GENERAL INTRODUCTION

NATURE AND DEFINITION OF CRIME

I. NATURE OF CRIME
WHAT IS A CRIME? We must answer this question at the outset. In order to answer this
question we must know first, what is law because the two questions are closely inter-related.
Traditionally, we know a law to be a command enjoining a course of conduct. The command
may be of a sovereign or of political superiors to the political inferiors; or it may be the
command of a legally constituted body or a legislation emanating from a duly constituted
legislature to all the members of the society. A crime may, therefore, be an act of
disobedience to such a law forbidding or commanding it. But then disobedience of all laws
may not be a crime, for instance, disobedience of civil laws or laws of inheritance or
contracts. Therefore, a crime would mean something more than a mere disobedience to a law,
"it means an act which is both forbidden by law and revolting to the moral sentiments of the
society." Thus robbery or murder would be a crime, because they are revolting to the moral
sentiments of the society, but a disobedience of the revenue laws or the laws of contract
would not constitute a crime. Then again, "the moral sentiments of a society" is a flexible
term, because they may change, and they do change from time to time with the growth of the
public opinion and the social necessities of the times. So also, the moral values of one country
may be and often are quite contrary to the moral values of another country. To cite a few
instances, heresy was a crime at one time in most of the countries of the world, because in
those days it offended the moral sentiments of the society. It was punished with burning. But
nobody is punished nowadays for his religious beliefs, not even in a theocratic state. The
reason is obvious. Now it does not offend the moral sentiments of the society. Adultery is
another such instance. It is a crime punishable under our Penal Code, but it is not so in some
of the countries of the West. Then again suttee, i.e., burning of a married woman on the
funeral pyre of her deceased husband, was for a long time considered to be a virtue in our
own country, but now it is a crime. Similarly, polygamy was not a crime in our country until
it was made so by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. This Act, it may be stated, does not apply to
Mohammedans or Christians. But Christians are forbidden to practise polygamy under their
law of marriage, while Mohammedans are yet immune from punishment for polygamy. All
these instances go to show that the content of crime changes from time to time in the same
country and from country to country at the same time because it is conditioned by the moral
value approved of by a particular society in a particular age in a particular country. A crime of
yesterday may become a virtue tomorrow and so also a virtue of yesterday may become a
crime tomorrow. Such being the content of crime, all attempts made from time to time
beginning with Blackstone down to Kenny in modern times to define it have proved abortive.
Therefore, the present writer agrees with Russell when he observes that "to define crime is a
task which so far has not been satisfactorily accomplished by any writer. In fact, criminal
offences are basically the creation of the criminal policy adopted from time to time by those
sections of the community who are powerful or astute enough to safeguard their own security


R.C Nigam, LAW OF CRIMES IN INDIA25-37(1965)
and comfort by causing the sovereign power in the state to repress conduct which they feel
may endanger their position".
But a student embarking on study of principles of criminal law must understand the chief
characteristics and the true attributes of a crime. Though a crime, as we have seen, is difficult
of a definition in the true sense of the term, a definition of a crime must give us "the whole
thing and the sole thing," telling us something that shall be true of every crime and yet not be
true of any other conceivable non-criminal breach of law. We cannot produce such a
definition of crime as might be flexible enough to be true in all countries, in all ages and in all
times. Nevertheless, a crime may be described and its attributes and characteristics be clearly
understood. In order to achieve this object, we propose to adopt two ways, namely, first, we
shall distinguish crime from civil and moral wrongs, and secondly, we shall critically examine
all the definitions constructed by the eminent criminal jurists from time to time.
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL WRONGS
In order to draw a distinction between civil and criminal liability, it becomes necessary to
know clearly what is a wrong of which all the three are species. There are certain acts done by
us which a large majority of civilised people in the society look upon with disapprobation,
because they tend to reduce the sum total of human happiness, to conserve which is the
ultimate aim of all laws. Such acts may be called wrongs, for instance, lying, gambling,
cheating, stealing, homicide, proxying in the class, gluttony and so on. The evil tendencies
and the reflex action in the society of these acts or wrongs, as we have now chosen to call
them, differ in degree. Some of them are not considered to be serious enough as to attract
law's notice. We only disapprove of them. Such wrongs may be designated as moral wrongs,
for instance, lying, overeating or gluttony, disobedience of parents or teachers, and so on.
Moral wrongs are restrained and corrected by social laws and laws of religion.
There are other wrongs which are serious enough to attract the notice of the law. The
reaction in the society is grave enough and is expressed either by infliction of some pain on
the wrongdoer or by calling upon him to make good the loss to the wronged person. In other
words, law either awards punishment or damages according to the gravity of the wrong done.
If the law awards a punishment for the wrong done, we call it a crime; but if the law does not
consider it serious enough to award a punishment and allows only indemnification or
damages, we call such a wrong as a civil wrong or tort. In order to mark out the distinction
between crimes and torts, we have to go deep into the matter and study it rather elaborately.
Civil and Criminal Wrongs: We may state, broadly speaking, first, that crimes are graver
wrongs than torts. There are three reasons for this distinction between a crime and a tort. First,
they constitute greater interference with the happiness of others and affect the well-being not
only of the particular individual wronged but of the community as a whole. Secondly, because
the impulse to commit them is often very strong and the advantage to be gained from the
wrongful act and the facility with which it can be accomplished are often so great and the risk
of detection so small that human nature, inclined as it is to take the shortest cut to happiness,
is more likely to be tempted, more often than not, to commit such wrongs. A pickpocket, a
swindler, a gambler are all instances. Thirdly, ordinarily they are deliberate acts and directed
by an evil mind and are hurtful to the society by the bad example they set. Since crimes are
graver wrongs, they are singled out for punishment with four-fold objects, namely,of making
an example of the criminal, of deterring him from repeating the same act, of reforming him by
eradicating the evil, and of satisfying the society’s feeling of vengeance. Civil wrongs, on the
other hand, are less serious wrongs, as the effect of such wrongs is supposed to be confined
mainly to individuals and does not affect the community at large.
Secondly, the accused is treated with greater indulgence than the defendant in civil cases.
The procedure and the rules of evidence are modified in order to reduce to a minimum the
risk of an innocent person being punished. For example, the accused is not bound to prove
anything, nor is he required to make any statement in court, nor is he compellable to answer
any question or give an explanation. However, under the Continental Laws an accused can be
interrogated.
Thirdly, if there is any reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of
doubt is always given to the accused. It is said that it is better that ten guilty men should
escape rather than an innocent person should suffer. But the defendant in a civil case is not
given any such benefit of doubt.
Fourthly, crimes and civil injuries are generally dealt with in different tribunals. The
former are tried in the criminal courts, while the latter in the civil courts.
Fifthly, in case of a civil injury, the object aimed at is to indemnify the individual
wronged and to put him as far as practicable in the position he was, before he was wronged.
Therefore he can compromise the case, whereas in criminal cases generally the state alone, as
the protector of the rights of its subjects, pursues the offender and often does so in spite of
the injured party. There are, however, exceptions1o this rule.
Lastly, an act in order to be criminal must be done with malice or criminal intent. In
other words, there is no crime without an evil intent. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea,
which means that the act alone does not make .a man guilty unless his intentions were so.
This essential of the crime distinguishes it from civil injuries.
Criminal and Moral Wrongs: A criminal wrong may also be distinguished from a
moral wrong. It is narrower in extent than a moral wrong. In no age or in any nation an
attempt has ever been made to treat every moral wrong as a crime. In a crime an idea of
some definite gross undeniable injury to someone is involved. Some definite overt act is
necessary, but do we punish a person for ingratitude, hard-heartedness, absence of natural
affection, habitual idleness, avarice, sensuality and pride, which are all instances of moral
lapses? They might be subject of confession and penance but not criminal proceeding. The
criminal law, therefore, has a limited scope. It applies only to definite acts of commission
and omission, capable of being distinctly proved. These acts of commission and omission
cause definite evils either on definite persons or on the community at large. Within these
narrow limits there may be a likeness between criminal law and morality. For instance,
offences like murder, rape, arson, robbery, theft and the like are equally abhorred by law and
morality. On the other hand, there are many acts which are not at all immoral, nonetheless
they are criminal. For example, breaches of statutory regulations and bye laws are classed as
criminal offences, although they do not involve the slightest moral blame. So also “the
failure to have a proper light on a bicycle or keeping of a pig in a wrong place," or the
neglect in breach of a bye-law to cause a child to attend school during the whole of the
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ordinary school hours; and conversely many acts of great immorality are not criminal
offences, as for example, adultery in England, or incest in India. However, whenever law and
morals unite in condemning an act, the punishment for the act is enhanced.
Stephen on the relationship between criminal law and morality observes:
The relation between criminal law and morality is not in all cases the same. The two may
harmonise; there may be a conflict between them, or they may be independent. In all
common cases they do, and, in my opinion, wherever and so far as it is possible, they
ought to harmonise with and support one another. Everything which is regarded as
enhancing the moral guilt of a particular offence is recognised as a reason for increasing
the severity of the punishment awarded to it. On the other hand, the sentence of the law is
to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax. It
converts into a permanent final judgement what might otherwise be a transient sentiment.
The mere general suspicion or knowledge that a man has done something dishonest may
never be brought to a point, and the disapprobation excited by it may in time pass away,
but the fact that he has been convicted and punished as a thief stamps a mark upon him
for life. In short, the infliction of punishment by law gives definite expression and a
solemn ratification and a justification to the hatred which is excited by the commission of
the offence, and which constitutes the ll1oral or popular as distinguished from the
conscientious sanction of that part of morality which is also sanctioned by the criminal
law. The crill1inal law thus proceeds upon the principle that it is ll1orally right to hate
crill1inals, and it confirms and justifies that sentill1ent by inflicting upon criminals
punishments which express it.
Criminal Law and Ethics: Let us also distinguish criminal law from ethics. Ethics is a
study of the supreme good. It deals with absolute ideal, whereas positive morality deals with
current public opinion, and law is concerned with social relationship of men rather than with
the individual's excellence of character. The distinction between law and morality has been
discussed already. We may now bring out the distinction between law and ethics by citing
two illustrations. Your neighbour, for instance, is dying of starvation. Your granary is full. Is
there any law that requires you to help him out of your plenty? It may be ethically wrong or
morally wrong; but not criminally wrong. Then again, you are standing on the bank of a tank.
A woman is filling her pitcher. All of a sudden she gets an epileptic fit. You do not try to
save her. You may have committed an ethical wrong or a moral wrong, but will you be
punished criminally? However, with the growth of the humanitarian ideas, it is hoped that
the conception of one's duty to others will gradually expand, and a day might arrive when it
may have to conform-to the ideal conduct which the great Persian Poet. Sheikh Saadi, aimed
at, viz.: “If you see a blind man proceeding to a well, if you are silent, you commit a crime.”
This was what the poet said in the 13th century. But we may have to wait for a few more
decades, when we might give a different answer to the question: “Am I my brother's
keeper?"
Are Crimes and Torts Complementary? In the foregoing, we have drawn a clear
distinction between crimes and civil injuries. In spite of those distinctions, however, it
should be remembered that crimes and torts are complementary and not exclusive of each
other. Criminal wrongs and civil wrongs are thus not sharply separated groups of acts but
are often one and the same act as viewed from different standpoint, the difference being not
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one of nature but only of relation. To ask concerning any occurrence, "is this a crime or a
tort?" is, to borrow Sir James Stephen's apt illustration, no wiser than it would be to ask of a
man, "Is he a father or a son? For he may be both." In fact, whatever is within the scope of
the penal law is crime, whatever is a ground for a claim of damages, as for an injury, is a
tort; but there is no reason why the same act should not belong to both classes, arid many
acts do. In fact, some torts or civil injuries were erected and are being erected into crimes,
whenever the law-making hand comes to regard the civil remedy for them as being
inadequate. But we cannot go so far as to agree with Blackstone when he makes a sweeping
observation that "universally every crime is a civil injury." This observation of Blackstone is
proved incorrect in the following three offences which do not happen to injure any particular
individual. First, a man publishes a seditious libel or enlists recruits for the service of some
foreign belligerent. In either of these cases an offence against the state has been committed
but no injury is caused to any particular individual. Secondly, an intending forgerer, who is
found in possession of a block for the purpose of forging a trade mark or engraving a bank-
note or for forging a currency note, commits a serious offence but he causes no injury to any
individual. Thirdly, there are cases where though a private individual does actually suffer by
the offence, yet the sufferer is no other than the actual criminal himself who, of course,
cannot claim compensation against himself, for example, in cases of attempted suicide.
However, in England as elsewhere the process of turning of private wrongs into public ones
is not yet complete, but it is going forward year to year. For instance, the maiming or
killings of another man’s cattle were formerly civil wrongs but they were made crimes in
the Hanoverian reign. Then again, it was not until 1857 a crime for a trustee to commit a
breach of trust. So also, incest was created a crime in 1908. In fact, the categories of crimes
are not closed. In our own country, since Independence, many acts have now been enacted
into crimes which we could not even have conceived of, for instance, practice of
untouchability or forced labour or marrying below a certain age and so on. A socialistic state
does conceive of many anti-social behaviours punishable as crimes more frequently.
We must remember that crime is a relative concept and a changing one too. Different
societies have different views as to what constitutes a criminal act and the conception of a
crime may vary with the age, locality and several other facts and circumstances. For
example, people were burned for heresy a few centuries ago, but in modern times no
civilised nation punishes a man on the ground that he professes a different religious view.
Then again, adultery is a crime according to our penal code, while it is a civil wrong
according to English law.
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CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF CRIME

ELEMENTS OF A CRIME
The two elements of crime are mens rea and actus reus. Apart from these two elements
that go to make up a crime, there are two more indispensable elements, namely, first, “a
human being under a legal obligation to act in a particular way and a fit subject for the
infliction of appropriate punishment,” and secondly, “an injury to another human being or to
the society at large.” Thus the four elements that go to constitute a crime are as follows: first,
a human being under a legal obligation to act in a particular way and a fit subject for the
infliction of appropriate punishment: secondly, an evil intent or mens rea on the part of such
human being; thirdly, actus reus, i.e., act committed or omitted in furtherance of such an
intent; and fourthly, an injury to another human being or to society at large by such an act.
A Human Being: The first element requires that the act should have been done by a
human being before it can constitute a crime punishable at law. The human being must be
“under a legal obligation to act, and capable of being punished.” .
Mens Rea: The second element, which is an important essential of a crime, is mens rea or
guilty mind. In the entire field of criminal law there is no important doctrine than that of mens
rea. The fundamental principle of English Criminal jurisprudence, to use a maxim which has
been familiar to lawyers following the common law for several centuries, is “actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea”. Mens rea is the state of mind indicating culpability, which is required
by statute as an element of a crime. It is commonly taken to mean some blameworthy mental
condition, whether constituted by intention or knowledge or otherwise, the absence of which
on any particular occasion negatives the intention of a crime. The term ‘mens rea’ has been
given to volition, which is the motive force behind the criminal act. It is also one of the
essential ingredients of criminal liability.
As a general rule every crime requires a mental element, the nature of which will depend
upon the definition of the particular crime in question. Even in crimes of strict liability some
mental element is required. Expressions connoting the requirement of a mental element
include: ‘with intent’, ‘recklessly’, ‘unlawfully’, ‘maliciously’, ‘unlawfully and maliciously’,
‘wilfully’, ‘knowingly’, ‘knowing or believing’, ‘fraudulently’, ‘dishonestly’, ‘corruptly’,
‘allowing’, and ‘permitting’. Each of these expressions is capable of bearing a meaning,
which differs from that ascribed to any other. The meaning of each must be determined in the
context in which it appears, and the same expression may bear a different meaning in
different contexts. Under the IPC, guilt in respect of almost all offences is fastened either on
the ground of intention or knowledge or reason to believe. All the offences under the Code are
qualified by one or the other words such as wrongful gain or wrongful loss, dishonestly,
fraudulently, reason to believe, criminal knowledge or intention, intentional co-operation,
voluntarily, malignantly, wantonly. All these words describe the mental condition required at
the time of commission of the offence, in order to constitute an offence. Thus, though the


Edited from:R. C. Nigam, LAW OF CRIMES IN INDIA38-43 (1965); V. Suresh and D.
Nagasaila (eds.), P.S. ATCHUTHEN PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW 42-47(9thedn., 2006)
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word mens rea as such is nowhere found in the IPC, its essence is reflected in almost all the
provisions of the code. The existence of the mental element or guilty mind or mens rea at the
time of commission of the actus reus or the act alone will make the act an offence.
Generally, subject to both qualification and exception, a person is not criminally liable for
a crime unless he intends to cause, foresees that he will probably cause, or at the lowest,
foresees that he may cause, the elements which constitute the crime in question. Although the
view has been expressed that it is impossible to ascribe any particular meaning to the term
mens rea, concepts such as those of intention, recklessness and knowledge are commonly
used as the basis for criminal liability and in some respects may be said to be fundamental to
it:
Intention: To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; it is
used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible
consequences of his conduct. The idea foresees but also desires the possible consequences of
his conduct. The idea of ‘intention’ in law is not always expressed by the words ‘intention’,
‘intentionally’ or ‘with intent to’. It is expressed also by words such as ‘voluntarily’,
‘wilfully’ or ‘deliberately’ etc. Section 298 IPC makes the uttering of words or making
gestures with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings punishable under the Act. ON a
plain reading of the section, the words ‘deliberate’ and ‘intent’ seem synonymous. An act is
intentional if, and in so far as it exists in idea before it exists in fact, the idea realizing itself in
the fact because of the desire by which it is accompanied. Intention does not mean ultimate
aim and object. Nor is it a synonym for motive.
Transferred intention: Where a person intends to commit a particular crime and brings
about the elements which constitute that crime, he may be convicted notwithstanding that the
crime takes effect in a manner which was unintended or unforeseen. A, intends to kill B by
poisoning. A places a glass of milk with poison on the table of B knowing that at the time of
going to bed B takes glass of milk. On that fateful night instead of B, C enters the bedroom of
B and takes the glass of milk and dies in consequence. A is liable for the killing of C under
the principle of transferred intention or malice.
Intention and Motive: Intention and motive are often confused as being one and the
same. The two, however, are distinct and have to be distinguished. The mental element of a
crime ordinarily involves no reference to motive. Motive is something which prompts a man
to form an intention. Intention has been defined as the fixed direction of the mind to a
particular object, or determination to act in a particular manner and it is distinguishable from
motive which incites or stimulates action. Sometimes, motive plays an important role and
becomes a compelling force to commit a crime and, therefore, motive behind the crime
become a relevant factor for knowing the intention of a person. In Om Prakash v. State of
Uttranchal [(2003) 1 SCC 648] and State of UP v. Arun Kumar Gupta [(2003) 2 SCC 202]
the Supreme Court rejected the plea that the prosecution could not signify the motive for the
crime holding that failure to prove motive is irrelevant in a case wherein the guilt of the
accused is proved otherwise. It needs to be emphasised that motive is not an essential element
of an offence but motive helps us to know the intention of a person. Motive is relevant and
important on the question of intention.
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Intention and knowledge: The terms ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ which denote mens
rea appear in Sections 299 and 300, having different consequences. Intention and knowledge
are used as alternate ingredients to constitute the offence of culpable homicide. However,
intention and knowledge are two different things. Intention is the desire to achieve a certain
purpose while knowledge is awareness on the part of the person concerned of the
consequence of his act of omission or commission, indicating his state of mind. The
demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin, but it is not difficult to
perceive that they connote different things. There may be knowledge of the likely
consequences without any intention to cause the consequences. For example, a mother jumps
into a well along with her child in her arms to save herself and her child from the cruelty of
her husband. The child dies but the mother survives. The act of the mother is culpable
homicide. She might not have intended to cause death of the child but, as a person having
prudent mind, which law assumes every person to have, she ought to have known that
jumping into the well along with the child was likely to cause the death of the child. She
ought to have known as prudent member of the society that her act was likely to cause death
even when she may not have intended to cause the death of the child.
Recklessness: Intention cannot exist without foresight, but foresight can exist without
intention. For a man may foresee the possible or even probable consequences of his conduct
and yet not desire this state of risk of bringing about the unwished result. This state of mind is
known as ‘recklessness’. The words ‘rash’ and ‘rashness’ have also been used to indicate this
same attitude.
Negligence: If anything is done without any advertence to the consequent event or result,
the mental state in such situation signifies negligence. The event may be harmless or harmful;
if harmful the question arises whether there is legal liability for it. In civil law (common law)
it is decided by considering whether or not a reasonable man in the same circumstances would
have realized the prospect of harm and would have stopped or changed his course so as to
avoid it. If a reasonable man would not, then there is no liability and the harm must lie where
it falls. The word ‘negligence’, therefore, is used to denote blameworthy inadvertence. It
should be recognized that at common law there is no criminal liability for harm thus caused
by inadvertence. Strictly speaking, negligence may not be a form of mens rea. It is more in
the nature of a legal fault. However, it is made punishable for a utilitarian purpose of hoping
to improve people’s standards of behaviour. Criminal liability for negligence is exceptional at
common law; manslaughter appears to be the only common law crime, which may result from
negligence. Crimes of negligence may be created by statute, and a statute may provide that it
is a defence to charges brought under its provisions for the accused to prove that he was not
negligent. Conversely, negligence with regard to some subsidiary element in the actus reus of
a crime may deprive the accused of a statutory defence which would otherwise have been
available to him.
Advertent negligence is commonly termed as wilful negligence or recklessness. In other
words, inadvertent negligence may be distinguished as simple. In the former the harm done is
foreseen as possible or probable but it is not willed. In the latter it is neither foreseen nor
willed. In each case carelessness, i.e. to say indifference as to the consequences, is present;
but in the former this indifference does not, while in the latter it does prevent these
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consequences from being foreseen. The physician who treats a patient improperly through
ignorance or forgetfulness is guilty of simple or inadvertent negligence; but if he does the
same in order to save himself trouble, or by way of a scientific experiment with full
recognition of the danger so incurred, his negligence is wilful. It may be important to state
here that the wilful wrong doer is liable because he desires to do the harm; the negligent
wrong doer is liable because he does not sufficiently desire to avoid it. He who will excuse
himself on the ground that he meant no evil is still open to the reply: - perhaps you did not,
but at all event you might have avoided it if you had sufficiently desire to do so; and you are
held liable not because you desired the mischief, but because you were careless and
indifferent whether it ensured or not. It is on this ground that negligence is treated as a form
of mens rea, standing side by side with wrongful intention as a formal ground of
responsibility.
Actus Reus: To constitute a crime the third element, which we have called actus reus or
which Russell1 has termed as “physical event”, is necessary. Now what is this actus reus?2 It
is a physical result of human conduct. When criminal policy regards such a conduct as
sufficiently harmful it is prohibited and the criminal policy provides a sanction or penalty for
its commission. The actus reus may be defined in the words of Kenny to be “such result of
human conduct as the law seeks to prevent.”3 Such human conduct may consist of acts of
commission as well as acts of omission. Section 32 of our Penal Code lays down: “Words
which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions.”
It is, of course, necessary that the act done or omitted to be done must be an act forbidden
or commanded by some statute law, otherwise, it may not constitute a crime. Suppose, an
executioner hangs a condemned prisoner with the intention of hanging him. Here all the three
elements obviously are present, yet he would not be committing a crime because he is acting
in accordance with a law enjoining him to act. So also if a surgeon in the course of an
operation, which he knew to be dangerous, with the best of his skill and care performs it and
yet the death of the patient is caused, he would not be guilty of committing a crime because
he had no mens rea to commit it.
As regards acts of omission which make a man criminally responsible, the rule is that no
one would be held liable for the lawful consequences of his omission unless it is proved that
he was under a legal obligation to act. In other words, some duty should have been imposed
upon him by law, which he has omitted to discharge. Under the Penal Code, Section 43 lays
down that the word “illegal” is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is
prohibited by law, or which furnishes a ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be
“legally bound to do whatever it is illegal in him to omit.” Therefore, an illegal omission
would apply to omissions of everything which he is legally bound to do. These indicate
problems of actus reus we have discussed in detail elsewhere. However, the two elements
actus reus and mens rea are distinct elements of a crime. They must always be distinguished
and must be present in order that a crime may be constituted. The mental element or mens rea
in modern times means that the person’s conduct must be voluntary and it must also be

1
Russell, op. cit, p. 27
2
It includes not only the result of active conduct (i.e. a deed), but also the result of inactivity.
3
Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (17th Ed.), p. 14.
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actuated by a guilty mind, while actus reus denotes the physical result of the conduct, namely,
it should be a violation of some law, statutory or otherwise, prohibiting or commanding the
conduct.
Injury to Human Being: The fourth element, as we have pointed out above, is an injury
to another human being or to society at large. This injury to another human being should be
illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or property. Therefore, it becomes
clear that the consequences of harmful conduct may not only cause a bodily harm to another
person, it may cause harm to his mind or to his property or to his reputation. Sometimes, by a
harmful conduct no injury is caused to another human being, yet the act may be held liable as
a crime, because in such a case harm is caused to the society at large. All the public offences,
especially offences against the state, e.g. treason, sedition, etc. are instances of such harms.
They are treated to be very grave offences and punished very severely also.
We may state again that there are four essential elements that go to constitute a crime.
First, the wrongdoer who must be a human being and must have the capacity to commit a
crime, so that he may be a fit subject for the infliction of an appropriate punishment.
Secondly, there should be an evil intent or mens rea on the part of such human being. This is
also known as the subjective element of a crime. Thirdly, there should be an actus reus, i.e. an
act committed or omitted in furtherance of such evil intent or mens rea. This may be called
the objective element of a crime. Lastly, as a result of the conduct of the human being acting
with an evil mind, an injury should have been caused to another human being or to the society
at large. Such an injury should have been caused to any other person in body, mind,
reputation or property. If all these elements are present, generally, we would say that a crime
has been constituted. However, in some cases we find that a crime is constituted, although
there is no mens rea at all. These are known as cases of strict liability. Then again, in some
cases a crime is constituted, although the actus reus has not consummated and no injury has
resulted to any person. Such cases are known as inchoate crimes, like attempt, abetment or
conspiracy. So also, a crime may be constituted where only the first two elements are present.
In other words, when there is intention alone or even in some cases there may be an assembly
alone of the persons without any intention at all. These are exceptional cases of very serious
crimes which are taken notice of by the state in the larger interests of the peace and
tranquillity of the society.

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