DKC Holdings v.

CA
G.R. No. 118248. April 5, 2000

On March 16, 1998, petitioner DKC Holdings Corporation (DKC) entered into a Contract
of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome, decedent herein, whereby
petitioner was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land.

Encarnacion died. Thereafter, petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent

Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept
these payments. On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail,
notice that it was exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of
P15,000.00 as rent. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to
surrender possession of the property to petitioner. On April 23, 1990, petitioner filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages against Victor and the Register of
Deeds

ISSUE: Whether or not the rights under a Contact of Lease with Option to Buy were
transmissible.

YES. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by
their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom
are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. The
Court held that there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the
rights and obligations under the lease contract intransmissible. More importantly, the
nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible.

In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is a lease, which is a property right.
The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a
property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal
representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death
of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the
contract.

Therefore, Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.

ALVAREZ vs. IAC

May 7, 1990

FACTS:

Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Aniceto Yanes was
survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by
her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is established that Rufino and his children left the
province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to
Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in
question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar
produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and
Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. After Fuentebella's death, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.

On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a
complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of
Lots 773 and 823. During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00
to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to
reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.

ISSUE:

WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and
773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without
violation of law and due process.

RULING:

The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of

the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and
heirs. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and
paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason
is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs
or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares
that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.

"Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman concept of a relation
from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to
patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare
cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by a
specific person and by no other. . . ."Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez,
they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to
the present claim for damages.

HEIRS OF REGANON vs. RUFINO IMPERIAL

G.R. No. L-24434 (22 SCRA 80)

January 17, 1968

FACTS

Residuary Estate of Eulogio Imperial – money accumulated in his guardianship

proceedings from the monthly allowances given to him by the US Veterans
Administration during his lifetime.

 The Heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of about 1 hectare portion of a parcel of land in Zamboanga Del Norte
against Rufino Imperial.

 Trial court rendered a decision declaring the heirs of Reganon as lawful owners of the
land and entitled to its peaceful possession, ordering Imperial to immediately vacate
the portion occupied by him. The court sentenced him to pay plaintiffs the amount of
P1,929.20 and the costs.

 A writ of execution was granted by the RTC and the deputy provincial sheriff
submitted a sheriff’s return reporting the garnishment of a carabao and goat of
Imperial for P153.00 and attachment & sale of defendant’s land for
P500.00. (In short, ang properties ni Imperial were not enough to satisfy the
judgment)

 However, on March 13, 1964, PNB deposited with PNB-Dipolog Branch the
residuary estate of its former ward, EULOGIO IMPERIAL (predecessor of
defendant) in the amount of P10,303.80.

 The heirs of Eulogio Imperial (including the defendant) executed a Deed of

Extrajudicial Partition of the Residuary Estate wherein defendant was
apportioned with P1,471.97.

 When petitioners learned about this development, they filed an ex parte motion for
issuance of an alias writ of execution and of an order directing the manager of
PNB Dipolog to hold the share of defendant and deliver the same to the
provincial sheriff to be applied to the satisfaction of the balance of the
money judgment.
  RTC granted the motion and the deputy provincial sheriff notified the defendant of
the garnishment of the rights, interests, shares and participation that defendant may
have over the residuary estate of the late Eulogio Imperial consisting of the money
deposited in PNB Dipolog.

Defendant’s Arguments:

- The property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia legis and

therefore cannot be attached.

RULING

1. Upon the death of the ward, is the money accumulated in his guardianship
proceedings (deposited in the bank) still considered in custodia legis and therefore
cannot be attached?

NO. The money deposited in the bank is no longer considered in custodia

legis and can therefore be attached.

The New Rules of Court provides for the procedure to be followed in case what is attached is
in custodia legis. The clear import of this new provision is that property under custodia
legis is NOW ATTACHABLE, subject to the mode set forth in said rule.

Besides, the ward having died, the guardianship proceedings no longer

subsist since death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and
thereupon all powers and duties of the guardian ceases, except the duty, which remains, to
make proper accounting and settlement in the probate court.

Branch I of CFI Zamboanga del Norte (where the guardianship proceedings were heard)
directed PNB (guardian) to deposit the residuary estate of Eulogio Imperial (ward) with its
bank agency in Dipolog, in the name of the estate of the deceased ward Eulogio Imperial,
preparatory to the eventual distribution of the same to the heirs when the latter shall be
known, and “upon proof of deposit of said residuary estate, the guardian Philippine National Bank shall
forthwith be relieved from any responsibility as such, and this proceeding shall be considered closed and
terminated.”
This condition has been fulfilled by PNB when it deposited the money with PNB
Dipolog.

2. Was there transmission of rights from the death the ward, Eulogio Imperial in
favor of his heirs?

YES. When Eulogio Imperial died on Sept. 13, 1962, the rights to his
succession – FROM THE MOMENT OF HIS DEATH- were transmitted to his
heirs, one of whom is his son – RUFINO IMPERIAL.

This automatic transmission cannot but proceed with greater ease and certainty than in this
case where the parties agree that the residuary estate is not burdened with any debt. For,
the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death, and
where, as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with
any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominion,
ownership, and possession of the properties of his predecessor and consequently
stands legally in the shoes of the latter.

That the INTEREST OF AN HEIR IN THE ESTATE of a deceased person MAY BE

ATTACHED for purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement
before courts, is already a settled matter in this jurisdiction.

The heirs of Eulogio Imperial, including defendant, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
which suffices to settle the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the estate for all
practical purposes have been settled. The heirs are at full liberty to withdraw
the residuary estate from the bank and divide it among themselves.

3. Is the residuary estate of a US Veteran (Eulogio Imperial) exempt from execution?

NO. The residuary estate of Eulogio Imperial is NOT EXEMPT from

execution.

Any pension, annuity, or gratuity granted by a Government to its officers or employees in

recognition of past services rendered, is primordially aimed at tiding them over during their
old age and/or disability. This is therefore a right personalissima, purely personal because
founded on necessity.

It requires no argument to show that where the recipient dies, the necessity motivating or
underlying its grant necessarily ceases to be. Even more so in this case where the law
providing for the exemption is calculated to benefit U.S. veterans residing here, and is
therefore merely a manifestation of comity.

Besides, as earlier stated, the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is appellant,
have already executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition — the end result of which is
that the property is no longer the property of the estate but of the individual heirs.

When the heirs by mutual agreement have divided the estate among themselves , one of the heirs
cannot therefore secure the appointment of an administrator to take charge of and
administer the estate or a part thereof. The property is no longer the property of the estate, but of
the individual heirs, whether it remains undivided or not .

GR No. 191031 Hacbang vs Alo

FACTS: Bishop Sofronio Hacbang died leaving several properties

behind. Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and
Maria Hacbang, and his siblings: Perfecto Hacbang, Joaquin
Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang, and Dolores Hacbang Alo. In his
will he instituted half of his estate to his parents and the
other half to Dolores. The will was accepted for probated but was
archived before the proceeding was completed.

ISSUE: WON the ownership of properties passes to the heirs even

without completing the probate.

HELD: No. Article 777 of our Civil Code provides that the
inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent’s death without a
moment’s interruption. Heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed
with specific properties do not require Court adjudication to
identify which particular properties become theirs; the testator
had already identified these. From the very moment of the
testator’s death, title over these particular properties vests on
the heir, legatee, or devisee
NHA vs Almeida

Facts:

Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land with her
children as her heirs. The first child, Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, predeceased her mother and left heirs.
When the mother passes away, the remaining child, Francisca Herrera, filed Deed of Self-Adjudication
claiming to be the exclusive and remaining heir of the deceased, which was based on a Sinumpaang
Salaysay of the latter.

The heirs of the first child filed an annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication which was declared null
and void by the Court of First Instance. On the other hand, the alive child of Herrera filed an application
with National Housing Authority (NHA) to purchase the same lots which was granted by the same. This
was affirmed by the Office of the President. When Francisca Herrera died, her heirs executed an
extrajudicial settlement of her estate, approved by NHA and directed the heir of Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado the leave the property.

In RTC, they raised that the Deed of Self-Adjudication was declared of nullity since the other heirs were
disregarded. The heirs of Francisca Herrera countered that the transfer of the purchase of the subject
lots was valid since there was consideration paid. RTC set aside the decision of NHA and Office of the
President, declaring the Deeds of Sale to be null and void. This was affirmed by CA.

Issue:

(1) Was NHA correct in its resolution in granting the application of the purchase of lots by Francisca
Herrera?

Ruling:

NO. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Margarita Herrera was in fact a will which effectivity commences at her
time of death which means that all her interests as a person should cease to be to hers and shall be in
the possession of her estate until transferred to the heirs by virtue of Art. 774:

“Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his
will or by operation of law.”

Margarita Herrera is under a contract to sell with NHA such that upon her death, this obligation
does not cease since it is transmissible either by will or by operation of law. NHA cannot make
another contract to sell to other parties since the property was already initially paid for by the
decedent. What NHA should have done was to consider the estate of the decedent as the next
person to fulfill the obligation to pay the remaining purchase price. NHA should have been alert
to note that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may
claim the property after testate or intestate proceedings.

21. SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, &
LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. SPS. JOSE
LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:]

TOPIC: II. General Provisions

DOCTRINE: Whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the
heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and
surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. Petitioners
Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.
2. Respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107-
square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.
3. Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share
in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate.
a. It was evidence by documents entitled, “Bilihan ng Lupa”
2. Respondents Lumbao later on took actual possession thereof and built a house which they have
been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present.
3. Lumbaos made several demands from Rita and the heirs for them to execute the necessary
documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in their favor.
a. Lumbaos alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao
she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited
by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned
4. Lumbaos alleged that the petitioners acted fraudulently and are conspiring with another by
executing a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement portioning among themselves the properties of
Maria, including the subject property.
5. Lumbaos then sent a formal demand to petitioners but the latter refused to reconvey the subject
property. So the Lumbaos filed a Complaint for Reconveyance before RTC of Pasig City.
6. Petitioners denied the alleged sale to Lumbaos and that the Extrajudicial Settlement was duly
published as required by law.
7. Lumbaos then amended their complaint, discovering that the petitioners executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage in favour of Julieta S. Esplana for P30,000.
8. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the Lumbaos to pay them P30,000 for
expenses incurred.
9. The CA ruled in favor of the respondent spouses Lumbao.
10. Hence the petition:
a. Petitioners contend that they are not bound by the “Bilihan ng Lupa” because it is null and
void for being falsified because of the following:
i. one of those documents made it appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were
witnesses to its execution and that they appeared personally before the notary
public, when in truth and in fact they did not.
ii. Identity of the properties were not established by the evidence presented
iii. Respondents are estopped by laches from claimining
iv. Claim on the properties had already prescribed.

ISSUE: Are the petitioner heirs bound to the “Bilihan ng Lupa” executed by the Rita, their mother, in
favor of the respondent spouses Lumbao?
HELD: Yes. Petition denied.
1. General Rule: heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest
2. whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs
by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to
the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs
3. In the present case the heirs cannot escape the obligation of the deceased since they only
inherited the property.
4. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only
succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also
valid and binding as against them.
5. Death of a party does not excuse non-performance of a contract which involves a property
right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased.
6. Heirs must reconvey to the respondent Lumbaos the 107sq. m. lot.
OTHER ISSUE: the documents “Bilihan ng Lupa” is presumed valid being notarized, a public instrument,
unless the contrary has been proved. In the case, petitioners failed to prove the falsity of the documents.

MEANING OF DEATH

Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009

FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The claim
was for Hortillano’s unborn child who died. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was on
her 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during the labor. The company granted Hortillano’s
claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano
claimed that the provision in CBS did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been
born alive or must have acquired juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA
did not contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed that
there are two elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate
dependent. None which existed in Hortillano’s case. They further contend that the only one with civil
personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code. Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child
never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents
from the very moment he/she was conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s
decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N only one with juridical personality can die.

HELD: No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only
when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do
not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil personality. One need not acquire
civil personality first before s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception.
ISSUE: W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.

HELD: Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus would have not reached 38-39
weeks without depending upon its mother.

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH –no digest

TRANSMISSION OF RIGHTS IN SUCCESSION

Calalang-Parulan vs. Calalang-Garcia

GR. No. 184148

Topic: Succession, Successional rights

Principle:

It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the
New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of
succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is
the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission
are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits
accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Facts:

In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property, the respondents Rosario Calalang -
Garcia, Leonora CalalangSabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of
land against the petitioners Nora B. CalalangParulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot was allegedly
acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latter’s
compulsory heirs.

According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime.
The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage,
their parents acquired the abovementioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother Francisca
Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the
same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.

On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then
gave birth to Nora B. CalalangParulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only
during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the
Bureau of Lands.

On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. CalalangParulan. Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 was issued in the name of Nora B. CalalangParulan. On December
27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang died.

The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 arguing that the sale of the land was void
because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who were co owners of the
same.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents were deprived of their respective shares by reason of the sale.

Ruling:

No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of
the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of
succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is
the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission
are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits
accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their
respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the
sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of
Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly
supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have
no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of
their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for Annulment
of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.

Bar-type Question:

A, is the child of B and C. During the subsistence of B and C’s marriage, they acquired a parcel of land
from C’s mother. Despite enjoying the continued possession of the said land, B and C failed to register
the same until the marriage was dissolved by reason of C’s death. After some time, B contracted a
second marriage with D. It was only during this time that B filed an application for free patent over the
parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, B sold the land to Z. A new TCT was issued by reason
of the sale to Z. A now filed a case for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the said property on
the ground that his father deprived him of his respective share. If you are the judge, would you grant the
petition?

Suggested Answer:

No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of
the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of
succession:
 The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is
the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission
are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits
accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Thus, it is only upon B’s death that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their
pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the
succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of B. And absent clear and convincing evidence that
the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious
donation inter vivas), A has no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that
their father deprived them of their respective shares.

Angela M. Butte vs Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc

G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.

FACTS

1. Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta Cruz, Manila. Upon the death of
Jose V. Ramirez, all his property including the 1/6 undivided share was bequeathed to his children
and grandchildren and 1/3 of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte.

2. Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez sold the property to Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. including the
undivided 1/6 share property in Sta Cruz, Manila. On the same day, a copy of letter regarding the
above-mentioned sell was sent to Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the property of
Jose V. Ramirez.
3. Mrs. Angela M. Butte filed a case against Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc for legal redemption when the
latter refused Mrs. Butte to redeem the said sold property.

ISSUE

Whether or not Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over
the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez.

HELD

Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share
sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez for being one of the co-owners of the heirs of the 1/6
undivided property of Jose V. Ramirez.

According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a co-owner of a thing may exercise the
right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is gross expensive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right to redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share that may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

GR No. 139611 Alfonso vs Andres

Facts: Spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres filed a complaint for

accion publiciana with damages against Noli Alfonso and spouses
Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan on the ground that Jose sold the
lot in question without publication of the extrajudicial
settlement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of deed of extrajudicial
settlement is needed to pass title to the heirs.

Held: No. Art 777 provides that the properties of a person who
dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is
subject to the claims of administration and the property may be
taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and
expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the
title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his
heirs. The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Filomena
Santos Vda. de Alfonso and Jose evidences their intention to
partition the inherited property. In Alejandrino v. Court of
Appeals, the Court upheld the effectivity of a deed of
extrajudicial settlement that was neither notarized nor
published. It delineated what portion of the inherited property
would belong to whom. The sale to respondents was made after the
execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
The extrajudicial settlement of estate, even though not
published, being deemed a partition of the inherited property,
Jose could validly transfer ownership over the specific portion
of the property that was assigned to him.

Bonilla v. Barcena, G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976.

25

JUL

[MARTIN, J.]

FACTS

Fortunata Barcena filed an action to quiet title over parcels of land. Pending the proceeding, she died.
The counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla
and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel’s
prayer for lack of merit, and dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal
personality to sue.

ISSUE
Whether or not a court action survives, through the heirs, after the death of the plaintiff.

RULING

YES. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.” From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs
become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and
they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. When
Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired
interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no
reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased
plaintiff.

Same; Succession; Title or rights to a deceased person’sproperty are immediately passed to his or her
heirs upon death.—Title or rights to a deceased person’s property are immediatelypassed to his or her
heirs upon death. The heirs’ rights becomevested without need for them to be declared “heirs.” Before
theproperty is partitioned, the heirs are coowners of the property

LORENZO vs. POSADAS JR.

G.R. No. L-43082
June 18, 1937

FACTS: Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of

real and personal properties. Proceedings for the probate of his will and the
settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga.
The will was admitted to probate.
The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a
trustee to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to
nephew Matthew ten years after the two executors named in the will was
appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned and the plaintiff
Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of
Internal Revenue (Posadas) assessed against the estate an inheritance tax,
together with the penalties for deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said
amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same time that unless the
amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery.
Posadas overruled Lorenzo’s protest and refused to refund the said amount.
Plaintiff went to court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzo’s complaint and Posadas’
counterclaim. Both parties appealed to this court.

ISSUE:

(e) Has there been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance tax?

HELD: The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs
against the plaintiff in both instances
YES
The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the
inheritance tax before the delivery of the decedent’s property to the trustee.
Stated otherwise, the defendant contends that delivery to the trustee was
delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case, within the
meaning of the first paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised
Administrative Code. This contention is well taken and is sustained. A trustee
is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust

The appointment of Moore as trustee was made by the trial court in

conformity with the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will. It is true
that the word “trust” is not mentioned or used in the will but the intention to
create one is clear. No particular or technical words are required to create a
testamentary trust. The words “trust” and “trustee”, though apt for the
purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the use of these two words is not
conclusive on the question that a trust is created. ” To constitute a valid
testamentary trust there must be a concurrence of three circumstances:

(1) Sufficient words to raise a trust;

(2) a definite subject;

(3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in
effect so providing.”

There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his
will that certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed
period, for a stated purpose. The probate court certainly exercised sound
judgment in appointmening a trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the
will