Assignment3_CivprSat1-6-(AY18-19)_PASTOR,GEE,A

1. Discuss the concept of newly discovered evidence using American Jurisprudence.

To begin preparing for trial, both sides engage in discovery. This is the formal process of exchanging
information between the parties about the witnesses and evidence they’ll present at trial.

Discovery enables the parties to know before the trial begins what evidence may be presented. It’s
designed to prevent "trial by ambush," where one side doesn’t learn of the other side’s evidence or
witnesses until the trial, when there’s no time to obtain answering evidence.

One of the most common methods of discovery is to take depositions. A deposition is an out-of-court
statement given under oath by any person involved in the case. It is to be used at trial or in preparation
for trial. It may be in the form of a written transcript, a videotape, or both. In most states, either of the
parties may take the deposition of the other party, or of any other witness. Both sides have the right to
be present during oral depositions.

Depositions enable a party to know in advance what a witness will say at the trial. Depositions can also be
taken to obtain the testimony of important witnesses who can’t appear during the trial. In that case,
they’re read into evidence at the trial.

Often a witness's deposition will be taken by the opposing side and used to discredit the witness's
testimony at trial if the trial testimony varies from the testimony taken during the deposition. (A lawyer
might ask a witness at trial, “Are you lying now or were you lying then?”)

In the case of United States vs. Owen, 672 F.2d 920, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 16947 (7th Cir. Oct. 13, 1981)

Brief Fact Summary. Following a severe beating suffered by John Foster (Victim), a correctional counselor
at a prison, Owens (Respondent) was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder in the lower
court. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on hearsay grounds, and certiorari was granted here
to consider whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and/or Rule 802 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence is violated by the admission into evidence of a prior, out-of-court statement of
identification when the witness is unable to recall the basis for the identification.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Neither Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment bar the admission into evidence of testimony concerning a prior, out-of-court
identification when the witness suffers from memory loss and cannot recall or explain the basis for the
identification.

Facts. Victim was beaten with a metal pipe and suffered a fractured skull and, as a result, was hospitalized
for nearly a month.

Victim suffered severe memory loss from his injuries, and when interviewed by an investigator concerning
the assault, could not recall the name of his attacker. In a subsequent meeting with the investigator,
however, he named Respondent as the perpetrator, and identified Respondent from a series of
photographs.

At trial, Victim stated that he clearly remembered identifying Respondent during the second interview,
but on cross-examination, admitted that he did not remember any other visitors he had in the hospital
except for the investigator. Further, Respondent admitted during cross-examination, he could not recall
whether any visitors had suggested to him that Respondent had committed the crime.

Ultimately, Respondent was convicted of the crime, and time was added to the sentence he was already
serving.

Issues.

Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution bar testimony
concerning a prior, out-of-court identification when the identifying witness is unable, because of memory
loss, to explain the basis for the identification?

Does Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence bar testimony concerning a prior, out-of-court
identification when the identifying witness is unable, because of memory loss, to explain the basis for the
identification?

Held. Reversed and remanded.

No; the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not bar
testimony concerning a prior, out-of-court identification when the identifying witness is unable, because
of memory loss, to explain the basis for the identification.

No; Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not bar testimony concerning a prior, out-of-court
identification when the identifying witness is unable, because of memory loss, to explain the basis for the
identification.

Justices Brennan and Marshall dissent, writing, “Because . . . the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal
defendants the right to engage in cross-examination sufficient to” afford[d] the trier of fact a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of [a] prior statement,’ . . . and because respondent clearly was not afforded
such an opportunity here, I dissent.”

As to the Confrontation Clause question, the majority cites its own precedent, stating, “the Confrontation
Clause guarantees only” an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."

As to the Federal Rule of Evidence issue, the majority reasons that the provisions of Rule 801(d)(1)(C),
which provide that a prior identification statement is not hearsay if the declarant is, “subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement,” applies to the identification at issue here, and the fact of Victim’s
memory loss does not render it inapplicable. The court writes:

Meaningful cross-examination within the Rule’s intent is not destroyed by the witness’ assertion of
memory loss, which is often the very result sought to be produced by cross-examination, and which can
be effective in destroying the force of the prior statement. Moreover, the Rule does not, on its face,
require more than that the cross-examination “concern the statement.”
The majority also relies on the legislative history of the Rules in reaching its conclusion:

The Advisory Committee’s notes on the Rule, the Rule’s legislative history, and the language of Rule 804(a)
(3) — which, in defining “unavailability as a witness” to include memory-loss situations, demonstrates
Congress’ awareness of the recurrent evidentiary problem of witness forgetfulness — all support this
reading of the Rule.

In the Philippines, usually depositions consist of an oral examination, followed by cross-examination by

the opposing side. In addition to taking depositions, either party may submit written questions, called
interrogatories, to the other party and require that they be answered in writing under oath. If one party
chooses to use an interrogatory, written questions are sent to the lawyer representing the other side, and
that party has a period of time in which to answer. New trial; newly-discovered evidence; requisites.
Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridel’s
extrajudicial confession, executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr., and the spot report of the
police on Plaridel’s apprehension.

Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change
the judgment if admitted.

The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term “newly-discovered.” The confession of Plaridel does
not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his
defense. It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he absconded.
Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water.
Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013]

2. Duties of the Clerk of Court of appeals processes:

a. Municipal trial court

Section 6, Rule 40 of Rules of Court provides for the duties of the clerk of court which states that:
“Within fifteen (15) days from the perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court or the branch clerk of
court of the lower court shall transmit the original record or the record on appeal, together with the
transcripts and exhibits, which he shall certify as complete, to the proper Regional Trial Court. A copy
of his letter of transmittal of the records to the appellate court shall be furnished the parties.
Sec. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. “

In the absence of the Judge, the clerk of court may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving
applications and petitions of appeals and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter
of course under these rules. (Rule 136, Sec 5.) As well as accepts for docket and other lawful fees of
appeals. (Rule 136, Sec 8).

b. Regional Trial Court

Rule 40, Sec. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.

(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.

(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall
be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant’s
memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a
memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

(b) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so, the
case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on
the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
as are filed.

Rule 41, Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees.

Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court
together with the original record or the record on appeal

Sec. 10, duty of clerk of court of the lower court upon perfection of appeal which states that: within
thirty (30) days after perfection of all the appeals in accordance with the preceding section, it shall
be the duty of the clerk of court of the lower court:

(a) To verify the correctness of the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, and
to make a certification of its correctness;
(b) To verify the completeness of the records that will be transmitted to the appellate court;

(c) If found to be incomplete, to take such measures as may be required to complete the records,
availing of the authority that he or the court may exercise for this purpose; and

(d) To transmit the records to the appellate court.

If the efforts to complete the records fail, he shall indicate in his letter of transmittal the exhibits or
transcripts not included in the records being transmitted to the appellate court, the reasons for their
non-transmittal, and the steps taken or that could be taken to have them available.

The clerk of court shall furnish the parties with copies of his letter of transmittal of the records to the
appellate court.

Sec. 11. Transcript.

Upon the perfection of the appeal, the clerk shall immediately direct the stenographers concerned
to attach to the record of the case five (5) copies of the transcripts of the testimonial evidence
referred to in the record on appeal. The stenographers concerned shall transcribe such testimonial
evidence and shall prepare and affix to their transcripts an index containing the names of the
witnesses and the pages wherein their testimonies are found, and a list of the exhibits and the pages
wherein each of them appears to have been offered and admitted or rejected by the trial court. The
transcripts shall be transmitted to the clerk of the trial court who shall thereupon arrange the same
in the order in which the witnesses testified at the trial, and shall cause the pages to be numbered
consecutively.

Sec. 12. Transmittal.

The clerk of the trial court shall transmit to the appellate court the original record or the approved
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the perfection of the appeal, together with the proof
of payment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees, a certified true copy of the minutes
of the proceedings, the order of approval, the certificate of correctness, the original documentary
evidence referred to therein, and the original and three (3) copies of the transcripts. Copies of the
transcripts and certified true copies of the documentary evidence shall remain in the lower court for
the examination of the parties.

Rule 42, Sec 2, the clerk of court shall certify the correctness of the forms and contents submitted by
the petitioner to the Court of Appeals.

He may be asked by the Court of appeals to submit elevate the original records of the case together
with the oral and documentary evidence. (Rule 42, Sec. 7)

c. Court of Appeals

The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page of which shall be numbered and prepared for
receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases, numbered consecutively in
the order in which they were received, and, under the heading of each case and a complete title
thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment entered, and of each other
step taken in the case, so that by reference to a single page, the history of the case may be seen (Rule
136, Sec 8). This includes appealed cases.

Shall receive for the amount of docket and other lawful fees and the transmittal and the document
of records from the lower court. And shall keep on the records together with the oral and
documentary evidence.

Rule 43, Sec 5 states that the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals shall accept the payment docket
and other lawful fees and the amount of P500.00 for cost

Rule 44, Sec. 4. Docketing of case.

Upon receiving the original record or the record on appeal and the accompanying documents and
exhibits transmitted by the lower court, as well as the proof of payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals shall docket the case and notify the parties
thereof.

Sec. 5. Completion of record.

 Where the record of the docketed case is incomplete, the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals shall
so inform said court and recommend to it measures necessary to complete the record. It shall be the
duty of said court to take appropriate action towards the completion of the record within the shortest
possible time.

d. Supreme Court

The clerk of court of the Supreme Court shall receive the payment of docket fees as stated in Rule
45, Sec. 3. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of petition.

Unless he has theretofore done so, the petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful
fees to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the
time of the filing of the petition. Proof of service of a copy thereof on the lower court concerned and
on the adverse party shall be submitted together with the petition.

They are responsible for overseeing filings with the Court and maintaining its records.

3. Effects of foreign and local judgements.

In the case of St. Aviation Services. Co., Pte. Ltd., vs. Grand International Airways, Inc., with GR No.
140288, October 23, 2006. The following is the effect of foreign judgement as discussed in the case.

The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our legal system are
contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the
issuing authority or by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a
foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

Respondent, in assailing the validity of the judgment sought to be enforced, contends that the service
of summons is void and that the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the Lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this case is the law
of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons
outside Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court granted leave to
serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law
of the Philippines for service of any originating process issued by the Philippines at ground floor,
APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City, or elsewhere in the
Philippines. This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the
Rules of Court 1996 of Singapore, which provides.

(2) Where in accordance with these Rules, an originating process is to be served on a defendant in
any country with respect to which there does not subsist a Civil Procedure Convention providing for
service in that country of process of the High Court, the originating process may be served

a) Through the government of that country, where that government is willing to effect service;

b) Through a Singapore Consular authority in that country, except where service through such an
authority is contrary to the law of the country; or

c) By a method of service authorized by the law of that country for service of any originating process
issued by that country.

Separation of recognition and enforcement

To what extent is the process for obtaining judicial recognition of a foreign judgment separate from
the process for enforcement?

Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is no requirement of special recognition or registration process of

a foreign judgment before it can be enforced in the Philippines. As such, the procedures for
recognition and enforcement are generally indistinguishable and accomplished in one proceeding.
The Philippine Supreme Court has ruled that ‘recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment or
final order requires only proof of fact of the said judgment or final order’ and that once proven, the
said foreign judgment enjoys a disputable presumption of validity. (BPI Securities Corporation v
Guevara, 752 SCRA at 371 (2015)).

The procedure of enforcing foreign judgement is discussed below. Once a foreign judgment is
recognized, what is the process for enforcing it in your jurisdiction?

As discussed in above, the procedures for recognition and enforcement are generally
indistinguishable and accomplished in one proceeding. Thus, the enforcement procedure follows the
discussion above; that is, the petition is filed with the Regional Trial Court. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court may be appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, and thereafter, a motion for
execution under Rule 39, section 1 of the Rules of Court is filed in the Regional Trial Court upon finality
of the local judgment recognizing the foreign judgment. The Philippine Supreme Court has
consistently held that the grant of a motion for execution upon finality of the judgment is mandatory
and considered as ministerial on the part of the trial court. Once the motion is granted, the Philippine
court shall issue the writ of execution requiring the court’s sheriff or other proper officer to enforce
the writ according to its terms (Rules of Court, Rule 39, section 8). To illustrate, if the judgment is a
money award, the sheriff shall demand, in writing, the payment from the judgment debtor of the
 judgment award by cash or certified bank cheque payable to the judgment creditor (upon proper
receipt) (Rules of Court, Rule 39, section 9). If the judgment debtor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation in cash, certified bank cheque or other acceptable modes of payment, the sheriff shall levy
upon the properties, whether real or personal, of the judgment debtor, which may be disposed of
for value, sufficient to satisfy the judgment award. (Rules of Court, Rule 39, section 9(b)).

4. Concept of Redemption of properties subjected to writ of execution.

In the case of Diez vs. Delgado, G.R. No. L-11732, January 12, 1918

The trial court resolved the first and third questions in the affirmative, and the second in accordance with
the provisions of section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only obliging the redemptioner to pay the
purchaser of the properties the amount paid in the acquisition, plus the interest provided by law, together
with all the taxes and other lawful expenses paid by the purchaser, after deducting from said amounts the
revenue collected by him. In that sense, on June 10, 1915, judgment was rendered whereby it was held
(a) that the plaintiff Gonzalez Diez was entitled to redeem from the defendant Vicente Delgado the four
properties in litigation, upon payment to the latter of P465, with interest thereon at one percent per
month from February 3, 1913, to January 2, 1914, the date when the plaintiff attempted the redemption,
deducting from this amount the sum of P310, the total of the rents collected by the sheriff and delivered
to Vicente Delgado; (b) that the defendant Delgado should execute in favor of the plaintiff Gonzalez Diez
the corresponding certificate of redemption, upon payment of the price of the redemption; (c) that the
defendant sheriff should put the plaintiff in possession of the disputed properties, after the redemption
had been made; and (d) that the complaint in intervention of Walter E. Olsen be dismissed, reserving to
the latter, as well as to the defendant Delgado and any rights which they still might have by reason of
their respective credits. There was no express finding as to costs.

Counsel for Walter E. Olsen and Vicente Delgado excepted to this judgment and, after due legal
proceedings, perfected their respective bills of exceptions for the review of this court of the findings of
fact and law contained in the judgment appealed from.

1. With respect to the property liable to execution, the Code of Civil procedure, in section 450, provides
as follows:

Sec. 450.Property liable to execution. — All goods, chattels, moneys and other property, both real and
personal, or any interest therein of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and all property and rights
of property seized and held under attachment in the action, shall be liable to execution. Shares and
interest in any corporation or company, and debts, credits, and all other property, both real and personal,
or any interest in either real or personal property and all other property, not capable of manual delivery,
may be attached on execution, in like manner as upon writs of attachment.

In the decision rendered in the case of Reyes vs. Grey (21 Phil. Rep., 73) we held that the term property,
in section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "comprehends every species of title inchoate or complete,
legal or equitable. The said code authorized the sale, under execution, of every kind of property and every
interest property which is, or may be, the subject of private ownership and transfer. It deals with equitable
rights and interest, as it deals with legal, without anywhere expressly recognizing or making any distinction
between them." And, moreover, the rule was laid down the real test as to whether or not property can
be attached and sold upon execution is: Does the judgment debtor hold such a beneficial interest in the
property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for value? If he does, then the property is subject to
execution and to the payment of his debts.

As a result of the legal doctrine established in the case above cited, Reyes vs. Grey, it was therein held
that the right of usufruct, even though gratuitous, is conveyable for a consideration and liable to
attachment and sale. In the case of Gonzaga vs. Garcia (27 Phil. Rep., 7) it was stated that in conventional
redemptions the vendor may convey to a third party the vendor's right to redeem the property. And in
the case of Benedicto vs. Yulo (26 Phil. Rep., 160), the decision rendered therein by this court it is deduced
that the judgment debtor, whose property has been sold under execution, may convey or sell his right of
legal redemption to third persons.

It is unquestionable that if the judgment debtor Pedro Bonnevie could, in the case mentioned, exercise
his legal right to redeem the properties of his ownership, sold at the request of his creditor, he had by
such right an alienable interest that, in the relations and transactions between men, represents a value
equivalent to its price. The interest forms a part of the property of his ownership from which originates
his right of redemption, and this right, as private property, is not exempt from attachment and execution.
(Sec. 452, Code of Civ. Proc.)