во домашната политика,
то општество од страна на националните влади во меѓународните заложби го олеснуваат усвојување-
регионот, како и недоволен административен капа- то на реформски политики што инаку би биле из-
цитет и јасна визија и сфаќање на потенцијалните бегнати од националните политичари. Извештаите
ГОи во полето на антикорупцијата. Претераната за напредокот на Европската комисија, финансиите
зависност од меѓународните, вклучувајќи го и фи- од ЕУ за реформи и твининг програмите се клучни
нансирањето од ЕУ и недостатокот на национални меѓународни влијанија врз националните антико-
политики за негување на жив граѓански сектор во рупциски агенции во повеќето ЈИЕ земји. Иако ан-
Југоисточна Европа го компромитираат одржли- тикорупцијата е една од главните елементи во из-
вото влијание врз локалните лидери во антико- вештаите за напредокот на ЕК, нивниот прием на
рупцијата. локално ниво е различен, земјите со појасни изгледи
за пристапување посветуваат многу поголемо и по-
Иако ГОи во СЕЛДИ успеале да утврдат некои меѓу- детално внимание на наодите од извештаите, додека
народни јавно-приватни партнерства, тие не се тран- во Турција, на пример, овие извештаи добиваат по-
сформирале во ефективни партнерства со нацио- мало внимание.
налните владини институции. Клучот за успешност
на овие партнерства е капацитетот да се стапи во Меѓународната вклученост, меѓутоа, со себе исто
различни односи со државните институции, и ком- така го носи ризикот од нереални очекувања за брзо
плементарни и конфронтирачки. На пример, еден поправање на ситуацијата што за возврат би може-
начин за помирување на соработката со извршување ло да предизвика усвојување на површни и ад хок
на функцијата на куче-чувар, е да се зајакне на про- мерки. Условеноста и поголемиот дел од стимулаци-
фесионализмот на НВО за следење на корупцијата и ите влијаат првенствено на агенциите од извршната
антикорупциските политики. власт, додека судството, собранието и другите засег-
нати јавни и приватни институции не се доволно вк-
Ефективноста на НВОи во решавање на прашањата лучени. Одржливоста на меѓународната вклученост
со доброто јавно владеење во СЕЛДИ земјите зависи беше зајакната со проширувањето на опсегот на вк-
во голем степен од нивниот капацитет да се доведе лучени локални засегнати страни, односно граѓанско-
в ред нивното сопствено владеење. Ризикот НВОи то општество, медиумите, еснафските здруженија,
да бидат зафатени од специјалните интереси и под синдикатите, итн. Ова проширување на домашните
влијание на корумпираните службени лица или по- соработници на меѓународните партнери имало за
литичари потекнува од можноста за искористување ефект зајакнување на изолираните реформистички
на бројните ранливости на непрофитниот сектор во политичари или политички групи, но и различни
регионот: невладини актери и охрабрување на јавното барање
за реформи. Клучно за влијанието на ЕУ во регионот
• Отсуство на задолжителни процедури за транс- ќе биде продолжувањето и надградувањето на овој
парентност; ангажман. За да се случи ова, не е доволна само повр-
• Неефективна контрола на усогласувањето со фи- заност на владата со Брисел. Ангажманот на меѓуна-
нансиските регулативи; родните партнери на реформистичките политичари
• Недостаток на култура за ревизија; и партии треба да бидат подржани и верифицирани
• Ниско ниво на саморегулација и координација на од граѓанското општество во некој вид на трилате-
напорите. рална соработка.
КЛУЧНИ ПРЕПОРАКИ • Зголемување на конкуренцијата во јавните набав-

ки;
• Подобрување на корпоративното владеење на
Искуството на земјите од СЕЛДИ во борбата против претпријатијата во државна сопственост;
корупцијата од 2001 година покажува дека реша- • Транспарентно управување со инвестициски про-
вањето на предизвикот со корупцијата во регионот екти од голем обем;
ќе бара одржливи напори на многу фронтови како и • Зголемување на отчетноста и независност на вла-
вклучување на сите локални и меѓународни заинте- стите кои го регулираат енергетскиот сектор.
ресирани страни на подолги патеки. Овој извештај
дава неколку препораки за да се постигне понатамо- Меѓународните партнери, и пред сѐ Европска-
шен напредок во ограничувањето на корупцијата. та комисија, треба директно да ги ангажираат
Од нив, три клучни области треба да бидат приори- граѓанските организации во регионот. Ова е од
тет на земјите во регионот и на европско ниво, со цел суштинско значење заради неколку причини: а) за
да се постигне напредок на среден рок: меѓународно поддржаните реформи да станат одр-
жливи, тие треба да бидат прифатени од поширока-
Ефикасно гонење на корумпираните високи та јавност, а граѓанските организации се неопходни
политичари и високи државни службеници е за ова да се случи; б) учеството на граѓанските орга-
единствениот начин да се испрати силна и непосред- низации е начин за гарантирање дека одговорноста
на порака дека корупцијата нема да биде толерира- на владите кон донаторите и меѓународните органи-
на. Изведувањето на корумпираните политичари зации нема да имаат предност во однос на одговор-
пред лицето на правдата се покажа како многу ефи- носта кон локалното гласачко тело; в) ефективноста
касно во зајакнување на антикорупциските мерки на меѓународната помош ќе биде зголемена, ако тоа
во Хрватска и Словенија, на пример. Успехот во оваа ги користи вештините за следење и анализа и мож-
насока, исто така, ќе бара меѓународна поддршка, вк- ностите за застапување на граѓанските организации;
лучувајќи го и учеството на земјите членки на ЕУ во г) директниот ангажман ќе има дополнителна ко-
спроведување на законот. рист од спречување граѓанското општество да биде
зафатен од страна на клиентелистички мрежи на
Независен механизам за следење и на ко- нереформираната и често корумпирана јавна адми-
рупцијата и на антикорупцијата треба да се во- нистрација.
веде на национално и регионално ниво со цел да се
обезбедат цврсти податоци и нивна анализа и да се
интегрира и дијагностицирање на корупцијата
и евалуација на антикорупциската политика. КОНКРЕТНИ ПРЕПОРАКИ
Механизмот треба да се спроведува преку нацио-
нални и / или регионални граѓански организации
и мрежи, и треба да биде независна од директно Политики и законодавство
национално финансирање на владата. Треба да слу-
жи како средство за отворање на административ- • Дефинирање на националните антикорупциски
ните податоци и зголемување на јавниот пристап напори во однос на политиката како мерливи
до информации. Податоците што овозможуваат цели и одредници, наместо едноставни мерки
следење на јавните набавки, концесиите, спроведу- или закони. Ова ќе вклучува поставување на кон-
вање на законодавството за конфликт на интерес, кретни цели што треба да се постигнат и избор
државна помош, трансфери од буџетот, годишни- на соодветни методи за интервенција. Овие цели
те извештаи за работата на агенциите за надзор и треба да бидат мерливи, но и достижни.
усогласеност, итн, треба да бидат јавно достапни во • Приоретизирање на одредени сектори, видови на
формат на база на податоци, со што ќе се овозмо- корупција и методи на интервенција и пилоти-
жува широка анализа на податоците и употреба на рање на различни пристапи пред целосно вове-
алатки за следење. дување на широки мерки. Корупцијата е широк
концепт, поврзан со различни и менливи видови
Критичните сектори со висок ризик за ко- на измама кои не можат да се решат истовремено
рупција и вклучување на државата, како енер- на ефективен начин.
гетскиот сектор, треба да бидат приоритет. • За дефинирање на политиките потребни се ре-
Други приоритетни мерки се: левантни информации. Иако се направени не-
Annex 203
какви напори во националните антикорупциски се администрираат од страна на националните

стратегии за процена на претходните резултати, власти. Бидејќи работата на ревизорските ин-
ниту една од земјите на СЕЛДИ нема одржлив ституции е во многу рана фаза, тие треба да го
механизам за евалуација на антикорупциските развијат нивниот капацитет за извршување на
политики. Во најмала рака, за ова е потребно: повеќе такви задачи.
а) веродостојни и редовни статистички податоци • Потребни се дополнителни мерки за да обезбеди
за антикорупциските напори (истраги, обвине- дека вработувањето во државната служба е врз ос-
нија, административни мерки, итн); б) редовно нова на заслуги, а не врз основа на партиска при-
следење и анализа на ширењето и формите на падност.
корупција во различни јавни сектори. Следењето • Антикорупциската работа треба да биде рамно-
треба да биде независно и/или спроведувано од мерно распределена меѓу повеќе владините тела.
надворешни лица, со вклучување на граѓанското Проширувањето на палетата на законските ин-
општество и вградување на основните компонен- криминации треба да се балансира со подобру-
ти на неадминистративните системи за следење вање на капацитетот во сите јавни тела за спра-
на корупцијата, како што е ССК на СЕЛДИ. вување со корупцијата во своите редови, преку
административни алатки, наместо префрлање
Антикорупциски институции и спроведување на одговорноста на полицијата и обвинителство-
на законот то. Општите органи на државната управа треба
да дејствуваат како вратари на системот на кри-
• Воведување на механизам за повратни информа- вичната правда, занимавајќи се со толку случаи
ции за спроведување на антикорупциските по- на корупција колку што им дозволуваат нивните
литики. Механизмот може да се заснова на нови административни надлежности. Во најмала рака,
иновативни инструменти кои се подостапни во ова подразбира создавање на механизми за ефек-
последниве години, како што се Интегрираната тивно справување со поплаките.
алатка за следење на спроведувањето на антико- • Одземањето на незаконски стекнатиот имот во
рупциското законодавство развиен од страна на случаите на корупција е антикорупциска алатка
Центарот за проучување на демократијата и Уни- чија примена треба да се прошири. Потребно е
верзитетот во Тренто. Таа им овозможува на кре- посебно внимание за да се балансираат правата
аторите на политиката да ги проценат ризиците на обвинетиот со интересите на општото добро,
за корупција во дадена владина институција и особено во услови на често корумпирана јавна
ефектот на соодветната антикорупциска полити- администрација, конфискација на богатството
ка, идентификувајќи ги решенијата со најголемо по кривичните обвиненија е важен фактор за од-
влијание. враќање кој сѐ уште е недоволно искористен во
• Институционалниот капацитет на релевантните ЈИЕ.
владини тела – особено специјализираните ан-
тикорупциски агенции и агенциите за надзор, Правосудство
како што се националните ревизорски институ-
ции – вклучувајќи ги и нивните буџети, објекти и • Земјите каде што мнозинството судски самоу-
персонал треба да бидат усогласени со широката правни тела не се избрани од страна на судиите
надлежност што им е дадена на овие институции. треба да усвојат реформи за зголемување на нив-
Алтернативно, тие треба да дизајнираат потесни ната гласачка моќ. Земјите кои не го сториле тоа,
годишни или среднорочни програми, кои им да- треба да го усвојат принципот „еден судија – еден
ваат приоритет на интервенциите. глас”.
• Националните ревизорски институции, исто • Изборот на судската квота треба да е колку што
така, треба да имаат зајакнат институционален е можно порепрезентативна, и треба да ги вклу-
капацитет, вклучувајќи и овластувања за воведу- чува судиите од првостепените судови. Внимател-
вање построги санкции. И оние кои се подлож- но треба да се ревидира, и ако е потребно да се
ни на ревизија и националните парламенти тре- преиспита, компатибилноста на позицијата на
ба да бидат обврзани да ги следат препораките претседател на суд со членство во судските самоу-
во извештаите на овие институции. Национал- правни тела.
ните ревизорски институции, исто така, треба • Во земјите каде што и обвинителството и судови-
да имаат мандат да вршат ревизија врз управу- те се управувани од страна на истото тело, двата
вањето со фондовите на ЕУ, таму каде што овие колегиуми, за обвинители и судии, треба да би-
дат одделени во рамките на ова тело. Обвините- равувањето со средствата и обврските на сите
лите и судиите, соодветно, ќе бидат избрани само јавни финансии, вклучувајќи ги и државните
во овие колегиуми. претпријатија, со цел да се ублажат финансиски-
• Да се укине или намали на минимум улогата на те ризици и да се подобри кредибилитетот на
владините министри (обично за правда) во суд- владата за управување со јавните финансии. Пре-
ските самоуправни тела, особено во однос на од- тпријатијата во државна сопственост треба да ги
луките за дисциплински постапки. исполнат строгите барања за корпоративно уп-
• Судиите треба да имаат приоритет во механизмот равување и известување (пр. правила на ОЕЦД),
за верификација на анкетните листови. како и компаниите со кои јавно се тргува. Овие
• Независноста и капацитетот на судските инспек- претпријатија треба електронски да ги објавува-
торати треба да се зајакне, за да се овозможи заси- ат кварталните извештаи.
лување на инспекциите. • Воведување на одговорност и санкции за органи-
• Воведување на повратни механизми за спрове- те кои склучуваат договори кои нема континуи-
дување на антикорупциските политики во однос рано да поднесат извештаи за јавните набавки,
на судиите. Овие механизми се суштински не- извештаи за повреди на антикорупциските про-
потполни или практично недостасуваат во сите писи или ќе поднесат неточни или нецелосни по-
СЕЛДИ земји; нивното отсуство го саботира ас- датоци.
пект за репресијата на антикорупциските поли- • Дефинирање на правна и институционална рам-
тики и го прави понатамошното инкриминирање ка за управување и контрола на склучените дого-
на корупцијата бескорисно. Можна добра прак- вори по пат на јавно-приватно партнерство.
тика што би можела да се реплицира, иако таа • Подобрување на надзорот на јавните набавки од
е сѐ уште недоволно развиена, е Платформата за страна на големите јавни набавувачи (државните
антикорупциска статистика на Косово, дизајни- претпријатија и јавните претпријатија) за да се
рана од страна на една невладина организација. зголеми ефикасноста и да се намалат неправил-
Таквиот механизам треба да вклучува редовно ин- ностите.
формирање за: дисциплински и административ- • Усвојување политики за намалување на бројот на
ни и кривични мерки во јавната администрација тендери за јавни набавки со само еден понудувач
и судството; различните аспекти на кривично и подобрување на конкуренцијата. Онлајн обја-
гонење, вклучувајќи обвиненија и пресуди / осло- вување во формат на база на податоци низ која
бодителни пресуди, казни за различни видови на може да се пребарува комплетната документација
корупциски дела. за јавни набавки вклучувајќи најави, известувања,
понуди, договори, и сите дополненија и измени.
Корупција и економијата • Земјите кандидати за ЕУ, кои немаат треба да
воспостават децентрализирани системи за спро-
• Да се сведат на минимум и да се ревидираат ед- ведување на фондовите на ЕУ за да се обезбеди
наш годишно политиките за доделување држав- соодветна правна и административна рамка за
на помош, затоа што тие создаваат значителен пренесување на одговорностите за спроведување
корупциски ризик. Однапред да се воведе строга на програмите финансирани од ЕУ. Надзорот
примена на правилата за државна помош на ЕУ, треба да остане централизиран и независен од
како и развивање на капацитетите на национал- органите што ги спроведуваат.
ните независни регулатори на државна помош за • Воведување на концептот на исплатливост при
спроведување на правилата. евалуација на договорите за јавни набавки.
• Подобрување на спроведувањето на антимоно-
полското законодавство со цел да се промовира Граѓанско општество
слободното претприемништво и конкуренција.
Да се посвети посебно внимание и редовно да • Да се зголемат капацитетите на граѓанските орга-
се ревидира концентрација во секторите кои се низации за следење и известување за корупција
силно регулирани и се соочуваат со лиценци- и антикорупција, вклучувајќи ја и способноста за
рање и други ограничувања, со што се создава собирање и средување на основните информации
ризик од судири меѓу поголемите конкуренти и за работата на владините институции, вештини-
политичарите. те за мерење на реалното ширење на корупцијата
• Земјите кои не го направиле тоа треба да вос- и анализа на податоците, институционална ева-
постават институционални врски помеѓу уп- луација и пишување извештаи.
Annex 205
• Законодавството во врска со конфликт на инте- нос на проценката на ширењето на корупцијата

реси треба да ги вклучува непрофитните инсти- и развивањето на политики за борба против ко-
туции, особено онаму каде што се финансирани рупцијата.
преку програми спроведувани од владата, како
што се државниот буџет, ЕУ фондови, итн. Меѓународна соработка
• Правила и прописи за јавно финансирање, и од
централната и локалната власт, за непрофитните • Програмите за надворешна помош треба по-
организации треба да бидат јасни и транспарент- добро да ги одразуваат резултатите од меѓународ-
ни. Само на невладините организации регистри- ните и домашните независни евалуации. За тоа
рани за јавен интерес треба да им биде дозволено да се постигне, програмите за помош треба да
да добиваат јавни средства, и соодветно треба да бидат пофлексибилни, вклучувајќи пократок рок
ги исполнуваат построгите барања за известување помеѓу дизајнот и испораката.
и објавување на информации. • Меѓународната антикорупциска помош за наци-
• Европската Унија и другите донаторски агенции оналните влади треба да предвиди посилна улога
треба да ја разгледаат можноста за поголемо фи- на граѓанското општество. Ова вклучува и учест-
нансирање на програми за добро владеење спро- во на невладините организации како партнери за
ведени во соработка со граѓанските организации спроведување, следење и ресурсни организации,
и јавните институции. Овие програми треба да особено во евалуацијата на влијанието на проек-
имаат јасни одредби против тоа невладините ор- тите за помош.
ганизации да бидат зафатени од посебните инте- • Ефективноста на помошта треба периодично да
реси. Треба да се напомене дека за да се има влија- се оценува преку методи за евалуација на влија-
ние потребен е подолг рок (10 години и повеќе) и нието. Во прилог на обезбедување на исплатлива
постојана заложба. мерка, особено се вклучени јавни финансии, ова
• Граѓанскиот сектор треба да обезбеди сопствена ќе овозможи успешните програми да бидат одр-
саморегулација. Во најмала рака, ова вклучува до- жливи, а неуспешните да се прекинат. Императив
несување кодекси на однесување со стандарди кон е оваа проценка да биде независна и да ја користи
кои треба да се стремат. Тие, исто така, треба да се експертизата на граѓанските организации.
најдат повеќе и подобри начини за организирање • Помошта треба да поттикне програми што ќе се
на коалиции на интереси. спроведуваат во повеќе држави за заедничките
• НВО треба подобро да ја разберат потребата да прашања, како што е прекуграничниот крими-
бидат транспарентни и одговорни. Ова вклучува нал. Бугарското искуство во јавно-приватната со-
процес на редовна ревизија, објавување на финан- работка во анализа на врските на организираниот
сиските извештаи, експлицитни и транспарентни криминал и корупцијата треба да се искористи во
процедури за корпоративно управување, и мерки регионот.
против зафаќање од страна на посебни интереси. • Подготовката и наодите на редовните извештаи
• Во земјите кои не се членки на ЕУ од ЈИЕ им се на Европската комисија треба да бидат подобро
препорачува да учат од знаењето и експертизата вградени во локалната политика преку потпи-
содржани во Извештајот на ЕУ за борба против рање во поголема мера врз локалното граѓанско
корупцијата. Ова ќе им обезбеди со увид во од- општество и бизнис заедницата.
Montenegro saradnja. Izvještaj daje stanovište civilnog društva i

procjenu javnih politika, a po pitanju njegovih nalaza
i preporuka konsultovane su nacionalne i regionalne
javne institucije.
Rezime Procjena nacionalnih institucionalnih i pravnih

aspekata koji omogućavaju korupciju u regionu nije
namijenjena kao sveobuhvatan popis propisa i praksi
Korupcija u Jugoistočnoj Evropi je tako često i tako dugo u svim zemljama, već naglašava neka od prioritetnih
u vijestima, u fokusu javne rasprave, i na političkoj pitanja koja su relevantna za potencijalne napore
agendi nacionalnih i međunarodnih institucija, ne traži zajedničkih izvora korupcije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi
pretjerano opravdanje. Razlog tome je upravo činjenica (JIE). Izvještaj daje model za izvještavanje o napretku
da se korupcija pokazala kao veoma složen problem, u borbi protiv korupcije od strane civilnog društva u
pa su savremeni pristupi njenom razumijevanju – Jugoistočnoj Evropi.
a samim tim i smanjenju – svakako opravdani.
Perspektiva ulaska u Evropsku Uniju za zemlje
regiona, iako daleka, obezbjeđuje podsticajni okvir za
djelovanje. Lokalni akteri procesa, a naročito civilno KLJUČNI NALAZI
društvo su ti koji mogu ostvariti održivi napredak u
borbi protiv korupcije. Liderstvo jugoistočne Evrope
za razvoj i integritet (SELDI) je detaljnu dijagnozu i Ukupna procjena
razumijevanje korupcije i nedostataka u upravljanju
u regionu postavilo kao svoje glavne prioritete i kao Bez obzira na određena važna dostignuća – najviše
nužni preduslov za zagovaranje antikorupcijske u odnosu na stabilizaciju demokratskih institucija,
politike zasnovane na znanju. usvajanje zakona u ključnim oblastima borbe
protiv korupcije, smanjenje sitne korupcije i sve
Ovaj Izvještaj SELDI mreže uklapa se u razvojni veću javnu netrpeljivost prema korupciji – reforme
i implementacioni okvir nastajućih regionalnih u borbi protiv korupcije i dobrog upravljanja nijesu
antikorupcijskih politika i infrastrukture, kao što je konsolidovane, čini se da je korupcija među izabranim
prikazano u SEE2020 Stubu Strategije Upravljanja koju političarima i sudijama sve veća, a da je sprovođenje
vodi Regionalna antikorupcijska inicijativa. antikorupcijskih zakona nasumično. Antikorupcijska
politika i institucije u regionu će imati ogromne
Kao rezultat saradnje u okviru SELDI mreže, ovaj koristi od usvajanja redovnog i preciznog alata za
izvještaj je inovativan i u svojoj metodi i postupku. On je mjerenje korupcije i stope napretka u oblasti dobrog
rezultat primjene sistema koji je razvio SELDI početkom upravljanja zasnovanog na istraživanju viktimizacije,
2000-ih za procjenu korupcije i antikorupcije, a slično posebnom Eurobarometru za borbu protiv
prilagođen je društvenom i institucionalnom okruženju korupcije, Monitoringu korupcije i organizovanog
zemalja jugoistočne Evrope.1 Pristup koji se zasniva kriminala u Jugoistočnoj Evropi od strane Kancelarije
na istraživanju viktimizacije kojim se služi Sistem za Ujedinjenih nacija za pitanja droge i kriminala
monitoring korupcije upotrijebljen u Izvještaju pruža (UNODC), i Sistemu za monitoring korupcije koji je
jedinstvenu vođenu podacima procjenu napretka koristio ovaj izvještaj.
u borbi protiv korupcije u regionu od 2001. godine.
Runda ocjenjivanja za period 2013-2014.godine,
koje je sažeto u ovom izvještaju, je rijedak slučaj u Rasprostranjenost korupcije
međunarodnoj praksi monitoringa gdje su ista pitanja u Jugoistočnoj Evropi
i isti region ponovo aktuelizovani nakon nešto više
od jedne decenije. Procjena je uporedila nacionalno Iskustvo sa korupcijom, drugim riječima, učešće javnosti
zakonodavstvo i institucionalnu praksu u nizu oblasti u koruptivnim transakcijama, u jugoistočnoj Evropi je
ključnih za antikorupcijske napore: regulatorni i veoma visoko. Čak u Turskoj i Hrvatskoj, gdje je nivo
zakonski okvir, institucionalne pretpostavke, korupcija administrativne korupcije najniži u regionu, oko 8-9%
u ekonomiji, uloga civilnog društva i međunarodna stanovništva prijavljuje da je dalo mito u posljednjih
godinu dana. Takav nivo iskustva sa korupcijom je
1
(SELDI, 2002). daleko iznad prosječnog nivoa koji bilježi istraživanje
Annex 207
Eurobarometra u Evropskoj Uniji.2 To pokazuje da je

administrativna korupcija masovna pojava i ne može Otpornost na koruptivni pritisak
se ograničiti na pojedinačne slučajeve korumpiranih
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Izvor: SELDI/CSD Sistem monitoringa korupcije, 2014. menta koji sadrži njihov sveukupni pristup borbi
protiv korupcije. Iako postoje određene razlike među
zemljama, implementaciju ovih dokumenata uglavnom
Koruptivni pritisak od strane javnih službenika je glavni sputava nedovoljno resursa i predanosti na visokom
faktor koji statistički utiče na nivo učešća u korupciji. državnom nivou. Dodatni problem u cijelom regionu
Većinu zemalja u kojima su i učešće i pritisak visoki je bila izrada strategija koje bi se bavile svim mogućim
karakteriše i niska otpornost na koruptivni pritisak aspektima korupcije. Umjesto da postave prioritete, ovi
(većina ispitanika od kojih je tražen mito su i dali mito). dokumenti su postali sveobuhvatni; u smislu borbe
Iako se otpornost ne može smatrati glavnim faktorom protiv korupcije, strategije je poprimila značenje nečeg
za smanjenje korupcije, ona odražava preovladavajuće jednostavno iscrpljujućeg.
društvene stavove po pitanju integriteta i u velikoj je
mjeri rezultat napora civilnog društva i vlasti u odnosu Što se tiče političkih prioriteta, došlo je do dvije značajne
na unapređenje antikorupcijske svijesti. U tom smislu, promjene u pristupu borbi protiv korupcije, pomjeranje
uloga civilnog društva je od ključnog značaja jer je pažnje sa sitne korupcije (među saobraćajnom policijom
ono u poziciji da ocjenjuje rezultate i predvodi pritisak ili doktorima u javnom sektoru) na veliku (među
javnosti ka promjenama. članovima parlamenta ili ministrima) i kriminalizacije
šireg niza zloupotreba javne funkcije. Međutim,
2
Indikatori za iskustvo sa korupcijom koji se koriste u ostvarivanje uticaja u smislu kažnjavanja velike korupcije
istraživanjima Eurobarometra imaju malo drugačiji sadržaj, jer se u najboljem slučaju ostaje ograničeno. Ključni izazov za
odnose na direktna iskustva i slučajeve u kojima su ispitanici bili
svjedoci slučajeva mita. Za više detalaja, molimo pogledajte (TNS antikorupcijsku politiku u regionu je da se premosti
Opinion & Social, februar 2014.). implementacioni jaz i održi korak sa promjenljivim
manifestacijama i oblicima korupcije, istovremeno nedostatak, koji je zajednički, je nedostatak pouzdanih

održavajući regulatornu stabilnost i izbjegavajući i javno dostupnih podataka o radu vladinih institucija,
preplavljivanje pravosuđa čestim promjenama. a naročito u odnosu na borbu protiv korupcije. Podaci i
statistika se ili ne prikupljaju, ili nisu dostupni javnosti,
Nalazi SELDI monitoringa naglašavaju značaj ili se prikupljaju tako nasumično da onemogućavaju
javne podrške za uspjeh antikorupcijske politike. monitoring i analizu.
Povjerenje javnosti u vladu i djelotvornost politike
spojeni su u nekoj vrsti moralnog kruga: veći udio ljudi Jedno od ključnih pitanja vezanih za model specija
koji su optimistični po pitanju vjerovatnoće uspjeha u lizovanih nacionalnih antikorupcijskih institucija
borbi protiv korupcije je u korelaciji sa nižim nivoima u regionu je kako kombinovati preventivnu i
korupcije. S druge strane, preovladavajuća korupcija ide represivnu funkciju. U pravilu, zemlje članice SELDI
ruku pod ruku s povećanim pesimizmom o izgledima mreže su pokušale da se njihove institucije za borbu
u borbi protiv korupcije. protiv korupcije bave i jednom i drugom funkcijom,
iako je represija daleko manji aspekt njihovog rada.
Većina zadataka ovih organa odnosi se na neki oblik
Izvodljivost odgovora javnih politika na korupciju: nadzora i kontrole, obično nacionalnih strategija za
kako to javnost procjenjuje borbu protiv korupcije, a malo je dokaza da su imali
bilo kakav značajan uticaj na zakonodavnu agendu
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ovlašćenja koja su već dodijeljena drugim nadzornim
organima (npr. nacionalnih institucija za reviziju ili
Institucionalna praksa i sprovođenje organa za sprovođenje zakona).
zakona • Većina ih je ograničenih institucionalnih kapaciteta –
budžet, osoblje – uprkos suprotno deklarisanim
U Jugoistočnoj Evropi, raniji naglasak na usaglašavanje namjerama.
nacionalnog zakonodavstva s međunarodnim
standardima u borbi protiv korupcije je postepeno Što se tiče zakonodavstva, parlamenti u regionu nijesu
prelazio u fokus na njegovo sprovođenje pod sve većim visoko rangirani po pitanju povjerenja javnosti i taj
pritiskom Evropske Unije i lokalnog civilnog društva. nezavidan položaj nije bez razloga. Kodeksi etičkog
ponašanja su rijetki i ne sprovode se; propisi koji se
Nedostatak koji je zajednički za sve zemlje članice SELDI tiču lobiranja su još rjeđi; tek nedavno su počele da se
mreže je ugrožena autonomija različitih organa za uvode procedure za skidanje imuniteta zbog krivičnog
nadzor i sprovođenje zakona. Određeni stepen uplitanja gonjenja, premda bojažljivo; gdje god postoji organ za
od strane izabranih političara – članova parlamenta borbu protiv korupcije u parlamentu, on obično nadgleda
ili vladinih ministara – u rad javne administracije je neki izvršni organ, umjesto da se bavi korupcijom među
tipičan. Pored toga, nijedna od zemalja članica SELDI svojim članovima. Pitanje od posebne brige u zemljama
mreže nema mehanizam upravljanja pritužbama članicama SELDI mreže je finansiranje političkih partija
u javnoj upravi koji adekvatno funkcioniše. Većina i izbornih kampanja. Većina zemalja je implementiralo
zemalja je osnovala organ za borbu protiv korupcije od preporuke GRECO-a o finansiranju partija, ali brojni
kojeg se očekuje da prima pritužbe javnosti. Još jedan problemi – kao što su anonimne donacije, kupovina
Annex 209
glasova (ili podmićivanje birača), nedovoljni kapaciteti Pravosuđe u borbi protiv korupcije
za reviziju finansija partija i ograničena ovlašćenja za
uvođenje sankcija, itd. – i dalje postoje. U Jugoistočnoj Evropi, snažan fokus na obezbjeđivanje
nezavisnosti pravosuđa nije ujednačen sa jednako
Postojeće stanje državne uprave odgovara tranzicijskoj snažnim zahtjevima po pitanju odgovornosti. Bez
prirodi zemalja Jugoistočne Evrope i nedostatku adekvatne kontrole i ravnoteže autonomija sudstva
adekvatne zakonske i institucionalne tradicije kao je ispala iz kontrole, i pretvorila se u korporativizam
i hroničnom nedostatku sredstava. Bez obzira na sa svim povezanim rizicima od korupcije. Pretjerano
određene razlike među zemljama, ono što je zajedničko naglašavanje formalne izborne nezavisnosti postalo
za većinu je potreba da se unaprijedi menadžerski je tipičan primjer lijeka koji je postao bolest – umjesto
i organizacijski razvoj u okviru državne uprave. da obezbijedi ravnotežu izvršnoj vlasti, autonomnost
Kultura „kontrole” administracije, umjesto upravljanja je ovjekovječila klijentelističke odnose između sudija i
radom administracije kroz motivaciju, je ono što posebnih interesa. Danas je pravosuđe u Jugoistočnoj
opstruira unaprijeđenje profesionalnosti i smanjenje Evropi efikasno zarobljeno kao i druge grane vlasti.
korupcije. Jedan od glavnih zaključaka u izvještaju je Usled nedostatka javnog nadzora i političkih faktora
međusobno jačanje nadležnosti i integriteta. Obično, koji su doveli do takvih aranžmana, danas je malo
kad god se osporavaju antikorupcijske kvalifikacije provjera lobiranja od strane sudija.
određene vladine institucije, utvrdi se da postoji
nedostatak institucionalnih kapaciteta. Nasuprot Ne iznenađuje činjenica da pravosuđe ne uživa naročito
tome, svaki napredak u profesionalnosti vodi do visoko poštovanje od strane javnosti. Sistem za monitoring
unapređenja integriteta. Stoga, izazov u regionu je korupcije SELDI mreže nalazi da se sudije smatraju
kako transparentnost i odgovornost učiniti bitnim među najkorumpiranijim javnim funkcionerima u
karakteristikama državne službe, a istovremeno regionu; nepostojanje transparentnosti i odgovornosti
povećati profesionalizam. Vrlo često, loše upravljanje, je nesumnjivo značajan faktor u takvim procjenama.
nejasni kriterijumi i neadekvatna podjela ovlašćenja U svim zemljama članicama SELDI mreže, došlo je
i odgovornosti je ono što ometa reforme i podriva do opipljivog pogoršanja procjene širenja korupcije
autoritet države. među sudijama od 2001.godine.
Antikorupcijsku ulogu organa za sprovođenje zakona Kapacitet pravosuđa u regionu da sprovodi

u regionu treba shvatiti u kontekstu stalnog proširivanja antikorupcijske zakone, naročito vezano za političku
niza inkriminišućih koruptivnih praksi čime se korupciju, narušen je nizom problema koji su izvršili
rizikuje kanalisanje neproporcionalnog broja slučajeva svoj uticaj kumulativno:
prema policiji i tužilaštvu. Antikorupcijska uloga
organa za sprovođenje zakona u Jugoistočnoj Evropi • Ustavna pitanja, prije svega u odnosu na obnavljanje
dodatno je ugrožena njihovom visokom osjetljivošću ravnoteže između nezavisnosti i odgovornosti
na korupciju, a posebno organizovanim kriminalom. pravosuđa;
Policijske snage u većini zemalja članica SELDI • Kompleksnost krivičnog gonjenja počinilaca
mreže imaju jedinice specijalizovane za borbu protiv krivičnih djela korupcije, naročito na političkom
djelovanja organizovanog kriminala; od ovih jedinica nivou;
se takođe očekuje da rade na borbi protiv korupcije. • Ukupno nedovoljni kapaciteti i povezana pitanja
Smještanje ove dvije funkcije u jedan organ uglavnom niskog profesionalizma, preopterećenosti u radu,
je opravdano time da se organizovani kriminal koristi i rezultirajući neriješeni predmeti, upravljanje
korupcijom, ali i potrebom za specijalnim istražnim predmetima, objekti, itd.
metodama u otkrivanju sofisticiranih koruptivnih
šema – ekspertiza koja je obično povjerena odjeljenjima Važan nalaz ove runde SELDI monitoringa korupcije
za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala. Te jedinice značajan za ulogu pravosuđa u borbi protiv korupcije
su, međutim, obično smještene unutar većih policijskih je nedostatak mehanizama povratnih informacija
snaga ili ministarstava unutrašnjih poslova, što ih koji omogućavaju javnosti i kreatorima politike da
lišava institucionalne autonomije koja je potrebna procijene i integritet pravosuđa i njegovu efikasnost u
specijalizovanim institucijama za borbu protiv primjeni krivičnih antikorupcijskih zakona. Ni u jednoj
korupcije. od zemalja Jugoistočne Evrope ne postoji pouzdan,
sistematski i sveobuhvatan mehanizam za prikupljanje,
obradu i stvaranje javno dostupnih statističkih podataka
o radu sudova i tužilaštava, naročito o slučajevima uprave. Stvarnost se od tada nije puno promijenila,
korupcije. jer dobro osmišljena pravila se zaobilaze od strane
korumpiranih političara i dobro povezanih biznisa.
Institucionalna rascjepkanost ne dozvoljava efikasno
Korupcija i ekonomija sprovođenje propisa o javnim nabavkama.
U Jugoistočnoj Evropi, izuzetno značajan angažman

vlade u ekonomiji stvara brojne tačke potencijalnih Civilno društva u borbi protiv korupcije
sukoba između javnih institucija i biznisa; zauzvrat,
to stvara rizik od korupcije. Rizik je posebno visok u Nevladine organizacije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi su među
području privatizacije i javnih nabavki i koncesija za najvažnijim pokretačkim snagama u borbi protiv
teške industrije (kao što je energetika) i za zdravstvo. korupcije. One su, međutim, i dalje daleko od prevođenja
Osim toga, prenormiranost biznisa – uglavnom u javnih zahtjeva u efikasno zalaganje za javne politike, a
odnosu na registraciju, licenciranje i režim izdavanja i od ustajanja protiv korupcije zbog niza nedostataka.
dozvola – nastavlja stvarati različite prepreke Njihov doprinos zavisi u velikoj mjeri od sposobnosti
početnicima na tržištu i veće troškove poslovanja, da služe kao jedna vrsta kontrole i da podtsaknu vladu
iako su neke zemlje u regionu napravile značajan na antikorupcijske reforme. Ipak, nedostaju formalni
napredak u rješavanju biznis barijera. Ipak, organi za mehanizmi za uključivanje civilnog društva od strane
nadzor i izdavanje dozvola i dalje narušavaju tržište nacionalnih vlada u regionu, kao i administrativni
tako što se fokusiraju većinom na kontrolu i kazne bez kapaciteti i jasne vizije i razumijevanje potencijala
odgovarajuće procjene rizika, koristi i troškova. Ovo organizacija civilnog društva u oblasti borbe protiv
se posebno odnosi na uprave carina u cijelom regionu, korupcije. Pretjerano oslanjanje na međunarodne,
koje se još uvijek smatraju efikasnim sredstvom za uključujući i evropske izvore finansiranja i nedostatak
vršenje pritiska na biznis. Ovo ili otjera preduzetnike nacionalne politike za održavanje vitalnog građanskog
u neformalni sektor ili ih primorava da pribjegavaju sektora u Jugoistočnoj Evropi, ugrožava održiv uticaj
podmićivanju. U silaznoj spirali to onda opravdava lokalnih antikorupcijskih šampiona.
dalje normiranje i administrativne barijere.
Iako su nevladine organizacije na području SELDI
Raznolikost okolnosti koje stvaraju priliku za korupciju mreže uspjele da uspostave neka međunarodna javno-
u interakcijama predstavnika biznisa i javnih službenika privatna partnerstva, ona nisu pretvorena i u efikasna
ilustruju poteškoće sa kojima se antikorupcijske partnerstva s nacionalnim vladinim institucijama.
politike suočavaju jer moraju uzeti mnoštvo faktora Ključ za stvaranje uspješnog partnerstva je sposobnost
u razmatranje. Kad ih pokreću predstavnici biznisa, da se uđe u različite odnose sa državnim institucijama,
koruptivne prakse se mogu podijeliti u dvije glavne kako komplementarne tako i konfrontirajuće. Jedan od
kategorije – izbjegavanje dodatnih troškova i sticanje načina, na primjer, pomirenja saradnji uz obavljanje
nepravedne prednosti. U prvoj grupi je mito na koji funkcije čuvara (en. watchdog), bio je da se unaprijedi
primorava loša ili pretjerana normiranost, lične ili profesionalnost monitoringa korupcije i antikorupcijske
institucionalne nesposobnosti, itd.; u drugoj grupi politike od strane nevladinih organizacija.
su različite vrste prevara – utaja poreza, utaja PDV-
a, krijumčarenje, nepridržavanje zdravstvenih i Efikasnost nevladinih organizacija u rješavanju pitanja
bezbjedonosnih standarda, itd. dobre javne uprave u zemljama članicama SELDI mreže
zavisi u velikoj mjeri od njihove sposobnosti da održe
U Jugoistočnoj Europi, javne nabavke su jedan od ispravnim sopstveno upravljanje. Rizik od zarobljavanja
glavnih kanala kroz koje korupcija utiče na ekonomiju. nevladinih organizacija posebnim interesima i
Rizik od korupcije u ovoj oblasti je povezan s nizom korumpiranim javnim službenicima ili izabranim
nedostataka: nedovoljno transparentne procedure, političarima proizlazi iz mogućnosti iskorišćavanja
veliki udio nekonkurentnih postupaka, slab nadzor i brojnih ranjivosti neprofitnog sektora u regionu:
neefikasna sudska revizija (s obzirom na korupciju u
pravosuđu), itd. Iako je prije više od deset godina studija • nepostojanje obavezne procedure za transparentnost;
SELDI mreže pokazala da su zemlje u regionu ostvarile • neefikasna kontrola usklađenosti sa finansijskim
napredak u jačanju pravnog okvira procesa i njegovo propisima;
usklađivanje s pravnom tekovinom EU, javne nabavke • nepostojanje kulture revizije;
i dalje predstavljaju jedan od najslabijih aspekata javne • nizak nivo samoregulacije i koordinacije napora.
Annex 211
Suprotstavljanje zarobljavanju civilnog društva kao KLJUČNE PREPORUKE

dio nacionalnih napora za borbu protiv korupcije u
Jugoistočnoj Evropi bi trebalo da bude u vrhu reformske
agende u regionu. Iskustva zemalja članica SELDI mreže u bavljenju
korupcijom od 2001.godine pokazuju da bi rješavanje
izazova korupcije u regionu zahtijevalo kontinuirane
Međunarodna saradnja napore na mnogim frontovima i uključivanje svih
lokalnih i međunarodnih aktera na dugi rok. Trenutni
Međunarodne institucije i strane partnerske zemlje izvještaj daje niz preporuka za ostvarivanje daljeg
odigrale su važnu ulogu u razvoju borbe protiv napretka u ograničavanju korupcije. Među njima, tri
korupcije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi. S obzirom na ekstremni ključne oblasti bi trebalo da budu prioriteti zemalja
nepotizam u unutrašnjoj politici, međunarodne u regionu i na evropskom nivou kako bi se postigao
obaveze olakšavaju usvajanje reformskih politika napredak u srednjem roku:
kojih bi nacionalni političari inače klonili. Izvještaji
Evropske komisije o napretku, finansiranje reformi Uspješno procesuiranje korumpiranih političara na
od strane EU i twinning aranžmani su ključni visokom nivou i viših državnih službenika je jedini
međunarodni uticaji na nacionalne antikorupcijske način da se pošalje snažna i neposredna poruka da se
planove u većini zemalja Jugoistočne Evrope. Iako je korupcija neće tolerisati. Dovođenje nepoštenih političara
borba protiv korupcije jedan od glavnih elemenata pred lice pravde pokazalo se vrlo efikasnim u jačanju
Izvještaja Evropske Komisije o napretku, oni su antikorupcijskih mjera u Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji, na primjer.
lokalno prihvaćeni na različite načine – zemlje sa Uspjeh u ovom pravcu će zahtijevati i međunarodnu
jasnijom perspektivom pristupanja obraćaju mnogo podršku, uključujući i uključivanje organa za sprovođenje
više pažnje i detalja na zaključke izvještaja, dok im zakona država članica Evropske Unije.
se u Turskoj, na primjer, uglavnom posvećuje manje
pažnje. Nezavisne mehanizme za monitoring korupcije
i antikorupcije bi trebalo uvesti na nacionalnom i
Međunarodni angažman, međutim, donio je sa sobom regionalnom nivou u cilju pružanja čvrstih podataka i
i rizik od nerealnih očekivanja za brza rješenja koja bi analize i uključivanja kako dijagnostike korupcije tako
za uzvrat mogla podstaći usvajanje površnih i ad hoc i evaluacije antikorupcijske politike. Mehanizam bi
mjera. Uslovljenost i većina incijativa utiče prije svega trebalo implementirati kroz nacionalne i/ili regionalne
na organe izvršne vlasti, dok pravosuđe, parlamenti i organizacije civilnog društva i mreže, i trebalo bi da
druge zainteresovane javne i privatne institucije nijesu bude nezavistan od direktnog finansiranja nacionalnih
bile dovoljno uključene. Održivost međunarodnog vlada. Ovaj mehanizam takođe trebalo bi da posluži
angažmana ojačana je proširenjem opsega uključenih kao sredstvo za otvaranje administrativnih podataka
lokalnih aktera da uključe civilno društvo, medije, i unapređenje pristupa javnosti informacijama. Podaci
profesionalna udruženja, sindikate, itd. Ovo proširenje koji omogućavaju praćenje javnih nabavki, koncesija,
domaćih sagovornika međunarodnim partnerima sprovođenja zakona o sukobu interesa, državne
ima efekat osnaživanja izolovanih reformističkih pomoći, budžetskih transfera, godišnjih izvještaja o
političara ili političkih grupa, ali i raznih nevladinih radu organa za nadzor i izdavanje dozvola, itd., trebalo
aktera i podsticanje javne potražnje za reformama. bi da budu dostupni javnosti u obliku baze podataka,
Nastavljanje i nadograđivanje ovog angažmana će biti omogućavajući time analizu velikih podataka i
od presudnog značaja za uticaj koji EU ima u regionu. korištenje alata za monitoring.
Da bi se to desilo, veza vlada – Brisel nije dovoljna.
Angažman reformističkih političara i partija od strane Kritične sektore s visokim rizikom od korupcije i
međunarodnih partnera treba da bude podržan kao zarobljavanja države, kao što je energetski sektor,
i verifikovan od strane civilnog društva u nekoj vrsti treba prioritetno rješavati. Druge prioritetne mjere
trilateralne saradnje. uključuju:
• povećanje konkurentnosti u oblasti javnih nabavki;

• unapređenje korporativnog upravljanja preduzećima
u državnom vlasništvu;
• transparentno upravljanje investicionim projektima
velikih razmjera;
• jačanje odgovornosti i nezavisnosti energetskih različitim javnim sektorima. Monitoring treba da

regulatornih tijela. bude nezavistan i/ili eksterni za zemlju, da uključuje
civilno društvo i objedinjuje osnovne komponente
Međunarodni partneri, a prije svega Evropska neadministrativnih sistema monitoringa korupcije,
komisija, bi trebalo direktno da angažuju kao što je CMS sistem SELDI mreže.
organizacije civilnog društva u regionu. Ovo je
bitno iz nekoliko razloga: a) da bi reforme koje imaju Antikorupcijske institucije i sprovođenje zakona
međunarodnu podršku postale održive, potrebno
je da steknu prihvatanje šire javnosti,a organizacije • Uvesti mehanizam povratnih informacija za
civilnog društva su neophodne da bi se to dogodilo; sprovođenje antikorupcijskih politika. Mehanizam
b) uključivanjem organizacija civilnog društva može biti zasnovan na inovativnim novim
garantuje se da odgovornost vlade prema donatorima instrumentima koji su učinjeni dostupnijim u
i međunarodnim organizacijama nema prednost u posljednjih nekoliko godina, kao što su Integrisani
odnosu na odgovornost prema lokalnoj zajednici; alat za monitoring sprovođenja antikorupcijskih politika
c) efikasnost međunarodne pomoći će se povećati koji je razvijen od strane Centra za demokratske
ako se koristi za vještine monitoringa i analize studije i Univerziteta Trento. To omogućuje
i sposobnosti zagovaranja organizacija civilnog kreatorima politike da procijene rizik od korupcije
društva; d) direktan angažman bi imao dodatnu korist u datoj vladinoj instituciji i efekat odgovarajuće
u sprečavanju zarobljavanja građanskog društva od antikorupcijske politike, identifikujući rješenja sa
strane klijentelističke mreže nereformisane i često najvećim uticajem.
korumpirane javne uprave. • Institucionalni kapaciteti relevantnih državnih
organa – naročito specijalizovanih organa za
borbu protiv korupcije i nadzornih organa, kao
što su državne revizorske institucije – uključujući i
SPECIFIČNE PREPORUKE njihove budžete, objekte i osoblje se moraju uskladiti
sa širokim nadležnostima koje su date ovim
institucijama. Kao alternativu, trebalo bi osmisliti
Javne politike i zakonodavstvo sažetije godišnje ili srednjoročne programe, koji za
prioritet imaju intervencije.
• Definisati nacionalne napore u borbi protiv korupcije • Institucionalne poluge državnih revizorskih
u smislu politike koja se odnosi na mjerljive ciljeve institucija bi trebalo ojačati, kao i njihova ovlašćenja
i odrednice, a ne samo mjere ili zakonodavstvo. To da izriču oštrije sankcije. I subjekti revizije i
bi značilo postavljanje specifičnih ciljeva koji se žele nacionalni parlamenti bi trebalo da budu u obavezi
postići i odabir odgovarajuće metode intervencije. da isprate izvještaje ovih institucija. Državne
Ove ciljeve treba izraziti količinski koliko je to revizorske institucije bi trebalo da imaju mandat za
moguće. reviziju upravljanja sredstvima Evropske Unije, tamo
• Postaviti pojedine sektore, vrste korupcije i metode gdje njima upravljaju nacionalne vlade. Budući da je
intervencije kao prioritete, i uvesti različite pristupe rad na reviziji učinka u vrlo ranoj fazi, ove institucije
prije postavljanja kompletnih mjera. Korupcija je treba da razvijaju svoje kapacitete za obavljanje više
širok pojam, koji se odnose na razne i različite vrste ovakih revizija.
prevara koje se ne mogu rješavati istovremeno na • Potrebne su dodatne mjere kako bi se obezbijedilo da
efikasan način. zapošljavanje u državnoj upravi bude zasnovano na
• Javne politike treba da budu zasnovane na zaslugama, a ne da zavisi od pripadnosti političkoj
provjerljivim i pouzdanim informacijama. Iako partiji.
su određeni napori učinjeni u nacionalnim • Rad u borbi protiv korupcije treba podijeliti na
strategijama za borbu protiv korupcije na evaluaciji ravnomjerniji način između državnih organa.
dosadašnjih rezultata, nijedna od zemalja članica Proširenje opsega zakonskih inkriminacija treba
SELDI mreže nema održiv mehanizam za evaluaciju izbalansirati unapređenjem kapaciteta u svim javnim
antikorupcijske politike. U najmanju ruku, to organima za rješavanje korupcije u sopstvenim
zahtijeva: a) pouzdanu i redovnu statistiku o redovima kroz administrativne alate umjesto
antikorupcijskim naporima (istrage, krivično prebacivanja odgovornosti na policiju i tužilaštvo.
gonjenje, administrativne mjere, itd.); b) redovni Organi javne uprave bi trebalo da djeluju kao čuvari
monitoring i analizu širenja i oblika korupcije u sistema krivičnog pravosuđa tako što će se baviti sa
Annex 213
onoliko slučajeva korupcije koliko im administrativna pravosuđu; različitim aspektima krivičnog gonjenja,
ovlašćenja omogućavaju. U najmanju ruku, to uključujući i optužnice i presude/oslobađajuće
podrazumijeva stvaranje djelotvornih mehanizama presude, kazne po različitim vrstama krivičnih djela
za upravljanje pritužbama. korupcije.
• Oduzimanje nezakonito stečene imovine u
slučajevima korupcije je alat za borbu protiv Korupcija i ekonomija
korupcije čiju primjenu treba proširiti. Dok posebnu
pažnju treba posvetiti balansiranju prava optuženog • Smanjiti na minimum i pregledati na godišnjem
sa interesima javnog dobra – pogotovo u okruženju nivou politiku državne pomoći jer ona stvara
često korumpirane javne uprave – oduzimanje značajan rizik od korupcije. Uvesti unaprijed strogo
bogatstva nakon krivičnih presuda je značajno sprovođenje pravila Evropske Unije o državnoj
zastrašivanje koje se još uvijek ne koristi dovoljno u pomoći, i razviti kapacitete nacionalnih nezavisnih
Jugoistočnoj Evropi. regulatora državne pomoći za sprovođenje pravila.
• Unaprijediti sprovođenje anti-monopolističkog
Pravosuđe zakonodavstva u cilju promocije slobodnog tržišta
i konkurencije. Povesti posebnu brigu i redovno
• Zemlje u kojima se većina autonomnih pravosudnih ispitivati zasićenje u sektorima koji su pretjerano
organa ne bira iz redova sudija bi trebalo da usvoje normirani i suočavaju se sa izdavanjem dozvola
reforme kojima se povećava njihovo pravo glasa. i ostalim ograničenjima, stvarajući tako rizik od
Zemlje koje to nemaju, bi trebalo da usvoje princip tajnih sporazuma između ponuđača i političara.
„jedan sudija jedan glas“. • Zemlje koje to nisu učinile bi trebalo da uspostave
• Obezbijediti da kvote pri izboru pravosudnih institucionalne veze između upravljanja imovinom
funkcija budu što je moguće više reprezentativne, i odgovornosti svih javnih finansija, uključujući
uključujući i sudije prvostepenih sudova. Pažljivo i preduzeća u državnom vlasništvu, kako bi se
pregledati, a po potrebi preispitati, kompatibilnost ublažio finansijski rizik i poboljšao kredibilitet vlade
položaja predsjedavajućeg suda sa članstvom u u upravljanju javnim finansijama. Preduzeća u
autonomnom pravosudnom organu. državnom vlasništvu bi trebalo da ispunjavaju stroge
• U zemljama u kojima tužilaštvom i sudovima zahtjeve korporativnog upravljanja i izvještavanja
upravlja isti organ, dva kolegijuma – za tužioce i (npr. pravila Organizacije za ekonomsku saradnju
sudije – moraju biti odvojena u ovom organu. Tužioci i razvoj – OECD), u rangu sa javnim dioničkim
i sudije bi se birali samo u ove kolegijume. društvima. Ova preduzeća bi trebalo da objavljuju
• Ukinuti ili smanjiti na minimum ulogu vladinih svoje kvartalne izvještaje onlajn.
ministara (obično pravde) u autonomnim • Uvesti odgovornost i sankcije za ugovorne organe
pravosudnim organima, naročito vezano za odluke koji ne podnose izvještaje o javnim nabavkama u
o disciplinskim postupcima. kontinuitetu, izvještaje o kršenju antikorupcijskih
• Sudije bi trebalo da budu prioritet u mehanizmu za propisa, ili dostavljaju pogrešne ili nepotpune
provjeru prijavljivanja imovine. podatke.
• Nezavisnost i kapacitet pravosudnih inspekcija • Definisati pravni i institucionalni okvir za
treba ojačati kako bi im se omogućilo da pojačaju upravljanje i kontrolu nad ugovorima zaključenim u
inspekcije. javno-privatnom partnerstvu.
• Uvesti mehanizme povratnih informacija za • Unaprijediti nadzor nad nabavkama od strane
sprovođenje antikorupcijskih politika u odnosu velikih javnih nabavljača (državna preduzeća i
na sudije. Ovi mehanizmi su znatno oskudni ili komunalna društva) kako bi se povećala efikasnost i
ih praktično nema u svim zemljama članicama smanjile nepravilnosti.
SELDI mreže; njihovo odsustvo sabotira represivni • Usvojiti javne politike kako bi se smanjio udio tendera
aspekt antikorupcijskih politika i čini dalju za javne nabavke sa samo jednim ponuđačem i
inkriminaciju korupcije beskorisnom. Moguća unaprijedila konkurencija. Objaviti u bazi podataka
najbolje praksa koju treba kopirati – iako je još u formatu koji je moguće pretraživati onlajn
uvijek nedovoljno razvijena – je Platforma Kosova kompletnu dokumentaciju o predobavještenjima
za antikorupcijsku statistiku, koju je izradila jedna o javnim nabavkama, obavještenjima, ponudama,
nevladina organizacija. Takav mehanizam bi trebalo ugovorima, i prilozima.
da uključuje redovne informacije o: disciplinskim • Zemlje kandidati za članstvo u Evropsku Uniju koje
i upravnim i krivičnim mjerama u javnoj službi i to nemaju, bi trebalo da uspostave decentralizovani
sistem za implementaciju EU fondova kako bi se • Nevladine organizacije bi trebalo bolje da razumiju

obezbijedio odgovarajući pravni i administrativni potrebu da budu transparentne i odgovorne.
okvir za prenos odgovornosti za realizaciju To uključuje prolaženje kroz redovne revizije,
programa koje finansira Evropska Unija. Nadzor objavljivanje finansijskih izvještaja, eksplicitne i
bi trebalo da ostane centralizovan i nezavistan od transparentne procedure upravljanja, kao i mjere
organa za implementaciju. protiv zarobljavanja posebnim interesima.
• Uvesti koncept vrijednosti za novac u evaluaciji • Zemljama Jugoistočne Evrope koje nijesu članice
ugovora o javnim nabavkama. Evropske Unije se preporučuje da se uče od organa
znanja i stručnosti sadržanog u Izvještaju EU o za
Civilno društvo borbu protiv korupcije. To će im dati vrijedan uvid
u odnosu na procjenu širenja korupcije i izradu
• Jačati kapacitete organizacija civilnog društva za antikorupcijske politike.
vršenje monitoringa i izvještavanje o korupciji i
borbi protiv korupcije, uključujući i sposobnost za Međunarodna saradnja
prikupljanje i objedinjavanje primarnih informacije
o radu vladinih institucija, vještine za mjerenje • Strani programi pomoći bi trebalo bolje da odražavaju
stvarnog širenja korupcije i analizu podataka, nalaze međunarodne i nezavisne domaće procjene.
institucionalnu evaluaciju i pisanje izvještaja. Da bi se to moglo postići, programi pomoći treba da
• Legislativa koja tretira sukob interesa bi trebalo da imaju više sluha i fleksibilnosti, kao i kraći vremenski
obuhvati neprofitne institucije, posebno kada se period između izrade i isporuke.
finansiraju preko programa kojima upravlja vlada, • Međunarodna pomoć nacionalnim vladama u
kao što je nacionalni budžet, EU fondovi, itd. borbi protiv korupcije bi trebalo da predvidi
• Pravila i propisi o javnom finansiranju – kako od jaču ulogu civilnog društva. To podrazumijeva
strane centralne tako i lokalne vlasti – neprofitnih uključivanje nevladinih organizacija kao partnera u
organizacija bi trebalo da budu jasni i transparentni. implementaciji, kontrolora i resursnih organizacija,
Samo nevladinim organizacijama koje su naročito u procjeni uticaja projekata pomoći.
registrovane za javnu korist treba omogućiti da • Djelotvornost pomoći bi trebalo periodično
dobiju javna sredstva, i trebalo bi u skladu s time da procjenjivati kroz metode procjene uticaja. Pored
zadovolje strožije kriterijume u oblasti izvještavanja obezbjeđivanja mjere “vrijednost za novac” –
i objavljivanja informacija o radu. posebno kada je uključeno i javno finansiranje – to
• Evropska Unija i ostali donatori bi trebalo da uzmu bi omogućilo da se uspješni programi održe, a
u obzir veći udio finansiranja za programe dobrog neuspješni prekinu. Imperativ je da ova procjena
upravljanja koji se sprovode u saradnji između bude nezavisna i da koristi stručnost organizacija
organizacija civilnog društva i javnih institucija. Ovi civilnog društva.
programi bi trebalo da imaju eksplicitne zahtjeve • Trebalo bi podsticati prekogranične programe o
protiv zarobljavanja nevladinih organizacija zajedničkim pitanjima, kao što je prekogranični
posebnim interesima. Treba napomenuti da kriminal. Bugarsko iskustvo u javno-privatnoj
ostvarivanje uticaja zahtijeva dugoročnu (10 i više saradnji vezano za analizu povezanosti
godina) neprekidnu posvećenost. organizovanog kriminala i korupcije bi trebalo
• Sektor civilnog društva bi trebalo da obezbijedi iskoristiti širom regiona.
sopstvenu samoregulaciju. U najmanju ruku, • Pripremu i nalaze redovnih izvještaja Evropske
to uključuje usvajanje kodeksa ponašanja sa komisije bi trebalo bolje ugraditi u lokalno kreiranje
standardima kojima se teži. Trebalo bi takođe javnih politika jačim oslanjanjem na lokalno civilno
pronaći više i bolje načine organizovanja interesnih društvo i poslovnu zajednicu.
koalicija.
Annex 215
Serbia stanovište civilnog društva i političku procenu, dok

su nalazi i preporuke koji se navode u izveštaju dati
uz konsultovanje nacionalnih i regionalnih javnih
institucija.
REZIME Procena nacionalnih institucionalnih i pravnih

aspekata koji korupciju u regionu čine mogućom nije
zamišljena kao sveobuhvatan popis propisa i prakse
Korupcija u jugoistočnoj Evropi je već toliko često i u svim zemljama, već naglašava neka od prioritetnih
toliko dugo u vestima, u središtu javne rasprave i na pitanja od značaja za potencijalne napore iznalaženja
dnevnom redu nacionalnih i međunarodnih institucija, zajedničkih izvora korupcije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi
da za njeno praćenje nije potrebno posebno opravdanje. (SEE). Izveštaj pruža model za izveštavanje o napretku
Razlog tome je upravo činjenica da se korupcija u borbi protiv korupcije od strane civilnog društva u
pokazala kao veoma složen problem, pa su savremeni zemljama Jugoistočne Evrope.
pristupi njenom razumevanju –a samim tim i njenom
smanjenju – svakako opravdani. Izgledi zemalja u
regionu za pristupanje EU, iako daleki, predstavljaju
mogući okvir za akciju, ali je na lokalnim akterima, a NAJVAŽNIJI NALAZI
posebno na civilnom društvu, da dovedu do održivog
napretka u borbi protiv korupcije. Liderstvo jugoistočne
Evrope za razvoj i integritet (SELDI) je detaljnu dijagnozu Opšta ocena
i razumevanje korupcije i “nedostataka” u upravljanju u
regionu postavilo kao jedan od svojih glavnih prioriteta Uprkos nekim značajnim dostignuć ima – uglavnom
i kao nužni preduslov za zagovaranje antikorupcijske u vezi sa stabilizacijom demokratskih institucija,
politike zasnovane na znanju. Ovaj SELDI izveštaj usvajanjem zakona u ključnim oblastima borbe protiv
uklapa se u razvojni i implementacijski okvir Regionalne korupcije, smanjenjem sitnog podmić ivanja i rastućom
antikorupcijske politike i infrastrukture u nastajanju, javnom netrpeljivošću prema korupciji – borba protiv
kao što je to prikazano u SEE2020 Stubu Strategije korupcije i reforme u oblasti dobrog upravljanja
Upravljanja koju vodi Regionalna antikorupcijska nisu konsolidovane, korupcija među izabranim
inicijativa. političarima i sudijama se po svemu sudeći povećava,
a sprovođenje antikorupcijskih zakona je nasumično.
Kao rezultat saradnje u okviru SELDI ovaj izveštaj je Antikorupcijske politike i institucije u regionu će
inovativan, kako metodološki tako i po pitanju samog imati neizmerne koristi od usvajanja redovnog i
procesa.To je rezultat primene sistema razvijenog preciznog, na istraživanju viktimizacije zasnovanog
od strane SELDI ranih 2000-ih za procenu korupcije alata za merenje korupcije i stope napretka u dobrom
i borbe protiv korupcije, prilagođen društvenom upravljanju, slično specijalnom Eurobarometru za
i institucionalnom okruženju Jugoistočne Evrope.1 borbu protiv korupcije, UNODC–ovog nadzora
Pristup zasnovan na istraživanju viktimizacije koji korupcije i organizovanog kriminala u zemljama
je Sistem za monitoring korupcije koristio pri izradi Jugoistočne Evrope, i Sistema monitoringa korupcije koji
izveštaja pruža jedinstvenu analizu zasnovanu na je upotrebljen u ovom izveštaju.
podacima o antikorupcijskom napretku u regionu
počevši od 2001 godine. Period analize 2013 – 2014 i
zaključci te analize koji su sažeti u ovom izveštaju, Rasprostranjenost korupcije
redak su primer u međunarodnoj praksi da se ista u Jugoistočnoj Evropi
pitanja i isti region ponovo analiziraju nakon nešto
više od jedne decenije. Analiza poredi nacionalno Iskustvo sa korupcijom – drugim rečima, umešanost
zakonodavstvo i institucionalnu praksu u brojnim javnih predstavnika u transakcije koruptivnog
oblastima kritičnim za antikorupcijske napore: karaktera – u Jugoistočnoj Evropi je na veoma visokom
regulatornom i pravnom okviru, institucionalnim nivou. Čak i u Turskoj i Hrvatskoj, gde su nivoi
preduslovima, korupciji u privredi, ulozi civilnog korupcije u administraciji najniži u regionu, oko 8-9 %
društva i međunarodnoj saradnji. Izveštaj prikazuje stanovništva izjasnilo se da je dalo mito u poslednjih
godinu dana. Takav nivo iskustva sa korupcijom
1
(SELDI, 2002). znatno je iznad prosečnog nivoa registrovanog
istraživanjima Evrobarometra u EU.2 To pokazuje da u poziciji da proceni rezultate i podstakne pritisak

je korupcija u administraciji masovna pojava i ne može javnosti za promene .
se svesti samo na pojedinačne slučajeve korumpiranih
zvaničnika.
Otpornost prema koruptivnom pritisku
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koji sadrži njihov opšti pristup borbi protiv korupcije.
Iako postoje neke razlike među zemljama, primena
Koruptivni pritisak od strane zvaničnika je statistički ovih dokumenata je uglavnom otežana nedovoljnom
glavni faktor koji utiče na nivo umešanosti u korupciju. količinom resursa i nedovoljnim zalaganjem viših
Već inu zemalja u kojima su i umešanost u korupciju nivoa vlasti. Dodatni problem u čitavom regionu je
i koruptivni pritisak visoki, takođe karakteriše niska izrada strategije koja bi trebalo da obuhvati sve moguće
otpornost na koruptivni pritisak (već ina ispitanika aspekte korupcije. Umesto uspostavljanja prioriteta, ovi
od kojih je traženo da daju mito su ga i dali). Iako dokumenti su postali sveobuhvatni; u pogledu borbe
se otpornost na ovu vrstu pritiska ne može smatrati protiv korupcije, strategija je poprimila značenje nečeg
glavnim faktorom smanjenja korupcije, ona odražava jednostavno iscrpljujućeg.
preovlađujuće društvene stavove prema integritetu i
uglavnom je rezultat napora civilnog društva i vlasti Što se tiče prioriteta politike, došlo je do dve značajne
za povećanje antikorupcijske svesti. U tom pogledu promene u pristupu borbi protiv korupcije –
uloga civilnog društva je od ključnog značaja jer je preusmeravanja pažnje sa sitnih koruptivnih dela (od
strane saobraćajne policije ili lekara u javnom sektoru) na
2
Indikatori za iskustvo sa korupcijom koji su korišćeni u velika (od strane poslanika ili ministara) i kriminalizacije
istraživanjima Erobarometra imaju nešto drugačiji značaj s šireg niza zloupotreba službenog položaja. Učinak u
obzirom da se odnose na direktno iskustvo sa korupcijom
i slučajeve gde su ispitanici direktno svedočili slučajevima pogledu kažnjavanja počinilaca većih koruptivnih dela,
podmićivanja (TNS Opinion & Social, February 2014). medjutim i dalje ostaje u najboljem slučaju ograničen.
Annex 217
Ključni izazov za antikorupcijsku politiku u regionu je konstituisala tela za borbu protiv korupcije od kojih
premošćavanje jaza na planu implementacije i držanje se očekuje da primaju sve prigovore javnosti. Još jedan
koraka sa promenljivim manifestacijama i oblicima zajednički nedostatak je nepostojanje pouzdanih
korupcije, uz istovremeno očuvanje regulatorne i javno dostupnih podataka o delovanju državnih
stabilnosti i izbegavanje preopterećivanja pravosuđa institucija, naročito u pogledu borbe protiv korupcije .
zbog čestih promena. Informacije i statistički podaci se ili ne prikupljaju, ili su
nedostupni javnosti, ili se tako nasumično prikupljaju
Nalazi monitoringa koji je sproveo SELDI ističu značaj da ne omogućavaju praćenje i analizu.
podrške javnosti za uspeh antikorupcijskih politika.
Poverenje javnosti u vlast i efikasnost politike čine Jedno od ključnih pitanja vezanih za formiranje
neku vrstu začaranog kruga: već i udeo ljudi koji su specijalizovanih nacionalnih institucija za borbu
optimisti u pogledu postizanja uspeha u borbi protiv protiv korupcije u regionu je kako objediniti
korupcije u korelaciji su sa nižim nivoima korupcije. I preventivnu i represivnu funkciju. Tipično, SELDI
obrnuto, preovlađujuća korupcija ide ruku pod ruku sa zemlje su težile da njihove institucije za borbu
povećanim pesimizmom u pogledu izgleda za uspeh u protiv korupcije obavljaju obe funkcije, iako represija
borbi protiv korupcije. čini daleko manji aspekt njihovog delovanja. Već ina
zadataka ovih tela odnose se na neki oblik nadzora
i kontrole, obično Nacionalne strategije za borbu
Uspešnost odgovora politike na korupciju: protiv korupcije, i malo je dokaza da su one imale
kako to javnost procenjuje značajanijeg uticaja na zakonodavni program vlade.
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organima nadležnim za sprovođenje zakona).
• Već ini je omogućen ograničeni institucionalni
Institucionalna praksa i primena zakona kapacitet – budžet, osoblje – uprkos deklarisanim
namerama da se postigne suprotno.
U zemljama Jugoistočne Evrope, nekadašnji naglasak
na usklađivanju nacionalnog zakonodavstva sa Što se tiče zakonodavstva, parlamenti u regionu
međunarodnim standardima u borbi protiv korupcije nisu visoko rangirani po pitanju poverenja javnosti
postepeno ustupa mesto usredsređivanju na primenu i ta nezavidna pozicija nije bez razloga.Obrasci
zakona pod sve većim pritiskom EU i lokalnog civilnog etičkog ponašanja su retki i ne sprovode se; pravila
društva. za lobiranje su još ređa; Ttek nedavno se počelo sa
uvođenjem procedure za ukidanje imuniteta u slučaju
Nedostatak koji je zajednički za sve SELDI zemlje je krivičnog gonjenja, mada stidljivo; gde god postoji telo
ugrožena nezavisnost raznih nadzornih tela i organa za borbu protiv korupcije u parlamentu, ono obično
nadležnih za primenu zakona. Odredjeni nivo mešanja nadgleda neki izvršni organ vlasti, umesto da se bavi
izabranih političara – poslanika ili ministara – u rad korupcijom među članovima parlamenta. Značajan
državnih službi je tipičan. Osim toga, nijedna od SELDI problem u SELDI zemljama je finansiranje političkih
zemalja nema adekvatan funkcionalni mehanizam partija i izbornih kampanja.Već ina zemalja je sprovela
za upravljanje prigovorima u javnoj upravi. Već ina je preporuke GRECO-a po pitanju finansiranja stranaka,
ali brojni problemi – kao što su anonimne donacije, Pravosuđe u borbi protiv korupcije
kupovine glasova birača (ili podmić ivanje), nedovoljna
sposobnost da se vrši revizija finansiranja političkih U zemljama Jugoistočne Evrope, snažan akcenat na
partija i ograničena ovlašćenja za izricanje sankcija, obezbeđivanju nezavisnosti pravosuđa nije usaglašen
itd., – i dalje postoje. sa podjednako snažnim zahtevima za odgovornost. U
odsustvu adekvatnih provera i ravnoteže, autonomija
Sadašnje stanje u državnoj službi odgovara tranzicionoj pravosuđa se otrgla kontroli i pretvorila u korporatizam
prirodi zemalja Jugoistočne Evrope i nedostatku sa svim rizicima korupcije koje to sa sobom nosi.
adekvatnih zakonskih i institucionalnih tradicija, kao Prenaglašena formalna izborna nezavisnost postala
i hronično nedovoljnom finansiranju. Uprkos nekim je tipičan primer “leka” koji se pretvario u “bolest” –
razlikama između zemalja, potreba da se podstakne umesto da postane ravnoteža izvršnoj vlasti, autonomija
upravljački i organizacioni razvoj javnog sektora je je omogućila klijentelistički odnos između nosilaca
zajednička za već inu. Kultura “kontrole” administracije pravosudnih funkcija i posebnih interesnih sfera.
umesto da se njenim poslovanjem upravlja putem Danas je pravosuđe u zemljama Jugoistočne Evrope
motivacija je ono što sprečava kako poboljšanje podjednako efikasno zahvaćeno korupcijom kao i
profesionalizma tako i smanjenje korupcije. Jedan ostale grane vlasti. Pošto su oslobođeni od nadzora
od glavnih nalaza u izveštaju je uzajamno jačanje javnosti i političkih faktora koji su doprineli takvim
kompetentnosti i integriteta. Obično, kadgod se aranžmanima, malo je danas kontrola kojima podležu
zalaganje nekog vladinog sektora u borbi protiv korupcije nosioci pravosudnih funkcija.
dovede u pitanje, utvrde se i njegove manjkavosti u
smislu institucionalnog kapaciteta. Suprotno tome, Stoga, činjenica da pravosuđe nije posebno cenjeno
svaki napredak u smislu profesionalizma vodio je u javnosti nije iznenađujuća. SELDI sistem nadzora
poboljšanju integriteta. Dakle, glavni izazov u regionu korupcije utvrdio je da nosioci pravosudnih funkcija
je kako da transparentnost i odgovornost postanu spadaju među najkorumpiranije javne funkcionere
ključne karakteristike javnog sektora, uz istovremeno u regionu; odsustvo transparentnosti i odgovornosti
unapređenje njegove profesionalnosti. Vrlo često, loše je verovatno značajan faktor koji je doprineo takvim
upravljanje, nejasno definisani kriterijumi i neadekvatna ocenama. U svim SELDI zemljama, došlo je do
podela vlasti i odgovornosti su ti koii ometaju reforme i primetnog pogoršanja u proceni širenja korupcije u
podrivaju autoritet vlade. pravosuđu u odnosu na 2001 godinu.
Ulogu organa nadležnih za sprovođenje zakona Kapacitete pravosuđa u regionu da sprovode anti
u borbi protiv korupcije u regionu treba razumeti korupcijske zakone, naročito kada je upitanju politička
imajući u vidu sve širi spektar inkriminatorne korupcija, podrivaju brojni problemi koji kumulativno
prakse u vezi sa korupcijom, što dovodi do rizika od deluju na njihov uticaj:
prosleđivanja nesrazmernog broja predmeta izvršnim
organima i tužilaštvu. Uloga organa za sprovođenje • Ustavna pitanja, pre svega ona koja se odnose
zakona u borbi protiv korupcije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi na ponovno uspostavljanje ravnoteže između
dodatno je ugrožena time što su veoma podložni nezavisnosti i odgovornosti pravosuđa;
korupciji, posebno od strane organizovanog kriminala. • Kompleksnost krivičnog gonjenja počinilaca
Policijske snage u već ini zemalja SELDI imaju jedinice krivičnih dela korupcije, posebno na političkom
specijalizovane za borbu protiv organizovanog nivou;
kriminala; od ovih jedinica se takođe očekuje da rade • Nedovoljan ukupan kapacitet praćen odgovarajućim
na borbi protiv korupcije. Sažimanje ove dve funkcije u niskim nivom profesionalizma, prekomerno
jedno telo uglavnom se pravda povezanošću korupcije opterećenje poslom što dovodi do zaostajanja u
i organizovanog kriminala, ali i potrebom upotrebe predmetima, neadekvatno upravljanje predmetima,
specijalnih istražnih metoda u otkrivanju sofisticiranih neodgovarajući prostor, itd
oblika korupcije – stručnost koja je obično svojstvena
odeljenjima za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala. Važan nalaz ove runde SELDI nadzora korupcije koji je
Te jedinice su, međutim, obično sastavni deo širih značajan za ulogu pravosuđa u borbi protiv korupcije
policijskih snaga ili ministarstava unutrašnjih poslova, je nedostatak mehanizama za dobijanje povratnih
čime su lišene institucionalne autonomije koja je informacija koji bi omogućili javnosti i kreatorima javne
neophodna specijalizovanim institucijama za borbu politike da ocene kako integritet sudstva tako i njegovu
protiv korupcije. efikasnost u primeni krivičnih antikorupcijskih zakona.
Annex 219
Ni u jednoj od zemalja Jugoistočne Evrope ne postoji i neefikasnom sudskom revizijom (s obzirom na

pouzdan, sistematski i sveobuhvatni mehanizam postojanje korupcije u pravosuđu), itd. Iako je pre više
za prikupljanje, obradu i stavljanje na uvid javnosti od jedne decenije SELDI studija utvrdila da su zemlje
statističkih podataka o radu sudova i tužilaštva, a u okruženju nedavno ostvarile napredak u jačanju
posebno o slučajevima korupcije . pravnog okvira za ovaj proces i njegovom usklađivanju
sa pravnim tekovinama EU, javne nabavke su i dalje
među najslabijim oblastima javne uprave. Realna
Korupcija i ekonomija situacija se nije mnogo promenila s obzirom da
korumpirani političari i dobro povezana preduzeća
U Jugoistočnoj Evropi, izuzetno značajno uplitanje vlada i dalje uspešno zaobilaze dobro osmišljena pravila.
u privredu otvara brojne mogućnosti za potencijalni Usitnjenost institucija ne dozvoljavaja efektivnu
konflikt između javnih institucija i privrede; s primenu pravila u oblasti javnih nabavki.
druge strane, to stvara rizik za nastanak korupcije.
Rizik je posebno visok u oblastima privatizacije,
javnih nabavki, koncesija, teške industrije kao što je Civilno društvo u borbi protiv korupcije
energetika, kao i u zdravstvu. Pored toga, preterana
administrativna regulativa – uglavnom po pitanju Nevladine organizacije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi su među
registracije, režima izdavanja dozvola i licenci- nastavlja najvažnijim pokretačkim snagama u borbi protiv
da stvara različite prepreke za učesnike na tržištu kao korupcije. One su, međutim, i dalje veoma daleko od
i veće troškove poslovanja, mada su neke od zemalja mogućnosti efikasne artikulacije zahteva javnosti u
u regionu značajano napredovale u otklanjanju ove efikasno zagovaranje politike, i od suprodstavljanja
vrste prepreka za poslovanje. Ipak, organi nadležni za korupciji zbog mnogih nedostataka. Njihov doprinos
nadzor i poštovanje propisa i dalje utiču na distorziju u velikoj meri zavisi od sposobnosti da istovremeno
tržišta time što se pretežno fokusiraju na kontrolu i nadziru rad vlasti i uključe vlast u antikorupcijske
kazne, bez odgovarajuće procene rizika i isplativosti. reforme. Ipak, neki formalni mehanizam za
To se posebno odnosi na carinsku administraciju u angažovanje organizacija civilnog društva od strane
zemljama u regionu, koja se još uvek smatra efikasnim nacionalnih vlada u regionu ne postoje, kao ni
sredstvom za pritisak na preduzeća. Takva situacija ili administrativni kapacitet i jasna vizija i razumevanje
navodi preduzetnike da predju u sivu zonu poslovanja potencijala organizacija civilnog društva u oblasti
ili ih primorava da pribegnu podmić ivanju. To zatim borbe protiv korupcije. Preveliko oslanjanje na
opravdava uvodjenje dodatne regulacije i povećava međunarodno, uključujuć i i Evropsko finansiranje, kao
administrativnih barijere. i nedostatak nacionalnih politika za negovanje živog
građanskog sektora u Jugoistočnoj Evropi, dovodi u
Raznovrsnost okolnosti koje pogoduju nastanku pitanje održivost uticaja lokalnih predvodnika u borbi
korupcije u interakciji privrede i javnih funkcionera protiv korupcije.
ukazuje na teškoće sa kojima se suočava politika
borbe protiv korupcije, s obzirom da je potrebno uzeti Iako su nevladine organizacije u oblasti koju obuhvata
mnoštvo faktora u razmatranje. Kada je inicirana SELDI uspele da uspostave neka međunarodna javno –
od strane privrede, koruptivna praksa može se privatna partnerstva, ona se nisu transformisala
podeliti u dve glavne grupe – izbegavanje dodatnih i u efikasna partnerstva sa nacionalnim javnim
troškova i nepravedno sticanje prednosti. U prvoj institucijama. Ključ za uspešno partnerstvo je
grupi je podmićivane uslovljeno lošom ili preteranom sposobnost uspostavljanja različitih odnosa sa
regulacijom, nekompetentnošću pojedinaca ili državnim institucijama, kako komplementarnih tako
institucija, itd; u drugu spadaju razne vrste prevara – suprotstavljenih. Jedan od načina da se, primera radi,
utaja poreza, PDV prevara, krijumčarenje, neusklađenost pomiri saradnja i nadzorna funkcija organizacija
sa standardima zdravlja i bezbednosti, itd. civilnog društva, je da se poboljša profesionalizam u
praćenju korupcije i antikorupcijske politike od strane
U zemljama Jugoistočne Evrope, javne nabavke nevladinih organizacija.
su jedan od glavnih kanala preko kojih korupcija
utiče na ekonomiju. Rizik od nastanka korupcije Efikasnost nevladinih organizacija u rešavanju pitanja
u ovoj oblasti je povezan sa brojnim nedostacima: dobrog javnog upravljanja u zemljama SELDI zavisi u
nedovoljno transparentnim procedurama, velikim velikoj meri od njihove sposobnosti da dobro upravljaju
udelom nekonkurentnih procedura, slabim nadzorom sopstvenim radom. Rizik da nevladine organizacije
potpadnu pod uticaj posebnih interesnih grupa i i jačanje takvog angažovanja bili bi od presudnog
korumpiranih javnih službenika ili izabranih političara značaja za uticaj koji Evropska Unija ima u regionu.
proizlazi iz mogućnosti da se iskoristi ranjivost Da bi se to dogodilo, nije dovoljna samo veza izmedju
neprofitnog sektora u regionu: vlade i Brisela. Uključivanje reformski orijentisanih
političara i partija od strane medjunarodnih partnera
• nepostojanje obaveznih procedura za transparentnost; treba da podrži – i verifikuje – civilno društvo kroz
• nedelotvorna kontrola usaglašenosti sa finansijskim neki vid trilateralne saradnje.
propisima;
• nepostojanje kulture revizije;
• nizak nivo samoregulacije i koordinacije napora.
KLJUČNE PREPORUKE
Borba protiv mogućnosti pojave korupcije u
organizacijama civilnog društva treba da bude na vrhu
dnevnog reda reformi u regionu, kao deo nacionalnih Iskustva zemalja SELDI u borbi protiv korupcije od
antikorupcijskih napora u Jugoistočnoj Evropi. 2001. godine do danas pokazuju da hvatanje u koštac
sa izazovom korupcije u regionu zahteva neprekidno
ulaganje napora na više frontova, kao i dugoročno
Medjunarodna saradnja uključivanje svih lokalnih i medjunarodnih aktera.
Ovaj izveštaj sadrži nekoliko preporuka za postizanje
Medjunarodne institucije i strane zemlje partneri daljeg napretka u suzbijanju korupcije. Medju njima,
odigrale su značajnu ulogu u razvoju borbe protiv tri ključne oblasti treba da budu prioritetne za zemlje
korupcije na prostoru Jugoistočne Evrope. S obzirom regiona i za Evropu da bi se mogao ostvariti suštinski
na snažan uticaj stranaka na domaću politiku, napredak u srednjeročnom period:
medjunarodne obaveze potpomažu usvajanje politika
reformi koje bi inače mogle biti odbačene od strane Efikasno sudsko gonjenje korumpiranih visoko
domaćih političara. Izveštaji o napretku Evropske pozicioniranih političara i rukovodilaca na čelu
Komisije, finansiranje reformi od strane EU i twinning javnih službi je jedini način da se odmah pošalje
projekti predstavljaju ključne medjunarodne uticaje snažna poruka da se korupcija neće tolerisati.
na nacionalne antikorupcijske programe većine Privodjenje korumpiranih političara pravdi pokazalo se
zemalja Jugoistočne Evrope. Iako borba protiv veoma efikasnim za jačanje antikorupcijskih mera, na
korupcije čini jedan od glavnih elemenata Izveštaja primer, u Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji. Uspeh u tom smislu bi
o napretku Evropske Komisije, na lokalnom nivou ti takodje zahtevao medjunarodnu podršku, uključujući i
izveštaji se različito prihvataju – zemlje sa izglednijom angažovanje policijskih snaga zemalja članica EU.
perspektivom priključenja detaljno i sa mnogo više
pažnje razmatraju nalaze koji su u njima sadržani, dok Potrebno je uvesti jedan nezavisni mehanizam
se na primer u Turskoj tim izveštajima poklanja manje za praćenje i kontrolu korupcije i borbe protiv
pažnje. korupcije na nacionalnom i regionalnom nivou
kako bi se obezbedilo prikupljanje i analiza obilja
Medjunarodno uplitanje, medjutim, sa sobom nosi podataka i integrisalo dijagnostifikovanje korupcije sa
i rizik od nerealnog očekivanja brzih rešenja, što bi evaluacijom antikorupcijske politike. Taj mehanizam
sa svoje strane moglo podstaći usvajanje površnih bi trebalo sprovoditi kroz nacionalne i/ili regionalne
i ad hoc mera. Uslovljavanje i većina podsticaja organizacije i mreže civilnog društva i on bi morao
utiču prevashodno na izvršne organe vlasti, dok biti nezavistan od direktnog finansiranja sredstvima
pravosudje, parlamenti i druge zainteresovane javne i nacionalnih vlada. Takodje, trebalo bi da doprinese
private institucije nisu dovoljno uključene. Održivost otvaranju administrativnih podataka i olakša javni
medjunarodnog angažovanja potpomognuto je pristup informacijama. Podaci koji omogućavaju
širenjem spektra lokalnih aktera uz uključivanje uvid u javne nabavke i koncesije, primenu propisa za
civilnog društva, medija, profesionalnih udruženja, spečavanje sukoba interesa, državnu pomoć, budžetske
sindikata itd. To umnožavanje domaćih sagovornika transfere, godišnje izveštaje agencija za nadzor i
medjunarodnih partnera imalo je za posledicu sprovodjenje zakona, itd. moraju biti dostupni javnosti
osnaživanje reformskih političara ili političkih grupa, u vidu baza podataka, kako bi se omogućila analiza
ali takodje i raznih aktera iz nevladinog sektora I velike količine podataka i primena odgovarajućih
podstaklo je javnu tražnju za reformama. Dalji nastavak alata za monitoring.
Annex 221
Kritičnim sektorima sa visokim stepenom rizika • Politike treba da budu promišljene. Mada su
od korupcije na državnom nivou, kao što je sektor u nacionalnim antikorupcijskim strategijama
energetike, trebalo bi se baviti prioritetno. Ostale učinjeni izvesni napori u smislu procene prethodno
prioritetne mere uključuju: ostvarenih rezultata, nijedna od SELDI zemalja nema
održiv mehanizam za evaluaciju antikorupcijske
• jačanje konkurencije u javnim nabavkama politike. To, u najmanjem slučaju, zahteva: a) redovne
• bolje korporativno upravljanje preduzećima u i pouzdane statističke podatke o antikorupcijskim
državnom vlasništvu naporima (istrage, sudsko gonjenje, administrativne
• transparentno upravljanje velikim investicionim mere, itd.); b) redovni monitoring i analizu raširenosti
projektima i oblika korupcije u raznim delovima javnog sektora.
• jačanje odgovornosti i nezavisnosti regulatornih tela Monitoring treba da bude nazavisan i/ili da se
u oblasti energetike obavlja van zemlje, da uključuje civilno društvo i
da sadrži osnovne komponente neadministrativnih
Medjunarodni partneri, a pre svega Evropska sistema za praćenje i kontrolu korupcije, kao što su
Komisija, trebalo bi da neposredno angažuju SELDI-CMS.
organizacije civilnog društva u regionu. To je od
suštinske važnosti iz više razloga: a) da bi reforme Institucije za borbu protiv korupcije i sprovodjenje
koje podržava medjunarodna zajednica bile održive, zakona
potrebno je da budu šire prihvaćene u javnosti, a
organizacije civilnog društva su neophodne da bi se to • Uvesti povratni mehanizam za sprovodjenje
ostvarilo; b) uključivanje organizacija civilnog društva antikorupcijskih politika. Taj mehanizam se može
je garancija da odgovornost vlada prema donatorima zasnivati na novim inovativnim instrumentima koji
i medjunarodnim organizacijama neće imati prevlast su poslednjih godina postali dostupniji, kao što je
nad odgovornošću prema lokalnim biračima; Integrated Anticorruption Enforcement Monitoring Toolkit
c) efikasnost medjunarodne pomoći bi bila veća ako bi koji je razvio Centar za proučavanje demokratije pri
se mogle koristiti monitoring i analitičke veštine, kao i Univerzitetu u Trentu. On omogućava nadležnima
sposobnost zagovaranja interesa od strane organizacija za usvajanje politike da procene rizike od korupcije u
civilnog društva; d) direktno angažovanje bi imalo i datoj državnoj instituciji, kao i efekte antikorupcijske
dodatnu prednost jer bi sprečilo da civilno društvo politike i tako identifikuju najefikasnija rešenja.
postane plen klijentelističkih mreža nereformisanih i • Institucionalni kapacitet relevantnih državnih
često korumpiranih javnih uprava. organa – naročito specijalizovanih agencija za
borbu protiv korupcije i nadzornih tela, kao što
su nacionalne revizorske institucije – uključujući
njihove budžete, objekte i osoblje kojima raspolažu,
KONKRETNE PREPORUKE treba uskladiti sa širokim nadležnostima koje su
tim institucijama poverene. Alternativno, trebalo bi
predvideti uže godišnje ili srednjeročne programe
Politike i zakonodavstvo sa utvrdjivanjem prioritetnih intervencija.
• Nacionalne revizorske institucije bi takodje trebalo
• Definisati nacionalne napore za borbu protiv da imaju snažnija institucionalna ovlašćenja,
korupcije kao politiku vezanu za merljive rezultate uključujući i pravo da nameću oštrije sankcije. Kako
i ciljeve a ne samo kao mere ili zakonske propise. organe koji su predmet revizije tako i parlamente
To podrazumeva postavljanje konkretnih ciljeva trebalo bi obavezati da postupaju na osnovu izveštaja
koje treba ostvariti i izbor odgovarajućih metoda za tih institucija. Nacionalne revizorske institucije bi
intervenisanje. Ti ciljevi treba da budu kvantifikovani takodje morale obavezno da vrše reviziju upravljanja
i izvodljivi. fodovima Evropske Unije kada je administrativno
• Dati prioritet odredjenim sektorima, tipovima upravljanje tim sredstvima povereno nacionalnim
korupcije i metodama intervencije, i isprobati organima. Pošto je rad na reviziji učinka još uvek
različite pristupe pre nego što se krene sa primenom u početnoj fazi, revizorske institucije bi trebalo da
usvojenih mera. Korupcija je širok pojam, povezan razvijaju svoje kapacitete kako bi mogle obavljati
sa različitim i promenljivim tipovima prestupa veći broj takvih revizija.
koje je nemoguće istovremeno rešavati na efikasan • Potrebno je preduzeti dodatne mere kako bi se
način. obezbedilo da se zapošljavanje u državnim službama
vrši na osnovu zasluga a ne da zavisi od članstva u ojačati kako bi im se dozvolile učestalije kontrole.
političkim partijama. • Uvesti mehanizme povratnih informacija u
• Rad na suzbijanju korupcije treba ravnomernije sprovođenju antikorupcijskih politika kada su
rasporediti tako da uključuje više državnih organa. u pitanju nosioci pravosudnih funkcija. Ovi
Propisivanje šireg spektra krivičnih dela treba da mehanizmi su suštinski manjkavi ili praktično
bude uravnoteženo sa jačanjem kapaciteta svih nepostojeći u svim SELDI zemljama; njihovo
državnih organa da se administrativnim sredstvima odsustvo otežava represivni aspekt antikorupcijskih
bore sa korupcijom u svojim redovima, umesto da politika i čini dalje optuživanje za korupciju
samo “prenose” odgovornost na policiju i tužilaštvo. beskorisnim. Verovatno najbolja praksa koju je
Organi javne uprave treba da deluju kao branioci moguće usvojiti – iako i dalje nedovoljno razvijena –
pravosudnog sistema tako što će sami rešavati jeste Kosovska platforma za statistiku borbe protiv
onoliki broj slučajeva korupcije koliko im to njihova korupcije, koju je osmislilo nevladin sektor. Takav
administrativna moć dopušta. U najmanjem slučaju, mehanizam bi trebalo da sadrži redovne podatke
to podrazumeva stvaranje efikasnih mehanizama o: disciplinskim i administrativnim i krivičnim
za upravljanje pritužbama. merama u javnim službama i pravosuđu; različitim
• Oduzimanje nezakonito stečene imovine zbog aspektima krivičnog gonjenja, uključujuć i optužnice
koruptivnih dela je sredstvo za borbu protiv i osuđujuće/ oslobađajuće presude i izrečene kazne
korupcije čiju primenu treba proširiti. Mada treba za različite vrste koruptivnih krivičnih dela.
postupati sa posebnom pažnjom kako bi se poštovala
prava okrivljenih, koja treba da budu usklađena sa Korupcija i ekonomija
zaštitom javnog interesa – naročito u sredinama sa
često korumpiranom javnom upravom – oduzimanje • Smanjiti na minimum i na godišnjem nivou
nezakonito stečenog bogatstva na osnovu osudjujućih preispitivati politike državne pomoć i, jer su one
presuda predstavlja važno sredstvo za odvraćanje značajan izvor rizika za nastanak korupcije. Unapred
od takvog ponašanja, koje se u Jugoistočnoj Evropi uvesti striktno sprovođenje pravila EU o državnoj
još uvek nedovoljno koristi. pomoć i, i razviti kapacitete nacionalnih nezavisnih
regulatora državne pomoć i za primenu tih pravila.
Pravosuđe • Poboljšati sprovođenje antimonopolskog zakono
davstva u cilju promovisanja slobodnog predu
• Zemlje u kojima već ina autonominih pravosudnih zetništva i konkurencije. Posebno voditi računa i
tela nije izabrana od strane nosilaca pravosudnih vršiti redovan pregled koncentracije u sektorima
funkcija trebalo bi da usvoje reforme koje bi povećale koji su u velikoj meri regulisani i suočavaju se sa
njihovu glasačku moć. Zemlje koje to do sada nisu licenciranjem i drugim ograničenjima, stvarajuć i
učinile, svakako bi trebalo da usvoje princip “jedan tako rizik od dosluha između već ih konkurenata i
sudija – jedan glas”. političara.
• Osigurati da sudijska izborna kvota bude • Zemlje koje to nisu već učinile treba da uspostave
što reprezentativnija uključivanjem sudija iz institucionalnu povezanost između upravljanja
prvostepenih sudova. Pažljivo preispitati, i ako je imovinom i obavezama svih javnih finansija,
potrebno, ponovo razmotriti kompatibilnost položaja uključujuć i i preduzeća u državnom vlasništvu, u
predsednika suda sa članstvom u samoupravnim cilju ublažavanja potencijalnih finansijskih rizika i
sudskim telima. povećanja kredibiliteta Vlade u upravljanju javnim
• U zemljama gde i tužilaštvom i sudstvom upravlja finansijama. Preduzeća u državnom vlasništvu treba
isto telo, trebalo bi to razdvojiti uvođenjem dva da ispune stroge zahteve u pogledu korporativnog
posebna saveta – za tužioce i za sudije – u okviru upravljanja i izveštavanja (npr. pravila OECD), na
tog tela. Tužioci i sudije, bi dakle bili birani samo u isti način kao kompanije koje posluju na tržištu.
ove savete. Ova preduzeća bi trebalo da objavljuju kvartalne
• Ukinuti ili smanjiti na minimum ulogu vladinih izveštaje o poslovanju na svojim internet sajtovima.
ministara (posebno ministra pravde) u pravosudnim • Uvesti odgovornost i sankcije za ugovorne strane/
samoupravnim organima, naročito u pogledu naručioce koji ne podnose redovne izveštaje o javnim
odlučivanja o disciplinskim postupcima. nabavkama, izveštaje o kršenju antikorupcijskih
• Nosioci pravosudnih funkcija trebalo bi da budu propisa ili koji dostave netačne ili nepotpune podatke.
prvi u postupku provere prijavljene imovine. • Definisati pravni i institucionalni okvir za
• Nezavisnost i kapacitet pravosudnih inspekcija treba upravljanje i kontrolu ugovora zaključenih u okviru
Annex 223
javno-privatnog partnerstva. • Sektor civilnog društva trebalo bi da obezbedi

• Poboljšati nadzor nabavki od strane velikih javnih sopstveni sistem samoregulacije. U najmanju ruku,
nabavljača (državnih i komunalnih preduzeća) kako to podrazumeva usvajanje kodeksa ponašanja
bi se povećala efikasnost i smanjile neregularnosti sa standardima za buduće delovanje. Takođe bi
• Usvojiti politike koje će imati za cilj da smanje trebalo da pronađu više i bolje načine organizovanja
udeo javnih nabavki sa samo jednim ponuđačem interesnih koalicija.
i poboljšaju konkurentnost. Objaviti u formatu • Neophodno je bolje razumevanje nevladinih
onlajn baze za pretraživanje podataka kompletnu organizacija za potrebe transparentnosti rada i
dokumentaciju o najavama, obaveštenjima, ponu odgovornosti. Ovo uključuje redovno sprovođenje
dama, ugovorima, i bilo kojoj dodatnoj dokumen revizije, objavljivanje finansijskih izveštaja, jasne i
taciji o javnim nabavkama. transparentne procedure korporativnog upravljanja,
• Zemlje kandidati za priključivanje EU trebalo kao i mere protiv mogućnosti potpadanja pod tuđe
bi, ukoliko to već nije slučaj, da uspostave interese.
decentralizovane sisteme upravljanja fondovima EU • Zemaljama jugoistočne Evrope koje nisu članice
i da obezbede odgovarajuć i pravni i administrativni EU savetuje se da uče iz celine objedinjenih znanja
okvir za prenos odgovornosti za implementaciju i stručnosti sadržanih u izveštaju EU za borbu
programa koje finansira EU. Nadzor treba da ostane protiv korupcije. To im može pružiti dragoceni uvid
centralizovan i nezavistan od tela zaduženih za u procenu širenja korupcije i kreiranja politika za
implementacijeu. borbu protiv korupcije.
• Uvesti koncept odgovarajuće vrednosti za dati novac u
proces evaluacije ponuda za javne nabavke. Međunarodna saradnja
Civilno društvo • Programi inostrane pomoć i bi trebalo bolje da

odražavaju nalaze međunarodnih i domać ih
• Unaprediti kapacitete organizacija civilnog društva nezavisnih procena. Da bi se to postiglo, programi
za praćenje i izveštavanje o korupciji i borbi protiv pomoć i bi morali da pružaju više odgovora i budu
korupcije, uključujuć i i sposobnost prikupljanja i fleksibilniji, uključujuć i kraći vremenski period
sređivanja primarnih informacija o radu državnih između kreiranja i realizacije.
institucija, veštinu merenja stvarnog širenja korupcije • Međunarodna pomoć nacionalnim Vladama u borbi
i analize podataka, institucionalnu procenu i pisanje protiv korupcije trebalo bi da predvidi snažniju ulogu
izveštaja. civilnog društva. To podrazumeva učešće nevladinih
• Zakon o sukobu interesa trebalo bi da uključuje i organizacija kao partnera u implementaciji, kao
neprofitne institucije, posebno one koje se finansiraju nadzornih tela i resursnih organizacija, posebno u
preko programa kojima upravlja Vlada, kao što su proceni uticaja projekata pomoć i.
nacionalni budžet, fondovi EU, itd. • Efektivnost pomoć i trebalo bi periodično ocenjivati
• Pravila i propisi za javno finansiranje neprofitnih putem metode procene uticaja. Pored obezbeđivanja
organizacija – kako od strane centralne tako i najveće vrednosti za dati novac – posebno kada
od strane lokalnih vlasti – treba da budu jasni i je uključeno javno finansiranje – to bi omogućilo
transparentni. Samo nevladinim organizacijama i održivost uspešnih programa I okončanje
registrovanim za obavljanje delatnosti u javnom neuspešnih. Imperativ je da ova procena bude
interesu treba da bude omogućeno da primaju javna nezavisna i da koristi stručnost organizacija civilnog
sredstva, i one bi stoga trebalo da zadovolje znatno društva.
strožije zahteve izveštavanja i obelodanjivanja • Pomoć bi trebalo da podstakne međudržavne
podataka. programe o zajedničkim pitanjima, kao što je
• Evropska Unija i druge donatorske agencije/ prekogranični kriminal. Bugarsko iskustvo u
institucije trebalo bi da razmotre odvajanje većeg javno-privatnoj saradnji u analizi veza između
dela sredstava za programe dobrog upravljanja koji organizovanog kriminala i korupcije treba da se
se realizuju u saradnji između organizacija civilnog koristi u celom regionu.
društva i javnih institucija. Ovi programi treba • Priprema i nalazi iz redovnih izveštaja Evropske
da imaju eksplicitne zahteve kojima se osigurava komisije trebalo bi da budu bolje iskorišćeni za
nezavisnost delovanja organizacija civilnog društva. donošenje oduka na lokalnom nivou uključujući u
Treba napomenuti da je postizanje rezultata zahteva većoj meri lokalne organizacije civilnog društva i
dugoročnu posvećenost (10 godina i više). poslovnu zajednicu.
Turkey mevzuata ve hukuki çerçeveye; kurumsal gereklilik-

lere; ekonomideki yolsuzluğa değinmekte; sivil top-
lumun rolü ve uluslararası iş birliği gibi yolsuzluk
ile mücadelede önemli bir yere sahip olan konularda
ulusal yasa ve mevzuatlar ile kurumsal uygulamaları
Yönetici Özeti karşılaştırmalı olarak ele almaktadır. Rapor sivil toplu-
mun perspektifi ve siyasa değerlendirmesi sunmanın
yanında ulusal ve bölgesel kamu kuruluşları ile görüş
Güneydoğu Avrupa’daki yolsuzluk sorunu, üzerine sık- alışverişinde bulunarak geliştirilen bulgu ve öneriler
ça haber yapılan, toplumsal tartışmaların odağında yer paylaşmaktadır.
etmiş olan, hem ulusal hem de uluslararası kurumların
sürekli ve uzun süredir siyasa gündeminde bulunan, Bölgede yolsuzluğu mümkün kılan ulusal kurumsal
sorunsallığı kanıksanmış bir meseledir. Yolsuzluğun ve hukuki şartların değerlendirilmesi, tüm ülkelerde-
bu kadar yaygın ve kolay kontrol edilemeyen bir so- ki mevzuat ve uygulamalara dair kapsamlı bir döküm
run olmasından dolayı, meseleyi anlamaya ve dolayısı almak amacı ile değil, Güneydoğu Avrupa (GDA)’daki
ile de azaltmaya yönelik yenilikçi yaklaşımlara gerek yolsuzluğun yaygın kaynaklarını belirleme çerçevesin-
duyulmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği’ne katılım beklentisi, de yapılan potansiyel çalışmalar ile ilişkili önemli ko-
bölge ülkelerinin harekete geçmesi için gereken huku- nuları vurgulamasından dolayı yapılmıştır. Bu rapor,
ki çerçeveyi sağlıyor olsa da, yolsuzlukla mücadelede GDA’daki sivil topluma yolsuzluk ile mücadelenin
sürdürülebilir bir gelişimin sağlanmasında yerel siya- gelişmesinin nasıl raporlanması gerektiğine dair bir
setteki menfaat sahiplerinin ve özellikle de sivil top- model sağlamaktadır.
lumun oynayacağı rol öne çıkmaktadır. Kalkınma ve
Entegrasyon için Güneydoğu Avrupa Liderliği (SELDI)
ağı, bilgi temelli yolsuzlukla mücadele amacı kapsa-
mında, yolsuzluk ile bölgedeki yönetimsel eksiklikle- ANA BULGULAR
ri tanımlama ve anlamaya yönelik araştırmalara ön-
celik vermiştir. Elinizdeki bu SELDI raporu, Bölgesel
Yolsuzluk ile Mücadele Girişimi tarafından yürütü- Genel Değerlendirme
len SEE (Güneydoğu Avrupa) 2020 Stratejisi Yönetim
Prensibi ile örneklenen bölgesel yolsuzluk ile mücadele Demokratik kurumların istikrarı, öne çıkan yolsuz-
siyasetinin kalkınma ve uygulama konusu çerçevesin- lukla mücadele alanlarında yasalarının kabul edilme-
de hazırlanmıştır. si, küçük çaplı rüşvetçiliğin azalması ve halk arasın-
da yolsuzluğa dair toleransın giderek azalması gibi
SELDI ile yapılmış olan işbirliği sonucunda hazırlanan önemli kazanımlara rağmen, yolsuzlukla mücadele
bu rapor, hem metodolojik olarak hem de süreci ele alışı ve iyi yönetişim reformları hala tam olarak konsolide
açısından yenilikçi bir özellik taşımaktadır. Bu rapor, edilmemiş; seçilmiş siyasetçi ve yargı mensupları ara-
SELDI tarafından 2000li yılların başlarında geliştiril- sında yolsuzluğun arttığı gözlemlenmekte, yolsuzluk-
miş, Güneydoğu Avrupa’nın sosyal ile kurumsal özel- la mücadele yasalarının uygulanması gelişigüzel bir
liklerini göz önüne alarak tasarlanmış ve hem yolsuz- şekilde yapılmaktadır. Düzenli ve hatasız uygulanan
luk hem de yolsuzluk ile mücadeleyi değerlendirme ve yolsuzluğu ve iyi yönetişim alanındaki iyileşme
özelliği olan bir sistemin uygulanması sonucunda ha- oranını ölçebilen araçların kullanılması bölgedeki yol-
zırlanmıştır.1 Bu raporda kullanılan Yolsuzluk Denetleme suzlukla mücadele politikaları ve kurumlarına önemli
Sistemi (YDS) mağduriyet anketi temelli bir yaklaşım katkıda bulunacaktır. Yolsuzlukla mücadele hakkında-
kullanmakta ve bölgede 2001’den bugüne yolsuzluk ile ki Eurobarometer, Birleşmiş Milletler Uyuşturucu ve
mücadele konusunda nasıl bir gelişim olduğuna dair Suç Ofisi’nin GDA (Güneydoğu Avrupa) yolsuzluk ve
önemli, veri temelli bir değerlendirme sunmaktadır. organize suç izleme sistemi ve bu raporda kullanılan
Sonuçları bu raporda paylaşılmış olan 2013-2014 döne- Yolsuzluk Denetleme Sistemi benzeri çalışmalardan
minin değerlendirmesi aynı bölgede aynı konuların faydalanılması elzemdir.
10 yıldan biraz fazla bir süre sonra tekrar ele alınıyor
olması açısından uluslararası izleme çalışmaları arasın-
da ender bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. Değerlendirme,
1
(SELDI, 2002).
Annex 225
Güneydoğu Avrupa’da Yolsuzluğun İstatistiki olarak, resmi görevlilerden kaynaklanan yol-

Yaygınlığı suzluk baskısı yolsuzluğa dâhil olma seviyesini etkile-
yen ana faktördür. Hem dâhil olmanın hem de yolsuz-
Yolsuzluk deneyimi, diğer bir deyişle halkın yolsuzluk baskısının yüksek olduğu ülkeler, yolsuzluk bas-
luk işlemlerine karışmış olması durumu, GDA’da çok kısına karşı olan direncin de en düşük olduğu yerler
yüksektir. Bölgede idari yolsuzluğun en düşük oldu- olarak göze çarpmıştır (kendisinden rüşvet talep edilen
ğu Türkiye ve Hırvatistan’da bile, nüfusun yaklaşık çoğu katılımcı rüşvet vermeyi kabul etmiştir). Her ne
%8-9’u geçen yıl içinde en az bir kere rüşvet verdiği- kadar direnç yolsuzluğun düşürülmesini sağlayacak
ni belirtmiştir. Bu seviyedeki bir yolsuzluk deneyimi, ana faktör olarak nitelendirilemezse de, doğruluk/dü-
Eurobarometer tarafından AB’de yapılan anketlerde rüstlük açısından yaygın sosyal davranışları yansıt-
ortaya çıkan ortalama rakamın oldukça üzerindedir.2 makta ve çoğunlukla sivil toplum ile yetkili kurumla-
Bu veriler, idari yolsuzluğun münferit olaylara indirge- rın yolsuzluk ile mücadele alanında yapmış oldukları
nemeyecek ölçekte kitlesel bir olgu olduğunu göster- farkındalık çalışmalarının bir sonucu olarak karşımıza
mektedir. çıkmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bulunduğu konum itibariy-
le sonuçları değerlendirme ve değişim için toplumsal
Ortak tarihi bir geçmişe sahip olan ülkeler arasındaki baskıya yön verme kapasitesi bulunan sivil toplumun
azımsanamayacak farklılıklar, farklı sosyal, ekonomik rolü önemlidir.
ve kurumsal gelişimlerin değişik sonuçlara sebebiyet
verdiğini göstermektedir. 2013-14 çalışmasından bir
önceki YDS araştırmaları (2001 ve 2002)3 Bulgaristan Yolsuzluk Baskısına Karşı Direnç
dışındaki tüm ülkelerde değişikliklerin genel olarak
SÛǰWFUWFSNFCBTLTBMUOEBLBMBOMBSJÉJOEFO
olumlu yönde olduğunu; yalnız gelişimin yavaş ve dü-

"SOBWVUMVL
zensiz bir rota izlediğini göstermiştir.
.BLFEPOZB
,PTPWB
.POUFOFHSP
Yolsuzluk Baskısı ve Yolsuzluğa Dâhil Olma
4SCJTUBO
(FÉFOTFOFSÛǰWFUUBMFCJ IFEJZF QBSB JMUJNBTFUNF
JMFLBSǰ #VMHBSJTUBO
LBSǰZBLBMNǰWFSÛǰWFUWFSNJǰZBǰÛ[FSJPMBOMBSOZÛ[EFTJ
)SWBUJTUBO
#PTOB)FSTFL
"SOBWVUMVL

5ÛSLJZF

.POUFOFHSP

#BTL4POVDV3ÛǰWFU7FSNJǰ $FWBQ:PL
#VMHBSJTUBO
#BTLZBSBǓNFO3ÛǰWFUWFSNFNJǰ

4SCJTUBO
Kaynak: SELDI/CSD Yolsuzluk Denetimi Sistemi, 2014.

.BLFEPOZB

,PTPWB
Yolsuzlukla Mücadele Politikaları
#PTOB)FSTFL

ve Mevzuatı

)SWBUJTUBO

#BTL 3ÛǰWFU Genel olarak bakıldığında, SELDI ülkeleri uluslarara-
UBMFCFEJMNJǰ
sı yolsuzlukla mücadele standartlarının önemli olan

5ÛSLJZF %BIJM0MNB
bölümlerini, özellikle de bu standartların mantık ve
yaklaşımlarını, ulusal mevzuatlarında yürürlüğe koy-
Kaynak: SELDI/CSD Yolsuzluk Denetimi Sistemi, 2014. muşlardır. Bununla birlikte, yasal uygulamalardaki
kalitenin süregelen bir problem olduğu göze çarp-
maktadır. Yasalarda yapılan sık ve istikrarsız deği-
şiklikler, usul ve yasal açıdan karmaşıklık yaratırken,
2
Eurobarometer anketlerindeki yolsuzluk deneyimine dair
göstergelerin içeriğinin bazı noktalarda farklılıklar göstermesinin mahkemelerin çelişkili yorumlamalarına sebebiyet
sebebi, bu içeriklerin katılımcıların rüşvet içeren durumlara vermiştir.
tanıklık etmesi durumuna göre tanımlanmış olmasından
kaynaklanmaktadır. Daha fazla detay için, lütfen (TNS Opinion
& Social, February 2014) dosyasına başvurunuz. Bölgedeki tüm ülkeler, yolsuzlukla mücadele açısın-
3
2001-2 yıllarında Türkiye bu araştırmalara dahil edilmemişti. dan genel yaklaşımlarını içeren bir tür stratejik dokü-
manı benimsemişlerdir. Her ne kadar ülkeler arasında lukla mücadelenin uygulanabilir olduğu konusunda
bazı farklar olsa da, bu dokümanların hayata geçiril- halkın iyimserliği, düşük yolsuzluk seviyeleri ile doğru
mesi genel olarak yetersiz kaynaklar ve üst düzey hü- orantıdadır. Buna karşın, daha yaygınlaşmış yolsuzluk,
kümet yetkilileri seviyesindeki ilgisizlik dolayısı ile yolsuzlukla mücadele hakkındaki yüksek karamsarlık
aksaklığa uğramıştır. Bölgede karşılaşılan diğer bir ile el ele yürümektedir.
sorun ise, yolsuzluğun tüm boyutları ile mücadele et-
meyi amaçlayan stratejilerin oluşturulması olmuştur.
Öncelikleri belirlemek yerine, bu dokümanlar tümü Kurumsal Uygulamalar ve Yasanın
kapsayıcı bir şekilde hazırlanmış, yolsuzlukla müca- Uygulanması
dele açısından strateji sadece etraflı bir yaklaşım ola-
rak geliştirilmiştir. Güneydoğu Avrupa’da yolsuzlukla mücadelede ko-
nusunda ulusal mevzuatı uluslararası standartlar ile
Siyasa öncelikleri hususunda, yolsuzluk ile mücadele uyumlu hale getirme gerekliliği vurgusu, son zaman-
yaklaşımında iki önemli değişiklik olmuştur: odağın larda yerini AB ve yerel sivil toplumun baskısı ile uy-
küçük çaplı yolsuzluklardan (trafik polisinin ya da ka- gulamanın hayata geçirilmesi konusuna kaymıştır.
muda çalışan doktorların yaptığı) büyük çaplı yolsuz-
luklara (milletvekillerinin ya da bakanların yaptığı) Tüm SELDI ülkelerinde ortak eksiklik, pek çok gözetim
kaymış olması ve devlet görevini kötüye kullanmanın ve kanun uygulayıcı kurumun özerkliklerinden veri-
daha geniş bir yelpazede değerlendirilip suç olarak sa- len taviz olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Milletvekilleri ya da
yılması. Büyük çaplı yolsuzlukların cezalandırılması bakanlar gibi seçilmiş siyasetçilerin bir dereceye kadar
hususunda sınırlı adımlar atılmış, büyük bir etkiye he- kamu hizmetlerine karışmaları tipik bir özellik olduğu
nüz ulaşılamamıştır. Bölgedeki yolsuzlukla mücadele görülmektedir. Ayrıca, hiçbir SELDI ülkesinde sorun-
konusunda karşılaşılan esas zorluk uygulama eksik- suz çalışan kamusal bir şikâyet yönetimi mekanizması
liğini kapatmak; yolsuzluk tezahür ve şekillerinin sü- bulunmamaktadır. Çoğu ülke halk şikâyetlerini topla-
rekli değişmesine ayak uydururken mevzuata ilişkin mak üzere yolsuzlukla mücadele alanında çalışan bir
sürekliliği korumak ve yargı sisteminde sıkça değişik- kurum oluşturmamıştır. Diğer ortak bir noksan ise,
likler yapmaktan kaçınmaktır. devlet kurumlarının performansına, özellikle de yol-
suzlukla mücadeleye dair, güvenilir ve halk tarafından
SELDI izleme çalışmasının bulguları, yolsuzlukla mü- ulaşılabilir verilerin eksikliğidir. Bilgi ve istatistikler ya
cadele politikalarının başarısında kamuoyu desteği- toplanmamakta, ya halka açılmamakta ya da oldukça
nin önemini vurgulamaktadır. Halkın hükümete olan özensiz toplandığından ötürü denetim ve analizi im-
güveni ve etkili siyasa uygulamaları bir nevi verimli kânsız kılmaktadır.
bir döngü halinde birbirini tamamlamaktadır: yolsuz-
Bölgedeki yetkili ulusal yolsuzlukla mücadele kurum-
larının yapısına dair önemli kilit konulardan biri de
Yolsuzlukla mücadele politikalarının etkisi: önleyici ve baskılayıcı işlevlerin nasıl birleştirilece-
Halkın tahmini nedir? ğidir. Baskılayıcı işlevler görevlerinin ufak bir kısmını
oluştursa da, genellikle SELDI ülkelerindeki bu kurum-
ZBǰÛTUÛ
lar her iki işlevi de gerçekleştirmek üzere kurulmuştur.

5ÛSLJZF
Bu kurumların görevleri büyük oranda ulusal yolsuz-
)SWBUJTUBO
lukla mücadele stratejilerinin denetleme ve kontrol iş-
.POUFOFHSP
,PTPWB
leri ile ilgili olup, hükümetlerin yasama gündemlerine
#PTOB)FSTFL
etkileri azdır. Bu kurumların kuruluş ve işleyiş süreç-
4SCJTUBO lerinde, birtakım zorluklardan ötürü sürekli sorunlar
#VMHBSJTUBO yaşanmıştır:
.BLFEPOZB
"SOBWVUMVL • Yolsuzluk her ne kadar hükümetlerin gündemle-
rinde olsa da, var olan güç dengesini değiştirecek
:PMTV[MVLÕOFNMJCJSÕMÉÛEFB[BMUMBNB[ ölçüde güçlü ve yetkili kurumların yaratılması
:PMTV[MVLB[BMUMBCJMJSZBEBUBNBNJZMFBǰMBCJMJS mümkün olmamıştır. Bu husustaki genel yaklaşım,
$FWBQ:PL bu kurumları yürütme organına bağlamak, denet-
Kaynak: SELDI/CSD Yolsuzluk Denetimi Sistemi, 2014. leme yetkileri vermek; fakat bu yetkileri yolsuz-
lukla mücadele görevi taşıyan diğer kamu kurum-
Annex 227
larından rapor almak ile sınırlandırmak şeklinde etik değerlerde de bir artışa yol açmıştır. Bu bağlamda,
olmuştur. bölgede çözülmesi gereken temel sorun bir yandan şef-
• Bu kurumların, diğer gözetim kurumlarına (ulusal faflık ve hesap sorulabilirliği kamu hizmetinin temel
hesap denetim kurumları, kanun uygulayıcı kuru- özelliklerinden biri haline getirirken, diğer yandan da
luşlar) verilmiş olan yetki alanlarını ihlal etmemek profesyonelliği sağlamlaştırmaktır. Çoğu zaman başa-
için dikkatli olmaları gerekmiştir. rısız yönetim, belirsiz kriterler ve eksik görev ve güçler
• Tersi dile getirilen hedeflerin aksine, çoğu kurum ayrılığı, reformun önüne geçmekte ve devlet otoritesini
sınırlı kurumsal kapasite (bütçe ve personel) ile ça- zayıflatmaktadır.
lışmak zorunda bırakılmıştır.
Bölgedeki yasa uygulayıcı kurumların yolsuzlukla
Yasama organı hususunda, bölge ülkelerinin parla- mücadele rolünü değerlendirirken, yolsuzlukla ilgili
mentoları halkın kendilerine duyduğu güven konu- suçlamaların yelpazesinin devamlı genişliyor olma-
sunda üst sıralarda yer almamakta ve bunun geçerli sının, yasa uygulayan kurumlara ve yargıya orantı-
nedenleri olduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Etik davranış sız sayıda dava yönlendirilmesine sebep olduğunu
kuralları nadiren bulunmakta ve uygulanmakta; regü- göz önüne almak gerekir. Bu kurumlar, Güneydoğu
lasyona dair lobicilik faaliyetleri neredeyse hiç yapıl- Avrupa ülkelerinin, özellikle organize suç alanında,
mamakta; dokunulmazlığın sınırlı olarak kaldırılması yolsuzluğa açık olmalarından dolayı daha da büyük
konusu yeni yeni dile getirilmektedir. Parlamentoda bir zorluk yaşamaktadırlar. Çoğu SELDI ülkesindeki
ne zaman yolsuzlukla mücadele konusunda yetkili bir polis güçleri organize suç ile mücadele için uzmanlaş-
komisyon görevlendirilse, bu komisyon milletvekille- mış birimlerden oluşmaktadır; bu birimlerin aynı za-
rinin yapmış olabileceği yolsuzluklar ile ilgilenmekten manda yolsuzluk ile mücadele etmesi de beklenmek-
çok, yürütme organının bir kolunu denetlemek amacı tedir. Bu iki görevin tek bir çatı altında toplanmasının
ile görevini yapmaktadır. SELDI ülkelerindeki önem- sebebi, yolsuzluğun organize suçta kullanılan bir araç
li kaygılardan bir diğeri de siyasi partilerin ve seçim olması kadar yolsuzluğu ortaya çıkaracak karmaşık
kampanyalarının nasıl finanse edildiği meselesidir. araştırma metotlarının organize suçlar ile mücadele
Çoğu ülke GRECO’nun4 partilerin finanse edilmesine birimleri tarafından iyi bilinmesidir. Bununla bera-
yönelik önerilerini kabul etmiş olsa da; isimsiz bağış- ber, bu birimler genellikler polis kuvveti veya içişleri
lar, oyların satın alınması (ya da oy için rüşvet veril- bakanlıklarına bağlı olduklarından, uzmanlaşmış bir
mesi), partinin finansal kayıtlarının kapasite eksikli- yolsuzlukla mücadele kurumunun sahip olması gere-
ğinden dolayı düzgün denetlenememesi ve yaptırım- ken kurumsal bağımsızlıktan yoksundurlar.
ların uygulanmasındaki sorunlar vb. meseleler devam
etmektedir.
Yolsuzlukla Mücadelede Yargı
Kamu hizmetlerinin şu anki durumu, GDA ülkeleri-
nin içinde bulunduğu geçiş dönemine, uygun yasal Güneydoğu Avrupa’da, yargı bağımsızlığını güvence
ve kurumsal geleneklerin eksikliğine ve kronikleşmiş altına almaya atfedilen önem, hesap verme alanın-
finansal kaynak sorunlarına işaret etmektedir. Ülkeler da aynı şekilde güçlü şartlar ile dengelenmemiştir.
arasında birtakım farklılıklar olmasına rağmen, kamu Sorunsuz işleyen bir kuvvetler ayrılığı mekanizması
hizmetlerinde idari ve organizasyonla alakalı kalkın- olmadığından, kendi kendini yöneten yargı sistemi
maya olan ihtiyaç çoğu ülkede ortaya çıkmaktadır. İda- kontrolden çıkmış ve yolsuzluk riskleri ile dolu kor-
ri yönetimi motive ederek sağlamak yerine kültüre yer- poratist bir sisteme dönüşmüştür. Resmi seçimlerin
leşmiş olan “kontrol” yaklaşımı kullanıldığından, hem bağımsızlığına yapılan aşırı vurgu, maalesef çözümü
profesyonelliğin güçlenmesi hem de yolsuzluğun azal- problemin bir parçası haline getirmiştir. Bu durum,
ması başarılamamaktadır. Raporun ana bulgularından yürütme erkini dengeleyecek bir yapı olarak çalış-
bir tanesi, yetkinlik ve manevi sağlamlığın birbirini mak yerine, yargı mensupları ve özel çıkarlar arasın-
karşılıklı olarak kuvvetlendirdiğine işaret etmekte- da müşteri mantığına dayanan bir sistemin yerleşme-
dir. Genel olarak, ne zaman herhangi bir devlet kuru- sine sebebiyet vermiştir. Günümüzde GDA’daki yargı
munun yolsuzluk sicili sorgulansa, aynı zamanda ku- organı, diğer güç erkleri kadar etki altında kalmaya
rumsal kapasitesi de mercek altına alınmaktadır. Diğer açıktır. Kendisini kamu sorgulamasından ve bunla-
yandan, profesyonellikteki her türlü gelişme, kurumsal rı mümkün kılan politik ayarlamaları muaf tutabil-
diği noktada, rant peşinde olan yargı mensuplarını
4
GRECO – Group of States against Corruption (Yolsuzluğa karşı denetleyecek çok az mekanizmanın varlığından söz
Ülkeler Birliği). edilebilir.
Tahmin edileceği gibi, halk da yargı sistemine saygı yapanlar bazı engellerle hala karşılaşmakta ve iş yap-
duymamaktadır. SELDI’nin Yolsuzluk Denetleme Sistemi, manın yüksek maliyeti devam etmektedir. Ancak,
yargı mensuplarının bölgede en çok yolsuzluk yapan gözetim ve uyum mekanizmaları düzgün risk ve ma-
kamu görevlileri olduğunun düşünüldüğünü ortaya liyet-kazanç değerlendirmesi yapmadan kontrol ve
koymuştur. Şeffaflık ve hesap verebilirlik eksikliğinin, ceza alanlarına odaklandıklarından, hala piyasalara
bu sonucu etkileyen önemli bir faktör olduğu düşü- olumsuz bir etki yapmaktadırlar. Bu durumla özellik-
nülmektedir. Tüm SELDI ülkelerinde, 2001 yılından bu le iş dünyasına karşı kullanılabilecek önemli bir baskı
yana yargı mensupları arasında yolsuzluğun yaygın- aracı olarak görülen gümrük idaresi alanında sıklıkla
lığının değerlendirilmesinde somut bir kötüleşme karşılaşılmaktadır. Bu husus girişimcileri ya resmi ol-
olduğu ortadadır. mayan sektörlere; ya da onları rüşvet vermeye itmek-
tedir. Bunun sonucunda da daha sıkı bir regülasyon
Bölgedeki yargı organının yolsuzlukla mücadele mev- rejiminin ve daha fazla idari engelin koyulması meş-
zuatını uygulama konusundaki yetkisi, özellikle de si- rulaştırılmaktadır.
yasi alandaki yolsuzluklar ile ilgilenmesi, etkileri ekle-
nerek artan birtakım sorunlar ile karşılaşmıştır: İş dünyası ve kamu görevlileri arasındaki etkileşim
çok çeşitli platformlarda gerçekleştiğinden dolayı,
• Özellikle yargının bağımsızlığı ve hesap verebilirli- yolsuzlukla mücadele stratejilerinin bu alanlar yakla-
ği arasındaki dengeyi sağlamaya yönelik anayasal şımında pek çok faktörü dikkate alarak hareket etme-
meseleler; si gerekmekte, bu da stratejilerin önemli zorluklarla
• Yolsuzluk suçu işleyen kişilerin, özellikle de siya- karşılaşmasına sebep olmaktadır. İş alanı tarafından
setçilerin, yargılanması sürecinin karmaşıklığı ve başlatılması durumunda, kanunsuz işler iki ana ka-
zorluğu; tegoride incelenebilmektedir – ekstra maliyetlerden
• Profesyonelliğin seviyesinin düşük olması, fazla iş kaçınmak ve haksız yere avantaj sağlamak. Birinci
yükü ve bunların beraberinde getirdiği iş birikimi kategoride yetersiz veya gereğinden fazla regülasyo-
ve yönetimi ile başa çıkma konusunda yeterli kapa- nun geri tepmesi, kişisel ya da kurumsal yetersizlik;
sitenin bulunmaması. ikincisinde ise vergi kaçırma, kaçakçılık, güvenlik ve
sağlık standartlarına uymama vb. dolandırıcılık faali-
Bu SELDI araştırmasının yargının rolüne dair ortaya yetleri bulunmaktadır.
çıkardığı diğer bir önemli bulgu ise, halkın veya siyasa
yapıcıların yargı erkinin yolsuzlukla mücadele mevzu- Güneydoğu Avrupa’da kamu ihaleleri, yolsuzluğun
atının hayata geçirilmesindeki etiğini ve verimliliğini ekonomiyi etkilediği temel kanallardan biridir. Bu
değerlendirmeleri için başvurabilecekleri bir geribildi- alandaki yolsuzluk riskleri, birtakım eksiklikler ile
rim mekanizmasının bulunmuyor olmasıdır. Hiçbir ilişkilendirilmektedir: şeffaf prosedürlerin yetersizliği,
GDA ülkesinde mahkemelerin çalışmalarına dair ista- rekabetçi olmayan prosedürlerin yaygınlığı, zayıf göze-
tistiklerin toplanma, değerlendirilme ve halka açık hale tim ve etkisiz yargı teftişi vb. Her ne kadar 2001-2002
getirilmesini sağlayan güvenilir, sistematik ve kapsam- dönemi SELDI araştırması bölgede yakın zamanda ya-
lı bir mekanizma bulunmamaktadır. sal çerçeveyi güçlendirmek ve AB mevzuatı ile uyum-
lu hale getirmek için adımlar atıldığını göstermiş olsa
da, kamu ihaleleri meselesi kamu idaresi alanındaki
Yolsuzluk ve Ekonomi en zayıf noktalardan biri olmaya devam etmektedir.
Kanunlar iyi tasarlanmış olsa da, siyasetçilerin ve iliş-
Güneydoğu Avrupa’daki ülkelerde hükümetlerin eko- kili iş sahiplerinin bu kanunların etrafından dolaşıyor
nomik alana dikkat çekici bir ölçüde dâhil olmaları, olabilmesi gerçeği değiştirmemiştir. Kurumsal dağı-
kamu kurumları ve iş dünyası arasında oluşabilecek nıklık, kamu ihaleleri kurallarının etkili bir şekilde uy-
birtakım potansiyel çatışmaları da beraberinde getir- gulanmasına izin vermemektedir.
mektedir; bununla beraber, yolsuzluk riski de ortaya
çıkmaktadır. Bu risk özellikle enerji ve sağlık sektörü
gibi ağır sanayi kollarının özelleştirme, kamu iha- Yolsuzlukla Mücadelede Sivil
leleri ve imtiyazları alanlarında oldukça yüksektir. Toplumun Rolü
İlaveten, bölgedeki bazı ülkeler iş girişimlerini engel-
leyen zorlukları aşmada önemli adımlar atmış olsa da Güneydoğu Avrupa’daki sivil toplum örgütleri, yolsuz-
özellikle kayıt, lisans ve izin rejimlerindeki yüksek lukla mücadele konusunda en önemli itici güçlerden
seviyedeki regülasyon sebebiyle, piyasaya yeni giriş birisidir. Yine de, halkın taleplerini etkili bir biçimde
Annex 229
siyasa yapım sürecine aktarmakta ve yolsuzluğa karşı dığında, uluslararası ilişkilerin ve taahhütlerin yerel
durmakta tam anlamı ile başarılı olmaları için önlerin- siyasetçilerin normalde gündemlerine almayacakları
de uzun bir yol vardır. Katkıları, hem gözlemci olarak reformları gerçekleştirmeyi mümkün kıldığı görül-
hem de hükümeti yolsuzluk alanında reform yap- mektedir. Avrupa Komisyonu tarafından hazırlanan
maya itebilme açısından kapasitelerine bağlıdır. Bölge ilerleme raporları, AB finansmanı ve eşleştirme (twin-
ülkelerindeki hükümetlerin hala sivil toplumu resmi ning) projeleri çoğu GDA ülkesinin yolsuzlukla mü-
mekanizmalara angaje etmekte eksik kaldığı; STK’ların cadele gündemini etkileyen uluslararası faktörlerdir.
yolsuzlukla mücadele konusundaki önem ve potansi- Yolsuzlukla mücadele meselesi Avrupa Komisyonu
yelini kavramakta zorluk çektiği gözlemlenmektedir. ilerleme raporlarının en temel maddelerinden biri ol-
Avrupa fonları dâhil olmak üzere uluslararası finans- duğu halde, bu raporlar yerelde farklı şekillerde algı-
mana olan aşırı bağımlılık ve GDA’da sivil toplumu lanmıştır. AB’ye katılım beklentisi yüksek olan ülkeler
canlandıracak ulusal politikaların bulunmuyor olması raporların bulgularına daha büyük bir dikkatle yakla-
yerel ölçekte önemli işler yapabilecek bu kurumların şırken, örneğin Türkiye’de raporlar genellikle daha az
başarılarına gölge düşürmektedir. dikkat çekmiştir.
Her ne kadar SELDI bölgesindeki STK’lar uluslarara- Uluslararası ilişkiler, bir yandan da gerçekçilikten
sı düzeyde bir kamu-özel sektör ortaklığı inşa etmeyi uzak, yüzeysel ve geçici tedbirlere yol açacak kestir-
başarmış olsa da, bu girişimler ulusal kamu kurumları me çözümlere dair beklentilerin oluşmasına sebep
ile etkili bir ortaklığa dönüştürülememiştir. Başarılı or- olmuştur. Koşulluluk kuralları ve sunulan teşvikler
taklıklar kurmak, devlet kurumları ile hem bütünleyici öncelikle yürütme organı kurumlarını etkilerken;
hem de sorgulayıcı birtakım ilişkileri hayata geçirmek yargı, parlamento ve diğer ilgili kamu ile özel sektör
ile gerçekleştirilebilir. Örneğin, işbirliği ve gözlemleme kuruluşları süreçlere yeterince dâhil edilmemiştir.
işlevlerinin bir arada yürütülebilmesi, STK’ların yol- Uluslararası bağlılığın sürdürülebilirliği; sivil toplum,
suzluk ve yolsuzluk ile mücadele politikalarının denet- medya, meslek kuruluşları, sendikalar vb. pek çok ye-
lenmesindeki profesyonelliğinin artması için izlenen rel paydaş kurumu süreçlere dâhil etmek ile destek-
yollardan biri olmuştur. lenmiştir. Yerel muhatapların ve uluslararası ortak-
ların genişletilmesi, ana akım siyasetten soyutlanmış
SELDI ülkelerindeki STK’ların iyi yönetişim alanında reformist siyasetçilerin, siyasi grupların ve çeşitli si-
ne derece etkili olacağı, büyük oranda kendi kurumsal vil toplum aktörlerinin de güçlenmesine yol açmıştır.
yönetimlerinin de düzenli olmasına bağlıdır. STK’ların Bu bağlantıların güçlendirilerek devam ettirilmesi,
belli çıkarlara, yolsuzluğa karışmış kamu görevlileri ya AB’nin bölgedeki gücünü sağlamlaştırması açısından
da siyasetçilerin amaçlarına alet edilmesi riski, bölge- oldukça önemlidir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, sadece
deki kar amacı gütmeyen sektörün bazı yönlerden is- hükümetler ile Brüksel arasında kurulan bağlantılar
tismara açık olmasından ileri gelmektedir: yeterli olmayacaktır. Reformist siyasetçilerin ve ulus-
lararası ortaklarla angajmanı sivil toplumun katılımı
• Şeffaflığı sağlayacak zorunlu prosedürlerin eksikliği; ve katkısı ile desteklenmeli ve üçlü bir işbirliği hayata
• Finansal düzenlemelere uygunluğun etkili bir bi- geçirilmelidir.
çimde kontrol edilmemesi;
• Hesap denetimi kültürünün oturmamış olması;
• Öz denetim ve koordinasyon girişimlerinin düşük
seviyede olması. KİLİT ÖNERİLER
Sivil toplumun suiistimal edilmesi ile mücadele,
Güneydoğu Avrupa’da yolsuzlukla mücadele günde- Güneydoğu Avrupa’daki bölgesel yolsuzluk sorunu-
minin en üst sırasında ele alınmalıdır. nun çözümünde hem yerel hem de uluslararası organ-
ların çabasına olan ihtiyaç SELDI ülkelerinin 2001’den
beri yolsuzlukla mücadele alanındaki deneyimleri ile
Uluslararası İşbirliği görülmektedir. Bu rapor, yolsuzluğu aşma konusun-
da daha çok yol kaydetmek için neler yapılabileceğine
Uluslararası kurumlar ve işbirliği yapılan yabancı ül- dair önerilerde bulunmaktadır. Bu öneriler arasından
keler, Güneydoğu Avrupa’da yolsuzlukla mücadele bölgedeki ve Avrupa’da özellikle üç alana öncelik ve-
alanında atılan adımlarda önemli bir rol oynamışlar- rilmesi, orta vadede başarı sağlanması bakımından
dır. Ulusal siyasetteki aşırı taraftarlık göz önüne alın- önemlidir:
Yolsuzluğa bulaşmış üst düzey siyasetçilerin ve de hesap verilebilirliğini artırır; c) uluslararası destek
kamu görevlilerinin seri ve etkili bir şekilde yar- ve yardımlar sivil toplum örgütlerinin gözlem, analitik
gılanması yolsuzluğa tolerans gösterilmeyeceğine çözümleme ve savunuculuk yetilerini kullanarak daha
dair güçlü ve net bir mesaj vermenin tek yoludur. Adı etkili bir şekilde yardım sağlayabilir; d) uluslararası
yolsuzluğa ve dolandırıcılığa karışmış politikacıların destek kuruluşlarının sivil toplum örgütleriyle direk
yargılandığını görmek Hırvatistan ve Slovakya’da kontak halinde olması, sivil toplumun yolsuz ve reform
yolsuzlukla mücadele alanında verimli sonuçlar ver- edilmemiş kamu idaresinin kayırmacı networkleri et-
miştir. Bu yönde başarı elde edilebilmesi için Avrupa kisi altına girmelerini önler.
Birliği üye ülkeleri başta olmak üzere uluslararası des-
teğe ihtiyaç vardır.
Bağımsız bir yolsuzluk ve yolsuzlukla mücadele ÖZEL ÖNERİLER

gözlem mekanizmasının hem bölgesel hem de ulusal
düzeyde oluşturulması bu konuda güçlü bir veri taba-
nının sağlanmasına ve dolayısıyla analiz kapasitesi- Siyasa ve Yasal Çerçeve
nin artmasına yarayacaktır. Böylece, yolsuzlukla ilgili
doğru teşhislerin konulması ve yolsuzlukla mücadele • Tedbirler ve yasal düzenlemeleri öne çıkarmaktan
alanında politika değerlendirmesinin yapılması bir çatı ziyade, ulusal yolsuzlukla mücadelede ölçülebilir
altında birleştirilebilir. Bu mekanizma devlet desteği ve hedefler ve dönüm noktaları belirlenmelidir. Bu hu-
bağışı almamalı ve tamamıyla bölgesel ve ulusal sivil sus, belirli hedefler seçerek bunlara uygun müdaha-
toplum örgütleri ve ağlar tarafından yönetilmelidir. le metotları seçmeyi gerektirir. Bu hedefler olabildi-
Aynı zamanda idari veri oluşturmak için bir araç ola- ğince niceliksel olarak ölçülebilmelidir.
rak da kullanılabilecek bu mekanizmadaki veri tabanı • Bütüne yönelik tedbirler yerine belirli sektörlere ön-
tamamen halka açık olmalıdır. Kamu hizmeti imtiyaz- celik verilerek, yolsuzluk çeşitleri, müdahale yön-
larının, devlet ihalelerinin, devlet yardımlarının, bütçe temleri ve çeşitli yaklaşımlar birbirinden ayrıştırıl-
transferlerinin, çıkar çatışmasıyla ilgili yasa tasarıla- malıdır. Yolsuzluk kapsamı geniş bir kavram olup
rının ve yıllık performans raporlarının vb. veri taba- aynı yaklaşımla ele alınması mümkün olmayan çe-
nında halka açık bir şekilde bulunması daha kapsamlı şitli dolandırıcılık ve sahtekârlık eylemlerini kapsar.
analizlerin ve gözlem olanaklarının ortaya çıkmasına • Politikalar bilgiye dayalı olmalıdır. Ulusal yolsuz-
yol açacaktır. lukla mücadele stratejileri çerçevesinde yolsuzluk-
la ilgili verilere ulaşılmaya çalışılmışsa da hiçbir
Enerji sektörü gibi yüksek yolsuzluk ve devlet suiis- SELDI ülkesinin yolsuzlukla mücadele politikaları-
timali riski taşıyan kritik sektörler öncelikle ele alın- nı ölçüp değerlendirebilecek sürdürülebilir bir me-
malıdır. Öncelik verilmesi gereken diğer tedbirler: kanizması yoktur. Sürdürülebilir bir mekanizma en
azında: a) yolsuzlukla mücadele alanındaki (soruş-
• Kamu ihalelerinde rekabeti artırmak; turmalar, davalar, idari tedbirler) çalışmaların gü-
• Devlete ait yatırımlarda kurumsal yönetimi geliş- venilir ve düzenli istatistiki verileri; b) çeşitli kamu
tirmek; alanlarında yolsuzluğun yayılışının ve çeşitlerinin
• Büyük çaplı yatırım projelerin idaresini şeffaflaş- düzenli gözlem ve analizini gerektirir. Bu gözetim
tırmak; mekanizmaları devletten bağımsız olmalı ve sivil
• Enerji sektörü düzenleyici kurumlarının hesap ve- toplum örgütlerini kapsamalıdır. Bunun yanı sıra,
rebilirlik ve bağımsızlığını arttırmaktır. SELDI’nin YDS’si gibi idari amaçlar gütmeyen yol-
suzluk gözlem sistemlerinden de yararlanılmalıdır.
Başta Avrupa Komisyonu olmak üzere bütün ulus-
lararası ortaklar bölgedeki sivil toplum örgütleriyle Yolsuzlukla Mücadele Kurumları ve Yasaların
doğrudan iletişim içinde olmalıdır. Bu birkaç neden- Uygulanması
den dolayı esastır: a) uluslararası destek sonucu mey-
dana gelen reformların sürdürülebilirliği için halkın • Yolsuzlukla mücadele alanındaki yasal uygulamalar
çoğunluğu tarafından kabul görmesini sağlamak açı- için geri bildirim mekanizmaları oluşturulmalıdır.
sından sivil toplum örgütleri büyük önem taşır; b) sivil Bu mekanizmalar Trento Üniversitesi ve Demok-
toplum örgütlerinin dâhil olması devlet birimlerinin rasi Çalışmaları Merkezi’nin geliştirdiği Yolsuzlukla
hesap verilebilirliğini garantilediği gibi uluslararası or- Mücadele Entegre Uygulamaları İzleme Araçları (Integ-
ganizasyonların öncelik veremediği seçim bölgelerinin rated Anticorruption Enforcement Monitoring Toolkit)
Annex 231
gibi son yıllarda erişimi daha kolay yenilikçi araçlar kelerde oy kullanma gücünü artıracak reformların
düzeyinde olmalıdır. Bu mekanizmalar siyasa yapı- hayata geçirilmesi gerekir. Diğer ülkelerde ise, ‘’bir
cıların bir devlet dairesinde yolsuzluk riskini daha yargıç/hakim-bir oy’’ prensibi uygulanmalıdır.
kolay değerlendirebilmesini sağlamasının yanında • Yargı kotası seçimlerinde olabilecek en yüksek tem-
bu devlet dairesine tekabül eden yolsuzlukla müca- siliyet sağlanmalı, asliye mahkeme hâkimlerin dâhil
dele alanındaki yasal düzenlemelerin de ne kadar edilmesine özen gösterilmelidir. Dikkatli inceleme-
etkili olduğu ölçülebilir. Böylece en çok etki göste- lerle, mahkeme başkanının mevkii ile kendi kendini
ren çözümlerin neler olduğu belirlenir. yöneten yargı birimlerine üyeliğinin uyuşup uyuş-
• Bu konuyla ilgilenen devlet birimlerinin kurumsal madığı kontrol edilmelidir.
kapasiteleri – ulusal denetim kurumları, yolsuzluk- • Adli kovuşturma ve mahkemelerin aynı organa
la mücadele ve gözetim birimleri vb. – personeli, bağlı olduğu ülkelerde, bu kurum iki alt birime ay-
olanakları ve bütçeleri yüksek seviyelerde tutulma- rılmalıdır: hâkimler ve savcılar. Savcılar ve hâkim-
lıdır. Alternatif olarak ise, daha sınırlı yıllık ve yarı- ler, sırasıyla, bu alt kurumlara seçilmelidirler.
yıllık programlar hazırlayarak, öncelikli müdahale • Başta disiplin yönetmenliği kararları alanında olmak
alanları kapsamında çalışabilirler. üzere, devlet bakanlarının (tipik olarak adalet baka-
• Ulusal denetim kurumları, baskı gücünü arttırma- nının) özerk yargı kurumlarındaki rolleri tamamıyla
lı özellikle daha yüklü yaptırımlar uygulayabilme kaldırılmalı veya minimuma indirilmelidir.
yetisine sahip olmalıdır. Hem milletvekillerinin • Mal varlığı beyanlarının soruşturulduğu mekaniz-
hem de denetlenen kurumların bu birimin hazırla- malarda yargıçlara öncelik verilmelidir.
dığı raporları okumaları zorunlu hale getirilmelidir. • Adli soruşturmalarda müfettişlerin bağımsızlığı ve
Ulusal yetkililer tarafından idare edilen Avrupa tarafsızlığı sağlanarak soruşturmaları rahatça yü-
Birliği hibelerinin kullanılmasını ve yönetimini de rütmeleri için uygun ortam yaratılmalıdır.
bu resmi denetim kurumları denetlemelidir. Perfor- • Yolsuzlukla mücadele uygulamaları için yargıçlar-
mans denetleme işlevi henüz daha gelişmemiş oldu- dan da destek alarak geribildirim mekanizmaları
ğundan, bu alandaki kapasiteleri geliştirilmelidir. oluşturulmalıdır. Bu mekanizmalar SELDI ülkele-
• Kamu görevlilerinin işe alımlarında siyasi görüşle- rinde ya kısıtlıdır ya da hiç yoktur. Bu boşluk yol-
rinin ve bağlantılarının etkisini ortadan kaldırmak suzluğun baskı yönünü sabote etmekte ve yolsuz-
için yeni tedbirler alınmalıdır. luk ithamlarının işlevselliğini kısıtlamaktadır. Hala
• Yolsuzlukla mücadele çalışmalarında devletin bi- yazım ve geliştirilme aşamasında olsa da örnek
rimleri arasında eşit görev dağılımı yapılmalıdır. alınabilecek en iyi uygulama yerel bir sivil toplum
Yasal suçlamaların çeşitliliğinin genişlemesi yolsuz- örgütü tarafından hazırlana Kosova’nın Yolsuzlukla
lukla mücadele alanında bütün kamu organlarının Mücadele İstatistikleri Platformu’dur. Böyle bir me-
kapasitelerinin de geliştirmesi ile dengelenmelidir. kanizma idari, disiplin, yargısal, hukuksal soruş-
Sorumluluğu polis veya yargıya atmak yerine kamu turmalar ve yolsuzluk suçlarının cezaları hakkında
kuruluşlarına kendi birimlerindeki yolsuzlukla başa düzenli ve güncel bilgilere sahip olmalıdır.
çıkmaları için idari yetki verilmelidir. Kamu idari
organları genel anlamda, yönetsel kapasitelerinin Yolsuzluk ve Ekonomi
yettiği kadar, yolsuzluk davası ile uğraşarak ceza
adalet sisteminin bekçileri olarak görev almalıdır. • Yolsuzluk riski taşıyan devlet yardım politikaları
Bu da en azından etkili çalışan bir şikâyet yönetimi yıllık olarak denetlenmeli ve bu risk minimum se-
mekanizmasını gerektirmektedir. viyeye indirilmelidir. Bunun için, Avrupa Birliği’nin
• Yolsuzluk olaylarında kanuni olmayan yollardan devlet yardımı alanındaki sıkı politika uygulamala-
edilen malların geri iadesi yolsuzlukla mücadele rı benimsenmeli ve bağımsız ulusal devlet yardımı
ajandasının bir parçası olarak geliştirilmeli ve ge- düzenleyici kurumlarının kapasitesi artırılarak, bu
nişletilmelidir. Yolsuzluğa bulaşmış kamu idari bi- kurumlara yaptırım gücü verilmelidir.
rimlerinin durumunda sanığın haklarını ve kamu • Anti-tekel yasal uygulamalar geliştirilmeli ve reka-
yararları ve çıkarlarını dengelemeye özen gösteril- bet ortamı sağlanmalıdır. Tekelciliğin baskın olduğu
melidir. Mal ve mülke haciz gelmesini şart koşan ve ruhsatlanma alanında sıkça kısıtlamalarla karşı-
cezai hükümler caydırıcılık özelliği taşımasına rağ- laşılan sektörlere yoğunlaşarak ve özel uygulama-
men Güneydoğu Avrupa ülkeleri tarafından kanunlar getirilerek büyük şirketler ile siyaset arasındaki
laştırılmamıştır. muhtemel danışıklı işin önüne geçilmelidir.
• Kendi kendini yöneten yargı birimlerinin çoğunlu- • Henüz yapmamış olan ülkelerde, finansal riskleri
ğunun yargı mensupları arasından seçilmediği ül- azaltmak ve kamu maliyesi yönetimine olan güveni
sağlamak amacıyla, başta kamu şirketlerinde olmak lum örgütlerine sağladıkları kamu fonları ile ilgili
üzere tüm kamu malvarlığında varlık ve borçların kural ve uygulamalar şeffaf ve açık bir hale getiril-
yönetimi için kurumsal mekanizmalar kurulmalı- melidir. Sadece kamu menfaatleri için hizmet veren
dır. Devletin teşekkülleri sıkı kurumsal yönetişim STK’ların kamu fonu almasına izin verilmeli ve bu
ve raporlama şartlarını yerine getirmeli (ör. OECD kuruluşlar daha sıkı raporlama ve bilgi verme şart-
kuralları) ve sermaye piyasalarına açık şirketler ile larına tabi tutulmalıdır.
bir tutulmalıdırlar. Bu kurumlar internet sitelerinde • Avrupa Birliği ve diğer bağışçı kurumlar bağışları-
üç ayda bir değerlendirme raporları yayımlamalı- nın daha büyük bir kısmını sivil toplum ve kamu
dırlar. kuruluşları arasında işbirliği kurmayı hedefleyen
• İşveren resmi yetkililerin kamu alımları ile ilgili ra- iyi yönetişim programları projelerine yönlendirme-
porlamaları ihmal etmeleri, sürekliliği sağlayama- lidir. Bu programların sivil toplum kuruluşlarının
maları, yolsuzlukla mücadele düzenlemelerini uy- çeşitli çıkar grupları tarafından suiistimal edilme-
gulamamaları ve yanlış veya eksik veri sunmaları sini önleyecek koşulları olmalıdır. Bu programların
durumunda yaptırımlar uygulanmalıdır. etki gücünün yüksek olabilmesi için uzun-dönem
• Özel sektör kamu ortaklıklarının yönetimi ve kon- (10 sene ve üstü) ve sürdürülebilir olmaları gerekti-
trolü için yasal ve kurumsal bir çerçeve tanımlan- ği özellikle belirtilmelidir.
malıdır. • Sivil toplum örgütlerinin şeffaflık ve hesap verebi-
• Geniş kapsamlı kamu alımı yapan kurumların (dev- lirliği daha çok benimsemeleri gerekmektedir. Bu,
let teşekkülleri ve gaz, su, elektrik şirketlerinin) te- düzenli bir şekilde hesaplarının incelenmesi, mali
darik işlemlerinin verimlilik şartlarını karşılaması durum tablolarının açıklanması, şeffaf kurumsal
ve usulsüzlükler yaşanmaması amacıyla denetimler yönetişim prosedürleri ve kişisel çıkarların önlen-
güçlendirilmelidir. mesi için alınan tedbirler ile sağlanmalıdır.
• Kamu alımlarını sadece belli bir kanala mahkum • Avrupa Birliği üyesi olmayan Güneydoğu Avru-
kılan düzenlemeler gözden geçirilmeli, rekabet or- pa ülkeleri AB Yolsuzlukla Mücadele Raporu’nda
tamı sağlanmalıdır. Aranabilir veri tabanı formatın- sunulan bilgi ve uzmanlıktan yararlanmalıdır. Bu
da kontratlar, ihaleler, ilanlar, ön-ilanlar, belgeler ve rapor, ülkelere yolsuzluğun yaygınlığının değerlen-
raporlar internette erişime açılmalıdır. dirilmesi ve yolsuzlukla mücadele politikalarının
• Avrupa Birliği aday ülkeleri, AB’den alınan hibeler şekillendirilmesi açısından yol gösterici olacaktır.
ve mali yardımların uygulamasında merkezî olma-
yan bir yürütme sistemine sahip olmalıdır. Bu sis- Uluslararası İşbirliği
tem alınan hibelerin ve mali yardımların dağıtımını
ve görev dağılımı uygun bir hukuki ve idari sistem • Yabancı destek programları, uluslararası ve bağım-
tabanına oturtmalıdır. Gözetmenler bağımsız ve sız yerel değerlendirmeleri daha iyi yansıtacak şe-
merkezi bir uygulama biriminde faaliyet gösterme- kilde düzenlenmelidir. Bunu gerçekleştirmek için,
lidirler. destek programları daha duyarlı ve esnek olmalı,
• Kamu alımlarının değerlendirilmesinde kalite anla- dizayn ve sonuçlar arasında geçen süreler kısaltıl-
yışı yürürlüğe sokulmalıdır. malıdır.
• Yolsuzlukla mücadele alanında ulusal hükümetlere
Sivil Toplum sunulan uluslararası destek programları sivil toplu-
mun daha güçlü bir rol oynamasını öngörmelidir.
• Sivil toplum örgütlerinin kapasitesini artırarak yol- STK’ların uygulama ortağı olarak süreçlere katılma-
suzluk denetleme ve devlet dairelerindeki yolsuz- sı, gözlemci ve kaynak sağlayan kurumlar olarak bu
lukla mücadele operasyonları hakkında ilk elden süreçlerde yer alması, özellikle destek programları-
bilgi toplama ve raporlama kabiliyetleri geliştirilme- nın etkisini değerlendirmek adına önemlidir.
lidir. Bunun yanı sıra, yolsuzluğun yayılması ile il- • Desteklerin etkisi, etki değerlendirme metotların-
gili araştırmalar yaparak bunun hakkında önlemler dan faydalanılarak periyodik olarak değerlendi-
alabilme, kurumsal değerlendirme ve rapor hazırla- rilmelidir. Kalite ölçümlerinin sağlanmasının yanı
ma kapasitelerinin artırılması önem taşımaktadır. sıra – özellikle kamu finansmanının kullanıldığı
• Çıkar çatışmalarını kapsayan yasal düzenlemeler durumlarda – başarılı olan programların devamı
başta devletin idari programları, Avrupa Birliği ve sağlanacak; başarısız olan programlar ise sonlandı-
devlet bütçesinden yardım alan kar amacı gütme- rılabilecektir. Bu değerlendirmenin bağımsız olma-
yen kurumları da kapsamalıdır. sı ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının deneyimlerinden
• Hem yerel hem ulusal devlet dairelerinin sivil top- faydalanması mecburidir.
Annex 233
• Destekler, ortak sorunlar ile ilgili ülkeler arası prog- • Avrupa Komisyonu’nun düzenli raporlarının bulgu-
ramları teşvik etmelidir (mesela sınırlar arası suç- larının yerel politika yapımı ile daha iç içe geçmesi
lar). Bulgaristan’ın kamu ve özel sektör işbirliği ile amacı için raporların hazırlık aşaması dahil yerel
hazırladığı organize suç ve yolsuzluk arasındaki sivil toplum ve iş dünyasından daha çok yararlanıl-
bağları inceleyen analizinden bölgedeki tüm ülkeler malıdır.
faydalanmalıdır.
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Anti-Corruption

Assessment of Southeast Europe

SELDI coalition founding members and contributors to this publication are:

Editors: Dr. Ognian Shentov, Ruslan Stefanov, Boyko Todorov

2014, Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI)

Center for the Study of Democracy

1. Corruption Levels in Southeast Europe......................................................29

2. Anticorruption Policies and Regulatory Environment............................39

3. Institutional Practice and Enforcement of the Law..................................55

4. The Judiciary in Anticorruption...................................................................75

5. Corruption and the Economy........................................................................91

6. Civil Society in Anticorruption.................................................................. 113

Methodological appendix: corruption monitoring system.......................135

Annex: Executive Summary in SELDI National Languages.......................147

Figure 1. Common corruption-related vulnerabilities

Figure 37. Performance index of selected Croatian municipalities................68

Figure 65. Businessmen considered most corrupt in Turkey..........................96

Figure 93. Share of anticorruption funding

Table 1. Number of convicted for crimes against justice in Albania..........83

Box 1. A model for monitoring anticorruption reforms............................41

Being the result of collaboration within SELDI, this report is innovative in

The assessment of the national institutional and legal aspects making

ety and authorities in increasing anticorruption aware-

The findings of SELDI monitor­ing emphasise the significance of public

A shortcoming that is common to all SELDI countries is the compromised

One of the key issues related to the design of specialised national

• High as corruption might have been on the governments’ agendas, it was

The anticorruption role of law enforcement agencies in the region needs to

The capacity of the judiciary in the region to enforce anticorruption legislation,

• Constitutional issues, primarily related to restoring the balance between

An important finding of this SELDI round of corruption monitoring that

anticorruption laws. In none of the SEE countries is there a reliable, systematic

Corruption and In Southeast Europe, the outstanding considerable involvement of govern­

The variety of circumstances that occasion corruption in the interactions of

In Southeast Europe, government procurement is one of the main channels

there is a lack of formal mechanisms for engaging civil society by national

partnerships, these were not transformed into effective

• absence of mandatory procedures for transparency;

Countering civil society capture as part of national anticorruption efforts in

International International institutions and foreign partner countries have played an

International involvement, however, also brought with itself the risk of

The experience of SELDI countries in tackling corruption since 2001

tolerated. Bringing crooked politicians to justice has

Critical sectors with high corruption and state-capture risks, such as

• increasing competition in public procurement;

International partners, and primarily the European Commission, should

Policies and legislation

• Define national anticorruption efforts in terms of policy related to

Anticorruption institutions and enforcement of the law

• Introduce a feedback mechanism for the enforcement of anticorruption

be separated within this body. Prosecutors and judges, respectively, would

Corruption and the economy

• EU candidate countries that do not have one should establish decentralised

• Enhance the capacity of civil society organisations to monitor and report

• Foreign assistance programmes need to better reflect the findings of

• The effectiveness of assistance needs to be periodically evaluated through

Today corruption is frequently referred to as a “global concern”; less frequently

“Reform” has become an overused term, which is partly due to failure to

In this context, policies hoping to upset entrenched special interests cannot be

The findings of SELDI monitoring emphasise the significance of public

Corruption and In Southeast Europe, the outstanding considerable involvement of govern

is done according to corruption pressure. The value of #PTOJBBOE

think that corruption is acceptable, more of the citizens

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have been a considerable number of cases when there $PSSVQUJPOQSFTTVSF

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