ADMINSTRATIVE LAW CASES 2018

1 Ram Jawaya Kapoor

Whether FRs of the petitioner was violated or infringed and what is the extent of executive power?
1. SC held that the action of the Govt. Did not amount to violation of the Art. 19(1)(c). and 19(1) (g)
2. Separation of powers under art. 77 / 162
3. Motilal vs. State of UP
4. Executive power connotes the residue of Govt functions that remain after legislative and judicial
functions are taken away.

2 Asif Hameed v J&K 1989

Does HC has power to issue directions to the State Government to constitute ‘statutory body’ for
making admissions
Court followed the State of HP v A parent of a student of Medical College , Shimla AIR 1985 3 SCC
1669
1. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action the Court is not an appellate
authority.
2. The Constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advise the executive in matter of policy
or to sermonize qua any matter which under the Constitution lies with the sphere of legislature
or executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory
powers.
3. Separation of power is not a absolutely rigid concept
4. Judicial review is an important tool
5. HC was patently in error in issuing directives in Jyotsan’a case and reiterating the same in this
case
3 State of MP v. Bharat singh :
1. SC upheld the order of HC and held Section 3(1)(b) of the Act as unconstitutional on the ground
that it invested the govt. With very wide discretion without any procedural safeguards as a
person could have even be interned in a place which could render him a destitute without any
means of livelihood.
2. This violated the principles of natural justice
3. It can not be arbitrary even in case of Art 358
4. Rule of Law – Dicey / No continental system , only British common law system
6 In Re. Delhi Laws
Is it permissible for the legislature to delegate legislative power to a subordinate authority-
limits within which this could be done
 Separation of power is not a part of Indian Constitution
 Doctrine of delegates non potest delgare is not applicable.
 Parliament completely cannot abdicate itself by creating a parallel authority.
 Only ancillary functions can be delegated
 Legislature cannot delegate its essential functions.

 Separation of powers is not followed strictly in India

 It can not be an excessive delegation

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7 Lachmi Narain v UOI 1976
The power to make notification in a legislation does not include power to make modification in any
essential feature
Where the validity of Section 2 of Union Territories (Laws) Act, 1950 and Section 6 of Bengal Finance
(Sales Tax) Act, 1941 was to be determined. The issue was that whether notification issued by Central
Government in purported exercise of its powers under Section 2 is ultra vires. In the High Court: the
validity of the withdrawal of the exemptions was challenged on these grounds" :
(1) The power given by Section 2 of the Laws Act to the Central Government to extend enactments in
force in a State to a Union territory, with such restrictions and modifications, as it thinks fit, could be
exercised only to make such modifications in the enactment as were necessary in view of the peculiar
local conditions. The modification in Section 6(2) of the Bengal Act , dated October 7, 1957, was not
necessitated by this reason. It was therefore, ultra vires Section 2 of the Laws Act.
(2) Such a modification could be made only once when the Bengal Act was extended to Delhi in 1951. No
modification could be made after such extension.
(3) The modification could not change the policy of the legislature reflected in the Bengal Act. The
impugned modification was contrary to it, and
(4) The modifications giving notice to withdrawn the exemptions and the notifications issued pursuant
thereto withdrawing the exemptions from sales tax with respect to durries, ghee, (and other items
relevant to these petitions) were void as the statutory notice of not less than three months as required
by Section 6(2) prior to its modification by the impugned notification of December 7, 1957, had not been
given.
Held by the SC: The SC the set aside the judgment of the DB of the HC and held the impugned
notification, purporting to substitute the words “such previous notice as it considers reasonable” for the
words “not less than three months notice” in section 6(2) of the Bengal Act, beyond the powers of the
Central Governement, conferred on it by section 2 of the Laws Act. In regard to the argument that the
power conferred by Section 2 of the Laws Act is a power of conditional legislation and not a power of
'delegated' legislation. In our opinion, no useful purpose will be served to pursue this line or argument
because the distinction propounded between the two categories of legislative powers makes no
difference, in principle. In either case, the person to whom the power is entrusted can do nothing
beyond the limits which circumscribe the power; he has to act - to use the words of Lord Selbourne -
"within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power" and without violating any
"express conditions or restrictions by which that power is limited". There is no magic in a name. Whether
you call it the power of "conditional legislation" as Privy Council called it in Burah's case it also laid down
that modification can be done as-the power does not exhaust itself on 1st exercise.
8 D L Mehra v UOI 1992
Delegation of taxing powers on local bodies- effacement, discrimination

The proposal of the Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow to levy theatre tax, @ Rs. 5 per cinema show held in a
building assessed on annual rental value of Rs. 10,000 or more and @ Rs. 3 per cinema show held in a
building assessed on annual rental value of less than Rs. 10,000 was accepted by the State
Government by following the procedure laid-down under the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959.
The Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika Theatre Tax Rules, 1965 were framed and enforced with effect from
December 15, 1965 and the theatre tax was levied with effect from June 1,1967. The rate of tax was
increased from time to time and finally by a notification dated October 30, 1979 the theatre tax was
enhanced to Rs.25 per show on all class-I cinemas with annual rental value more than Rs. 10,000 and
Rs. 20 per show on all class II cinemas with annual rental value of Rs. 10,000 or less.
The petitioners - the cinema owners/lessees in these Writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India challenged the imposition of theatre tax by the Respondent- Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow,
contending that Section 172(2) of the Act was unconstitutional because the legislature
abdicate its function by delegating the essential legislative powers upon the Nagar palikas to
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 levy all or any of the taxes enumerated in the Section; that the classification of cinemas on the
basis of annual rental value for the purpose of fixing the rate of tax was arbitrary and as such was
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and that the classification had no nexus with the
objects sought to be achieved.
Dismissing the writ petitions of the cinema owners/lessesse, this Court,

 Taxing power is an essential power that cannot be delegated, however the power to levy tax
can be delegated only subject to the legislature itself exercising essential legislative function,
namely laying down the policy which permits sufficient guidelines of tax.
 “for the purposes of Act” has been held to be sufficient guidelines for the permission of tax,
only when power is delegated to a responsive and representative body
 SC upheld the section 172(2) and its delegation

9 Govind Chhagan Lal Patel v A.P.M Committee AIR 1976 SC 263

(Procedural requirements- publication)

Issue: Whether the publication of notification u/s 6 (5) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Act,
1964, covering additional varieties of agricultural produce ( like ginger and onion), must not only be
published in official gazette but must be published in vernacular i.e., Guajarati Newspaper?
 The question whether statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the
legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed
 Khub Chand v State of Raj 1967 referred
 Held publication in the local news paper is mandatory
 The notification could affect valuable rights if the traders
 Violations could subject them to penal consequences
 Absence of prober and adequate publicity the right of the traders and agriculturalist hampered
without offerding them an opportunity to offer objections and suggestions.
 Publication in the News paper attracts greatest attention of the public than in OG

10 Sonik Industries Rajkot v Municipal Corp. Rajkot 1986

 Under section 77 of the Bombay Municipal boroughs Act,1925 power is given to Municipality to
levy the taxes. If any rule has to be made under this Act then rules have to be published in local
news papers having circulation in that area.
 Rules were framed, however, instead of publishing the entire rules a notice was published by
municipality that all the rules so made has been sanctioned by State Government
 The rules could be inspected in the Municipal office
 Held Notice satisfies the requirement of section 77 of publication
9 Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. State of Haryana AIR 1979 SC 1149
 Simple laying is merely directory, and non laying could not make the Executive order void
 Legislative Control through Laying Requirement
 SC held that the impugned provisions of law which provided that every order by the Central Govt.
Or its officer or authority “shall be laid down before both houses as soon as may be after it is
made” as merely directory and did not make ‘laying’ a condition precedent to the making of the
order. According to the court, the word Shall in section 3(6) of the essential Commodity Act, 1955
is not conclusive and decisive of the matter; and the Court is to determine the true intention of
the legislature.

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12 Rajnarain Singh v Chairman PAC 1954
 Section 3 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act was in question. Power was delegated to Patna
Admin. To extend with modification and restriction any law prevailing India to the area of Patna.
Accordingly Bengal Municipality Act was extended with modification and restriction. Sec.104
provided levying of tax in that area with consultation with affected people.
 Tax was levied but people were not consulted. Court held that consultation is mandatory in
nature and non compliance is procedural ultra vires.

13 Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v State of UP 1954

 Under the Essential Supplies (temporary Powers) Act, 1946, the U.P.Coal Control Order , 1953
was issued, which provided that no one can carry on business in coal except under a licence . it
further laid down that the State Coal Controller can exempt any person from the licence power.
 No guideline was allowed for regulation of this discretionary power.
 The said order held unconstitutional

14 A N Parasuraman v State of TN 1990

{Conferment of unguided power not permissible The appellants challenged the Section 6,7 and 15 of the
Tamil Nadu Pvt. Educational Institutions (Regulation )Act, 1966
 The Court held that Act conferred unguided power on the authority and, therefore was ultra vires
and illegal.
 The purpose of the Act to regulate Private educational institutions but does not give any idea as
to the manner in which the control over the institution could be exercised.

15 JR Ragupathy State of A P 1988

No power to the judiciary to issue writs when there is nothing on record to show that the decision of the
government was arbitrary or capricious or was one not reached in good faith or actuated with improper
considerations or influenced by extraneous considerations.
16 Coimbatore Distt. Central Co. Bank v Employee. Asson. 2007
The Wedsnesbury principle has given way to the doctrine of proportionality
Discipilanry action taken against 53 workmen on accounts of acts of misconduct and contiuinty of their
illegal strike.
 DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY So far as the doctrine of proportionality is concerned, there is
no gainsaying that the said doctrine has not only arrived at in our legal system but has come to
stay. With the rapid growth of Administrative Law and the need and necessity to control possible
abuse of discretionary powers by various administrative authorities, certain principles have been
evolved by Courts. If an action taken by any authority is contrary to law, improper, unreasonable,
irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a Court of Law can interfere with such action by exercising
power of judicial review. One of such modes of exercising power, known to law is the 'doctrine of
proportionality'.
 'Proportionality' is a principle where the Court is concerned with the process, method or manner
in which the decision-maker has ordered his priorities, reached a conclusion or arrived at a
decision. The very essence of decision-making consists in the attribution of relative importance to
the factors and considerations in the case. The doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focus true
nature of exercise the elaboration of a rule of permissible priorities.
 de Smith states that 'proportionality' involves 'balancing test' and 'necessity test'. Whereas the
former ('balancing test') permits scrutiny of excessive onerous penalties or infringement of rights
or interests and a manifest imbalance of relevant considerations, the latter ('necessity test')
requires infringement of human rights to the least restrictive alternative. ['Judicial Review of
Administrative Action'; (1995); pp. 601-605; para 13.085; see also Wade & Forsyth;
'Administrative Law'; (2005); p.366].
 "The court will quash exercise of discretionary powers in which there is no reasonable

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 relationship between the objective which is sought to be achieved and the means used to that
end, or where punishments imposed by administrative bodies or inferior courts are wholly out of
proportion to the relevant misconduct. The principle of proportionality is well established in
European law, and will be applied by English courts where European law is enforceable in the
domestic courts. The principle of proportionality is still at a stage of development in English law;
lack of proportionality is not usually treated as a separate ground for review in English law, but is
regarded as one indication of manifest unreasonableness."
 The doctrine has its genesis in the field of Administrative Law. The Government and its
departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements
of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without abuse of
discretion. There can be no 'pick and choose', selective applicability of Government norms or
unfairness, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It is not permissible to use a 'sledge- hammer to
crack a nut'. As has been said many a time; "Where paring knife suffices, battle axe is precluded".
In the celebrated decision of Council of Civil Service Union (CCSU) v. Minister for Civil Service,
(1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1985) AC 374 (HL), Lord Diplock proclaimed;
 So far as our legal system is concerned, the doctrine is well-settled. Even prior to CCSU, this Court
has held that if punishment imposed on an employee by an employer is grossly excessive,
disproportionately high or unduly harsh, it cannot claim immunity from judicial scrutiny, and it is
always open to a Court to interfere with such penalty in appropriate cases. In Hind Construction
Co. v. Workmen, (1965) 2 SCR 85 : AIR 1965 SC 917, some workers remained absent from duty
treating a particular day as holiday. They were dismissed from service. The Industrial Tribunal set
aside the action. This Court held that the absence could have been treated as leave without pay.
The workmen might have been warned and fined. (But) "It is impossible to think that any
reasonable employer would have imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire
permanent staff in this manner." The Court concluded that the punishment imposed on the
workmen was not only severe and out of proportion to the fault, but one which, in our judgment,
no reasonable employer would have imposed.
 "Judicial review developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by
which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the
grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I
would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'.

17 Om Kumar & Others v UOI 2000

Quantum of punishment and the doctrine of proportionality

 Rule of proportionality originated in Prussia in the 19 th century and has since been adopted in
other European Countries.
 Doctrine of proportionality is closely related to reasonableness and it is considered anew new
development in the area of judicial review
 Courts can interfere with decisions where punishment is disproportionate or excessive or totally
irrational
 Legislature or Administrative should adopt appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures to
achieve the object of legislation or the purpose of administrative order as the case may be
 The Legislature and the administrative authority given an area of discretion or a range of choice
but as to whether the choice made, infringes the rights excessively or not is for the Court to see,
that is what is meant by proportionality
 Since the adoption of Constitution the rule of proportionality has been applied.
 Art 14, 19, 21 are subject to the principle of proportionality
 There should be proper balance b/w the adverse effects

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18 R. v Secretary of State for Home Deptt. 2001
 Whether the policy infringes Mr. Daly’s common law right to maintain the confidentiality of his
privileged legal correspondence
 Court held that the policy infringes Mr. Daly’s common law right to legal professional privilege
 De Freitas v Secretary 1999 referred
 In determining whether a limitation (by an act, rule or decision) is arbitrary or excessive the Court
should ask itself whether
a. The legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a Fundamental Right;
b. The measure designed to meet the legislative objectives are more than is necessary to
accomplish the objective
c. The measure used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to
accomplish the objective.

19 G. Sadananadan v State of Kerala 1966

 The petitioner G. Sadananadan a businessman carries on wholesale business in Kerosene Oil, was
aresetd under defence rules,1962
 The object of the DSP to eliminate the petitioner from the field of wholesale business in
Kerosene Oil so that his relatives may benefit and obtain the dealership
 Held malfide exercise of power

20 Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd v UOI 1986

Malafide and doctrine of promissory estoppel

In this case the Express Newspaper were served with notices of re-entry upon forfeiture of lease of land
granted to them on which the lessee had raised the buildings for printing and publishing the newspapers.
 The SC held that the action had been politically motivated and, therefore, vitiated by malfide
intention
 The doctrine of promissory estoppels was used to prevent the government form quashing the
action of the Minister for approval of a lease as it was within the scope of his authority to grant
such permission.

21 State of Bombay v K P Krishnan 1961

Relevant and irrelevant considerations
1. Industrial dispute – MAH govt refused to refer
2. Petition under s 226
3. Court Held that reason given by the govt. was extraneous and not germane to the dispute
4. The govt. directed in a punitive fashion and this was contrary to the spirit of the statute to stifle
and investigate the dispute.
22 Ranjit Singh v UOI 1981 irrelevant considerations
In 1950, the State Government issued a manufacturing licence renewable every year to the
petitioners for the manufacture by hand of a specified number of guns per month. The guns were
however not proof-tested. After the Arms Act 1959, came into force, the
government insisted that the guns manufactured should undergo proof-testing. Pursuant
to that condition in 1960, the petitioners installed machinery and plant, by making substantial
investment of funds. From 1964, the Government of India, reduced the monthly quota of guns. The
petitioners in their writ petitions under Article 32 alleged that this reduction had resulted in
considerable
hardship to them because of the fixed overhead costs which could not be avoided. They also
alleged that though in the case of a number of other such manufacturers quotas were restored, in their
cases, the Government refused to restore the quotas. The Union of India, however, denied the
allegation of arbitrariness, and stated that: (a) what was done was pursuant to the Industrial
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 Policy Resolution of 1956 which envisioned an exclusive monopoly in the Central Government in the
matter of manufacturing arms and ammunition and that in fixing the quota the manufacturing capacity
of a concern was not a determining factor; (b) there is no fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution to carry on the manufacture of arms; and (c) there was laches on the part of the
petitioners.
Allowing the writ petitions,
HELD: (a)(i) Any curtailment of the quota must proceed on the basis of reason and relevance. The
Government is entitled to take into consideration the requirements of current administrative policy
pertinent to the maintenance of law and order and internal security. If all relevant factors
are not considered, or irrelevant considerations allowed to find place, the decision is vitiated by
arbitrary judgment. In the instant case the Government of India had not taken into careful
consideration the several elements necessary for forming a decision on the quota permissible to each
of the petitioners. That should be done and for that purpose the petitioners would be entitled to place
before the Government a fresh and complete statement of their case, with supporting
material, to enable the Government to reach a just decision.
(b) The Arms Act 1959, expressly contemplates the grant of licences for manufacturing arms and an
applicant for a licence is entitled to have it considered in accordance with the terms of the statute and
to press for its grant on the basis of the criteria set forth in it.

23 Nandlal Khodidas Barot v BC of Gujarat 1981

Application of mind
Advocate suspended from service
A. On forwarding a case to disciplinary committee , the council can not act
mechanically . It must apply its mind
B. Resolution was passed in a routine manner w/o forming an opinion that there was
a primafacie case.
C. Reference is invalid.
24 Shree Ram Sugar Industries v State of AP 1974
Fetters on discretionary powers
b. Exemption to pay tax in case of setting a new factory for 3 years only for cooperative
factories.
c. Decision: Govt can do classification though this should be relevant to subject matter in
hand
d. The desirability of laying down is a general principle of policy has to be reconciled with the
duty of authority not to fetter the discretion
e. Dissenting judgment – Ultra Vires

27 A K Kraipak v UOI 1970

Application of the PNJ in administrative Actions. {The dividing line b/w an administrative power and a
quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated.}
In this case, Naquishband, who was the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, was a member of the
Selection Board and was also a candidate for selection to All India cadre of the Forest Service. Though he
did not take part in the deliberations of the Board when his name was considered and approved, the SC
held that `there was a real likelihood of a bias for the mere presence of the candidate on the Selection
Board may adversely influence the judgement of the other members' Definition of adjudge
SC also made the following observations: -
1. The dividing line between an administrative power and quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being
gradually obliterated. Whether a power is Administrative or quasi-judicial, one has to look into-
a) the nature of power conferred
b) the person on whom it is conferred
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 c) the framework of the law conferring that power
d) the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised.
2. The principles of natural justice also apply to administrative proceedings,
3. The concept of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and it entails -
(i) No one shall be a judge of his own cause.
(ii) No decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing.
(iii) The quasi-judicial enquiries should be held in good faith and not arbitrarily or unreasonably.

28 Ashok Kumar Yadav Vs. State of Haryana

Rule against bias- doctrine of necessity

Issue
Whether the selection of candidate would vitiate for bias if close relative of a members of the Public
Service Commission is appearing for selection?
Held
The SC laid down the following propositions: -
1. Such member must withdraw altogether from the entire selection process otherwise all selection
would be vitiated on account of reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection
2. This is not applicable in case of Constitutional Authority like PSC whether Central or State. This is so
because if a member was to withdraw altogether from the selection process, no other person save a
member can be substituted in his place and it may sometimes happen that no other member is available
to take the place of such a member and the functioning of PSC may be affected.
3. In such a case, it is desirable that the member must withdraw from participation in interview of such a
candidate and he should also not take part in the discussions.
The SC conceptualised the doctrine of necessity in this case.
29 G. N. Nayak v Goa University 2002
The case is a leading case on Rule against Bias. In this case, a senior officer expressed appreciation of the
work of a junior officer in his confidential report. He was also a member of the Departmental Promotion
Committee to consider such junior officer along with others for promotion. The committee
recommended this junior officer for promotion which was challenged on the ground of personal bias
actuated by an element of personal interest. The Apex Court held that unless preference is unreasonable
and is based on self-interest, it will not vitiate an administrative decision. Taking the opportunity, the
apex court also held that preparing an exhaustive list about relations that could possibly lead to personal
bias cannot be made.

30 Amar Nath Chowdhary v Braithwaite & Co. Ltd 2002

 Rule against bias- doctrine of necessity
 The applicability of necessity was rejected. The appellant, an employee of government
undertaken company was dismissed from service. The order of dismissal was passed by the
Chairman-cum-MD of the company who was Disciplinary authority.
 The appellant preferred an appeal against the order of his removal from service before the Board
of Directors of the Company.
 The MD participated in the decision of the Board and the appeal was dismissed.
 The decision set aside on the ground of bias.
 Court rejected the defence of ‘doctrine of necessity’.

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31 Hira Nath Mashra v Prinicpal Rjendra Medical College 1973
 Right of cross examination
 Male students, entered naked into the compound of the Girls hostel late at night.-- enquiry
committee found the students guilty and were expelled
 Challenged the order as vilative of PNJ in as much as the statements of the girl students were
recorded behind their back and no opportunity was given to them to cross-examine those girls
students.

 The SC rejected the contention and held “---

The circumstances of the case shows that PNJ ARE NOT VIOLTED.
 DNJ can’t be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula and its application depends on
several factors.
 PNJ are flexible.

32 J K Aggarwal v Haryana seeds dev Corp. 1991

Right of legal Representation / right to counsel
 The right of representation by a lawyer may not in all cases be held to be a part of natural justice.
No general principle valid in all cases can be enunciated.
 The Rule itself recognises that where the charges are so serious as to entail a dismissal from
service, the inquiry-authority may permit the services of a lawyer.
 When the rule is silent then the party has no absolute right to be legally represented. It is the
matter for the discretion of the authorities or Tribunal. If they in the proper exercise of their
discretion, decline to allow legal representation, the courts will not interfere but the Tribunals
must not fetter its discretion by rigid rules. A Tribunal is not at liberty to lay down an absolute
rule: “we will never allow anyone to have a lawyer to appear for him”. The Tribunal must be
ready, in a prper case, to allow it.
 Pett v. Grehound Raling Association Ltd., [1969] Pett's case No. 2, 1970(1) QB 46: Enderby Town
Football Club Ltd. v. Football Association Ltd., [1971] Chancery Div. C.L. Subrahmaniam v.
Collector of Customs, Cochin, [1972] 3 SCR 485, referred. Board of Trustees of the Port of
Bombay v. Dilip Kumar, [1983] 1 SCR 828, followed.

33 BPCL v Maharastra General Kamgar Union 1999

The basic principle is that an employee has no right to representation in the departmental proceedings
by another person or lawyer unless the service rules specifically provides for the same. The right to
representation available only to the extent specifically provided for in the rules.
34 Maneka Gandhi v UOI
Post decisional hearing

In this case the passport of the Petitioner was seized on ground of interest of public by the central
government under section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act 1967 without giving her opportunity of any
hearing . Hence she filed a writ petition under art 32 on following grounds –

 Section 10(3)(c ) is violative of Article 21 as it does not prescribed any procedure for the seizure of
the passport.
 Section 10(3)(c) is violative of Article 14 as power conferred to the delegate is excessive .
 Section 10(3)(c) is violative of Article 19 (1)(a) and Article 19(1)(g) .
 She was denied from the opportunity of hearing which amount to the arbitrary exercise of the
power violating of Article 14.
 Held: The seizure of the passport was mala fide in violation of Article 14, 19, 21. Procedure
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 established by the law means a procedure which is just, fair and reasonable. Rule of Audi Alteram
Partem is a part of natural law protected under Article 21. Illegal seizure of passport violates Article
19 (1)(a) ,19(1)(g) having a direct bearing on right to food protected under art 21. Realising that there
was fatal defect and decision of the court would render the central government’s order, as void, the
attorney general gave the assurance that - “The opportunity of hearing and representation shall be
given to the petitioner within two weeks and representation will be dealt with expeditiously in
accordance with the law “. On getting this assurance the Supreme Court disposed the case.
 The post decisional hearing will give satisfaction to the affected individual that he was at least
given some opportunity of hearing even at a belated stage.Article 14, 19 and 21 strength each
other are not mutually exclusive but mutually inclusive.
35 H L Trehran v UOI
Post decisional hearing
In K.I.Shephard Vs. UOI certain employees of the amalgamated banks were excluded from employment.
The Court allowing the writs held that post-decisional hearing in this case would not do justice. The court
pointed out that there is no justification to throw a person out of employment and then give him an
opportunity of representation when the requirement is that he should be given an opportunity as a
condition precedent to action.
In H.L.Trehan Vs. UOI, a circular was issued by the Govt. on taking over the company prejudicially
altering the terms and conditions of its employees w/o affording an opportunity of hearing to them. The
SC observed that "In our opinion, the post
decisional opportunity of hearing does not subserve the rules of natural justice. The authority who
embarks upon a post-decisional hearing will normally proceed with a closed mind and there is hardly any
chance of getting proper consideration of the representation at such a post decisional hearing."
36 K I Shepherd v UOI 1988
 Post decisional hearing
 Due the nationalization of three banks, some employees were excluded and there services were
not taken over by the transferee banks. These employees filed writ petitions before the HC, which
granted partial relief by proposing post decisional hearing. Some of them even filed writ petition
before the SC, where Court did not allow post-hearing and observed that, in this case, it would
not serve any purpose and it is a mere formality.

37 S N Mukhrejee v UOI 1990

Requirement of passing reasoned Order
Issue
Whether it was incumbent upon the Chief of Army Staff to record the reasons of the orders passed by
him while confirming the findings and the sentence of the CG
Observed
SC observed that
 The requirement to record reasons could be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice.
 An administrative authority must record the reasons in support of their decisions, unless the
requirement is expressly or by necessary implication excluded.
 The reasons cited would enable the court to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory
powers.
 The giving of reasons would guarantee consideration of the matter by the authority.

The reasons would produce clarity in the decisions and reduce arbitrariness.
Held: U/s 162 of the Army Act, the reasons have to be reached only in cases where the proceedings of a
summary court martial are set aside or the sentence is reduced and not when the findings and sentence
are confirmed. Thus requirement of recording reasons
cannot be insisted upon at the stage of consideration of post-confirmation petition by the CG.

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38
MD, ECIL, Hyderabad v B. Karunakar 1993
 In K Keasv Mills Co.Ltd. v UOI 173 (SC) – Held if due to non suplly of report rights of the partiers are not
affected then there would be no violation of PNJ
 UOI v E. Bashyan 1988- a two judge Bench held that failure supply the inquiry report to the delinquent
before the disciplinary authority took the a final decision would constitute a violation of the PNJ.
 In Kailash Chander Asthaana v State of U.P 1988- Three Judge Bench held the copy of the enquiry
report need not to be shown to the delinquent employee.
 In UOI v Mohd. Ramjan Khan 1991 SC hled held that non furnishing of enquiry would amount to the
denial of PNJ.
 Following rules are laid down:
a. The delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the Inquiry Officer’s report
before the decision.
b. Denial of the copy is a denial of reasonable opportunity to prove his innocence and
breach of the PNJ
c. In case on minor punishments procedure given in the relevant service rules will applicable
d. When copy of the report not provided, the employees not reinstated with back wages.
The Court and Tribunal should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to him and give the
employee an opportunity to show that his case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the
report.
e. The Court or Tribunals don act mechanically
f. It is only if the Court or Tribunals finds that the furnishing of the report would made a
difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment.

40 Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chandra Rai 2003

Difference b/w Art.226 and 227

Article 226 Art.227

Original jurisdiction Supervisory Jurisdiction
The record of proceedings having been certified and sent up Not only quash or annul or set aside the
by the inferior Court or tribunal to the HC- the HC may simply impugned proceedings, may give directions a
quash or annul the proceedings and then do no more. facts & circumstances of the Case.
Jurisdiction u/226 is capable of being exercised on a prayer Jurisdiction u/227 can be exercised suo moto
made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved. well
41 Anadi Mukta Sadguru Case
Can the writ of mandamus be issued against any individual or private body?
1. If the rights are purely of private character, no mandamus can be issued
2. If the Mgt of the college is a private body with no public duty, Mandamus will not lie.
3. The appellant trust was managing the affiliated college to which public money was paid as
government aid.
4. The adied institutions discharge the public functions
5. Therefore legal right-duty relationship b/w staff and the Mgt. And mandamus can’t be refused.

43 Rupa Ashok Hurra

Even after a review petition filed u/art.137 is rejected by the SC, that may not be the end of the road.
The Court may still review the case under its inherent power but on very restricted ground.
Curative petition
The question before a Constitution Bench in this case was whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any
relief against a final judgment/order of the Supreme Court, after dismissal of review petition (under

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 Article 137 of the Constitution), either under Article 32 of the Constitution or otherwise.
Held that the Supreme Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice,
may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power. This was allowed by way of a curative
petition.
Grounds/ requirements
 Violation of PNJ
 Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject matter
 The grounds mentioned had been taken in the review petition and that it was dismissed by
circulation
 Certification by a senior advocate with regard to the fulfilment of the above requirements
 The curative petition has to be circulated to the Bench of 3 senior most judges and the judges
who passed the judgment complained of, if available.

44 Secretary Gen. SC v Subhash Chandra Agarwal 2010

Facts: In 1997 at the Conference of Chief Justices, all the judges adopted a “Code of Conduct” which
required them to disclose their assets in confidence to their Chief Justices. To see whether the judges are
complying with the Code of Conduct or not, an RTI activist Subash Agarwal filed an RTI application
seeking information from the Public Information Officer (PIO) of the Supreme Court in this regard and
also for a copy of the adopted “Code of Conducts”. The PIO responded by saying that the information
does not exist in the court registry. On appeal, the appellate authority directed the PIO to give name of
the officer having the relevant information and to refer the application to the authority having the
information by way of Section 6(3) of the Act. On remission the PIO rejected the application asking to file
the application to respective High Courts.
The applicant then approached the CIC. The CIC rejected the contentions of the Information Officer and
directed him to provide the information. This led to a writ petition in the Delhi High Court challenging the
order of the CIC. A single bench judge decided that the order given by the CIC was correct.
An appeal was filed against the decision given by the single judge bench.
Issues
· Whether the respondent had any "right to information" under Section 2(j) of the Act in respect of the
information regarding making of declarations by the Judges of the Supreme Court pursuant to 1997
Resolution?
· If the answer to question (1) above is in affirmative, whether CJI held the "information" in his
"fiduciary" capacity, within the meaning of the expression used in Section 8(1)(e) of the Act?
· Whether the information about the declaration of assets by the Judges of the Supreme Court is exempt
from disclosure under the provisions of Section 8(1)(j) of the Act?
Contention of the Appellant Side
The appellant in the plaint raised following points:
· That the appellant has no right to information under Section 2(j) of the Act, as of the two essential
ingredients second one is not being fulfilled.
· He stated that the resolution of 1997 has no force of law, as there is no legal or constitutional
requirement as such in this regard.
· The resolution of 1997 had two parts, first one talked about punishing a judge if he failed to fulfill values
of judicial life while second part was about the declaration of assets. However, no in-house procedure
has been established in this regard.
· The learned Attorney General relied heavily on Indira Jaising v. Registrar General, Kailash Rai v. Jai Jai
Ram, Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux.
Contentions of the Respondent Side: In reply the learned council stated that:
· The respondent is not seeking for enforcement of the resolution.

· When the information is provided to the CJI, it comes under the control of CJI as a public authority as

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 hence comes under the ambit of the Act.
· The code of conduct creates an in house mechanism for the punishment of judges. The CJI has
previously implemented this mechanism, which shows the binding character of the Code of Conduct.
· The information is being held by the CJI in full conscience and is being maintained in the office as a
record.
· The learned council rebutted all the cases cited by the Attorney General by stating that the authorities
used were of the matter of property and hence are of a different nature.
Judgment: The appeal was dismissed and the impugned order of the single judge was upheld. The
judgment passed by the court was:
· Judges have to declare there assets are not being introduced for the first time. Subordinate judges are
required to do so. Since, it is essential for the subordinate judge to declare his assets the requirement of
the higher court judge is even more. For a higher hierarchy judge the degree of accountability and
scrutiny should be stricter.
· Office of Chief Justice of India comes under the concept of “Public Authority” with respect to Section
2(e) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.
· Assets declaration held by CJI or CJ’s of the respective High Courts comes under the ambit of
information of the Section 2(f) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.
Asset information held by the CJI is not a fiduciary and if such information is revealed it will not result in
breach of such duty.

46 L Chandra Kumar v. UOI 1997

S. P. Sampat Kumar v. Union of India (1987) overruled.

 Power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts and the Supreme Court
under Articles 226 & 227 and 32 respectively is the basic structure of the Constitution.
 Power of judicial superintendence over decisions of all courts and Tribunals within their
jurisdiction is the basic structure of the Constitution.
 Article 323-A (2) (d) and Article 323-B (3) (d) of the Constitution of India, Section 28 of the
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 decaled unconstitutional as they damage the power of judicial
review which is a basic feature of the Constitution.
 Doctrine of prospective overruling applied
 The tribunals may perform the supplemental function
 All the decisions of the tribunals will be subject to the scrutiny before DB of the HC which has the
jurisdiction over the tribunals concerned

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