Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
Hornbook is the doctrine that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Also
settled is the rule that clients should take the initiative of periodically checking the
progress of their cases, so that they could take timely steps to protect their interest.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside the February 28, 2002 Decision 2 and the July 12, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 57077. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated
September 17, 1996 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, [Petitioner]
Macondray & Co., Inc., is hereby ORDERED to pay the [respondent] the amount of
P1,657,700.95."
"As per O cer's Return dated 4 June 1992, summons was UNSERVED to
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defendant TRADE AND TRANSPORT at the given address for reason that TRADE
AND TRANSPORT is no longer connected with Macondray & Co. Inc., and is not
holding o ce at said address as alleged by Ms. Guadalupe Tan. For failure to
effect service of summons the case against TRADE & TRANSPORT was
considered dismissed without prejudice.
The trial court, in the decision dated September 17, 1996 earlier adverted
to, ruled in favor of the [petitioner] . . . , the dispositive portion of which reads:
Article 586 of the Code of Commerce states that a ship agent is "the person
entrusted with provisioning or representing the vessel in the port in which it may be found."
Hence, whether acting as agent of the owner 1 0 of the vessel or as agent of the
charterer, 1 1 petitioner will be considered as the ship agent 1 2 and may be held liable as
such, as long as the latter is the one that provisions or represents the vessel.
The trial court found that petitioner "was appointed as local agent of the vessel,
which duty includes arrangement for the entrance and clearance of the vessel." 1 3 Further,
the CA found and the evidence shows that petitioner represented the vessel. The latter
prepared the Notice of Readiness, the Statement of Facts, the Completion Notice, the
Sailing Notice and Custom's Clearance. 1 4 Petitioner's employees were present at Sangi,
Toledo City, one day before the arrival of the vessel, where they stayed until it departed.
They were also present during the actual discharging of the cargo. 1 5 Moreover, Mr. de la
Cruz, the representative of petitioner, also prepared for the needs of the vessel, like money,
provision, water and fuel. 1 6
These acts all point to the conclusion that it was the entity that represented the
vessel in the Port of Manila and was the ship agent 1 7 within the meaning and context of
Article 586 of the Code of Commerce.
"Article 587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the
indemnities in favor of third persons which may arise from the conduct of the
captain in the care of the goods which he loaded on the vessel; but he may
exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipments and
the freight it may have earned during the voyage."
Petitioner does not dispute the liabilities of the ship agent for the loss/shortage of
476.140 metric tons of standard-grade Muriate of Potash valued at P1,657,700.95. Hence,
we nd no reason to delve further into the matter or to disturb the nding of the CA
holding petitioner, as ship agent, liable to respondent for the losses sustained by the
subject shipment.
Second Issue:
Finality of the CA Decision
Petitioner claims that it picked up the February 28, 2002 Decision of the CA on May
14, 2002, after receiving the postal notice the day before. It further attributes gross
negligence to its previous counsel for not informing the CA of his change of address. It
thus contends that notice of the assailed Decision given to the previous counsel cannot be
considered as notice to petitioner.
We are not persuaded. "It is well-settled that when a party is represented by counsel,
notice should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of
all kinds emanating from the court should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate
notice to the court of a change of address." 1 8
In the present case, service of the assailed Decision was made on petitioner's
counsels of record, Attys. Moldez and Galoz, on March 6, 2002. That copy of the Decision
was, however, returned to the sender for the reason that the addressee had "move[d] out."
If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that change, such
omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the nality of the decision. 1 9 "The
court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has
moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed
and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds o ce."
20
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of petitioner neglected his duties to the latter. Be
that as it may, the negligence of counsel binds the client. 2 1 Service made upon the present
counsel of record at his given address is service to petitioner. Hence, the assailed Decision
has already become final and unappealable.
In the present case, there is no compelling reason to overturn well-settled
jurisprudence or to interpret the rules liberally in favor of petitioner, who is not entirely
blameless. It should have taken the initiative of periodically keeping in touch with its
counsel, checking with the court, and inquiring about the status of its case. 2 2 In so doing, it
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could have taken timely steps to neutralize the negligence of its chosen counsel and to
protect its interests. "Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need
to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case." 2 3
In view of the foregoing, there is no necessity of passing upon the third issue raised
by petitioner. HTCSDE
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ ., concur.
Corona, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3–22.
2. Id., pp. 24–33. Twelfth Division. Penned by Justice B. A. Adefuin-de la Cruz (chair) and
concurred in by Justices Wenceslao I. Agnir Jr. and Josefina Guevara-Salonga
(members).
12. See Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Ramirez, 96 SCRA 297, February 21,
1980; and Maritime Agencies and Services Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 346, July
12, 1990.
17. In Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. (88 Phil. 125, January 31, 1951) the Court held
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that an agent who acts within the scope of his authority does not assume personal
liability for a contract entered into by him in behalf of his principal. This principle,
however, does not apply to the present case because the applicable law is not the
general rule on agency but the pertinent provisions of the Code of Commerce.
(Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Ramirez, 96 SCRA 297, 304, February 21,
1980)
18. Magno v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 555, 558, July 31, 1987, per Paras, J. (citing
Cubar v. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768, 772, February 23, 1983, per De Castro, J.); see also
Lee v. Romilla Jr., 161 SCRA 589, May 28, 1988.
19. Ibid.
20. Lee P. Romilla Jr.; supra, p. 600, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
21. BR Sebastian Enterprise, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 28, February 7, 1992;
Villaruel, Jr. v. Fernando, 412 SCRA 54, September 24, 2003; Pallada v. RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan, Br. 1, 364 Phil. 81, March 10, 1999.
22. Villaruel, Jr. v. Fernando, supra; Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos, 415 Phil. 492, August
15, 2001.
23. Villaruel, Jr. v. Fernando, supra, p. 66, per Carpio, J.