The European Union: Questions and Answers: Kristin Archick
The European Union: Questions and Answers: Kristin Archick
The European Union: Questions and Answers: Kristin Archick
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
September 4, 2015
Summary
The European Union (EU) is a political and economic partnership that represents a unique form
of cooperation among sovereign countries. The Union is the latest stage in a process of
integration begun after World War II, initially by six Western European countries, to foster
interdependence and make another war in Europe unthinkable. Today, the EU is composed of 28
member states, including most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and has helped to
promote peace, stability, and economic prosperity throughout the European continent.
The EU has been built through a series of binding treaties, and over the years, EU member states
have sought to harmonize laws and adopt common policies on an increasing number of economic,
social, and political issues. EU member states share a customs union; a single market in which
goods, people, and capital move freely; a common trade policy; and a common agricultural
policy. Nineteen EU member states use a common currency (the euro). In addition, the EU has
been developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes a Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and pursuing cooperation in the area of Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) to forge common internal security measures.
EU member states work together through several institutions to set policy and to promote their
collective interests. Key EU institutions include the European Council, composed of EU Heads of
State or Government, which acts as the strategic guide and driving force for EU policy; the
European Commission, which upholds the common interest of the Union as a whole and
functions as the EU’s executive; the Council of the European Union (also known as the Council
of Ministers), which represents the national governments; and the directly elected European
Parliament, which represents the citizens of the EU.
EU decision-making processes and the role played by the EU institutions vary depending on the
subject under consideration. For most economic and social issues, EU member states have largely
pooled their national sovereignty, and EU decision-making has a supranational quality. Decisions
in other areas, such as foreign policy, require the unanimous consensus of all 28 member states.
The Lisbon Treaty, which took effect in December 2009, is the EU’s latest attempt to reform its
governing institutions and decision-making processes in order to enable an enlarged EU to
function more effectively. The Lisbon Treaty also seeks to give the EU a stronger voice in the
foreign policy realm and to increase democratic transparency within the EU.
The United States has strongly supported the European integration project since its inception as a
means to foster democratic states and strong trading partners in Europe. The United States and the
EU have a dynamic political partnership and share a huge trade and investment relationship. To
expand and strengthen the transatlantic economy even further, the United States and the EU are
pursuing a comprehensive free trade agreement, known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (T-TIP). At the same time, some long-standing U.S.-EU trade disputes remain, as do
tensions on issues such as climate change and data protection. Many U.S. officials, including
some Members of Congress, are also concerned that the multiple challenges currently facing the
EU—from the Greek debt crisis and the upcoming UK referendum on EU membership to
migration and the rise of anti-EU populist political parties—may have significant implications for
the EU’s future and its ability to be a robust and effective U.S. partner in the years ahead. This
report serves as a primer on the EU and provides a brief description of U.S.-EU relations that may
be of interest in the 114th Congress. Also see CRS Report IN10065, The 2014 European
Parliament Elections: Outcomes and Implications, by Kristin Archick.
Contents
What Is the European Union?......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
How Does the EU Work? ................................................................................................................ 1
How Is the EU Governed?............................................................................................................... 2
What Is the Lisbon Treaty?.............................................................................................................. 3
What Is the Euro and the Eurozone Crisis? ..................................................................................... 4
Why and How Is the EU Enlarging? ............................................................................................... 6
Does the EU Have a Foreign Policy? .............................................................................................. 6
Does the EU Have a Defense Policy? ............................................................................................. 7
What Is the Relationship of the EU to NATO? ............................................................................... 8
What Is Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)? ...................................................................................... 8
Does the EU Have a Trade Policy and Process? ............................................................................. 9
How Do EU Countries and Citizens View the EU? ...................................................................... 10
Does the United States Have a Formal Relationship with the EU? ................................................ 11
Who Are U.S. Officials’ Counterparts in the EU? .......................................................................... 11
How Are U.S.-EU Political Relations Doing? ............................................................................... 12
How Are U.S.-EU Economic Relations Doing? ............................................................................ 13
Figures
Figure A-1. Member States and Candidates .................................................................................. 15
Appendixes
Appendix. Map of the EU and Aspirant Countries ........................................................................ 15
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
1
The 28 members of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
2
The Lisbon Treaty amends, rather than replaces, existing EU treaties. The history of the Lisbon Treaty is replete with
contentious negotiations among the member states and numerous ratification hurdles; it evolved from the proposed EU
constitutional treaty, which was rejected in French and Dutch national referendums in 2005. Despite the failure of the
EU constitutional treaty, experts say the Lisbon Treaty preserves over 90% of the substance of the original treaty. For
more information, see CRS Report RS21618, The European Union’s Reform Process: The Lisbon Treaty, by Kristin
Archick and Derek E. Mix.
3
The Lisbon Treaty technically renames the “co-decision” procedure as the “ordinary legislative procedure.”
4
The 19 members of the EU that use the euro are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
initiatives have included the creation of a permanent EU financial assistance facility (the
European Stability Mechanism, or ESM) to provide emergency support to Eurozone countries in
financial trouble; a decision to create a single bank supervisor for the Eurozone, under which the
ESM would be able to inject cash directly into ailing Eurozone banks; and ECB efforts to calm
the financial markets by purchasing large portions of European sovereign debt and providing
significant infusions of credit into the European banking system.5
The Eurozone crisis began to abate in late 2012 as market confidence became more positive, and,
despite some turbulence in 2013, the situation has stabilized in most Eurozone countries. Ireland
exited the EU-IMF financial assistance program in December 2013, and Portugal did so in May
2014; both countries have returned to the bond markets. EU aid to Spanish banks has also ceased.
Nevertheless, experts assert that the Eurozone remains fragile; many member states continue to
experience weak economic growth and high unemployment. In particular, Greece’s economy and
banking system remain in severe distress.
In January 2015, Greek elections resulted in a new government led by the leftist, anti-austerity
Syriza party. For months, negotiations between the Syriza-led government and Greece’s Eurozone
and IMF creditors on conditions for disbursing financial assistance foundered on Greek demands
for debt relief and an easing of austerity. By the end of June 2015, Greece failed to make a
payment to the IMF, and the government closed the banks and imposed capital controls. On July
5, Greek voters rejected calls from fellow Eurozone members for further austerity in a public
referendum, seemingly increasing the possibility of “Grexit,” or a Greek exit from the Eurozone.
On July 12-13, however, the Syriza-led government acceded to EU demands for more austerity
and economic reforms in exchange for the badly needed financial assistance. Although “Grexit”
appears to have been averted for now, Greece faces a long and uncertain road toward economic
recovery, and the threat of “Grexit” may still loom in the longer term.6
The most recent crisis over Greece has significantly challenged the EU as an institution and the
future of the EU integration project. From its start five years ago, the Eurozone crisis forced EU
leaders to grapple with weaknesses in the Eurozone’s structure and the common currency’s future
viability. It also generated tensions among member states over the proper balance between
imposing austerity measures versus stimulating growth and whether greater EU fiscal integration
was necessary. The fraught negotiations with Greece since early 2015 have produced an even
higher degree of acrimony and a serious lack of trust among EU member states. Many analysts
suggest that the crisis has threatened the core EU principle of solidarity and point to it as an
indication that member states are increasingly prioritizing narrow national agendas. Some suggest
that given how very close the EU came to “Grexit,” the crisis has undermined the integrity of the
Eurozone and raised questions about its irreversibility. Others contend that the EU has taken steps
over the last five years to strengthen the Eurozone’s architecture and improve fiscal discipline and
has found a way to “muddle through” the current crisis over Greece, and that EU governments
and leaders remain strongly committed to the EU project.
5
For more information, see CRS Report R42377, The Eurozone Crisis: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated
by Rebecca M. Nelson.
6
Also see CRS Insight IN10303, Crisis in Greece: Political Implications, by Paul Belkin; and CRS Insight IN10295,
Economic Crisis in Greece, by Rebecca M. Nelson.
7
The EU officially continues to recognize Iceland as a candidate for membership, but Iceland’s accession negotiations
have been on hold since May 2013, when a new Icelandic coalition government largely opposed to EU membership
took office. In March 2015, Iceland’s government requested that Iceland should no longer be regarded as a candidate
country, although it did not formally withdraw Iceland’s application for EU membership.
8
For more information, see CRS Report RS21344, European Union Enlargement, by Kristin Archick and Vincent L.
Morelli.
in the early 1990s and the EU’s limited tools for responding to the crisis convinced EU leaders
that the Union had to improve its ability to act collectively in the foreign policy realm. Previous
EU attempts to further such political integration had foundered for decades on member state
concerns about protecting national sovereignty and different foreign policy prerogatives.
CFSP decision-making is dominated by the member states and requires the unanimous agreement
of all 28. Member states must also ensure that national policies are in line with agreed EU
strategies and positions (e.g., imposing sanctions on a country). However, CFSP does not
preclude individual member states pursuing their own national foreign policies or conducting
their own national diplomacy.
CFSP remains a work in progress. Although many view the EU as having made considerable
strides in forging common policies on a range of international issues, from the Balkans to the
Middle East peace process to Iran, others argue that the credibility of CFSP too often suffers from
an inability to reach consensus. The launch of the U.S.-led war in Iraq in 2003, for example, was
extremely divisive among EU members, and they were unable to agree on a common EU
position. Others note that some differences in viewpoint are inevitable among 28 countries that
still retain different approaches, cultures, histories, and relationships—and often different national
interests—when it comes to foreign policy.
The EU’s Lisbon Treaty seeks to bolster CFSP by increasing the EU’s visibility on the world
stage and making the EU a more coherent foreign policy actor. As noted above, the treaty
establishes a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to serve
essentially as the EU’s chief diplomat. This post combines into one position the former
responsibilities of the Council of Ministers’ High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner
for External Relations, who previously managed the European Commission’s diplomatic
activities and foreign aid programs. In doing so, the High Representative position seeks to marry
the EU’s collective political influence with the Commission’s economic weight and development
tools. The Lisbon Treaty also creates a new EU diplomatic corps (the European External Action
Service) to support the High Representative.9
9
For more information, see CRS Report R41959, The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy, by Derek E. Mix.
10
ESDP was renamed CSDP by the Lisbon Treaty.
However, improving European military capabilities has been difficult, especially given flat or
declining European defense budgets. Serious capability gaps continue to exist in strategic air- and
sealift, command and control systems, intelligence, and other force multipliers. Also, a relatively
low percentage of European forces are deployable for expeditionary operations. Some analysts
have suggested pooling assets among several member states and the development of national
niche capabilities as possible ways to help remedy European military shortfalls. In 2004, the EU
established the European Defense Agency to help coordinate defense-industrial and procurement
policy in an effort to stretch European defense funds farther.
11
Six countries belong to the EU, but not to NATO (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden); six other
ones currently belong to NATO but not the EU (Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United States).
12
Turkey continues to formally object to Cypriot participation in NATO-EU meetings on the grounds that Cyprus is
not a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and thus does not have a security relationship with the alliance.
The absence of Cyprus from PfP also hinders NATO and the EU from sharing sensitive intelligence information. In the
current political climate, Cyprus essentially cannot join PfP because it would require the consent of all NATO allies,
including Turkey.
fighting terrorism and other cross-border crimes such as drug trafficking, and combating racism
and xenophobia. For many years, however, EU efforts to harmonize policies in the JHA field
were hampered by member states’ concerns that such measures could infringe on their legal
systems and national sovereignty. The 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the subsequent
revelation of Al Qaeda cells in Europe, and the terrorist bombings in Madrid and London in 2004
and 2005, however, helped give new momentum to many initiatives in the JHA area. Among
other measures, the EU has established a common definition of terrorism, an EU-wide arrest
warrant, and new tools to strengthen external EU border controls.
The EU’s Lisbon Treaty gives the European Parliament “co-decision” power over the majority of
JHA policy areas. The Treaty also makes most decisions on JHA issues in the Council of
Ministers subject to the qualified majority voting system, rather than unanimity, in a bid to
strengthen JHA further and speed EU decision-making. In practice, however, the EU will likely
still seek consensus as much as possible on sensitive JHA policies. Moreover, for some issues in
the JHA area, the EU has added an “emergency brake” that allows any member state to halt a
measure it believes could threaten its national legal system and ultimately, to opt out of it. Despite
these safeguards, the UK and Ireland negotiated the right to choose those JHA policies they want
to take part in and to opt out of all others; Denmark extended its previous JHA opt-out in some
JHA areas to all JHA issues. The Lisbon Treaty technically renames JHA as the “Area of
Freedom, Security, and Justice.”
the negotiations but draws on expertise from across the Commission. Typically, there are a series
of negotiation rounds; the duration of the negotiations varies but can range from two to three
years or longer. During the course of negotiations, the Commission is expected to keep both the
Council and the Parliament apprised of its progress, and the Council and the Parliament may take
the opportunity to voice their respective views and concerns. The Parliament may conduct its own
oversight hearings through its International Trade Committee (INTA). When negotiations reach
the final stage, both parties to the agreement initial the proposed accord. It is then submitted to
the Council and the Parliament for review.13 If the Council approves the accord, it authorizes the
Commission to formally sign the agreement.
Once the new trade accord is officially signed by both parties, the Council submits a draft
decision to conclude negotiations to the Parliament for its consent. The Parliament reviews the
signed agreement both in the INTA Committee and in plenary session. Although the Parliament is
limited to voting “yes” or “no” to the new accord, it can indicate that it would not support the
agreement should it find fault with any of its provisions, and can ask the Commission to review or
address its concerns. If parts of the trade agreement fall under member state competence, all EU
countries must also ratify the agreement according to their national ratification procedures.14 After
Parliament gives its consent and following ratification in the member states (if required), the
Council adopts the final decision to conclude the agreement. It may then be officially published
and enter into force.15
13
Some trade agreements submitted for Council and Parliament approval are accompanied by Commission legislative
proposals needed to implement the new accord; these legislative proposals must also be adopted by both the Council
and the Parliament.
14
With the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty, most policy areas usually included in trade agreements are now
considered areas of exclusive EU competence; thus, most experts judge that member state ratification may be
unnecessary, or required only for small parts of new EU trade agreements. See Stephen Woolcock, “EU Trade and
Investment Policymaking After the Lisbon Treaty,” Intereconomics, 2010.
15
For more on the EU process for concluding new trade agreements, see European Commission, “Factsheet: Trade
Negotiations Step By Step,” June 2012, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doculib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149616.pdf.
The prevailing view among European publics has likewise been historically favorable toward the
EU. Despite the EU’s recent financial troubles and a drop in public support for the EU’s single
currency, surveys indicate that the majority of EU citizens continue to consider EU membership
as good for their countries overall.16 EU citizens also value the freedom to easily travel, work, and
live in other EU countries.
At the same time, there has always been a certain amount of “euroskepticism” among some
segments of the European public. Traditionally, such skepticism has been driven by fears about
the loss of national sovereignty or concerns about what some view as a “democratic deficit” in the
EU—a feeling that ordinary citizens have no say over decisions taken in far-away Brussels.
Recently, however, the Eurozone crisis has increased the degree of euroskepticism in some
countries and, along with fears about immigration and globalization, has contributed to the rise of
anti-EU populist parties in several member states, including Austria, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Partly as a result of
increasing pressure from hardline euroskeptics, UK Prime Minister David Cameron intends to
renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU and to hold an “in-or-out” public referendum by
the end of 2017. With current polls indicating an almost even split among voters on staying in or
leaving the EU, a British exit from the EU (a so-called “Brexit”) could be a distinct possibility.
16
See for example, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends 2014.
Washington, DC, represents the European Union in its dealings with the U.S. government, while
the U.S. Mission to the European Union represents Washington’s interests in Brussels.
17
James Fontanella-Khan, “MEPs Call for Clause to Limit American Internet Snooping,” Financial Times, June 19,
2013; Michael Birnbaum, “EU Fury on Allegations of U.S. Spying,” Washington Post, June 30, 2013; Alison Smale,
“Indignation Over U.S. Spying Spreads in Europe,” New York Times, October 24, 2013.
Meanwhile, over the last few years, some European leaders have expressed concerns about the
U.S. “pivot” or rebalancing toward Asia. U.S. officials stress that this rebalancing will not come
at the expense of the transatlantic relationship and note that the United States hopes to engage
more closely with Europe in the future on issues of strategic and economic importance in Asia.
Many experts in the United States and Europe view T-TIP as a concrete reaffirmation of the
importance of close transatlantic ties, both politically and economically.
At the same time, U.S. officials and analysts worry that an EU increasingly preoccupied with its
own internal problems may be a less robust and effective partner for the United States. Some
experts contend that the breadth and scale of the multiple challenges currently facing the EU—
from the Greek crisis and the upcoming UK referendum on EU membership to migratory
pressures and the rise of anti-EU populist parties—are unprecedented, and how the EU responds
could have lasting implications for the EU’s role as an international actor and as a key U.S.
strategic and economic partner. The Obama Administration has consistently asserted its
opposition to both “Grexit” and “Brexit,” viewing such possibilities as significant threats to the
credibility of the EU, to European stability, and to a strong U.S.-EU relationship.
as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. U.S. and EU policymakers hope that the T-
TIP negotiations will result in an agreement that further opens markets and increases U.S. and EU
exports; strengthens rules-based investment; tackles costly non-tariff barriers; reduces regulatory
barriers; and enhances cooperation on trade issues of global concern.19
Historically, U.S.-EU cooperation has been a driving force behind efforts to liberalize world trade
and ensure the stability of international financial markets. U.S. and EU leaders sought to pursue a
coordinated response to the global financial crisis through the G-20, which brings together
industrialized and developing countries. And many view U.S.-EU cooperation as crucial to
managing emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil in the years ahead. At the same
time, divisions exist both among EU countries and between the EU and the United States in some
policy areas. U.S.-EU disagreement over agricultural subsidies, for example, has contributed to
the stalemated Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. In addition, U.S.-European
differences persist regarding how to curb large global trade imbalances viewed as posing serious
risks to economic growth and an open international trading system.
Given the extensive U.S.-EU commercial relationship, U.S. officials have also been concerned
about recent events in Greece and their implications for the Eurozone. Throughout the crisis, the
Obama Administration has urged the EU to provide more substantial financial assistance for
struggling Eurozone economies. Some U.S. officials questioned what they viewed as the EU’s
emphasis on austerity measures, believing that greater efforts were needed to promote growth. As
a potential “Grexit” loomed in mid-2015, the Obama Administration consistently urged the EU to
find a way to keep Greece in the Eurozone, fearing that “Grexit” could introduce broad
uncertainty into the European and global economies.20
19
Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Fact Sheet: United States To Negotiate Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership with the European Union,” February 13, 2013.
20
Mike Dorning, “The U.S. Suddenly Sounds an Alarm on Greece,” Bloomberg.com, May 28, 2015; Julie Hirschfeld
Davis and Binyamin Applebaum, “Obama Tries to Soften Creditors’ Stance to Salvage a Deal,” New York Times, June
30, 2015.
Source: Delegation of the European Union to the United States, “On the Path to EU Membership: The EU
Enlargement Process,” EU Insight, December 2010; Adapted and updated by CRS.
Note: Although the EU continues to recognize Iceland as a candidate country, accession negotiations have been
on hold since May 2013. In March 2015, Iceland requested that it should not be considered a candidate for EU
membership, but did not formally withdraw its application.
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
[email protected], 7-2668