Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154305. December 9, 2004.]

MACONDRAY & CO., INC. , petitioner, vs . PROVIDENT INSURANCE


CORPORATION , respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN , J : p

Hornbook is the doctrine that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Also
settled is the rule that clients should take the initiative of periodically checking the
progress of their cases, so that they could take timely steps to protect their interest.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside the February 28, 2002 Decision 2 and the July 12, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 57077. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated
September 17, 1996 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, [Petitioner]
Macondray & Co., Inc., is hereby ORDERED to pay the [respondent] the amount of
P1,657,700.95."

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.


The Facts
The CA adopted the factual antecedents narrated by the trial court, as follows:
". . . On February 16, 1991, at Vancouver, B.C. Canada, CANPOTEX
SHIPPING SERVICES LIMITED INC., of Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, (hereinafter the
SHIPPER), shipped and loaded on board the vessel M/V 'Trade Carrier', 5000
metric tons of Standard Grade Muriate of Potash in bulk for transportation to and
delivery at the port of Sangi, Toledo City, Cebu, in favor of ATLAS FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, (hereinafter CONSIGNEE) covered by B/L Nos. VAN-SAN-1 for the
815.96 metric tons and VAN-SAN-2 for the 4,184.04 metric tons. Subject
shipments were insured with [respondent] against all risks under and by virtue of
an Open Marine Policy No. MOP-00143 and Certi cate of Marine Insurance No.
CMI-823-91.

"When the shipment arrived, CONSIGNEE discovered that the shipment


sustained losses/shortage of 476.140 metric tons valued at One Million Six
Hundred Fifty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos and Ninety Five Centavos
(P1,657,700.95), Philippine Currency. Provident paid losses. Formal claims was
then led with Trade & Transport and Macondray but the same refused and failed
to settle the same. Hence, this complaint. ACcTDS

"As per O cer's Return dated 4 June 1992, summons was UNSERVED to
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defendant TRADE AND TRANSPORT at the given address for reason that TRADE
AND TRANSPORT is no longer connected with Macondray & Co. Inc., and is not
holding o ce at said address as alleged by Ms. Guadalupe Tan. For failure to
effect service of summons the case against TRADE & TRANSPORT was
considered dismissed without prejudice.

"Defendant MACONDRAY led ANSWER, denying liability over the losses,


having NO absolute relation with defendant TRADE AND TRANSPORT, the alleged
operator of the vessel who transported the subject shipment; that accordingly,
MACONDRAY is the local representative of the SHIPPER; the charterer of M/V
TRADE CARRIER and not party to this case; that it has no control over the acts of
the captain and crew of the Carrier and cannot be held responsible for any
damage arising from the fault or negligence of said captain and crew; that upon
arrival at the port of Sangi, Toledo City, Cebu, the M/V Trade Carrier discharged
the full amount of shipment, as shown by the draft survey with a total quantity of
5,033.59 metric tons discharged from the vessel and delivered to the CONSIGNEE.

"ISSUES: Whether or not Macondray and Co. Inc., as an agent is


responsible for any loss sustained by any party from the vessel owned by
defendant Trade and Transport. "Whether or not Macondray is liable for loss
which was allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in this case.

"EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF

"Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Marina Celerina P. Aguas and


depositions of Alberto Milan and Alfonso Picson submitted as additional
witnesses for PROVIDENT to prove the material facts of the complaint are
deemed admitted by defendant MACONDRAY, on their defense that it is not an
agent of TRADE AND TRANSPORT.
"EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANT MACONDRAY:

"Witness Ricardo de la Cruz testi ed as Supercargo of MACONDRAY, that


MACONDRAY was not an agent of defendant TRADE AND TRANSPORT; that his
functions as Supercargo was to prepare a notice of readiness, statement of facts,
sailing notice and custom's clearance in order to attend to the formalities and the
need of the vessel; that MACONDRAY is performing functions in behalf of
CANPOTEX and was appointed as local agent of the vessel, which duty includes
arrangement of the entrance and clearance of the vessel."

The trial court, in the decision dated September 17, 1996 earlier adverted
to, ruled in favor of the [petitioner] . . . , the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the case as against [petitioner]


MACONDRAY is hereby DISMISSED.

"No pronouncement as to costs." 4

Ruling of the Court of Appeals


The CA a rmed the trial court's nding that petitioner was not the agent of Trade
and Transport. The appellate court ruled, however, that petitioner could still be held liable
for the shortages of the shipment, because the latter was the ship agent of Canpotex
Shipping Services Ltd. — the shipper and charterer of the vessel M/V Trade Carrier.
All told, the CA held petitioner "liable for the losses incurred in the shipment of the
subject cargoes to the [respondent], who, being the insurer of the risk, was subrogated to
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the rights and causes of action which the consignee, Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, had
against the [petitioner]." 5
Hence, this Petition. 6
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"Whether or not liability attached to petitioner despite the unequivocal
factual findings, that it was not a ship agent.
"Whether or not the 28 February 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals has
attained finality.

"Whether or not by ling the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari,


petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping." 7

The Court's Ruling


The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Petitioner's Liability
As a rule, factual ndings of the Court of Appeals — when not in con ict with those
of the trial court — are not disturbed by this Court, 8 to which only questions of law may be
raised in an appeal by certiorari. 9
In the present case, we nd no compelling reason to overturn the Court of Appeals
in its categorical nding that petitioner was the ship agent. Such factual nding was not in
con ict with the trial court's ruling, which had merely stated that petitioner was not the
agent of Trade and Transport. Indeed, although it is not an agent of Trade and Transport,
petitioner can still be the ship agent of the vessel M/V Trade Carrier. CDESIA

Article 586 of the Code of Commerce states that a ship agent is "the person
entrusted with provisioning or representing the vessel in the port in which it may be found."
Hence, whether acting as agent of the owner 1 0 of the vessel or as agent of the
charterer, 1 1 petitioner will be considered as the ship agent 1 2 and may be held liable as
such, as long as the latter is the one that provisions or represents the vessel.
The trial court found that petitioner "was appointed as local agent of the vessel,
which duty includes arrangement for the entrance and clearance of the vessel." 1 3 Further,
the CA found and the evidence shows that petitioner represented the vessel. The latter
prepared the Notice of Readiness, the Statement of Facts, the Completion Notice, the
Sailing Notice and Custom's Clearance. 1 4 Petitioner's employees were present at Sangi,
Toledo City, one day before the arrival of the vessel, where they stayed until it departed.
They were also present during the actual discharging of the cargo. 1 5 Moreover, Mr. de la
Cruz, the representative of petitioner, also prepared for the needs of the vessel, like money,
provision, water and fuel. 1 6
These acts all point to the conclusion that it was the entity that represented the
vessel in the Port of Manila and was the ship agent 1 7 within the meaning and context of
Article 586 of the Code of Commerce.

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As ship agent, it may be held civilly liable in certain instances. The Code of
Commerce provides:
"Article 586. The ship-owner and the ship agent shall be civilly liable
for the acts of the captain and for the obligations contracted by the latter to
repair, equip, and provision the vessel, provided the creditor proves that the
amount claimed was invested for the benefit of the same."

"Article 587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the
indemnities in favor of third persons which may arise from the conduct of the
captain in the care of the goods which he loaded on the vessel; but he may
exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipments and
the freight it may have earned during the voyage."

Petitioner does not dispute the liabilities of the ship agent for the loss/shortage of
476.140 metric tons of standard-grade Muriate of Potash valued at P1,657,700.95. Hence,
we nd no reason to delve further into the matter or to disturb the nding of the CA
holding petitioner, as ship agent, liable to respondent for the losses sustained by the
subject shipment.
Second Issue:
Finality of the CA Decision
Petitioner claims that it picked up the February 28, 2002 Decision of the CA on May
14, 2002, after receiving the postal notice the day before. It further attributes gross
negligence to its previous counsel for not informing the CA of his change of address. It
thus contends that notice of the assailed Decision given to the previous counsel cannot be
considered as notice to petitioner.
We are not persuaded. "It is well-settled that when a party is represented by counsel,
notice should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of
all kinds emanating from the court should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate
notice to the court of a change of address." 1 8

In the present case, service of the assailed Decision was made on petitioner's
counsels of record, Attys. Moldez and Galoz, on March 6, 2002. That copy of the Decision
was, however, returned to the sender for the reason that the addressee had "move[d] out."
If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that change, such
omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the nality of the decision. 1 9 "The
court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has
moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed
and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds o ce."
20

It is unfortunate that the lawyer of petitioner neglected his duties to the latter. Be
that as it may, the negligence of counsel binds the client. 2 1 Service made upon the present
counsel of record at his given address is service to petitioner. Hence, the assailed Decision
has already become final and unappealable.
In the present case, there is no compelling reason to overturn well-settled
jurisprudence or to interpret the rules liberally in favor of petitioner, who is not entirely
blameless. It should have taken the initiative of periodically keeping in touch with its
counsel, checking with the court, and inquiring about the status of its case. 2 2 In so doing, it
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could have taken timely steps to neutralize the negligence of its chosen counsel and to
protect its interests. "Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need
to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case." 2 3
In view of the foregoing, there is no necessity of passing upon the third issue raised
by petitioner. HTCSDE

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ ., concur.
Corona, J ., is on leave.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3–22.
2. Id., pp. 24–33. Twelfth Division. Penned by Justice B. A. Adefuin-de la Cruz (chair) and
concurred in by Justices Wenceslao I. Agnir Jr. and Josefina Guevara-Salonga
(members).

3. Id., pp. 35–36.


4. CA Decision, pp. 1–3; rollo, pp. 24–26. Emphasis supplied.

5. Assailed Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 32.


6. This case was deemed submitted for decision on February 19, 2003, upon this Court's
receipt of petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Attys. Edgar Dennis A. Padernal &
Elizabeth L. Benin. Respondent's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Arnold B. Lugares, was
received by this Court on February 18, 2003.

7. Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 150. Original in upper case.


8. Cuenco v. Cuenco, GR No. 149844, October 13, 2004; Imperial v. Jaucian, GR No. 149004,
April 14, 2004; Go v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 145, February 5, 2001.
9. Cuenco v. Cuenco, supra.
10. In the Complaint here, Trade and Transport is alleged, but not proven, to be the owner.
11. Canpotex Shipping Services Limited, Inc.

12. See Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Ramirez, 96 SCRA 297, February 21,
1980; and Maritime Agencies and Services Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 346, July
12, 1990.

13. RTC Decision, pp. 2–3; CA rollo, pp. 46–47.


14. Records, p. 591 (cited in the assailed Decision).

15. Records, pp. 208–209 (cited in the assailed Decision).


16. TSN, July 29, 1993, pp. 48–51 (cited in the assailed Decision).

17. In Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. (88 Phil. 125, January 31, 1951) the Court held
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that an agent who acts within the scope of his authority does not assume personal
liability for a contract entered into by him in behalf of his principal. This principle,
however, does not apply to the present case because the applicable law is not the
general rule on agency but the pertinent provisions of the Code of Commerce.
(Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Ramirez, 96 SCRA 297, 304, February 21,
1980)

18. Magno v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 555, 558, July 31, 1987, per Paras, J. (citing
Cubar v. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768, 772, February 23, 1983, per De Castro, J.); see also
Lee v. Romilla Jr., 161 SCRA 589, May 28, 1988.
19. Ibid.
20. Lee P. Romilla Jr.; supra, p. 600, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
21. BR Sebastian Enterprise, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 28, February 7, 1992;
Villaruel, Jr. v. Fernando, 412 SCRA 54, September 24, 2003; Pallada v. RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan, Br. 1, 364 Phil. 81, March 10, 1999.
22. Villaruel, Jr. v. Fernando, supra; Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos, 415 Phil. 492, August
15, 2001.
23. Villaruel, Jr. v. Fernando, supra, p. 66, per Carpio, J.

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