Exposure, Legitimacy, and Social

Disclosure

Dennis M. Patten

This study examines whether the voluntary social disclosures included by corporations
in their annual reports are related to either public pressure or firm profitability. It is
argued that social disclosures are used as a means of addressing the exposure firms face
with regard to the social environment, and as such should be related more closely with
public-pressure variables than profitability measures. A regression analysis on the level
of disclosure for 128 firms in 1985 indicates that size and industry classification are
significant explanatory variables whereas a number of profitability variables are not.

The voluntary social disclosures provided by corporations in their annual

reports have been a topic of academic interest for over two decades. Within the
accounting domain, most of the research has focused on either the descriptive
analysis of social disclosure (Ernst & Ernst 1978; Lessem 1979; Trotman
1979) or the market reaction to such disclosures (Belkaoui 1976; Ingram 1978;
Anderson and Frankle 1980; Jaggi and Freedman 1982). Although the descrip-
tive analyses have indicated that social disclosure is not consistent across firms
or across time, * very few studies have attempted to examine whether there are
systematic factors that lead companies to include this type of information in
their annual reports.
The purpose of my study is to examine whether variation in social disclo-
sures across firms is a function of public pressure and/or profitability. It is
argued that social disclosure is a means of addressing the exposure companies
face with regard to the social environment. Furthermore, it is suggested that
the social legitimacy of business is monitored through the public-policy arena
rather than the marketplace and, as such, the extent of social disclosure should

Address correspondence to: Dennis M. Patten, Department of Accounting 5520, 435A Stevenson Hall,
Ill~ois State University, Normal, IL 61761.
Ernst & Ernst (1978, p. 3). for example, reports that the percentage of companies including social
disclosures increased from 59.6 percent in 1973 to 91.2 percent in 1976 and then declined slightly to 89.6
percent in 1977. Similarly, individual company amounts varied from no disclosure to as much as 4.5
pages (pp. 75-136).

Joumd of Accounting and Public Policy, IO, 297-308 (1991) 297

0 1991Ekvier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0278-4254/91/$05.00
298 Dennis M. Patten

be more closely related to the public pressure variables than the profitability
measures. Regression analysis on a sample of 1985 social disclosures is used as
a preliminary test of this argument. The paper begins with the development of
this underlying theory.
According to Trotman and Bradley (1981, p. 355), no well-developed theory
of social disclosure exists. However, the concept of corporate legitimacy,
which has been used by Ramanathan (1976), Schreuder and Ramanathan
(1984), and Benston (1982) in arguing either for or against the need for social
accounting, may have some relationship to social disclosure.
To a great extent, legitimacy theory has a basis in the notion of the social
contract. According to Shocker and Sethi (1974, p. 67), “any social institution
[including business] operates in society via a social contract, expressed or
implied. . . . ” Furthermore, the authors (1974, p. 67) note:

. neither the sources of institutional power nor the needs for its services are
permanent. Therefore, an institution must constantly meet the twin tests of
legitimacy and relevance by demonstrating that society requires its services and
that the groups benefitting from its rewards have society’s approval. (Shocker and
Sethi 1974, p. 67)

The classical economic model assumes that legitimacy is market-based. As

explained by Abbott and Monsen (1979, p. 51 I), the “system is not based on
the motivation of the entrepreneur to be socially useful, but rather on the
existence of competitive forces in the system as a form of social control that
directs the self-interest of the entrepreneur into socially useful channels.”
Friedman summarizes the argument succinctly: “There is one and only one
social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits” (1962, p. 133). As such, performance is
measured via profits and successful (profitable) firms are rewarded with
legitimization.
This concept of economic legitimacy was, until recent years, largely the
only constraint placed on business by society. More recently as Tinker and
Niemark (1984, p. 84). state:

. . the public, in general, became increasingly aware of the adverse consequences

of corporate growth. . . They pressured both business and government to make
outlays to repair or prevent damage to the physical environment, to ensure health
and safety of consumers, employees, and those who reside in the communities
where products are manufactured and wastes are dumped, and to be responsible for
the consequences of technological unemployment and plant closings.

Evidence suggests that society’s confidence in business has decreased.’ Busi-

nesses have been forced to respond to various social issues that were consid-

’ Lipset and Schneider (1983, pp. 29-34) present a detailed analysis of the decline in public confidence
in business during the 1960s and 1970s.
Exposure, Legitimacy, and Social Disclosure 299

ered to be consequences of their activities (see, e.g., Tinker and Niemark

1987, p. 85).
Since social performance could not be evaluated by business profit and the
markets, the issue was addressed by public policy makers (see the discussion in
Heard and Bolce (1981, p. 248)). The association of social concern with public
policy has been addressed extensively in management literature, notably, by
Preston and Post (1975).
Preston and Post (1975, p. 2) suggest that matters noted by society can, after
due consideration, become law. Because business can be constrained by the
formal legal environment, firms have an incentive to be involved in the policy
process. As noted by Preston and Post (1975, p. 4):

. . . since private business units constitute large and important organizational

elements within our society, it should be expected that they will initiate and
participate in, as well as respond to, the process of social decision-making.

Thus a business can use social disclosure to attempt to affect public policy.3
Such disclosures may address policy issues themselves or, alternatively, may
be used to attempt to create an overall image of social responsibility for the
firm. The goal is to deal with what Miles (1987) calls throughout his book the
“exposure” of a business to both the social environment and the political
environment (see, e.g., Miles 1987, pp. 2-5). Parker (1986, p. 76) summa-
rizes this point well. He notes:

. . . it has been argued that social [disclosure] can act as an early response to
impending legislative pressure for increased disclosure and as a counter to possible
government intervention or pressure from other outside interest groups. Thus,
from this viewpoint, social [disclosure] might be used to anticipate or avoid social
pressure. At the same time it may be used to boost the corporation’s public
standing. (Parker 1986, p. 76)

Furthermore, because social exposure is not constant across all firms and
industries (Miles 1987, p. 275), the extent of social disclosure can be hypothe-
sized to be likewise variable.
Some modelists argue that social performance must be subjugated to eco-
nomic performance and, as such, social disclosure will also be a function of
firm profitability. Ullman (1985, p. 541), for example, posits that whenever
economic performance is poor, voluntary social disclosure will be low. From
another perspective Cowen et al. (1987, p. 113) note that some theorists “cite
profitability as a factor that allows, or perhaps impels, management to under-
take and to reveal to shareholders more extensive social responsibility pro-

3Zeghal and Ahmed (1990, pp. 39-40) discuss other methods firms may use to influence the policy
process. These methods might include, for example, advertising, press releases, and information in
company publications or brochures.
300 Dennis M. Patten

grams. ’ ’ These arguments may be related to Zmijewski and Hagerman’s

(1981, p. 13 1) contention that higher net income increases firm visibility.
However, if indeed social legitimacy is monitored in a different arena than
economic legitimacy, social disclosures should be a function of social, as
opposed to economic, legitimization. Analysis, therefore, should indicate that
the extent of social disclosure is more closely related to public pressure
variables than economic ones. Research in this area, however, has been very
limited to date.

Previous Research
A number of studies in the social responsibility area have examined the
relationship between social disclosure and profitability. Bowman and Haire
(1975, pp. 51-52), for example, analyzed the annual report disclosures of 82
firms in the food-processing industry. They (1975, p. 52) found that the 31
companies including social responsibility information showed a four to five
percent greater return on equity over a five-year period than nondisclosing
firms. Similarly, Preston (1978, pp. 147-148) reports that firms with high
social disclosure in the 1971-1975 period had a greater 1975 return on equity
than other companies in the Fortune 500.
Although each of the above studies shows support for the argument that
social disclosure impacts upon profitability, neither examines whether prof-
itability impacts upon the level of social disclosure.4 Indeed, relatively few
studies to date have examined what characteristics are associated with social
disclosure. Among the notable exceptions, however, is Cowen et al. (1987).
In the Cowen et al. study, the authors (1987, p. 114) examine whether size,
industry classification, the presence of a social responsibility committee, and
return on equity were related to the categories of disclosures included in annual
reports. The sample was drawn from Ernst & Ernst (1978). Results indicated
that size and some industry classifications were significant explanatory vari-
ables,5 but return on equity was not (Cowen et al., 1987, pp. 117-120). This
is consistent with the argument developed in the previous section, but is hardly
conclusive. Furthermore, the Cowen et al. study examines only categories of
disclosure as opposed to the extent of space devoted to those disclosures (1987,
pp. 116-117).
Trotman and Bradley (1981) also examined the impact of firm characteristics
on social disclosure. Using a sample of 207 companies listed on the Australian
Associated Stock Exchange, the authors (1981, pp. 360-361) found that size,
the extent of company-perceived social pressure, and management decision

4 The distinction concerns which measure is viewed as the dependent variable. My study examines
whether differences in profitability impact on the level of social information included in annual reports.
Ty previous studies examined whether the level of social disclosure impacted on profits.
For example, the paper, fiber and wood products industry was found to be significantly associated
with environmental disclosures.
Exposure, Legitimacy, and Social Disclosure 301

horizon were all significantly related to the amount of social disclosure

included in annual reports. No profitability measures, however, were included
in this analysis.
In light of the theoretical arguments discussed above and the limited research
in this area to date, my study examines whether the extent of social disclosure
for a sample of firms drawn from the 1985 Fortune 500 is related to public
pressure and/or profitability variables. The research method is outlined in the
next section.

Research Method
Because both Cowen et al. (1987) and Trotman and Bradley (1981) examine
data from the 197Os, it was decided to use more recent information for this
study. Accordingly, the annual reports of 156 companies drawn from eight
industry classifications in the 1985 Fortune 500 listing were analyzed for social
disclosures.6 Classification of information as socially related was based on the
categories used by Ernst and Ernst in its annual surveys during the 1970s.
According to this method, disclosures are considered socially related if they
fall into one or more of the following general categories (Ernst & Ernst 1978,
pp. 22-28):

1. “Environment.”
2. “Energy.”
3. “Fair business practices. ”
4. “Human resources.”
5. “Community involvement. ”
6. “Products.”
7. “Other disclosures.”

The details relating to each category can be obtained by contacting the author
(or see Ernst & Ernst 1978, pp. 22-28).
Similar to the procedure used by Ernst & Ernst (1977), total disclosures
were measured as the amount of pages, in l/lOOth of a page intervals,
included in the annual report. The mean disclosure amount for the sample used
in my study was .39 pages, with a median of .07 pages.7
Both myself and an independent reviewer made separate calculations of the
disclosures under consideration. This was done to reduce the arbitrariness that

6 The 1985 annual reports were chosen due to the availability of a large selection on file with 10-K
reports. The eight industries examined were petroleum refining, chemical. forest and paper products,
electronics, industrial and farm machinery, metal products, computer, and tubber products. As noted
later in my paper, the sample was chosen to include both high-profile and medium- or low-profile
industries. Thus, the final sample chosen was based on 1) availability of annual reports on file with
lO;Ks, and 2) industry classification.
The mean disclosure for my sample is significantly lower than for the sample used by Cowen et al.
(1987, p. 116). This is consistent with the findings of Patten (1991) who suggested that overall social
disclosure in the mid-1980s was lower due to decreased public pressure in general.
302 Dennis M. Patten

both Wiseman (1982, p. 55), and Ingram and Frazier (1980, p. 617) suggest
can occur when identifying and measuring social disclosures. The independent
reviewer and myself addressed and reconciled any differences.

Variables
The dependent variable for this analysis is the level of social disclosure in the
annual report. Rather than using the raw amount of pages of disclosure,
however, companies were partitioned into high disclosure and low disclosure
classifications. Companies including a quarter-page or more of social informa-
tion were classified as high disclosers, companies with less than one-tenth of a
page of social information were classified as low disclosers. In order to present
a sharper distinction between the groups, and taking into consideration the
subjectivity of the measurement, firms with disclosure ranging from one-tenth
to a quarter-page were excluded. 8 This resulted in a net sample of 128 firms,
with 47 in the high-disclosure category and 81 in the low-disclosure group.
A major problem with attempting to model the impact of public pressure on
firms is that no pure measure of this pressure exists. As such, researchers must
rely on proxy variables that are, at best, imprecise indicators of the public
pressure companies face. For my study, two proxy variables were used as
measures of the public pressure facing firms with respect to policy issues. The
first of these is size.
Preston (1978, p. 145), Trotman and Bradley (1981, p. 360), and Cowen et
al. (1987, p. 117) found size to be a significant explanatory variable in their
studies of social disclosure. Cowen et al. suggest the reason for the relationship
may be that “larger companies tend to receive more attention from the general
public and, therefore, to be under greater public pressure to exhibit social
responsibility” (p. 113). That larger firms tend to face greater political
pressures has also been brought out extensively in political science literature.
Andres (1985, p. 218), for example, found that size is significantly related to
the formation of corporate political-action committees by U.S. companies. In
explaining this relationship, he notes (p. 216) “just being big creates political
problems for a company” and “the bigger the firm the greater the perceived
threat.“’

a Various alternative testing procedures were used. In order to assure that results were not a spurious
result of the classification scheme, all tests were repeated using various classification cut-offs for the two
groups. Results for all cases were comparable. In addition, a second measurement scale using the
percentage of space in the annual report devoted to social responsibility information was examined. The
breakdown of companies into high and low disclosure groups was identical using this approach. Finally.
tests were run using the raw amount of social disclosure measure. Although the explanatory power of the
model was lower in this case, the significance of all variables was comparable.
9 Size has also been used extensively in accounting research as a proxy for political pressure. See, for
example, Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981); Zimmerman (1983); Watts and Zimmerman (1986); and
Patten (forthcoming). As noted by an anonymous reviewer, size is at best a very noisy proxy for public
pressure. It may also represent many other things. Analysis of results, therefore, is subject to the
assumption that size is a meaningful proxy.
Exposure, Legitimacy, and Social Disclosure 303

The size measure used in my analysis is the natural log of 1985 revenues. lo
Because larger firms are assumed to face greater public pressures than smaller
firms, a positive relationship between this variable and the extent of social
disclosure is hypothesized.
The second variable used as a proxy for public pressure is industry classifi-
cation. Numerous authors (e.g., Bowman and Haire 1976, pp. 54-55; Heinze
1976, p. 49; Carroll 1979, p. 501; Cowen et al. 1987, p. 114) have noted that
the extent of public-pressure companies face regarding social issues varies
across industries. This is perhaps most obvious with respect to environmental
matters. A major focus of the legislative actions of the 1960s and 1970s dealt
with environmental concerns. ” Dierkes and Preston (1977, pp. 4-5) suggest
that the extractive industries are subject to greater constraints because of these
laws. Similarly, Rockness et al. (1986, pp. 173-176) note that the chemical
industry has been the focus of much public concern because of environmental
and safety concerns regarding its products.
Based on the perceived differences in public pressure due to industry
classification, my study uses a dummy variable to identify firms in the
high-profile petroleum, chemical, and forest and paper product industries.
Because companies in these industries are assumed to have a greater incentive
for projecting a positive social image, it is hypothesized that the relationship to
the extent of social disclosure will be positive.
In addition to the two public-pressure variables, my study also analyzes
whether profitability is associated with the level of social disclosure. Specifi-
cally, independent models were run using 1) return on assets (ROA); 2) return
on equity (ROE); 3) five year average ROE; 4) one-year lagged ROA, and 5) a
dummy variable indicating firms reporting a decrease in net income from the
previous period. I2 Based on the argument discussed above, the association
between the profitability variables and social disclosure is hypothesized to be
insignificant.

Analysis
The relationship between the level of social disclosure, and the public pressure
and profitability explanatory variables was calculated using OLS regression.
There is some question as to whether OLS or logitlprobit analysis is preferable
when a binary dependent variable is used (see, for example, Alrich and Nelson

” Tests were also repeated using Fortune 500 rank as the size measure. Results, not presented here,
we,;e comparable.
Environmental concerns continue to be a major topic in public policy discussions. Debate is
currently raging, for example, over whether the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge should be opened up for
pet&oleum exploration. See, for example, Nulty (1989, pp. 47-48).
ROA was calculated using data from the 1985 Fortune 500 report (The 1985 Forfune 500 1986)
ROE information was obtained from Value Line reports (Value Line, Inc. 1987). One-year lagged ROA
is the ROA for 1984 calculated using data from the 1984 Fortune 500 report (The 1984 Fortune 500
1985).
304 Dennis M Patten

1984; Noreen 1988; Stone & Rasp 1991). Aldrich and Nelson (1984, p. 53)
note that because the estimation of parameters for logit/probit models is
statistically based on asymptotic methods, large sample sizes are required.
They (p. 53) suggest a general guideline of 50 cases per parameter. For
smaller sample sizes, Noreen (1988, p. 120) recommends the use of OLS.
Because the sample size for this study (128) does not meet the 50 case per
parameter guideline, OLS was used.13
The regression model was stated as:
Disclosure = a, + b,LogRev + &Industry + b3ROA14

Results
Results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 1. In addition, the 1
values and significance levels of the other tested profitability variables (when
substituted for ROA) are presented in Table 2. l5 As hypothesized, both size
and industry classification are significantly associated with the level of social
disclosure (p > .Ol). In contrast, none of the profitability variables even
approach statistical significance. Furthermore, while the short-term measures
(ROA, ROE, one-year lagged ROA) are positively related to the level of

Table 1. Regression Results

n = 128
Disclosure = a, + b,LogRev + &Industry + b,ROA
Mean
Multiple R S2392 ANOVA df of Squares Square
R2 .27449 Regression 3 8.1MO 2.721
Adj. R2 .25694 Residual 124 21.5781 ,174
Std. Error .41715 F= 15.63840 Sig. f = .OOOO

Variable B sb Beta t sig. t

Log Rev .39632 .07651 .40588 5.180 .oOOO
Industry .24250 .07548 .25335 3.236 .0016
ROA .38340 .57061 .05 142 .672 .5029
-3.45780 .70678 A.892 .OOoo

B = regression coefficient
S, = standard error of regression coefficient
Beta = standardized regression coefficient
Log Rev = natural log of 1985 revenues
Industry = industry classification
ROA = reNr” on assets for 1985

‘3Given the debate over which method is better, analysis was also performed using the SPSS logit
prypam. Results for parameter significance, not presented here, were comparable to the OLS results.
The other economic variables (ROE; 5-year average ROE; lagged ROA; and decrease in reported
nef;mcome) were substituted for ROA in subsequent runs of the model.
The t-values and significance levels for the size and industry variables were virtually the same in all
models. Also, F-statistics indicated all models were significant at the .OOl level. As such, these items are
not reported here.
Exposure, Legitimacy, and Social Disclosure 305

Table 2. Significance of Other Profitability Variables’

Variable t value Significance

Return on equity .569 .5704

Five-year alTerageROE -.386 .7002
Lagged ROA .I78 .8588
Decrease in reported
net income (dummy) -.302 .7630

u Each of tbe measures was substituted for ROA in the regression presented in Table 1. Each of
these meaS”reS is described on page 303.

disclosure, the long-term measure (five-year average ROE) is negatively

associated. Results, therefore, are consistent with the argument that social
disclosure is related to public pressure as opposed to profitability.

Discussion
The purpose of my study was to examine whether social disclosures are related
to either public pressure or profitability measures. It was proposed that these
disclosures may be used as a means of addressing the exposure companies face
to the social environment. Because this exposure is monitored through the
public-policy arena rather than the marketplace, it was hypothesized that the
level of social disclosure will be more closely related to public pressure than
profitability.
The results of regression analysis on the level of social disclosure for 128
firms in their 1985 annual reports indicate that both size and industry classifi-
cation (public pressure variables) are significant explanatory variables. In
contrast, the profitability variables included in the analysis were not signifi-
cantly associated with the extent of social disclosure.
It is important to note, of course, that interpretation of the results is subject
to the assumption that the proxy variables used are reliable indicators of the
public pressure companies face. A valuable extension of research in this area
would be the identification of less noisy proxies for public pressure. It also
must be noted that the analysis examined only one year’s disclosures and, as
such, may not be generalized across other periods. However, given the
previous findings of Cowen et al. (1987) and Trotman and Bradley (1981) for
disclosures during the 1970s it appears that generalizability may not be
particularly limited.

References
Abbott, W. F. and Monsen, R. J. September 1979. On the measurement of corporate
social responsibility: Self-reported disclosures as a method of measuring corporate
social involvement. Academy of Management Journal 22(3):501-515.
306 Dennis M. Patten

Aldrich, J. H. and Nelson, F. D. 1984, Linear Probability, Logit & Probit Models
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences No. 07-04.5. Beverly Hills:
SAGE Publications.
Anderson, J. C. and Frankle, A. W. July 1980. Voluntary social reporting: An Iso-Beta
portfolio analysis. The Accounting Review 55(3):467-479.
Andres, G. J. Spring 1985. Business involvement in campaign finance: Factors
influencing the decision to form a corporate PAC. PS: Political Science
18(2):213-220.
Belkaoui, A. Winter 1976. The impact of the disclosure of the environmental effects of
organizational behavior on the market. Financial Management 5(4):26-3 1.
Benston, G. J. 1982. Accounting and corporate accountability. Accounting, Organiza-
tions and Society 7(2):87- 105.
Bowman, E. H. and Haire, M. Winter 1975. A strategic posture toward corporate
social responsibility. California Management Review 18(2):49-58.
Carroll, A. B. October 1979. A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate
performance. Academy of Management Review 4(4):497-505.
Cowen, S. S., Ferreri, L. B. and Parker, L. D. 1987. The impact of corporate
characteristics on social responsibility disclosure: A typology and frequency-based
analysis. Accounting, Organizations and Society 12(2): 11 I- 122.
Dierkes, M. and Preston, L. R. 1977. Corporate social accounting reporting for the
physical environment: A critical review and implementation proposal. Accounting,
Organizations and Society 2(1):3-22.
Ernst & Ernst 1977. Social Responsibility Disclosure: 1977 Survey. Cleveland: Ernst
& Ernst.
Ernst & Ernst 1978. Social Responsibility Disclosure: 1978 Survey. Cleveland: Ernst
& Ernst.
Friedman, M. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Heard, J. E. and Bolce, W. J. 1981. The political significance of corporate social
reporting in the United States of America. Accounting, Organizations and Society
6(3):247-254.
Heinze, D. C. Spring 1976. Financial correlates of a social involvement measure.
Akron Business and Economic Review 7(1):48-51.
Ingram, R. W. Autumn 1978. Investigation of the information content of (certain)
social responsibility disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 16(2):270-285.
Ingram, R. W. and Frazier, K. Autumn 1980. Environmental performance and
corporate disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research 18(2):614-622.
Jaggi, B. and Freedman, M. September 1982. An analysis of the information content of
pollution disclosures. The Financial Review 17(3): 142- 152.
Lessem, R. Spring 1979. Corporate social report in action. Journal of General
Management 4(3):27-41.
Lipset, M. S. and Schneider, W. 1983. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and
Government in the Public Mind. New York: The Free Press.
Miles, R. H. 1987. Managing the Corporate Social Environment. Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Exposure, Legitimacy, and Social Disclosure 307

Noreen, E. Spring 1988. An empirical comparison of probit and OLS regression

hypothesis tests. Journal of Accounting Research 26(l): 119- 133.
Nulty, P. May 1989. The future of big oil. Fortune 119(10):46-49.
Parker, L. 1986. Polemical themes in social accounting: A scenario for standard
setting. In Advances in Public Interest Accounting Vol. 1. (M. Niemark, B.
Merino, and T. Tinker, eds.) Greenwich: JAI Press Inc, pp. 67-93.
Patten, D. M. May 1991. Changing trends in social disclosure: Evidence from 1985
annual reports. Presented at Western American Accounting Association Meeting,
Scottsdale, AZ.
Patten, D. M. forthcoming. Intra-industry environmental disclosures in response to the
Alaskan oil spill: A note on legitmacy theory. Accounting Organizations and
Society.
Preston, L. E. Winter 1978. Analyzing corporate social performance: Methods and
results. Journal of Contemporary Business 7( 1): 135- 150.
Preston, L. E. and Post, J. E. 1975, Private Management and Public Policy.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Ramanathan, K. V. July 1976. Toward a theory of corporate social accounting. The
Accounting Review 51(3):516-528.
Rockness, J., Schlachter, P. and Rockness, H. 0. 1986. Hazardous waste disposal,
corporate disclosure, and financial performance in the chemical industry. In Ad-
vances in Public Interest Accounting Vol. 1. (M. Niemark, B. Merino, and T.
Tinker, eds.) Greenwich: JAI Press Inc., pp. 167- 191.
Schreuder, H. and Ramanathan, K. V 1984. Accounting and corporate accountability:
An extended comment. Accounting, Organizations and Society 9(3):409-416.
Shocker, A. D. and Sethi, S. P. 1974. An approach to incorporating social preferences
in developing corporate action strategies. In The Unstable Ground: Corporate
Social Pohcy in a Dynamic Society (S. P. Sethi, ed.) Los Angeles: Melville
Publishing Company, pp. 67-80.
Stone, M. and Rasp, J. January 1991. Tradeoffs in the choice between logit and OLS
for accounting choice studies. The Accounting Review 66(l): 170-187.
The 1984 Fortune 500. April 29, 1985. Fortune 111(9):266-285.
The 1985 Fortune 500. April 28, 1986. Fortune 113(9): 182-201.
Tinker, T. and Niemark, M. 1987. The role of annual reports in gender and class
contradictions at General Motors. Accounting, Organizations and Society
12(1):65-88.
Trotman, K. T. March 1979. Social responsibility disclosures by Australian companies.
The Chartered Accountant in Australia 49(8):24-28.
Trotman, K. T. and Bradley, G. W. 1981. Associations between social responsibility
disclosure and charactertistics of companies. Accounting, Organizations and Soci-
ety 6(4):355-362.
Ullman, A. A. 1985. Data in search of a theory: A critical examination of the
relationships among social performance, social disclosure, and economic perform-
ance of U.S. firms. Academy of Management Review 10(3):540-557.
Value Line, Inc. 1987. The Value Line Survey. New York: Value Line, Inc.
308 Dennis M. Patten

Watts, R. L. and Zimmerman, J. L. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood

Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Wiseman, J. 1982. An evaluation of environmental disclosures made in corporate
annual reports. Accounting, Organizations and Society 7(1):53-63.
Zeghal, D. and Ahmed, S. A. 1990. Comparison of social responsibility information
disclosure media used by Canadian firms. Accounting, Auditing and Accountabil-
ity Journal 3(1):38-53.
Zimmerman, J. L. August 1983. Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 5(2): 119- 149.
Zmijewski, M. and Hagerman, R. August 1981. An income strategy approach to the
positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 3(2): 129- 149.