H

Human Trafficking Detailed Description

Fabrizio Sarrica Introduction

Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, Human trafficking is a crime affecting all the
Policy Analysis and Research Branch; UN Office countries around the world. Lives are stolen, vio-
on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Office at lated, exploited, bought, and sold. In the year
Vienna, Vienna, Austria 2000, the United Nations presented to the inter-
national community the Protocol to Prevent, Sup-
press and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Synonyms especially Women and Children (henceforth the
UN Trafficking Protocol). (The Protocol to Pre-
Trafficking in persons vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime.)
Definition
The UN Trafficking Protocol is certainly not
the first piece of international legislation tackling
The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
human trafficking; however, it is the most com-
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and
plete. It frames it under the UN Transnational
Children defines trafficking in persons as
Organized Crime Convention, and by doing so
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, it provides the legal tools to national authorities
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
to combat it more effectively. In addition, the UN
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of Trafficking Protocol has the great merit to define
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the trafficking in persons internationally.
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person, for the purpose of exploita- Defining Trafficking in Persons
tion. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the The UN Trafficking Protocol supplementing the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or ser- United Nations Transnational Organized Crime
vices, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servi- Convention was adopted by General Assembly
tude or the removal of organs. resolution 55/25. It entered into force on
25 December 2003. It is the first global legally
binding instrument with an agreed definition on

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_1-1
2 Human Trafficking

trafficking in persons. Article 3, paragraph (a) of The definition of trafficking in persons allows
the Protocol defines trafficking in persons as for the categorization of exploitation in three
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, ways: trafficking for sexual exploitation
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the (prostitution of the others and other forms of
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of sexual exploitation), trafficking for labor exploi-
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of tation (forced labor, slavery or practices similar
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to to slavery and servitude), and trafficking for
achieve the consent of a person having control organ removal. In addition, by introducing the
over another person, for the purpose of exploita- term “at a minimum” in the definition of the
tion. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the purposes of trafficking, the UN Trafficking Pro-
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or ser- tocol leaves open the option of including other
vices, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servi- forms of exploitation. In recent years, national
tude or the removal of organs. legislation and jurisdictions have expanded the
application of trafficking legislation. This has
On the basis of the definition given in the
resulted in the inclusion of trafficking for child
Trafficking in Persons Protocol, it is evident that
begging or the use of children to commit petty
trafficking in persons has three constituent
crimes or trafficking for forced marriages and
elements:
others. Cases of trafficking for the trading of
body parts for rituals and/or traditional healing
• The act: recruitment, transportation, transfer,
and medicine and trafficking for child soldiering
harboring or receipt of persons
have also been identified in some parts of the
• The means: threat or use of force, coercion,
world.
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
The combination of a universal definition that
vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits
is successful in addressing a variety of exploit-
to a person in control of the victim
ative patterns and the evolving national jurispru-
• The purpose: exploitation, which includes, at
dences makes this a complex dynamic
least, exploiting the prostitution of others, sex-
transnational problem. At the same time, this
ual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, or sim-
necessarily brings challenges in terms of mea-
ilar practices and the removal of organs
surement, analysis, and evaluation of this
phenomenon.
From a criminological point of view, the
exploitation is not only an element of the legal
definition of the crime but also the motivation
Research in the Field of Trafficking
that drives the criminal to commit the crime.
in Persons
Trafficking in persons happens mostly because
of money, as some human beings exploit others
One of the most persistent issues on the human
in order to gain profits. Exploitation normally
trafficking agenda has been the lack of knowl-
takes place as the victim is vulnerable and/or
edge about the phenomenon. Criminology and
discriminated. This is often the case for migrants,
related social sciences developed different
who are among the most frequently reported vic-
methods of research according to the type of
tims of human trafficking (75 % of the victims
crime under analysis. Victim surveys are largely
detected worldwide), or children because of their
used to estimate the severity of corruption, for
young age, or females in patriarchal societies.
instance.
The most frequently reported victims of traffick-
The methodological debate aiming at better
ing are those who suffer some sort of vulnerabil-
studying and measuring human trafficking is
ity vis-à-vis the more typical traffickers, adult
still at its early stages, especially when moving
men, and local nationals.
to an international ambit. As indicated above, the
first challenge lies in the definition and nature of
Human Trafficking 3

the phenomenon. Trafficking in persons, as The challenges indicated above may help to
described in the protocol supplementing the explain why it is so difficult to carry research in
Transnational Organized Crime Convention, is a the field of human trafficking.
criminal “process” rather than a criminal event. The increased number of human trafficking
Indeed, the process may take place in different National Rapporteurs and similar mechanisms
geographical areas and at each moment of the whose function is to collect and report about
trafficking process, different complex events are cases detected from the different national author-
occurring. These different events do not represent ities opens the door to a new approach to research
trafficking per se, but all the events connected trafficking in persons. A generally accepted, offi-
produce the trafficking experience. The identifi- cial statistics on trafficking in persons represents
cation of instruments capable of capturing the the tip of the iceberg, meaning that the large part
severity of trafficking in persons would require of the phenomenon remains hidden, the so-called
identifying a set of measurements representing dark number of crime. As a consequence, by
the prevalence of these different phenomena in using information concerning the cases officially
each of the geographical areas affected by the detected by the national authorities, it will not be
process. possible to draw conclusions on the dimension of
In addition, the trafficking process can take a the phenomenon. Nevertheless, this data is
particular form (or forms) in the countries of proven to be effective to understand what the
origin of those who will potentially become vic- main patterns of the cases detected at national
tims of trafficking in persons. It takes different level are.
forms in transit countries and yet other forms in The difficulties about grasping the size of the
countries of destination. One single country human trafficking phenomenon cannot in any
could be affected at the same time by all of the way hinder investigating all the rest.
steps of the process in the case of domestic traf-
ficking, or because it is at same time a country of
origin of trafficking toward other regions and a The Need for an International
country of destination for victims of trafficking in Monitoring Tool
persons from other countries.
The trafficking process may also have differ- There is a clear need to enhance the knowledge
ent characteristics according to the specific type on trafficking in persons in its national and trans-
of exploitation. The phenomenon of child sol- national manifestations. Such observation of traf-
diers is very different, in form, from forced pros- ficking patterns and flows can be
titution, which in turn is very different from comprehensively conducted only from an inter-
trafficking for organ removal or for begging. national, objective, and independent observatory.
Thus, it is extremely difficult to develop a While national-level studies and reports may
research method, an indicator, or a research tool accurately present the human trafficking situation
able to capture at once different forms of human in a particular country and provide valuable input
trafficking. to international analyses, an international author-
Moreover, trafficking in persons is ity is well placed to discern commonalities and
(fortunately) a relatively rare phenomenon. The differences between countries or regions and
number of victims of trafficking is not as frequent identify trafficking flows and patterns in different
as the victims of corruption or of property crimes. parts of the world. This is the reason behind the
In comparison to these other crimes, fewer per- decision of the international community to assign
sons get in contact with trafficking events, do UNODC the mandate and the duty to produce a
have direct trafficking experience, or define Global Report on Trafficking in Persons to assess
their perceptions on the base of facts or episodes. trafficking flows and patterns at national,
This makes human trafficking extremely difficult regional, and international levels (General
to assess using normal survey instruments. Assembly Resolution 64/293, para. 60).
4 Human Trafficking

The first Global Report on Trafficking in Per- flows for certain nationalities whose countries
sons was published in 2009 (available at www. enjoy economic improvements such as increased
unodc.org/glotip). That Report was building GDP or higher employment rates.
upon the experiences of many National Rappor- UNODC has also been able to monitor traf-
teurs existing in the world, using mainly infor- ficking flows from the perspectives of the desti-
mation concerning the profile of the detected nation countries. The regional and international
victims and of the offenders to grasp patterns relevance of the flow is then assessed, not on the
and flows of human trafficking. It was a first basis of one source of information but by the
global effort to collate official national-level number of destination countries in which a cer-
information with the perspective of an interna- tain nationality among trafficking victims is
tional overview of trafficking in persons. This detected. For instance, if a specific nationality
was done to assess the trafficking situation, par- among victims is detected in many countries
ticularly in terms of the criminal justice system and every region of the world, this may indicate
response, at the national and international levels. that some trafficking flows occur globally as
Following that experience, a new Global compared to trafficking flows limited to specific
Report was published by UNODC in December regions. On the basis of these assumptions, it is
2012 (available at www.unodc.org/glotip). This possible to compare the East Asian trafficking
new edition of the Global Report continues the flows vis-à-vis the flows originating from Africa.
work started earlier in terms of the methodolog- During the reporting period (2007–2010), Afri-
ical approach, it pushes forward the explanatory can victims were detected by national authorities
power of the data collected in order to discern, for in Africa, the Middle East, and Western Europe.
each region and subregion, the profile of the At the same time, East Asian victims were largely
victims, the profile of the offenders, and the detected by the authorities of many countries in
forms of exploitation detected. the Americas, in Europe, in Africa and the Mid-
Currently, forced labor is the most frequently dle East, and in Asia and the Pacific. It is clear
detected form of exploitation in Africa and in that East Asian trafficking has global promi-
Asia, while trafficking for sexual exploitation is nence, while African trafficking flows are limited
more prominent in Europe, and the two forms are to certain areas of the world. The strength of the
somewhat equally detected in the Americas. results just described lies in the fact that they are
Trafficking in children is affecting the African built on data analyses provided by a multitude of
continent most heavily, while in Europe victims national authorities.
are more frequently adults, and child trafficking This approach is also used to assess possible
ranges around 15–17 % of the victims detected. increases or decreases in trafficking from certain
The Report also registers trends globally and origins. While the reduction or increase of certain
regionally, such as that concerning the increase nationalities detected in one destination country
in the detection of child trafficking, especially in may be due to local factors, the same trend reg-
Europe and especially when the victims detected istered in many other different countries of des-
are girls. tination can only mean that trafficking from those
Other patterns are also apparent. For example, origins is generally decreasing. This is the case of
there is a link between certain profile of the trafficking in persons originating from Eastern
offenders and certain profile of the victims, such Europe, which has been decreasingly detected
as women traffickers being involved in the traf- over the last decade by most or all the institutions
ficking of girls. There is also a relation between reporting this trafficking flow affecting their own
economic dynamics and trafficking. Certain country.
nationalities are more frequently trafficked
abroad when their own countries are undergoing
economic downturn or a rise in unemployment.
Conversely, there is a reduction of trafficking
Human Trafficking 5

Conclusions about blaming and shaming one or another gov-

ernment, but it is about understanding who, why,
During the last two decades, the international when, where, and how victims are exploited and
community has raised its head to combat and trafficked around the world. This is needed to
prevent this human trafficking, and more coun- better combat it and prevent it, and this is what
tries are identifying it as one of their top priori- global research on trafficking in persons is trying
ties. The UN Trafficking Protocol, open for to achieve.
signature in the year 2000, entered into force in
a record time just 3 years later. As of August
2012, the vast majority of the countries in the Cross-References
world do have a comprehensive legislation on
trafficking in persons. The number of prosecu- ▶ Global Trafficking in Persons
tions and convictions is (too) slowly rising ▶ Human Trafficking
around the world. ▶ Human Trafficking Research
More countries are nowadays systematically ▶ UN Trafficking Protocol
reporting and publishing about cases of traffick- ▶ United Nations
ing detected in their territory, with the result that ▶ UNODC
more is known about forms of exploitation, about
the potential victims, and about the profile of the
offenders and their modus operandi. The General References
Assembly decision to produce a United Nations
Global Report on Trafficking in Persons is The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
unprecedented, as individual countries are nor-
supplementing the United Nations Convention against
mally reluctant to have an international organiza- Transnational Organized Crime.
tion to look at their domestic crime situation. It is UNODC (2013) Global report on trafficking in persons
now clear that studying human trafficking is not
L

Labor Trafficking Detailed Description

Melynda Barnhart Labor trafficking is a form of human trafficking

New York Law School, New York, NY, USA involving the exploitation of workers who are
forced, defrauded, or coerced into a condition of
servitude. Labor trafficking encompasses all
Synonyms forms of labor or services except sexual exploi-
tation. Labor traffickers often target migrants,
Forced labor; Human trafficking; Modern-day finding their victims at various stages of the
slavery migration process. Labor trafficking victims
may be migrating for a variety of reasons, but
most seek better employment or working
conditions than what is available at home.
Definition
While travel from home is not a necessary
component of trafficking, labor trafficking com-
Labor trafficking is a subset of human trafficking,
monly occurs in internal and external migration.
involving the exploitation of a person’s labor by a
The International Labor Organization reports
variety of means whereby the person does not
that almost half of forced labor victims migrate
believe he or she is free to leave his or her work.
within their country or across borders before
Trafficking usually begins with the transporta-
enduring forced labor (International Labor
tion, harboring, recruiting, or procuring of a per-
Organization, Questions and answers on forced
son by means of force, deception or fraud,
labor, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/
coercion, confiscation of identity documents,
newsroom/comment-analysis/WCMS_181922/
debt, or abuse of power or vulnerability, ending
lang--en/index.htm. Last visited 18 Dec 2012),
with the person in a form of labor servitude.
also confirming the connection between move-
Labor trafficking is more than the condition of
ment and labor trafficking. The cost of labor
servitude, slavery, or exploitation, as it also
trafficking exploitation is estimated to be $20
includes the process by which a person was
billion annually in the amount of wages, and
placed in that servitude. It is a form of modern-
other benefits denied enslaved migrant workers
day slavery.
(United States Department of State).
The separation of human trafficking into two
forms, sex and labor, does not have a clear defin-
ing line. In general, any form of sexual
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_2-4
2 Labor Trafficking

exploitation, commercial or not, is considered to willingly undertakes migration. Recruiters may

be sex trafficking rather than labor trafficking. be friends, relatives, or neighbors of the victim
Some forms of legal commercial sex work, such and approach them individually, or recruiters
as erotic dancing, may be included in labor traf- may set up storefronts advertising jobs in other
ficking definitions rather than sex trafficking, countries, just like legitimate labor recruiters.
depending upon the relevant laws. For the most Some recruiters are trafficked people themselves,
part, labor trafficking is a catchall definition that who are offered the opportunity to “purchase”
encompasses all nonsexual labor exploitation. their freedom by recruiting others. Some traffick-
Legal definitions of what precisely encom- ing recruiters find victims after they have entered
passes the crime of labor trafficking vary at the or been smuggled into the destination country and
state and international levels, but most include all may be crew foremen or recruiters paid by legit-
forms of nonsexual labor or services, wherein the imate employers to hire laborers. Due to the con-
person’s services are procured initially through stant market for workers in many parts of the
various methods and the person is kept in servi- world, traffickers usually have no difficulty
tude by a variety of means. Labor trafficking recruiting their victims. Because this recruitment
shares many aspects of forced labor, but such mimics usual migration patterns and traffickers
terms are usually not legally synonymous. At often insert themselves into active migration
the international level, forced labor focuses only paths, most victims are not aware that they are
on the conditions of servitude at the site of labor, being trafficked until it is too late.
while labor trafficking also encompasses the Once the worker arrives at the worksite, the
methods of recruitment and the means of control- falsity of the “good job” is revealed. The prom-
ling the victims. The methods of trafficking com- ised job is instead labor exploitation, from which
monly include transporting, obtaining, recruiting, there is no apparent escape. Typically the migrant
harboring, or selling a person for his or her ser- arrives at the foreign destination only to have his
vices. These methods commonly involve decep- or her identification and travel documents confis-
tion and fraud, as many trafficking victims are cated, to be threatened and physically or sexually
willing migrants and trust their recruiters. The abused, and to be forced to perform work that is
common means of control once the person is at either unpaid or severely underpaid. Debt bond-
the labor site involve restriction of movement and age is quite common, in which a manufactured
harmful living and working conditions. These fraudulent debt is required to be “repaid,” which
means of labor trafficking encompass physical can be a highly effective form of coercion. This
force or restraint, psychological coercion, fraud debt is often in the form of a smuggling or
or deceit, abuse of power or vulnerability, confis- recruiting fee, set so high that the person can
cation of identity or travel documents, and threats never pay it. Labor trafficking cases may also
against the person or their loved ones. involve indentured servitude, wherein the person
Labor trafficking situations manifest in a vari- is held in servitude for a certain period of time,
ety of ways, but there are common patterns. The but this is less common than debts. Time periods
stereotypical migrant labor trafficking case may be a harvest season or a term of years or
involves traffickers who have established them- months. The trafficking ends when the person
selves in the foreign country or region and then frees himself or herself from the exploitative
recruit others in their hometown with promises of situation.
helping newer migrants to successfully migrate The psychological trauma involved in labor
just as the trafficker did. The trafficking usually trafficking is a primary reason victims find it so
begins with recruitment for a “good job” else- difficult to escape, even if the person is not being
where, such as a job with better pay, benefits, or literally restricted in his or her movement. Com-
working conditions than may be available to that mon emotional responses to trauma and victimi-
person at home. The recruiter establishes trust zation include emotional detachment and
with the victim, such that the victim usually feelings of self-blame, anxiety and fear, and
Labor Trafficking 3

difficulty in making decisions or concentrating. exploitation (Id.). Forty-four percent of the total
Many experience a loss of memory related to the victims of forced labor had migrated either inter-
traumatic event. Physical reactions, particularly nally or internationally, although cross-border
where the person was physically or sexually movement was more strongly associated with
abused, include weakened physical state, sexual exploitation than labor exploitation
untreated medical conditions, and often hunger (Id. at 17).
(2012 TIP report, p. 17). These traumas, com- Women and children are often the focus of
bined with threats from traffickers, can cause a anti-trafficking campaigns, but comprise about
person to believe that he or she is not able to half of all victims of labor trafficking. This
leave. Trafficked people often do not know that focus means that male trafficking victims are
what they are experiencing is a crime, and many often overlooked by governments and law
are unwilling to trust law enforcement or govern- enforcement and are often not identified properly.
ment officials in the country where they are. Women are the most likely victims of forced
Modern-day slavery thus involves psychological labor through migration, but this is largely due
chains more than physical ones. to their overrepresentation in sexual exploitation
Identified labor trafficking cases range in scale cases. Women are 98 % of sexually exploited
from single victims, most commonly in house- forced labor victims, while comprising slightly
hold domestic service as nannies or maids, to less than half of the labor exploitation victims
hundreds of victims, often occurring at sweat- (Id. at 14). Women’s representation in labor traf-
shops or factories. Labor trafficking has been ficking cases is roughly consistent with their rep-
discovered in regulated and unregulated forms resentation in migration overall (United Nations
of labor. Industries common to labor trafficking Population Fund). Children are also trafficked for
include domestic service, restaurants, agriculture, labor; the type of labor and age of victims varies
construction, manufacturing, and mining. World- greatly by geographic region. Approximately
wide, very few industries have not included traf- 26 % of forced labor victims are children (ILO
ficked workers. Even occupations requiring Global Estimate of Forced Labor at 14).
extensive education have included trafficking The current international definition of human
victims, such as teachers and nurses. Certain trafficking is from the “Palermo Protocol,” an
industries may have higher incidence of labor anti-trafficking protocol to the United Nations’
trafficking in particular geographic regions, Convention Against Transnational Organized
such as fisheries in Western Africa or Crime (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish
brickmaking in South Asia. Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
The International Labor Organization (ILO), Children, supplementing the United Nations
an international treaty organization, compiled the Convention Against Transnational Organized
most accurate global statistics on forced labor in Crime (“Palermo Protocol”), Article 3(a),
2012. While the ILO’s Global Estimate of Forced 25 December 2003, http://www.uncjin.org/Doc
Labor report focuses on more broadly defined uments/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/con
forced labor rather than human trafficking, all vention_%20traff_eng.pdf). The convention also
human trafficking is encompassed within the def- included a separate protocol against the Smug-
inition of forced labor (International Labor Orga- gling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air (United
nization). The ILO estimates the division of Nations Convention Against Transnational
forced labor as 90 % by the private sector and Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent,
10 % by governments, in the form of work Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
imposed by militaries or prisons in contravention Especially Women and Children). Notably, the
of ILO agreements (ILO Global Estimate of definition does not distinguish between labor
Forced Labor, p. 13). Sixty-eight percent of vic- and sex trafficking, focusing on the means and
tims are estimated to be in forced labor exploita- methods of trafficking for “exploitation”
tion, with the remaining 22 % in sexual (Palermo Protocol, Article 3(a)). Exploitation
4 Labor Trafficking

is given an inclusive definition, enumerating continuum of abuses. The spectrum also includes
exploitation of “the prostitution of others or difficult or dangerous working conditions, denial
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor of safety equipment, underpayment or lack of
or services, slavery or practices similar to slav- payment, sexual harassment, overly long-
ery, servitude or the removal of organs. . .” (Id.). working hours, no breaks, lack of union protec-
This protocol has been ratified by 154 countries tions, the absence of promotion or advancement
(United Nations Treaty Collection database, opportunities, etc. Just like with trafficking vic-
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= tims, exploited migrants may not seek the pro-
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18& tections of labor or employment laws in the host
lang=en. Last visited 18 Dec 2012). As well as country where such exist for fear of being
providing a common definition of human traf- deported, ignored, solicited for a bribe, or
ficking, the Palermo Protocol mandates legal harmed. In many ways, migrants are perfect tar-
and physical protection for victims of trafficking gets for labor exploitation because these are a
in persons, including counseling, housing, group of willing workers who are less likely to
employment opportunities, and protections in demand fair treatment and may not have legal
repatriation (Palermo Protocol, Articles 6–8). protections available to them. Until migration is
The protocol also details the measures govern- made safer, labor exploitation of migrants is
ments must undertake to prevent trafficking in likely to continue.
persons, detailing particular policies and pro-
grams and cooperation with other nations
(Palermo Protocol, Articles 9–13). References
In the wake of extensive political pressure
from the United States, as well as to implement International Labor Organization, ILO global estimate
of forced labor: results and methodology, 2012
the ratification of the Palermo Protocol, most
report, pp 19–20. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
countries have adopted domestic criminal sanc- public/---ed_norm/declaration/documents/publication/
tions against labor trafficking as well as sex traf- wcms_182004.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012
ficking. Enforcement of these laws varies, but is United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent,
relatively nonexistent. When most countries
Suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially
attempt to enforce anti-trafficking laws, the women and children. http://www.unodc.org/docu
focus is almost exclusively on sex trafficking ments/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Con
cases. Law enforcement officers are generally vention/TOCebook-e.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Female
unfamiliar with enforcing labor laws, while pros-
migrants: bridging the gaps throughout the life cycle,
titution crimes are quite familiar. Considering the May 2006, p 3. http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/
estimates that most forced labor victims do not global/shared/documents/publications/2006/bridging_
leave their country of origin, although they may gap.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012
United States Department of State, 2012 trafficking in
move internally (ILO report at 16), the lack of
persons report, p 13. http://www.state.gov/docu
enforcement of labor trafficking statutes in par- ments/organization/192587.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec
ticular means that labor trafficking victims are 2012
unlikely to receive any assistance. Thus, imple-
mentation of domestic labor trafficking laws con- Further Reading
tinues to be a widespread concern. Brennan, Denise. Life Interrupted: Trafficking into Forced
Labor in the United States. Duke University Press,
Labor trafficking falls within a continuum of
2014
migrant labor exploitation. Migrants are often Bales, Kevin. Disposable People: New Slavery in the
vulnerable to exploitation, traveling to places Global Economy. University of California Press,
with which they are unfamiliar, with few support Third Edition, 2012
European Commission Organized Crime and
networks, where they may have few legal pro-
Human Trafficking website. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
tections as migrants. Thus, slavery, forced labor, home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-
and labor trafficking are only one end of the and-human-trafficking/index_en.htm
Labor Trafficking 5

Free the Slaves and Human Rights Center, University of International Organization for Migration Counter-
California, Berkeley, Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in Trafficking website. http://www.iom.int/cms/
the United States, Sept 2004. http://www. countertrafficking
freetheslaves.net//Document.Doc?id=17 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website. http://
International Labor Organization Elimination of Forced www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html
Labor website. http://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/ ?ref=menuside
elimination-of-forced-labor/lang--en/index.htm US Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons website. http://www.state.gov/j/
tip/index.htm
S

Sex Trafficking Detailed Description

Grace Chang The US TVPA definition differs from interna-

Department of Feminist Studies, UC Santa tional definitions of “human trafficking” in its
Barbara, University of California, Santa Barbara, narrow focus and privileging of that deemed to
CA, USA be “sex trafficking.” This both reflects and facili-
tates the priority within the US government
approach to focus on the prosecution of prostitu-
Definition tion. In contrast to the TVPA, international agree-
ments such as the 2000 Palermo Protocol establish
The definition of sex trafficking has been a broader definition of trafficking, allowing for
contested across international and US contexts greater attention to other forms of labor exploita-
and among US government policy and legal and tion and an emphasis on the means by which the
advocacy frameworks as well. The US Trafficking exploitation is achieved. The Palermo Protocol
Victims Protection Act (TVPA) defines “severe states (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
forms of trafficking” as: (1) sex trafficking in Trafficking in Persons):
which a commercial sex act is induced by force, (a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruit-
fraud, or coercion or in which the person induced ment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt
to perform such an act is under 18 or (2) the of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
or obtaining of a person for labor or services, vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of pay-
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion, for ments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
the purpose of subjecting that person to involun- having control over another person, for the purpose
tary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a min-
imum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others
The TVPA also defines “sex trafficking” as “the or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a servitude or the removal of organs
commercial sex act” (Trafficking Victims Protec-
The Palermo Protocol put forth one of the first
tion Act of 2000).
international reformulations of the definition of
“trafficking in persons” since the 1949 UN Con-
vention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Per-
sons and the Exploitation of Prostitution of

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_3-2
2 Sex Trafficking

Others, which had focused exclusively on prosti- trafficking cases, despite service providers’ obser-
tution and considered all prostitution, whether vations of more cases of labor trafficking:
voluntary or forced, to be trafficking. The Palermo Federal and state human trafficking data indicate
Protocol, in contrast, recognizes the existence and more investigations and prosecutions have taken
possibilities of both voluntary and forced prosti- place for sex trafficking than labor trafficking; how-
tution. The Palermo delegates had agreed that ever, victim service providers reported assisting
significantly higher numbers of foreign national
involuntary participation in prostitution consti- victims in cases of labor trafficking than in cases
tutes trafficking, but the majority of delegates of sex trafficking. . . (http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/
rejected the idea that voluntary participation by tiprpt/2012/)
adults in prostitution should be identified as traf-
Anti-trafficking advocates across the USA
ficking and thus left the definition of “prostitu-
consistently report that in the USA, domestic
tion” ambiguous to allow for different
work is the industry in which people are most
interpretations by nation-states. The language of
commonly trafficked, not sex work. One of the
the TVPA does not allow for such open interpre-
foremost anti-trafficking organizations in the
tation or the autonomy of other states in defining
country, CAST (the Coalition to Abolish Slavery
prostitution and trafficking. This poses a concern
and Trafficking), reported that among the traffick-
that the TVPA precludes the possibilities offered
ing survivors they have served in the Los Angeles
and originally intended by the delegates in creat-
region, 40 % were in domestic work, 17 % in
ing the terms of the Palermo Protocol and may
factory work, 17 % in sex work, 13 % in restaurant
lead to the assumption or bias in anti-trafficking
work, and 13 % in servile marriage (McMahon
policy or practice that all prostitution is traffick-
and Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking
ing, regardless of whether participation in this
2002). Despite these reports, US government anti-
labor is voluntary or not (Chang and Kim 2007).
trafficking efforts have continued to be focused on
Many scholars and advocates suggest that the
sex trafficking, which continues to be conflated
lack of a consistent definition of trafficking rein-
with prostitution.
forces the tendency within US government poli-
The US focus on sex trafficking has been
cies and practices to conflate human trafficking
imposed globally through restrictions that require
with prostitution and hinders the work of anti-
any foreign nongovernmental organizations
trafficking advocates in combating trafficking
(NGOs) receiving US federal funding to sign on
and protecting the rights of trafficking survivors.
to the “antiprostitution” pledge, attesting that they
Furthermore, many argue that this conflation has
do not support the practice or legalization of pros-
facilitated the use of these policies to criminalize
titution. Scholars and advocates argue that this
prostitution, rather than to combat human traffick-
reinforces the criminalization of prostitution and
ing. Finally, the US government approach to traf-
implies the criminalization of any activity in sup-
ficking has been dominated by a focus on
port of or serving sex workers. This hinders the
prosecution of participants in the sex industry, work of some anti-trafficking organizations as
within the “prevention, protection and prosecu-
well as sex worker rights organizations. It has
tion” framework (Chang and Kim 2007).
forced some international NGOs to forego US
The disproportionate focus on prosecution of funding in order to continue to provide essential
traffickers and search for potential victims of sex
services to sex workers or has led others to dis-
trafficking may leave many victims of trafficking
continue these services in favor of continued
in sectors other than the commercial sex industry funding (Chang and Kim 2007).
without due attention, recognition, or protections.
The US government has also pressured other
The 2012 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report,
countries to adopt the focus on “sex trafficking”
produced annually by the US State Department through international “prevention” measures that
to assess efforts to combat trafficking in the USA,
are mandated, monitored, and enforced by the US
notes the prevalent focus on prosecuting sex
State Department’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Sex Trafficking 3

Report (U.S. Dep’t of State). The TIP Report Francisco identified as suspected trafficking sites
ranks countries’ performance in preventing traf- and “rescued” over 120 women. Authorities
ficking based on their compliance with anti- detained the women at a military base in Califor-
trafficking measures endorsed by the USA. The nia, while federal officials questioned them to
US government sanctions countries with lower determine their status as possible victims of traf-
tier rankings, while offering higher ranked coun- ficking, before calling in trained service providers
tries funding to aid their anti-trafficking efforts. 24 h later. By the time advocates arrived, federal
Rankings are determined largely by each officials had already decided that the majority of
country’s adoption of the major elements of the the women were not legal victims of trafficking
US anti-trafficking approach: prostitution/traf- and placed them in immigration detention (Kim
ficking conflation, level of focus on prostitution, K (2006) Interview. 7 October).
and emphasis on prosecution. Advocates were able to convince officials to
The case of Korea provides a good illustration interpret the law more broadly in screenings of the
of the consequences of the US government’s remaining women, in direct conflict with the nar-
antiprostitution and prosecutorial approach as row federal framework. In this case and others,
imposed internationally. Advocates report that advocates report that when clients identify them-
the Korean government has defined human traf- selves as voluntary or consenting participants in
ficking, in legal terms, only as prostitution. This their migration or employment at any point,
interpretation did not change subsequent to the authorities deem them ineligible for benefits
Palermo Protocol and was reinforced after intro- under T-visas as legal victims of trafficking. If
duction of the TVPA. After Korea’s initial low clients do not fit traditional conceptions of invol-
ranking as a Tier 3 country in 2001, the Korean untary or non-consenting victims, they may face
government responded by establishing an inter- deportation, like many of the women in the Oper-
ministry task force to combat trafficking and sub- ation Gilded Cage case. Advocates also comment
sequently introduced a prostitution prevention that often they can only secure certifications from
law. Despite protests by sex worker rights groups, law enforcement agents enabling their clients to
Korea instituted a sweeping antiprostitution law, apply for T-visas if their clients cooperate exactly
the first of its kind since 1961. The law included as law enforcement demands during the investi-
prison sentences and fines for traffickers and for gation and prosecution process. Authorities
women in the sex industry. Encouraged by its deprived one woman “rescued” in Operation
subsequent higher ranking at Tier 1, the Korean Gilded Cage of trafficking victim status, citing
government set a goal ultimately to eliminate that she was “uncooperative,” after she decided
prostitution. This illustrates the large-scale nega- that she did not wish to cooperate with law
tive impact of the antiprostitution and enforcement and instead, return to Korea. Author-
prosecution-oriented framework of the TVPA ities also denied her the ability to return to Korea
and other US trafficking policy globally (Cheng and held her in jail as a material witness for the
2005). case (Leigh 2005).
Other government practices focused on prose- Comprehensive research by Melissa Ditmore
cution within the sex industry, such as the domi- of the Sex Workers Project (SWP) (Ditmore 2009)
nant model of “raid and rescue” tactics in and of the Urban Justice Center in New York has
outside of the USA, negatively impact both survi- similarly documented the ineffectiveness and neg-
vors of trafficking and migrant workers voluntar- ative consequences of such raids through inter-
ily engaged in sex work. One “raid and rescue” views with migrant sex workers and trafficked
case in the USA, dubbed Operation Gilded Cage persons, social service providers (including case-
and reported to be the largest “sex trafficking” workers and attorneys), and law enforcement per-
case in the history of the USA, illustrates this sonnel (including federal and immigration agents)
pattern (U.S. Dep’t of Justice). In July of 2005, (Ditmore 2009). The interviewees identified the
law enforcement agents raided ten brothels in San criminal justice approach to trafficking as a major
4 Sex Trafficking

problem, as it focuses on finding people to prose- victims. Moreover, all victims of trafficking need
cute, rather than on victims’ needs and rights. protection, rights, and access to benefits, regard-
Those who were targeted in raids experienced less of whether they choose to cooperate with
them as chaotic and traumatic and often experi- prosecution efforts or the form of trafficking they
enced further trauma in subsequent detention. The have faced.
research found that police and the criminal justice
system have not been effective in either identify-
ing or helping victims of trafficking, noting that in References
a number of cases, “trafficked sex workers have
been arrested multiple times without ever being Chang G, Kim K (2007) Reconceptualizing approaches to
human trafficking: new directions and perspectives
identified as victims of trafficking.”
from the field(s). Stanf J Civ Rights Civ Lib 3:318–344
The report concludes that many of those who Cheng S Anti-trafficking discourses and policies: a gen-
self-identified as being trafficked were able to help dered and human rights perspective. Paper presented at
themselves, that the service providers who Women’s Worlds 2005 conference, Ewha Women’s
University, Seoul, Korea, 21 June 2005; see also Lisa
reported such cases did not learn of them as a
Katayama, Sex Trafficking: Zero Tolerance, Mother
result of raids, and that people familiar with sex Jones Blog, 4 May 2005. http://www.motherjones.
work and those who have experienced trafficking com/news/dailymojo/2005/05/sex_trafficking.html
situations themselves are better able to identify Cheng S (2010) On the Move for Love: Migrant Enter-
tainers and the U.S. Military in South Korea. Philadel-
victims of trafficking. Thus, it recommends that
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
anti-trafficking efforts be focused on building Ditmore M (2009) The use of raids to fight trafficking in
public awareness within sex worker and immi- persons: a study of law enforcement raids targeting
grant communities about resources available to trafficking in persons. Sex Workers Project (SWP) of
the Urban Justice Center, New York. http://sexworker
people in coercive situations, instead of the cur-
sproject.org/publications/reports/raids-and-trafficking/
rent prevalent practice of raids. Leigh C, Op-Ed. Behind the moral panic, an opportunity to
These examples reflect the potential negative work, S.F. Chron., 22 July 2005, at B9
impacts of US anti-trafficking policies and prac- McMahon K, Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking
(2002) Speaking out: three narratives of women traf-
tices, both in the USA and globally, when traffick-
ficked to the United States. Los Angeles
ing is conflated with prostitution. The US Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 29 charged in con-
government’s focus on trafficking for prostitution, nection with alien harboring conspiracy (1 July 2005)
and the assumption that prostitution is involuntary Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in
persons, especially women and children,
in all cases, has led to an inordinate emphasis on
supplementing the United Nations Convention against
the prosecution of prostitution. This emphasis Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25,
often results in human and labor rights abuses Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (15 Nov 2000)
against exploited workers who are consenting Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, reauthorized and supplemented by the Traf-
adults in sex work and other industries yet may
ficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
still face exploitation through labor rights abuses, (TVPRA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–193 and the
poor working conditions, and debt bondage. Such TVPRA of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–164
exploitation should be recognized and addressed U.S. Dep’t of State, Trafficking in persons report, http://
www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/ 2012/
in the identification and treatment of all trafficking
M

Migration Industries, Legal Services, migration patterns generally, and the rise of
and Human Smuggling migrant smuggling and trafficking specifically.
Apart from focusing on the institutional interme-
David Kyle diaries, the migration industry concept allows for
Davis Sociology, 1282 Social Sciences & an analysis of more asymmetric economic and
Humanities, University of California, Davis, political power relationships shaping the migra-
CA, USA tion process and subsequent patterns of transna-
tional mobility.
The “business of migration” is often used
Synonyms casually to refer to the mostly legal set of formal
businesses profiting from migration and human
Migration business; Migration entrepreneurs; mobility more generally; at times, this is also
Migration industries; Migration merchants used interchangeably with the “migration indus-
try.” However, in both the academic and popular
literatures, migrants and others inhabit either an
Definition entirely legal world facilitated by for-profit busi-
nesses and nonprofit organizations in which they
Migration industry: the business of migration or follow the regulations and laws or they use crim-
migration merchants. inal syndicates who smuggle them. In contrast,
the migration industry concept includes a broader
set of actors (variously labeled “migration mer-
Detailed Description chants” or migration entrepreneur), but also
potentially blurs the lines between legal and ille-
There has been much attention recently in what gal businesses, recognizing that migrations are
has been labeled alternatively the “migration shaped by the complex interplay of economically
industry,” the business of migration, or migration motivated individuals and organizations, the
merchants. Much of the literature on international legal frameworks established by states, and the
migration emphasizes either the role of social culturally embedded rationality of migrants
networks and social capital or highly stylized themselves.
economic explanations. There is growing dissat- There is widespread agreement about the core
isfaction with conventional models of migration, definition of the migration industry. Kyle defines
even when packaged together within a migration a “migration merchant” as anyone (individual or
systems framework, for explaining contemporary organization) profiting from the commodification
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_5-3
2 Migration Industries, Legal Services, and Human Smuggling

of the migration process, legally or illegally, social dimensions growing or diminishing in

without specifying the many commercial activi- size, developing or eliminating new products or
ties connected to migration and transnational services, and dynamically engaging with part-
social life in sending, transit, and destination ners, subcontractors, and other migration indus-
regions (Kyle 2000). Similarly, Castles and try actors in an ever-changing economic and
Miller define the migration industry as “a broad policy environment.
spectrum of people who earn their livelihood by How the role of migration industries evolves
organizing migratory movements. . . . [including] in relation to state immigration policies and
travel agents, labor recruiters, brokers, inter- enforcement strategies is most striking in the
preters, housing agents, immigration lawyers, case of Mexico. Until the 1990s, most Mexican
human smugglers (like the “coyotes” who guide migrants and others coming from further south
Mexican workers across the Rio Grande, or the quite often crossed the border without a guide or
Moroccan fishermen who ferry Africans to coyote; if they used a coyote, it was more out of
Spain), and even counterfeiters who falsify offi- convenience. However, in the 1990s, it became
cial identification documents and passports” increasingly desirable as it would increase one’s
(Castles and Miller 2009). chances in successfully crossing the
Hernández-León’s definition of a “migration border – today, it is rare not to use a smuggler
entrepreneur” is similar to Kyle’s notion of a or intermediary organization. With higher and
migration merchant, including an emphasis on higher smuggling fees, the direct costs of the
embedded social relationships, though its rubric transportation of the journey is now only a
is restricted to co-ethnic relationships and the minor part of the total cost, especially when
term is reserved for individuals. For Hernández- interest on smuggling debts is included. Mexican
León, a migration entrepreneur is “a distinct type emigration, as striking as it may be, however,
of ethnic entrepreneur who specializes in the may not provide the most appropriate model for
migration-driven mobility of people, remittances, understanding the current and future role of
and goods across international borders and mov- migration industries connecting sending and des-
ing between formality and informality, legality tination regions without the long-standing ties or
and illegality, depending on the activity, financial long contiguous border of the USA and Mexico.
resources, and other circumstances” (Hernández- Specifically, the Mexico case may lead one to
León 2008). A migration industry, then, is the view migration industries as mostly responsive
“ensemble of entrepreneurs who, motivated by rather than as robust actors shaping many features
the pursuit of financial gain, provide a variety of of the migratory circuit, including initiating it.
services facilitating human mobility across inter- To the extent that a migration industry’s inde-
national borders” (Hernández-León 2008). pendent impact in shaping many aspects of
These migration industries consist of the spe- migration patterns in ways that transcend either
cialized services that have arisen in response to supply–demand models, or more sociological
migration challenges and opportunities, becom- social network models, is debatable, we may
ing significant players in the perpetuation of the conceptualize a “weak” versus more “robust”
flow. Some of the common features of organiza- model of migration industries. In the weak ver-
tions that make them attractive and even neces- sion, migration entrepreneurs are more or less
sary to contemporary migration within this mix neutral middlepersons profiting from migration
are the higher levels of ongoing trust formalized services without fundamentally shaping migra-
in ways that transcend the concept of “social tion systems in significant ways. For this reason,
capital.” And, for the very same reasons that this view would also not attribute to contempo-
organizations have proliferated in every area of rary migration industries much historical signifi-
social life today, they also prevail in migration cance in that similar migration entrepreneurs
industries. They can be tailored to the unique have operated for centuries.
demands of regional, economic, political, and
Migration Industries, Legal Services, and Human Smuggling 3

Under a more robust conceptualization, the new indentured servitude with ever-higher smug-
combination of punitive and restrictive immigra- gling fees financed with future earnings. While
tion policies, while giving economic markets the fact of for-profit intermediaries playing a
more power to organize nearly all aspects of role – even a significant one – is not entirely
social and political life, leads to novel forms of novel in the history of human mobility, these
migration industries that increasingly act as gate- contemporary examples underscore two signifi-
keepers and exert much sway over the evolution cant dimensions beyond the sheer numbers they
of migration flows. Thus, Castles and Miller note are able to facilitate: illicit journeys or border
that “[Their] development. . .is an inevitable crossings and the fact that they are indebted to
aspect of the social networks and the transna- intermediaries or facilitators, not employers.
tional linkages which are part of the migratory Profits can now be gained not only from labor at
process . . . . [and] in time, the migration industry the destination but extracting more of their
can become the primary motive force in a migra- income through the debts, real or imagined,
tory movement” (Castles and Miller 2009). incurred by the journey itself and by the ongoing
Today, in addition to crossing borders, vulnerability of the immigrant population. The
migrants must also navigate various legitimate global scale and diversity of this phenomenon is
and illicit intermediary organizations – it is new and expands the means by which individuals
nearly impossible to migrate without an organi- may be trafficked.
zation, whether it is to help in navigating state Organizations with the financial, informa-
bureaucracies such as immigration and labor tional, and above all social resources to either
agencies or crossing borders using legal transpor- navigate or overcome state barriers have quietly
tation or illicit smuggling strategies. Like the rise taken center stage in the migration process. The
of bureaucracies everywhere, once the logic and future of migration in the context of climate
capacity of organizations to successfully compete change and the resulting social and political com-
in transnational markets have taken hold, apart plexities will certainly require an appreciation of
from the initial conditions from which they arose the significant role of migration merchants and a
connecting supply with demand, they increas- complex migration industry more generally.
ingly begin to play more of a gatekeeping role
and assert strategic control over sectors, terri-
tories, and modes of transportation. Cross-References
There is a growing parallel not simply histor-
ically with past migration services, but specifi- ▶ Human Smuggling
cally a global revival of a new form of indentured ▶ Human Trafficking
servitude in which most migrants and refugees
today are expected to have invested large amount
of resources in both their human capital but also References
go into debt, often without the protection of the
state. Contemporary migration industries are Castles S, Miller MJ (2009) The age of migration: inter-
national population movements in the modern world,
much better at profiting from the journey and 4th edn. The Guilford Press, New York/London
usurious financing than profiting from Hernández-León R (2008) Metropolitan migrants: the
resettlement or regularization. Even under condi- migration of urban Mexicans to the United States.
tions of global recession, employers continue to University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles
Kaye J (2010) Moving millions: how coyote capitalism
find ways to reach migrant labor they so desper-
fuels global immigration. Wiley, New Jersey
ately feel they need (Kaye 2010). The truly novel Kyle D (2000) Transnational peasants: migrations, net-
aspect of migration industries today is the works, and ethnicity in Andean Ecuador. Johns Hop-
increasing power to transform migration into a kins University Press, Baltimore
C

Child Trafficking of a person having control over another person,”

the means that define trafficking in adults (United
Wendi Adelson Nations protocol), were used (United Nations
College of Law, Florida State University, protocol).
Tallahassee, FL, USA According to UNICEF estimates, approxi-
mately 1.2 million children are trafficked world-
wide ever year (http://www.youtube.com/watch?
Synonyms gl=CA&hl=en&v=ayg8NriNEdU, UnicefUK
Campaign to End Child Exploitation, Last visited
Child labor; Child trafficking May 25, 2012), accounting for almost 20–50 % of
the world total of human trafficking (However, in
some parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, children
Definition are the majority (up to 100 % in parts of West
Africa). “A Global Report on Trafficking in Per-
Child trafficking is the recruitment, transporta- sons,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-
tion, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.
the purpose of labor or commercial sexual exploi- html, Last visited, May 25, 2012; http://
tation. Unlike the trafficking of adults, child traf- siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE
ficking can occur in the absence of threatened or LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6
actual force, coercion, or fraud. 012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf,
page 7). Trafficking in children can occur within
national boundaries, or across international bor-
Detailed Description ders, and can take on many forms. (Antonio Maria
Costa, United Nations Office On Drugs and
Child trafficking is “the recruitment, transporta- Crime, Global Report on Trafficking on Persons,
tion, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for February 2009, page 7, available at: http://www.
the purpose of exploitation.” (United Nations unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf.)
protocol). When children are the victims, child These permutations range from bonded labor,
trafficking has occurred whether or not “threat or domestic servitude, commercial sexual exploitation,
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduc- and prostitution to exploitative labor practices in the
tion, of fraud, of deception, of abuse of power or a restaurant industry and agricultural and industrial
position of vulnerability or the giving or receiv- sectors. (UN definition also includes removing
ing of payments or benefits to achieve the consent organs. The “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht (outside the USA) 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_6-1
2 Child Trafficking

Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women Administration and the American Bar Associa-
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations tion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936 (1978).)
Convention Against Transnational Organized Factors that increase children’s vulnerabilities
Crime” Page 42 http://www.unodc.org/docu to being trafficked are similar to those that put
ments/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Con adults at risk. Poverty is an important risk factor,
vention/TOCebook-e.pdf. See also Melynda though poverty alone is not enough (World Bank,
Barnhart, Labor Trafficking, Encyclopedia of “Human Trafficking, A Brief Overview,” Social
Migration (Springer 2013); Grace Chang, Sex Traf- Development Notes, Conflict Crime and Violence,
ficking, Encyclopedia of Migration (Springer No. 122, Dec. 2009, page 11, available at http://
2013).) Each of these types of trafficking involves siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE
the exploitation of a child’s vulnerability for the LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6
purposes of securing their bodies or their labor 012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf).
for use. Additional risk factors include lack of rule of law,
A child is generally defined as a person who has marginalization based on gender, religion, race,
not yet reached 18 years of age, unless their country ethnicity, or disability, lack of work or educational
has recognized them as an adult at an earlier age. opportunities, political conflict or war, violence,
(“The Convention defines a “child” as a person instability due to natural disasters or climate
below the age of 18, unless the relevant laws rec- change, and poor governance (World Bank,
ognize an earlier age of majority. In some cases, “Human Trafficking, A Brief Overview,” Social
States are obliged to be consistent in defining Development Notes, Conflict Crime and Violence,
benchmark ages – such as the age for admission No. 122, Dec. 2009, page 11, available at http://
into employment and completion of compulsory siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE
education; but in other cases the Convention is LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6
unequivocal in setting an upper limit – such as 012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf).
prohibiting life imprisonment or capital punish- The socioeconomic status of their families can put
ment for those under 18 years of age.” (UNICEF children at risk. In many parts of the world attitudes
2006); The FAQ page of the “Protocol to Prevent, that do not value education for girls put girls at a
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, heightened risk for trafficking (World Bank,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing “Human Trafficking, A Brief Overview,” Social
the United Nations Convention Against Transna- Development Notes, Conflict Crime and Violence,
tional Organized Crime” uses the strict “under 18” No. 122, Dec. 2009, page 11, available at http://
definition. http://www.unodc.org/documents/tre siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE
aties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/ LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6
TOCebook-e.pdf.) According to UNICEF esti- 012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf).
mates, 130 million children are born each year, An organization working against child trafficking
and in many countries, they represent more than in Southeastern Europe also identified violence or
50 % of the population (UN Convention on the abuse in the home, lack of family support or pro-
Rights of the Child). Given global increase in the tection (e.g., children who were separated from
population of people under 18 and deepening con- families or in institutional care), leaving school
nections and communication between countries, early, and having been previously trafficked as
children are far more likely now than at any time risk factors for children in the region (UNICEF
in the past to leave their homes in search of better 2005). Within the United States childhood sexual
economic opportunities. This migration can place abuse, exposure to domestic violence, homeless-
children in harm’s way. Recognizing the special ness, and inadequate care or supervision within the
vulnerabilities of children, the law privileges home have been identified as increasing the risks of
childhood and carves out special protections for children and teens of being commercially sexually
children. (See Franklin E. Zimring, Juvenile Jus- exploited (Chicago Alliance Against Sexual
tice Standards Project. By the Institute of Judicial Exploitation, “Know the Facts: Commercial
Child Trafficking 3

Sexual Exploitation of Children,” page 2, available entire family, as collateral against a debt in order to
at http://fdff.org/docs/case_facts.pdf). get a loan (United States Department of Labor).
Despite legal protection for trafficked chil- The United Nations Convention on the Rights
dren, exploitation of children for their labor of the Child (CRC) states that governments must
and sexual services continues worldwide. Pre- protect children from exploitation, abuse, and
ventative efforts focus on enforcement of child trafficking in Articles 34 and 35 (UNICEF
labor laws, decreasing demand for child sex and 2006). 192 countries have ratified the CRC
punishing those who solicit sex from minors, (UNICEF: Convention on the Rights of the
advocating for Fair Trade products, and educat- Child, Frequently Asked Questions, available
ing children about avoiding “too good to be true” at http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.
schemes to make money (UNICEF Reference html). The United Nations Convention on the
guide). Patterns have emerged around the Rights of the Child’s Optional Protocol on the
world of scenarios involving trafficked children. sale of children, child prostitution, and child
Common patterns involve children who have pornography became legally binding in January
been abused at home or are severely 2002 (UNICEF 2006). More than 100 nations
impoverished (World Bank: Social Develop- have signed and ratified the protocol (UNICEF
ment Notes: Conflict, Crimes, and Violence, 2006). This protocol expands upon Articles
No. 122, December, 2009, page 11 cites poverty 34 and 35 of the CRC by mandating that gov-
as a key factor, but emphasizes the “poverty ernments both punish those who buy and sell
plus” approach, saying that poverty alone is not children and provide support for trafficked chil-
enough. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ dren by considering child victims’ best interests
EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/ in the criminal justice system and providing
244362-1239390842422/6012763-123990579322 legal, medical, psychological, and financial sup-
9/Human_Trafficking.pdf) and either run away or port to child victims of trafficking
are given by their parents to a trusted person to (UNICEF2006).
earn money through work in a restaurant or as a Prosecutions involving children are different
domestic servant (World Bank: Social Develop- than prosecutions involving adult victims of traf-
ment Notes: Conflict, Crimes, and Violence, ficking. In the United States, a T visa is available to
No. 122, December, 2009, page 6 http:// foreign-born victims of human trafficking on a few
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE conditions (Questions and Answers: Victims
LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/60 of Human Trafficking T Non-Immigrant Status,
12763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://
“There are several identified common patterns for www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9
recruiting victims into sex trafficking,22 which bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=
include but are not limited to 1) a promise of a 9a52923ee5dd3210VgnVCM100000082ca60aR
good job in another country; 2) a false marriage CRD&vgnextchannel=02ed3e4d77d73210VgnV
proposal turned into a bondage situation; 3) being CM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited 6/8/12)).
sold into the sex industry by parents, husbands or The T visa enables a victim of trafficking without
boyfriends, and 4) being kidnapped by traffickers. immigration status to stay in the United States
Recruiters are often very familiar persons to the while prosecutors assemble a case against the traf-
victims, such as neighbor, friend, a friend of a fickers. One of those conditions is that adult vic-
friend, boyfriend, acquaintance, and family tims must cooperate with law enforcement by
friend.23”). The actual scenario is different from testifying against their traffickers. However, a
what was promised, and exploitative, either child in the same situation is not required to coop-
because it involves the commercial sex industry erate with law enforcement because it is thought
or because it involves labor without end, without potentially more harmful for a child to recount their
just compensation. In cases of bonded labor, very experience with trafficking and to face the traf-
poor families use the labor of their children, or of the ficker again.
4 Child Trafficking

In the United States, there is federal law on trafficking and sets standards for how EU mem-
human trafficking that addresses the role of chil- ber states should respond to this crime (http://
dren in the commercial sex industry (Trafficking www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/192359.htm
Victims Protection Act of 2000 22 U.C.S. 7105 § (last accessed June 27, 2012)). This directive
107 (2000) – need to cite to the reauthor- requires that special measures be implemented
izations?). In essence, a child induced to perform to provide child trafficking victims with care
a commercial sex act is considered a victim of and support based on their vulnerabilities as chil-
human trafficking. The standard is similar to that dren. In addition, the Organization of American
present in cases of statutory rape: a child is unable States has partnered with many other countries to
to consent to sexual abuse (whether commercial end human trafficking (http://www.state.gov/j/
or not) perpetrated against them. A child is there- tip/4p/partner/ (last accessed June 27, 2012)).
fore unable to consent to being prostituted, and Mauritania has outlawed slavery entirely, and
prostituted children are considered victims of Mauritius has provided care to children in bonded
human trafficking according to US federal law. labor and helped bring around 2,000 children
These children are victims regardless of their back to public school (http://www.state.gov/doc
immigration status or country of origin. In con- uments/organization/192596.pdf (last accessed
trast, most states in the United States define pros- June 27, 2012)). Many countries around the
titution as a criminal act, meaning that regardless world have made laudable efforts to combat
of the age of the person engaged in prostitution, child slavery. However, one enslaved child is
they are considered criminals and not victims. still too many.
Currently, only a handful of states make any
distinction in culpability based on the age of the
prostituted person. That said, many states are Cross-References
moving in the direction of having state laws on
human trafficking mirror the federal standard to ▶ Human Trafficking
ensure that prostituted children receive the ther- ▶ Labor Trafficking
apeutic services and safe living spaces that they ▶ Sex Trafficking
require for recovery (Secure housing remains the
most acute need for trafficked children, as well as
intensive recovery and support services. Florida: References
http://www.kristihouse.org/safeharbor.php New
York: Cynthia Godsoe, Finally, There’s a Safe UNICEF (2005) Action to prevent child trafficking in
Harbor, The National Law Journal, November Southeastern Europe, A preliminary assessment.
Available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Assess
10, 2008 (available at Lexis Nexis)). ment_report_June_06.pdf. p. 36
Many different countries and regions of the UNICEF (2006) Convention on the rights of the child.
world have made efforts to combat child slavery. Web. 7 Jun 2012. Available at http://www.unicef.org/
These efforts have involved the enactment of crc/index_30229.html
UNICEF (2012) Convention on the rights of the child,
strong antitrafficking laws, increasing investiga- optional protocol on the sale of children, child prosti-
tions and prosecutions of traffickers, rehabilita- tution, and child pornography. Available at http://
tion for the victims, and building public www.unicef.org/crc/index_30204.html
awareness of this crime. For example, the Euro- UNICEF Reference guide on protecting the rights of child
victims of trafficking in Europe, talks generally about
pean Union passed a new comprehensive all of these things except fair trade. Available at http://
antitrafficking directive (21011/36/EU of the www.unicef.org/ceecis/UNICEF_Child_Trafficking34-
European Parliament and of the Council of 43.pdf. p. 33
5 April 2011 on preventing and combating traf- United Nations protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish
trafficking in persons, especially women and children,
ficking in human beings and protecting its vic- supplementing the United Nations Convention Against
tims.) in 2011 that defines the crime of human Organized Crime, general provisions, Article 3(c).
Child Trafficking 5

Available at http://www.unicef.org/protection/conven http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/sweat2/

tion_20traff_eng.pdf bonded.htm#.UI3rW8Ue6So
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Interna-
tional Labor Affairs. Forced and bonded child labor.
H

Human Trafficking Policy Responses ranging from 20.9 million to 29 million, require
a coordinated global policy response applied to a
Kavitha Sreeharsha modern context (Data on human trafficking is
Mountain View, CA, USA methodologically limited and accurate numbers
are difficult to obtain. See Fabrizio Sarrica,
Human Trafficking, Encyclopedia of Migration
Synonyms (Springer 2013) (discussing challenges in
research on human trafficking)).
Anti-trafficking legislation; Palermo Protocol; On November 15, 2000, the United Nations
The three Ps; Trafficking Victims Protection Act General Assembly adopted the “Protocol to Pre-
vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children,” also known as
Definition the Palermo Protocol. The Palermo Protocol
notably defined human trafficking as the “recruit-
Human trafficking, or modern slavery, is a pro- ment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
cess in which a person is compelled into service, receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
psychologically or physically. Formal policy of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction,
responses to human trafficking began toward the or fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of
end of the twentieth century. Such responses a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
include multilateral protocols, state legislation, receiving of payments of benefits to achieve the
bilateral agreements, local legislation, adminis- consent of a person having control over another
trative oversight and implementation, and formal person, for the purposes of exploitation” includ-
private sector endeavors. ing exploitation of prostitution, forced labor, and
organ removal. The definition in the Palermo
Protocol covers those under 18 years of age who
Detailed Description are exploited as noted without requiring the
means included in the definition.
While perceived as a separate human rights issue, In addition to establishing a definitional
there is evidence in some countries that slavery framework that would be adopted in many coun-
has bridged the span between the era of the trans- tries, it also created a comprehensive framework
atlantic slave trade and modern slavery. Never- dubbed the three Ps (prevention, prosecution,
theless, the estimated numbers of people and protection) to address human trafficking,
currently enslaved, with estimates currently encouraging state parties to enact and enforce
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_7-1
2 Human Trafficking Policy Responses

criminal offenses for human trafficking, develop United Nations Special Rapporteur on Traffick-
protections for trafficking victims including per- ing in Persons, especially women and girls, con-
mission to remain in a destination country, and ducts country visits and consults with
facilitation of repatriation. The Protocol also international governments (See The Global
required state parties to create prevention strate- Trafficking in Persons Report, UNODC
gies including protection against revictimization. (2013) (tracking legislative responses to human
The adoption of this Protocol signaled the estab- trafficking); see also Fabrizio Sarrica, Human
lishment of a comprehensive global effort to Trafficking, Encyclopedia of Migration
encourage state parties to enact legislative (Springer 2013)).
responses and coordinate multilateral efforts. The US State Department Trafficking in Per-
During the same time period, a bill proceeded sons Report, which now also evaluates US
in the US Congress and was enacted as the efforts, continues to influence and motivate inter-
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) on national states to enact legislation and improve
October 28, 2000. Adopting a framework similar implementation. The report, issued annually by
to the Palermo Protocol, the TVPA included the US State Department’s Office to Monitor and
definitions and a framework to address human Combat Trafficking in Persons, evaluates and
trafficking in the United States including preven- ranks the efforts of countries to engage in anti-
tion of human trafficking, protection of victims, trafficking efforts. The report evaluates indicia of
and prosecution of human traffickers. The TVPA a government’s effort to prosecute trafficking,
established the T visa, which offered foreign- protect victims, educate the public, cooperate
born victims of a severe form of trafficking in bilaterally with prosecutions, monitor and
persons who are cooperative in the investigation respond to migration patterns related to traffick-
or prosecution of trafficking and meet other ing, hold public officials accountable and coop-
requirements the opportunity to receive tempo- erate with related US State Department efforts,
rary permission to remain and work in the United assess percentage of noncitizen trafficking as
States and apply for permanent residence. The insignificant, and monitor and assess these indi-
law includes an authorization of funding to cia. The report also evaluates a country’s relative
implement these various efforts. Notably for annual progress in these efforts and efforts to
global efforts, the TVPA also established a reduce demand for commercial sex. The report
requirement that the US State Department issue ranks countries into three tiers. Tier 1 countries
an annual report that evaluates each international are deemed to be in full compliance with the
state government’s efforts to comply with “min- TVPA’s anti-trafficking standards. Tier 2 coun-
imum standards for the elimination of traffick- tries are not in full compliance but are making
ing,” resulting in the State Department’s Annual efforts to come into full compliance. Tier 3 coun-
Trafficking in Persons Report. tries are not in compliance and are not making
Following the passage of the TVPA, many US significant efforts toward compliance. Tier
states began to pass additional state anti- 3 countries are subject to US sanctions in the
trafficking laws. While not necessarily compre- form of the withdrawal of economic assistance,
hensive, nearly each US state has enacted legis- which has been criticized by some commentators
lation to address human trafficking, primarily as ultimately harming victims of trafficking
focusing on criminal penalties available to state rather than encouraging governments to increase
prosecutors. State laws also include victim ser- anti-trafficking efforts (Janie Chuang, The United
vice provisions and prevention efforts. US states States as Global Sheriff: Unilateral Sanctions
have adopted their own definitions of human traf- and Human Trafficking, 27 Mich. J. Intl. L. 437
ficking, which in some case exclude all forms of (Winter 2006)).
trafficking included the US federal definition. Substantial gaps remain in human trafficking
State parties have also begun to enact laws and policy. For example, some country’s laws do not
strategies to address human trafficking. The penalize all forms of trafficking or they fail to
Human Trafficking Policy Responses 3

enforce criminal penalties uniformly, leaving The business community itself is also at the
particular sectors such as men and boys, foreign forefront of efforts to address trafficking involv-
labor trafficking, or child labor unaddressed. ing their own corporations. In 2006, a coalition of
Many countries fail to comprehensively protect business leaders came together and established
trafficking victims to the same extent that they the Athens Ethical Principles to Combat Human
prosecute crimes related to human trafficking. Trafficking. Many companies have signed onto
Furthermore, there is very little formal policy these seven principles, which were aspirational in
development to institutionalize some of the best nature. Building on these principles, in December
practices including training in health and educa- 2010, the Luxor International Forum endorsed
tion sectors, partnership with education and job the Luxor Protocol, which offered guidelines for
training initiatives that prevent human traffick- the private sector to adhere to the Athens Ethical
ing, and resources to offer high-level services that Principles. The Athens Ethical Principles and
prevent re-exploitation. the Luxor Protocol formed the foundation for
Countries are beginning to advance formal growing private sector interest and leadership in
mechanisms to offer foreign trafficking victims addressing human trafficking. The goal was to
to remain and accept employment in their desti- encourage the business community and govern-
nation countries. Formal and informal partner- ments to advance the seven ethical anti-
ships between law enforcement and the NGO trafficking principles, yet there does not appear
sector are yielding fruitful results to protect the to be a continuing method of evaluation or
rights of trafficking victims in concert with crim- enforcement of these principles.
inal justice interventions. Yet, in some cases, As multilateral agencies, countries and local
NGO and law enforcement partnerships may governments, and the private sector continue to
reinforce a “raid and rescue” approach to victim develop policies to address human trafficking,
liberation that may result in harm to victims. they will undoubtedly move beyond the frame-
Finally, several countries have engaged in bilat- work of the initial decade following the Palermo
eral and multilateral agreements to better address Protocol and the TVPA to develop practical and
trafficking spanning and affecting multiple coun- institutionalized solutions that extend beyond
tries. However, such bilateral agreements may formulaic criminal justice enforcement, protec-
also result in repatriations of trafficking victims tions, and prevention toward mechanisms that
against their preferred interests. address the root causes of human trafficking.
Policy initiatives involving the private sector
have also evolved. For example, in the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010
Cross-References
(SB 657), California’s state legislature enacted a
law with global reach, reflecting the global nature
▶ Athens Ethical Principles
of slavery and human trafficking. Cal. Civ. Code,
▶ Executive Order: Strengthening Protections
§ 1714.43. The law requires qualifying retailers
Against Trafficking In Persons In Federal
and manufacturers to disclose their efforts to
Contracts
address slavery in their supply chains. Because
▶ Luxor Guidelines
the law reaches companies merely doing business
▶ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
in California, many companies incorporated or
Persons
based outside of California are still obligated to
▶ The California Transparency in Supply Chains
comply. In September 2012, President Obama
Act of 2010
signed Executive Order – Strengthening Protec-
▶ Trafficking in Persons Report
tions Against Trafficking In Persons In Federal
Contracts, to reach and prevent human trafficking
by federal contractors. However, these measures
still lack meaningful enforcement mechanisms.
4 Human Trafficking Policy Responses

Further Readings The athens ethical principles (adopted January 23, 2006).
Available at http://www.endhumantraffickingnow.
Executive order – strengthening protections against traf- com/?page_id=77
ficking in persons in federal contracts (2012). Avail- The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2010 (codified in sections of the California state code.)
2012/09/25/executive-order-strengthening-protections- The luxor protocol (2010). Available at http://www.
against-trafficking-persons-fe endhumantraffickingnow.com/wp-content/uploads/
Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in 2012/08/The-Luxor-Protocol.pdf
persons especially women and children, The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
supplementing the United Nations Convention against 2000, P.L. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as
Transnational Organized Crime, UN Doc. A/53/383 amended in various sections of the U.S.C.)
(2000). Available at http://www.uncjin.org/Docu UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
ments/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/conven and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
tion_%20traff_eng.pdf Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, 15 November 2000
L

Labor Migration migration, as a notion, emerges as a spatial

reallocation to pursue better economic opportuni-
Mathias Sinning1 and Massimiliano Tani2 ties relative to those available at the place of
1
The Australian National University, Canberra, residence.
ACT, Australia The International Convention on the Protec-
2
The University of New South Wales (Canberra), tion of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Canberra, Australia Members of Their Families, adopted by the
United Nations (UN) General Assembly on
18 December 1990 and which came into force
Definition on 1 July 2003, defines a “migrant worker” as “a
person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has
International labor migration refers to the move- been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State
ment of individuals from one country to another of which he or she is not a national” (Art. 2.1). As
for employment and other economic reasons that most UN members, particularly those with the
often may be inseparable from reasons such as largest number of immigrant workers, did not
family reunification, education, and seeking ref- ratify the Convention (United Nations 2013), the
uge or asylum. Labor migration is regulated by definition of labor migrant still varies across coun-
selective immigration policies of destination tries, affecting the international comparability of
countries and may affect economic and social data on labor migration.
conditions in source and destination countries. Additional sources of internationalçvariation
An increasing number of international labor in the definition of labor migration include
migrants are temporary workers who return to (a) different usages of the concepts of “residence”
the source country after a certain period of time. (the minimum length of time to record someone
leaving or arriving in a region may not match
between origin and destination) and “nationality”
Detailed Description (which can be based on where a person is born, jus
soli, or the nationality of the parents, jus
Labor migration affects most countries in the sanguinis), (b) whether employment information
world. People do not necessarily find employment is collected on the basis of where someone lives
or employment adequate to support themselves (national concept) or works (domestic concept)
and their families where they normally live, (examples of countries which adopted the domes-
while other places face local shortages of workers tic concept are Germany, the Netherlands, and the
and offer attractive job opportunities. Labor UK), and (c) minimum and maximum working
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_9-1
2 Labor Migration

ages which vary according to national practices in migrants or foreign citizens temporarily employed
relation to the end of compulsory schooling and by a domestic company. Hence identical services
the retirement age. Movements of illegal and delivered by the same person under an employ-
undocumented migrants which the UN Conven- ment contract with a local company or a services
tion includes in its definition of “migrant workers” contract with a foreign provider may be treated
tend to be reported separately, if at all, from offi- differently (Charnovitz 2003).)
cial statistics on labor migration. Labor migrants may enter their destination
The estimated stock of international migrants country through various channels. In many coun-
worldwide increased considerably during the tries most labor migrants enter under family
recent decades of globalization from nearly reunification schemes (Lucas 2008). In addition,
156 million in 1990 to about 214 million in international students have become a rapidly
2010. As a percentage of world population, it increasingly part of international migrants. The
grew only slightly from 2.9 % in 1990 to 3.1 % estimated number of international students world-
in 2010 (United Nations 2011). The expansion in wide grew from about 1.8 million in 2000 to 2.8
international migrants lagged far behind those of million in 2007 (Altbach et al. 2009). Regardless
international trade and capital flows, with global of the program under which they arrive, interna-
exports growing by more than 300 % and foreign tional migrants often work. International migrants
direct investment by more than 500 % over the entering through reunification schemes typically
same period (IMF 2012; OECD 2012). In 2010, exhibit high labor force participation rates. Many
about 60 % of international migrants resided in international students have jobs while studying
economically more developed regions, where and they often stay in their destination countries
they constitute 10.3 % of the population. Interna- for employment after graduation. Refugees in
tional migrants make up only 1.5 % of the popu- higher-income countries participate in the labor
lation in economically less developed regions force, although asylum seekers often do not have
(United Nations 2011). the right to work.
People movements do not necessarily repre- Despite attempts to barricade international bor-
sent labor movements, and labor migration may ders to limit international migration, irregular
or may not include movements of workers that can migration of undocumented workers represents a
be accounted for as either a flow of a factor of considerable part of international migration
production or a service. If labor migration is around the world. Moreover, many international
related to an employment contract (contract of labor migrants return to their home countries after
services), then it is accounted for as a movement a certain period in the destination country. Return
of labor, regulated by employment and immigra- migrants are not only temporary visa holders but
tion laws of the place of destination. If labor also “permanent” settlers who decide to return to
migration is bundled with the provision of a ser- their country of origin. Over the last decades, the
vice (contract for services), the World Trade Orga- number of temporary migrant workers around the
nization in the General Agreement for the Trade of world has increased considerably (Lucas 2008). In
Services (GATS) Mode 4 (Movements of Natural particular, the globalization process has increased
Persons) argues that it should be treated as a the dependence of employers on temporary
service, and hence be governed by trade legisla- migrant workers and induced a growth in the
tion (e.g., Charnovitz 2003). As identical tasks number of temporary migrant worker programs
can be performed using alternative contractual in destination countries, mainly in low-skilled
engagements with different normative obligations sectors such as agriculture, construction, the
and costs, labor migration statistics may omit food industry, and services (Baruah and
some movements of highly specialized workers Cholewinski 2006).
occurring because of globalization, outsourcing, Labor migration is a flow concept, though both
and technical change. (The GATS makes no pro- flow and stock of labor migrants at different points
visions for either self-employed temporary in time are studied. The two key interests of the
Labor Migration 3

literature on labor migration are documenting the expected earnings (average wage weighted by
flows of workers and identifying their determi- the probability of being unemployed) between
nants and impacts in both places of origin and places of origin and destination (Harris and
destination. Several studies are carried out by Todaro 1970). Interregional differences in income
institutional organizations such as the Interna- distribution also matter when places of origin and
tional Labour Organization, which promotes destination have similar average earnings because
“decent and productive work opportunities” for income dispersion is viewed as a proxy of an
migrants; the International Office for Migration, individual’s skills and abilities. As a result, given
which promotes good practices in “migration a level of observable characteristics, workers in
management”; as well as the United Nations, the the upper part of a compressed income distribu-
World Bank, and the Organisation for Economic tion will have an incentive to migrate to places
Cooperation and Development among others, with higher income inequality, while those on the
which have labor migration and labor market lower part of the compressed distribution will
units. have no incentive to migrate. In other words,
Two distinct theoretical approaches have char- labor migrants self-select (Roy 1951; Borjas
acterized studies of labor migration since the 1994) and take advantage of different earning
1960s. The first is a neoclassical economic opportunities caused by an uneven spatial distri-
approach, which models labor migration as an bution of jobs. Under this interpretative frame-
optimization choice carried out by individual work, labor migration is akin to an investment in
agents (Lee 1966) or households (Stark and the pursuit of optimal returns to one’s human
Bloom 1985). Labor migration is determined by capital. Regions may hence experience contem-
the economic incentive of higher discounted earn- poraneous in- and outflows of workers and wide
ings available in the place of destination once differences between their gross and net migration
transport/lodging, psychological/social (e.g., no rates (Sjaastad 1962).
friends and family), and uncertainty costs associ- Macroeconomic theoretical models have ana-
ated with the move are netted out (Hatton and lyzed labor migration as a complement or substi-
Williamson 1998; Borjas 1994; Chiswick 2005; tute of trade in other factors or commodities in
Freeman 2006). The second is a heterodox eco- perfectly competitive markets (Mundell 1957;
nomics/historical/structuralist approach (Castles Markusen 1983; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983).
and Kosack 1973; Massey 1988) whereby institu- In models of imperfect competition, workers
tional forces associated with the development of a migrate in response to agglomeration externalities
capitalist production system cause an almost insa- exploited by firms locating near their market
tiable demand for migrant labor, which therefore (Krugman 1991).
emerges from institutional/systemic circum- International labor migration affects economic
stances rather than rational individual choices. conditions in sending and destination countries. In
Between these two competing interpretations, destination countries with a flexible wage struc-
some relevant work has addressed specific deter- ture, such as the USA, there is some evidence that
minants of labor migration, while others have immigration may lower the wage of competing
tried to combine elements of these two approaches workers. Evidence on countries with a more rigid
(e.g., summary in Abreu 2010). More recently, the wage structure and stronger influence of unions in
development of large and detailed datasets on the wage-setting process, such as many European
migrants and advancements in statistical analysis countries, suggests that immigration may increase
have contributed to identifying key individual and unemployment. However, in both cases, labor
institutional determinants of labor migration, pro- market effects of immigration are rather small.
viding a better understanding of this phenomenon. From an economic perspective, migrant
Within the neoclassical economic framework, workers do not only constitute factors of produc-
microeconomic studies have posited that labor tion but are also consumers, and their arrival in the
migration occurs when there is a difference in destination country may increase demand for all
4 Labor Migration

factors of production, including migrant labor. By to their country of origin, but less skilled emi-
paying taxes and receiving state support, they may grants are usually those who send remittances to
also have a sizeable impact on the fiscal balance of lower-income families (Lucas 2008).
the destination country. In addition, labor
migrants have the potential to foster technical
progress by the introduction of new ideas and
Cross-References
knowledge. On balance, empirical studies on the
impact of immigration on these outcomes have
▶ Brain Drain
generated mixed results (Bodvarsson and Van
▶ Circular Migration
den Berg 2009).
▶ Economic Migration
The economic impact of labor migration on
▶ Illegal Migration
destination countries relies heavily on the rela-
▶ International Migration
tionship between individual skills of migrant
▶ Labour Mobility
workers and labor market needs. Consequently,
▶ Migration
several traditional immigration countries, includ-
▶ Permanent Migration
ing Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have
▶ Skilled Labour Migration
introduced a point scheme to select immigrants
▶ Temporary Migration
on the basis of their skills to improve the match
between foreign-born workers and skill require-
ments in the domestic labor market. Other coun-
tries, such as the USA, require prior job offers for References
some visa categories to ensure a close match
between migrant workers and the demand of Abreu A (2010) The new economics of labor migration:
beware of neoclassicals bearing gifts. Springer
employers (Lucas 2008). Many developed coun- online http://www.academia.edu/349009/The_
tries, which typically face a declining working- New_Economics_of_Labor_Migration_Beware_of_
age population, require skilled workers. As a con- Neoclassicals_Bearing_Gifts
sequence, these countries have started to compete Altbach PG, Reisberg L, Rumbley LE (2009) Trends in
global higher education: tracking an academic revolu-
for skilled workers in the international labor mar- tion. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
ket (OECD 2010). tural Organization (UNESCO), Paris
The effects of international labor mobility on Baruah N, Cholewinski R (2006) Handbook on
the population in the sending countries also establishing effective labour migration policies in
countries of origin and destination. Organization for
depend on the skill profiles of international labor Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Interna-
migrants. On the one hand, the departure of skilled tional Organization for Migration (IOM), International
emigrants, commonly referred to as “brain drain,” Labour Office (ILO), Vienna
is considered as a serious cost of immigration for Bhagwati J, Srinivasan TN (1983) On the choice between
capital and labour mobility. J Int Econ
the sending countries. A number of policies have 14(3–4):209–221
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the phenomenon but very few are actually in immigration – theory and policy. Springer, Berlin/
place, partly because there is a lack of consensus Heidelberg
Borjas GJ (1994) The economics of immigration. J Econ
on the actual costs and benefits of the brain drain Lit 32(4):1667–1717
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and Van den Berg 2009). On the other hand, gration in Western European Capitalism. New Left Rev
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Charnovitz S (2003) Trade law norms on international
external funding for many developing countries, migration. In: Aleinikoff TA, Chetail V (eds) Migration
exceeding three times the size of official develop- and international legal norms. T.M.C. Asser Press, The
ment assistance in 2010 (Ratha and Silwal 2012). Hague, pp 241–253
Highly skilled emigrants typically earn relatively Chiswick, Barry R (2005) The Economics of Immigration.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing
high wages that allow them to transfer large sums
Labor Migration 5

Freeman R (2006) People flows in globalization. J Econ Co-operation and Development (OECD). www.oecd.
Perspect 20(2):145–170 org/investment/statistics. Accessed 4 Oct 2012
Harris J, Todaro M (1970) Migration, unemployment and Ratha D, Silwal A (2012) Remittance flows in 2011 – an
development: a two-sector analysis. Am Econ Rev update. migration and development brief
60(1):126–142 no. 18, migration and remittances unit. The World
Hatton TJ, Williamson JG (1998) The age of mass migra- Bank, Washington
tion: causes and economic impact. Oxford University Roy AD (1951) Some thoughts on the distribution of
Press, New York/Oxford earnings. Oxf Econ Pap 51(3):135–146
IMF (2012) IMF Data mapper: international financial statis- Sjaastad LA (1962) The costs and returns of human migra-
tics, International Monetary Fund (IMF). http://www.imf. tion. J Polit Econ 70(5):80–93
org/external/datamapper/index.php. Accessed 4 Oct 2012 Stark O, Bloom D (1985) The new economics of labour
Krugman PR (1991) Geography and trade. The MIT Press, migration. Am Econ Rev 75(2):173–178. Papers and
Cambridge, MA/London proceedings of the ninety-seventh annual meeting of
Lee E (1966) A theory of migration. Demography the American Economic Association
3(1):47–57 United Nations (2011) Trends in international migrant
Lucas REB (2008) International labor migration in a glob- stock: migrants by age and sex. United Nations,
alizing economy. Carnegie Endowment for Interna- Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Popula-
tional Peace. Working Paper No. 92 tion Division (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/
Markusen JR (1983) Factor movements and commodity Stock/Rev.2011)
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Massey D (1988) Economic development and international ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&
migration in comparative perspective. Popul Dev Rev chapter=4&lang=en
14(3):383–413
Mundell RA (1957) International trade and factor mobility.
Further Reading
In: Bhagwati J (ed) International trade. The MIT Press,
Borjas GJ (2003) The labor demand curve is downward
Cambridge, MA/London, pp 321–335
sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the
OECD (2010) International migration outlook. Organiza-
labor market. Q J Econ 118:1335–1374
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development
World Bank (2012) World development indicators 2012.
(OECD), Paris
The World Bank, Washington
OECD (2012) Most recent FDI statistics for OECD and
Zimmermann KF (2005) European migration: what do we
G20 countries. Organization for Economic
know? Oxford University Press, Oxford
R

Reservation Wages and Immigrants destination country exceeds the reservation wage
plus the costs of migration. Economic studies that
Mathias Sinning extend Sjaastad’s basic framework also recog-
The Australian National University, Canberra, nize the importance of reservation wages. In par-
Australia ticular, Borjas (1987) discusses a framework that
accounts for self-selection of immigrants
resulting from the distribution of human capital
Definition among workers in source and destination coun-
tries. According to this model, the decision to
A reservation wage is the lowest wage rate at migrate also depends on differences in income
which a worker is willing to accept a particular distributions between source and destination
type of job. Reservation wages are important in countries and the extent to which immigrants
the context of immigration because they may may transfer their skills to the labor market of
affect the immigration process at various stages, the destination country.
including the individual decision to migrate, the Reservation wages of immigrants are typically
economic integration of immigrants in their des- lower than those of native-born workers. Differ-
tination country, the labor market success of the ences in reservation wages between native- and
native-born population, and the attitudes of the foreign-born workers are not only the result of
native-born population toward immigration. sizeable wage disparities between poorer source
and richer destination countries, but may also be
attributed to differences in individual character-
Detailed Description istics. Recent labor migrants often do not possess
relevant country-specific human capital – such as
Reservation wages may influence the individual language skills – and have not received firm-
decision to migrate. Although migration deci- specific training in the destination country
sions depend on numerous factors, economists (Chiswick 1978). Education and labor market
typically view wage differentials between source experience acquired in the source country are
and destination countries as the most important typically less valued in the labor market of the
determinant of international labor migration. In destination country (Friedberg 2000), and many
his seminal article on the costs and returns of migrant workers do not even have a license to
human migration, Sjaastad (1962) studies migra- apply the skills they acquired in the country of
tion in a human capital framework, which implies origin (Chiswick 1978). As a result, a consider-
that workers decide to migrate if the wage in the able nativity wage gap may be observed, which
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_10-1
2 Reservation Wages and Immigrants

typically declines over the settlement process skills. The United States requires job offers for
(Chiswick 1978). some visa categories to ensure a close match
If reservation wages of immigrants are lower between migrant workers and the demand of
than those of native-born workers, they may have employers (Lucas 2008). Many developed coun-
adverse effects on labor market outcomes of tries, which typically face a declining working-
native-born workers. Economic theory suggests age population, have started to compete for
that immigration may reduce wages or increase skilled workers in the international labor market
unemployment (or both) if foreign-born workers (OECD 2010).
are substitutes to native-born workers. The eco-
nomic literature on the effects of immigration
mainly focuses on the empirical analysis of References
unskilled immigrants, because they are more
likely to substitute native-born workers than Borjas GJ (1987) Self-selection and the earnings of immi-
grants. Am Econ Rev 77:531–553
skilled immigrants. The size of the effects does
Borjas GJ (2003) The labor demand curve is downward
not only depend on the substitutability of skills sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the
but also on the wage flexibility in the labor mar- labor market. Q J Econ 118:1335–1374
ket. If wages are highly flexible – such as in the Chiswick BR (1978) The effect of Americanization on the
earnings of foreign-born men. J Polit Econ 86:897–921
US labor market – then immigration is expected
Longhi S, Nijkamp P, Poot J (2005) A meta-analytic
to have relatively large wage effects. By contrast, assessment of the effect of immigration on wages.
if wages are more rigid and unions play an impor- J Econ Surv 19:451–477
tant role in the wage-setting process – such as in Lucas REB (2008) International labor migration in a glob-
alizing economy, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
many European labor markets – then immigration
tional Peace, working paper no 92
is expected to increase unemployment. Empirical OECD (2010) International migration outlook. Organiza-
studies typically find that immigration has rela- tion for Economic Co-operation and Development
tively small or no effects on wages and employ- (OECD), Paris
Sjaastad LA (1962) The costs and returns of human migra-
ment (Borjas 2003; Longhi et al. 2005;
tion. J Polit Econ 70:80–93
Zimmermann 2005). Zimmermann KF (2005) European migration: what do we
Low reservation wages of immigrants are usu- know? Oxford University Press, Oxford
ally a source of concern and a matter of intense
debate among policy-makers and the Further Reading
public. Actual and perceived labor market effects Borjas GJ (1991) Immigration and self-selection. In:
Abowd J, Freeman R (eds) Immigration, trade, and
of immigration have important implications for
the labor market. University of Chicago Press, Chi-
immigration policies designed to regulate immi- cago, pp 29–76
gration flows and shape immigrant populations. Friedberg R (2000) You can’t take it with you? immigrant
Since unskilled immigrants are more likely to be assimilation and the portability of human capital.
J Labor Econ 18:221–251
a substitute for native-born workers than skilled
Harris JR, Todaro MP (1970) Migration, unemployment
immigrants, many immigration countries, includ- and development: a two-sector analysis. Am Econ Rev
ing Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have 60:126–142
started to select immigrants on the basis of their
H

High-Skilled Migration as between the Commonwealth countries, or from

former colonies to the UK, the Netherlands, and
Robyn Iredale France. There was a major change in the period
Australian Demographic and Social Research leading up to World War II as Jewish refugees left
Institute, ANU, Canberra, ACT, Australia Eastern Europe for the USA, Canada, Australia,
and elsewhere. A significant proportion of these
European refugees were highly skilled, and the
Definition arrival of non-British doctors, engineers, and
other professionals led associations/boards in
“Highly skilled workers are normally defined as receiving countries to start developing procedures
those having a university degree or extensive/ to ensure that only “the fully qualified” were
equivalent experience in a given field” (Iredale admitted to the profession. “Fully qualified”
2001, p. 8). According to the Organization for often did not extend to Eastern Europeans, and a
Economic Cooperation and Development large proportion of these skilled refugees in the
(OECD SOPEMI 1997, p. 21), it includes highly 1940s and 1950s were destined for unskilled
skilled specialists, independent executives and employment.
senior managers, specialized technicians or In the 1960s and 1970s, the main focus came to
tradespeople, investors, business people, “key be on “brain drain” and the “losses” that develop-
workers,” and subcontract workers. Individuals ing countries allegedly sustained when their
in this category often seek to maximize the return highly skilled workers emigrated permanently to
on their investment in education and/or training more industrialized countries. Though some of
by moving around in search of the highest paid or these skills went under- or unutilized in receiving
most rewarding employment. countries, there was still a clear economic benefit
to these countries. In 1970 the monetary value to
the USA from admitting technical and profes-
Introduction sional immigrants was estimated at $3.7 billion
(Sassen 1990, p. 191). There were persistent calls
Highly skilled migrants represent an increasingly for taxes and levies to compensate sending coun-
large component of global migration streams. The tries that were not yet industrially developed for
phenomenon is not new, but the numbers and their human capital losses, but such schemes
trends have been rapidly changing. Historically received very little favorable attention as they
there was skilled mobility between countries were seen as unworkable and they were politically
with similar cultures and training systems, such unpopular in receiving countries.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_12-1
2 High-Skilled Migration

Increasingly, by the 1980s, some countries Cooperation and Development (OECD 1997,
came to see skilled migration as a means of filling p. 21), highly skilled migrants include specialists,
skilled labor shortages so as to ensure that eco- independent executives and senior managers, spe-
nomic growth was not held back. For others, it cialized technicians or tradespeople, investors,
was primarily to improve the “stock” of brains business people, “key workers,” and subcontract
generally. Papademetriou and Yale-Loehr (1995, workers. Others tend to want to limit “highly
p. 2) argued that more than ever before human skilled” to professionals with a university degree
resources constituted as much the wealth of a or equivalent, but this is a narrow definition that
company as of a nation and that immigration places too much stress on only the highest level of
should play its proper role in the broader strategy formal education. The OECD definition is more
of making the next century “America’s Century.” universally acceptable.
Other measurement problems that have been
Measuring Skilled Migration enunciated by the OECD (2010, p. 31) include:
The total number of highly skilled migrants at any “movements that appear . . . as temporary are clas-
one time is unknown. One of the major problems sified as permanent because the migrants in ques-
in estimating the numbers is that there are many tion, for example, intracorporate transfers, are
types of movement: permanent settlement to granted a status that essentially places them on a
immigrant-receiving countries; temporary inter- permanent migration track. Some movements, for
national migration within and increasingly out- example, those involving cross border service
side of multinational corporations; and highly providers, may not be explicitly identified. In
skilled refugee flows and skilled people who still other cases, work assignments are short and
move as part of family reunion policies. Very the movements may escape recording entirely.”
few countries take highly skilled migrants on a Given these difficulties, any attempt at measuring
permanent basis, but an increasing number have skilled migration will be fraught with problems.
been seeking them on a temporary basis, suppos- Until recently, there was no systematic empir-
edly to meet skills shortages until they can train up ical assessment of skilled migration or especially
their own stock of skilled workers. This opening of the economic impact of the brain drain. The
of doors to “legally admitted, ostensibly tempo- main reason for this seems to have been the lack of
rary, high-skilled foreign workers” (Cornelius and harmonized international data on migration by
Espenshade 2001, p. 3) has become a global phe- country of origin and education level (Docquier
nomenon. In more recent years it has been and Mafouk 2004). One exception was a paper by
supplemented by the rise of trade in services Carrington and Detragiache (1998) in which they
under the World Trade Organization’s General estimated 1990 skilled emigration rates for
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and sim- 61 developing countries.
ilar arrangements. Such trade has largely been There are two major global approaches to mea-
confined to skilled contract service suppliers. surement. The first approach takes data that are
The increased level of mobility is also a man- available in receiving countries to build up figures
ifestation of the internationalization of profes- on stocks of skilled immigrants generally or from
sions and professional labor markets and the particular countries. For example, using OECD
desire of many people to move to widen their data Stalker (2000, p. 107) estimated that there
skills base and gain more international experi- were 1.5 million skilled expatriates from develop-
ence. Skilled migrants often seek to maximize ing countries in Western Europe, the USA, Japan,
the return on their investment in education and and Australia. Docquier and Mafouk (2004) used
training by moving around in search of the highest a database covering 92.7 % of the OECD immi-
paid and/or most rewarding employment. gration stock and showed that in absolute terms
Another issue in accurately measuring the the largest numbers of highly educated migrants
flows is how to define highly skilled migration. in 1990 and 2000 were from Europe, Southern
According to the Organization for Economic and Eastern Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Central
High-Skilled Migration 3

America. Such data were also used to estimate Australia), the scale and extent of skilled migra-
emigration numbers or rates of skilled personnel tion is now very widespread. Few parts of the
from particular countries, as a proportion of the world remain excluded from the systems at
potential educated labor force. The highest brain work, and the majority of countries embody both
drain rates were observed in the Caribbean, Cen- inflows and outflows. Where the outflows
tral America, and Western and Eastern Africa. severely outweigh the inflows, the perception of
Most data sets on international skilled migra- brain drain is still very evident, as will be
tion define skilled migrants according to educa- described later.
tion level, independently of whether education While the early skilled migrants were largely
was acquired in the home or in the host country. doctors, nurses, engineers, scientists, teachers,
According to Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport and academics, the variety of skilled migrants is
(2006), this led to an overestimation of skilled now enormous. These early occupations have
emigration/immigration. They introduced immi- escalated in the size and direction of their flows
grants’ age of entry (as a proxy for where educa- and have been joined by a myriad of others. The
tion was acquired) into their statistical analyses. outstanding examples are in the information tech-
Using this technique they estimated that six small nology (IT) field where the growth of IT has
(less than four million population) countries in created worldwide opportunities and intense com-
Africa and the Caribbean suffered losses of over petition for skilled workers in this field, leading
50 % of their skilled labor force (i.e., they emi- many countries to ease restrictions on the entry of
grated after age 22). For countries with more than such workers. The German “green card” system is
four million population, Haiti suffered the greatest a good example of this. It would be easier to list
rate of loss (73.7 %) with Sierra Leone, Mozam- the skilled occupations where there is relatively
bique, and Ghana experiencing loss rates in the little mobility than vice versa. For example, the
40–50 % range. legal profession is one that stands out as being
The second approach involves the national characterized by low levels of mobility as trained
measurement of skilled migration. This occurs in professionals find their skills as usually highly
some countries by means of tabulating permanent specific to particular jurisdictions. However,
and temporary visa-issuance figures or arrivals/ even this is changing with the growth of interna-
departure data, where such data are collected. tional business, trade and the provision of services
These data vary in quality and the categories across international borders.
used, so they are not universally comparable.
Many countries are only just beginning to
improve their data collection systems so that The Rise of Temporary Migration
they can measure how many skilled migrants are Early skilled migrations were generally seen as
coming and/or going. permanent though some did return home or move
on elsewhere. One of the most dramatic changes
in recent decades has been the rise of “temporary”
Changing Trends in High-Skilled skilled migration. For example, the “number of
Migration temporary workers entering OECD countries was
approximately 2.3 million in 2008, significantly
Escalation and Differentiation in High-Skilled higher than the number of permanent labor
Migration migrants, which stood at roughly 1.5 million.
Whereas “brain drain” was seen by analysts as A significant proportion of this migration
being confined to a small set of countries that occurred between OECD countries” (OECD
were “losers” (e.g., India, Pakistan, the Carib- 2010, p. 30). Australia’s skilled migration pro-
bean, and parts of Africa) and to a similarly gram has undergone a revolution: temporary
small group of countries that were perceived as skilled migrant arrivals rose from 48,610 people
“winners” (the UK, the USA, Canada, and (including dependants) in 2004–2005 to 110,570
4 High-Skilled Migration

in 2007–2008, compared with permanent arrivals intracompany transferees by reducing the period
of 108,500 in 2007–2008 (Hawthorne 2011). of secondment from 6 to 3 months; Germany no
This change has been facilitated by a number longer requires a resident labor market test in the
of factors. First, the development of new visa case of intracompany transferees or their family
entry categories, often based on points systems, members who are posted to Germany, and Poland
has enabled short-term migration of skilled (and introduced new work permits for highly skilled
sometimes unskilled) workers. Many countries workers, including intracompany transferees,
now have complex arrangements to enable tem- with stays of 3–5 years depending on seniority
porary skilled migrants to enter for a specified (OECD 2010, pp. 59–60).
period. They are constantly evolving as new Few countries collect information on intracom-
shortages emerge or other pressures lead to pany transferees, but the data that are available
changes in critical shortages lists or methods of show that the annual numbers rose in most coun-
selecting skilled employees. tries between 2000 and 2008: from 3,900 to
Second, the rise of more varied methods of 10,200 in Canada; from 1,300 to 5,700 in Ger-
selection has been used to expedite migration in many; from 3,900 to 7,300 in Japan; from 6,200 to
areas of high demand and where this does not 7,300 in Switzerland; and from 55,000 to 84,000
disadvantage local workers. In the USA, the in the USA. Only France and Korea registered
major avenue for large-scale temporary entry has falls (OECD 2010).
long been the H1-B visa scheme (no assessment Fourth, increased transnational accreditation/
of qualifications but must hold university degree), recognition with the creation of regional blocs,
which admitted 462,000 in 2007 and 410,000 in such as the European Union (EU), the Australia-
2008, along with many other visa types. “The US New Zealand Mutual Recognition Agreement
Department of Labor certifies employer applica- (MRA), and the North American Free Trade
tions for both permanent and temporary foreign Agreement (NAFTA), has facilitated skills mobil-
workers. Certification procedures vary according ity. The EU introduced measures to achieve gen-
to the type of visa requested, but generally require eral mutual recognition and harmonized training
that the employer advertise the job or intent to that has enabled skilled workers to move rela-
hire, and meet certain wage conditions to prevent tively freely within the bloc. The Trans-Tasman
adverse effects on American workers. Certifica- MRA created a mini-common labor market with
tion is required for application for a visa” (OECD mutual reciprocity arrangements in some occupa-
2010, p. 250). tions and a sharing of resources in others. NAFTA
Third, the increased mobility of intracompany has few mutual recognition provisions but permits
transferees has led to new categories of skills qualified Canadian and Mexican citizens to seek
mobility. “The structure of business, particularly temporary entry into the USA to engage in busi-
the process of internationalization by large ness activities at a professional level, providing
employers, is leading to increasing international the following provisions are met:
mobility among highly skilled employees of these
companies to meet client needs, provide input into • The profession qualifies under the regulations.
project teams, and aid in professional develop- • The position in the USA requires a NAFTA
ment” (Khoo et al. 2007, p. 480). As companies professional.
become more global and competition for their • There is a prearranged full-time or part-time job
location intensifies, OECD countries, for exam- with a US employer (not self-employment).
ple, have increasingly adopted policies to facili- • The person holds the qualifications of the
tate the ensuing secondment of staff: Belgium profession.
amended its work permit conditions to allow
lower management the same benefits as executive Fifth, increased trade in services, under the
personnel; 2007 legislation in France relaxed the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) General
conditions for granting a residence permit to Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and
High-Skilled Migration 5

other agreements, has dramatically increased the from the flow of international students, averaging
mobility of temporary service providers. The 264,200 a year between 2000 and 2008, that it
GATS covers four modes (1, 2, 3, and 4) of oper- continues to attract (OECD 2010, p. 251).
ation, but modes 3 (commercial presence) and Many OECD countries have new measures to
4 (movement of natural persons) specifically encourage international students to stay and enter
cater for the cross border mobility of service pro- their labor markets, in order to provide the domes-
viders. At the global level this provides a mecha- tic labor market with highly skilled migrants who
nism for skilled people to move temporarily (for a have received education in the host country. The
defined length of time) to provide a service in issues of recognition of qualifications and lan-
another WTO-member country. Few data are guage knowledge, which are often obstacles to
available on highly skilled service provider high-skilled migration, are largely avoided when
flows, partly because of the difficulty of isolating students stay on after graduation. For example, the
these flows from highly skilled migration flows. Canadian Experience Class, implemented in Sep-
The Association of South East Asian Nations tember 2008, facilitates permanent residence for
(ASEAN) has replicated the WTO agreement as a international student graduates who have gained
means of speeding up service provider flows professional and skilled work experience in Can-
between its ten member countries. Arrivals and ada. Encouragement for international students to
departures data are at present patchy for ASEAN, stay and work is also part of the new green card
but some data indicate that Singapore and Malay- regime in the Czech Republic. From 2009, those
sia are currently the two major destinations within who have completed secondary or higher educa-
ASEAN. They are both heavily involved in inter- tion in the country no longer need a work permit.
national business, and the consequent flow of Similarly, those students awarded a masters
intracompany transferees is substantial, though degree or a PhD in Italy may request the conver-
independent movement is also considerable. The sion of their residence permit for study purposes
Philippines is the major source of independent to a work or job-seeking permit, valid for a period
service suppliers – a proportion is highly skilled of 12 months. Germany and Poland have both
and most are destined for non-ASEAN member made it easier for international students and
states. Emerging economies in ASEAN, such as those trained in other countries to gain access to
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and the labor market, through removing the need for a
Viet Nam, are beginning to benefit from flows of resident labor market test. In the UK, post-study
skilled service suppliers associated with foreign students are part of Tier 1 of the new point-based
direct investment (Iredale et al. 2010). system. The category provides a bridge to highly
skilled or skilled work. International graduates
The Role of Educational Services and the Link accepted under Tier 1 may stay in the UK and
to Migration look for work without needing a sponsor (OECD
In recent years there has been a growing aware- 2010, pp. 63–64).
ness of the role played by the international migra-
tion of students in the global mobility system. In Greater Involvement of Governments
the most popular destination countries, they are Many of these changes have resulted in the
seen by governments as a major source of finance increasing involvement of governments in migra-
for educational institutions, thereby reducing the tion and tertiary education policy and manage-
need for state funding, as well as an important ment. Increasingly, countries have sought to
source of foreign revenue and future skilled immi- identify workers/students in demand by their pol-
grants. Postgraduates especially are often viewed icy formulation. Point-based systems (based on
as new knowledge creators who will contribute to occupation, work experience, education, age, lan-
economic growth, either directly or indirectly. The guage skills, job offer, finances available, and
USA has consistently drawn a large number of intended location) were originally developed in
both permanent and temporary skilled workers traditional settlement countries (Australia,
6 High-Skilled Migration

Canada, and New Zealand) in the 1980s to select Major Debates and Dilemmas
permanent migrants from a broad pool of appli-
cants for a limited number of visas available. Brain Drain, Brain Circulation, and Brain Waste
These countries continue to periodically review Ongoing debate has prevailed since the 1960s
their points system to adapt them to changing about the occurrence, scale, and consequences of
demands and cater for expanded temporary “brain drain.” In the 1990s to 2000s, it became
migration. common for many to argue that even if brain drain
In the past five years, a number of European occurred it was of little policy concern for devel-
countries – the UK, the Netherlands, and oping countries as the benefits provided by a
Denmark – have introduced their own points sys- diaspora of skilled emigrants potentially
tems. The recently introduced point-based sys- outweighed the loss of human capital resources
tems in Europe are modeled on established through emigration. That is, brain drain should not
systems, but they introduced several new param- be interpreted as a sheer loss to a source country
eters: for example, the UK assesses earnings in the because in the longer term the country could ben-
home country; Denmark and the Netherlands, in efit from return migration if its former residents
order to overcome the problem posed by assess- brought back foreign knowledge and skills, and
ment of qualifications obtained abroad, use inter- extensive foreign diasporas could be instrumental
national survey rankings to classify educational in building business/research and other relation-
degrees, and Denmark gives points for experience ships between sending and the receiving coun-
gained elsewhere in the European Economic Area tries. That is, converting “brain drain” into
and Switzerland (OECD 2010, p. 59). “brain circulation” [could] play an important role
These policies are constantly under review, and by facilitating the transfer of foreign technologies
in recent years, Australia has moved from “points or by helping the development of cultural and
tested” to “employer nominated” (similar to the economic ties with other countries (Soubbotina
USA) as the dominant basis of entry so that by 2004, p. 93). Developing countries were advised
“2009 . . . 70% of Australia’s labor migrants were to develop mechanisms for encouraging the actual
employer-sponsored, entering through the tempo- or virtual return migration of their qualified
rary and permanent skilled migration streams” workers.
(Hawthorne 2011, p. 6). Further, recent decisions While some countries, most notably India, Tai-
in Australia to allow skilled US workers to get wan, and China, have clearly benefited from their
work licenses on arrival instead of in the USA and diasporas of their skilled expatriate workers,
the introduction of Enterprise Migration Agree- return of ICT, medical and research workers, net-
ments for large-scale resources projects will both works established, and subsequent flows of busi-
escalate this trend. ness investment, there is less evidence to support
Another role of some governments has been this argument elsewhere. Sub-Saharan African
evident in enabling/encouraging the expansion of countries, Caribbean countries, much of South
training arrangements to provide skilled workers/ America, and parts of Asia argue that they do
service providers for overseas countries. For not benefit from their diasporas, and brain drain
example, in the Philippines nurse production has has not turned into general brain circulation. This
not only exceeded the country’s numerical is not to say that in specific fields of scientific
requirements but focused largely on preparing expertise, some countries may make gains from
practitioners for the health-care needs of devel- their foreign nationals. For example, recent
oped nations rather than the public health needs of research into scientific networks shows that
the indigenous population (Brush 2010). Explicit some expatriate scientists from less industrialized
policies to send skilled workers abroad are countries participate in research related to their
increasingly common. source countries’ development problems, such as
High-Skilled Migration 7

Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Barbados
Benin
Cape Verde
Congo
Cook Islands
Dominica
Fiji
Grenada
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Liberia
Mozambique
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
St Vincent and the Grenadines
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
UR of Tanzania
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Emigration rate of doctors (%)

High-Skilled Migration, Fig. 1 Rate of emigration of doctors for the 23 most seriously affected countries, 2000
(Source: OECD 2007b)

eradicating malaria or improving crop production. working in unskilled jobs in 2005–2006.

But in order for this to happen, it is necessary to “African-born skilled immigrants also found
have sufficient local scientific capacity that is able themselves at a disadvantage, having the highest
to access these dispersed science networks unemployment rates of all foreign-born groups”
(Turpin et al. 2008). (Batalova et al. 2008, p. 2).
Moreover, many skilled emigrants continue to The role of migration in promoting develop-
experience “brain waste” in the destination, ment is the subject of ongoing debate about the
potentially detracting from any possible benefits scale and usage of remittances, impacts on levels
of this emigration. For example, in the USA “[h] of investment in human capital and enterprises,
ighly skilled European and Asian immigrants” impacts of returning and circulating migrants, and
rates of underutilization approximated those of the role of the diasporas. In relation to migration
natives; Latin Americans fared worse. About of the highly skilled, it is clear that a positive
44 % of recent immigrants and 35 % of long- outcome is dependent on a number of key factors:
term immigrants from Latin America were rates of return (actual or virtual); networks that
8 High-Skilled Migration

develop between groups of researchers/business affected, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, and
people; and the economic, social, and political Guyana, had 89.3 %, 72.7 %, and 72.2 %, respec-
climate in the source country and employment tively, of their medical workforces in OECD
and social outcomes in the destination. “The countries in 2000. Fiji (58 %) and the Cook
hope that change will be propelled by skilled and Islands (54 %) from the Pacific feature in the
business returnees or non-residents is overly opti- graph. Five African countries, Mozambique,
mistic . . . and ignores the crucial importance that Angola, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanza-
negative factors play in influencing decisions to nia, (URT) and Liberia, had rates above 50 %.
both leave and return: such as the lack of individ- Countries that have both high emigration rates
ual autonomy and freedom, the high level of “red and low doctor density ratios (number of doctors
tapism,” the lack of reward for excellence and per 1,000 population) are particularly badly
promotion on merit and the general poor level of affected: French-speaking African countries,
governance at the institutional, regional and such as Senegal and Malawi, fall into this cate-
national level” (Iredale and Guo 2002, p. 22). gory. On the other hand, some countries with high
The return migration of skilled and business peo- emigration rates may be less impacted as they
ple may play a major role in transforming an have “not-too-low” density ratios: Cuba, Barba-
economy and society, but it is in a dos, Bahamas, and some other Caribbean coun-
complementary way. tries fall into this category.
Other World Health Organization data (2006)
Local-National-Global Policies show that 57 “priority” countries are suffering
The situation in some occupations is such that severe health worker shortages, often
outflows of skilled migrants are particularly dam- compounded by the out-migration of their pre-
aging for the source countries and special steps cious health workers. There is now widespread
need to be taken to ameliorate the impacts. By the agreement that the cooperation of all stakeholders
late 1990s, the OECD began collecting data from is needed to ensure that migration factors are
destination countries that enabled it to estimate the addressed coherently to have a positive impact
expatriate rate of doctors and nurses from various on the management of the movement of health-
source countries. Studies have found that the most care workers. Discussion of policy implications
significant indicator of “loss” is the percentage of has canvassed the major options available for
trained doctors who have left a country, or the countries experiencing extreme shortages to
emigration rate. Using WHO Global Health improve the quantity and quality of health
Atlas data on the number of doctors at home and workers: improving national health sectors with
the number working in OECD countries, the additional (obviously limited) finance; training to
OECD calculated emigration rates. The 23 most meet local needs; creating new types of practi-
seriously affected countries are shown in Fig. 1 tioners to fill specific roles; bans, bonds, and
where it is seen that all have rates above 40 %. taxes; and more managed migration schemes. On
Those with above 50 % emigration rates have the other hand, recipient country policy options
more doctors working in OECD countries than include improving workplace conditions, increas-
at home. They could, of course, have doctors ing training and reducing attrition rates, compen-
working elsewhere as well, but they do not show sating sending countries for the training costs
up in the OECD data (For example, most Filipino embedded in their health workers, encouraging
doctors and nurses and Sudanese doctors work return migration to countries of shortage, and
outside of OECD countries, in the Middle East making use of their own diasporas. Compensation
(OECD 2007a, p. 177)). for scarce skills gained from overseas could be
Figure 1 shows that some Caribbean and addressed by more generous overseas aid to spe-
Pacific Islands, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, cific countries. International solutions, such as
are most affected by the loss of medical practi- codes of ethical recruitment, have limited chance
tioners to OECD countries. The most severely of producing much effect though the WHO Global
High-Skilled Migration 9

Code of Practice on the International Recruitment and increased regionalism mean that the mobility
of Health Personnel (2010) code is unique in its of skilled migrants has escalated. The role of
broad focus and its emphasis on more overseas aid governments has become more complicated as
to support struggling health systems and self- they seek to balance national and international
sufficiency in developed countries. interests and responsibilities. And within this
broad framework, the opportunities for skilled
individuals to expand their horizons and more
Conclusion freely choose their work destination/s mean that
the world is truly now their oyster.
High-skilled migration has become a very com-
plex and nuanced phenomenon in the twenty-first
century. In part, it has come to be seen in part as
Cross-References
competition between more industrialized coun-
tries for skills, with benefits for receiving coun-
▶ Australian Immigration
tries being encapsulated in terms such as
▶ Business Migration and Intra-Company
“Advantage Canada,” “Benefiting Australia,”
Transfers
and “America’s Century.” At the same time, they
▶ Employment-Based Immigration
may complain about the emigration of their own
▶ International Students
skilled personnel. On the other hand, less indus-
▶ Points System
trialized countries that are faced with the emigra-
▶ US Immigration Though the Diversity Visa
tion of many of their skilled workers continue to
Program
voice concern about their human capital losses.
These concerns are not necessarily assuaged by
promises of brain circulation or the benefits of
networks incorporating their skilled expatriates. References
The rise of temporary migration has been the
most dramatic part of this process as countries Batalova J, Fix M, Creticos PA (2008) Uneven progress,
the employment pathways of skilled immigrants in the
seek workers to meet short-term needs, not per- United States, migration policy institute, Washington,
manent migrants that will absorb government DC. https://secure.migrationpolicy.org/images/2008.
resources or change the ethnic composition of 10.22_Batalova.pdf. Accessed 10 Nov 2009
populations. While some of these temporary Beine M, Docquier F, Rapoport H (2006) Measuring
international skilled migration: new estimates con-
migrants will remain permanently, others may trolling for age of entry, world bank research report.
return home, which could be to the advantage of http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/
less industrialized sending countries. The growth 469232-1107449512766/MeasuringInternationalMigra
of trade in services has introduced a new dimen- tion_paper.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2012
Brush BL (2010) The potent lever of toil: nursing devel-
sion with short-term flows of service providers opment and exportation in the postcolonial Philippines.
being seen as potentially beneficial for both send- Am J Public Health. http://ajph.aphapublications.org/
ing and receiving countries. These flows are less cgi/content/short/AJPH.2009.181222v1. Accessed
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Carrington WJ, Detragiache E (1998) How big is the brain
richer countries, and could potentially aid devel- drain? IMF working paper 98/102, Washington,
opment in less industrialized countries. Sending DC. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
government selection of countries for the move- wp98102.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2012
ment of natural persons could be based on which Cornelius WA, Espenshade TJ (2001) The international
migration of the highly skilled: “high-tech braceros”
country offers the best conditions and options for in the global labor market. In: Cornelius WA,
benefiting the sending country (Mayer 2009). Espenshade TJ, Salehyan I (eds) The international
The globalization of business, the internation- migration of the highly skilled. Center for Comparative
alization of many occupations, the export of Immigration Studies, University of California, San
Diego, pp 23–54
skilled workers as explicit government policy,
10 High-Skilled Migration

Docquier F, Marfouk A (2004) Measuring the international 1996. Organization for Economic Co-operation and
mobility of skilled workers (1990–2000), world bank Development, Paris
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25 July 2012 OECD countries in the broader context of highly
Hawthorne L (2011) Competing for skills: migration poli- skilled migration. In: International migration outlook,
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sorship and temporary migration of skilled workers to beyond/beyondco/beg_all.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2012
Australia. Int Migr Rev 41(2):480–510 Stalker P (2000) Workers without frontiers. The impact of
Mayer J (2009) Trade trends and what they mean in terms globalization on international migration. International
of income gains for developing countries. In: Caliari A, Labor Organization, Geneva
Yu III VP (eds) Debt and trade: making linkages for the Turpin T, Woolley R, Marceau J, Hill S (2008) Conduits of
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop- practice on the international recruitment of health per-
ment (OECD) (1997) Trends in international migration, sonnel. www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/practice/en/
continuous reporting system on migration annual report index.html. Accessed 11 Mar 2011
P

Pacific Island Countries Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu), Polynesia

and Migration (including Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tonga,
and Tuvalu), and Micronesia (including Federated
Carmen Voigt-Graf States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Nauru,
Development Policy Centre, Crawford School of Palau, and Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI)).
Public Policy, The Australian National University, Proportionate to their home population sizes,
Canberra, ACT, Australia migration has been significant, particularly in the
smaller island states of Micronesia and Polynesia,
and no other region in the world has in recent
Definition decades experienced a larger outflow of their
populations than Polynesia.
Pacific Island countries (PICs) refer to the 14 polit- In contrast to Polynesians and Micronesians,
ically independent island countries located in the there have been few migration opportunities for
Pacific Ocean which are members of the Pacific Melanesians, with the exception of Fiji citizens.
Islands Forum Secretariat (www.forumsec.org). Population growth rates in Melanesia remain
These are Cook Islands, Federated States of among the highest in the world. Melanesian coun-
Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, tries have suffered considerable civil unrest, partly
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall caused by the absence of a migration outlet for
Islands (RMI), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, their unemployed youth (Duncan et al. 2006).
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The PICs can be divided Melanesian countries currently experience a
into the three cultural regions of Melanesia, Poly- large influx of internal migrants into urban centers
nesia, and Micronesia. with the associated problems of a rise in squatter
settlements, growing unemployment, increasing
crime and violence, problems with waste disposal,
Introduction and breakdown of basic social services.

Numerous migration flows cross the Pacific

region and link rural areas with urban areas, Current Migration Patterns and Trends
outer islands with main islands, different Pacific
Island countries (PICs) with each other, and with The largest contemporary international migration
the Pacific Rim. flows in the Pacific are those from the islands to
PICs are divided into three cultural regions: the metropolitan countries of the Pacific Rim.
Melanesia (including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Migration is primarily a response to real and
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_19-3
2 Pacific Island Countries and Migration

perceived inequalities in incomes, education, world. In 2010, Tonga received 72 million US$
training, socioeconomic opportunities, and in remittances, equivalent to 19.7 % of the
health care. country’s GDP, while the corresponding figures
In postcolonial times, several PICs have con- for Samoa were 122 million US$ and 22.5 % (The
tinued to maintain close relationships with devel- World Bank). These figures would be even higher
oped Pacific Rim countries which often result in if unrecorded remittances were included.
special residency and work rights. The US grants In recent years, migration opportunities in met-
free access to citizens of the three Compact States, ropolitan states have increasingly targeted skilled
FSM, RMI, and Palau. New Zealand has special migrants. Thus migration flows from the Pacific
relationships with several PICs. Cook Islanders, are increasingly likely to be of skilled migrants
Niueans, and Tokelauans are New Zealand citi- from various sectors including health (Connell
zens with full residential and work rights in New 2009) and education (Iredale et al. 2015). In con-
Zealand. trast to the MIRAB argument that development
Both the Cook Islands and Niue have experi- patterns in the Pacific, based on migration gener-
enced substantial population losses, to the extent ating remittances and aid financing local bureau-
that both actively encourage return migration and, cracies, are durable and sustainable, the
for Niue at least, there are concerns over future emigration of workers, particularly skilled
viability. The population in Niue has declined to workers, may have severe implications for small
just over 2,000 people while more than 22,000 countries that have to cope with limited human
Niueans live overseas, largely in New Zealand. resources. There has been a general shift in the
Similarly, the Cook Islands recorded a resident debate on the effects of migration from a previous
population of 21,000 in 2006 compared to focus on the largely positive effect of remittances
58,000 Cook Islanders in New Zealand to the potentially more negative effects of skill
(Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Pacific loss or brain drain.
Island Affairs 2010). Due to high emigration In line with global patterns, Pacific Islander
rates, the resident population of the Cook Islands migration has become more diversified in recent
is projected to fall to less than 10,000 by 2029 years with the emergence of nontraditional desti-
(Duncan et al. 2006). nations, new types of migration including tempo-
A different migration pattern is prevalent in rary and seasonal migration, and new
Tuvalu and Kiribati where the main overseas occupational groups. Among the nontraditional
employment opportunity is as seafarers on Ger- destination countries of Pacific Islander migrants
man merchant ships and Asian fishing boats, lead- are the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries that have
ing to a specific form of temporary migration that attracted skilled migrants such as airline pilots
ensures the economic survival of these two atoll from Fiji and PNG.
states while also leading to less favorable social An example of a new occupational group is
implications. that of Fijians working overseas as private secu-
Due to the huge emigration flows particularly rity officers. Opportunities for employment in pri-
from Polynesia, the smaller island states have vate security companies have expanded
been characterized as MIRAB states, where considerably in recent years, and Fijians, with
development is based on migration generating their long history of serving in the British Army
remittances and aid financing local bureaucracies and as peacekeepers in various UN missions, have
(Bertram and Watters 1985). The MIRAB model been able to make use of these opportunities. By
suggests that external sources of financing that do mid-2005, there were over 1,000 Fijians working
not leave a residue of debt are the key to economic in Iraq and Kuwait as soldiers, security guards,
performance of small islands. drivers, and laborers. In addition there were more
In many Polynesian countries remittances rep- than 2,000 Fijian soldiers in the British Army in
resent the main source of foreign income and 2006 (Wikipedia).
reach levels rarely found in other parts of the
Pacific Island Countries and Migration 3

In response to high migration pressures, PIC ▶ New Zealand Immigration

governments have been engaged in a campaign to
allow short-term migrants into Australia and New
Zealand. In April 2007, the New Zealand govern- References
ment introduced the “Recognised Seasonal
Employer” scheme under which up to 8,000 sea- Bertram G, Watters RF (1985) The MIRAB economy in
South Pacific microstates. Pac Viewpoint
sonal agricultural workers from Kiribati, Samoa,
26(3):497–520
Tuvalu, Tonga, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu are Connell J (2009) The global health care chain: from the
given visas for New Zealand (Immigration New pacific to the world. Routledge, New York
Zealand). A similar scheme was introduced in Duncan R, Booth H, Zhang G, Rao M, Taomia F (2006)
The young and the restless: population pressures in the
2008 by Australia for three PICs, called the
pacific. In: World Bank (ed) At home and away:
“Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme;” in expanding job opportunities for Pacific Islanders
2012 it was replaced by the Seasonal Worker through labour mobility. World Bank, Washington,
Program which expanded the program to eight pp 28–45
Hay D (2011) New pacific seasonal workers scheme. Devel-
PICs (Department of Education, Employment
opment policy blog. http://devpolicy.org/new-pacific-sea
and Workplace Relations). The USA has also sonal-workers-scheme. Accessed 1 Sept 2012
included nine PICs into the list of countries eligi- Immigration New Zealand Recognised seasonal
ble to participate in nonimmigrant visa programs, employers. http://www.immigration.govt.nz/
employers/employ/temp/rse/. Accessed 2 Sept 2012
known as H-2A (agricultural work) and H-2B
Iredale R, Voigt-Graf C, Khoo SE (2015) Trends in inter-
(nonagricultural work) (Hay 2011). national and internal teacher mobility in three Pacific
Despite the significance of migration in PICs, Island countries, International Migration, 53
research on the issue is lacking, partly due to the (1):97–114
Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Pacific Island
paucity of data in many countries. While some
Affairs (2010) Demographics of New Zealand’s
good qualitative studies have provided insights Pacific population. Statistics New Zealand and
into the causes and consequences of migration, Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, Wellington.
the absence of reliable statistical data on migration http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_
and_communities/pacific_peoples/pacific-progress-dem
by skill level, age, sex, etc., has hampered demo-
ography.aspx. Accessed 27 Aug 2012
graphic analyses. Wikipedia. Economy of fiji. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Economy_of_Fiji. Accessed 29 Aug 2012
World Bank. Migration and remittance data. http://econ.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTD
Cross-References
ECPROSPECTS/0, contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:6
4165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html.
▶ African Island Migration Accessed 3 Sept 2012
▶ Australian Immigration
Encyclopedia of Migration
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_26-2
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Southern African Migration

Eugene K. Campbell*
Department of Population Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana

Introduction
Southern Africa is at the southernmost part of the African continent, and it is characterized by internal and
international labor migration whose history goes way back to the seventeenth century. Internal migration
is the movement of people within national borders of a country, while international migration occurs when
people move across international borders. This entry will state very briefly about internal migration; but its
focus is on contemporary international migration. Most recent studies of migration focus on international
migration because of the increasing awareness of its importance in national and international development
issues. Southern Africa experienced considerable forced migration from South Africa, Mozambique,
Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe between the 1950s and 1990s due to violent civil wars. The major
destinations in the region for refugees were Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia. While several economic,
social and political, environmental, and demographic factors have influenced internal and international
migration in Southern Africa, these movements have in turn influenced national and international
development in these areas. Meanwhile, migration has had considerable effects on the incidence and
spread of communicable diseases, such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other sexually transmitted infections
and noncommunicable diseases, such as hypertension and obesity (Levitt et al. 1993; Collinson
et al. 2006; Ansell and Van Blerk 2011).

Data Availability
So much has been written about the limited data on migration, especially international migration (Byerlee
1974; Black 2003) that it is needless getting into that here. Studies in genetic anthropology indicate that
the history of internal and international migrations in Southern Africa is ancient and may be traced back to
several centuries before the birth of Jesus Christ. However, social scientists have been more occupied with
investigating movements that occurred in modern history and contemporary times. There are indications
from studies in African genome that the modern human migration in Africa originated in Southern Africa,
especially Namibia and Angola, with pastoral occupation being the major motive for these movements
(Tishkoff et al. 2009). However, several unexplained factors, such as cattle herding and tsetse fly-induced
sleeping sickness in prehistoric times, have raised questions about the link between current and ancient
geographical locations of Khoikhoi people of South-West Africa and their northern “cousins” in
Botswana and Zambia (Boonzaier et al. 2000). Oral history and DNA were used in 1987 and 1988 by
Spurdle and Jenkins (1996), with a sample of 49 unrelated Lembas, to explain the existence of people with
non-African ancestry in the continent. These methods helped to identify the cultural origins and history of
the Lemba ethnic people who live in Zimbabwe and claim that their ancestral parents were Jews who
migrated from the Middle East to Southern Africa to trade in gold and other items. According to Spurdle
and Jenkins (1996), the ancestors of the Lemba settled in Yemen and traded initially with East Africans.
But a hostile invasion of their land, with devastating results, forced them to migrate to Africa with a part of
the ethnic group settling in East Africa, while another part proceeded to Southern Africa. It was observed

*Email: [email protected]

Page 1 of 16
Encyclopedia of Migration
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_26-2
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

that the Lemba people practice circumcision in a manner similar to the Jews. They also observe dietary
laws similar to those of the Jews. The authors concluded that the Lemba was more likely a descendant of
Middle Eastern Jews than Arabs at about seventh century B.C.
Other data sources include censuses, random sample survey, and continuous recording systems
especially at international border posts and airports. Official statistics on remittances are generally
obtained from banks, post offices, and money transfer agencies. These sources have been widely used
to estimate volumes, rates and patterns of migration as well as explain their determinants (Kok et al. 2006;
Collinson et al. 2007; United Nations 2009a, b; World Bank 2011). Though little effort has been made to
improve the collection of international migration data in Africa, Southern Africa has been fortunate to
have over 12 years of continuous investigation of attitudes and behavior of internal and international
migrants and nonmigrant citizens by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). SAMP surveys are
mostly cross-sectional and cover several subjects including brain drain, brain circulation, remittance,
diaspora, xenophobia, and health (see SAMP website www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresource). Several
other researchers have done individual studies on the subject, and in 1978–1982, the government of
Botswana conducted a National Migration Survey which remains one of few such exercises in the region.
A notable finding from an individual researcher is the contribution of Ghanaian immigrants to economic
development in Southern Africa where the professionals worked in the educational, legal, and adminis-
trative sectors. As many of the men were accompanied by their wives, the women brought along skills
which they applied in commerce and service sectors and acquired considerable wealth (Van Dijk 2003).
These women also invested in the importation and sale of clothing obtained mainly from Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire. The variety of data sources has occasionally raised questions about the consistency of variable
definitions and measurements (Frayne and Pendleton 2001; Posel and Casale 2003; Campbell 2010).

Internal Migration
The most documented of internal migration in the region is the Great Trek, a mass movement of Dutch
settlers (or Boers) from the Cape Province in the western part of South Africa to areas which later became
the provinces of Orange Free State, Natal, and Transvaal. Calvinist Dutch began settling in South Africa
in the seventeenth century having moved from Europe to escape persecution at the hands of conservative
followers of John Calvin. The Great Trek was motivated by a mix of economic, political, and religious
factors. But central to these was a determination by the Dutch settlers to attain independence from British
rule as it was perceived to be oppressive (Templin 1968). The blacks in South Africa were restricted in
their ability to move to the cities. Movement from rural to urban areas was predominantly of the circular
type and families were not permitted to stay with male workers in the cities. The situation was similar in
Namibia and Zimbabwe. Black Namibians were confined in undeveloped communal farmlands with
controlled movement to the town, mines, and commercial farms (Frayne and Pendleton 2001). Before
independence in 1980, black people in Zimbabwe were restrained from undertaking rural to urban
migration because of economic and political factors. Rural–urban migration increased after 1980 resulting
in dramatic increase in urban population growth rates. For example, the growth rate of Harare rose from
3 % before 1980 to 6.2 % by 1990 largely due to internal migration (Potts 2010). Historically most labor
migrants in Southern Africa (internal and international) were men, though within short distances, women
dominated (Crush 2000; Crush et al. 2005; Posel and Casale 2003). Botswana is among the few
exceptions where females were dominant among internal migrants (Gwebu 1987).

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Immigration and Emigration

Southern African countries have a common economic goal (within the Southern African Customs Union)
which is to attain maximum economic development. This and other factors, including national security
and social development, contributed to the formation of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) which has recently been determined to facilitate international migration for development in the
region. However, the level of cooperation on international migration in the region has been fraught with
several challenges emanating from the markedly differential economic status of the countries. While
South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia have made significant economic progress, several others have not
done so well. This difference has been a major obstacle to the implementation of the protocol on free
movement of persons within the region, settling instead for the protocol on the facilitation of movement
persons in the region (United Nations 2011). The patterns of immigration and emigration in Southern
Africa center on South Africa, a country that has historically been the economic hub of the region. The
history of emigration in the region goes back to the nineteenth century when South Africa began recruiting
foreign labor to work in the gold mines. The recruiting agency of the South African Chamber of Mines is
The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA).
The intention of the South African government was not to recruit foreigners to work in the gold mines
permanently, but to restrict their stay and lifestyle by excluding families, keeping them in hostels and
ensuring that they were repatriated periodically. For instance, the contracts of miners from Botswana,
Lesotho, and Swaziland were for 6–9 months, while Malawians were granted 2 years, partly due to the
travel risk associated with long distance from South Africa (Lucas 1987). Although most migrants to
South Africa were men who sought employment in the mines and farms, women also migrated to South
Africa primarily to work in the informal domestic sector. Most of the migrants were unskilled. The
motivation for cross-border migration was primarily economic with the aim of increasing household
incomes at home. Migrant remittances assisted much in this direction although there are conflicting views
on the level of assistance. Table 1 indicates that the peak of mine labor recruitment in South Africa varied
between countries of origin. The sudden stop in recruitment of Malawians was largely due to a conflict
between the South African and Malawian governments over HIV testing of applicants. Botswana received
tens of thousands of refugees from South Africa in 1976–1978 as they passed through to seek asylum in
Zambia and Tanzania. At the same time, Zimbabwean refugees increased in Botswana by over threefold to
25,300. Many resided in the country with thousands receiving Botswana citizenship (Campbell 2003).
The stock of immigrants in Southern Africa reached 2.2 million people in 2010 – with an average
annual increase of 7.3 % between 2005 and then. South Africa hosts the majority of these migrants (1.9
million) (see Fig. 1). The high sex ratios in Table 2 indicate the persistence of male dominance among
international migrants in the region. But with increasing education and personal liberation of women,
these ratios are falling due to the growing feminization of international migrants in the continent. Since
1990, migration within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and from the rest of
Africa to SADC has increased dramatically. The direction of movement is highly influenced by the
marked economic differentials in the region, with South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia being the
dominant destinations. The number of persons migrating from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia to
the commercial farms of Zimbabwe declined considerably since the land transfer program in Zimbabwe.
Immigration in Zimbabwe began in the nineteenth century with Europeans and South Africans entering in
the twentieth century (Mlambo 2010). Later in the century, an exodus of blacks and whites occurred in
response to the liberation struggle. But the greater exodus occurred in the twenty-first century following
the country’s economic recession which began in the late 1990s. The number of Zimbabweans migrating
to work or to look for work in Botswana and South Africa has increased dramatically. Opportunities for
Zimbabweans to work legally in other countries are limited but that has not prevented many from
migrating (Crush et al. 2010).

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Table 1 Mine labor recruitment in South Africa, 1990–2000

Year Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Malawi
1920 2,112 10,439 77,921 3,449 354
1930 3,151 22,306 77,828 4,345 0
1940 14,427 52,044 74,883 7,152 8,037
1950 12,390 34,467 86,248 6,619 7,831
1960 21,404 48,842 101,733 6,623 21,934
1970 20,461 63,988 93,203 6,269 78,492
1980 17,753 96,308 39,636 5,050 13,569
1989 16,051 100,529 42,807 16,730 72
1990 14,609 99,707 44,590 17,757 –
1991 14,028 93,897 47,105 17,393 –
1992 12,781 93,519 50,651 16,273 –
1993 11,904 89,940 50,311 16,153 –
1994 11,099 89,237 56,197 15,892 –
1995 10,961 87,935 55,140 15,304 –
1996 10,477 81,357 55,741 14,371 –
1997 9,385 76,361 55,879 12,960 –
1998 7,752 60,450 51,913 10,336 –
1999 6,413 52,188 46,537 9,307 –
2000 6,494 58,224 57,034 9,360 –
Source: Crush et al. 2005

2009 (est.) 2005 2000

1,863
South Africa 1,249
1,022

139
Namibia 132
125

115
Botswana 80
56

40
Swaziland 39
37

6
Lesotho 6
6

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
Stock of migrants (in thousands)

Fig. 1 Stock of migrants in Southern Africa, by destination, in 2000, 2005, and 2010 (in thousands)

Skilled emigration on a large scale in Southern African is a relatively recent phenomenon and it is
associated with tertiary education and brain drain. The most attractive African country for skilled migrants
is South Africa. A distant second is Botswana, followed by Namibia. While it is quite difficult to estimate
skilled immigrants in Southern Africa, the proportion of skilled immigrants in South Africa seems to be
inversely related to social distance from the source countries. Most of the skilled migrants are from

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Table 2 Foreign-born population in Southern Africa (2007)a

Country Male Female Sex ratio**
Botswana 17,995 11,562 156
Namibia 63,056 56,162 112
South Africa 1,206,287 648,274 186
Swaziland 17,049 14,694 116
Zambia 72,623 68,791 106
Source: UN (2009) Demographic Yearbook 2007
a
Information is for countries with adequate immigration data. It excludes persons whose migration status was not known

Western Europe, followed by the rest of Africa and southern Africa (Mattes et al. 2000). About 33 % of
African labor migrants employed in South Africa are skilled (McDonald et al. 2000). Skilled Namibians
are more likely than the unskilled to migrate to South Africa. Greater skills among urban than rural
populations largely explain why urban Namibians are more likely to migrate to South Africa than the rural
folks. Among Zimbabweans, 20 % of male and 14 % of female visitors to South Africa had completed at
least high school education. The four principal sources of skilled immigrants in Botswana are South
Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and the UK. Just as South Africa and Botswana have experienced brain gain,
it seems that there is the risk of brain drain from these countries. Brain drain occurs when the skills that a
government invested in emigrate to work and live elsewhere. Up to 1992, South Africa gained more
skilled immigrants than it lost (Mattes and Richmond 2000; Mattes et al. 2000). But since 1994, the
country has been experiencing a deficit in skilled human resource. Effectively, it has consistently lost than
gained skilled persons through international migration. The situation is similar in Zimbabwe.
From the wealth of research-based information on Zimbabwe’s brain drain, it may seem that the
country has lost the most skills in the region. But Table 3 indicates that Zambia is relatively the biggest
skill loser with 17 % of its professionals having emigrated. Still, it is evident that Zambia and Zimbabwe
have experienced the most brain drain in the region. Having previously been considered a curse, brain
drain is now acknowledged to be a national blessing because it has contributed directly to the positive
effects of international migration, namely, the diaspora, remittance, and brain circulation. From being a
net immigration country between 1921 and 1975, Zimbabwe has been characterized by emigration for
political reasons during the second half of the 1970s and for economic reasons since 2000 (Crush and
Tevera 2010). The health sector has been the most affected by skilled emigration in and from Southern
Africa. According to Table 3, every country has lost over 10 % of its native-born physicians and a fair
proportion of its nurses. From the health point of view, Zimbabwe has lost the most skilled workers with
the majority having obtained employment in the UK and South Africa.
In view of the extent to which professionals felt obliged to leave their ancestral home countries, it
appears that skilled emigration was underestimated. Between 1989 and 1997, about 233,000 South
Africans emigrated to the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. But official statistics
revealed that 82,811 people actually left during this period. Throughout the 1990s, there has been a steady
decline in the number of immigrants. In 1993, there were 9800 immigrants and this declined to 4100 in
1997. Meanwhile, from 1994 to 1998, South Africa experienced net emigration of close to 4,000 annually.
Forty-eight percent of the 342,947 emigrants who lived in OECD countries were highly skilled (OECD
2006). Their exit left serious social, economic, and political consequences in its wake. Unfortunately the
loss of skills was not offset by a proactive, aggressive recruiting immigration policy. The implications of
these trends are very clear. There will continue to be a shortage of skilled workers as well as an oversupply
of unskilled labor. The negative implications will reverberate throughout the South African economy and
impact on the country’s global competitiveness given that skilled workers generally create jobs for
unskilled workers and that the level of skills in the labor force is an attraction for foreign investment.

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Table 3 Immigration and emigration statistics

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Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Swaziland Zambia Zimbabwe Africa

Total population (2009) 2,000,000# 2,100,000 2,200,000 49,300,000 1,200,000 12,900,000 12,500,000
No. of emigrants (2010) 63,000 427,500 16,500 878,100 163,300 185,800 1,253,100
Emigrant as % of total popa 3.2 20.5 0.7 1.7 13.3 1.4 9.9
Skilled (tertiary) emigrant (%) 3.6 4.3 3.5 7.5 0.5 16.8 12.7
Emigration of physicians (%) 11.4 33.3 45.0 21.1 28.5 56.9 51.1
Emigration of nurses (%) 2.2 2.8 5.4 5.1 2.8 9.2 24.2
Immigrant stock (2010) 114,800 6,300 138,900 1,862,900 40,400 233,100 372,300
Immigrant as % of total pop 5.8 0.3 6.3 3.7 3.4 1.8 2.9
Remittance inflow (US$ mil)b 141 490 17 834 99 59 500+
Source: World Bank (2011) Migration and Remittances Factbook
a
2000
b
2008 # 2011 National Census figure + over US$500 million

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A clear gender dimension emerges; men are more likely to leave permanently than women (Dodson and
Crush 2004).

Consequences of Immigration and Emigration

Until the 1990s, the informal sector was almost absent in South Africa’s economy. Its growth owes much
to the economic activities of contemporary immigrants especially from West and East Africa. The
informal economic sector which has historically been a common feature of West and East African lifestyle
hardly existed in South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia before 1990. Considering the high levels of
unemployment in the cities, the informal sector is crucial for providing those not employed in the formal
sector with a way out of poverty. Several migrants who fail to find work or are refused work permits in the
country become self-employed, at times illicitly setting up barber, food, clothing shops, etc. Zimbabweans
constitute the highest proportion of migrant street vendors. Mozambicans and, to a lesser extent,
Batswana, Basotho, and Swazi are also quite active in promoting the informal sector in South Africa.
Tevera and Zinyama (2002) observed that, among all visitors and migrants to South Africa, the highest
proportion of men and women who buy and sell goods is from Zimbabwe. Basotho, Mozambican, and
Namibian migrants also buy and sell goods in South Africa (Sechaba Consultants 2002). Zimbabwean
males seem to be in South Africa as much to work or look for work as it is for commerce. But almost three
quarters of migrant women are there for commercial purposes (Tevera and Zinyama 2002). Apart from
personal development within the new diaspora, a common feature of this group is the remitting of money
and goods to families in the ancestral home.

Diasporas in Southern Africa

Between ancient and modern times, two categories of diaspora have been identified. These are the
“classic” and “modern” diaspora. Classic diasporas are associated with the Jewish, African, Indian, and
other diasporas which were formed several centuries ago, while modern diasporas were formed fairly
recently from contemporary international migration (Cohen 1997). Examples of classic South African
diasporas in the region are the Tswana in Botswana and Shona in Zimbabwe. The modern diasporas in the
region were formed from contemporary migration from in and outside the region. The latter include
Nigerian, Ghanaian, Somali, and Kenyan diasporas. Though the African Union recognizes that both
groups should be encouraged to make significant contribution to economic and social development in the
continent, the focus in Southern Africa is harnessing the potential of the modern diaspora for immediate
and future socioeconomic development in the region. South Africa has taken the lead in this by organizing
meetings for dialogue and cooperation as well as reaching out to the diaspora with provision of incentives.
Diasporas in and out of Southern Africa have contributed much to the national economies at home
through financial and social remittances. Financial remittances are monies and goods sent home by
migrants, while social remittances include the ideas, identities, language, behavior, food, music, other
arts, and social capital that are transferred from destination to origin countries (Levitt 1998). The altruistic
relationship between African parents and their offspring explains much of the factors that influence
migrant remittances. The South Africa diaspora is the highest remitter in the region, and it is estimated that
Zimbabweans sent over US$500 million home in 2009 (IRIN 2012). Indeed, the nation of Zimbabwe
would have collapsed without migrant remittances (Crush and Tevera 2010). Lesotho also receives a
considerable amount of remittance, while Namibia is the lowest recipient (Table 3).
Migrant remittances contribute significantly to poverty reduction in the region. The bulk of all
remittances received in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and Swaziland comes from South
Africa. Though the region receives the lowest amount of international remittances in Africa, they

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Table 4 Items remittance in Southern Africa is spent on, 2004 (in percentage)
Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Zimbabwe Total
% % % % % %
Food 87.5 89.3 69.9 83.4 75.7 81.9
School fees 42.9 56.0 49.1 54.9 54.6 52.3
Clothing 62.9 76.1 43.5 24.0 56.6 52.2
Transport fares 27.0 50.0 24.8 29.2 31.6 33.8
Seed 2.4 24.4 26.3 44.4 11.3 24.0
Fertilizer 1.1 18.5 1.3 34.2 9.4 15.2
Tractor 1.5 12.5 0.9 39.7 1.3 13.6
Savings 8.6 18.7 10.9 4.7 19.4 12.5
Cement 26.7 5.2 14.9 7.2 8.1 11.1
Funeral 18.9 16.3 5.5 5.0 9.1 10.8
Roofing 21.6 3.6 7.2 3.5 6.7 7.5
Bricks 20.3 4.5 5.0 2.7 6.7 6.9
Fuel 3.6 9.9 6.1 2.0 7.8 6.0
Labor 5.0 5.1 9.8 4.1 4.3 5.5
Cattle purchase 20.8 1.4 2.2 1.6 2.0 4.6
Repay loans 6.8 1.9 5.8 4.2 3.5 4.2
Other items excluded
Source: Pendleton et al. (2006) Migration, remittances. . .. . .. SAMP

contribute significantly to national development in several countries, especially Lesotho and Zimbabwe
where the remittance is 29 % and about 40 % of GDP, respectively (World Bank 2011; Bhebhe 2012).
Migration, remittances, and development have a long history in the region. Bilateral agreements between
South Africa and several Southern African countries, including Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and
Swaziland, ensured that foreign miners put significant proportions of their earnings into the national
economies (referred to as deferred payment). In 1984, 18,691 Batswana miners generated nearly R17
million ($2.6 million) in officially recorded remittances alone, which helped to grow Botswana’s rural
economies in particular. Remittances contribute substantially to several key areas within the Millennium
Development Goals, especially mitigating hunger and enhancing children’s education. Most of the
remittances to and in the region are used for personal and household consumption (Table 4). Food is
the primary item on which remittances are spent, followed by school fees, clothing, and transport fares.
Apparently, Batswana (citizens of Botswana) do not require remittances for children’s school fees as
much as other nationals do, and this is partly because of the existence of government-induced public
education system which is almost fee-free from primary to university levels (UNECA 2011). Meanwhile,
the dominance of Botswana’s expenditure on cattle purchase is due to the great value the nationals place in
cattle rearing (cattle is a major export product in the country). Most migrants remit through unofficial
channels, including taking money and goods home when they visit, using bus drivers and friends. High
frequency of visitation makes personal remitting the most popular. Others use banks, post office, and
money transfer agent such as Western Union.
Associated with diaspora and African development is ensuring that brain drain is moderated and
encouraging brain circulation. Former President Mbeki of South Africa once pledged about US$71
million to encourage highly skilled citizens to stay in (or return to) the country (Campbell 2007). In an
attempt to ease the effect of emigration of health workers in Lesotho, the Minister of Health and Social
Welfare met with Basotho health professionals in the UK to discuss the plans that the Lesotho government
had for those who returned. In order to attract skills back home, several governments are implementing

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economic policies that would guarantee employment, investment, and internationally competitive
income. The government of Malawi has introduced economic and investment policies since 2000.
These have helped improve economic performance and attracted the attention of potential professional
returnees. In collaboration with DFID, the government is offering incentives to discourage emigration of
health professionals. Sadly, brain circulation (generally defined as return home of skilled emigrants),
which has been successful in developed countries and in India and China, has not quite taken off in
Southern Africa because the social, economic, and emotional investment risks are high and minimize its
usefulness in the region and the rest of Africa (Wickramasekara 2002). It works best within developed
nations’ socioeconomic systems where the environment for setting up the networks required for profitable
professional, academic, and commercial ventures are quite advanced and favor performance and compe-
tition. But it is not so in Africa where populations are transitional.

Human Rights
Much of the policies on international migration either affects or is influenced by the rights of people to
move freely between countries. Though human trafficking has become increasingly important in human
rights issues, irregular migration takes precedence because of its general and more transparent nature.
Irregular migration is movement of people across cross-international borders without appropriate travel
documents (i.e., passport and entry visa). It also applies to migrants who entered another country legally
but stayed beyond the time permitted by their visitor of work permit. An alternative concept of irregular
migration is undocumented migration. The two terms are widely preferred to the apparently derogatory
one “illegal migration” because the concept “illegal” criminalizes the act of irregular border crossing. Due
to the absence of effective border controls in many African countries, irregular migration did not seem to
exist until the twentieth century. While irregular immigration occurred in Zambia and Zimbabwe during
the peak of mining, none is comparable to the attraction of South Africa. Irregular movement to South
Africa by men and women began in the 1920s. Women were more disadvantaged than men in getting jobs.
Apart from domestic work and street hawking, some women got into more demeaning activities such as
prostitution (Crush 2000, p. 17). A decline in recruitment of foreign mine workers occurred in the 1960s
partly due to the negative post-independence attitudes in several Southern African countries toward
apartheid South Africa. The governments of Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi did not favor labor migration
to South Africa; so Zambia and Tanzania withdrew its mine workers shortly after independence and
Malawi did so in 1972 (Crush et al. 2005). The policies which restricted migration to South African mines
fostered irregular migration to South Africa in pursuit of employment and higher living standards in South
Africa’s multi-sectoral economy.
Several countries which did not permit their citizens to visit or work in South Africa suspended this
policy when apartheid formally ended in 1994. The attraction to Zimbabwe, where almost a quarter of a
million African migrants were employed in 1961, and Zambia had dwindled remarkable as their
economies declined (Crush et al. 2005). Also, the lifting of apartheid occurred at a time of serious
economic and political turmoil in most other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. These factors boosted irregular
migration to South Africa. Initially, employment of irregular migrants was concentrated in the commercial
farm sector and mostly in farms close to the borders of Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Crush 1999). But
political changes in the 1990s enhanced opportunities for irregular employment in urban centers such as
Johannesburg and Durban, and the social and environmental effects of this drew the most attention to the
increasing inflow of irregular migrants to the country. Zimbabweans form the second largest group of
irregular migrants in South Africa. Between 1994 and 1999, they grew much faster than the Mozambicans
did (27.0 % annually), and from 2000 to 2004, they grew annually by 12 % (8.5 % points more than the

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corresponding growth rate of Mozambicans). In the absence of reliable statistics on irregular migrants, the
deportation figures give some idea of the trend of irregular migration. The total number of deportees from
South Africa between 1994 and 1995 increased from 90,692 to 183,861 (an increase of over 100 %). It is
acknowledged that this increase may be an effect of the governments’ restriction of movements into the
country and an intensified search for irregular migrants than increase in irregular immigration.
Zimbabwe’s economy has struggled immensely since 1990. The decision by ZANU PF, the ruling
party, in 2000 to redistribute highly productive white-owned farms to black nationals worsened the state
of the country’s economy (Bracking 2005; Moyo and Yeros 2005). Zimbabwe’s poor rose markedly after
the 2002 elections as a result of international discontent with the reelection of Robert Mugabe, the
inability of blacks to maintain the commercial value of the land, and the political excesses of Mugabe.
This forced scores of thousands of young Zimbabwean men and women to emigrate to South Africa and
Botswana. Botswana has historically been a transit station for refugees and travelers who moved
northward from South Africa to Zambia and Tanzania to escape violent conflict in their country. Between
1976 and 1978, about 10,000 refugees who escaped the apartheid regime of South Africa to seek asylum
in Zambia and Tanzania went through Botswana whose government was exceptionally sympathetic to
refugees. Botswana was also a popular destination of Zimbabwean refugees in the 1970s and remains so
to irregular migrants from Zimbabwe. Deportation figures indicate that about 95 % of all deportees from
Botswana are Zimbabweans. The average annual growth rate of irregular migrants in Botswana between
2000 and 2007 is 28.1 % (Campbell 2009). The surge in irregular migration to Botswana is largely due to
geographical distance and cultural relationship between the two countries. The northeastern part of
Botswana is dominated by the Bakalanga whose ancestry is in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Other
contributors to irregular migration since the 1970s include: (1) the financial cost passport and visa may
be too high for the poor, (2) poor education limits potential migrants’ access to information about where
and how to obtain international travel document, (3) mileage distance between the potential migrant’s
residence and the city (where travel documents are obtained) may be too far, (4) corruption of customs and
immigration officers at border posts, and (5) close proximity of potential migrant’s residence to the
destination country.
Among the difficulties experienced by irregular migrants in Southern Africa is the abuse of their right to
economic and social services. Much of this is due to negative opinion of nationals of the host country (i.e.,
the destination country) about irregular migration. Irregular migrants are usually stereotyped as criminals
as well as being the perpetrators of unemployment and spread of sexually transmitted diseases in host
countries. Irregular migration has therefore contributed to a rise in xenophobia in several countries in the
region, especially Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa (SAMP 2001; Crush and Pendleton 2004).
Table 5 indicates that Namibians and Batswana are less tolerant of irregular migrants than South Africans.
Paradoxically, even nationals such as Mozambicans and Zambians who have been victimized by
xenophobic reactions to their presence in major destinations like South Africa and Botswana are
apparently also intolerant of irregular migrants (Crush 2000; Nyamnjoh 2002; Campbell 2003; Campbell
and Oucho 2003; Crush and Pendleton 2004). Over half of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans would
support a policy by their government if it denied legal protection to irregular migrants. Generally, there
was overwhelming support for a policy which ensured that irregular migrants were never granted freedom
of speech, voting right, and legal protection and giving policy the right to apprehend all irregular migrants
as well as military presence along the country’s borders. Some preferred the arrest of employers of
irregular migrants, while nearly a third approved the use of electric fencing of national borders.
Notwithstanding these negative attitudes toward irregular migrants, the policies of governments should
be guided by the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families. Though irregular migrants have limited coverage within this
Convention, it may be argued that, subject to correction of residence status, all migrants should be treated

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Table 5 Nationals support of government policies to minimize irregular migration, by country of enumeration (%)
South
Support policy Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozambique Swaziland
Police right to detain suspected irregular 82.4 95.1 87.6 77.5 88.3 56.9
migrant
Foreigners to carry identification always 74.9 89.6 82.0 65.7 92.3 47.7
Increase tax to assist border patrol 20.6 49.9 37.7 14.6 35.7 11.4
Use army to patrol border 82.6 94.6 94.9 62.0 71.7 73.3
Allocate more money to border protection 61.1 80.7 68.5 39.8 61.0 51.4
Punish employers of irregular migrant 81.1 94.8 95.4 57.7 86.6 66.0
Turn on electric fence 60.4 79.8 62.7 47.5 22.9 33.7
No freedom of speech for irregular 85.5 90.9 94.8 82.9 84.5 87.3
migrant
No voting right for irregular migrant 88.7 98.8 98.4 90.4 96.1 95.8
No legal protection of irregular migrant 62.1 64.7 59.9 50.4 57.3 46.2
No social service to irregular migrant 65.4 49.9 77.3 46.5 33.9 40.7
Source: SAMP (2001) Raw data from 2001 NIPS survey

as equals with nationals and should therefore be granted freedom of expression of religious and cultural
beliefs and practices, social independence, medical care, education of children, and judicial rights in cases
of detention and deportation (United Nations 1990, Article 1.1; Bosniak 1991).
Other contributors to irregular migration since the 1970s include: (1) the financial cost passport and visa
may be too high for the poor; (2) poor education limits potential migrants’ access to information about
where and how to obtain international travel document; (3) Mileage distance between the potential
migrants residence and the city (where travel documents are obtained) may be too far; (4) corruption of
customs and immigration officers at border posts; (5) close proximity of potential migrant’s residence to
the destination country.
Irregular immigration contributes substantially to economic development of the nations throughout the
world. Contrary to “stealing” jobs from nationals, these migrants actually save the host citizens much
from the low wages they receive and their willingness to work in sectors which nationals do not favor.
Moreover, they do not necessarily benefit from health and unemployment insurance. Lack of data makes it
difficult to determine the financial benefit of irregular migration to African nations; but there is evidence
that in the USA, they save the private sector millions of dollars annually due to wage depression (Huddle
1995).
An increasing area of concern to governments in the SADC region is the trafficking of women and
children. Human trafficking involves deception of the victims and their parents about the eventual benefits
of the transporting to the destination. Unlike people smuggling, the association between victims and
traffickers does not end with the arrival at the destination. It continues and is often exploitive and violent
(Orhant 2009, p. 4). In Africa, this occurs mainly between West and East Africa (the source) and South
Africa where they are used mostly as prostitutes. Businesswomen in Malawi often work with long-
distance truck drivers to recruit young women with promises of marriage, education, and jobs in South
Africa. Trafficking of Asian women to South Africa involves trips through transit countries, such as
Lesotho and Mozambique, to Johannesburg and Cape Town where they are forced to become commercial
sex workers. Other sources of trafficked women include Eastern European countries from which women
are flown to South Africa with false offers of employment as waitresses and domestic workers
(Adepoju 2005).

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Table 6 Moving to another country

Consideration of moving abroad South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Swaziland Lesotho Average
A great deal 40.0 28.9 33.3 71.2 55.8 43.8 44.8
Some 41.4 40.4 33.7 20.8 29.4 34.4 34.4
None at all 15.7 26.6 27.4 6.0 11.1 17.9 17.2
Do not know 2.9 4.1 5.7 1.9 3.7 4.0 3.6
Source: Crush et al. (2005)

Future Emigration
Several studies by SAMP in the SADC region in 2002–2003 indicate strong intentions by young
professionals to emigrate. The studies were done in six countries and the respondents were final year
students in tertiary education institutions. The students were interviewed about their future emigration
intentions. The results indicated that 45 % of students who were about to enter the labor market had given
a great deal of consideration to emigrating (Table 6). The highest proportion of potential emigrants was in
Zimbabwe and the lowest was in Namibia. Only 17 % of them had never considered moving to another
country. The data also showed that 88 % of the students preferred to move to the USA, South Africa, and
Europe (in descending order), and about 7 % of them had already applied for work permits in the country
they were most likely to move to (Crush et al. 2005). With 62 % of the primary reasons for wanting to
emigrate, economic factors dominated the emigration consideration. They include income, job availabil-
ity, cost of living, professional advancement, etc. Thirty-two percent intended to stay in the destination for
a long time (over 5 years), while for 28 % the intended length of stay was 2–5 years. There was a general
desire to maintain socioeconomic links with families at home. The majority (37 %) wished to visit home
yearly, while 28 % intended such visits to be once every few months. Meanwhile, 52 % intended to remit
once a month, while 19 % wished to do so a few times a year. Relatively few students (17 %) expressed
satisfaction with their countries’ current economic condition, and just over a quarter anticipated future
improvements in the economy. Even economically prosperous countries (Botswana and South Africa)
were not perceived favorably. While some people may argue that intentions and behavior are mutually
independent, there is considerable reason to believe otherwise (see Campbell 2001 for a comprehensive
discussion of the interrelationship between attitude and behavior). Considering the effect of the ongoing
global financial crisis on the demand for luxury goods, it is more likely now than in 2002 that the
professionals (especially health providers) would increasingly look elsewhere for higher real income.

International Migration Policy

Until recently, migration (internal and international) was not considered a significant area in the devel-
opment of human populations and was therefore excluded from national policies. This position has
changed, and recognition of the positive economic effects of international migration has influenced
several governments to develop policies which address especially brain drain, brain circulation, diaspora,
and financial remittances. Several Southern African countries claim to have policies which address
international migration, especially issues related to irregular migration. Table 7 indicates that the
international migration in Botswana, Malawi, and South Africa operates on “policies” which determine
their goals on some immigration and emigration issues. For example, Botswana seeks to reduce overall
level of immigration while discouraging brain circulation (United Nations 2006). But the mechanism for
attaining these goals does not exist. Presently, the government is actively working toward developing a
comprehensive international migration policy. So far, it has addressed some immigration issues using the

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Table 7 Excerpts o f immigration and emigration policies of three countries

Country Immigration policy Emigration
Overall Highly integration Overall Encouraging
Level Skills of noncitizen level Return of citizens
Malawi Lower – Yes No interview Yes
Botswana Lower Lower Yes No interview No
South Africa Lower Maintain Yes Lower Yes
Source: United Nations (2006)

Immigration Act (Botswana 1987). South Africa is the only country in the region with a comprehensive
international migration policy (South Africa 2010). All other countries operate from the Constitution.
This is not adequate because, as much as possible, the international migration policy should address all
legal and development aspects of immigration and emigration. In order for Southern Africa to attain
maximum benefit from the positive effects of emigration, the governments should endeavor to produce
comprehensive international migration policies as soon as possible. South Africa’s experience shows that
it requires considerable time, money, and commitment to produce a fairly humane migration policy.

Conclusion
Southern Africa has been a center of considerable internal and international migration before the
seventeenth century, and their importance has grown since 1990 due to positive and negative economic
and political factors which have had significant effects on socioeconomic development in the region. Both
internal and international migrations have been largely influenced by the markedly different economies in
the region and particularly the dominant South African economy. Though government perceptions of
international migration vary, there has been a general shift from the pessimistic to the optimistic because
of the observed positive effects of the diasporas and migrant remittances. Hence, there has been increasing
positive response to the idea that cooperation between governments and the diaspora is crucial to the
enhancement of national economic development. The contributions of the Basotho, Batswana, Mozam-
bican, South African, Swazi, and Zimbabwean diasporas to economic and social development in the home
countries are highly commendable. Though it is not advisable to rely too much on migrant remittances, at
the expense of macroeconomic sources of national development, they have the potential to improve the
standards of living of families living in rural and urban areas. The contribution to children’s education
alone constitutes a viable investment in human development. For many poor families, this may not have
been possible without migration.

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African Island Migration

Iain Walker*
COMPAS, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Definition
African Island migration concerns the islands off the east coast of Africa in the western Indian Ocean:
Madagascar and the Comoros, the Mascarene Islands of Mauritius and Réunion, and Seychelles.

Detailed Description
Islands are particularly distinctive sites of migration. They are geographically separated from their
neighbors by water, which constrains movements of populations and grants island migrations a special
character. Moving into and out of an island generally requires more effort than crossing a land border, and
in the contemporary world, movements by sea and air are more easily controlled by the state. Island
populations are often more aware of their identities than groups on the mainland, partly because of the
difficulties faced in settling the island and partly because of the controlled character of contact with
neighbors. However, islands require contact with the outside world: all but the very largest of islands are
unlikely to be self-sufficient, and they rely on trading partners for foodstuffs, manufactured goods, labor,
and capital.

Historical Migrations
All the islands of the southwestern Indian Ocean have been settled by immigrants in a relatively recent
past. Madagascar was the last of the world’s great land masses to have been colonized by humans, during
one of the world’s great historical migrations. The Austronesian-speaking peoples of Southeast Asia
began moving out of their ancestral homeland in Taiwan more than 5,000 years ago, and their descendants
today are found across a wide swathe of the globe, from Easter Island in the southeast Pacific, through
Polynesia and Indonesia to, in the western Indian Ocean, Madagascar itself. These migrations finally
ended with the settlement of New Zealand in the fourteenth century. However, while there are indications
of a human presence in Madagascar as early as the late third millennium BC, there is no reliable evidence
of the existence of a settled human population prior to the fifth century AD, and linguistic and genetic
evidence suggests that Austronesian settlers arrived later still, almost certainly via the East African coast.
Regardless of the dates of their arrival, however, geneticists, linguists, and anthropologists all agree that
the contemporary Malagasy are descended from African and Austronesian immigrants (Adelaar 2012;
Cox et al. 2012).
The same migratory movements probably led to the settlement of the Comoro Islands, to the northwest
of Madagascar, but once again, evidence is lacking: the earliest reliably dated archaeological site in the
archipelago is late first millennium. However, the historical record and the physical evidence from the
nearby African coast confirms that Arab seafarers were navigating in the region some 2,000 years ago, and
by the time Islam reached the area toward the ninth century, it is clear that the Comoros were already
inhabited. Genetic analysis suggests that the bulk of the population has its roots in East Africa, but that
both Arab men and Austronesian women contributed to the Comorian melting pot. The populations of

*Email: [email protected]

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both Madagascar and the Comoros were subsequently augmented by substantial movements of slaves
from the East African mainland: the Comoro Islands were a notorious slave-trading center, while in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, large-scale slave raids on the African coast by
Betsimisaraka and Sakalava slavers from Madagascar saw the forced migration of large numbers of
East Africans to the latter island, whence many were sold onward to the Mascarenes.
Further east the smaller creole island states of Mauritius, Réunion, and Seychelles, uninhabited when
first visited by Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were populated by large-scale
migrations during the colonial era. Plantation colonies were established on the islands, initially under
French control, later, following the Napoleonic Wars and (with the exception of Réunion, which was
returned to the French) under British control. In the early period large numbers of Africans were imported
as slaves to work on the plantations, and they rapidly came to constitute a majority of the population and
develop (much as in the Caribbean) a creole society. Although slaves were brought from all parts of the
African continent, it seems likely that the majority were from East Africa and a substantial number were
Malagasy. Malagasy immigrants were present in sufficient numbers in both Mauritius and Réunion to
maintain their own language and culture until well into the second half of the nineteenth century; they
were eventually assimilated to the general creole population, and while they lost their language in the
process, creole culture in both states owes much to Malagasy origins (Larson 2009).
Following abolition, initially of the slave trade, later of slavery itself, the colonists were forced to turn
elsewhere for their labor force. The French administration in Réunion was the first to recruit laborers
under the indenture system and began shipping contract laborers from their ports in India, particularly
Pondicherry, in 1826; however, it was the British government who recruited the greatest number of
indentured laborers, and it is estimated that nearly half a million indentured laborers arrived in Mauritius
from India between 1834 and 1913, with several thousand more arriving from Madagascar, China, and
parts of East Africa (Addison and Hazareesingh 1993; Carter 1995). Although indentured laborers were in
theory accorded a degree of legal protection and a free passage home at the end of their indenture, the
conditions under which they lived and worked differed little from slavery; nevertheless, few opted for a
return, and these mass migrations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have shaped contemporary
demographics in the creole islands: Mauritians of Indian origin today constitute some 67 % of the
population, while people of mixed African and European descent represent close to 30 %. Franco-
Mauritians and Sino-Mauritians make up the remainder. In Réunion the proportions are more equitable:
the three principal groups – of mixed African and European origin, of European origin, and of Indian
origin – probably each account for approximately a third of the population; Réunion similarly has a small
community of Chinese origin (Leguen 1979). In Seychelles – too small and remote for the development of
a successful plantation economy – there are few of Indian descent and the population is largely of mixed
European and African origin.

Internal Mobilities
From the high-income island of Réunion (a French department(s) and an EU Outermost Region) to the
resource-poor and overpopulated Comoros, contemporary migrations have left their mark on all the
islands although the political, economic, and demographic diversity of these islands provide for signif-
icant differences in the character and magnitude of migratory flows across the region. In the creole islands
internal migrations are of minor significance – employment prospects draw individuals to the urban areas,
while facility of movement allows those employed in towns to move out: in Mauritius, for example,
infrastructure improvements have prompted a slight net outward migration from urban areas to rural areas
over the past two decades. There are minor movements between the islands of Seychelles, generally for
profession reasons; there is also a small net out-migration from the Mauritian island of Rodrigues,

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although this has decreased significantly since the 1990s as the island’s economy and infrastructure
improves (Govt. of Mauritius 2000).
In Madagascar, internal migrations are more significant and are largely responsible for the growth in
urban populations, particularly outside the capital, Antananarivo: while the capital’s share of the popu-
lation has remained constant at about 9 % of the total population over the past 20 years, regional urban
centers have been growing proportionately more rapidly for several decades, currently at a rate 2 % in
excess of that of the national population growth rate. One in three Malagasy households now lives in an
urban area (Freeman et al. 2010; World Bank 2011). Despite this relative shift in growth, Antananarivo
continues to attract more than 100,000 internal migrants annually: urbanization in Madagascar is almost
entirely due to internal migratory flows, which are facilitated by the cultural and linguistic homogeneity of
the island and underpinned by the strong attachment that Malagasy feel toward their ancestral lands and
their ancestral tombs. This tends to discourage international migration; it also allows migrants to maintain
strong links with their homes. Although in many cases poverty is certainly a factor encouraging
rural–urban migration – migrants are drawn to urban areas by economic opportunities and better
infrastructure, particularly in health and education – internal migrations in Madagascar are also often
made possible by the wealth and support of a home that funds the movement to the city. Many rural
dwellers move to the cities in order to sell agricultural produce from their home regions, and many are
successful. It is not without significance that the majority of urban dwellers in Madagascar are land-
owners: all but the very poorest possess their house and a small garden where they grow rice – a culturally
significant foodstuff in Madagascar. Kin groups are particularly important in shaping migrant networks,
and the importance of the ancestors in Malagasy society means that an individual may belong to several
large and cohesive descent groups who can provide support, extending a welcome to new arrivals in the
city. In a similar vein, regional and ethnic associations also provide valuable support to migrants in urban
areas. The migratory process is therefore a dynamic relationship linking urban and rural economies:
produce from rural areas permits movement to the cities and provides both for regular physical return and
for remittances to the rural areas, thus in turn sustaining the rural economy and encouraging further
rural–urban migration (Nawrotzki et al. 2012).
Internal migrations are important on an interisland level in the Comoro Islands; the bulk of outward
migrations are from the island of Ndzuani where the economy is exiguous, land shortages are acute,
erosion is severe, and the population density (574/km2 at the 2003 census) is twice that of Ngazidja and
more than three times that of Mwali. Ndzuani is the poorest of the islands and, unlike Ngazidja, has no
significant diaspora on whom to rely for remittances.
For many years migrants from Ndzuani have therefore settled in Mwali, taking up agricultural land and
creating immigrant villages; they have also been drawn to Ngazidja, seat of the national government and
where many work either in the civil service or in private enterprise; and they continue to travel to Mayotte,
today (and despite Comorian claims over the island) a French département. All three of these movements
have caused problems in the past. The influx of large numbers of immigrants to Mwali has occasionally
caused tension, particularly over land, while in Ngazidja, migrants from Ndzuani are accused of being
disproportionately represented in the civil service. These conflicts are exacerbated by sporadic outbreaks
of secessionist sentiment on Ndzuani itself. In 1997, chronic political and economic instability at a
national level finally prompted local leaders on Ndzuani to declare independence and seek recolonization
by France; political reconciliation was achieved with the promulgation of the 2002 constitution, which
devolved significant powers to the islands, but there are still regular expressions of separatist sentiment
and, on a more social level, a general recognition and acceptance of strong and distinct island identities
within the Comorian nation that often characterizes interisland migrants as being socially and culturally
different.

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Mayotte
Migrations to Mayotte are particularly problematic and are inscribed within a long-term circulation of
individuals and families in the archipelago. In a 1974 referendum Mayotte voted against Comorian
independence, and when the territory declared independence from France the following year, Mayotte
expressed a desire to remain French. French support for Mayotte’s self-determination, contrary to UN
resolutions on decolonization and Comorian claims over the island, culminated in the full incorporation of
the island into France as a département in 2011; and although the island is significantly less developed
than other French départements, it is significantly more prosperous than the other islands of the group. For
two decades following independence, there was a freedom of movement between the islands, but in 1995
France imposed visa requirements on Comorian passport holders wishing to travel to Mayotte. However,
Comorians from Ndzuani, in particular, continue to enter Mayotte in large numbers, traveling in small,
overloaded, and often unseaworthy boats: these boats frequently sink and the loss of life is high (Causes
Communes 2012).
Many of those who travel to Mayotte do so to visit family and friends but others are seeking work. In
Mayotte the undocumented are regularly exploited in the labor market; denied access to housing,
education, and health services; and frequently denounced to French immigration. Those apprehended
by immigration officials are held in overcrowded and insalubrious conditions in unfurnished cells in a
detention center in Pamandzi that has repeatedly attracted condemnation from human rights organizations
before being deported to Ndzuani: currently more than 20,000 individuals are deported annually from
Mayotte – in 2011 this represented almost 15 % of the population of the island. Amnesty International has
described the conditions in the detention center as “inhuman and degrading”; but the legal issues
surrounding movements from the other islands to Mayotte are particularly difficult to resolve since
from a Comorian point of view these are internal migrations. Furthermore, the nature of interisland
mobilities and attendant kin-links, particularly between Ndzuani and Mayotte, is such that it is often
difficult to determine with any precision who belongs where: many may have origins on the other islands
but have been residents of Mayotte for decades.

Regional Flows
Intraregional migrations tend to follow patterns established in the colonial period. Mauritius and Sey-
chelles are reasonably prosperous middle-income economies and migratory flows to the other islands are
limited, although there are some 3,300 Mauritian residents in Réunion; likewise a relatively small number
of migrants from Réunion to the other islands tend to be professionals. Intraregional migrations to
Mauritius and Seychelles are also limited. Seychelles is a small state, difficult to get to, and with limited
prospects for immigrants; and while French is widely spoken in both Mauritius and Seychelles, English is
the official language, thus also discouraging potential immigrants from the other islands. Both countries
are less attractive than Réunion which, as a French département, is a high-income economy member of the
EU; even if less prosperous than metropolitan France, the socioeconomic benefits of France, a shared
colonial history and a common language, and the facilitating role of Réunion for onward migration to
Europe are strong drawcards. More than three quarters of Réunion’s immigrant population come from
neighboring islands: nevertheless, at 1.8 % of the population, there are proportionally far fewer immi-
grants in Réunion than in metropolitan France, where the figure is more than 8 %. There are, according to
official figures, 6,400 Malagasy and 1,500 Comorians in Réunion. However, the latter are a particularly
visible minority since their numbers are increased by a significant number of French citizens of Comorian
origin, many of whom are from Mayotte: there may be as many as 30,000 Comorians in Réunion, almost
all of whom, as citizens, are legally resident (INSEE 2010; Marie and Rallu 2012). However, identifiable
both by their dress and by their practices as both Comorian and Muslim, they are frequently subject to

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discrimination, exploitation, and abuse. They frequently find it difficult to obtain employment and
housing and many live in insalubrious conditions in the poorer urban areas of the island.
Comorians are also present in Madagascar. French colonial policy encouraged the emigration of
Comorians to Madagascar rather than East Africa to palliate labor shortages on the big island. However,
rather than seeking work as agricultural laborers, the majority settled in the urban areas. A sizeable
Comorian community was established in Mahajanga, on the northwest coast, and by 1960, Mahajanga
counted some 23,000 Comorian inhabitants, almost 40 % of the town’s population. Muslim Comorians
(the majority of Malagasy are Christian), often prosperous and, following independence, foreign, were not
always viewed favorably by their Malagasy neighbors and strained relationships reached breaking point
in December 1976 when, following a dispute between two families, intercommunal rioting broke out and
over a three-day period some 2000 Comorians were massacred. More than 17,000 individuals of
Comorian origin were subsequently repatriated to the Comoros, the largest forced migration in the region
in recent history. Although largely reintegrated, many of those repatriated had been born in Madagascar
and retain a distinct identity in the Comoros where they are known as Sabenas (from the airline whose
aircraft repatriated them) or Zanatany (Malagasy, “children of the land”) (Etudes Océan Indien 2007).
Forced migration was also responsible for the depopulation of the Chagos Islands, detached from
Mauritius in the late colonial period to constitute the British Indian Ocean Territory. The colony was
leased to the United States for military purposes, on the understanding that there was no local population,
and between 1965 and 1973 some 2,000 Chagossians were forcibly removed, the majority to Mauritius
(Evers and Kooy 2011). Compensation was derisory and many lived in extreme poverty in the urban
fringes: unemployment was high, mental health problems were widespread, and there were several
suicides. Following many years of legal battles, the Chagossians obtained some compensation and British
passports, and they now have right of abode in the United Kingdom: a sizeable community now live in the
United Kingdom, particularly in Crawley, Sussex (Jeffery 2011). Others continue to live in Mauritius, and
there is also a small community in Seychelles. In 2000 the community won a judgment in the British High
Court that their eviction from the islands was illegal, paving the way for the Chagossians to return; but in
2004 this right was effectively blocked by a British Order in Council. After several further decisions the
community is now pursuing the case at the European Court of Human Rights.

International Migration
Inward immigration to the Comoros is negligible, with the exception of return migrations of Comorians
born elsewhere. The events of Majunga were a more brutal echo of the expulsion of a number of
Zanzibaris of Comorian origin following the Zanzibar revolution in 1964. Prior to the French annexation
of Madagascar (and the subsequent incorporation of the Comoros into the colony of Madagascar), the
Comoros, and particularly the island of Ngazidja, had maintained strong links with East Africa, where
Zanzibar was an economic and cultural center of some importance. A small Comorian community was
present in Zanzibar at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but emigration from Ngazidja to Zanzibar
increased rapidly following the French occupation of the former island in 1886. Enjoying the advantages
of French citizenship, the small but influential Comorian community of Zanzibar enjoyed the respect both
of the French government and of the British colonial administration and were generally employed in the
civil service or served as religious leaders. Although many took up Zanzibari nationality in the run up to
independence, they maintained their identity as a community and generally aligned themselves (with
varying degrees of success) with the Arab communities and the ruling classes. One month after
independence, the sultan of Zanzibar was deposed in a bloody coup that was followed by anti-Arab
pogroms that saw widespread killings (the number of deaths remains obscure today) and the mass
expulsion of Zanzibaris of Arab origin. Some Comorians, also perceived as foreigners due both to their
French citizenship and, for many, their Arab origins, were expelled or forced to flee, and although their

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number was small, the experience has marked the collective memory of the Comorian community in
Zanzibar.
Comorian emigrants are found elsewhere in East Africa – there are communities in mainland Tanzania,
Kenya, and Mozambique and individuals of Comorian origin in South Africa – and beyond. Ngazidja has
long been a supplier of migrants, partly due to the lack of economic development of the island and partly
due to the existence of an onerous customary marriage ritual, known as the ^ a da, which forces individuals
overseas to seek the capital with which to discharge their social obligations. For much of the late and
postcolonial period, the preferred destination was France and there are sizeable Comorian communities in
Paris, Dunkerque, and, above all, Marseille; and while the initial migrants are usually men, they are often
later joined by spouse and children. Many of these Comorians are sans-papiers, undocumented migrants,
and many more are French citizens and it is therefore hard to be precise about numbers – it is thought that
80 % of Comorians in France are French citizens, but that of the remainder 80 % are undocumented.
Official French government statistics give a figure of 18,700 Comorian citizens in France and 25,800
Comorian-born, categories that presumably largely overlap, but these figures grossly understate the size
of the population and it is thought that there are upwards of 100,000 Comorians in the country, of whom a
majority live in Marseille (Vivier 1996). The Comorian community is one of the largest and most visible
of immigrant communities and is frequently singled out for criticism, most notably in September 2011
when the French minister of the interior, Claude Guéant, claimed that the Comorian community was
responsible for much violence in the city. Certainly the community, and particularly the younger, French-
born, suffers from the discrimination and social disadvantage that touch many immigrant communities;
but they are also well organized: there are several dozen Comorian migrant associations in France and
social cohesion is strong.
Although much of the savings accumulated during a sojourn in France is destined for costs associated
with the ^a da and its rituals, the social cohesion that is both at the heart of these rituals and is reinforced by
them maintains immigrant links with the homeland. Most first-generation immigrants intend to retire to
the Comoros (hence participation in the ritual), and the social investments prompt economic investments
as the diaspora finance local development projects and send remittances to families at home. Remittances
are crucial to the Comorian economy, perhaps accounting for as much as 20 % of GDP (da Cruz et al.
2004; Thierry and Axus 2007). Once again, exact figures are difficult to obtain since up to 75 % of funds
are remitted in cash, but estimates range upward from €50 million annually. Criticism therefore that 75 %
of these funds are spent on consumption items (implicitly the ^ a da) should be tempered by the fact that
^
without the a da the remaining 25 % would undoubtedly be very much smaller. Recently, Comorian
migrants have moved beyond the traditional destination of France to the United Kingdom and Nordic
countries, North America, and even Australia. These latter destinations also attract Mauritians, partly for
linguistic reasons, and a small but significant group of Mauritians emigrated to Australia around the time
of Mauritian independence in 1968 – the largest population, some 9,000, live in the Melbourne area.
Although there are small communities of Indian and Chinese origin in Madagascar – both groups
generally run businesses, the former in the urban areas of the west coast, the latter on the east
coast – migratory flows to and from Madagascar and Réunion are also largely orientated toward France.
More than 100,000 Réunionnais live in metropolitan France; but the lure of the tropics is strong and there
are some 80,000 metropolitan French natives living in Réunion, where they are known as zorey. The
French also constitute the largest immigrant group in Madagascar, numbering perhaps 30,000, and the
Malagasy community in France is also sizeable, numbering perhaps 50,000. It is thus one of the larger
sub-Saharan African groups in France but is significantly less visible – at least in the French
imagination – than similar sized communities from West Africa. This is largely due to their profile.
Many Malagasy migrate to France for study rather than as laborers and they are also better integrated into
French society, partly no doubt, by virtue of the fact that Malagasy are Christian (albeit largely Protestant)

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and partly because many are phenotypically Asian rather than African and thus less likely to be subject to
the sorts of prejudices suffered by West Africans or Comorians.
Malagasy emigrate elsewhere – to other European destinations and North America – but one destina-
tion is egregious: some 7,000 Malagasy women work as domestic laborers in Lebanon. Maltreatment of
domestic migrants in Lebanon is chronic, and in 2009, in response to complaints and a rising number of
suspicious deaths and suicides, the Malagasy government imposed a partial ban on labor migration to
Lebanon, preventing new departures but allowing those in possession of Lebanese work permits to return.
In 2010, 17 Malagasy maids died in Lebanon, and at the end of the year, the ban was upgraded to prohibit
all labor migration to Lebanon; the following year, in response to more than 600 requests for help from
Malagasy in Lebanon, 86 domestic workers were repatriated (Human Rights Watch 2010). Nevertheless,
Malagasy continue to emigrate as domestic workers and there are small numbers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and Jordan.

References
Addison J, Hazareesingh K (1993) A new history of Mauritius. Éditions de l’Océan Indien, Rose Hill
Adelaar A (2012) Malagasy phonological history and Bantu influence. Oceanic Linguistics
51(1):123–159
Carter M (1995) Servants, sirdars and settlers: Indians in Mauritius, 1834–1874. Oxford University Press,
Delhi/Oxford
Causes Communes: Mayotte, la déchirure (2012) La Cimade, Paris
Cox M, Nelson MG, Meryanne T, Ricaut F-X, Herawati S (2012) A small cohort of Island Southeast
Asian women founded Madagascar. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 279(1739):2761–2768
da Cruz V, Fengler W, Schwartzman A (2004) Remittances to Comoros: volume, trends, impact and
implications. Africa Region working paper series No.75. World Bank, Washington, DC
Etudes Océan Indien No 38–39 (2007) Special issue: Les Comoriens à Majunga: Histoire, migrations,
émeutes
Evers S, Kooy M (2011) Eviction from the Chagos Islands: displacement and struggle for identity against
two world powers. Brill, Leiden
Freeman L, Rasolofohery S, Randriantovomanana EB (2010) Patterns, features and impacts of
rural–urban migration in Antananarivo, Madagascar. http://www.hayzara.org/index.php/eng/Knowl
edge-bank/Cross-Cutting-Themes/Patterns-Features-and-Impacts-of-rural-urban-Migration-in-Antanan
arivo-Madagascar
Government of Mauritius (2000) 2000 Housing And Population Census Analysis Report. Volume
IV. Population distribution and migration. Government of Mauritius, Port Louis. http://www.gov.mu/
portal/sites/ncb/cso/report/hpcen00/census4/index.htm
Human Rights Watch (2010) Without protection: how the Lebanese justice system fails migrant domestic
workers. Human Rights Watch, New York
INSEE (2010) Dossier Migrations: l’impact démographique et économique. Économie de La Réunion,
No 136. INSEE, Paris
Jeffery L (2011) Chagos islanders in Mauritius and the UK: forced displacement and onward migration.
Manchester University Press, Manchester
Larson P (2009) Ocean of letters: language and creolization in an Indian Ocean diaspora. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Leguen M (1979) Histoire de l’Ile de la Réunion. L’Harmattan, Paris

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Marie C-V, Rallu J-L (2012) Les tendances démographiques et migratoires dans les régions ultrapér-
iphériques: quel impact sur leur cohésion économique, sociale et territoriale? Institut national d’études
démographiques, Paris
Nawrotzki R, Hunter L, Dickinson T (2012) Rural livelihoods and access to natural capital: differences
between migrants and non-migrants in Madagascar. Demogr Res 26:661–699
Thierry B, Anne-Laure Axus (2007) Valoriser les potentialités économiques de la diaspora comorienne
pour le développement de l’archipel. Etude de cas Programme Pays Comores. Union des Comores/
FIDA, Moroni. www.fidacomores.net/IMG/doc/DOSSIER_transfert_diaspora_comores.doc
Vivier G (1996) Les migrations comoriennes en France: Histoire de migrations coutumières. Centre
français sur la Population et le Développement, Paris
World Bank (2011) L’urbanisation ou le nouveau defi Malgache. World Bank, Washington, DC

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Trans-Saharan Slave Trade

Michael Kehinde*
Department of Political Science, Lagos State University, Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria

Definition
Trans-Saharan slave trade was conducted within the ambits of the trans-Saharan trade, otherwise referred
to as the Arab trade. Trans-Saharan trade, conducted across the Sahara Desert, was a web of commercial
interactions between the Arab world (North Africa and the Persian Gulf) and sub-Saharan Africa. The
main objects of this trade were gold and salt; gold was in abundance in the western part of Africa, but
scarce in North Africa. On the other hand, while salt remains indispensable to human societies, it was not
producible in sub-Saharan Africa, but was abundant in North Africa. This created a rationale for trading
between these two regions, separated by a vast and hostile terrain. Subsequently, there developed an
intricate web of trade routes, powered by caravans of camels, between different sub-Saharan societies and
the Arab world. It was during the course of trading that human beings gradually became items of exchange
as the need for manpower grew on the north side of the Sahara.
Trans-Saharan slave trade was the trade in “human commodity,” sourced from different places in
sub-Saharan Africa, destined for locations north of the Sahara Desert, the Mediterranean shores, and the
Middle East. Unlike its later trans-Atlantic variant, trans-Saharan slave trade took place within the context
of a larger exchange relation between black Africa on the one hand and the Maghreb and the rest of the
Arab world on the other. It has been argued that perhaps one of the most significant effects of the trans-
Saharan trade was the establishment and proliferation of the trade in human beings (Brett 1969).
Sub-Saharan African slaves were bartered for bars of salt and other Mediterranean goods.

Origin
Trans-Saharan slave trade has its roots in classical times. Though it is difficult to specifically state the
origin of the trade, evidence suggests that as early as 1000 BC, slaves were one of the chief commodities
of the trade between Carthage (centered on present-day Tunisia) and regions located to the south of the
Sahara Desert (Boahen 1962). By the fifth century BC, trans-Saharan trade, of which slave trade was an
important component, had become very significant to the economy of Carthage. Trans-Saharan trade
blossomed following the introduction of camels as pack animals for the arduous journey across the Sahara
around 100 AD. While it is difficult to specifically date the origin of trans-Saharan slave trade, it is
possible to state that the trade reached its peak between the eighth and the late sixteenth century
AD. Indeed, by the tenth century AD, North Africa was “chiefly remarkable for black slaves” (Rose
2003). Trans-Saharan slave trade flourished following the establishment of Islamic kingdoms in North
Africa around the seventh and eighth century AD. The wars waged to spread Islam beyond North Africa
into other regions of the continent provided the initial impetus for trans-Saharan slave trade as prisoners of
war became enslaved and transported to the north side of the Sahara. The first set of slaves during this
period was transported to Islamized Egypt following the treaty of protection with Nubia (present-day
Sudan), as tributes in exchange for peaceful relations between the two states (Shinnie 1978).

*Email: [email protected]

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Though the Koran does not discriminate among races, racial prejudices were later used by Arab slave
traders to justify slave trade and significantly influenced the enslavement of sub-Saharan Africans. Black
people were regarded as “dim” of intelligence and that “. . .the moral characteristics found in their
mentality are close to the instinctive characteristics found naturally in animals” (Reid and Lane 2004).
Hence, they were considered right for enslavement, and sub-Saharan Africa gradually became the greatest
reservoir of slaves to the Arab world. Slaves were sourced through raids and conquests and exchanged by
local rulers for a wide variety of Mediterranean products, especially salt and horses.
Slaves were transported in caravans of camels to North Africa through several routes across the Sahara.
As a rule, slave caravans usually departed North Africa between September and October, and the return
journey began just before the start of the rainy season in April or May. All things being equal, the duration
of the journey was usually 70–90 days depending on the size of the caravan (Boahen 1962). The journey
was hazardous and difficult. The major source of casualty being the harsh conditions of the desert and the
unpredictable sandstorms could bury alive an entire caravan or obliterate routes. Slaves were transported
naked, barefoot, and chained around the neck. They were also burdened with heavy loads of commodities
on their head. About 80 % of slaves transported across the Sahara perished in the course of the journey.

Rationale
Following the conquest and Islamization of the Maghreb and the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh and
eighth centuries AD, the Islamic state supplanted the old order and inherited the trans-Saharan trade.
Slavery is taken for granted in Islam; the religion provides a humane treatment of slaves with their rights
protected under the Koran. It also states who can be enslaved – generally non-Muslims. As Islam was
expanding through wars and conquests, prisoners of war, who refused to accept Islam, were enslaved as
required by the Koran. As the growing need (economic, military, and prestige) for manpower in the courts
of rulers in North Africa and the Middle East continued to outstrip the supply by conquests, slaves were
sought from places far and wide. This was justified by the philosophy that it was legitimate to enslave
black people as they were no better than animals. It was during this period that black Africa became the
largest depot of slaves to the Islamic world.
Slave labor was mainly used in the service sector – domestic chores as cooks, wet nurses for masters’
children, and waiters on ladies of the house and as concubines. It has been argued that the overwhelming
desire for female over male slaves in the trans-Saharan trade was driven by the need for concubines. It is
lawful under Islamic law for a man (Muslim) to have a number of slave women with whom (only) he
could have sexual relations. Concubinage however allowed some degree of integration into the society for
the slaves as they became excluded from resale and became free following the death of their masters
(if they had children for them). Their children were free, as the assumption was that it was impossible for
fathers to enslave their children.
Other roles served by slaves included military and security. Slaves were trained as distinct corps of
fighting men and bodyguards to rulers and merchants. Slave soldiers were a common phenomenon in the
Islamic world. Black troops were first introduced into Egypt between 868 and 884 AD (Hunwick 1992).
The Ifriqiya and the Fatimid also raised corps of black slave soldiers used in their many wars. Slaves were
also used as bodyguards and gatekeepers for members of the royalty and merchants. Black troops were
often used to counteract rebellious tendencies among local soldiers by the creation of a corps of alien
soldiers who had no local connections and whose allegiance can be taken for granted.
Slaves were also used as administrators and traders. They were used in the service of their lords as
record keepers, as deputies, and as couriers. They engaged in commercial activities on behalf of their

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masters; they accompanied them on commercial trips and served as bodyguards as well as took care of the
pack animals for the journey.
These different uses for slaves aided the perpetuation of the trans-Saharan slave trade as it engendered
growing demands for black slaves on the north side of the Sahara. Sub-Saharan Africa remained a vast
repository of slaves as political instability and Muslim expansionism provided the impetus for slave
raiding and slave trading. Trans-Saharan slave trade blossomed until the advent and growth of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade in the sixteenth century and the eventual abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century.
Even after the abolition, slaves continued to change hands in sub-Saharan Africa between local rulers and
Muslim slave traders until European colonization.

Features
Over 28 million sub-Saharan African slaves were enslaved in North Africa and the Middle East during the
course of the trans-Saharan slave trade (see Austen 1992). However, the population of slaves taken from
sub-Saharan Africa was much more as only about 20 % of slaves successfully made the trip across the
Sahara to the slave markets on the Mediterranean coast. Trans-Saharan slave routes were littered with
countless human skeletons – fatal remains of those who perished in the desert.
Trans-Saharan slave trade was dominated by female slaves. The ratio of female to male slaves in North
Africa and the Middle East was 2:1. This has been explained in the desire for slaves not primarily as
laborers, but as concubines. Harem of rulers and merchants were reported to host hundreds of female
slaves. For example, the harem in the Fatimid palace in Cairo had over 6000 concubines (Khan 2009).
Most male slaves on the other hand were castrated and employed as soldiers, bodyguards, or
administrators.
For the greater part of the slave trade, slaves were exchanged for other good (salt, horses, and other
Mediterranean goods). However, records from Morocco in 1876 show that market prices for slaves ranged
between $48 and $140 (US Dollar of 1876) (Black Moor n/d). Other means of exchange included bars of
salt, cowry shells, and much later, the French francs. Prices varied according to the quality of the human
commodity, sex, and attractiveness. Female slaves commanded much higher price than male slaves, with
“attractive virgins” costing between $192 and $386 (Black Moor n/d).

Decline
Trans-Saharan trade generally began to decline with the entrance of European traders and adventurers into
Africa beginning from the sixteenth century. Trans-Saharan slave trade was the most affected by the
European with the emergence of trans-Atlantic slave trade, which diverted the direction of flow from the
desert to the ocean. Furthermore, following the European and American abolition of slavery, major slave
markets in North Africa and beyond began to decline, making the trade less attractive. Though these
factors greatly hampered the flow of slaves across the Sahara, it was not until European colonization
replaced local authorities that trans-Saharan trade in general experienced a fatal blow. Firstly, European
colonizers enforced the abolition of slavery in their new domains and promoted “legitimate” commerce in
place of slavery. In addition, as the European mode of organization of society and economy was imposed,
altering the traditional pattern of conducting business, the desert trade was fundamentally affected. The
stability and security engendered by the traditional power structure were shattered and could not be
reproduced under European political control. This resulted in the desert becoming unsafe for caravans as
they became easy targets for raiding desert bands. Finally, the transformation from the traditional to the

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modern mode of production and the growth of the railway shifted the direction of trade from the Maghreb
through the Sahara to Europe and the Americas across the ocean. While caravans were useful to cross the
desert, they were comparatively slow and ineffective compared to the railway and the ocean liners, which
were much faster and capable of conveying multiples of caravan cargoes.
Trans-Saharan slave trade resisted these forces well into the second decade of the twentieth century
when it was forced to an end. Though the trade is all but dead, slavery still existed in various forms in
regions that were sources of slaves during the trans-Saharan slave trade. In Mauritania and parts of Mali,
slavery remains an integral part of the society. However, slaves are no longer transported across the
Sahara. In other words, contemporary slavery in Mauritania and parts of Mali are domestic in nature, and
migration is limited to internal movement of slaves from poor regions to more affluent locations (within
the same country).

References
Austen R (1992) The Mediterranean Islamic trade out of Africa: a tentative census. Slav Abolit J Slav
Post-Slave Stud 13(1):214–248
Black Moor (n/d) Arab racism and imperialism in Sudan (Africa). http://blackmoro.blogspot.ca/p/
moslims-de-pioniers-van-de-afrikaanse.html. Retrieved from 5 Dec 2012
Boahen A (1962) The caravan trade in the nineteenth century. J Afr Hist 3(2), Third conference on African
history and archaeology: school of oriental and African studies, University of London, 3–7 July 1961,
pp 349–359
Brett M (1969) Ifriqiya as a market for Saharan trade from the tenth to the twelfth century A.D. J Afr Hist
X(3):347–364
Hunwick J (1992) Black Africans in the Mediterranean world: introduction to a neglected aspect of the
African Diaspora. In: Savage E (ed) The human commodity: perspectives on the trans-Saharan slave
trade. Frank Cass, London, pp 5–38
Khan M (2009) Islamic Jihad: a legacy of forced conversions, imperialism and slavery. iUniverse,
Bloomington
Reid A, Lane P (2004) African historical archaeologies. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York
Rose C (2003) Minerals, medals, faith and slaves: the trans-Saharan commodity trade. Paper presented at
the Hemispheres Summer Teachers’ Institute, Austin. http://www.utexas.edu/cola/orgs/hemispheres/_
files/pdf/presentations/Metals_Minerals_Faith_Slaves.pdf. Retrieved from 12 Nov 2012
Shinnie P (1978) Christian Nubia. In: Fage J (ed) The Cambridge history of Africa, vol.
2, c. 500BC – AD1050. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 556–588

Further Reading
Fage J (1969) Slavery and the slave trade in the context of West African History. J Afr Hist 10(3):393–404
Law R (1967) The Garamantes and trans-Saharan enterprise in classical times. J Afr Hist
V111(2):181–200
McDougall E (1992) Salt, Saharans, and the trans-Saharan trade: nineteenth century developments. In:
Savage E (ed) The human commodity: perspectives on the trans-Saharan slave trade. Frank Cass,
London, pp 61–88
Savage E (ed) (1992) The human commodity: perspectives on the trans-Saharan slave trade. Frank Cass,
London

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Gentrification
Jan Brueckner*
University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

Definition
Gentrification is an intra-urban migration process under which households with high socioeconomic
status move into parts of a city formerly occupied by households of low socioeconomic status. According
to the Free Dictionary, gentrification’s route word (“gentry”) refers to “people of gentle birth, good
breeding, or high social position.” With gentrifying neighborhoods often located in central cities, where
the poor are usually concentrated in the United States and some European countries, the phenomenon is
commonly viewed as a path toward revitalization of ailing downtown areas. This view makes gentrifi-
cation a popular subject for newspaper articles, and the anecdotal evidence they provide has been
supplemented by data-driven scholarly research documenting and analyzing the phenomenon (for recent
examples, see Vigdor 2002; Ellen and O’Regan 2011; McKinnish et al. 2010).
Two main questions have been the focus of gentrification research by economists. The first question is
why gentrification occurs. What forces lead high-income households to relocate into neighborhoods
previously occupied solely by lower-income residents? The second question concerns the effect of
gentrification on the poor. Does gentrification harm the poor households living in the areas that experience
it either by displacement of these households or an escalation in their living costs?

Why Gentrification Occurs

To analyze the forces leading to gentrification, economists usually rely on the standard model of a
monocentric city, developed by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969). Under this model, all
employment is located in the city’s central business district (CBD), and workers commute to the CBD
from their residences, which are dispersed around the center. A stylized version of the model has two
income groups, rich and poor. The model can be used to predict the relative locations of the rich and poor
residential areas, along with possible changes in these locations over time. A pattern of gentrification
would be observed if the poor initially live in the central city, with the rich living in the suburbs, and if this
pattern is altered by the relocation of some rich households into central neighborhoods.
In the basic model, the location of the rich group relative to the poor reflects the interplay of two forces.
The first force is a household’s wish to economize on commuting costs, mainly time costs, a force that
pulls the household toward the CBD. The second force is a desire to consume housing where it is cheap on
a per-square-foot basis. This desire pulls the household toward the suburbs, where the model predicts that
cheap land and correspondingly cheap housing are found. For the rich to live in the suburbs, this housing
force must strengthen relative to the commuting-cost force at higher incomes, making the relative
advantage of the suburbs stronger for the rich. When this pattern holds, the rich will outbid the poor for
suburban housing, and the poor will outbid the rich for housing in the central city. Starting with this
location pattern, which has the rich in the suburbs, the model can generate gentrification if some change in
the economic environment causes the housing force to weaken, not strengthen, relative to the commuting-

*Email: [email protected]

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cost force at higher incomes. Then, the rich will outbid the poor for central city housing, reversing the
locations of the two groups.
For example, suppose that traffic congestion in the city grows, a pattern that has become common
across the United States. With the rich having higher time costs, their commuting costs will increase
proportionally more than the commuting costs of the poor in response to the higher congestion. With the
commuting-cost force then stronger at higher incomes, the housing force, which is unchanged, will now
weaken relative to the commuting-cost force as income increases. With the relative advantage of the
center now stronger for the rich, the result will be gentrification, with the rich moving into the central city.
Simply put, the rich’s stronger desire to escape worsening traffic congestion will pull them toward the
CBD more strongly than the poor, leading to gentrification.
While changes that affect commuting costs might promote gentrification, the urban model identifies
other, more familiar forces that can lead to this outcome. These forces are (i) a change in consumer tastes,
which places more weight on the amenities available in central cities; (ii) a change in the level of these
amenities due to public investments in parks or other facilities or private investments in restaurants and
other retail outlets, with no change in tastes; and (iii) replacement of a worn-out central city housing stock,
which attracts high-income households in search of newer dwellings to downtown areas. The effects of
these forces again can be analyzed using the monocentric city model.
Central cities usually offer amenities such as museums and theaters, noteworthy architecture and public
spaces, and a wide variety of restaurants, which create a third locational force in addition to the housing
and commuting-cost forces. Like the commuting-cost force, the amenity force pulls consumers toward an
amenity-rich CBD. In addition, the force is likely to be stronger for higher-income households, who may
value the amenities offered by central cities more than the poor while having the purchasing power to
enjoy them. The amenity force, however, could initially be weak, with the housing and commuting-cost
forces determining the location pattern, and with the rich living in the suburbs. Rich households may then
experience a change in tastes, with their valuation of central city amenities strengthening. With the
amenity force now stronger for the rich and still inconsequential for the poor, it may then dominate the
housing and commuting-cost forces, leading the rich to outbid the poor for central city housing. The result
is taste-driven gentrification. Kern (1981) formalizes this argument using the monocentric city model.
This kind of change in the taste for central city amenities is frequently mentioned in popular
commentary as a cause of gentrification. The change is sometimes linked to the “empty-nester” phenom-
enon, where the departure of grown children from family households frees the parents to satisfy their
suppressed tastes for downtown amenities by moving to the city center. Other trends, such as the growing
culinary interests of consumers (which are more easily satisfied downtown), could also be a factor in such
a change.
Central city amenities can generate gentrification even in the absence of a change in tastes. If public
investment or other factors cause amenities to increase in the central city, then even if tastes remain the
same, the amenity force will strengthen, just as if tastes for amenities had become stronger. The amenity
force may then once again dominate the housing and commuting-cost forces for rich households, leading
them to outbid the poor for central city housing. Chicago, where substantial public investment in parks
and street-side amenities has occurred since 1990, appears to offer an example of this phenomenon. As the
central city has become a more appealing environment due to these public investments, anecdotal
evidence suggests that a number of central neighborhoods have undergone gentrification, experiencing
inflows of well-educated, high-income households.
These conclusions are connected to the analysis of Brueckner, Thisse, and Zenou (1999), who extend
the monocentric city model to capture the effect of amenity patterns on the location of the rich and poor.
However, rather than attempting to explain gentrification in a single city, their goal is to explain
differences in location patterns across cities. Arguing as above, they claim that in a city like Paris,

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which has strong central amenities, the rich will live in the center, whereas in a city like Detroit, where
central amenities are weak, the rich will be found in the suburbs (both patterns match reality). The
implication is that if Detroit could somehow generate Paris-style central amenities, the result would be
gentrification in that city.
Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009) attempt to explain gentrification by modifying the housing force to
include dwelling age as a factor. In a city that has expanded outward over time and has not yet experienced
any redevelopment, dwelling ages will decrease moving out from the CBD to the suburbs, where the
newest dwellings are found. In the model, both rich and poor prefer younger dwellings, so that the age
force (a modified housing force) then draws both groups to the suburbs, where dwellings are young. As
before, the commuting-cost force again draws both groups toward the center. But assuming that the rich
have a stronger preference and ability to pay for new dwellings than the poor, the age force is likely to
strengthen relative to the commuting-cost force at higher incomes. The relative advantage of the suburbs
will then be stronger for the rich, leading them to outbid the poor for young suburban dwellings, with the
poor then living in older housing in the central city.
Redevelopment of the central city, which occurs as its worn-out dwellings are replaced with new
housing, leads to gentrification in this model. The reason is that along with the commuting-cost force, the
age force will now also pull the rich toward the center, where new housing like that in the suburbs can be
found. With the center offering both new dwellings and a chance to economize on their high time costs,
the rich will outbid the poor for central housing, leading to gentrification. Some rich households, however,
will remain in the suburbs.

Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?

Although gentrification helps to revitalize central cities, many observers express concern about possible
negative effects on poor households. In the case where the poor are renters and the incoming higher-
income households are also renters rather than owner-occupiers, this concern has a logical basis. Then, the
higher bids of gentrifying households will drive up rents in the area, either making housing unaffordable
for the poor, who are then displaced, or crimping their budgets if they decide to stay. But the case where
gentrification occurs in an owner-occupied area may not entail negative effects. Escalating home prices
due to gentrification will confer capital gains on poor owner-occupiers, which can be cashed out if these
households decide to move or could be realized at a later date if they decide to stay. Although property tax
liabilities may rise with housing prices, poor owner-occupiers will generally gain from gentrification in
their neighborhoods.
Vigdor (2002), who studies Boston, casts some doubt on displacement as a consequence of gentrifi-
cation by showing that low-status households living in gentrifying areas were no more likely to relocate
than similar households outside such areas. McKinnish et al. (2010) present similar results for a broader
sample, showing that the share of black and Hispanic residents staying in gentrifying census tracts
matched their shares in the initial tract population 10 years earlier, showing no disproportionate displace-
ment of these racial groups. In addition, gentrification seldom led to lower incomes among stayer
households, regardless of race, indicating no displacement of the lowest-income households. Gentrifica-
tion also raised the incomes of black stayers with high school degrees, suggesting that gentrification may
spur better labor market outcomes for some existing households, reflecting a beneficial spillover from a
more affluent neighborhood environment.
Ellen and O’Regan (2011) find a similar “achievement” effect for stayer households in census tracts
experiencing strong gentrification. In addition, like McKinnish et al. (2010), they find that renter
households exiting census tracts with strong gentrification are similar to those exiting non-gentrifying

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tracts, with both exiters having incomes somewhat above those of original residents. Exiting owners in
gentrifying tracts, however, had notably lower incomes relative to original residents than did exiting
owners from non-gentrifying tracts. However, this pattern suggests that poorer owners were more inclined
to cash out capital gains from gentrification by moving, as seems natural. Overall, the up-to-date evidence
in these three studies mostly undercuts any concern that gentrification harms the poor.

References
Alonso W (1964) Location and land use. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Brueckner JK, Rosenthal SS (2009) Gentrification and neighborhood housing cycles: will America’s
future downtowns be rich? Rev Econ Stat 91:725–743
Brueckner JK, Thisse J-F, Zenou Y (1999) Why is central Paris rich and downtown Detroit poor? An
amenity-based theory. Eur Econ Rev 43:91–107
Ellen IG, O’Regan K (2011) How low income neighborhoods change: entry, exit, and enhancement. Reg
Sci Urban Econ 41:89–97
Kern CR (1981) Upper-income renaissance in the city: its sources and implications for the city’s future.
J Urban Econ 9:106–124
McKinnish T, Walsh R, White TK (2010) Who gentrifies low income neighborhoods? J Urban Econ
67:180–193
Mills ES (1967) An aggregative model of resource allocation in a metropolitan area. Am Econ Rev Pap
Proc 57:197–210
Muth RF (1969) Cities and housing. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Vigdor JL (2002) Does gentrification harm the poor? In: Gale WG, Pack JR (eds) Brookings-Wharton
papers on urban affairs. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, pp 133–173

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Refugee Roulette
Jaya Ramji-Nogalesa*, Philip G. Schragb and Andrew I. Schoenholtzb
a
Temple University Beasley School of Law, Philadelphia, PA, USA
b
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, USA

Synonyms
Disparities in asylum adjudication

Definition
The term “refugee roulette” refers to disparities in asylum adjudication, also known as refugee status
determination. Asylum adjudication is the process by which a host state decides whether or not to grant
lawful immigration status to individuals who seek protection from persecution or torture in their home
countries. The adjudicator is generally a government official tasked with interviewing the applicant or
hearing testimony, reviewing background facts relevant to their claim, and applying the relevant legal
standards. In the developed world, this process may have several levels, entitling asylum applicants to two
or more opportunities to have their claim heard and reviewed.

Overview
Recent research on asylum systems in the United States and Canada has found high levels of disparity in
rates of granting asylum across adjudicators at all levels of the asylum process (USGAO 2008;
Rehaag 2008; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009). Some scholars suggest that the outcome of asylum determi-
nations in the United States is like a game of “refugee roulette,” depending in large part on the identity of
the particular adjudicator to whom an application is randomly assigned, rather than on the merits of
the asylum claim, and that this is cause for concern (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009). Other commentators state
that a good deal of disparity is inevitable and that refugees and their advocates must “learn to live” with
“unequal justice” (Legomsky 2007). A different set of researchers reported that the amount of disparity
diminished after 2008 (TRAC 2009).
The study that coined the term “refugee roulette” presents an empirical analysis of decision-making at
all four levels of the asylum process in the United States, namely, the asylum office of the Department of
Homeland Security, the immigration courts of the Department of Justice, the Board of Immigration
Appeals, and the United States Courts of Appeals, between 2000 and 2004 (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007).
The authors argue that their findings reveal an unacceptable level of disparities in grant rates, noting that
the asylum adjudicators who were studied heard large numbers of cases from the same country in the same
location over the same period of time.
For example, in one regional asylum office, 60 % of the officers decided in favor of Chinese applicants
at rates that deviated by more than 50 % from that region’s mean grant rate for Chinese applicants,
with some officers granting asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted asylum in as
many as 68 % of their cases. Similarly, Colombian asylum applicants whose cases were adjudicated in
the federal immigration court in Miami had a 5 % chance of prevailing with one of that court’s judges

*Email: [email protected]

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and an 88 % chance of prevailing before another judge in the same building. Half of the Miami judges
deviated by more than 50 % from the court’s mean grant rate for Colombian cases.
Relying on public biographies, the study also explores correlations between sociological characteristics
of individual immigration judges and their grant rates. The regression analyses determine that the chance
of winning asylum was strongly affected not only by the random assignment of a case to a particular
immigration judge but also by the quality of an applicant’s legal representation, by the gender of the
immigration judge, and by the immigration judge’s work experience prior to appointment.
The study concludes with recommendations for reforming the immigration adjudication system,
including more comprehensive training, more effective and independent appellate review, mandated
representation for asylum seekers, and other reforms that would further professionalize the adjudication
system. A second book by the authors of Refugee Roulette explored in greater depth the disparities in
decision making by asylum offices of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Schoenholtz et. al
2014)
In a 2008 study of immigration court decision-making between 1994 and 2007, the United States
Government Accountability Office found that “the likelihood of being granted asylum varied consider-
ably across and within the [immigration courts studied]” (USGAO 2008).

Cross-References
▶ Asylum and Expert Evidence
▶ Asylum and Human Rights
▶ Asylum: Overview
▶ Gender and Asylum
▶ Medical and Psychological Evidence of Trauma in Asylum Cases
▶ On US Refugee Laws, particularly stressing the 1975 Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act and the
1980 Refugee Act
▶ Refugees Defined
▶ Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum

References
Legomsky S (2007) Learning to live with unequal justice: asylum and the limits to consistency. Stanford
Law Rev 60:413
Ramji-Nogales J, Schoenholtz A, Schrag P (2007) Refugee roulette: disparities in asylum adjudication.
Stanford Law Rev 60:295
Ramji-Nogales J, Schoenholtz A, Schrag P (2009) Refugee roulette: disparities in asylum adjudication
and proposals for reform. NYU Press, New York
Rehaag S (2008) Troubling patterns in Canadian refugee adjudication. Ottawa Law Rev 39:335
Schoenholtz A, Schrag P, Ramji-Nogales J (2014) Lives in the Balance: Asylum Adjudication by the
Department of Homeland Security. NYU Press, New York
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) (2009) Latest data from immigration courts show
decline in disparity. http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/209/. Accessed 25 Jan 2013

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United StatesGovernment Accountability Office (USGAO) (2008) U.S. asylum system: significant
variation existed in asylum outcomes across immigration courts and judges. http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08940.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2013

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A

Asylum and Human Rights allocating legal status to certain classes of

migrant. As such, they tend not to relate to the
Thomas Southerden direct intentions of the migrants themselves, but
Department of Law, University of Sussex, as post hoc concepts and processes States use to
Brighton, UK respond to the arrival of migrants in their
territories.
Despite being distinct in a number of ways,
Definition asylum and human rights, in this context, are
often perceived as being similarly related to the
The legal process of allocating entitlement to concept of international protection. At the base of
international protection for migrants. this notion is a legal expectation that a host state
will refrain from returning migrants to a situation of
persecution or serious harm in their home country.
Legal Processes, International This expectation, known as the principle of non-
Protection, and Immigration Control refoulement, is widely regarded as having achieved
the status of a universal norm within international
While asylum is by definition a migration-related law. However, as mentioned above, asylum and
concept, the notion of human rights is applicable human rights derive from differing international
to a variety of contexts. In relation to migrants treaties and have differing political histories and
and migration, human rights issues can be raised legal statuses.
both in connection to the physical and legal act of Asylum as a legal process is based on the 1951
migration and also to the conditions in which United Nations Convention on the Status of Ref-
migrants find themselves once having arrived in ugees (which was principally designed to deal
their host nation. In relation to this latter point, a with the ongoing problem of refugees in postwar
number of studies have shown that migrants find Europe) and its New York Protocol of 1967
themselves particularly vulnerable to human (which universalized the original Convention’s
rights infractions as a result of state policies and application by removing its temporal and geo-
their precarious position in host societies (see, graphical limits). Under the Convention and Pro-
e.g., Dembour and Kelly 2011; Benhabib 2005; tocol, an individual who believes they are at risk
Nash 2009). With regard to the former, the con- of persecution for a specified set of reasons
cepts of asylum and human rights can be consid- (political or religious opinion, race or nationality,
ered together as essentially legal frameworks or membership of a particular social group) and
followed by states for formally recognizing and who presents themselves to the authorities of a
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_33-4
2 Asylum and Human Rights

host state seeking their protection from such per- so the key issue is therefore where a reasonable
secution is regarded as an asylum seeker during balance can be found between the legitimate
the period when their claim for this protection is exercising of states’ authority to control immi-
being considered. If such a claim meets with gration and the individual claimant’s entitlement
success, they are then formally and legally rec- to exercise their rights in their adopted country.
ognized as a refugee and are entitled to the forms While such judgments frequently provoke con-
of support and assistance described in the later troversy, they have introduced a form of indepen-
sections of the Refugee Convention. dent assessment of the reasonableness of
In contrast, human rights concepts in migra- governmental efforts to manage migration. They
tion are far more diverse in their sources of both thus provide a powerful counterpoint to the
legal legitimacy and procedures. Human rights’ impacts of politicized immigration policy.
relationship to international protection begins Debate remains ongoing as to the relative
with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, superiority of asylum or human rights claims
in which Article 14 declares the right “to seek and from the perspective of the protection and suc-
enjoy asylum.” This formulation, however, was cessful integration of migrants (see, e.g., Chetail
expressly developed by the Declaration’s drafters 2012). Arguments in favor of the human rights
to avoid any duty being placed on States Parties model include its capacity to provide regulariza-
to actively grant such a status (Plender and Mole tion to migrants who would fail under the Refu-
1999, p. 81). In place of a single binding interna- gee Convention, for example, in cases where they
tional Convention relating to the issue, then, a are excluded from benefiting from the Conven-
myriad of international instruments (including tion as a result of serious nonpolitical criminality.
the United Nations Convention Against Torture, Conversely, defenders of the Convention identify
the International Covenant on Civil and Political as crucially important the duties it places on host
Rights, and the UN Convention on the Rights of states to provide “treatment as favorable as pos-
the Child) make up a general basis for entitle- sible and, in any event, not less favorable than
ments to international protection on human rights that accorded to aliens generally in the same
grounds, augmented by regional and national circumstances” across a range of social and eco-
rights charters that have a greater or lesser utility nomic issues related to integration.
for migrants’ rights claims (see, e.g., Plender and Whichever route is deemed most appropriate
Mole 1999). However, these instruments cover a to a given case, it should be understood that both
broader range of issues than the sole focus on the asylum and human rights as legal processes are
threat of persecution dealt with by the Refugee necessarily focused on the circumstances of indi-
Convention and have either served as comple- vidual claimants, including their motivations for
mentary to the role played by the Convention or migrating and their characteristics as migrants.
as entirely separate bases for legal migration. These processes are therefore highly personal-
Important in this regard is the capacity, espe- ized and, as a result, are ill-equipped to respond
cially in states party to the European Convention to the large-scale mass migrations following war
on Human Rights (ECHR), for migrants to apply and natural disasters that are often associated
for legal residence on grounds that are distinct with the humanitarian concept of “refugees.”
from issues related to international protection. These limitations have been demonstrated across
Article 8 of the ECHR, the right to respect for Western Europe during a period of unusually
private and family life, for example, has broad- high migrant intake over the last decade, where
ened dramatically the impact of human rights national immigration authorities have failed to
concepts on migration and has been applied to keep up with growing demand, resulting in sys-
such disparate issues as family reunion, student temic breakdowns and, in some cases, near aban-
migration, and regularization of long-term donment of formal legal processes altogether
undocumented migrants. In such cases, the issue (see, e.g. Vine 2012; MSS v Greece & Belgium
of non-refoulement does not normally arise, and 2011).
Asylum and Human Rights 3

A rigid adherence to the formalized legal cat- migrants in Europe and the United States. Routledge,
egories that asylum and human rights processes London
MSS v Greece & Belgium. Grand Chamber Judgement
are the results of can therefore provide extremely No. 30696/09. The European Court of Human Rights.
important tangible benefits to certain types of 21 Jan 2011
migrants but also risk excluding large numbers Nash K (2009) The cultural politics of human rights:
of others in broadly similar circumstances. comparing the US and UK. CUP, Cambridge
Plender R, Mole N (1999) Beyond the Geneva Conven-
tion: constructing a de facto right of asylum from
international human rights instruments. In:
References Nicholson F, Twomey P (eds) Refugee rights and
realities: evolving international concepts and regimes.
Benhabib S (2005) The rights of others: aliens, residents CUP, Cambridge
and citizens. CUP, Cambridge Vine J (2012) An inspection of the UK Border Agency’s
Chetail V (2012) Are refugee rights human rights?: an handling of legacy asylum and migration cases. Statu-
unorthodox questioning of the relations between refu- tory Inspection Report. Independent Chief Inspector of
gee law and human rights law. Social Science the UK Border Agency. Available at http://icinspector.
Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/UK-
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147763. Accessed 20 Dec Border-Agencys-handling-of-legacy-asylum-and-mig
2012 ration-cases-22.11.2012.pdf. Accessed 20 Dec 2012
Dembour M-B, Kelly T (2011) Are human rights for
migrants?: critical reflections on the status of irregular
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Medical and Psychological Evidence of Trauma in Asylum Cases

S. Megan Berthold*
University of Connecticut School of Social Work, West Hartford, CT, USA

Definition
Individuals who flee their homelands due to persecution often apply for asylum, seeking a safe haven in
exile. Asylum adjudicators are frequently faced with making difficult asylum determinations. Medical and
psychological evidence of the applicant’s trauma and its impact may be valuable in contributing to the
asylum officer’s or immigration judge’s decision related to the credibility of the applicant’s claim of
persecution.

Detailed Description
The process of applying for asylum is often complicated, lengthy, and adversarial. Typically the applicant
has the opportunity to provide evidence of their persecution. This evidence often includes documenting
psychological evidence of the trauma and, if present, medical evidence. Some asylum claims put forward
by applicants are fabricated or embellished. Asylum adjudicators are frequently faced with making
difficult asylum determinations. Forensic medical and/or psychological assessments of an asylum seeker
may provide valuable evidence of the persecution and its impact on the person’s psychological state and
functioning in asylum proceedings and contribute to the asylum officer’s or immigration judge’s decision
related to the credibility of the applicant’s claim (Einhorn and Berthold 2015; Herlihy and Turner 2007;
Keast 2005; Quiroga and Jaranson 2005).
Chronic pain is one of the more common physical consequences of torture and other forms of physical
persecution frequently documented by physicians (Quiroga and Jaranson 2005). Evidence of physical
abuse may be acute and/or temporary, observable upon medical examination soon after the trauma, such
as with certain lacerations, burns, bruises, hematomas, and fractures of teeth or bones (Quiroga and
Jaranson 2008). Quiroga and Jaranson (2008) indicate that more permanent lesions/scars have been
documented in 40–70 % of torture survivors. Common medical consequences found with particular types
of torture have been well documented. The use of a metallic or wooden baton to beat the soles of the
feet (known as Falanga) typically results in a burning sensation, chronic pain, and MRI evidence of
thickened plantar aponeurosis (Skylv 1995, as cited in Quiroga and Jaranson 2005). Skull fractures,
disrupted brain function, brain hemorrhage and edema, dementia, and seizure have been found in
survivors who have experienced severe traumatic brain injury, while those suspended by their arms
have developed peripheral neuropathies, and tight handcuffing has been found to be associated with
handcuff neuropathies (Moreno and Grodin 2002, as cited in Quiroga and Jaranson 2005).
Certainly there can be multiple possible causes of pain and other medical symptoms and conditions.
Often a physician may not be able to state with certainty that a given symptom or lesion is due to the
persecution but rather that it is consistent with the history of persecution that the individual reports and
that there is no evidence of alternative explanations (Physicians for Human Rights 2001).
Severe and persistent mental health consequences of torture and other traumatic persecution include,
most commonly, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression (often comorbid), other anxiety
disorders (generalized anxiety disorder or panic disorder), substance abuse, changes in worldview and
personality, and a host of other cognitive symptoms (impaired memory and concentration, disorientation/

*Email: [email protected]

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confusion), neurovegetative symptoms (insomnia, nightmares, lack of energy, sexual dysfunction), and
other psychological symptoms (withdrawal, irritability, emotional liability, dissociation) (Gerrity
et al. 2001; Quiroga and Jaranson 2005; Steel et al. 2009). A thorough mental health evaluation may
provide evidence associating the development or exacerbation of these symptoms/conditions with the
persecution.
The Istanbul Protocol is an official document of the United Nations (UN Resolution 55/89) and
provides international guidelines for legal, medical, and psychological professionals to investigate and
document the consequences of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment (experiences that qualify as persecution) (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
2001). The Istanbul Protocol recommends that an assessment cover, in part, a complete life history
(including history of torture, ill treatment, and other non-torture-related traumas), mental status exam,
medical and psychiatric history and current complaints, history of substance use/abuse, and an assessment
of psychosocial functioning over time.
A health and/or mental health professional’s assessment for malingering may provide information
relevant to the adjudicator’s determination regarding the applicant’s credibility. For both medical and
psychological reports, the inclusion of collateral information (if available), such as a medical report from
the time of the persecution, an independent report from others present at the incident of persecution,
and/or reports of family or friends noting changes in the person’s behavior or demeanor over time
associated with their history of persecution, may be valuable. Documenting the presence of notable and
visible scars not attributed to the persecution may lend strength to their claim.
In addition to providing evidence of the persecution itself, medical and psychological experts can help
the adjudicator understand that traumatized applicants might present with a variety of demeanors
consistent with their experience of persecution and mental state, including a blunt or flat affect, emotional
numbness, or a very emotional or labile affect. These demeanors are possible posttraumatic reactions and
also may be influenced by the impact of testifying in a stressful asylum proceeding. In the absence of
psychological explanation, an adjudicator may make an adverse credibility finding, erroneously conclud-
ing that the applicant was not sufficiently emotive or presented an overly emotional account based on their
own assumptions of how a person who is recounting traumatic experiences should present.
Culture and the impact of trauma can influence what is disclosed in an asylum application and/or
testimony. An applicant may not initially disclose their rape in their asylum application, for example, due
to the consequences and meaning of rape in their culture (e.g., being ostracized or disowned by family). If
the rape is revealed later in the asylum process, credibility concerns often arise. Reports or testimony from
a psychological expert may provide an explanation for this behavior (Einhorn and Berthold 2015).
Over time, the recollection of details tends to be compromised, even for nontraumatic events or in those
who have not experienced significant trauma. Medical and psychological experts may provide evidence
about the impact of head injury and other trauma on the applicant’s ability to provide a coherent,
consistent narrative of their experiences of persecution (Herlihy and Turner 2007; PHR 2001). Spatial
perception (Pynoos and Nader 1989), report of date and time sequence (Terr 1983), and ability to
concentrate may all be affected by trauma. As traumatic memories are usually triggered, the particular
trigger present during the trauma survivor’s asylum proceeding (including variations in how they are
asked about their experiences) may influence them to emphasize or recall different parts of their
experiences and lead to discrepancies in their testimony.
The strong desire to avoid revisiting their traumas and difficulty recalling aspects of one’s traumas (both
possible symptoms of PTSD) may further compromise a survivor’s testimony (Berthold and Gray 2011).
Trauma may be associated with memory blocks or dissociation in survivors such that their traumatic
experiences are not integrated effectively, with their memories stored as disconnected fragments, com-
prised of sensory perceptions and emotional states. If asked to testify in detail about their persecution,

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their account may appear incoherent, and they may not be able to recount aspects of their trauma that the
adjudicator believes is most salient to their case. Herlihy and Turner (2007) studied refugees with a history
of torture or other traumas and no reason to embellish or fabricate an account of trauma for secondary
gain. They found that inconsistencies in details of the traumas were common, particularly for those details
the survivor perceived as more peripheral to their experience, the longer the time between interviews, and
for those with PTSD. Inconsistencies are also more common when the individual is more anxious, under
great stress (such as during an asylum proceeding), and/or has experienced multiple traumas that share
some commonalities. Asylum adjudicators may perceive applicants who have experienced the most
severe trauma as the most incredible for the reasons discussed here.
Negative credibility determinations often result in an order of deportation for the asylum applicant.
Medical and psychological evidence can play an important role, where relevant, in providing alternative
explanations for the applicant’s demeanor, memory deficits, inconsistencies, and other aspects of their
functioning that may inform an asylum adjudicator’s determination of credibility.

References
Berthold SM, Gray G (2011) Post-traumatic stress reactions and secondary trauma effects at tribunals: the
ECCC example. In: Van Schaack B, Reicherter D, Chhang Y (eds) Cambodia’s hidden scars: trauma
psychology in the wake of the Khmer Rouge. Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh,
pp 92–120
Einhorn BJ, Berthold SM (2015) Reconstructing Babel: Bridging cultural dissonance between asylum
seekers and asylum adjudicators. In Lawrance BN, Ruffer G (eds) Adjudicating Refugee and Asylum
Status: The Role of Witness, Expertise, and Testimony (pp. 27–53). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press
Gerrity E, Keane TM, Tuma F (eds) (2001) The mental health consequences of torture. Kluwer/Plenum
Publishers, New York
Herlihy J, Turner S (2007) Asylum claims and memory of trauma: sharing our knowledge. Br J Psychiatry
191:3–4
Keast R (2005) Using experts for asylum cases in immigration court. Interpret Releases Rep Anal Immigr
Natl Law 82(30):1237–1243
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2001) Istanbul protocol: manual on the
effective investigation and documentation of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment. Professional training series, no. 8. United Nations, Geneva (HR/P/PT/8, ISBN 92-1-
154136-0, ISSN 1020–1688). www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training8Rev1en.pdf.
Accessed 1 Jan 2013
Physicians for Human Rights (2001) Examining asylum seekers: a health professional’s guide to medical
and psychological evaluations of torture. Physicians for Human Rights, NYC/Boston/Washington, DC
Pynoos RS, Nader K (1989) Children’s memory and proximity to violence. J Am Acad Child Adolesc
Psychiatry 28(2):236–241
Quiroga J, Jaranson JM (2005) Politically-motivated torture and its survivors. A desk study review of the
literature. Torture 13(2–3):1–111
Quiroga J, Jaranson J (2008) Torture. In: Reyes G, Elhai JD, Ford JD (eds) The encyclopedia of
psychological trauma. Wiley, New York, pp 654–657
Steel Z, Chey T, Silove D, Marnane C, Bryant RA, van Ommeren M (2009) Association of torture and
other potentially traumatic events with mental health outcomes among populations exposed to mass
conflict and displacement: a systematic review and meta-analysis. JAMA 302(5):537–549

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Terr L (1983) Time sense following psychic trauma: a clinical study of ten adults and twenty children. Am
J Orthopsychiatry 54:244–262

Further Reading
Bohmer C, Shuman A (2008) Rejecting refugees: political asylum in the 21st century. Routledge,
London/New York
Bremner JD, Marmar CR (eds) (2002) Trauma, memory and dissociation. American Psychiatric Press,
Washington, DC
Gangsei D, Deutsch AC (2007) Psychological evaluation of asylum seekers as a therapeutic process.
Torture 17(2):79–87
International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (2009) Psychological evaluation of torture
allegations: a practical guide to the Istanbul Protocol – for psychologists, 2nd edn. Copenhagen,
Denmark
Jacobs U (2000) Psycho-political challenges in the forensic documentation of torture: the role of
psychological evidence. Torture 10(3):68–71
Jacobs U, Lustig SL (2010) Psychological and psychiatric opinions in asylum applications: ten frequently
asked questions by fact finders. Bender’s Immigr Bull 15:1066–1069
Jacobs U, Evans FB, Patsalides B (2001a) Principles of documenting psychological evidence of
torture – part I. Torture 11(3):85–89
Jacobs U, Evans FB, Patsalides B (2001b) Principles of documenting psychological evidence of
torture – part II. Torture 11(4):100–102
Moreno A, Grodin MA (2002) Torture and its neurological sequelae. Spinal Cord 40:213–223

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Relationship Between Asylum and Trafficking

Jean-Pierre Gauci*
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, The People for Change Foundation, Naxxar, Malta

Synonyms
Asylum – trafficking nexus; Human trafficking; Long-term protection for trafficked persons; Refugee law
and trafficking; Trafficking in persons

Human trafficking refers to the coerced or deceitful recruitment and/or holding of persons for the
purpose of exploitation. The crime of trafficking is composed of three related elements, each of which
must be fulfilled for the crime to subsist. These are the act (recruitment, transportation transfer, harboring,
receipt of persons), the means (deceit, coercion, abuse of a position of power or vulnerability), and the
exploitative purpose (UN General Assembly 2000a). Actual exploitation is not technically a requirement
and it is sufficient that there was an intention to exploit (UN 2000). Three broad types of exploitation are
usually identified: sexual exploitation, labor exploitation, and the removal of organs (this should be
distinguished from organ trafficking).
Trafficking is often described as modern-day slavery and entails a variety of human rights violations.
In particular circumstances, it may be a crime against humanity or a war crime (UN General Assembly
2000b). Trafficking must be distinguished from smuggling, another crime which involves the facilitation
of irregular movement across borders. Smuggling is often the only option available to asylum seekers in
their efforts to reach a safe country. In some circumstances, smuggling situations develop into exploitative
situations amounting to trafficking and as such the distinction between the two crimes is often difficult to
maintain.
An increasing number of trafficked persons have been turning to refugee law in search of protection.
This is partly because existing counter-trafficking law and policy does not prioritize the protection
of trafficked persons but instead is concerned primarily with the law enforcement dimension of the
crime (Gauci 2015). The international rules set out discretionary provisions on protection, and in some
cases one will only get support and protection if he/she is able and willing to help the law enforcement
agencies prosecute the traffickers.
International protection (asylum) offers a number of advantages over the protection provided by anti-
trafficking laws. It broadens the scope of protection. It protects not only individuals who have been
trafficked but may also, at least in theory, be used to protect persons facing real prospects of future
trafficking. It can also be used to protect family members and other known associates facing risks as a
result of their link to the trafficked person and individuals who are targeted due to their actions to combat
the crime. Moreover, it broadens the scope of where such protection may be sought to cover countries that
were not part of the trafficking route and experience. Another advantage is that protection is not made
dependent on helping law enforcement but only the needs of and risks faced by the individual applicant.
Moreover, asylum offers better protection in terms of the content and duration of the protection granted.
It is critical to note however that the recognition of trafficked persons as refugees is neither straight-
forward nor an easy process. Asylum processes have increasingly become skeptical of asylum seekers
meaning that recognition as a refugee is an increasingly complex and difficult endeavor. A culture of
disbelief is often quoted as underpinning many asylum decisions at least at the initial decision stages.

*Email: [email protected]

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UNHCR notes that not all trafficked persons or potential trafficked persons are refugees within the
meaning of the Convention definition. Courts have often found it difficult to determine that trafficked
persons form a particular social group.
A trafficked person must fulfill all of the refugee definition criteria in order to be recognized as a refugee
or a person who is otherwise in need of international protection. In 2006 the UNHCR issued guidelines
regarding the application of the refugee definition to trafficked persons and persons at risk of being
trafficked.
Some of the subjective factors that impact the well-founded fear of persecution in the context of
trafficking include the individual’s gender, age and past experiences, family background, as well as his/her
own state of mind. Persecution in trafficking-based asylum claims can include: re-trafficking, retribution
by traffickers, and ostracization by the family and/or the community. The agents of persecution in this
context are usually non-state actors including past traffickers and their associates, other traffickers, family
members, as well as society more broadly. This means that an asylum applicant must prove not only
persecution but that the State in his/her country of origin is unable or unwilling to protect him/her. Past
experiences of trafficking create a rebuttable presumption that such persecutory behavior will repeat itself
and is therefore relevant to the examination of a trafficking-based asylum claims. As highlighted above
the exploitation might have happened in the country of origin, in the country where asylum is being
sought, or in a third country. However the risk of persecution must be established with regard to the
country of origin. Many trafficking-based asylum claims have been filed under the Convention ground of
membership of a particular social group, and different jurisdictions have found it difficult to accept this.
Other grounds might also be relevant most notably race and religion. In Norway the Immigration Act
explicitly states that victims of human trafficking are members of a particular social group.

Cross-References
▶ Gender and Asylum
▶ Human Trafficking
▶ Human Trafficking Policy Responses
▶ Labor Trafficking
▶ Protection of Victims of Trafficking
▶ Refugee
▶ Sexual Offences
▶ Transnational Crime
▶ Victim Protection

References
Alfirev C, Bhabha J (2009) The identification and referral of trafficked persons to procedures for
determining international protection needs. In: Division of International Protection Services
(ed) Legal and protection policy research series. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Geneva
Bhabha J (2002) Internationalist gatekeepers: the tension between asylum advocacy and human rights.
Harv Hum Rights J 15:155
Gallagher AT (2009) Human rights and human trafficking: quagmire or firm ground? A response to James
Hathaway. Va J Int Law 49(4):789–848

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Gauci JP (2015) Why trafficked perosns need asylum. In: Gauci JP, Guiffre M, Tsourdi E (eds) Forced
migration(s). Current Challenges in Refugee Law, Brill
Hathaway JC (2008) The human rights quagmire of human trafficking. Va J Int Law 49:1
Juss S (2012) Human trafficking, asylum and the problem of protection, Chapter 13. In: Juss S (ed) The
Ashgate research companion to migration law, theory and policy. Ashgate, London, pp 281–319
Kneebone S (2010) The refugee–trafficking nexus: making good (the) connections. Refug Surv
Q 29(1):137–160
Piotrowicz R (2005) Victims of people trafficking and entitlement to international protection. Aust Year
B Int Law 24:159
UN General Assembly (2000a) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially
women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against transnational organized
crime, 15 Nov 2000
UN General Assembly (2000b) Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air,
supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime, 15 Nov 2000
UNHCR (2006) The application of Article 1a(2) of the 1951 convention and/or the 1967 protocol relating
to the status of refugees to victims of trafficking and persons at risk of being trafficked. In: United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ed) Guidelines on international protection. United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva

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Asylum and Language Analysis

Peter L. Patrick*
Department of Language and Linguistics, University of Essex, Colchester, UK

Definition
Language Analysis for Determination of Origin (LADO) is a new branch of applied linguistics, used by
governments in processing asylum seekers who are applying for refugee status.

Overview
Undocumented asylum seekers present two types of evidence to refugee status determination (RSD)
processes:

• Their body, i.e., medical evidence relating to age, torture, injury, etc.
• Their speech, including both what they say about the reasons for their flight (the narrative content) and
the way in which they say it (the linguistic evidence)

Since the 1990s, when language expertise in Scandinavian government bureaux first became
outsourced to private language firms, governments have appealed to linguistic evidence as one means
of verifying asylum seekers’ claims of identity, ethnicity, origin or nationality, in the context of increasing
reliance on scientific evidence (e.g., fingerprints, DNA, x-rays) from expert fields to assist in RSD.
Academic and forensic linguists refer to this as Linguistic Analysis for Determination of Origin (Eades
2009; Patrick 2012). Governments commissioning LADO – from language firms, individual experts, or
internal bureaux – include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland,
Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.
LADO practitioners before about 2002 were not scientifically trained academic linguists but had other
language qualifications (interpreting, translating) or were simply native speakers of the languages in
question, or related languages, without any formal linguistic training (Baltisberger and Hubbuch 2010).
Such persons, termed nonexpert native speakers (given their lack of credentials for the task of scientific
linguistic analysis that lies at the core of LADO and their consequent inability to qualify as linguistic
experts according to the legal requirements for forensic experts in many courts), still play a controversial
and central role in the practices of commercial and government LADO agencies today. Most agencies
have since raised their technical standards and hired linguists with varying levels of professional
qualifications, partly in response to pressures of competition, litigation, and the 2004 Guidelines
(see below).
LADO is a new and controversial application of linguistics, related to well-established areas such as
sociolinguistics, language assessment, speaker profiling and identification, first- and second-language
acquisition, language contact, and linguistic variation and change. Extensive academic research under-
lines linguistic findings crucial to the application of LADO:

1. “National origin, nationality and citizenship are all political or bureaucratic characteristics, which have
no necessary connection to language” (Language and National Origin Group 2004).

*Email: [email protected]

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2. Linguistic science can sometimes correlate an individual’s way of speaking with language socialization
into a particular speech community – a primary influence on native language acquisition – which may
help identify their country of origin; however, there are many circumstances where this cannot be done
with any certainty.
3. “Features of speech may vary in complex ways according to many. . . social and stylistic factors”
(Foulkes and French 2012). Variation occurs in the speech of individuals, often explicable by the
context in which they are speaking, while even greater cross-speaker variation is normal in stable, well-
studied speech communities, where it may be correlated with factors such as social class, age, gender,
ethnicity, etc.

LADO seeks to analyze a brief speech sample, specially collected in a formal, bureaucratic
setting – generally an interview of an asylum seeker concerning whose origins doubt has arisen – to
determine whether the person’s native language is as claimed. In forensic speaker comparison, typically
performed for criminal cases by phoneticians with expert credentials, such a sample is compared
explicitly, perhaps with statistical testing, to a dataset drawn from an adequately delimited reference
population (Foulkes and French 2012). In LADO, however, comparisons are often based only on an
analyst’s intuitions and beliefs as to what his native language (or some other language he knows) is
typically like, with little documentation, on the basis of few features implicitly analyzed, and conclusions
are expressed with great certainty (Patrick 2010).
Linguistic research has documented typical speech patterns (e.g., pronunciation or accent, grammar
including syntax and morphology, vocabulary, characteristic speech genres and discourse types, etc.) for
many languages and explored interspeaker variation in many speech communities. However, little research
specifically on LADO has been performed or published to date (fewer than 100 works). Relevant languages
for LADO are often under- or undocumented, while their home communities may be inaccessible to
research for the very reasons that produce refugees (civil unrest, armed conflict) and subject to dramatic
change over recent generations (e.g., age/sex imbalances due to flight and conflict, exodus to refugee
camps, change or interruption of education, abandonment of traditional ways of life and speaking).
In addition, language choice and contact between languages and dialects are the norm in much of the
world and may be extensive under normal circumstances for the communities in question, leading to
complexities in the notion of “native language” – complexities often underappreciated by governments who
commission and interpret LADO tests, as well as agencies who perform them and courts which review RSD
cases. Such intricacies may increase exponentially for individual refugees whose family life is interrupted,
who are raised or live for long in refugee camps, or whose flight carries them across regional, ethnic, or
national boundaries for periods of years, such that the notion of typical native language habits may become
wholly inapplicable (Blommaert 2009). For these reasons, most linguists familiar with LADO accept that its
application should be approached with considerable caution, and that the ability of linguistics to give
definitive answers to questions of origin and identity in the asylum context should not be overestimated.
Some common and important reasons for caution are spelled out in the “Guidelines for the Use of
Language Analysis in Relation to Questions of National Origin in Refugee Cases” (Language and
National Origin Group 2004; available via UNHCR’s RefWorld, www.essex.ac.uk/larg/resources/guide
lines.aspx). This document, intended to assist governments in assessing the validity of LADO, was
coauthored by 19 academic and forensic linguists in six countries and has been endorsed by a dozen
national and international linguistic organizations with membership numbering tens of thousands. Its
recommendations, largely uncontroversial among academic linguists, concern the complexity of language
use and the nature of linguistic expertise.
The 2004 Guidelines are routinely cited in asylum appeals in European countries. Their program for
improving the standard practice of LADO has been cited and responded to by various organizations,

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including De Taalstudio, Sprakab, and Verified language firms; the Swiss, Canadian, Norwegian, and
Dutch government bureaux; UNHCR; and many NGOs and legal organizations. Since 2010, a second
phase has been undertaken by the Language and Asylum Research Group (LARG), coordinated at the
University of Essex by the author and Dr. Diana Eades of the University of New England, Australia, with a
mission to stimulate research, contribute to the further development of guidelines, and promote best
practice for practitioners working in the field of LADO (www.essex.ac.uk/larg/).
An alternative resolution to the 2004 Guidelines, addressing the issue of the role of native-speaking
analysts vis-à-vis qualified linguists in the LADO process, was passed in 2009 by the International
Association for Forensic Phonetics and Acoustics (IAFPA) and is cited by a number of agencies whose
practices resemble those recognized by the resolution (www.iafpa.net/langidres.htm).
Since academic linguists became aware of LADO in the early 2000s, monitoring and engagement with
government and commercial practices and legal cases has regularly featured in conferences, expert
meetings, and networks involving sociolinguists and applied and forensic linguists, alongside people
from many areas touching asylum and RSD: lawyers, doctors, immigration judges, policymakers,
members of government immigration and asylum bureaux, police officers, human rights practitioners,
forensic scientists, and academics from such fields as anthropology, genetics, interpreting, and
psychoanalysis.
Such efforts serve to introduce the complexity of language to actors in the RSD process and to engage
language experts and practitioners with a high-stakes application of their fields of knowledge. They may
ultimately function to minimize the misuse of language expertise in RSD, raise the standards at which it is
applied, or eliminate the practice of LADO entirely.

References
Baltisberger E, Hubbuch P (2010) LADO with specialized linguists: the development of Lingua’s
working method. In: Zwaan K, Muysken P, Verrips M (eds) Language and Origin. The role of language
in European asylum procedures: a linguistic and legal survey. Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen,
pp 9–19
Blommaert J (2009) Language, asylum, and the national order. Curr Anthropol 50(4):415–441
Eades D (2009) Testing the claims of asylum seekers: the role of language analysis. Lang Assess
Q 6:30–40
Foulkes P, French P (2012) Forensic speaker comparison: a linguistic-acoustic perspective. In: Tiersma P,
Solan L (eds) The Oxford handbook of language and the law. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp 557–572
Language and National Origin Group (2004) Guidelines for the use of language analysis in relation to
questions of national origin in refugee cases. In: Eades D, Arends J (eds) Language analysis and
determination of nationality. Thematic issue of “Int J Speech Lang Law Forensic Linguist”
11(2):261–226
Patrick PL (2010) Language variation and LADO (language analysis for determination of origin). In:
Zwaan K, Muysken P, Verrips M (eds) Language and origin. The role of language in European asylum
procedures: a linguistic and legal survey. Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, pp 73–87
Patrick PL (2012) Language analysis for determination of origin: objective evidence for refugee status
determination. In: Tiersma P, Solan L (eds) The Oxford handbook of language and the law. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, pp 533–546

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Local Mobility
William A. V. Clark*
Department of Geography, University of California, California Center for Population Research, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Synonyms
Household moves; Residential mobility; Short-distance migration

Definition
Local mobility, or residential mobility, describes changes of residence that do not change the networks of
local interaction, including links to schools, health care, friends, and usually the place of work. Most local
moves occur within the same labor and housing markets and even in large metropolitan areas do not break
up the fabric of daily activities.

Overview
Most changes of residence involve very short-distance moves. In the last decade about 8.4 % of all moves
in the United States were within the same county, that is, basically within the same housing and labor
market. The proportion of changes of residence has been declining over the last three decades and is now
much lower than it was during the period of population expansion after World War II (see Fig. 1).
Traditionally, local mobility in Europe and Japan has been at lower rates than in the United States (Long
1992). Recent studies of OECD countries have documented their lower rates in general, but at the same
time New Zealand and Australia have some of the highest mobility rates worldwide (Caldera-Sanchez and
Andrews 2011).

Correlates of Mobility
Both short-distance and long-distance moves are usually linked to age as an explanatory variable for
household relocation, but in fact age is simply a proxy for the events that occur more frequently at younger
ages. The desire for, and move to, ownership also occurs at younger ages though affordability has become
an issue, especially in expensive housing markets, and often delays the transition to ownership. The move
to ownership itself is linked to socioeconomic status and the ability to purchase more space and higher-
status housing with increasing income. Overall, the likelihood of changing residence declines with age
and is lower overall for owners than for renters.

The Life Course and Residential Change

Overall residential mobility is the process by which households match their housing needs to the houses
available to them and is central to understanding how the housing market operates. As households change
their space needs with changes in the life course, they make decisions about what housing to choose and
where to move within the city. The choices are a function of their needs, external events, and the housing
stock available to them.

*Email: [email protected]

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Fig. 1 Sources: Percent of US population who change residence. US Census Bureau Current Population Survey (March
estimates) and Frey (2009) Brookings Institute

Early research on residential change by Rossi (1955) established how changes in residence were related
to the changing needs for housing space as families were established and grew with the addition of
children. That work was extended by Quigley and Weinberg (1977), who provided a theoretical expla-
nation for how residential change was linked to a disequilibrium between the space a family needed in
contrast with the space they were currently consuming. In response to this disequilibrium the household
engaged in a process of search and relocation (Brown and Moore 1970).
Recent research has elaborated the way in which housing demand affects choices to include specific
links to changes in the evolution of the life course. The concept of the life course recognizes that
movement from one residence to another is embedded in a sequence of events which occur with relative
regularity as individuals marry, have children, and experience interruptions to their life such as divorce
and widowhood. This approach to the way in which residential change occurs emphasizes the link
between specific events and the need to change locations (Mulder 1993; Clark and Dieleman 1996).

Mobility Across Neighborhoods

Because most moves involve short-distance relocations there is considerable interest in the link between
residential change and neighborhood choice. When the household makes a choice of an apartment or a
single-family home they are also making a choice of a particular location within the city. That neighbor-
hood choice brings with it a whole range of social and economic connections, including links to schools
and urban services more generally. Neighborhood choice also involves selections which express prefer-
ences for particular combinations of other neighbors, choices which often reflect ethnic and socioeco-
nomic preferences. These choices in turn lead to much of the residential patterning that we observed in
modern metropolitan areas (Clark and Morrison 2012). Studies of relocation behavior out of poorer
neighborhoods have shown that minority households have greater difficulty in leaving such neighbor-
hoods (South et al. 2005).

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Models of Mobility
Economists and demographers have suggested a number of ways of analyzing the probability of moving
and have used a series of logit and discrete choice models to provide an explanation for both the decision
to move and the choice of a house during the relocation process (Lee and Waddell 2010; Clark and
Dieleman 1996). Because residential change often involves moving from renting to owning there is a
substantial literature which links residential change and home ownership and how residential change is
linked to the housing market more generally (Smith et al. 2012).

Cross-Reference
▶ Family Migration
▶ Housing Change
▶ Life Course

References
Brown LA, Moore EG (1970) The intra-urban migration process: a perspective. Geogr Ann B 52:1–13
Caldera-Sanchez A, Andrews D (2011) Residential mobility and public policy in OECD countries. OECD
J Econ Stud 2011(1):185–206
Clark WAV, Dieleman F (1996) Households and housing: choice and outcomes in the housing market.
Rutgers, State University, Center for Urban Policy Research, New Brunswick
Clark WAV, Morrison P (2012) Socio- spatial mobility and residential sorting: evidene from a large scale
survey. Urban Stud 49:3253–3270
Frey W (2009) The Great American Migration Slowdown. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
Lee BH, Waddell P (2010) Residential mobility and location choice: a nested logit model with sampling of
alternatives. Transportation 37:587–601
Long L (1992) Changing residence: comparative perspectives on its relationship to age, sex and marital
status. Population Studies 46:141–158
Mulder CH (1993) Migration dynamics a life course approach. Thesis Publishers- PDOD Publications,
Amsterdam
Quigley J, Weinberg D (1977) Intra-urban residential mobility: a review and synthesis. Int Reg Sci Rev
2:41–66
Rossi PH (1955) Why families move: a study in the social psychology of urban residential mobility. Free
Press, Glencoe
Smith S, Elsinga M, Eng O, O’Mahony L, Wachter S (2012) International encyclopedia of housing and
home, vol 7. Elsevier, Amsterdam
South SJ, Crowder K, Chavez E (2005) Exiting and entering high-poverty neighborhoods: Latinos,
Blacks and Anglos compared. Soc Forces 84(2):873–900

Further Reading
Clapham D, Clark WAV, Gibb K (2012) The sage handbook of housing. Sage, London
Flatau P, James I, Watson R, Wood G, Hendershot PH (2007) Leaving the parental home in Australia over
the generations: evidence from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
survey. J Popul Res 24:51–71

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Intrametropolitan Population Distribution

Lincoln Quillian*
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

Definition
Intrametropolitan population distribution refers to the distribution of population within one or more
metropolitan areas. A metropolitan area is a city and its surrounding suburbs. Scholarly attention on
intrametropolitan population distribution has examined overall population distribution but has more often
focused on the relative distributions of population subgroups. Important subtopics of intrametropolitan
population distribution are studies of segregation between race, ethnic, and socioeconomic status groups.
Migration is a key mechanism of change of the intrametropolitan population distribution.

General Description
In general, intrametropolitan population densities decline with distance from the city center, with the
lowest densities at the metropolitan fringe. Population densities and the gradient of density with distance
have declined over the twentieth century. Improvement in transportation, in particular the spread of the
automobile, has been the key cause of declining densities, although increasing size of dwellings and
smaller household sizes have also played an important role. The growth of lower-density areas around
cities is explored in the literature on suburbanization and “urban sprawl” (Jackson 1985).
A basic fact of intrametropolitan population distribution is that persons with like social characteristics
tend to live near each other. Or as the early urban sociologist Robert Park put it, social distances tend to be
reflected in spatial distances.
Park’s dictum has been most thoroughly explored in studies of segregation. There is a large literature on
the measurement of segregation (James and Taeuber 1985), but the most-used measures of segregation
reflect the extent to which two or more population groups are unevenly distributed across neighborhoods
(or another spatial unit). Complete evenness implies that the same percentage of population of the groups
over which the measure is calculated live in each neighborhood, while complete unevenness implies that
there is no overlap between the neighborhoods lived in by different groups.
Segregation is most often applied to race and ethnicity (“segregation” without further qualifiers almost
inevitably refers to racial or ethnic segregation), but a literature exists on segregation on the basis of
income and socioeconomic status, and less commonly segregation measures are applied to other charac-
teristics. One reason for the emphasis on racial and ethnic segregation is that in American cities
segregation on the basis of race and ethnicity is higher than segregation measured on the basis of
socioeconomic status or other social characteristics (White 1987).
Segregation on the basis of race and ethnicity in American cities remains high. In the average
U.S. metropolitan area in 2010, 57 % of blacks or whites would need to move to other neighborhoods
to achieve an even spatial distribution between groups. Black segregation is consistently highest of major
race/ethnic groups but is gradually declining. By contrast, about 48 % of Hispanics and 41 % of Asians
would need to move to achieve an even distribution with whites in 2010; Hispanic and Asian segregation
has stayed at about the same level since 1970 (Logan and Stults 2011).

*Email: [email protected]

Page 1 of 3
Encyclopedia of Migration
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_41-1
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Segregation on the basis of income in American cities has increased since 1970, with most of the
increase occurring from 1980 to 1990 and 2000 to 2010. Both poor and affluent households have become
more segregated from other households, although the most affluent households are consistently more
segregated from other households than poor households. These trends are partly accounted for by
increasing household income inequality (Reardon and Bischoff 2011).
A distinct literature on intrametropolitan population distribution examines the spatial geography of
population and land use. An early model of this sort is the concentric zone model of Burgess, which
described land use and populations as distributed across concentric circles around the central business
district. In Burgess’ model the affluence of residents increased with distance from the center. The sectoral
model of Hoyt, in contrast, described land use and population characteristics as segmented into distinct
sectors radiating from the central business district. Hoyt suggested the sectoral pattern resulted from land
use around transport corridors like rails and roads (Barry and Kasarda 1977).
Another research tradition in this area, factorial ecology, sought to define major dimensions of
population that differentiate urban neighborhoods. Factorial ecologists took demographic measures of
neighborhoods (like percentage in race/ethnic groups, percentage 25–35, etc.) and subjected them to
factor analyses. Using this method Shevky and Bell identified three major bases of neighborhood
population differentiation: socioeconomic status (income and education), life-cycle stage (age and
household type), and race/ethnicity. Subsequent studies support these as major dimensions of urban
spatial differentiation in many but not all metropolitan areas.
Changes in the intrametropolitan population distribution are the product of several population pro-
cesses, including births, deaths, household changes, changes in the housing stock, and migration. With
about 15 % of households migrating each year, migration is the most important of these.
Intrametropolitan population distribution has been studied in most detail in U.S. cities since 1940,
making possible a detailed history. From the 1940s to the 1960s, rapid expansion of manufacturing
employment in urban areas and the mechanization of Southern agriculture produced massive migration of
blacks from Southern rural areas into cities. This migration in the context of housing discrimination
outside of black neighborhoods produced highly segregated and dense black residential areas in Northern
cities. Black-white residential segregation peaked in 1970, when 79 % of black or white households
would need to relocate to achieve an even distribution over neighborhoods in the average metropolitan
area. These decades also saw increasing suburbanization and “white flight” by which white households in
racially transitioning neighborhoods moved to white middle-class or upper-class suburbs.
Increasing deindustrialization and worsened economic conditions of cities in the 1970s resulted in a
near halt to black migration into cities. Unemployment increased sharply, resulting in substantail increase
in the number of high-poverty urban neighborhoods from 1970 to 1990. While most agreed the decline of
urban manufacturing jobs was the most important factor contributing to growing high-poverty neighbor-
hoods, there was debate about other potential causes. W.J. Wilson (1987) proposed that many middle-
class blacks migrated from black to white neighborhoods with declines in the most overt forms of housing
discrimination. In Wilson’s account, this migration stripped black neighborhoods of their middle-class
residents and contributed to the formation of high-poverty black neighborhoods. Massey and colleagues
argued, by contrast, that middle-class blacks did not move to white neighborhoods in significant numbers
(see Massey and Denton 1993). Quillian (1999) found evidence that there was black migration to white
neighborhoods, but it was often a part of racial turnover in neighborhoods, and thus the share of middle-
class blacks in white neighborhoods did not significantly increase.
The populations of many central cities saw resurgence in the 1990s and (to a lesser extent) the 2000s,
with urban information and service economies prospering and more affluent households increasingly
choosing to live in central cities. Urban population growth also reflected increased international

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# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

immigration into cities, resulting in growing Latino and Asian populations. These decades also saw
increasing racial diversity in suburbs and concentrations of poverty in some inner-ring suburbs.
Finally, intrametropolitan population distribution influences the character of urban and neighborhood
life and the quality of life, health, and life chances of residents. Living in close proximity to wealthier
persons is associated with better access to jobs, lower crime, better local schools, lower pollution, and
better access to urban amenities; close proximity to impoverished persons tends to be associated with the
opposite of these conditions. A major reason for concern with race/ethnic segregation is that it contributes
importantly to income segregation and increases the contact of blacks and Latinos with economically
disadvantaged contexts. These topics are the subject of the literatures on neighborhood effects, spatial
mismatch, and school effects (Sampson et al. 2002).

References
Barry BJ, Kasarda JD (1977) Contemporary urban ecology. Macmillan, New York
Jackson K (1985) The crabgrass frontier: the suburbanization of the United States. Oxford, New York
James DR, Taeuber K (1985) Measures of segregation. Sociol Methodol 14:1–32
Logan JR, Stults B (2011) The persistence of segregation in the metropolis: new findings from the 2010
Census. Census brief prepared for project US2010. http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010
Massey DS, Denton NA (1993) American apartheid: segregation and the making of the underclass.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Quillian L (1999) Migration patterns and the growth of high-poverty neighborhoods 1970–1990. Am
J Sociol 105:1–37
Reardon SF, Bischoff K (2011) Growth in the residential segregation of families by income, 1970–2009.
Census brief prepared for project US2010. http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010
Sampson RJ, Morenoff JD, Gannon-Rowley T (2002) Assessing “neighborhood effects”: social processes
and new directions in research. Annu Rev Sociol 28:443–478
White MJ (1987) American neighborhoods and residential differentiation. Russell Sage, New York
Wilson WJ (1987) The truly disadvantaged: the inner city, the underclass, and public policy Chicago.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Page 3 of 3
P

Place Utility Place Utility Through Time

David López-Carr and Daniel Phillips Wolpert (1966) advanced this theory in propos-
Department of Geography, University of ing an ecological model based on his concept of
California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, place utility. He theorized that people are
CA, USA exposed to some amount of stress in a given
place throughout their lifespan, and their reac-
tions to stress (which he called “strains”) differ
Definition depending on their stage of life. Certain “nox-
ious” elements such as traffic, pollution, noise,
The concept of place utility was introduced in a and crowding produce stress that detracts from
pair of articles published in the mid-1960s by the utility of the current place of residence, and
Princeton geographer Julian Wolpert. In the first people are more vulnerable to these stressful ele-
(1965), he coined the term “place utility” to ments during certain life cycle periods, particu-
describe “the net composite of utilities which larly infancy and old age. During such life
are derived from the individual’s integration at periods, the utility of the current place diminishes
some position in space.” Based on past experi- and the relative attractiveness of another place
ences, both positive and negative, the individual increases; people at these stages will be more
measures the utility of the place in which he/she prone to migrate to that appealing place. Life
presently resides. According to Wolpert, place stage, therefore, exerts considerable influence
utility is operationalized by migrants or potential on the utility that people assign to places, and
migrants who assess the outstanding attributes of thus on who migrates, where they migrate, and
their current place of residence relative to those when they migrate.
same aggregate characteristics of a potential Since economic factors are typically more
place of migration destination. Traditionally, substantial and thus more motivating than non-
most migrants have little or no personal experi- economic ones, some writers have viewed place
ence in the potential destination. They make a utility in the lens of economic utility, meaning
judgment based on information they hear or those places with the most economic advantages
read about, rather than from personal experience. will have the most utility and attract the most
In sum, Wolpert theorized that people will base migrants, regardless of other factors. Economic
their migration decisions on the varying values of factors that often earn mention include availabil-
utility they associate with potential destinations ity of employment, prospects for high income and
vis-à-vis their current place of residence. remittances, and the general standard of living in
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_42-1
2 Place Utility

the destination place (Kok 2006). According to environmental factors are increasingly examined
Datta (2003), people will migrate only if they in the context of migration pushes and pulls and
believe that the destination will offer more live- many of these are directly related to shaping
lihood opportunities than the present place of perceived place utility. For example, Adams and
residence. Adger (2013) found that a pleasant climate, sim-
Macrolevel political-economic factors frame ple lifestyle, lack of pollution, and the aesthetics
migrant structural push and pull pressures, but of the landscape contribute greatly to a place’s
microlevel processes determine who migrates, attractiveness. Similarly, in his Guatemalan
with the ultimate decision usually made at the research, Carr (2008) observed that incentives
household level (De Jong and Gardner 1981). for out-migration varied depending on place of
The importance of the household scale is origin. In addition to local sociocultural and
highlighted by the fact that most people choose demographic factors, he found that environmen-
to not migrate despite sometimes gaping spatial tal change, in the form of increasing or decreasing
income disparities (Goldscheider 1971). frequency, timing, and magnitude of precipita-
Bilsborow and colleagues (1984), among several tion events, ultimately changes perception of
others, have framed migration decisions within place characteristics that relate to migration deci-
perceptions of “place utility” given structural sions. Place-related characteristics arguably
inequalities (Wolpert 1965, 1966). Together, remain the most important considerations in
these observations suggest that the way in which migration decisions. Further development of the
an individual (or household) relates to surround- concept of place utility promises greater under-
ing space, an attribute of which could be connec- standing of age-old questions surrounding human
tions to other spaces, shapes the likelihood of mobility.
migration.
Some scholars have questioned the usefulness
of place utility as a concept due to its perceived
References
subjectivity. Measured through surveys in which
individuals express their attitudes or preferences Adams H, Neil Adger W (2013) The contribution of eco-
about certain places, the concept is largely based system services to place utility as a determinant of
on opinions that vary from person to person and migration decision-making. Environ Res Lett
may shift in time for a single individual (Janelle 8(1):015006
Baker RGV (1982) Place utility fields. Geogr Anal
1969). Perhaps as a consequence, scholars have 14(1):10–28
sought to find objective characteristics of places Bilsborrow RE, Oberai AS et al (eds) (1984) Migration
by which to measure their utility. Baker (1982) surveys in low-income countries: guidelines and ques-
developed a utility function based on the interac- tionnaire design. Croom-Helm, London, 552 pp
Carr DL (2008) Migration to the Maya Biosphere Reserve,
tion of points in space. Fotheringham et al. (2000) Guatemala: why place matters. Hum Organ
created what they called a relative intrinsic 67(1):37–48
attractivity (RIA) measure for a given place gen- Datta A (2003) Human migration: a social phenomenon.
erated by its relative accessibility from adjacent Mittal Publications, New Delhi, pp 25, 26
De Jong GF, Gardner RW (eds) (1981) Migration decision
locales likely to attract migrants to that place. making: multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel
Though using the distinct term of “locational studies in developed and developing countries.
utility,” Janelle (1969) defined a formula for Pergamon Press, New York
aggregate transport cost and effort needed for a Fotheringham AS, Champion T, Wymer C, Coombes
M (2000) Measuring destination attractivity: a migra-
place to meet its functional role in the regional tion example. Int J Popul Geogr 6(6):391–421
and world systems. Goldscheider C (1971) Theoretical issues in migration
Recent scholarship has continued to provide research. Population, modernization, and social struc-
fresh insight on the role of place in migration. ture. Little, Brown, Boston
Janelle DG (1969) Spatial reorganization: a model and
While economic pushes and pulls constitute the concept. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 59(2):348–364
primary motivations for moving to a given place,
Place Utility 3

Kok P (2006) Migration in south and southern Africa: Papers of the European population conference 2006.
dynamics and determinants. HSRC Press, Cape Liverpool, June 21–24 Session 32 “Population, devel-
Town, pp 275, 276 opment and environment in developing countries”
Wolpert J (1965) Behavioral aspects of the decision to http://epc2006.princeton.edu/papers/60302
migrate. Pap Reg Sci Assoc 15:159–169 Hugo G (1981) Village-community ties, the village
Wolpert J (1966) Migration as an adjustment to environ- norms, and ethnic and social networks: a review of
mental stress. J Soc Issues 22(4):92–102 evidence from the Third World. In: Jong GFD, Gard-
ner RW (eds) Migration decision making: multidis-
ciplinary approaches to micro-level studies in
Further Reading
developed and developing countries. Pergamon Press,
Arthur JA (2008) The African Diaspora in the United
New York
States and Europe: the Ghanaian experience. Ashgate,
Lee ES (1966) A theory of migration. Demography
Hampshire, pp 27, 28
3:47–57
Bible DS, Brown LA (1981) Place utility, attribute
López-Carr D (2012) Agro-ecological determinants of
tradeoff, and choice behavior in an intra-urban migra-
rural out-migration to the Maya biosphere reserve,
tion context. Socioecon Plann Sci 15(1):37–44
Guatemala. Environ Res Lett 7(4):045603. pp 7
Brown L, Horton F et al (1970) On place utility and the
Massey DS (1990) Social structure, household strategies,
normative allocation of intra-urban migrants. Demog-
and the cumulative causation of migration. Popul
raphy 7:175–183
Index 56(1):3–26
Findley AM, Li F (1999) Methodological issues in
Ravenstein EG (1889) The laws of migration. J R Stat Soc
researching migration. Prof Geogr 51(1):50–67
52:241–305
Golledge RG, Stimson RJ (1997) Spatial behavior: a geo-
Wood C (1982) Equilibrium and historical-structural per-
graphic perspective. Guilford Press, New York,
spectives on migration. Int Migr Rev 16(2):298–319
pp 414–418
Henry S, Bilsborrow R (2006) How migrants choose their
destination in Burkina Faso? A place-utility approach.
W

White Australia Policy Detailed Description

Gwenda Tavan The White Australia policy, in the form of the

LaTrobe University, Melbourne, Australia IRA 1901, was one of the first pieces of legisla-
tion introduced by the newly created Common-
wealth Parliament of Australia. Another related
Synonyms measure was the decision to abolish the use and
settlement of Pacific Island labor in northern
White Australia Australia (Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901).
Various other laws denied voting, naturalization,
and welfare rights to non-Europeans, including
the country’s indigenous peoples, in order to dis-
Definition
courage the growth of non-European populations
(Franchise Act 1902; Naturalization Act 1903).
A euphemism for both a national doctrine and a
The roots of “White Australia” lay in British-
government policy aimed at severely restricting
Australian colonial experiences during the
non-European immigration and maintaining
mid-to-late nineteenth century and broader polit-
Australia’s racial, cultural, and legal integrity as
ical and intellectual currents across the white,
a white, British nation-state (Fig. 1). The Immi-
English-speaking world. Economic competition
gration Restriction Act (IRA) of 1901 did not
on the Australian goldfields, and later in shipping
expressly prohibit non-European immigration
and manufacturing, saw the various colonies
but permitted Australian officials to enforce
introduce restrictions on Chinese migration
migration restrictions through discretionary
(Fig. 2). The use of Pacific Island labor on north-
application of a “dictation test.” The policy
ern Australian sugar plantations was also a source
helped keep Australia “white,” though exclusion
of political concern (Fig. 3). Hostility towards the
of non-Europeans was never absolute, and its
Chinese and other non-Europeans, including the
enduring record damaged Australia’s interna-
country’s indigenous population, found affirma-
tional reputation. The final vestiges of the policy
tion in Social Darwinist theories of the suprem-
and doctrine were abolished during the period
acy of the white races and the incompatibility of
1973–1975.
interracial mixing (Fig. 4). By the end of the
century, the growing nationalist consciousness
of colonists, and concern about Australia’s vul-
nerability as a white outpost on the edge of Asia
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_50-1
2 White Australia Policy

White Australia Policy, Fig. 1 The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 severely prohibited the entry of non-European
settlers through the nefarious use of a ‘dictation test’. https://museumvictoria.com.au/pages/22912/1900s_3.jpg

reinforced the popular view that racial and cul- Canada, New Zealand, and the USA, no doubt
tural homogeneity were fundamental to national provided powerful legitimacy.
development and that all “Asiatic” migration Political leaders could not completely ignore
should be restricted (Fig. 5). Similar evolving the diplomatic sensitivities of immigration
restrictions in other “white” countries, including restrictions. To mitigate the offence to Asian
White Australia Policy 3

White Australia Policy, Fig. 2 Economic competition which left approximately 250 Chinese miners severely
on the Australian goldfields deepened European hostility injured. http://www.nma.gov.au/collections/collection_
towards Chinese diggers. This hostility spilled over into interactives/endurance_scroll/harvest_of_endurance_html_
outright violence on numerous occasions, including the version/explore_the_scroll/lambing_flat_riots
infamous Lambing Flat riots in New South Wales in 1861

White Australia Policy,

Fig. 3 A group of South
Sea Islanders , Cairns, Qld,
1890 (Wikimedia
commons) www.google.
com.au/search?as_st=y&
tbm=isch&hl=en&as_q=
kanaka+labour+qld&as_
epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&
cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe=
images&tbs=sur:f#imgdii=
j1XOn9W_7PN5hM%3A
%3Bj1XOn9W_7PN5hM
%3A%3BDvib1mMTc
6SEmM%3A&imgrc=
j1XOn9W_7PN5hM%3A

countries, outright prohibitions were avoided and an European language directed by the officer”
restrictions relied upon Section 3(a) of the IRA, (IRA 1901).
which defined “prohibited” immigrants as “any The policy proved remarkably successful. By
person who when asked to do so by an officer fails 1933, Asian “races” represented less than 1 % of
to write out at dictation and sign in the presence the national population (Census 1933, p 902).
of the officer a passage of fifty words in length in Political and public consensus underpinned
4 White Australia Policy

White Australia Policy, Fig. 4 Philip May’s cartoon moral degeneracy. Phil MAY, Phil. The Mongolian Octo-
captured common fears about the ‘Chinese’ threat to pus - His Grip on Australia, The Bulletin (Sydney),
white Australians. These ‘threats’ took various forms August 21, 1886. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
including disease, cheap labour, opium smoking and File:Mongolian_octopus.png

White Australia Policy, Fig. 5 Cartoons such as Liv- little Australian Christmas family party of the future’,
ingstone Hopkins ‘Piebald Possibilities’ evoked deep anx- The Bulletin (Sydney) 13 December 1902. http://www.
ieties amongst early Federation white Australians about aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/
inter-racial sexual relations and racial ‘miscegenation’ Parliamentary_Library/pubs/APF/monographs/Within_
mixing. Livingstone Hopkins ‘Piebald Possibilities – a Chinas_Orbit/Chapterone

“White Australia’s” status as a settled policy and transnational movement between Asian countries
the foundation of national identity and sover- and Australia continued. Small but dynamic com-
eignty. Yet, commercial and diplomatic consid- munities remained, concentrated in major cities
erations meant a considerable amount of like Sydney and Melbourne and parts of northern
White Australia Policy 5

White Australia Policy, Fig. 6 Controversial cases like immigration restrictions in the 1960s. Sun Herald,
that of little Nancy Prasad helped to build domestic and 8 August 1965
international pressure on Australian governments to end
6 White Australia Policy

White Australia Policy,

Fig. 7 Vietnamese boat
people arriving in Darwin
Harbour 1976 (image
courtesy of National
Museum of Australia).
http://www.nma.gov.au/
online_features/defining_
moments/featured/
vietnamese_refugees_
boat_arriv

Australia (Fitzgerald 2007). Neither did Austra- including Canada and the USA, and the decline of
lian political leaders ever completely hide their traditional British and European migration
racial preferences, at great cost to Australia’s sources by the late 1960s also prompted a rethink.
reputation. Prime Minister Billy Hughes was Policy change itself was gradual and slow,
instrumental in blocking Japan’s request for a beginning with citizenship rights to long-term
racial equality clause to be included in the Paris non-European settlers in 1956 and the replace-
Peace Settlement of 1919. Hughes later boasted ment of the IRA with the Migration Act 1958. In
that his actions had saved “White Australia.” 1966, the Holt Liberal Government liberalized
Japanese authorities were deeply offended by non-European migration on the basis of people’s
the public slight. capacity for “ready integration into the Austra-
Pressure built on the policy after World War lian community” and “ability to make a contribu-
II, despite repeated claims that the policy was tion to Australia’s economic, social and cultural
inviolable. State-sponsored racial discrimination progress” (Cabinet sub. 31 1966) (Fig. 6). By
was increasingly unjustifiable after the horrors of 1970, almost 10,000 non-Europeans a year were
Nazism and as postcolonial movements across entering the country, though immigration policy
the globe, including Australia’s own indigenous remained discriminatory (Cabinet sub.
people, demanded independence, racial equality, 713 1972).
and respect. Australia’s increasing strategic and The final “official” phase of the abolition
economic enmeshment with the Asia region occurred with the election of the socially progres-
made it particularly vulnerable to criticism. sive Whitlam Labor Government in 1972.
A mass immigration program, introduced in Whitlam introduced a universal visa system and
1945 on defense, labor and nation-building removed privileges for British migrants provid-
grounds and focused on British and European ing assisted passages, citizenship, and voting.
migration, was profoundly changing Australian The introduction of the Racial Discrimination
society but tended to reinforce the racial biases at Act 1975 made it illegal to discriminate on the
the heart of immigration policy. The abandon- grounds of race, color, descent, or national or
ment of racial restrictions by other settler states, ethnic origins (RDA 1975).
White Australia Policy 7

The policy’s substantive end occurred in the Immigration Restriction 1901 (Cth), no 17 of (1901)
late 1970s with the arrival of thousands of Indo- Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901 (Cth) no 16, (1901)
Racial Discrimination Act (1975) (Cth). http://www.
Chinese refugees and the expansion of family comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00013. Accessed
reunion provisions (Fig. 7). By the late 1990s, 20 Mar 2013
around 40 % of annual immigration intakes Tavan G (2005) The long, slow death of white Australia.
were from the Asia region. Today, the majority Scribe, Melbourne
of Australia’s top ten source countries for migra-
tion are from there as well and the country Further Reading
Bagnall K. A legacy of White Australia: records about
proudly proclaims itself as “multicultural”. Yet Chinese Australians in the national archives. http://
successive immigration debates since the 1970s www.naa.gov.au/collection/publications/papers-and-
indicate continuing disquiet amongst some Aus- podcasts/immigration/white-australia.aspx. Accessed
tralians about the rate and impact of migration 4 Mar 2016
Bagnall K, Sherratt T (2010) Invisible Australians
from Asia and, increasingly, from Africa and the [electronic resource]: living under the white
Middle East. This has prompted some commen- Australia policy. http://invisibleaustralians.org/http://
tators to claim that the ghost of “White Australia” invisibleaustralians.org/. Accessed 4 Mar 2016
still lingers (Tavan 2005). Brawley S (1995) The white peril: foreign relations and
Asian immigration to Australasia and North America
1919–1978. UNSW Press, Sydney
Jupp J (2007) From white Australia to Woomera: the story
References of Australian immigration, 2nd edn. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Port Melbourne
Cabinet submission 31, ‘Entry and stay of Lake M, Reynolds H (2008) Drawing the global colour
non-Europeans’, 2 March 1966, National Archives of line: white men’s countries and the question of racial
Australia, Canberra (NAA): A5908, submission 713 equality. Melbourne University Publishing, Carlton
Cabinet submission 713, ‘Report on entry and stay of Markus A (2001) Race: John Howard and the remaking of
non-Europeans and persons of partly non-European Australia. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest
descent’, 15 June 1972, NAA: A5908, submission 713 Palfreeman AC (1967) The administration of the white
Commonwealth Franchise (Cth), no 8, (1902) Australia policy. Melbourne University Press, London
Commonwealth Naturalisation Act 1903 (Cth) no Richards E (2008) Destination Australia: migration to
11, (1903) Australia since 1901. UNSW Press, Sydney
Commonwealth Naturalisation Act, Census of the Com- Rivett K, Immigration Reform Group (Australia) (1975)
monwealth of Australia, 30 June 1933, Part 1. Com- Australia and the non-white migrant. Melbourne Uni-
monwealth Government Printer, Canberra versity Press, Carlton
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2013) Walker D, Sobocinska A (eds) (2012) Australia’s Asia:
Factsheets. http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/. from Yellow Peril to Asian century. University of
Accessed 20 Mar 2013 Western Australia Publishing, Crawley
Fitzgerald J (2007) Big white lie: Chinese Australians in Willard M (1967) History of the White Australia policy
white Australia. University of New South Wales Press, to1920, 2nd edn. Melbourne University Press,
Sydney Melbourne
G

Gold Rushes (Australia) from 1831. But the gold rush overcame that dis-
tance and also attracted immigrants from China
James Jupp and the Californian gold rush of two years earlier.
The Australian National University, Centre for By 1861 there were 24,732 Chinese residents in
Immigration & Multicultural Studies, Building Victoria, making up two-thirds of the continental
70, Canberra, ACT, Australia total but only two percent of the Australia-wide
population. The largest number of immigrants
came from England (170,000), Ireland (87,000),
Definition Scotland (61,000), and Germany (10,000),
including those already in Victoria. Small but
Between 1851 and 1861, the British colony of influential numbers came from the United States
Victoria in southern Australia increased its pop- and were regarded unfavorably by the British
ulation from 77,345 to 538,628, constituting half authorities, who feared their republican influence
of the total population of the Australian conti- and their use of arms.
nent. This massive increase was predominantly The lasting impact of the Victorian gold rush
due to uncontrolled immigration, mainly from cannot be understood only in terms of immigrant
Britain and Ireland, and internal migration from numbers, which made the arrival port of Mel-
the adjacent colonies of Tasmania, South Austra- bourne the largest city in Australia until the
lia, and New South Wales. The cause of these depression of the 1890s (Serle 1963). The
migrations was the discovery of gold in 1851. suppressed miners’ revolt against licensing fees
The second half of the nineteenth century saw at Eureka (Ballarat) in 1854 is credited with the
many other Australian “gold rushes,” but none foundation of a democracy based on manhood
as large as that to Victoria (Hill 2010). suffrage, before Britain or the United States
(Molony 1984). Hostility to the Chinese eventu-
ally gave rise to the White Australia policy,
Detailed Description which prohibited non-European immigration
until the late 1960s. The predominance of British
The isolation of Australia, which took shipping immigration consolidated the links with Britain,
many weeks to reach it from the United King- which still survive. A heritage of magnificent
dom, previously limited immigration to schemes architecture in Melbourne, Ballarat, Bendigo,
organized by the British state. These included and other towns was built on the wealth which
convict transportation and assisted passages for gold brought. The modern population of Mel-
free immigrants, who began to replace convicts bourne exceeds four million and of Ballarat and
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_51-1
2 Gold Rushes (Australia)

Bendigo 100,000 each. Most other gold-created Pilbara and further north, but no longer on gold.
towns are much smaller or have faded away. Much of it is based on flying in miners from
Shipping connections with Europe were greatly elsewhere in Australia for set periods, rather
improved, with clipper ships bringing out immi- than on permanent communities. Foreign labor
grants and returning with wool to Britain. is mainly based on limited term contracts.
Other gold rushes were launched over most of
Australia (Blainey 1969). The only one with last-
ing influence was in Western Australia at
References
Kalgoorlie and Coolgardie in the 1890s. This
increased the population of Western Australia Blainey G (1969) The rush that never ended. Melbourne
fivefold between 1885 and 1901 from 36,000 to University Press, Melbourne
184,000. By then gold mining had moved from Hill D (2010) The gold rush. Heinemann, Sydney
Molony J (1984) Eureka. Viking, Ringwood
small-scale to major mechanized deep opera-
Serle G (1963) The golden age: a history of the colony of
tions. Most migration to Kalgoorlie was from Victoria 1851-1861. Melbourne University Press,
other parts of Australia. Labor migration in the Melbourne
west is now focused on the ore mines of the
J

Jewish Diaspora expulsions and partly due to creation of Jewish

trade routes, which by the medieval period
Suzanne Rutland stretched from France to China. Since the recog-
University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia nition of Christianity as the official religion of the
Roman Empire in the fourth century, there have
been major four seismic shifts in the Jewish Dias-
Synonyms pora, which have led to the formation of four
major Diaspora centers, each of which lasted for
Galut (Heb: exile); Tfusot (Heb: dispersions) centuries. These have been located in Babylon,
Spain, Eastern Europe, and currently America. In
the first three cases, a specific name has emerged
Definition to describe the Jewish descendants from these
centers: Mizrachi (Oriental Jews) for the Jews
The word “Diaspora” is a Greek term referring to of the Arab, Muslim world; Sephardi (Spanish
“dispersion.” It refers to the dispersion of Jews to Jews) for medieval Spain; and Ashkenazi (lit.
countries outside of the Land of Israel, perceived German Jews) for Eastern Europe. In each case,
as the Jewish homeland. Over time the Jewish Jewish practice was influenced by the majority
people have, indeed, been dispersed across the society, and issues of acculturation and integra-
four corners of the world. Today, the term is used tion came into play. These factors are relevant in
to refer not only to Jews living outside Israel but general for migration.
also to other groups of people who have been
dispersed from their homelands, such as the The Babylonian Diaspora
Greeks, Italians, and Chinese. The Babylonian Diaspora began with the defeat
of the Jews of Judea and the destruction of the
First Temple in 586 BCE by the Babylonian king,
Overview Nebuchadnezzar, who enslaved the Israelite lead-
ership and took them back to Babylon. The pain
The concept of the Jewish Diaspora began with of the loss of their homeland in Israel is expressed
the biblical narrative, when according to tradition in the words of Psalm 137:
Joseph, the second youngest son of the patriarch,
By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea,
Jacob, was sold into slavery in Egypt and his
we wept, when we remembered Zion. . . If I forget
entire family ended up joining him there. Jewish thee, O Jerusalem let my right hand forget her
dispersion has been partly due to persecution and cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_52-1
2 Jewish Diaspora

cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not (head of the exile/Diaspora). This position was
Jerusalem above my chief joy. hereditary, claiming to date back to King David
However, this first exile did not last long, since and the leading Jewish scholar, Hillel, who had
Cyrus, known as “the Great,” defeated Babylon originated from Babylon in the first century BC-
in 550 BCE and permitted the conquered Israel- E. The exilarch enjoyed the status of a prince and
ites to return to their homeland. By 515 BCE the was extremely wealthy and powerful.
Second Temple had been rebuilt, inaugurating With the Muslim conquest of Babylon in the
the period of the Second Jewish Commonwealth. seventh century, the position of the Jewish com-
Jewish independence was to last another munity continued largely unchanged. As the
600 years. Even after the defeat of the two People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab), they were
major Jewish rebellions against the Romans in granted dhimmi status (the tolerated ones), pro-
70 and 135 CE, the Jewish population remained vided that they paid both a poll tax and a land tax
substantial in the land the Romans renamed for their protection by the Muslim ruler. Theoret-
Palestina-Syria after 135, although the epicenter ically, according to the Pact of Umar, they had to
of Jewish life moved to the Galilee in this period. be inferior to the Muslim population, but the
Little is known about Babylonian Jewry dur- restrictions placed upon them were not always
ing the Second Temple period, apart from the fact strictly enforced. Thus, the exilarch continued to
that there were annual pilgrimages to the Temple enjoy his elevated status. However, due to the
in Jerusalem for the Biblical festivals of Passover land tax and other external factors, the Jews of
and Tabernacles. In this period, a second Dias- Babylon gradually gravitated to the urban centers
pora center emerged in Alexandria, Egypt, and and changed from being farmers to traders and
there were other substantial Jewish settlements in craftsmen.
Egypt. However, following the second major In the post-Talmudic period, from the eighth
Jewish Revolt of 132–135, the Bar Kokhba to the eleventh centuries, Jewish scholarship con-
Revolt, key Babylonian scholars began to emerge tinued to thrive, under the leadership of the
so that we have more information about Jewish Geonim (geniuses), who were the heads of the
life in Babylon. By the fourth century CE, this Babylonian Talmudic academies. The most
community emerged as the center of Jewish famous of these was Saadia HaGaon, who was
thought and life as a result of Byzantine Christian born in Egypt, but moved to Babylon and became
persecution of Jews in Palestine. head of the Sura Talmudic academy. Saadia
The predominance of Babylonian Jewry by translated the bible into Arabic and was one of
the fifth century is seen in the emergence of key the first Jewish scholars to synthesize Greco-
Babylonian academies, which discussed rabbinic Arabic philosophy with Jewish thought. When
laws and developed what has become known as conflict developed between Saadia and the
the Babylonian Talmud, which is considered to exilarch, he was sent into exile, but his reputation
be more authoritative than the Jerusalem Talmud went with him. Eventually the exilarch recalled
(also known as the “Palestinian Talmud”). The him and reestablished him as head of the acad-
leading academies were located in Sura and emy, indicating that while the hereditary position
Pumbedita. Twice a year before Passover and was the most powerful in theory, in practice it
the Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashanah), scholars was scholarship that predominated. In this period,
across the Jewish world would gather around the the rabbinical responses to legal questions that
lake of Sura to discuss Jewish law and make legal were sent to them from across the Jewish world
decisions for what was called the “Yarchei developed a body of literature known as
Kallah” or month of learning. “responsa.”
While the rabbis were appointed on the basis By the eleventh century, the conditions for
of their scholarship, Babylonian Jewry was led by Babylonian Jewry had begun to deteriorate.
the exilarch, who was also known as Resh Galuta Even though a Jewish community continued to
Jewish Diaspora 3

exist there, and throughout the Arab world, these Golden Age of Spain.” Jewish life flourished, as
Oriental Jews, or Mizrachim, no longer enjoyed seen in the rich poetry, rabbinic literature, and
the privilege of being the epicenter of the Jewish leading roles played by Jewish figures in this
Diaspora – that center had moved to Spain. period. This was particularly the case under
Abd-ar-Rahman III, who appointed Hasdai ibn
The Spanish Diaspora Shaprut as his adviser in the tenth century. Ibn
There are records of Jews living in Spain from the Shaprut was able to purchase the library of the
time of the Roman Empire. After the two major Academy of Sura, which was facing a period of
revolts in the first and second centuries CE, many decline, and bring it to Cordova. The area where
Jewish slaves were brought to Rome, but the local this rich Jewish culture emerged was known as
Jewish community quickly purchased and freed Andalusia or al-Andalus and included centers in
them, since “redemption of the captives” is con- Seville, Granada, Malaga, and Cádiz, in addition
sidered a very important commandment in Jewish to Cordova. For the next two centuries, under the
tradition. Some of these liberated Jews moved into Umayyads, Jewish life continued to flourish, but
the Iberian Peninsula. The history of the Jews in the situation began to deteriorate with the gradual
Spain is a complicated one, which can be divided Christian reconquest, which led to first the
into three main periods: the Visigoth period, the Almoravides and later a more radical Muslim
Muslim period, and the Christian Reconquista group, the Almohades, and Berbers from North
(conquest). Each of these began well, but ended Africa, taking control in Southern Spain.
up in religious persecution with the Jews being While Jewish scholarship flourished in Spain
faced with the alternatives of conversion or death. during this period, much of the Spanish Jewish
The Visigoths conquered the Iberian Penin- poetry reflected a sense of pain at the fact that the
sula with the disintegration of the Roman Empire Jewish community was living in the Diaspora and
in the fifth century. Originally pagan, they ini- did not have their own homeland in Israel. One of
tially converted to a form of Christianity known the best known of these poems was written by
as Arianism, which rejected the concept of the Yehudah HaLevi (Judah the Levite):
Trinity and papal power. During this period, the My heart is in the East, and I am at the ends of the
Jews were permitted to continue to live in peace. West;
However, in 586 CE one of the Visigoth kings How can I taste what I eat and how could it be
converted to Roman Catholicism and insisted that pleasing to me?
How shall I render my vows and my bonds,
the Jews leave, accept Christianity, or die. In while yet
response to this ultimatum, many decided to con- Zion lies beneath the fetter of Edom, and I am in
vert to Christianity, while secretly continuing to the chains of Arabia?
practice Judaism. This response provided a pre- It would be easy for me to leave all the bounty
of Spain -
cedent for the ongoing decision of Sephardi Jews As it is precious for me to behold the dust of the
to accept conversion rather than martyrdom when desolate sanctuary.
faced by such choices.
In 711, the Muslims under the Umayyad Zion is the name of a mountain in Jerusalem
dynasty from Babylon conquered the Iberian and is a term which has come to represent not
only Jerusalem but also the Land of Israel, while
Peninsula. Initially reaching as far as France,
they were pushed back by the Christians, who Edom refers to the Christian crusaders then ruling
retained control of the northern provinces of Palestine and Arabia to the Muslim rulers of
Spain. HaLevi in the end followed his heart and
Leon and Navarre. Under the Umayyads, Cor-
dova became the center of power. Jews followed attempted to return to the Land of Israel. While
the Muslim conquerors, and many of the secret there are historical records that he spent time in
Egypt, it is unclear what happened to him after
Jews again openly became practicing Jews, inau-
gurating a period of symbiosis between Jews and that, even though legend claimed that he was
Muslims, which has been described as “The murdered when he reached Jerusalem.
4 Jewish Diaspora

The leading scholar of the Spanish period was introduced, to limit the positions that the New
Moses Maimonides (also known as Rabbi Moses Christians were permitted to fill. In 1469, Isabella
ben Maimon – son of Maimon – or the acronym and Ferdinand married, uniting Leon and Aragon,
RAMBAM). He was born shortly before the con- the two most powerful kingdoms in Spain. Ini-
quest of the Almohades, when his family was tially the Jews were promised protection, and two
forced to convert to Islam, before escaping to Fez leading Jewish figures, Isaac Abravanel and
in Morocco, which was also under the Almohades. Abraham Seneor, became advisers to the king
The family then tried to settle in Palestine, but had and played a key role in fundraising for his cam-
to leave because of the crusaders and in the end paign against Muslim Granada.
settled in Fustat, the Jewish quarter near Cairo. In 1480, the monarchs introduced the Inquisi-
After his younger brother died in a shipwreck, tion, which was aimed at heretics, rather than the
Maimonides became the physician to the caliph. open Jews. This placed the New Christians under
In addition to his medical works, he is known as immediate threat, since any of them could be
the leading Jewish scholar who attempted a major accused of “Judaizing” and face the Inquisition
codification of Jewish law, called the Mishneh with torture, forced confessions, and the auto-
Torah, as well as taking a scientific and philosoph- da-fé or burning at the stake. While the open
ical approach to assist Jews who were questioning Jews were not the target of the Inquisition, they
the traditions in his The Guide for the Perplexed. were also at risk of being accused of converting
His Thirteen Principles of Faith are included in the Christians or assisting conversos. Once the
Jewish prayer book and are considered founda- Muslims in Granada were defeated in 1492,
tional to Jewish belief. Ferdinand and Isabella issued the Edict of Expul-
As a result of this Muslim persecution, the sion, giving the Jews just four months to leave
Jews in Andalusia welcomed the Christian con- Spain or convert to Christianity.
querors, who initially needed the assistance of the Initially, 100,000 Jewish refugees – around
Jews, due to their knowledge of Arabic and their one third of Spain’s Jewish population – fled
willingness to resettle those areas from where the across the border to Portugal where they formed
Muslims had fled. Under Christian rule, Jewish 10 % of the Portuguese population. However, in
life again flourished with the symbiosis. The first 1496 King Manuel of Portugal negotiated for the
warning of deterioration came in 1263, with the hand of Isabella and Ferdinand’s daughter, and
Barcelona Disputation, when a leading Jewish they insisted that he expel his Jewish population
scholar, Nachmanides, was forced to debate before they would consent to the marriage.
Judaism with a Christian convert from Judaism. Manuel issued an Edict of Expulsion but he was
The king ended the debate before a final conclu- reluctant to lose his Jews, whose financial exper-
sion was reached and subsequently Nachmanides tise he valued. Thus, when they arrived in Lisbon,
was attacked and left Spain for Palestine. there were no boats waiting for them, and instead
However, the situation for the Jews of the they were all forcibly converted to Christianity.
Iberian Peninsula seriously deteriorated from However, the Portuguese Inquisition itself was
the end of the fourteenth century, when riots only introduced in 1536, after Manuel’s death,
against Jews in 1391 forced many to convert to and the first auto-da-fe in Portugal was held in
Christianity. While some became committed 1540. Despite the risk of exposure, many New
Christians, many sought to secretly practice Juda- Christians continued to practice Judaism secretly,
ism and became known by the derogatory term while creating trading networks in Amsterdam
Marranos or “pigs.” They are also called New and Antwerp. The situation developed after
Christians, conversos in Spanish, or Anusim, the 1600 when the Netherlands became Calvinist,
forced ones in Hebrew. Many of the New Chris- where Jews could again become openly practic-
tians were extremely successful, creating a sense ing Jews. A number of Sephardim managed to
of jealousy among the Old Christians, and in escape the Iberian Peninsula and create the Jew-
Toledo in the 1450s, blood purity laws were ish communities of Amsterdam and later London.
Jewish Diaspora 5

East European Jewry Jewish scholarship in Poland flourished during

The third major Diaspora center emerged in East- this period. In a period when most people were
ern Europe from the thirteen century onwards, illiterate, Jewish literacy was valued. All boys
when the Polish kings invited the Jews of the studied Hebrew, the Torah, and Talmud from
German Rhineland area, as well as non-Jewish the age of three in what became known as
Germans, to settle in their kingdom. A rich Jew- heder, literally room, as they learned in a room
ish life had emerged in France from the eighth in the teacher’s home. The more talented stu-
century under Charlemagne the Great and from dents, regardless of their economic status, were
the tenth century along the Rhineland, in towns then selected to continue their studies after their
such as Cologne, Speer, Mainz, and Bonn. They Bar Mitzvah, the coming of age at 13, in a Tal-
became known as Ashkenazim, literally German, mudic academy, or yeshiva, located in the bigger
and they developed a rich Jewish learning tradi- Jewish centers. The system known as “tag”
tion exemplified by Rabbenu Gershom and Rabbi developed, where the yeshiva boys would sleep
Solomon Isaac, known by the acronym in the synagogue, and each day a different family
“RASHI,” who till the present day is considered in the shtetl would host them for their meals.
one of the greatest biblical commentators. Sometimes they would earn some money by
These communities suffered severe attacks matchmaking.
during the First and Second Crusades in the elev- One of the key centers of Jewish scholarship to
enth and twelfth centuries, and even though their emerge in this period was in Krakow, with Rabbi
numbers were reinforced with the expulsion of Moshe Isserles emerging as the most significant
the Jews from English in 1290 and from France in scholar in the mid-sixteenth century. He
1306, they felt under threat. The invitations from responded to the codification of Jewish law by
the Polish kings offered them a possibility of the Sephardi scholar, Joseph Caro, who was born
escape to a more welcoming environment. This in Spain just before the expulsion, lived in Italy,
movement of Jews from Western Europe to East- and then moved to Safed in the Galilee, where he
ern Europe was reinforced in 1348–1349, during produced his codification called Shulchan Aruch
the terrible plague, known as the Black Death. (Prepared Table). Isserles produced a critique of
Jews were accused of causing the plague and Caro’s work, which aimed to undermine it, but
suffered terrible attacks across the Germanic- instead his comments were incorporated into the
speaking kingdoms and duchies. work, so that a unified code of Jewish law rele-
The most important of the Polish kings was vant for both the Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jewish
Casimir, who offered the Jews special protection traditions emerged. This is used as the basis of
and the right to organize themselves, provided Jewish law to the present day.
they paid him a communal tax under the charter The positive Jewish life in Poland was
system. Many Jews were invited in by the Polish disrupted in the mid-seventeenth century, when
nobility to run their estates and collect the taxes the Cossacks attempted to conquer the country.
from the serfs. They settled in shtetls (private They were supported by the serfs, who attacked
towns), with each shtetl being ruled by the council the nobility, and the Jews were caught between the
(kehilla), consisting of 12 representatives of the two opposing groups, suffering enormous losses in
leading citizens. In 1580, a united Jewish Council, 1648–1649. With this tragedy, the center of Jewish
known as the Council of Four Lands, was formed, life moved north to Lithuania. By the beginning of
and it continued to operate until 1764, so that the eighteenth century, the Jews of Poland and the
Polish Jewry became a state within a state. The Ukraine were suffering from great poverty and a
kehilla was responsible for every aspect of com- spiritual crisis. The system of Talmudic scholar-
munal life, including running the synagogue and ship excluded the lower classes, who felt alienated
mikvah (ritual bath) and providing assistance to from their Jewish traditions. In response, the Has-
the sick, the poor, the widows, and the orphans sidic movement was created by the Baal Shem
through an extensive system of charity. Tov (Master of the Good Name or Besht), a
6 Jewish Diaspora

pseudonym referring to his healing powers as a pogroms and government-sponsored attacks, and
naturalist. The Besht focused on the joy of Juda- in May 1882 new laws were introduced forcing
ism, stressing that love of God, expressed through many to move from their small shtetls into the
song and dance, and the allegiance to a rebbe or larger towns. The unofficial tsarist policy was
tzaddik were what was required to be a good Jew. that one third of the Jews should emigrate, one
After his death, his movement splintered into dif- third should die of starvation, and one third
ferent Chassidic sects, each led by a dynasty of should convert. While the latter two goals were
rebbes. not achieved, Jewish there was mass Jewish
In Lithuania, there was a movement called the migration from Eastern Europe, as will be
Mitnagdim, which opposed the Chassidic discussed in the next section.
approach, fearing the undermining of the Jewish The perilous existence of Jews in Eastern
intellectual tradition. Elijah ben Shlomo Zalman Europe continued after World War I, and Polish
Kremer, known as the Gaon (genius) of Vilna, led Jewry experienced almost total devastation with
this oppositional movement. He sought to intro- the Nazi Holocaust. Of the six million Jews mur-
duce more secular knowledge, including trans- dered in Europe, three million were from Poland,
lations into Hebrew of key mathematical and leaving a tiny residue of less than a quarter of
scientific works by his students. While he million. Most died in the six death camps, all
attacked the Chassidim, they admired his Talmu- located in Poland. The gas chambers were fully
dic scholarship. operational by 1942. The numbers 1942 can be
The period of the Enlightenment resulted in transposed to 1492 – marking the destruction of
radical changes in Western Europe, with the the two major Jewish Diaspora centers in Spain
gradual breaking down of the ghetto walls, par- and Poland.
ticularly after the French Revolution. However,
while classical Christian anti-Judaism waned in American Jewry
Western Europe, a new form of prejudice, called The most recent Diaspora center is located in the
anti-Semitism, based on racial characteristics United States. The first Jews to settle in the North
emerged in Western Europe by the end of the America were Dutch Sephardi Jews, fleeing per-
nineteenth century. secution in the Portuguese and Spanish colonies
Dominated by tsarist Russia, the situation for of South America. However, by the early nine-
Jews in Eastern Europe deteriorated in the nine- teenth century, these communities, reinforced by
teenth century. In 1772, Catherine the Great con- some British Jews, were still very small with
quered Eastern Poland and the country was about only 10,000 Jews living in North America
carved up between Russia, the Austro-Hungarian in the early nineteenth century. However,
Empire, and Prussia. Catherine disliked Jews and between 1830 and 1880, around 300,000 German
did not wish them to enter Russia proper, a policy Jewish refugees fled to the United States, follow-
continued by her successors. The Jewish Pale of ing the defeat of Napoleon and the failure of the
Settlement was established from the Baltic to the 1830 and 1848 revolutions in Western Europe.
Black Sea, with Jews only being permitted to live Then, from 1880 to 1924, over two million Rus-
within these boundaries. During the rule of sian Jews arrived on American shores, in what
Nicholas I, the position of the Jews was particu- they called the Goldene Medina (the Golden
larly difficult, as he sought to introduce Russifi- Country). While the German Jews became
cation and forcibly conscripted Jewish boys into hawkers and traders and tended to spread out
the Russian army, from the age of 12. Under across the country, including the Californian
Alexander II, who emancipated the serfs in gold fields after 1848, the East European Jews
1860, the position of the Jews was slightly liber- clustered in the East Coast in the major urban
alized, but after his assassination in 1881 by a centers of New York, Chicago, and Boston.
group of radical students, one of whom was Jew- In 1924 America closed her doors to refugee
ish, their situation again deteriorated. Jews faced migration in response to the anti-migrant Populist
Jewish Diaspora 7

movement, which saw the introduction of a quota world lives in North America and over 40 % in
system. The American Jews rapidly acculturated Israel. There are only around 4000 Jews
and moved up the socioeconomic ladder, from remaining in the Arab world, and Europe’s pop-
working in the industrial sweatshops, largely of ulation is less than one and a half million and
the textile industry, to becoming professionals declining.
and businessmen, within a generation. After the
war, one third of New York’s population was
Jewish – the other two thirds of the nation’s
Further Reading
economic center being black and Irish/Italian.
The Jewish population had increased to five mil- Antony P (2012) The Jews in Poland and Russia
lion by the 1950s, and with the destruction of (volume 3: 1914–2008). Littman Library of Jewish
European Jewry and the forced expulsions of Civilization, Portland
the Mizrachi Jews from the Arab Muslim lands, Baron SW (1983) A social and religious history of the
Jews, vol 3. Columbia University Press, New York
America had emerged as the new Jewish Dias- Bauer Y (1982) History of the Holocaust. F Watts, New
pora center. York
Bauer Y (2010) The death of the Shtetl. Harvard Univer-
Hybrid Languages sity Press, London/New Haven
Ben-Sasson HH (ed) (1976) A history of the Jewish peo-
One of the key features of all the different Jewish ple. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Diaspora centers has been the development of Biale D (1986) Power & powerlessness in Jewish history.
hybrid languages. The first hybrid language to Schocken Books, New York
emerge in the Jewish world was Aramaic, the Cohn-Sherbok D (1994) Atlas of Jewish history.
Routledge, London/New York
spoken language across the Greek and Roman Cohn-Sherbok D (2003) Judaism: history, belief, and
worlds. With the emergence of Islam and the practice. Routledge, London/New York
Muslim conquests, Judeo-Arabic and Judeo- Dawidowicz L (1996) The golden tradition: Jewish life
Persian developed. Thus, Maimonides wrote his and thought in Eastern Europe. Syracuse University
Press, Syracuse
The Guide for the Perplexed in Judeo-Arabic. Deshen S, Zenner WP (eds) (1996) Jews among Muslims:
Ladino, a mixture of medieval Spanish, Hebrew, communities in the pre-colonial Middle East. Macmil-
and Arabic, developed first in the Iberian Penin- lan Press, London
sula and later in the Balkans, while Yiddish, a Eisen A (1986) Galut: modern Jewish reflection on home-
lessness and homecoming. Indiana University Press,
mixture of medieval German, Slavic languages, Bloomington
and Hebrew developed in Eastern Europe. The Elazar DJ (1991) Land, State and Diaspora in the history
cementing element of these different hybrid lan- of the Jewish polity. Jewish Polit Stud Rev 3:1–2,
guages, representing the cultures of the Mizrachi, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), http://
www.bjpa.org/Publications/details.cfm?
Sephardi, and Ashkenazi Jews, was that they PublicationID=3641
were always written in the Hebrew alphabet, Eliach Y (1998) There once was a World: A 900-year
since Hebrew remained the language of prayer chronicle of the Shtetl of Eishyshok. Little Brown,
and scholarship. Hebrew was the glue that kept Boston
Flannery EH (1985) The Anguish of the Jews: twenty-
the Jewish Diaspora together, throughout all the three centuries of Antisemitism. rev. edn. Paulist
period of the Diaspora. Press, New York
It can be argued that no other ethnic or reli- Gerber J (1992) The Jews of Spain: a history of the
gious group has experienced such radical demo- Sephardic experience. The Free Press, New York
Goitein SD (1974) Jews and Arabs: their contacts through
graphic changes over the history of its Diaspora the ages. Schocken Books, New York
or dispersion. This phenomenon has been partic- Goodman M (ed) (2002) The Oxford handbook of Jewish
ularly dramatic from the mid-nineteenth century. studies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York
In the early nineteenth century, the bulk of the Hertzberg A (1999) Jews; the essence and character of a
people. Harper, San Francisco
Jewish world lived in Europe and the Arab lands, Holtz BW (1992) Back to the sources: reading the classic
with only a tiny minority in America and Pales- Jewish texts. Simon & Schuster, New York
tine/the Land of Israel. Today, 40 % of the Jewish
8 Jewish Diaspora

Johnson P (1988) A history of the Jews. Harper Perennial, Sarna JD (2004) American Judaism: a history. Yale Uni-
New York versity Press, New Haven
Neusner J (1965) A history of the Jews in Babylonia, Scheindlin R (1998) A short history of the Jewish people:
vol 1 & 2. Brill, Leiden from legendary times to modern statehood. Oxford
Parkes J (1965) The conflict of the Church and the Syna- University Press, Oxford
gogue. Meridian, New York Seltzer RM (1982) Jewish people, Jewish thought: the
Poliakov L (1974) The history of anti-semitism. Jewish experience in history. Macmillan, New York
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London Stillman NA (1979) The Jews of Arab Lands. JPS,
Polonsky A (1914) The Jews in Poland and Russia Philadelphia
(volume 2: 1881–1914). Littman Library of Jewish Telushkin J (1991) Jewish literacy: the most important
Civilization, Portland things to know about the Jewish religion, its people
Polonsky A (2010) The Jews in Poland and Russia and its history. William Morrow, New York
(volume 1: 1350–1881). Littman Library of Jewish Wistrich R (1991) Antisemitism: the longest hatred.
Civilization, Portland Schoken Books, New York
Raphael C (1985) The road from Babylon: the story of Zohar Z (ed) (2005) Sephardic & Mizrahi Jewry: from the
Sephardi and Oriental Jews. Weidenfeld and Nichol- golden age of Spain to modern times. New York Uni-
son, London versity Press, New York/London
Sachar H (2005) A history of the Jews in the modern
world. Knopf, New York
C

Cultural Diversity: The Australian international indicators, which rank Australia at

Social Cohesion Surveys or near the top of developed countries in terms of
standard of living, education, health services, and
Andrew Markus quality of life. There is, however, also a consistent
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia finding of lower levels of social cohesion in
regions of high immigrant concentration, indi-
cated by survey findings on trust, experience of
Definition discrimination, political participation, and
involvement in voluntary work.
The Scanlon Foundation social cohesion surveys,
first conducted in 2007 and repeated on seven
occasions, provide a rich body of surveying data Detailed Description
on Australian attitudes to immigration, cultural
diversity, and social cohesion. The survey find- Over the last 10 years, Australia’s population has
ings indicate that Australia ranks alongside Can- increased by over three million, or 15%, to an
ada as the most receptive to immigration among estimated 22,485,000 (2011). There has been a
Western nations. There is, however, a substantial steady increase in the proportion overseas born,
minority in Australia, close to 40 %, who do not from 23 % in 2001 to 24 % in 2006 and 26 % in
support immigration. The Scanlon Foundation 2011; this represents an increase from 4.1 million
surveys – and other polling over the last overseas-born persons in 2001 to 5.3 million in
30 years – have consistently found that the vast 2011. The proportion overseas born ranks Austra-
majority of Australians have a high level of iden- lia first within the OECD, among nations with
tification with their country, the fundamental pre- populations over ten million. The Australian pro-
requisite for any cohesive society. Consideration portion compares with 20 % overseas born in
of attitudes of recent arrivals provides evidence of Canada, 13 % in Germany, 13 % in the United
rapid integration. Of those who arrived since States, 11 % in the United Kingdom, and 12 % in
2000, 86 % of English-speaking background and France. The average for the OECD is 12 %.
88 % of non-English-speaking background indi- In 2011, of the overseas-born population of
cate a sense of belonging to a “great” or “moderate Australia, the leading countries of birth were the
extent.” There is strong endorsement of the view United Kingdom (20.8 %) and New Zealand
that “Australia is a land of economic opportunity (9.1 %). Over the last 30 years, an increasing
where in the long run, hard work brings a better proportion of immigrants have been drawn from
life.” These views are consistent with the Asian region. Thus, between 2007 and 2011,
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_56-1
2 Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys

the leading country of birth for immigrants was discussion of Australian surveying, see Goot
India (13 %). Among settler arrivals in 1999; Goot and Watson 2011.)
2010–2011, immigrants from New Zealand and The Scanlon Foundation social cohesion sur-
the United Kingdom ranked first and third; of the veys, for the first time in Australian social
remaining seven top countries of origin, five were research, provide a rich body of surveying data
Asian and one was African. on public attitudes to immigration, cultural diver-
A high proportion of the overseas born in Aus- sity, and social cohesion. Eight Scanlon Founda-
tralia live in capital cities, with concentrations tion national surveys have been conducted to date
above 50 % in some local government areas. (2007, 2009–2015), with an average sample of
The full extent of cultural diversity is indicated 1,750 respondents, utilizing a uniform methodol-
by census findings on the proportion of Austra- ogy and a survey instrument of some 70 questions;
lians who speak a language other than English in in addition, three parallel surveys (2007, 2009,
the home. In 2011, suburbs with a large proportion 2012) have been conducted in Sydney and Mel-
indicating that they speak a language other than bourne in areas of high immigrant concentration
English in the home include Cabramatta (88 %), (Markus 2007–2015).
Canley Vale (84 %), and Lakemba (84 %) in The Scanlon Foundation surveys are distinc-
Sydney and Campbellfield (81 %), Springvale tive not only for the scale, consistency, and fre-
(79 %), and Dallas (73 %) in Melbourne. quency of surveying but for exploring attitudes in
Given the significance of immigration for Aus- multiple dimensions: at the national level, within
tralia, there has been surprisingly little investment selected localities, within subgroups, and with
in systematic public opinion research. In England, comparative reference across these dimensions.
the Citizenship Surveys were conducted bienni- The large sample makes possible reliable analysis
ally and then every 3 months between 2001 and of subgroups of the population, for example, by
2010. The first three Citizenship Surveys were age group, educational attainment, and political
each administered to some 15,000 respondents alignment.
(including a minority ethnic boost of 5000) in
face-to-face interviews, taking approximately What Does the Corpus of Australian Surveying
60 min to complete. The Canadian Department Establish?
of Citizenship and Immigration for more than The evidence indicates that Australia, together
20 years undertook annual surveys to track atti- with Canada, ranks as the most receptive to immi-
tudes to immigration (EKOS 2010). Statistics gration among Western nations (Markus 2012;
Canada, in conjunction with other government Reitz 2011). In Australia and Canada, a majority
departments, conducted an Ethnic Diversity Sur- of the population supports the level of immigra-
vey in 2002 which interviewed 42,500 respon- tion, in contrast with a number of European coun-
dents. Within the EU, major surveys include the tries. For example, in 2003, an international
annual Eurobarometer, established in 1973, with a survey found that 32 % of Canadian and 39 % of
minimum of 1,000 respondents in each member Australian respondents favored a reduction of
state, and the biennial European Social Survey, immigration, compared with 58 % in Sweden,
which reaches over 30,000 respondents. 66 % in France, 70 % in Germany, and 78 % in
In Australia, knowledge of public attitudes to England. The 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey
immigration and cultural diversity has in large found that 27 % of Canadian respondents agreed
measure been dependent on commercial polling with the proposition that “immigration is more of
for the print media. The problem with such polling a problem than an opportunity,” compared to 52 %
is that it is reliant on a handful of questions, often of respondents in the United States and 65 % in
just two or three, administered to small samples the United Kingdom (Markus 2012, pp 117, 119).
and without consistent wording to track change There is, however, a substantial minority in
over time. A few government and academic sur- Australia, close to 40 %, who do not support
veys have provided richer insights. (For a detailed immigration. This includes a core element,
Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys 3

To a great extent To a moderate extent Only slightly Not at all

2012 74% 21% 4%

2011 73% 21% 6%

2010 72% 23% 3%

2009 72% 23% 4%

2007 77% 19% 2%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Fig. 1 To what extent do you have a sense of belonging
in Australia? 2007–2012

comprising an estimated 10 % of the population A prime objective of the Scanlon Foundation

(or 1.5 million adults), who consistently indicate a surveys has been to further understanding of the
strong level of opposition to immigration and social impact of Australia’s increasingly diverse
cultural diversity. immigration program. A central focus is on the
The Scanlon Foundation surveys – and other emerging challenges of cultural diversity. To fur-
polling over the last 30 years – have consistently ther this specific objective, the Scanlon-Monash
found that the vast majority of Australians have a Index (SMI) of Social Cohesion was developed,
high level of identification with their country, the using the findings of the 2007 national survey to
fundamental prerequisite for any cohesive society. provide baseline data.
Almost unanimously, Australians express a sense As a concept, social cohesion has a long tradi-
of belonging (95 % in 2012), indicate pride in the tion in academic enquiry, of fundamental impor-
Australian way of life (90 %), and believe that its tance in discussion of the role of consensus and
maintenance is important (91 %). Less than 5 % of conflict in society. From the mid-1990s, interest in
respondents to the 2012 Scanlon Foundation sur- the dynamics of social cohesion grew amid con-
vey indicated that they had slight or no sense of cerns prompted by the impact of globalization,
belonging (Fig. 1). economic change, and fears fuelled by the “war
Consideration of attitudes of recent arrivals on terror.” There is, however, no agreed definition
provides evidence of rapid integration. Of those of social cohesion. Most current definitions dwell
who arrived since 2000, 86 % of English-speaking on intangibles, such as sense of national belong-
background and 88 % of non-English-speaking ing and attachment, willingness to participate in
background indicate a sense of belonging to a community life, mutual respect, and common
“great” or “moderate extent.” aspirations or identity. The Scanlon Foundation
There is strong endorsement of the view that surveys adopted an eclectic, wide-ranging
“Australia is a land of economic opportunity approach, influenced by the work of social scien-
where in the long run, hard work brings a better tists Jane Jenson and Paul Bernard, to incorporate
life.” In 2007, 81 % of respondents “strongly five domains related to:
agreed” or “agreed,” 82 % in 2010, and 81 % in
2012. These views are consistent with interna- sense of belonging, valuation of the Australian way
of life;
tional indicators, which rank Australia at or near
worth: satisfaction with financial status and level of
the top of developed countries in terms of standard happiness;
of living, education, health services, and quality social justice and equity: views on economic
of life (Fig. 2). opportunity, income distribution, government
4 Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys

Strongle agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree

2012 39% 42% 5% 10% 5%

2011 40% 42% 4% 10% 4%

2010 34% 48% 4% 10% 3%

2009 39% 43% 3% 10% 4%

2007 34% 47% 2% 12% 3%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Fig. 2 Australia is a land of economic opportunity
where in the long run, hard work brings a better life, 2007–2012

Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Table 1 The Scanlon-Monash Index (SMI) of Social
Cohesion, 2007–2012
2007 2009 2010 2011 2012
SMI – average result 100 101.2 92.6 93.8 94.4

policies to assist people on low incomes, confi- surveys, conducted in suburbs defined by their
dence in government; high concentration of immigrants – and relatively
participation: in the political process of the nation,
indicated by voting in an election, contact with a high economic disadvantage.
member of parliament, participation in a boycott The local surveys, parallel with the national
or protest surveys, have found consistent evidence of strong
sense of acceptance/ rejection: experience of dis- identification with the Australian way of life
crimination, view of cultural diversity and gov-
ernment assistance to migrant communities, among both native born and immigrant. Immi-
expectations for the future. (Markus and grants, presumably reflecting on their previous
Kirpitchenko 2007) conditions of life, provide strong endorsement of
Australia as a land of economic opportunity and
social justice.
The key finding of the SMI is the stability of
There is, however, also a consistent finding of
Australian society. Despite the continuing large lower levels of social cohesion in regions of high
immigration intake and global economic uncer-
immigrant concentration, indicated by survey
tainties, the variance in the Index over five sur-
findings on trust, sense of safety, experience of
veys has been within 10 points, from a high of discrimination, political participation, and
101.2 to a low of 92.6. The major shift in the Index
involvement in voluntary work. At 82.9 in 2012,
occurred between 2009 and 2010, associated with the SMI for areas of high immigrant concentration
the growing unpopularity of the federal labor gov- is markedly lower that the national Index (94.4).
ernment, with trust in the government declining
A relatively high proportion of respondents of
from 48 % to 31 %. The two surveys after 2010 non-English-speaking background (NESB) in
registered marginal upward movement in the areas of high immigrant concentration indicate a
Index (Table 1).
positive response when considering the level of
A major point of interest in the Scanlon Foun- immigration, the contribution of immigrants, the
dation surveys has been the findings of three local impact of immigration in the local area, and the
Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys 5

Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Table 2 Which, if any, of the following have you done
over the last 3 years or so?
National Australia Local Australia National Local
Response born born NESB NESB
Voted in an election 91.8 % 83.5 % 81.8 % 81.9 %
Signed a petition 58.6 % 38.4 % 42.3 % 26.9 %
Written or spoken to a federal or state member of 28.2 % 17.7 % 28.5 % 9.6 %
parliament
Joined a boycott of a product or company 14.7 % 12.8 % 12.0 % 5.7 %
Attended a protest, march, or demonstration 13.5 % 11.4 % 16.8 % 8.3 %

ability of people of different backgrounds to get The fact that these areas are also classified at
on with each other. Thus, among NESB respon- the most economically disadvantaged raises the
dents to the 2012 local survey, 77 % agreed that question of whether the lower levels of social
“my local area is a place where people from dif- cohesion are more a consequence of poverty
ferent national or ethnic backgrounds get on well than cultural diversity.
together,” and 66 % agreed that “people in my Robert Putnam, in an influential 2007 article,
local area are willing to help their neighbors.” Just argued that ethnic diversity has a negative impact
36 % considered that the immigration intake was on social cohesion. Putnam’s argument was based
“too high,” and 63 % agreed that “accepting on a US survey of 30,000 participants, which was
immigrants from many different countries makes analyzed using a range of bivariate and multivar-
Australia stronger.” iate processes. He concluded that in areas of eth-
But the local survey found markedly higher nic diversity, there were, among other outcomes,
reported experience of discrimination on the lower confidence in ability to influence local deci-
basis of “skin color, ethnic origin, or religion.” sions, less expectation that people will work
The reported level in 2012 was 12 % for together on community projects, lower likelihood
Australian-born and 11 % for NESB respondents of giving to charity or volunteering, lower indica-
in the national survey, 23 % for both groups in the tion of life satisfaction, and lower perception of
local survey. quality of life. Putnam concluded that “inhabitants
The survey in areas of high immigrant concen- of diverse communities tend to withdraw from
tration also found markedly lower levels of collective life,” but the evidence did not establish
political participation and trust (Table 2). that ethnic diversity led to “bad race relations” or
In response to the question, “generally speak- to “ethnically defined group hostility” (Putnam
ing, would you say that most people can be trusted 2007).
or you can’t be too careful in dealing with peo- The 2009 and 2012 Scanlon Foundation local
ple,” 52 % of respondents in the national survey surveys found evidence consistent with Putnam’s
indicated that “most people can be trusted.” In findings. Using the 2012 survey, economically
marked contrast, in the local survey, just 34 % of disadvantaged areas of low ethnic diversity (less
Australian-born and 30 % of NESB respondents than 20 % overseas born) were compared with
agreed that “most people can be trusted,” while economically disadvantaged areas of high diver-
close to 65 % disagreed. sity (over 50 % overseas born). Economically
A further finding of significance is the rela- disadvantaged areas were identified using the
tively high proportion of third-generation Austra- Australian Bureau of Statistics Socio-Economic
lian respondents who indicate dissatisfaction with Indexes for Areas (SEIFA), which provides a
their neighborhoods in the local survey, an ranking of postcode areas in deciles, from rank
increase of close to 20 percentage points when 1 for the most disadvantaged to rank 10 for the
compared to the national survey. least disadvantaged. Analysis of seven general
6 Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys

questions related to neighborhood and level of life References

satisfaction across the most disadvantaged SEIFA
deciles found lower participation and higher Ekos (2010) Ekos Research Associates, annual tracking
survey – winter 2010. Submitted to Citizenship and
levels of negativity in the areas of high ethnic
Immigration Canada, Apr 2010
diversity. Thus, 65 % of respondents in high- European Commission Public Opinion, Eurobarometer
diversity areas indicated low levels of trust (“you Surveys, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opin
can’t be too careful in dealing with people”), ion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en
Goot M (1999) Migrant numbers, Asian immigration and
compared with 44 % in the low-diversity areas;
multiculturalism: trends in the polls, 1943–1998,
28% of respondents in high-diversity areas National Multicultural Advisory Council, Australian
disagreed with the proposition that “people are Multiculturalism for a New Century Commonwear of
willing to help their neighbors,” compared to Australia, Canberra Statistical Appendix part 2
Goot M, Watson I (2011) Population, immigration and
16 % in low-diversity areas.
asylum seekers: patterns in Australian public opinion,
In conclusion, the Scanlon Foundation surveys Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library,
in conducted between 2007 and 2012 indicate that Commonwear of Australia, Canberra, May
Australia is a socially cohesive and welcoming Markus A (2012) Immigration and public opinion. In:
Pincus J, Graeme H (eds) A greater Australia: popula-
country, but areas of high immigrant concentra-
tion, policies and governance, CEDA Pollara 2003,
tion present a complex and far from uniform pic- A Pollara report on Canadian’s attitudes regarding
ture: they are characterized by many positive immigration. Prepared for Citizenship and Immigration
findings but also lower levels of trust and sense Canada, Dec 2003
Markus A, Kirpitchenko L (2007) Conceptualising social
of safety, lower levels of political participation
cohesion. In: Nieuwenhuysen J, James J (eds) Social
and involvement in voluntary work, and height- cohesion in Australia, Cambridge University Press,
ened experience of discrimination. Cambridge
There is also clear evidence of disaffection and Markus A, Mapping Social Cohesion, The Scanlon Foun-
dation Surveys (2007–2015) available at Mapping
negative valuation of the impact of immigration
Australia’s Population internet site. http://www.arts.
among a minority of third-generation Australians monash.edu.au/mapping-population/
in high-diversity areas. The survey identifies a Putnam R (2007) E pluribus Unum: diversity and commu-
constituency potentially receptive to advocacy of nity in the twenty-first century. Scand Polit Stud
30(2):137–174
discriminatory immigration policies, which if
Reitz J (2011) Pro-immigration Canada. Social and eco-
translated into action would present a threat to nomic roots of popular views, IRPP Study, No 20, Oct
social cohesion.
P

Points-Based Immigration Points systems can take many different forms,

some of which have little in common with each
Madeleine Sumption other. In the purest version of the points-based
Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, immigration model, prospective immigrants
USA apply directly to the relevant government agency
and can qualify to migrate on the basis of their
personal and human capital characteristics alone.
As a result, points systems are often referred to as
Keywords
“government-led” selection mechanisms,
because governments determine the selection
Points system; Points; Human capital; Highly
criteria. They are also known as “supply-driven”
skilled immigration; Merits-based immigration;
selection systems because applications depend on
Employer-based immigration; Hybrid systems;
prospective immigrants’ decisions rather than on
Government-led immigrant selection, Canada;
employers’ demand for specific foreign workers.
Australia; The United Kingdom
Points systems are usually defined in contrast
with the more widespread “employer-led” sys-
tems, under which migrants qualify to receive
Definition work visas only when they are sponsored by
prospective employers. In practice, points-based
A points system is a mechanism for determining and employer-led selection approaches are not
eligibility for employment-based immigration. In mutually exclusive, and several governments
a points-based immigration system, governments have experimented with hybrid selection models
devise a list of attributes or characteristics that that combine elements of both systems
they deem important for prospective foreign (Papademetriou et al. 2008). In particular, while
workers or their employers to possess to receive the term “points system” is often used to refer to a
a temporary, provisional, or permanent visa. Dif- system that admits immigrant workers without a
ferent attributes are assigned a certain number of job offer, several recently introduced versions of
points, and applicants who earn sufficient points points systems either require or prioritize a job
are eligible to apply for a visa. The points system offer in the application process.
was first introduced in Canada in 1969 and has Points systems were traditionally used to
since been adopted and adapted by several other admit immigrants on a permanent basis, although
countries, including Australia, New Zealand, more recent adopters such as Austria and Den-
Hong Kong, Denmark, Austria, and Singapore. mark have used them to admit workers on an
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_65-2
2 Points-Based Immigration

initially temporary basis, adjudicating permanent working life ahead of them. Third, awarding
residence applications a few years later. Austria points for age may help to offset the disadvantage
also uses a points system to determine eligibility that younger applicants otherwise face because
for job-search visas that allow prospective immi- they have had less time to accumulate work
grants to come to the country to find work. More experience.
unusually, some Chinese provinces and cities Education and relevant work experience
have used points systems to award urban hukou appear in almost all points systems. Applicants
registration (a status which confers various social can often earn additional points if their education
benefits and rights) to internal, mostly rural, and experience were gained in the host country,
migrants. on the basis that local education and experience
are among the factors that best demonstrate
migrants’ ability to integrate. Local education is
Commonly Used Criteria in Points valued because it is easily recognized by local
Systems employers, reducing the barriers to employment
than foreign-trained professionals often face.
The most basic points system comprises a pass Local work experience is a signal that host-
mark and a list of points for various individual, country employers have “endorsed” an individ-
occupational, or employer characteristics. Points ual’s qualifications by choosing to employ them.
are typically awarded for criteria that imply that Language skills appear in all of the major
applicants have high levels of human capital or points systems and are considered one of the
that their skills are in high demand. The most most important predictors of an immigrant’s abil-
common attributes for which points are awarded ity to find employment at their skill level. All
are language ability, education, age (i.e., youth), systems award points for proficiency in the
and work experience, especially in occupations national language or languages, while some
considered to be in high demand. Less common non-English-speaking countries reward English
criteria include the intention to settle outside of or other widely used second languages. Austria
the major destination regions or cities, the pres- rewards English language skills as well as as its
ence of close relatives in the country, and the native German, for example, and applicants in
education and work experience of an applicant’s Denmark can earn points for Danish, Swedish,
partner (these criteria are also less valued, earn- Norwegian, German, or English.
ing considerably fewer points). Some points systems award points for specific
Points systems generally allocate points to occupational skills considered to be in high
factors that are associated with (a) a positive demand. New Zealand, for example, gives extra
economic contribution (such as high levels of points for applicants with qualifications, a job
human capital or specific occupational skills) offer, or work experience in one of a list of
and (b) the ability to integrate successfully into occupations perceived to face a shortage of qual-
the receiving country’s labor market. ified workers. In 2002, Canada stopped awarding
Most points systems award points for age, points for specific occupations because of con-
with younger applicants generally receiving cerns that immigrants selected on this basis did
higher scores. Age is valued for several reasons. not fare well in the labor market; the revised
First, people who migrate at a younger age, on points test instead emphasized education and lan-
average, integrate more seamlessly into the labor guage more strongly, and the data from the pro-
market, are more likely to be able to learn the gram suggest that immigrants selected under the
local language, and have a longer time horizon in new system have fared better in the labor market
which to invest in local human capital (such as (even if poor labor market outcomes from points-
qualifications or in-work training). Second, youn- tested migrants is still a major concern in Canada)
ger migrants contribute more to resolving demo- (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010). In
graphic imbalances, because they have a longer 2011, Australia also stopped awarding points for
Points-Based Immigration 3

specific occupations; the new system required all some prospective immigrants could earn suffi-
migrants coming under the national-level points cient points for entry on the basis of their educa-
test to work in one of a narrower list of occupa- tion alone. Canada, by contrast, gives most
tions, while pushing applicants in other occupa- weight to having a job offer or sponsorship by a
tions toward employer-sponsored visas. Canadian province.
Other points systems have used more unusual By way of example, Table 1 shows the points
criteria. In 2012, Australia introduced a new allocations in Australia for prospective migrants
“innovation points test” for migrants applying applying without an employer or regional-
under its business innovation and investment pro- government sponsor. Applicants can reach the
gram designed to attract investors and entrepre- required 60 points in numerous ways. For exam-
neurs. This test include several criteria that do not ple, an individual between the ages of 25 and
usually appear in points systems. In addition to 32 who speaks excellent English will reach the
age, language, and educational qualifications, it pass mark with relative ease by earning just
gave points for years of business and investment 10 points in other areas (e.g., having a diploma
experience, financial assets that the individual or trade qualification or higher). An older appli-
may be able to invest, the turnover of businesses cant would need higher qualifications; for exam-
they own, and certain indicators of innovation ple, a 42-year-old applicant (15 points) might
such as having registered patents or being reach the pass mark with 10 years of work expe-
involved in joint ventures or export trade. rience (20 points), a bachelor’s degree (15 points),
In China, some subnational jurisdictions use and proficiency in English (10 points).
points systems to award hukou registration to Several points systems have compulsory
residents from other areas within China; these requirements in addition to optional ones. For
systems have rewarded criteria such as property example, Australia and New Zealand require a
ownership, charitable giving, and blood donation minimum threshold of English language ability,
(Zhang 2012). while Denmark requires applicants to have at
least a bachelor’s degree. Australia also requires
applicants to have their credentials and skills
The Mechanics of Points Systems assessed and validated by the relevant assessing
agency in Australia before prospective candi-
Points systems can come in many forms, adapted dates apply for a visa.
to a country’s policy objectives and circum- Traditionally, points systems have made
stances. They generally provide significant flexi- applicants eligible for a visa if their points equal
bility for determining eligibility – for example, or exceed the specified pass mark. However,
applicants might qualify if they have either very recently the ‘expression of interest’ model has
high levels of education or substantial work expe- become more popular. Under this system, created
rience in the host country and they might be able in New Zealand and later adopted in Australia
to compensate for deficiencies in one area (such and Canada, applicants with more than a certain
as language ability) with higher achievement in number of points are instead admitted to a “pool,”
another (such as education). As a result, the from which candidates are then invited by the
points system is essentially a way of organizing government (or, potentially, by employers or
information about the different ways in which regional governments); this system is designed
applicants can qualify for visas. to give the government greater control over the
The criteria in points systems are not weighted number of applicants that are eligible in a given
equally. Some characteristics earn their holders period and to select people from the pool who are
more than others, and the emphasis that the var- considered most skilled or most closely matched
ious attributes receive varies widely by country. to current labor market needs. The UK policy,
In late 2012, for example, Denmark’s points test meanwhile, specifies that a points test should be
valued academic credentials above all else, and used to prioritize applications for employer-
4 Points-Based Immigration

Points-Based Immigration, Table 1 Points table for Australian skilled independent visa (subclass 189)
Maximum points Attribute for which maximum
Category awarded points are awarded
Age 30 25–32 years old
English language ability 20 Superior English
Work experience in Australia 20 8–10 years
Work experience overseas 15 8–10 years
Education qualifications 20 Doctorate degree
From Australian institution or overseas qualification of
recognized standard
Other qualifications, including: 5 for each attribute
Study within Australia
Professional year in Australia
Skilled partner
Speaks community language
Studied in regional Australia
Pass mark 60
Source: Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012)

sponsored visas only in the event that the numer- criteria. The United Kingdom previously oper-
ical limit on these visas is oversubscribed this ated a traditional points system that allocated
happened for the first time in June 2015. points for human-capital characteristics and
Since points systems are, at their core, a way admitted immigrants without a job offer, but
of presenting information about eligibility this route was closed to new entrants in 2010.
criteria, almost any country’s immigration could
be organized into a points system without any
change to the underlying eligibility criteria. Policy Rationale and Critiques of Points
A typical employer-led immigration system Systems
could be presented as a points system in which
immigrants earn 100 % of the required points by Governments that rely on points systems have
having an employer sponsor. The United King- done so for a number of reasons. First, the points
dom, for example, uses a points system to orga- system allows governments to choose the charac-
nize information about eligibility requirements in teristics of selected immigrants. Points systems
what is – in all but name – a relatively traditional that admit immigrants without a job offer have
employer-driven immigration system. Table 2 largely been used as a mechanism to accumulate
shows the points table for workers applying as human capital, bringing in workers with high
an employer-sponsored skilled worker (known in levels of qualifications who are thus expected to
the United Kingdom as “Tier 2 of the points- contribute economically in the long run (even if
based system”). Applicants must earn at least their integration is not always immediate). Points
70 points to qualify; the only way of earning systems may also have a demographic objective,
70 points is to meet all of the listed criteria. prioritizing applications from younger immi-
This is not a points system as the term is typically grants who have a full working (and tax-paying)
understood. It does not allow immigrants to apply life ahead of them. Meanwhile, points systems
without an employer sponsor, applicants do not that require a job offer or employer sponsor are
earn points on the basis of their human-capital often designed to ensure that the immigrants that
characteristics such as age or education, and there employers select have a minimum threshold of
is no flexibility in how applicants can meet the human capital and thus (a) have the potential to
Points-Based Immigration 5

Points-Based Immigration, Table 2 Points awarded in the United Kingdom for employer-sponsored skilled workers
Attribute Points
Employer sponsorship 30
Job will pay appropriate salary 20
English language 10
Individual has GBP 945 to support self 10
Pass mark 70
Source: United Kingdom Borders Agency (2012)
“Appropriate salary” is defined in regulation according to the applicant’s occupation and experience level

integrate in the long run, even when no longer workers – giving credence to the concern that
working for their initial employer, and (b) are less points systems often lead to “brain waste” and
likely to compete for jobs with low-wage local do not identify workers with skills that local
workers. employers value. A further criticism of points
Second, points systems are transparent, since systems is that they are slower than employer-
the selection criteria can be easily published and led systems to react to changing labor market
explained; this allows governments to demon- conditions (including business cycles) and that
strate to their publics that immigrants are selected they do not satisfy employers’ demand for spe-
on merit and are bringing valuable human capital. cific workers to fill specific vacancies in real time.
The major critique of the points-based selec- In recent years, several countries have sought
tion model is that it has often been used to admit to address these problems by relying less on
immigrants without a job offer; there is thus no “pure” points systems that admit immigrants with-
guarantee that these individuals will find work at out a job offer. Canada and Australia have scaled
their skill level. Employers routinely dedicate back the share of immigrants admitted without a
very substantial resources to vetting prospective job offer and encouraged greater use of employer-
hires through interviews and tailored assess- sponsored visas. Hybrid selection systems that use
ments, but points systems are by their nature a points test but also require or prioritize a job
based on a relatively narrow set of criteria. Points offer have also become increasingly popular.
systems can only assess quantifiable skills and Some systems, such as Canada’s and New
credentials, and it is difficult for them to distin- Zealand’s, offer high numbers of points for a job
guish between qualifications of different quality offer, making it harder for people to qualify if they
or value to local employers. Some countries have do not already have employment lined up. The
attempted to address this problem by maintaining points system in Austria is also a hybrid of
lists of academic institutions from which points points-based and employer-led selection. Under
for education can be claimed or awarding extra the Austrian system, most applicants must have a
points for degrees from top-ranked institutions. job offer and pass a points test; applicants who
Denmark, for example, awards bonus points if the pass a slightly more stringent points test but do not
applicant’s university is among the top 400 world have a job offer can receive a 6-month job-search
universities, as ranked by the higher-education visa which can be converted into a work permit if
consultant Quacquarelli Symonds. they find skilled employment. Finally, some coun-
Points systems are also ill equipped to identify tries, including Australia and New Zealand, allow
“soft” attributes that are rewarded in the labor workers initially selected by an employer to qual-
market, such as interpersonal skills or informal ify for permanent residence or a status indepen-
on-the-job training. A research from Canada, in dent of their employer, by applying through the
particular, points to substantial un- and underem- points system; points tests that reward local work
ployment among points-selected foreign experience naturally facilitate this transition.
6 Points-Based Immigration

References economic migration schemes. Migration Policy Insti-

tute, Washington, DC, http://www.migrationpolicy.
Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship org/transatlantic/HybridSystems.pdf. Accessed 1 Dec
(2012) Skilled independent (subclass 189) visa. Online 2012
document. http://www.immi.gov.au/skills/skillselect/ UK Visas and Immigration (2016) Tier 2 of the Points Based
index/visas/subclass-189/#australian-study-requirements. System – Policy Guidance. https://www.gov.uk/gov
Accessed 3 June 2016 ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the /514054/Tier_2_Policy_Guidance_04_2016. Accessed
federal skilled worker program. http://www.cic.gc.ca/ 3 June 2016
english/pdf/research-stats/FSW2010.pdf. Accessed Zhang (2012) Economic migration and urban citizenship
3 Dec 2012 in China: the role of points systems. Popul Dev Rev
Papademetriou D, Somerville W, Tanaka T (2008) Hybrid 38(3):503–533
immigrant-selection systems: the next generation of
S

Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Directive, in December 2011, the United States
and Asylum issued specific guidelines for the evaluation of
asylum claims based on sexual orientation and
Rachel Lewis gender identity (USCIS 2011). Despite recent
Women and Gender Studies Program, George developments in political asylum policy, it is
Mason University, Fairfax, USA still difficult for LGBT refugees to translate
their experiences of persecution into the kinds
of narratives that are recognizable to the state.
Keywords Like all asylum applicants, LGBT refugees
must prove both that they have a “well-founded
Sexuality; Gender; Asylum; Refugee law; fear of persecution” and that they are members of
Human rights a particular social group (in this case, gay men,
lesbians, transgendered individuals, and so on).
The primary challenge to LGBT asylum claims
Definition lies in the fact that the 1951 Refugee Convention
was designed to protect individuals from racial,
The process of seeking asylum for persecution on religious, or political persecution, and the cate-
the basis of one’s sexual orientation or gender gory “social group” included neither women nor
identity; the challenges to political asylum claims individuals persecuted for their sexual orienta-
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. tion. Although sexual orientation and gender
identity have been included in the category
“membership of a particular social group” since
Overview the mid- to late 1990s, it is still the case that the
closer one’s application conforms to the tradi-
Since the United Nations Refugee Agency tional model of the male political activist fleeing
published its official guidelines on claims relating an oppressive regime, the more likely one is able
to sexual orientation and gender identity in 2008, to obtain asylum (Bohmer and Shuman 2008).
there has been a growing interest in the treatment While a number of countries – including the
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and inter- United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Czech
sex refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR 2008). Republic, and Australia – have recently rejected
While the European Union recently recognized the “discretion” argument (i.e., the notion that
sexual orientation as a cause of persecution in LGBT asylum applicants can return to their coun-
Article 10 of the EU Asylum Qualification try of origin and be “discreet” about their sexual
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_68-2
2 Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Asylum

orientation or gender identity), a growing number problems” by immigration officials, bisexuals

of LGBT asylum claims are now being refused on are deemed unworthy of protection because of
the grounds that the applicant’s claimed sexual the notion that it is possible for them to return to
orientation is disbelieved (Jansen and their country of origin and assume a heterosexual
Spijkerboer 2011; UKLGIG 2010). In assessing orientation (Jansen and Spijkerboer 2011). All of
the credibility of a political asylum applicant’s these stereotypes reinforce the idea that sexual
claim, the immigration officials often rely on orientation and gender identity can be strictly
stereotypical assumptions and expectations (i.e., ordered according to a set of categories within
that all lesbians and gay men engage in practices which heterosexuality remains the norm.
of cross-gender identification, that they all form In the future, there is a need for greater self-
part of a common social group with shared cul- awareness on the part of immigration officials
tural tastes and social spaces, and that they will about the challenges to establishing credibility
all “come out” as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or trans- in the context of asylum claims based on sexual
gendered immediately upon arrival in the receiv- orientation and gender identity. The United
ing country). Unlike other refugee claimants, Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has
who are not compelled to “perform” a visible suggested that asylum adjudicators need to be
identity as part of political asylum hearings, sensitive to the difficulties of proving sexual ori-
LGBT asylum applicants are frequently expected entation and focus instead on narratives that help
to conform to Western models of sexual citizen- individuals to articulate their sexual histories
ship grounded in visibility, consumption, and an (UNHCR 2008). By showing asylum adjudica-
identity in the public sphere in order to be con- tors how to better understand the complexities of
sidered worthy candidates for asylum. refugee narratives, LGBT asylum cases could
These sexual citizenship narratives, which are represent an important site of reform for political
based primarily on racialized sexual stereotypes asylum policy in the twenty-first century.
and behavioral white gay norms, pose particular Because claims based on sexual orientation and
challenges to lesbian asylum applicants. In the gender identity are so far removed from the initial
context of lesbian asylum cases, courts still refugee convention, they serve as an instructive
equate lack of documented evidence of human example for how the political asylum system
rights abuses against lesbians in country of origin might better account for the experiences of
reports with an absence of such persecution those subjects – namely, women, children, and
(Minter 2000; NCLR 2006; UKLGIG 2010). sexual minorities – to whom international human
Moreover, courts will often disregard the interre- rights discourses have traditionally been slow to
lation of gender and sexual identity in narratives attend.
of lesbian persecution. The privileging of credi-
bility assessment in women’s and LGBT’s asy-
lum claims means that lesbian asylum cases are
References
frequently evaluated on the basis of
heteronormative assumptions about lesbian sex- Bohmer C, Shuman A (2008) Rejecting refugees: political
uality. For example, lesbian asylum applicants asylum in the twenty-first century. Routledge, New
are regularly asked by judges to “explain the York
nature of a sexual relationship between two Human Rights Watch (2010) Fast-tracked unfairness:
detention and denial of women asylum seekers in the
women” (Human Rights Watch 2010). As a UK. Resource document. http://www.hrw.org/sites/
recent report examining asylum claims based on default/files/reports/uk0210webwcover.pdf. Accessed
sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe 30 July 2012
has shown, bisexual and transgender identities Jansen S, Spijkerboer T (2011) Fleeing homophobia: asy-
lum claims related to sexual orientation and gender
tend to be similarly misunderstood by asylum identity in Europe. Resource document. http://www.
adjudicators; while transgender and intersex indi- rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%
viduals are commonly labeled as “medical
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Asylum 3

20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf. Accessed United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

30 July 2012 (2011) Guidance for adjudicating lesbian, bisexual,
Minter S (2000) Lesbians and asylum: overcoming bar- gay, transgender, and intersex asylum claims.
riers to access. Resource document. http://www. Resource document. http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/
asylumlaw.org/docs/sexualminorities/Lesbian%20Issu Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%20Asylum/Asylum/
esPacket.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2012 Asylum%20Native%20Documents%20and%20Static
National Center for Lesbian Rights (2006) The %20Files/RAIO-Training-March-2012.pdf. Accessed
challenges to successful lesbian asylum claims. 30 July 2012
Resource document. http://www.nclrights.org/site/
DocServer/challenges_lesbian_asylum_cases.pdf?
Further Reading
docID=1142. Accessed 30 July 2012
Berg L, Millbank J (2009) Constructing the personal nar-
The UN Refugee Agency (2008) UNHCR guidance note
ratives of lesbian, gay and bisexual asylum claimants.
on refugee claims relating to sexual orientation and
J Refug Stud 22(2):195–223
gender identity. Resource document. http://www.
Morgan D (2006) Not gay enough for the government:
unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48abd5660.pdf. Accessed
racial and sexual stereotypes in sexual orientation asy-
30 July 2012
lum cases. Law Sex Rev 15:135–161
UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group (2010)
Randazzo T (2005) Social and legal barriers: sexual ori-
Failing the grade: home office initial decisions on
entation and asylum in the United States. In:
lesbian and gay claims for asylum. Resource docu-
Luibhéid E, Cantú L (eds) Queer migrations: sexuality,
ment. http://uklgig.org.uk/docs/publications/Failing%
U.S. citizenship, and border crossings. University of
20the%20Grade%20UKLGIG%20April%202010.pdf.
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 30–60
Accessed 27 Jan 2013
F

Fertility of Immigrants minority groups. The fertility and immigration

subject area complements the field of sociology
Sylvie Dubuc concerned with social and cultural assimilation/
Department of Social Policy and Intervention, integration processes of minority groups. Today,
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK the field is mainly concerned with the adaptation
of fertility to the country of resettlement follow-
ing international migration, although some of the
Definition concepts are derived from earlier work studying
fertility of internal migrants, notably rural–urban
Fertility and immigration is a subject area of migrants. Most of the work on fertility and immi-
demography and population studies, investigat- gration has been conducted in developed Western
ing how the fertility behavior of immigrants and countries, where the fertility of immigrants and
their descendents is influenced by the migration that of their descendants increasingly shape
process and the sending and resettlement national ethnic compositions.
environments. Many of the early studies on the fertility of
immigrants were conducted in Western countries
with long immigration histories, particularly the
Detailed Description USA, Australia, and Canada. Strong immigration
flows into Western European countries com-
Immigration affects the size and composition of menced during the economic recovery after
the population directly and indirectly, through World War II and were often fuelled by migrants
childbearing. Understanding the ways in which from former colonies. The rather heterogenic ter-
resettlement and adaptation to the socioeconomic minology used to describe the incorporation pro-
and cultural context of the receiving country may cess of new comers to the receiving society
influence the fertility of immigrants and that of probably reflects the absence of theoretical con-
their descendants is of interest to minority group sensus on the matter. While the general concept
integration processes and of practical value for of integration is widely but not exclusively used
ethnic population projections. Because fertility is in Europe, the somewhat differing notion of
a major characteristic of immigrant assimilation prevails in the USA, mainly pivoting
groups – reflecting on socioeconomic and cul- on the assimilation theory (see Schneider and
tural norms – changes in childbearing behavior Crul 2010 and references therein). Although crit-
can serve as indicators of assimilation and inte- icized, assimilation theory remains prevalent to
gration processes of immigrants and ethnic analyze the incorporation of immigrants (Barkan
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_69-1
2 Fertility of Immigrants

Fertility of Immigrants, Table 1 Theoretical framework to analyze fertility of immigrants

Disruption hypothesis Stress associated with migration resulting in temporary fertility disruption,
lowering fertility
Interrelation with family Migration linked with union/family formation, fertility often especially high
formation following migration
Selectivity effects Characteristics of migrants are different to that prevalent in their country of origin.
Family/childbearing aspirations are closer to the receiving country than the norms
in the sending country
Socialization hypothesis Influence of the context of socialization in influencing fertility choices
Adaptation hypothesis Immigrant’s adaptation with duration of settlement to the fertility norms in the
receiving country
Socialization hypothesis Influence of the context of socialization in influencing fertility choices
Assimilation and Intergenerational fertility adaptation toward the mainstream, pace of fertility
intergenerational adaptation convergence depending on duration of settlement and socialization
Characteristics hypothesis Differences in fertility between immigrants and natives are due to unequal
socioeconomic characteristics
Subculture hypothesis Prevalence of the norms and values in the sending country on fertility choices of
immigrants and their descendants
Segmented assimilation Impact of ethno-cultural dimension in the process of incorporation, groups may
hypothesis assimilate to various socioeconomic strata of the society
Minority status hypothesis In response to minority status penalty, individuals/families have fewer children in
order to facilitate upward social mobility

2007; Alba and Nee 2003) and is applied to behavior – whereby the values and norms at the
understand fertility of immigrants’ children in childhood place of residence largely influence
the USA (e.g., Bean et al. 2000; Parrado and later reproductive behavior – was supported by
Morgan 2008), although assimilation is increas- the fertility behavior of first-generation migrants
ingly understood in a broader sense, compared to in industrialized countries (e.g., Duncan 1965).
its initial conceptualization. The socialization hypothesis and Gordon’s sem-
The more recent emergence of conflicting and inal work (1964) on the influence of the cultural
complementary hypotheses to explain fertility of and socioeconomic environment at destination
immigrant groups in Western countries (Table 1) underpinned the linear assimilation theory.
probably reflects on their heterogeneity and our Applied to fertility, the linear assimilation theory
increasingly detailed understanding of the under- assumes that immigrants are influenced by repro-
lying factors influencing fertility of immigrants. ductive norms and values in their place of origin
and childhood environment (Goldstein and Gold-
stein 1983) and the fertility of immigrants at
destination would be weighted by the duration
Early Work
of stay in each place, resulting in ethnic fertility
differentials. The fertility adaptation to the desti-
Although the link between fertility and interna-
nation country would occur over time and partic-
tional migration has received much attention,
ularly from generation to generation (Goldstein
earlier work on rural–urban migration has
and Goldstein 1983; Stephen and Bean 1992).
nourished our understanding on how newcomers
Immigrants’ children are therefore expected to
adapt to the environment of resettlement. Park’s
show a fertility pattern closer to the local norm
first conceptualization of assimilation of new-
(i.e., traditionally white mainstream levels) than
comers was based on the socioeconomic adapta-
the one of their immigrant parents and that of the
tion of internal migrants to urban Chicago. The
new comers from the same region of origin,
socialization hypothesis applied to fertility
Fertility of Immigrants 3

Fertility of Immigrants, 250

Fig. 1 Prior and
postmigration ASFRs of
immigrant women in the 200

Births per 1,000 women

UK (Source: Dubuc (2012)) Prior women's
150 migration

Post migration
100
Total immigrant
women
50

0
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
5 years age group of women

assuming a constant selectivity effect of migra- the disruption hypothesis, although lower fertility
tion over time. According to Gordon (1964), after migration may be temporary. A “catch up”
immigrants’ social and economic adjustment to effect a few years after resettlement was observed
the receiving country would follow their cultural in some studies.
assimilation. Therefore, socioeconomic assimila- Many studies, notably in Europe, found a
tion to the general profile of the society of settle- higher parity progression of immigrants com-
ment would result in full fertility convergence pared to that of nonmigrants shortly after arrival.
(Bean and Marcum 1978). For instance, in France, a peak of fertility within
3 years following migration was observed
(Toulemon 2004). The interrelation of migration
Influence of the Migration Process and union/family building is likely to increase
on Fertility fertility following migration. The high
postmigration fertility is often thought to fully
Major sources of criticism of the traditional linear compensate for especially low premigration
assimilation theory include the association levels, presumably due to earlier childbearing
between structural (social and socioeconomic) postponement in the country of origin.
assimilation and acculturation and the view of Low premigration fertility and high
assimilation as a linear process. Deviation from postmigration levels were evidenced for immi-
the expectation of the linear assimilation theory grants in France (Toulemon 2004), the USA
with respect to fertility has led many contempo- (Parrado 2011), and the UK (Dubuc 2012,
rary analysts of immigrants’ fertility to mobilize Fig. 1). For instance, Emilio Parrado (2011)
a number of concurrent and/or complementary found that the apparent high fertility of Hispanic
hypotheses (e.g., Milewski 2010). These include immigrants in the USA recorded in previous stud-
hypotheses related to the migration process ies was the result of postmigration fertility mea-
per se. surements, whereas the total fertility was
The disruption hypothesis postulates that significantly lower when premigration fertility
prolonged partner separation and stress associ- history of immigrant women was taken into
ated with the migration process would disrupt account. These differences called into question
childbearing postmigration. The depressed fertil- the use of standard period total fertility rates
ity of some immigrant groups shortly after immi- (period TFRs) that are based solely on birth reg-
gration to Canada (Ram and George 1990), the istration data in the receiving country to approx-
USA (Stephen and Bean 1992), and Australia imate the average number of children of
(Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2000) support immigrants. For instance, in France, the period
4 Fertility of Immigrants

TFR of immigrants based on vital statistics was 1980s, fertility decreased more rapidly among
0.86 higher than the TFR of the French native non-Hispanic White natives than among His-
(1.86) over the period 1991–1998. Over half of panic immigrants, contributing to widen the gap
this difference was shown to be attributable to (Bean and Tienda 1987; Kahn 1994). The
period TFR calculations compared with calcula- decrease in fertility of Hispanic immigrants in
tions including the premigration fertility history recent years is consistent with and is reflective
(Toulemon 2004). of the fertility transition in their sending country
The selectivity or selection hypothesis postu- (Parrado 2011).
lates that migrants are a select group with specific The socialization hypothesis emphasizes the
sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., age, fam- role of the main place/environment of socializa-
ily/marital status, education, employment, and tion in shaping norms and consequently repro-
inspirational model) influencing family forma- ductive choices. According to the socialization
tion and reproductive choices. Therefore, fertility hypothesis, the main place of childhood largely
of immigrants may be closer to those at destina- shapes the fertility of women. Evidence in sup-
tion than the fertility norms in their place of port has been provided by studies showing that
origin (e.g., Sobotka 2008). Although the selec- the women’s age at immigration largely influ-
tivity hypothesis is often considered in studies of ences fertility behavior (e.g., Andersson 2004;
fertility and immigration, its validity has rarely Toulemon 2004).
been tested. Immigrants from high-fertility coun- The adaptation hypothesis focuses on the role
tries tend to exhibit fertility levels lower than of the duration of settlement of new comers in
those in their country of origin (e.g., Abbassi converging fertility across immigrant groups
Chavazi and Mc Donald 2000). Potentially, this toward the local norm – generally estimated by
may be an effect of selectivity, as it has been the average fertility at destination, potentially as
suggested of Indian immigrants in Australia and a result of an adjustment to the new institutional,
the UK. However, other factors may apply, economic, cultural, and political context (e.g.,
including the disruption effect and/or the influ- Hervitz 1985). The adaptation hypothesis is
ence of the host country. supported by a number of studies, showing a
convergence of immigrants’ fertility to the local
norms or childbearing behaviour depending on
Settlement of Immigrants in the Host the duration of residence in the receiving country
Society (e.g., Ford 1990; Kahn 1994; Sobotka 2008).
In accordance with the socialization hypothe-
Other hypotheses relate to the influence of the sis, immigrants who arrived in their early child-
context in which immigrants are living. The influ- hood (the so-called 1.5 generation) show stronger
ence of the immigrant background and that of the signs of adaptation to the receiving country’s
receiving country’s environment in determining childbearing prosil. For example, Lebanese who
fertility remain a matter of debate. migrated to Australia in their childhood show
Immigrants tend to exhibit fertility levels considerably lower fertility than other migrants
between those in the sending country and those from Lebanon and similar to that of the second
at destination. The difference between immi- generation (Abbasi-Shavazi and Mc Donald
grants’ and natives’ fertility may fluctuate over 2000).
time linked to fertility dynamics either in the
sending or receiving country. For instance, fertil-
ity of immigrants from Hispanic countries to the Intergenerational Adaptation Processes
USA was stable during the baby boom years
when US natives’ fertility was rising, resulting The descendents of immigrants are mostly
in a narrowing of the fertility gap (Parrado and nationals of their resident country. These are
Morgan 2008). In contrast, in the 1970s and commonly referred to as second, third, and
Fertility of Immigrants 5

successive generations the and may further be (presumably with large family) to more modern
distinguished by ethnic or racial categories (small nuclear family) attitudes to fertility. Per-
when these differ from the majority white popu- sistence of differences in fertility between ethnic
lation of Western countries. Recalling and groups would reflect differences in
extending the socialization hypothesis, the fertil- sociodemographic and/or economic characteris-
ity of the second and successive generations has tics of their members over generations, according
been generally assumed to converge toward that to the characteristic hypothesis. The role of
of the majority ethnic group. This assumption female education in shaping fertility patterns
was supported by the rapid converging fertility and differences between immigrant groups and
of the descendants of earlier European immigrant natives appears particularly significant and
waves to the USA (Morgan et al. 1994). In inversely related (e.g., Bean and Tienda 1987).
Europe, the converging fertility trends of descen- Some authors tend to distinguish the social char-
dants of immigrants from high-fertility countries acteristic hypothesis from the economic hypoth-
further support ongoing intergenerational inte- esis, derived from the economics of the family and
gration. Nonetheless, persisting fertility differen- particularly the “opportunity-cost” of rearing
tials over generations of some ethnic minority children.
groups may suggest some ethnic-specific fertility In contrast, the subculture hypothesis assumes
distinctiveness. the dominance of parental and ethnic community
Early critique of the linear assimilation theory values in the socialization process of the second
was based on the intergenerational fall in fertility generation and the maintenance of community or
of the Jews and some segments (middle and upper ethnic-specific cultural and family norms
class) of Black and Japanese Americans in the (independently of socioeconomic factors),
USA, below the level of White Americans of influencing fertility behavior across generations,
similar socioeconomic position. In response to shaping ethnic minorities. For instance,
the divergence from the expected pronatalist values promoted by traditional fami-
intergenerational fertility convergence, lism in Hispanic countries have been proposed to
Goldscheider and Uhlenberg (1969) proposed explain some of the maintenance of high fertility
the minority status hypothesis. Due to perceived among Hispanic immigrants and their children in
minority status penalty, and in the absence of the USA, which are not fully explained by their
pro-natal norms, individuals/families would social characteristics (Bean and Tienda 1987).
have fewer children in order to facilitate upward The causal link formulated at the origin of the
social mobility, potentially until full assimilation linear assimilation theory between cultural and
is completed. Further evidence of this effect was structural integration/assimilation processes and
found among relatively high-fertility minority later the co-occurrence between these dimensions
groups in the USA like Black Americans have been repeatedly contested. The more recent
(Ritchey 1975) and the Chicanos (Lopez and segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou
Sabagh 1978). The effect of the minority status 1993) proposes alternative combinations
on childbearing choices may apply independently between these two dimensions of assimilation
of cultural and structural factors influencing and an attempt to integrate some of the multicul-
fertility. turalist and structuralist views. The segmented
Intergenerational adaptive fertility behavior assimilation theory, whereby various groups
should accompany sociodemographic change may assimilate to various socioeconomic strata
(like age composition, marital status, age at mar- of the society (i.e., mainstream, upward, and
riage, education, and social class) of the second downward paths), includes an ethno-cultural
generation, assuming no strong inherited cultural dimension to the process of incorporation of
distinctiveness. Adaptation of fertility behavior immigrants and their children into the society of
would involve changes in family norms and settlement. The segmented assimilation proposi-
values, for instance, from traditional tion has hitherto mainly focused on social
6 Fertility of Immigrants

Fertility of Immigrants, Table 2 Children ever born (CEB) to women of Mexican origin: immigrant and two
successive generations in the USA
CEB Birth cohort Period of completed fertility
In Mexico 6.5 1910–1914 1950–1954
Immigrant generation 4.3 1910–1914 1950–1954
Second generation 3.5 1935–1939 1975–1979
Third generation 2.4 1960–1964 2000–2004
Non-Hispanic White 2.0 1960–1964 2000–2004
Sources: Drawn from Parrado and Morgan (2008), Tables 2 and 3

mobility, education, and socioeconomic achieve- the national levels has been evidenced for immi-
ment but is increasingly considered in immi- grants from high-fertility countries in the UK
grants’ fertility studies. Emerging research (Dubuc 2012), in the Netherlands (Garssen and
analyzing fertility behavior of immigrants’ chil- Nicolaas 2008), and Germany (Milewski 2010).
dren converging toward the national average in In Australia, Abbasi-Shavazi and Mc Donald
the USA remains inconclusive. A number of stud- (2000) found that adaptation of immigrants to
ies comparing fertility of Hispanic Americans by the local fertility pattern was the norm, although
immigration status (i.e., immigrant, second, and with some signs of cultural persistence over the
third and successive generations) found a rela- second generation of Italian and Greek ancestry.
tively high total fertility of third and successive
generations often above levels recorded for the
second generation (e.g., Carter 2000; Bean
The Contribution of Immigrants
et al. 2000). The apparent persistence of high-
to Fertility Replacement in Receiving
fertility levels of Hispanic Americans across gen-
Countries
erations is inconsistent with the expectation of
the linear assimilation theory and has been
Immigrants from high-fertility countries tend to
interpreted as indicative of downward social
dominate international migration movements
mobility and racial stratification (Frank and
contributing to a rise in overall fertility in receiv-
Heuveline 2005). However, more recent findings
ing countries with below-replacement fertility. In
on fertility of successive cohorts of immigrants
Europe, the contribution of higher fertility of
and subsequent generations of Hispanic Ameri-
migrants to the total fertility of receiving coun-
cans may suggest otherwise (Parrado and Morgan
tries remains relatively small (Sobotka 2008).
2008). Comparing completed number of children
Immigration and fertility of both Hispanic and
over the parent immigrant generation in the early
non-Hispanic immigrants, particularly Asians,
twentieth century and successive second and
have fuelled the recent population growth of the
third generations of Hispanic background, Emilio
USA. However, their expected contribution to
Parrado and Philip Morgan found evidence for a
radical changes in the demographic and ethno-
continued intergenerational decrease in fertility
racial composition of the USA may well be
and convergence toward the native childbearing
overestimated according to a recent study of
behaviour (Table 2). Changes in fertility of His-
cohort fertility of Hispanic immigrants (Parrado
panic American generations also follow the same
2011). The global fertility transition over the past
general trends as the US mainstream, providing
decades, showing rapidly decreasing fertility in
arguments for the impact of the US context in
many developing countries, is likely to influence
influencing fertility of immigrants’ descendants.
the fertility differential between sending and
Similarly, an ongoing process of
receiving countries in the future.
intergenerational fertility convergence toward
Fertility of Immigrants 7

Glossary Bean FD, Swicegood GC, Berg R (2000) Mexican-origin

fertility: new patterns and interpretations. Soc Sci
Q 81:404–420
Age-specific fertility rate (ASFR) Refers to Carter M (2000) Fertility of Mexican immigrant women in
the number of live births to females in a par- the U.S.: a closer look. Soc Sci Q 81:1073–1088
ticular age category in a particular year com- Dubuc S (2012) Immigration to the UK from high-fertility
pared to the number of females in that age countries: intergenerational adaptation and fertility
convergence. Popul Dev Rev 38(2):353–368
category. Most commonly 1 and 5 years age Duncan OD (1965) Farm background and differential
categories are used. fertility. Demography 2:240–249
Children ever born (CEB) CEB to women in a Ford K (1990) Duration of residence in the United States
particular age group is the mean number of and the fertility of U. S. immigrants. Int Migr Rev
24(1):34–68
children born alive to women in that age Frank R, Heuveline P (2005) A crossover in Mexican and
group. The number of children ever born to a Mexican-American fertility rates: evidence and expla-
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Garssen J, Nicolaas H (2008) Fertility of Turkish and
the data are collected. Moroccan women in the Netherlands: adjustment to
Cohort fertility A cohort is a group of women native level within one generation. Demogr Res
born in the same year. Cohort completed fer- 19(33):1249–1280. http://www.demographic-
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Goldscheider C, Uhlenberg PR (1969) Minority group
fertility of successive generations of women status and fertility. Am J Sociol 74(4):361–373
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Gordon MM (1964) Assimilation in American life the role
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old). A comparison of alternative hypotheses on the effects
of migration on fertility: the case of Brazil. Int Migr
Rev 19(2):293–317
Kahn JR (1994) Immigrant and native fertility during the
1980s: adaptation and expectations for the future. Int
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D

Dual/Multiple Citizenship citizens to hold multiple passports provides

increased mobility and enables expatriates to
Sara Wallace Goodman maintain connections with their country of birth
University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA or heritage. Dual citizenship can also facilitate
integration by encouraging immigrants to natu-
ralize and participate politically in their new
Definition country without compromising other connec-
tions. According to this view, compulsory renun-
Dual/multiple citizenship enables a person to ciation of prior citizenship(s) may not only
hold full membership – conveying rights, access, stymie migrants’ personal integration but also
and obligations – in two or more countries. generate a disincentive to citizenship acquisition
A person may have a claim to dual citizenship altogether. On the other hand, critics of dual
by any number of circumstances: they may inher- citizenship claim that it undercuts immigrant
ent citizenship from one or more parents, they integration and that, in maintaining a second cit-
may obtain citizenship through jus soli (birth in a izenship or identity, immigrants are never fully
territory, e.g., the United States recognizes all moored to their country of residence. Dual citi-
persons born in the country as citizens regardless zenship raises not only the specter of dual – and
of parental status), they may gain eligibility potentially divided – loyalty but it is also believed
through ancestral claims (Israel, e.g., allows any to create conflicts between states regarding an
Jewish immigrant to claim citizenship without imbalanced distribution of the benefits and bur-
renouncing other nationalities), they may gain a dens of citizenship, as dual citizens could enjoy
new citizenship through the process of naturali- multiple rights and benefits (such as social bene-
zation, or they may acquire it through other fits) or face multiple duties (such as military
means (e.g., through marriage). service) compared to mono-nationals. States
also may take different positions on whether to
allow dual citizenship for an immigrant natural-
Detailed Description izing into the host society (as is the focus of this
entry) compared to whether they allow expatriate
Dual citizenship is often at the center of vigorous citizens to maintain citizenship if they naturalize
political debate, both internally among political elsewhere. Politics are even further amplified
parties and across borders between the conferring when considering the implications not merely of
and sending states. On the one hand, allowing dual nationality but multiple citizenships.

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_76-2
2 Dual/Multiple Citizenship

Dual citizenship is widely accepted across Estonia Greece

many advanced democracies. Indeed, there has Germanya Hungary
been a recent wave of change in the past couple of Latvia Ireland
decades whereby more and more European states Lithuania Italy (1992)
have begun to adopt dual citizenship laws for Netherlandsb Luxembourg (2008)
immigrants (Faist 2007; Sejersen 2008). Italy Polandc Malta
abolished a requirement that immigrants natural- Sloveniad Portugal
izing as Italians renounce a previous citizenship Spaine Romania
in 1992, and other countries that have recently Slovakia
removed renunciation requirements include Sweden (2001)
Sweden (2001), Finland (2003), and, most United Kingdom
recently, Luxembourg (2008). These states join Non-EU
other Western European countries as well as the Croatia Iceland
postcolonial traditional countries of immigration Moldova (2002) Switzerland
Norway Turkey
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United
States (While the United States maintains allow- a
Not for citizens of other EU member states (since 2007)
ance for multiple citizenship de facto, naturaliz- b
Not between 1992 and 1997. After 1997, exemption for
ing citizens formally swear to “absolutely and persons born in the Netherlands and for spouses of Dutch
entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and citizens
c
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or In practice, renunciation is requested discretionarily and
performed in low numbers
sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore d
Not for citizens of other EU member states where there is
been a subject or citizen” during the Naturaliza- reciprocity
e
tion Oath of Allegiance.)), which all tolerate dual In practice, no evidence of renunciation is required
citizenship. The following table identifies these
states in the right-hand column as states that do This table also illustrates two additional pat-
not require renunciation as a condition for natu- terns of interest. First, there remain a number of
ralization. (For a full discussion and where this significant holdouts to the liberalizing trend of
table originally appears, see Goodman 2010.) tolerating multiple citizenships. Austria and Den-
This table pertains to the rules of dual citizenship mark, as well as a majority of recent European
for naturalizing immigrants; policies for native- Union accession countries, have firm require-
born citizens who naturalize abroad may differ. ments for renunciation. In the Netherlands, after
a period of allowing dual citizenship
(1992–1997), dual citizenship can now only be
Renunciation of Prior Citizenship
claimed by those applicants born in the Nether-
as a Requirement for Naturalization
lands or by spouses married to Dutch citizens.
Renunciation requirement The second trend this table indicates is that
Yes No while a number of states maintain a renunciation
Postcolonial requirement de jure, practices produce a de facto
Australia toleration of multiple citizenships. The many
Canada asterisks that appear next to country names in
New Zealand the left-hand column indicate some of these
United States exceptions to the rule. Effective enforcement of
European union renunciation exists in countries like Austria, the
Austria Belgium Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany
Bulgaria Cyprus (with the exception of citizens of other EU mem-
Czech Republic Finland (2003) ber states), and the Netherlands (except for per-
Denmark France
sons born in the Netherlands and spouses of
(continued)
Dutch citizens). In Spain, however, while persons
Dual/Multiple Citizenship 3

granted citizenship need to declare renunciation citizenship do so as an instrument for promoting

of a prior citizenship, they do not need to deliver immigrant integration within traditionally inclu-
any proof that they have actually lost another sive conceptions of citizenship, such as in Bel-
citizenship, and no request for information or gium, France, and the United Kingdom.
for evidence is sent to the country of the presump- Beyond the question of whether or not states
tively renounced citizenship. In Poland, persons allow for immigrants to obtain dual citizenship, a
granted citizenship are formally required to second question is whether immigrants decide to
renounce a previous citizenship, but this is take up multiple citizenships. Laws might make
applied in a discretionary manner and, as a result, or allow people to hold multiple citizenships due
a high percentage of persons become dual citi- to birth, heritage, marriage, or naturalization, but
zens through naturalization. There are also not everyone knows that they have the legal abil-
exceptions practiced when renunciation is ity to hold dual citizenship or identify unique
deemed unreasonable. The extent to which incentives for seeking out multiple passports.
exceptions are granted in countries like Austria, A study of naturalized immigrants in Canada in
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, for the 1990s Bloemraad (2004) showed that while
example, is based on the fee that candidates reports of dual citizenship had tripled from 1981
need to pay in their country of origin to be to 1996, only 17 % reported multiple nationality
released from their previous citizenship, which (Bloemraad 2004). Immigrants born in countries
varies from country to country. As a rule, renun- that allowed multiple citizenship and who were
ciation is normally not required when this is not naturalized Canadian citizens were, in the eyes of
possible (as is the case, e.g., for citizens from the law, dual citizens, but in every case but Swit-
most Arab countries). Also, for reasons of prac- zerland, less than half of immigrants acknowl-
tical impossibility or unreasonable burdens, a edged their dual citizenship status.
number of countries make explicit exceptions to This brief overview of dual citizenship poli-
the renunciation requirement for refugees. cies reveals patterns of both convergence toward
Why do some states allow for dual citizenship toleration and continued divergence with regard
while others do not? In some cases, countries to requiring renunciation of prior citizenship by a
have different historical interpretations of citi- certain group or by all outsiders. Though many
zenship, which have led to particular bureaucratic states that require renunciation by law do not
practices and political debates in a path- adhere to this stricture, a number of European
dependent way (Faist et al. 2004; Howard states continue to limit dual citizenship. The
2009). Greece, Italy, and Hungary are often salience of the politics of dual citizenship only
seen as more restrictive countries of immigration, reaffirms the continued relevance of political
but they have relatively liberal dual citizenship belonging and national membership through cit-
practices because they are historic nations of izenship in an age of migration, mobility, and
emigration. Sometimes the politics of dual citi- diversity.
zenship hinges on the composition and political
strength of immigrant populations within the
country or co-ethnic communities living abroad. References
Thus, in the cases of Hungary, Greece, and Italy,
dual citizenship is a strategy for keeping expatri- Bloemraad I (2004) Who claims dual citizenship?
ates and co-ethnics living abroad connected to The limits of postnationalism, the possibilities of
transnationalism, and the persistence of traditional
homeland identity. Spain is an exception to this citizenship. Int Migr Rev: IMR 38(2):389
rule, but allows for an easier, facilitated natural- Faist T (2007) Dual citizenship in Europe: from nation-
ization among co-ethnics from Spanish-speaking hood to societal integration. Ashgate, Burlington
countries. Other countries that tolerate dual Faist T, Gerdes J, Rieple B (2004) Dual citizenship as a
path-dependent process. Int Migr Rev 38(3):913–944
4 Dual/Multiple Citizenship

Goodman SW (2010) Naturalisation policies in Europe: Howard MM (2009) The politics of citizenship in Europe.
exploring patterns of inclusion and exclusion. In: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
EUDO citizenship comparative reports. Florence: Sejersen TB (2008) “I Vow to Thee My Countries” – the
EUDO Citizenship, Robert Schuman Centre for expansion of dual citizenship in the 21st century. Int
Advanced Studies, EUI Migr Rev 42(3):523–549
I

Indirect Methods for Estimating Detailed Description

Internal Migration
Indirect methods estimate net migration based on
Richelle Winkler1 and Katherine J. Curtis2 the principles of the demographic balancing
1
Department of Social Sciences, Michigan equation, which explains that a population in a
Technological University, Houghton, MI, USA given geography changes through births, deaths,
2
University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA and migration. Population change between two
time periods for any geographic area is the com-
bined result of natural increase (births minus
Synonyms deaths) and net migration (in-migration minus
out-migration). The demographic balancing
Cohort forward survival methods; Residual equation can be rearranged to calculate net
methods migration, shown below, whereby P0 is the pop-
ulation in a geography at time zero, P1 is the
population at a future time, B is the number of
births in that geography between the two time
Definition
points, and D is the number of deaths:
Indirect methods are a set of techniques used to
Net MigrationðNMÞ ¼ ðP1  P0 Þ  ðB  DÞ
estimate net migration and net migration rates
based on population counts and other character-
Because population counts are generally known
istics (i.e., vital statistics, life tables) at two suc-
from censuses and natural increase is generally
cessive time periods. The methods do not require
known from vital statistics (or can be estimated
administrative data collection of individuals’
using survival ratios), net migration is indirectly
moves or specific survey or census questions
estimated as the residual of this equation. For this
about migration. They are applied to geographic
reason, indirect methods are sometimes referred
units (e.g., counties, states) and can be calculated
to as residual methods. Residual methods can be
for subpopulations (e.g., age, sex, race,
applied to generate migration estimates by
ethnicity).
unchanging demographic characteristics includ-
ing age, sex, race, and/or ethnicity.
The basic strategy is to start with a beginning
population at a particular age (i) at time zero,
advance the population forward in time t years
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_83-1
2 Indirect Methods for Estimating Internal Migration

so age is i + t at time t, and adjust the population table methods use established life tables to esti-
for natural increase that occurs over the time mate natural increase for component geogra-
period (t) to generate an “expected” population phies. This practice becomes problematic when
at time t had there been no net migration. The appropriate life tables are not available for all
estimate of the number of net migrants is the geographies of interest. For instance, national
observed population at time t (based on the suc- life tables may not accurately represent mortality
cessive census) minus the expected population. in each component geography of a country. Cen-
This estimate is divided by the expected popula- tral challenges with this approach are the poten-
tion to construct a net migration rate. tial misrepresentation of mortality for constituent
Net migration captures the balance of geographies, the inability to account separately
in-migration and out-migration in a geographic for international migration without introducing
area over the intercensal time period. It cannot specific measures, and the effects of census cov-
measure inflows, outflows, gross migration (total erage and reporting errors.
sum of migrants), or migration streams from one Census survival ratio methods estimate popu-
location to another. Thus, indirect methods cap- lation “survival” by comparing the ratio of the
ture migration’s contribution to population redis- number of people in the same national cohort at
tribution, not individual migration experiences. successive censuses. An example is to compare
Residual methods can be based on vital statis- the number of people in the USA who are aged
tics or survival ratios. Vital statistics methods 20–24 in Census 2000 to the number of people in
directly incorporate data on births and deaths to the USA who are aged 30–34 in Census 2010.
inform the demographic balancing equation. This This ratio captures mortality and the relative dif-
approach provides “theoretically exact” esti- ference between census coverage and reporting
mates of net migration (Siegel and Hamilton errors in the two censuses. National data must be
1952) since each of the data points is a count of used since the goal is to create a survival ratio
the population or demographic events. Typically, reflecting mortality, not migration. The census
it combines internal and international migration survival ratio approach is preferred for its few
unless specific assumptions are introduced to data requirements and generally works well in
subtract international migration. While concep- circumstances with incomplete data (McInnis
tually simple, vital statistics approaches require 1974). However, the assumption that survival
more data points than other indirect methods and ratios, census coverage errors, and international
the amount of data that must be collected and migration for component geographies are the
organized can be overwhelming, particularly same as the nation can be problematic, particu-
when generating estimates of demographic char- larly in circumstances with high mortality and
acteristics (e.g., age) for multiple small geogra- geographic variability.
phies. This approach is only feasible for Important limitations to all indirect
geographies with reasonably complete vital reg- approaches are that only net migration is avail-
istration systems and censuses. The greatest con- able, with no counts for gross flows or streams;
cerns associated with vital statistics methods time periods must be defined for intercensal
center on errors in census or vital statistics data, periods to generate highly accurate estimates;
including misallocations, undercounts/over- and it is not possible to estimate migration for
counts, and missing data. Moderate errors in cen- characteristics that change in unpredictable ways
sus counts produce large errors in net migration over time (i.e., educational levels, marital status,
estimates, although errors may be offsetting. or income). Potential complications common to
Survival ratio methods estimate the natural each of the residual approaches include census
increase portion of the demographic balancing misallocations and undercounts/overcounts,
equation using either life tables or census survival changes in census geographies, errors in vital
ratios. These methods provide reasonable esti- statistics or life table data, inability to separately
mates of net migration, not exact measures. Life account for international migration, and a lack of
Indirect Methods for Estimating Internal Migration 3

options for countries or geographies without Cross-References

quality mortality data.
▶ Demographic Balancing Equation
▶ Inflows
Application ▶ Migration Streams
▶ Net Migration
Indirect methods have been used by government ▶ Outflows
statistical agencies and researchers to estimate
net migration at least since the early 1900s and
continue to be popular methods around the world References
because of the limited data collection required,
high level of accuracy, applicability for small McInnis RM (1974) Census survival ratio estimates of net
geographic areas, and low cost. Especially in migration for Canadian regions. Can Stud Popul
1:93–116
the context of wide availability and highly accu- Siegel JS, Hamilton CH (1952) Some considerations in the
rate digital census and vital statistics data, vital use of the residual method of estimating net migration.
statistics approaches provide cost-effective and J Am Stat Assoc 47(259):475–500
robust estimates of net migration. In the USA,
for instance, a set of county-level net migration Further Reading
estimates by age, sex, and race has been produced Hamilton CH (1967) The vital statistics method of esti-
mating net migration by age cohorts. Demography
each decade from 1950 to 2010 by university- and
4(21):464–478
agency-based demographers with support from Morrison PA, Bryan TM, Swanson DA (2004) Chapter 19:
federal agencies. They are publically available Internal migration and short-distance mobility.
through the Inter-university Consortium for In: Swanson DA, Siegel JS (eds) The methods and
materials of demography, 2nd ed. Elsevier Academic
Social and Political Research (ICPSR) and online
Publishing out of San Diego, CA, pp 503–508 on
at www.netmigration.wisc.edu. “Residual Estimates”
The data are used by applied demographers in Smith SK, Swanson DA (1998) In defense of the net
generating small area population estimates and migrant. J Econ Soc Meas 24(3–4):249–264
Thomas DS, Arias J, Bachi R, Eldridge HT, Elizaga JC,
projections, by planners for understanding com-
Kono S, Macura M, Shryock HS, van den Brink T,
munity change, and by academics for ecological Zachariah KC (1970) United Nations. Chapter 2: Indi-
analyses of age- and race-specific migration pat- rect measures of net internal migration. In: United
terns. The authors rely on the US county-level net Nations manual VI, methods of measuring internal
migration. United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.
migration estimates by age, race, and ethnicity in
70.XIII.3
1950–2010 in their own research. Winkler Voss PR, McNiven S, Hammer RB, Johnson KM, Fuguitt
employs the data to understand the growing pull GV (2004) County-specific net migration by five-year
of environmental amenities for attracting age groups, Hispanic origin, race and sex 1990–2000,
CDE Working Paper no 2004–24. Center for Demog-
migrants to specific places at different points in
raphy and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
the life course. Curtis uses these data to investi- Madison
gate racial patterns of return migration to the US Winkler RL, Johnson KM, Cheng C, Beaudoin JM, Voss
South, and she is currently relying on them to PR, and KJ Curtis (2013) Age-specific net migration
estimates for US counties, 1950–2010. Applied Popu-
understand how natural disasters and climate
lation Laboratory, University of Wisconsin- Madison.
change interact with age- and race-specific Web. Accessed 9/29/2015. www.netmigration.wisc.
migration patterns to shift population composi- edu
tion in affected areas.
D

Dual-System Estimation et al. 2012). The name refers to the two frames
or populations from which all or a sample of units
Patrick J. Cantwell (people, wildlife, farms) are selected for
U.S. Census Bureau, Suitland, MD, USA enumeration.
Under specified conditions and assumptions,
by comparing the enumerations between frames
Definition and noting whether the units were captured in
both enumerations, one can estimate the size of
Dual-system estimation is a statistical method, the total population. The net coverage error of the
based on the capture-recapture technique, applied census can then be defined as the difference
to estimate the size of a population of people, between the estimated population size and the
animals, farms, etc. One enumerates the units of census count. If the census count is smaller than
interest independently in two separate frames and the estimated size, the difference is labeled as the
observes how many are found in each frame and estimated net undercount in the census. With a
in both frames. Under appropriate conditions, an net overcount, the census count is larger than the
estimate of the number missed – and thus an estimated size.
estimate of the size of the total population – can As noted, one can apply DSE to estimate the
be calculated. size of the total population. However, one of its
strengths is that it can also be used to estimate the
size of demographic subgroups or geographic
Concept and Use subdomains. Since 1990, the US Census Bureau
has conducted a survey following its census of
Dual-system estimation (DSE) is a statistical pro- population and housing and applied DSE to
cedure used to estimate the size of a population. It assess the quality of the census. The Census
is based on an approach, often referred to as Bureau then released estimates of net undercount
“capture-recapture” or “mark and recapture,” or overcount for the nation as a whole, the
long used to measure the number of wildlife in a 50 states and the District of Columbia, and for
region or setting (Petersen 1896; Lincoln 1930; demographic groups defined by race, gender, and
Sekar and Deming 1949). In recent decades, DSE age categories.
has been one of several methods applied to eval- To estimate the size of a subpopulation
uate the quality of a national census by estimating through DSE, the distinguishing characteristic
the actual number of people in a country or identifier should be collected or available in
(demographic analysis is another; see Devine both enumerations. If the characteristic is not
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_84-1
2 Dual-System Estimation

Dual-System Estimation, Table 1 Estimated undercount of Hispanics in the US census, 1990–2010

Census year Estimated undercount (%) Standard error (%)
1990 4.99 0.82
2000 0.71 0.44
2010 1.54 0.33
Source: US post-enumeration surveys (Mule 2012)

available in either enumeration, DSE cannot be (a) that the capture and recapture are conducted
used without additional assumptions or modifica- independently, (b) that each fish has an equal
tions to estimate the size of that subpopulation. chance of being captured initially, and (c) that
For example, the US census attempts to count each fish has an equal chance of being recaptured,
everyone living in the country as of census day, then the ratios N11/N+1 and N1+/N should be
but it does not collect information on place of approximately equal. Hence, an estimator for
birth, citizenship, or legal status in the country. the unknown total, N, is
Thus, a dual-system estimate or net undercount is
not produced for immigrants or noncitizens. N 1þ  N þ1
N^ ¼ (1)
On the other hand, the US census and its post- N 11
enumeration survey collect information on His-
panic origin, allowing an estimate of the net cov- or
erage of Hispanics in the USA. Post-enumeration
survey estimates of coverage among Hispanics N^ ¼
no: counted in first enumeration  no: counted in second enumeration
have been used to set upper bounds on coverage :
no: counted in both enumerations
among Hispanic subgroups, such as the Mexican (2)
or Hispanic foreign born (Van Hook et al. 2014),
or among groups containing larger portions of Turning from fish to people, the census itself is
Hispanics, such as the unauthorized foreign the initial capture, while a second
born (e.g., Passel and Cohn 2009) (Table 1). enumeration – often a post-enumeration sample
survey – represents the recapture. In Eq. 1, N11 is
the number of people enumerated in the census
How It Works and then later in the second enumeration. They
can be matched across the data files created from
To understand how DSE works, one can consider the two enumerations.
capture-recapture methodology. To estimate the
number of fish in a pond using this approach, one
captures a set of fish, tags them for later identifi- Erroneous Enumerations and Other
cation, and throws them back into the pond. After Complications
the fish have had time to disperse sufficiently, a
second set of fish is caught, representing the In extending the analogy of capture-recapture
“recapture.” One then counts the second set of from fish to people, much has been simplified to
fish and how many of them are tagged. All fish in focus on the basics. For example, the first row of
the pond can be placed into one of four categories the table portrays numbers of census enumera-
as depicted in the following Table 2: tions. Before inserting N11 and N1+ into Eq. 1 or 2,
Note that the numbers in the Table 2, N11, N1+, “erroneous enumerations” must be removed from
and N+1, can all be observed by counting the fish. each. In the pond analogy, one can think of an
The entry N22, and thus the true size of the erroneous enumeration as a captured “frog”; a
population N, is unknown. If we can assume frog does not contribute to the size of the fish
Dual-System Estimation 3

Dual-System Estimation, Table 2 Number of fish or people captured in the two enumerations
Found in second enumeration (recaptured)?
Yes No Total
Found in first enumeration (captured)? Yes N11 N12 N1+
No N21 N22 N2+
Total N+1 N+2 N

population in the pond. In a census, erroneous areas. Sampling weights and other adjustments
enumerations include people who should not can be applied to produce estimates for the entire
have been counted for any of several reasons: population or a subdomain of interest.
they had already been counted at a different A basic assumption on which DSE
(correct) location, they died before census day relies – whether estimating fish or people – is
or were born after census day, they were only that the two enumerations are conducted indepen-
visiting from another country, etc. dently. To satisfy this requirement, the second
The US census count also includes people for enumeration cannot use the same list frame or
whom so little valid information was collected any results obtained from the first enumeration.
that all the characteristics had to be imputed An independent area sample or another approach
(statistically inserted). For these people, it is often used. In the 1980 US Post-Enumeration
would be difficult to determine whether their Program, the second enumeration was based on a
census records match to someone in the second sample from the US labor force survey (Wolter
enumeration. DSE addresses this problem by 1986). When collecting data for the two enumer-
removing these records from the census count. ations, care must be taken so that neither will
The idea is that these people will generally be contaminate the results of the other.
found in the second enumeration but not match to In a census, the people enumerated are not
the census because of the missing census infor- actually “tagged” as the fish in a pond. To deter-
mation. Algebraically, if the frequency of these mine which ones are counted in both enumera-
records is relatively small, the effects on the tions, sophisticated computer or clerical
terms N11 and N1+ in Eq. 1 essentially offset matching operations are conducted (Hogan
each other. 1993). Although matching errors can occur due
The dual-system estimate removes erroneous to missing data or because addresses or people’s
and certain other census enumerations and then names may differ slightly between the two enu-
adjusts upward for units missed in the census. merations, procedures are implemented to mini-
Breaking the census count and the estimate into mize the errors. Follow-up interviews may be
these “components of census coverage,” as in the conducted to resolve a small portion of cases in
following table, can provide additional valuable which more information is needed.
information for assessing a census and preparing When catching fish on consecutive occasions,
for the next one (Mulry and Cantwell 2010) one might assume that the pond and the fish
(Table 3): population have not had much opportunity to
In practice, two samples are often used in DS- change before the recapture. A related issue
E. Although records from the entire census are when conducting a post-enumeration survey is
usually available, determining whether a census the delay between census day and the occurrence
enumeration is correct or erroneous is generally of the survey enumeration. Such a delay may be
done for only a sample to save money and time. warranted to maintain independence between the
For similar reasons, the second enumeration to two operations. However, a longer delay carries
measure coverage of the census is usually with it several risks. First, as the time between
conducted on only a sample of geographic enumerations grows, it is possible that the
4 Dual-System Estimation

Dual-System Estimation, Table 3 Components of census coverage for the US household population, 2010
(in thousands)
Component of census coverage Estimate Standard error Percent Standard error
Census count 300,703 0 100.0 0
Correct enumerations 284,668 199 94.7 0.07
Enumerated in the correct state 283,720 206 94.4 0.07
Enumerated in a different state 948 31 0.3 0.01
Erroneous enumerations 10,042 199 3.3 0.07
Due to duplication 8,521 194 2.8 0.06
For other reasons 1,520 45 0.5 0.01
Minimal information 5,993 0 2.0 0
Dual-system estimate from post-enumeration survey 300,667 429 100.0 0
Correct enumerations 284,668 199 94.7 0.07
Omissions 15,999 440 5.3 0.07
Net overcount 36 429 0.01 0.14
Source: US census coverage measurement survey of 2010 (Mule 2012)
Does not include people living in dormitories, prisons, military barracks, etc., or remote Alaska

respondents forget where they or their household enumerated. In a census, these variables might
members lived on census day or other details include demographic characteristics such as age,
relevant to the estimation. Perhaps more impor- gender, and owner/renter status, as well as oper-
tant, as this time grows, more people will have ational variables such as whether census forms
moved to another residence, making it more dif- are mailed in the area or the level of the mail
ficult to determine exactly who lived at which return rate.
address on census day. It can be shown that applying DSE within
One may recall, among the assumptions lead- post-strata is simply a special case of a more
ing to Eq. 1, that each fish has an equal chance of general modeling approach that uses logistic
being captured and that each fish has an equal regression to estimate the probability of being
chance for recapture. In fact, the accuracy of DSE included in both enumerations (Mule 2012).
generally increases if the underlying probabilities Working with the more general model allows
are equal for units (fish or people) in each enu- one to select a more efficient model – compared
meration separately. In reality, these probabilities to forming post-strata – and thus reduces the
are generally not equal among different units. As correlation bias.
they become more and more heterogeneous, an Other innovations can be applied to the con-
error labeled “correlation bias” can increase cept of DSE. With multiple-systems estimation,
(Konicki 2012). one extends the number of overlapping frames to
This problem can be addressed by defining a three or more. A third frame might consist of a
number of mutually exclusive groups, sometimes database of administrative records that covers all
called post-strata, such that the probability of or part of the universe of interest (Zaslavsky and
being captured in the pond or the census is more Wolfgang 1993). Matching records between any
homogeneous among those units within the same two frames, along with its difficulties and poten-
post-stratum (US Census Bureau 2004). To esti- tial for error, become more important and
mate the population total, one then computes the complex.
estimated total within each post-stratum and adds
the estimates across the post-strata. One can
define the post-strata using available variables
that are correlated with the chance of being
Dual-System Estimation 5

Cross-References http://www.census.gov/coverage_measurement/pdfs/
g01.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015
Mulry MH, Cantwell PJ (2010) Overview of the 2010
▶ Capture-Recapture census coverage measurement program and its evalu-
▶ Erroneous Enumerations ations. Chance 23(3):46–51
▶ Net Undercount Passel JS, Cohn D (2009) A portrait of unauthorized
▶ Omissions immigrants in the United States. Pew Hispanic Center,
Washington, DC, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/
▶ Post-Enumeration Survey 107.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015
Petersen CGJ (1896) The yearly immigration of young
plaice into the Limfjord from the German Sea. Rep
Dan Biol Station 6:5–84
References Sekar CC, Deming WE (1949) On a method of estimating
birth and death rates and the extent of registration.
Devine J, Bhaskar R, DeSalvo B, Robinson JG, J Am Stat Assoc 44:101–115
Scopilliti M, West KK (2012) The development and US Census Bureau (2004) Accuracy and coverage evalu-
sensitivity analysis of the 2010 demographic analysis ation of census 2000: design and methodology. DSSD/
estimates. US Census Bureau, Washington, DC http:// 03-DM. Issued September 2004. US Census Bureau,
www.census.gov/people/files/popworkingpapers/ Washington, DC. Chapter 7. http://www.census.gov/
Development%20and%20Sensitivity%20Analysis prod/2004pubs/dssd03-dm.pdf. Accessed 14 October
%202010%20DA.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015 2015
Hogan H (1993) The 1990 post-enumeration survey: oper- Van Hook J, Bean FD, Bachmeier JD, Tucker C (2014)
ations and results. J Am Stat Assoc 88:1047–1060 Recent trends in coverage of the Mexican-born
Konicki S (2012) 2010 Census coverage measurement population of the United States: results from applying
estimation report: adjustment for correlation bias. multiple methods across time. Demography
DSSD 2010 Census Coverage Measurement Memo- 51(2):699–726
randum Series #2010-G-11, https://www.census.gov/ Wolter KM (1986) Some coverage error models for census
coverage_measurement/pdfs/g11.pdf. Accessed 14 data. J Am Stat Assoc 81:338–346
October 2015 Zaslavsky AM, Wolfgang GS (1993) Triple-system
Lincoln FC (1930) Calculating waterfowl abundance on modeling of census, post-enumeration survey, and
the basis of banding returns. US Department of Agri- administrative-list data. J Bus Econ Stat 11:279–288
culture, Circular No 118: 1–4
Mule T (2012) 2010 Census coverage measurement esti- Further Reading
mation report: summary of estimates of coverage for Anderson M, Fienberg SE (2001) Who counts? The poli-
persons in the United States. DSSD 2010 Census Cov- tics of census-taking in contemporary America. Rus-
erage Measurement Memorandum Series #2010-G-01. sell Sage Foundation, New York
M

Methods for Estimating administrative data sources. The Census Bureau

International Migration annually produces estimates of international
migration as part of its Population Estimates Pro-
Melissa Scopilliti, Kirsten West and Jason gram. The population estimates use the most
Devine recent decennial census as a base and measure
U.S. Census Bureau, Suitland, MD, USA population change from the census forward. They
include one series of international migration esti-
mates, using the most robust methods for estimat-
Keywords ing international migration. In addition, the
Census Bureau produces international migration
International migration; Immigration; Emigra- estimates every decade as part of the Demo-
tion; Population estimates; Demographic graphic Analysis (DA) Program. The DA esti-
analysis mates are used to assess coverage of the most
recent decennial census. Unlike the population
estimates, the Demographic Analysis estimates
Definition do not use the decennial census as a base. They
are developed using historical data on births,
International migration is the movement of peo- deaths, and international migration and are inde-
ple across a national border. This includes both pendent of the census being evaluated. The DA
immigration (migration to a country) and emigra- estimates for 2010 included a range of interna-
tion (migration from a country) or the combina- tional migration estimates that reflected different
tion of the two (net international migration). The assumptions and methods for estimating interna-
US Census Bureau produces estimates of inter- tional migration. This entry will focus primarily
national migration annually as part of the Popu- on methods for estimating international migra-
lation Estimates Program and decadally as part of tion in the 2012 Population Estimates Program
the Demographic Analysis Program. although some alternative methods will be
presented.
The United States collects administrative data
Overview on some types of immigrants, but does not main-
tain administrative records on most persons leav-
International migration is a component of popu- ing the country (emigrants). For example, the
lation change (i.e., births, deaths, migration) that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) col-
is difficult to measure directly using lects and publishes information on immigrants
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht (outside the USA) 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_85-1
2 Methods for Estimating International Migration

who became naturalized US citizens, obtained Producing National-Level Estimates

legal permanent resident status, were admitted of Net International Migration
as refugees or granted asylum, or who entered
the United States as nonimmigrants (foreign Net international migration (NIM) is estimated at
nationals who are granted temporary entrance), the national level using the following
while the Department of State collects and pub- subcomponents:
lishes information on immigrant and
nonimmigrant visa issuances and refugee admis- (a) Foreign-born immigration (FBIM)
sions (Grieco and Rytina 2011). Although these (b) Foreign-born emigration (FBEM)
administrative data sources are useful for mea- (c) Net migration of the native-born population
suring particular migration streams, they cannot (NNM)
be used to measure total immigration flows unless (d) Immigration of the native- and foreign-born
assumptions are made for immigrant groups not population from Puerto Rico (PRIM)
represented (e.g., persons entering the United (e) Emigration of the native- and foreign-born
States illegally and citizens relocating to the population to Puerto Rico (PREM)
United States after residence abroad) or people (f) Net movement of the Armed Forces popula-
obtaining multiple visas within the time period of tion (AFM)
interest (may be counted in the statistics more
than once). In addition, little information is avail- where
able on people leaving the United States.
In the past, the Census Bureau used adminis- NIM ¼ FBIM  FBEM þ NNM þ PRIM
trative data sources to estimate international  PREM þ AFM:
migration as part of the Population Estimates
Program and pre-2000 Demographic Analysis Foreign-Born Immigration
estimates. However, during the last decade, data The term “foreign born” refers to people who
sources and methods were altered to incorporate were not US citizens at birth and includes both
information from the newly implemented Amer- noncitizens and naturalized US citizens. Foreign-
ican Community Survey (ACS) (Dick and born immigration is estimated using information
Bhaskar 2012). While administrative data are on residence 1 year ago (ROYA) from the ACS.
still used in research and evaluation, the Census The ROYA question is asked in two parts. The
Bureau’s current methods rely primarily on infor- first asks “Did this person live in this house or
mation from the decennial census, ACS, and data apartment 1 year ago?” If not, the next part of the
collected by other countries. The next several question asks “Where did this person live 1 year
sections will describe methods the Census ago?” An annual estimate of foreign-born immi-
Bureau used to produce annual estimates of inter- gration is produced by tabulating the foreign-
national migration as part of the 2012 Population born population who lived outside of the United
Estimates Program. Alternative methods will be States, Puerto Rico, and outlying areas 1 year
presented, and in some cases, alternatives prior. Because of the large migration flows
described were used in the development of the between Mexico and the United States, immigra-
2010 Demographic Analysis estimates. For infor- tion estimates are produced separately for the
mation on methods used in 2010 Demographic population migrating from Mexico and the pop-
Analysis, see Bhaskar et al. (2013) and Devine ulation migrating from “other countries”
et al. (2012). (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The ACS is an
annual survey (U.S. Census Bureau 2009); there-
fore, a time series of estimates can be produced
using several years of ACS data.
Methods for Estimating International Migration 3

Although not used in the national-level esti- 2 months unless they do not have another place
mates production process, foreign-born immigra- to stay. Therefore, immigrants with short dura-
tion flows can also be estimated using ACS data tions of stay in the United States or who stay at
from a question on year of entry that asks, “When multiple addresses for short periods of time may
did this person come to live in the United States?” be underestimated in ACS-based estimates.
An annual estimate of immigration could be pro- In addition, ACS estimates are centered on
duced by tabulating the population who came to July 1 of the survey year. If the aim is to produce
live in the United States in the year prior to the immigration estimates for the calendar year,
ACS survey year. Year-of-entry-based estimates assumptions about the sub-annual distribution of
were included in the range of 2010 Demographic estimates are needed.
Analysis estimates and tend to be higher than
residence 1-year-ago-based estimates. There are
Foreign-Born Emigration
also differences in the characteristics of immi-
Emigration of the foreign born is harder to esti-
grants estimated using the two survey questions
mate because censuses and surveys do not usually
(Borsella and Jensen 2013).
ask about people who reside outside of the United
The Census Bureau uses information from the
States. In addition, little information on migrants
ACS rather than administrative data sources pri-
leaving the United States is collected by nation-
marily because the ACS includes the foreign born
wide surveys or through administrative records.
regardless of legal status. In addition, the survey
Therefore, a residual method is used to estimate
measures migration of people, rather than migra-
emigration (Ahmed and Robinson 1994;
tion events (i.e., multiple visas issued to a person
U.S. Census Bureau 2012), where
for trips within the same year), so records do not
have to be unduplicated. The ACS sample size is
Emigrationtime 1 to time 2 ¼ ðPopulationtime 1
also relatively large for a survey, sampling
roughly three million household addresses a Deathstime 1 to time 2 Þ
year in the United States and 36,000 household  Populationtime 2 :
addresses in Puerto Rico (U.S. Census Bureau
2009). For example, to estimate foreign-born emigration
However, there are several limitations of using from 2000 to 2008, the Census Bureau starts with
survey data to estimate migration. Surveys have the foreign-born population estimated by the
both sampling and non-sampling error that can 2000 Census (Population time 1) that arrived
impact estimates. Population controls are applied before 2000 (using year of entry); the population
to surveys to help account for sampling and is then survived to 2008 (time 2) by subtracting
non-sampling errors. However, population con- deaths from 2000 to 2008 (calculated using life
trols are applied to the ACS by age, sex, race, and tables). This provides an “expected” foreign-born
Hispanic origin but not by nativity (i.e., native population in 2008 of the cohort arriving before
born or foreign born) or migration status 2000 if there were no emigration. An estimate of
(U.S. Census Bureau 2009). Therefore, if immi- the “actual” foreign-born population in the
grants are underrepresented relative to nonimmi- United States in 2008 that arrived before 2000
grants within a control cell, the resulting estimate (from the 2008 ACS) is subtracted from the
of immigration may be too low. “expected” population. The difference (residual)
While both the residence 1 year ago and year provides an estimate of emigration from 2000 to
of entry approaches can be used to produce an 2008 of the foreign-born population who resided
annual estimate of foreign-born immigration, in the United States in 2000.
time lapses between the date an immigrant enters In the Population Estimates Program, resid-
the United States and the time of the survey. The uals are annualized and divided by the estimated
ACS’s residency rule excludes people who plan mid-period population to create annualized emi-
to stay at their current address for less than gration rates that are applied to the population “at
4 Methods for Estimating International Migration

risk of emigrating” each year to obtain annual (Suitland Working Group 2012, Suitland Work-
estimates of emigration (U.S. Census Bureau ing Group forthcoming).
2012). The “population at risk of emigrating” is
obtained by tabulating the foreign-born stock in Native-Born Migration
annual ACS files. For example, if the foreign- There is little direct information on the native-
born population in the 2008 ACS is assumed to born US population residing abroad. The US
be “at risk of emigrating,” the emigration rate can Department of State maintains information on
be applied to this population to generate an esti- US citizens traveling or residing abroad, but reg-
mate of emigration from 2008 to 2009. Since istration is voluntary. Many overseas trips are for
recent immigrants have a higher propensity to vacation and are short in duration and even
emigrate, emigration rates and estimates for two longer-term migrants may not register with the
periods of entry groups are calculated, those that Department of State when they move abroad.
entered the United States in the past 10 years and Due to the dearth of information, native migra-
those that entered more than 10 years prior. Rates tion is estimated as a net number using informa-
are also calculated separately for people born in tion on people born in the United States or US
Mexico and those born in other countries. citizens (if place of birth information is not avail-
There are several limitations to this approach. able) collected by censuses and population regis-
The ACS is subject to sampling and ters in other countries (Gibbs et al. 2003;
non-sampling error that may impact the residual Schachter 2008).
calculation. In the Population Estimates Program, Comparable data for two time points are
several emigration rates are averaged before needed to produce the native migration estimate.
being applied to the population at risk of emigrat- The US-born or US citizen population at time 1 is
ing. Additionally, emigration rates are lagged survived forward (subtracting deaths) and com-
because the residual calculation is limited to the pared to the population at time 2. The difference
population residing in the United States at time in the time 1 and time 2 population provides an
1. This can be problematic if there are period- estimate of net native migration over the time
specific changes in emigration rates. Information period. For example, information on the
on year of entry is needed at both time 1 and time US-born population was obtained from the 2001
2 to match entrance cohorts across time (and to 2006 Census of Canada. The population in
exclude immigrants who entered between time 2001 was survived to 2006 by age group and
1 and time 2). If this information is not available, sex then compared to the population in 2006.
the Warren and Peck (1980) model could be used The difference represents net migration between
to estimate emigration. Warren and Peck (1980) the United States and Canada from 2001 to 2006
used information on the foreign-born population of the US-born population. Schachter (2008)
at time 1 and time 2 (regardless of year of entry) annualized the residuals and combined net native
and subtracted a measure of immigration from migration estimates from 84 countries to produce
time 1 to time 2 from the emigration residual. an overall estimate of native migration.
Since the immigration component is subtracted There are several limitations to the method.
from the residual, the emigration residual is Similar to the foreign-born emigration estimate,
highly sensitive to the accuracy of the immigra- the native migration estimate assumes that cur-
tion component. rent migration is similar to migration in prior
While Ahmed and Robinson’s (1994) residual periods. Additionally, not all countries collect
method is used in the population estimates pro- information at the same point in time; therefore,
gram, there are several other methods for estimat- the composite measure of migration is a sum of
ing emigration. These include panel attrition country-specific migration estimates across a
methods, indirect estimation and multiplicity variety of time periods. The quality of data also
sampling methods, using migration surveys or varies across countries, and coverage of the
population registers, and statistical modeling native-born US population may not be complete.
Methods for Estimating International Migration 5

The method for estimating the native-born popu- Movement of the Armed Forces Population
lation also has some imprecision, particularly International movement of the Armed Forces
when citizenship is used to classify the native population is estimated using restricted-use data
born (person may be a US citizen by naturaliza- obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Cen-
tion and therefore not “native born” or may have ter (DMDC). DMDC provides monthly tabula-
dual citizenship and not report their US citizen- tions of military personnel stationed or deployed
ship). The measure is sensitive to errors in esti- outside the United States by demographic char-
mating mortality when surviving the population acteristics. Net movement of the Armed Forces
from time 1 to time 2 and is also time intensive to population is estimated by comparing the popu-
update regularly. lation overseas during consecutive time points.
Rather than using information from other
countries, a method of estimating native-born
immigration and emigration separately could be Producing Subnational Estimates
used. Information on residence 1 year ago can be of International Migration
used to measure the native-born population
migrating back to the United States (note that Producing subnational (e.g., state, county) inter-
year of entry is not asked of the US-born popula- national migration estimates poses additional
tion). However, estimating emigration is more challenges. Foreign-born immigration can be
difficult. Flows of the native-born population estimated at the subnational level using informa-
are small relative to the size of the native-born tion on current place of residence, residence
population in the United States. Residuals (using 1 year ago, and/or year of entry. Since the ACS
the native-born population residing in the United is based on a sample, the margin of error around
States at time 1 and time 2) are sensitive to errors the immigration estimate may be relatively large,
in estimation because the time 1 and time 2 pop- particularly for smaller levels of geography or
ulation is large compared to the residual between areas with few international migrants. Estimating
the two time periods. Differential error in esti- foreign-born emigration and native migration at
mating the population at time 1 and time 2 results the subnational level is more difficult. If the
in a volatile residual estimate. residual method is used to estimate these compo-
nents, it is not possible to distinguish between
international migration and domestic migration
Migration Between the United States
unless an independent estimate of domestic
and Puerto Rico
migration is produced and included in the model.
Migration between the United States and Puerto
In the Population Estimates Program, state and
Rico is estimated separately from foreign-born
county estimates (by age, sex, race, and Hispanic
and native-born migration because data sources
origin) are produced using a distributive method
are available to measure both immigration and
whereby national-level estimates are allocated to
emigration flows. The ACS is fielded in Puerto
states and counties. This is done through the
Rico (Puerto Rico Community Survey or PRCS).
creation of “proxy universes,” or groups of peo-
Migration is estimated using information on res-
ple who are assumed to have similar characteris-
idence 1 year ago (similar to the method for
tics to recent immigrants or emigrants. For
estimating foreign-born immigration). People
example, to distribute the national-level estimate
who indicated on the ACS that they lived in
of foreign-born immigrants to states and counties
Puerto Rico 1 year ago are considered immigrants
by demographic characteristics, the distribution
to the United States. Those who indicated on the
of the foreign-born population who entered the
PRCS that they lived in the United States 1 year
United States within 5 years of the ACS year is
ago are considered emigrants.
applied to the national total (age is adjusted to
represent age at arrival instead of age at survey
date). The foreign-born immigration totals are
6 Methods for Estimating International Migration

distributed separately for people born in Mexico Borsella CP, Jensen EB (2013) Evaluating methods for
and people born in other countries. There are two estimating foreign-born immigration using the Amer-
ican community survey. Paper presented at the popu-
main reasons for using proxy universes. First, lation association of America annual meeting, New
some of the estimation methods cannot distin- Orleans. 13 Apr
guish between domestic and international movers Devine J, Bhaskar R, DeSalvo B, Robinson JG,
when applied at the subnational level. Second, Scopilliti M, West K (2012) The development and
sensitivity analysis of the 2010 demographic analysis
estimates must be produced for all states and estimates, Population division working paper 93.
counties by demographic characteristics, and U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC
sampling error around the ACS-based estimates Dick C, Bhaskar R (2012) Improvements to the net inter-
of recent migrants by demographic characteris- national migration component in the U.S. Census
Bureau’s population estimates: 2000 to 2011. Presen-
tics is substantial for some cells. For information tation at the southern demographic association annual
on the proxy universes for other components, see meeting, Williamsburg. 10–12 Oct
US Census Bureau (2012). Gibbs JC, Harper GS, Rubin MJ, Shin HB (2003) Evaluat-
The Population Estimates Program releases ing components of international migration: native-
born emigrants, Population division working paper
estimates of net international migration, but the 63. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC
subcomponents of net international migration are Grieco EM, Rytina N (2011) U.S. data sources on the
not publicly released. However, the 2010 Demo- foreign born and immigration. Int Migr Rev
graphic Analysis subcomponent estimates for 45(4):1001–1016
Schachter J (2008) Estimating native emigration from the
2000 through 2010 are publicly available. United States. Memorandum dated December
Tables on residence 1 year ago, year of entry 24, delivered to the U.S. Census Bureau
and place of birth are available on the Census Suitland Working Group (2012) Update on the Suitland
Bureau website or through tabulations from the Working Group project on reviewing methods for esti-
mating emigration. Presentation at the joint economic
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). Addi- commission for Europe and conference of European
tionally, ACS-based state-to-state and county- statisticians work session on migration statistics.
to-county migration files are publicly released Geneva. 17–19 Oct. http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/
on the Census Bureau’s website that includes a DAM/stats/documents/ece/ces/ge.10/2012/WP_8_US.
pdf. Accessed 13 May 2013
category for “movers from abroad.” Suitland Working Group (forthcoming) A review of
methods for estimating emigration
U.S. Census Bureau (2009) Design and methodology:
References American community survey. U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, DC
U.S. Census Bureau (2012) Methodology for the United
Ahmed B, Robinson JG (1994) Estimates of emigration of States resident population estimates by age, sex, race,
the foreign-born population: 1980–1990, Population and hispanic origin and the state and county total resi-
division working paper 9. U.S. Census Bureau, Wash- dent population estimates (Vintage 2012): April 1, 2010
ington, DC to July 1, 2012. Methodology statement. http://www.
Bhaskar R, Cortés R, Scopilliti M, Jensen E, Dick C, census.gov/popest/methodology/2012-nat-st-co-meth.
Armstrong D, Arenas-Germosén B (2013) Estimating pdf. Accessed 13 May 2013
net international migration for 2010 demographic Warren R, Peck JM (1980) Foreign-born emigration from
analysis: an overview of methods and results, Popula- the United States: 1960 to 1970. Demography
tion division working paper 97. U.S. Census Bureau, 17:71–84
Washington, DC
A

Age, Period, and Cohort Effects they complicate our understanding of immigrant
integration by providing empirical examples
Claire E. Altman from published research.
University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, Period effects are defined as changes occur-
USA ring over time experienced by all groups in the
population regardless of age (Ryder 1965; Yang
and Land 2008). Broad historical, social, cultural,
Definition or environmental changes such as wars and tech-
nological advances that affect all members of a
Age effects refer to variation in life course expe- society at a particular moment are considered
riences due to chronological age (e.g., an immi- period effects. Cohorts, in contrast, are defined
grant’s age upon arrival). Period effects are by a common initial experience or event such as
experienced by all groups in the population birth, marriage, migration, etc. Cohort effects
regardless of age (e.g., national immigration pol- include social and historical changes affecting a
icies). Cohort effects include social and historical specific group with a shared initial event (Reither
changes affecting a specific group with a shared et al. 2009; Ryder 1965; Yang and Land 2008).
event (e.g., immigration). Cohorts share a social history during the same
historical time period (Alwin et al. 2006). Age
effects denote “the variation associated with dif-
Detailed Description ferent age groups brought about by psychological
changes, accumulation of social experience,
In 1965, Norman Ryder wrote about the cohort as and/or role or status changes” (Yang and Land
a critical demographic element of social change 2008, p. 298). In other words age effects refer to a
and began to lay out the process for untangling birth cohort moving through the life course
the differences between cohort, age effects, and because the biographical time of an individual
period effects. In doing so, he established an or cohort is embedded in historical time.
important approach for distinguishing changes In thinking about immigrant incorporation,
experienced by a population or those experienced period, cohort, and age effects play important
by a specific group. These approaches are still roles. For instance, migration to the USA has
employed today by demographers and sociolo- varied drastically during the last century. During
gists studying a range of events including immi- the early twentieth century, the majority of
gration. We begin by discussing period, cohort, migrants originated from Southern and Eastern
and age effects generally and then discuss how Europe. The passage of the Immigration and
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_88-1
2 Age, Period, and Cohort Effects

Nationality Act of 1965, which served to elimi- larger percentage of earlier cohorts of immigrants
nate national-origin quotas, resulted in larger occupied professional or technical occupations
flows of migrants from Latin America and Asia. compared to more recent entry cohorts (e.g.,
Currently, the largest migration stream is from 32 % of immigrants arriving before 1965 were
Mexico to the USA which has grown substan- in professional occupations compared to 21.6 %
tially since the 1970s (Durand et al. 2001). Period of immigrants arriving between 1985 and 1990).
changes in geographic origin of immigrants have Furthermore, more recent cohorts of immigrants
altered the size and composition of the US popu- work in service, farm, craft, or laborer occupa-
lation and context of reception, as millions of tions (Jensen and Chitose 1994). The increasing
nonwhite immigrants moving to the United States diversity of immigrants has increased the likeli-
may now have difficulty integrating (Portes and hood that recent cohorts of immigrants speak
Zhou 1993; Telles and Ortiz 2008). Furthermore, languages other than English. Carliner found an
period changes in the US economic structure important cohort effect in language ability among
have served to bifurcate the economy which immigrants: immigrants arriving since 1950 are
may limit the economic mobility and integration less likely to be English language proficient
of immigrants (Foner 2000; Park and Myers (2000). Moreover, evidence from the 1990 Cen-
2010). sus found that recent cohorts of immigrants were
Cohort effects on immigrant integration often less likely to speak English exclusively and more
refer to the arrival of a group of immigrants, likely to speak Spanish or an Asian language
regardless of the time period or their age at (Jensen and Chitose 1994). Finally, two other
arrival. For instance, a cohort may include immi- cohort effects play a role in immigrant integra-
grants of any age arriving to the USA between tion: legal status and selectivity. Larger shares of
1987 and 1997. Recent research suggests that recent immigrant cohorts have unauthorized legal
recent cohorts of immigrants are more racially status compared to earlier cohorts (Durand
and ethnically diverse than previous cohorts et al. 2001). As migration has spread through
(Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003; community networks, recent cohorts are less pos-
Park and Myers 2010; Portes and Rumbaut itively selected (Durand et al. 2001; Feliciano
2006). They are also more diverse in terms of 2005).
education, earnings potential, occupation, lan- An immigrant’s age at migration, also thought
guage ability, and legal status. These factors of as age effects, may have implications for their
may serve to propel or impede their integration. integration. Age at arrival denotes which life
In terms of education differences, more recent cycle stage an immigrant was in upon arrival
cohorts of immigrants have slightly higher attain- (Myers et al. 2009; Piore 2011). In the immigra-
ment than earlier cohorts, but compared to tion literature, these age effects are often used to
natives, recent cohorts have become less well distinguish among the foreign born or those in the
educated (Betts and Lofstrom 2000). However, first generation. Age at arrival is used to further
there is substantial variation by country of birth distinguish the 1.5 generation (who arrived
and period of immigration on years of schooling before age 12 or 15) from adult, first-generation
attained (Chiswick 1986). As a related point, immigrants (Rumbaut 1991). Immigrants arriv-
recent cohorts of immigrants earn a smaller per- ing at younger ages spend a larger portion of their
centage of the median earnings of native males. childhood and adolescence being socialized in
For instance, the 1965–1969 immigrant entry the USA and may have outcomes similar to
cohort earned 65 % of the median earnings, the native-born children. Thus, age effects may
1975–1979 immigrant entry cohort earned 50 %, have bearing on an immigrant’s language ability
and the 1985–1989 immigrant entry cohort or acquisition, schooling, and other socioeco-
earned only 41 % (Duleep and Regets 1999). nomic indicators of integration. Immigrants that
Immigrant cohorts also vary in their occupational arrive at older ages are less likely to speak
distributions. Among immigrants with children, a English well than younger arrivals (Carliner
Age, Period, and Cohort Effects 3

2000; Stevens 2004). Mexican immigrants who specifying one of the three effects (age, period,
arrive as children are more likely to be English or cohort) as a random effect while treating the
proficient in adulthood than teenage/late adoles- other two as fixed effects in a multilevel model
cent arrivals (Myers et al. 2009). Further, those (Yang et al. 2004). This approach has been used
who migrate as teenagers have fewer completed to simultaneously estimate age, period, and
years of schooling compared to those who cohort effects for general populations, but to my
migrated before or after teenage years knowledge has not yet been applied to immigrant
(Chiswick and DebBurman 2004; Myers integration. To date, the debate on how to best
et al. 2009). Finally, child migrants earn higher estimate age, period, and cohort effects is ongo-
wages as adults than migrants who moved at ing as evidenced by a scholarly exchange on the
older ages (Bleakley and Chin 2004). Higher challenges of identifying age, period, and cohort
educational attainment and English proficiency effects in a 2013 issue of Demography (Tolnay
mediate this earnings gap. Overall, the findings 2013).
suggest that earlier age at arrival may lead to
increased integration (Myers et al. 2009).
In sum, period, cohort, and age effects play
References
important roles in the immigrant integration pro-
cess. However, distinguishing between cohort, Alba R, Nee V (2003) Remaking the American main-
aging, and period effects remains an empirical stream: assimilation and contemporary immigration.
challenge since they are intertwined. The bound- Harvard University Press, Cambridge
ary of each effect blurs into the next effect; “The Alwin DF, McCammon RJ, Hofer SM (2006) Studying
baby boom cohorts within a demographic and devel-
cohort record is not merely a summation of a set opmental context: conceptual and methodological
of individual histories. Each cohort has a distinc- issues. In: Whitbourne SKE, Willis SL (eds) The
tive composition and character reflecting the cir- baby boomers grow up: contemporary perspectives
cumstances of its unique organization and on midlife. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers,
Mahwah
history” (Ryder 1965, p. 845). In practical Bean F, Stevens G (2003) America’s newcomers and the
terms, one cannot include age, period, and cohort dynamics of diversity. Russell Sage, New York
effects in a multivariate model because they are Betts JR, Lofstrom M (2000) The educational attainment
completely collinear. For example, for of immigrants: trends and implications. In: Borjas GJ
(ed) Issues in the economics of immigration. Univer-
nonimmigrant populations, age is a function of sity of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 51–116
birth cohort and time period. For immigrants, the Bleakley H, Chin A (2004) Language skills and earnings:
situation is more complicated because more time evidence from childhood immigrants*. Rev Econ Stat
scales are involved: the time since birth 86:481–496
Carliner G (2000) The language ability of U.-
(indicating age) and the time since migration S. immigrants: assimilation and cohort effects. Int
(indicating duration of residence). Thus the col- Migr Rev 34:158–182
linearity problem is magnified; for example, Chiswick BR (1986) Is the new immigration less skilled
duration of residence for a particular immigrant than the old? J Labor Econ 4:168–192
Chiswick BR, DebBurman N (2004) Educational attain-
entry cohort in a given year is a function of ment: analysis by immigrant generation. Econ Educ
current age and age at migration. Some Rev 23:361–379
researchers have attempted to follow immigrant Duleep HO, Regets MC (1999) Immigrants and human
cohorts as they concurrently increase in age and capital investment. Am Econ Rev 89:186–191
Durand J, Massey DS, Zenteno RM (2001) Mexican
duration of residence in the USA with the “gen- immigration to the United States: continuities and
erational cohort method” (Myers and Lee 1998; changes. Lat Am Res Rev 36:107–127
Park and Myers 2010). This method involves Feliciano C (2005) Does selective migration matter?
(1) pooling multiple cross-sectional surveys and Explaining ethnic disparities in educational attainment
among immigrants’ children. Int Migr Rev
(2) estimating the effects of multiple interaction 39:841–871
terms among time period, age or birth cohort, and Foner N (2000) From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s two
period of entry. Another approach involves great waves of immigration. Russell Sage, New York
4 Age, Period, and Cohort Effects

Jensen L, Yoshimi C (1994) Today’s second generation: Rumbaut RG (1991) The agony of exile: a study of the
evidence from the 1990 US census. Int Migr Rev migration and adaptation of Indochinese refugee
28:714–735 adults and children. In: Ahearn FL, Athey JL (eds)
Myers D, Seong Woo L (1998) Immigrant trajectories into Refugee children: theory, research, and services.
homeownership: a temporal analysis of residential Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 53–91
assimilation. Int Migr Rev 32:593–625 Ryder NB (1965) The cohort as a concept in the study of
Myers D, Gao X, Emeka A (2009) The gradient of immi- social change. Am Sociol Rev 30:843–861
grant age-at-arrival effects on socioeconomic out- Stevens G (2004) Using census data to test the critical-
comes in the US. Int Migr Rev 43:205–229 period hypothesis for second-language acquisition.
Park J, Myers D (2010) Intergenerational mobility in the Psychol Sci 15:215–216
post-1965 immigration era: estimates by an immigrant Telles EE, Ortiz V (2008) Generations of exclusion. Rus-
generation cohort method. Demography 47:369–392 sell Sage, New York
Piore MJ (2011) Birds of passage. Cambridge University Tolnay S (2013) Editor’s note. Demography
Press, Cambridge 50:1943–1944
Portes A, Rumbaut RG (2006) Immigrant America: a Yang Y, Land KC (2008) Age–period–cohort analysis of
portrait. University of California Press, Berkeley repeated cross-section surveys: fixed or random
Portes A, Zhou M (1993) The new second generation: effects? Sociol Methods Res 36:297–326
segmented assimilation and its variants. Ann Am Yang Y, Fu WJ, Land KC (2004) A methodological com-
Acad Pol Soc Sci 530:74–96 parison of age-period-cohort models: the intrinsic esti-
Reither EN, Hauser RM, Yang Y (2009) Do birth cohorts mator and conventional generalized linear models.
matter? Age-period-cohort analyses of the obesity epi- Sociol Methodol 34:75–110
demic in the United States. Soc Sci Med 69:1439–1448
D

Duration of Residence Measurement time spent in the receiving country, either as an

independent variable or, at least, as a control.
1 2
Ilana Redstone Akresh and Douglas S. Massey Hence, most national censuses and surveys con-
1
University of Illinois, Champaign, IL, USA tain questions to ascertain the place of birth and
2
Office of Population Research, Princeton year of arrival of foreign-born persons; and most
University, Princeton, NJ, USA analyses based on such data include a variable
labeled “time since arrival” in statistical models
involving immigrants.
Definition

Duration of residence refers to the variable used Challenges to Measurement

in empirical research that captures the time a
foreign-born individual has been in the USA. This Despite its centrality to the process of immigrant
time could be accumulated in one continuous adaptation, measuring the amount of host-
stretch (e.g., an individual who left his or her country experience an immigrant has accumu-
home country, came to the USA, and remained lated is far from straightforward. A question on
in the USA), or it could be accumulated across the year of arrival works well in a world in which
multiple trips to the USA. While this variable is all immigrants arrive once and only once to settle
relevant in both qualitative and quantitative permanently in the host society. Under these cir-
research on the foreign born, it is relied upon cumstances, subtracting the year of arrival from
heavily in quantitative studies as a proxy for an the year of the census or survey exactly yields the
individual’s exposure to the USA. years of host-country experience, and there is no
ambiguity. In addition, cross-sectional compari-
sons of immigrants by duration of residence may
Concept and Background lead to biased estimates of the effects of US
exposure due to cohort differences (for more
A fundamental attribute of all immigrants is the detail on this point, see Park’s entry in this vol-
amount of time they have spent in the host coun- ume on following immigrant cohorts overtime).
try. Whatever theory of immigrant absorption If migrants move back and forth in multiple
one favors – whether classical assimilation the- trips, however, this methodology breaks down
ory, ethnic pluralism, human capital theory, seg- because it begs two crucial questions: on which
mented assimilation, or ethnic stratification – an of the several US trips did a respondent “arrive”
adequate empirical test requires measuring the and when did he or she decide to remain
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_90-1
2 Duration of Residence Measurement

permanently? For instance, in the 2004 study they came to stay that is not the year of their
referenced in the section below using data from last trip.
the New Immigrant Survey – Pilot, 22 % of 2. Estimates of the total amount of US experi-
respondents stated they had made two trips to ence that are based on answers to the census
the USA before being granted legal permanent question on the year of arrival produce num-
residency, and 17 % reported three or more trips bers that are quite different from those that are
prior to the same event. Perhaps more important produced by asking about US experience
is that no matter how one defines “settlement,” directly. Only 59 % of immigrants had their
either objectively or subjectively, subtracting the total US experience accurately estimated by
year of arrival from the year of the census or the usual census-based procedure. In contrast,
survey will not equal the total amount of time 31 % of immigrants had their experience
the migrant has accumulated in the host society. understated and 10 % had it overstated, with
Inevitably, picking 1 year to define “arrival” out an average difference of about 4 years.
of a series of entries and exits will either over- or 3. Whether total US experience is under- or
understate the total amount of host-country expe- overestimated depends on the year of the first
rience the migrant has accumulated. trip and the number of trips taken between the
first trip and the survey date. Immigrants
whose prior trips were in undocumented status
Known Biases tend to have their experience underestimated
by the census procedure, whereas those whose
The following are three of the biases found in a trips are in documented status tend to have
2004 study (using the New Immigrant their experience overestimated. The size of
Survey – Pilot data) when comparing the census the error is likewise determined by the year
question on year of arrival with a more inclusive, of the first trip and the number of trips taken.
cumulative measure of US duration (Redstone
and Massey 2004):
References
1. One study of legal permanent residents found
that roughly 45 % of all legal immigrants to Redstone I, Massey DS (2004) Coming to stay: an analysis
the USA report a year they came to stay that is of the U.S. census question on year of arrival. Demog-
not the year of their first US trip; and among raphy 41(4):721–738
those with multiple trips, 54 % report a year
E

Ethnographic Analysis that endeavor. Participant observation involves

watching and analyzing social life as well, usu-
David FitzGerald ally with great attention to details of social life
University of California, San Diego, CA, USA that could not be captured in a standardized
survey.
Participant observation is often complemented
Keywords by qualitative interviews, which differ from sur-
veys in that they are unstructured or semi-
Participant observation; Qualitative structured in a way that allows the researcher to
interviewing; Fieldwork probe for nuance, emotion, and explanations of
actions. Qualitative interviews by a researcher
engage the other individual less as a passive
Definition object, and more as an interlocutor, who together
with the researcher creates the substance and
Ethnographic analysis is a set of methods involv- meaning of the interview (Emerson 2001). Qual-
ing direct, long-term engagement between the itative interviewing techniques are also easily
ethnographer and the individuals whose lives adapted to focus groups. The line between infor-
are the object of study. mal conversations and formal interviews may be
blurred in practice.
What distinguishes ethnographies from jour-
Overview nalism or travelogues is the systematic way in
which evidence is collected (typically in the
Ethnographic analysis is the principal method form of field notes, transcriptions of conversa-
used in anthropological approaches to studying tions, photographs, and audiovisual recordings),
migration as well as an important technique in the extended time period of the study, and the
sociology. The most classical form of ethnogra- engagement between findings in a particular site
phy involves many months – even years – of and broader theories of social life. The presenta-
“participant observation” in which the ethnogra- tion of ethnographies, most often in the form of a
pher becomes immersed in a field site. All eth- monograph, usually emphasizes what Clifford
nographers participate in the life of the Geertz described as a “thick description” of a
community, though they vary in the degree to setting that sheds light on social worlds with
which they attempt to become social insiders which the reader is unfamiliar. Carefully
and the degree to which they are successful in designed ethnographies also move beyond
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_91-1
2 Ethnographic Analysis

descriptions of processes to address broader the- thought to rely on deep, local knowledge of
oretical questions. everyday interactions as a means to understand
members’ experience. The requisite intensity of
fieldwork and linguistic competence may be dif-
Ethnographies of Migration ficult to achieve in multiple sites, with conse-
quent variation in the quality of the fieldwork
Fieldwork among international migrants poses a and the ability to make systematic comparisons
host of challenges. Classical ethnographies between sites (Marcus 1995; Hannerz 2003). It is
involved a lone researcher working in a single precisely because of the dangers of stretching
site. Yet international migration is defined by time and resources too thin that successful
movement that often takes place across multiple multi-sited fieldwork is even more dependent on
sites. Migration inherently means both emigra- a clear theoretical orientation and strategic site
tion from some place and immigration to another, selection than work in a single site.
implying that research should include both send- A second objection to multi-sited fieldwork is
ing and receiving areas as ethnographers “follow that scientific comparative ethnography is no lon-
the people” on the move (Marcus 1995; Glick ger possible. Colonialism and globalization have
Schiller 2003; Sayad 2004). eroded the idea that discrete cultural units exist.
Among studies adopting a two-site strategy, In a world of rapid mobility of people, ideas, and
Smith (2005) examined migration between a goods, the cases themselves may be influencing
town in the Mexican state of Puebla and New each other. Without discrete units, causal pro-
York City, demonstrating migrants’ integration cesses are not independent of each other, and
into New York at the same time as many remain the logic of the Millian methods of agreement
deeply engaged in the political, economic, and and difference breaks down (Ragin 1987; de
cultural life of Puebla. A second strategy is to Munck 2002). That is, similar outcomes across
compare multiple destinations for migrants of a cases cannot necessarily be ascribed to similar
common origin, as Tilly and his associates (1998) conditions in each case (as in the method of
began to do for Italians from the village of agreement), and different outcomes among
Roccasecca dispersed in Lyon, Sao Paolo, cases with different conditions cannot necessarily
Buenos Aires, New York, and Toronto. Such a be ascribed to those different conditions (as in the
comparison sets up a natural quasi-experiment method of difference). Seen from a different
controlling for origins that explains how local view, the linkages between sites are not the end
and national receiving contexts pattern migrants’ of comparative ethnography, but rather an oppor-
economic mobility. The multi-sited framing of tunity for its rejuvenation. Different source and
the field need not be exclusively destination localities can be selected precisely
geographic. Migrants and expatriates around the because they are linked by migrant networks
world have established Internet sites containing while still shaping migrants’ experiences
membership directories, chat rooms, political differently.
commentaries, advertisements for goods and ser- Another objection to comparative ethnogra-
vices, and news about life in different nodes of phy is the ceteris paribus problem that bedevils
the members’ network – all of which are grist for comparative study regardless of method. In
the virtual ethnographer’s mill. Internet sites nonexperimental studies of social life, it is impos-
linking dispersed virtual communities based on sible to definitively isolate the effects of just one
a common town of origin are important vehicles factor’s addition or removal. For instance, one
for maintaining cross-border ties and can be used should not assume a given difference between
to locate members in other nodes. two migration destinations causes variation
Several cautions and objections about multi- found between migration streams sharing the
sited fieldwork have been advanced. First, multi- same source. That connection can only be made
sited work tests the limits of a method usually by carefully specifying process and exploring
Ethnographic Analysis 3

alternative accounts. It is because the methods of The extended case method offers a more ambi-
agreement and difference should never be applied tious alternative to the descriptive case study by
mechanistically by simply creating a matrix of showing how a single case can yield theoretical
independent and dependent variables (Lieberson leverage (Gluckman 1961; Burawoy 1991). In
1992) that multi-sited ethnographies are best any scientific research program, there is a set of
positioned to tease out the influences of different “core” postulates. Surrounding the core is an
ecologies on migration processes by explaining “outer belt” of secondary postulates that explain
causal mechanisms through an evidence-rich outcomes the core postulates do not predict. If
encounter with theory. multiple ad hoc qualifications are necessary to
The practical difficulties involved in multi- explain anomalies, the research program is
sited research, particularly when they involve degenerative. If the secondary postulates can be
multiple languages, can be resolved in part by revised to explain anomalous outcomes and pre-
abandoning the “lone ranger” model of fieldwork dict new facts, the research program progresses
and adopting a bi- or multinational collaborative (Lakatos 1978). A single case study that success-
model. Thomas and Znaniecki’s The Polish fully explains an anomaly by developing a sec-
Peasant in Europe and America (1927) is an ondary postulate protects the core of the research
early template. The collaborative dimension program from negation and provides an ethnog-
combined the advantages of insiders’ intimate rapher with justifiable claims to generalize based
acquaintance with the social milieu and easier on the program’s enhanced explanatory
access with the advantages of outsiders’ fresh capability.
perspectives and autonomy (Merton 1972). The The dominant research program in the sociol-
binational dimension enabled the researchers to ogy of immigration analyzes “assimilation” or
examine the full range of migrants’ experiences, “integration.” Ethnographies have pushed the
migration’s impacts on both countries, and the assimilation program forward by showing that
causes of migration from Polish push factors to the different domains of assimilation (e.g., cul-
US pull factors. There are inherent limits to rig- tural, marital, and economic) are not always
orous multi-sited fieldwork, but collaborations mutually reinforcing and, in fact, can be at odds
are a way to approach those limits. with each other. Specifically, economic assimila-
tion, in the sense of upward mobility, can actually
be increased through ethnic retention.
What Do Case Studies Represent? For example, Zhou and Bankston (1998) mix
ethnographic and quantitative school testing data
Ethnography’s capacity to show process in fine- to argue that Vietnamese students in a poor
grained detail and to open “black boxes” to show neighborhood of New Orleans performed well
mechanisms causally linking independent and in school despite their impoverished material cir-
dependent variables is a recognized strength of cumstances and low human capital when they
the method. Ethnography is also particularly well became deeply involved in family and Vietnam-
suited to describe and explain the articulation of ese Catholic institutions that discouraged the
macrostructures with members’ lived experience, adoption of the putatively “oppositional culture”
micro-interactions, and a deep appreciation of of urban youth in the neighborhood. Zhou and
members’ meanings. That same strength inher- Bankston help refine the assimilation program,
ently limits the ability of the ethnographer to even though their study only analyzes a tiny pro-
study a wide range of cases intensively. portion of contemporary US immigrants, by
A commonly held view is that ethnographies adopting the logic of the crucial case. It is com-
can only explain a particular case (Blumer 1939, monly held that Asians tend to do well on educa-
1969). How can ethnographers hope to make tional measures in the United States relative to
general arguments about anything other than other immigrant groups because of their gener-
their field site? ally higher levels of human capital. The case of
4 Ethnographic Analysis

Vietnamese in New Orleans was a good test of negative cases than probabilistic theories. If
this proposition, because this population was gen- “laws” are conceived in probabilistic terms
erally low in human capital even as children (Berk 1988), as they generally are even in the
tended to do well in school. grander versions of social scientific theory, par-
The question still remains how ethnographers ticular negative cases can still be useful for
know if what they find are just “outliers.” If the advancing general theoretical claims under two
case is just a product of rare conjuncture, the conditions. Negative cases are most useful when
research program is not threatened. There are at the gap is large between the theoretical prediction
least three complementary strategies for and the outcome, and an examination of the case
assessing representativeness (see Hammersley is the basis of expanding a theory’s range of
1992). The first is collaboration via contempora- explanation (Emigh 1997). Research programs
neous or serial ethnographies that capture a are not negated simply by the discovery of
greater range of variation than is possible in one disconfirming evidence, but rather when compet-
researcher’s project. For example, Levitt (2003) ing research programs offer greater explanatory
conducted research on the role of religion in power (Lakatos 1978). Thus, a single ethno-
contemporary “transnational life” by working graphic study cannot disprove a research pro-
with colleagues in India, Ireland, Brazil, and the gram, but to the extent that the case refines an
Dominican Republic. The second strategy is existing program or contributes to a competing
using existing statistics to assess the degree of program, an ethnographic study can make a the-
representativeness of a case, as ethnographers oretical contribution that indirectly warrants
often do using census data (e.g., Guarnizo claims applicable beyond the cases studied.
et al. 1999). The third is combining ethnographic Ethnographies are less suited to falsify
and survey evidence gathered either on one’s own grander, even a historical, theories, like the theo-
or in collaboration. The ongoing Mexican Migra- ries of neoclassical economics, new economics of
tion Project “ethnosurveys” (Massey 1987) of migration, and cumulative causation seeking to
more than 100 migrant sending communities, explain the generation and persistence of migra-
co-directed by demographer Douglas Massey tion across many contexts (Massey et al. 1993).
and anthropologist Jorge Durand, are a premier The inherently limited range of ethnographic
example of this sort of collaboration. Armed with cases means they are poorly suited vehicles for
quantitative data on how representative a case is trying to reconfigure these broader theories, even
of a larger category, it is possible to convincingly if ethnographic studies do generate important
adopt another strategy for developing a crucial insights into relevant processes and raise ques-
case (Eckstein 1975). Knowing that a case is tions leading to more general formulations. Case
highly atypical can be grounds for generalizing studies are most useful in pushing forward theo-
if the case is an extreme crystallization of some ries that are restricted in their historical scope, for
theoretically significant phenomenon. If a theo- example, the “segmented assimilation” thesis
retical prediction does not apply to the extreme that seeks to account for the experience of the
case, it is unlikely to apply anywhere. contemporary second generation of American
The utility of using a single case or small set of immigrants. Theoretically oriented ethnographic
cases to advance a research program is positively work is thus most useful when it is close to the
related to the degree of the theory’s determinism scale of the theory it seeks to refine.
and inversely related to the scope of the theory.
According to a Popperian (1968) logic of deter-
ministic laws, a single case of negation is not a
References
fatal blow to the research program if a secondary
postulate consistent with the core explains the Berk R (1988) Causal inference for sociological data. In:
anomaly. But Popperian formulations are delib- Smelser NJ (ed) The handbook of sociology. Sage,
erately made to be easier to falsify with a few Newbury Park
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Blumer H (1939/1969) An appraisal of Thomas and Levitt P (2003) You know, Abraham was really the first
Znaniecki’s the polish peasant in Europe and America. immigrant: religion and transnational migration. Int
In: Blumer H (ed) Symbolic interactionism: perspec- Migr Rev 37:847–874
tive and method. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall Lieberson S (1992) Small N‘s and big conclusions: an
Burawoy M (ed) (1991) Ethnography unbound: power and examination of the reasoning in comparative studies
resistance in the modern metropolis. University of based on small numbers of cases. In: Ragin CC, Becker
California Press, Berkeley H (eds) What is a case? Exploring the foundations of
de Munck VC (2002) Contemporary issues and challenges social inquiry. Cambridge University Press,
for comparativists: an appraisal. Anthropol Theory Cambridge
2:5–19 Marcus GE (1995) Ethnography in/of the world system:
Eckstein H (1975) Case study and theory in political the emergence of multi-sited ethnography. Annu Rev
science. In: Greenstein FI, Polsby NW (eds) Handbook Anthropol 24:95–117
of political science, vol 7. Addison-Wesley, Reading Massey DS (1987) The ethnosurvey in theory and prac-
Emerson RM (ed) (2001) Contemporary field research: tice. Int Migr Rev 21:1498–1522
perspectives and formulations, 2nd edn, Prospect Massey DS, Arango J, Hugo G, Kouaouci A, Pellegrino A,
Heights. Waveland Press, Long Grove Taylor JE (1993) Theories of international migration: a
Emigh RJ (1997) The power of negative thinking: the use review and appraisal. Popul Dev Rev 19:431–466
of negative case methodology in the development of Merton RK (1972) Insiders and outsiders: a chapter in the
sociological theory. Theory Soc 26:649–684 sociology of knowledge. Am J Sociol 78:9–47
Glick Schiller N (2003) The centrality of ethnography in Popperian KR (1968) The logic of scientific discovery,
the study of transnational migration. In: Foner N - 2nd edn. Harper & Row, New York
(ed) American arrivals: anthropology engages the Ragin CC (1987) The comparative method: moving
new immigration. School of American Research beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. Univer-
Press, Santa Fe sity of California Press, Berkeley
Gluckman M (1961) Ethnographic data in British social Sayad A (2004) The suffering of the immigrant. David
anthropology. Sociol Rev 9:5–17 Macey (trans). Polity Press, Cambridge
Guarnizo LE, S´anchez AI, Roach EM (1999) Mistrust, Smith RC (2005) Mexican New York: the transnational
fragmented solidarity, and transnational migration: lives of new immigrants. University of California
Colombians in New York City and Los Angeles. Press, Berkely
Ethn Racial Stud 22:367–396 Thomas WI, Znaniecki W (1927) The Polish peasant in
Hammersley M (1992) What’s wrong with ethnography? Europe and America. Knopf, New York
Methodological explorations. Routledge, London Tilly C (1998) Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of
Hannerz U (2003) Being there . . . and there . . . and there! California Press
Reflections on multi-site ethnography. Ethnography Zhou M, Bankston CL (1998) Growing up American: how
4:201–216 Vietnamese children adapt to life in the United States.
Lakatos I (1978) The methodology of scientific research Russell Sage, New York
programmes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
M

Measuring Internal Migration: Concept and Usage

Retrospective Self-Report
The retrospective approach to migration is likely
Matthew Hall the most widely used method for estimating
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA migration and is employed extensively to evalu-
ate gross and net flows across areas, particularly
in the United States where administrative data on
migration is limited. The widespread use of this
Keywords
method is due to its many key strengths: First, the
approach is simple to implement, requiring, in its
Internal migration; Domestic migration; Migra-
simplest form, only two questions – i.e., where do
tion measurement
you currently live? and where did you previously
live? – that can be incorporated easily onto sur-
vey questionnaires. Second, the method allows
Definition migration events to be detected without actually
observing them and can thus be applied as part of
The direct retrospective self-report cross- a survey administered at only a single point in
sectional method is a common approach for time. Its ease of implementation and efficiency
detecting and measuring migration that is based allow it to be administered to large samples,
on a comparison of survey respondents’ current which make it possible to summarize migration
and prior places of residence. In its most basic flows at and between different geographic scales
form, “migrants” are those whose current and (e.g., across particular states, counties, or neigh-
former places of residence differ. The method is borhoods). Another advantage of the retrospec-
highly flexible as it can be applied to various tive approach is its use in constructing migration
observation units (e.g., persons and households), histories. Like the more common marriage histo-
can be easily aggregated (e.g., to those living in a ries, migration histories allow researchers to
particular region or possessing some demo- track the timing and locations of migration events
graphic characteristic), can identify both recent and can be constructed over a life history or a
and more distant migration events, and can cap- more limited time span (e.g., since adulthood).
ture moves at various spatial scales. Despite these major strengths, the method has
several weaknesses that limit its complete

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_93-1
2 Measuring Internal Migration: Retrospective Self-Report

usefulness. Unlike panel-based migration Application

approaches (see “▶ Measuring Internal Migra-
tion Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data” in Because the cross-sectional approach to measur-
this volume), retrospective survey instruments ing migration is cost-effective and can be admin-
are prone to recall error – i.e., the potential to istered to large samples, its use is ubiquitous. In
omit or misreport previous experiences or events North America, retrospective migration ques-
(Bound et al. 2001). While memory errors are less tions have been asked on censuses in Canada,
common for physical moves than for other less- Mexico, and the United States. More recently,
significant life events (e.g., wage change, voting 1-year migration questions are included in both
behavior), they can bias migration estimates, par- the American Community Survey and the
ticularly those assessing short-distance or tempo- National Household Survey, the replacements to
rary moves or those that occurred in the distant long-form census questionnaires in the United
past. Evaluation research has demonstrated that States and Canada, respectively. It is also used
migration-related recall errors are reduced for the in the Current Population Survey, and most major
better educated and are less likely to occur when surveys will, at a minimum, include questions on
migration events correspond with major life tran- current place of residence and place of birth.
sitions (Smith and Duncan 2003). Memory errors Survey questions typically ask, as on the Ameri-
also increase as the number of episodes or events can Community Survey, “Did this person live in
grows – an important consideration in the design this house or apartment 1 year ago?” If the answer
of survey instruments (Dex 1995). An additional is “no,” then survey respondents are instructed to
limitation to the retrospective method is that, in provide the address of past residence. The 2011
its most basic two-question format, multiple ACS shows, for example, that 1.5 % of New York
moves are not captured and returning migrants State residents migrated from another US state in
can be wrongly identified as non-migrants. As an the last year. The ACS also collects data on place
illustration, consider that a New York resident of birth and show, again for New York, that
who moved to Florida in 1996 before returning 11.8 % of 2011 residents were born in another
to New York in 1999 would have been missed by US state. These aggregated data are used to cal-
the question in the 2000 Census inquiring about culate gross in-, out-, and net migration flows and
migration over the prior 5 years. In addition to rates and to assess streams across areas (e.g.,
these limitations that threaten the validity of patterns of migration between the 62 counties in
migration estimates, cross-sectional approaches New York).
typically do not collect sociodemographic infor- Demographers and other social scientists have
mation on survey respondents preceding migra- used the cross-sectional approach to explore a
tion events. Thus, while retrospective questions variety of migration-related research topics. It
indicate that long-distance (interstate) moves are has been used to study the Great Migration of
more common among college-educated, blacks to northern cities (Tolnay 1998), their
divorced, and higher-income persons (Ihrke and more recent return to the south (Frey 2004), and
Faber 2012), they do not indicate whether educa- the movement of Latinos to new destination areas
tion, marital status, and income are causes or (Lichter and Johnson 2009). The method has
consequences of migration. Lastly, when used been applied in research to understand whether
to calculate migration risk pools (i.e., the denom- welfare policies trigger poverty migration
inator in migration rates), the retrospective (Schram et al. 1998), how interstate moves affect
approach assumes that the sample drawn from children’s educational progress (Long 1975), and
the cross section (at time t) is the representative how migration induces social tolerance (Wilson
of the population at risk of moving (at time t-k). 1991).
Measuring Internal Migration: Retrospective Self-Report 3

References Lichter DT, Johnson KM (2009) Immigrant gateways and

Hispanic migration to new destinations. Int Migr Rev
Bound J, Brown C, Mathiowetz N (2001) Measurement 43:496–518
error in survey data (pdf). In: Heckman J, Leamer Long L (1975) Does migration interfere with children’s
E (eds) Handbook of econometrics, vol 5. North progress in school? Sociol Educ 48:369–381
Holland, Amsterdam Schram SF, Nitz L, Krueger G (1998) Without cause of
Dex S (1995) The reliability of recall data: a literature effect: reconsidering welfare migration as a policy
review. Bulletin De Methodologie Sociologique problem. Am J Polit Sci 42:210–230
49:58–89 Smith JP, Thomas D (2003) Remembrances of things past:
Frey WH (2004) The New Great Migration: black Amer- test-retest reliability of retrospective migration histo-
icans return to the south, 1965–2000, Living Cities ries. J R Stat Soc Ser 166:23–49
Census Survey. Brookings Institution, Washington, Tolnay SE (1998) Educational selection in the migration
DC of southern blacks, 1880–1990. Soc Forces
Ihrke D, Faber CS (2012) Geographic mobility: 2005 to 77:487–514
2010, Current Population Reports, P20-567. US Wilson TC (1991) Urbanism, migration, and tolerance: a
Census Bureau, Washington reassessment. Am Sociol Rev 56:117–123
U

Using Registration Data to Measure includes the international migration both from
International and Internal Migration one EU member state to another and from/to
in the European Union European Union to non-EU states. Accordingly,
three categories of international migrants are
Shushanik Makaryan included in the statistic and are distinguished by
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, their citizenship. These three categories are EU
PA, USA citizens who migrate to another EU member
state, citizens of a particular member state who
return to their country of citizenship (i.e., return
Definition citizens), and non-EU citizens (Herm 2008). To
define short-term migration, which is not man-
The European Commission Regulation (EC) No datory to be reported to the Eurostat, the EU
862/2007, issued in 2007, makes it mandatory for member states again rely on the United Nations
all European Union (EU) member states to report (1998) definition: a change of place of residence
international migration statistics. In its recom- for at least 3 months but not more than 12 months.
mendations to make international migration sta- In contrast to international migration, internal
tistics compatible with the United Nations (1998) migration statistics describe only the migration
definitions, the Eurostat – the Directorate- contained within the same member state. The UN
General of the European Commission in charge (1998) definitions are also used to compile data
of the statistical information from EU member on internal migration. The Regulation (EC) No
states – conceptualizes an international migrant 862/2007 specifies the following sources for
according to the United Nations (1998) definition migration statistics: administrative and judicial
of a long-term migrant: a person who for at least records and registers, population registers,
12 months changes his/her usual residence, i.e., censuses, sample surveys, and other appropriate
“the place at which a person normally spends the methods.
daily period of rest. . .” (Regulation (EC) No
862/2007). Because this definition is based on
the previous place of residence, the concept Overview

I thank Jennifer Van Hook and Gordon De Jong for their In recent years, the European Union (EU) has
useful comments on earlier versions of this entry and
initiated a number of policy initiatives to facili-
David Reichel for his advice on locating data sources and
most recent policy research on migration statistics of the tate legal migration of EU and third-country cit-
European Union. izens within the EU. To emphasize the benefits
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_94-1
2 Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the EU

that migration can bring to EU local communities migrant’s actual, intended, registered, or autho-
and member states, the EU policies have increas- rized stay of 12 months (Eurostat 2011a).
ingly framed legal migration of labor migrants as Most member states rely on population regis-
mobility. However, this conceptualization ters (often used in combination with administra-
should not be confused with statistical conceptu- tive records and registers), followed by censuses
alization of migration upon which all migration and sample surveys. Because other entries in this
statistics of the EU are compiled. volume discuss the measurement of international
Prior to 2007, the data on international immi- and internal migration based on censuses and
gration and emigration flows in the EU were surveys, this entry focuses on population registers
submitted to Eurostat based on a “gentlemen’s and administrative records.
agreement,” with no legal binding (Eurostat
metadata n.d.a). Statistics on international emi-
gration were compiled by only sex and for immi- Population Registers
gration also by country of birth (Eurostat
Metadata n.d.a). Population registers are designed to maintain
In 2007 Regulation EC No 862/2007 aimed to demographic information on the population at
harmonize statistics on international migration selected points in time, such as on a quarterly
and made their reporting mandatory for all EU basis. By tracking individuals over time and
member states. Since 2008 the data are reported across space, they can be used to generate both
by age, sex, citizenship, country of birth, country migration stock and flow data. With improve-
of previous/next residence of a migrant, and refer ments in population registration systems, and in
to the calendar year (Eurostat Metadata n.d.a). some countries with transition to register-based
Many EU member states, among those the population censuses, population registers have
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Nor- increasingly become an important source on
way, Poland, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom, migration flow data. To date, most of the EU
changed their migration collection systems to member states rely on population registers to
achieve harmonization with the Regulation generate migration statistics for both interna-
(Eurostat 2011a). tional and internal migration of their own citizens
These changes in how international migration and noncitizen migrants.
is reported created discontinuities in migration One of the best examples is in Austria, where
statistics between pre- and post-Regulation the establishment of the Central Register of Res-
periods. Additionally, because the 2007 Regula- idence (CRR) in 2001 allowed a transition to a
tion aimed to collect more demographic variables full register-based population census in 2011.
on migrants, the coverage period differs by the Every resident of Austria is required to register
variable, and the oldest series date to 1998 his/her place of permanent/usual residence in
(Eurostat Metadata n.d.a). Moreover, interna- Austria – i.e., the place of continuous residence
tional migration statistics are not completely con- for at least 90 days – at the CRR local municipal
sistent across member states even after 2007. offices (Statistics Austria 2012:43). Homeless
Even though the 2007 Regulation specified persons register without indicating their dwelling
acceptable sources of data on international (Reeger 2009). Persons who change their place of
migration, the member states are free to choose permanent residence are required in person or by
among these sources (Herm 2008), which reduces mail within 3 days to (de)register with the CRR
comparability across EU member states. Further office (Reeger 2009). The registration documents
inconsistencies arise from differences in how include the completed application form, the pass-
international migration is operationalized, specif- port, and the birth certificate (Reeger 2009).
ically whether in applying the UN (1998) and EC Migration statistics are generated from the
definitions the member states refer to the population register data as follows (Lebhart
et al. 2007): upon registration at the CRR, each
Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the EU 3

individual is assigned a CRR identification num- because they are not aware of the legal require-
ber which is also the personal identification num- ments to deregister (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). In
ber (PIN) of the person, and the submitted contrast, in many EU member states, the migrants
information is coded into variables about the are required to have a residence permit to work,
individual (the CRR identification number, citi- rent an apartment, use health and medical ser-
zenship, sex, country, and date of birth), the place vices, or open a bank account (Lindhardt Olsen
of residence (record key, previous and next 2010). Thus, the incentives to register immigra-
address of usual residence, building ID numbers), tion are higher than the incentives to deregister
and the type of registration action (registration/ for emigration. Hence, EU international immi-
deregistration, birth/death, immigration/emigra- gration statistics are more accurate than the inter-
tion within or outside of Austria, origin/destina- national emigration statistics.
tion country for migration, date and time of Moreover, because migration of non-EU citi-
record filing). The CRR submits data to the Sta- zens depends on the residence permit and thus is
tistics Austria, the authority in charge of national regularly recorded, it is the migration of EU cit-
statistics of Austria. Two files are submitted: izens that is typically underreported. Usually,
individual-level data on (de)registration of place data on emigration and on duration of stay abroad
of usual residence for the previous quarter of the are missing for their own citizens, i.e.,
calendar year (to calculate migration flows on co-nationals of EU member states (as high as
quarterly basis) and data on persons registered about 80 % in Germany in 2009; see Eurostat
by main place of residence (to calculate stock 2011b). Additionally, the deregistration require-
population). The migration flow data include ments in EU member states also vary: in Austria,
one record for the registration in the new place for example, persons who emigrate abroad for
of usual residence and one record for longer time periods are advised to deregister
deregistering from the prior place of residence. from the place of usual residence, but this is not
Based on the submitted data, the Statistics Aus- obligatory (Reeger 2009), whereas in Denmark,
tria compiles three statistical tables – of residents, the person is required to deregister, but this is in
residences, and citizenships. This detail of infor- case the emigration is for more than 6 months
mation allows analysts to generate statistics both (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). This variation in defini-
for international and internal migration by var- tions and legal requirements creates additional
ious territorial units at municipal, regional, and sources of error for emigration statistics and
national levels. The CRR data submitted to the cross-country comparisons within the EU. These
Statistics Austria do not contain the person’s variations in definitions also affect immigration
names, but instead include the person’s CRR statistics for return migrants as some EU member
identification number. The time coverage start/ states are not able to report return migration of
end dates for both quarterly flow and stock data their own citizens (Herm 2008; Eurostat 2011b).
are harmonized to allow comparisons, and the Thus, typically, EU data on international migra-
stock data are compiled along the same variables tion of non-EU citizens are more reliable than
as migration flow data. migration data of EU citizens (Herm 2008), and
Population registers omit illegal migrants who international immigration statistics are more
do not possess residence permits. Another major accurate than the international emigration
disadvantage of population registers is the statistics.
underreporting of emigration, especially interna-
tional emigration. Because the registration of a
change of place of residence is left on a self- Administrative Records
declaratory basis, persons who emigrate are
reluctant to register their move to continue Many member states supplement or combine
receiving various state benefits and to retain population register data with alternative admin-
their official status in the country (Reeger 2009) istrative records and registers – to estimate the
4 Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the EU

undeclared emigration or immigration both for years. This is another reason that immigration
annual migration statistics and for register-based statistics have higher accuracy than
population census results (Eurostat 2011b, c). emigration data.
These administrative sources include records on
work or residence permits, national revenue and
tax service data, health insurance or social secu- References
rity databases, dwelling or realty registers, unem-
ployment registers, etc. Data from the national Eurostat (2011a) Migrants in Europe: a statistical portrait
revenue service and the residence permits are of the first and second generation. Publications Office
of the European Union, Luxemburg. http://ec.europa.
typically used to estimate migration of non-EU
eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/5727749/KS-31-10-
citizens. Residence permits are authorizations 539-EN.PDF/bcf27a60-7016-4fec-98c5-e8488491ebbd.
valid for a minimum of 3 months and issued to 7 Oct 2015
non-EU citizens to stay legally in the EU Eurostat (2011b) Annual migration statistics data collec-
tion, reference year 2009: summary of data sources used
(Scarnicchia 2011). According to the Regulation
for immigration rates. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
(EC) No 862/2007, the statistics on residence cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/migr_flow_esms_an9.pdf.
permits are mandatory for EU member states, 13 Mar 2013
should refer to the calendar year, and describe Eurostat (2011c) Annual migration statistics data collec-
tion, reference year 2009: summary of data sources
the number of persons issued such permits (not
used for emigration rates. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
the number of acts issued; see Eurostat Metadata eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/migr_flow_esms_an10.
n.d.b). However, because various administrative pdf. 13 Mar 2013
registers use different definitions when recording Eurostat metadata (n.d.a) International migration flows:
reference metadata, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
observations (Reinhard et al. 2010), some uncer-
cache/ITY_SDDS/en/migr_flow_esms.htm. Accessed
tainty still remains when linking various admin- on 12 Mar 2013
istrative records with population registers to Eurostat metadata (n.d.b) Residence permits: reference
estimate migration flows. metadata, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/
ITY_SDDS/en/migr_res_esms.htm. Accessed on
In EU Nordic countries, administrative
12 Mar 2013
records play an important role in the production Herm A (2008) Population and social conditions. In:
of population statistics. In Denmark, for example, EUROSTAT statistics in focus, 98/2008
population registers are linked to the Central Lebhart G, Neustadter C, Kytir J (2007) The new popula-
tion register at statistics Austria: conceptualization and
Business Register and the Dwelling Register
methodology for register-based flow and stock statis-
(Lindhardt Olsen 2010). Linking these three reg- tics. Aust J Stat 36(4):277–289
isters allows analysts to accumulate information Lindhardt Olsen A (2010) Information on migrants in
on the population size and the number of busi- register-based censuses: migration data in the Danish
register-based statistical system. Working Paper
nesses and dwellings, to retrieve information on a
15 presented at the Joint UNECE/Eurostat Expert
wide range of sociodemographic attributes of a Group Meeting on Register-Based Censuses, The
person, as well as to impute missing observations Hague, 10–11 May 2010
on a variable (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). Because Reeger U (2009) Austria. In: Fassmann H, Reeger U,
Sievers W (eds) Statistics and reality: concepts and
emigration data are frequently underreported, as
measurements of migration in Europe. IMISCOE
discussed above, tax records can be linked to the report. University Press, Amsterdam
person through the Central Business Register and Regulation (EC) No 862/2007. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
the population register and can help reveal emi- LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0023:
0029:EN:PDF. Accessed on 9 Mar 2013
grations when no income tax is reported for the
Reinhard F, Schwerer E, Berka C, Moser M, Humer
person and the requests to submit tax report S (2010) Quality of registers: quality assessment for
remain unattended. But typically, this type of register–based statistics in Austria. Working Paper
information becomes available with some sub- 4 presented at the Joint UNECE/Eurostat Expert
Group Meeting on Register-Based Censuses, The
stantial delay (Lindhardt Olsen 2010), as can be
Hague, 10–11 May 2010
the case with tax data. These missing data are Scarnicchia L (2011) Residence permits issued to non-EU
imputed in the database eventually for previous citizens in 2009 for family reunification, employment
Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the EU 5

and education. In: EUROSTAT Statistics in Focus, United Nations (1998) Recommendations on statistics of
43/2011 international migration, papers series M, No. 58 ⁄rev.1,
Statistics Austria (2012) Wanderungsstatistik 2011: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United
Herausgegeben von Statistik Austria, Wien Nations, New York
N

Naturalization or more generally someone outside of the

national political community, “becomes natural”
Sara Wallace Goodman by becoming a full member of that community
University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA through citizenship acquisition. However, “natu-
ralization” is a paradoxical expression; there is
nothing “natural” about this process of member-
Definition ship acquisition. This contradiction is immedi-
ately visible when adopting a legal perspective,
Naturalization is the primary process by which where the process of naturalization requires legal
immigrants become citizens in a host society. It is regulation. In this latter context, naturalization is
defined as any acquisition after birth of a citizen- the process of acquisition where a person applies
ship not previously held by a person and requires for citizenship to the state represented by relevant
an application and decision by public authorities. public authorities. This emphasis on the aspiring
While there are many procedures for obtaining citizen’s process of application is key. Unlike
citizenship (e.g., registration, declaration, auto- other procedures which require only a unilateral
matic, and other ex lege procedures), naturaliza- act of oral or written declaration, naturalization is
tion is the most visible because of its connection conditional on a decision by relevant public
to immigration policy and its regulatory effect on authorities. In other words, applicants cannot
the size and composition of the national political merely declare themselves to be citizens; their
community. In fact, naturalization is the most applications are subject to conditions and evalu-
densely regulated and most politicized aspect of ations. Acquisition through naturalization can
citizenship law. Its application ranges from ordi- either be a legal entitlement, by which public
nary, residence-based immigrants to refugees, authorities must grant citizenship to the applicant
spouses, as well as minors. The material and if and when the relevant conditions specified by
procedural conditions that comprise this journey law have been acknowledged as being success-
can make acquisition either a liberal, relatively fully completed, or a discretionary act. Discre-
easy progression from settlement to citizenship or tionary naturalization is obviously the more
a restrictive, onerous process full of impediments precarious and contingent of the two types,
that may not lead to citizenship at all. where even upon successful completion of rele-
vant conditions, public authorities reserve for
Detailed Description themselves the right to deny citizenship to an
Conceptually, naturalization is understood as a applicant. In both cases, naturalization is condi-
transformative process whereby an immigrant, tional in the sense that it requires an individual
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_101-2
2 Naturalization

Naturalization, Table 1 Comparison of naturalization policies across postcolonial and European states
Residence
duration Allows dual Citizenship Administrative Right of
Country (years) citizenship Language test fee appeal
Europe
Austria 10 No Yes Yes €1010 plus Yes
provincial fees
Denmark 9 No Yes Yes 1000 DKK No
(€133)
France 5 Yes Yes No, None Yes
assimilation
interview
Germany 8 Only for non-EU Yes Yes €255 Yes
citizens
Netherlands 5 If born in the Yes Yes €810 Yes
Netherlands or have
Dutch spouse
UK 5 Yes Yes Yes £851 GBP No
(€1018)
Postcolonial
Australia 4 Yes Yes Yes 300 AUD Yes
($316 USD)
Canada 3 (1,095 Yes Yes Yes 200 CAD Yes, but not
days) in the ($203 USD) of federal
past 4 decisions
New 5 Yes Yes No 470 NZD Yes
Zealand ($395 USD)
United 5 Yes Yes Yes $680 USD Yes
States

action by the applicant as well as a positive certain job opportunities, free movement, rights
response by public authorities. to family unification, etc. Also, because citizen-
Naturalization allows immigrants not only to ship represents full membership to the state,
enjoy formal rights and protections through the immigrants may aspire to achieve a sense of
legal status of citizenship but also to become civic belonging through naturalization.
members of a national political community The discipline of identifying, comparing, and
through citizenship status. Therefore, it holds explaining citizenship policies across advanced
strong significance for both the receiving state industrialized states is a growing preoccupation
and the aspiring citizen. From the state’s perspec- among scholars of political science, sociology,
tive, naturalization enables people to join and and legal studies. In its formative stage, this aca-
therefore expand the national political commu- demic practice drew heavily from the nationalism
nity. Changes to citizenship rules – either the literature and concepts of nationhood. (For an
loosening or tightening of them – yield a direct example of this, see Brubaker (1992).) This ren-
effect on the contours of national membership. dered a classificatory system of citizenship policy
From the immigrant’s perspective, naturalization that was largely dichotomous, referring to state
in most states is still the key to full rights of policies as either ethnic or civic. More recent
citizenship. Citizenship matters for a number of works have presented alternatives to this nation-
reasons, including obtaining voting rights and hood framework by employing more
other forms of political participation, access to membership-neutral terminology where policies
Naturalization 3

are described not by invoking a sense of belong- period to 5 years). No other state in Europe main-
ing or by their outcome but by the process itself. tains residence durations lower than 5 years. By
These works include the constellation of both comparison, all postcolonial states boast low
policies and practices that determine citizenship durations of residence. Moreover, it should be
acquisition. (Work illustrative of this approach noted that the length of residence condition in
includes Bauböck et al. (2006); Bloemraad citizenship law does not mean that every immi-
(2006), Howard (2009), also see Koopmans grant who has lived in a country for so many
et al. (2005).) Many of the fine-grained descrip- years can apply for naturalization. Many coun-
tions and nuanced comparisons of citizenship tries create additional hurdles by requiring
today rely on a closer look at the mechanics of periods of uninterrupted residence or only
naturalization, recognizing that the process is a counting the years with a permanent residence
complex aggregate, comprised of many small permit, which may itself take up to 5 years to
policies and procedures. These polices include, acquire in a number of European states (as is the
but are not limited to, residency duration, renun- case in Austria).
ciation of previous citizenship, clean criminal Dual citizenship is a dimension of naturaliza-
records, evidence of integration (defined by lan- tion that is often at the center of vigorous political
guage acquisition, knowledge of the country, debate, both internally among political parties
demonstration of values, etc.), sufficient income, and across borders between the conferring and
as well as procedures such as processing time, sending states. On the one hand, allowing citizens
administrative fees, and process/right of appeal, to hold multiple passports provides increased
all of which affect the ultimate experience and mobility and enables expatriates to maintain con-
rate of naturalization. nections with their country of birth or heritage
In comparing these different policy dimen- (as was vociferously advocated by former Presi-
sions across the major, immigrant-receiving soci- dent Vicente Fox on behalf of Mexicans living in
eties, we see significant variation, portending the United States). Dual citizenship can also
differences in both the priorities of and pressures facilitate integration by encouraging immigrants
for inclusion. Table 1 compares a handful of to naturalize and participate politically in their
naturalization policies – both material and new country without compromising other con-
procedural – for a select number of traditional nections. According to this view, compulsory
immigration countries (the “postcolonial” states) renunciation may not only stymie one’s personal
and European states, who have only transitioned integration but also generate a disincentive to
into robust immigrant-receiver states in the post- citizenship acquisition altogether. On the other
war period. (For more on policies of naturaliza- hand, critics of dual citizenship claim also that it
tion in Europe, see the EUDO Citizenship undercuts immigrant integration. In maintaining
Observatory website eudo-citizenship.eu. For a second citizenship or identity, immigrants are
more in-depth comparisons on polices across a never fully moored to their host country. Dual
larger number of European countries, see in par- citizenship raises not only the specter of dual
ticular Goodman (2010), RSCAS/EDUO-CIT- loyalty but is also said to create conflicts between
Comp. 2010/7.) states or an unfair distribution of the benefits and
Beginning with residence, states exhibit a sig- burdens of citizenship because of the multiple
nificant amount of difference in the duration of rights or multiple duties that dual citizens have
residence required of potential citizens. At a max- compared to mono-nationals. In the sample of
imum level, Article 6 of the 1997 European Con- countries in the table above, all of the traditional
vention on Nationality (ECN) stipulates that no immigration countries allow for dual citizenship.
more than 10 years of residence should be The United States does not have a de jure provi-
required. At a minimum, Belgium has required sion requiring renunciation of other citizenship
3 years of residence since a 2000 revision to its and therefore establishes multiple citizenship de
citizenship law (a 2012 change may raise this facto. Within Europe, only Austria and Denmark
4 Naturalization

have firm requirements for renunciation. In the costly. And considering that applicants’ decision
Netherlands, after a period of allowing dual citi- to apply is strongly influenced by their expected
zenship (1992–1997), dual citizenship can still be chances of success, administrative fees factor
claimed by those applicants born in the Nether- into this decision-making process. Only in Ger-
lands or by spouses married to Dutch citizens. many and the Netherlands, from the list of Euro-
Language and citizenship tests can be catego- pean states above, is naturalization an entitlement
rized together as types of integration or cultural (instead of a discretionary procedure) if an appli-
requirements for naturalization. While language cant satisfies all the conditions. In general, there
has long been a requirement for citizenship in is an acknowledged norm to allow for a right of
several states in Europe and beyond (Denmark appeal in response to a negative decision on an
since the nineteenth century; the United States application. Exceptions to this include Denmark
since the early twentieth), the introduction of (an applicant can make a report to the ombuds-
citizenship tests to assess country knowledge is men, but not appeal the decision of Parliament)
a new facet of naturalization in many states. and the United Kingdom (which allows for judi-
Indeed, only the United States and Canada cial review since 2002 and appeal for asylum
could be considered experienced practitioners of cases, but not on matters of naturalization).
citizenship tests by comparison. Every European This brief overview of naturalization policies
state in Table 1 has only recently introduced a reveals patterns of both similarity and difference.
citizenship test (as well as integration tests for Generally speaking, some states provide for a
acquisition for permanent residence). (For more more facilitated naturalization process through
on integration requirements in Europe, see Good- more inclusive policies while others maintain
man (2012).) Australia also is a recent addition to higher barriers that impede a migrant’s political
the list of test givers. However, not all states use incorporation. An accurate empirical picture of
citizenship tests to assess integration or knowl- naturalization policies identifies configurations
edge. France, for example, has long maintained and constellations of policies, recognizing that
an assimilation interview in which the state practices are not dichotomously ethnic or
interviewing officer assesses an applicant’s civic or inclusive or exclusive. Policy combina-
adherence to Republican values as well as knowl- tions reflect a reality in which states pursue mul-
edge of social and political rights. While former tiple policy goals for citizenship and immigration
President Nicolas Sarkozy passed legislation through naturalization, and governments fre-
introducing a citizenship test for naturalization quently modify and reform citizenship laws to
in France, plans were subsequently scrapped by achieve these goals. As states continue to use
the new Socialist government. Attempts to naturalization to make citizens out of immigrants,
increase the period of residence and make more the many policy choices that shape this procedure
onerous other conditions for British citizenship are consequential not just for the migrant but for
(like adding a community service requirement) the democratic nation-state itself.
under Labour leadership were also rejected when
the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coali-
tion came into power. These attempts at policy References
change reveal the extent to which citizenship is
often politicized and thus susceptible to revision Bauböck R, Ersbøll E, Groenendijk K, Waldrauch
H (2006) Acquisition and loss of nationality. volume 1:
with changes of government.
comparative analysis. Policies and trends in 15 Euro-
Finally, it is meaningful to consider and com- pean Countries, vol 1. Amsterdam University Press,
pare variation in administrative practices for nat- Amsterdam
uralization. Most obviously, the “price” of Bloemraad I (2006) Becoming a citizen: incorporating
immigrants and refugees in the United States and Can-
citizenship is quite divergent across states.
ada. University of California Press, Berkeley
Where administrative fees are high, naturaliza- Brubaker R (1992) Citizenship and nationhood in France
tion is not only lengthy and difficult but also and Germany. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Naturalization 5

Goodman, SW (2010) Naturalisation policies in Europe: Howard MM (2009) The politics of citizenship in Europe.
exploring patterns of inclusion and exclusion.” In: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York
EUDO citizenship comparative reports. EUDO Citi- Koopmans R, Statham P, Giugni M, Passy F (2005)
zenship, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Stud- Contested citizenship: immigration and cultural diver-
ies, EUI, Florence sity in Europe. University of Minnesota Press,
Goodman SW (2012) Fortifying citizenship: policy strat- Minneapolis
egies for civic integration in Western Europe. World
Polit 64(4):659–698
T

Temporary Labor Migration 2009, p. 6). Again, this is a very broad term that
requires only that migrants leave their country of
Christopher Foulkes origin and at some point return. Circular migra-
International Organization for Migration tion is often used in literature to describe cyclical
Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan temporary migration, where migrants repeatedly
leave and then return to their place of origin.
In sociological literature, temporary labor
Keywords migrants are often referred to as sojourners, as
compared with settlers. Uriely defines a sojourner
Circular migration; Seasonal migration; as having both a general intention and concrete
Sojourners; Guest workers plan to return to their place of origin, whereas a
settler is defined as someone with the absence of
either of these things. As such, it is possible to
Definitions equate temporary migrants with sojourners as
compared to settlers (Uriely 1994, p. 435).
Temporary migration is migration to a country Longer-term temporary migration programs
that is not intended to be permanent, for a spec- last longer than a year and do not necessarily
ified and limited period of time, and usually involve seasonal employment in the agricultural
undertaken for a specific purpose. Host countries or horticultural sectors. Under this type of guest-
admit temporary migrants for the purposes of worker scheme, migrants are generally annually
employment, study, tourism, business activities, granted the right to remain, that is, contingent on
and religious or cultural visits and exchanges. them remaining employed.
This entry focuses on employment- or labour-
related temporary migration.
Temporary labor migration programs are The Purpose of the Temporary Labor
often referred to in host countries as guest-worker Migration Programs
programs. As Abella (2006, p. 5) says, “[t]he
term ‘guest workers’ is the generic label for all Temporary labor migration programs are used by
migrant workers who have no right to permanent both countries of destination (receiving) and
settlement.” Within the guest-worker category, countries of origin (sending) countries to address
circular migration programs are defined as pro- their labor needs at various skill levels and can be
grams that facilitate “the process of leaving and expanded or curtailed in response to changing
then returning to one’s place of origin” (Newland economic conditions, thus providing greater
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_102-1
2 Temporary Labor Migration

flexibility in the labor market (Abella 2006). seasonal migration programs and longer-term
From the point of view of host countries, robust migration programs.
and well-designed temporary labor programs for
migrants are often viewed as a safeguard mecha-
nism against illegal labor migration (e.g., the Short-Term Programs
United States of America) (Papademetriou
2013). These countries also rely on temporary A subset of circular migration programs is sea-
programs to satisfy labour supply shortages sonal migration programs. These are circular
when permanent immigration of foreigners, espe- migration programs where the migrants are “per-
cially low-skilled ones, is not desired or socially sons employed by a country other than their own
accepted. This is the case in many Middle- for only part of a year because the work they
Eastern states such as the United Arab Emirates perform depends on seasonal conditions”
and Saudi Arabia (Baldwin-Edwards 2005). (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Sending states, most of whom are developing Development 1998). Seasonal migrants typically
countries, participate in temporary labor pro- migrate in order to provide agricultural or horti-
grams to help their citizens find work abroad cultural labor services in the on-season and return
when economic opportunities at home are lim- to their country of origin in the off-season. While
ited, to tap into remittances for the country’s seasonal migration is not a new phenomenon,
economic development, and to benefit from specific government policy responses to it are a
the enhanced qualifications and experiences of relatively recent occurrence. It has been argued
temporary migrants who return home (Abella that seasonal migration “has only become a pol-
2006). While generally considered a positive icy issue since governments have started to
phenomenon, temporary labor migration – expend great efforts to control movement across
particularly of low-skilled migrants – tends to their borders in ways that make spontaneous cir-
leave migrants vulnerable to abuse in a foreign culation more difficult” (Newland 2009, p. 23).
country. Because temporary labor migrants’ right Seasonal migrants generally do not remain in
to remain in their country of employment is con- their county of employment for longer than
tingent on them continuing that employment, 9 months at a time. The governments of devel-
these migrant workers are less likely to complain oped host countries are increasingly regulating
when the employers violate labor and wage con- circular migrants through recognized seasonal
ditions. This turns temporary migrant laborers employer (RSE) schemes, seasonal work permits,
into “precarious workers” over whom employers and specialized circular migrant visas.
and labor users have particular and wide-ranging One example of this is New Zealand, where an
mechanisms of control (Anderson 2010). In addi- RSE scheme has been in place since 2006 to
tion, local government bureaucrats and enforce- regulate low-skilled migrant workers from the
ment agents may take advantage of the workers’ Pacific Islands Forum countries (including the
lack of language skills and cultural knowledge Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New
and make them pay bribes. Formal temporary Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Republic of
labour migration programmes often come with a Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tonga,
contract of employment, predeparture cultural Tuvalu, Samoa, and Vanuatu) and employers in
orientation, and consular services in the country the horticulture and viticulture industries. Under
of employment. These programmes go some way the scheme employers are required to be recog-
to protecting migrant workers from being taken nized as seasonal employers by meeting certain
advantage of by unscrupulous employers and criteria, including being in sound financial state,
corrupt officials in host countries. having human resources and workplace policies
Temporary migration programs for employment and practices that follow a high standard, demon-
purposes generally take two forms: short-term, strating a commitment to hire New Zealand
Temporary Labor Migration 3

nationals, and having not violated relevant immi- construction industry, domestic and household
gration and employment laws in the past. Pacific services, and manufacturing and marine indus-
Island workers can then be recruited under the tries. These low-skilled workers generally come
RSE. There are up to 5,000 seasonal work visas from other Association of Southeast Asian
per year available under the scheme. These visas Nations (ASEAN) countries as well as from
require workers to attend predeparture orienta- China, India, and Sri Lanka. Singapore uses its
tion; are valid for up to 7 months, or 9 months migrant-worker scheme as a policy lever to
for workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu; and tie ensure flexibility in the size of the low-skilled
workers to a specific location, type of work, and migrant-worker population. Low-skilled workers
employer (ILO 2008). are admitted to the country provided they remain
in employment and are not allowed to bring
Longer-Term Programs spouses or family members with them,
Longer-term temporary employment schemes are and employers are required to pay levies to the
common in Southeast Asia as well as in Europe government to retain them (Cerna 2010).
and North America and fall loosely into two This stands in contrast with Singapore’s high-
categories. One type of program facilitates the skilled migrant laborers that mostly come from
movement of low-skilled, low-paid workers. For the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
instance, nationals of less developed Asian coun- and Australia, as well as from Japan and South
tries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Phil- Korea. These migrants generally either hold
ippines arrive in more developed states such as advanced degrees or specialized skills in particu-
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia to lar fields and are granted employment passes
take construction, domestic, and manufacturing (types P, Q, or S) by the Singapore government.
jobs that the locals are no longer willing to do These migrants are entitled to bring dependants
(Appave and Cholewinski 2008, pp. 445–447). with them, and only family members of S pass-
Other programs facilitate the temporary holders are subject to a monthly levy of SGD50
migration of highly paid, high-skilled workers (USD32). High-skilled migrants are also the only
invited by host countries to fill skills shortages category of labor migrant entitled to apply for
in the information technology, aviation, engi- permanent residency or citizenship (Cerna 2010).
neering, medicine, and academia (Appave and
Cholewinski 2008, p. 447).
The United States has in place a number of Working-Holiday Programs
guest-worker programs for low- and high-skilled Another form of temporary employment migra-
employment. For instance, the H-1B “specialty tion is the working holiday or overseas experi-
occupations” visa program provides annually at ence (OE). For instance, it is common for young,
least 85,000 3-year visas to employ foreign sci- university-educated people from Australia and
entists, engineers, and computer programmers, New Zealand to migrate to the United Kingdom
among other professionals. The H-2B program for up to 2 years on their OE after university
issues 66,000 visas to foreign workers from eli- graduation. Working-holiday programs are avail-
gible countries to fill temporary nonagricultural able in many countries around the world, includ-
jobs, such as in construction, hospitality, and ing Argentina, Japan, Canada, the United States,
landscaping. Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, and many European
Similarly, Singapore has well-established countries. These visa types are generally utilized
longer-term temporary migrant programs for by well-educated young people around the world,
both high- and low-skilled workers not necessarily for career advancement, but
(Abella 2006). There were an estimated rather to spend time traveling and experiencing
1,305,011 migrant labours in Singapore in 2010; new places – while making enough money to
of them, the vast majority (87 %) were cover the basic necessities – before returning
low-skilled laborers that worked mostly in the home to begin their careers.
4 Temporary Labor Migration

References www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/newland_HDRP_2009.
pdf. Accessed 18 Apr 2013
Albella M (2006) Policies and best practices for manage- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment of temporary migration. International Sympo- ment (1998) Recommendations on statistics of inter-
sium on International Migration and Development, national migration, revision 1, Statistical Papers,
Turin Series M, No. 58. United Nations, New York. http://
Anderson B (2010) Migration, immigration controls and stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2402
the fashioning of precarious workers. Work Employ Papademetriou D (2013) The fundamentals of immigra-
Soc 24(2):300–331 tion reform. University of North Carolina, North Car-
Appave G, Cholewinski R (eds) (2008) World migration olina, http://prospect.org/article/fundamentals-
report 2008: managing labor mobility in the evolving immigration-reform. Access 18 Apr 2013
global economy. International Organization for Migra- Uriely N (1994) Rhetorical ethnicity of permanent
tion, Geneva sojourners: the case of Israeli immigrants in the Chi-
Baldwin-Edwards A (2005) Migration in the Middle East cago area. Int Sociol 9(4):431–445
and Mediterranean. Global Commission for Migration,
Geneva, http://iom.ch/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/ Further Reading
shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/gcim/rs/ Daly B (2005) Australian and New Zealand university
RS5.pdf. Accessed 18 Apr 2013 students’ participation in international exchange pro-
Cerna (2010) Policies and practices of highly skilled grams. J Stud Int Educ 9(1):26–41
migration in times of the economic crisis. International Immigration New Zealand (2011) u.3.20, Immigration
Labour Organization, Geneva, International Migration New Zealand operational manual. http://www.immi
Papers 99 gration.govt.nz/opsmanual/43653.htm. Accessed
International Labour Organization (2008) The 18 Apr 2013
recognized seasonal employers scheme (RSE) New Newland K, Agunias DR, Terrazas A (2008) Learning by
Zealand. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ doing: experiences of circular migration. Migration
@asia/@robangkok/documents/projectdocumentation/ Policy Institute, Washington, DC
wcms_120560.pdf. Accessed 15 Feb 2013 United Kingdom Border Agency (2013) Tier 5 (Youth
Newland K (2009) Circular migration and human devel- Mobility Scheme). http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.
opment, human development research paper. United uk/visas-immigration/working/tier5/government-au
Nations Development Programme, New York, http:// thorised-exchange/. Accessed 18 Apr 2013
M

Measuring Internal Migration may additionally involve on a job change for one
Prospectively Using Longitudinal or both partners. As children near school age,
Data parents may decide on a different neighborhood
or city that will allow for better child outcomes,
Randall Olsen1 and Elizabeth Cooksey2 also triggering migration. At retirement, oppor-
1
Department of Economics, The Ohio State tunities for leisure activities or a desire to live
University, Columbus, OH, USA near grandchildren may take precedence. At the
2
Department of Sociology, The Ohio State oldest ages, there may be a need for assisted
University, Columbus, OH, USA living.

Definition Why Is Measuring Internal Migration So

Difficult?
Internal migration may be defined as a change in
residence from one geographical unit to another. Whereas a birth or death is readily distinguish-
able, a move can be difficult to classify and hence
measure. This is especially true for internal
Why Is Measuring Internal Migration migration and most residential moves occur
Important? within the United States. Whether a move counts
as migration will depend on how we choose to
Accurately capturing a population’s spatial incorporate other factors into our decision mak-
mobility patterns is highly important because res- ing: the distance between origin and destination,
idential moves have a direct effect upon popula- the length of stay at the destination, and the
tion distribution and are associated with reason for moving. Precise measurement may
significant demographic processes across the also prove elusive. In 1970, a United Nations
life course. These patterns and processes have manual on “methods of measuring internal
critical implications for policy makers at multiple migration” United Nations, 1970 noted that it
geographic levels. For example, young people would only be possible to tabulate moves by
frequently move to pursue postsecondary educa- distance covered if exact information was avail-
tion or training, enter the armed forces, or take a able on points of both origin and destination. At
first step in their career. Household unions often the time, most data on people’s moves were gath-
involve a change in residence of at least one of the ered retrospectively and hence were open to prob-
partners so that couples can live together, and this lems of recall error, a general lack of specificity
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_104-1
2 Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data

regarding location, and an inability to also collect undertake, so too are studies that take a longer-
data on other life events that occurred both before term life cycle orientation. For example, a person
and after moving. In order to really understand who bounces back and forth between two loca-
how migration fits into people’s life histories, the tions every couple of years would appear to be
complexity of migratory patterns demands com- highly mobile which in a sense they are. How-
prehensive data gathered prospectively over the ever, a longer-term study with a life cycle orien-
life course. tation may show this pattern of moving to be
closely connected to spells of employment and
to evidence a much more limited degree of mobil-
The National Longitudinal Surveys ity once return migration is taken into account.
as a Data Resource Below we use the NLSY79 matrix-of-moves data
to assess the migratory behavior of 5,207 respon-
One of the best resources currently available to dents who had given an interview in each of the
measure internal migration over a significant 24 rounds of interviewing from 1979 (at ages
span of the life course is the geocode data in the 14–21) through 2010. One might think this
1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth restriction would rule out frequent movers. How-
(http://www.nlsinfo.org/site/nlsy79/docs/79html/ ever, it is relatively rare that an NLSY79 respon-
Geocode79/geotoc.htm). Respondents provide dent cannot be found. Nonresponse is primarily a
their address at each interview, and these have problem of cooperation rather than a lack of
since been geocoded to as precise a latitude and contact.
longitude as possible. By applying to the Bureau We begin with the question: how much do
of Labor Statistics, users can obtain a restricted people really move? For illustrative purposes
access version of the data containing created we classify a “change of location” to be a move
“matrix-of-moves” variables that measure the outside a radius of 25 miles, hypothesizing that
distance from each survey address to every other such a move would potentially cause a change in
reported address. Using these “matrix-of-moves” labor market location and disruption to social
variables makes it possible to summarize the connections and hence be economically and
movement that occurs over many years. Further, socially significant. We also characterize
because social, economic, and behavioral infor- “return” migration as any move to a location
mation were also collected contemporaneously, within 25 miles of a previous location. Note that
moves of varying distance can be placed in the if a person makes several short moves to the west
context within which migratory decisions were and then returns to their original location, which
made. For example, when one considers the is by now more than 25 miles from their most
depressed labor market in 2013, a feasible way recent location, that move will be counted as both
to find work if living in a chronically depressed a “move” and a “return.” Using this standard,
area may well be to move. However, are people at more than half of our sample did not move more
higher risk of being out of work also less likely to than 25 miles between their mid/late teens and
migrate? The NLSY79 data can help answer such their late 40s/early 50s. Another 19 % only
questions also taking past experiences into “move” once, 14 % twice, and 15 % three or
account. more times. Accounting for return migration
changes the story, however, as over 81 % of our
respondents have lived in two or fewer “places”
Descriptive Analysis of Internal their entire adolescent and young adult lives,
Migration Using the NLSY79 where unique places are at least 25 miles apart.
Of those who move at least once, about half
Moving and Returning return to within 25 miles of a previous residence.
Although short-term studies that gather informa- Two-thirds of people, who had a long distance
tion on every move made are important to move and never returned to a previous location,
Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data 3

Measuring Internal
70.0%
Migration Prospectively HGC 14 & over
Using Longitudinal Data,
Fig. 1 Number of 25-mile 60.0% HGC Under 14
moves by highest grade
completed 50.0%

40.0%

30.0%

20.0%

10.0%

0.0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

had only one 25+ mile move. For all the mobility more likely to stay put and about half as likely to
that occurs within the United States, it appears make four or more moves to new locations. These
that we stay pretty close to home base and only patterns may reflect the fact that those with sub-
about 8 % of our sample population moved four stantial education place themselves in a national
or more times. labor market and are more likely to move longer
distances not only to gain their education in the
first place but also to exploit post-educational
Patterns of Mobility by Population opportunities. A corollary of lower mobility by
Subgroups the less educated is that local labor market dis-
ruptions in the form of losses of employment at
Mobility for youth in the late 1970s over the next local employers generate problems for the less
30 years of their lives does not appear to be educated as they are less likely to move toward
gender linked or differ significantly by better labor market opportunities.
income – at least when median income is the cut
point for two comparison groups. There are some
differences in the number of 25-mile moves
References
between blacks and whites where whites are
slightly more likely to report more moves. More United Nations (1970) Manual VI: methods of measuring
of a difference is seen by education, however, as internal migration. United Nations Publications, New
illustrated in Fig. 1. York
Highly educated people are quite mobile while
those with fewer than 14 years of education are
R

Refugees Defined a massive diaspora to the New World seeking

both political freedom and economic prospects.
Peter I. Rose (See Miller and Wagner 1994.)
Smith College, Northampton, MA, USA Still, the most common cause of sudden flight
is the targeting of individuals or groups – tribal,
racial, religious, political, or ideological – to
Definition which they belong. This may result in their actual
expulsion or more often the decision to escape
lest those singled out be arrested, segregated,
Refugees are people who have been forced to leave
their homelands due to persecution, war, or natu- incarcerated, or killed, sometimes in genocidal
ral disasters and seek asylum in other countries. campaigns known today as “ethnic cleansing.”
Sometimes people caught in the crossfire of
Other migrants are those who go from one coun-
wars and other conflicts that have little to do
try to another seeking economic opportunities
with who they are also seek safer havens in
where they are thought to abound. When such a
other lands.
contemplated move is anticipated to be a perma-
In popular parlance, those who are victims of
nent one, or what is commonly known as
calamities ranging from famine to earthquakes
emigration. Debating and planning to leave
and sudden storms – hurricanes, tornadoes, tsu-
one’s homeland usually involves a complex
namis, and floods – are also called refugees, but
calculus, weighing the centripetal attraction of a
the term is more commonly used to refer to those
particular destination as well as centrifugal fac-
who fit the formal definition recognized by the
tors, those that draw them away and those that
United Nations High Commission for Refugees
make people hesitate to leave hearth and home.
(UNHCR), that is, as border crossers “with a
Refugees rarely have a choice. Their departure is
well-founded fear of persecution,” in other
usually an absolute necessity in order to survive
words, those who are “forced to flee.”
either man-made conflicts or natural disasters.
According to reliable statistics, in 2013, there
To be sure, sometimes there is a conflation of
were 45.2 million forcibly displaced people
“push” and “pull” factors. One classic example is
worldwide at the end of 2012. At that time,
that of beleaguered Irish farmers, who, toiling
three quarters of the world’s refugees were to be
under the heavy-handed rule of English landlords
found in nations neighboring their countries of
under near serf-like conditions, were devastated
origin, with more than half (55 %) of all refugees
by the potato blight that swept Ireland in the
worldwide coming from five countries:
middle of the nineteenth century. Millions joined

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_105-1
2 Refugees Defined

Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and Sudan defined above, but they were never referred to
(UNHCR 2012). as such.
In addition to those who do find a way to cross The term refugee did not appear until late in
into other lands, there are many, many others the seventeenth century. It was first used in ref-
under threat or under fire who cannot exit from erence to Huguenots, a French Protestant group.
their beleaguered countries. They are sometimes After the revocation of the Treaty of Nantes in
said to be “in a refugee-like situation” and are 1685, a treaty which for almost a century had
otherwise known by the apt phrase used by inter- guaranteed freedom of religion in France, many
national agencies as being “internally displaced fled the Catholic-dominated country and sought
persons,” or “IDPs.” Their plight is in many ways asylum in other lands, especially in England,
the most precarious of all for they often remain Holland, and Switzerland. They said of them-
captives of the very regimes that may have driven selves that they were in Le Refuge and called
them from their homes and otherwise sought themselves réfugiés since they had gone in search
ways to oppress them through humiliation, ostra- of havens of security where their right to worship
cism, mass internment, and, in some cases, mass as they chose was not impeded. The term would
murder. The same source cited earlier indicates soon be applied to others belonging to persecuted
that, at the end of 2012, there were 15.4 million groups who found themselves in a growing dis-
people recognized as “official” refugees in the persion of stigmatized people subjected to intim-
world, plus 937,000 asylum seekers and 28.8 idation, maltreatment, and discrimination.
million internally displaced persons. By 2015 While it is often assumed that all refugees are
these figures had more than doubled. persons wanting to live under democratic rule,
and this is generally the case, there are excep-
tions. For example, a century after the Huguenots
Expellees and Escapees left France, pro-British loyalists who escaped
from New York and New England fled to Nova
In ancient times, many of those seen as threats by Scotia and other parts of Canada because of their
those in power were chased into the unwillingness to live under the new Republican
countryside – or “into the wilderness”– or sent administration or because of fear of being
abroad. They were known as exiles. The word maltreated by it. They were mentioned and
itself comes from the Latin exilium, meaning referred to as refugees in the pages of the Ency-
banishment. clopaedia Britannica as early as its 1797 edition.
Then as now others under threat of persecution Throughout the last three centuries, the world
took it upon themselves to get away from oppres- has witnessed domestic upheavals and national
sive political regimes, powerful rivals, or racial, conflicts that have coerced or compelled the emi-
ethnic, or religious persecution. Such acts, like gration of millions. The mass movement of asy-
those of the classic exiles, are as old as human lum seekers that has already occurred in the early
history, and both forms of decades of the twenty-first century, highlighted
dispossession – removal and flight – have been by the millions who have fled Afghanistan and
clearly documented from the time of Moses’ exo- Syria for neighboring countries and by hundreds
dus from Egypt and the Babylonian exile of Jews of thousands crossing the dire straits of the Med-
nearly 600 years before Christ. They are featured iterranean trying to get to European shores, does
in sacred texts as well as in the writings of Eurip- not bode well for the present era. Still, there is
ides, Sophocles, Virgil, and Ovid, in descriptions little question that to date no period has been as
of Muslims who escaped the wrath of zealous bloody nor caused more upheaval than the twen-
Crusaders, and in the writings of Jews who fled tieth century. That was an era marked by Russian
into the Levant to avoid forced conversion or the pogroms and the Bolshevik Revolution; a world
flames of the Inquisitor’s pyre in Spain at the end war from 1914 to 1918 that left nine million dead
of the fifteenth century. All were refugees as and millions of displaced and stateless people;
Refugees Defined 3

genocide in Armenia; an exchange of population membership in a particular social group or polit-

of ethnic Greeks born in Turkey and Turks born ical opinion, are outside the country of their
in Greece; World War II and the Holocaust gen- nationality and are unable to avail themselves of
erated by the Nazi regime, which left six million the protection of that country.” Even with such a
Jews dead and many more displaced persons; the seemingly clear definition, ambiguities
Hungarian Uprising in mid-century; the mass remained – and still remain. As Kathleen
exodus of Cubans beginning with the “Triumph Newland put it:
of the Revolution” in the 1960s, exodus that has The technical and sometimes tiresome question of
never ceased; the war in Vietnam and the panic of who is and who is not a refugee has enormous
losers eager to get away lest they be placed in significance for the displaced people themselves.
“reeducation camps” or worse; the Cambodian The answer determines the degree of support and
protection the individuals receive as well as the
genocide and the struggles of those who survived long-term resolution of their plight. The fundamen-
it; the brutalities of various factions in the after- tal right that refugee status gives people is the right
math of decolonization of many states in Africa not to be sent back against their will to the country
as well as between tribal groups on that continent; from which they have fled; the right, in legal par-
lance of “non-refoulement.” Nations that ratify the
and the Balkan Wars at the end of the century. U.N. Convention and Protocol obligate themselves
Even before it was over, the German novelist, not to expel refugees from their territory without
Heinrich Boll, described the twentieth as “a cen- due process of law, and, if grounds for expulsion
tury of refugees and prisoners” (Mooneyman are found, to give the refugee time to seek legal
admission to another country of asylum. The obli-
1980) and many others addressed the matter as gations of the host country also include issuing
one of mass flight and asylum (see Kahn and identity papers and travel documents, allowing ref-
Talal 1986). And it is small wonder that ugees at least the same civil rights as those enjoyed
Samantha Powers described the same century as by other legal immigrations, and facilitating as far
as possible the refugees’ assimilation and natural-
“the age of genocide” (Powers 2003). ization. (Newland 1981)

In the United States, there was no official

Refugees in Law mention of refugees in law until the McCarran-
Walter Act dealing with immigration and natu-
After World War I, attempts began to be made to ralization was passed by Congress in 1952. This
give a clear universal definition to the dispos- meant that during the mass migration of Jews
sessed. But aside from providing League of from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
Nations’ sponsored “Nansen passports,” interna- countries, motivated by the anti-Jewish riots
tionally recognized identity cards for stateless known as pogroms, Jews were free to come to
persons (named for the Norwegian explorer, the United States and passed through Ellis Island
Nobel Prize winner, and refugee advocate, from 1880 to 1924 just like predominantly eco-
Fridtjof Nansen), little else was done until the nomically motivated immigrants coming from
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 Poland, Italy, Greece, and other European coun-
affirmed in one of its articles that “Everyone has tries at that time. But, with severe restrictions
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries imposed through the highly restrictive “Quota
asylum from persecution.” That principle was Acts of 1921 and 1924” and the lack of recogni-
reaffirmed in 1951, when the United Nations tion of those in special circumstances and desper-
sponsored a convention on the status of refugees. ate flight of those targeted by Hitler, many who
On January 31, 1967, an amended version of what could have been saved were refused entry into the
was drawn up earlier became the basis for the United States in the 1930s and early 1940s. Even
famous United Nations Protocol on the Status of those fleeing other right-wing and often fascist
Refugees, which defined refugees as being per- regimes after World War II were not welcomed
sons who, owing to “a well-founded fear of per- for the McCarran-Walter Act only officially
secution on account of race, religion, nationality,
4 Refugees Defined

recognized refugees as those who were fleeing country to a rich, under-populated one. (Grant
communism or were from the Middle East. 1980)
This narrow definition did, however, open the Today the vast majority of refugees, especially
door to those fleeing the failed Hungarian Upris- those leaving oppressive or failed states in Africa,
ing against Soviet domination in 1956 and the the Balkans, Latin America, and the Middle East
Cuban Revolution that took place several years and hoping to go to countries in Europe and North
later and some Czechs in 1968 and hundreds of America, tend to be found in lands that are imme-
thousands at the end of the war in Vietnam in diately contiguous to those they have left. These
1975. Exceptions were sometimes granted by are known in the international community as
what was known as the “parole authority” of the “countries of first asylum.” With the Cuban exo-
Attorney General as had been the case in World dus that began around 1960, the United States
War II, but the United States did not accept the became, for the first time, a country of first asy-
United Nations’ broader, nonpartisan definition lum. The recognition that they were, as then
of who is a refugee until the Refugee Act of 1980 President Lyndon B. Johnson put it, “victims of
was passed by Congress, with language matching communism,” impelled the United States to cre-
that of the UN Protocol. ate the multifaceted Cuban Refugee Program to
help them “translate” their education and occu-
pations into valuable American credentials
The Dependency of the Dispossessed (Pedraza 2007).
Even in those nations where governments
In addition to the continuing general problem of willingly allowed their entry, the worry is that
defining refugees in international law and by they might stay. And for good reason, they cannot
national governments, equally long-pressing has go home; in many cases, others will not take
been what to do with them once they are legally them. They end up waiting and languishing in
recognized. overcrowded camps or in new enclaves some-
The plight of refugees does not end once a times for months, sometimes for years, or even,
border crossing is successful. In some ways it as in the case of the Palestinians, for decades.
compounds it, as it puts special burdens on Local residents often feel overwhelmed as they
those in the host societies; the organizations see their own scarce resources dwindle; they also
drawn in to provide aid and assistance, care, and find themselves under additional stress created by
succor; and other, much larger cohorts of those imported factionalisms. Moreover, foreign agen-
who see their own precarious situations threat- cies concerned with the protection and care of the
ened by the presence of foreigners on their soil refugees resent the fact that donors and agency
and by competition for jobs and scarce resources. officials often fail to take their needs, wants, and
At the time many refugees were trying to leave fears into sufficient account. Thus, at times, the
Vietnam on boats operated by traffickers; Bruce term refugee becomes pejorative – and those
Grant succinctly noted that, to many people, encamped on such foreign soil have a new stigma
A refugee is an unwanted person. He or she makes to contend with. They are often viewed and even
a claim upon the humanity of others without referred to as “the unwanted.” (See Marrus 1985.)
always have much, or even anything to give in A well-known poster used by the UNHCR
return. If, after resettlement, a refugee works hard
or is lucky and successful, he may be accused of
shows a displaced person in front of a wall on
taking the work from someone else. If he fails or which were painted the words “REFUGEES GO
becomes resentful or unhappy, he is thought to be HOME.” Beneath it are typed the telling words,
ungrateful and a burden on the community. “They would if they could.”
A refugee is especially unwanted by officials: his
papers [if he has them] are rarely in order, his
It is not unusual for host governments, espe-
health is often suspect, and sometimes, although cially those driven by political tensions of their
he claims to be fleeing from persecution, he is own, to worry when confronted with large
simply trying to get from a poor overpopulated
Refugees Defined 5

cohorts of people who look, act, or pray in ways kindness” (Loescher and Scanlan 1986) in regard
similar to their own minorities and to see them as to the making and implementing of US refugee
a threat to the status quo. A recent example is the policy. And the United States was not alone in
situation in Jordan, which borders Syria. But it is exercising a kind of willful altruism based on
also true that refugees ensconced just inside the “strategic considerations.”
border of the new place of asylum or scattered
throughout it often become convenient scape-
goats for those with grievances that have little Of Madonnas and Maestros
to do with their presence or the reasons they felt
compelled to seek asylum. For Americans and others around the world, the
“Third-country resettlement” is quite differ- whole refugee experience is often compressed
ent. It is what happens to those who, having fled into an evocative representation of “The
from their own countries, spend only a short Madonna of the Refugee Camp” (Rose 1984),
period of time in bordering lands and then move an iconic Pieta of a wan, empty-eyed ragged
on to another haven. This is what occurred when woman clutching her tiny infant to her breast. It
nearly one million refugees from Southeast Asia is a poignant image frequently used by interna-
managed to get to the United States in the late tional organizations to highlight the plight of the
1970s and early 1980s. Despite the publicity, dispossessed. But not all refugees are the same.
such movement is rare and, when it does occur, Not all are poor. Not all are destitute.
is often related to geopolitical or ideological con- While it is true that the vast majority of refu-
cerns, not just humanitarian considerations. gees in today’s world are “low skilled,” there are
After the fall of Saigon in 1975, policy makers many who are highly trained and well educated
in the United States felt a special obligation to (Koser 2007), some of the latter being academics,
assist those who were their allies throughout the musicians, and artists – once referred to as “the
war in Vietnam. The South Vietnamese were maestros in exile” (Rose 1997) – and others being
fleeing the newly installed communist regime businesspeople, scientists and engineers, and, not
that had reconquered the whole of the country infrequently, leaders of opposition parties and
and renamed the southern capital, Ho Chi Minh political factions. Yet they share certain common
City. Since they were escaping from the yoke of characteristics with those who are less worldly
communism, they could readily attain refugee than they. Most significant is the dependence
status under the then-extant US law. Once in upon others to rescue them from their plight, to
this country, most were welcomed by the felt provide them with assistance to meet immediate
responsibility of both the war’s supporters and physical needs, and, for those who are fortunate
its critics. On the one side were the “hawks” enough to be resettled in another country, to aid
who had supported the war and felt that the US them in making a new life once the initial trauma
government and its troops had let the South Viet- of escape has been addressed.
nam regime down by failing to win the war. On
the other side were the “doves” who had opposed
the war and felt the US government and its troops Political and Personal Causes
were responsible for the incredible destruction in and Effects
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Many on both
sides came to the conclusion that “We owe them In addition to examining both international and
something.” national definitions and laws relating to their
While having positive results for those from situation, a number of issues are relevant to the
the former states of Indochina, as well as for the study of refugees: a critical examination of the
Hungarians and for the Cubans, the policy root causes of flight; the disorientation that results
reflected what the political scientists Gilbert from dispossession and deprivation and being
Loescher and John Scanlan called “calculated abruptly alienated from all that is familiar; the
6 Refugees Defined

politics of rescue, relief, and resettlement; the Loescher G, Scanlan J (1986) Calculated kindness: refu-
impact refugees have on their host countries, gees and America’s half-open door, 1945 to the pre-
sent. Free Press, New York
their new homes; the continuing search for what Marrus M (1985) The unwanted: European refugees from
are called “durable solutions” to the general the First World War through the Cold War. Oxford
plight of refugees and ways to address University Press, New York/London
them – usually specified as “voluntary repatria- Miller KA, Wagner P (1994) Out of Ireland: the story of
Irish emigration to America. Elliot and Clark, Wash-
tion” and “local resettlement”; the role of refu- ington, DC
gees in international law today (Rodriquez 2013), Newland K (1981) Refugees: the new international poli-
as well as how refugee policies transform socie- tics of displacement. Worldwatch, Washington, DC,
ties (Essed et al. 2005); and a closer look at the pp 7–8
Pedraza S (2007) Political disaffection in Cuba’s revolu-
psychology of altruism itself. The last asks the tion and exodus. Cambridge University Press, New
age-old question, “Are we really our brother’s York/London
keeper?” If so, what are states and individuals Powers S (2003) A problem from hell: America in an age
prepared to do for those seeking assistance and of genocide. HarperCollins, New York
Rodriquez S (2013) Immigration and refugee law and
protection because they are dispossessed? policy: 2013 Supplement. West Group, Los Angeles
Finally, when one experiences the trauma and Rose P (1984) The harbor masters: American politics and
tumult of exile, when, if ever, does a person refugee policy. In: Lewis M (ed) Social problems and
stop being a refugee? public policy. JAI Press, Greenwich, pp 273–312
Rose P (1986) Toward a sociology of exile. Int Migr Rev
Some say not until they die. 19(Winter):768–773
Without a fatherland Rose P (1997) Tempest-Tost: exile, ethnicity, and the
the landless find politics of rescue. Soc Forum 8(1):5–24
all brown earth an insult, UNHCR (2012) Global trends: refugees asylum seekers,
all soil rootless. returnees, internally displaced and stateless persons.
The exile is a stranger http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013
even to his grave. (Zaroukian 1985) Zaroukian A (1985) Let there be light. In: Bouvard MG
(ed) Landscape and exile. Rowan Tree Press, Boston,
Put another way but expressing the poignant p 18
spirit of that poem by the Armenian exile,
Antranik Zaroukian, the sociologist Lewis Further Readings
Coser, a Jewish escapee from Nazi Germany Abella I, Tropem H (1983) None is too many: Canada and
who became an American citizen, offered his the Jews of Europe, 1933–1948. Lester and Orpen
Dennys, Toronto
own illuminating answer: “I will always be a
Agier M (2008) On the margins of the world: the refugee
refugee. But my children speak without accents” experience. Polity Press, Cambridge/Boston
(Rose 1986). Agier M (2011) Managing the undesirables: refugee
camps and humanitarian government (trans: Fernback
D). Polity Press, Cambridge, UK/Boston
Balakian P (2004) The Burning tigress: the Armenian
References genocide and America’s response. Harper Collins,
New York
Coser LA (1984) Refugee scholars in America: their
Boll H, as quoted in Mooneyman WS (1980) Sea of impact and their experiences. Yale University Press,
heartbreak. Plainfield Logos, p 207 New Haven
Essed P et al (eds) (2005) Refugees and the transformation Dinnerstein L (1982) America and the survivors of the
of societies: agency, policies, ethics and politics, Holocaust. Columbia University Press, New York
vol 13, Forced migration series. Refugee Study Centre, Edwards JK (2007) Sudanese women refugees: transfor-
Oxford University, Oxford mations and future imaginings. Palgrave Macmillan,
Grant B (1980) The boat people. Penguin, New York, p 2 New York
Khan AS, Bin Talal H (eds) (1986) Refugees: dynamics of Fermi L (1968) Illustrious immigrants: the intellectual
displacement: a report for the Independent Commis- migration from Europe, 1930–1941. Chicago Univer-
sion on International Humanitarian Issues. Zed Books, sity Press, Chicago
London/New York, pp 9–19 Gil Loescher G et al (2008) UNHCR: the politics and
Koser K (2007) International migration: a very short intro- practice of refugee protection into the twenty-first cen-
duction. Oxford University Press, London, p 17 tury. Routledge, London
Refugees Defined 7

Gold SN (1991) Refugee communities: a comparative Rieff D (2003) A bed for the night: humanitarianism in
field study. Sage, New York crisis. Simon and Schuster, New York
Goodwin-Gill GS, Jane McAdam J (2007) The refugee in Rose PI (ed) (1983) Working with refugees. Center for
international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford Migration Studies, Staten Island
Hein J (2006) Ethnic origins: the adaptation of Cambodian Rose PI (ed) (2005) The dispossessed: an anatomy of
and Hmong refugees in four American cities. Russell exile. University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst
Sage, New York Rose PI (2014) They and we: racial and ethnic relations in
Helton AC (2002) The price of indifference: refugees and the United States – and beyond, 7th edn. Paradigm
humanitarian action in the new century. Oxford Uni- Publishers, Boulder
versity Press, New York/London Roumani M (1977) The case of Jews from Arab countries:
Howe I (1976) World of our fathers: the journey of the a neglected issue. World Organization of Jews from
East European Jews to America and the life they found Arab lands, 1983, Tel Aviv
and made. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, New York Said E (2002) Reflections on exile and other essays. Har-
Hughes HS (1975) The sea change: the migration of social vard University Press, Cambridge
thought, 1930–1965. Harper and Row, New York Sanders R (1988) Shores of refuge: a hundred years of
Karadawi A, Woodward P (1999) Refugee policy in Jewish emigration. Henry Holt, New York
Sudan, 1967–1984. Berghahn Books, New York/ Schulz HL (2003) The Palestinian diaspora. Routledge,
Oxford London
Lewis B (2010) In Ishmael’s house: a history of Jews in Smith-Hefner NJ (1999) Khmer Americans: identity and
Muslim lands. Yale University Press, New Haven moral education in a diasporic community. University
Mertus JA et al (eds) (1997) The suitcase: refugee voices of California Press, Berkeley
from Bosnia and Croatia. University of California Tabori P (1972) The anatomy of exile: a semantic and
Press, Berkeley historic study. Harrap, London
Nasser R (2004) Palestinian identity in Jordan and Israel. Wyman D (1984) The abandonment of the Jews: America
Taylor and Francis, Oxford/New York and the Holocaust, 1941–1945. Pantheon Books, New
Nikolic-Ristanovic V (2000) Women, violence and war: York
wartime victimization of refugees in the Balkans. Cen- Wyman M (1998) Europe’s displaced persons,
tral European University Press, Budapest 1945–1951. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Parsoun SK, Zacharia CE (1997) Palestine and the Zolberg AR et al (1989) Escape from violence: conflict
Palestinians. Westview Press, Boulder and the refugee crisis in the developing world. Oxford
Pedraza P, Rumbaut R (eds) (1996) Origins and destinies: University Press, New York
immigration, race, and ethnicity in America. Zucker NL, Zucker NF (1987) The guarded gate.
Wadsworth, Belmont Houghton Mifflin, New York
Rieff D (1995) Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the failure of Zucker NL, Zucker NF (1996) Desperate crossings: seek-
the West. Simon and Schuster, New York ing refuge in America. M.E. Sharpe, New York
R

Refugee Integration: Issues society, learning the dominant language, and

and Challenges developing interpersonal ties and contacts out-
side their particular group. Integration for both
immigrants and refugees is attained when they
are able to participate in their new country eco-
Theo Majka and Linda Majka nomically, socially, politically, and culturally,
Department of Sociology, Anthropology and without necessarily losing their cultural distinc-
Social Work, University of Dayton, Dayton, tiveness and ties with their homeland (Ives 2007).
OH, USA For refugees, English language proficiency,
acculturation, employment, education, and
access to health care are all considered to be
Definition vital elements of the resettlement and integration
process (Ives 2007; Gilbert et al. 2010).
Since integration depends on the adaptation by
both refugees and host communities and includes
participation in the wider community by refugees Background
as well as increasing social relations outside
one’s ethnic group, we adapt Alba and Nee’s Refugees who seek to build a new life in a differ-
updating of the assimilation approach to define ent country face distinct challenges. Many of the
refugee integration as “the decline of an ethnic findings of the extensive literature on the assim-
distinction and its corollary cultural and social ilation of immigrants apply to refugees. How-
differences” (Alba and Nee 2003, p. 11). ever, there are crucial differences as well that
Integration is multidimensional and dependent are based on the nature of the refugees’ experi-
on both the efforts of refugees and the willingness ences and their insufficient preparation for
of individuals, communities, organizations, and becoming residents of specific societies.
institutions for the host society to accept and We focus on those fleeing their country of
incorporate the newcomers. The key component origin who have been officially classified as ref-
of integration is the ability to participate in the ugees by the United Nations High Commissioner
institutions of the larger society. Achieving inte- for Refugees (UNHCR) and were resettled in
gration is also dependent on immigrants and ref- Western countries, particularly the USA. The
ugees absorbing important cultural norms of the USA has resettled over three million since 1975,
far more refugees than any other nation. For
Linda Majka: Deceased example, of the 69,000 refugees resettled in
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_106-1
2 Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

2012, the USA took in 53,000 or 77 %, even as before being resettled beginning in 2008, primar-
Norway and Australia had slightly higher per ily in the USA, Canada, and Australia. Due to the
capita resettlement rates (UNHCR Global limited opportunities for employment and educa-
Resettlement Report 2012). The challenges to tion in camps, refugees that have spent a longer
integration are also relevant for many asylum time in them tend to have more difficulties
seekers who flee their country due to violence establishing themselves after resettlement.
and locate in Western countries via other means,
such as a temporary visa.
Resettlement agencies receive refugees as
Challenges to Integration
they arrive and assist them in obtaining services
that are crucial to their integration, including
Research on the process of refugee resettlement
employment services, housing, school enroll-
has identified several factors that have contrib-
ment for children, English as a Second Language
uted to and facilitated successful integration into
(ESL) enrollment, applications for public assis-
the refugees’ new communities. Although their
tance, and health screenings. Resettlement agen-
importance can vary among communities and for
cies may often serve as cultural mentors to help
refugee groups, there is consistent mention of
with the transactions among refugees and local
adequate employment, satisfactory and afford-
institutions (Nawyn 2010). As a variety of prob-
able housing, and access to education and health
lems can arise concerning the adequacy and
care as crucial elements of the process of incor-
accessibility of services refugees need, it
poration. Language barriers often create difficul-
becomes important to evaluate the roles that insti-
ties for refugees. Also, a lack of community
tutions play in the resettlement process. In partic-
support expressed by, for example, institutions
ular, the ability and willingness of institutions to
that do not accommodate non-English speakers,
accommodate refugees are crucial to the integra-
can significantly inhibit the process of successful
tion process since institutional policies and prac-
and comprehensive resettlement and integration.
tices can facilitate or inhibit incorporation.
Unlike some immigrant populations, refugees
Moreover, at present, the US Office of Refugee
have fewer problems with respect to law enforce-
Resettlement expects refugee households to be
ment, the legal system and the courts, proof of
financially self-sufficient within only eight
identity, and, of course, immigration status. In
months after arrival, and federal assistance is
contrast, issues related to mental health and
similarly limited to that time period.
knowledge of institutional practices and norms
In comparison with voluntary immigrants, a
(“how things work”) are considerably more
greater divergence in the experiences of
prominent among many refugee populations.
resettlement and adjustment exists among refu-
gee populations, even when controlling for char-
acteristics such as level of education, age, and Employment
occupational experiences. Refugee populations Employment issues illustrate the interrelated
vary with respect to their knowledge and expo- nature of these challenges. Employers frequently
sure to Western cultures and languages, educa- require job applications and supporting docu-
tional levels, transferable skills, and experiences ments to be submitted in English. Initially, refu-
useful in the job market. Also, their exposure to gees have assistance from resettlement agency
violence and traumatic events varies consider- case managers in preparing the necessary mate-
ably. For those who spent time in refugee rials, but time limits on aid place the burden of the
camps, the amount of time there can range con- application process on refugees. Sometimes, case
siderably. For example, many Burundian refu- managers need to accompany refugees to their
gees were in refugee camps in Tanzania for jobs for several days so as to explain to them
more than three decades, and many Bhutanese what they are supposed to do. Also, many
were in camps in Nepal since the early 1990s employers make English language fluency a
Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges 3

precondition for employment, even for jobs that floors (Majka and Majka 2012). The lack of
do not really require interaction in English. acceptance of educational degrees earned in
Part-time jobs tend to be more readily avail- their country of origin appears to be particularly
able to refugees than full-time ones. Part-time significant. These obstacles can be overcome if a
schedules do allow more time to address family particular program is designed to do so, as was
needs, attend ESL classes, and even continue the the case with the Cuban Refugee Program that
search for more adequate jobs, but the short hours was put in place from 1960 to 1974, to enable
frequently do not provide sufficient income to Cubans then coming to the USA to “translate”
cover all the necessities. their educational and occupational credentials in
Employment difficulties are exacerbated by Cuba, making them valuable in America. As a
the difference in kinds of employment between result of retraining programs and recertification
home countries and the USA. For those living in efforts, former Cuban lawyers became librarians
refugee camps, opportunities for employment or social workers; former Cuban professionals
were very limited. Culturally, many refugees went on to become Spanish teachers in the USA
need to adjust to what to them seem like very (cf. Pedraza-Bailey 1985).
formalized and routinized work schedules.
Studies have found that refugees are often
Language
forced to take entry-level jobs, regardless of pre-
Compared to other immigrants, a lower percent-
vious employment or education history. Many
age of refugees come to the USA with a familiar-
have to work long hours in multiple low-paying
ity of Western cultures and knowledge of the
jobs, and unlike their previous experiences, they
primary language of their new country. Research
recognize that at least two incomes are required
consistently shows language to be the primary
per household to insure economic survival
barrier to better integration. Gilbert et al. (2010)
(Hume and Hardwick 2005; Ives 2007; Smith
found that the most important indicator of refu-
2008). Their employment situations are also
gee integration in the USA was acquiring an
dependent on the general employment pattern
adequate level of English language fluency.
and economic activities of the region where
Acquisition of the English language plays a cru-
they live.
cial role in long-term prosperity and well-being
Employment nevertheless provides benefits in
for refugees. For example, higher levels of
addition to income and résumé building. Some
English proficiency, as well as education, were
refugees report that their jobs provide their pri-
associated with lower levels of acculturation
mary sources of contact with native-born Amer-
stress among Bhutanese refugees living in the
icans and they used these opportunities for
southwestern USA (Benson et al. 2012). Refu-
interaction to improve their English and knowl-
gees often feel that a lack of English proficiency
edge about American norms, culture, and institu-
can create serious problems when searching for
tions and “how things work” (Gahimer 2013).
and retaining employment (Ives 2007). Although
For better-educated refugees, their educa-
the vast majority of foreign born becomes
tional credentials (e.g., a college degree in a par-
English proficient over time, the rate of English
ticular field) or occupational credentials (e.g.,
language acquisition is a factor influencing
prior work as a doctor or judge) are frequently
opportunities for mobility and success (Portes
not recognized or accepted by American institu-
and Rumbaut 2006). Refugees and immigrants
tions, so they are unable to obtain a job in their
who are overwhelmingly concentrated in ethnic
field (Ager and Strang 2008; Gilbert et al. 2010;
enclaves, however, need to rely less on English
Nawyn 2010). Thus, many refugees with a col-
language proficiency to be successful than those
lege education and even with advanced degrees
who are resettled at large or who constitute a
end up employed in unskilled occupations. For
minority in their area of settlement (Portes and
example, in our study, two Iraqis with engineer-
Bach 1985).
ing degrees and computer skills were sweeping
4 Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

In our own research on refugee integration, Health Care

language issues also emerged as the primary bar- The refugee experience is one of loss. Many still
rier to better integration (Majka and Majka 2012). carry physical and psychological injuries from
A higher proportion of agency officials, refugee their experiences in their homeland, trauma
leaders, and participants in refugee focus groups which led them to become refugees. Conse-
chose language issues and barriers as the most quently, health-care issues are particularly salient
frequently mentioned obstacles to becoming inte- concerns for refugees. These include access to
grated into our communities than any other fac- treatment of previously undiagnosed conditions
tor. This was also the finding of a prior study we (e.g., intestinal parasites), lack of insurance, lack
conducted on the integration of immigrants in the of knowledge regarding how to negotiate the
Dayton area (Majka and Majka 2011). system, availability of trained medical inter-
Acquisition of English (or any other language) preters, and cultural misunderstandings.
is more difficult for those who are older, have Access to adequate health care is influenced
fewer years of formal schooling, and lack expo- by a variety of factors, many of which refugees
sure to or fluency in another Western language. share with other Americans. As noted previously,
Motivation to learn English varies considerably many refugees take low-paying, entry-level
as well. Those lacking employment or employed employment, and most of their employers do
in jobs that do not require English and offer little not provide health-care insurance. Nevertheless,
prospect of advancement have less of an incen- some of those with low-paying positions that
tive to learn. In her study of Bhutanese refugees included health coverage were less motivated to
in Dayton, Ohio, Winslow (2013) found these look for jobs that were more commensurate with
patterns pertain mostly to adult women. For their skills and experiences because of the uncer-
some, the hope and expectation that they will tainty of future access to health care (Ives 2007).
eventually return to their homeland makes it dif- Like many other foreign-born residents, refugees
ficult to justify the investment required to learn frequently encounter difficulties with language
English. barriers when trying to communicate with health
Refugees are enrolled in ESL classes shortly professionals, and they generally experience a
after their arrival by the resettlement agency. great deal of difficulty navigating the health-
Attendance, however, cannot be enforced. care system (Ager and Strang 2008). For exam-
Access to classes is influenced by the times and ple, many refugees report that they have not had a
places the classes are offered, the capacity of the physical exam or received dental care for a while
classes to accommodate the demand, and, for or received medical information in their native
some, adequate and affordable transportation language. Instances where a physician did not
and child care. Class times may also conflict understand them are too common, and many
with work hours. They may be taught at a level had to reschedule medical appointments due to
that is too advanced or too basic for individual the lack of an interpreter (Mukunzi 2011).
refugees. Some refugees feel that classes that Mental health issues are regarded as particu-
focus on conversational English would be more larly important among both refugees themselves
useful, as would classes that make connections and service providers. It can be difficult to ade-
between texts and their lives (Sarroub et al. 2007; quately address mental health needs since there is
Baynham 2006). Local organizations often lack no systematic screening or evaluation of resettled
the resources to provide bilingual ESL classes for refugees for mental health problems. Also, some
specific language groups. Nevertheless, ESL leaders of refugee communities may lack an
classes are generally the most effective way to awareness of mental health problems within
gain a basic knowledge of English. their group, even though others recognize them
as significant.
As Pipher described in her study of refugees in
Lincoln, Nebraska, there are different cultural
Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges 5

interpretations of mental health problems and the in effect prolong the consequences of the viola-
appropriate means for treating them. Even when tion of human rights that they experienced.
accessible, Western psychotherapeutic methods Some refugees understandably manifest post-
are not often utilized by refugees from traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, such
non-Western cultures. Sometimes the reasons as flashbacks, unsettling dreams, emotional
are practical, such as language barriers, access numbness, inability to concentrate, anger, self-
to health insurance, more pressing demands, and destructive behavior (including substance
scheduling difficulties. But more important are abuse), and hopelessness about their future
the cultural reasons. Some refugees come from (Pipher 2002). One consequence is what Kai
cultures where discussing problems outside the Erikson called “collective trauma,” stemming
family, especially mental ones, is simply never from the erosion of communality accompanying
done. Also, some issues, such as rape and family the loss of a particular community. It is often
violence, are taboo to discuss even within the manifested in the feeling that time is suspended
family, let alone to anyone else. Finally, mental and the inability to put shattered lives back
anguish may be thought to be due to physical or together and plan for the future (Erikson 1978).
spiritual problems. Sometimes, talking to a tradi- As Pipher (2002) noted, the integration of
tional healer or a trusted member of their cultural refugees into their new society and communities
community, such as a spiritual or religious leader, is a critical aspect of recovery from traumatic
is the most effective way to begin the healing experiences. Institutions have a crucial part to
process. Participating in cultural rituals and fes- play in this regard. By making research-informed
tivities, sharing positive emotions, and nurturing efforts to accommodate refugees, they can facil-
and being nurtured by family and friends are itate recovery and create conditions for refugees
ways that help individuals move beyond the and their children to become productive members
traumas (Pipher 2002; Stein 1986). of their new communities. Refugees who remain
Examples from a study of Rwandan and unintegrated risk prolonging their mental health
Burundian refugees in the Dayton, Ohio, area problems, and this can have detrimental impacts
illustrate some of the mental health issues many on their families, especially on the children.
refugees experience (Mukunzi 2011). Slightly
over half reported that stress was their number Housing
one health issue. Rwandans mentioned that they For housing, research presents a mixed picture. In
still carry psychological wounds from the loss of their study of Cuban refugees in Texas, Barnes
many relatives during the 1994 genocide and and Aguilar (2007) found low-income refugee
later mass killings in the neighboring Democratic housing conditions to be crowded, squalid, and
Republic of the Congo. Similarly, Burundians neglected, and they were almost always in the
reported stresses due to the loss of their relatives undesirable parts of town with higher crime
during the 1972 and 1993 genocides and other rates. In contrast, Ager and Strang (2008) found
losses during their decades in refugee camps in that refugees generally were less concerned with
Tanzania and elsewhere. Also, both groups the physical conditions or size of a house than
reported many post-migration stressors, such as they were concerned with the ability to form a
unfamiliarity with the culture and norms, lack of community with fellow refugees and close rela-
adequate English fluency, unemployment, unpaid tionships with neighbors. Belonging to a commu-
medical bills, and housing expenses. nity often provides refugees with a much-needed
How important integration is for refugees is sense of being “settled,” as well as opportunities
emphasized by these kinds of traumas and, for to learn from each other. A study of refugees in
some, lingering conditions of what we now term Utica, New York, showed that refugees helped
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Failure to revitalize neighborhoods, buying older run-down
integrate these refugees could delay recovery and houses for a low price and subsequently renovat-
ing them, resulting in an increase in real estate
6 Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

values in these neighborhoods of around 25 % Similar to many immigrant groups, the differ-
between 2003 and 2006 (Smith 2008). This con- ent rates of acculturation and English acquisition
tribution led to a more positive perception of do result in parents relying on their children to be
refugees by both community members and land- translators and cultural mediators for them.
lords. Moreover, former refugees often became Sometimes children get in trouble at school for
landlords themselves, renting to newer refugees, absences due to their parents’ demands for
often of different nationalities. translation.
Housing issues also interact with employment.
The cost of housing, transportation to jobs, long
commutes, and the limitations of public transpor- Responses
tation and carpooling all constitute obstacles.
Housing tends to be less expensive in the central In general, refugee populations face distinctive
city, and many refugees live there. Nevertheless, situations and challenges due to their experiences
the more desirable jobs are often located outside in their homeland and the frequently unplanned
the radius of public transportation. nature of their migration to the USA or other,
Sandoval et al. (2011) note that research has mostly Western, countries. The studies cited
consistently shown that cars have a significant above illustrate similar issues and challenges for
impact on the ability of individuals and house- refugee groups or resettled refugees. Taken
holds to attain economic self-sufficiency. together, they show that while progress is being
Obtaining a car can be more complicated for made, many refugee populations still experience
many refugees, however, since it requires suffi- difficulties dealing with some local agencies and
cient English proficiency and obtaining a drivers’ organizations due to both their own circum-
license, along with the expenses of auto owner- stances and agency practices. Since the issues
ship (such as insurance, fuel costs, and mainte- and challenges are interrelated, improvements in
nance/repairs), which can be particularly one area can be expected to have positive impacts
expensive for older cars. on the others.
Similar to other immigrants, refugee commu-
Youth and Education nities and networks are important forms of
In general, the integration of refugee youth has mutual support and information, and members
been largely successful, both for those who came facilitate each other’s integration. All else being
to the USA as children and those born in the equal, the cohesiveness of refugee communities
USA. The resettlement process places a priority is important for the adaptation and success of
on enrolling refugee children and adolescents in their members.
school as soon as possible, and this contributes to For both immigrants and refugees, the institu-
rapid English language understanding and usage. tional context is important for the trajectory it can
School environments also offer social incentives set for either incorporation and generational
that cause refugee youth adapt quickly. In fact, mobility or marginalization and prolonged gen-
their acculturation contrasts strongly with the erational disadvantage.
cultural distance experienced by many of their Some communities and organizations have
parents. responded in conscious ways to assist refugees.
Refugee parents tend to have high expecta- Often this is part of more general efforts to attract
tions for their children’s education. In our study immigrants to cities with declining populations
(Majka and Majka 2012), many parents praised (Davey 2014; Preston 2013). Some of this
the city’s public schools and noted the efforts of involves changes in institutional policies and
schools and some individual teachers to accom- practices among both public and private organi-
modate their children, make them aware of zations to make them more accommodating. It
opportunities (e.g., summer programs), and facil- also involves recognizing and appreciating the
itate their learning of English. resources, strengths, and benefits that
Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges 7

immigrants/refugees bring to communities and . . .the nature and scale of refugee flows, internal
the positive aspects of their cultures and values. displacement and statelessness puts national and
international systems under considerable
For example, in receiving an All-American City pressure. . . But solidarity is not only a matter for
Award in 2009, the city of Fort Wayne, Indiana, states. Civil society organizations, communities
was recognized for its “efforts in assisting refu- and individuals often make the most meaningful
gees and helping them integrate and succeed in contributions to improving the state of the world’s
refugees. (p. 31)
the community” (MacLachlan 2012). In 2011, the
city of Dayton, Ohio, adopted an “immigrant Refugees do need specific programs to address
friendly city” plan, officially called “Welcome their needs, as well as supportive local initiatives
Dayton,” and undertook a number of initiatives and advocates. Integration into the new society is
to assist the integration of immigrants/refugees blocked both by refugee circumstances and
(Sewell 2011). It is in part an evolving response agency practices, but these are for the most part
to refugee resettlement that endorses improving surmountable obstacles. Churches, mosques,
cooperation between governmental and synagogues, and other faith-based organizations,
nongovernmental organizations. It recognizes as well as local public schools, local libraries, and
that no single institution bears responsibility for police departments, can and should take up ini-
and can alone accomplish successful refugee tiatives to assist refugees in becoming integrated
resettlement in their community (City of Dayton into their new communities and the larger
Human Relations Council 2011). society.
Our study of refugees in Dayton, Ohio,
resulted in an assessment report for the local Acknowledgments This entry is dedicated in loving
community (Housel et al. 2012) and a conference memory to my spouse and co-author Dr. Linda Majka
(1947–2014). It represents the last of many works
on refugee integration. In addition, the United
we collaborated on during our careers as professional
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees sociologists.
(UNHCR) website is a rich source of information
on how best to respond to the challenges that
refugees bring to their new communities. Two
other websites listed are also good sources.
Cross-References
The UNHCR’s summary report titled “The
State of the World’s Refugees: In Search of Sol-
▶ Asylum and Human Rights
idarity” (2012) called for a new paradigm to
▶ Citizenship
respond effectively to the fact that refugees
▶ Forced Migration, Natural Resources, and
increasingly live in cities and towns where they
Violence
struggle to survive as highly diverse populations.
▶ Forced Migration: Detention
The report stated: “To respond to the protection
▶ Integration Policies
and assistance needs of refugees living in urban
▶ Refugee Mental Health
areas, humanitarian agencies, development agen-
▶ Refugee Roulette
cies and host governments will need to work
▶ Refugees Defined
together more closely and more consistently”
▶ Social Assimilation
(p. 25). Solidarity is viewed as managing chal-
▶ Women at Risk Refugee and Humanitarian
lenges “in a way that distributes costs and bur-
Visas
dens fairly” (p. 29). To make the principle of
solidarity more concrete, the report underlined,
“Responsibility sharing is the expression of soli-
darity in practice” (p. 30). References
The UNHCR report concluded:
Ager A, Strang A (2008) Understanding integration: a
conceptual framework. J Refug Stud 21(2):166–191
8 Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

Alba R, Nee V (2003) Remaking the American main- Nawyn S (2010) Institutional structures of opportunity in
stream: assimilation and contemporary immigration. refugee resettlement: gender, race/ethnicity, and refu-
Harvard University Press, Cambridge gee NGOs. J Sociol Soc Welf 37(1):149–167
Barnes D, Aguilar R (2007) Community social support for Pedraza-Bailey S (1985) Political and economic migrants
Cuban refugees in Texas. Qual Health Res in America: Cubans and Mexicans. University of
17(2):225–237 Texas Press, Austin
Baynham M (2006) Agency and contingency in the lan- Pipher M (2002) The middle of everywhere: helping ref-
guage learning of refugees and asylum seekers. Lin- ugees enter the American community. Harcourt,
guist Educ 17:24–39 Boston
Benson G, Sun F, Hodge D, Androff D (2012) Religious Portes A, Bach R (1985) Latin journey: Cuban and Mex-
coping and acculturation stress among Hindu Bhuta- ican immigrants in the United States. University of
nese: a study of newly-resettled refugee in the United California Press, Berkeley
States. Int Soc Work 55(4):538–553 Portes A, Rumbaut R (2006) Immigrant America: a por-
City of Dayton Human Relations Council, Welcome Day- trait, 3rd edn. University of California Press, Berkeley
ton: immigrant friendly city. Report. September 2011. Preston J (2013) Ailing Midwestern cities extend a wel-
Resource document. www.daytonohio.gov/ coming hand to immigrants. New York Times, 6 Oct
welcomedaytonreport. Accessed 23 Nov 2012 2013. Resource document. http://www.nytimes.com/
Davey M (2014) Immigrants seen as way to refill Detroit 2013/10/07/us/ailing-cities-extend-hand-to-immigrants.
ranks. New York Times, 23 Jan 2014. Resource docu- html. Accessed 3 Jan 2014
ment. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/ Sandoval J, Cervero R, Landis J (2011) The transition
immigrants-seen-as-way-to-refill-detroit-ranks.html from welfare-to-work: how cars and human capital
Accessed 24 Jan 2014 facilitate employment for welfare recipients. Appl
Erikson K (1978) Everything in its path: destruction of Geogr 31:352–362
community in the buffalo creek flood. Simon and Sarroub L, Pernicek T, Sweeney T (2007) “I was bitten by
Schuster, New York a scorpion”: reading in and out of school in a refugee’s
Gahimer E (2013) Refugees in Dayton: the job search & life. J Adolesc Adult Lit 50(8):668–679
employment experience in their new home. Senior Sewell D (2011) “Welcome Dayton” Ohio city makes it a
research thesis policy to encourage immigrants to come. Associated
Gilbert P, Hein M, Losby J (2010) Exploring refugee Press, 30 Oct 2011. Resource document. http://www.
integration: experiences in our American communi- dailyherald.com/article/20111030/news/710309972/
ties. ISED Solutions, Washington, DC . Accessed 3 Jan 2014
Housel J, Majka L, Majka T, Redko C, Saxen C (2012) Smith RS (2008) The case of a city where 1 in 6 residents
Dayton refugee community assessment, 2012. is a refugee: ecological factors and host community
Resource document. www.welcomedayton.org/ adaptation in successful resettlement. Am
dayton-refugee-community-assessment or http:// J Community Psychol 42(3–4):328–342
www.udayton.edu/artssciences/forum_on_immigration/ Stein B (1986) The experience of being a refugee: insights
images_files/refugee_report.pdf. Accessed 3 Jan 2014 from the research literature. In: Williams C,
Hume S, Hardwick S (2005) African, Russian and Ukrai- Westermeyer J (eds) Refugee mental health in
nian refugee resettlement in Portland, Oregon. Geogr resettlement countries. Routledge, New York
Rev 95(2):189–209 UNHCR (2012) “The state of the World’s refugees: in
Ives N (2007) More than a “Good Back”: looking for search of solidarity.” Resource document. http://
integration in refugee resettlement. Refuge www.unhcr.org/4fc5ceca9.html. Accessed 23 June
24(2):54–63 2012
MacLachlan H (2012) Creating Pan-Karen identity: the UNHCR global resettlement report, 2012. Resource doc-
wrist-tying ceremony in the United States. Asia Pacific ument. http://www.unhcr.org/52693bd09.html.
Migr J 21(4):459–482 Accessed 24 Dec 2013
Majka T, Majka L (2011) Institutional obstacles to incor- Winslow M (2013) Resettled: a portrait of Bhutanese
poration: Latino immigrant experiences in a mid-size refugees in Dayton, Ohio. Senior research thesis
rustbelt city. In: Martinez R (ed) Latinos in the Mid-
west. Michigan State Press, East Lansing
Selected Websites
Majka T, Majka L (2012) Refugees in a mid-sized mid-
Bridging Refugee Youth and Children’s Services
western urban area: circumstantial and institutional
(BRYCS) of the United States Conference of Catholic
challenges to incorporation. Paper presented at the
Bishops. http://brycs.org
American Sociological Association meetings, Denver,
Migration and Refugee Services of the United States Con-
CO, Aug 2012
ference of Catholic Bishops. http://www.usccb.org/
Mukunzi J (2011) Assessment of refugees health in mont-
about/migration-and-refugee-services
gomery county: a case study of refugees from Rwanda
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. http://
and Burundi. Resource document. http://corescholar.
www.unhcr.org
libraries.wright.edu/mph/63/. Accessed 13 July 2012.
R

Refugee Mental Health: Child Child Development and Psychological

and Adolescent Refugees Trauma in Refugees

Eugenio M. Rothe1, Andrés J. Pumariega2 and The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
Hector Castillo-Matos3 has estimated that 80 % of victims of modern
1
Herbert Wertheim College of Medicine, Florida wars are children and women, many of whom
International University, Miami, FL, USA will become refugees. The United States admits
2
Department of Psychiatry, Cooper Medical from 20,000 to 27,000 child and adolescent refu-
School, Camden, NJ, USA gees each year (UNHCR 2013). Mental health
3
Nueva America Community Mental Health experts have framed the problems that result
Center, Miami, FL, USA from these experiences under the diagnosis of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); its treat-
ment now constitutes a separate field of investi-
Definition gation (Lustig et al. 2004). In spite of this,
accurate data on the mental health status of
A refugee is a person who is outside their home young refugees is still lacking, as is information
country because they have suffered (or feared) on their help-seeking and service utilization. Fur-
persecution on account of race, religion, nation- thermore, controversy is ongoing as to whether
ality, and political opinion or because they are a mental health care is among the primary needs of
member of a persecuted social category of per- refugees and, particularly, what a child refugee
sons or because they are fleeing a war. Such a needs and how to provide it. Our focus here is on
person may be called an “asylum seeker” until the types of mental health issues that affect child
recognized by the state where they make a claim. and adolescent refugees around the world today,
Unaccompanied immigrant children sometimes the diagnosis and treatment that have been uti-
fit the definition of “refugee,” because they arrive lized to treat these children and adolescents in
at a host country to escape domestic abuse, gang Europe and the United States, and the risk factors
violence, human trafficking, or extreme poverty and protective factors that may influence their
in their home countries and seek asylum in the mental health outcomes (Rothe and Pumariega
host country. In contrast, other unaccompanied 2010). Due to differences in samples, methods,
children arrive in the host country to seek better and instrumentation, we lack consistent preva-
opportunities and some simply to reunite with lence rates for psychiatric disorders in refugee
family members already living in that host children. Also, there is a wide variability in the
country. exposure to different forms of trauma in these
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_107-1
2 Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees

children. Nevertheless, there seems to be agree- and acculturation stress initially encountered in
ment that refugee children are at a higher risk of the host country. Despite these many difficulties,
developing multiple, coexisting psychiatric dis- refugees oftentimes demonstrate remarkable
orders than the general pediatric population, risk resiliency and resourcefulness (Rothe and
which is calculated at around 20 % Pumariega 2012).
(US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
(USCRI) 2013). Persecution, violence, war, kill-
ing, or torture as well as the losses suffered by Phases of the Refugee Experience
these children and adolescents increase the risk of
psychological distress and psychiatric disorders. Refugee children and adolescents are often
PTSD can be understood as a neurophysiological exposed to experiences of war, persecution, vio-
disorder characterized by an exaggerated lence, torture, killings, disrupted attachments,
response to the “fight-flight” reaction, though and emotional losses which increase the risk for
such distress is expressed differently culturally. psychological distress and may contribute to the
Given the multiple losses experienced and the risk of their developing psychiatric disorders.
violent and traumatic nature of the events, These young refugees may undergo a series of
depression, anxiety, and grief are also commonly very stressful experiences prior to arriving to the
found among young refugees. Other commonly host country that fit within the three phases of the
reported, but less well-researched, problems refugees’ experience: preflight, flight, and
include physical complaints, such as sleep prob- resettlement (Lustig et al. 2004).
lems, social problems, and conduct disorder;
emotional problems, such as social withdrawal, Preflight
attention problems, generalized fear, This phase before the escape from the country of
overdependency, restlessness, irritability, and origin is often fraught with uncertainty and dread.
eating disorders; and learning problems, such as Refugee families begin to experience the disrup-
those involved with school functioning, peer rela- tion of their lives and increasing chaos. Children
tionships, defiance, hyperactivity, and aggres- may face changes in their daily routines and
sion. Among child refugees, there can be a loss limited access to schools, with both their educa-
of previously acquired skills, such as loss of blad- tion and social development being disrupted. At
der control with secondary bedwetting, soiling, times, they encounter threats to their safety; they
intense separation anxiety, and nail-biting. Sad- suffer the separation from their parents and care-
ness, introversion, tiredness, suicidal ideation, takers; and many even witness or engage in
attempted suicide, and violent self-harm have violence.
also been reported. The risk for developing psy-
chosis (becoming out of touch with reality) has Flight
been found to increase in adolescent refugees. This phase begins with the displacement of the
Even more, a syndrome of pervasive devitaliza- refugees from their home environments; it often
tion has been found, characterized by a refusal to entails being at the mercy of external circum-
eat, drink, talk, walk, engage socially, or accept stances that they cannot control. The children’s
help. Other preexisting conditions such as atten- emotional state and stability depend in large part
tion deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) may upon the availability and emotional state of their
become exacerbated by the trauma of migration. caretakers. One of the most common effects of
It is important to note that the presence of PTSD war and persecution is the separation of children
is related to earlier experiences of war trauma and from their caretakers. In a clinic sample of
resettlement stress, while depression is exacer- 300 Cuban child and adolescent refugees seen in
bated after arrival in the receiving country, as it an infirmary located inside a refugee camp, 58 %
consists of mourning the multiple emotional of preschoolers and 31 % of elementary school
losses experienced, as well as the life difficulties boys had been separated from their fathers during
Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees 3

the process of flight (Rothe 2005). In another are unaware of their legal rights (Women’s Com-
sample of 100 Cuban adolescents released from mission for Refugee Women and Children 2013).
refugee camps and seen after arrival in the United Once refugees resettle in the new host country,
States, 69 % had left behind grandparents and they need to undergo a process of acculturation
79 % had left behind aunts, uncles, and other which brings about inherent stressors. Families
members of their extended families, many of often need to learn a new language and to adjust
whom were the child’s primary caretakers while to new values, beliefs systems, social mores, and
their parents worked (Rothe et al. 2002). family roles. In the process of resettlement and
acculturation, the child and the family need to
work through a process of mourning similar to
Resettlement and Access to Care
the one that is experienced when people are faced
The resettlement phase is characterized by mas-
with the loss of a loved one, but in this case, the
sive losses of the person’s homeland, family,
losses are multiple and simultaneous (Rothe
friends, and material possessions. Refugee
et al. 2010). Continued psychological distress in
camps are oftentimes situated on foreign soil. In
this stage may result from delays in processing
these camps, inhabitants are depersonalized:
asylum applications, uncertainty about asylum
becoming numbers without names and
status, negotiation with immigration authorities,
experiencing traumatic events are common. In
obstacles with obtaining employment and ade-
the massive exodus of balseros (rafters) that
quate housing, frequent moves, language prob-
took place in the summer of 1994, Cuban children
lems, racial discrimination, and social isolation.
and adolescents who left the island on rafts and
Oftentimes, traditional Western mental health
boats were later detained in the Guantanamo ref-
services and treatment approaches have not been
ugee camps for months, prior to arriving in the
effective with immigrants and refugees, who
United States. These refugees reported they had
underutilize traditional mental health services as
faced storms at sea, witnessed people drowning,
a result of the stigma associated with mental
and had observed corpses floating being
illness in their culture, the lack of clinicians
devoured by sharks. Inside the refugee camps,
who speak the language, the more pressing
fully 80 % witnessed acts of violence, and 37 %
human needs, and the lack of finances or insur-
saw someone attempt or commit suicide (Rothe
ance coverage to pay for the services. Most
et al. 2002). Many children and adolescents expe-
recently, standardized principles for culturally
rienced involuntarily soiling themselves and
competent mental health services and
bedwetting at night, as well as nightmares, sepa-
community-based systems of care applicable for
ration anxiety, aggression, and other disruptive
child and adolescent immigrants and refugees
behaviors (Rothe 2005).
have been developed (Pumariega et al. 2013).
Many young refugees are unaccompanied and
Upon arrival in the host country, many child
lack identifiable adult guardians when they arrive
refugees and their families are undergoing signif-
in the host country. They may have traveled long
icant turmoil in their lives, so a treatment
distances and experienced many traumatic events
approach that fluctuates back and forth between
without adult supervision. Political violence may
the different phases of treatment is the most
sometimes render entire villages devoid of adults
appropriate intervention. These phases are estab-
(Lustig et al. 2004). Children who come to the
lishment of safety and trust, trauma-focused ther-
United States without a guardian are faced with
apy, and reintegration.
having to negotiate the legal system without
advocates. Children awaiting asylum hearings in
Establishment of Safety and Trust
the United States are sometimes held up to
The first goal of the therapeutic intervention is to
2 years in detention facilities or juvenile jails.
help the child and the family to develop a sense of
Resources for refugee children are scarce, and
stability and safety and a sense of control over
many who may have legitimate asylum claims
their lives. Liaison work with agencies is
4 Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees

necessary to provide for their basic needs and to health service utilization while downplaying
focus on solving housing, educational, and finan- their resiliency and strengths (Summerfield
cial problems through the use of attorneys as well 1995, 2000, 2001, 2003). The most recent models
as educational, health, religious, cultural, and of mental health care for refugees utilize the
leisure organizations. principles of Brofenbrenner’s (1979) ecological
systems theory, which explains that human
Trauma-Focused Therapy beings develop in an interaction with their envi-
For children suffering from symptoms of post- ronment at four levels: the macrosystem (societal
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which results rules and beliefs), the exosystem (community and
from being exposed to overwhelming life circum- neighborhood factors), the microsystem (the fam-
stances that produced damage to the central ner- ily), and the ontogenic level (individual factors).
vous system and resulted in psychiatric The interplay between these four levels deter-
symptoms, this phase of treatment involves work- mines the adaptation of the refugees to their
ing through the trauma experienced (at a pace that new environments in the host country. This
is emotionally manageable). Alternative inter- model is useful in designing treatment interven-
ventions may be offered for a range of difficul- tions that will take into account different cultural
ties, including depression, anxiety, sleep views of traumatic events, life cycles, and family
problems, somatic complaints, and behavioral systems (Hodes 2002).
difficulties.

Reintegration Risk Factors and Protective Factors

During this phase, the focus is on creating future
goals and aspirations and integrating into a new “Resilience” is the term used to describe a set of
community and culture. Young refugees usually qualities in people that foster a process of suc-
begin this process with help from their schools cessful adaptation and transformation despite the
and community resources. Sometimes, geograph- risk and adversity faced. We are all born with an
ical relocation is considered (Ehntholt and Yule innate capacity for resilience, by which we are
2006). able to develop social competence, problem-
solving skills, a critical consciousness, auton-
omy, and a sense of purpose. Longitudinal studies
Psychological Development of Child over the lifespan have consistently documented
and Adolescent Refugees that from half to two-thirds of children growing
up in families with mentally ill, alcoholic, abu-
Children and adolescents depend on adults for sive, or criminally involved parents, or in
guidance and safety, and if the child’s trust in poverty-stricken or war-torn communities, do
the adult’s ability to care for them is shaken, overcome the odds and turn a life trajectory of
this may complicate or derail the stages of their risk into one of adaptation and success. However,
normal psychological development. The trauma a number of risk factors and protective factors
they experienced during war and persecution and also contribute to determine these outcomes
the inability of adults to protect them under these (Garmezy 1991).
circumstances may result in the children’s feel- Factors that have been found to increase the
ings of mistrust, betrayal, humiliation, and a risk of mental health problems and PTSD in
sense of vulnerability in children and adoles- young refugees are experiencing a large number
cents. However, some controversy exists in that of traumatic events; being in close proximity to
the concept of psychological vulnerability is the traumatic events; witnessing someone being
based predominantly on Western values and injured, tortured, or killed; the perceived degree
may well exaggerate the psychiatric pathology of personal threat; separation from family mem-
of refugees and lead to an increase in mental bers; immigration detention; and being an
Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees 5

unaccompanied child refugee. The political per- humiliation – events that oftentimes continue to
secution or incarceration, injury, torture, or loss occur even after they have been placed in refugee
of a parent or close family member has been camps, group homes, or foster homes with little
found to have a devastating effect on young ref- supervision or support where they continue to be
ugees. Also, the stresses inherent in the asylum- victimized. Uncertain legal status can also com-
seeking process, the effects of acculturation and plicate their emotional adjustment and contribute
resettlement stress, and if the social support sys- to their being further isolated in detention facili-
tem in the receiving country is inadequate have ties for extended periods, interfering with their
all been found to increase the risk for mental resettlement adjustment and acculturation pro-
health problems. While traumatic events contrib- cess. Unaccompanied child refugees may also
ute to PTSD, problems related to loss, lack of encounter ambivalence and even rejection by
social support, and acculturation stress all con- their natural family when they reunify. Their
tribute to depression. natural family may also hardly believe the extent
Yet many refugee children have been found to of their psychological problems and distress – in
be free of mental health problems. What accounts part out of denial and guilt at their having made
for their resilience is only now beginning to the decision to allow them to emigrate alone
receive attention (Hodes 2000; Summerfield (Ehntholt and Yule 2006).
2000). Some of these protective factors include In the early 1960s, close to 15,000 unaccom-
being of a young age at the time of the trauma, panied children and adolescents fled the island of
having good self-esteem and an easy tempera- Cuba and arrived in the United States in what
ment that allows them to respond well and effec- became known as Operation Pedro Pan. This
tively to new situations, having religious faith, exodus was precipitated by the panic that ensued
and holding a strong ideological commitment to a after the newly installed communist dictatorship
political or national cause. In addition, character- on the island announced that the parental guard-
istics of the family and peers also have been ianship of all children (Patria Potestad) no longer
found to be protective during the flight as well belonged to the parents but to the state. Fearing
as the resettlement period, such as adaptability that these children would be conscripted into the
and cohesion within the family, the positive psy- militias or sent to communist-run boarding
chological well-being of caregivers, and good schools, parents allowed the children to immi-
peer group and social supports. grate alone with the help of the Catholic Church
and the US government. These children were
placed in youth camps and in Catholic boarding
Unaccompanied Child and Adolescent schools or foster homes. Many of their parents
Refugees were unable to leave the island until years later,
when many of these children were already adults.
Unaccompanied child refugees are typically Although no systematic empirical studies have
exposed to a higher number of traumatic stressors been done on a good sample of this population,
prior to fleeing than their accompanied counter- the existing reports paint a mixed picture of the
parts. These children flee their nations alone after outcomes, alternating between those that harbor
the death of parents or guardians during the war deep psychological scars and those that have
or political strife. They also flee alone to avoid demonstrated admirable resilience and success
threats of persecution or violence toward them or in the United States (Eire 2003; Triay 1999;
their families, the threat of war and resulting Torres 2003).
victimization, the threat of enslavement or
recruitment as child soldiers, or the threat of
ideological reeducation. A great number of
them were raped, including some males, or have
been subjected to other forms of subjugation and
6 Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees

Child Soldiers which combines elements of testimonial psycho-

therapy with cognitive-behavioral therapy; and
Approximately 300,000 child soldiers under the more experimental eye movement desensiti-
18 years of age are actively fighting in 14 different zation and reprocessing (EMDR), which uses
countries around the world today. Child soldiers bilateral stimulation when processing traumatic
are at risk of rape, torture, and war injuries and memories in individuals with PTSD (Lustig
may later suffer from substance abuse, depres- et al. 2004).
sion, and anxiety. In addition, child soldiers lose Psychodynamic psychotherapy has recently
trust in authority figures and also may lose their been shown to be as efficacious as cognitive-
moral perspective, engaging in stealing, looting, behavioral therapy for the treatment of depres-
and killing when being ordered to do so and told sion and generalized anxiety (Leischenring
that killing for political reasons is morally justi- et al. 2009). The goals of psychodynamic therapy
fied. The complex psychodynamic factors in refugee children and adolescents include pro-
involved in being a child soldier often translates viding a safe place within therapy for the adoles-
into feelings in which the military becomes a cent to express affect and experience
surrogate family, particularly in children sepa- containment and tolerance; facilitating the
rated from their biological families. We have mourning process associated with the migration,
scarce information regarding the long-term men- including the expression of grief which may not
tal health outcomes and efforts at reintegration be allowed by their family members because they
into society of these child soldiers, including think it expresses ingratitude for their sacrifices
where they end up seeking asylum and what or because it may exacerbate their own grief;
happens in their lives when they become adults, allowing identification by the immigrant adoles-
given that many chose to remain silent about their cents with the therapist, so as to rehearse new
past experiences (Human Rights Watch/Child aspects of their identity from the host culture
Soldiers Worldwide 2012). while dropping aspects that are no longer useful
in the receiving country; allowing transferences
to develop and to be analyzed, utilizing the ther-
Assessment and Treatment apy as a new, reconstructive emotional experi-
ence; mediating affects between the adolescent
Although a number of diagnostic mental health and his family, allowing for both to complete
instruments for child and adolescent refugees their process of adaptation to the new culture;
have been identified, only extensive, open- and serving as the mediator between the adoles-
ended interviewing and assessment have proven cent’s family and the new culture while
accurate to establish a diagnosis. Standardized empowering the family and enabling them to
diagnostic questionnaires tend to overidentify create a new supportive milieu within the host
pathology and have been designed for main- culture (Rothe 2004). A number of community-
stream populations with Western values, which based interventions have been identified as
often prove useless for populations of developing increasingly important for helping immigrant
countries (Kinzie et al. 2006). youth improve academic achievement, stay in
Different models of types of psychotherapy school, and avoid risky behaviors such as preg-
have been found effective in addressing the men- nancy and substance abuse (Rothe and
tal health needs of refugee children and their Pumariega 2010).
families. Some of these are trauma-focused
cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT); testimonial
psychotherapy, which works by helping the refu- Preventing Mental Health Problems
gee transcend grief, anger, and resentment
through using testimonies for purposes of educa- Dealing with sudden refugee crises, the receiving
tion and advocacy; narrative exposure therapy, community may find itself besieged by their
Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees 7

massive arrival, which may overwhelm the avail- Garmezy N (1991) Resiliency and vulnerability to adverse
able mental health infrastructure. To avoid this developmental outcomes associated with poverty. Am
Behav Sci 34:416–430
situation, it is advisable to compose teams of Hodes M (2000) Psychologically Distressed Refugee
mental health professionals, including transla- Children in the United Kingdom Child Psychology
tors, that take into account the particular circum- and Psychiatry Review 5(2):57–68
stances of the refugee crisis, composed by Hodes M (2002) Three key issues for young refugees’
mental health. Transcult Psychiatry 39(2):196–213
culturally competent professionals (Sack Human Rights Watch. Child Soldiers Worldwide
et al. 1997). A preventive model of intervention (2012) March 12, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/
to treat refugee children while they are still inside 12/child-soldiers-worldwide. Accessed 27 Dec 2013.
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refugee children: the case for individualized diagnosis
ical damage (Rothe 2008). and treatment. J Nerv Ment Disord 194:534–537
Psychiatric symptoms and mental health diffi- Layne CM, Pynoos RS, Saltzman WR, Arslanagic B,
culties in young refugees have been found to Black M, Savjak N, Popvic’ T, Durakovic’ E,
persist over many years (Sack et al. 1999). It is Musˇic’ M, Campara N, Djapo N, Houston R (2001)
Trauma/grief-focused group psychotherapy: school-
important to take into account that symptoms of based postwar intervention with traumatized Bosnian
emotional distress in child and adolescent refu- adolescents. Group Dyn Theory Res Pract 5:277–290
gees may sometimes be experienced subjectively Leichsenring F, Salzer S, Jaeger U, Kächele H,
even though the child may function well socially Kreische R, Leweke F, R€ uger U, Winkelbach C,
Leibing E (2009) Short-term psychodynamic psycho-
and academically, without the parents and therapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy in general-
teachers becoming aware of the child’s internal ized anxiety disorder: a randomized, controlled trial.
suffering (Rothe 2005). Am J Psychiatry 166(8):875–881
Refugees have historically been a significant Lustig SL, Kia-Keating M, Knight WG, Geltman P,
Ellis H, Kinzie JD (2004) Review of child and adoles-
proportion of the immigrant population in the cent refugee mental health. J Am Acad Child Adolesc
United States, and it is reasonable to expect that Psychiatry 43(1):24–36
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Mental health and support services are most Toppleberg C, Harris T, Gogineni RR, Webb S,
effective in the context of a refugee and immi- Smith J (2013) Practice parameters for cultural
gration policy based on rational national interests competence in child psychiatric practice. J Am Acad
Child Adolesc Psychiatry 52(10):1101–1115. Available
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F

Forced Migration: Global Trends in membership in the United Nations (UN) would
and Explanations never again allow nationalism to disrupt Europe.
Two developments disproved this assumption.
Jeremy Hein and Tarique Niazi First, in 1964, the number of refugees in
Department of Sociology, University of Africa and Asia surpassed those in Europe for
Wisconsin-Eau Claire, Eau Claire, WI, USA the first time. Forced migration was now a global
problem due to the independence struggles of
countries that had been European colonies.
Definitions Thus, in 1967, the UN removed the geographic
and time limitations from the 1951 definition.
World War II still exerts a great influence on Second, in the early 1990s, the number of
definitions and explanations of forced migration. internally displaced persons (IDPs) surpassed
The policy makers who established the United the number of refugees for the first time. IDPs
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are people who flee from violence but they stop
(UNHCR) in 1951 believed that forced migration moving when they reach a safer place within their
was caused by extreme nationalism, which led to own country. Refugees are people who flee for
wars that pushed people from one country to the same reasons but seek safety by crossing an
another. The 1951 Convention relating to the international border and residing in a neighboring
Status of Refugees, therefore, defined a refugee country.
as a person “outside the country of his national- In 1998, the UN adopted the Guiding Princi-
ity” due to “a well-founded fear of persecution” ples on Internal Displacement (Cohen and Deng
(UNHCR 2000). Its most important guarantee 1998). With regard to protection, these are much
of protection is that refugees may not be weaker than the 1951 Convention. UN members
forcibly returned to the country from which they were reluctant to intrude on a country’s sover-
fled – non-refoulement. But the 1951 Convention eignty when it concerned treatment of its own
only covered refugees from events that occurred citizens. By contrast, the UN extends more pro-
in Europe before January 1, 1951. At the time, tections when citizens of one country flee to
58 % of the world’s refugees resided there. Once another country since these refugees then become
they were taken care of, policy makers assumed part of the international political system.
that forced migration would not be a problem
because the new international system expressed

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_108-1
2 Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations

Statistical Overview immigration officials. Asylum seekers argue

that they would suffer persecution if they had to
In 1978, the number of refugees in the world return to their homelands. On average, about
surpassed 5 million for the first time since 25 % of asylum seekers receive a positive deci-
World War II. It reached 10 million in 1981 and sion. In 2012, the USA granted asylum to 25,200
15 million in 1990. In 2012, the UNHCR’s man- people who applied while already residing in the
date covered 46.3 million people (UNHCR 2013, country. Other major asylum countries include
2015). The largest concentration resides in Africa Germany (17,000), Sweden (13,700), and Canada
(30 %) with the second largest concentration in (10,200).
the Middle East and North Africa (27 %). There People deemed “stateless” are the most vul-
are large populations of forced migrants in Asia nerable people on earth. At present, the world is
(19 %) as well as in Latin America (14 %). divided into 211 independent countries and terri-
Today, Europe accounts for only 6 %, although tories. The international system expects every
in 1996 and 1997, Bosnia produced the second person to be a member of one of them. But
largest number of refugees in the world. some governments never recognize or even
The populations of concern to the UNHCR are revoke the citizenship of its people so as to dis-
primarily IDPs (56 %) and refugees (28 %). The criminate against unpopular groups. The collapse
UNHCR is less able to assist IDPs since they of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, and
remain under the territory and jurisdiction of then the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991,
their national government, which either foments, created large stateless populations as the newly
condones, or cannot control local violence. The independent countries established their own citi-
UNHCR provides far more assistance to refugees zenship criteria that often excluded ethnic minor-
because they live in someone else’s country and ities. In 2012, there were still significant numbers
are, thus, covered by international law. Most ref- of stateless people in Latvia (280,000), the Rus-
ugees reside in UN-operated camps for many sian Federation (178,000), and Estonia (94,000).
years until political conditions improve and they The largest population of stateless people, how-
can return to their homeland. This protracted ever, are the approximately 800,000
waiting is termed “warehousing” and places a Rohingya – the Muslim population in the Myan-
great burden on host countries such as Pakistan, mar state of Rakhine, bordering Bangladesh.
Iran, and Kenya (each of which allows more than Myanmar does not recognize their citizenship
500,000 refugees to live in its territory). Some even though the Rohingya were born there. It
refugees apply for permanent resettlement to a also does not give citizenship to the children
third country. In 2012, the USA accepted 66,200 born in Thailand to Myanmar refugees, nor does
refugees who applied for admission while resid- Thailand provide them with birth certificates.
ing overseas. Other major resettlement countries There is little the UNHCR can do for stateless
include Canada (9,600), Australia (5,900), and people other than advocate that they be granted
Sweden (1,800). citizenship and make sure the world does not
The UNHCR also advocates for several other forget them.
types of forced migrants: IDPs and refugees who
have returned to their homes but still need assis-
tance (5 %), stateless persons (8 %), and asylum Explanations of Forced Migration
seekers (3 %). Asylum seekers resemble refugees
in the conditions that push them and their moti- A number of explanations have been offered for
vations. But unlike refugees who first move to an the various types of forced migration. The geo-
adjacent country, asylum seekers flee directly to a political explanation emerged after World War II
potential place of permanent settlement (usually with the onset of the Cold War between the for-
Europe, North America, and Australia) and then mer USSR and the USA. After the collapse of the
request retroactive refugee status from Soviet Union in 1991, the ethnic conflict and
Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations 3

failed state explanation became influential. The forced migration (Betts and Loescher 2011;
natural resources explanation and the climate Haddad 2008). But many scholars think that the
change explanation have gained support since refugee crises that began in the 1990s do not fit
2000. this geopolitical model. They argue that the
global dynamics of forced migration changed in
1991 with the end of the Cold War between the
The Geopolitical Explanation
USA and the former Soviet Union. Instead of
To explain the increase in forced migration since
conflict between states, the underlying cause of
the 1960s, social scientists first studied interna-
most forced migration is now ethnic or religious
tional politics and conflicts between states (Hein
conflict in fragile, failing, or failed states (Keely
1993; Zolberg et al. 1989). They concluded that
1996; Nurussaman 2009).
refugees were primarily produced by decoloniza-
The case of Afghanistan is very important for
tion, revolutions, and proxy wars in which the
debates about the causes of forced migration and
USA and USSR provided weapons and training
its solutions. At its peak in the late 1990s, about
to allies around the world. The UNHCR (2000)
8 million people had fled the country creating an
reached similar conclusions. It used types of geo-
Afghan diaspora that stretched across Pakistan,
political conflicts to summarize the main refugee
Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Europe, the USA,
crises it addressed during the mid to late twenti-
Canada, and Australia. Estimates suggest that
eth century:
from one-third to 64 % and possibly even
two-thirds of all living Afghans have been refu-
The 1950s Cold War in Europe
gees at one point in their lives (Kronenfeld 2008).
The 1960s decolonization in Africa
The conflict first erupted in 1979 with the Soviet
The early 1970s birth of the state of Bangladesh
Union’s invasion. Now Afghanistan is cited as an
The mid 1970s communist revolutions in former
example of a failed state that is too weak and
Indochina
destabilized to protect its citizens from ethnic
The 1980s proxy wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin
power struggles (Rubin 2002).
America
The failed state explanation of forced migra-
The early 1990s separatist conflicts in the
tion assumes that citizens need a strong central
Caucasus
government to protect them. Afghan refugees
The late 1990s ethnic cleansing in Iraq, Balkans,
disprove that assumption (Hein and Niazi 2012).
and Rwanda
Since 1973, a series of different
regimes – socialist, Islamist, and
Although refugees from Cuba did not receive
capitalist – have used repression in failed
assistance from the UNHCR, their migration to
attempts to create various states in Afghanistan.
the USA following the Cuban Revolution in 1959
From 1979 to 1992, the USSR targeted rural and
is significant and merits a place on this list. It was
religious segments of society as it pursued social-
the first time that the USA became a country of
ist modernization and secular modernity. From
first asylum (Pedraza 2007). Currently, about
1992 to 1996 in the new Islamic Republic of
20 % of Cubans live outside of Cuba. The Syrian
Afghanistan, the targets were the urban middle
refugee crisis (which errupted in 2014 and is
class, the feminist movement, and the Shiite reli-
currently the largest in the world) can also be
gious minority. Under the Taliban (1996–2001),
explained by the geopolitical theory (Russia and
all women were repressed and the Tajik minority
Iran v. the US and Saudi Arabia).
singled out for persecution. Since 2001, the Pash-
tuns have been discriminated against because
The Ethnic Conflict and Failed State some have links to the Taliban. The fact that
Explanation virtually every group in Afghan society has
Studies of international relations and state sover- been subject to state persecution at some point
eignty continue to define some explanations of since 1979 indicates that the underlying cause of
4 Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations

forced migration is not a state that is too weak but Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations,
one that is too strong. Contrary to the ethnic Table 1 Seven largest producers of forced migrants in
2012 and natural resource conflicts
conflict and failed state explanation, no ethnic
group in Afghanistan has sought independence Origin Numbera Natural resource conflicts
and sovereignty. Colombia 4.356 Oil, metals, cattle, and
agricultural produce
Afghanistan 4.122 Land transit for oil and
The Natural Resources Explanation natural gas
State-centered explanations of forced migration DRC 3.613 Metals and diamonds
have limitations because they are primarily Syria 2.846 Land transit for natural gas
informed by the lessons drawn from World War Sudan 2.574 Water, pasture, cattle,
II. An alternative approach emphasizes globaliza- arable land, and oil
tion’s environmental impact and conflicts over Somalia 2.313 Mogadishu as entrepot and
transit site
natural resources (Hein and Niazi 2009). From a
Iraq 2.203 Oil and water
demographic perspective, the increasing size of
World 61.5%b
the world population and expanding middle-class a
In millions of people of concern to the UNHCR (2013).
consumption causes competition for scarce
Population of concern comprises refugees, returned refu-
resources (Homer-Dixon 1999). From a political gees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons,
economy perspective, the conflicts are caused by returned internally displaced person, stateless persons,
private and sovereign wealth corporations seeking and others of concern
b
Percent of total world population of concern to UNHCR
ownership and quick profits from natural resources
originating from Colombia, Afghanistan, the Democratic
all over the world (Peluso and Watts 2001). Republic of the Congo, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, and Iraq
The two perspectives are in fact complemen-
tary. Demography explains demand for natural
resources while political economy explains the not new (Collins 2008). Independence in 1956
supply. Controlling natural resources is therefore led to a civil war between the Arab and Islamic
central to almost all the world’s conflicts which dominant group which controlled the capital of
produce forced migration (see Table 1). Khartoum and minority groups in the south. The
The groups in these conflicts often use ethnic north–south conflict is part of a larger pattern
names to define each other, but what they are resulting from Sudan’s extreme ecological and
really fighting over is wealth production from cultural regionalism. Some of the main ethno-
nature (Niazi and Hein 2013). Globalization has ecological groups are Fur farmers and herders
vastly increased the value of land, fresh water, from the west (Darfur means land of the Fur
wood, metals, gems, energy sources, and the people), Nuba farmers and herders in the Nuba
transportation routes to move these commodities. Mountains, and Dinka and Nuer pastoralists in
Competition over access, appropriation, develop- the south. These groups became forced migrants
ment, and shipping of natural resources leads to as the state and economic elites in Khartoum
conflicts among resource-dependent local com- exploited regional resources. Pasture and water
munities, resource-extractive states, and elites are of great value in arid Darfur, oil reserves are
that seek profits from resources. Often, the result in the south, while the Nuba Mountains are val-
is human rights violations followed by forced ued for their strategic location along the
migration. The state and elites coerce subnational north–south oil pipelines. South Sudan became
communities in resource rich areas in order to an independent country in 2011 but its oil
rapidly produce wealth for the global market. resources are still a source of conflict.
This pattern of resource extraction, violence,
and forced migration is very evident in Sudan. The Climate Change Explanation
The conflict is so severe that in 2005 the UN The UNHCR (2009) and the US Department of
investigated charges of genocide in the country’s Defense (2010) predict that climate-induced nat-
Darfur region (de Waal 2007). But the conflict is ural disasters will cause massive population
Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations 5

displacement. In fact, forced migration due to wetlands and diversion of rivers to accommodate
climate change has already begun in Asia housing developments proved unsustainable when
among island nations and coastal populations the hurricane hit. Blaming only nature for causing
(Niazi 2013). On 8 November 2013, Typhoon this destruction neglects the interaction between
Haiyan caused massive destruction in the Philip- social systems and ecosystems. At present, we
pines, displacing more than 3 million people from have been warned that carbon-fueled climate
their homes. It was the largest and most powerful change is raising sea levels and sea temperatures,
tropical storm to ever hit land. More are likely to both of which will lead to more frequent and
occur. Bangladesh predicts that 20 million of its more destructive hurricanes and typhoons
coastal residents are threatened. The country’s (Environmental Justice Foundation 2011).
policy makers propose their “managed migra-
tion” to western nations before future disasters
strike. Since the migration is inevitable, the Conclusion
country’s leaders advocate that Europe and the
USA accept Bangladeshi “climate refugees” now At the end of World War II, there were about
rather than wait until forced migration occurs. 42 million forced laborers, prisoners of war, and
The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel displaced civilians all over Europe (Marrus
on Climate Change supports this proposal. 1985). The UNHCR was established in 1951 to
The concept of environmental refugees assist them and by 1954 there were less than one
(El-Hinnawi 1985) first called attention to this million. Now the UNHCR seeks to protect about
problem. During the 1990s, scholars began to 36 million forced migrants in 79 % of the world’s
systematically document how deforestation, ris- 211 countries and territories. Rather than being
ing sea levels, desertification, drought, and other due to episodic instability in a subset of countries,
forms of environmental disruption were forcing forced migration is now a continuous by-product
people from their homes. By the early 2000s, it of globalization. There is a global level of vio-
appeared self-evident that nature, not state perse- lence comparable to, but far more dispersed than,
cution, was to blame for uprooting people the most destructive war in world history. While
throughout the world (Myers 2001). Numerous revolutions and proxy wars still occur, the under-
neologisms are now used to describe these lying cause of forced migration at the start of the
populations, such as climate refugee, environ- twenty-first century is society’s unbalanced rela-
mentally displaced people, and eco-migrant. Pro- tionship with the environment. World War II and
ponents of these terms argue that flight from its aftermath in the Cold War showed that
catastrophic ecological problems should be extreme nationalism can disrupt the international
added to the United Nations’ definition of refugee state system and lead to human flight for survival.
(Environmental Justice Foundation 2011). This geopolitical perspective is now only one of
Climate change explanations of forced migra- several explanations for forced migration. Some
tion are quite complex and can lead to oversimpli- scholars and policy makers focus on the ethnic
fication. The perspective sometimes conflicts that lead to failed states. Others empha-
unintentionally naturalizes displaced people – i.e., size that the causes of violent conflict and flight
conceptualizes them as a problem, like a flood. can be found in globalization’s demand for natu-
Some scholars argue that many “natural disasters” ral resources and its attendant commodity trans-
are, in fact, not caused by nature but by portation routes. The climate change explanation
maldevelopment in pursuit of economic growth at also focuses on the environment. Geopolitical
all costs (Freudenberg et al. 2009). In 2005, Hurri- and failed state explanations of forced migration
cane Katrina displaced 800,000 people in New should be complemented by explanations empha-
Orleans. It was indeed a “natural” phenomenon, sizing the damage done to humans and the envi-
but a deeper analysis showed powerful economic ronment by the rapid production of wealth from
interests were also a root cause. The destruction of natural resources.
6 Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations

References Marrus MR (1985) The unwanted: European refugees in

the twentieth century. Oxford University Press, New
Betts A, Loescher G (eds) (2011) Refugees and interna- York
tional relations. Oxford University Press, Oxford Myers N (2001) Environmental refugees. The Royal Soci-
Cohen R, Deng FM (1998) Masses in flight. Brookings ety, London
Institute, Washington, DC Niazi T (2013) The Asia-Pacific in the eye of super-
Collins RO (2008) A history of modern Sudan. Cambridge storms. Asia-Pacific J 11: 5 Dec. http://www.
University Press, Cambridge japanfocus.org/-Tarique-Niazi/4043/article.html
de Waal A (2007) Sudan: The turbulent state. In: de Waal Niazi T, Hein J (2013) Political economy of the world
A (ed) War in Darfur and the search for peace. Global system: the social-ecological theory of human rights.
equity initiative. Harvard University, Cambridge, In: Brunsma DL, Smith KEI, Gran BK (eds) The
pp 1–38 handbook of sociology and human rights. Paradigm
El-Hinnawi E (1985) Environmental refugees. United Publishers, Boulder, pp 374–383
Nations Environmental Program, Nairobi Nurussaman M (2009) Revisiting the category of fragile
Environmental Justice Foundation (2011) Climate change and failed states in international relations. Int Stud
and migration. http://ejfoundation.org/sites/default/ 46(3):271–294
files/public/EJF_climate%20change%20and%20migra Pedraza S (2007) Political disaffection in Cuba’s revolu-
tion%20%282011%29.pdf. Accessed 24 Dec 2013 tion and exodus. Cambridge University Press, New
Freudenberg WR, Gramling R, Laska S, Erikson K (2009) York
Catastrophe in the making. Island Press, Washington, Peluso NL, Watts M (eds) (2001) Violent environments.
DC Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Haddad E (2008) The refugee in international society. Rubin B (2002) Fragmentation of Afghanistan. Yale Uni-
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge versity Press, New York
Hein J (1993) Refugees, immigrants, and the state. Annu U.S. Department of Defense (2010) Quadrennial defense
Rev Sociol 19:43–59 review report. U.S. Department of Defense, Washing-
Hein J, Niazi T (2009) A well-founded fear: a social ton, DC
ecology of twenty-first century refugees. Harvard Int UNHCR (2000) The state of the world’s refugees. Oxford
Rev 31(3):38–42 University Press, Oxford
Hein J, Niazi T (2012) State-society incompatibility and UNHCR (2009) Climate change, natural disasters, and
forced migration: the violent development of Afghan- human displacement. United Nations High Commis-
istan under Socialist, Islamist, and Capitalist regimes. sioner for Refugees. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/
Soc Without Bord 7(3):341–363 texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4901
Homer-Dixon TF (1999) Environment, scarcity, and vio- e81a4%26query=%22climate%20change,%20natural
lence. Princeton University Press, Princeton %22. Accessed on 18 Dec 2013
Keely CB (1996) How nation-states create and respond to UNHCR (2013) 2012 statistical yearbook. United Nations
refugee flows. Int Migration Rev 30:1046–66 High Commissioner for Refugees. http://www.unhcr.
Kronenfeld DA (2008) Afghan refugees in Pakistan: not org/52a7213b9.html. Accessed 18 Dec 2013
all refugees, not always in Pakistan, not necessarily UNHCR (2015) UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2014. United
Afghan. J Refugee Stud 21(1):43–63 Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva
Zolberg A, Suhrke A, Aguayo S (1989) Escape from
violence. Oxford University Press, New York
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Changing Contexts: From Multiculturalism to Transnationalism?

Stephen Castles*
University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Definition
When migrants come to another country, they become part not only of the economy but also of the society
of that place. This is obviously the case where immigration is regarded as permanent, but applies even to
temporary movements: despite the ideas of governments and employers who plan “guest worker”
systems, you cannot have workers without people. In any case, many forms of migration are not primarily
motivated by economic concerns – even though all migrations have economic effects. Migrants have
widely varied experiences of reception and settlement, according to the policies, attitudes, and practices
prevailing in the destination country. These differing contexts of migration affect the way migrants
become incorporated into society, which in turn shapes processes of social and cultural change affecting
both migrants and nonmigrants.
This entry explores the historical background to varying migration contexts, discusses some of the
dynamics of migratory processes, and then looks at the way migration contexts have changed over the
period of accelerated mobility since 1945 with special reference to the emergence of global migration
flows in the phase of neoliberal globalization since the mid-1970s. Two key conclusions are emphasized.
One is that the growth of temporary mobility in the latest phase of the evolution of the world labor market
presents a challenge to all existing forms of incorporation, whether they are labeled as assimilation,
integration, or multiculturalism. The other is that the growth of transnational consciousness requires new
ways of understanding and responding to migration and minorities. (Much of this text is based on Castles
et al. 2014, where more detail and references are to be found.)

Nation-State Formation and the Treatment of Minorities

“National models” for the treatment of immigrants and minorities depend on varying historical experi-
ences of nation-state formation, which in turn gave rise to differing concepts of nationality and citizen-
ship, and the extent to which these could include newcomers. Even countries as close as Britain, France,
and Germany had quite different approaches. The British history of territorial expansion and responding
to religious diversity led to a state that accepted difference: political loyalty was required, but a person’s
group identity could be Welsh or Scottish, Protestant or Catholic. Thus, immigrants could become citizens
without losing their cultural and religious distinctiveness. In France, the 1789 Revolution established
principles of equality and the rights of man that rejected group cultural identity and aimed to include
individuals as equal political subjects. Immigrants could be incorporated, but group difference was
unacceptable. Germany by contrast was not united as a state until 1871, and the nation – defined on the
basis of shared language and culture – came before the state. This led to a form of ethnic or folk belonging
that was not consistent with incorporation of immigrants or minorities as citizens.
Quite different approaches are to be found in the white settler societies of the New World. The nations
of North and South America, of Oceania, and of some parts of southern Africa and Southeast Asia were
built through the dispossession of indigenous peoples and through immigration from Europe.

*Email: [email protected]

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Incorporation of immigrants as citizens was part of their national myths. In such settler societies, civic
belonging was thought to lead to national identity, so that differing identities were acceptable as a passing
phase on the way through the “melting pot” which led to “Americanization” (or the equivalent in other
places). It was thought that only white people could be assimilated: nearly all of these emerging nations
had racially selective immigration laws.
Today in Northeast Asia, emerging immigration countries like Japan and South Korea have strong
beliefs in ethnic homogeneity and find it very hard to incorporate people of different backgrounds.
Southeast Asia countries like Malaysia have culturally mixed populations – often the result of colonial
labor recruitment schemes – but the public and politicians often fear that incorporating newcomers could
upset existing ethnic balances. Gulf oil countries recruit large numbers of migrant workers from
Asia – often these outnumber local populations – but have strict rules to prevent family reunion and
long-term settlement, so that migrants remain marginalized and politically excluded. Similarly, in
postapartheid South Africa, immigration from other African countries is often seen as a threat and has
led to violent clashes. In North Africa, increasing presence of sub-Saharan migrants is largely seen as an
undesirable phenomenon.

The Social Dynamics of the Migratory Process

The problem of “national models” of migrant incorporation (apart from their inherent “methodological
nationalism”) (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) is that they are based more on ideological principles than
on a real understanding of the migratory process. Governments believe that they can divide migrants up
into neat categories and make differential rules that will allow them to maximize the economic benefits of
immigration while keeping social costs down. But migration and settlement are parts of a long-drawn-out
process that will be played out for the rest of the migrant’s life and affect subsequent generations too.
Migration is often not an individual decision but a collective action, arising out of social, economic, and
political change and affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas. Moreover, the
experience of migration and of living in another country often leads to modification of the original plans,
so that migrants’ intentions at the time of departure are poor predictors of actual behavior.
Macro-social factors that lead migrants to revise their original intentions lie in the economic and social
development of both origin and destination areas, and in the relationships between them. Migration
systems approaches are very useful in understanding such issues, but cannot be dealt with here
(Castles et al. 2014, pp. 43–46). Equally significant are micro-level factors: most migrants do indeed
believe when they first arrive that they will return home, but as their stay in the new country lengthens,
they get older, form relationships, and have children; their life goals often change. Virtually, every
temporary movement leads to some settlement. Democratic states are rarely willing or able to adopt the
draconian measures needed to prevent this, while more authoritarian states often lack the capacity to
enforce departure and prevent a shift into irregular status – particularly, when employers are eager to
retain experienced workers. Few circular or temporary programs provide opportunities for transition to
permanent status yet the transition takes place nonetheless, and often under very difficult circumstances.
That is why the “circular migration schemes” so favored by European Union countries at present, or the
temporary employment schemes used not only by the Gulf oil countries but increasingly also by the USA,
Canada, and Australia, often have unexpected results (Castles and Ozkul 2014).

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Migration Since 1945 and the Evolution of Incorporation Models

Ideas on the position of immigrants in society changed rapidly in the post-1945 period, with the great
majority of industrial (and later postindustrial) countries allowing immigration for various economic,
demographic, and political reasons. Yet incorporation of the newcomers was not seen as a major issue, and
there was little or no long-term planning. The numbers were not expected to be large, and there was a
strong belief in the efficacy of existing national models for controlling cultural and religious difference.
The “classical immigration countries” (such as the USA, Canada, and Australia) only wanted white
settlers from their “mother countries” or other Western European countries and saw no problem in
assimilating them. Assimilation meant that immigrants were to be incorporated into society through a
one-sided process of adaptation. They were to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural, or social
characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population. Britain, France, and the
Netherlands also expected to be able to assimilate immigrants from their colonies (or former colonies)
and from other European countries such as Spain and Italy.
Germany and other “guest worker” importers (e.g., Austria and Switzerland) did not permit family
reunion or long-term settlement and therefore pursued polices of temporary admission to the labor market.
The “guest worker” model can be described as differential exclusion: migrants were to be temporarily
incorporated into certain areas of society (above all the labor market and work-related social insurance
schemes) but denied access to others (especially citizenship and political participation).
But the belief in the controllability of difference proved misplaced. In the post-1945 boom, immigration
grew in volume and became a structural feature of Western societies. Racially selective immigration rules
broke down, and migrants increasingly came from more distant or culturally different countries. When the
economic boom faltered in the 1970s, family reunion took place – even in “guest worker” countries. Then,
the end of the Cold War and globalization brought new migrations from ever more diverse origins.
In the classical immigration countries, migrants from non-Western European backgrounds (Southern
and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa) tended to have disadvantaged work situations and
to become concentrated in specific neighborhoods: generally inner cities or industrial peripheries. This led
to separation from majority populations, community formation, and the maintenance of minority cultures,
languages, and minorities. Assimilation had failed for many immigrant groups and new approaches were
needed. Even in the European “guest worker” countries, settlement was taking place despite official
denials. The absence of measures to assist incorporation often led to social exclusion and an enduring link
between class and ethnic background.
Governments replaced assimilation (initially at least) with the principle of integration, which meant
recognizing that adaptation was a gradual process that required some degree of mutual accommodation.
Acceptance of cultural maintenance and community formation might be a necessary stage, but the final
goal was still absorption into the dominant culture – integration was often simply a slower and gentler
form of assimilation. Today, of all the highly developed immigration countries, France comes closest to
the assimilationist model. Elsewhere, however, there was a shift to approaches that recognized the long-
term persistence of group difference. In some countries, such models were referred to as “multicultural-
ism”; in other places, terms like “minorities policy” and “equality and freedom of choice” were used.
Multiculturalism meant that immigrants (and sometimes nonmigrant minority groups) should be able to
participate as equals in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their own culture, religion,
and language, although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key values. There have been
two main variants. In the USA, cultural diversity and the existence of ethnic communities are officially
accepted, but it is not seen as the role of the state to work for social justice or to support the maintenance of
ethnic cultures. Access to the “American Dream” of individual advancement (and even wealth) is
supposed to be provided by free public education and an open labor market. The second variant is

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multiculturalism as a public policy. Here, multiculturalism implies both the willingness of the majority
group to accept cultural difference and state action to secure equal rights for minorities. Multiculturalism
originated in Canada and was taken up under various labels between the 1970s and the 1990s in Australia,
the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and elsewhere.
All of the different approaches to incorporation have proved problematic in one way or another, leading
to perceptions of a “crisis of integration.” In recent years, since violent attacks in the USA on 11 September
2001 and in other western countries in the following years, immigrant incorporation has been
overshadowed by concerns about security. At the same time, anxiety about loss of national identity has
become prominent, often linked with hostility against Muslim migrants. Since 2008, the global economic
crisis and the eurozone crisis have added fears about economic competition from migrants, leading to a
negative climate toward newcomers and the rise of extreme-right anti-immigration groups. The pendulum
has swung back from celebrating diversity to insisting on policies of “civic integration” based on often
rather unclear ideas about social cohesion and national values.

Temporary and Circular Migration: A Challenge to Assimilation and

Multiculturalism
All of the types of migrant incorporation discussed in the previous section share a common feature: they
are premised on citizens who belong to just one nation-state. Migrant settlement is seen as a process of
transferring primary loyalty from the state of origin to the new state of residence. This process is
symbolically marked by naturalization and acquisition of citizenship of the new state. But key global
trends question this premise. The neoliberal economic model, which has become dominant over the last
30 years, is based on dividing up work processes so that they can be carried out in the most cost-effective
way, often over multiple sites in several countries. Many products, from electronic devices to garments,
are now the result of transnational production processes giving rise to global value chains (Elms and Low
2013). Often, control of finance and marketing (and the capture of value) remains mainly in postindustrial
countries like the USA, while much of the production work is done in emerging, low-wage economies.
In this new model, medium- and lower-skilled migrants are generally only admitted to industrial and
postindustrial countries to do jobs that are unattractive to generally well-educated locals. Examples are the
recruitment of domestic workers to release educated women from home and child care duties in Singapore
(Huang et al. 2012), the employment of farm laborers from Mexico in the USA, and temporary visa
schemes for building workers in Germany or Australia (Castles and Ozkul 2014). Typical of such schemes
is the lack of migrant rights – either because workers are admitted with strict time limits and no right to
bring in dependents or because they have to enter or work as irregulars, that is, without official permission.
Highly skilled personnel, by contrast, are welcomed by most destination countries, since they are in
short supply, while recruitment from poorer countries saves education and training costs. This category of
personnel – often seen not as “migrants” but as “professional transients” or even as “cosmopolitan
experts” – is generally encouraged to bring in their families and stay permanently, and yet they are the
least likely to do so. Since they are in demand everywhere, they often remain highly mobile, chasing
opportunities wherever they find them, including in their countries of origin.

From Multiculturalism to Transnationalism

Whatever the skill category of migrants and their migration situation, it is clear that they do not fit easily
into the old model of transferring primary loyalty from the state of origin to the new state of residence.

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Temporary or circular migrants can use new forms of electronic communication and social media to
remain actively involved in their communities of origin, wherever they are living at one particular time.
The lack of residential security offered to the lower skilled keeps them mobile whatever their long-term
intentions, while the opportunities available to the highly skilled also lead to repeated movements.
Paradoxically, one reason why governments like temporary migration is because they believe it will
save social costs, but it may also lead to a much greater social issue: the lack of commitment of many
residents to a particular community and society.
Thus, an additional type of migrant consciousness may be emerging: a transnational model in which
the identities of increasing numbers of people transcend national boundaries, leading to multiple and
differentiated forms of belonging. Transnationalism could have important consequences for democratic
institutions and political belonging in the future.
In the multicultural model, easy access to citizenship and continued acceptance of dual citizenship are
important for building feelings of belonging. But trends to repeated mobility and transnational relation-
ships make it vital to think through the consequences of multiple belongings. In future, many people may
divide their careers and lives between several places. Citizenship will need to include portable civil,
political, social, and health rights, to reflect the growing flexibility of social identities. One could imagine
distinctions between active and dormant rights, to avoid privileging mobile people over those who stay
put. The biggest adjustment will be to move away from singular national identities and jealously guarded
borders to a much more open model that corresponds with our increasingly integrated and more mobile
world.

References
Castles S, De Haas H, Miller MJ (2014) The age of migration: international population movements in the
modern world. Palgrave and Guilford, Basingstoke/New York
Castles S, Ozkul D (2014) Circular migration: triple win, or a new label for temporary migration?
In: Battistella G (ed) Global and Asian perspectives on international migration. Cham, Heidelberg,
New York, Doordrecht and London:Springer 27–49
Elms DK, Low P (2013) Global value chains in a changing world. World Trade Organization, Geneva
Huang S, Thang LL, Toyota M (2012) Global networks special issue: transnational mobilities for care:
rethinking the dynamics of care in Asia. Blackwell, Oxford/Malden
Wimmer A, Glick Schiller N (2003) Methodological nationalism, the social sciences and the study of
migration. Int Migr Rev 37(3):576–610

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Group-Specific Effects of Contexts of Migration

Suzanne Model*
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA

Definition
As the number of immigrant destinations grows, cross-national comparison becomes an increasingly
popular research strategy. Most cross-national research on immigrant integration assumes that the policies
and practices of destinations affect all immigrants equally. While this is often the case, in many situations,
destinations privilege some groups over others. “Group-specific effects of contexts of migration” refers to
the differential treatment that immigrant groups encounter within a single destination. Scholars comparing
the integration of two or more groups within a single destination are more likely to acknowledge this
phenomenon than are researchers comparing one or more groups in two or more destinations. Perhaps this
asymmetry occurs because the emphasis of the former is differences between immigrant groups, while the
emphasis of the latter is differences between destinations. Whatever the reason, a more balanced
perspective is needed.

Detailed Description
Since the Second World War, international migrants have settled in an increasing number of destinations.
Yet, until relatively recently, few migration scholars thought in cross-national terms. Intra-Europe
comparisons did not appear until the 1990s, when Europeans began worrying that non-EU nationals
were failing to integrate (Niessen 2000). Since then, cross-national research has increased rapidly, with
contemporary students of integration comparing migrants in the Old World with the New (Reitz
et al. 1999; Heath 2007; Thomson and Crul 2007) and migrants in Asia with migrants in the West
(Xi 2002; Skrentny et al. 2007).
These comparisons have emphasized four explanations for cross-national variation in receiving
country’s responses to foreigners: differences in demographic history, ideologies about national belong-
ing, social policy, and institutional structure. To be sure, these explanations offer useful insights; yet, they
can be misleading when translated into hypotheses for research. The reason is that they implicitly assume
that the customs and laws of a given receiving country affect all immigrants similarly. This is rarely the
case; rather, responses at destination vary with the characteristics of the immigrants themselves. Although
this interaction is rarely a problem for cross-national studies in which the object of analysis is “immigrants
in general,” when research focuses on migrants with particular characteristics – for instance, those with
the same national origin, race, or ethnicity – then the potential for differential treatment within host
societies increases.
This is hardly a new insight. Interactions between origin and destination form part of the “context of
reception” that Portes and his collaborators introduced to explain variation in immigrant outcomes in the
United States (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Some reviews of cross-national
differences in immigrant adaptation have also acknowledged it (Schmitter-Heisler 2000; Lahav 2004;
Alba and Waters 2011). In addition, several quantitative analysts have included interactions between
origins and destinations in their multi-level models (Kogan 2007a; van Tubergen 2006; Levels

*Email: [email protected]

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et al. 2008). Yet, researchers studying the integration of two or more groups within a single destination are
more likely to consider the implications of differences among immigrants than are researchers comparing
two or more destinations. Perhaps this happens because the emphasis of the former is differences between
immigrant groups, while the emphasis of the latter is differences between destinations.
This entry highlights five theories that anticipate differences in how particular host societies respond to
specific types of immigrants as opposed to how they respond to “immigrants in general.” The first three
are broad; the processes they emphasize are expected to affect most dimensions of integration. Yet,
integration is multifaceted and often proceeds unevenly (Freeman 2004; Bean et al. 2012). This imbalance
is illustrated by the fourth and fifth theories, which have a narrower purview. One identifies some reasons
for cross-national differences in economic integration, reasons that do not necessarily affect other
dimensions of integration. The last posits that social integration is inversely related to political integration.
From this perspective, progress on one dimension is associated with stagnation in the other. These
differences aside, all five provide grounds for expecting host societies to privilege some groups and
penalize others.

Segmented Assimilation
Probably the most debated theory in migration studies today is segmented assimilation. As proposed by
Herbert Gans (1992) and elaborated by Alejandro Portes and his collaborators (Portes and Zhou 1993;
Portes and Rumbaut 1996), it predicts that the offspring of some American immigrant groups will
assimilate into the ghetto underclass rather than into the mainstream. Among those at risk, the children
of black and Latino immigrants rank high. The reasoning behind this prediction is complex.
Since the 1980s, the number of well-paying, low-skilled jobs in America has been declining. Increas-
ingly, a middle-class livelihood requires more than a high school diploma. Yet, residential segregation
forces some dark-skinned immigrants to share neighborhoods with poor African Americans, Mexicans,
and Puerto Ricans; hence, some immigrant children attend ghetto schools. In such schools, aspirations are
low and education is substandard; large proportions of the student body do not graduate. Some African
American, Mexican, and Puerto Rican students subscribe to an “oppositional subculture” that valorizes
gangs, drug dealing, teenage parenthood, hustling, and honor. Unsurprisingly, this motivates some
children of black and Latino immigrants to embrace these values too. “From their perspective, immigrant
jobs are demeaning; moreover, illegal jobs and scams may pay more and look better socially – especially
when peer pressure is also present” (Gans 1992, p. 182).
Of course, immigrant parents hope “to promote educational success and to ward off threats posed by
discrimination, narrowing labor market options and street culture” (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, p. 62). And
some parents do prevail. However, Portes and Rumbaut identify two factors that weaken parental
influence: single parenthood and dissonant acculturation. Single parents have less time, less money,
and less authority than two parents do. Dissonant acculturation results when adolescents abandon their
parents’ customs, values, and language for American ways, while the parents remain enmeshed in the
customs, values, and language of the homeland. The resulting intergenerational conflict rarely resolves in
the parents’ favor.
Recently researchers have found that some children of black and Muslim immigrants in Europe also
exhibit high rates of school dropout, idleness, and encounters with the criminal justice system (Sansone
1992; Batalha 2004; Alba and Silberman 2002; Silberman 2011). They also report experiencing labor
market discrimination and police harassment. This discovery has triggered debate over whether seg-
mented assimilation is occurring in Europe.
But, in order to apply, segmented assimilation requires the presence of a marginalized and disaffected
native minority. It is into their subculture that the children of nonwhite immigrants are expected to
assimilate. This logic makes the adaptation uniquely American. No European host society houses a

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stigmatized, long-resident minority into whose subculture black and Muslim youth can assimilate. Nor are
Europe’s immigrant neighborhoods as ethnically homogeneous and socially isolated as American
ghettoes (Paulle 2005; Wacquant 2008). Thus, if a subset of Europe’s immigrant youth are participating
in an oppositional subculture, a mechanism other than segmented assimilation must be responsible. In
short, from the perspective of segmentation theory, the vulnerability of the children of black and Latino
immigrants occurs only in the United States.

Legacies of Colonialism
A second theory that addresses variation in ethnic outcomes within host societies draws on the conse-
quences of colonialism. It assumes that imperialist nations denigrate the peoples they colonize and that
decolonization has done little to diminish this propensity. If this expectation is correct, in their respective
mother countries, immigrants from colonies and former colonies stand at the bottom of the ethno-racial
ladder (Rex 1983).
World systems theorist Ramon Grosfoguel (2003) uses this idea to create a three-tiered hierarchy. At the
bottom are immigrants from past or present colonies who have relocated to their respective mother
countries. Grosfoguel labels them “colonial/racialized subjects.” Next on the scale stand “colonial
immigrants.” Their homelands are colonies or former colonies, but they have settled in host societies
other than their respective mother countries. At the top sit “immigrants,” movers whose homelands have
never been colonies. Since these sending countries have a relatively unblemished geopolitical position,
their nationals outrank ex-colonials in any ethno-racial hierarchy.
What about the United States? Although it never defined any of its “territories” as colonies, several of
its minorities have been described as “internal colonials,” including African Americans, Native Ameri-
cans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos (Blauner 1972; Barrera 1979). Other groups to which the
label applies include Maoris in New Zealand, blacks in Brazil, or Palestinians in Israel. According to
Grosfoguel, internal colonials experience exclusion on a par with “colonial/racialized subjects.”
To sum up, according to world systems theorists, negative stereotypes about conquered and enslaved
peoples were part and parcel of the expansion of Europe. If these peoples reside in a Western country,
whether as migrants or internal colonials, negative stereotypes continue to undermine their integration,
especially in comparison to the reception accorded other international migrants.

Ethnic Returnees
A third category of movers who elicit a special response is ethnic return migrants. This is a label used for
people who, after living abroad for a generation or more, return to their real (or imagined) homeland.
Compared to other migrants, ethnic returnees face lower barriers to entry and may enjoy other advantages.
Their privileged status is an extreme case of the general principle that the greater the similarity between
the culture and phenotype of natives and newcomers, the warmer the relationship between the two groups
(Lynch and Simon 2003).
Still, similarity does not explain why countries initiate policies to attract return migrants. The most
frequent motive is to protect co-ethnics from persecution. Israel was founded for this reason. Both Jews
and their non-Jewish kin can establish permanent residency and, having done so, are eligible for a variety
of benefits. Most non-Jews qualify only for temporary residence.
Refugees from the wars for colonial independence were similarly favored. In 1968 the United Kingdom
created a new category for admission: persons whose parents or grandparents had been born, adopted, or
naturalized in the United Kingdom. Soon, persons not meeting this criterion – e.g., nonwhites – had
difficulty attaining permanent residency. France introduced similar policies toward its Pied-Noirs from
Algeria and Portugal toward its Retornados from Africa. Both these groups were white settlers displaced
by decolonization.

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In other cases, ethnic groups migrated to neighboring regions without the protection of empire and were
later ejected. The most prominent example are Aussiedlers, ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern Europe,
often for generations, but who were persecuted after Germany lost the Second World War. The German
government was so generous in its assistance that, after the fall of the Eastern Bloc, hundreds of thousands
applied for resettlement (Joppke 2005). The Chinese too had a major presence abroad, primarily in
Southeast Asia. But when Ho Chi Minh and the communists conquered Vietnam, Chinese were no longer
welcome in that country. Although many relocated in the West, China accepted 270,000, resettling many
close to the border over which they fled (Lam 2000).
In Asia, scholars have identified a different motive for welcoming returning co-ethnics: economic
development (Skrentny et al. 2007). In both Korea and Japan, co-ethnics are desired for their labor power.
Because these countries are unusually homogeneous, neither government was eager to alleviate labor
shortages by recruiting “foreigners.” To minimize these fears, they turned instead to co-ethnics. Korea
introduced policies to attract persons of Korean ancestry from China (Joseonjok); Japan introduced
policies to attract persons of Japanese ancestry from South America (Nikkejin).
In sum, several nations have extended a warmer welcome to co-ethnics than non-co-ethnics. These
policies are intended to benefit the state economically and/or politically. Though this goal is often
accomplished, research indicates that ethnic return migrants are disappointed with their reception
(Tsuda 2009). Despite expectations that cultural and phenotypical similarities foster integration, ethnic
returnees are not on a par with natives, socially or economically. At the same time, they register better
outcomes than non-co-ethnic migrants (Alba and Silberman 2002; Kogan 2007b). Perhaps this fact offers
little solace because return migrants take their native-born counterparts as their reference group.

Queuing Theory
The discussion now turns to queuing theory, a perspective that predicts within-destination differences in
the economic realm. It is especially helpful in understanding ethnic and racial differences in unemploy-
ment and occupational status but has less relevance for earnings (Hodge 1973; Lieberson 1980). Its name
reflects the assumption that motivates the theory, namely, that native employers rank racial and ethnic
groups in a hierarchical fashion, favoring their own group over others. The theory does not specify the
basis for assigning ranks to the remaining groups. It assumes only that native employers within a given
locale agree on the ethno-racial composition of the hierarchy.
From these principles, it follows that native employers view applicants for vacancies or promotions as
arranged in a line or queue, with members of the most favored group at the front, followed by the second
most favored, and so on, down to the least favored at the back. Controlling for credentials and skills,
queuing theorists expect employers to start hiring (or promoting) at the front, moving down to the second
ranked group only after members of the first are exhausted. Members of the least favored group are rarely
hired but rank first when layoffs occur.
An obvious implication of queuing theory is that, in every country, some ethnic and racial minorities
experience more attractive economic opportunities than others. But there is a more subtle implication: the
sizes of the competing groups also affect their economic well-being. The larger the proportion of the labor
force ranked below a given group (or the smaller the proportion ranked above), the more successful that
group will be. To offer a simple example, in a locale where only two groups compete, the larger the more
favored group, the poorer the opportunities open to the less favored group and vice versa. Since most host
societies house more than two groups, developing appropriate hypotheses about the trajectory of any
specific group is a demanding task.

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Trade-Off Perspective
Very recently an intriguing hypothesis has been proposed to explain ethno-racial variation in political
integration. This argument, sometimes called the “trade-off” perspective, takes political participation and
electoral representation as the main indicators of political integration. The theory holds that, the more
socially segregated an ethnic minority – as measured by indicators like language, religion, and
intermarriage – the more politically integrated it is likely to be (Maxwell 2012). Segregation is helpful
because groups that are socially separate create their own institutions – voluntary organizations, religious
centers, media outlets, etc. – which, in turn, facilitate political mobilization (Fennema and Tillie 1999).
Conversely, groups that are socially integrated participate in mainstream associations and institutions, a
pattern that discourages the emergence of leaders or organizations committed to benefiting group
members. In other words, groups cannot have both social and political integration; they must “trade”
one “off” for the other.
Research designed to test this hypothesis finds that South Asians and Muslims in the United Kingdom,
France, and the Netherlands exhibit high levels of social and geographic segregation and high levels of
political activity. Conversely, Black Caribbean immigrants in these three host societies exhibit low levels
of social and geographic segregation and low levels of political activity (Maxwell 2012).
Black Caribbeans in the United States provide a useful extension of this relationship. In New York City,
they have a high voting rate and strong representation in city offices, both elected and appointed (Kasinitz
1992; Mollenkopf et al. 2001; Kasinitz et al. 2008) As the trade-off hypothesis predicts, Black Caribbean
Americans are also more segregated than Black Caribbean Europeans, usually sharing neighborhoods
with African Americans (Peach 1999). These neighborhoods nurture a range of institutions, including
churches, voluntary associations, civil rights groups, and “political clubs.” The latter are especially
important because their purpose is to identify and support local candidates for political office and to
distribute patronage to supporters. Although African Americans and Black Caribbeans sometimes
compete for leadership roles, residence in or near African American neighborhoods has given Black
Caribbeans an infrastructure for politics that is unavailable to their European counterparts (Foner 1985;
Rogers 2006).
Of course, social segregation has both a voluntary and an involuntary component. But, as the Black
Caribbean example illustrates, host societies respond differently to different groups. On the one hand, the
cultural gap between native whites and Black Caribbeans is modest on both sides of the Atlantic. On the
other hand, antiblack sentiment is much stronger in the United States than in Europe, due in part to
America’s legacy of slavery and institutionalized segregation (Vermeulen 2002). Consequently, despite
their shared culture, America offers Black Caribbeans far fewer opportunities to interact socially with
native whites than does Europe (Foner 1985, 2005).
In many ways, the trade-off hypothesis challenges existing theories about integration. The assimila-
tionist perspective, for instance, argues that integration brings ethnic minorities more advantages than
does segregation (Alba and Nee 2003). In a similar vein, segmented assimilation theory associates the
segregation of blacks in America, native or foreign born, with alienation, poverty, and crime (Portes and
Zhou 1993). Yet, advocates of the trade-off hypothesis perceive segregation as politically advantageous
because it facilitates mobilization. This example illustrates the multidimensional, nonlinear quality of the
integration process.

Research Implications
To conclude, cross-national comparisons are a useful tool for understanding the factors that promote
immigrant integration. Understandably, the hypotheses that motivate cross-national comparisons operate
at the level of nations. When the object of analysis is “immigrants in general,” this is the appropriate
approach. Frequently, however, the relationship between a specific immigrant group and its host society is

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“special.” This special relationship may affect one or several dimensions of integration. And the result
may help or harm the integration process.
The goal of this article is to show that hypotheses formulated at the level of nations overlook these
special relationships. Nor do the five theories outlined above provide the sole grounds for cross-national
variation. Depending on the nations under scrutiny, a myriad of factors may produce special relationships.
For example, applicants for refugee status in the United States must demonstrate “a well-founded fear of
persecution. . .” unless they are Cuban, in which case their presence on American soil justifies granting
them asylum. In this example, geopolitics trumps a level playing field. Exceptions like this mean that
when scholars engage in cross-national comparisons of specific groups, they must consider hypotheses
that operate both across host societies and within host societies. That integration is so complex is
unfortunate, but ignoring this complexity diminishes scholars’ ability to understand it.

Cross-References
▶ Employment-Based Immigration
▶ Guest Workers
▶ Points-Based Immigration

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R

Role of Contexts and Political Culture Institutional Accounts of Political

in Political Incorporation: A Case Incorporation
Study of Chilean Migration
to Toronto Immigrant political incorporation is an uneven,
institutionally embedded, and context-contingent
Patricia Landolt social process associated with political learning
Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, and political participation in the country of set-
Toronto, ON, Canada tlement (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). It
includes informal civic and grassroots organizing
and participation in formal, electoral politics and
Definition can intersect with transnational engagement in
homeland politics or politics in diaspora
Immigrant political incorporation is an uneven, (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). The relationship
institutionally embedded, and context-contingent between civic engagement, grassroots organiz-
social process associated with political learning ing, and formal politics and between these and
and political participation in the country of set- the incorporationist, transnational, and diasporic
tlement (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). Migra- orientations of political incorporation is complex
tion contexts and institutional opportunity and multidirectional and typically changes
structures affect the form and orientation of over time.
immigrant political incorporation in various, Migration contexts and institutional opportu-
sometimes contradictory, ways. This entry exam- nity structures affect the form and orientation of
ines the role of political culture and political immigrant political incorporation in various,
learning to help account for these seemingly con- sometimes contradictory, ways. Mainstream
tradictory relations between migration contexts, political parties may marginalize immigrants
institutional opportunity structures, and political even when the immigrants themselves maintain
incorporation. The focus of discussion will be a dynamic community-based organizations
case study of the political incorporation of (Siemiatycki and Isin 1997; Odmalm 2005;
Chileans in Toronto for the forty-year period Wong 2006). Civil society organizations such as
from 1973 to the 2000s. The case illustrates how labor unions, religious congregations, hometown
political culture and political learning mediate associations, refugee resettlement organizations,
the impact of context on political incorporation. and political parties may extend or restrict the
pathway to citizenship for immigrants, as well
as encourage passive or active forms of
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F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
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2 Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation

citizenship (Hardy-Fanta 1993; Rogers 2006). This case illustrates how political culture and
Government policies for immigrant selection, political learning mediate the impact of context
and for multiculturalism and citizenship, are on political incorporation. The entry draws on
sometimes associated with active transnational materials previously published in Landolt and
politics (Faist 2000; Koopmans and Statham Goldring (2009) and Landolt and Goldring
2003), while in other cases they are associated (2010). The form and orientation of Chilean
with incorporation (Bloemraad et al. 2008). immigrant politics have had three phases, each
Home-country state policies and non-state actors of which was marked by distinct migration con-
may promote transnational politics but do not texts and institutional opportunity structures. The
guarantee it (Itzigsohn 2000; Levitt and de la three phases were: first, the formation of grass-
Dehesa 2003). Participation in transnational roots transnational organizations focused first on
grassroots or electoral politics may preclude political change in Chile and later on bridging
immigrants’ interest in politics in the settlement Chileans to Canadian society; then, participation
society, but more often than not it serves as a in the creation of pan-ethnic, social service orga-
stepping-stone for engagement in nizations; and, finally, migrant participation in
incorporationist politics (Karpathakis 1999). electoral politics in Canada and Chile. In each
To help account for these seemingly contra- phase, Chilean migrant political culture and the
dictory relations between migration contexts, political learning that occurred over time
institutional opportunity structures, and political informed how Chileans interpreted each moment,
incorporation, the following discussion will focus developed political priorities and strategies of
on the role of political culture and political learn- action, and identified possible allies and partners.
ing (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Landolt and The presentation of the Chilean case is followed
Goldring 2010). Migration contexts and institu- by a discussion of the broader implications for the
tional opportunity structures set the stage for study of contextual effects on political
political incorporation, but political cultures incorporation.
interact with contexts to chart the process of
political incorporation. Political culture refers to
a group’s ways of doing politics and its Context of Exit and Reception
established basis for organizing (cf. Swidler
1986). A group’s political culture shapes the Chilean migration to Canada began in 1973 and
types of alliances, partnerships, and dialogues it was sparked by the overthrow of the Popular
is likely to sustain, to which types of actors and Unity coalition government of socialist president
institutions it is drawn and to which it is legible. Salvador Allende. Just under 10,000 Chileans
As well, migrant political cultures vary and came to Canada between 1973 and 1978, includ-
change further through the process of incorpora- ing 4,000 who settled in the City of Toronto. By
tion. Over time, encounters or interactions among the 1990s, there were an estimated 10,000
actors generate political learning or reflection and Chileans in Toronto and 30,000 in Canada (Diaz
evaluation of past experiences to adjust present 1999). The migration context for Chileans was
and future political action. The distinct character characterized by forced migration from Chile, a
of migrant political cultures and the group’s eval- chilly reception by the Canadian government,
uations and adjustments over time shape the form and a warm welcome by a well-organized and
and orientation of immigrant politics and explain resource-rich civil society.
why similar contexts and opportunity structures During the Allende years (1970–1973), for-
can easily lead to different incorporation eign relations between Chile and Canada were
outcomes. strained because of the Canadian government’s
The focus of discussion will be a case study of ideological hostility toward Marxism and its alli-
the political incorporation of Chileans in Toronto ance with the United States. After the coup, the
for the forty-year period from 1973 to the 2000s. federal government in Ottawa refused to respond
Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation 3

to the human rights crisis occurring in Chile and migration and generated a migrant population
referred to the country’s growing refugee popu- with a large proportion of educated working and
lation as “Marxist riff-raff.” middle-class families with strong roots in Chile’s
In contrast, civil society relations between left-wing political party system and a clearly
Canadians and Chileans were extremely produc- defined political culture.
tive both during and after the Allende years. Chilean migrant political culture echoed the
Canadian social justice groups organized student political landscape of the Allende years. Chileans
exchanges, interchurch dialogues, trade union considered political party affiliations important,
visits, and a host of other activities. They also respected the hierarchical decision-making pro-
formed local chapters of the Committee in Soli- cess of Marxist party structures, and had a strong
darity with Socialist Chile. When the coup culture of activism as a mode of civic engage-
occurred, social justice and faith-based refugee ment. In turn, forced migration from Chile con-
rights groups lobbied Ottawa to respond to the tributed to the socially expected duration of
human rights crisis. They launched a successful migration as temporary. Chileans refused to call
media campaign to shame the government and Canada “home” and planned for an imminent
make Canadians aware of the situation in Chile. return to Chile: they lived out of suitcases, bought
Lobbying was preempted and support for refu- used cars, and made no effort to learn English.
gees accelerated when Chileans stormed the The framing of migration as a temporary exile
Canadian embassy in Santiago and demanded cemented pre-coup Chilean ways of doing poli-
asylum. tics as a legitimate point of reference for doing
Pushed by social justice and refugee rights politics “while in Canada.” As such, migrant
groups in Canada along with the events in strategies of action rested on organizational
Chile, the federal government launched Opera- habits rooted in pre-coup Chilean politics and
tion Chile, which granted Chileans the right to drew on a diasporic network of exile contacts
emigrate to Canada under relaxed criteria. How- and resources.
ever, the Canadian government lacked both the
contacts and expertise to oversee the initiative
and was required to partner with refugee rights Transnational Politics of Exile
activists to manage the selection and resettlement and Settlement
process. Rejecting the federal government’s
“first-come, first-serve” approach, activists The first phase of Chilean political incorporation
imposed their own criteria on the selection pro- includes two aspects, both involving transna-
cess. They identified people who were most at tional organizations. One is focused narrowly on
risk, visited jails in Chile to select 100 political transnational opposition politics organized
prisoners for migration to Canada, and demanded through a diasporic network of political parties
that those at risk be able to migrate with their in exile and through partnerships with the Cana-
families. dian social justice activist community. The other
Migration contexts are dynamic moments of saw an expansion in the agenda of transnational
political action that set the stage for the process of organizations to include a concern with social
political incorporation. In this case, the coup in incorporation and the formation of partnerships
Chile and the targeted nature of political repres- with a broader range of institutions in Canadian
sion resulted in the forced and unplanned migra- society.
tion of a politically homogeneous population. Chileans’ first political act in Toronto was to
The political battle between the federal govern- constitute political parties in exile. Their princi-
ment and refugee rights activists had a direct pal goals were to fundraise for the underground
impact on the demographic character and politi- resistance in Chile, provide support for families
cal tenor of Chilean migration to Canada. It deter- of political prisoners, and raise local awareness
mined the size of the first wave of Chilean about human rights violations. Political parties in
4 Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation

exile had a dual structure that included a semi- a larger web of contacts in Canadian institutions.
clandestine group of militants with links to a High-impact political events resulted from this
party leadership in exile and a sociocultural arm collaboration. In 1977, TACH and the TCS
that organized public education and fundraising co-organized the Canadian Inquiry into Human
events. Over time, the number, size, and Rights in Chile. The event marked the first time
resources of Chilean political parties in exile that members of the Association of Families of
have waxed and waned, but it has never ceased the Detained and Disappeared were able to leave
to be a relevant feature of Chilean political Chile to denounce publicly the dictatorship’s
incorporation. human rights violations and impunity. In 1980,
Chilean party militants constituted an activist TACH and the TCS co-organized the Canadian
umbrella organization: the Toronto Chilean Conference for Justice in Chile at the University
Association-Popular Unity (TCA, 1974–1980), of Toronto’s Faculty of Law. These two confer-
later renamed the Toronto Chilean Society ences provided the basis for a legal challenge to
(TCS, 1981–1990). The TCS brought together the Chilean Constitution of 1980. The findings of
local representatives from each political party in the two events were sent to the United Nations
exile. The umbrella structure of the TCS allowed and, in 1990 (post-dictatorship), served as evi-
Chileans to overcome some of their ideological dence for Chile’s Truth and Reconciliation
differences and to present a common political Committee.
front vis-à-vis Canadian institutions. The TCS By the late 1970s, Chileans’ transnational
membership included Chileans and Canadians, political party organizations began to develop a
although the latter were excluded from central dual orientation and served as the base for com-
decision-making. Canadians grew frustrated munity projects of social incorporation. Chilean
with the verticalism of the TCS, the expectation cultural clubs sponsored soccer teams for
that Canadians learn and be tested on Chilean Toronto city leagues at the same time that they
history, and what they perceived as ideological raised funds for the underground resistance in
squabbling and paralysis generated by the fact Chile. Chileans participated in the city’s cooper-
that the TCS political agenda was set by distant ative housing movement and secured affordable
political parties in exile. housing for many Chilean families. The Arauco
Eventually, a small group of Canadians and Housing Complex cemented the socio-spatial
Chileans left the TCS and formed Toronto Action concentration and visibility of Chilean exile pol-
for Chile (TACH), an independent transnational itics in Toronto. The Toronto Chilean Society
solidarity organization. TACH had a diverse net- (TCS) created the President Salvador Allende
work of Canadian supporters including aca- School (EPSA, Spanish acronym) to teach the
demics, lawyers, and both union and church children of exiles Chilean history and Spanish in
leaders, as well as provincial and federal mem- preparation for an eventual return. The EPSA
bers of parliament. TACH also developed an partnered with teachers and elected school
independent network of political contacts in trustees to access the resources of the Toronto
Chile and coordinated activities with Canadian District School Board (TDSB). The EPSA and
transnational activist organizations such as the its Canadian allies eventually played an impor-
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in tant role in the establishment of the heritage lan-
Latin American (ICCHRLA) and local OXFAM guage program of the TDSB.
chapters. In this first phase of political incorporation,
The establishment of TACH shifted the terms Chilean exile political culture shaped the form
of political dialogue between Chilean and Cana- and orientation of migrant organizations and the
dian activists because it enabled the TCS and range and character of migrant contact with
TACH to work as political equals. Collaboration nonmigrant institutions and individuals.
between the TCS and TACH bridged and Chileans’ shared narrative of leftist solidarity
extended the reach of Chilean activist actions to and exile from dictatorship resonated with the
Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation 5

ideals and concerns of the Canadian social justice and social service programming (Lanphier and
community. Chileans’ modes of organizing were Lukomskyj 1994).
intelligible to Canadian social justice activists Multiculturalism prompted a diversification of
and, with minor adjustments, convertible to the Chileans’ political repertoire as community
Canadian institutional context. The TCS-TACH activists participated in the formation of the Cen-
partnership generated a resource-rich social net- tre for Spanish-Speaking Peoples (CSSP). The
work for political incorporation and political CSSP was created originally by a group of Span-
learning for both Chileans and Canadians. In ish women with financing from the Communist
turn, transnational political organizations served Party of Spain to offer solidarity to arriving Latin
as the platform for Chileans’ shifting political Americans. The CSSP provided refugee families
priorities, which began to include a concern with childcare, social support, and settlement
with sports, housing, and schooling. This information. Given political affinities between
expanded orientation of political incorporation Spanish and Chilean exiles, Chileans went
required the development of new partnerships quickly from being recipients of assistance to
and a new political vocabulary. Thus, the shifting frontline workers and leaders in the agency. The
form and orientation of Chilean political engage- Centre was transformed into a well-funded,
ment generated new experiences of political pan-ethnic organization with diverse partnerships
learning and modifications in Chilean exile polit- and programs, including a legal clinic, English
ical culture. language classes, and a women’s program. Under
Chilean leadership, the CSSP gained a reputation
as an innovative and progressive community set-
tlement and social service agency.
Canadian Multiculturalism and the Rise
The Latin American Women’s Collective
of Pan-ethnic Politics
(LAWC, 1983–1991) is a second example of the
shift from ethno-national to pan-ethnic politics.
The second phase of Chilean political incorpora-
After years of working within male-dominated
tion in Canada was shaped by the new multicul-
organizations, Chilean women became aware of
turalism policy of 1971. This policy redefined the
the contradictions between the progressive rhe-
relationship between the Canadian state and both
toric of political parties in exile and their lived
recently arrived immigrants and Canadian-born,
experiences of patriarchal decision-making, sex-
multigenerational, ethnolinguistically distinct
ism, silencing, and violence. When women
groups (Fleras and Elliott 1992). The policy
militants made instances of domestic violence
emphasized cultural and linguistic differences,
known to the political leadership, it dismissed
at the same time that it elided other dimensions
such violence as an inevitable effect of men’s
of diversity such as race, class, and gender
traumas of exile. Women’s experiences of
(Bannerji, 2000). Over time, the implementation
domestic and political violence were thus mini-
of the official policy encouraged pan-ethnic
mized and left unaddressed (Landolt and
forms of organizing clustered around shared lan-
Goldring 2009).
guage (e.g., Hispanics) or shared geography (e.g.,
The LAWC was the first explicitly feminist
South Asians, Asians). Political recognition
Latin American organization in Toronto. Its
vis-à-vis the state and the societal mainstream
membership included exile political party
required an ethnic vocabulary of political
militants, first- and second-generation women,
engagement (Landolt and Goldring 2009). In
and both grassroots activists and frontline
this context, the structure of state funding shifted
workers employed in social service agencies.
considerably. Of particular relevance to new-
The LAWC recognized the intersectional speci-
comers, the federal and provincial government
ficity of Latin American women’s political prior-
encourage the use of a pan-ethnic framework for
ities and ways of doing politics (San Martin
the design and delivery of immigrant settlement
1998). It advocated for the rights of Latin
6 Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation

American women and children with a focus on dictatorship redefined Chilean cross-border poli-
equal access to culturally competent social ser- tics. In Canada, Chileans faced a new landscape
vices. The LAWC encouraged members to take of restricted opportunities for civic engagement
the organization’s strategic priorities into other resulting from fiscal austerity and government
arenas in which they did political work. The cutbacks. Changes in the institutional landscape
LAWC also connected Latin American feminist prompted a redefinition and diversification of
activists to other migrant and nonmigrant Chilean transnational politics, as well as an atten-
women’s groups in the city, across Canada, and uation of Chileans’ distinct style of
transnationally in the members’ countries of ori- incorporation-oriented activist politics. This was
gin and beyond. also a period in which Chileans entered electoral
In the 1980s, multiculturalism had a transfor- politics at the municipal level. Each dimension of
mative effect on Chilean political incorporation. this transition reflects the layering of new modes
Chileans participated in the creation of of political engagement onto Chileans’
pan-ethnic organizations that sat comfortably established trajectory of political incorporation.
within Toronto’s multicultural landscape. How- Regarding changes in Chile and the transition
ever, the organizational structure and political to democracy, transnational politics took three
mandate of these groups also embodied the dis- overlapping forms. There was a continuation of
tinct political culture and dual orientation of Chil- transnational oppositional politics (Bolzman
ean migrants. Both the CSSP and LAWC had an 2011). Chilean and Canadian social justice activ-
incorporationist agenda with a commitment to ists provided evidence to Chile’s National Com-
social justice and grassroots strategies of activ- mission for Truth and Reconciliation. They also
ism. Further, while the focus of their work continued to fundraise and advocate for Chilean
remained local, their symbolic orientation and organizations that were largely excluded from the
social networks reflected members’ transnational democratic transition. Chilean exiles also advo-
orientation to doing politics. cated for the rights of migrants themselves. They
The formation of Chilean-led pan-ethnic orga- sought redress and compensation for forced dena-
nizations reflected a diversification of political tionalization and lobbied for changes to the Chil-
agendas and new forms of political learning. ean Constitution to allow for dual citizenship,
Chileans’ commitment to the CSSP implied mov- relaxed criteria for naturalization for children of
ing away from Chilean-only spaces of political Chileans born abroad, and the right to vote from
engagement to increased dialogue with other abroad (Pereyra 2003). Finally, they participated
immigrant groups and the state. The formation in new arenas of transnational solidarity in Chile
of the LAWC, a product of intra-community con- including the Mapuche land struggle in the south
flict (cf. Trinh Võ 2001), generated a political and the environmental movement against the
dialogue and partnerships with other migrant Barrick Gold mining project in Pascua Lama.
and nonmigrant women’s organizations. Both In Canada, government cutbacks in social ser-
experiences further extended and transformed vice funding, restrictions on advocacy work by
Chilean political culture. state-funded agencies, and increased require-
ments for reporting and accounting for the use
of state funds curtailed activism in the immigrant
Changing Contexts, Declining Activist settlement sector (Richmond and Shields 2005).
Politics, and Entrance into Electoral The arrival of new waves of Latin Americans
Politics with an aversion to formal political party and
activist politics weakened the contestatory spirit
Beginning in the 1990s, the political and social of pan-ethnic organizations. In this context, the
context changed considerably in Chile and Can- Latin American Women’s Collective disbanded,
ada resulting in a third phase of political incor- and the Centre for Spanish-Speaking People was
poration of Chileans. In Chile the end of the required to mainstream services to ensure
Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation 7

continued funding; community members became political culture mediated Chileans’ interpreta-
clients of services and horizontal consultation tion of the migration context and institutional
weakened. landscape when they first arrived and the form
Chileans in Toronto also made inroads into and orientation of the organizations they created.
electoral politics. Using the tight-knit exile In tandem with the political learning that
community’s resources and the President Salva- occurred over time, Chilean political culture
dor Allende School (EPSA) partnership with informed how Chileans adjusted to changes in
equity-minded school board officials as a spring- the context and institutional opportunity struc-
board, one Chilean woman, a leading figure in the ture, the possibilities it afforded, or political ges-
EPSA, was elected as a public school board tures it required. Political culture also framed
trustee in 1990. The first Latin American to be how other social actors interpreted Chilean poli-
elected to this post, she held the position for three tics and Chilean organizations and thus impacted
terms until 1997. A second case is that of a the types of alliances and partnerships that
second-generation daughter of Chilean exiles Chileans were able to create.
who ran for city council in 2006 and 2014. Raised Chileans first came to Canada as political
in the midst of Chilean transnational politics, the exiles hoping for a quick return home. This polit-
candidate proudly attributes her passion for pol- ical agenda led them to focus on transnational
itics and commitment to social democracy to her politics of change in their country of origin. It
family’s exile experience (Nice 2011). She has also encouraged them to connect with particular
drawn heavily on the material and symbolic sup- kinds of Canadian and migrant organizations,
port of a rich network of first- and second- namely, social justice and international solidarity
generation Chileans to run her campaign. groups. Chilean transnational political organiza-
More than 40 years after the coup in Chile, the tions and Canadian social justice groups had
dual orientation of the Chilean migrant political mutually intelligible political cultures, allowing
agenda in Toronto continues to generate a pro- for very productive alliances and partnerships
ductive tension. The political priorities and ways that often lasted for decades, even as political
of doing politics captured in the present period priorities and strategies changed. Over time and
are layered onto decades of political action. Also in response to multiculturalism policies, Chileans
part of the mix are many of the networks and restructured their organizations and become
resources created through 40 years of political increasingly pan-ethnic, less overtly political
engagement. Further, the present pattern of polit- and transnational in focus. Pan-ethnic organizing
ical incorporation continues to embody features took different forms including: the development
of Chilean exile political culture – namely, a left- of a mainstream immigrant social service organi-
wing orientation and the ability to move comfort- zation, the Centre for Spanish-Speaking People,
ably between grassroots ways of organizing and and the formation of social justice-oriented,
political party structures. grassroots organizations such as the Latin Amer-
ican Women’s Collective. Pan-ethnic organizing
required forging new partnerships and again the
The Lessons of a Longitudinal Case affinities of political culture were relevant. After
Study for Understanding Contexts 1990, the end of the dictatorship in Chile
prompted significant changes in Chilean migrant
This brief case study illustrates that the impact of political priorities. While never completely aban-
contexts of exit and reception may be understood doned, transnational politics become a secondary
by reference to political cultures and processes of focus and participation in Canadian electoral pol-
political learning. Chilean migrant political cul- itics gained ground. Chilean participation in elec-
ture first emerged as a mix of pre-coup organiza- toral politics in Canada drew on the networks,
tional capacity and party militancy and an exile resources, and ways of doing politics developed
narrative of forced migration. This deeply rooted decades earlier under a different context and with
8 Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation

a very different set of priorities. This connection and institutions in the country of settlement. Over
over time highlights the organizationally layered time changes in migrant political culture alter the
and path-dependent nature of the process of polit- character of dialogues and convertibility in rela-
ical incorporation. tion to places of origin and in diaspora.
The focus on migrant political culture through Political learning involves reflection and eval-
an in-depth study of the forms and orientation of uation of past experiences to adjust present- and
immigrant politics over time captures the rela- future-oriented political actions. It occurs
tional, dynamic, and contingent nature of the through encounters among individuals and orga-
process of political incorporation. While nizations, each of which operates within a partic-
Chileans in Toronto have been my specific ular political culture. Encounters may occur
focus, the framework thus applies readily to between migrants and nonmigrants, within dif-
other cases of political incorporation. ferent institutional arenas and across multiple
Longitudinal studies capture change over time geographies. Contexts and institutional opportu-
and confirm the cumulative, path-dependent, and nity structures shape political encounters. Politi-
multidirectional character of political incorpora- cal learning, however, transforms the political
tion. A diachronic approach illustrates how the culture of migrant and nonmigrant actors at the
forms and orientations of politics shift over time, same time as it generates changes in the form and
making it possible to map interactions between orientation of migrant political incorporation.
grassroots and electoral forms of political Political learning also transforms the political
engagement and between local, transnational, vocabulary of migrant groups and thus their polit-
and diasporic orientations. Changes in contexts ical legibility vis-à-vis other political actors in the
and institutional opportunity structures across country of origin and the place of settlement.
multiple locations impact political forms and ori- Understanding political incorporation thus
entations, priorities, and initiatives and may even may be enhanced with a move toward an
produce a retreat from political engagement. The expanded temporal frame for research and iden-
layering of organizational experiences is revealed tification of a broader range of relevant actors.
as a key mechanism of cumulative causation. Mapping organizational interactions for a single
Contextual changes do not erase past organiza- case and over an extended period offers important
tional forms and political experiences; rather, conceptual lessons for studies of immigrant polit-
new forms and orientations are layered onto the ical incorporation.
existing landscape of political engagement.
Capturing this layering of experiences in
changing contexts is aided by the focus on polit-
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M

Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare pressing for recognition and accommodation of
State their differences. But are these tensions real?
More importantly, are they universal? Or do the
Keith G. Banting cases of tension that we do observe reflect partic-
School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, ular contexts and circumstances?
Kingston, ON, Canada This essay examines the evolution of research
and scholarly debate on these questions. It begins
by setting the debate in the larger context of
Definition research on the welfare state and then summa-
rizes the trends in recent literature. A concluding
One of the most compelling challenges facing section then draws together the general patterns
western democracies is how to maintain and and suggests some implications for future
strengthen the bonds of community in ethnically research.
diverse societies. How can we reconcile growing
levels of migration and multicultural diversity
with the sense of a common identity and mutual Origins of the Debate
support which underpins generous welfare
states? In recent decades, a growing number of Students of social policy have long argued that
analysts argue that migration and growing ethnic the welfare state was built on and can only be
diversity erode trust and a sense of community sustained by a strong sense of community and
among citizens and that contemporary democra- associated feelings of trust, reciprocity, and
cies face a trade-off between the accommodation mutual obligation. An early expositor of this
of ethnic diversity on the one hand and support view was T.H. Marshall, who argued that the
for redistribution on the other. This concern has expansion of social rights reflected the emer-
been labeled the “progressive’s dilemma” gence of a national consciousness in Britain.
(Goodhart 2004), which holds that reformist “Citizenship,” he argued in an oft-quoted pas-
forces face a tough choice between pursuing sage, “requires a bond of a different kind, a direct
greater redistribution or supporting a more sense of community membership based on
diverse, multicultural society. loyalty to a civilisation that is a common posses-
If these trade-offs are real, the welfare state is sion” (Marshall 1950/1992, p. 8). In recent years,
in considerable trouble. Migration is a reality in however, analysts have increasingly argued that
virtually all western democracies; and there is no ethnic/racial diversity will erode the sense of a
reason to assume that ethnic minorities will stop common community. They fear that the public
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_114-1
2 Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State

may withdraw support from social programs range of findings and uncovered a terrain of
that redistribute resources to people they regard considerable complexity. Nevertheless, some
as “strangers,” or “outsiders” who are not part general patterns are beginning to emerge. We
of “us.” explore them here in several categories: public
Traditionally, researchers interested in the attitudes, political processes, the design of public
welfare state paid relatively little attention to policy, and social policy outcomes.
such factors (Swank 2002; Huber and Stevens
2001; Esping-Andersen 1990). However, the
issues surfaced in other fields. For example,
Public Attitudes
development economists increasingly pointed to
ethnic and tribal diversity in attempting to
Does migration and ethnic diversity weaken sup-
explain the poor economic performance and
port for redistribution among the general public?
limited provision of public goods such as educa-
In the US, Robert Putnam famously concluded
tion in a number of developing countries,
that trust and community engagement, which he
especially in Africa (Easterly 2001).
argues is critical for collective action, is weak-
More importantly for current purposes,
ened by ethnic diversity; individuals living in
analysts began to extrapolate from US experi-
more homogeneous parts of the country are in
ence. The crippling effects of race run through
effect “hunkering down” in social isolation
the history of social policy in that country, from
(Putnam 2007). Putnam did not extend his anal-
Civil War pensions to the Social Security Act in
ysis directly to support for welfare spending. But
1935 to the Great Society programs in the 1960s
Luttmer concludes that support for welfare
to welfare reform in the 1990s (Schram
spending is lower in diverse neighborhoods
et al. 2003). Traditionally, the politics of race
(Luttmer 2001); Gilens has demonstrated how
was seen as contributing to American exception-
the interaction between racial attitudes and
alism (Lipset and Marks 2000). Increasingly,
media-driven images of poor blacks as lazy
however, the racialized dimension of US welfare
explains “why Americans hate welfare” (Gilens
politics is seen as evidence of a normal, even
1999); and Fox (2004) has found that a greater
inevitable, reaction to ethnic/racial heterogeneity
proportion of Latinos in a state is correlated with
and a warning to other countries being
lower public support for welfare spending.
transformed by migration. Gary Freeman
Comparative research, however, suggests that
described migration as a “disaster” for the wel-
US story is not universal. Cross-national findings
fare state and predicted that it would lead to “the
have been mixed at best, with contradictory
Americanization of European welfare politics”
results reflecting different outcome measures,
(Freeman 1986: 62). Alesina and Glaeser worried
different migrant populations, different control
that “As Europe has become more diverse,
variables, and different time periods. Nonethe-
Europeans have increasingly been susceptible to
less, cross-national studies tend to find either no
exactly the same form of racist, anti-welfare dem-
relationship or, at most, a weak negative relation-
agoguery that worked so well in the United
ship between migration and public support for the
States. We shall see whether the generous welfare
welfare state. Certainly, negative effects seem
state can really survive in a heterogeneous soci-
smaller than one might expect from simply
ety” (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, pp. 180–181).
extrapolating from US experience and tend to
Since the early 2000s, research on these issues
fade when a number of moderating factors are
has exploded. Scholars in more and more coun-
included in the analysis. Other factors are clearly
tries are asking whether such warnings might be
more important in predicting welfare attitudes
right. They also ask what governments can do to
(See, e.g., Brady and Finnigan 2014; Senik
mitigate any tensions between migration and
et al. 2009; Finseraas 2008; Mau and Burkhardt
social solidarity. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the
2009; Crepaz 2008).
rapidly growing literature has generated a diverse
Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State 3

Case studies of other individual countries are have emerged. Some studies have found support
similarly varied. In Canada, one the most diverse for a “compensation hypothesis,” which holds
countries among western democracies, Soroka that anxiety about migration actually increases
et al. (2006) find that although interpersonal support for the welfare state. High levels of
trust tends to be lower in racially diverse neigh- migration generate economic insecurity in the
borhoods, echoing Putnam, trust in government majority population, especially among
institutions and support for the welfare state are low-skilled workers, increasing their support for
not strongly related to racial diversity. A more social programs (Finseraas 2008; Brady and
recent study qualifies this rosy image of multicul- Finnigan 2014). In effect, antimigrant attitudes
tural Canada: perceptions of heavy migrant use of and proredistribution views can and often do go
social assistance are not associated with a general together.
rejection of redistribution, but perceptions Importantly, however, the compensation
of welfare dependence among aboriginal people effect does not guarantee an inclusionary
are (Banting et al. 2013). In Germany, approach to social solidarity. In many countries,
Stichnoth(2012) found greater opposition when there is considerable support among the majority
he asked whether the native population supported population for maintaining the welfare state but
state help for the unemployed in regions where denying its benefits to newcomers. Migrants are
the proportion of foreigners among the unem- consistently seen as the least “deserving” group
ployed is high. However, after adjusting for indi- of beneficiaries (van Oorshot 2006), and there is
vidual differences such as income and East substantial support for what is, in effect, a
German origins, the negative association two-tier welfare state, generous for natives but
between migration and public support was restricted for migrants. This exclusionary
relatively weak. approach, often called “welfare chauvinism,”
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the effects of ethnic can take several forms: lower levels of support
diversity are especially sensitive in Scandinavia. for social programs thought to disproportionately
The Nordic model of the welfare state was benefit migrants and support for lengthy resi-
constructed in the context of striking homogene- dency requirements which delay access to gen-
ity, but migration is transforming these countries, eral programs for newcomers (Sainsbury 2012;
most notably Sweden, where the proportion of Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012; Koning 2013).
the population born outside of the country has It is worth underscoring that the compensation
grown the fastest. Once again, the evidence is effect and welfare chauvinism are entirely com-
mixed. Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008) study the patible with each other. Interestingly, Brady and
ways in which the distribution of refugees across Finnigan (2014) find support for both in their
Danish municipalities affect voting patterns, and cross-national analysis. Moreover, as we shall
find no clear indication of a decline in support for see next, this combination of support for the
the welfare state. In contrast, two studies in welfare state but exclusion of newcomers from
Sweden are less reassuring. Eger (2010) finds a its benefits resonates in the political processes of
negative association between the proportion of many countries.
migrants in different regions and support for
social spending, although the relationship is
much weaker for universal social programs such Political Processes
as health care; and Dahlberg et al. (2012) report a
negative impact of migration from nonwestern Scholars have asked whether diversity has weak-
countries on public support for social benefits. ened social movements and political parties
In retrospect, the idea that the public would which were traditionally the primary champions
abandon social programs they value simply of the welfare state, indirectly undermining it
because of migration seems a bit implausible. over time. Once again, the classic case comes
Not surprisingly, several alternative hypotheses from the US. In the 1960s, racial politics swirled
4 Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State

around Aid to Families with Dependent Children The Mediating Role of Policy Regimes
(AFDC) and the Great Society programs. As wel-
fare rolls expanded, the profile of the poor Some researchers have asked whether there is
became racially charged: black families anything states can do to mitigate the progres-
represented close to half of the AFDC caseload, sive’s dilemma. In particular, they have investi-
and Hispanic groups were also increasingly over- gated whether the structure of the welfare state
represented. Resentment against these programs itself or the nature of multiculturalism policies
helped fracture the New Deal coalition and the matter to the compatibility of migration and
electoral base of the Democratic Party. White solidarity.
union members, white ethnics, and southerners Since Marshall (1950), the welfare state has
deserted their traditional political home, been seen as an instrument of social integration,
especially in presidential elections, in part which can strengthen the sense of cohesion and
because of its image on race and welfare issues. solidarity in divided societies. Contemporary
The effect was so powerful that the Democratic analysts, however, insist that such integrative
Party sought to insulate itself in the 1990s by potential depends heavily on the actual design
embracing hard-edged welfare reforms, which of the welfare state. Some argue that heavy reli-
President Clinton signed in 1995. Clinton’s ance on means-tested benefits lock societies into
strategy may have helped his re-election in an unending conversation about the legitimacy of
1996, but it failed to alter Americans’ particular groups of recipients, such as migrants,
racialization of and opposition to welfare (Dyck while universal programs dampen discussion of
et al. 2008). which recipients are deserving and which are not.
Migration has also had a dramatic impact on Others caution that easy access to the welfare
the party systems in Europe. A potent public state for newcomers reduces their incentive to
backlash against migration has contributed to integrate socially and economically and courts
electoral volatility, voter realignment, and the majority backlash as newcomers become associ-
rise of radical right parties. This backlash has ated with welfare dependence (Koopmans 2010).
placed immense pressure on mainstream parties, To date, the empirical evidence suggests that the
especially social democratic parties which tradi- public in countries with highly selective welfare
tionally have supported both the welfare state and states is more inclined to welfare chauvinism and
cultural diversity. The voters most attracted to that egalitarian policies and institutions can help
radical anti-immigrant parties have been white, in fighting such sentiments (van der Waal
low-skilled male voters who traditionally et al. 2013; Larsen 2006).
represented an important part of the base of left Others argue that support for redistribution
parties, which might suggest that US commenta- depends more on trust in government than inter-
tors about Europe’s future were right. However, personal trust and that such trust is sustained by
as anti-immigrant parties became more depen- the quality of government, especially fairness and
dent on working-class votes, they have moved effectiveness in the administration of government
left, increasingly defending the welfare state for programs (Rothstein 2011). Indeed, Rothstein
the majority population and pledging to protect it (forthcoming) argues that a high quality of gov-
from the “burden” of supporting migrants ernment institutions generates high levels of
(Bay et al. 2013; Oesch 2008; Lefkofridi and social trust even in societies with high levels of
Michel forthcoming). Welfare chauvinism is ethnic diversity, dampening down welfare
now the dominant position among these parties. chauvinism.
Similar debates arise over the state’s own
approach to diversity policy, especially the role
of multiculturalism policies. Some countries
have responded to growing ethnic diversity with
the adoption of multiculturalism policies that
Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State 5

recognize distinctive rights or entitlements for Policy Outcomes

ethnic and religious groups. (Despite political
rhetoric about a “retreat” from multiculturalism Finally, research has analyzed the impact of
policies, there is strong evidence of their persis- migration, not on public attitudes or the political
tence, including in Europe (Banting and process but on actual social spending. Once
Kymlicka 2013; Koopmans et al. 2012).) How- again, there are two possibilities. The first is that
ever, multiculturalism policies have been contro- migration increases social spending, especially
versial, and some countries have steadfastly in generous welfare states, because low-income
resisted that approach. Not surprisingly, much migrants are drawn to countries with expansive
of the debate has centered on their implications social programs and rely on benefits when they
for social solidarity. Critics insist that multicul- arrive (Borjas 1999). The second possibility is
turalism policies exacerbate the tension between that migration decreases social spending,
diversity and redistribution, by encouraging iden- because of the political mechanisms discussed
tity politics which crowds out redistributive earlier: migration tends to reduce support for
issues from the policy agenda, corrodes trust social spending generally and/or increase support
among vulnerable groups who would otherwise for excluding migrants from benefits.
coalesce in a proredistribution lobby, or misdiag- As discussed earlier, there is substantial
noses the real problems facing minorities, leading evidence from the US that racial diversity
them to believe that their problems reflect their weakens redistribution. Alesina and his col-
culture rather than economic barriers they con- leagues demonstrate that public spending tends
front (Barry 2001). Defenders of multicultural- to be lower in cities and states with higher levels
ism policies reply that such policies do not create of racial heterogeneity (Alesina et al. 1999;
distrust among groups but that such policies can Alesina and Glaeser 2004). However, a growing
ease intercommunal tensions over time and body of cross-national research suggests that neg-
strengthen the sense of mutual respect, trust, and ative effects on social spending are limited or are
support for redistribution. offset by other factors. Lipsmeyer and Zhu’s
Given the intensity of the debates, there has analysis of EU countries (Lipsmeyer and Zhu
been surprisingly little empirical research on the 2011) suggests that increased migration may
impact of multiculturalism policies on support for increase social spending if left parties are strong
redistribution. (Schaeffer 2014 notes the virtual or union density is high (also Taylor-Gooby
absence of such studies. For analyses of the 2005). Other studies suggest that the design of
impact of multiculturalism policies on other the welfare state is important, not only to public
aspects of integration, see Bloemraad and Wright attitudes as discussed earlier but also to the
2014; Koopmans 2013.) Nevertheless, the studies impact of migration on spending levels (Mau
that are available provide little evidence that and Burkhardt 2009). In short, the relationship
multiculturalism policies weaken public support between migration and welfare spending is com-
for the welfare state. Countries that have adopted plex and mediated by a variety of factors.
such programs did not experience an erosion of One distinction that deserves more attention is
their welfare states or even slower growth in that between levels of migration and change in
social spending than countries that have resisted migration. Consistent with much existing cross-
such programs (Banting et al. 2006). This finding national work, Soroka et al. (forthcoming) find no
has been replicated with updated data (available relationship between the proportion of the popu-
on request) and has been confirmed by Brady and lation born outside the country and the level of
Finnigan 2014. social spending. However, they find a negative
relationship between the rate of increase in
migration and the rate of increase in social spend-
ing over time. Countries with large increases in
the proportion of their population born outside
6 Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State

the country tend to have smaller increases in (Van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). In the words of
social spending. This suggests that public reac- two leading scholars “the debate about the con-
tions take time to develop. The public needs to sequences of ethnic diversity on social cohesion
notice the change and react, and their reactions has reached a stalemate” (Stolle and Allison
need to work through political processes. In addi- 2015, p. 117).
tion, Soroka et al. find it useful to disaggregate Yet the progressive’s dilemma has not been
social spending into subdomains, such as pen- laid to rest. Serious tension between migration,
sions, employment benefits, and so on. In most ethnic diversity, and the welfare state is clearly
domains, there is only weak evidence of a rela- possible. The key challenge in future research is
tionship between changes in migration and to identify more systematically the conditions
changes in spending, but negative effects do which mitigate or exacerbate such tensions. To
emerge in the case of unemployment benefits advance the debate, we need more differentiated
and labor market programs. understandings of both of our core concepts,
migration and the welfare state. Which types of
migrants are seen as “other”? Much of the litera-
Conclusions ture assumes simply being foreign born is what
matters. But other studies focus on low-skilled
What can we conclude from the diverse and migrants, illegal migrants, racialized minorities,
sometimes contradictory findings that populate or religious minorities. A systematic comparison
this terrain? Most obviously, one needs to be of the implications of different categories of
cautious about sweeping statements about a migrants in different contexts would help. Simi-
toxic relationship between migration and social larly, we need more a systematic analysis of the
solidarity. The evidence is mixed at best. In many dimensions of the welfare state at stake. Is it total
studies, there is no impact of migration on public social spending, the generosity of benefits, inclu-
attitudes about social programs or levels of public sive access to benefits, or the redistributive
spending. In other studies, there is evidence of a impact of the state?
relationship, but the association is often weak and Relatedly, we need a finer-grained under-
the direction varies. In general, estimates of the standing of the politics of migration. How does
impact of migration, positive or negative, tend to the public decide who is "us" and who is a
be small, and other factors emerge as more "stranger”? We need a fuller understanding of
important in explaining the views of the public “othering” and of how to overcome it. In partic-
or the spending decisions of governments. (For a ular, more attention needs to be paid to the role of
similar conclusion, see Stichnoth and Van der the media and political parties in framing migra-
Straeten 2013.) (Similarly, in a related debate tion and newcomers. Much of the “flash” poten-
not discussed here, estimates of the net impact tial of migration as a political issue undoubtedly
of migration on the fiscal position of government flows from such processes. Future research
tend to be small (Rowthorn 2008). should also pay more attention to the political
Interestingly, this pattern of mixed findings is agency of migrants themselves and their attitude
consistent with research on the implications of to redistribution. As the size of the migrant elec-
ethnic diversity for social capital or social cohe- torate grows, their views and political behavior
sion more generally. A survey of 464 findings will increasingly shape the future (Koopmans
found that “there are nearly as many studies et al. 2012). There are likely to be tipping points
rejecting the negative effects of diversity as argu- in this process. When the size of the migrant
ing for them” (Schaeffer 2014, p. 4 and electorate reaches a critical mass, political parties
Table 2.1). A meta-analysis of 90 articles testing will find it harder to win power by attacking
Putnam’s conclusions found that 26 articles tend migrants. Countries such as Canada are already
to support his findings, 25 articles reject them, at that stage. The Republican Party in the US is
and 39 studies provide mixed or neutral evidence
Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State 7

struggling with the electoral calculus. This too multiculturalism policies erode the welfare state?
will be part of Europe’s future. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Banting K, Soroka S, Koning E, Edward K (2013) Multi-
Context clearly matters in all of this. Part of cultural diversity and redistribution: immigrants,
that context is the structure of the welfare state aboriginal peoples and public support for social pro-
itself. The evolution of the welfare state reflects grams. In: Banting K, Myles J (eds) Inequality and the
considerable path dependence, and welfare states fading of redistributive politics. University of British
Columbia Press, Vancouver, pp 165–186
at different stages of development respond differ- Barry B (2001) Culture and equality: an egalitarian cri-
ently to common social pressures. We therefore tique of multiculturalism. Harvard University Press,
need to be cautious about simple extrapolations Cambridge
from the US to other contexts. There is consider- Bay A-H, Finseraas H, West A, Axel W (2013) Welfare
dualism in two Scandinavian welfare states: public
able difference between the American experience opinion and party politics. West Eur Polit
of racial diversity constraining the development 36(1):199–220
of a welfare state from its very beginning and Bloemraad I, Wright M (2014) “Utter failure” or unity out
European countries coming to terms with new of diversity? debating and evaluating policies of mul-
ticulturalism. Int Migr Rev 48(S1):S292–S334
forms of diversity in the context of mature wel- Borjas G (1999) Heaven’s door: immigration policy and
fare states which are well embedded in national the american economy. Princeton University Press,
cultures and voters’ expectations (Crepaz 2008). Princeton
In the European context, the compensation Brady D, Finnigan R (2014) Does immigration undermine
public support for social policy. Am Soc Rev
hypothesis and welfare chauvinism clearly 79(1):17–42
deserve primary attention. Crepaz M (2008) Trust beyond borders. University of
Finally, we should ask why migration has Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
emerged so dramatically in debates about the Dahlberg M, Edmark K, Lundqvist H (2012) Ethnic diver-
sity and preferences for redistribution. J Polit Econ
future of the welfare state. Clearly, the redistrib- 120(1):41–76
utive state is subject to a wide range of pressures, Dyck JJ, Hussey LS (2008) The end of welfare as we know
rooted in globalization, economic restructuring, it? Durable attitudes in a changing information envi-
dualization, neoliberalism, and on and on. If the ronment. Public Opin Q 72:589–618
Easterly W (2001) The elusive quest for economic devel-
effects of migration appear small at best, why opment. MIT Press, Cambridge
does the issue command so much attention? Is Eger MA (2010) Even in Sweden: the effect of immigra-
migration really a proxy for wider fears about the tion on support for welfare state spending. Eur Soc Rev
future? Does migration policy rise to the surface 26:203–217
Esping-Andersen G (1990) The three worlds of welfare
because it appears to be one final domain in capitalism. Princeton University Press, Princeton
which the nation state, so constrained elsewhere, Finseraas H (2008) Immigration and preferences for redis-
can actually have an impact? tribution: an empirical analysis of European social
survey data. Comp Eur Polit 6:407–431
Fox C (2004) The changing colour of welfare? How
Whites’ attitudes towards Latinos influence support
for the welfare state. Am J Soc 110:580–625
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C

Citizenship in the Context Converging Trends of Access

of Immigration – Comparative to Citizenship
Perspectives
Across countries, immigrants’ access to citizen-
Thomas Faist1, Kerstin Schmidt1 and Christian ship has been eased; concomitantly, legal oppor-
Ulbricht2 tunities for participation in all walks of life
1
Department of Sociology, Bielefeld University, (Kivisto and Faist 2007) and tolerance of dual
Bielefeld, Germany citizenship (Faist 2007) have increased. The
2
Bielefeld Graduate School in History and 1980s and 1990s saw major debates over
Sociology (BGHS), Bielefeld University, ethnonational understandings of nationhood (ius
Bielefeld, Germany sanguinis: blood principle, parental lineage) and
legal-rational understandings of political mem-
bership (ius soli: territorial principle, birthright;
Definition ius domicilii: residence principle, permanent
abode) (Brubaker 1992; based on Meinecke
Citizenship defines membership in bounded 1908). But this debate is largely over: “we all
states, and migration across borders raises the are republican now” (Faist 2007). Access to citi-
question: who is a member? The recent evolu- zenship focuses on individual skills and the self-
tion in citizenship policies must be assessed in responsible individual who possesses or is eager
the context of divergent trends. The greater to learn competences necessary to integrate in a
value placed on human rights, skilled migration, political community, rather than on collective
and the emphasis on global markets in national reciprocity, solidarity, and trust. This change is
policies, have produced a shift toward more reflected in the increasing emphasis on human
liberalized citizenship access. But such inclu- capital when admitting migrants.
sionary processes have been accompanied Paradoxically, such inclusionary processes
by exclusionary tendencies based on specific have been accompanied by exclusionary tenden-
cultural criteria, so that illiberal attitudes toward cies in civil society, raising the questions of how
immigrants are increasingly accepted in public citizenship and communal relations interact, and
and policy discourses. how this interaction has evolved. Exclusionary
tendencies vary from religious issues in Europe
to linguistic issues in the USA (cf. Zolberg and
Woon 1999). While religious differences and
social distance matter in most countries, the
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_115-1
2 Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives

institutional channels for dealing with such het- capital, goods, services, and people in the eco-
erogeneities differ. For example, the corporatist nomic sphere. At the same time, the principles of
German system sets high hurdles for access of political communities demand some closure
Muslim organizations in public policy, whereas against the outside, thus enforcing a logic of
the British system does not require such elaborate inclusion/exclusion of newcomers (Freeman
institutional inclusion (Faist and Dörr 1997). The 1986; Carens 2013). Political communities need
extension of the rights of citizens from civil, boundaries to create a desired social order and
political, and social rights (Marshall 1964) to lessen the ubiquitous, yet diffuse, threat of vio-
include cultural rights of national minorities lence. Besides the fundamental Hobbesian idea
(Kymlicka 1995) also varies. Most major Euro- of social order, the production and redistribution
pean countries have turned away from “multicul- of collective goods for purposes of justice,
turalism,” but cultural rights continue to cause including welfare, also requires a bounded com-
conflicts in civil society. Other issues include munity. Only by the monopolization of power
the significance of “securitization” in migration through the nation-state (Tilly 1990) and by
control and in civic life more generally; the impli- curtailing the liberty of individuals falling out-
cations of the fiscal, financial, and economic cri- side the nation-state can the liberty of those
sis for inclusion; and the penetration of economic within be guaranteed (Bosniak 2008). In short,
criteria into the discourse of citizenship policy. citizenship is both internally inclusive and exter-
Increasing liberalization of access to citizen- nally exclusive.
ship for migrants in western democracies is part
of a shift from “ethnic” to “civic” nationalism,
whereby membership based on descent (ius Developments in Major Immigration
sanguinis) has been complemented by birth in Countries
the immigration country (ius soli). Moreover,
almost half of all world states now tolerate some In what follows, we discuss the nexus between
form of dual citizenship. Basically, a “rights rev- immigration and citizenship policies, taking a
olution” underway since the 1960s is being brief look at recent developments in several
expressed in citizenship legislation. major migrant receiving countries: Germany,
Yet this trend runs counter to a second one the UK, the Netherlands, France, the USA, Can-
which is twofold: (1) the prioritization of ada, and Australia (cf. Reitz 1998).
migrants who contribute actively to economic
productivity, especially the highly skilled, and Germany
(2) the illiberal culturalization of undesirable In 2000, Germany made a leap from being a
migrants as the other. Merit-based citizenship historically restrictive country with respect to
and cultural devaluation represent opposite ends immigration and citizenship access by introduc-
of a spectrum: at one end are migrants who are, to ing the ius soli principle alongside ius sanguinis,
paraphrase Aristide Zolberg, “wanted and wel- making it possible to acquire German citizenship
come” (Zolberg 1987); at the other are those by being born on German soil, provided one
“wanted but not welcome,” wanted for economic parent had a permanent residence permit.
reasons but not welcome for cultural ones. The Requirements for citizenship acquisition were
focus on the ends leaves out many other catego- lowered, and the general attitude toward natural-
ries in an imagined middle, for example, those ization, traditionally considered the most impor-
categorized legally as asylum seekers or those tant result of immigration, was revised. The
who immigrate in the context of family length of the residence period to qualify for nat-
reunification. uralization dropped from 15 to 8 years. In 2008 it
The so-called liberal paradox is one aspect of was further reduced to 7 years for applicants
the opposing trends. The principles of liberal completing integration courses containing a lan-
economies call for the opening of borders for guage test (higher language skills reduce
Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives 3

residence requirements to 6 years) and a natural- skilled can enter more easily if they fulfill
ization test to demonstrate knowledge of German specific criteria considered important for British
society. While restrictive, the civic integration society.
courses are well within “the ambit of liberalism” The selection criteria for becoming a UK cit-
(Joppke 2010, p. 68), as they relate to the izen by naturalization became more rigid in
individual level, implying they can be met by October 2013. Along with some vague character-
every individual. Yet with their language require- istics (“good character” and “sound of mind”),
ment, they are used as “an instrument for the applicants must be 18 years of age or older, will-
selection of (more highly) skilled migrants” ing to live in the UK, and pass a test proving
(Michalowski 2010, p. 191). Several exceptions knowledge of the English language and about
to the rule of rejecting dual citizenship were also life in the UK (UK Government, 2014).
established, although Germany still does not tol-
erate dual citizenship as a rule, except for other The Netherlands
EU member states with whom reciprocity rules In the 1960s and 1970s, the Dutch government
apply. considered immigration – mainly guest workers
and their families from Morocco and
UK Turkey – would be temporary. In 1980, a para-
In contrast to Germany, the UK is a long-term digm shift in policies on naturalization and inte-
immigration country and often defines itself as a gration of migrants led to the creation of the
multicultural nation, based on its colonial history “Minorities Policy” based on the recognition
and Commonwealth system. Yet since EU that immigration was often a lasting phenomenon
enlargement, particularly the inclusion of Eastern and “immigrant integration would be assisted by
European countries, skepticism about the free a secure residence status, equal rights, family
movement of people within the EU and immigra- reunification and full participation in education
tion has risen. Fears of an economic decline and the labour market” (OECD 2011, p. 336).
caused by immigrants occupying jobs needed by During this time, the Netherlands defined itself
British citizens and their perceived abuse of the as tolerant and multicultural.
welfare system have created a climate of exclu- Over the last 15 years, this very liberal Dutch
sion. The majority of British citizens oppose approach to immigration and citizenship
migration, believe too many migrants enter the (compared to other European countries) has
UK, and perceive migration as a problem, not an been replaced by a narrow and restrictive one
opportunity. Public opinion of immigrants with (Vasta 2006). Populist views saw the laissez-
skills required for the functioning of society, such faire attitude as endangering “native Dutch”
as doctors or nurses, is less hostile (Blinder values and many citizens as unwilling/unable to
2012). Government policies have contributed to integrate. The 2002 murder of the leader of anti-
the perception of migrants, especially asylum immigrant party Pim Fortuyn and the 2004 mur-
seekers, as a threat to be addressed by severe der of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, known for his
border protection and measures preventing islamophobic statements, increased anti-
migrants from overstaying or staying for pur- immigrant sentiment among the self-defined
poses other than stated in their visas (Mulvey “autochthonous” parts of the Dutch population
2010). The British Government recently defined (ibid.).
British citizenship as “a privilege and not a right,” These developments were mirrored at the pol-
demanding advanced language skills and knowl- icy level. The conservative government, elected
edge about British culture (UK Government in 2002, introduced an immigration (culture and
2013). In theory, “citizenship is more esteemed language) test to acquire a visa. Unlike the inte-
and valued if it is earned, not given” (Crick Com- gration courses offered since 1998, organized and
mission 2003, p. 3). At the same time, in the financed by the government, the new test is
points system established in 2010, the highly offered by private institutes and paid for by the
4 Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives

immigrants. Fines and residence status sanctions USA

are imposed on those who do not pass it in time In the USA, debate has focused on citizenship
(OECD 2011). status for undocumented migrants, mainly from
Policies promoting “naturalization as a right” Mexico. In 2013, the Obama administration pro-
for children of immigrants born in the Nether- posed the 11 million undocumented immigrants
lands and the right to obtain dual nationality, in the USA could earn citizenship by passing
established in 1984, resulted in a peak of national security and criminal background
applications for citizenship in 1996. In the checks, paying taxes and a penalty, and learning
context of a more critical policy and public English. At this point, this type of earned citizen-
debate on immigration, this right was revoked ship is the answer to include certain categories of
by the introduction of a naturalization test in Mexican immigrants, the highest proportion of
2003 framing Dutch citizenship as “something undocumented immigrants with the lowest natu-
to be proud of, not a consumption article” ralization levels.
(OECD 2011, p. 340). Current legislation is based on amendments of
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act; no
France new and comprehensive immigration law has
The French case is an example of the republican been created (Giovagnoli 2014). In 2010, the
principle, with nationality intricately connected Senate rejected the Development, Relief, and
to a confirmation of political values (Nicholls Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act to
2012). The double ius soli principle of citizenship provide temporary legal status and potentially
acquisition, applied from 1899 until 1993, US citizenship to children of undocumented
ensured the third generation (both parents born migrants wanting to pursue tertiary education.
in the country) was automatically naturalized, A number of immigration bills introduced by
while the second generation (at least one immi- Congress in 2013 and 2014 reflect the state’s
grant parent) was naturalized upon reaching intention to facilitate the permanent stay of
maturity. French republicanism is related to a highly qualified people, for example, foreign
version of laicism; for example, in 2004, graduates at US universities. At the same time,
headscarves were outlawed in schools. In 2008, fears about national security and a decline of
the highest court (Conseil d’E´tat) denied a burka- employment opportunities in the economic
wearing woman French citizenship because of downturn are leading to enhanced border protec-
“insufficient assimilation,” a case showing the tion measures and identity checks of prospective
fear of the destruction of the republican ideology immigrants. Furthermore, new legislation crimi-
(Lefebvre 2010). In 2003, under Interior Minister nalizes unauthorized stay, resulting in more depor-
Nicolas Sarkozy, a compulsory integration tations of undocumented migrants (IPC 2014).
course was introduced, emphasizing language US naturalization rates are lower than in most
training and knowledge about institutions and OECD countries, and citizens of high-income
values of the French republic. Completing it countries renounce their right of becoming a US
meant establishing a “relationship of trust and citizen despite qualifying, arguably because US
mutual obligation” between the individual and citizenship will not provide increased benefits
the state. The government has since passed the over their current citizenship. Yet US citizenship
law of immigration and integration, making civic can have beneficial economic outcomes, includ-
integration courses obligatory to obtain a 1-year, ing higher average salaries compared to nonciti-
renewable resident permit. After 2 years, zens; that said, those applying for citizenship
immigrants can apply for a 10-year permanent often possess a higher level of education
residence card. As Sarkozy put it, the law facili- (Sumption and Flamm 2012). For less privileged
tates a fundamental change in immigration poli- migrant groups, barriers to citizenship include a
cies from the “unwanted” (subie) to the “chosen” lack of knowledge of the application process,
(choisie). language difficulties, and prohibitive costs.
Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives 5

Canada Other Countries

Canada is considered a classic example of an Generally speaking, highly qualified workers are
immigration country, defining itself as a settler welcomed by rich, industrialized, and democratic
society with a welcoming attitude toward new- countries, with mobility conceptualized as a fea-
comers and corresponding legislation facilitating ture of a highly skilled workforce possessing
citizenship acquisition and ius soli citizenship for sufficient financial and human capital to move.
children of immigrants born in the country The new mobile cosmopolitans, mainly highly
(Bauder 2014). With about 85 % of legal immi- skilled young urban populations, are recognized
grants becoming naturalized, the Canadian rate is as a distinct type of migrant: “Eurostars,” for
among the highest in the world (NHS Canada example, are young persons mobile within the
2011). It is the immigrants’ “way of showing European Union (Favell 2008). Their migration
thanks” to Canada’s open multicultural policies intentions are often temporary and circular, as
(Bloemraad 2002, p. 218). opposed to migrants who establish long-term or
Immigration has historically been perceived permanent links to their destination countries.
crucial to Canadian economic well-being. Corre- Mobile migrants from rich countries are also
spondingly, the points-based immigration less interested in naturalization in other rich
scheme for highly skilled foreigners is based on countries. For citizens of EU member states, it
criteria of education, work experience, financial is easy to explain: migrants working or studying
independence, language proficiency in English in other EU countries enjoy the same civil and
and/or French, age, offer of employment by a social rights as national citizens, so their rate of
Canadian employer, and personal or family naturalization is understandably low. In addition,
links to the country. Recent changes have acquisition of the citizenship of the immigration
increased the importance of employment-related country has become legally less important for the
criteria; the citizenship test has also been revised internationally mobile, highly skilled migrants
to include more information about Canada and who are wanted and welcome, and who do not
“Canadian values” (Reitz 2014). plan to stay in the destination country for an
extended period. For many, citizenship in the
Australia host country is neither desirable nor necessary.
Australia is another country with strong multicul- Yet for migrants from poor countries, acquiring
tural policies. At 80 %, the naturalization rate is citizenship of rich countries remains important
close to Canada (Australian Government 2011). In (see Rutter et al. 2008 for the UK). A main benefit
2007, Australia introduced civic integration of immigration country citizenship, and implic-
requirements for immigrants to qualify for natural- itly dual citizenship, is the ability to travel with
ization, with residence time doubled from 2 to fewer restrictions, such as the need for a visa.
4 years and the addition of a citizenship test,
requiring immigrants to demonstrate English
language competence and familiarity with the Liberal and Illiberal Paths: Dual
Australian way of life. Immigrants also need a Citizenship Versus Citizenship Tests
penal clearance certificate to prove they are of
good character. Australia operates a points-based Toleration of dual citizenship in immigration
scheme based on skills and qualifications needed countries is usually legitimated by positing that
in the country. While Australia welcomes highly legal equality should be a prerequisite for sub-
skilled migrants, its policies toward refugees stantive citizenship, that is, full participation in
and asylum seekers, including housing people for economic, political, and cultural life in the place
long periods in detention centers, is internationally of residence. Instrumentally, the claim hinges on
criticized. In the public discourse, refugees and the observation that those states tolerating dual
asylum seekers are framed as a threat to national citizenship have proportionally more immigrants
security and identity (Bleiker et al. 2013). who have naturalized. Citizenship as a human
6 Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives

right also comes into play. First, in international presently live, dual citizens still have one vote
law, for example, citizenship is increasingly only in each election. These separate votes are
viewed as a human right, as in the case of state- never aggregated in the process of electing rep-
less persons (Chan 1991). Second, gender equal- resentatives or in a referendum. Dual citizens
ity as a human right entered international law in have a stake in two different states, but their
the Convention on Nationality for Married votes do not count twice in any decision. This is
Women in 1957 and later found its way into the different in federal states, such as the USA, or
law of national states. According to this body of protofederal systems, such as the EU. If a resident
law, women do not have to cede legal citizenship of both Germany and France were enfranchised
when marrying a spouse of another nationality. In in both countries for elections to the European
a further step, taken by a Convention of the Parliament, her vote is counted twice in deter-
Council of Europe (1993), children from bina- mining the representation of these countries
tional marriages have dual or multiple citizen- (more precisely, districts of these countries).
ships. Countries with significant shares of Dual citizenship is not the only form of multiple
emigrants have adapted their citizenship laws, citizenship. On the substate level, there are forms
verging toward more tolerance of dual citizenship of local citizenship, and on the suprastate level,
among their citizens abroad. However, in such incarnations such as European Union citizenship.
cases, the abovementioned factors have played a In the overall liberal framework, however, we
less important role than maintaining and observe restrictive countertrends. After 2001,
reforging ties to (former) citizens abroad (e.g., many countries raised the bar for naturalization,
Górny et al. 2007). Third, it causes normative with the implementation of assimilatory elements
problems of legitimation if immigrants with per- like language and citizenship tests, integration
manent residency are denied access to citizenship courses, and citizenship ceremonies (Green
in the long run (Bauböck 1994). 2012). Obligatory civic integration points to
The increasing toleration of dual citizenship is concerns about liberal-democratic norms and
reflective of multiple belonging, whereby inser- principles being shared by all (Triadafilopoulos
tion in the country of settlement is not necessarily 2011). Consider, for example, the increasing
accompanied by dismantling ties in countries of securitization of citizenship and public concern
origin. Affiliation to transnationally connected about the compatibility of Muslim immigrants
families, religious communities, and transna- post 9/11. Finally, in the sphere of emigration,
tional networks of entrepreneurs is, thus, not an we see a re-ethnicizing, whereby home country
anomaly but one of many pathways to incorpora- governments promote dual citizenship to foster
tion (Faist and Gerdes 2008). the affiliation of emigrants to their country of
Dual citizenship has different implications for origin (Lafleur 2013).
political systems, depending on their design. It
derives, above all, from the acquisition of citi-
zenship at birth: from parents with different Conclusion
nationalities or a combination of ius sanguinis
transmission by state of origin and ius soli acqui- Despite tendencies toward re-ethnicization, rules
sition in the state of residence. Moreover, dual of acquisition for citizenship depend less on eth-
nationality increasingly stems from naturaliza- nic criteria. This does not mean exclusionary
tion without renouncing previously acquired tendencies are less pronounced. Instead, they
legal citizenship. While dual citizenship may have changed shape to focus on economic com-
raise certain problems, it does not violate demo- petitiveness and cultural modernity. This conclu-
cratic principles. Some say dual citizenship vio- sion is borne out by the imposition of new rules
lates equality of representation by giving people for access to citizenship and more restrictive
two votes, but even assuming they can also vote immigration rules, applying not only to labor
by absentee ballot in a country where they do not migrants but also to asylum seekers and refugees.
Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives 7

As the debate focuses less on the ethnic versus liberal ways of life. “Liberal nationalism” or
civic distinction in the legal status dimension of identity liberalism practices a particularized uni-
citizenship and more on the normative realm of versalism: “The liberal state is only for liberal
the political community, it becomes crucial to people” (Joppke 2010, p. 140). The selection of
understand the shifting boundaries of the political immigrants has shifted from openly discrimina-
sphere, which go far beyond the migration field to tory group-level exclusion to an individualistic
touch on the principles of democracy. The liber- skills approach, in addition to criteria based on
alization/restriction of citizenship and the impli- human rights, such as family reunification
cations for state-citizen relations are often and asylum. The blurring of racial, ethnic, and
discussed in terms of the withdrawal of the religious boundaries is enforced by a human
nation-state and the erosion of social rights. rights discourse that stigmatizes group-level
A rights revolution occurred after World War II, exclusion but sanctions individual-level exclu-
especially in the late 1970s; this revolution is now sion based on language, culture, and human
considered by some observers in danger, with the capital.
reciprocity of rights and duties challenged by The nation-state that relies on and enforces
plural citizenship. Some argue the incorporation liberal norms and universalistic rules can legiti-
of highly diverse migrants will create a thin citi- mately demand loyalty to the inside and auton-
zenship or cheapen citizenship (Schuck 2000; omy and support to the outside. This represents
Spiro 2007) as the rights accruing to citizenship both a liberalization of citizenship law and a
status and the obligations flowing from it become liberal cultural discrimination of immigrants at
increasingly thin. It is up for debate whether this the lower end. Empirical research must consider
cheapening of citizenship is caused by plural the management of this liberal paradox, including
citizenship and immigration. Be that as it may, how nation-states incorporate universalistic
the loss of a meaningful citizenship is observed norms, for example, through marketization at
by research noting the perpetuation of negative the upper end of the social status of the immi-
rights (protection rights against the state) and the grants which then becomes the norm to create
decline of positive rights (the state must actively identity and difference. Researching the liberal
provide material and other resources to realize nationalist architecture (Levey 2014) will yield
these rights), changes induced by government further insights into the relationship between cit-
policies enforcing a civic and liberal universalis- izenship, inequality, and democracy.
tic orientation. As various authors have observed,
the new social project in Europe favors a citizen-
ship model that privileges individuals as bearers
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