CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

A Guide for Nuclear Industry Professionals / 30-Year Update

Updated April 2016

NucNet: The Nuclear Communications Network
www.nucnet.org
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

Contents

Introduction 2
Summary 3
The Accident 4
The Causes: A Combination Of Reasons 6
The Sequence Of Events Leading Up To the Accident 7
The Aftermath 8
The Health Effects 9
Chernobyl Today: Status In Brief 11
December 2000: Plant Closure 11
Next Steps 12
The Costs 12
Chernobyl Shelter Fund Contributions (Table) 13
Nuclear Safety Account Contributions (Table) 14
The Future 14
Slavutich 15
Environment 16
Radiation and Animals 17
Nuclear Safety 18
Three Mile Island 20
March 2011: Fukushima-Daiichi 22
The Health Effects: As Reported by NucNet 23
Nuclear Energy Agency Study 23
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 24

1|Page
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

NucNet Chernobyl Fact File

Introduction
Few technical subjects raise as much controversy as nuclear energy and few nuclear sub-
jects are as emotive as the disaster at Chernobyl in what was then the Soviet Union (now
Ukraine) in April 1986. The word “Chernobyl” conjures up images of environmental
catastrophe and serious long-term human health consequences.
But who knows what really happened? A combination of rumour and the complex nature of
scientific evidence surrounding Chernobyl can make it difficult to establish fact from fiction.
The picture is complicated further by contradictory media reports.
On some questions, there are no unequivocal answers. Early speculation was that radiation
exposure would claim tens of thousands of lives. Yet as of the end of 2010, fewer than 50
deaths had been directly attributed to it. According to three branches of the United Nations –
the World Health Organisation (WHO), the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Ef-
fects of Atomic Radiation (Unscear), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –
poverty, mental health problems and lifestyle diseases now common in the former Soviet
Union pose a greater threat to local communities than radiation exposure.
The accident at Chernobyl distorted the arguments both for and against nuclear power. As
the arguments became distorted, so did the popular view of what had gone wrong and what
happened in the accident's aftermath.
This is a crucial time for the nuclear energy industry, with renewed interest worldwide in
building new reactors to deal with climate change and security of supply, and the aftermath
and lessons to be learned from the serious accident at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant
in Japan in March 2011.
The IAEA says more than 60 countries – mostly in the developing world – have told it they
are interested in starting nuclear power programmes. Among countries engaged in new-build
programmes are: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Finland, France, India, Iran, Japan,
Pakistan, Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Thirty years have passed since Chernobyl. The technology of nuclear energy has changed
dramatically. The Chernobyl accident significantly slowed down nuclear developments
throughout the Soviet bloc. The construction of new plants was stopped and plans put on
hold in the face of environmental protests, local authority resistance, and serious economic
problems. But public hostility to nuclear power abated, allowing an ambitious new
programme of civil nuclear power development to be drawn up. Worldwide, because of

2|Page
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

growing concern about energy security and global warming, nuclear energy is back at the
top of the political agenda – and back in the media.
This Chernobyl Fact File, published by the Brussels-based nuclear energy communications
network NucNet, is designed to help nuclear communications professionals and journalists
covering Chernobyl and nuclear energy in general, understand the reasons behind what
happened and for the contradictions that have arisen. It concentrates on the facts of
Chernobyl. Where the facts cannot be established, it takes as its sources scientific evidence
such as the 2005 Chernobyl Forum report* on health consequences, the Nuclear Energy
Agency's 2002 Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts†, and the 2011 Unscear re-
port on the health effects due to radiation from the Chernobyl accident‡.
Each section of the Chernobyl Fact File deals with an important aspect of the accident and
its aftermath, including how it happened, why it happened and the steps that were taken to
make sure it could not happen again. The events leading up to and following the accident
are described and explained. Chernobyl myths are dispelled, the reasons for and the reper-
cussions of the accident clarified.
The information in this document is directed at communicators, but is equally as pertinent to
researchers, students, nuclear professionals and politicians.

Summary
The Chernobyl nuclear power plant had four RBMK reactor units. These are light-water
graphite reactors. The accident on 26 April 1986 was in the fourth unit.
RBMK is an acronym for reactor Bolshoi moshchnosti kanalniy (Russian for “high-power
channel reactor”), a type of reactor with individual fuel channels. It uses ordinary water as its
coolant and graphite as its moderator. Moderator is the medium that reduces the speed of
fast neutrons from nuclear fission, thereby turning them into thermal neutrons capable of
sustaining a nuclear chain reaction involving uranium-235. The combination of graphite
moderator and water coolant is found in no other type of nuclear reactor.
The RBMK was never built outside the former Soviet Union and had certain design charac-
teristics that would have prevented it receiving a licence elsewhere. Most notably, it had
characteristics which made it prone to power surges. And it had no full containment struc-
ture.
The accident at Chernobyl was caused when the reactor's operating crew switched off safety
systems so they could carry out a test. A violent explosion blew off the 1000-tonne sealing
cap on the reactor top. A second explosion threw out fragments of burning fuel and graphite
from the core and allowed air to rush in, causing the graphite moderator to burst into flames.

*
Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts (Chernobyl Forum, September 2005).
†
Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts – 2002 Update of Chernobyl: Ten Years On (Nuclear Energy
Agency).
‡
Health Effects Due to Radiation From the Chernobyl Accident – Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Unscear 2008, Volume 2, Annex (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,
February 2011).

3|Page
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

The initial explosion resulted in the deaths of two workers. Twenty-eight of the firemen and
emergency clean-up workers died within three months of acute radiation sickness and one of
cardiac arrest.
Long-term health effects have occurred since 1986 and may also occur in the future. A 2005
report published by the IAEA said up to 4000 people could eventually die of radiation expo-
sure from the accident. It also said public health effects have not been nearly as substantial
as had at first been feared.
As of end-2010, fewer than 50 deaths had been attributed to radiation from the accident, al-
most all being highly exposed rescue workers, many who died within months of the accident,
but others who died as late as 2006.
All four reactors at Chernobyl have been shut down and the plant is no longer operational.
The last reactor, unit 3, was shut down on 15 December 2000. Decommissioning is continu-
ing.
There are 15 RBMK reactors in operation today, all in Russia. All these RBMK reactors have
undergone modifications to eliminate the deficiencies that caused the Chernobyl accident.
Other RBMK reactors, including two in Lithuania, have been shut down as a condition of this
country’s entry into the European Union.
In 1986, a shelter was built to enclose the remnants of the destroyed Chernobyl reactor
number four. The shelter, initially called a “sarcophagus”, was hurriedly built in seven months
and has deteriorated. To reduce the risk of collapse the roof and the western wall were suc-
cessfully stabilised from 2004 to 2008. Inside the shelter, the ventilation stack got new
structural supports. The stabilisation was finished on time and within the cost estimate of
about US$50 million.
A conceptual design of a new arch-shaped structure, known as the New Safe Confinement
(NSC) was decided in 2001 and the safety document approved in 2008. The main orders for
steel and crane were placed in 2010. On-site construction began in 2011.
With a 100-year design life, this huge structure will be constructed away from the sarcopha-
gus to reduce radiation exposure to workers. When complete, it will be slid over the sar-
cophagus in a single day. This will isolate the sarcophagus from the weather and outside
environment, and provide safe conditions for future deconstruction work that will take place
inside the shelter.
The Chernobyl Shelter Fund, managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (EBRD), was set up in 1997 to make the sarcophagus stable and environmentally
safe, clean up the site, build intermediate storage facilities for radioactive waste and fuel,
and build the NSC. The overall cost of the Shelter Implementation Plan is close to €1.6 bil-
lion. As of November 2015 the CSF has received close to €1.3 billion in total. Twenty-three
countries, the European Union and EBRD shareholders will share the costs.§

§
Chernobyl 25 Years on: New Safe Confinement and Spent Fuel Facility (European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, London, 14 December 2010)

4|Page
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

The Accident
In the early hours of Saturday 26 April 1986, the world’s worst nuclear power accident oc-
curred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the former USSR, now Ukraine, 130 kilome-
tres north of Kiev.
The accident was the result of a flawed Soviet reactor design coupled with mistakes made
by the plant operators within a system where training was minimal and feedback of experi-
ence unknown. These failings, in turn, were a direct consequence of Cold War isolation and
the resulting lack of a rigorous safety culture.
Reactor number four, an RBMK unit of 925 megawatts (MW) was to be shut down for routine
maintenance and it was decided to take advantage of this to run a test. Ironically, the test
was designed to improve safety. The reactor’s cooling pumps relied on electrical power, so
the operators wanted to determine whether, in the event of a loss of power, the kinetic en-
ergy of the slowing turbo-generator could provide enough electrical power to operate the
emergency equipment and the core cooling water circulating pumps until the diesel emer-
gency power supply became operative.
To reduce cooling requirements, the reactor was to be run at low power, despite the fact that
RBMK reactors were known to be unstable at low power settings. The test had been at-
tempted on two previous occasions but never completed.
The reactor’s power was reduced to half power and one of the two turbo-generators pow-
ered by the reactor was disconnected. The reactor’s emergency cooling system was deliber-
ately disabled, because operators didn’t want it cutting in when the main pumps slowed. At
this point, grid controllers asked for the test to be delayed due to system requirements. The
reactor ran for more than nine hours in this condition until permission was given to continue
reducing power for the test to proceed. The power should have been held at the test level of
700 MW to 1,000 MW, but the automatic control was incorrectly set and power fell to 39 MW,
allowing concentrations of the neutron-absorbing fission product xenon to build up.
This, together with the fact that six main cooling pumps were operating and water flow was
excessive, significantly decreased reactivity, making it difficult for the operator to restore
power. Eventually, the operator managed to stabilise the power at 200 MW, but was unable
to increase it further due to loss of reactivity. This power level was well below that required,
but the decision was taken to go ahead with the test.
Two further standby cooling water pumps were started, leading to an increase in water flow
beyond operating limits. This caused a reduction in steam bubbles in the cooling system,
reducing reactivity still further. Control rods – which are used in nuclear reactors to control
the rate of fission – were withdrawn beyond prescribed limits in an attempt to increase reac-
tivity.
At one point, only six to eight control rods were being used. According to procedure, at least
30 were required to maintain control. If there were fewer than 30, the reactor should have
been shut down.
Operators continued the test, despite knowing that about 20 seconds would be required to
lower all the control rods and shut down the reactor in the event of a power surge. To keep
the test going, the protection system that would have tripped the reactor if limits were ex-
ceeded was disconnected. The test was started by closing the steam supply to the turbo
generator.

5|Page
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

As the turbine ran down, the amount of cooling water being provided to the reactor de-
creased and steam was produced at a rapid rate. The reactor’s positive void coefficient – the
increase in the number of fission reactions and consequently of power production when
there are voids (e.g. steam bubbles) instead of water in the fuel channels – meant the reac-
tor produced more power and even more steam and hence more voids in the fuel channels:
a typical “runaway” process.
At 01:23 local time on 26 April, there was a sudden and unexpected power surge. Reactor
power increased exponentially, up to an estimated 100 times nominal. The control rods
could not be fully re-inserted in time. Their design simply did not allow an accelerated inser-
tion. What’s more, their design meant that initial displacement of water as they were lowered
into the channels could exacerbate the situation. The fuel overheated and some of the fuel
channels ruptured.
The resulting explosion, thought to be caused mainly by steam pressure and chemical reac-
tion with the exposed fuel, blew the 1000-tonne sealing cap on the reactor clear of the core.
A second explosion threw out burning fuel and graphite from the core and allowed air to rush
in, causing the graphite moderator to burst into flames. The exact cause of the second ex-
plosion remains unknown, but it is thought that hydrogen may have played a part.
Determining the causes of the accident was not easy, because there was no experience of
comparable events to refer to. Eyewitness reports, measurements carried out after the acci-
dent, and experimental reconstructions were necessary. The causes of the accident are still
described as a fateful combination of human error and technological shortcomings.

The Causes: A Combination Of Reasons

The test during which the accident happened was carried out under time pressure. Shortly
after it started, the test run was interrupted for nine hours. Electricity still had to be supplied
to Kiev so the test took place at night.
Several flaws in the technical design of the RBMK are thought to have been decisive. These
included the handling of the control rods. In a reactor, the power level is controlled by raising
and lowering the control rods: raising the control rods increases power; lowering them ab-
sorbs more neutrons leading to a decrease in power.
In this type of reactor, however, the design of the control rods had a fatal flaw. Graphite fol-
lowers fitted to the control rods could actually increase reactivity at the bottom of the core
when the rods were inserted from a completely withdrawn position. Followers are a special
design feature of the RBMK. They displace water and improve the reactor’s neutron balance.
In the Chernobyl test, too many control rods were withdrawn and then simultaneously in-
serted into the core while the positive void coefficient was already causing a rapid rise in
power. This caused the power level to rise so dramatically that the reactor was destroyed.
A similar error, but with much less severe consequences, had occurred in a reactor of the
same type in Lithuania in 1983. This experience, however, was not passed on to the oper-
ating crew at Chernobyl.
Thirty-one people died as an immediate consequence of the accident; one in the explosion
itself, one from coronary thrombosis, one from thermal burns and 28 from acute radiation
poisoning. The highest radiation doses were received by the 1,000 on-site reactor staff and

6|Page
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

emergency workers on the first day of the accident. Among the more than 200,000 emer-
gency and recovery operation workers exposed during the period from 1986 to 1987, an es-
timated 2,200 radiation-caused premature deaths must be expected during their lifetime.
Information on the individual received doses is sketchy, but doses are thought to have
ranged from 170 millisieverts (mSv) in 1986 to 15mSv in 1989. A commonly used limit for the
maximum allowable exposure is 1mSv per person per year above natural background levels.
For comparison, average natural background radiation levels in the UK are 2.2mSv per per-
son per year.
Nobody off-site suffered from acute radiation poisoning.

The Sequence Of Events Leading Up To the Accident

Reactor number four, an RBMK unit of The operator has difficulty manually
925 MW (electrical) is to be shut down for maintaining the water level and steam
routine maintenance. It is decided to take pressure in the steam drums. He discon-
advantage of the shut-down to run a test. nects the protection system that would
have tripped the reactor.
The test is to demonstrate that in the
event of loss of power, a slowing turbine At one point, only eight control rods are
has enough inertial energy to power the used. Procedure stipulates at least 30 are
reactor cooler pumps until emergency die- needed to maintain control.
sel generators cut in. The reactor’s emer-
Operators allow the test to continue, de-
gency cooling system is deliberately dis-
spite knowing that insufficient reserve ex-
abled so it doesn’t cut in when the main
ists to shut down the reactor should an
pumps slow down.
emergency develop.
Due to operational error, power falls to 30
The operator closes the steam supply to
MW thermal * – well below the designed
the turbo-generator to start the test. There
test power of 700 to 1000 MW thermal – a
is a sudden and unexpected power surge
level where the positive void coefficient is
due to the positive void coefficient. Reac-
dominant.
tor power increases exponentially, up to
The neutron absorbing fission product xe- an estimated 100 times nominal. The con-
non builds up. This, together with a de- trol rods cannot be re-inserted in time. The
crease in coolant flow, decreases reactiv- fuel overheats and some of the fuel chan-
ity, making it difficult for the operator to nels rupture.
restore power rapidly.
The resulting explosion blows the 1,000-
The operator stabilises reactor power at tonne sealing cap on the reactor clear of
200 MW thermal, but is unable to raise the core. A second explosion throws out
power further due to shortage of reactivity. fragments of burning fuel and graphite
The operator decides to proceed with the from the core. Air rushes in to the exposed
test. core, causing the graphite moderator to
burst into flames.
With reactor power reduced and eight
pumps operating, water flow exceeds * Thermal power is the power produced by the
permitted levels. The extra water absorbs uranium fission reaction in the form of heat in the
reactor. This heat is used to make the coolant –
neutrons, reducing reactivity. In an attempt
water – boil. Water vapour is produced, transported
to compensate, the operator withdraws the to the turbines and makes them turn to produce
control rods further. electricity in the generator. Because of the funda-

7|Page
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

mental laws of physics, only about a third of the the cooling tower or surface water. As a result, the
heat can be transformed into mechanical energy by thermal capacity of a nuclear power plant is about
turbines and then into electrical energy by the gen- three times larger than the electrical capacity.
erator. The remainder is waste heat dissipated by

The Aftermath
With the reactor core now fully exposed, a plume of smoke, radioactive fission products and
debris rose more than ten kilometres into the air.
The material was carried northwest by the wind, mainly to Belarus, although other areas
were affected, including Ukraine.
Fires broke out all over the plant. About 250 firemen were called, many of whom were not
equipped with measuring instruments to monitor the radiation dosages they were receiving.
The operators and rescue workers are to be commended. Many stayed on call in the area
after having been relieved of their duties and many risked their lives to save others and bring
the situation under control.
Most of the fires had been extinguished by 05:00, but the graphite fire continued for another
nine days. The main release of radioactivity into the environment was caused by the burning
graphite.
On 27 April, the town of Pripyat, with about 45,000 inhabitants, was evacuated completely.
The evacuees were never to return, and the town remains how it was left. In the years fol-
lowing the accident, a further 210,000 people were resettled into less contaminated areas,
and the initial 30-kilometre radius exclusion zone (2,800 square kilometres) was extended to
cover 4,300 square kilometres.
To put out the reactor fire and stop the release of radioactive materials, fire-fighters pumped
cooling water into the core of the reactor during the first 10 hours after the accident. This un-
successful attempt to put out the fire was then abandoned. From 27 April to 5 May, more
than 30 military helicopters flew over the burning reactor. They dropped 2400 tonnes of lead
and 1800 tonnes of sand to try to smother the fire and absorb the radiation.
These efforts were also unsuccessful. In fact, they made the situation worse because heat
accumulated beneath the dumped materials. The temperature in the reactor rose again and
thus also the quantity of radioactive products emerging from it. In the final phase of fire-
fighting, the core of the reactor was cooled with nitrogen. Not until 6 May were the fire and
radioactive emissions brought under control.
On 9 May, work began to dig a tunnel underneath the core to install a huge concrete slab
and cooling system. The slab was intended to act as a barrier to prevent radioactive material
leaking into the groundwater. Finally, the core was entombed in a 300,000-tonne concrete
and steel shelter, or “sarcophagus”, and the surrounding land and buildings decontaminated.
It is estimated that about six tonnes of uranium dioxide fuel and solid fission products es-
caped, among them many radionuclides, as well as radionuclides – principally xenon, kryp-
ton, iodine, tellurium and caesium – in form of gases and small particles. It is estimated that
about six tonnes of uranium dioxide fuel and solid fission products escaped. Many of them
were highly radioactive. Moreover, radionuclides in the form of gases and small particles
escaped – principally xenon, krypton, iodine, tellurium, and caesium.
According to the WHO, a total of about 12 exabequerels of radioactivity was released.

8|Page
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

A becquerel – abbreviation Bq – is the activity of a quantity of radioactive material in which one nucleus decays
per second. This is not much. One gram of the naturally occurring radioactive substance radium-226 has an
activity of 37 gigabequerel (this quantity is called one curie, an older unit for radioactivity), and this is a significant
amount. Twelve exabequerels are 12 trillion becquerels, a number with 20 digits (12 followed by 18 zeros) and
would correspond to 300 tonnes of radium.

The highest levels of contamination were within a 30-kilometre radius of the site; levels of
caesium-137 exceeded 1500 kilobequerels per square metre (kBq/m2). Caesium-137 was
used as an indicator because it is easily measurable, and posed the greatest health risk
once another radioactive element released by the accident, iodine-131 (which has a short
half-life of eight days) had decayed. Levels of 40 kBq/m2 covered large parts of northern
Ukraine and southern Belarus, with a number of “hot-spots” occurring where it happened to
be raining as the cloud passed over.
The first time the cloud was detected outside of the USSR was by workers at a Swedish nu-
clear plant, who suspected another Swedish facility. The cloud was tracked and passed over
Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK, carried by easterly winds. It then went
south, covering much of the rest of Europe, in particular Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Greece and Turkey and then again Poland. As a result of changing wind and rainfall pat-
terns, the distribution was locally very uneven**.
Contamination was detected in nearly every country in the northern hemisphere, as far as
North America and Japan, and half a year later also in the Southern Hemisphere. However,
detection does not mean risk, because measuring methods are extremely sensitive and
amounts can be easily detected that are many orders of magnitude below any risk level.

The Health Effects

The exact nature of the long-term health effects of the Chernobyl accident is impossible to
define or predict. However, learned estimations of the upper limits of possible consequences
are feasible (see also box text pages 21 and 22).
According to a United Nations report published in 2002, the number of thyroid cancer cases
among people who were children and adolescents when the accident happened will reach
8000 in the coming decades. The IAEA says about 4000 cases of thyroid cancer, mainly in
children and adolescents at the time of the accident, have resulted from the accident’ s con-
tamination and at least nine children died of thyroid cancer. However, the survival rate
among such cancer victims, judging from experience in Belarus, has been almost 99%.
There is a consensus that at least 1800 children and adolescents in the most severely
contaminated areas of Belarus have contracted thyroid cancer because of the Chernobyl
accident. Thyroid cancer is normally a treatable disease.
In September 2005, the Chernobyl Forum published a report (the Chernobyl Forum Report
2005), written by more than 100 specialists from seven UN organisations including the
WHO, the IAEA and the World Bank, as well as from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.
The report concludes that up to 4,000 people could eventually die prematurely of radiation
exposure from the accident. It said public health effects have not been nearly as substantial
as had at first been feared. By and large, scientists did not find serious negative health im-
pacts on the general population in surrounding areas. Nor did they find widespread contami-
**
An animated reconstruction of the cloud’s path can be found on the website of France’s Institut de
Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN): www.irsn.fr/FR/popup/Pages/tchernobyl_video_nuage.aspx

9|Page
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

nation that would continue to pose a substantial threat to human health, except for a few ex-
ceptional, restricted areas.
The findings and conclusions of the Forum Report have essentially been confirmed in a fol-
low-up report published by the United Nations Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiation
(Unscear) published in February 2011.
As of end-2010, fewer than 50 deaths had been directly attributed to radiation from the dis-
aster, almost all being highly exposed rescue workers, many of whom died within months of
the accident, but others as late as 2004.
The Chernobyl Forum report said most emergency workers and people living in contami-
nated areas received relatively low whole-body radiation doses, comparable to natural back-
ground levels. As a consequence, no evidence or likelihood of decreased fertility has been
found, nor has there been any evidence of increases in congenital malformations that can be
attributed to radiation exposure. The report also said poverty, mental health problems and
“lifestyle” diseases in the former Soviet Union pose a greater threat to local communities
than radiation exposure.
The estimate for the eventual number of deaths in the Chernobyl Forum report is far lower
than earlier speculation that radiation exposure would claim tens of thousands of lives.
In 1986, a WHO representative told a conference that claims by Ukrainian officials that more
than 100,000 people had died as a result of the accident were “fiction”. He said the proven
death toll was about 40; some due to direct exposure at the time, and a further 10 fatal
cases of radiation-induced thyroid cancer.
A report published in 2000 by Unscear concluded that there was no evidence that most peo-
ple exposed to radiation from Chernobyl in Ukraine or elsewhere were likely to suffer any
serious long-term health effects. Unscear’s follow-up report of 2011 confirmed this conclu-
sion. A 2002-United-Nations report on the human consequences of Chernobyl said “very
considerable uncertainty remains” over the possible long-term health effects of the accident.
It said morbidity in the affected areas continues to reflect the pattern in other parts of the
former Soviet Union. Life expectancy, particularly of males, is substantially lower than in
western and southern Europe, with heart disease and trauma the leading causes of death.
The report said no reliable evidence has emerged of an increase in leukaemias, which had
been predicted to result from the accident. However, it said some 2,000 cases of thyroid
cancer have so far been diagnosed among young people exposed to radioactive iodine in
April and May 1986.
There have been reports of some thousands of deaths among clean-up workers since the
accident.
These reports are difficult to evaluate for a number of reasons. First, it has proved difficult to
trace the workers because they were so many and have returned to areas all over the former
Soviet Union. Second, any normal population would have sustained deaths naturally in any
20-year period. (For example, in developed countries, the normal death rate is about 0.3%
per year, or about 36,000 deaths in a population of 600,000 over a 20-year period). Third,
many of the diseases being claimed among the clean-up workers, such as heart disease,
have been shown not to be caused by radiation.

10 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

In the areas of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine defined as “contaminated areas” by the former
Soviet Union, because of higher soil levels of the long-lived caesium-137, the average
additional dose over the period 1986-2005 is “approximately equivalent to that from a
medical computed tomography scan”.
The report also says that it is not possible to state scientifically that radiation caused a par-
ticular cancer in an individual. This means that in terms of specific individuals, it is impossi-
ble to determine whether their cancers are due to the effects of radiation or to other causes,
or moreover, whether they are due to the accident or background radiation.

Chernobyl Today: Status In Brief

 Construction company Novarka said in April 2016 that the New Safe
Confinement project is on track with commissioning scheduled for
2017.
 Overall cost of Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) is around €2 billion.
 In April 2015, a donor conference secured €165 million of funding for
the SIP, reducing the funding gap to €85 million. The NSC, at a cost of
€1.5 billion, is the most prominent element of the SIP, the strategic
framework developed to overcome the consequences of the 1986
accident.

December 2000: Plant Closure

Safety concerns and operating problems led the international community to call for complete
and permanent closure of the Chernobyl plant. The last operating reactor of the four at
Chernobyl was permanently shut down on 15 December 2000.
In December 1995, Ukraine signed a memorandum of understanding with the G7 (now the
G8) countries and the European Union on the closure of the then operating units at Cherno-
byl. This followed an acceleration of international cooperation after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The major task was to assess the risks posed by the destroyed reactor and to devise
a strategy to provide a long-term solution for remediation of the site. The G7 countries and
the EU took the lead in helping Ukraine find a solution to the risks posed by the destroyed
unit four.
In 1996, the Chernobyl Centre for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radioecology was
established in Slavutich. The centre provides engineering, scientific and technical services in
the fields of nuclear and radiation safety, decommissioning, emergency response and radio-
ecology. The centre's International Radioecology Laboratory (IRL) is carrying out research
within the 30-kilometre Chernobyl exclusion zone. This research includes studying the im-
pact of radioactivity on animal cells and tissue.
Steps have been taken to upgrade the unstable shelter that was hastily built in 1986 around
the destroyed reactor number four. That shelter – the “sarcophagus” – covers the remains of
the destroyed unit four and new structures and systems built after the accident. Corrosion
and other factors have increased the risk of its collapse.

11 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

In June 1997, Ukraine, the G7 (as it was then) and the EU approved the Shelter Implemen-
tation Plan (SIP), which now covers both the stabilisation of the “sarcophagus” and con-
struction of the New Safe Containment (NSC). This is a more secure and permanent struc-
ture to be built around the sarcophagus. The stabilisation project ended successfully in 2008.
Construction of the NSC is an unparalleled project in the history of engineering. With a
height of more than 100 metres it will be big enough to house the Statue of Liberty. The new
structure will be assembled on site, but away from the highly radioactive unit 4 and then slid
in place, covering the remains of the reactor building and the old shelter. It has a design life-
time of 100 years.
The G8 nations pledged to contribute US$300 million towards the Chernobyl Shelter Fund
(CSF), which was set up in 1997 to administer contributions towards the cost of stabilisation
work on the sarcophagus and construction of the NSC. The fund is managed by the EBRD.
Ukraine is cooperating with the countries of the G8 economic group, Russia, and the Euro-
pean Commission in activities to stabilise and maintain the sarcophagus, to build the NSC,
and to remove portions of the existing shelter to ensure its long-term stability.
The sarcophagus still contains radioactive material. The inventory includes more than 200
tonnes of uranium and around one tonne of radionuclides, of which 80% is plutonium.

Next Steps
The Shelter/NSC
 Commission the New Safe Confinement in 2017;
 Once the New Safe Confinement is complete, remove
unstable sarcophagus structures.
Decommissioning
 Remove fuel from reactors 1-3 and complete radioactive
waste facilities.

The Costs
According to the EBRD, the overall cost of the SIP including support to the regulatory au-
thorities as well as project and fund management is close to €2 billion. It still requires an
additional €85 million. The overall cost of construction of the Interim Storage Facility (ISF-2)
is close to €300 million, with €140 million still needed.
Considerable contributions have been made to both funds. After an initial pledge of $300
million at the G7 summit in Denver 1997 for the Chernobyl Shelter Fund, pledging con-
ferences took place in New York (1997), Berlin (2000), London (2005), Kiev (2011 and
London (2015).

12 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

A separate pledging event was held in 2008 to raise additional funds for the Nuclear Safety
Account (NSA). Contributors to the EBRD-managed NSA have agreed to finance the con-
struction of two facilities needed to prepare the plant for the decommissioning, one to safely
store the spent fuel from the operations of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and one to
treat liquid radioactive waste.
The EBRD to date has provided €675 million of its own resources to support Chernobyl
projects including the NSC.

Chernobyl Shelter Fund Contributions

Donor Contribution (€ million)
European Community 250.0
United States 182.8
Germany 60.5
United Kingdom 53.1
France 52.5
Japan 45.7
Ukraine 45.0*
Italy 41.5
Canada 34.9
Russia 15.3
Switzerland 9.3
Ireland 8.0
Austria 7.5
Sweden 7.2
Norway 7.0
Netherlands 5.7
Kuwait 5.4
Spain 5.1
Denmark 5.0
Greece 5.0
Finland 4.9
Belgium 4.3
Poland 2.5
Luxembourg 2.5
* In addition, Ukraine has agreed to take over one SIP task
valued at US$22 million.

13 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

Nuclear Safety Account Contributions

Donor Contribution (€ million)
France 63.3
United Kingdom 40.4
Germany 37.5
European Community 36.2
Japan 27.0
United States 26.3
Italy 21.2
Canada 15.3
Switzerland 10.9
Sweden 9.0
Russia 7.6
Finland 6.0
Ukraine 5.8
Netherlands 4.2
Denmark 63.3
Norway 40.4
Belgium 37.5
France 36.2
United Kingdom 27.0
Germany 26.3
European Community 21.2
Japan 15.3
United States 10.9
Italy 9.0

The Future
Thirty years after the accident at Chernobyl, two crucial projects are entering the completion
phase: The construction of the NSC for the destroyed reactor 4 is almost complete and a
storage facility for spent fuel from the operations of reactors 1-3 can now be finalised after
the Ukrainian regulator has approved the project design.
The initial clean-up operation at Chernobyl was impressive. The sarcophagus was com-
pleted in only seven months and radiation levels on the site are now relatively low.
But decommissioning the three remaining reactors first required an infrastructure, including:
 A new heating plant, completed in 2001. This consists of three hot water boilers of 50
megawatt thermal (MWt) each and three steam boilers of 40 MWt each. The plant has

14 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

sufficient capacity to power a city and will be able to meet all anticipated future site de-
mand including that of the decommissioning infrastructure.
 A new interim spent fuel store (ISF-2) because the existing store was inadequate.
 A new liquid radioactive waste storage facility, which is substantially complete, to treat
low- and medium-level liquid radioactive waste accumulated during the reactors’ opera-
tional lifetimes. About 25,000 cubic metres of this waste is currently stored in tanks on-
site. The new facility will receive, process (i.e. reduce the volume), encapsulate and dis-
patch the waste to a repository.
 A solid radioactive waste treatment plant, construction of which has begun.
The new interim spent fuel store, or ISF-2, is needed so fuel can be removed from the reac-
tors. There was not enough existing capacity for this. Design issues caused construction of
ISF-2 to be halted in 2003 while solutions were sought. In the meantime, removal of some of
the fuel from reactors 1-3 to the existing storage facility began in December 2005.
A conceptual design and a concept design safety document for the NSC have already been
approved. The concept shows an arch-shape structure with a height of more than 100 me-
tres and an internal span of 245 metres. The structure will be 150 metres long and its end
walls will be built around the existing sarcophagus.
The contract for design and construction of the NSC was signed in September 2007 with the
Novarka consortium, formed by the construction companies Bouygues and Vinci.
Work on the detailed design of the structure and its systems such as cranes, fire protection,
and ventilation is complete and regulatory approval is expected in 2011. The assembly site
has been cleared and excavation work for the foundations has been completed. Piling for the
foundations and the lifting cranes started in September 2010.

Slavutich
On 27 April, 36 hours after the accident, the 45,000 inhabitants of the town of Pripyat, four
kilometres from the plant, were evacuated in buses. The town remains uninhabited to this
day.
In the period up to 5 May, people living within a radius of 30 kilometres of the reactor had to
leave their homes. Within 10 days, 130,000 people from 76 settlements in this area were
evacuated.
Before the accident, the Chernobyl workforce and their families lived in the town of Pripyat,
close to the plant. Within 48 hours, they had been evacuated from their homes and now live
in a new town called Slavutich (also Slavutych), 50 kilometres east of the plant.
The town was built by eight former Soviet republics: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus,
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Ukraine. Each republic brought its own workforce and ma-
terials, and built houses and apartments in its own style. Therefore, the town had eight dif-
ferent sectors, each very different in architectural style and atmosphere.
The population of Slavutich today is about 25,000. About one third of the population is under
the age of 16. About 3000 residents work at the Chernobyl site, mostly on monitoring and
maintenance. In 2011, 500 to 700 of them were working on construction of the various waste
storage facilities and preparing the ground for the New Safe Confinement (NSC).

15 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

The town has Ukraine’s youngest population, highest birth rate and lowest mortality rate.
The families of Slavutich enjoy a relatively high standard of living and have access to some
of the best stocked shops in Ukraine. There are also schools, sports facilities, and one of the
country’s best hospitals.
With the closure of Chernobyl as a power plant in 2000, the town had to come to terms with
the socio-economic problems of adapting to being less dependent on the plant. The town
administration, supported by international agencies, has made progress with the establish-
ment of a business development agency, business incubator, centre for community devel-
opment, credit unions, and facilities to encourage enterprise and attract new business.
The International Labour Organisation created a training centre in Slavutich where former
Chernobyl plant employees are being retrained for other jobs. In 2002, the United Nations
Development Programme earmarked US$597,000 for further training programmes of this
kind.

Environment
The plume of radioactive fission products from the destroyed reactor dropped fall-out over
most of Europe in a complex pattern mainly in May 1986.
The accident resulted in the radioactive contamination of 18,000 square kilometres of agri-
cultural land, of which 2640 square kilometres could no longer be farmed. In Ukraine, the
forest was particularly affected: 35,000 square kilometres of forested areas, 40% of the total,
were contaminated. In the forests, the conifers and broadleaves absorbed the radiation like a
filter, and the fallout was initially concentrated here. Dead leaves and needles have since
transported the contamination into the soil. In the coming decades, the contamination will
accumulate in wood.
The radioisotope caesium-137 was a significant problem. Its 30-year half-life means half of
its activity will still be in the environment in 2016 and a quarter in 2046. Caesium is chemi-
cally similar to the nutrient potassium, so tends to be taken up readily by plants and animals
and enter into the food chain. As it rises up the food chain, its concentrations can become
higher in specific foodstuffs.
The main routes into the food chain are from consumption of contaminated berries, mush-
rooms, game and fish, and via grass and hay eaten by dairy cattle. It is estimated that con-
centrations in fish in Lake Kozhanovskoe, Russia, will remain above the recommended
maximum limit for consumption for another 30 years.
Milk contaminated with a radioactive isotope of iodine (I-131, 8-day half-life) in the weeks
after the accident in Soviet areas (today: Belarus, western and southern oblasts of Russia,
and Ukraine) is believed to be responsible for cases of thyroid cancer. Quantities of poten-
tially contaminated milk in Poland, Hungary, Austria and Sweden were destroyed.
Many countries across Europe burned contaminated vegetation, and a ban on many agri-
cultural goods was placed across Eastern Europe. Among the worst affected were Sweden’s
and Finland’s reindeer and sheep.
The sale of milk, meat, many fruit and vegetables was banned in 1986 and 1987 in the mar-
kets of Kiev, Chernigov, Minsk, and other smaller cities and towns. In the UK, Ministry of Ag-

16 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

riculture restrictions on the sale and slaughter of sheep lasted for only a few months after the
accident.
The degree of soil contamination in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine was influenced by several
factors: the natural decay process of the radioactive isotopes, their mobility in the earth, and
the type of soil. For example, in Belarus, which received 70% of the fallout, about 22% of the
country was declared contaminated with more than 1 curie of caesium-137 per square kilo-
metre (or 37 kBq/m2) after the accident in 1986.
The Belarusian government’s Chernobyl Committee estimates that 16% of the territory will
still be contaminated in 2016.
The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency has said that since the accident, the dose rate from ex-
ternal radiation has decreased by a factor of 40 in some areas and in some places is less
than 1% of its original value. In short, there is a continuous, but slow, reduction in the levels
of caesium-137 activity in agricultural soil.
Forest fires in contaminated areas of western Russia and Ukraine in July and August 2010
resulted in a transitional elevation of contamination in the air. However, the radioactivity lev-
els (in particular, of caesium-137) were many orders of magnitude lower than in 1986 and no
supplementary protection measures were necessary.
The situation regarding contamination of food can be expected to continue for some time to
come. As far as agricultural production is concerned, the central problem is the small farm-
ers, who often live off their own produce. Both the official Belarusian Chernobyl Committee
and the Ukrainian government agency Chernobyl Interinform have established aid pro-
grammes to include special efforts to improve advisory services for these subsistence farm-
ers.

Radiation And Animals

Since 1994, Dr Robert J. Baker and Professor Ronald K. Chesser, together with colleagues in the
Ukraine and the UK, have worked extensively examining the effects of radiation on animals
surrounding Chernobyl. Dr Baker and Prof Chesser both work at Texas Tech University in the US.
They concluded that the elimination of human activities such as farming, ranching, hunting and
logging have benefited wildlife. "It can be said that the world's worst nuclear power plant disaster is
not as destructive to wildlife populations as are normal human activities," said Dr Baker.
Following research expeditions to the Chernobyl region, a US Department of Energy official asked
Dr Baker to assess the ecological impact of the disaster on populations of animals.
Although a quantitative assessment was difficult, the net ecological impact was positive. But Dr
Baker also said detailed long-term studies are needed to understand how animal populations
exposed to chronic radiation differ from unexposed populations. Issues concerning the latent and
long-term effects of exposure must be resolved before the total significance of the accident to
native wildlife and to humans can be understood.
For more information:
www.nsrl.ttu.edu/chornobyl/conclusions.htm and
www.groenerekenkamer.nl/grkfiles/images/Chesser%20Baker%2006%20Chernobyl.pdf

17 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

All three countries have specified safe limit values for food from state farms and for goods
that are to be sold in markets. In Belarus, for example, these limits are three times as strin-
gent as the corresponding German regulations.
The efforts required to maintain this monitoring can be illustrated by the example of Ukraine.
In 2000 alone, more than one million food samples were analysed nationwide, and the pro-
gramme continues 30 years after the accident.
Since 1993, according to Chernobyl Interinform’s figures for Ukraine, compliance with the
official limits has been assured for produce from state-run farms and goods sold in public
shops.
One of the main concerns immediately following the accident was the waters of the river
Dnieper and its tributary, the Pripyat. Although the river did indeed distribute contamination
throughout Ukraine, mitigation efforts were successful and drinking water was largely unaf-
fected. Nevertheless, contamination has accumulated in other water basins, and there is still
long-term a risk of groundwater contamination from strontium and americium.
With the exception of areas inside the exclusion zone, the air in the contaminated territories
is no longer affected.

Nuclear Safety
There have been three major reactor accidents in the history of civil nuclear power: Three
Mile Island in the US, Chernobyl in the ex-USSR, and Fukushima-Daiichi in Japan. The first
one was contained, in the second one containment helped keep the impact on environment
low, and the third one – Chernobyl – had no provision for containment.
These are the only major accidents to have occurred in some 14,000 cumulative reactor-
years of commercial operation in 32 countries (data of 2010).
The risks from nuclear power plants, in terms of the likelihood and consequences of an acci-
dent or terrorist attack, are minimal compared with other commonly accepted risks. Nuclear
power plants are robust. The goal of safety measures is to ensure that under all reasonably
conceivable conditions public health and safety are never endangered by exposure to radio-
activity.
The IAEA was set up by the United Nations in 1957 with one of its functions to act as auditor
of world nuclear safety and security. It prescribes safety procedures and oversees the re-
porting of even minor incidents (see also box page 23: International Nuclear Event and Ra-
diological Scale).
Its role has been strengthened in the last decade. Every country which operates nuclear
power plants has an independent nuclear safety inspectorate and all of those inspectorates
work closely with the IAEA.
Personal safety is among prime concerns for those working in nuclear plants. Radiation
doses are controlled in a number of ways, including physical shielding, protective clothing
and apparatus, limiting the time workers spend in areas with significant radiation levels, and
by using remote handling techniques.
These are supported by continuous monitoring of individual doses and of the work environ-
ment to ensure very low radiation exposure comparable with other industries.

18 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

One mandated safety indicator to minimise the possibility of reactor accidents is the calcu-
lated frequency of degraded core or core melt accidents. The US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) specifies that reactor designs must meet a one in 10,000 year core
damage frequency. Modern designs exceed this. The best currently operating plants are
about one in one million and those likely to be built in the next decade – the so-called Gen-
eration III reactor types – are almost one in 10 million. The Three Mile Island accident in
1979 was the only accident in a reactor conforming to NRC safety criteria, and it was con-
tained as designed without radiological harm to anyone. (The accident at Fukushima-Daiichi
in Japan in March 2011 cannot yet be classified.)
Regulatory requirements today are that the effects of a core-melt accident must be confined
to the plant, without the need to evacuate nearby residents.
The main safety concern has always been the possibility of an uncontrolled release of radio-
active material, leading to contamination and consequent radiation exposure off-site. At
Chernobyl, this happened and the results were severe, once and for all vindicating the extra
expense involved in designing to high safety standards.
To achieve optimum safety, nuclear plants today operate using a “defence in depth” ap-
proach, with multiple safety systems. Key aspects of the approach are:
 High-quality design and construction;
 Equipment which prevents operational disturbances developing into problems;
 Redundant and diverse systems to detect problems, control damage to the fuel and
prevent significant radioactive releases;
 Provisions to confine the effects of severe fuel damage to the plant itself.
The safety systems include a series of physical barriers between the radioactive reactor core
and the environment, the provision of multiple safety systems, each with backup and de-
signed to accommodate human error. Safety systems account for about one quarter of the
capital cost of such reactors.
Safety systems include control rods, which are inserted to absorb neutrons, and secondary
shut-down features that introduce neutron-absorbing material into the reactor. Back-up
cooling systems remove excess heat.
In addition, most of the world’s operating reactors – those at Chernobyl were an exception –
have negative void coefficients. This means circulating water acts as both moderator and
coolant. Both functions are needed to operate a fission reactor: moderation slows down the
neutrons necessary to sustain the nuclear chain reaction and cooling carries away the heat
energy released by the chain reaction. When the coolant liquid starts to boil and form steam
bubbles – or when it leaks out due to a technical problem – voids are formed in the cooling
liquid. This ultimately results in a reduction in power.
But not so at Chernobyl, where the reactors had a separate moderator made of graphite.
With voids forming in the reactor cooling water channels, graphite moderation would con-
tinue and the chain reaction – instead of breaking down – would increase. In other words,
the voids have a positive impact on the chain reaction. The result is a power surge.
There are other physical features that enhance safety. In the most common reactors, the fuel
is in the form of solid ceramic pellets, and radioactive fission products remain bound inside
these pellets as the fuel is burned. The pellets are packed inside zirconium alloy tubes to
form fuel rods. These are confined inside a large steel pressure vessel with walls about 20

19 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

centimetres thick. This pressure vessel, in turn, is enclosed inside a robust concrete con-
tainment structure with walls at least one metre thick, protecting the installation against ex-
ternal attacks such as an aircraft crash.
Modern nuclear power plants are also designed with a high standard of seismic resistance
and can be shut down safely and rapidly in the event of an earthquake. This happened in
Japan on 16 July 2007 at the world’s biggest nuclear power station, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa,
and again in Japan on 11 March 2011, the reactors at Fukushima-Daini, Fukushima-Daiichi,
Onagawa and Tokai-mura. With the exception of four reactor units at Fukushima-Daiichi, all
the units of these plants resisted a tsunami as well. It followed the 9.0-magnitude earthquake
and was about two times stronger than plants had been designed for.
The Three Mile Island accident of 1979 demonstrated the pertinence of the multiple safety-
barrier concept. The containment building which housed the reactor prevented any signifi-
cant release of radioactivity, despite the fact that about half of the reactor core melted inside
the pressure vessel. The accident was attributed to a combination of mechanical failure, a
maintenance error, and operator confusion. The reactor’s other protection systems also
functioned as designed. What’s more, the emergency core cooling system would have pre-
vented the accident, but the operators shut it down.
Investigations following the accident led to a new focus on the human factors in nuclear
safety. No major design changes were called for in western reactors, but controls and in-
strumentation were improved and operator training and instructions were completely over-
hauled. By way of contrast, the Chernobyl reactor did not have a containment structure like
those used in the West or in post-1980 Soviet designs.

Three Mile Island

The accident at unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near
Middletown, Pennsylvania, on 28 March 1979, was the most serious in US
commercial nuclear power plant operating history, even though it led to no
deaths or injuries to plant workers or members of the nearby community. But it
brought about sweeping changes involving emergency response planning,
reactor operator training, human factors engineering, radiation protection, and
many other areas of nuclear power plant operations.
According to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the sequence of certain
events – equipment malfunctions, design-related problems and worker errors –
led to a partial meltdown of the reactor core, but only very small offsite releases
of radioactivity.
For the NRC’s Backgrounder on Three Mile Island see
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html

20 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

In the immediate aftermath of Chernobyl, the IAEA gave high priority to addressing the
safety of nuclear power plants, especially in some areas of eastern Europe, where deficien-
cies remained.
International programmes of assistance have been carried out by organisations such as the
OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency, the IAEA, the Commission of the European Union and the
EBRD-administered Nuclear Safety Account to enhance the safety of early Soviet-designed
reactors by applying western safety standards, or implementing significant improvements to
the plants and their operation.
Modifications have been made to overcome deficiencies in the RBMK reactors still operating
in Russia. Among other things, these modifications have reduced the danger of a positive
void coefficient response.
Since the World Trade Centre attacks in New York in 2001, there has been concern about
the consequences of a large aircraft being used to attack a nuclear facility with the purpose
of releasing radioactive materials. Various studies have looked at the possibility of such at-
tacks on nuclear power plants.
The studies show that nuclear reactors would be more resistant to such attacks than virtually
any other civil installation. A study was undertaken by the US Electric Power Research In-
stitute using specialist consultants and paid for by the US Department of Energy. It con-
cluded that US reactor structures “are robust and [would] protect the fuel from impacts of
large commercial aircraft”.
Similarly, the massive structures mean that any terrorist attack even inside a plant would not
result in any significant radioactive releases.

21 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

March 2011: Fukushima-Daiichi

It is too early to say what the repercussions of the accident at the Fukushima-Daiichi
nuclear plant in Japan in March 2011 will be for the nuclear industry.
Safety authorities in many countries with nuclear programmes have called for reviews of
their nuclear plants. In Europe, the EC is calling for stress tests to be carried out to make
sure plants would be able to withstand the impact of earthquakes and tsunamis or floods.
What is clear is that Fukushima-Daiichi, which has six reactor units, withstood the impact
of the earthquake.
But problems arose because electricity rooms and seawater pump rooms were flooded
when the tsunami struck. External power supply was interrupted and all but one of the
emergency diesel generators stopped due to tsunami damage.
The extended loss of all cooling functions resulted in fuel damage in the reactor cores of
units 1, 2, and 3 and in the spent fuel pools of units 1 to 4.
Overheating and damage to fuel elements resulted in loss of containment, damage to
buildings and installations, and the release of radioactive substances into the
environment, with high dose rates at the plant site and beyond its boundary.
The Japanese government decided to evacuate people living in a 20-kilometre zone
around the plant and advised people within a 30-kilometre zone to stay indoors
The events have been provisionally rated at Level 5 on the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES).
Level 5 on the scale means an “accident with wider consequences”.
Chernobyl was Level 7 of the scale, meaning “major accident”.
See INES boxed text page 24.

22 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

The Health Effects of Chernobyl: As Reported By NucNet

On 5 September 2005, under the headline Chernobyl Health Effects ‘Not As

Substantial As Feared’ NucNet reported the findings of the Chernobyl Forum
report:
Up to 4000 people could eventually die of radiation exposure from the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident nearly 20 years ago, an international
team of more than 100 scientists has concluded.
But the scientists said public health effects have not been nearly as substantial
as had at first been feared.
By and large they did not find serious negative health impacts on the general
population in surrounding areas. Nor did they find widespread contamination
that would continue to pose a substantial threat to human health, except for a
few exceptional, restricted areas.
As of mid-2005, fewer than 50 deaths had been directly attributed to radiation
from the 1986 disaster, almost all being highly exposed rescue workers, many
who died within months of the accident but others who died as late as 2004.
The estimate for the eventual number of deaths is far lower than earlier
speculation that radiation exposure would claim tens of thousands of lives.
On 3 March 2011, under the headline New UN Chernobyl Health Report
‘Reconfirms Earlier Findings’ NucNet reported the following:
Major conclusions regarding the scale and nature of the health consequences of
the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident are “essentially consistent with previous
assessments”, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation (Unscear) says.
The 173-page report, ‘Health effects due to radiation from the Chernobyl
accident,’ reconfirms that radiation doses to the general public in the three most
affected countries were relatively low and most residents “need not live in fear of
serious health consequences”.
Among the report’s major findings are:
• 134 plant staff and emergency workers suffered acute radiation syndrome
(ARS) from high doses of radiation;
• In the first few months after the accident, 28 of them died;
• Although another 19 ARS survivors had died by 2006, those deaths had
different causes not usually associated with radiation exposure;
• Skin injuries and radiation-related cataracts were among the most common
consequences in ARS survivors.

23 | P a g e
CHERNOBYL FACT FILE

Energy Industry Study Shows ‘Far Fewer Fatalities’ In Nuclear Sector

The nuclear energy industry is perceived as high risk, but comparison with other energy
sources shows “far fewer fatalities”, according to a 2010 study by the OECD’s Nuclear
Energy Agency.
The study, primarily directed at policymakers, used data gathered by the Paul Scherrer
Institute (PSI) in Switzerland. The data consists of accidents that have caused five or
more “prompt fatalities” from 1969 onwards. The study considered the “full energy chain”
from exploration and extraction to waste treatment and disposal. It looked at severe
accidents, which it defines as accidents that result in five or more prompt fatalities.
The study concluded that, contrary to the expectations of many people, nuclear power
generation presents “a very low risk” in comparison to the use of fossil fuels.
PSI’s database contains data on 1,870 severe energy related accidents. It shows that
from 1969 to 2000 there were 81,258 immediate fatalities across all energy chains. There
were 1,221 severe accidents in the coal industry, but only one – Chernobyl – in the
nuclear industry. In OECD countries there has never been a severe accident at a nuclear
power plant. The worst energy related accident was the Banqiao/Shimantan dam failure
in China in 1975 when some 30,000 people were killed.
The study is online:
www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/reports/2010/nea6861-comparing-risks.pdf

The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) was developed by
the IAEA and the OECD in 1990 to communicate and standardise the reporting of
nuclear incidents or accidents to the public.
The INES Scale explains the significance of events from a range of activities,
including industrial and medical use of radiation sources, operations at nuclear
facilities and transport of radioactive material.
Events are classified on the scale at seven levels: Levels 1 to 3 are called
“incidents” and Levels 4 to 7 “accidents”. The scale is designed so that the severity
of an event is about 10 times greater for each increase in level on the scale. Events
without safety significance are called “deviations” and are classified Below Scale /
Level 0.
Chernobyl rated as 7 (Major Accident) on the scale and Three Mile Island rated 5
(Accident with Wider Consequences). A level 4 “Accident with Local Consequences”
occurred in France in 1980. Another accident rated at level 4 occurred in a fuel
reprocessing plant in Japan in September 1999.
7 Major Accident (Chernobyl)
6 Serious Accident
5 Accident with Wider Consequences
4 Accident with Local Consequences
3 Serious Incident
2 Incident
1 Anomaly
0 Below Scale / No Safety Significance

-
24 | P a g e