GLOBAL REPORT ON

INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT

TONE
8-16 C
NEW DISPLACEMENT BY CONFLICT AND
South Sudan Libya Sudan
6,600 | 321,000 70,000 121,000 | 41,000 27,0

United States
1,247,000 Niger
40,000 | 52,000
Cuba
52,000 Mali
19,000 | 126,000
Mexico
20,000 | 11,000 Burkina Faso
5,100 | 42,000
Guatemala
27,000 Benin
23,000 | 3,500
El Salvador
4,700 | 246,000 Ghana
61,000 | 5,000
Dominican Republic
27,000
Colombia Nigeria
67,000 | 145,000 613,000 | 541,000

Venezuela Cameroon
32,000 459,000
Brazil Central African Republic
86,000 9,300 | 510,000

Paraguay Dem. Rep. Congo

30,000 81,000 | 1,840,000

Rwanda
More than 3 million 47,000 35,000
1,000,001 to 3 million
200,001 to 1,000,000
20,001 to 200,000 164,000
Less than 20,000

Total The Americas Europe and Central Asia M

28 m 17,188,000 | 10,779,000 1,687,000 | 404,000 41,000 | 12,000 2
New displacements New displacements (7.5% from the total figure) (0.2%) (
- disasters - conflict

The country names and figures are shown only when the total new displacements value exceeds 20,000. Due to roundi
The boundaries and the names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by ID
D DISASTERS IN 2018
Syria Iraq Ethiopia Iran Afghanistan India
000 | 1,649,000 69,000 | 150,000 296,000 | 2,895,000 74,000 435,000 | 372,000 2,675,000 | 169,000

China
3,762,000

Dem. People's Rep. Korea

69,000

Myanmar
298,000 | 42,000

Japan
146,000

Viet Nam
143,000
Cambodia
37,000

Philippines
3,802,000 | 188,000

Yemen Indonesia
18,000 | 252,000 853,000 | 4,500

Papua New Guinea

61,000 | 360

Sri Lanka Malaysia

100,000 | 1,100 38,000

Somalia Bangladesh
547,000 | 578,000 78,000 | 300
Madagascar
75,000 | 1,700

Kenya
336,000 | 10,000

Burundi Tanzania
| 5,100 29,000

Uganda Mozambique
| 9,000 31,000 | 3,800

Middle East and North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia East Asia and Pacific
214,000 | 2,137,000 2,611,000 | 7,446,000 3,303,000 | 544,000 9,332,000 | 236,000
(8.4%) (36.0%) (13.8%) (34.2%)

ing, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.
DMC.
WITH THANKS
IDMC’s 2019 Global Report on Internal Displacement has been produced with the generous contribution of the
following funding partners: the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency, the German Federal Foreign Office, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Australia’s
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the US Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration,
the European Commission, the International Organization for Migration, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs and Liechtenstein’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CMYK

Cover photo: Displaced woman from the island of Bhola living in ‘Bhola Slum’ in the city of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Many people have had to
leave their homes as a result of coastal erosion and other climate impacts in the country’s southern regions. The majority of the displaced
now live in the slums of Dhaka. Credit: Mahmud Hossain Opu for IDMC, February 2019
GLOBAL REPORT ON
INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT
MAY 2019
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

|| Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
|| Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
|| Key Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
|| Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
|| Part 1: The global displacement landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
||| Internal displacement in 2018: New Displacements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
New displacement by conflict, violence and disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
||| Regional overviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Sub-Saharan Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Spotlight - Ethiopia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Spotlight - Cameroon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Spotlight - Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Middle East and North Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Spotlight - Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Spotlight - Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
East Asia and Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Spotlight - Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Spotlight - Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Spotlight - Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Spotlight - India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
The Americas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Spotlight - United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Spotlight - Colombia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Europe and Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
||| People living in displacement as a result of conflict and violence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Assessing progress toward durable solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
|| Part 2: Internal displacement data: from challenge to opportunity . . . . . . . . . 52
||| Why does internal displacement data matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
||| Coordination and collaboration: the internal displacement data ecosystem . . . . . . . . 54
Who uses internal displacement data and what for? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Arriving at better internal displacement data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
||| Critical data gaps and ways to overcome them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Inconsistent methodologies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Spotlight - Data triangulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

GRID
2019
 iii

Data disaggregation: who is displaced, where and why?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Spotlight - Urban displacement: first steps to paint a global picture . . . . . . . . . 63
Other methods of tracing displacement flows. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Determining the duration of displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Assessing the impacts and the severity of displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Hard-to-detect displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Accounting for future risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
The way forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
|| Part 3: Urban internal displacement: risk, impacts and solutions. . . . . . . . . . . 76
Defining “urban” and “displacement” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
||| Urban displacement in the context of conflict, disasters and development . . . . . . . . 79
The importance of rural conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Urban conflict, violence and displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Spotlight - Medellin and San Salvador: urban displacement and criminal violence . . 81
Urban disasters and displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Spotlight - Flood displacement risk: an urban perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Urban development projects and displacement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Spotlight - Nairobi: Development and displacement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
||| Urban displacement impacts and conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Spotlight - Displacement profiling in urban areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Employment, housing and basic services: urban governance of displacement. . . . . . 91
Employment and livelihoods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Housing, land and property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Spotlight - Syria: Reconstruction and challenges around housing, land and property. 96
Basic services and resilient infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
||| Toward a development approach to urban displacement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
|| Conclusion: From global to local solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
|| Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
|| Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
|| Table 1: New and total displacement in 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
|| Table 2: Largest disaster events triggering displacement per region in 2018 . . . . . 121
|| Table 3: Displacement associated with conflict in 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
|| Background Papers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
|| Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
iv

FOREWORD
Internal displacement is increasingly a protracted and Cities today are faced with ever-increasing risks associ-
urban phenomenon. Existing rapid urbanisation can be ated with disasters, violence and conflict. Cities can also,
further accelerated with the arrival of people fleeing however, offer sanctuary to those who have lost their
conflict and disasters, which in turn has serious implica- homes and livelihoods and facilitate access to durable
tions for municipal authorities and urban communities solutions.
coping with the rapid influx. In fragile settings with
weak planning systems and capacities, this leads to The analysis undertaken by the Internal Displacement
fast and unplanned urbanisation, further aggravating Monitoring Centre shows that we still have a long
inequalities, and generating further risk of displacement way to go. Significant data gaps mean that we still
and instability. do not know how many people are displaced in cities
and what the pull and push factors are. Limited under-
This year’s Global Report on Internal Displacement high- standing of the relationship between urban change and
lights the many challenges, but also opportunities, that displacement risk are also thought to result in millions
cities face today when dealing with internal displace- of unaccounted forced evictions every year. Despite
ment. It also demonstrates a changing humanitarian existing normative frameworks at the international and
landscape where internal displacement poses risks to national levels to manage and reduce urban displace-
both current and future crises. In cities, considering ment, progress remains slow.
the additional strain placed on already limited local
capacities and resources, durable solutions require that The New Urban Agenda, Sustainable Development Goal
local, national and international actors integrate internal 11 on resilient cities, the Sendai Framework and the Paris
displacement into urban development strategies and Agreement on Climate Change, provide a shared road
financing. map for our collective efforts. We must strive to collec-
tively deliver on our commitments captured in these
Increasing demand for adequate housing, dignified jobs, global agendas, so that we do not fail the millions of
quality health care and education, social protection and internally displaced people across the globe and so that
participation in public life presents opportunities for our we work towards cities that can flourish, providing a fair
cities and host communities. Investments in resilient and equitable urban future for all. This Global Report
infrastructure, including accessible road networks and on Internal Displacement represents an important step
public transport, and services, such as water, electricity towards attaining this vision.
and waste management, as part of urban growth strate-
gies, can contribute not only to individual well-being but
also to urban economic growth, thereby accelerating
the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.
It is along these same lines that ensuring adequate infra-
structure and service provision to returning refugees
and internally displaced people can contribute to social
cohesion and stability, and the overall resilience of a city. Maimunah Mohd Sharif
United Nations Under-Secretary-General
and Executive Director, UN-Habitat

GRID
2019
 v

KEY FINDINGS
|| Internal displacement is a global challenge, but it is also || Heightened vulnerability and exposure to sudden-onset
heavily concentrated in a few countries and triggered by hazards, particularly storms, resulted in 17.2 million
few events. 28 million new internal displacements associ- disaster displacements in 144 countries and territories.
ated with conflict and disasters across 148 countries and The number of people displaced by slow-onset disasters
territories were recorded in 2018, with nine countries each worldwide remains unknown as only drought-related
accounting for more than a million. displacement is captured in some countries, and only
partially.
|| 41.3 million people were estimated to be living in internal
displacement as a result of conflict and violence in 55 || The devastating power of extreme events highlighted
countries as of the end of the year, the highest figure again the impacts of climate change across the globe.
ever recorded. Three-quarters, or 30.9 million people, Wildfires were a particularly visible expression of this in
were located in only ten countries. 2018, from the US and Australia to Greece and elsewhere
in southern Europe, displacing hundreds of thousands
|| Protracted crises, communal violence and unresolved of people, causing severe damage and preventing swift
governance challenges were the main factors behind returns.
10.8 million new displacements associated with conflict
and violence. Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the || Global risk of being displaced by floods is staggeringly
Congo (DRC) and Syria accounted for more than half of high and concentrated in towns and cities: more than
the global figure. 17 million people are at risk of being displaced by floods
each year. Of these, more than 80 per cent live in urban
|| Newly emerging crises forced millions to flee, from and peri-urban areas.
Cameroon’s anglophone conflict to waves of violence in
Nigeria’s Middle Belt region and unprecedented conflict || An overlap of conflict and disasters repeatedly displaced
in Ethiopia. Displacement also continued despite peace people in a number of countries. Drought and conflict
efforts in the Central African Republic, South Sudan and triggered similar numbers of displacements in Afghani-
Colombia. stan, and extended rainy seasons displaced millions of
people in areas of Nigeria and Somalia already affected
|| Many IDPs remain unaccounted for. Figures for DRC, by conflict. Most of the people displaced by disasters in
Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen are considered Iraq and Syria were IDPs living in camps that were flooded.
underestimates, and data is scarce for Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela. This || Promising policy developments in several regions show
prevents an accurate assessment of the true scale of increased attention to displacement risk. Niger became
internal displacement in these countries. the first country to domesticate the Kampala Convention
by adopting a law on internal displacement, and Kosovo
|| Estimating returns continues to be a major challenge. recognised the importance of supporting returning refu-
Large numbers of people reportedly returned to their gees and IDPs, updating its policy to that end. Vanuatu
areas of origin in Ethiopia, Iraq and Nigeria, to conditions produced a policy on disaster and climate-related displace-
which were not conducive to long-lasting reintegration. ment, and Fiji showed foresight in adopting new guide-
lines on resettlement in the context of climate change
|| Urban conflict triggered large waves of displacement impacts.
and has created obstacles to durable solutions. Airstrikes
and shelling forced many thousands to flee in Hodeida in
Yemen, Tripoli in Libya and Dara’a in Syria. In Mosul in Iraq
and Marawi in the Philippines, widespread destruction
and unexploded ordnance continued to prevent people
from returning home.
vi

KEY MESSAGES
|| Persistently high levels of new displacement each || With displacement increasingly becoming an urban
year coupled with increasingly protracted crises phenomenon, integrated approaches across sectors
across the globe left 2018 with the highest number and more investment in humanitarian, development
of IDPs ever recorded. Despite policy progress in and peace-building are required. To support local
several countries, the root causes of internal displace- action effectively, the international community must
ment are still not being adequately addressed. address institutional barriers to coherence, and
pursue joined-up funding and programming with a
|| Cyclical and protracted displacement continues to renewed sense of urgency and purpose.
be driven by political instability, chronic poverty
and inequality, environmental and climate change. || The way ahead is clear. Filling the significant data,
Many IDPs are returning to insecure areas with few analysis and capacity gaps is imperative to progress.
socio-economic opportunities. Instead of creating Only around a quarter of global internal displacement
the conditions for lasting solutions, this is recreating data is georeferenced and little to no information
conditions of risk and increasing the likelihood of exists on the duration and severity of displacement
crises erupting again in the future. across contexts and demographic groups. These
gaps prevent the development of strategies to end
|| Ending displacement remains an elusive quest. or reduce the risk of displacement and mean that
Precious little information exists on how and when too many IDPs are still falling between the cracks of
durable solutions are being achieved, and how protection and assistance.
people and states are progressing toward them.
There is growing evidence that the obstacles to IDPs || A systemic approach to filling the data gaps is
integrating locally are mostly political. This is also possible. Common standards and better cooperation
reflected in the almost complete lack of reporting and coordination are within our reach and will
on successful stories of local integration. go a long way in providing the evidence base
required for policy work, development planning
|| The primary responsibility for addressing internal and humanitarian operations. Appropriate tools
displacement lies with national governments. for needs assessments, risk analyses, investment
Concrete action to protect IDPs and to reduce planning and progress monitoring already exist and
displacement risk must take place from the national allow states to develop sustainable approaches to
to the local level. Given the ever-growing number displacement. The priority now is to provide national
of IDPs living in urban centres across the world, and local authorities with the financial and technical
this local action will increasingly need to happen in support they will need to apply them.
towns and cities.

|| Effecting change will require the involvement and

leadership of displaced people themselves and
their urban host communities. More investment is
needed at the city level to strengthen the capacity
of communities and local authorities to analyse, plan
and act jointly. Inclusive legislation, housing provi-
sion and service delivery need to become a part of
the DNA of urban governance if urban IDPs are to
break out of protracted and cyclical displacement.

GRID
2019
 1

INTRODUCTION
Yemen’s main port and fourth-largest city of Hodeidah More than 64,000 new displacements were recorded
became the scene of intense urban conflict and mass between June and November.5 Many of those who fled
internal displacement in 2018. Yemeni forces backed by have been unable to return, integrate locally or settle
a Saudi-led coalition launched an offensive on 13 June elsewhere in the country and remain in displacement.
to wrest control of the city, the entry point for about After years of civil war, more than 2.3 million people
70 per cent of the country’s imports including food, were living in displacement in Yemen as of the end of
medicines and fuel, from the Houthi movement. Aware 2018. The lack of verifiable data on displacement in
the battle was imminent, many people had already left the country makes such estimates highly conservative,
and thousands more fled in a matter of a few weeks of which has serious implications for the response to what
the conflict breaking out.1 has arguably become the world’s worst humanitarian
crisis.6
The fighting disrupted people’s access to goods and
basic services, and trenches dug by Houthi fighters cut Despite the dire situation in Yemen, the country
water and electricity supplies to a number of neighbour- accounted for only a fraction of the 10.8 million new
hoods.2 Saudi-led airstrikes in October and November displacements associated with conflict worldwide in
severely damaged or destroyed a number of health facil- 2018. Another 17.2 million associated with disasters
ities and other infrastructure including roads, bridges were also recorded. These global figures mirrored
and factories. One airstrike hit a busy market.3 previous years in terms of the countries and regions
most affected. The number of recorded new displace-
Many of those who fled Hodeidah and the surrounding ments was slightly lower than in 2017, but consistent
area made for other cities, including Sana’a, Aden and with the average over the last decade (see Figure 1).
Taiz, in search of safety, services and humanitarian aid.4

Figure 1: New displacements associated with conflict, violence and disasters (2008-2018)
50

42.4

40 38.2*

Conflict and violence

New displacements in millions

32.4
Disasters
30

24.2
22.1

20 19.1 19.2 18.8

16.7 17.2
15.0
11.8
10.9* 10.8
10 8.2 9.0*
6.5 6.6 6.9
4.6
2.9 3.5

0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

*Updated figures. For further details see methodological annex, available online.
2
2018 also marked the 20th anniversary of the Guiding Nor will capturing its scale be enough. Knowing how
Principles on Internal Displacement, a reminder that many IDPs live in cities provides the basis for a conver-
despite two decades of development in national policy sation about how urban areas may facilitate or impede
and local practice, internal displacement figures remain their achievement of durable solutions, but it does not
stubbornly high. The good news is that more countries explain the drivers of displacement risk or the factors
and regions are acknowledging the challenge and step- that trigger new and secondary displacements. The
ping up efforts to address and reduce the phenomenon. conditions and vulnerabilities of those forced to flee
also need to be accounted for. This means under-
The world’s only legally binding regional instrument standing how impacts vary depending on people’s
on internal displacement, the African Union’s Kampala gender, age, socioeconomic situation and ethnic and
Convention, celebrates its 10th anniversary this year, a cultural background, as well as over time. It also means
milestone that will hopefully encourage more countries understanding how urban areas and systems aggravate
to domesticate its provisions into national laws and or alleviate these issues, about which only anecdotal
policies. New policy developments in the region, most evidence is currently available.
notably in Niger, hold the promise of renewed action
toward reducing internal displacement. Whether their displacement is triggered by conflict,
violence, disasters or development projects, hundreds of
Global efforts are important to galvanise political will thousands of people flee from, to, between and within
and financing to this end, but Hodeidah and many other urban areas. Capturing this phenomenon both qualita-
stories of urban displacement from across the world tively and quantitatively so that its dynamics, risks and
show that risk and impacts are unequally distributed. impacts can be understood will allow local and national
The increasing concentration of conflict and disaster governments to plan and invest to reduce its human
displacement risk in towns and cities has implications for and economic impacts effectively over time. It will also
both policy and practice, and means action needs to be be a key element in efforts to meet targets set out in
accelerated as much at the local as at the national level. the 2030 Agenda, including the New Urban Agenda
Local governments have a pivotal role to play because and other frameworks that aim to make development
they are the first responders to crises, but they are often sustainable and cities work for all.
overlooked in decision-making processes and higher-
level discussions on addressing internal displacement. About GRID 2019

Why a global report on urban This report is divided into three main parts:
internal displacement?
Part 1 presents the internal displacement data IDMC
collected, validated and verified in 2018. It includes the
Given the vital and ever-growing role of cities in this number of new displacements associated with conflict
urban century, this year’s Global Report on Internal and disasters monitored, and an estimate of the number
Displacement (GRID) is dedicated to exploring the of people living in internal displacement as a result of
phenomenon’s urban dimensions. There are signifi- conflict as of the end of the year. Data, contextual anal-
cant knowledge, policy and capacity gaps, but also ysis and urban perspectives are presented in regional
opportunities to prevent displacement from continuing overviews. Specific situations are highlighted in the form
to become a humanitarian and development challenge of country spotlights.
that, as in the case of Hodeidah, represents a major
setback at both the local and national levels. Part 2 discusses why monitoring internal displacement
systematically and independently at the local, national
It is often suggested that 80 per cent of the world’s and global level matters. It identifies the main gaps in
internally displaced people (IDPs) live in urban areas, but current practice and points to solutions for the future
there is not enough data available to paint an accurate and makes the case for more investment in improving
global picture.7 There has been progress in capturing data availability and quality. The section also proposes
information, but a lack of disaggregated data and clear a way forward for greater collaboration in developing
definitions are among the challenges in assessing what standards and in data collection to ensure that it is inter-
is a complex and dynamic phenomenon. operable and meets the needs of different stakeholders

GRID
2019
 3
working to understand and reduce the risks and impacts
How to read GRID figures
of internal displacement.

Part 3 develops the thematic focus of the report and The GRID presents the following headline figures:
unpacks the main characteristics, risks, impacts, chal-
lenges and opportunities related to urban internal New displacements corresponds to the estimated
displacement around the world. It reflects on the number of internal displacement movements to have
different contexts in which internal displacement taken place during the year. Figures include individuals
unfolds in towns and cities and highlights selected who have been displaced more than once. In this sense,
areas of critical importance to urban development the number of new displacements does not equal to the
and governance as well as to addressing and reducing number of people displaced during the year.
internal displacement.
Total number of IDPs corresponds to the total
Several tables at the end of the report and an online number of people living in internal displacement as of
methodological annex provide detailed explanations of 31 December 2018.
how IDMC calculates its figures and undertakes data
analysis. GRID 2019 also benefits from the input of many Partial or unverified solutions corresponds to cases
partners, research institutions and independent experts. of individuals who are reported as having returned,
IDMC’s call for papers on urban internal displacement resettled or locally integrated but for whom there is
in mid-2018 elicited contributions and analysis that are insufficient or no evidence to clearly determine if they
presented as background papers to the main report. have achieved a durable solution. Figure 2 presents
The papers’ abstracts appear at the end of this report IDMC’s data model.
and full versions are available online.8

Figure 2: IDMC Data Model

Internally
Displaced People
(IDPs)

Cross-border
Triggers of New displacements returns to displacement
displacement

Conflict Cross-border movements Refugees, asylum seekers

and violence and migrants
Disasters
Partial or unverified
Development
projects
solutions

Failed returns / returns

Returns
into displacement

Local integration Failed local integration

Population movements
Failed settlement that increase or decrease
Settlement elsewhere
elsewhere the total number of IDPs
Inflows
Outflow
Deaths of IDPs Children born to IDPs
4

PART 1
THE GLOBAL
DISPLACEMENT
LANDSCAPE

A view of the IDP settlement

in Badghis, Afghanistan.
There are thousands of
makeshift homes spread
between mountain hills on
the outskirts of Qala-i-naw
city. Photo: NRC/Enayatullah
Azad, November 2018

GRID
2019
 5

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN 2018:

PART 1
NEW DISPLACEMENTS
There were 28 million new displacements associated and the need for a more nuanced understanding of
with disasters and conflict recorded in 2018 across 148 its drivers and impacts are discussed throughout the
countries and territories. Nine out of the ten worst- report.
affected countries accounted for more than a million
new displacements each. Several countries such as Robust information on all of these dimensions is needed
Ethiopia, Nigeria and Afghanistan, were affected to form an evidence base for the decisions and actions

D
by displacement associated with both conflict and disas- of policymakers, planners and responders working to
ters. Many people who fled disasters in countries such provide durable solutions to IDPs and reduce the risk
as Syria, Somalia, Iraq and Yemen, had already been of future displacement.
displaced by conflict.
New displacements in millions
These are the best estimates of a complex and dynamic 5
global phenomenon that manifests in significantly

Philippines
different ways across countries and situations. The
severity and duration of displacement are not captured,
4

China
Figure 3: Highest number of new displacements in 2018
(50 countries and territories) U

opia
Ethi
3
Do

ia
min

Ind
Malawi
Gua
ica

Benin
nR

o
tem

ng
100,000
epu

Co
ala

50,000 2
Ta

blic

p.
n

0
Re
za
nia
Pa

m.
ra

De
gu

M
ay

ex
ria

ico
1 es
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Ve
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ue St
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Mo ite
zam Un
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ue 0.5 eri
a
Nig
Cam alia
bod
ia Som
ia
nes
Indo

Cen
Mala
ysia nistan
Afgha
ic
ican Republ
Burundi Central Afr

Cam
Cameroon
Kenya
Rwanda Myan
mar
Sou
Burkina Fa
so
El
Ira Salv
t
Yem h Suda
en n Kenya
Myan
q ad
Cuba or
Co and

m
Ug an
lo
Sud n

m
Japa

nea
Mali

bi

Sou
Viet Nam

Gui
a
a

ua New

Yem th Su
Pap
ana
Gh
rea

sR
ep
. Ko
ya El en
Ira Sa
p le’ Lib
Peo

q lva
Conflict and Disasters
n

m.
Ira

De violence
r
ca

do
0
as

50,000 Total new Total new

h

Co and
ag

des

r
100,000
ad

il

displacements: displacements:
Ug da
Braz
gla

Niger
M

Sri Lanka

10.8 million 17.2 million

Su
Ban

lo
Jap
Ma
V ie

m
b
6

Figure 4: New displacements in 2018: Breakdown for

conflict, violence and disasters

28m
10.8m Total new
Total new displacements
displacements
(conflict)
in 2018
438,000
4.9m
Armed
Other conflict*

255,000
252,000
NEW DISPLACEMENT BY
Violence 995,000 CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND
(criminal)*
4.2m DISASTERS
Sixty-one per cent of the new displacements recorded
Violence in 2018, or 17.2 million, were triggered by disasters,
(political)* Violence
(communal)* and 39 per cent, or 10.8 million, by conflict. Displace-
ment associated with communal violence increased
* For defintions see Glossary p.105 considerably compared with 2017. Criminal violence also
continued to trigger displacement but numbers should
be considered underestimates.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

Syria, Somalia, Central African Republic (CAR) and
Afghanistan were again among the countries with
NEW the highest number of new displacements associated
DISPLACEMENTS with conflict. New waves of conflict and violence trig-
(CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE)
gered displacement in Nigeria and Cameroon, that
2.9m were among the ten worst-affected countries globally.
Ethiopia had the highest figure, with 2.9 million new
displacements, a considerable increase that influenced
global trends.
1.8m
1.6m Almost 1,600 disaster events triggered new displace-
ments during the year, most of them associated with
weather-related hazards. Storms, particularly tropical

578,000 541,000 510,000 459,000 372,000 321,000 252,000

Ethiopia DRC Syria Somalia Nigeria CAR Cameroon Afghanistan South Yemen
Sudan
GRID Figure 5: Ten countries with most new displacements associated with conflict and violence in 2018
2019
 915,000
7
186,000

PART 1
Earthquakes Volcanic
eruptions

28,000

1.1m Dry mass

movement

17.2m
Geophysical
1,000

Total new Mass

movement
displacements
(disasters)

16.1m
24,000 Weather 5.4m
related Floods
Extreme
temperatures
165,000

Landslides
424,000
9.3m
765,000
764,000 Storms
1.4m
Wildfires
Other storms

Droughts
cyclones, accounted for the majority, a reminder of the NEW
importance of reducing the risks associated with vulner- DISPLACEMENTS
ability and exposure to climate change. Geophysical 7.9m (DISASTERS)

events including earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic 3.8m 3.8m

Cyclones,
eruptions triggered 1.1 million new displacements, a hurricanes,
considerable increase compared with 2017. typhoons

The Philippines, China and India between them

2.7m
accounted for about 60 per cent of all new displace-
ments associated with disasters. Many were pre-
emptive evacuations of people living in high-risk areas,
highlighting the unmitigated exposure of people and
assets. Vulnerability also played a key role in preventing
people from returning and recovering from the impacts
1.2m
of disasters in many countries.
853,000

547,000 613,000
435,000
298,000 336,000

Myanmar Kenya Afghanistan Somalia Nigeria Indonesia United India China Philippines
States
Figure 6: Ten countries with most new displacements associated with disasters in 2018
8

REGIONAL OVERVIEWS

Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East were dispro- and vulnerability to hazards. Sub-Saharan Africa and
portionally affected by displacement associated with the Americas were relatively lightly affected, but floods
conflict in 2018, and new waves were also recorded in and storms still triggered millions of new displacements.
South Asia. Figures for the Americas mirrored those of This section presents data, contextual analysis and urban
previous years. Displacement associated with disasters perspectives by region. Detailed analysis is presented in
mainly affected East Asia and Pacific, and South Asia, the form of country spotlights.9
both regions with high levels of population exposure

Conflict and violence: New displacement by region

Disasters: New displacement by region

GRID
2019
 9

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

PART 1
5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST
NEW DISPLACEMENT
(conflict, violence and disasters)
Ethiopia 3,191,000

DRC 1,921,000

Nigeria 1,154,000
Conflict 7,446,000
Disasters 2,611,000 Somalia 1,125,000

36% of the global total

CAR 519,300

Sub-Saharan Africa experienced ongoing as well as new intercommunal violence reignited in December 2017,
conflict and violence throughout 2018 and in addition, leading to 60 deaths and more than 576,000 new
suffered droughts, floods and storms that forced millions displacements. What rekindled the conflict is unclear,
of people to flee their homes. Around 7.4 million new but a national political crisis, the disintegration of state
displacements associated with conflict and violence and authority and the increasing activity of politically-moti-
2.6 million associated with disasters were recorded, vated militias may all have been contributing factors.12
more than any other region and accounting for 36 per The western province of Mai-Ndombe also experienced
cent of all displacements worldwide. Ethiopia, DRC, an outbreak of intercommunal violence between 16
Nigeria, Somalia and CAR were the countries worst and 18 December 2018, when at least 535 people were
affected. Around 16.5 million people were living in killed in a massacre and around 12,000 people displaced
internal displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result from the town of Yumbi.13
of conflict as of the end of the year. This figure once
again shows that protracted displacement is a signifi- More than three million people were thought to be living
cant issue for many countries. in internal displacement as of the end of 2018 in DRC,
a highly conservative figure that does not capture the
Against a backdrop of important and many positive whole country. There are hopes that presidential elec-
political changes, 2.9 million new displacements asso- tions that took place on 30 December after a two-year
ciated with conflict were recorded in Ethiopia, the delay will help to stabilise the political situation.14
highest figure in the world and four times as many as
in 2017. Old conflicts became more entrenched and More than 578,000 new displacements associated with
new conflicts escalated along various state borders, conflict and violence were recorded in Somalia, the
prompting the government to establish a new Ministry highest figure in a decade and the result of three main
of Peace in response to the increasing violence (see factors. Evictions from urban centres, mainly of IDPs,
Ethiopia spotlight, p.14).10 Disasters also triggered accounted for about 44 per cent of the figure. Driven by
296,000 new displacements, many of them associated a lack of adequate housing and informal tenure agree-
with flooding in the Somali region.11 ments in increasingly crowded areas, the number of
evictions reached a record high.15 Tensions between
More than 1.8 million new displacements associated Somaliland and Puntland over the disputed regions of
with conflict were recorded in DRC, primarily in North Sool and Sanaag also flared, and Al Shabaab fighters
and South Kivu, Tanganyika and Kasai Central provinces, clashed with government and African Union troops,
where conflict and insecurity continued. The province particularly in the southern regions of Middle and Lower
of Ituri had been embroiled in conflict between 1999 Shabelle.16
and 2007 and had since been relatively peaceful, but
10
In addition, around 547,000 new displacements associ- ment moves to impose French on the anglophone popu-
ated with disasters were recorded in Somalia. Almost lation that had been simmering since 2016 erupted into
half of the figure, or 249,000, were associated with armed conflict between separatists and the military
drought, mainly in the southern regions of Bay, Lower (Cameroon spotlight, p.16).
Shabelle and Bakool, as people moved from rural areas
in search of water and livelihood opportunities. Above Continued fighting between armed groups in CAR
average rainfall also caused flooding in southern and triggered 510,000 new displacements in 2018, leaving
central areas of the country during the rainy season in around 641,000 people living in internal displacement as
April and May, triggering around 289,000 new displace- of the end of the year. Clashes in Ouham Pende, Ouaka
ments. Some families in remote villages were cut off and Haut-Kotto prefectures triggered the majority of
from the rest of the country for months, leaving them the displacement, including in the urban centres of
in particularly vulnerable conditions.17 Bambari and Bria. The government signed a peace deal
with 14 armed factions in February 2019, raising hopes
Conflict and violence in the north-eastern and Middle that levels of violence and displacement would decrease
Belt regions of Nigeria triggered 541,000 new displace- in the future.
ments in 2018, and floods inundated 80 per cent of the
country, triggering 600,000. Clashes between northern In South Sudan, more than 321,000 new displace-
herders and southern farmers competing for scarce ments associated with conflict were recorded during the
resources have taken place in Middle Belt since 2014, year, leaving almost 1.9 million people living in internal
but the violence escalated significantly last year, trig- displacement as of December. The two main parties to
gering 200,000 new displacements. Whole villages and the conflict signed a peace deal in September 2018, but
herder settlements were burnt down and hundreds of there was no immediate reduction in violence.20
people were killed, making the conflict more deadly
than the Boko Haram insurgency.18 Clashes in neighbouring Sudan between the govern-
ment and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
Fighting between the government and armed opposi- (SLM/A) triggered 41,000 new displacements in the
tion groups in the north-east of the country entered Jebel Marra mountains at the intersection between
its tenth year, triggering 341,000 new displacements. South, North and Central Darfur. Torrential rains and
Despite the ongoing insecurity, the government insists landslides also triggered 420 new displacements in the
that Boko Haram is near defeat and has been promoting same area in early September.21 SLM/A declared a unilat-
returns to some parts of the north-east. At least 311,000 eral three-month ceasefire the same month to allow
IDPs were recorded as having returned in 2018, along humanitarian access to those affected.22 
with more than 30,000 Nigerian refugees returning
from Cameroon.19 Based on data on housing conditions Around 5,600 returns to the five states that make up
of returnees, however, at least 86,000 people returned the Darfur region were recorded in 2018, but a lack of
to partially damaged housing or makeshift shelters. information about people’s circumstances and reports
Around two million people were thought to be living of returnees being attacked raised serious questions
in displacement as a result of conflict as of the end the about their sustainability.23 The Sudanese government
year (Nigeria spotlight, p.18). is also working with the international community to
convert a number of displacement camps into residential
Other countries in the Lake Chad Basin also continued to areas, leading to IDPs’ de facto local integration –a
be affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, with more positive move though the outcome remains to be seen.24
than 52,000 new displacements recorded in Niger and
22,000 in Cameroon. There was not enough reliable Around 126,000 new displacements associated with
information to compile an estimate for new displace- conflict and violence were recorded in Mali, 42,000 in
ments for Chad for 2018, but displacement is thought Burkina Faso, 5,000 in Ghana, 3,500 in Benin and
to be ongoing in the country. 3,000 in Sierra Leone, between them accounting
for a significant increase in the overall figure for West
The impact of Boko Haram in Cameroon was overshad- Africa compared to 2017. Inter-communal clashes in
owed by 437,000 new displacements in the Northwest Mali between Fulani herders and Dogon and Bambara
and Southwest regions, where tensions over govern- farmers escalated during the year, and intra-community

GRID
2019
 11

PART 1
Internally displaced people return to their
homes in Kipese, a small town situated in
North Kivu province, which was affected
by armed conflict in May 2018. Photo:
NRC/Martin Lukongo, July 2018

violence among the Fulani and attacks by extremist 121,000 in Sudan, 56,000 in Ghana, 15,000 in Liberia
groups added to the instability. Many villages were and 3,000 in Côte d’Ivoire.
looted and torched, making returns more chal-
lenging.  Armed Islamist groups have increased their These significant levels of displacement occurred despite
presence in Burkina Faso since 2016, prompting coun- policy progress in the region. 2019 marks the tenth
terterrorism operations in 2017 and 2018 that led to anniversary of the African Union Convention for the
numerous allegations of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons
arrests and the abuse of suspects in custody.25 in Africa.27 Also known as the Kampala Convention, it
is the world’s only legally binding regional instrument
Small to medium-scale disasters affected many coun- on internal displacement. Renewed commitment to its
tries in the region in 2018, events that tend not to provisions on the part of African Union member states
receive enough attention or resources despite their is needed, however, given that new and protracted
severe impacts on people and local economies. Around displacement continue to be a major challenge. Niger
336,000 new displacements were recorded in Kenya should be commended for becoming the first country to
as heavy rains led to flooding in all of the country’s 47 incorporate the convention into its domestic legislation,
counties. Thousands of hectares of farmland were inun- when parliament voted unanimously to adopt a national
dated and livestock killed, threatening the livelihoods of law on internal displacement in December 2018.28
pastoralists and farmers alike.26 At least six dams burst,
triggering around 12,000 new displacements. Flooding
also led to 158,000 new displacements in Uganda,
12
tions. In response, the local government in Maiduguri
Urban perspectives
has collaborated with Nigeria’s central bank to set up
entrepreneurship centres for unemployed young people
Internal displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa takes and IDPs. In Mogadishu, the Banadir regional authority
place against the backdrop of unprecedented urban- has worked with the UN and the private sector to create
isation. The region is still substantially rural with 40 a durable solutions unit to support employment creation
per cent of its population living in cities, but this is set and entrepreneurship programmes for IDPs.35
to change considerably in the coming years.29 African
cities are among the fastest growing in the world and Such initiatives serve as examples to other local govern-
some, including Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, Kampala ments of their potential to facilitate durable solutions.
in Uganda, Abuja in Nigeria, Ouagadougou in Burkina Urbanisation in Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to play
Faso and Bamako in Mali, are expected to double in a major role in shaping the region’s development. It has
size by 2035.30 the potential to bring significant social and economic
benefits, including alleviating poverty and inequality
The rapid and unplanned nature of much of this urban- and reducing the risks and impacts of displacement.36
isation has the potential to aggravate existing chal- To do so, the role of local authorities must be leveraged.
lenges and create new ones. Many of the region’s urban
dwellers have little or no access to water and sanita-
tion.31 Millions of people live in inadequate housing in
overcrowded, underserved and marginalised neighbour-
hoods, in conditions of high exposure and vulnerability
to hazards and displacement risk.32 Some cities are also
trying to cope with significant influxes of IDPs from
rural areas.

Urban floods are a major challenge. Six of the ten

largest flooding events that triggered displacement in
2018 were in Sub-Saharan Africa, and urban areas bore
the brunt of the impacts. Thousands of people were
displaced during the rainy season in cities including
Beledweyne in Somalia and Lagos in Nigeria. IDMC’s
flood displacement risk model suggests that floods are
likely to displace on average 2.7 million people in the
region at any given year in the future, two-thirds of
them in urban and peri-urban areas.

When crises hit, local authorities often struggle to

respond to the needs of those affected, including IDPs.33
They tend to be understaffed and underfunded, and
rely on resources provided by national authorities and
in some cases the international humanitarian commu-
nity. Response capacity also varies between smaller and
larger cities, an issue that needs to be considered in
future interventions and investments that aim to tackle
the challenges associated with urban displacement.34

The municipal governments of Maiduguri in Nigeria and

Mogadishu in Somalia have taken some positive steps
to this end. IDPs in both cities face specific vulnerabili-
ties related to their displacement, including access to
employment and livelihoods and the risk of forced evic-

GRID
2019
 13

PART 1
Somali families that fled conflict and drought live in crowded and unhealthy
conditions in a shelter camp in Kismayo in southern Somalia. With shelters made
only of plastic, cloth and sticks, families here are vulnerable to flooding and
insecurity. Photo: NRC/Jepsen, February 2019
14

SPOTLIGHT

ETHIOPIA
New waves of conflict cause
unprecedented displacement

Ethiopia had the highest number of new internal

displacements associated with conflict worldwide in
2018. The country’s crisis has been deepening steadily
since 2016, but conflict and intercommunal violence
escalated significantly and spread to new areas last
year, triggering almost 2.9 million new displacements,
four times the figure for 2017. Conflict and displace-
ment were recorded along three of the Oromia region’s presence in the south of the country, to set up and
borders, with the Southern Nations, Nationalities and coordinate a large-scale response.41
Peoples’ (SNNP) region in the south-west, the Benis-
hangul-Gumuz region in the north-west and the Somali Ethnic violence also broke out between Oromos,
region in the east. Urban centres were also affected, Amharas and Gumuz in Benishangul Gumuz in October
including Addis Ababa and Jijiga, the capital of the following the killing of three local police officers.42
Somali region.37 Around 62,000 new displacements were recorded
between October and December. Humanitarian needs
This unprecedented rise in new displacement comes were acute, but insecurity hampered agencies’ access
against the backdrop of significant political change in and only one aid delivery was reported.43
the country, with a new prime minister taking power
in April 2018. The new government ended the coun- Fighting and displacement that began along the
try’s state of emergency, released political prisoners border between the Oromia and Somali regions in
and forged a peace deal with Eritrea.38 It has also 2017 continued unabated last year. Conflict over the
been praised for abandoning past practices including disputed border was aggravated by drought, which
the excessive use of force to curb protests and for its increased competition for scarce resources, leading to
cooperation with aid agencies in responding to acute the displacement of ethnic Oromos living in the Somali
humanitarian needs. By doing so the new government region and ethnic Somalis living in Oromia. Hundreds of
has acknowledged the presence of conflict-induced thousands of new displacements were recorded. Heavy
IDPs within its border. A crucial step towards addressing fighting in the Oromo town of Moyale between the
their plight.39 Somali Garreh and Oromi Borenas sub-clans triggered
around 80,000 new displacements in two weeks in
After two decades of relative calm, the most significant December. The town also suffered significant damage.
displacement was triggered by inter-communal violence Its hospital was destroyed and its shops and banks
between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups that erupted looted.44
in April and again in June in the West Guji zone of
Oromia and the Gedeo zone of SNNP. Underlying Inter-communal violence in Jijiga, a previously calm and
ethnic tensions were aggravated by competition for vibrant city, led to the displacement of 140,000 people
land and scarce resources.40 The conflict left hundreds of in just a few days in August, of whom 35,000 remained
thousands of people sheltering in overcrowded collec- in the city and sheltered in and around churches. Jijiga
tive centres, where humanitarian agencies struggled was inaccessible for several weeks as a result of the inse-
to provide food, health, water and sanitation for the curity, but economic activity had resumed by the middle
rapidly growing displaced population. The government of the month and many people returned once the situ-
collaborated with the agencies, who had no previous ation had stabilised.45 Clashes on the outskirts of Addis

GRID
2019
 15

Displaced women attending

a focus group discussion on
beneficiary satisfaction in Guji
Zone, Oromia Region. Photo:
Rikka Tupaz / UN Migration
Agency (IOM) 2017

Ababa in September, when Oromo youth flocked to The government has been criticised, however, for
the capital to welcome Oromo Liberation Front fighters encouraging premature returns to regions not yet safe
returning from Eritrea, displaced 15,000 people.46 and for not doing enough to protect civilians.49 Nor
has Ethiopia ratified the Kampala Convention yet. In
Ethiopia’s new government has put a number of meas- light of the country’s growing internal displacement
ures in place in response to the country’s displacement crisis and in the spirit of improving policies to tackle the
crisis, including peace-building activities to promote phenomenon, the tenth anniversary of the convention’s
voluntary returns and programmes to support those adoption in 2019 presents an ideal opportunity to do so.
who prefer to integrate into their host communities or
settle elsewhere.47 A minister for peace has also been
appointed. A durable solutions strategy for the Somali
region was developed in 2017 in line with the Guiding
Principles and the Kampala Convention, a regional
treaty on IDPs’ protection and assistance.48
16

SPOTLIGHT

CAMEROON
A deepening but neglected crisis

Boko Haram’s regional insurgency continued to cause

displacement in Cameroon in 2018, but events in the
Far North region were all but eclipsed by an internal
conflict that erupted in the Northwest and Southwest
regions, home to the country’s anglophone minority.
A protest movement that began in 2016 escalated into
fighting between armed separatists and the country’s
military, triggering around 437,000 new displacements
during the year. Another 30,000 people fled across
the border into Nigeria.

The Northwest and Southwest regions, with a popula-

tion of four million people, have long been marginalised
and have experienced occasional outbreaks of violence
as the government suppressed protests. The latest
violence has its roots in a strike declared by lawyers’ and Education has been severely disrupted. Many schools
teachers’ trade unions over the government’s efforts to shut down as part of the initial protests, and armed
impose French on the two sectors. Cameroon’s security groups have banned them from reopening. They have
forces launched a violent crackdown on protests in also burned some schools down, and threatened others
support of the strike, and numerous anglophone activ- who did not comply with the ban. Around 42,500 chil-
ists were arrested, including 47 in Nigeria. dren are thought to be out of school as a result, and the
figure is expected to rise to 311,000 in 2019.53
This repression in turn led elements of the opposition
to take up arms, and separatist groups calling for an The insecurity and violence have also undermined
independent Ambazonia Republic have engaged in people’s livelihoods. The majority of the population
armed confrontation with the military since January depends on agriculture and small-scale trade for a
2018. The government has responded with full-blown living, and people’s inability to access their land and
counterinsurgency operations. It has been accused of markets as a result of displacement has led to serious
engaging in extrajudicial executions, excessive use of food shortages.54
force, the torture and ill-treatment of suspected sepa-
ratists and other detainees and the burning of homes Humanitarian needs in both the Southwest and North-
and property.50 west regions are acute, but the response has been
limited. Instances of new displacements have even
Military operations have been recorded in more than 100 been reported in the Ouest and Littoral regions, as the
villages in the Southwest and Northwest regions since conflict has spilled over into neighbouring regions. The
October 2017.51 Most if not all of the inhabitants of the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan published in May
villages targeted have fled, and around 80 per cent are 2018 called for $15.2 million to reach 160,000 people,
thought to have sought refuge in the forest, where they but the number of IDPs and others in need has since
have no access to shelter, water or sanitation.52 Meme risen significantly. Very few international agencies are
Division in the Southwest region has borne the brunt of present on the ground, and those who are have had
the crisis, producing and hosting the majority of IDPs. to prioritise the little funding they receive to address
the basic needs of the newly displaced people.55 The

GRID
2019
 17
response began to gather pace in the second half of
the year, but by the end of the year, only 40 per cent
of the requested funding had been secured.56

Education lies at the heart of Cameroon’s new conflict,

and the government has continued to enforce French
in anglophone schools despite intense and widespread
opposition. Doing so drives the tensions that have trig-
gered violence and displacement. The education sector
has been particularly hard hit, but the response has
been hampered by limited funding and competing
priorities.57 More humanitarian assistance will reduce
the impact on those affected, particularly children, but
a political solution to the conflict is key to preventing
further displacement.

Displaced families in northeast Cameroon waiting to receive

emergency aid. Photo: NRC/Philippe Douryan
18

SPOTLIGHT

NIGERIA
Floods and conflict converged to
deepen an existing crisis

More than 541,000 new displacements associated

with conflict and violence were recorded in Nigeria
in 2018, bringing the number of people living in
displacement as of the end of the year to 2.2 million.
Ongoing conflict in north-eastern states and new
conflict between herders and farmers over scarce
resources in the Middle Belt led to 341,000 and before IDPs go back to their areas of origin. As such, it
200,000 new displacements, respectively. Thirty-four is an important step toward ensuring safe, sustainable
of Nigeria’s thirty-six states were also affected by and dignified returns.63
flooding as the banks of the Benue and Niger rivers
burst, triggering 600,000 new displacements and
In the Middle Belt, tensions that had been brewing
submerging thousands of homes.58
for four years between pastoralists from the north of
the region and farmers from the south erupted into
Despite official insistence that Boko Haram is close to armed conflict in 2018, leading to significant violence
defeat, attacks by armed opposition groups continued and destruction. Desertification associated with climate
last year, particularly in the north-eastern states of change was a factor, degrading already overstretched
Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.59 About 90 per cent of pasture and forcing herders to move south in search
IDPs, or just over two million, were living in the north- of grazing land. The conflict in the north-east has also
east of the country as of the end of 2018. An estimated driven herders south. These factors combined with
832,000 people also continue to live in areas under the others in 2018 to inflame tensions. New anti-grazing laws
control of armed groups in the north-east and remain in Benue state enraged herders, who were pushed into
inaccessible to aid workers.60 Humanitarian access has neighbouring states where they clashed with farmers,
been severely restricted throughout the ten years of and a culture of impunity for past crimes, including
conflict, despite organisations’ efforts to negotiate entry killings and the destruction of villages, has aggravated
points. the situation further by encouraging people to take
the law into their own hands. Only five people have
Over 311,000 movements were reported as returns by been tried and sentenced for killings in the region since
data providers in 2018; however, these are not consid- 2017. The under-reporting of the crisis and the lack of
ered sustainable as IDPs are returning to damaged or humanitarian presence in the area mean that reported
destroyed housing, or are still living in areas plagued displacement figures are likely to be underestimates.64
by security risks. The Nigerian government is investing
in reconstruction initiatives to promote IDPs’ return.61 The majority of the new displacements associated
In the Bama area of Borno state, it built or renovated with the Middle Belt conflict were recorded in Benue,
around 10,000 homes, more than 150 classrooms and Nasarawa and Plateau states. Local emergency manage-
more than 50 hand water pumps. It approved the return ment agencies have been responding to the crisis. For
of 120,000 IDPs in March 2018, but armed groups example, the Plateau State Emergency Management
are still active in the area.62 Concerns about the vola- Agency has been providing food and water to IDPs in
tile security situation led the UN and the Borno state camps in the state, but shortages are still reported.65
governor to sign a returns policy framework, which Camp residents complain of overcrowding and lack of
states that basic services and security must be restored water. More than 60 per cent of those displaced in the

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2019
 19

Congestion of the Teachers Village camp in Maiduguri,

Borno State resulted in lack of shelter and more than
10,000 internally displaced persons had to be moved to
a new site. Photo: IOM/Jorge Galindo, March 2019

region are children, who are out of school.66 There has Nigeria has Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest population
been a significant international response to the displace- and economy, but conflict, disasters and development
ment situation in the north-east, but no significant projects cause significant displacement each year.72 The
international presence is engaged with the unfolding government was presented with a draft national policy
Middle Belt crisis.67 on internal displacement aligned with the Guiding Prin-
ciples and the Kampala Convention in 2011. Eight years
Nigeria is also highly prone to flooding, which was later, however, it is still to be adopted.73 Designing and
particularly widespread in 2018. Eighty per cent of the implementing policies to reduce people’s vulnerability
country was inundated at some point during the year, and exposure to displacement and address the needs
and the government declared a state of emergency in of those already displaced must be a priority for the
the worst-affected states of Anambra, Delta, Kogi and government.
Niger.68 Hundreds of thousands of hectares of agri-
cultural land were flooded, harming the livelihoods of
farmers who lost crops.69 In urban areas, poor plan-
ning and zoning means many residential areas have
been built on exposed river banks and flood plains. This
combined with poor drainage systems makes homes
highly vulnerable to regular flooding.70 The Nigerian
Red Cross has been at the forefront of the response to
those displaced by the flooding.71
20

MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST

NEW DISPLACEMENT
(conflict, violence and disasters)
Syria 1,676,000

Yemen 270,000

Iraq 219,000
Conflict 2,137,000
Disasters 214,000 Iran 74,000
8.4% of the global total
Libya 70,000

Conflict and violence continued to drive internal displace- particularly intense in 2018, displaced as many as 27,000
ment in the Middle East and North Africa. More than people in Al Hasakeh, Idlib, Aleppo and Ar Raqqa gover-
2.1 million new displacements represented a drop of norates, all of them IDPs already living in precarious
more than 50 per cent on the previous year, but almost conditions in camps.
11 million people were living in internal displacement in
the region at the end of the year, accounting for more The conflict in Yemen escalated significantly in the
than a quarter of the global total. The decrease in new second half of 2018 as the Saudi-led coalition stepped
displacements was mainly the result of the conflicts in up its offensive to take control of Hodeidah port,
Iraq and Syria winding down as both countries’ armies which is controlled by the Houthi movement. Residents
consolidated their hold on territory recovered from began to flee the city pre-emptively in early June, when
Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and other armed fighting appeared imminent, eventually leading to mass
groups. Disasters triggered more than 200,000 new movements. At least 64,000 new displacements could
displacements. be verified, but several unvalidated media reports cited
hundreds of thousands of displacements and the true
Despite the decline in conflict and displacement in Syria figure is likely to be much higher. There was subse-
during 2018, the country’s civil war, in its eighth year, quently a temporary lull in the fighting, but it escalated
continued to trigger some of the largest population again in October and November, raising serious humani-
movements in the world. More than 1.6 million new tarian concerns.
displacements were recorded, the highest number in
the region for the fourth year running. Government The parties to the conflict met in Stockholm in December
offensives to retake areas of Idlib and Dara’a gover- and agreed to mutually redeploy their forces, swap
norates and the Damascus suburbs led to the majority prisoners and discuss de-escalation along the Taiz
of new displacements. The battle for Dara’a triggered frontline.74 Many details of the agreement were still
more than 285,000, the largest single displacement to be ironed out as of early 2019 and exchanges of
event of the war. fire continued to threaten the fragile ceasefire, but it
succeeded in preventing a major humanitarian crisis.
Large-scale returns were also recorded shortly after
each offensive, and these are likely to continue in the Across the country as a whole, 252,000 new displace-
coming months. It will be important to monitor such ments associated with conflict and violence were
movements closely to better understand the condi- recorded and at least 2.3 million people were living in
tions to which people are returning (see Syria spot- internal displacement as of the end of the year. These
light, p.24). Heavy rains and flooding, which were figures are considered underestimates, due to chal-

GRID
2019
 21
lenges in data collection caused by access constraints. landmines and unexploded ordnance.76 These factors

PART 1
More than 18,000 new displacements associated with have combined to slow the pace of returns as IDPs
disasters were also recorded, the result of cyclones that choose to remain in displacement until conditions in
struck southern governorates in May and October. their areas of origin improve.

Around 1.1 million returns were recorded in Iraq in Flooding and drought triggered the majority of the
2018, outnumbering new displacements. At 150,000, 69,000 new displacements associated with disasters
the number of new displacements was at its lowest recorded in Iraq last year. Flooding affected the north
since 2014 when the war against ISIL began. Despite of the country particularly hard, triggering more than
the official end of the conflict on 9 December 2017 and 35,000 in Ninewa, Salah al Din, Dahuk and Kirkuk gover-
the high number of returns, almost two million people norates in late November and early December. A
were still living in displacement as of the end of 2018. significant number of IDPs were displaced again from
Their living conditions are generally difficult, and many camps when their tents were destroyed. Drought trig-
of those in camps have to make do with inadequate gered 20,000 new displacements in the south of the
shelter and services, and struggle to meet their most country as people fled their homes in search of liveli-
basic needs.75 hoods, particularly in Thi Qar, Missan and Qadissiya
governorates.77
Whether those who have tried to return have been able
to achieve durable solutions is unclear. Almost 9,000 The situation in Libya deteriorated significantly in 2018,
people deemed to have returned actually returned to with 70,000 new displacements associated with conflict
displacement, but not enough information is available and violence recorded, more than double the number
to determine the situation of the vast majority. Poten- for the previous year. New conflict in the urban centres
tial obstacles to durable solutions include bureaucratic of Tripoli, Derna and Sebha led to the destruction of
procedures, damage to homes and basic infrastructure, infrastructure and breakdown of basic services, trig-
a lack of livelihood opportunities and the presence of gering more than 63,000 new displacements. Migrants

Children play at the Al

Habbari informal camp for
displaced people in Sana’a,
Yemen. Photo: NRC/Becky
Bakr Abdulla, August 2018
22
and refugees whose detention centres were caught in In cities such as Aleppo, Mosul and Taiz, intra-urban
the crossfire were also affected (see Libya spotlight, displacement patterns have been observed as residents
p.26). Fighting and displacement also took place in move to safer neighbourhoods in search of safety and
the districts of Jufra and Murqub and the cities of Sirte services.83 In Aleppo, Baghdad and Damascus, power
and Sabratha, and across large swathes of the south, struggles influenced such movements, with conflict and
where foreign armed groups continued to establish safe violence used to reorganise and divide populations into
havens and fuel insecurity. ethnic and religious groups, dictating where people are
able to go and whether or not they are able to return.84
Military offensives in Egypt against an ISIL affiliate led
to evictions and the widespread destruction of homes, Urban conflict is not a new phenomenon, but it creates
commercial buildings and farms in North Sinai gover- specific challenges for IDPs. Unexploded ordnance,
norate. More than 15,000 new displacements were landmines and booby traps constitute an important
recorded, but that is likely to be an underestimate given security threat for people wanting to return to previ-
that the area is inaccessible and the figure was compiled ously densely populated areas.85 The destruction of
using satellite imagery and eyewitness accounts.78 infrastructure and disruption of essential services have
direct, indirect and cumulative impacts that have the
More displacements associated with sudden-onset potential to render whole neighbourhoods and entire
disasters were recorded across the region in 2018 than towns or cities uninhabitable.86 Once the fighting is
in previous years. Iran, which is prone to a range of over, the extent of the destruction and damage may
natural hazards, was worst affected. Snow storms in mean recovery takes years. More than a year after its
January and February triggered 24,000 new displace- liberation from ISIL, most of Raqqa still lies in ruins and
ments, while floods led to more than 1,400 throughout unexploded ordnance litters the town.87
the year. In November, an earthquake struck the western
province of Kermanshah, in particular Sar Pol-e Zahab, De-escalating protracted urban conflict is key to
triggering almost 47,000 new displacements. promoting long-term stability and development in the
Middle East and North Africa. Reconstruction is essential
Urban perspectives for peace-building and to ensure those affected are able
to re-establish their lives. Delays may destabilise cities
More than 65 per cent of the region’s population lives and countries, fuelling future conflict and displacement.
in urban areas, in a region where cities have historically Beyond immediate and much-needed humanitarian
been key hubs of trade and development.79 Much of assistance, the setbacks caused by urban conflict and
the region’s conflict and displacement in recent years displacement will not be overcome unless the devel-
has also taken place in towns and cities.80 Examples opment sector engages in implementing longer-term
include Aleppo, Dara’a, Idlib and Raqqa in Syria, Aden, recovery initiatives. Reinvigorating local economies will
Hodeidahand Taiz in Yemen, Benghazi and Tripoli in be key to reducing poverty, and robust urban planning
Libya and Mosul in Iraq.81 Some of the conflicts are will be equally important in supporting recovery and
ongoing, and among those that have concluded or reducing the underlying drivers of insecurity and conflict
stabilised, reconstruction and recovery challenges have across the region as a whole.88
impeded the achievement of durable solutions.

Some conflicts have involved sieges being laid to entire

neighbourhoods, trapping civilians in their homes or
immediate surroundings. Eastern Ghouta in Syria is a
case in point. Home to a million people, it was under
siege for five years. Repeated airstrikes and mortar fire
disrupted the provision of basic services and blocked
the entry of food and humanitarian aid. When the siege
was broken in March 2018, more than 158,000 people
moved out.82

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 23

PART 1
Displaced people in Al-Areesha camp in Syria were severely
affected by heavy rains and widespread flooding in December
2018. Photo © UNHCR/Hisham Arafat, December 2018
24

SPOTLIGHT

SYRIA
A decisive year for the conflict,
but not for those displaced

The Syrian government brought large swathes of terri-

tory back under its control in 2018, making it a decisive
year in the country’s civil war. Non-state armed groups
suffered severe losses as the government and affili-
ated forces retook Eastern Ghouta, Dara’a and Quneitra
governorates, the southern Damascus suburbs and the
city of Homs and its surrounding countryside. Only Idlib
governorate remains in the hands of non-state actors.

As the conflict nears its end, discussions about post-

conflict reconstruction and returns have begun. The A similar fate seemed to await Idlib governorate in late
government passed a new law in April which designates August and early September. The build-up of govern-
reconstruction zones across Syria. Law No. 10 also gives ment and affiliated forces along the conflict line in the
landowners in those areas a year to prove ownership or north of Hama and west of Aleppo governorates and a
risk losing their land with no compensation.89 This law subsequent increase in aerial bombardments prompted
has been criticised for its potential to create significant an international outcry and calls for restraint. The UN,
obstacles to return (see Spotlight, p.96).90 international NGOs and governments around the world
warned that further escalation would result in a humani-
The year began with government forces advancing toward tarian disaster.96 The area is home to 2.3 million people,
the north of Hama and west of Aleppo governorates almost half of them IDPs, who would have had nowhere
northern areas of rural Hama and western areas of rural to flee because Turkey has shut its border.
Aleppo, triggering more than 325,000 new displace-
ments over a six-week period.91 An offensive launched in Idlib is the largest host of displaced people in the
February to retake the besieged enclave of Eastern Ghouta country relative to population size, both in and outside
lasted seven weeks and triggered more than 158,000 new camps, and repeated displacement within the governo-
displacements between 9 March and 22 April.92 Around rate is commonplace. Aid agencies on the ground report
66,000 people were displaced to areas of north-west that families have been displaced an average of three
Syria including Idlib and Aleppo, which were still under or four times, and some as many as a dozen times.97
the control of non-state armed actors. These areas have Many may have chosen to flee abroad had Turkey not
received large numbers of displaced fighters and their closed its border. The proliferation of armed groups has
families over the years as a result of local ceasefires.93 further destabilised the region, with occasional clashes
between factions and criminality disrupting daily life
Heavy fighting also broke out in the southern governo- and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
rates of Dara’a and Quneitra in June and July, culminating
in an agreement that restored government control. The Turkey and Russia brokered an agreement on 17
offensive led to the single largest displacement event of September to establish a demilitarised zone between
the war.94 The month-long campaign triggered at least 14 and 19 kilometres wide along the contact line and
285,000 new displacements, the majority over a period extending into north-eastern areas of rural Latakia.
of just two weeks.95 Turkish military police have been stationed to monitor

GRID
2019
 25

High levels of damage, destruction and displacement in Aleppo.

Photo: UNHCR/Antwan Chnkdji, October 2018

compliance, which includes the withdrawal of all heavy Anecdotal evidence suggests that the security situation
weaponry. The agreement may have averted a humani- in the south has improved somewhat. Basic services
tarian disaster for now, but reports of violations by all are still lacking, however, particularly in rural Dara’a
parties are a cause for concern.98 The initial stability it and Quneitra, and restrictions to humanitarian access
has introduced should be built on to establish a more means little aid has been delivered. Unemployment is
lasting solution which genuinely protects Idlib’s civilians. also a problem, particularly for low-skilled workers and
those suspected of being anti-government activists,
Many of the IDPs who fled their homes in 2018 have ex-combatants or former officials in non-state armed
since returned to their areas of origin, particularly in the groups.101 Many government employees who have not
south. About 695,000 people have been reported to have been directly affiliated with armed groups have report-
returned to their homes in 2018. However, given the extent edly returned to their jobs.
of the damage caused by the fighting, ongoing insecurity
and lack of basic services and livelihood opportunities, it As the conflict apparently nears its end, important post-
is unclear how many of these will have reached durable conflict questions remain. It is unclear who will fund the
solutions. An unknown number have been unwilling to reconstruction of major urban centres such as Aleppo
return, preferring to wait and see what life will be like in and Raqqa so that those displaced are able to return in
their areas of origin under government control.99 safety and dignity.102 Nor is it clear how north-eastern
Syria and Idlib governorate will be administered, a situ-
Southern residents who want to remain in their homes, ation that has the potential to reignite conflict.
including former fighters, have been told to “regu-
larise” their status with the government, which involves In a country where nearly half of the population has
visiting a local registration centre to begin a reconcili- been displaced, managing the safe and sustainable
ation process and be granted amnesty. What this will return of refugees and IDPs will be a huge challenge.
mean for the many people who previously lived in areas Pressure should be put on the Syrian government to
beyond government control remains to be seen, but address its displacement crisis with comprehensive poli-
there have been some initial reports of former fighters cies in line with the Guiding Principles to prevent the
and other young men being arrested.100 country from descending into conflict again.103
26

SPOTLIGHT

LIBYA
Urban displacement driven by
escalating conflict and insecurity

There was hope in 2017 of a decrease in fighting and held in detention centres in the city. Humanitarian access
displacement in Libya, but clashes escalated in several to the areas affected by conflict was severely restricted,
areas of the country in 2018. Fighting took place particu- leaving thousands of detainees without food or water
larly in the urban centres of Tripoli, Derna and Sebha, for several days.107 Hundreds more were evacuated to
triggering 70,000 new displacements. Around 221,000 safer locations or simply released and left to find their
people were living in displacement nationwide as of own way to safety through the conflict zone. Others
the end of year, suffering dire conditions and unable to were pulled out of the detention centres by militias,
return because of destroyed housing, ongoing insecurity who then forced them to take part in the hostilities.108
and a lack of resources.104
The coastal city of Derna has been under siege by the
In Tripoli, the seat of the internationally recognised Libyan National Army (LNA), linked to the authorities in
government, the deteriorating economic situation the east of the country, since July 2017. It was controlled
fuelled new conflict. Militias from outside the city by a coalition of local fighters and Islamists known as
attacked its southern neighbourhoods in late August, the Derna Shura Council, and was the only city in the
and the intense clashes continued until early October. east resisting LNA control.109 A renewed offensive to
The fighting was sparked by a push to gain greater take the city began in May 2018 and heavy fighting and
control over economic institutions based on the percep- shelling continued into June, triggering almost 24,000
tion that a small number of rival militias and interest new displacements. Electricity and water supplies
groups in the capital have disproportionate access to were cut and the provision of basic services disrupted.
the country’s wealth.105 Markets ran short of food and non-food items, and
only one hospital was left working at severely reduced
Almost 33,000 people were displaced as a result, and capacity. Entry points to the city were initially closed,
many others were trapped in their homes without access hindering the delivery of life-saving assistance, but the
to basic goods and services. The Libyan Red Crescent authorities opened a humanitarian corridor and began
received more than 2,000 calls from families asking allowing families to leave the city at the end of May.110
to be evacuated, of whom only ten per cent had their
request granted. The use of heavy weaponry caused Conflict in southern city of Sebha erupts periodically
severe damage to homes, roads, telecommunications between the Tebu and Awlad Suleiman tribes over the
and utilities infrastructure and health and education control of smuggling and trafficking routes, and fighting
facilities. Most of those displaced sheltered with family in 2018 triggered almost 7,000 new displacements.
or friends, though about 200 families sought refuge in Those who fled the southern and eastern districts of
five schools across Tripoli.106 the city were initially housed in schools that were on
holiday, but they have since been moved on to allow
Libya continues to be the main point of departure for them to reopen.111 Civilians’ freedom of movement was
people attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Europe also restricted and severe shortages of basic goods and
and a final destination for economic migrants from services were reported.112 Very few reports mentioned
West Africa. Thus, the fighting also affected the lives the plight of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, but
of around 8,000 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers given that Sebha was named the world’s human traf-

GRID
2019
 27
ficking capital last year, they are very likely to have been feature of the country’s crisis, particularly in coastal and
affected. Assessments undertaken in Sebha’s districts urban areas where economic activity is concentrated.116
report the presence of refugees and migrants in every The government also recognises the importance of
assessed area.113 improving security in the south, but the vastness of the
territory makes doing so a daunting task with relatively
The violence in Sebha was further testament to the little promise of a political dividend.117
government’s lack of control over southern Libya. The
region’s porous borders aggravate insecurity, allowing There is hope that presidential and parliamentary
foreign armed groups to establish safe havens in the elections due to take place in 2019 may break Libya’s
area, and facilitate the trafficking of people heading political gridlock. Yet divisions remain between the
north. The combination of mounting lawlessness and rival governments in the east and west, and national
deteriorating basic services mean conditions are dire for reconciliation conferences have been delayed, leaving
many residents in the south, including the displaced.114 the way open for fighting to continue.118 It will likely be
IDPs in the area are in desperate need of adequate some time before the country is safe, for Libyans and
shelter, food and basic household items, but prevailing for those migrants and refugees who continue to pass
insecurity across the south means humanitarian access through the country.
is sporadic at best.115

The internationally recognized government in Tripoli

adopted the first package of economic reforms since
the 2011 fall of Muammar Gaddafi in September 2018,
but fighting over resources is likely to remain a central

Members of the Tawergha ethnic

minority gather their belongings after
their homes were demolished by a local
militia near Tripoli. Photo © UNHCR/
Tarik Argaz, August 2018
28

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST

NEW DISPLACEMENT
(conflict, violence and disasters)
Philippines 3,990,000

China 3,762,000

Indonesia 857,500
Conflict 236,000
Disasters 9,332,000 Myanmar 340,000

34.2% of the global total Japan 146,000

As in previous years, the East Asia and Pacific region There were 301,000 people living in displacement as
accounted for most of the internal displacement asso- a result of conflict in the Philippines as of the end of
ciated with disasters recorded worldwide in 2018. the 2018. They include around 65,000 in Marawi who
Typhoons, monsoon rains and floods, earthquakes, have been unable to return to their homes more than
tsunamis and volcanic eruptions triggered 9.3 million a year after the country’s military retook the city from
new displacements. From highly exposed countries such affiliates of ISIL, because of the extent of the damage
as the Philippines, China, Indonesia and Japan, to small and presence of unexploded ordnance (see Philippines
island states and territories such as Guam, Northern spotlight, p.32).
Mariana Islands and Vanuatu, the impacts varied signifi-
cantly across the vast region. Almost 3.8 million new displacements associated with
disasters were recorded in China, particularly in south-
The Philippines alone recorded 3.8 million new displace- eastern provinces that were hit by typhoons. Despite
ments associated with disasters, more than any other the fact that some of the storms were severe, including
country worldwide. Pre-emptive evacuations organised the category five typhoon Maria, disaster management
by the government to mitigate the impacts of typhoons authorities successfully reduced the risk of loss of life by
between July and December accounted for a significant evacuating people from high-risk areas. China and the
portion. The most powerful, typhoon Mangkhut, trig- Philippines between them accounted for much of the
gered 1.6 million new displacements or around 40 per increase in both regional and global figures for disaster
cent of the national total. Monsoon flooding, volcanic displacement in the year.
eruptions and landslides also triggered displacements
during the year.119 Most of the 853,000 new displacements associated
with disasters recorded in Indonesia were triggered by
Armed conflict between the Filipino military and Islamist geophysical events. A number of earthquakes struck the
groups, and other violence including clan feuds and island of Lombok in July and August, triggering 445,000
land disputes, triggered 188,000 new displacements new displacements, and an earthquake and tsunami
in 2018, the majority in Mindanao region. There was in Central Sulawesi province a month later triggered
also a positive development in efforts to bring peace to 248,000. The event caused soil liquefaction and exten-
the region with the signing of the Bangsamoro Organic sive damage and destruction of housing, particularly
Law in July. The new legislation is intended to address in the coastal city of Palu and the surrounding area.
some of the longstanding grievances that have fuelled At least 1,754 people were killed. Another tsunami
conflict in Mindanao for decades.120 following a volcanic eruption in the Sunda Strait resulted

GRID
2019
 29
in 47,000 new displacements in Lampung province in climate change and disasters last year, an initiative that

PART 1
December. other countries facing similar challenges would do well
to emulate.127
In Myanmar, monsoon rains and flooding triggered
most of the 298,000 new disaster displacements
recorded during the year. All fourteen of the country’s URBAN PERSPECTIVES
states and regions were affected, and a dam breach
caused by a swollen river in Bago region in August The East Asia and Pacific region has undergone rapid
triggered almost 79,000 new displacements.121 Around urbanisation in recent decades.128 Often hailed as a
42,000 associated with conflict and violence were also success for reducing poverty and improving people’s
recorded. Many of these were triggered by an escalation access to markets and basic services, urban growth has
in fighting between the military and the Kachin Inde- also brought challenges, including inequality that fuels
pendence Army in Kachin and northern Shan states.122 social tensions.129
Inter-ethnic violence over disputed resource-rich areas
of Shan state also triggered displacement, as did other The expansion of the region’s cities has also increased
events in Karen, Chin and Rakhine states.123 disaster displacement risk, particularly in areas ill-
planned to withstand hazards’ impacts.130 Many are
Around 146,000 new displacements were recorded in located in the tropical cyclone belt and the Pacific Ring
Japan, the result of typhoons, storms, monsoon rains of Fire, which is the world’s most active seismic and
and floods, earthquakes and landslides. The country was volcanic zone.131 Given this degree of exposure, the
hit by an unusually high number of disasters in 2018 and combination of early warning systems and robust urban
though it is generally well prepared, some weaknesses planning, building regulations and land management
in local disaster risk management and early warning will be key to reducing risk as cities continue to expand.
systems were exposed, particularly in terms of ensuring
citizens’ responsiveness (see Japan spotlight, p.30). IDMC’s global disaster displacement risk model suggests
that an average of more than 5.4 million people are likely
In the Pacific, an earthquake triggered more than to be displaced by floods in the region in any given year
58,000 new displacements in Papua New Guinea. in the future, the highest level of flood displacement
Volcanic activity triggered most of the 13,000 recorded risk globally (see Part 3). Many Pacific small island states
in Vanuatu and floods most of the 12,000 in Fiji. A and territories such as Vanuatu, New Caledonia and
series of deadly bushfires aggravated by record drought Palau rank among the highest in the world in terms of
conditions in Australia caused significant damage and risk relative to population size. Many Pacific cities have
triggered around 10,000 new displacements.124 expanded in recent years, including informal settlements
on river banks and estuaries, peri-urban areas, waste
A number of countries have made significant progress disposal sites and mangrove swamps. This has increased
in reducing disaster displacement risk, and regional not only exposure to hazards but also the vulnerability
monitoring, preparedness and response initiatives have of populations and assets, which in turn drives up the
also been strengthened.125 Many countries including risk and potential impacts of displacement.132
Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia have put disaster
displacement high on their political agendas by devel- The policy developments mentioned above point in the
oping and implementing disaster risk management laws right direction, but it is important to strengthen capacity
and policies. Pre-emptive evacuations carried out by for implementation. Urban development planning that
national and local authorities are among the measures takes disaster and displacement risk into account will
which, while they cause displacement, save lives and also be key, particularly given that East Asia and Pacific’s
reduce the impacts of disasters. annual urban growth rate is projected to be three per
cent, among the highest in the world.133
Some Pacific small island states have adapted their laws
and policies to emerging climate change risks. Fiji, for
example, has developed planned relocation guidelines
that take into account future risk.126 Vanuatu also devel-
oped a national policy on displacement associated with
30

SPOTLIGHT

JAPAN
Disaster evacuations and the
importance of resilience

Located at the intersection of three tectonic plates and

in the path of seasonal typhoons, Japan is prone to
a range of hazards that have the potential to trigger
large-scale displacement and cause significant damage
to homes and infrastructure. Last year was no exception.
Storms, floods, flash floods, landslides, earthquakes and
volcanic eruptions triggered more than 146,000 new
displacements.
the wind and rain. In some areas the order to evacuate
The country has, however, developed significant resil- was issued after flooding had begun.138 Jebi was the
ience to the disasters natural hazards can cause.134 Most most powerful typhoon to hit Japan in 25 years, and
new displacements recorded were pre-emptive evacua- the magnitude of the disaster did help to raise aware-
tions, which are an effective measure to reduce loss of ness about the importance of pre-emptive evacuations
life when people are exposed to hazards. Japan’s ability among affected communities.139 Around half of the
to manage disaster risk via early warning systems and respondents in Kobe said they would evacuate next
evacuation schemes is generally effective at reducing time if they received a similar order.140
impacts, but last year showed that citizens are not
always as responsive as they could be. Evacuations associated with earthquakes appear to
paint a very different picture. A pre-emptive order to
Disaster displacement events in 2018 ranged from two evacuate issued to 100 people before a 6.6 magnitude
people displaced by a landslide in Oita prefecture in earthquake that struck Hokkaido in September was
April to more than 30,000 by typhoon Prapiroon in early heeded by 12,000.141 The earthquake triggered land-
July.135 Less than three weeks after Prapiroon’s rains trig- slides that caused casualties and significant damage,
gered widespread flooding and landslides in south-west including a power cut that affected 5.3 million people.142
Japan, the same region was struck by typhoon Jongdari. The evacuation order was issued early enough, however,
The government issued pre-emptive evacuation orders to allow people in the city of Sapporo to flee to safer
for Jongdari, but research conducted in Hiroshima city areas before it struck. This suggests that the Japanese
suggests that less than four per cent of people heeded public is more sensitised to the dangers of earthquakes
them.136 Some of those who stayed put became trapped than those of flooding, in part perhaps because of the
by landslides and rising floodwaters and more than amount of media attention the former receive.
170 people died, making Jongdari Japan’s deadliest
weather-related disaster in decades.137 The government took steps to improve its disaster
response in 2018 with the pre-positioning of supplies
When typhoon Jebi hit in August, citizens’ respon- in evacuation centres, as opposed to sending them
siveness was similarly low. Japan’s Cabinet Office after the event at the request of municipal authori-
ordered around 30,000 people to evacuate, but studies ties.143 It also recognised the phenomenon of “at-home
conducted in Kobe prefecture after the disaster showed evacuees”, people who remain in their damaged homes
that less than 10 per cent had followed the order. Power after a disaster but use facilities at evacuation centres
cuts prevented some people from receiving the order, because of the disruption caused to the supply of water,
while others were unable to hear it over the sound of electricity and other basic services. Some may also have

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2019
 31

A man in an evacuation
centre in Okayama
Prefecture, organised by
the Japanese Red Cross.
Photo: Japanese Red Cross
Society, July 2018

to rely on humanitarian assistance for food and non- number of challenges remain, including raising disaster
food items.144 risk awareness at the local level and ensuring that early
warning systems are effective so that timely and well-
Others seek shelter outside officially designated evacu- disseminated evacuation orders are issued and heeded.
ation areas, and these “self-evacuees” tend not to be More comprehensive data on the movement of people
included in disaster recovery efforts. Some people who during and several months or even years after the event
evacuated by their own means during the 2011 Great is also needed. Beyond pre-emptive evacuations, there
East Japan earthquake, for example, faced significant is a lack of information on how long displacement lasts,
challenges in accessing housing and other basic services when people return or where they resettle or integrate
earmarked for evacuees because they did not figure locally.
in official government records.145 Addressing the issue
of at-home and self-evacuees would be an important
step in ensuring that all displaced people are able to
achieve durable solutions. Not having provisions for
those who evacuate on their own can create inequali-
ties in compensation mechanisms and increase the risk
of protracted displacement.

The disasters that struck Japan in 2018 showed that

even in a well-prepared country there is still room for
improvement. With the very high level of exposure of
people and assets to hazards, the country will need to
continuously invest in reducing disaster risk further and
responding more comprehensively to those displaced. A
32

SPOTLIGHT

PHILIPPINES
Solutions still a distant prospect in
Marawi, one year on

Marawi, a majority Muslim city of 200,000 people, is the

capital of Lanao del Sur province and the economic hub
of the southern Philippines. Between May and October similar to that of ISIL in Mosul and other Iraqi and Syrian
2017, it was also the scene of the country’s longest cities. They created a maze of improvised tunnels in the
urban conflict, during which more than 1,000 people densely-built city centre to evade airstrikes, engaged
were killed and 350,000 displaced. A year later, recon- the security forces and resisted a siege for five months.
struction of the city has begun and most people have The city’s roads were choked with traffic during the
returned. Around 65,000 remain displaced, however, first three days of the battle as residents attempted to
of whom around 14,000 are still living in evacuation get out. Between 80 and 90 per cent eventually fled,
and transitional shelters.146 some of them on foot.147

The conflict erupted on 23 May 2017 when the Filipino By the time the fighting was officially declared over,
security forces raided the home of the leader of the Abu after the leaders of both Abu Sayyaf and the Maute
Sayyaf group, a local affiliate of ISIL. The Maute Group, Group had been killed, the city had suffered exten-
another local radical Islamist organisation and an Abu sive damage. The financial and business district, which
Sayyaf ally, was called in to provide reinforcement. The accounted for 30 per cent of the urban area, was
militants waged urban warfare unseen in the region but completely destroyed.148 The military escorted residents

GRID
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 33

In April and May 2018,

the Government of the
Philippines allowed
residents of Marawi City
to visit their homes, which
had been left in ruins
after the five-month long
conflict. Photo © UNHCR/
Alecs Ongcal, April 2018

in to retrieve what they could from the rubble of their fled. Lanao del Sur was the country’s poorest province
homes before the area was cordoned off. It remains even before the fighting, and malnutrition levels were
uninhabitable, and reconstruction will not begin until among the highest with half of its young population
the debris has been cleared and roads rebuilt, which is affected.154
expected to take at least 18 months.149
Resolving displacement in cities decimated by urban
As many as 70 per cent of those displaced, or more than warfare is a long and complex process that governments
270,000 people, were thought to have returned as of in many regions are grappling with. The cost of rebuilding
the end of 2018.150 In some areas deemed habitable, Marawi has been put at around $1.2 billion, of which
however, returnees still have no electricity or running the international community had pledged around $670
water, nor access to education or livelihood opportuni- million as of November 2018.155 Reconstruction is likely
ties, which prevents them from rebuilding their lives.151 to take years, however, leaving thousands of people
Others have had to go back to evacuation centres while displaced in the meantime. Their protracted displace-
they wait for their homes to be repaired. The majority of ment has the potential to fuel further conflict as the
those still displaced are living with family or friends, but young and working-age, in particular, may grow tired
almost 2,000 families live in 21 government-run evacu- of slow and inadequate progress. A transparent recon-
ation centres where they face sanitation and waste struction process that includes community consultation
management issues.152 will be key to quelling residents’ fears and frustration.

The government intends to transfer the people still

living in evacuation centres to temporary shelters, but
those already transferred say that families of six or more
members have had to share a single room, which barely
constitutes an improvement on their previous condi-
tions.153 Food security is another major concern, because
many IDPs have been unable to find work since they
34

SOUTH ASIA

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST

NEW DISPLACEMENT
(conflict, violence and disasters)
India 2,844,000

Afghanistan 807,000

Sri Lanka 101,100

Conflict 544,000
Disasters 3,303,000 Bangladesh 78,300
13.8% of the global total
Nepal 12,000

Large-scale displacement in South Asia was once again Years of successive dry spells and below average rainfall in
triggered by a series of floods, storms and droughts as Afghanistan led to drought conditions in 2018, particu-
well as unresolved conflicts and violence. Countries in larly in the rural north-west of the country. More than
the region continue to struggle with managing seasonal 371,000 new displacements were recorded as people’s
and recurring weather-related extreme events, resulting livelihoods became unviable and their living conditions
in more than 3.3 million new displacements. In addition untenable. Conflict triggered roughly the same number,
to tropical storms and floods in India and Pakistan, the leaving around 2.6 million people living in displacement
monsoon season took a heavy toll in Bangladesh and as of the end of the year, one of the highest figures in
Sri Lanka as did drought in Afghanistan. New waves of the world (see Afghanistan spotlight, p.36).
conflict and violence in India and Pakistan and ongoing
fighting in Afghanistan triggered around 544,000 new Afghanistan’s four-decade conflict involves not only the
displacements. country’s military, international forces, the Taliban and
ISIL, but also various ethnic, communal and Islamist mili-
India accounted for most of the region’s new displace- tias.158 Exact numbers are hard to come by, but military
ments. Its overall total of 2.8 million was among the operations by the government triggered a significant
highest in the world, of which nearly 2.7 million were portion of the new conflict displacements recorded, with
triggered by disasters across 15 states. The country was a total of 372,000.
particularly hard-hit by the monsoon season, when
flooding devastated the south-western state of Kerala.156 Intercommunal violence triggered localised, small-scale
Almost 1.5 million new displacements were recorded in displacement in neighbouring Pakistan, but this is not
Kerala in what were described as the worst floods in a systematically reported on, so the figure of 1,800 is likely
century. Cyclone Titli struck Orissa and Andhra Pradesh to be a significant underestimate. Numbers are not avail-
states in October, triggering 400,000 new displacements, able for Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, but frequent cease-
and cyclone Gaja hit Tamil Nadu in November, triggering fire violations and cross-border shelling in 2018 strongly
249,000.157 suggest that displacement must have taken place. For
disasters, more than 2,100 new displacements were
More than 160,000 new displacements associated with recorded, mainly triggered by localised floods.
conflict and violence were recorded in Indian-controlled
Kashmir. Communal violence in Kashmir and West Bengal The monsoon season also brought significant flooding
cast violence in Maharashtra and political violence in to both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Around 75,000
Tripura also triggered small-scale displacement (see India new displacements were recorded in Sri Lanka in the
spotlight, p.38). second half of May, and nearly 16,000 in the first

GRID
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 35
half of October, though the latter figure is likely to be makes it difficult to estimate how the phenomenon is

PART 1
conservative. Riverine floods in Bangladesh triggered contributing to urbanisation trends. The evidence that
12,000 new displacements in Moulvibazar district and is available, however, suggests that disasters, climate
riverbank erosion around 44,000 in Shariatpur, mainly change impacts and conflict trigger displacement both to
in September. Flooding was also reported in Cox’s Bazar and within urban areas. A study conducted in Bangladesh
district, which is currently home to hundreds of thousands suggests that a significant proportion of people who live
of Rohingya refugees who have fled violence in Myanmar. in informal urban settlements may have been displaced
from rural areas by riverbank erosion, a major hazard in
While relatively few new displacements associated with the country, projected to increase in the coming years.167
floods were recorded in Bangladesh in 2018, IDMC’s
flood displacement risk model shows that the country IDPs are also drawn to urban areas by the prospect of
has the third-highest flood displacement risk in the world. better livelihood and income-generating opportunities.168
Around 1.8 million people are likely to be displaced at Many, however, struggle to adapt and find themselves
any given year in the future, with more than 96 per cent living in deepening poverty. They are also vulnerable to
of the risk concentrated in urban and peri-urban areas secondary displacement triggered by urban disasters and
(see Part 3). evictions.169

Urban perspectives The Bangladeshi capital, Dhaka, has been identified as

the country’s main destination for people fleeing disasters
Rural to urban migration and natural population growth and climate change impacts, and local authorities have
in the region’s towns and cities give South Asia one of been unable to cope with the influx. New approaches
the highest annual urbanisation rates in the world at 2.5 to develop the potential of secondary cities to host IDPs,
per cent.159 This does not, however, equate with economic however, hold the promise of alternative durable solutions
growth and higher levels of human development.160 Major and a reduction in the risk of repeated displacement.170
cities such as Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata in India, Dhaka
in Bangladesh and Karachi in Pakistan are among the People who flee to urban areas to escape conflict face
most densely populated in the world, but high numbers similar challenges to those displaced by disasters. IDPs
of people live in informal settlements in peri-urban areas in the Afghan capital of Kabul struggle to secure tenure
that lack adequate housing, infrastructure and services.161 over adequate housing, which puts them at constant
Recent data shows 30 per cent of the urban population risk of secondary displacement, mainly in the form of
across the region as living in informal settlements.162 evictions. Kabul’s IDPs tend to have significant protec-
tion concerns and often live in sub-standard housing in
Urban infrastructure development is unable to keep marginalised areas of the city.171 Policy initiatives such a
up with the pace of population growth in the region. 2006 white paper on tenure security and community-
In countries such as India, complex political structures, based upgrading and a 2013 policy on the upgrading
capacity gaps, corruption and funding shortfalls, hamper of informal settlements point in the right direction, but
infrastructure development as well as basic service adoption and implementation remain a challenge.172
provision.163 Such challenges generate widespread and
growing socioeconomic inequality.164 South Asia’s high urbanisation rate presents both major
challenges and opportunities.173 The meaningful partici-
Many urban plans are devised without involving locals in pation and engagement of local communities in urban
decision-making, and new investments in infrastructure planning and development will be paramount if the
and the upgrade of informal settlements have the poten- region is to meet sustainable development targets under
tial to push the most vulnerable into displacement and international frameworks and reduce the risk of future
isolate them from their livelihoods.165 That said, in-situ displacement.174
initiatives to upgrade informal and unserved settlements
in several Indian cities have been effective in reducing the
risk of evictions and displacement.166

As in the rest of the world, the true scale of urban internal

displacement in South Asia is essentially unknown, which
36

SPOTLIGHT

AFGHANISTAN
Drought displaced as many as
conflict

Afghanistan has been plagued by four decades of

armed conflict, undermining development efforts across
the country and triggering displacement every year. Herat provinces, respectively.176 Conditions in the camps
In 2018, drought added to the existing crisis and trig- are deplorable and protection issues rife. Shelters are
gered more than 371,000 new displacements, a similar overcrowded and provide little privacy, and with the
number to those associated with conflict. After four onset of winter and sub-zero temperatures members of
years of below average rainfall in the north-western different families were huddled together in one tent in
provinces of Badghis, Ghor and Herat, the situation an effort to keep warm. People are destitute and have
became critical as a lack of rain and snow melt caused resorted to harmful coping mechanisms, including child
crops to fail and livestock to perish. Large numbers of labour and early marriage. There were 161 reported
people began to move from rural to urban areas in April, cases of child marriage in Herat and Badghis provinces
in search of livelihood opportunities, basic services and between July and October 2018.177
humanitarian aid.
There is a misconception that people who flee slow-
In reality, the drivers of displacement in Afghanistan onset disasters have time to pack their belongings and
are intertwined. The impact of the drought was the organise their departure, putting them in a better posi-
final straw for many families who had been living in tion than those displaced by sudden-onset disasters or
rural areas underserviced after years of armed conflict. conflict. The situation in Afghanistan disproves this.
Their resources and coping mechanisms had been People fleeing the drought had already sold many of
eroded over time, and 2018 marked a tipping point their assets and left their areas of origin with almost
when conditions became unbearable, leading to the nothing.
country’s largest disaster-related displacement in at least
a decade. Humanitarian response teams in the country have exten-
sive experience in dealing with displacement triggered
North-west Afghanistan is primarily rural, and the by conflict, which affects the entire country but tends
drought has decimated the livelihoods of tens of thou- to be localised and relatively small-scale. Their usual
sands of households dependent on livestock and rain- response mechanisms have not been able to cope with
fed agriculture.175 Eighty-four per cent of landowners the mass movements concentrated in the north-west
surveyed in IDPs’ areas of origin said production was of the country associated with the drought. Some
down by half compared with 2017. Those who owned humanitarians may also have been influenced by the
livestock said they had lost almost all of their poultry, reluctance of host communities and authorities to allow
camels and horses and 90 per cent of their large and IDPs to settle in their areas, due in part to ethnic and
small ruminants. Respondents also said the lack of water tribal differences, but also security concerns; this caused
for domestic use was a significant concern. Rain-filled delays in the initial response to the displaced. Given that
reservoirs are used not only for irrigation but also for the drought has predominantly affected areas that are
drinking water, because groundwater from hand pumps contested or beyond government control, authorities
and wells is unpotable. fear the new arrivals may include members of non-state
armed groups.
As of September 2018, more than 250,000 IDPs were
living in scattered informal camps on the outskirts of The response has been further complicated by the
Qala-e-Naw and Herat, the capitals of Badghis and fact that people living in protracted displacement

GRID
2019
 37

As winter approached in
Afghanistan, many families
displaced by drought and
conflict were still living in
makeshift tents. Photo:
NRC/Enayatullah Azad,
November 2018

and vulnerable host community members have set up This raises the question of how to secure suitable, long-
makeshift shelters among the new IDPs in an attempt term housing, land and livelihoods for people displaced
to secure humanitarian assistance, making it chal- by the drought.180 Most have pitched their shelters on
lenging for humanitarians to target the most vulner- private land where landlords only grudgingly accept
able recently displaced households. As drought is a their presence, which leaves them vulnerable to eviction.
slow-onset phenomenon, it is also unclear who has the The Afghan Land Authority has signed a memorandum
responsibility to respond: at the outset of the drought- of understanding with the Ministry of Refugees and
induced displacement crisis, there was much debate Repatriation to allocate state-owned land to IDPs for
about which agencies had the mandate to respond, five years, but this is on the assumption that they will
with many humanitarian agencies suggesting that the eventually return to their areas of origin so does not
emphasis of the response should be on development constitute a durable solution.
in the places of origin, and thereby fall to development
agencies rather than humanitarians. The Afghan government is already struggling to facilitate
durable solutions for the 2.6 million people displaced by
Despite the reticence of local authorities and hosts to conflict in the country. Strong political will and substan-
let IDPs settle, many intend to stay. Only about one per tial support from the international community will be
cent of IDPs interviewed in Herat and eight per cent in needed to make real progress towards durable solu-
Badghis said they would consider an assisted volun- tions for those displaced by conflict and drought in the
tary return, and 71 per cent in Herat said they would country.181
not consider returning regardless of the assistance on
offer.178 They cite factors such as insecurity, lack of food
and livelihoods, and poor access to water and basic
services as reasons for not wanting to return to their
places of origin.179
38

SPOTLIGHT

INDIA
Monsoon and conflict displaced
millions

India is not unfamiliar with heavy monsoon rains and

floods, but the 2018 season was particularly intense.
Above average rainfall triggered flooding and land-
slides nationwide between June and August. Tropical
cyclones also struck the country’s east coast between
October and December, severely damaging homes and
affecting millions of people in the states of Andhra storm. When cyclone Phethai hit two months later, many
Pradesh, Odisha and Tamil Nadu and Puducherry terri- were still living in damaged homes.185 Phethai triggered
tory. Disasters triggered as many as 2.7 million new as many as 32,000 displacements in the two states in
displacements during the year, nearly double the figure December. Cyclone Gaja triggered 249,000 displace-
for 2017. The poverty and vulnerability of many of the ments in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry in November.
households affected was a significant factor in aggra- It also destroyed homes and livelihoods, potentially
vating the losses, damage and displacement caused. hindering return for many of those displaced.186

The monsoon season was the world’s second largest Though dwarfed in scale, conflict also triggered
disaster displacement event in 2018 after typhoon displacement in India in 2018. Cross-border shelling
Mangkhut, triggering almost two million displacements led to more than 160,000 displacements in Indian-
between May and October. The impacts were wide- controlled Kashmir.187 Heavy fire from Pakistani forces
spread, but most media attention focussed on the state triggered about 54,000 in January, when people
of Kerala, where severe flooding in 13 out of 14 districts deserted a number of border villages, and as many
was described as the worst in a century.182 as 100,000 from Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts
in May.188 The intensity of cross-border shelling and
The Kerala floods accounted for more than half of subsequent displacement has increased in recent years,
India’s new displacements in 2018. As many as 1.5 but it repeats past patterns of short-term but recurring
million people were recorded as displaced in about movements that disrupt daily life, education and the
5,600 camps set up by the authorities. That figure is a provision of other basic services.189
significant underestimate of the overall scale of displace-
ment, given that an unknown number of IDPs stayed The events of 2018 serve as a reminder that displace-
with friends and family or in rented accommodation.183 ment is an everyday reality in India, and one which has
By the end of the monsoon season, as many as 2,000 the potential to drag down the country’s emerging
homes had been destroyed and as many as 22,000 economy if measures to reduce displacement risk are
damaged, hampering return for many people.184 not taken. The authorities have made commendable
efforts in improving early warning and disaster manage-
Three cyclones struck India’s eastern seaboard during ment systems, but they continue to face challenges
the year. Cyclone Titli triggered around 300,000 pre- when it comes to preventing and responding to crises.
emptive evacuations in Odisha and around 100,000 The last 12 months also showed that poverty and
displacements in Andhra Pradesh in October, the latter vulnerability, which are key drivers of risk, need to be
figure calculated using housing destruction as a proxy. better addressed. Given ever more frequent and intense
Communities living in affected coastal areas tended to weather events and continuing tensions along the coun-
live in mud and bamboo homes or dwellings with corru- try’s disputed border with Pakistan, these challenges
gated tin sheets, which were unable to withstand the may only get more severe in the future.

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 39

THE AMERICAS

PART 1
5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST
NEW DISPLACEMENT
(conflict, violence and disasters)
United States 1,247,000

El Salvador 250,700

Colombia 212,000
Conflict 404,000
Disasters 1,687,000 Brazil 86,000
7.5% of the global total
Cuba 52,000

Weather-related disasters once again impacted groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the
several countries in the Americas in 2018. In addition, Popular Liberation Army (EPL), triggered most of the
unresolved conflict, criminal violence and social and new displacements.
economic crises continued to push people to flee. Disas-
ters triggered the majority of new displacements in the Norte de Santander was the worst affected department.
region, accounting for around 1.7 million. In addition, Around 30,000 new displacements were recorded,
about 404,000 new displacements associated with the highest figure since 2002 and 20 per cent of the
conflict and violence were recorded. national total for last year. The department also shares
a border with Venezuela, and its capital Cúcuta has
Hurricanes and wildfires triggered more than 1.2 been the main crossing point for refugees and migrants
million new displacements in the United States, the fleeing Venezuela’s political and economic crisis (see
highest figure in the region. Florida was struck by two Colombia spotlight, p.44).
major hurricanes during the year. Hurricane Florence
triggered 464,000 new displacements in August, More than 67,000 new displacements associated with
and hurricane Michael another 375,000 in October. disasters were also recorded in Colombia. Floods in the
Unprecedented and devastating wildfires triggered northern department of Antioquia led to more than
354,000 new displacements in California in the second 26,000 evacuations in April and May, when construc-
half of the year, accounting for around 30 per cent tion failures at the Ituango hydroelectric complex,
of the total new displacements in the US (see United Colombia’s largest and one of its most controversial
States spotlight, p.42). development projects combined with rising waters
upstream, raising fears the dam would burst.190 Torren-
Confrontations between different armed groups, intimi- tial rains caused several rivers to break their banks in
dation and extorsion triggered 145,000 new displace- the southern department of Putumayo triggering more
ments in Colombia in 2018, an increase compared than 30,000 in August.
with previous years. The government and the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a Around three million people have been recorded as
peace agreement in 2016, but to date the country’s fleeing Venezuela in the past 18 months, but the
military has been unable to secure areas the demobilised government’s unwillingness to acknowledge its popu-
guerrilla group used to control. The power vacuum has lation’s growing humanitarian needs means solid infor-
been filled by other armed groups vying for control mation about any internal displacement is scarce.191
of land, illegal mining and drug plantations and traf- Evidence suggests that it has been significant, however,
ficking routes. Fighting between two smaller guerrilla particularly toward border areas as people seek easier
40

A city bus burned by gang members in Apopa, 19

kilometres away from the city of San Salvador, El
Salvador. Photo: Shutterstock/ES James

access to basic services in Colombian and Brazilian try’s General Victims Law to include IDPs as a vulner-
border towns.192 Venezuela’s crisis escalated significantly able group and the Senate proposition to establish a
in 2018 as food shortages increased and the provision specific law on IDP protection in 2018 are positive steps
of basic services including electricity and healthcare forward.196
deteriorated.193
Mexico also saw 13,000 new displacements triggered
At least 420 new displacements associated with conflict by hurricane Willa, which tracked across six states
and violence were recorded in Ecuador, as the presence with wind speeds of up to 220 kilometres an hour in
of FARC dissidents and drug trafficking groups such as November. Many of these displacements can be attrib-
the Mexican Sinaloa cartel in the province of Esmer- uted to evacuations organised by the authorities as
aldas forced people to flee.194 Esmeraldas is a strategic a result of the advanced disaster risk management
location for these groups because it shares sea and systems in place in the country.
land borders with Tumaco, the largest coca-producing
municipality in Colombia.195 Joint military operations In El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, which make
have taken place on both sides of the border and the up the Northern Triangle of Central America, high
emerging situation shows that drug production and levels of violence, much of it urban, continued to trigger
trafficking remain significant drivers of conflict, insta- displacement. Gang activity, structural violence, gener-
bility and displacement in the region. alised insecurity, heavy-handed state security responses,
corruption and a culture of impunity have all been iden-
Violence associated with the drug trade also triggered tified as drivers of internal and cross-border displace-
at least 11,000 new displacements in Mexico, where ment in the region.197
the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacán, Oaxaca
and Sinaloa were worst affected. Figures on internal Around 246,000 new displacements associated with
displacement and policies to address it are far from conflict and violence were recorded in El Salvador and
comprehensive, but the modification of the coun- 950 in Honduras. Ongoing violence in Guatemala

GRID
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 41
suggests that displacement has taken place there too, gang violence have been documented. 205 Violence

PART 1
but not enough data is available to compile an esti- perpetrated by criminal groups associated with drug
mate. Of the three countries, not all recognise internal trafficking in Mexico has triggered displacement in many
displacement associated with violence let alone collect cities, including Ciudad Juárez, Culiacan and Tijuana.206
data on it systematically, effectively rendering the Direct and indirect security threats have also been
phenomenon all but invisible. It is clear, however, that observed to trigger intra-urban displacement, in which
many IDPs fail to find safety and security in their own people move from one neighbourhood to another, in
country, leading to significant numbers of cross-border cities including San Salvador in El Salvador and Medellin
movements within and beyond the region.198 The cara- in Colombia (see Medellin and San Salvador spotlight,
vans that gained momentum in 2018 are illustrative of p.81). 207 The scale and dynamics of urban displace-
this point. ment associated with criminal violence, however, remain
poorly captured and understood across the region.
Urban perspectives
Some countries have implemented successful urban
Many countries in the Americas have undergone rapid poverty reduction measures, particularly by upgrading
urbanisation over the last 50 years, and with it came a informal settlements. Many initiatives in Brazil have
concentration of economic development in and around combined physical and architectural with social and
large cities. Increasing trade and employment opportu- participatory components to prevent evictions and
nities have drawn economic migrants from rural areas displacement. 208 Urban regeneration projects in
and secondary and less economically active cities toward Colombia that combine improved transport, security
capitals and other major urban centres.199 Internal and social support have benefited hundreds of thou-
displacement has tended to follow similar patterns.200 sands of poor urban dwellers, including IDPs living in
These influxes have combined with natural urban demo- marginalised peri-urban areas.209 Disaster risk reduction
graphic growth to make the Americas the most urban- initiatives have also helped to mitigate displacement risk
ised region in the world, with around 80 per cent of its in cities such as Santa Fe in Argentina, Montego Bay in
population living in towns and cities.201 Jamaica and Lima in Peru.210

Its urban centres are characterised by the concentra- Cities in the Americas will play an ever-greater role in
tion of wealth in specific pockets and among specific supporting durable solutions and reducing the risk of
groups, creating socioeconomic and spatial inequalities displacement. Robust urban planning with a focus on
that drive urban poverty, segregation and marginalisa- risk reduction and conflict prevention will be vital if its
tion. Many poor people, including IDPs, live in rapidly triggers and drivers are to be addressed and its impacts
expanding but unplanned, unregulated and under- reduced.211
served settlements in peri-urban areas.202

This issue is among the region’s main urban chal-

lenges. Poorly planned urban development in the US
has increased disaster risk in many cities, and evidence
shows that disasters disproportionately affect poor
households living in exposed areas, often leading to
their displacement.203 Estimates also suggest that more
than 20 per cent of Latin America’s urban popula-
tion live in unregulated and underserved settlements,
many of them built in hazard-prone and often insecure
areas.204 This puts the urban poor at particularly high
risk of displacement triggered by disasters, criminal
violence and evictions.

Many of the region’s cities rank among the most

dangerous in the world, and cases of individuals and
families being forced to flee targeted and generalised
42

SPOTLIGHT

UNITED
STATES
California wildfires: urban
expansion and the risk of
displacement

The western US state of California is highly prone to

wildfires. In recent years, the combination of climate four times the area. Nor was it unique in how fast it
change and people’s increased vulnerability and expo- spread. The Tubbs fire in 2017 moved at similar speeds.
sure to hazards made the wildfire seasons longer What set Camp fire apart and made it the deadliest and
and more destructive. The extension of the two long most destructive fire in California’s history was what
seasons, the first spanning from June to September and happened in Paradise, a town which lay in its path.217
the other from October to April, has the potential of
turning wildfires into a year-round threat.212 Prolonged Paradise, a picturesque town in Butte county nestled
drought, higher temperatures, stronger winds and the in the Sierra Nevada foothills, had a large percentage
overuse of water for agriculture have caused significant of its homes in the wildland-urban interface, increasing
harm to local ecosystems, leaving forests tinder-dry and the town and its residents’ exposure and vulnerability
littered with dead wood.213 The increasing housing stock to wildfires. 218 Within a few hours of taking hold,
in the wildland-urban interface, where housing meets the fire had spread and destroyed most of the town,
and intermingles with wildland vegetation, also means displacing about 30,000 people. It was an example of
ever more homes are exposed to fire risk, which in turn urban conflagration, a phenomenon last seen more
increases the risk of displacement.214 than a century ago in which a fire leaps from structure
to structure igniting them as it goes.219
The state experienced the deadliest and most destruc-
tive outbreak of wildfires in its history in the second half Since the 1906 San Francisco fire, urban design and
of 2018, burning about 355,000 hectares of land, four development have included better materials and more
times the annual average for the past five years.215 More defensible spaces, space between buildings and grass,
than 100 people are thought to have died. At least 22 trees or shrub, to prevent fire from spreading quickly.220
wildfires triggered over 354,000 new displacements, Since the 1990s, however, millions of homes have been
accounting for almost 30 per cent of the total new built in undeveloped areas on the fringes of towns and
displacements recorded in the United States last year. cities. This has increased the interface between wilder-
The Carr, Holy and Mendocino Complex fires, named ness and urban areas, and the trend is set to continue
after the places where they started, forced the evacu- as ever more people move to such places to live closer
ation of over 90,000 people in July and August, and to nature and reduce living costs.221
during the Woolsey and Camp fires a further 235,000
people in November. If future urban conflagrations are to be prevented,
homes in the wildland-urban interface will have to
Camp fire alone killed 85 people, displaced at least be built with more fire-retardant materials and larger
53,000 and destroyed almost 14,000 homes.216 It burnt defensible spaces between them to slow the spread of
62,000 hectares of land and caused between $11 and fires.222 The California Board of Forestry and Fire Protec-
$13 billion in commercial and residential losses. It was tion recommends that homes have between 30 and 100
not the largest fire. Mendocino Complex burned almost feet (10 to 30 metres) of defensible space, but without

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 43

A view of a suburban Californian

neighborhood, after a wildfire
burned the hillside right up to edge
of the houses. Photo: Shutterstock/
Erin Donaldson, 2018

state enforcement of regulations on private property, ment. The disaster in Paradise offers an example of what
such guidelines are more often than not ignored.223 the future may hold if authorities do not enforce urban
planning legislation and strengthen disaster prevention
In an area that was already experiencing a housing and response.225
shortage, Camp fire left thousands of people homeless.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
has dispersed millions of dollars in assistance to those
who lost their homes, but many of those displaced
still struggle to find somewhere to live locally. FEMA
is encouraging people to look for housing in Sacra-
mento, 135 kilometres away, and further afield, but
this would disconnect people from their livelihoods and
social networks.224 The lack of available and affordable
housing in the area will inevitably affect those with
fewer resources the most.

The 2018 wildfire season in California demonstrates how

climate change and urban expansion have combined
to intensify fires, alter their patterns and extend the
seasons. Average temperatures will continue to rise
and populations living in the wildland-urban interface
to grow, exposing more people to the risk of displace-
44

SPOTLIGHT

COLOMBIA
Norte de Santander, where two
displacement crises converge

Two displacement crises converged in Colombia in 2018.

The one that has attracted by far the most media atten-
tion had its origins in neighbouring Venezuela, where
more than 3.4 million people are thought to have fled
the country to escape economic meltdown and hyperin-
flation, increasing criminality and human rights abuses,
worsening food shortages and deteriorating provision
of goods and services.226 Colombia has received more
than half of Venezuela’s refugees and migrants. Some
have continued their journey onward to Ecuador and
elsewhere in the region, but more than a million have Armed clashes intensified after the breakdown of an
stayed in the country.227 Between 300,000 and 500,000 agreement between these groups on illegal businesses,
Colombians have also returned from Venezuela since including drug trafficking. Not only did coca cultivation
the start of the crisis.228 in Catatumbo increase by 145 per cent between 2015
and 2017, but the expansion of the drug trade combined
These events have diverted the international communi- with the reconfiguration of conflict has led to a growing
ty’s attention and resources away from ongoing internal number of attacks against civilians.233 At least 31 social
displacement in Colombia. Many aid providers now leaders were assassinated in Norte de Santander in
dedicate less than 30 per cent of their resources to the 2018, out of a national total of 172.234
issue.229 Despite the 2016 peace agreement between
the government and the FARC, the number of new Fighting between ELN and EPL in January and March
displacements associated with conflict and violence restricted the movement of almost 18,000 civilians,
increased in 2018 compared with the previous year to whose access to basic goods, livelihoods and health
more than 145,000.230 In addition, 5.8 million people services was also impeded. Humanitarian organisa-
remain displaced in Colombia as of the end of the year. tions struggled to reach those affected.235 Children’s
education was also disrupted when 80 schools had to
The situation in Norte de Santander department, which suspend classes because of violence and the presence
borders Venezuela, is of particular concern. Around of landmines.236
30,000 new internal displacements associated with
conflict and violence were recorded in 2018, the highest The accompanying influx of Venezuelans risks under-
figure since 2002.231 Within the department, the Catat- mining livelihood opportunities for the department’s
umbo region has been particularly hard hit. Once a IDPs and poor host communities. The situation in the
FARC stronghold, the territory has since been retaken capital, Cúcuta, highlights some of the challenges asso-
by the ELN and the EPL, two other guerrilla groups ciated with the combination of internal and cross-border
which have been present in the area for decades. FARC movements. Not only is it a destination for IDPs fleeing
dissidents and other armed groups have also joined conflict and violence in rural areas of the department.
the fray.232 It is also the busiest border crossing between Colombia
and Venezuela, and hosts more Venezuelans than any

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 45

Venezuelan refugees and migrants cross the

Simon Bolivar Bridge, one of 7 legal entry
points on the Colombia-Venezuela border,
the largest entry point with over 30,000
people crossing into Colombia on a daily
basis. Photo © UNHCR/Siegfried Modola,
January 2019

other municipality in the country. Thousands cross the who cross the border into the city to move on directly
border every day in search of food, medicine and basic elsewhere in Colombia, or further afield to Ecuador,
services.237 Hospitals and other social service providers Peru and Chile.244 International humanitarian organi-
struggle to meet the growing population’s basic needs, sations, government agencies and the private sector
and local authorities are close to overwhelmed.238 have introduced initiatives to tackle xenophobia and
refocus attention on the true priorities of the region’s
Cúcuta has the highest unemployment rate in the unprecedented displacement crisis.245
country, reaching 15.8 per cent between September
and November 2018.239 It also has the highest partici- The government in Bogota has adopted an open and
pation rate for informal labour, at more than 68 per supportive approach to the influx of Venezuelans, of
cent of the workforce.240 The influx of Venezuelans has whom as many as 770,000 entered Colombia in 2018.
increased competition for this type of work. There are In a spirit of reciprocity, it has acknowledged that in
few alternatives and some IDPs report finding it harder the past, Colombians have flowed into Venezuela in
to secure employment.241 The integration of Venezue- search of better opportunities or to escape conflict
lans into the workforce is well recognised as an unprec- and violence. More than 574,000 Venezuelans were
edented challenge for Colombia.242 officially registered in Colombia as of February 2019,
240,000 were in process of registering and 218,000
This, in turn, has led to a rise in xenophobia toward had no legal status.246 Supporting these refugees and
Venezuelans. Threatening leaflets have been circu- migrants is rightly a priority in the region, but doing
lated in Cúcuta, Molotov cocktails have been thrown so should not be at the expense of those internally
at places where they live and they have been targeted displaced, particularly at a time when peacebuilding and
for robbery and extortion.243 The lack of opportunities reconciliation are key priorities in Colombia.
and increasingly hostile environment have led some
46

EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST

NEW DISPLACEMENT
(conflict, violence and disasters)
Ukraine 12,000

Greece 9,200

France 5,400
Conflict 12,000
Disasters 41,000 Tajikistan 4,700
0.2% of the global total
Kyrgyzstan 3,600

Every year, Europe and Central Asia have lower Ossetia. Similar conditions were faced by around
numbers of new displacement than other regions and 228,000 people in Cyprus, who remain displaced as a
fewer people living in displacement. However, a total consequence of the deadlock between the Turkish and
of 53,000 new displacements were still recorded in Greek Cypriot authorities over the status of the north
2018, of which 41,000 were associated with disasters of the island. Many of Europe’s IDPs have been living
and more than 12,000 with conflict. Almost 2.9 million in displacement for 15 years or more.
people were living in internal displacement as of the end
of the year, the result of old and unresolved conflicts There is no up-to-date information about displacement in
and territorial disputes in several countries. Turkey, but renewed fighting between the government
and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2015 and
The latter figure includes 800,000 in Ukraine, subsequent security operations triggered hundreds
where the country’s conflict entered its fifth year. of thousands of displacements in the south-east of
New displacements were recorded in October when the country. In 2018 the government began building
12,000 people were evacuated following an explosion new homes in the region as part of an urban renewal
at an ammunition depot east of Kyiv, thought by the project and to compensate victims of the conflict.
government to have been an act of sabotage.247 The Around 25,000 homes are thought to have been built
majority were able to return home two weeks later. to date, but it is unclear who the beneficiaries will be.
Around 200 new displacements were also recorded Some of the housing offered to IDPs for compensation
in settlements along the contact line, where ceasefire are far from city centres, pulling them away from their
violations including shelling continue. livelihoods and social networks. 248 Several people
who remained in their homes in areas affected by the
Around 344,000 people were living in protracted conflict, such as in the historic Sur district of Diyarbakir,
displacement in Azerbaijan as a result of the country’s have also been evicted to make way for regeneration
unresolved conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno- initiatives.249
Karabakh region. An additional 301,000 IDPs were
estimated to have made partial progress towards Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia accounted for an
durable solutions, thanks to the government’s efforts important share of the region’s new displacements
to relocate them into temporary housing. In Georgia, associated with disasters. Days of heavy rain caused
293,000 people remain displaced because of long- flooding in Tajikistan’s southern province of Khatlon in
standing territorial disputes in Abkhazia and South May, triggering more than 5,400 new displacements

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 47
and damaging homes, roads, bridges and farmland.250 many IDPs have managed to establish themselves in

PART 1
Landslides in the Jalal-Abad region of Kyrgyzstan their new urban environments.258
triggered almost 4,700 new displacements in April,
and floods 1,500 in the Russian republics of Altai, Tuva Housing, land and property rights are challenges,
and Khakassia in March. however, because Ukraine does not have a specific
mechanism to process claims on properties affected by
Storms and floods triggered at least 5,400 new the conflict.259 Nor does Ukrainian legislation list IDPs as
displacements in France, including 1,500 in the Ile-de- a group entitled to social housing. The local authorities
France area around Paris when the banks of the river in Bakhmut, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk have made
Seine burst in January.251 A riverine flood in the Piave efforts to address some of these issues with support
basin in Italy led to 1,300 new displacements in from the international humanitarian community.260
October, and flash flooding and storm surges pushed
a similar number out of their homes in Greece in late Local governments and international agencies have
September when a storm struck the island of Evia and also worked together to address displacement in
the southern Peloponnese peninsula. Kosovo, where policies have been put in place to help
municipalities support sustainable returns for people
A short winter, warm spring and record-breaking displaced by conflict between 1998 and 2004. The
temperatures and below average rainfall in the summer Regulation on the Return of Displaced Persons and
led to one of Europe’s most destructive wildfire seasons Durable Solutions in Kosovo, for example, calls for
in recent years.252 Approximately 3,000 homes were municipal action plans on the issue and emphasises the
destroyed in the Greek region of Attica in July, triggering importance of IDPs’ socioeconomic integration based
more than 7,000 new displacements.253 Wildfires in the on their skills, gender, age and disabilities.261 It also aims
Valencia region in Spain triggered 2,600 in August. to improve cooperation between national and local
authorities to ensure return conditions are comparable
The European parliament and Council of Europe across the territory.262
approved plans in December 2018 to improve the EU’s
management of disaster risk. The scheme, known as In many parts of the region, however, urban IDPs face
rescEU, will create a reserve of civil protection capacity marginalisation and unequal access to basic services.
to support national responses to the impacts of natural Those in many post-Soviet countries receive lower quality
hazards and epidemics. Member states will also share service provision than host communities, particularly
national prevention and preparedness plans to identify in terms of healthcare. 263 The dynamics of urban
and address possible gaps.254 displacement in Central Asian countries remain poorly
understood, but evidence suggests that urban renewal
Urban perspectives and beautification projects have caused displacement
in cities including Ashgabat in Turkmenistan, Dushanbe
Europe and Central Asia is one of the most urbanised in Tajikistan and Tashkent in Uzbekistan.264
regions in the world. Seventy-two per cent of its
population live in towns and cities.255 It is a diverse The Council of Europe called in 2018 for renewed
region, and as in other contexts, the drivers, triggers and action by states and regional bodies to address
impacts of urban displacement vary across it, making internal displacement in the region.265 Among many
it difficult to generalise. From Spain to Uzbekistan, recommendations, it highlighted the importance of
the way national and local authorities respond to the addressing IDPs’ housing, land and property rights and
phenomenon also vary widely. providing humanitarian assistance to those living in
protracted displacement. The role of local authorities
Many IDPs in Ukraine come from urban backgrounds, and cities in unlocking solutions will be central to
particularly cities such as Donetsk, Horlivka, Kramatorsk, implement these national and regional commitments.
Luhansk and Sloviansk.256 The country’s urban centres,
including the capital Kyiv, have also been important
destinations for those fleeing the conflict.257 Ukraine’s
towns and cities offer better access to services and
income-generating opportunities than rural areas, and
48

PEOPLE LIVING IN DISPLACEMENT AS A

RESULT OF CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

There were an estimated 41.3 million people living in These are conservative estimates that should be treated
internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence with caution. Each country and organisation that reports
in 55 countries as of the end of 2018, an increase of on the number of people living in displacement as of
about 1.4 million on the previous year. Around 70 per the end of the year faces numerous challenges and
cent were living in just ten countries (see Figure 7). limitations when it comes to compiling their figures.
They include inconsistent methodologies for collecting,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Nigeria and analysing and sharing data, reporting biases, political
Cameroon saw increasing numbers of people living considerations and out-of-date datasets.
in internal displacement. The end of year figures for
countries such as Syria, Iraq, India and Myanmar fell, but The data for 2018 shows, however, that as in previous
they remain among the highest in the world. years, millions of IDPs around the world have been
unable to achieve durable solutions, and the figures
As figures 7 and 8 show, displacement associated with serve an important purpose in reminding us not just
conflict and violence is highly concentrated, mainly in of their existence, but also of our collective failure to
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and address their predicament.
North Africa that are in the throes of protracted crises.

Figure 7: The ten countries with the highest number of people displaced by conflict and violence as of the end of 2018

Syria 6.1 m
Colombia 5.8

30.9 m Dem. Rep. Congo

Somalia
3.1
2.6
People living in

41.3 m
displacement in the Afghanistan 2.6

10 countries reporting Yemen 2.3

most IDPs Nigeria 2.2

People living in displacement as
result of conflict and violence in Ethiopia 2.1

55 countries and territories Sudan 2.1

as of 31 December 2018 Iraq 2

GRID
2019
Figure 8: People internally displaced by conflict and violence as of 31 December 2018
49

PART 1
50
Number of IDPs who have reportedly returned,
ASSESSING PROGRESS been resettled or locally integrated but who may
TOWARD DURABLE still have vulnerabilities linked to their displace-
SOLUTIONS ment: In some cases, IDMC’s sources provide evidence
that those who have returned, resettled or begun to
integrate into their host communities still face risks
We have not included people reported to have made related to their displacement. We have therefore
some progress toward achieving durable solutions in our accounted for these movements as partial solutions.
global end-of-year estimate of the number of IDPs. To
do so would have significantly risked inflating the figure In north-east Nigeria, for example, 86,000 people were
and double counting anyone who was displaced more reported as having returned home, but information on
than once. This is because most of the data on internal their shelter conditions suggested they had gone back
displacement does not track the trajectory or conditions to damaged or destroyed housing or were living in
of individual IDPs or households over time, nor does it temporary structures in their original place of origin. In
distinguish between new and repeated displacements. DRC, almost 1.5 million people were reported as having
For example, once an IDP has returned or left a camp returned, but there was significant evidence to suggest
with the intention of returning, this is the last we hear that their situation was not sustainable given high levels
of them. If they were to become displaced and counted of insecurity. In both cases, IDMC accounted for the
again as an IDP we would end up accounting for them returns as partial solutions.
twice.
Number of IDPs whose reported return, resettle-
Rather than continue to account for these people in ment or local integration cannot be verified: In
our global headcount, we have developed additional other cases, IDMC’s sources report only that people
metrics that allow us to shine a light on their situa- have left a shelter, camp, evacuation centre or host
tions and underscore the need for governments and community, sometimes with the stated intention of
data providers to capture the number and conditions returning home. No further information is available
of people reported as having returned or achieved about what happens to them or the conditions they
durable solutions (see Table 3, p.123). This is vital to face after leaving. Characterising these movements as
prevent people who may still be extremely vulnerable durable solutions would be both misleading and incon-
from falling off the radar. sistent with the Guiding Principles, which clearly state
that IDPs who continue to face risks and vulnerabilities
Total number of IDPs: The map on the previous page related to their displacement should still be considered
presents IDMC’s best estimate of the number of people internally displaced.
living in internal displacement as a result of conflict
and violence as of 31 December 2018. It encompasses In Burundi, for example, the total number of IDPs
a wide range of situations across 55 countries, each of reported by the International Organization for Migration
which is unique. The global total includes people who (IOM) declined by around 25,000 between 2017 and
have been displaced for vastly different lengths of time 2018 because security had improved. IDMC character-
and who face a wide array of challenges in their efforts ised this change as an unverified solution, because no
to achieve durable solutions to their displacement. If further information about these people was available.
IDMC is able to verify that returned IDPs or refugees are In South Sudan, the UN Office for the Coordination of
still effectively living in displacement, they are included Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and local media reported
in the global figure. that 12,000 IDPs returned. IDMC accounted for these
returns as an unverified solution since it could not obtain
This was the case for 9,000 “returnees” in Iraq who, any information about the conditions to which people
although they had returned to their areas of origin, were had returned.
living in collective shelters, in displacement camps or
with host families. As such they were, by IDMC’s defini-
tion, still displaced. They and a number of other groups
whom IDMC still considers IDPs but its data providers no
longer count as such are included in the global figure.

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 51

PART 1
Children run through ‘Bhola
Slum’ in the city of Dhaka,
Bangladesh. Many people
have been forced to relocate
to the capital as a result of
coastal erosion and other
climate impacts in the
country’s southern regions.
Credit: Mahmud Hossain Opu
for IDMC, February 2019
52

PART 2
INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT DATA:
FROM CHALLENGE TO
OPPORTUNITY

Internally displaced people

receive aid at a distribution
site, Gedeo Zone, Ethiopia.
Photo: IOM/Olivia Headon,
September 2018
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 53

WHY DOES INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

PART 2
DATA MATTER?

As the number of IDPs worldwide continues to rise and To be considered comprehensive and robust, internal
crises become increasingly protracted, it is ever more displacement data should cover the causes, triggers,
important that all actors working to address internal patterns and impacts of displacement in all its forms and
displacement have comprehensive and accurate data regardless of scale, including its duration and severity. It
and evidence. We currently have a good sense of the is also vital that such data is recorded using methodolo-
numbers of IDPs from country to country, but much gies that track population flows based on events and
remains unknown about the scale, patterns, impacts without the use of minimum thresholds for collection
and drivers of the phenomenon, particularly in urban and analysis, in order to fully capture and differentiate
areas. There are a number of unanswered questions between small-scale disasters or localised conflicts and
about the extent to which displaced people are able to major events that trigger mass displacement.
achieve durable solutions.
Data should be disaggregated by geographic, demo-
There are many good reasons to invest in quality data graphic, temporal and socioeconomic characteristics
and evidence. It helps to prioritise the investment of which also cover host communities to ensure that
resources and inform programming, policymaking vulnerable groups are identified and no one is left
and advocacy. It establishes a better understanding behind.
of internal displacement, which helps to forecast
and contextualise trends. This in turn informs better Significant advances have been made, including the
responses and contingency and long-term planning. development and use of innovative technologies and
It also sheds light on the costs and impacts of the methodologies that will be discussed below. Partner-
phenomenon on individuals, communities and states, ships at the national and international level need to be
which helps to make the case for risk reduction and strengthened and government agencies’ capacity to
promote the accountability of governments and other record displacement data improved. Greater collabora-
actors to vulnerable people. tion would also help to explore the untapped potential
of data to generate evidence and insights about the
Improved data and evidence may also challenge assump- whole spectrum of human mobility and its links with
tions and orthodoxies about the nature of displacement development challenges and opportunities.
crises, including those in urban areas, which remain
poorly understood. Solid baseline data and evidence at Along with political will, adequate resources and appro-
the national and global level is a precondition for meas- priate capacities, a clear and comprehensive picture
uring the success of efforts to protect and assist IDPs of the severity and scale of internal displacement will
and help them achieve durable solutions. Using data to enable those working to address the phenomenon
better understand the phenomenon over time, including to take appropriate measures to mitigate the risk of
displacement risk, is also paramount to informing the future displacement. It would also help donors and the
achievement of sustainable development targets and humanitarian and development community to prioritise
the monitoring of progress to that end. their spending and national and local governments to
take evidence-based decisions.
54

COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION:

THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
DATA ECOSYSTEM

WHO USES INTERNAL || Research bodies use data to analyse displacement

DISPLACEMENT DATA AND trends, patterns and impacts, collate and aggregate
figures, and to establish understanding of emerging
WHAT FOR? or under-explored aspects of internal displacement

|| Civil society organisations use data to raise aware-

A broad range of stakeholders with diverse roles ness, and advocate for policy changes, resource
produce and publish internal displacement data for allocation and more effective programming
different reasons. They include governments, UN agen-
cies, local and international NGOs and research organi- || Technology initiatives use data to identify better
sations. Some focus on data collection, others support ways to quantify displacement and understand its
its sharing or analysis and some perform a combination impacts
of functions.
|| Media use data and evidence for reporting and to
Internal displacement data is often collected or analysed inform the public
as part of wider exercises, or can be extrapolated from
reports that focus primarily on other issues such as The main functions performed by various actors at the
housing or protection. It often does not to cover the full national and global level in the data ecosystem are
scope of displacement crises, whether because of access outlined below. Some specialise in specific functions, but
restrictions, funding shortfalls, security issues or other many engage across a number of them (see Figure 9).
factors. Nor is the data that is collected always made
public to increase transparency and accountability. || Primary data collection: this is the process by which
actors gather specific information on IDPs and
Data users at the local, national, regional and global other populations affected by crises, using methods
level can be divided into the following broad categories: including key informant interviews, surveys and
various forms of registration
|| Governments, donors and institutional policymakers
use data to design laws and policies, decide where || Data aggregation: once primary data has been
to invest resources for prevention, planning and collected, it is consolidated with other data to facil-
response, and to track progress over time itate analysis, whether for geographic, sectoral,
temporal or thematic purposes
|| Operational (including coordination) actors use
data to inform responses to internal displacement || Data analysis: once data has been collected and/or
crises, collate and aggregate figures, and help aggregated, it is evaluated and scrutinised to inform
monitor trends and identify risks to inform future and support policymaking, operational decisions,
programming reporting and research

|| Displaced persons can use evidence to inform their || Data repositories: these are storage platforms that
own decision making, and to advocate for better host and preserve data according to specific cate-
service delivery, inclusive solutions and respect for gories, and which are used to facilitate analysis,
their civil, human and political rights reporting and research

GRID
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 55
|| Coordination: the process of bringing together the or the potential proliferation of initiatives, but the main

PART 2
work of different actors that collect and aggregate ones in obtaining comprehensive and quality data and
data to share information and, where relevant, align evidence – which emerge repeatedly during formal and
their efforts informal discussions – relate largely to a lack of common
standards, ineffective coordination and limited sharing
|| Research: the use of primary or aggregated data and interoperability.
to produce qualitative and quantitative studies that
explore specific lines of inquiry and answer specific Common standards
questions
There is conceptual and legal guidance on internal
|| Technical support and capacity building: the provi- displacement, starting with the Guiding Principles
sion of expert advice and training to governments and encompassing various resources such as the Inter-
and other stakeholders to build or reinforce their Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on
capabilities in areas such as profiling and other data durable solutions for internally displaced persons, its
collection methods Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in
Situations of Natural Disasters, and the Brookings Insti-
A number of processes, initiatives, networks and frame- tution’s publication Addressing Internal Displacement:
works focus on humanitarian or development data, A Framework for National Responsibility.266
and include internal displacement as a component of
their work. But only a handful focus solely on internal Translating this guidance into practical common stand-
displacement data. ards for data collection and analysis has, however,
proved challenging. There is not yet agreement on major
questions such as how to systematically measure the
ARRIVING AT BETTER end of displacement, and what the best methodologies
are for accurately capturing its different stages and char-
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT acteristics. This significantly hampers the availability and
DATA compilation of quality, comparable data and evidence
at the national and global level.

The displacement data ecosystem is complex, particu- Processes such as the Expert Group on Refugee and
larly given that actors often perform more than one IDP Statistics (EGRIS), established by the United Nations
function. Different stakeholders also experience and Statistical Commission (UNSC) at its 47th session in
prioritise challenges in different ways, depending on 2016, are starting to address some of these questions
their focus (e.g. humanitarian or development) and the as they relate to official statistics. The group includes
levels at which they operate (e.g. local, national, regional various governments, international experts and organi-
or global). Some challenges involve institutional overlap sations including the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the

Figure 9: Functions in the internal displacement data ecosystem

Data analysis: Local NGOs, research bodies, governments, clusters,
UNHCR, IOM, REACH, UNICEF, WFP, IDMC, PDD, ACAPS
Analysis Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other INGOs
Data repository: Governments, IDMC, HDX, IOM,
ti on UNHCR-WB joint data centre, WB Open Data Initiative
Re

ina Repository
se

rd Data aggregation: Regional bodies, governments, OCHA, UNHCR,

ar

o
Co
ch

IOM, REACH, IDMC

Aggregation
Data collection: Governments, UNHCR, IOM, OCHA, NRC, REACH,
UNICEF, WFP, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, local NGOs
Collection
Data coordination: Governments, OCHA, clusters
Technical support and capacity building: JIPS, IDMC, INGOs,
Technical support & UN agencies, clusters, WB
capacity building Research: IDMC, ACAPS, UN agencies, INGOs, research bodies,
governments
This graphic is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of organisations contributing to each category.
56
World Bank, IOM, the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS),
Coordination
and IDMC among others. It has been developing two
sets of guidelines for national statistics offices, the Inter-
national Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS) There are examples of good coordination on data collec-
and International Recommendations on IDP Statistics tion. But many displacement crises happen in countries
(IRIS).267 Building government capacity and developing where governments have limited capacity, or in some
this type guidance is important, and EGRIS’s recom- cases the political will to collect data. In the international
mendations will be an extremely valuable resource once community, while it is the role of the humanitarian
finalised in 2020. coordinator’s role to lead and coordinate responses
during crises, no single agency has the sole mandate to
In many displacement situations, however, govern- monitor and lead the response to internal displacement.
ments still lack the capacity and support, or have little Even where the Cluster System or other consortia
incentive, to collect data. Major data gaps are currently operate, coordination within and across them can be
largely filled by humanitarian and development agen- challenging, creating data collection and aggregation
cies, which collect the bulk of internal displacement issues that ultimately affect the quality of evidence.
data. But their operational planning and responses When national authorities lead the collection or aggre-
require information that differ substantively from offi- gation of data, typically in response to disasters, gaps
cial statistics. in coverage and the fragmentation of datasets across
ministries or levels of government are also challenges.
IASC’s guidelines to improve common data collection to Lack of coordination also is an issue internationally,
inform disaster preparedness and response, mentioned which can create confusion about the scope of institu-
above, outline the common datasets needed for tional mandates. This can lead to overlapping initiatives
responses to humanitarian emergencies. This govern- and ultimately the publication of less comprehensive
ance model lays out accountabilities and responsibilities and reliable data than would have been the case if
in data management, technical standards and recom- coordination were more effective.
mendations to improve data quality and interopera-
bility.268 To support the guidance, IASC has developed In order to avoid duplication and identify potential
and endorsed operational datasets, which OCHA has complementarities, new and existing data initiatives
disseminated. These articulate and share baseline data and processes should be linked and aligned as much
across sectors for mapping and other information and as possible. Opportunities to collaborate on broader
planning purposes. thematic research that goes beyond data would also
help to establish a stronger evidence base on internal
IASC’s durable solutions framework is also supported by displacement.
a library that builds on the IASC framework to develop
a set of indicators and guidance to durable solutions Data sharing and interoperability
analysis in internal displacement contexts.269 Such anal-
yses can support national authorities and other stake- Interoperable data is drawn from different sources but
holders to develop joint evidence-based responses to can be jointly analysed or compared to help consolidate
displacement crises. numbers and create more holistic contextual informa-
tion to support analysis, decision-making and account-
However to further improve the quality of the evidence ability. In practice, however, different organisations
base on internal displacement, national and interna- define and monitor population movements and collect
tional actors will still need to agree on clear definitions data in different ways. There may even be differences
of basic concepts and develop common metrics and within organisations in how populations, their move-
indicators. They could also build on existing indicators ments and their needs are defined. This means the data
from other fields as proxies, in order to monitor and produced tends not to be interoperable. At the national
analyse different forms of displacement. level, this can undermine the effectiveness of program-
ming and impedes critical insights into trends, patterns
and linkages between different population movements.
The lack of interoperability also affects efforts to aggre-
gate and analyse data at the global level, including

GRID
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for forecasting. To address the issue, organisations will

PART 2
need to share information more regularly, consistently
and systematically, with due regard for data protection
and privacy concerns. They will also need to identify the
different methodologies they use to collect data more
clearly to strengthen analyses and identify potential
duplication, overlap and gaps in coverage.

Box 1. HXL: making datasets interoperable and useful

One of the main challenges data users face is the sheer amount available across different platforms. One way to
address this is by labelling, storing and sharing displacement data in a way that allows for easier, faster and more
efficient access and use.

Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL, pronounced HEXel) aims to do just that.270 It is a new kind of standard,
designed to complement rather than replace existing humanitarian data processes. Supported by a range of part-
ners and convened by OCHA, it is intended to reduce duplication, improve interoperability, semi-automise data
preparation and make use of existing data visualisation applications using common tags and practices.

IOM, for example, uploads, updates and shares its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) data on the Humanitarian
Data Platform (HDX) as part of its standard operating procedure. It also adds HXL hashtags to improve processing
and sharing. Common tags include administrative division, geographical information, population, sector, needs
and incident/event. This helps to harmonise and enhance data quality and usefulness.271

Adding a row of HXL hashtags to a spreadsheet greatly improves interoperability. For example, #country+name 
identifies a column containing country names,  #adm1+name  always identifies a column containing top-level
geopolitical subdivision names and #affected+idps+ind identifies a column containing the number of individual
IDPs. Because the hashtags are standardised, differences in column ordering or even the number of columns no
longer pose a problem.272

Country Top-Level Geopolitical Subdivision Number of IDPs

#HXL #country+name #adm1+name #affected +idps +ind

Burundi Admin1 Nombre de PDI

Central African Republic ADM1_NAME IDP_ind

Libya ADM 1 Geodivision (EN) IDPs in Baladiya (IND)

Madagascar Admin 1 Total No# of IDPs Ind#

Nigeria State of Displacement Number of IDP

IDMC releases all its publicly available datasets with HXL tags to make it easier to promote, disseminate and share.
Tagging also facilitates data visualisation using platforms such as HDX and its tools.273
58

CRITICAL DATA GAPS AND WAYS TO

OVERCOME THEM

IDMC collects data from a wide range of sources, INCONSISTENT

including UN organisations, national governments, the
Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, international
METHODOLOGIES
and local NGOs and media sources (see Figure 10).
These organisations are engaged in a broad spectrum The lack of consistent methodologies for data collection
of humanitarian, development, human rights and other and analysis creates many challenges. When different
work. They also differ widely in terms of regional and stakeholders use different methodologies to collect
national scope, and the types of movement and metrics displacement data in the same country, it may lead
they report. to conflicting estimates of the number of IDPs, new
displacements or returns. This is turn has the poten-
Seventy-five per cent of the data that IDMC uses to tial to cause confusion for policymakers, donors and
compile its global estimates for displacement associated organisations on the ground, and to undermine effec-
with disasters comes from national governments. It tive interventions and the prioritisation of resources to
relies largely on UN and humanitarian agencies for data respond to internal displacement crises. In some crises,
on displacement associated with conflict and violence. constraints on humanitarian access to areas where IDPs
are present impede or severely limit data collection
IDMC uses the data provided by different sources to efforts. In others, more effort is required to ensure the
produce the best estimates possible of internal displace- added value of simultaneous data collection in similar
ment at the national and global level (see Figure 11). In locations.
doing so we have identified some critical gaps in data
collection that prevent a comprehensive assessment of This issue also makes aggregating and comparing data
the scale, nature, trends and impacts of the phenom- at the regional and global level more difficult, particu-
enon. Still, progress has been made in some areas, and larly if no adequate explanation for differing method-
new technologies and approaches hold the promise of ologies is given that might allow for comprehensive
significant advances in the future. analysis. This in turn hampers efforts to understand
the regional dynamics of crises. Collecting displacement
data will by necessity continue to involve a number of
stakeholders. Addressing this issue requires the develop-
ment of clear, harmonised and consistent approaches
to data collection for these actors.
Figure 10: IDMC workflow

Monitoring Compiling,triangulating, aggregating

Internal displacement and curating internal displacement data
(structured and unstructured data)

Assessments, surveys
registration data, media and Organized by
satellite imagery analysis* displacement
Conflict term
and violence
IDPs, evacuees,
forced to flee* Validation of data Publication of global figures
Disasters and analysis in the GIDD
in coordination with (Global Internal Displacement Database)
primary data collectors,
Housing
governments and other
destruction
relevant actors

Development
projects

* The list of terms used in this graphic is not exhaustive.

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Figure 11: Sources of IDMC’s estimates for displacement associated with conflict and violence, and disasters, by region

PART 2
|| Conflict and violence

United Nations
Sub-Saharan Africa

Clusters and Consortias

East Asia & Pacific Media

Civil Society
South Asia Local Authority
International NGOs
Middle East & North Africa Government
Europe & Central Asia National/Regional Disaster Authority
International Organisations
Americas Community Leaders
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
Non-State Armed Group

|| Disasters

National/Regional Disaster Authority

East Asia & Pacific

Local Authority

Americas

Government

South Asia Media

Clusters and Consortias
Sub-Saharan Africa United Nations
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
Europe & Central Asia Civil Society
Middle East & North Africa International Organisations
International NGOs
Community Leaders
Private Sector

Note: IDMC distinguishes between the the source, where the information comes from, and where it is published. Sources provide their own figures for IDPs.
60

SPOTLIGHT

DATA TRIANGULATION
What is it, and why is it useful?

The main purpose of triangulating data is to increase Triangulation is also useful in compiling the best esti-
its credibility and validity.274 IDMC uses triangulation to mates for new displacements associated with conflict.
validate datasets from various sources that describe the Ethiopia had the highest figure worldwide in 2018, and
same phenomenon. Doing so becomes even more rele- IDMC used data from 16 sources that reported internal
vant given today’s fast-moving news cycle, including the displacement during the year. IOM’s DTM reports were
proliferation of “fake news”, and the fact that anyone used as the basis for triangulation, and calculations were
can present unverified information, potentially leading made using the sum of positive variations between
to significant discrepancies in what is reported and reports at site level for the whole year. The DTM reports,
confusion about true displacement numbers. Around which covered only nine out of eleven regions in the
70 per cent of the information on disasters recorded in country, were published bi-monthly and people’s move-
IDMC’s database in 2018 was collected for triangula- ments were highly dynamic. This meant that relying
tion purposes. only on DTM data risked missing a significant number
of short-term or repeated displacements. Using only
The value of triangulation is demonstrated by IDMC’s IOM DTM reports, IDMC calculated about 1.5 million
method of estimating displacement associated with new displacements.
disasters in Afghanistan. IOM and OCHA each work
closely with local humanitarian organisations to produce To overcome this issue, IDMC used other sources
two comprehensive datasets on disaster damage. OCHA including OCHA, national and regional government
recorded 235 disaster incidents in the first six months of reports, The Directorate-General for European Civil
2018, and IOM 304 incidents. The datasets overlapped Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO),
geographically. OCHA’s covered 24 of Afghanistan’s 34 other types of IOM DTM reports and assessments,
provinces, and IOM’s covered 26. Twenty-three prov- and local and international media to produce a more
inces were covered by both. The two datasets differ in comprehensive estimate. This method allowed to reach
the terminology they use to classify disaster events or 2.9 million new displacements, which is almost twice the
damaged and destroyed housing, which highlights the number based only on IOM DTM bi-monthly reports. In
need to synchronise and develop common definitions order to avoid double counting and errors, the dates,
and metrics. type of movement, triggers, contextual information,
geographical and temporal coverage and access to IDPs
IDMC used the two datasets to analyse displacement were considered to determine which caseloads should
triggered by floods in May 2018. Using OCHA’s data be included or excluded from the calculation. This
on housing destruction as a proxy for the number of method ensured that a significant number of under-
people displaced yielded a figure of 24,589. IOM’s reported displacements were not left out, and at the
data on housing destruction produced an estimate of same time minimised the risk of double counting.
12,090 people. Additional IOM data on affected people
living with host families, in open spaces and informal Given the increasing amount of information, news and
settlements suggested that 44,884 people had been data available, such triangulation exercises will remain
displaced. IDMC compared the data taking into account important and necessary tools in IDMC’s monitoring.
differences in definition and coverage, and the potential
for double counting. It also triangulated the data with
information from media sources to arrive at a final figure
of 46,380 people displaced.

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DATA DISAGGREGATION: Data disaggregated by sex, age

PART 2
WHO IS DISPLACED, WHERE and other characteristics
AND WHY?
Data disaggregation is essential to ensure all vulner-
able groups and their needs are properly captured and
addressed. Different groups will require tailored inter-
A number of challenges remain when it comes to iden- ventions that respond to the circumstances of their
tifying IDPs’ place of origin, destination and current displacement depending on their income, age, gender
location at a specific point in time. The general lack and location. It is challenging, however, to obtain
of data disaggregated by sex, age, disability and other comprehensive data on key metrics disaggregated by
characteristics is also a significant issue that countries sex, age and other characteristics such as socioeconomic
need to address if they are to support IDPs in achieving status, ethnicity, and disability.
durable solutions and report progress against global
frameworks.275 Data disaggregation gaps currently tend In 2018, IDMC obtained data on displacement associ-
to be filled with qualitative and anecdotal evidence. ated with conflict disaggregated by sex or age for 12
Data disaggregated demographically, geographically out of 57 countries and territories, or 21 per cent, and
and temporally would also make a significant difference by age for 8, or 23 per cent. Some of the data received
in shaping responses, informing policy and assessing for other countries was also disaggregated in this way,
progress in reducing displacement. but the datasets either did not cover the whole country
or the whole year. Further, despite greater efforts and
Displacement is a highly dynamic phenomenon, making improvements over the past decade in collecting data
it difficult to monitor over time, and a number of factors on displaced children, there is very little information
make doing so more complicated still. A significant available about their age and sex, where they come
proportion of IDPs live in dispersed settings with or from, where they are going, why they moved, whether
among host families and communities, where they are they moved with their families or alone, how they fared
harder to locate let alone monitor. Some IDPs may be along the way or what their specific vulnerabilities and
displaced a number of times, while others undertake needs are.276
pendular movements between their places of origin and
refuge. Families may also split up, with some members Understanding these characteristics, the push and pull
remaining in displacement while others return home. factors that lead to their displacement and its impacts is
In addition, capturing pendular displacement is further key to designing responses that address diverse protec-
complicated by the fact that it is often missed by assess- tion and assistance needs and to better understanding
ments which are more prone to capture data on indi- the implications of displacement for communities and
viduals in camps or camp-like settings. states.

IDMC aims to gather and report information disaggre- Geolocation and geographical
gated by geographical area, including by urban and rural reference issues
locations, but even when such data is available it can be
inaccurate and is not always broken down by location.
Obtaining data disaggregated by specific location
Knowing what triggers people’s displacement is also continues to be a challenge. One of the most notable
vital to fully understand the phenomenon and the gaps in displacement monitoring is the lack of georef-
type of response needed. To address this issue, IDMC erenced information. Local data collectors often have
revised its hazard classification and developed a new a more accurate idea of where people move to, but
conflict typology in 2018 with the aim of improving its gaining access to such information at the global level is
reporting, and clarifying and expanding its data model difficult. This means that most of the data made avail-
to better capture how and why people move. able to IDMC is not geolocated at the site level. At best,
only the names of towns and provinces are mentioned.
62
In some conflicts, governments or non-state actors The main method used was reverse geocoding, in which
obstruct the systematic collection of data, or security coordinates are automatically allocated based on loca-
risks may be too high to undertake such exercises. Data tion names mentioned in the data sources. Automated
may also not be made available because of protection coordinates are generated using the centre of adminis-
protocols, and investments in data collection tend to trative areas, which reflect an approximate location of
decrease after the emergency phase of a crisis. This may where displacement occurred. If information is provided
mean that IDPs in hard-to-reach areas or protracted at the provincial level, reverse geocoding will only point
situations fall off the radar. Having accurate estimates to the centre of the province in question. Municipal-
of the scale of population movements, including rural level information allows more accurate locations to be
to urban, urban to urban, intra-urban and urban to rural determined.
movements, would also help to fill the stubborn data
gap on the number of displaced people living in cities Using reverse geocoding in this way is useful in under-
(see Urban displacement spotlight, p.63). standing where displacement happens, but most
sources’ data tends not to identify the origin and desti-
To establish a more accurate picture of where displace- nation points of peoples’ movements, which makes it
ment happens, IDMC applies different methods to difficult to understand specific displacement patterns.
georeference the phenomenon. In doing so, it gives This is particularly the case for fast-moving emergencies,
due consideration to the ethical implications of using hard-to-reach areas and less visible protracted displace-
such data. The aim is not to track individuals, but rather ment caseloads.
to understand broader displacement trajectories during
and after crises to inform improved responses and help
estimate future movements.

In 2018, IDMC was able to geolocate the origin or desti-

nation of some displacement flows. Figure 12 shows
the approximate geolocation of displacement reports
related to both conflict and disasters during the year.

Figure 12: Geolocated displacement events monitored by IDMC in 2018

Note: 11,511 data entries in the IDMC database by cause of displacement recorded in 2018

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SPOTLIGHT

URBAN DISPLACEMENT
First steps to paint a global picture

By some estimates, between 60 and 80 per cent of IDMC was able to address some of these challenges for
IDPs live in cities and “out-of-camp settings”.277 There the first time in 2018, and disaggregate displacement
is, however, no strong evidence to support such asser- associated with conflict by urban and rural location.
tions, and a number of factors make understanding the The EU’s Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) was
true scale and characteristics of urban displacement used as a basis for conducting the analysis. GHSL is a
particularly challenging. global dataset that assesses degrees of urbanisation
using census data from national statistical institutes
There is a lack of common definitions and method- and satellite observations.280 It provides multi-temporal
ologies to classify urban and rural areas.278 Different geospatial data, presented in grids of one square kilo-
definitions emphasise different factors including demo- metre, enabling a globally consistent and comparable
graphics, social dynamics, infrastructure, the availability classification of rural and urban areas.281 By overlaying
and provision of services and the way land use and the information on displacement sites with GHSL, it was
built environment are structured.279 Nor does displace- possible to disaggregate the data.282
ment data that includes information about the type of
settlement, whether it be a camp, out-of-camp setting More than 41.3 million people were living in internal
or spontaneous site, necessarily specify an urban or displacement as result of conflict and violence as of the
rural location. end of 2018. Information on displacement sites was
obtained for 19.8 million, or 48 per cent of the total. Of
Camps and camp-like settlements facilitate data collec- 55 countries where conflict displacement was identified,
tion because IDPs are gathered together in one place, information on IDPs’ specific location was available for
unlike urban areas where they tend to live in dispersed 12. Within these 12, specific caseloads were selected
settings among the local population, which makes them where good quality geolocalised data was available, for
more difficult to identify. Some may also choose to stay example from site-level assessments. IDMC’s analysis
under the radar to preserve their anonymity because of concluded that 52 per cent of IDPs were living in urban
potential threats to their security. settings in these twelve countries (see Figure 13).

Figure 13: Disaggregation of stock figures for 12 countries by rural and urban settings using GHSL as reference
80% 20% Syria

41.3 m 48% of these 48% 72%

70%
28%
30%
Nigeria
Iraq
People living in datasets have Living in 68% 32% Palestine
displacement as disaggregated
rural areas 44% 56 % Cameroon
result of conflict and information 42% 58% Dem. Rep. Congo
violence in 55 countries
as of 31 December 2018
(e.g. GPS coordinates)
52% 28%
28%
72%
72%
Yemen
Sudan
Living in 24% 76% Afghanistan
17% 83% Myanmar
urban areas 99% Libya
in 12 countries* 100 % Chad

* Percentages refer to the portion of the national IDP caseload that has geospatial information. In the case of Yemen, Chad, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Sudan and Dem.
Rep. Congo, more than the 90% of the caseload is published with coordinates. In other countries this proportion is lower: Libya 85%, Nigeria 55%, Cameroon 37%
and Palestine 0.2%.
64
Iraq provides an interesting example. The use of data
provided by IOM’s DTM, all of which was geolocated,
helped to paint a more accurate picture of urban
displacement. The analysis shows that 70 per cent
of IDPs were living in urban settings as of the end of
2018. Sixty-two per cent were living with host families
or in rented accommodation.283 Ninety-six per cent of
displacement sites were also within ten kilometres of
an urban area. At an even more granular level, Figure
14 illustrates urban displacement in Mosul as revealed
by overlaying data with the GHSL layer.

This exercise was a first step toward filling the significant

data gaps on urban displacement. Clearly, when primary
collectors geolocate and share their data, a consistent
methodology can be applied to illustrate the scale of
the phenomenon. As long as this kind of information is
not consistently collected or shared, however, it will be
difficult to paint a global picture. In its absence, policies
and programmes to support IDPs and host communities
and to help cities cope with displacement will not be as
effective as they might.

Figure 14: Iraq: IDPs’ location by distance from an

urban settlement

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 65
not focus specifically on displacement, which can pose
OTHER METHODS OF

PART 2
challenges in terms of accuracy.
TRACING DISPLACEMENT
FLOWS Mobile phone data

The number of mobile phone users in the world is

IDMC collects and analyses data on two main metrics expected to pass five billion in 2019, and anonymous
– stocks and new displacements, as well as on solu- mobile phone data offers a way to bridge data gaps
tions. Stocks are the number of people displaced at a and better monitor IDPs’ movements with due regard
certain moment in time, new displacements also include for privacy and data protection concerns. The use of
repeated movements, and solutions include returns, mobile technology in the humanitarian sector is not
local integration, resettlement and “partial or unveri- new, but it has been used primarily to support emer-
fied solutions” (see Part 1). IDMC uses a number of gency operations and disaster relief.284 Its use beyond
proxy data sources to paint a more complete picture the emergency phase helps to understand popula-
of internal displacement events. A significant part of tion movements before, during and after a disaster
IDMC’s analysis relies on data and reporting that does or conflict event, including their duration (see Box 2).

Box 2. Using mobile phone data to track displacement in Papua New

Guinea

Papua New Guinea experienced a 7.5 magnitude earthquake on 26 February 2018, which was followed by significant
aftershocks in the subsequent days and weeks.285 As many as 465,000 people are thought to have been affected
by the disaster, which left around 247,000 in need of immediate humanitarian assistance. Around 58,000 people
were internally displaced.

A study conducted in the aftermath of the earthquake showed the benefits of using anonymous mobile phone
data to track the displacement it triggered. The data proved particularly useful in assessing how far and in which
direction people had fled, and how their movements evolved over time. Because mobile phone data is uniquely
detailed and traceable, it can provide information that is not easily gleaned from other sources at such scale. On
the downside, only the movements of mobile phone users can be analysed, and it is not possible to assess people’s
specific vulnerabilities.

Papua New Guinea has a mobile penetration rate of 54 per cent, and Digicel is the main service provider with a
market share of more than 90 per cent. The study, which was carried out with the collaboration of the govern-
ment, the UN country team and Digicel, ensured users’ privacy was protected by following guidelines for the use
of mobile phone data published in 2014 in response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.

The data was analysed from several angles, first by modelling the relationship between the activity of transmis-
sion towers and their distance from the earthquake’s epicentre. The logs of calls and messages sent and received
via the towers also reveal population movements that can be tracked over time. Analysis over longer periods can
provide insight into return movements.

The study also combined mobile phone data with information from humanitarian sources including OCHA and
IOM DTM. It found that the humanitarian community had targeted its assistance effectively, showing the data’s
added value in monitoring crisis responses and disaster management.

The Papua New Guinea study illustrates the significant value of anonymous mobile phone data in tracking displace-
ment flows, including when it is used in conjunction with other forms of data collection and assessments deter-
mining displaced people’s specific needs.
66

Young Senegalese who returned home from Algeria,

Mali, and Libya interview one another about their
migration experiences. The initiative is part of IOM’s
Migrants as Messengers project, which uses peer-to-
peer messaging to fill gaps in information and ensure
people are better informed about the risks of irregular
migration. Photo: IOM/Julia Burpee, June 2017

Aerial and satellite imagery This method does not come without challenges,
analysis however, such as the expense of scaling up given the
cost of the images, and the complexity of the analysis.
The human validation currently required is also resource
Satellite and aerial imagery is useful in assessing intensive, and may lead to misinterpretation and errors.
displacement via proxy indicators such as housing
damage and destruction or the extent of flooding. The That said, new technologies such as aerial and drone
method is particularly suited to urban settings, where imagery produce high-resolution images, and recent
the ready availability of images can also help to track advances in artificial intelligence permit the extraction
reconstruction processes and estimate the duration of of information with very high accuracy, even if image
displacement. quality is compromised. This can help to overcome some
limitations from satellite imagery noted above. IDMC
For example, IDMC conducted a satellite imagery anal- continues to work with its partners to explore innovative
ysis exercise for its previous global report in close collab- ways of filling data gaps. This includes a study of disaster
oration with the UN’s Operational Satellite Applications displacement in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), where drone
Programme (UNOSAT). It aimed to assess displacement imagery is complemented by local data collection on
associated with development projects by tracking the ground (see Box 3).
the number of dwellings inundated as a result of the
construction of a dam in Indonesia. Similar method-
ologies were applied to estimate housing damage and
destruction in southern Turkey, because no other form
of data on the conflict in the region was available.286

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PART 2
Box 3. The Ramani Huria project: community mapping to assess
displacement
Ninety-five per cent of global urban growth over the next 20 years will take place in developing countries.287 As
cities grow, disaster displacement risk is also expected to increase, but a number of factors make assessing it at
the local level difficult.288 They include:

|| A lack of up-to-date population data

|| A lack of up-to-date urban plans
|| A lack of data on populations’ exposure, vulnerability and resilience
|| A lack of disaggregated information on possible vulnerability to specific hazards
|| A lack of national spatial data infrastructures that provide access to information, such as exposure, vulnerability
or risk models

To overcome these challenges, participatory tools such as community mapping have been developed to report on
events that take place at the local level. This type of crowdsourcing, which is combined with geographical data,
has been constantly improving as communication technologies and tools evolve.

One example of this approach is Ramani Huria, Swahili for “open map”, a project in flood-prone areas of Dar es
Salaam. Dar es Salaam is one of the fastest growing cities in Africa. Its population is expected to exceed 10 million
by 2040, making it a megacity. However urbanisation is largely unplanned and flooding occurs regularly during
two annual rainy seasons, the “long rains” between March and May and the “short rains” between October and
December.289

Around 70 per cent of the city’s residents live in informal settlements which are particularly vulnerable to flooding
given their poor infrastructure and drainage and a lack of solid waste management.290 Data and information about
the impact of large-scale floods are fairly easy to come by, but not for smaller, more localised events in vulnerable
areas, despite the fact that local residents are affected. The Ramani Huria project is supported by the World Bank
and DFID, and implemented by the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team. It has addressed the need for up-to-date
and detailed data on flood hazards, vulnerability and exposure since 2015. Through the engagement and partici-
pation with local communities, authorities, leaders, civil society and academia, it produces community maps using
open geospatial technologies and tools supported by the collection of high-resolution drone imagery.291

Drainage mapping
being conducted
at the Hananasif
Ward in Kinon-
doni District,
Tanzania. Photo:
World Bank/
Chris Morgan,
September 2017
68
there are many examples of such displacement lasting
DETERMINING years and even decades. This in turns means policy
THE DURATION OF and operational responses tend not to address major
DISPLACEMENT questions such as how to achieve durable solutions to
disaster displacement. Without time-series data it is also
difficult to measure and track the social and economic
With a few exceptions, it remains difficult to estimate impacts on individuals, communities and economies.
for how long people are displaced. This is a major gap
that is far from being filled, but it requires attention, IDMC was able to estimate a global stock figure for
especially as internal displacement becomes protracted. disaster displacement for the first time in 2018. More
As explained above, IDMC collects and analyses data and better data from partners was obtained, and
on two main metrics – stocks and new displacements, models to fill gaps and infer the number of people
as well as on solutions. displaced by disasters over time were applied. The esti-
mate for 2018 was of just over 1.6 million people still
Measuring the duration of living in displacement as a result of disasters which took
displacement associated with place in 2018. This is a highly conservative estimate, as
disasters it does not include people displaced by disasters prior
to 2018. More work will need to be done to refine the
model in 2019 and beyond (see Box 4).
The main obstacle to determining the end of displace-
ment following disasters is that systematic data collec- Estimating a stock figure for disaster displacement
tion stops long before IDPs have achieved a durable will not only clarify how many people are still living in
solution. Data tends to be collected only during the displacement at the end of a given year. It will help to
immediate recovery phase to guide responses. The reveal those who until now have been off the radar and
emergency phase is also usually covered by media so are unlikely to have been reached as part of disaster
reporting. IDMC has previously found that for more recovery processes or with initiatives to support the
than half of the largest disasters recorded since 2008, achievement of durable solutions. It will also help to
displacement data was collected for less than a month. assess the mid to long-term impacts of displacement
This makes attempting to assess whether IDPs have on societies and economies.292
achieved a durable solution following many disasters
extremely complex and resource intensive. More broadly, comprehensive monitoring and reporting
on the duration and end of disaster displacement will fill
As a result, it has been difficult to compile an end-of- a critical gap, which in turn will help the humanitarian
year estimate of the total number of people living in and development sectors to plan and implement more
situations of internal displacement as a result of disas- effective and evidence-based responses.
ters at a given moment in time (disaster stock figure).
Without this the aggregate global estimates of the Returning home, but under which
number of people living in displacement, including conditions?
those quoted in previous GRIDs, are incomplete. For
example, UNHCR adds its global number of refugees
to IDMC’s conflict stock figure to arrive at a global A core element of the Guiding Principles is that IDPs
displacement figure that is often published or cited by achieve durable solutions by returning to their habitual
the media and policymakers, but without a disaster place of residence, integrating locally or resettling else-
stock figure it constitutes a considerable underestimate. where in the country or further afield. To be consid-
This gap also encourages the framing of displacement ered a durable solution, this must happen voluntarily, in
as associated exclusively with conflict, when in fact it safety and in dignity and involve overcoming all vulner-
is a much broader and more complex phenomenon. abilities associated with displacement. Such outcomes
are particularly complex to achieve, and also to measure.
The absence of a global disaster stock figure also feeds
the mistaken assumption that people who flee disas-
ters are only displaced for short periods, when in fact

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PART 2
Box 4. Estimating a disaster stock figure for 2018
Figure 15 shows a conceptual illustration of how the number of people living in displacement as a result of disasters
at the end of 2018 was estimated. The time-series curves for the stocks are represented by the blue dotted lines.
The stock for disasters on a given date equals the sum of the values of each curve on that date.

Figure 15: A conceptual illustration of IDMC’s Figure 16: Estimating the decay rate for
disaster stock estimation disaster displacements
Magnitude of displacement

Event 1 Stock figure

1.2
Event n
Event 2
1.0

0.8

1.6 million 0.6

people remaining, displaced
by disasters in 2018
Stock
0.4
Un

“
“Universal” model curve ive
for returns 0.2 rsal”
model Uncertainty
Estimation of stock
cumulating remaining
displacement as of
0.0
31 December
0 20 40 60 80 100
Sep Oct Nov 31 Dec Time from onset [days]
Note: The time series for the 100 events are approximated by
exponential functions. The average of the time series is used to
fit the “universal” model, depicted by the thick black line. The
grey interval either side depicts the uncertainty in the prediction.

IDMC applied a two-step approach based on data gathering and modelling to estimate the number of people
living in displacement as a result of disasters as of the end of 2018. A data pool from a variety of sources was
compiled, based primarily on around 100 disaster events recorded in its database during the year. Each time series
describes the evolution over time of the number of people displaced in a specific location.

These time series were used to model the remaining displacement for each event. Due to the lack of data, the
model does not distinguish between different types or location of disasters, and is applied to all of the events.
A simple model was used because it provided a good fit with the observational data and was easy to interpret.
IDMC may construct specific models for hazard types or countries in the future as more time series data becomes
available.

IDMC derived a closed mathematical expression for the model. By using the most recent stock figure it had for
each of the events that took place in 2018, it applied the model and estimated a global stock figure of 1,601,150
individuals. Taking into account the uncertainty of the model, the number could be twice as high.

IDMC believes this to be an underestimate because the learned curve is heavily skewed toward capturing evacu-
ations, which dominated the time-series pool used for training. This type of displacement tends to last for a rela-
tively short period of time.

The same curve is also applied to all events, regardless of whether the reported figures correspond to evacuations
or displacements. This implicit assumption is an important source of modelling error because the same decay rate
is applied even to time series in which the reported displacement was inferred from reported destruction of hous-
ing. Again, given these issues, the true figure could be twice as high.

This methodology is a first step toward estimating a global stock figure for disaster displacement. IDMC will refine
the model by using additional and more representative data, testing and validating it against observational data
and employing more complex modelling methods. Taken together, these improvements will help to estimate how
the number of people displaced by disasters evolves over time more accurately.
70
The IASC’s framework establishes a set of criteria for of vulnerability. There are, for example, roughly equal
what would constitute a durable solution.293  They are: numbers of IDPs in Colombia and Syria, but their needs
are vastly different. Effective and targeted responses
|| Safety and security require a fuller understanding of the impacts and experi-
|| Adequate standard of living ences of displacement beyond the numbers.
|| Access to livelihoods
|| Restoration of housing, land and property Economic impacts of
|| Access to documentation displacement
|| Family reunification
|| Participation in public affairs
|| Access to effective remedies and justice. Displacement affects economies in many overlapping
and interconnected ways. Its impacts may be felt directly
Putting the framework into practice, however, has or indirectly, in the short or long term and at the local
proved a challenge. It is supported by the Durable or national level. Some are tangible, for instance when
Solutions Indicators Library that provides useful guid- crops and livestock are lost. Others, such as months of
ance for durable solutions analyses, but translating such lost education, are intangible. Impacts may occur at
analyses into numerical, universal and comparable data the time of displacement, when IDPs have to pay for
is difficult, particularly when trying to aggregate at the transport and temporary lodgings, or later when they
global level.294 It is hard, for example, to measure vulner- have to accept a lower-paid job in the saturated labour
abilities numerically and so to assess progress toward market of their host area. As part of IDMC’s research
achieving durable solutions. EGRIS is, however, in the into the economic impacts of internal displacement,
process of developing guidance and recommendations we have developed a new methodology to assess the
for measuring the end of displacement statistically, and direct costs, showing that internal displacement could
it is hoped that this will provide more concrete guidance. be costing countries across the world a total of nearly
$13 billion each year.295
Nor are many reported returns followed up on over time,
making any assessment of their sustainability extremely We were able to estimate the direct economic impact
difficult. When return movements are reported prema- of displacement associated with flooding in Somalia in
turely or go unverified, people may be “taken off the 2018 at around $19 million for 287,000 people displaced
books” before they have been able to achieve a durable from April to August. We also estimated the impact of
solution, which means their needs are unlikely to be displacement associated with drought between January
met. This happens, for example, when IDPs are reported 2017 and August 2018 at $500 million for 1.2 million
as returnees simply because they have left a camp, or IDPs, and of displacement associated with conflict over
because they have gone back to their places of origin the same period at $110 million for 423,000 IDPs. The
despite their homes having been damaged or destroyed. latter figures represent 4.7 and 1 per cent of Somalia’s
In order to capture such movements, IDMC has started annual average GDP respectively.296
recording them as “partial and unverified solutions”
(see Part 1). A better understanding of the longer-term economic
impacts of displacement is also needed to inform the
development sector about where and how to engage
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS in displacement crises (see Box 5).

AND THE SEVERITY OF

DISPLACEMENT
The number of people living in displacement offers only
partial insight into IDPs’ reality. Their needs and the
impacts of their displacement at the individual, local and
national level differ from one situation to another. They
may vary widely based on the duration of displacement,
pre-existing capacities and resources and current levels

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PART 2
Box 5. A
ssessing the economic impacts of displacement
IDMC’s estimates account for the costs associated with IDPs’ housing, health, education and security needs, and for
their loss of livelihoods. They focus on direct and immediate costs and losses for which quantitative data is publicly
available at the global level. Information such as the funding required to provide food to a given number of IDPs
serves as proxy for the cost associated with nutritional needs that result from displacement.

The estimates do not account for the longer-term consequences of internal displacement, nor its impacts on hosts,
communities of origin and other affected groups. As such, they should be considered underestimates of its overall
financial burden.

Dimension Metric What is included

Housing Cost of shelters or || providing emergency and transitional shelter solutions,

Data sources: Humanitarian Response Plan and temporary accom- including subsidies for rents or repairs
Humanitarian Needs Overview by OCHA modations || delivering needs-based lifesaving non-food items
|| providing water, sanitation and hygiene services
|| coordinating and managing shelters and camps

Livelihoods Loss of income || loss of income from work

Data sources: World Development Indicators
and PovcalNET by the World Bank, Displace-
ment Tracking Matrix by IOM

Education Cost of providing || restoring educational activities for children of primary

Data sources: Humanitarian Response Plan and temporary educa- and secondary school age
Humanitarian Needs Overview by OCHA tion || ensuring healthy and secure learning environments,
including in some cases psychological support to children

Health Cost of providing || providing life-saving food assistance

Data sources: Humanitarian Response Plan and food assistance || improving food production
Humanitarian Needs Overview by OCHA || preventing and treating malnutrition of children aged
under five, and pregnant and lactating women

Cost of providing || providing emergency and essential primary/secondary

healthcare in health services
emergency situa- || preventing and responding to outbreaks and commu-
tions nicable diseases
|| providing immunisation coverage for children aged
under five

Security Cost of ensuring || reinforcing and providing protection to IDPs

Data sources: Humanitarian Response Plan and security in host || preventing and responding to human rights violations
Humanitarian Needs Overview by OCHA areas || protecting children and women
72
An illustrative example can be found in India, where
Toward a better understanding
tropical cyclone Titli struck the states of Odisha and
of displacement severity and Andhra Pradesh in October 2018 and caused significant
vulnerability destruction, particularly in coastal districts. In the after-
math of the disaster, the authorities in Andhra Pradesh
Understanding how IDPs’ vulnerabilities differ from one recorded the extent of damage by housing type.
situation to another, irrespective of scale, is important
in painting a comprehensive picture of the severity of Indian families traditionally build different types of
the phenomenon and informing effective and targeted housing depending on their location and economic
responses and planning. IDPs in the Afghan city of resources. “Pukka houses” are relatively solid struc-
Ghazni, for example, were caught in the crossfire of tures built with durable materials such as concrete,
fighting between the Taliban and government forces bricks and timber. They tend to withstand the impacts
in 2018. Those sheltering in civilian protection sites in of cyclones reasonably well, but may be vulnerable to
South Sudan are generally shielded from such conflict, earthquakes. “Kutcha houses” are built with cheaper
but women and girls are at high risk of sexual and and less durable materials such as mud, thatch and
gender-based violence. IDPs in Mexico’s Guerrero state bamboo, which makes them vulnerable to most natural
are exposed to criminality and extortion. hazards. When kutcha houses are destroyed, they tend
to be replaced by pukka houses.298
These contrasting experiences of security are just one
component of displacement severity. Access to housing, By using the authorities’ classification of damage
services, livelihoods, documentation, family reunifica- according to the two housing types, IDMC was able
tion, public affairs and justice are also factors.297 IDPs to establish a better and more nuanced understanding
in makeshift shelters in Tanganyika and South Kivu in of Titli’s impacts on the local population. People living
DRC, for example, are exposed to severe weather and in kutcha houses were four times more affected by
fire hazards, while those in collective centres in Ukraine’s housing destruction than those living in pukka houses.
government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Those whose pukka houses were destroyed, however,
regions close to the Line of Contact receive free accom- are likely to have remained displaced for longer time.
modation but are reportedly at risk of eviction. Similar
contrasts exist in terms of access to services. The cost IDMC will continue to develop this qualitative assessment
of medicines is the main barrier to healthcare for IDPs of the severity of displacement to enable meaningful
in Donetsk and Luhansk, while for those in Tanganyika comparisons between countries, and to help monitor
and South Kivu it is scarce and poorly equipped facilities.  their progress toward resolving the phenomenon.

Assessing the severity of displacement and differing

vulnerabilities associated with disasters is also chal- HARD-TO-DETECT
lenging, mainly because of the absence of reliable data
on its duration and the different coping capacities of
DISPLACEMENT
individuals, communities and states. Some people are
able to return shortly after a disaster strikes, but many Some types of displacement are particularly difficult to
remain displaced for months or even years and find it assess because of missing data or the complexity of their
difficult to access effective mechanisms to restore or drivers and triggers. These include displacement associ-
rebuild their homes, land and property. ated with development projects, criminal violence, slow-
onset hazards such as drought and sea level rise, and
For each disaster event recorded, IDMC tries to collect overlapping factors. Data limitations also impede efforts
as much information as possible on housing destruction, to determine how many IDPs become refugees, and
whether as a proxy for displacement or for triangula- migrants return to a life of internal displacement. The
tion purposes. Housing destruction is a good proxy to result is an incomplete understanding of the displace-
estimate the magnitude of displacement. Also, as high- ment continuum and its dynamics.
lighted in the section above on measuring the disaster
stock, the duration of displacement could be used as Many reports of displacement associated with disasters
an indicator of people’s vulnerability. provide data on evacuation orders, but not necessarily

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PART 2
Box 6. W
hy do some people refuse to leave?
The most visible and tangible aspect of displacement associated with disasters is having to evacuate from one’s
home. This may take the form of self-evacuations or as ordered by local authorities. The challenge with accounting
for displacement associated with mandatory evacuation orders is that the orders cover more people than are
accounted for in temporary shelters.

At the height of tropical cyclone Prapiroon in Japan, for example, as many as two million people were ordered to
evacuate, but fewer than 31,000 were recorded in shelters (see Japan spotlight, p.30).299 Two factors account
for at least some of such discrepancies. First, not all of those ordered to evacuate may comply, meaning that the
number of people covered by evacuation orders is likely to overestimate the scale of displacement. Second, many
evacuees may choose to stay with family and friends, in hotels or elsewhere, meaning the number of people in
shelters is likely to underestimate the scale of displacement.

People’s reasons for not following evacuation orders are complex and multifaceted. They range from practical chal-
lenges for the elderly and those with disabilities, to a lack of timely and accessible information and the perception
and communication of disaster risk. These factors may also combine with people’s desire to protect their home,
pets, livestock and other assets.300 Socioeconomic factors may also be an influence. Some households may not be
able to afford to self-evacuate, and the same people may also be vulnerable in other ways such as being located
on flood plains, living in mobile homes or lacking reliable transport.301

on how many people obey them. This makes the scale

of disaster displacement hard to detect, given that many
people do not to follow mandatory evacuation orders,
taking the risk of staying put (see Box 6).

Displacement associated with slow-onset disasters and

environmental degradation is also complex to monitor.
It is difficult to distinguish from internal migration and
painting a comprehensive picture is challenging because
it encapsulates a wide range of phenomena, drivers,
triggers, impacts and movement types. More concrete
examples and evidence of how displacement occurs in
different slow-onset situations are needed to inform
more solid risk assessments and the evaluation of appro-
priate policy responses.

To overcome these challenges, IDMC has begun to

explore modelling and the interconnectivity of systems
to understand the complexity of slow-onset displace-
ment. A similar approach is being used to better under-
stand the interconnected factors driving displacement
associated with criminal violence in the Northern
Triangle of Central America (see Figure 17, p.74).302
74

Figure 17: Interconnectivity of systems

Shelter Infrastructure Crops / Water Soil Land
livestock

Physical Natural
capital capital
Income
Networks

Remittances Financial Present Social

capital capital
wellbeing
Savings Relationships

Health Human Political Corruption /

capital capital coercion

Physical Governance /
security freedom
Expected Expected Expected
Skills /
human social natural
education
capital capital capital
Perceived
wellbeing
Expected Expected Expected
financial Expected political
capital wellbeing capital wellbeing
elsewhere

Gap in
Expected expected Networks
physical wellbeing elsewhere
capital Past
wellbeing Savings

Motivation Ability Health

to flee to flee

Infrastructure

Displacement
Displaced
Population
population

Based on system dynamics and agent-based modelling drivers. However, the development and improvement of
approaches, IDMC is also mapping the ways in which these tools is still catching up with the demand.
policy responses and long-term investments determine
displacement risk. This helps to understand the circum- Using probabilistic approaches to estimate displace-
stances in which displacement is likely to occur and why. ment, however, requires highly localised and detailed
This approach will enable IDMC to model scenarios for information, and many governments lack the data
displacement risk in different slow-onset situations and needed to validate risk models and conduct full risk
with different policy interventions. assessments. More capacity building is needed before
models can be adapted to specific needs and the results
applied to inform policy development and investment
ACCOUNTING FOR planning.
FUTURE RISK
IDMC released its unique global disaster displacement
risk model in 2017.303 The first iteration, based on a
Many governments and operational actors recognise global model developed by the UN Office for Disaster
the need to understand future displacement risk. There Risk Reduction (UNISDR) calculates the average number
is increasing demand for displacement risk models and of people likely to be displaced every year by sudden-
forecasting tools that are able to estimate the scale and onset hazards (earthquake, tsunami, floods, cyclonic
severity of future displacement and reveal its underlying winds and storm surge).304 It calculates the probability

GRID
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 75
Figure 18: How is displacement risk calculated?

PART 2
Probability of
being destroyed
Probability of

= X X being damaged
Probability of not
being affected
Displacement risk Hazard Exposure Vulnerability
Phenomenon that may People and buildings How different buildings react
cause displacement in hazard-prone areas to different hazard intensities
(e.g. Earthquake)

and intensity of hazards, and exposure and vulnera- IDMC’s model also provides a benchmark for meas-
bility components to estimate disaster displacement risk uring progress toward DRR, including against interna-
(see Figure 18). The results are based on the likelihood tional frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for
of housing destruction as a proxy for displacement, and Disaster Risk Reduction, and the 2015 Paris Agreement
suggest that an average of around 14 million people are on climate change. It can also be adapted to support
likely to be displaced globally in any given year in the operations in real time by indicating the number and
future.305 location of damaged and destroyed homes caused by
modelled or observed hazards.
Because the model excludes those displacements asso-
ciated with pre-emptive evacuations – which is particu-
larly relevant for countries with strong disaster prepar- THE WAY FORWARD
edness capacity such as Bangladesh, China, Cuba, the
Philippines and Viet-Nam – the estimation of risk is
inherently conservative. The model is likely to be a closer The ongoing challenges associated with internal
fit for countries with less disaster preparedness capacity. displacement data are clearly interlinked. A systemic
response which develops common standards and
IDMC has since worked closely with the Swiss Federal improves cooperation, coordination and data interop-
Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETHZ) to improve erability is critical, if governments and other actors are
the model’s ability to predict flood displacement risk. to fully understand, prevent and address the phenom-
Increasing the resolution of the exposure layer from enon through better policymaking, planning and risk
five square kilometres to one allowed a more granular reduction.
assessment of the people and assets exposed to floods.
This, coupled with a re-run of hazard scenarios using New technologies and approaches have the potential to
the latest technologies, produced a more accurate esti- overcome some of the specific challenges in obtaining
mate that suggests the number of people at risk of comprehensive, timely, accurate and disaggregated data
displacement by floods is significantly higher. Better on a range of displacement situations. Used with due
resolution of the model also allowed the disaggregation regard for ethical questions of privacy and data protec-
of displacement flood risk figures by urban and rural tion, they could help to fill significant knowledge gaps.
locations (Flood displacement risk spotlight, p.84).
Armed with stronger data and evidence, governments
The evidence disaster displacement risk modelling and other stakeholders will be better equipped to
produces can be used to inform national and more understand and plan for future risk and to monitor
local disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies and invest- progress toward targets under frameworks such as the
ments, and to identify areas where large numbers of Sustainable Development Goals, the Sendai Framework
people risk losing their home and being displaced. It on Disaster Risk Reduction and the Paris Agreement.
also helps to identify the required capacity for evacu- More importantly, they would also be in a better posi-
ation centres and the amount of assistance needed to tion to address the needs of IDPs.
support displaced people.
76

PART 3
URBAN INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT:
RISK, IMPACTS AND
SOLUTIONS

Damage and destruction in Damascus,

Syria. Photo: IOM/Muse Mohammed,
November 2015

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Bogota has a long history of displacement. Today, Displaced people make their way to urban areas because

PART 3
more than 386,000 internally displaced persons are they are seen to offer opportunities. IDPs are often
estimated to be living in the city, around five per cent highly vulnerable and lack protection, but the social
of its population.306 City authorities have made different networks, jobs and services in towns and cities have
forms of support available and have established assis- the potential to help them achieve durable solutions.
tance centres for victims of conflict.307 Over the years, Ever better connectivity and new technologies, greater
some IDPs may have found a way to settle into their social mobility and planning aligned with this century’s
new urban environment, but others live in poverty and urban agenda hold the promise of positively shaping
deprivation without adequate housing or basic services. entire communities and driving national-level growth
and development. In principle, urbanisation and human
Bogota has also felt the effects of the political and mobility present great opportunities for individual and
economic crisis in Venezuela in recent years. More than social wellbeing.
238,000 refugees and migrants have arrived in the city
in search of jobs and livelihood opportunities, repre- Not that urban areas are spared challenges. Many cities
senting almost 20 per cent of the Venezuelan popula- have high levels of poverty and inequality, and large
tion in Colombia.308 With support from the national numbers of residents who live in inadequate housing
government and international humanitarian organisa- with few if any basic services. This is the reality for
tions, the city’s authorities have had to adapt quickly many, if not the majority of IDPs, and the differentiated
to cater to the new arrivals’ needs.309 living conditions in cities influence the ways in which
displacement is experienced and the way urban centres
Despite the sophisticated systems Colombia has to are able to support displaced people.311
monitor and respond to internal and cross-border
displacement, the complexities and rapidly changing How cities cope with these challenges affects the extent
dynamics of displacement to, from and within Bogota to which they are able to welcome and support those
make it difficult to paint a clear picture of the phenom- displaced.312 If IDPs are offered the means to integrate,
enon in the city. Assessing and comparing the living urban centres benefit from their productive social and
conditions of its IDPs, refugees and migrants and how economic contributions. Rapid and badly managed
long they have been displaced is equally challenging. urban growth and the forced movement of people
Even for those registered upon arrival in the city, there to and within cities stretches urban systems and the
is only limited information about whether they stayed, capacity of authorities and host communities to deal
moved to other locations or were displaced again by with displacement. Urban crises may also trigger new
disasters, insecurity or urban development projects. and secondary displacement, creating a downward
spiral of vulnerability and risk. How displacement and
Bogota is just one of many towns and cities across the urban change are managed therefore makes the differ-
world that are affected, and are being shaped by forced ence between systemic resilience or risk of collapse.
displacement. From Damascus and Sana’a, ravaged by
conflict, to Jakarta and Tokyo, struck by disasters, the This calls for a better understanding of how urban
drivers and triggers of urban displacement vary consid- displacement comes about, so that it can be effectively
erably, as do the capacities of national and local govern- addressed and reduced. Knowing how displacement
ments to respond. drivers, risks and impacts play out in urban settings
will be vital in implementing the 2030 Agenda for
When large numbers of displaced people seek refuge in Sustainable Development, particularly given the central
a city, the repercussions may be felt by whole commu- role cities will continue to play in shaping 21st century
nities and urban systems. Competition for work may societies and economies.313 Left unaddressed, urban
increase, as does the demand for housing, healthcare, displacement will impede achievement of SDG 11 on
education and other services. In this sense, urban making cities safe, resilient and sustainable, with knock-
displacement constitutes a local and national develop- on effects for the achievement of other goals.
ment challenge, and reducing it is a prerequisite for
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).310
78
rural areas. In this urban century, a growing proportion
DEFINING “URBAN” AND of displacement can also be expected to start and end
“DISPLACEMENT” within the same city. Urban centres’ capacity to deal
with the phenomenon varies significantly according
Given the lack of a common definition of what consti- to their size and wealth and whether they are main or
tutes an urban area, for the purposes of this report it secondary cities.
is defined as “a spatial concentration of people and
wealth that is usually reliant on a cash-based economy, Urban displacement is a complex topic that touches on
with relationships between the two shaped and regu- a wide range of issues. The following does not try to
lated by a set of political, social, legal and economic capture it in its entirety but will focus on the specific
institutions”.314 In this sense, both towns and cities are ways in which displacement risk accumulates in urban
considered urban areas (see Glossary p.105). areas and its impacts, and the main aspects of urban
life that influence the extent to which IDPs are able
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define to adapt. These include employment and livelihoods,
IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been housing and tenure security, basic services and infra-
forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or structure. It will also propose ways forward in addressing
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of the challenges of internal displacement in towns and
or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situa- cities across the world.
tions of generalized violence, violations of human rights
or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized border”.315 Urban
displacement encompasses forced movements from
rural to urban areas; between urban areas, referred to
as inter-urban; and within urban areas, referred to as
intra-urban (see Figure 19).

Towns and cities are common destinations for people

fleeing conflict, violence, disasters and development
projects, but also dispossession and loss of income in

Figure 19: Urban displacement flows

Urban and Towns Rural areas

peri-urban
areas
Displacement flows

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URBAN DISPLACEMENT IN THE CONTEXT

PART 3
OF CONFLICT, DISASTERS AND
DEVELOPMENT
Conflict and insecurity, climate shocks and changes in Unpacking the push and pull factors and the relation-
the rural economy erode livelihoods and drive displace- ships and overlaps between them is key to under-
ment toward cities in many countries. As such, urban standing when and why displaced people may choose
systems and growth are strongly connected to what to move to cities, stay there or return to their places
happens in peri-urban and rural areas. That said, of origin. Investments in connecting rural and urban
displacement increasingly takes place within cities, areas and improving socioeconomic and security condi-
whether the result of urban conflict, disasters or infra- tions in areas of origin have been shown to go some
structure and urban renewal projects. way in increasing people’s choices and reducing urban
displacement.320

THE IMPORTANCE OF RURAL

CONDITIONS URBAN CONFLICT, VIOLENCE
AND DISPLACEMENT
Disasters, conflict, a lack of livelihoods, land grabs, the
eviction of indigenous and poor communities, and loss Conflict and violence in cities may trigger mass displace-
of land, productivity and opportunity in rural areas all ment both within and from them, and the damage
push people toward cities.316 Extended drought in the and destruction wrought may create long-term barriers
Horn of Africa, for example, has severely disrupted to return and other durable solutions.321 Many of the
the ability of pastoralists and farmers to make a living world’s most recent conflicts have taken place in densely
in recent years. Options to diversify their income populated urban areas, as evidenced in Iraq, Libya, Syria
have become increasingly limited over time, forcing and Yemen. Other types of violence that do not reach
them to move to urban areas in search of alternative the threshold of armed conflict may also trigger signif-
livelihoods.317 icant displacement, as seen in Latin American cities
affected by criminal and gang violence.
People from rural areas are also drawn to cities by the
prospect, real or perceived, of better income and liveli- Urban conflict triggers displacement in a number of
hood opportunities, access to education, healthcare ways. Warring parties use cities as military bases and
and markets, and greater individual liberty and social as places to hide, and booby traps and sniper fire can
mobility. turn residents’ everyday routines into potentially life-
threatening activities. The use of explosive weapons in
Acknowledging that many IDPs who make for cities do densely populated areas causes significant civilian casu-
not want to go back to rural areas is also important. alties and displacement.322 The death toll from conflict
Young people and the more educated are particu- in urban areas of Iraq and Syria has been eight times
larly averse to returning. The majority of young IDPs higher than in other areas, and airstrikes and mortar
in Butembo, DRC, for example, decided to stay in the fire have displaced hundreds of thousands of people in
city because it offered them better socioeconomic the last two years in cities such as Hodeida in Yemen
conditions and opportunities than their rural places and Raqqa in Syria. The disruption of basic services and
of origin.318 A study conducted in Khartoum, Sudan, the destruction of housing and infrastructure such as
showed that IDPs with better education, higher levels schools, hospitals, electricity plants and water mains also
of economic integration and job security were more have direct, indirect and cumulative impacts.323
intent on staying to establish urban lives.319
80
Displacement patterns specific to urban conflict and activity. In other cities, such as Medellin in Colombia,
violence have been identified. Some people move to gang violence continues to trigger displacement despite
safer neighbourhoods within the same city, as was seen development gains (see Medellin and San Salvador spot-
during the battle for the Iraqi city of Mosul. Others may light, p.81).331
flee further afield and across borders.324 Parties to a
conflict may also seek to exert territorial control in cities
by expelling certain political, ethnic or religious groups.
This took place in cities such Baghdad and Aleppo,
where residents were segregated and their previously
peaceful coexistence shattered.325

Such politics of exclusion may persist long after a

conflict ends.326 Sieges have also been used in recent
Middle East conflicts, denying people access to food and
healthcare and preventing them from fleeing high-risk
areas, a serious violation of international humanitarian
law.327

Destruction, segregation and the presence of booby

traps, unexploded ordnance and other explosive
hazards are among the main obstacles to return and
other durable solutions. Returning refugees and IDPs
may unwittingly go back to damaged or destroyed
homes or neighbourhoods that are still highly inse-
cure, which may effectively mean they continue to live
a life of internal displacement.328 If the destruction is
such that service delivery and urban systems collapse,
conflict may also lead to “de-urbanisation”, as seen in
towns such as Bentiu and Rubkona in South Sudan’s
Unity state in 2013, when an almost complete lack of
facilities and services makes it difficult to consider these
as urban centres.329

Reconstruction costs tend to be extremely high, as the

case of Marawi city in the Philippines shows (see Phil-
ippines spotlight, p.32). The challenges associated
with reconstruction can be overcome, however. A UN
planning framework for the reconstruction of Mosul
published in January 2019 envisages rebuilding not only
homes but also public and social spaces, with particular
emphasis on markets. It aims to encourage investment
and stimulate the urban economy to create livelihood
opportunities for returnees. The restoration of basic
services and transport infrastructure is also a priority.330

Criminal violence can also have effects comparable with

those of a war zone, displacing thousands of people
within and from urban centres. Central American cities
such as San Pedro Sula in Honduras and San Salvador in
El Salvador have some of the highest homicide rates in
the world as a result of widespread criminal and gang

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SPOTLIGHT

MEDELLIN AND SAN SALVADOR

Urban displacement and criminal violence

Medellin is Colombia’s second city with a population of Similar patterns emerge in El Salvador’s capital of San
around 2.5 million people. Once considered the most Salvador, where insecurity and criminal violence also
violent in the world, it has successfully reduced poverty push people to leave their homes. For those who have
and violence over the last decade. Criminal gangs still been victims of crime or targeted persecution, it is often
operate in many peripheral neighbourhoods, however, the only reason they flee. For others, it may be one
where they continue to force individuals and families of several considerations, including economic condi-
to flee. Estimates put the number of people displaced tions and family reunification. Other factors are also
at between 5,000 and 15,000 a year. emerging, such as violence perpetrated by the security
forces, drought and food shortages.333
Displacement patterns associated with criminal violence
in Medellin are mainly intra-urban, as people move Much of the urban displacement that takes place in
from one neighbourhood to another in search of El Salvador is effectively invisible, because many of
safety. Where they move to is influenced by a number those affected prefer to remain anonymous for fear of
of factors, including family ties, economic opportuni- reprisals. Most, however, is known to take place from
ties and the nature of the threats they face. A fifth of informal settlements in peri-urban areas of large towns
respondents in a recent study said they had fled violence and cities. IDPs tend to move to safer neighbourhoods in
more than once.332 Returns only tend to take place once the same city in an effort to minimise disruption to their
a new gang has taken control of the area, the reason work, education and family and social networks. If they
for flight, such as an unpaid debt, has been resolved or are unable to find a viable local option, however, or if
generalised violence has abated. The activities of street the threats or violence they face are severe, people will
gangs appear to trigger most of the displacement. flee further afield, whether it be to another city, depart-
ment or country. In fact, what was previously a largely
The same study identified two different types of trigger intra-urban phenomenon appears to be becoming
for displacement: targeted gang violence, including less so. Some urban-to-rural displacement has been
gender-based violence, forced recruitment, extortion observed and it is thought to be increasing, but many
and threats against community leaders based on their more people choose to leave the country instead.
rights activism; and generalised violence fuelled by
shootouts between gangs or clashes between gangs Several similar patterns emerge in the displacement
and police that may lead whole neighbourhood blocks occurring in Medellin and San Salvador. Much of it
to flee. takes place in marginal neighbourhoods and many
people flee within the same city, to minimise the disrup-
Medellin’s IDPs tend to share socioeconomic condi- tion to their lives, but others flee beyond the city and
tions and characteristics. They are usually younger, have even country borders. As increasing numbers of case
more children and are more likely to have been active studies shed light on the drivers, triggers and impacts of
in their community than their non-displaced peers. displacement associated with criminal violence in Latin
They are also likely to incur significant financial and American cities, the issue can no longer be ignored.334
social losses as result of their displacement. Many lack
tenure documents for their homes, and for property
owners, violence tends to drive down prices. Many
IDPs also struggle to find work and afford three meals
a day, and children’s education is disrupted even if only
temporarily.
82
deltas and estuaries, and climate change is increasing
URBAN DISASTERS AND the frequency and intensity of weather-related hazards.
DISPLACEMENT Depending on their location, cities may also be exposed
to climate change impacts such as sea level rise, coastal
The close relationship between rapid and badly erosion, salinisation, extreme temperatures and water
managed urbanisation and heightened disaster risk is scarcity.338
well recognised. When hazards hit urban areas, the
concentration of people and assets and the vulner- Beyond hazard intensity, urban disaster displacement
ability of residents and the built environment can lead risk is largely determined by the way cities are planned,
to catastrophic outcomes.335 Displacement associated developed and built. Kathmandu, which has undergone
with disasters has only recently been acknowledged rapid and largely unplanned and informal urban growth
in national policies and international frameworks. The in recent decades, is a case in point. Most of the 2.6
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is impor- million people estimated to have been displaced by the
tant in this sense, because it mentions disaster displace- devastating earthquake that struck Nepal in 2015 were
ment and its risks among the main global challenges living in the country’s capital.339
to address in ensuring communities and countries are
resilient.336 The New Urban Agenda reinforces this need The city’s authorities were already aware about the link
as it applies to towns and cities.337 between disaster risk and urban development. They
had devised a risk-sensitive land use plan for 2010
Given the rapid urbanisation the world is undergoing, to 2020, intended to guide urban development that
people’s exposure and vulnerability to disasters and the reduced seismic risk and improved disaster resilience.340
displacement they trigger is likely to continue to rise. The earthquake severely disrupted Kathmandu’s urban
Many major and expanding urban areas are located system, but it also became an opportunity to accelerate
in hazard-prone areas such as seismic zones, coasts, implementation of the plan, acting as a reminder that

Marginalized communities in the neighbou-

rhood of Iztapalapa, in Mexico City, were still
living in displacement a year after the 2017
earthquake, at risk of flooding and diseases.
Photo: IDMC/Vicente Anzellini, August 2018

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robust urban planning, land use regulation, zoning and quake when many buildings that were not compliant

PART 3
building standards are vital in reducing urban disaster with the building code collapsed.348 The recovery
and displacement risk. The same applies in other cities process was also blighted by a lack of transparency.349
and for other hazards, particularly floods that displace Civil society organisations have developed promising
large numbers of people every year (see Flood displace- approaches to challenging and tackling corruption
ment risk spotlight, p.84).341 before, during and after disasters, but a better under-
standing is needed of how it continues to impact risk
Stark differences exist within cities in how risk is distrib- levels and people affected, including IDPs.350
uted. Disaster impacts are often highly localised and
affect only a small proportion of the urban population. Most future displacement associated with disasters
There is, in effect, an urban segregation of disaster and is expected to take place in urban settings. Disasters
displacement risk.342 Not all areas of Rio de Janeiro, for also have the potential to cause the collapse of urban
example, are exposed to flooding and landslides and systems, markets and supply chains, with short and
not all homes are vulnerable to destruction. Those that long-term implications for cities’ residents and econo-
are often lack water and sanitation infrastructure, a mies. As such, displacement should become part of a
common feature of low-income neighbourhoods and broader conversation about the reduction and manage-
informal settlements.343 ment of urban disaster risk that also covers planning,
governance and poverty reduction.
Urban poverty and inequality play a significant role in
the dynamics of urban disasters and the distribution
of displacement risk. In cities such as in Mumbai and
Kolkata in India, high levels of exposure to hazards such
as floods combine with high levels of vulnerability, poor
education and limited access to critical infrastructure
and livelihood opportunities.344 This not only increases
displacement risk and impacts. Recovery also takes
longer if people do not have the financial resources to
rebuild or move elsewhere and impoverishment contrib-
utes to making displacement protracted.

Unplanned and poorly managed urban growth combine

with poverty to aggravate the impacts of disaster
displacement. Urban expansion has grown in parallel
to Nigeria’s economic boom, but the percentage of the
population living in extreme poverty continues to rise.345
Lagos, Nigeria’s economic hub, is growing rapidly and is
soon expected to become one of the world’s 20 most
populated cities.346 The city has attracted investment in
recent years and more roads and other infrastructure
have been built, reducing its water run-off capacity,
and poor drainage systems are unable to cope with
the rainy season. The result is urban flooding.347 The
poor, who make up most of the city’s residents, are
disproportionately affected and many are displaced,
as happened most notably in 2012 and again last year.

Corruption is also a pervasive underlying driver of urban

disaster displacement risk. Mexico City, for example,
has stringent construction standards, but corruption
continues to compromise compliance. This can have
serious consequences as witnessed in the 2017 earth-
84

SPOTLIGHT

FLOOD DISPLACEMENT RISK

An urban perspective

Floods are the most common hazard to affect towns Eighty per cent, or 14.2 million, live in urban and peri-
and cities around the world, which means that miti- urban areas (see Figure 20). Flood displacement risk is
gating the risk of urban flooding would considerably highest in South Asia and East Asia and Pacific, and also
reduce future disaster displacement. IDMC improved its high in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 21).
global disaster displacement risk model for floods, and
results show that around 80 per cent of the people at The model also allows the assessment of displacement
risk of displacement associated with riverine flooding risk at the subnational level to reveal hotspots, which
live in urban and peri-urban areas. unsurprisingly are urban areas. Dhaka, the capital
of Bangladesh and home to more than nine million
By using more granular exposure data for its modelling people, is traversed by six rivers that have been vital to
and disaggregating the results by urban and rural loca- trade, transport and livelihoods for centuries. In recent
tions, IDMC was able to calculate that on average 17.8 years, however, rapid urbanisation and badly managed
million people worldwide are at risk of being displaced embankment and drainage schemes have increased the
by floods every year, far more than previously thought. risk of flooding and waterlogging.351

Figure 20: Global flood displacement risk

Dhaka

Bangladesh Dhaka Division Dhaka City

People at risk of being displaced

by floods
Roads (Source: OSM) High risk of displacement
Rivers (Source: OSM) Low risk of displacement

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Figure 21: Flood displacement risk, by region

South Asia 92.2%

East Asia
and Pacific
80.1%

Sub-Saharan
Africa
76.1%

Europe and
Central Asia
62.7%

Americas 50.7%
AAD Urban

Middle East and

North Africa
75.6% AAD Rural

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Average Annual Displacement - AAD, in millions

As the city continues to expand, this risk will grow with Given that no climate change scenarios were applied
city’s population unless adequate measures to reduce to the model and that it uses current levels of expo-
it are put in place. By revealing where in Dhaka flood sure, future climate variations and urban growth have
displacement risk is concentrated, the results identify the potential to increase the displacement risk revealed
areas where interventions are most needed (see Figure significantly.
22). Such metrics are useful to decision-makers at the
local, national and global level to inform planning and
investments in disaster risk reduction. This in turn will
help to prevent displacement and reduce its impacts.

Figure 22: Flood displacement risk in Dhaka, Bangladesh

86
Development-based displacement may be a slow process
URBAN DEVELOPMENT that evolves over months or even years, but it sometimes
PROJECTS AND takes the form of sudden movements when people are
DISPLACEMENT evicted. Evictions are not by definition unlawful, but
there are concerns that in reality many are because they
violate people’s rights (see Nairobi spotlight, p.88).
From large-scale infrastructure projects to local gentri- Displacement to make way for development projects
fication initiatives, urban development can trigger is often justified as being in the public interest, but it
displacement. The construction of infrastructure, the often lacks the prospect of durable solutions for those
upgrading of neighbourhoods and gradual changes in affected.352
housing markets can force people to move with little or
no respect for their rights, including to relocation and The UN’s Basic Principles and Guidelines on Develop-
compensation. The scale, severity and visibility of this ment-based Evictions and Displacement recognise that
type of displacement vary depending on the project forced evictions “share many consequences similar to
or change taking place, and there are also significant those resulting from arbitrary displacement” as defined
differences in the phenomenon between countries and in the Guiding Principles. They also highlight the fact
regions. that forced evictions violate the right to housing. The
guidelines, together with the right to adequate housing,
Data is sparse and difficult to obtain, and greater efforts constitute a strong normative framework to guide policy
are needed to fill this significant information gap. There and practice on urban housing and neighbourhood
is currently no global estimate of the scale of displace- regeneration that prevent displacement and reduce its
ment associated with development projects, but the impacts.353
first attempts to compile one reveal significant risk in
urban areas (see Box 7). Adopting a human rights approach to make visible the
challenges of displacement, evictions and resettlement

Box 7. Development and displacement: an urban glimpse of a global issue

IDMC began to explore approaches to estimating the number of people at risk of being displaced by development
projects in 2017. One such approach was to review data on projects funded by the World Bank, which represent
only a fraction of those that involve displacing or relocating people, but on which documentation was available.354

The World Bank has some of the most rigorous environmental and social standards and reporting requirements for
infrastructure investments. It is one of the few institutions to publish resettlement plans.355 An analysis of nearly
600 of its resettlement plans, published between 2014 and 2017, identified more than 130,000 people at risk of
displacement in 77 countries. Most of the projects assessed were in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia
and Pacific.

Taking the projects in the dataset that could be geolocated, 70 per cent of the people at risk of displacement
were identified as living in urban and peri-urban areas. The project’s scale and nature varied from small and highly
localised to medium and large-scale initiatives, some of which cut across municipalities, provinces or, in the case
of roads and pipelines, even countries. Some also cut across sectors.

Efforts to fully understand and report on this phenomenon are still in their infancy, but new methodologies and
technologies such as satellite imagery analysis, economic and built environment growth projections and demo-
graphic change analysis offer the prospect of gradually painting a comprehensive picture.

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associated with developments projects is useful, but it Many questions about displacement associated with

PART 3
does not easily translate into practical action. Situating developments projects arise, among them the role of
it within national and international sustainable develop- the private sector. States are the ultimate duty bearers
ment frameworks would help identifying steps towards when it comes to addressing the impacts of displace-
reducing displacement risk and impacts by applying ment, but this does not absolve other parties of all
more inclusive approaches that respect people’s rights responsibility.363 A better understanding is needed of
and promote sustainable solutions.356 how real-estate and other private sector investments
trigger urban displacement, and how they can play a
Good examples of more inclusive approaches to reset- role in reducing displacement risk.
tlement do exist. An urban development project led
by the Wold Bank in Nouakchott, Mauritania in 2004 Gentrification has played an increasingly significant role
involved resettling 2,300 households. Participatory in urban demographic change and displacement.364
approaches were used and socioeconomic studies that In cities of emerging and high-income economies
informed the process were conducted to minimise the and neighbourhoods, it often involves large capital
negative impacts on those forced to move. The Artisan investments in urban renewal processes that lead to
and Fez Medina project in Morocco, included a reset- changes in the built environment and land-use of an
tlement programme that focused on maintaining IDPs’ unattractive neighbourhood to raise its socioeconomic
jobs, even for those in informal work, during and after status. It can also result in evictions and other forms of
the project.357 displacement.365

All too often, however, the displacement of poor and High gentrification rates in San Francisco have made
marginalised populations happens without any such many neighbourhoods increasingly unaffordable to
support, rarely attracting the attention of national or local residents, leading to the displacement of some
international organisations or the media.358 The eviction lower-income families.366 Large numbers of evictions
of people from informal settlements has short and long- are recorded in the US every year, but little information
term effects on those affected, and for many the loss is available on how long those affected are displaced
of their homes often means the loss of their livelihoods for.367 The relationship between gentrification and
too.359 Nor do the urban poor tend to benefit from the displacement generally is complex, and its drivers,
projects they are displaced to make way for, whether patterns and impacts poorly understood.368
they be neighbourhood upgrades, shopping malls or
high-speed city trains.360 Homelessness can be also linked to gentrification in
some situations.369 The relationship between displace-
State-driven affordable housing schemes in India have ment and homelessness is hard to define, however,
been promoted as upgrading slums and reducing and differentiating between homeless people and
poverty. In the cities of Mumbai, Vishakhapatnam and IDPs can be difficult, particularly in urban settings.370
Raipur, however, making the case for “slum free cities” Yet, it is unlikely that most homeless people would
has been used to justify infrastructure megaprojects be considered IDPs, and many displaced people have
that have been detrimental to the urban poor and trig- shelter and do not consider themselves homeless.371
gered evictions. The two groups do, however, tend to suffer similar
discrimination, marginalisation, impoverishment and
Many people were displaced toward urban peripheries human rights violations.
without being considered or consulted in decision-
making processes.361 Others said their new homes had The data and knowledge gaps on urban displacement
not been adapted to their livelihoods and were discon- associated with development projects should not
nected from markets and other urban services. Beyond detract from the significance of the phenomenon. In
the physical loss and deprivation people suffered, an ever-more urbanised world, people forced to move
impacts on people’s feelings of wellbeing and other by development, renewal and expansion in towns and
mental health issues caused by displacement also came cities should not be left behind.
to light.362
88

SPOTLIGHT

NAIROBI
Development and displacement

Nairobi is one of the fastest growing cities in the world.372 flies in the face of commitments made by the govern-
Natural population increase, international migrants and ment to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals”.377
refugees, IDPs and internal economic migrants have Nairobi illustrates the problems that many cities in low
all contributed to shaping the urban landscape and and middle-income countries will face in the coming
demography. decades if the risk and drivers of urban displacement
are not addressed. The quality of infrastructure and the
Ethnic, political and economic disputes over land and way it is built will play an important role in determining
property have also played a part in the Kenyan capital’s the risks and impacts of displacement, as will the types
development for decades. Powerful groups have carved of governance and accountability mechanisms in place
the city up to their benefit through land acquisition and to oversee and manage urban development.378
evictions.373

These dynamics have created a city divided by income

and ethnicity, in which half of the population is concen-
trated in just two per cent of the metropolitan area.374
Electoral violence and disasters have triggered urban
displacement, and the city’s social and spatial divergence
aggravate the risk of new and secondary movements.375

More than 30,000 people were evicted from an informal

settlement in July 2018 to make way for a road. The
project and its consequences were justified as being in
the public interest. The Kenya Urban Roads Authority,
the National Land Commission and the Kenya National
Commission on Human Rights reached an agreement
before the evictions took place meaning that, on paper
at least, the process was legal.

Kenya’s 2012 law on internal displacement states that

when no feasible alternatives exist, the government is
obliged to seek the free and informed consent of the
people to be displaced by a development project, and is
responsible for providing those affected with a durable
solution.376

In reality, however, people were evicted without

adequate notice, and homes and schools were bull-
dozed. The situation was condemned by the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, who
Over half of Nairobi’s population lives in just two per cent of the
said “the destruction of houses, schools and a place of metropolitan area. Photo: Portland Seminary, November 2008.
worship in one of the poorest communities of Kenya https://flic.kr/p/6KYAHs

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URBAN DISPLACEMENT IMPACTS AND

PART 3
CONDITIONS
When IDPs arrive in an urban area, they face chal- By contrast, many IDPs who were forced to flee to Iraqi
lenges and opportunities determined by its character, cities during of waves of violence in 2014 and 2015 were
demographic composition, spatial layout, infrastruc- able to establish lives in their new urban environments.
ture, socioeconomic dynamics and governance.379 Their People who moved from one urban area to another
experience and ability to adapt will also depend on found it easier than IDPs from rural areas to get informal
their gender, ethnic and cultural background, economic and temporary work and make a living. Public sector
resources and social networks before and after their workers also found it easier than their counterparts in
displacement. Any thorough analysis of urban displace- the private sector to re-engage in work and earn an
ment also needs to consider how its impacts differ from income.381
those observed in rural areas and camps, and how
responses may also have to vary in terms of timeframes, How IDPs navigate and adapt to urban spaces varies
stakeholders, approaches and financing. from city to city and between different groups and
individuals. There is little evidence about the different
In the Nigerian city of Maiduguri, for example, pre- impacts of urban displacement on IDPs, host commu-
existing unemployment and lack of livelihood opportu- nities and marginalised groups, but urban profiling
nities affect both IDPs and host communities, and the exercises are particularly useful in establishing a better
former face challenges in accessing credit and engaging understanding and should be a priority so as to inform
in economic activities. Displaced women in particular tailored responses (see Spotlight, p.90).382
struggle to find work and integrate into urban life. That
said, insecurity, freedom of movement restrictions and That said, urban IDPs also face many similar impacts
even more limited livelihood opportunities in rural areas and challenges across cities, countries and regions (see
still make Maiduguri a destination for many.380 Figure 23).

Figure 23: Urban displacement: main impacts on IDPs383

LIVELIHOODS HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Jobs are more readily available in urban than in URBAN Many urban IDPs live in overcrowded, sub-stand-

INTERNAL
rural areas or camps, and cities may support ard conditions. They often settle in the poorest
self-reliance in the long run. Urban IDPs’ peripheral neighbourhoods where their informal

DISPLACEMENT
economic conditions, however, tend to be similar arrangements make them particularly vulnerable
to if not worse than those of the urban poor. to eviction and abuse from landlords. IDPs
They often have lower incomes and only limited regularly cite rent as one of their main expenses.
social networks, making it even harder for them Ensuring they have access to adequate housing
to adapt to their new environment. Farmers and with secure tenure should be a priority for urban
agricultural workers who flee from rural areas authorities. Lack of access to adequate infrastruc-
tend to find their skills are irrelevant in the city. ture may drive new and secondary displacement.

HEALTH SECURITY
Cities tend to offer better access to health On one level cities provide IDPs anonymity and
services than rural areas, but the overcrowded security, but informal settlements and poorly
conditions in which many IDPs live, with little or managed collective centres may also carry risks.
no access to safe water and sanitation, increase Displaced women, children and other vulnerable
the risk of diseases for them and their hosts alike. groups may be subject to abuse, harassment and
The mental health implications of displacement violence. Young IDPs in some cities may be
are also widely acknowledged but tend to be exposed to criminal violence and forced to join
overlooked. gangs.

EDUCATION ENVIRONMENT SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE

Cities offer better education opportunities than Large influxes of IDPs into already overpopulated Cities offer more potential than camps for social
rural areas. Urban IDPs tend to prioritise urban areas may rapidly increase water and soil mobility and local integration, but many urban
education over other services because it is pollution, and create challenges in terms of solid IDPs find themselves isolated and marginalised
transferrable human capital that may be key to waste. Cities should be prepared and able to because of their backgrounds. Creating ties with
rebuilding their lives. During urban crises, adapt their waste management, sanitation and host communities is essential to support their
however, schools may be used as emergency water infrastructure to cope with mass displace- integration. Authorities should also take a
shelters. They may also be damaged or destroyed ment. participatory approach to decision-making by
during conflict or disasters. Ensuring education including IDPs and local residents in the process.
for displaced children as well as those from host
communities should be a priority.
90

SPOTLIGHT

DISPLACEMENT PROFILING
In urban areas

Effective interventions to address internal displacement information on their conditions previously existed. The
depend on robust and trusted evidence of its impacts. exercise only covered displaced populations in specific
The complexity of displacement dynamics in cities, settlements and not in the entire city, but its results
however, makes collecting such data particularly chal- have been useful to the local authorities in Mogadishu
lenging. For a start, urban IDPs tend to be less visible in supporting durable solutions.
than those in camps because they do not all live in one
area, which makes them difficult to reach with assis- With the Mogadishu experience in mind, a second
tance and protection measures. exercise conducted in the Iraqi city of Erbil in 2015 and
2016 adopted an area-based approach. It provided a
Profiling exercises strengthen the evidence on urban holistic and comparative analysis not only of IDPs and
internal displacement by bringing stakeholders together non-displaced populations, but different areas of the
to collaborate in collecting and analysing data. This city as well. The results also informed broader local
provides the basis for information to be more relevant authority plans for issues such as service delivery, which
and useful in informing the pursuit of durable solutions. benefit IDPs and their hosts alike. The exercise was not,
The process involves analysing not only IDPs’ needs, however, able to analyse the pressure displacement puts
but also those of the general population living in the on service provision. A main takeaway was the need for
same area to better understand how both groups are more specific urban planning expertise and additional
affected by displacement. time and resources to generate more detailed results.

To best capture the diverse experiences of urban These considerations in turn were built into a series of
displacement, a combination of complementary data profiling exercises under way in various Syrian cities.
collection methods is used. This normally includes They include the identification of gaps between the
enumeration, sample-based household surveys, inter- population’s needs and the city’s capacity to meet
views with key informants, focus group discussions them. Understanding urban systems and their capacity
and a review of secondary data. This mixed methods to respond to IDPs’ needs is the next important step to
approach has proven the most effective in establishing incorporate into urban displacement profiling.
a shared and in-depth understanding of the challenges
that urban IDPs and their hosts face. The lessons learned from these and other displacement
profiling exercises have made a significant contribution
A series of profiling exercises in cities in Somalia, Iraq to good data collection and analysis practices for urban
and Syria have yielded a number of important lessons crises.384 Forging stronger partnerships and encouraging
that have helped to refine the methodology and scope joint planning among humanitarian and development
of the process and adapt it to other urban displacement responders, technical experts, local authorities and
situations. others is key to helping urban IDPs overcome the chal-
lenges brought on by displacement.
An exercise conducted in Mogadishu in 2014 and 2015
Source: JIPS385
mapped and enumerated informal settlements, which
helped to identify IDPs and differentiate them from their
hosts. The analysis highlighted the specific challenges
IDPs faced in different areas of the city where little or no

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These impacts are not only barriers to durable solutions services can help both IDPs and those at risk of displace-

PART 3
and sustainable urban development. They may also ment to improve their living conditions and wellbeing
function as triggers and drivers of new and secondary
displacement. Many IDPs fleeing conflict, disasters and Political participation and urban governance cut across
lack of livelihoods in rural areas of Somalia have made for all three of these areas. An inclusive city is all the more
the capital, Mogadishu, in search of safety and oppor- likely to be able to address and reduce displacement.
tunity. Once there, however, they face overcrowded The consultation and participation of IDPs and their
housing conditions, insecure tenure and only limited hosts in governance and decision-making would also
access to basic services and infrastructure. They also directly shape their lives and increase the likelihood of
have difficulty finding livelihood and income-generating their being able to achieve durable solutions.
opportunities and are at high risk violence, including
gender-based violence. Poverty, marginalisation and Employment and livelihoods
extortion, forced evictions and disasters push many into
secondary displacement.386 One of the main concerns for displaced people is to
ensure a livelihood and regular income. Doing so is vital
Similar challenges in managing displacement in major to improving their self-reliance and preventing their
urban centres occur in other countries and regions. displacement from becoming protracted.389 It also helps
Not only are cities difficult to govern. Large influxes of them to integrate socially, reduce their dependence on
people put further strain on already fragile systems. The government and humanitarian aid and contribute to
speed and scale of displacement into urban areas tends the local economy.390
to significantly outpace regular urbanisation processes.
This in turn means that urban systems, including plan- The potential for IDPs to integrate economically and
ning processes, services, markets and financing instru- improve their overall situation over time is greatest in
ments, need to adjust much more quickly to displace- urban areas.391 A distinct advantage of cities can be
ment than they otherwise would usually do.387 that the range of opportunities expands, particularly
for those who previously lived in rural areas and had
EMPLOYMENT, HOUSING less diversified sources of income, provided the right
conditions are in place.392 Higher employment figures
AND BASIC SERVICES: do not necessarily mean a higher employment rate,
URBAN GOVERNANCE OF but evidence shows that cities tend to provide more
DISPLACEMENT opportunities, and that job prospects tend to be better
in larger, more economically diverse cities.393

Internal displacement creates a wide range of chal- There is relatively little information about the extent to
lenges for urban systems. If local authorities are unable which displaced people are able to take advantage of
to cope and respond effectively, its impacts are borne these opportunities, but research suggests that more
almost entirely by IDPs and their hosts, fuelling further than half of the IDPs displaced by conflict for whom
vulnerability and displacement risk. Cities’ capacity to location data is available live in urban areas. Given that
support IDPs and create opportunities for them is central almost half among them are of the working age, they
to reducing such risk, and local and national authori- should in theory at least be in a position to benefit
ties have a key role to play in ensuring they are able to from the better access to employment cities offer.394
achieve durable solutions.388 More detailed data would help to enrich these types
of analyses.
This section covers three areas which will be critical
to preventing, avoiding and reducing the impacts of IDPs’ economic activity may also have positive impacts
urban displacement: first, the employment opportuni- on urban areas, and their skills and enterprise may
ties affecting IDPs’ self-reliance and local integration; benefit host communities. Somalian refugees and
second, the role of adequate housing in reducing the Ethiopian IDPs in Addis Ababa trade with their areas
risk of new, secondary and protracted displacement; of origin and bring in goods, contributing to a vibrant
and finally, the ways in which basic infrastructure and local economy in the Ethiopian capital.395 IDPs and refu-
92
gees have also helped to diversify the local economy When formal employment opportunities are scarce,
Kitchanga in DRC’s North Kivu province, where many informal labour and businesses emerge. UN data shows
young displaced people have found alternative liveli- that more than half of the labour force and more than
hoods. Some have even managed to buy land and settle 90 per cent of small and medium enterprises worldwide
permanently.396 are involved in the informal economy.400 This reality
presents both challenges and opportunities.
That said, large influxes of displaced people over a short
period of time can have adverse local effects on local Informal local economies help urban IDPs to foster live-
economies, at least initially, in many cases driving down lihood opportunities and self-reliance.401 For many of
wages while increasing rents.397 This in turn makes it those in Soacha, on the outskirts of Bogota, informal
more difficult for IDPs to settle temporarily or perma- labour remains their only source of income even after
nently, particularly if the city concerned already had high several years of displacement.402 Many IDPs and refugees
unemployment or underemployment before their arrival. in the Ugandan capital of Kampala have also adopted
informal livelihood strategies to cope with displacement
Years of conflict and insecurity in and around the in an urban environment where jobs are scarce.403
Nigerian city of Maiduguri have decimated the local
economy. The regional employment rate was less than The informal sector, however, often involves discrimina-
30 per cent in 2017, and many local markets and busi- tion and the exploitation of IDPs, and may encourage
nesses have had to close.398 Instead of finding new dangerous or high-risk activities. The average day rate
livelihood opportunities in the city, IDPs only receive for casual construction work in Goma, the capital of
humanitarian assistance. This not only has the potential DRC’s North Kivu province, is normally $1.80, but IDPs
to make them more vulnerable and marginalised, it also earn as little as $1.20.404 A profiling exercise in Moga-
puts further strain on a local government already strug- dishu showed that almost half of IDPs were working as
gling to provide the city’s displaced people with food, day labourers, compared with 36 per cent of economic
water and shelter.399 migrants and 30 per cent of host community members
in the same informal settlements.405

Internally displaced Nigerian repairs

phones for a living in Old Maiduguri,
Nigeria. Photo: NRC

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The hardship of internal displacement may also push Humanitarian approaches such as cash-based assistance

PART 3
children into work. Many displaced Afghan children have also shown promise in urban displacement situa-
earn money as street vendors or car washers, which tions.414 Cash is a cost-effective means of support and
exposes them to the risk of road accidents, abuse and it gives beneficiaries more choice and flexibility in their
violence.406 Displaced women too face specific chal- spending. It also helps to reinvigorate local markets and
lenges in terms of employment and livelihood opportu- trade rather than dampening them as in-kind assistance
nities in cities.407 In 2016, around 68 per cent of unem- does can. Importantly, people are not passive recipients
ployed IDPs in Ukraine were women.408 Many displaced of relief but rather play an active role in revitalizing local
women in Abuja, Nigeria, resorted to self-employment urban economies.415 It requires a detailed understanding
and remained either unemployed or outside of formal of market systems, products and services and local-level
labour markets.409 demand, but it is increasingly seen as a potential way of
moving from humanitarian to longer-term development
Addressing these challenges will require investment interventions.416
in both the formal and informal institutions of labour
markets rather than offering one-off income gener- More important than targeted programmes, perhaps,
ating initiatives. This may include providing IDPs and are broader changes to institutional arrangements.
host communities with the documentation they need These include local trade and business incentives, labour
to engage in formal work, offering incentives such as market regulations, access to banking and insurance
tax breaks or wage subsidies to businesses that employ policies that facilitate the generation of employment
displaced and other disadvantaged people, and devel- opportunities.417
oping and investing in long-term economic growth
strategies at the municipal level that consider the impli- IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Mosul, for example,
cations of population influxes on labour supply and were employed by local small businesses involved in city’s
demand.410 reconstruction and recovery process. This combined
with self-build support for housing facilitated the return
Accepting that informal labour markets are a reality of IDPs and refugees and helped to reinvigorate whole
in many cities may be the first step in ensuring they neighbourhoods and local urban economies.418 Other
contribute to solutions for both displaced people and positive examples exist, mainly involving refugees, but
the urban poor. There is increasing evidence from they offer valuable lessons applicable to urban IDPs.419
across the globe that the risks associated with informal
employment, as with housing and services, are reduced
when formal systems accommodate and find provisions Housing, land and property
for less regulated markets.411
Finding shelter is among IDPs’ main priorities, and its
Involving IDPs and unemployed urban residents in city provision is a core priority for those involved in humani-
development may help to release them from the poverty tarian responses to crises. Beyond crises, the provision of
trap many find themselves in. Instead of evicting vendors housing becomes a matter for urban planners, munic-
who trade in goods from their areas of origin, nego- ipal authorities and community organisations, and lies at
tiating their regulated use of market space supports the centre of unlocking the challenges associated with
small businesses and self-employment with relatively urban displacement. Many countries, however, do not
little investment from local authorities. Many informal do enough to guarantee their IDPs’ housing, land and
settlements are places of small-scale economic activity property (HLP) rights, an old and unresolved issue that
where people set up home or street-based enterprises requires renewed attention.
that often coalesce to form complex economies.412
Urban centres tend to offer more housing stock than
Understanding and improving the livelihoods and skills rural areas, but that does not necessarily mean that
that IDPs bring with them and providing vocational urban IDPs and poor residents find it easy to access
training helps to support their local integration. The adequate and affordable housing. Even if they do, they
skills IDPs bring from rural areas can become irrelevant may struggle to secure tenure over their homes. This
in urban settings, and helping them to develop new issue tends to be overlooked or poorly addressed by
capacities benefits both them and their host cities.413 national and local authorities, but tenure insecurity is a
significant driver of urban displacement risk.
94
There are many forms of tenure, from freehold and Some resort to taking out loans to cover their rent
public or private rental agreements to cooperative, payments in an effort to avoid being evicted, leading to
customary and even religious systems.420 Each has its unsustainable debt burdens. Long-term housing policies
advantages and disadvantages. Which of these arrange- and urban planning and the implementation of regula-
ments are available to IDPs newly arrived in urban areas tions and municipal housing programmes are needed
and how they provide them and hosts with secure to mitigate and address such issues.423
tenure influences the extent to which they are able
adapt to their new situations (see Box 8).

Tenure insecurity is often driven by IDPs’ and poor urban

dwellers’ search for affordable places to live. Housing
costs in some cases account for up to three-quarters
of their monthly income.421 This leaves many, particu-
larly newly, displaced people with little or no option
but to live in informal and unregulated settlements
that tend to be overcrowded, insecure and lacking in
services. As such, the housing challenges urban IDPs
face involve not only unaffordability but also inadequacy
and precariousness.

In the DRC city of Goma, for example, both displaced

and host communities lack adequate housing and access
to sanitation and hygiene, but IDPs have less tenure
security and are at greater risk of forced eviction.422

Box 8. Tenure ambiguity in Afghanistan and Vanuatu

Many Afghan IDPs live in informal settlements in and around Kabul, where ambiguity over land ownership makes
it difficult for many to obtain formal deeds or rental agreements. It also facilitates land grabs and the occupation
of empty homes and other buildings by returning IDPs and refugees.

The latter phenomenon is aggravated by the fact that many refugees returning to Afghanistan find their own homes
have been occupied by other displaced people or local power brokers, effectively meaning they return to a life of
internal displacement. Even those who have deeds may struggle to reclaim their property because mechanisms to
resolve legal disputes are ineffective.

The lack of clear tenure has led to conflict over land disputes, harassment, unjustified rent increases and evictions
without due process, all of which have triggered secondary displacements.424 The government developed poli-
cies on tenure security and the upgrading of informal settlements in 2006 and 2013, but implementation of their
provisions has been slow.425

In Port Vila, the capital of Vanuatu, customary and newly introduced tenure arrangements exist side-by-side, creating
a hybrid legal system that makes it difficult to settle land disputes and is often applied arbitrarily. Powerful public
and private elites use the grey areas to justify forced evictions, in some cases of whole communities.

These have altered the cityscape and pushed its boundaries out into peripheral areas of a city that has not planned
adequately for such expansion. The new displacement policy that Vanuatu adopted in 2018 is still to address these
regulatory and legal issues, to the detriment of Port Vila’s IDPs.426

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PART 3
Around 248,000 new displacements were
recorded following the earthquake and tsunami
that hit the city of Palu in Indonesia.
Photo: ERCB/Martin Dody

|| Reconstruction, resettlement and the right to There are numerous accounts in Sudan, for example,
housing of the government forcibly evicting the new occupants
of abandoned homes to allow IDPs to return, fuelling
Transparent HLP rights and processes for settling new tensions and triggering further displacement.429
disputes are vital to the resolution of urban displace- Recent reconstruction efforts in Syria also show that
ment.427 Therefore, the establishment of tenure security in the absence of transparent HLP rights, resettlement
and guarantees of housing rights for displaced and host schemes contribute to the wilful appropriation of IDPs’
communities should be included in conflict prevention, property (see Spotlight, p.96).
disaster risk reduction and durable solutions initiatives.
They also need to be part of transitional justice, peace- Many cities have undertaken major gentrification and
building and reconciliation processes in the aftermath neighbourhood upgrade projects that involve large-
of conflicts. scale resettlement programmes for slum dwellers as well
as displaced populations. Such initiatives carry impov-
The same issues are fundamental in ensuring sustain- erishment risks that need to be addressed particularly
able returns for IDPs and refugees, and reducing the when, as if often the case, approaches seem to deal
risk of new and secondary displacement.428 In this with the symptoms rather than the causes of lack of
sense land and property disputes in places of origin adequate housing.430
can be both a cause and consequence of displacement.
96

SPOTLIGHT

SYRIA
Reconstruction and challenges around housing, land and property

Eight years of civil war have left around a third of the the population lived in such areas, meaning that it has
Syria’s urban housing stock in ruins.431 As the govern- the potential to significantly change the demographic
ment retakes control of towns and cities across the and spatial composition of Syrian cities.438
country, reconstruction is beginning, but evidence
suggests that segregation and displacement are being There are concerns that Law No. 10 and other HLP
used as part of the process to consolidate the state’s regulations will be used to consolidate the govern-
authority and reward its supporters. New HLP laws have ment’s authority to the detriment of its opponents, as
also been passed that raise questions about how IDPs highlighted by the case of Basateen al-Razi neighbour-
and other groups will be included in the reconstruction hood in Damascus. An informal settlement associated
process.432 with the opposition, its working and lower middle-class
residents were evicted to make way for Marota City,
The government adopted a law in April 2018 that an upmarket real estate project.439 Other legislation
speeds up expropriation procedures to support the imposes strict security clearances for property transac-
reconstruction effort and “redesign unauthorised or tions, ostensibly an anti-terrorism measure, and provides
illegal housing areas”. Known as Law No. 10, it is an for the confiscation of property owned by people who
extension of Decree 66, a measure first implemented in failed to do military service.440
the Damascus area. The new law initially established a
deadline of just 30 days for people to prove ownership Given that around half of Syria’s pre-war population
over property subject to expropriation, but this was has been displaced during the conflict, resolving HLP
extended to a year in November under international issues will have to be a first and central step toward
pressure.433 nationwide peace-building and stability. In its current
form, however, Law No. 10 appears to benefit only a
Once the deadline has passed, people will not be small fraction of the population, raising serious ques-
compensated and property rights will revert to the state tions about its role in the post-conflict recovery process.
or local authorities.434 This has the potential to dispro-
portionately affect Syria’s 6.1 million IDPs and more than
5.7 million refugees, many of whom are likely to find it
hard to prove ownership, whether because they have
lost documentation, are unaware of the new legisla-
tion or are unable to travel to deal with the formali-
ties required.435 Many land registries have also been
destroyed during the war.436

Nor does Law No. 10 provide for enough compensation

and assistance, making it difficult for former residents
to re-establish themselves in their areas of origin.437 This
has the potential both to prevent IDPs returning and
cause new displacement.

The law applies to informal and unplanned settlements

where residents lack building permits or property titles. High levels of damage and destruction in Eastern
Even before the conflict, between 30 and 50 per cent of Ghouta, Syria. Photo: Karl Schembri/NRC

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The Brazilian government, for example, launched a flag- Target 11.1 of the SDGs aims “to ensure adequate,

PART 3
ship programme known as Minha Casa Minha Vida, or safe and affordable housing and basic services and
My House My Life, in 2008 to build a million homes upgrade slums”. Given that the previous Millennium
across the country in four years. The focus, however, was Development Goal referred only to improving the lives
on quantity over quality, and led to millions of people of slum dwellers, the mention of adequate and afford-
being resettled into poor-quality houses in peripheral able housing reflects acknowledgement of a major gap
urban areas, far from their jobs and amenities.441 in urban development. Meeting the target would also
significantly increase IDPs’ prospects of improving their
Lessons from a similar approach four decades earlier lives and achieving durable solutions, including millions
clearly had not been learned. Nearly 30 per cent of living in protracted displacement.443
Rio’s informal settlers were moved to marginal areas
of the city in the late 1960s and early 1970s, ultimately Affordable housing schemes in many countries do not
creating new favelas with high levels of insecurity and necessarily meet the needs of the people they intend
poverty, and with it driving new displacement risk. to help, or in some cases are simply insufficient to cope
with ever-growing demand. Urban displacement adds
|| New approaches to addressing housing to the challenges, as seen in Colombia (see Box 9).444
challenges

Despite attempts to raise global awareness of the impor-

tance of housing, not least with the New Urban Agenda
and SDG 11, more than a billion urban dwellers across
the world are thought not to have decent accommoda-
tion or tenure security. Many if not most cities across
the world, even those unaffected by displacement, have
shortages of affordable and adequate housing.442

Box 9. M
atching housing policies to IDPs’ specific needs in Colombia

Colombia has one of the highest numbers of people displaced by conflict globally, and new displacements asso-
ciated with both conflict and disasters take place every year. The government has created robust legislation to
address the challenges of internal displacement, but as the national ombudsman’s office highlighted in a 2014
report, there was an important law and policy gap on making housing accessible and affordable to IDPs. It said
housing legislation failed to reflect IDPs specific vulnerabilities, and called for taking a differentiated approach
toward IDPs as a vulnerable group.445

The Constitutional Court made a similar point in 2016 when it ruled that the government had made only “medium
to low” progress in providing them with housing. It also noted that some urban municipalities had been allocated
funds to build homes without having been consulted to ascertain if they had enough land available for their
construction. It called on the government to expedite targeted action to fill this and other gaps.446

The housing ministry responded by issuing a decree in late 2017 that revised the housing legislation and included
a differentiated approach toward IDPs.447 The decree considers people displaced by both conflict and disasters,
and establishes key actions and the lead institutions accountable for them. Social and other housing policies now
need to consider IDPs recognising their specific situations.

Such efforts to match national housing policy with IDPs’ needs are commendable, but questions remain open, such
as how many IDPs will benefit, how resilient the homes provided will be to disasters, how safe and secure their
location will be, and which livelihood opportunities will be available. In short, the extent to which the legal reforms
will support IDPs in achieving durable solutions beyond the provision of four walls and a roof remains to be seen.
98
A number of promising approaches to tackle IDPs’ legal obstacles; and the financial sustainability of subsi-
housing challenges have been developed over the past dised housing schemes. In Mariupol, the last two combine
decades, many of them originally designed to address resulting in limitations to the support made available.
the general scarcity of urban housing and then adapted National budget allocations to the local authorities do
to the pursuit of durable solutions. They can broadly not account for IDPs and at the same time, IDPs are not
be divided into housing approaches and area-based locally registered, leaving them unable to exercise their
approaches, the former including incremental housing right to vote and with little leverage over local officials.452
schemes and purchase certificates targeting individuals’
needs and the latter broader schemes such as neigh-
bourhood upgrades, incremental tenure, support grants
Basic services and resilient
and cooperative development initiatives.448 infrastructure

As with informal labour markets, recognising that The provision of services, like housing, lies at the heart
housing and urban development in many cities are of urban planning and development. Access to water,
driven by informal processes is an important step toward sanitation, healthcare, education, security and transport
finding ways to build on existing potential. In Latin determine the living conditions of all urban dwellers.
America, for example, more housing per square kilo- They are also central to IDPs’ ability to integrate locally,
metre of city is built and maintained by informal settlers and to addressing and reducing urban displacement
than by governments and developers.449 Accepting this more broadly.453
reality implies adopting new approaches that find ways
of turning temporary answers to housing crises into The SDGs reflect the global significance of these services
sustainable solutions for all. and the infrastructure required to deliver them.454 SDG
3 covers health, SDG 4 education, SDG 6 water and
Mariupol municipality in Ukraine, for example, recog- sanitation, and SDG 9 infrastructure, including trans-
nised a need to provide IDPs with the option of afford- port. SDG 11, the urban goal, also calls for better service
able rented accommodation as well as the opportu- provision as part of its call for safe and affordable
nity of buying property. It developed a “rent to own” housing. Targets 11.1 and 11.5 emphasise the impor-
initiative, in which a range of stakeholders including tance of access to healthcare, drinking water, sanitation
an international development bank, the local govern- and social protection programmes. One of the Sendai
ment, civil society organisations and contractors have framework’s seven targets focuses on reducing the
come together to create affordable housing options disruption of basic services associated with disasters.455
for IDPs. Those eligible received homes with a contract
that gives then title deeds to their rented property after Many cities, however, have a serious shortfalls in terms
10 years.450 of coverage, quality and affordability. Only 43 per cent of
the urban population in low-income countries have access
Venezuela tested cooperative approaches in Petare, the to basic sanitation.456 Fewer than one in ten settlements
largest informal settlement of the capital Caracas. The for IDPs in Haiti meet minimum standards for water, sani-
idea was to facilitate the securing of loans for a group tation and hygiene.457 Provision is inadequate for most
of families and close communities against the value of displaced households in Kathmandu.458 Twenty per cent
larger properties. To do so, informal settlers were given of IDPs in Libya live in former schools or warehouses
land rights under collective rather than individual lease without adequate sanitation.459 Evidence from countries
agreements. This approach could be applied to urban in eastern Europe and Central Asia shows that urban IDPs
displacement situations when it becomes clear that IDPs are more likely to be dissatisfied with the public health
are unable or do not want to return to their areas of services they receive than their non-displaced counter-
origin. It would allow them to invest into their homes parts, even 10 or 15 years after their displacement.460
and neighbourhoods while reducing the risk of gentrifi-
cation and secondary displacement in the long-term.451 Shortfalls in urban service provision are often combined
with or are the result of infrastructure gaps, which may
These examples are promising steps in the right direction, also contribute to segregation, tensions, conflict and
but three major challenges remain: the availability of data disaster risk.461 Many urban areas in low and middle-
on numbers of IDPs, their capacities and requirements; income countries have poor infrastructure, which means

GRID
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local authorities may also struggle to cope with mass in recent decades, and many of these, once again, in

PART 3
displacement, whether to or within their cities.462 Latin America. Along with housing, these initiatives
have placed significant emphasis on transport infra-
|| Disruption of basic services structure, to the extent that “the most effective urban
policies were transport policies”.468
The extent of basic services disruption and infrastructure
damage caused by urban conflict may be make some Projects such as cable cars and express bus networks
cities all but uninhabitable. It has the potential to cause that connected low-income neighbourhoods with
the collapse of entire city systems and can have cumula- city centres became known as “urban acupuncture”,
tive or indirect effects that ripple out into peri-urban applying pressure and change to a small part of a
and even rural areas.463 The restoration of services is a city with positive effects for the whole system. Urban
vital element in establishing conditions conducive to acupuncture became a key strategy in cities including
IDPs’ sustainable return. Medellin in Colombia and Curitiba in Brazil, and on
other continents, with important lessons for efforts
In western Mosul, were most of the fighting against to address urban displacement about the significance
ISIL in the Iraqi city took place, critical infrastructure of infrastructure in fostering inclusion (see Box 10,
including nine out of 13 hospitals was severely damaged. p.100).469
Medical staff also fled, bringing health services to a
virtual standstill and obliging people in need of treat- Service provision and infrastructure development
ment to move to eastern areas of the city. Many IDPs before, during and after crises plays a significant role
who have returned to Mosul still live in damaged or in shaping IDPs’ vulnerabilities and the patterns and
destroyed homes without access to services.464 impacts of urban displacement.470 If current challenges
are to be overcome and global sustainable develop-
Disasters also regularly destroy critical infrastructure and ment goals achieved, planning tools and financing
disrupt service delivery, and the effects may continue instruments, particularly those of local authorities, will
to be felt long after the event. Typhoon Haiyan caused have to consider future demographic changes including
widespread damage in the Philippine city of Tacloban in displacement risk.
2013. Seventeen health facilities, including two public
and five private hospitals, were affected, more than 90 The cost of meeting SDG targets in terms of universal
per cent of education facilities were severely damaged access to drinking water, sanitation and electricity in
and most power lines were brought down. Tacloban’s both urban and rural areas by 2030 has been esti-
recovery has been effective given the extent of the mated at $3.5 trillion per year, the equivalent to 0.3
damage, but Haiyan was a powerful reminder of the percent of global GDP and significantly more than
importance of building disaster-resilient infrastructure.465 current investment scenarios envisage.471 Many coun-
tries currently trying to deal with internal displacement
|| Dealing with the infrastructure and service gap are still catching up and trying to plug their existing
infrastructure and service gaps, but significantly more
Not only is critical infrastructure indispensable for inclusive urban investment will be needed to fulfil their
service provision, it also plays a role in determining commitments under the SDGs.472
future displacement risk, and current practices in many
cities may be increasing rather than reducing it.466 In
the US, for example, aging and decaying infrastructure
and the way in which urban development has been
conceived and implemented in recent decades have
been major drivers of flood risk. Not only is the risk
of flooding increasing, but its impacts also tend to be
concentrated in poorer areas.467

Approaches that aim to address infrastructure gaps at

the same time as integrating informal neighbourhoods
and systems into the broader city have been developed
100

Box 10. C
onnecting the formal and the informal with urban acupuncture
Curitiba’s innovative bus rapid transit (BRT) system has
been replicated in 170 cities around the world.473 It
was originally conceived in the 1970s to respond to
rapid urban growth that was congesting the city, and
to connect peripheral areas with its economic centre.
The scheme was complemented by a range of other
investments in schools, parks and cultural buildings that
served to upgrade a number of low-income neighbour-
hoods while preserving their character and identify.474

Medellin has made a series of urban acupuncture invest-

ments over recent decades, from the renovation of
the city’s road network and the improvement of water
and sanitation facilities in poor neighbourhoods, to
installing street lighting in less secure areas and running art workshops to prevent young people being recruited
into gangs.475 These focused and relatively low-cost investments have been particularly successful in Comuna 13,
a neighbourhood affected by displacement, and have also helped to city as a whole to transform its image.476 A
similar initiative was successfully applied in Bogota.

There are also lessons to be learned from community-based approaches adopted by people living in informal settle-
ments in sub-Saharan Africa and south and south-east Asia, who used joint negotiating power to secure access as
a community to electricity, water and waste management, healthcare and education.477 The efforts of so-called
Slum Dwellers Federations helped to ensure that informal settlements were upgraded rather than demolished,
preventing potentially significant urban displacement.

A community-based initiative in Nairobi also successfully relocated residents of Kibera, the city’s largest informal
settlement. It facilitated new housing near people’s previous homes, minimising disruption to their lives and local
communities by preserving their networks and employment, livelihood and education opportunities.478

Urban planners, architects and engineers in cities across the world have developed innovative solutions to seemingly
intractable problems that can be brought to bear to support urban IDPs in integrating locally and achieving durable
solutions. In the Peruvian capital of Lima, for example, drones, community mapping and 3D-printing were used to
establish neighbourhood-level evidence to influence local and national policy to the benefit of the urban poor.479

Through the co-production and visualisation of quantitative and qualitative spatialised data, the communities
themselves and the municipal authorities were able for the first time to picture and combine the spatial aspects
required for planning with results from community-led household surveys and vulnerability mappings. The exercise
made the authorities aware of the “considerable income, time and labour that the urban poor spend on improving
collective accessibility and services and ameliorating housing conditions”.480 This shifted perceptions of the city’s
poor as a problem and brought their resilience and potential productivity to light.

A similar approach could be taken to highlighting and harnessing the huge investment that displaced people make
over time to navigate and survive in their host cities. Negotiated upgrade or resettlement schemes led by IDPs and
other inhabitants of informal settlements could go a long way toward countering the negative effects of evictions
and reducing the risk of secondary displacement.

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TOWARD A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO

PART 3
URBAN DISPLACEMENT
This year’s GRID reconfirms that internal displacement A new narrative and approach to
is clearly a development and a humanitarian concern. urban displacement
The global data highlights the fact that the persistently
high numbers of new displacements associated with
conflict and disasters are the result of a convergence The notion and narrative of urban displacement have to
of risk drivers, most of which are development-related change. When attention is drawn to displaced people’s
and often concentrated in cities. agency, resilience and potential contributions, local
responses are more likely to emphasise participation
There is a need for comprehensive development and inclusion rather than assistance and exclusion from
approaches to urban displacement, along with the longer-term vision of a city. Focusing on victimhood
humanitarian responses. But the institutions, policies and vulnerability will only convey a negative picture of
and financing instruments needed for an integrated urban displacement.481
approach are not yet in place. A number of vital steps are
required to support displaced people in cities, prevent Vulnerabilities undoubtedly exist and may be aggravated
displacement and reduce the risk of it happening in the over time, but the language and framing of the issue
future. Despite the highly localised and specific nature must promote and support IDPs as active agents of their
of each urban displacement situation, a few general own solutions. Local authorities and urban communi-
conclusions on the most important of these steps are ties, for their part, should be seen not only as facilitators
drawn below. but also beneficiaries of their resilience.

Filling data gaps and establishing Accepting local integration as a

an evidence base displacement solution

There are significant data and knowledge gaps on urban A new understanding and acceptance of the nature
displacement, and the lack of clear understanding about and duration of urban displacement is also required.
its scale, duration, severity and the way it relates to There is growing evidence that a significant number of
broader urban development challenges impedes the urban IDPs plan to stay. Responses to both acute and
design and implementation of appropriate prevention, protracted urban displacement need to recognise this,
risk reduction and response measures. A vital first step and authorities and host communities need to accept
to addressing the phenomenon and reducing its risk that local integration will often be the only feasible
and impacts effectively would be to establish a solid option for many.
and shared evidence base to guide policy and practice.
Common concerns about the impact of displacement on
Promising collaborative methods of doing so have been a city’s housing, infrastructure, services, labour markets,
developed and are in use, but more investment and stability and demographic and cultural composition will
greater efforts to ensure that data is interoperable are need to be addressed with a long-term perspective in mind.
needed. The empirical evidence available makes it clear
that local planners, sector departments, neighbourhood
organisations, local businesses and displaced people
themselves will all need to be involved.
102
and development stakeholders need to understand and
Building leadership of local
accept the role that informal local powerbrokers play in
communities and municipalities facilitating life in the city for IDPs, and allow a combina-
tion of formal and informal institutions to support them
Inadequate urban infrastructure, housing and services, in their process of local integration. This requires dealing
and limited job prospects and opportunities to access carefully with the benefits and risks of informal arrange-
justice and participate in public life are all issues that go ments, including transparency and accountability.
beyond the humanitarian sector’s remit. When urban
displacement crises occur, however, humanitarians often Developing new approaches to
find themselves having to deal with such challenges. housing and tenure
The leadership and continuous engagement of local
authorities before, during and after crises is paramount, The pivotal role of tenure security for IDPs and the urban
as is the active participation of displaced people and poor more broadly is recognised. New approaches have
their hosts in processes that affect their lives. Their been developed over the past decade that address the
involvement in and even management of urban plan- ambiguity of tenure that many displaced people experi-
ning and service provision is central to their success. ence, and facilitate their entry into more formal housing
Community-led data collection, needs assessments and arrangements and markets over time.
risk analyses in informal settlements, at-risk neighbour-
hoods and other urban areas have proven effective in Innovation and adaptation will be vital in regulating IDPs’
facilitating sustainable approaches to urban integration tenure agreements and supporting them in making the
and resettlement. transition from abusive rental markets to more secure
tenure and housing. Progressive approaches to housing
Supporting local authorities in policies and informal markets also mean investing in
hosting and integrating IDPs new approaches to informal settlements that allow for
them to develop in ways that benefit the city as a whole.

Instead of focusing on providing humanitarian assistance, Setting goals and tracking

national governments and the international community progress at the local level
need to devise new ways of supporting local authorities,
service providers and businesses in addressing displace-
ment and reducing the risk of it happening. To understand the progress made in addressing urban
displacement and reducing displacement risk globally,
This includes identifying new ways of providing assis- steps toward local durable solutions need to be moni-
tance at the local level through national governments tored at the city level.482 SDG 11 contains targets and
and organisations as well as directly, using existing indicators on planning and urban development financing
development funding instruments and developing new that will also need to be monitored effectively from the
ones to support local governments and community- bottom-up. The latter should in principle provide a solid
based organisations, and creating incentives for local basis not just for reporting but also for planning.
and national authorities to accept responsibility for their
IDPs and facilitate their local integration. As progress is aggregated, however, and ultimately
measured at national level, the metrics will not neces-
Integrating formal and informal sarily reflect urban realities. The disaggregation of
markets and institutions data by location, sex, age and mobility status has also
been encouraged, but there are few tools and little
capacity to systematically collect and analyse data in this
In the absence of functioning formal housing and labour way.483 In this sense, most of the SDGs’ metrics will be
markets, and strong governance and institutions to more effective in tracking the performance of national
address grievances and deliver justice, informal systems governments than in informing and shaping action at
take their place. For many IDPs, and particularly new the local level.484
arrivals, the latter are all that is available. Humanitarian

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CONCLUSION
From global to local solutions

In 2018, IDMC took stock of the progress made in the urban population. Decades of conflict and displace-
20 years since the adoption of the Guiding Principles ment result in municipal structures and services unable
on Internal Displacement. This year is the 10th anni- to meet the needs of the urban poor. Many IDPs are
versary of the Kampala Convention, and to mark the trapped in poverty, which in turn contributes to making
occasion the African Union has declared 2019 the Year their displacement protracted. In such circumstances,
of Refugees, Returnees and IDPs. Activities across the concerted and coherent poverty reduction efforts,
continent will draw attention to internal displacement including targeted assistance and broader social protec-
and the need for durable solutions, but the situation tion, need to be developed in place of siloed, short-term
of those displaced has not significantly improved at the humanitarian interventions.486
regional or global level.
Cities are also tasked with applying and localising global
The figures presented in this report show that in many and national development frameworks as part of the
countries affected by conflict, not only is displacement sustainable development agenda, but often struggle
becoming protracted, but new displacements continue to do so. The way and extent to which authority and
to take place, deepening national and regional crises. resources are decentralised will determine their capacity
Certain countries and regions are also consistently for effective governance and implementation. Finan-
affected by disasters year after year. Many IDPs face cial capacities to achieve development objectives and
serious vulnerabilities and protection gaps and are at address humanitarian crises vary considerably from
high risk of being displaced again within urban centres, country to country, and from city to city. Size, economic
particularly if they lack secure tenure, employment and productivity, social equality and institutional arrange-
social support that ensure their local integration. ments all determine the ability of a city’s government
and its communities to prevent and cope with crises,
Humanitarian responses alone will not resolve the including internal displacement crises.487
internal displacement crises affecting many countries
around the world, nor reduce the risk of future displace- Affecting city-level change will require progress across
ment. As our cities grow and the landscape of urban at least three main areas. Knowledge and evidence of
displacement changes, local authorities will be at the the drivers, impacts and risks of urban displacement and
forefront of both responding to crises and reducing risk of appropriate and successful approaches to addressing
in the long-term. National responsibility and leadership it are a prerequisite for effective action. The capacity
and international accountability now must combine to act on the evidence also needs to be strengthened,
with tangible and significant support to local action. particularly in low-income countries and those that face
And given that growing numbers of IDPs live in urban large displacement crises.
centres across the world, this local action will increas-
ingly need to happen in towns and cities. Most importantly, however, incentives to increase polit-
ical will are needed at both the municipal and national
The provision of basic services for IDPs remains an level to adapt urban planning, investment, regulation
important humanitarian challenge in active crises and and service delivery to the realities of informality and
camp settings. It also lies at the heart of development protracted displacement. Urban opportunities cannot be
efforts in complex urban and protracted displacement unlocked without political solutions, and those solutions
settings.485 Long-term displacement in already dete- need to move beyond short-term responses to embrace
riorating socioeconomic conditions makes it difficult long-term risk reduction and inclusive development.
for local authorities to provide services to the whole
104
In moving ahead in these three areas, a checklist of This report shows, however, that despite the significant
sorts may be useful to guide prioritisation of local-level challenges, promising approaches exist. In a rapidly
actions and encourage more national and international urbanising world, many of the opportunities for solu-
support for relevant sectors and institutions, adapted to tions to displacement are located in and around cities.
each city. Data and insight, and the capacity to present For the urban displaced to break out of protracted and
evidence that generates incentives to create the required cyclical displacement, inclusive legislation, housing
political will are critical in this regard and suggest a provision and service delivery need to become a part
first set of priority areas for action at local level (see of the DNA of urban governance.
Figure 24).
The involvement and, over time, leadership of displaced
As we look into the coming years, the conclusions from people in urban planning and service provision is central
our last global reports remain alarmingly valid. More to their success. Where responsible states work hand
than 20 years of mass displacement and increasingly in hand with local governments and communities,
protracted situations across the globe leave us today supported by the international community, solutions
with the highest number of people living in displace- are found and the future of those displaced today and
ment ever. Despite policy progress in several countries, of global displacement risk becomes less bleak.
the root causes of internal displacement persist.

Figure 24: Toward a checklist for action on urban displacement: start by building an evidence base

Data and analysis

|| Systematically account for urban IDPs. Record their number and the duration and severity of their displace-
ment, disaggregated by sex, age, disability and other relevant criteria
|| Monitor movements and conditions of those displaced over time, not just during and immediately after crises
|| Undertake profiling exercises that include both displaced and host populations
|| Collaborate with humanitarian, development and other stakeholders working to reduce vulnerability and risk
to ensure that any data collected is interoperable

Capacity and participation

|| Build on communities’ existing capacities, including for the collection of data on their vulnerabilities and needs,
but also their existing resources, skills and community services
|| Strengthen the capacity of local organisations and government departments for data and statistical analysis
|| Work with IDPs and those at risk of displacement to identify priority areas in service delivery and infrastructure
development
|| Identify urban development approaches that accommodate informality, including through flexible and secure
tenure arrangements and adaptive labour market strategies in line with national and international sustainable
development initiatives

Incentives and political will

|| Estimate the impacts of displacement on city development and the risks inherent in inaction, including effects
on the city’s economy, security, stability and social wellbeing
|| Use risk assessments to advocate for new and appropriate financing mechanisms to support city action and
make displacement risk one of the core considerations in urban planning and development
|| Document successful approaches to managing and reducing internal displacement in cities and provide a
platform for exchange and learning for municipalities and their partners
|| Recognise IDPs as local citizens, even when return is their preferred long-term solution, by allowing voting
rights and providing space for public participation, and supporting their access to documentation

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GLOSSARY
Armed conflict: An armed confrontation between the Flows: The number of individuals or instances of
armed forces of states (international armed conflict) displacement that cause the total number of IDPs (stock)
or between governmental authorities and organised to increase or decrease. Flows include new displace-
armed groups or between such groups within a state ments, returns, cross-border displacement, settlement
(non-international armed conflict).488 elsewhere, and local integration.

Communal violence: Violence perpetrated across Forced evictions: The permanent or temporary removal
ethnic, religious or communal lines that has not met against their will of individuals, families and/or commu-
the threshold of a non-international armed conflict. nities from the homes and/or land which they occupy,
Communal, in particular inter-communal violence can without the provision of, and access to, appropriate
overlap to a significant extent with political violence forms of legal or other protection.495
with one type of violence triggering the other.489
Informal settlements: The term is used in this report
Criminal violence: Homicides, threats, extortion and a to denote the wide spectrum of inadequate housing
general atmosphere of violence due to, inter alia, drug found in urban areas. While context-specific, the mostly
cartels, organised crime, or gang activity, in a situation widely applicable is probably that used by UN-Habitat
that has not met the threshold of a non-international which includes: i) residential areas where inhabitants
armed conflict.490 have no security of tenure and may squat or rent infor-
mally; ii) neighbourhoods that lack basic services and
Cross-border displacement: Forced movement of infrastructure, and iii) housing that may not comply with
persons across borders, whether as a result of conflict, planning and building regulations and may be built in
disasters, or other drivers of movement including devel- environmentally sensitive areas.496
opment projects, irrespective of legal status in receiving
countries.491 Locally integrated: A situation where former IDPs
who, based on a voluntary and informed decision, have
Disaster: A serious disruption of the functioning of a achieved safe, dignified and sustainable integration in
community or a society at any scale due to hazardous the location they were displaced to. Those who do not
events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulner- meet the criteria set out in this definition should still be
ability and capacity, leading to one or more of the considered to be IDPs.
following: human, material, economic and environ-
mental losses and impacts.492 Political violence: The use of force by a group with
a political purpose or motivation, such as surrounding
Driver of displacement: Underlying structural factors an electoral process or during civil unrest, riots, state
that combine, overlap and accumulate to enable a crisis repression or demonstrations, in a situation that has not
to erupt. Synonyms include root cause, push factor, met the threshold of a non-international armed conflict.
or stressor. Examples of displacement drivers include
environmental (e.g. desertification), social (e.g. ethnic Protracted displacement: A situation in which the
tensions), political (e.g. corruption), and economic (e.g. process for securing a durable solution to displacement
poverty or inequality).493 is stalled, and/or IDPs are marginalised as a consequence
of a lack of protection of their human rights.497
Durable solutions: In the context of internal displace-
ment, a situation where IDPs no longer have any specific
assistance and protection needs that are linked to their
displacement and can enjoy their human rights without
discrimination on account of their displacement.494
106
Relocation: The act of moving evacuated people to a Trigger: Event in the wider environment that threaten
place where they stay until return or settlement else- people’s security. Triggers may or may not lead to
where in the country becomes possible (temporary), displacement as people evaluate the level of threat
or the act of moving people to another location in the posed by an event to their immediate physical and
country and settling them there when they no longer economic security and their capacity to flee their homes.
can return to their homes or place of habitual residence While these events directly trigger displacement, they
(permanent).498 come about as a result of the complex interaction of
multiple underlying drivers.500
Resettlement: A situation where former IDPs who,
based on a voluntary and informed decision, have Urban area: Given the lack of a common definition of
settled in a location other than their place of former what an urban area is, for the purposes of this report,
habitual residence or place of displacement, and have an urban area is defined as “a spatial concentration of
achieved safe, dignified and sustainable integration in people and wealth that is usually reliant on a cash-based
this location. economy, with relationships between the two shaped
and regulated by a set of political, social, legal and
Return: For internal displacement, return implies move- economic institutions”. In this sense, both towns and
ment from the place of displacement back to the place cities are considered here as urban areas.501
of former habitual residence, ideally the former home.
In the case of cross-border displacement, return signifies Urban displacement: Encompasses forced move-
movement from the host country back to the country ments of people from rural to urban areas (rural-
of origin. urban), between (inter-urban) and within urban areas
(intra-urban).
Returnees: A distinction should be made between
‘returning refugees’ and ‘returning IDPs’. In the case Vulnerability: The characteristics determined by
of internal displacement, a returnee is a former IDP physical, social, economic and environmental factors
who, based on a voluntary and informed decision, has or processes which increase the susceptibility of an indi-
returned in safety and dignity to their place of former vidual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts
habitual residence. Former refugees or migrants who of hazards.502
cannot go back to their former habitual residence for
one of the reasons set out in the Guiding Principles and
are unable to sustainably integrate elsewhere are IDPs.
Similarly, former refugees or migrants who, after their
return, are forced to flee or leave their home or place
of habitual residence for one of the reasons set out in
the Guiding Principles, are also IDPs.

Risk: The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or

damaged assets which could occur to a system, society
or a community in a specific period of time, determined
probabilistically as a function of hazard, exposure,
vulnerability and capacity.499

Stock: Number of individuals living in situations of

internal displacement as a result of conflict, disasters,
or other drivers of displacement at any given point in
time. In the absence of durable solutions, the stock
figure may include IDPs who have attempted to return
to their areas of origin, resettle elsewhere, or integrate
locally in their place of displacement.

GRID
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 107
(Kampala Convention)”, 2009.

NOTES 28. UNHCR, “Niger becomes the first country in Africa to adopt
a national law for the protection and assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons”, December 5, 2018.
1. Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Key Concerns for Hodeida
Battle”, June 15, 2018. 29. The World Bank, “Urban population (% of total) | Data”,
available at, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.
2. Reuters, “As Hodeidah battle grinds on, residents suffer lack TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=ZG.
of clean water, electricity”, June 22, 2018.
30. DESA, “World Urbanization Prospects - Population Division
3. The Independent, “Saudi airstrike kills 19 civilians, including - United Nations”, available at, https://population.un.org/
children, near Yemeni city of Hodeida”, October 25, 2018; wup/Download/; Patel, “Figure of the week: Africa is home
BBC News, “Battle for vital Yemeni port intensifies”, to the 10 fastest growing cities in the world”, October 5,
November 7, 2018. 2018.
4. OCHA, “Yemen Humanitarian Update, 7-21 October”, issue 31. Satterthwaite, “The impact of urban development on risk
30, 2018. in sub-Saharan Africa’s cities with a focus on small and
5. These were figures that could be verified. Several unvalidated intermediate urban centres”, December 1, 2017.
media reports cited hundreds of thousands of displacements 32. Lall et al., “Africa’s cities: opening doors to the world”, 2017;
and the true figure is likely to be much higher. See Middle- Dr. Ibidun O. Adelekan, “Urban Dynamics and Everyday
East and North Africa Regional Overview and Table 3 for Hazards and Disaster Risks in Ibadan, Nigeria”, September
more information about the Yemen figure. 2018.
6. NRC, “10 things to know about the crisis in Yemen”, 33. de Boer et al., “Conceptualizing City Fragility and Resilience”,
February 22, 2019. October 2016; Lall et al., “Africa’s cities: opening doors to
7. UNHCR, “The power of cities”, November 25, 2016. the world”, 2017.
8. See: http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/ 34. Satterthwaite, “The impact of urban development on risk
grid2019/ in sub-Saharan Africa’s cities with a focus on small and
9. The regional breakdown used in this report is based on intermediate urban centres”, December 1, 2017
the World Bank region classification, with the difference 35. IDMC, “City of Challenge and opportunity Employment and
that it merges North American and Latin America and the livelihoods for internally displaced people in Maiduguri”,
Caribbean under a single region, the Americas. Borno State, February 2018; International Rescue
10. Ethiopian News Agency, “Newly Formed Ministry of Peace Committee, “Urban Refuge: How Cities Are Building,
Aims to Enhance Cherished Values of Peace among Public”, Inclusive Communities”, October 31, 2018; IDMC, “City of
October 16, 2018. flight, New and secondary displacements in Mogadishu,
Somalia”, November 2018.
11. UNITAR-UNOSAT, “Ethiopia-Flooding, Flash Update 2. The
National Meteorology Agency forecast continued risk of 36. African Union, UNDP, African Development Bank, “2018
localized flooding”, May 10, 2018. Africa Sustainable Development Report, Towards a
Transformed and Resilient Continent”, November 2018.
12. Congo Research Group, “What’s happening in Ituri?”,
March 5, 2018. 37. Addis Fortune, “Ethiopia: Displacement, No Easy Way Out”,
August 28, 2018.
13. ACAPS, Start Network “, DRC/Congo-Brazzaville, Yumbi -
IDPs and refugees to Congo-B, Briefing note”, February 14, 38. OCHA, “Ethiopia: Oromia - Somali. Conflict-Induced
2019. Displacement. Situation Report no.4”, June 20, 2018.
14. The Guardian, “He will bring light into our darkness’: DR 39. IDMC, “Ethiopia: Government recognition of conflict IDPs
Congo pins hope on a new leader”, December 15, 2018; Al crucial to addressing their plight. A profile of the internal
Jazeera News, “DR Congo election observers say setbacks displacement situation”, April 2006.
kept many from voting”, January 3, 2019. 40. Refugees International, “The crisis below the headlines:
15. NRC, “Troubling trend sees evictions in Somalia double”, Conflict Displacement in Ethiopia”, November 2018.
August 28, 2018; IDMC, “City of flight, New and secondary 41. OCHA, “Humanitarian Bulletin, Ethiopia”, 16-29 July, 2018.
displacements in Mogadishu, Somalia”, November 2018. 42. Ethiopia Insight, “Tens of thousands flee Benishangul after
16. UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Oromia border dispute flares”, October 4, 2018.
Somalia”, May 2, 2018. 43. OCHA, “Humanitarian Bulletin, Ethiopia, 29 October-11
17. Radio Ergo, “Life unbearable for 7,000 families cut off by November”, 2018.
floods in villages in Bala’ad”, November 22, 2018. 44. ECHO, “Ethiopia: Internal Conflict, Displacement, Daily
18. International Crisis Group, “Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Flash”, December 21, 2018.
Farmer-Herder Violence”, July 26, 2018. 45. International Federation of the Red Cross, “Emergency Plan
19. UNHCR, Fleeing violence, “Cameroonian refugee arrivals in of Action (EPoA), Ethiopia: IDP Population Movement”,
Nigeria pass 30,000”, November 9, 2018. August 29, 2018.
20. ACLED, “South Sudan: This War is not Over”, October 5, 46. The New York Times, “Thousands Are Arrested in Ethiopia
2018. After Ethnic Violence”, September 25, 2018.
21. Reuters, “Aid delivered after deadly mudslides in Sudan’s 47. OCHA, “Ethiopia: Conflict Displacement Situation Report”,
Darfur”, September 24, 2018. January 23, 2018.
22. Sudan Tribune, “Darfur rebels declare three-month ceasefire 48. Government of Ethiopia, IOM, “Somali region durable
to rescue landslides victims in Jebel Marra”, September 19, solutions strategy 2017-2020”, October 6, 2017.
2018. 49. Refugees International, “The crisis below the headlines:
23. Radio Dabanga, “Again voluntary returnees killed in South Conflict Displacement in Ethiopia”, November 2018.
Darfur”, April 22, 2018. 50. Human Rights Watch, “These killings can be stopped”:
24. Sudan Tribune, “S. Darfur begins to transform IDPs camps abuses by government and separatist groups in Cameroon’s
into permanent residential areas”, February 12, 2018. Anglophone regions”, July 19, 2018.
25. Human Rights Watch, “By Day We Fear the Army, By Night 51. Journal du Cameroun, “Rights group says over 100 villages
the Jihadists, Abuses by Armed Islamists and Security Forces burnt in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions”, August 22,
in Burkina Faso”, May 21, 2018. 2018.
26. OCHA, “Flash Update #5 , Floods in Kenya”, May 10, 2018. 52. OCHA, “Emergency Response Plan, Summary, Cameroon
27. African Union, “African Union Convention for the Protection North-West and South-West”, May 2018.
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 53. UNICEF, “Humanitarian Action for Children - Cameroon”,
108
2019, available at, https://www.unicef.org/appeals/ 84. Foreign Policy, “The New Frontlines Are in the Slums”,July
cameroon.html. 3, 2018.
54. OCHA, “Emergency Response Plan, Summary, Cameroon 85. IDMC, “Nowhere to return to, Iraqis’ search for durable
North-West and South-West”, May 2018. solutions continues”, November 2018; New Yorker, “A Year
55. OCHA, “Cameroon: Situation Report N°1, North-West After the End of ISIS Control in Raqqa, a Ruined City Looks
and South-West Crisis”, November 30, 2018; UNICEF, to Rebuild”, December 5, 2018.
“Humanitarian Action for Children - Cameroon”, 2019, 86. ICRC, InterAction, “When War Moves to Cities: Protection
available at, https://www.unicef.org/appeals/cameroon. of Civilians in Urban Areas”, May 2017.
html. 87. Time, “Raqqa Needs Rebuilding After ISIS Fight. Who’ll
56. OCHA, “Cameroon: Situation Report N°2, North-West and Pay for It?”, 2019, available at, http://time.com/rebuilding-
South-West Crisis, 31 December 2018”, January 18, 2019. raqqa/.
57. OCHA, “Emergency Response Plan, Summary, Cameroon 88. The World Bank, “Cities of Refuge in the Middle East,
North-West and South-West”, May 2018. Bringing an Urban Lens to the Forced Displacement
58. International Federation of the Red Cross, “Nigeria: Floods, Challenge”, September 14, 2017.
Emergency appeal”, September 23, 2018; International 89. The law originally gave land owner 30 days to prove
Federation of the Red Cross, “1.4 million people in Nigeria ownership, but in June 2018 the Syrian government
affected by floods disaster”, September 25, 2018. extended the period to one year. The Washington Institute,
59. OCHA, “Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Update no.23”, April 2018. “Assad’s Law 10: Reshaping Syria’s Demographics”,
September 17, 2018.
60. OCHA, “North-East Nigeria: Humanitarian Situation
Update”, November 2018. 90. Human Rights Watch, “Q&A: Syria’s New Property Law,
May 29”, 2018.
61. Al Jazeera, “Nigeria displaced return to ruin homes, fear
violence”, August 12, 2018. 91. OCHA, “Turkey | Syria: Recent Developments in North-
western Syria (Idleb Governorate and Afrin District), as of
62. OCHA, “Fact Sheet North East Nigeria: Bama LGA”, October 13 February”, 2018.
6, 2018.
92. OCHA, “East Ghouta, Humanitarian Update, Facts and
63. UNHCR, Government of Nigeria, “Borno State Return Figures”, 22 April, 2018.
Strategy, Draft”, September 2018.
93. OCHA, “Syrian Arab Republic: East Ghouta Response to the
64. International Crisis Group, “Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling East Ghouta Crisis in rural Damascus Situation Report No.
Farmer-Herder Violence”, July 26, 2018. 3”, April 2018.
65. ACAPS, Start Network, “Nigeria, Displacement in Plateau 94. NRC, “Intense fighting in southern Syria creates largest
State”, July 10, 2018. displacement since start of war”, July 6, 2018.
66. Nigerian Tribune, “102,000 children of IDPs out of school in 95. OCHA, “Syrian Arab Republic: Dar’a, Quneitra, As-Sweida,
Benue”, March 25, 2018. Situation Report No.1”, July 4, 2018.
67. ACAPS, Start Network, ”Nigeria, Displacement in Plateau 96. The Independent, “UN warns of “worst humanitarian
State”, July 10, 2018. disaster” of 21st century as 30,000 flee Syria’s Idlib”,
68. International Federation of the Red Cross, “1.4 million September 10, 2018.
people in Nigeria affected by floods disaster”, September 97. Interviews with aid agency on the ground, Syria, 2018
25, 2018.
98. The Economist, “Turkey and Russia cut a deal over Syria”,
69. ACAPS, “Nigeria: Floods Update II”, October 2, 2018. September 20, 2018.
70. BBC News, “Reality Check: Why does Nigeria keep 99. Interview with NRC staff in Syria, 2018.
flooding?”, September 27, 2018.
100. Syria Direct, “Life after reconciliation marred by arrests,
71. International Federation of the Red Cross, “Nigeria: Floods, broken promises as Syria’s southwest returns to government
Emergency appeal”, September 23, 2018. control”, October 16, 2018.
72. Business Report, “These are the biggest economies in Africa 101. Interviews with NRC staff in Syria, 2018
- IMF”, July 10, 2018.
102. BBC News, “Who will help rebuild the former “capital” of
73. Bukar, “Nigeria needs to take responsibility for its IDPs”, IS?”, October 22, 2018.
August 2012.
103. Washington Post, “Why Syrian refugees are at risk of a
74. International Crisis Group, “Five Steps to Save Yemen’s forced return to Syria”, February 13, 2019.
Stockholm Agreement”, January 15, 2019.
104. UNHCR, “Internally displaced persons and returnees in
75. Shelter Cluster, “Iraq, Jan-August 2018”, 2018. Libya”, April 2018.
76. IDMC, “Nowhere to return to, Iraqis’ search for durable 105. International Crisis Group, “Watch List 2018, Third update”,
solutions continues”, November 2018. October 5, 2018.
77. IOM, “DTM Iraq Water Crisis (Central-South)”, November 106. OCHA, “Flash Update #1”, September 4, 2018; UNHCR,
2018. Protection Cluster, “Protection sector update on the
78. Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Army Intensifies Sinai Home protection situation in Tripoli, Libya”, September 5, 2018;
Demolitions”, May 22, 2018. 107. Médecins sans Frontières, “Conflict in Tripoli puts lives in
79. World Bank, “Urban population (% of total) | Data”, 2018, danger, demonstrating that Libya is not a place of safety”,
available at, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB. August 31, 2018; UNHCR, “Tripoli violence threatens
TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=ZQ. civilians, displaced, refugees and migrants”, September 4,
80. ICRC, “I saw my city die: the human toll of urban warfare, 2018.
June 15, 2017; Foreign Policy, The New Frontlines Are in the 108. Voice of America News, “Armed Clashes in Tripoli Take
Slums”, July 3, 2018. Heavy Toll on Migrants, Refugees”, August 31, 2018;
81. ICRC, “Displaced in Cities. Experiencing and Responding to ECHO, “Libya, Inter-militia Fighting in Tripoli, Daily Flash”,
Urban Internal Displacement Outside Camps”, August 16, September 4, 2018; The Guardian, “Libya is a war zone.
2018. Why is the EU still sending refugees back there?”, October
4, 2018.
82. Syria Deeply, “A Timeline of the Tightening Siege in Eastern
Ghouta”, December 27, 2017; OCHA, “East Ghouta, 109. Reuters, “Impact of fighting on civilians in Libya’s Derna
Humanitarian Update, Facts and Figures”, 22 April, 2018. “devastating”: U.N.”, May 24, 2018.
83. IDMC, “For cities, specify the neighbourhood, Expert 110. REACH Initiative, “Libya: Public services break down as
opinion”, October 2018. conflict escalates in encircled city of Derna”, June 5, 2018.

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111. Libya Inter-Sector Coordination Group, “Sebha Rapid Japan”, November 2018.
Situation Overview”, March 27, 2018. 139. The Straits Times, “Powerful Typhoon Jebi kills at least 10 in
112. OCHA, “Sebha Flash Update 2”, May 13, 2018. Japan; 3,000 stranded at Kansai airport transferred to Kobe
113. Libya Inter-Sector Coordination Group, “Sebha Rapid by boat”, September 5, 2018.
Situation Overview”, March 27, 2018. 140. Takabatake et al., “Field Survey of 2018 Typhoon Jebi in
114. UNSMIL, “Statement on the Security Situation in Southern Japan”, November 2018.
Libya”, October 19, 2018. 141. Cabinet Office Japan, “Damage situation on Heisei 30
115. UNHCR, “UNHCR convoy reaches displaced people in Hokkaido Eastern Chubu Earthquake: Disaster Prevention
southern Libya”, April 20, 2018. Information Page”, 2018.
116. International Crisis Group, “Libya’s Economic Reforms Fall 142. Reuters, “Power returning to Hokkaido, but quake exposes
Short”, October 25, 2018. flaws of Japan grid”, September 7, 2018.
117. AFP News Agency, “Libya’s south falls prey to foreign armed 143. Cabinet Office Japan, “White Paper, Disaster Management
groups”, October 29, 2018. in Japan 2017”, 2017.
118. The Guardian, “Libya: reconciliation conference delay could 144. Information provided by Japan Platform - Emergency
fuel military solution”, January 18, 2019. humanitarian aid organization, available at, https://www.
japanplatform.org/E/.
119. WMO, “Devastating tropical cyclones Florence and
Mangkhut raise renewed questions about climate change”, 145. Cabinet Office Japan, “White Paper, Disaster Management
September 12, 2018. in Japan 2017”, 2017.
120. The Diplomat, “Bringing Peace to the Philippines’ Troubled 146. The Straits Times, “Philippines’ longest urban war ruins
South: The Bangsamoro Organic Law”, October 2, 2018. Marawi”, October 20, 2017; Disaster Response Assistance
and Management Bureau, “Armed Conflict in Marawi City
121. ACAPS, Start Network, “Myanmar: Floods in Yedashe, as of 03 April 2018”, 2018; UNHCR, Protection Cluster
Taungoo, Oktwin and Kyaut Gyi Townships,Bago Region”, Philippines, “Mindanao Displacement Dashboard”, October
September 10, 2018. 2018.
122. ACLED, “Myanmar’s Changing Conflict Landscape”, January 147. South China Morning Post, “Philippine troops using
17, 2019. ‘maximum force’ to drive militants out of Marawi”, May
123. ACLED, “Understanding Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar”, 27, 2017; Philstar, “Marawi crisis: What we know -and
September 28, 2018. don’t know- so far”, May 29, 2017; South China Morning
124. Phys.org, “Australia drought extends despite “widespread, Post, “Life after Islamic State: Marawi faces its next battle –
significant rain”, September 9, 2018. rebuilding”, December 8, 2018;
125. AHA Centre, “Disaster Monitoring”, available at, https:// 148. Al Jazeera News, Duterte: Marawi “liberated” from ISIL-
ahacentre.org/disaster-monitoring/. linked fighters, October 19, 2017; South Chinad Morning
Post, Life after Islamic State: Marawi faces its next battle –
126. Government of Fiji, “Planned Relocation Guidelines, A rebuilding, December 8, 2018.
framework to undertake climate change related relocation”,
2018. 149. MindaNews, “Marawi’s Ground Zero residents can start
rebuilding homes by “middle of 2020””, November 3, 2018;
127. Government of Vanuatu, “National Policy on Climate South China Morning Post, “Life after Islamic State: Marawi
Change and Disaster Induced Displacement 2018”, 2018. faces its next battle – rebuilding”, December 8, 2018.
128. World Bank, “Urban population (% of total) | Data”, 150. UNHCR, Protection Cluster Philippines, “Mindanao
available at, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB. Displacement Dashboard”, October 2018.
TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=Z4-ZJ-8S-Z7-ZG-ZQ.
151. UNHCR, Protection Cluster Philippines, “IDP Protection
129. World Bank, “East Asia and Pacific Cities: Expanding Assessment Report, Armed Confrontations and
Opportunities for the Urban Poor”, July 19, 2017. Displacement in Marawi”, April 16, 2018.
130. ESCAP, “Measuring Disaster Risk for Urban areas in Asia- 152. Ibid; ABS-CBN News, “Palace satisfied with Marawi
Pacific”, available at, http://communities.unescap.org/ rehab efforts”, May 22, 2018; UNHCR, Protection Cluster
system/files/urban_areas_at_risk.pdf. Philippines, “Mindanao Displacement Dashboard”, October
131. National Geographic Society, “Ring of Fire”, January 6, 2018.
2015. 153. Ibid.
132. Asian Development Bank, “The emergence of Pacific urban 154. ABS-CBN News, “A year after the war, displaced Marawi
villages, urbanization trends in the Pacific Islands”, 2016; children still “at risk” - UNICEF”, May 22, 2018.
Australian Council for International Development, Pacific
Island Towns and Cities, A resilience agenda urbanisation 155. The Straits Times, “Philippines’ longest urban war ruins
and urban growth in Pacific Island Countries”, February Marawi”, October 20, 2017;Government of Philippines,
2019. “Gov’t working on funding mix for P62-B Marawi rehab”,
July 16, 2018; Government of Philippines, “PHL receives
133. World Bank, “East Asia and Pacific Cities: Expanding P35.1-B pledges for Bangon Marawi rehab program”,
Opportunities for the Urban Poor”, July 19, 2017. November 28, 2018.
134. Cabinet Office Japan, “White Paper, Disaster Management 156. Al Jazeera News, “India’s Kerala state hit by worst flood in a
in Japan 2017”, 2017. century”, August 19, 2018.
135. Cabinet Office Japan, “The July 2018 Heavy Rainfall 157. ACT Alliance, “Cyclone Gaja Emergency Response in Tamil
Emergency Response Headquarters: Disaster Prevention Nadu, India, Rapid Response Fund”, December 5, 2018;
Information”, 2018. BBC News, “Cyclone Titli: Eastern India battered by deadly
136. Based on an extrapolation from a survey conducted by the storm”, October 11, 2018.
Prefectural University of Hiroshima on the needs of evacuees 158. ACLED, “ACLED 2018: The Year in Review”, January 11,
and issues related to shelter management in Hiroshima, 2019.
Okayama and Ehime following Typhoon Jongdari, only
400 out of the 10,000 people surveyed were considered 159. The World Bank, “Urban population growth (annual %) |
evacuees, The Japan Times Online, “Only 3.6 percent of Data”, available at, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
Hiroshima residents had evacuated when July rain disaster SP.URB.GROW?locations=8S-Z7-ZJ-ZG-Z4-XU.
struck”, August 3, 2018. 160. Deb, City Systems in South Asian Urbanization and Growth,
137. The Japan Times Online, “Japan hit by worst weather Paper for the IARIW-ICRIER Conference: Experiences and
disaster in decades”, July 11, 2018. Challenges in Measuring Income, Inequality and Poverty in
South Asia”, October 30, 2017.
138. Takabatake et al., “Field Survey of 2018 Typhoon Jebi in
110
161. Humanitarian Policy Group, “Sanctuary in the city? Urban used on this map do not imply official endorsement or
displacement and vulnerability in Peshawar, Pakistan”, May acceptance by IDMC. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir
2013; UNESCAP, Urbanization trends in South Asia: Issues has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
and Policy options, Presentation”, December 17, 2014; The 188. Hindustan Times, “India, Pakistan hold flag meet to discuss
World Bank, “Leveraging Urbanization in South Asia”, Jammu and Kashmir border firing”, June 4, 2018.
2016; World Economic Forum, “These are the world’s most
populous cities”, October 30, 2017. 189. Firstpost, “Incessant ceasefire violations by Pakistan derail
life in Kashmir’s border towns as India struggles to protect
162. The World Bank, “Slums. End Poverty in South Asia”, locals”, May 28, 2018.
February 10, 2016.
190. Contraloría General de la República, Colombia, “Gestión de
163. The World Bank, “South Asian Urbanization: Messy and las autoridades ambientales en el proceso de licenciamiento,
hidden. End Poverty in South Asia”, September 28, 2015. Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Ituango”, August 2018.
164. Kanbur et al., “Inequality in Asia and the Pacific: Trends, 191. BBC News, “The bridge of desperation”, August 22, 2018.
drivers, and policy implications”, February 24, 2014.
192. UNHCR, “UNHCR to intensify aid to Venezuelans in
165. Patel, “Upgrade, rehouse or resettle? An assessment of Colombia”, October 8, 2018.
the Indian government’s Basic Services for the Urban Poor
(BSUP) programme”, April 2013. 193. IMF Blog, “Outlook for the Americas: A Tougher Recovery”,
July 23, 2018.
166. Jain, “India: Building 20 Million Homes”, 2016; De, “Slum
improvement in India: determinants and approaches”, 194. Figures reported by the government of Ecuador.
October 3, 2017; 195. UNODC, “Colombia, Monitoreo territorios afectados por
167. Environmental Justice Foundation, “Climate Displacement cultivos ilícitos 2017”, September 2018.
in Bangladesh”, March 20, 2019, available at, https:// 196. Cámara de Diputados, México, “Ley General de Víctimas con
ejfoundation.org /rep or t s /climate - displacement- in - Reformas 2017”, January 3, 2017; Senado de la República
bangladesh. de México, “Presentan propuesta de ley para atender a
168. IDMC, “2018 GRID, South Asia, Regional Overview”, 2018. víctimas de desplazamiento forzado interno”, April 3, 2018.
169. Ahsan et al., “Climate Migration and Urban Changes in 197. IDMC, “Crime and displacement in Central America”,
Bangladesh”, January 2016. available at, http://www.internal-displacement.org/
research-areas/crime-and-displacement-in-central-america.
170. Alam et al., “Building Climate-Resilient, Migrant-Friendly
Cities and Towns”, July 2018. 198. IDMC, “Understanding and estimating displacement in the
Northern Triangle of Central America”, September 2018.
171. Abdoh, Hirsch-Holland, “Stuck in the Mud, Urban
Displacement and Tenure Security in Kabul’s Informal 199. Jordán et al., “Desarrollo sostenible, urbanización y
Settlements”, 2019. desigualdad en América Latina y el Caribe”, September
2017.
172. Government of Afghanistan, “White paper on tenure
security and community based upgrading in Kabul”, 2006; 200. Leguízamo, Solano, “El Desplazamiento Forzado como
Nazire et al., “Afghanistan: A Case Study of Afshar Area, generador de nuevos ordenes sociales, culturales y urbanos:
Effects of Informal Settlement Upgrading in Kabul City, ” los casos de Puebla-México y Bogota-Colombia”, 2016.
December 28, 2016. 201. DESA, “2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects”,
173. Seconded European Standardization Expert in India, “Report May 16, 2018.
on Smart City Mission-India”, 2018. 202. Jordán et al., “Desarrollo sostenible, urbanización y
174. Housing and Land Rights Network, “India’s smart cities desigualdad en América Latina y el Caribe”, September
mission: Smart for whom? Cities for whom?”, 2018. 2017.
175. OCHA, “Afghanistan Drought Impact & Needs Assessment, 203. University of Maryland, Texas A&M University, “The growing
Part I: Internally Displaced People in Badghis, Ghor and Hirat threat of urban flooding: a national challenge”, 2018.
Provinces”, August 2018. 204. World Bank, “Population living in slums (% of urban
176. OCHA, “Afghanistan: Drought Response Situation Report population)”, 2019, available at, https://data.worldbank.
No. 2”, September 16, 2018. org/indicator/EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS?locations=ZJ.
177. Reuters, “Drought drives desperate Afghans to marry off 205. World Economic Forum, “Latin America is the world’s most
children for money”, November 27, 2018. dangerous region. But there are signs it is turning a corner”,
March 14, 2018; IDMC, “Understanding and estimating
178. Interim results of IOM Return Intentions Survey, January displacement in the Northern Triangle of Central America”,
2019: DTM Afghanistan, “Drought Response Situation September 2018.
Report, Herat, Badghis”, February 1, 2019.
206. IDMC, Forced displacement linked to transnational crime
179. Abdoh, Hirsch-Holland, “Stuck in the Mud, Urban in Mexico, May 2012; Senado de la República de México,
Displacement and Tenure Security in Kabul’s Informal “Estancia de Investigación Proyecto: “Organizaciones
Settlements”, 2019. Paramilitares, Grupos de autodefensas y Desplazamientos
180. Ibid. Internos forzados en México 2006-2013”, July 10, 2018.
181. This spotlight was built based on inputs provided by the NRC 207. Martson, “The Urban Displaced: Fleeing Criminal Violence in
country office in Afghanistan. Latin American Cities”, 2019; IDMC, Refugee Law Initiative,
182. International Federation of the Red Cross, “Swathes of “An Atomised crisis. Reframing displacement caused by
South India underwater after worst floods in a century”, crime and violence in El Salvador”, September 2018.
August 20, 2018. 208. Magalhães, Villarosa, “Slum Upgrading: Lessons Learned
183. Sphere India, “Kerala Floods 2018 Joint Detailed Needs from Brazil”, June 2012.
Assessment Report”, September 2018. 209. Instituto de Desarollo Urbano, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota,
184. Ministry of Home Affairs, India, “Situation report on Heavy “TransMiCable”, available at, https://www.idu.gov.co/
Rain fall in Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Assam, Archivos_Portal/Micrositios/Transmicable/.
Odisha, Nagaland and Punjab”, October 10, 2018. 210.
Inter-American Development Bank, “Una mirada de la
185. NDTV, “Over 11,000 Evacuated In Odisha As Cyclone gestión de riesgo de desastres desde el nivel local en
Phethai Hits Andhra”, December 18, 2018. Argentina”, September 2016; UN Habitat, “Pro-Poor
Climate Resilience In Marginalized Neighbourhoods”, 2017;
186. Hindustan times, “Cyclone Gaja leaves 40 dead, over Centro de Estudios y Prevención Perú, “Reducción del riesgo
80,000 stranded; TN seeks Central funds”, November 17, en áreas vulnerables de Pamplona Alta, distrito San Juan de
2018; Times of India, “Tamil Nadu announces relief package Miraflores, provincia de Lima, Perú”, 2018.
of 1,000 crore for cyclone relief”, November 20, 2018.
211. DESA, “World Urbanization Prospects - Population Division
187. The boundaries and names shown and the designations

GRID
2019
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- United Nations”, available at, https://population.un.org/ riesgo”, March 20, 2018; NRC, “Attacks on schools deny
wup/Download/. access to education”, July 10, 2018.
212.
Jin et al.”,Identification of two distinct fire regimes in 237. UNHCR, “UNHCR to intensify aid to Venezuelans in
Southern California”, September 2015. Colombia”, October 8, 2018.
213.
California Department of Water Resources, “Drought in 238. UNHCR, “Hay más víctimas de desplazamiento forzado
California, Fall 2015 Drought Brochure”, 2015; Auburn en Colombia que número de habitantes en Costa Rica”,
University, “Case Study: California - Climate, Energy, and December 26, 2018.
Society”, May 23, 2018, available at, https://cla.auburn.edu/ 239. La Opinión, “Aumentó el desempleo en Cúcuta”, December
ces/climate/california-case-study/. 28, 2018.
214. Radeloff et al., “Rapid growth of the US wildland-urban 240. La Opinión, “Cúcuta sigue siendo líder en empleo informal”,
interface raises wildfire risk”, March 27, 2018; EcoWest, August 15, 2018.
“Wildland urban interface”, available at, http://ecowest.
org/fires/wui/. 241. IDMC, ““Stuck in the middle” - Seeking durable solutions in
post-peace agreement Colombia”, March 2019.
215. Government of California, “Fire Statistics”, January 24, 2018,
available at, http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_ 242. Brookings, “Integrating Venezuelans into the Colombian
stats?year=2018; Government of California, Archived Fires, labor market”, December 3, 2018.
available at, http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_ 243. Semana, “Alerta por xenofobia en contra de los venezolanos
archived. en Colombia”, June 2, 2018; UNHCR, “UNHCR to intensify
216. Government of California, “Camp Fire Incident Update aid to Venezuelans in Colombia”, October 8, 2018.
11/25/2018”, 2018. 244. UNHCR, “Vulnerable Venezuelans find help in Colombia”,
217. National Fire Protection Association, “Old & In Harm’s October 5, 2018.
Way: How demographics and topography collided to make 245. UNHCR, “Campaña somos panas Colombia - Fact Sheet”,
the Camp Fire California’s deadliest and most destructive December 2018.
wildfire ever”, January 2, 2019. 246. Especiales Semana, “Venezolanos en Colombia, las cifras
218. Ibid. oficiales”, accessed on January 11, 2019.
219. USA Today, “Camp fire: Paradise, California destroyed, 247. Reuters, “Ukraine suspects sabotage after ammo depot
27,000 forced to evacuate”, November 9, 2018. explosions”, October 9, 2018.
220. Wired, “The Terrifying Science Behind California’s Massive 248. Reuters Graphics, ”Kurdish heartland of Turkey reshaped”,
Camp Fire”, November 9, 2018. May 7, 2018; The New Humanitarian/IRIN, “For Kurds in
221. Science News, “Development near natural areas puts more Southeast Turkey, the urban conflict continues”, July 9,
Californians in the path of wildfires”, November 15, 2018. 2018.
222. National Fire Protection Association, “Old & In Harm’s 249. Reuters, “In Turkey’s Kurdish heartland, a battle for homes
Way: How demographics and topography collided to make and votes”, May 7, 2018; The New Humanitarian/IRIN, “For
the Camp Fire California’s deadliest and most destructive Kurds in Southeast Turkey, the urban conflict continues”,
wildfire ever”, January 2, 2019. July 9, 2018.
223. CityLab, “What California’s Cities Can Do to Prevent 250. International Federation of the Red Cross, “Tajikistan:
Wildfires”, November 16, 2018. Floods. Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA)”, June 2, 2018;
FloodList News, “Tajikistan – Floods in South Leave 6 Dead”,
224. NBC News, “’Where’s everybody going to go?’ Survivors of June 6, 2018.
California’s Camp Fire struggle to find housing”, November
21, 2018. 251. BBC News, “River Seine bursts banks in Paris”, January 24,
2018.
225. Vox, “The Paradise fire is catastrophic. And the wildfire
threat to California is only growing”, November 16, 2018. 252. Munich Re, “Heatwaves, drought and forest fires in Europe:
Billions of dollars in losses for agricultural sector”, July 31,
226. UNHCR, “Venezuelan outflow continues unabated, stands 2018.
now at 3.4 million”, February 22, 2019.
253. International Federation of the Red Cross, “Greece:
227. Especiales Semana, “Venezolanos en Colombia, las cifras Wildfires, Emergency Plan of Action Final Report”, March
oficiales”, accessed on January 11, 2019. 26, 2019.
228. Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from 254. European Commission, “rescEU: a new European system to
Venezuela, “Regional Refugee and Migrant Response tackle natural disasters”, November 23, 2017.
Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, January
- December”, 2019; The World Bank, “Migracion desde 255. The World Bank, “Urban population (% of total)”, available
Venezuela a Colombia”, October 2018. at, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.
IN.ZS?locations=Z7.
229. Refugees International, “Crises Colliding: The Mass Influx
of Venezuelans into the Dangerous Fragility of Post-Peace 256. OSCE, “Internal Displacement in Ukraine”, August 12, 2014.
Agreement Colombia”, January 13, 2019. 257. OCHA, “Breaking the impasse, Reducing Protracted Internal
230. Unidad de Manejo y Análisis de Información Colombia, Displacement as a Collective Outcome”, 2017.
“Proyección de desplazamiento forzado en Colombia para 258. NRC, “Housing, Land and Property Rights of Displaced and
2016-2018”, December 2018; OCHA, “2019 Humanitarian conflict-affected communities in Eastern Ukraine”, January
Needs Overview”, January 15, 2019. 2016.
231. Red Nacional de Información, Unidad Victimas, Gobierno de 259. NRC, “Pursuing compensation for properties damaged or
Colombia, “Reportes”, March 1, 2019, available at, https:// destroyed as a result of hostilities in the armed conflict in
cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/Home/Vigencia. eastern Ukraine: Gaps and opportunities”, October 2018.
232. Defensoría del Pueblo, Colombia, “Defensoría del Pueblo 260. NRC, “Social housing solutions for internally displaced
urge proteger derechos de la población en el Catatumbo”, and conflict-affected population: comparative analysis of
April 17, 2018. Bakhmut, Slovyansk and Kramatorsk projects”, 2018.
233. UNODC, “Colombia, Monitoreo territorios afectados por 261. Government of Kosovo, “Kosovo: Regulation on the Return
cultivos ilicitos 2017.”, September 2018. of Displaced Persons and Durable Solutions (GRK) - NO.
234. Agencia EFE, “La Defensoría de Colombia registró 172 01/2018”, February 5, 2018.
líderes sociales asesinados durante 2018”, January 10, 2019. 262. This policy builds on previous policies in the years of 2002,
235. OCHA, “Boletín Humanitario Mensual, Colombia, Marzo 2008 and 2013. For more information see: Global Protection
2018”, March 2018. Cluster, “Serbia, Global Database on IDP Laws and
Policies”, available at, http://www.globalprotectioncluster.
236. NRC, “Colombia: escalamiento del conflicto, civiles en org/2018/07/27/serbia/.
112
263. Ivlevs, “Are IDPs satisfied with the quality of public health 286. IDMC, “GRID 2018”, 2018.
and education services they receive?” 2019. 287. The World Bank, “Tanzania Urban Resilience Program
264. The Diplomat, “Spectacular Cities and Urban Transformation (TURP)”, available at, http://www.worldbank.org/en/
in Central Asia”, October 17, 2018. programs/tanzania-urban-resilience-program.
265. Council of Europe, “Humanitarian needs and rights of 288. Winsemius et al., “Global drivers of future river flood risk”,
internally displaced persons in Europe”, April 9, 2018. December 2015; NRC, “Disasters will displace 14 million
266. UN, “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”, people every year”, October 20, 2017.
1998; Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 289. Dar Ramani Huria, “Community Mapping for Flood
“Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for Resilience”, available at, http://ramanihuria.org/.
National Responsibility”, April 2005; Brookings-Bern 290. Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team, “Urban flood
Project on Internal Displacement, “IASC Framework on resilience: Ramani Huria, April 1, 2015”, available at, https://
Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons”, April www.hotosm.org/projects/dar_ramani_huria_dar_open_
2010; Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, map; Msilanga, Community Mapping for Flood Resilience –
“IASC Operational Guidelines: The Protection of Persons in The case of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, June 12, 2018.
Situation of Natural Disasters”, January 2011.
291. Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team, “Students Complete
267. Eurostat, “Technical Report on Statistics of Internally Industrial Training – 228 Mapped Subwards and Action Maps
Displaced Persons: Current Practice and Recommendations for Disaster Management of Dar es Salaam”, September 26,
for Improvement”, March 2018. 2018.
268. IASC, “Guidelines Common Operational Datasets (CODs) in 292. IDMC, “The ripple effect: economic impacts of internal
Disaster Preparedness and Response”, November 2010. displacement”, June 2018.
269. JIPS, “Indicator Library”, available at, http://inform- 293. Following the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for
durablesolutions-idp.org/indicators/. Internally Displaced People, “a durable solution is achieved
270. Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL), available at, http:// when internally displaced persons no longer have any
hxlstandard.org/. specific assistance and protection needs that are linked
271. Nadeem, The Centre for Humanitarian Data, “IOM and to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights
OCHA: Partners in Displacement Data”, June 28, 2018. without discrimination on account of their displacement”.
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, “IASC
272. Megginson, The Centre for Humanitarian Data, “Using HXL Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced
to Combine IOM’s Displacement Data”, February 5, 2019. Persons”, April 2010.
273. OCHA, “HDX Tools”, available at, https://tools.humdata. 294. JIPS, “Indicator Library”, available at, http://inform-
org/. durablesolutions-idp.org/indicators/.
274. O’Donoghue, Punch, “Qualitative Educational Research in 295.
IDMC, “The ripple effect: economic impacts of internal
Action: Doing and Reflecting”, 2003. displacement”, June 2018.
275. IDMC, “Part 2: Making progress in reducing internal 296. IDMC, “Unveiling the cost of internal displacement”,
displacement.” 2018; IDMC, “Getting to 2030: internal February 2019.
displacement and sustainable development, summary
report”, October 18, 2018. 297. IDMC, “Impact and experience, Assessing severity of conflict
displacement. Methodological Paper”, February 2019.
276. UNICEF, “A Call to Action: Protecting children on the move
starts with better data”, February 14, 2018. 298. Government of India, “Kutcha House”, available at, https://
data.gov.in/keywords/kutcha-house; The Hindu, “New
277. Overseas Development Institute, “Mass displacement houses for flood-hit”, August 15, 2006.
and the challenge for urban resilience”, 2017; IDMC,
“Unsettlement: Urban displacement in the 21st century. 299. Cabinet Office Japan, “The July 2018 Heavy Rainfall
Research Agenda and call for partners”, February 2018. Emergency Response Headquarters: Disaster Prevention
Information”, 2018.
278. Moreno, UN-Habitat, “Concepts, definitions and data
sources for the study of urbanization: the 2030 Agenda for 300. Natural Hazards Center, “Do I stay or do I go? Hurricane risk
Sustainable Development”, September 5, 2017. perception and evacuation behavior”, November 1, 2017.
279. Hazeu et al., “European environmental stratifications and 301. Horney, “Thousands of people didn’t evacuate before
typologies: An overview”, July 1, 2011; Goerlich, Cantarino, Hurricane Matthew. Why not?”, October 17, 2016.
“Urban/Rural Areas: Population density (from a 1 km2 grid), 302. IDMC, “Crime and displacement in Central America”,
land cover and remoteness as basic elements for an urban/ available at, http://www.internal-displacement.org/
rural typology at LAU2 level”, 2013; Beynon et al., “Measuring research-areas/crime-and-displacement-in-central-america.
and understanding the differences between urban and rural 303. IDMC, “Global Disaster Displacement Risk - A Baseline for
areas”, November 1, 2016; Dijkstra, Pesaresi, “Applying the Future Work”, 2017.
degree of urbanisation to the globe: a new harmonised
definition reveals a different picture of global urbanisation”, 304. UNISDR, “The GAR Atlas - Unveiling Global Disaster Risk”,
September 2018; Eurostat, “Glossary: Functional urban available at, https://www.preventionweb.net/english/
area”, available at, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- hyogo/gar/atlas/.
explained/index.php/Glossary:Functional_urban_area. 305. IDMC, “Global Disaster Displacement Risk - A Baseline for
280. European Commission, “Global Human Settlement Layer”, Future Work”, 2017.
available at, https://ghsl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. 306. As of 2018, 8,159,307 persons were estimated to live in
281.
Melchiorri, Siragusa, “Analyzing Cities with the Global Bogota according to Government of Colombia, “Censo
Human Settlement Layer: A Methodology to Compare Nacional de Población y Vivienda”, April 13, 2018, available
Urban Growth Using Remote Sensing Data”, April 2018. at, https://censo2018.dane.gov.co/resultados-ecenso.
282. See IDMC, “GRID Methodological Annex”, 2019. 307. Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota, “Víctimas: Bogota cuenta con
Centros Locales de Atención”, May 20, 2017; Alcaldía
283. IOM Iraq, “Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 107”, Mayor de Bogota, “Información para población vulnerable,
December 2018. 2018”, available at, http://www.gobiernobogota.gov.co/
284. iRevolutions, “Tracking Population Movements using Mobile transparencia/control/informacion-poblacion-vulnerable.
Phones and Crisis Mapping: A Post-Earthquake Geospatial 308. Especiales Semana, “Venezolanos en Colombia, las cifras
Study in Haiti”, October 13, 2011. oficiales”, accessed on January 11, 2019.
285. Hodge et al., “Comparing Population Displacement 309. Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota, “Alcalde Peñalosa anuncia
Estimates from Mobile Network Data and Other Sources, atención integral a venezolanos migrantes en Bogota”,
Working Paper: Evidence from the Highlands Earthquake in September 12, 2018; Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota, “Distrito
Papua New Guinea”, 2019.

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adelantó la primera mesa de trabajo para atender migración Northern Triangle of Central America”, September 2018;
venezolana”, November 29, 2018. Martson, “The Urban Displaced: Fleeing Criminal Violence
310. See: IDMC, “GRID 2017”, 2017; IDMC, “Positioned for in Latin American Cities”, 2019.
action: Displacement in the Sendai Framework for disaster 332. Martson, “The Urban Displaced: Fleeing Criminal Violence
risk reduction”, February 16, 2017; IDMC, “Two steps in Latin American Cities”, 2019.
forward, one step back: Internal displacement and the 2030 333. IDMC, Refugee Law Initiative, “An Atomised crisis.
Agenda on Sustainable Development”, July 13, 2017; IDMC, Reframing displacement caused by crime and violence in El
“Leaving no one behind: internal displacement and the New Salvador”, September 2018.
Urban Agenda”, 2016.
334. See: IDMC, “Understanding and estimating displacement in
311. Maha Al-Zu’bi, Radovic, “SDG11 and the Associated the Northern Triangle of Central America”, September 2018;
Challenges to Implementation”, October 24, 2018. Ibid; IDMC, “Cristosal, Refugee Law Initiative, A web of
312. European Commission, “The Urban Amplifier: Adapting to violence, Crime, corruption, and displacement in Honduras”,
Urban Specificities”, 2018. April 2019.
313. IDMC, “Unsettlement: Urban displacement in the 21st 335. UN Economic and Social Council, “International Decade for
century. Research Agenda and Call for Partners”, February Natural Disaster Reduction, Note by the Secretary-General”,
2018. June 21, 1994; UNISDR, “Global Assessment Report on
314. IDMC, “Home sweet home: housing practices and tools that Disaster Risk Reduction”, 2009; UNISDR, ‘Global Assessment
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315. UN, “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”, 1998.
336. UN, “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 -
316. IDMC, “City of flight, New and secondary displacements 2030”, March 18, 2015.
in Mogadishu, Somalia”, November 2018; The Oakland
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scheme to privatize the commons”, 2019. the New Urban Agenda”, 2016; UN, Habitat III Secretariat,
“New Urban Agenda, 2017.
317. Adow, “Pastoralists in Kenya”, October 2008; Bonneau,
“Drought and Internal Displacements of Pastoralists in 338. Fuchs, “Cities at Risk: Asia’s Coastal Cities in an Age of
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NRC et al., “On the margin: Kenya’s pastoralists.”, March 339. IDMC, “GRID 2016, Nepal Spotlight, Obstacles to protection
2014. and recovery”, 2017; Rimal et al., “Monitoring Urban
318. Raeymaekers, “Forced Displacement and Youth Employment Growth and the Nepal Earthquake 2015 for Sustainability of
in the Aftermath of the Congo War: From Making a Living to Kathmandu Valley”, Nepal, June 2017.
Making a Life”, January 2011. 340. German Federal Foreign Affairs Office, EMI, “Risk-Sensitive
319. Jacobsen, “Khartoum, Sudan: Case 1 of the Tufts-IDMC Land Use Plan, Kathmandu Metropolitan City, Nepal”,
Profiling Study of IDPs in Three Urban Areas”, August 2008. February 28, 2010.
320. FAO, “Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 341. IDMC, “GRID 2018”, 2018.
requires investing in rural areas”, October 2017. 342. UNISDR, “Making development sustainable: the future of
321. Beall et al., “Cities and Conflict in Fragile States in the disaster risk management, Global Assessment Report on
Developing World”, November 1, 2013; ICRC, “I saw my city Disaster Risk Reduction”, 2015.
die: the human toll of urban warfare”, June 15, 2017. 343. Assis Dias et al., “Estimation of exposed population to
322. OCHA, “Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas”, available landslides and floods risk areas in Brazil, on an intra-urban
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populated-areas. 344. Gupta, “Urban flood resilience planning and management
323. ICRC, “Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict: a and lessons for the future: a case study of Mumbai, India”,
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June 15, 2017; ICRC, “Displaced in Cities. Experiencing 346. DESA, “World Urbanization Prospects - Population Division
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324.
IDMC, “For cities, specify the neighbourhood, Expert 347. Quartz Africa, “It’s only just started, flooding is going to get
opinion”, October 2018; IDMC, “Nowhere to return to, a lot worse in Nigeria”, August 17, 2017.
Iraqis’ search for durable solutions continues”, November
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325. Damluji, ““Securing Democracy in Iraq”: Sectarian Politics
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“Welcome to a New Kind of War: The Rise of Endless Urban sismos, la ONU-DH llama a proteger los derechos humanos
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326. Cottyn, “Small towns and rural growth centers as strategic
spaces of control in Rwanda’s post-conflict trajectory”, April 350. IDMC, “Civil society engagement in urban displacement:
3, 2018. lessons from Mexico City a year after the 19-S earthquake,
September 2018.
327. UNHCR, “Humanitarian evacuations in violence and armed
conflict”, June 17, 2016; ICRC, “I saw my city die: the human 351. The World Bank, “IBRD, Flood Risk Management in Dhaka:
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328. IDMC, “Nowhere to return to, Iraqis’ search for durable
solutions continues”, November 2018. 352. Gupte et al., “Forced evictions, demolitions and wellbeing
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329. Kang, “Urbanization as a Result of Displacement. A Case
Study of Bentiu”, South Sudan, 2019. 353. OHCHR, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development
based Evictions and Displacement”, 2007; UN Habitat,
330. UN Habitat, “UNESCO, The Initial Planning Framework for UNCHR, “The Right to Adequate Housing: Fact Sheet No.
the Reconstruction of Mosul”, 2018; IDMC, “Nowhere to 21/Rev.1”, November 2009.
return to, Iraqis’ search for durable solutions continues”,
November 2018. 354. IDMC, “GRID 2018”, 2018.
331. IDMC, “Understanding and estimating displacement in the 355. Asian Development Bank, “Resettlement Plans”, available
114
at, https://www.adb.org/projects/documents/doctype/ to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities
Resettlement%20Plans; The World Bank, Involuntary Act. No.56”, 2012.
Resettlement, available at, http://web.worldbank.org/ 377. OHCHR, “Kenya: Stop forced evictions from Nairobi’s
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EX Kibera settlement, say UN rights experts”, July 26, 2018.
TINVRES/0,,menuPK:410241~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093
~theSitePK:410235,00.html. 378. Arup, “Urban Africa Risk Knowledge, Risk beyond the red
line. Urban risk and large scale infrastructure projects in
356. Ghertner, “India’s Urban Revolution: Geographies of Kenya”, 2018.
Displacement beyond Gentrification”, July 1, 2014; Gupte
et al., “Forced evictions, demolitions and wellbeing in the 379. Guiu, Siddiqui, “Cities as a refuge, cities as a home”, 2019.
city”, 2019. 380. IDMC, “City of Challenge and opportunity. Employment
357. The World Bank, “Urban land acquisition and involuntary and livelihoods for internally displaced people in Maiduguri,
resettlement  : linking innovation and local benefits”, Borno State”, February 2018.
February 1, 2017. 381.
Davis et al., “Comparing the Experiences of Internally
358. Satterthwaite, Mitlin, “Reducing Urban Poverty in the Displaced Persons in Urban vs. Rural Areas: Findings from a
Global South”, 2014. Longitudinal Study in Iraq”, 2015-2017, 2019.
359. Sheng, Brown, “Prosperity for all: Enhancing the informal 382.
IDMC, “Unsettlement: Urban displacement in the 21st
economy through participatory slum upgrading”, February century. Research Agenda and call for partners”, February
2018. 2018; Cotroneo, “Specificities and challenges of responding
to internal displacement in urban settings”, May 7, 2018.
360. Gupte et al., “Forced evictions, demolitions and wellbeing
in the city”, 2019. 383. National Centre of Competence in Research North-South,
“Addressing issues and concerns of Internally Displaced
361. See in particular Principle 7: UN, “Guiding Principles on Persons in Nepal”, 2011 ; Syria Response Education Cluster,
Internal Displacement”, 1998. “Schools under Attack in Syria”, 2015; Ibáñez, Moya,
362. Gupte et al., “Forced evictions, demolitions and wellbeing “The Impact of Intra-State Conflict on Economic Welfare
in the city”, 2019. and Consumption Smoothing: Empirical Evidence for
363. OHCHR, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development the Displaced Population in Colombia”, 2016; Cotroneo,
based Evictions and Displacement”, 2007. “Migration and Displacement: Specificities and challenges
of responding to internal displacement in urban settings”,
364. Urban Displacement Project, available at, http://www. 2017; Overseas Development Institute, “Mass displacement
urbandisplacement.org/. and the challenge for urban resilience”, 2017; Boyd et al.,
365. Clark, “The order and simplicity of gentrification-a political “Emerging Infectious Diseases”, 2017; Faust, Kaminsky,
challenge”, 2005, p. 258; Freund, “Perpetuating segregation “Building Water & Wastewater System Resilience To Disaster
or turning discrimination on its head? Affordable housing Migration: Utility Perspectives”, 2017; ICRC, “Displaced
residency preferences as anti-displacement measures”, in cities: experiencing and responding to urban internal
April 2018; Gupte et al., “Forced evictions, demolitions and displacement outside camps”, 2018; Ivlevs, “Are IDPs
wellbeing in the city”, 2019. satisfied with the quality of public health and education
366. CityLab, “The Complex Connection Between Gentrification services they receive?” 2019.
and Displacement”, September 8, 2015. 384. Global Alliance for Urban Crises, “Resource Library”,
367. Nic Jay, “20 Years of evictions in San Francisco”, available at, available at, http://urbancrises.org/resource-library/.
https://public.tableau.com/profile/nic.jay#!/vizhome/SFEvict 385. JIPS, “Joint IDP Profiling Service, Homepage”, available at,
ions_0/20YearsofEvictions; Eviction Lab, Eviction Rankings, https://www.jips.org/; Weihmayer et al., “Displacement
available at, https://evictionlab.org/rankings/. profiling in urban areas. Methodological approaches for
368. Zuk, Chapple, “Case studies on Gentrification and collecting and analysing data on internal displacement in
Displacement in the San Francisco Bay Area”, July 2015. cities”, 2019.
369. The Homeless Hub, “Pushed Out - The Hidden Costs of 386. IDMC, ”City of flight, New and secondary displacements in
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Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur 387. Brandt, Earle, “The Global Compact for Refugees. Bringing
on adequate housing”, December 30, 2015. Mayors to the table: why and how”, 2018.
370. IDMC et al., “National Instruments on Internal Displacement. 388. IDMC, “Home sweet home: housing practices and tools that
A guide to their Development”, August 2013. support durable solutions for urban IDPs”, 2015.
371. UNISDR, “Disaster Displacement: How to Reduce Risk, 389. OCHA, “Breaking the impasse, Reducing Protracted Internal
Address Impacts and Strengthen Resilience. A companion Displacement as a Collective Outcome”, 2017.
for implementing the Sendai Framework target E”, 2018, p. 390. IOM, “Framework for Addressing Internal Displacement”,
2. 2017.
372. Ngetich et al., “Policies and strategies for tackling informal 391. Huang, Graham, “Are Refugees Located Near Urban Job
settlements: lessons for Kenya”, April 1, 2016; Patel, “Figure Opportunities?”, June 2018.
of the week: Africa is home to the 10 fastest growing cities
in the world”, October 5, 2018. 392. Davis et al., “Comparing the Experiences of Internally
Displaced Persons in Urban vs. Rural Areas: Findings from a
373. Metcalfe et al., “Sanctuary in the city? Urban displacement Longitudinal Study in Iraq, 2015-2017”, 2019.
and vulnerability in Nairobi”, September 2011; Omari, “From
rhetoric to practice: a study on the right to accessible and 393. Florida et al., “Global Metropolis: Assessing Economic
adequate housing in Kenya”, March 18, 2015; Mwangangi, Activity in Urban Centers Based on Nighttime Satellite
“Elections Related Evictions in Urban Slums: the Case of Images”, May 1, 2012; Duranton, “Growing through Cities
Mukuru Kwa Njenga Nairobi, 1991-2013”, December 2017. in Developing Countries”, February 1, 2015; Graham,
“Where are the World’s IDPs and What Does that Mean for
374. Lines, Makau, “Taking the long view: 20 years of Muungano Their Economic Integration?”, 2019.
wa Wanavijiji, the Kenyan Federation of Slum Dwellers”,
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375. Mwaniki et al., “Urbanisation, Informality and Housing 395. Brown et al., “Urban refugee economies: Addis Ababa,
Challenge in Nairobi: A Case of Urban Governance Failure?”, Ethiopia”, March 2018.
2015; Njiru, “Outsiders in their own nation: Electoral violence 396. Mathys, Büscher, “Urbanizing Kitchanga: spatial trajectories
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31, 2017; ReliefWeb, “Kenya: Floods - Mar 2018”, available March 21, 2018.
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376. Republic of Kenya, “Prevention, Protection and Assistance Some new empirical evidence”, December 10, 2016;

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Calderón-Mejía, Ibáñez, “Labour market effects of support durable solutions for urban IDPs”, 2015.
migration-related supply shocks: evidence from internal 421. Satterthwaite, Mitlin, “Reducing Urban Poverty in the
refugees in Colombia”, 2016; Depetris-Chauvin, Santos, Global South”, 2014.
“The Impacts of Internal Displacement Inflows on Host
Communities in Colombia”, 2017; World Economic Forum, 422. NRC, “Living conditions of displaced persons and host
Migration and Its Impact on Cities”, October 2017 Ruhs, communities in urban Goma, DRC”, October 15, 2014.
Vargas-Silva, “The Labour Market Effects of Immigration”, 423. Global Shelter Cluster, “The State of Humanitarian Shelter
December 14, 2018 and Settlements 2018”, December 18, 2018.
398. Adekola et al., “Unemployment in Nigeria; a challenge of 424. Oxfam, “Returning to Fragility: Exploring the link between
demographic change?” May 2016. conflict and returnees in Afghanistan”, January 2018.
399. The World Bank, UNHCR, “Forced Displacement by the 425. Abdoh, Hirsch-Holland, “Stuck in the Mud, Urban
Boko Haram Conflict in the Lake Chad region”, June 2016; Displacement and Tenure Security in Kabul’s Informal
IDMC, “City of Challenge and opportunity. Employment Settlements”, 2019.
and livelihoods for internally displaced people in Maiduguri, 426. Day, Wewerinke-Singh, “Learning from Survivors of
Borno State”, February 2018. Development-Induced Displacement: Operationalising
400. ILO, “Informal economy”, available at, https://www.ilo.org/ Vanuatu’s New Displacement Policy toward an Inclusive
global/topics/employment-promotion/informal-economy/ Capital City”, 2019.
lang--en/index.htm. 427. UN Habitat, “Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and
401. Brown, Smith, “Topic Guide: Livelihoods and urbanisation”, Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict”, 2012; NRC,
March 2016; Sheng, Brown, “Prosperity for all: Enhancing International Federation of the Red Cross, “The Importance
the informal economy through participatory slum of addressing Housing, Land and Property (HLP). Challenges
upgrading”, February 2018. in Humanitarian Response”, April 2016.
402. Aysa-Lastra, “Integration of Internally Displaced Persons in 428. IDMC, “Home sweet home: housing practices and tools that
Urban Labour Markets: A Case Study of the IDP Population support durable solutions for urban IDPs”, 2015.
in Soacha, Colombia”, June 1, 2011. 429. Sudan Tribune, “South Sudan’s Kiir directs to vacate
403. Anyanzu, “Livelihood and Informality: The Case of Urban newcomers from IDPs land”, December 11, 2018.
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Kampala”, 430. Cernea, Maldonado, “Challenging the Prevailing Paradigm
October 2016. of Displacement and Resettlement. Risks, Impoverishment,
404. NRC, “Living conditions of displaced persons and host Legacies, Solutions”, 2018.
communities in urban Goma, DRC”, October 15, 2014. 431. The World Bank, “The Toll of War: The Economic and Social
405. JIPS, “Internal displacement profiling in Mogadishu”, April Consequences of the Conflict in Syria”, July 10, 2017.
2016. 432. Daher, “Decree 66 and the Impact of its National Expansion”,
406. NRC et al., “Challenges of IDP Protection. Research March 7, 2018; Daher, “Reconstructing Syria: How the al-
study on the protection of internally displaced persons in Assad regime is capitalizing on destruction”, December
Afghanistan”, November 2012. 2018.
407. Aysa-Lastra, “Integration of Internally Displaced Persons in 433. Human Rights Watch, “Q&A: Syria’s New Property Law”,
Urban Labour Markets: A Case Study of the IDP Population May 29, 2018.
in Soacha, Colombia”, June 1, 2011. 434. Ibid.
408. ILO DWT, Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe, 435.
UNHCR, “Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response”,
“Employment needs assessment and employability of March 11, 2019, available at, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/
internally displaced persons in Ukraine: summary of survey situations/syria.
findings and recommendations”, 2016.
436.
Prettitore, “Will forcibly displaced Syrians get their land
409. Nor et al., “Forced Migration and the City: the urban back?”, July 21, 2016.
experience of IDPs in Abuja, Nigeria”, 2019.
437. PAX for Peace, “Legal Obstacles to Housing, Land and
410. Graham, “Where are the World’s IDPs and What Does that Property Rights in Syria”, March 6, 2019.
Mean for Their Economic Integration?” 2019.
438. Daher, “Reconstructing Syria: How the al-Assad regime is
411. Satterthwaite, Mitlin, “Reducing Urban Poverty in the capitalizing on destruction”, December 2018; Chatham
Global South”, 2014. House, “Property Law no.10 and its implications on Syrian
412. Sheng, Brown, “Prosperity for all: Enhancing the informal cities”, June 2018.
economy through participatory slum upgrading”, February 439. IRIN, “Decree 66: The blueprint for al-Assad’s reconstruction
2018. of Syria?” April 20, 2017.
413. Davis et al., “Comparing the Experiences of Internally 440. PAX for Peace, “Legal Obstacles to Housing, Land and
Displaced Persons in Urban vs. Rural Areas: Findings from a Property Rights in Syria”, March 6, 2019.
Longitudinal Study in Iraq, 2015-2017”, 2019.
441. McGuirk, “Radical cities: across Latin America in search of a
414. Smith, Mohiddin, “A review of evidence of humanitarian new architecture”, 2014.
cash transfer programming in urban areas”, December
2015. 442. World Resources Institute, “Confronting the Urban
Housing Gap”, July 12, 2017. UN, “Goal 11:. Sustainable
415. Oxfam GB, “Cash-transfer programming in emergencies”, Development Knowledge Platform”, available at, https://
2006. sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11;
416. Smith, Mohiddin, “A review of evidence of humanitarian 443. NRC, “From Shelter to Housing: Security of Tenure and
cash transfer programming in urban areas”, December Integration in Protracted Displacement Settings”, December
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417. Humanitarian Policy Group, “Protracted displacement: Agenda”, October 2015; UN, “Tracking Progress Towards
uncertain paths to self-reliance in exile”, September 2015; Inclusive, Safe, Resilient and Sustainable Cities and Human
Clemens et al., “The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Settlements. SDG 11 Synthesis Report. High Level Political
Refugees Formal Labor Market Access”, October 9, 2018. Forum”, July 12, 2018.
418. UN Habitat, UNESCO, “The Initial Planning Framework for 444. World Economic Forum, “Migration and Its Impact on
the Reconstruction of Mosul”, 2018. Cities”, October 2017.
419. Graham, “Where are the World’s IDPs and What Does that 445. Ministerio del Interior, República de Colombia, “Ley 1448,
Mean for Their Economic Integration?”, 2019. Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras”, 2011; Congreso
420. IDMC, “Home sweet home: housing practices and tools that de Colombia, “Ley 1523”, April 24, 2012; Defensoria
del Pueblo, Colombia, “Derecho a la vivienda para los
116
desplazados”, November 2014. countries, 7 sectors to 2040”, July 2017.
446. Corte Constitucional de Colombia, “Pautas y criterios para 472. IDMC, “Two steps forward, one step back: Internal
el levantamiento del estado de cosas inconstitucional en displacement and the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable
materia de desplazamiento forzado”, August 23, 2016. Development”, July 13, 2017.
447. Ministerio de Vivienda, República de Colombia, “Decreto 473. Global BRTData, available at, https://brtdata.org/.
2231”, December 27, 2017. 474. Pérez Caballero, “Acupuntura Urbana. Intervención en la
448. IDMC, “Home sweet home: housing practices and tools that ciudad y participación: cuatro experiencias. Thesis”, 2016.
support durable solutions for urban IDPs”, 2015. 475. Telemedellin, “Así se aplica la teoría de la Acupuntura
449. Bredenoord, van Lindert, “Pro-poor housing policies: Urbana en Medellin”, June 20, 2018.
Rethinking the potential of assisted self-help housing”, July 476. Verdad Abierta, “La comuna 13, en continuo desplazamiento
1, 2010; McGuirk, “Radical cities: across Latin America in forzado”, November 25, 2011; Saville, “Comuna 13: How
search of a new architecture”, 2014, Medellin’s Most Infamous Community Reinvented Itself”,
450. OCHA, “Addressing Protracted Internal Displacement: March 5, 2018; The Telegraph, “How Medellin went from
National and Sub National level workshops. Presentation”, murder capital to hipster holiday destination”, January 4,
November 2018. 2018.
451. McGuirk, “Radical cities: across Latin America in search of a 477. Ibid.
new architecture”, 2014. 478. Muungano wa Wanavijiji, “Railway Relocation - A
452. OCHA, “Addressing Protracted Internal Displacement: Collaborative Development Approach”, June 5, 2015;
National and Sub National level workshops. Presentation”, Muungano wa Wanavijiji, “Homeless but not hopeless:
November 2018. Working together for eviction alternatives in Kibera”, July
453. ICRC, “Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict: 30, 2018.
a call for a better approach to assisting affected people”, 479. Build a Better Future, “Reimagining Lima”, available at,
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454. UN, “Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform”, 480. Ibid.
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455. UN, “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 - and vulnerability in Nairobi”, September 2011.
2030”, March 18, 2015. 482. Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments et al.,
456. The World Bank, “People using at least basic sanitation “Roadmap for localizing the SDGs: Implementation and
services, urban (% of urban population)”, available at, monitoring at subnational level”, 2015.
ht tps: //data.worldbank.org / indicator/ SH.STA .BA SS. 483. Independent Expert Advisory Group, “United Nations
UR.ZS?end=2015&locations=XM-XN-XT-XD&start=2000. Secretariat, A World that Counts. Mobilising the data
457. Boyd et al., “Centers for Disease Control and Prevention revolution for sustainable development”, 2014, p. 22.
Public Health Response to Humanitarian Emergencies, 484. Satterthwaite, “Where are the local indicators for the SDGs?,
2007–2016”, December 2017. International Institute for Environment and Development”,
458. IDMC, NRC, “Nepal: Failed implementation of IDP Policy March 9, 2016.
leaves many unassisted”, January 28, 2010. 485. ICRC, “Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict:
459. OCHA, “2015 Libya: Humanitarian Needs Overview”, a call for a better approach to assisting affected people”,
September 2015. 2015.
460. Ivlevs, “Are IDPs satisfied with the quality of public health 486. Gutteres, “A coherent approach to poverty reduction,
and education services they receive?” 2019. development and displacement, Ideas for Development”,
461. Conflict in Cities, “Rethinking Conflict Infrastructure: How November 26, 2009.
the built environment sustains divisions in contested cities”, 487. Sampaio, “Our fast-growing cities are becoming hotbeds of
November 2012; McKinsey Global Institute, “Bridging unrest. It doesn’t have to be that way”, November 10, 2016.
Global Infrastructure Gaps”, June 2016; Watkins et al., 488. ICRC, “Exploring Humanitarian Law. Glossary. Terms used
“Lessons from Four Decades of Infrastructure Project- in EHL”, 2009.
Related Conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean”,
September 7, 2017. 489. UNODC, “Chapter 4: Homicide, Violence and Conflict.
Global study on homicide, Trends, Contexts, Data”, 2013.
462. European Commission, “The Urban Amplifier: Adapting to
Urban Specificities”, 2018. 490. IDMC, “Forced displacement linked to transnational
organised crime in Mexico”, May 2012.
463. ICRC, “Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict:
a call for a better approach to assisting affected people”, 491. IDMC, “The displacement continuum, research agenda and
2015. call for partners”, November 2017.
464. IDMC, “For cities, specify the neighbourhood, Expert 492. UN General Assembly, “Report of the open-ended
opinion”, October 2018. intergovernmental expert working group on indicators and
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465. Paragas et al., “Tacloban after Haiyan Working together 2016.
towards recovery”, September 2016.
493.
IDMC, “Understanding the root causes of displacement:
466. Kang, “Urbanization as a Result of Displacement. A Case towards a comprehensive approach to prevention and
Study of Bentiu, South Sudan”, 2019. solutions”, December 8, 2015.
467. Rufat et al., “Social vulnerability to floods: Review of case 494. The Brookings Institution-Bern Project on Internal
studies and implications for measurement”, December 1, Displacement, “Annex I: Glossary, IASC Operational
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growing threat of urban flooding: a national challenge”, natural disasters”, January 2011.
2018.
495. UN Habitat, OHCHR, “Forced Evictions, Fact sheet No.25/
468. McGuirk, “Radical cities: across Latin America in search of a Rev.1”, 2014.
new architecture”, 2014.
496. UN Habitat et al., “Informal Settlements, Habitat III Issue
469. Lerner, “Acupuntura urbana”, 2005. Paper 22”, May 2015; Brown, “Topic guide: Planning for
470. Faust, Kaminsky, “Building Water and Wastewater System sustainable and inclusive cities in the Global South”, 2015.
Resilience to Disaster Migration: Utility Perspectives”, 497. OCHA, “Breaking the impasse, Reducing Protracted Internal
August 2017. Displacement as a Collective Outcome”, 2017.
471. Oxford Economics, Global Infrastructure Hub, “Global 498. The Brookings Institution-Bern Project on Internal
Infrastructure Outlook. Infrastructure investment needs. 50

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Displacement, “Annex I: Glossary, IASC Operational
Guidelines on the protection of persons in situations of
natural disasters”, January 2011.
499. UN General Assembly, “Report of the open-ended
intergovernmental expert working group on indicators and
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1, 2016.
500. IDMC, “Understanding the root causes of displacement:
towards a comprehensive approach to prevention and
solutions”, December 8, 2015.
501. IDMC, “Home sweet home: housing practices and tools that
support durable solutions for urban IDPs”, 2015.
502.
UN General Assembly, “Report of the open-ended
intergovernmental expert working group on indicators and
terminology relating to disaster risk reduction”, December 1,
2016.
118

TABLE 1
New and total displacement in 2018

Country or Total New New Country or Total New New

territory number displace- displace- territory number displace- displace-
of IDPs ments ments of IDPs ments ments
as of 31 in 2018 in 2018 as of 31 in 2018 in 2018
December (conflict) (disasters) December (conflict) (disasters)
2018 2018
(conflict) (conflict)
Abyei Area 31,000 150 2 Chad 90,000 2,000

Afghanistan 2,598,000 372,000 435,000 Chile 2,500

Albania 110 China 3,762,000

Algeria 19 Colombia 5,761,000 145,000 67,000

American 4,600 Congo 107,000

Samoa
Costa Rica 5,800
Angola 11,000
Côte d'Ivoire 302,000 700 3,200
Argentina 16,000
Croatia 140
Australia 11,000
Cuba 52,000
Azerbaijan 344,000 390
Cyprus 228,000 8
Bahamas 230
Czech Republic 12
Bangladesh 426,000 300 78,000
Dem. People's 69,000
Belgium 50 Rep. Korea

Benin 3,500 3,500 23,000 Dem. Rep. 3,081,000 1,840,000 81,000

Congo
Bolivia 2,400
Djibouti 9,400
Bosnia and 99,000
Herzegovina Dominica 350

Botswana 1,600 Dominican 27,000

Republic
Brazil 86,000
Ecuador 420 4,200
Bulgaria 50
Egypt 97,000 15,000 8
Burkina Faso 47,000 42,000 5,100
El Salvador 246,000 4,700
Burundi 49,000 5,100 35,000
Eswatini 110
Cambodia 37,000
Ethiopia 2,137,000 2,895,000 296,000
Cameroon 668,000 459,000
Fiji 12,000
Canada 19,000
Finland 51
Central African 641,000 510,000 9,300
Republic France 6,300

Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures

GRID
2019
 119
Country or Total New New Country or Total New New
territory number displace- displace- territory number displace- displace-
of IDPs ments ments of IDPs ments ments
as of 31 in 2018 in 2018 as of 31 in 2018 in 2018
December (conflict) (disasters) December (conflict) (disasters)
2018 2018
(conflict) (conflict)

Georgia 293,000 310 Latvia 24

Germany 510 Lebanon 11,000

Ghana 5,000 5,000 61,000 Lesotho 1,400

Greece 9,200 Liberia 15,000

Greenland 170 Libya 221,000 70,000

Grenada 27 Macao, China 5,700

Guam 2,400 Macedonia 140 50

Guatemala 242,000 27,000 Madagascar 2,000 1,700 75,000

Guinea 3,900 Malawi 20,000

Guinea-Bissau 3,700 Malaysia 38,000

Guyana 170 Maldives 20

Haiti 8,800 Mali 120,000 126,000 19,000

Honduras 190,000 950 17,000 Mauritania 450

Hong Kong, 1,400 Mauritius 3,600

China
Mexico 338,000 11,000 20,000
India 479,000 169,000 2,675,000
Mongolia 5,900
Indonesia 16,000 4,500 853,000
Montenegro 6
Iran 74,000
Mozambique 14,000 3,800 31,000
Iraq 1,962,000 150,000 69,000
Myanmar 401,000 42,000 298,000
Israel 80
Namibia 13
Italy 3,300
Nepal 12,000
Jamaica 7
New Caledonia 48
Japan 146,000
New Zealand 990
Jordan 2,000
Nicaragua 6,900
Kazakhstan 400
Niger 156,000 52,000 40,000
Kenya 162,000 10,000 336,000
Nigeria 2,216,000 541,000 613,000
Korea 1,100
Northern 14,000
Kosovo 16,000 Mariana Islands

Kyrgyzstan 4,700 Oman 10,000

Lao PDR 19,000 Pakistan 119,000 1,800 2,100

120
Country or Total New New Country or Total New New
territory number displace- displace- territory number displace- displace-
of IDPs ments ments of IDPs ments ments
as of 31 in 2018 in 2018 as of 31 in 2018 in 2018
December (conflict) (disasters) December (conflict) (disasters)
2018 2018
(conflict) (conflict)
Palestine 238,000 490 Tanzania 29,000

Papua New 12,000 360 61,000 Thailand 41,000 4,600

Guinea
Tonga 5,700
Paraguay 30,000
Trinidad and 860
Peru 59,000 8,600 Tobago

Philippines 301,000 188,000 3,802,000 Tunisia 3,300

Portugal 410 Turkey 1,097,000 640

Puerto Rico 400 Uganda 32,000 9,000 164,000

Romania 1,200 Ukraine 800,000 12,000

Russia 2,300 3,600 United 160

Kingdom
Rwanda 47,000
United States 1,247,000
Samoa 330
Uruguay 300
Saudi Arabia 2,000
Vanuatu 13,000
Senegal 18,000 2
Venezuela 32,000
Serbia 130
Viet Nam 143,000
Sierra Leone 3,000 3,000
Yemen 2,324,000 252,000 18,000
Slovakia 270
Zambia 21
Slovenia 340
Zimbabwe 1,100
Solomon 1,100
Islands

Somalia 2,648,000 578,000 547,000

South Africa 2,100

South Sudan 1,869,000 321,000 6,600

Spain 3,300

Sri Lanka 37,000 1,100 100,000

Sudan 2,072,000 41,000 121,000

Sweden 130

Switzerland 18

Syria 6,119,000 1,649,000 27,000

Taiwan, China 19,000

Tajikistan 5,400

GRID
2019
 Region Event Month Countries and New Figure source(s)
name disaster began territories Displacements*

America Typhoon Mangkhut

outh Asia
September d Centra 3,191,000
tA
sia and Pac
ifi The s S b-S
aharan Afr
ic Eas
t and Nort
h e an lA

r
op

a
as Government

E
le China 1,610,000

c
Su

d
Af
Eu
sia

Mid
rica
Philippines 1,570,804 Government
China (Macao) 5,650 Government
Guam 2,143 Local authorities
TABLE 2

China (Hong-Kong) 1,400 Local authorities

9,332,000 1,687,000 3,303,000 2,611,000
Northern Mariana
214,000
Islands
41,000 1,116 Government and ECHO
54.3% OF THE 9.8% OF THE 19.2% OF THE 15.2% OF THE 1.2% OFThailand
THE 0.2% OF THE 6 Local authorities
GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL

Southwest monsoon July 970,000

(Habagat) Philippines 902,312 Government
Cambodia 31,990 Humanitarian Response Forum
Multiple tropical Laos 18,000 United Nations
depressions, typhoons, China 14,000 Government
storms: Son-Tinh (Henry), Viet Nam 3,852 Government
Tropical depression Josie, Thailand 262 Local authorities
Tropical storm Inday etc.

Typhoon Maria July 521,000

China 517,800 Government
China (Taiwan) 3,430 Government

America Monsoon
t aseason
nd No May
d Centra India 1,967,000 Government, local authorities
The s South Asia b-S
aharan Afr
ic Eas rth e an lA

r
op

a
Su le

d
Af
Eu
sia

Mid
rica
Cyclone Titli October India 400,000 Government and NGO

1,687,000 3,303,000 2,611,000 214,000 41,000

9.8% OF THE 19.2% OF THE 15.2% OF THE 1.2% OF THE 0.2% OF THE
Largest disaster events triggering displacement per region in 2018

LOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL
Drought January Afghanistan 371,000 IOM and OCHA

* Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures
121
 122
Region Event Month Countries and New Figure source(s)

2019
GRID
name disaster began territories Displacements*

America South Asia

Hurricane Florence
Saharan Af t August
and Nor United
d CentraStates of America 464,000 Government and local authorities
tA
sia and Pac
ifi The s b- ric Eas th e an l

a
as

E
le

c
Su op (Florida) A

d
Af
Eu
sia

Mid
rica
Hurricane Michael October 375,000
United States of America 375,000 Government and local authorities
(Florida)
Cuba 300 International Committee of the
9,332,000 1,687,000 3,303,000 2,611,000 214,000 41,000
9.8% OF THE 15.2% OF THE 0.2% OF THE Red Cross
54.3% OF THE 19.2% OF THE 1.2% OF THE
GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL
Wildfire Woolsey November United States of America 182,000 Government
(California)

South Asia
d Centra August Nigeria 600,000 OCHA
b-S
aharan Afr
ic Eas h e an
t and NortNigeria floods lA

r
op

a
Su le

d
Af
Eu
sia

Mid
rica
Kenya floods April Kenya 327,000 OCHA and Kenya Red Cross

Somalia floods April Somalia 289,000 OCHA and Protection and Return
Monitoring Network
3,303,000 2,611,000 214,000 41,000
19.2% OF THE 15.2% OF THE 1.2% OF THE 0.2% OF THE
GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL

d CentrSarpol-e Zahab November Iran 47,000 Iran Relief and Rescue Organization
b-S
aharan Afr
ic Eas
t and Nort
h e an al
A

r
op

a
Su le earthquake

d
Af
Eu
sia

Mid
rica
Iraq floods November Iraq 35,000 IOM, OCHA and Iranian Red
Crescent Society (IRCS)

Iran snow storms January Iran 23,000 IRCS

2,611,000 214,000 41,000
15.2% OF THE 1.2% OF THE 0.2% OF THE
GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL

d Centra Attica wildfires July Greece 7,200 International Federation of Red

Eas
t and Nort
h e an lA

r
le op Cross and Red Crescent Societies

d
Af
Eu
sia

Mid
rica
(IFRC)

Tajikistan floods May Tajikistan 5,400 IFRC

214,000 41,000 Jalal-Abad landslides April Kyrgyzstan 4,700 IFRC

1.2% OF THE 0.2% OF THE
GLOBAL TOTAL GLOBAL TOTAL
 Definitions

New displacements: This corresponds to new instances of internal displacement during 2018.

Total number of IDPs: This corresponds to the total number of people living in internal displacement as of 31 December 2018.

Number of IDPs who have made partial progress towards a durable solution: This corresponds to the number of IDPs whom our data providers have
TABLE 3

identified as having returned, resettled or locally integrated in 2018 and for whom the evidence obtained by IDMC suggests that progress toward durable solutions is
only partial given their living conditions. In a few instances this number may refer to movements rather than people.

Number of IDPs whose progress towards durable solutions cannot be verified: This corresponds to the number of IDPs whom our data providers have
identified as having returned, resettled or locally integrated in 2018 but for whom there is no available evidence to corroborate progress toward durable solutions. In
a few instances this number may refer to movements rather than people.

Partial or unverified solutions

Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards
Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Abyei Area 150 31,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Abyei Area is
(Year figure based on two intention surveys carried out by IOM in Abathok and
was last Agok in April and November 2017. Based on an analysis of the IOM
Displacement associated with conflict in 2018

updated: 2018)  DTM data, IDMC subtracted the estimated number of households
that consider themselves to be locally integrated in their area of
displacement according to the survey, but included those IDPs
newly displaced in 2018.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018

is based on an analysis of data from the IOM DTM event tracker,
which primarily identified incidents of displacement triggered by
armed attacks in Abyei Town in mid-July 2018.

Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures
123
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Afghanistan 372,000   2,598,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Afghanistan is based on an
(Year figure analysis of data obtained from IOM which was collected from key informants
was last between December 2017 and December 2018.
updated: 2018)  
IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is mainly
based on the number of newly displaced IDPs registered by OCHA’s displace-
ment tracking system and whose displacement has been verified. It also
accounts for people displaced as a result of arbitrary evictions reported by
OCHA, and temporary unregistered displacements reported by IOM’s humani-
tarian assistance programme. Given that many short-term displacements are not
verified by humanitarian agencies, IDMC’s reported number of new displace-
ments is likely to be an underestimate. 
Armenia        8,400 IDMC’s estimate of internal displacement in Armenia is based on data
(As of 2004)    from a mapping survey conducted by NRC and Armenia’s State Department for
Migration and Refugees and published in 2004. This report indicated that most
of Armenia’s approximately 8,400 IDPs, who were displaced as a result of the
conflict with Azerbaijan in 1994, had resettled in unknown conditions by 2004.
Given the lack of updated information on their conditions, IDMC has character-
ised these resettlements as unverified solutions.
Azerbaijan   344,000 301,000   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Azerbaijan is based on
(Year figure (As of 31 December an analysis of data provided by the government’s State Committee for Affairs
was last 2018)      of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. According to its data, there
updated: 2018)   were around 644,000 IDPs in Azerbaijan as of December 2018 as a result of
the unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-
Karabakh region. The figure is divided into two groups: 344,000 people living
in protracted displacement who still have outstanding needs in terms of access
to housing, employment, education and health; and 300,000 the government
reports as having been relocated to temporary housing.

IDMC has accounted for this second group as having achieved a partial
solution to displacement because they have been relocated and receive
assistance from the government. The government also reports that 750 IDPs
returned to Jojuq Marjanli in 2018. IDMC also characterises these returns as
a partial solution pending further information about conditions in the
village.
Bangladesh 300 426,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Bangladesh includes two
(Year figure protracted displacement caseloads associated with conflict: The Chittagong Hill
was last Tracts (CHT) IDPs, displaced by internal armed conflict between 1973 and 1997,
updated: and Urdu-speaking Bihari IDPs, also known as “stranded Pakistanis”, displaced
2007)  by Bangladesh’s 1971 war of independence. Recently updated estimates of the
size of these populations are not available. IDMC’s estimate for the CHT case-
load is based on a 2009 survey by the Human Development Research Centre, a
Bangladeshi NGO, which suggested about 31 per cent of rural CHT households
had been displaced at least once between 1977 and 2007. Given this figure,
along with census data, IDMC estimates there are 275,000 IDPs in Chittagong.
IDMC’s estimate of the Bihari IDPs comes from a profiling study commission by
UNHCR in 2006 and carried out by Al-Falah, a local NGO. This study indicated
that more than 151,000 people were displaced in camps or informal settlements
at the time.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

event monitoring using media sources.
Benin 3,500 3,500     IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Benin and the number
(Year figure of new displacements in 2018 are both based on data from IFRC and refer to
was last people displaced by clashes between pastoralists and agriculturalists in Atakora
updated: 2018)   department in July 2018. IDMC triangulated this information using reports from
local civil society organisations. IDMC did not receive any evidence that those
displaced have returned home or achieved any other form of durable solution,
and so has included them in the end-of-year figure.
Bosnia and   99,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
Herzegovina (Year figure based on official government statistics, which rely largely on lists from the elec-
was last toral commission. The Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the UN
updated: 2015)   in Geneva shared the statistics with IDMC. The displacement was triggered by
wars that followed the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, and the displace-
ment data was last updated in 2015. More than half of the country’s IDPs live in
Republika Srpska, more than a third in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and a minority in the Brcko district.
Burkina Faso 47,000     IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Burkina Faso and the
42,000 (Year figure number of new displacements in 2018 are based on an analysis of OCHA
was last reports which in turn refer to data collected by the Belgian Red Cross, Burkina
updated: 2018)   Faso Red Cross, Conseil National de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation,
ICRC, the Danish Refugee Council, UNICEF and others.
125
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Burundi 5,100  49,000   25,000 IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Burundi is based primarily
(Year figure (1 January - 31 on its analysis of data obtained from IOM. Most of the IDPs are people who fled
was last December 2018)    political violence in 2015, although the threat of political violence has continued
updated: 2018)   to generate displacement in subsequent years, including in 2018. IDMC’s
estimate of the total number of IDPs also includes refugees who returned from
Tanzania in 2018 and became displaced upon their return.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

an analysis of net increases in IOM’s monthly figures, as well as an analysis of
specific events that caused displacement in 2018.

As security improved, the total number of people living in displacement as a

result of conflict as reported by IOM decreased by about 25,000 between 2017
and 2018. IDMC characterises this change as an unverified solution in the
absence of further information about the situation. 
Cameroon 459,000  668,000 382,000   IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Cameroon and the
(Year figure (1 January - 31 number of new displacements in 2018 are based on data obtained from
was last December 2018)    IOM. The figures include people displaced by the regional crisis caused by Boko
updated: 2018)   Haram in the Far North region, and violence in the anglophone Northwest,
Southwest and Littoral regions of the country. The anglophone crisis has wors-
ened significantly, leading to assessments in new regions and accounting for the
notable increase in new displacements and the number of IDPs in 2018.

Based on its analysis of IOM’s data on the number of IDPs reported as having
returned, IDMC accounts for the 288,000 people who returned to undam-
aged houses and the 94,000 living in damaged or destroyed housing or
shelters as having achieved partial solutions, due to their living condi-
tions and general lack of security in those areas.
Central 641,000   175,000 IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in CAR is based on reports
African 510,000 (Year figure (1 January - 31 from the Commission of Population Movement (CMP).
Republic was last December 2018)
updated: 2018)   IDMC’s estimate of new displacements in 2018 is based on OCHA reports,
which IDMC complemented with analysis of additional information from UN
Security Council reports and the local media. IDMC considers the figure to be
an underestimate because of a lack of access to all displacement reports.

Based on its analysis of data from IOM DTM and Action Against Hunger
concerning 175,000 IDPs who reportedly returned, IDMC categorised these
movements as unverified because no information about their conditions
upon return was obtained.
Chad   90,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Chad is based on data from IOM
(Year figure DTM reports. The figure refers primarily to people displaced by the Boko Haram
was last insurgency, mainly concentrated around the Lac region in the west. Despite
updated: 2018)   evidence of new displacements in 2018, IDMC was not able to estimate their
number because of the limited monitoring and a lack of published quan-
titative data collected in 2018.
Colombia 5,761,000 1,902,000   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Colombia is based on an
145,000 (Year figure (As of 31 December analysis of data provided by the Victim’s Registry (RUV), which keeps record of
was last 2018)   all victims of the civil war. The RUV data accounts for all people displaced since
updated: 2018)    1985 and includes people who have died or made progress toward durable
solutions. IDMC has worked with the RUV to estimate the number of people
who are still displaced by discounting these two caseloads.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of partial solutions is based on an analysis

of RUV data on social and economic indicators for people in the registry. It
accounts for the 1,089,000 people who have overcome vulnerabilities related to
housing, family reunification, documentation, nutrition, health, education and
income; and the 813,000 who reportedly have only overcome vulnerabilities
related to housing.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is a projec-

tion performed by the UN’s Colombia Information Management and Analysis
Unit (UMAIC), based on RUV data from previous years.
127
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Congo   107,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Congo is based on an anal-
(Year figure ysis of data collected by the government’s Ministry for Social and Humanitarian
was last Affairs and refers to people displaced in the Pool and Bouenza departments.
updated: 2018)    The ministry is the main source of data on IDPs in the Republic of Congo and
collects and publishes its information in collaboration with OCHA. Given that
many IDPs reportedly returned from Bouenza to Pool in 2018, the total figure is
likely to be an overestimate. IDMC has included these people in our estimate of
107,000 IDPs and not categorised these returns as unverified solutions. This is
due to the fact that neither the number of returnees nor their conditions were
known.
Côte d’Ivoire 700 302,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Côte d’Ivoire is primarily
(Year figure based on a JIPS assessment from 2014 and refers to IDPs displaced during the
was last 2002-2003 war and the political crisis in 2010-2011. The figure also accounts
updated: 2018)   for IDPs displaced in 2017 as a result of land disputes between the Baoulé and
Wê communities, and who have not yet returned. It also includes people whose
houses were destroyed in May 2018 during a land dispute between indigenous
Toura and the Burkinabé Giandé community in Biankouma department.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

local media reports and refers to the people displaced in May 2018 mentioned
above.
Cyprus   228,000     IDMC’s estimate of the number of IDPs in Cyprus is based on the “‘Humani-
(Year figure tarian needs and rights of internally displaced persons in Europe” recommen-
was last dation report (document N° 2126) which was presented in 2018 on the 20th
updated: 2018)   anniversary of the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The report includes the
latest figure provided by the Cypriot delegation to the assembly. This refers to
people displaced since the armed conflict with Turkey and the latter’s occupa-
tion of the northern part of the island in 1974.
Democratic 1,840,000 3,081,000 1,480,000   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in DRC was derived from data
Republic of (Year figure (1 January - 31 from village-level assessments conducted by IOM DTM throughout 2018 in
the Congo was last December 2018) Kasai, Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental, Lomami, Sankuru, Tanganyika and South
updated: 2018)   Kivu provinces. It is also based on IDMC’s analysis of data on camp populations
in North Kivu, published by the camp coordination and camp management
cluster, and data from ACAPS on displacement associated with violence in Mai-
Ndombe. IDMC considers the figure to be a significant underestimate, because
it does not include data about provinces highly affected by displacement but
not yet covered by IOM DTM such as Ituri, Maniema and most of North Kivu.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

information on new arrivals in villages covered by IOM DTM, data published by
ACAPS for Mai-Ndombe and population movement alerts for provinces covered
by OCHA. This includes Haut Katanga, Haut Lomami, Ituri, Maniema, North
Kivu and Tshopo. Both IOM DTM and OCHA also reported significant numbers
of returns in 2018.

IDMC categorises as partial solutions people who returned to their former

homes and no longer have shelter as their primary humanitarian need but who
still have other needs related to their displacement.
Ecuador 420   420   IDMC’s estimates of the number of new displacements in Ecuador in 2018
(1 January - 31 are based on official reports by Ecuador’s National Risk and Disaster Manage-
December 2018)  ment Unit (UNGRD). They refer to displacements triggered by violence associ-
ated with drug trafficking groups in the province of Esmeraldas on the border
with Colombia. The people displaced were reportedly able to return and
have therefore also been added to the partial solutions category.
Egypt 15,000 97,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Egypt is primarily based
(Year figure on Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports from 2015 and 2018 which relied on a
was last combination of satellite imagery analysis of housing destruction and interviews
updated: 2018)   with affected families to estimate displacement in North Sinai. IDMC comple-
mented and verified this analysis with additional information obtained from
local media sources.

IDMC’s estimate for the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

the most recent HRW report. Given the lack of systematic data collection, the
figure is likely to be an underestimate.
129
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
El Salvador 246,000       IDMC’s estimate of new displacements in El Salvador in 2018 is based
on an analysis of a representative survey conducted in November 2018 by the
Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) at the José Simeón Cañas Central American
Unversity (UCA). IDMC extrapolated the results from the survey based on popu-
lation projections from the latest census, published in 2007.
Ethiopia 2,895,000 2,137,000 412,000   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Ethiopia is based on an
(Year figure (1 January - 31 analysis of several sources: IOM DTM data as of 31 December 2018 covering
was last December 2018) most of the country; IOM DTM data from 30 November covering West Guji and
updated: 2018)   Gedeo; and government data from December 2018 for Benishangul Gumuz.
IDMC also added about 111,000 Ethiopians deported from Saudi Arabia and
reportedly living in precarious conditions to the total number of IDPs.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 was calcu-

lated by analysing increases in figures published by IOM DTM and new case-
loads identified by other sources including OCHA, the government, local and
international media and the European Commission.

IDMC’s estimate of partial solutions is based on government reports and

refers to IDPs who returned to their homes in Addis Ababa but are still in need,
and IDPs who returned to their former homes along the border of the Oromia
and Somali regions and whose conditions following their return are unknown.
Georgia   293,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Georgia refers to three
(Year figure caseloads. The first two concern IDPs in South Ossetia assessed by OHCHR and
was last OCHA, in 2008 and 2009. The third refers to the number of IDPs in 11 prov-
updated: 2018)    inces, based on data provided by Georgia’s Ministry of IDPs from the Occupied
Territories, Accommodation and Refugees in February 2018. The displacements
took place in two major waves, both associated with conflict with the Russian
Federation in 1991-1992 and 2008.
Ghana 5,000 5,000     IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Ghana and new
(Year figure displacements in 2018 are both based on an OCHA report which cites local
was last authorities. IDMC subsequently triangulated these figures using local media.
updated: 2018)   The displacements were triggered by land disputes between two ethnic commu-
nities in the Northern region on 31 December 2018.
Guatemala   242,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Guatemala is based on
(Year figure a 1997 UNFPA figure for people left internally displaced after the civil war.
was last Although this figure is now outdated IDMC has not obtained any evidence
updated: suggesting these people are no longer displaced.
1996)  
Honduras 950 190,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Honduras is based on
(Year figure data obtained from UNHCR. UNHCR’s projection of the number of IDPs was
was last calculated from the average annual number of people displaced from 2004 to
updated: 2016)   2014, reported in a profiling exercise conducted by the Honduran Inter-Agency
Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced by Violence in 2015. The
exercise was updated in 2018 but the report and methodology have not been
published as of IDMC’s reporting.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

the latest report by the National Commissioner for Human Rights (CONADEH),
published in March 2019, which includes information on at least 950 people
who reported themselves to authorities in 2018 as displaced, mostly by criminal
violence.
India 169,000 479,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in India is based on a review
(Year figure of reports on displacement published by the media and academic research.
was last The figures include people displaced by armed conflict and intercommunal and
updated: 2018)   political violence across the country. IDMC considers its estimate to be a rough
approximation given that much of the data upon which it is based is now out of
date.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

event monitoring and draws primarily on data published by the media and other
publications.
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Indonesia 4,500 16,000   1,500 IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs and the number of new
(Year figure (1 January - 31 displacements in Indonesia in 2018 are based on media monitoring. The
was last December 2018) end-of-year total includes people displaced by intercommunal and insurgency-
updated: 2018)   related violence between 1998 and 2004 and who have been unable or
unwilling to return. The estimate also accounts for people displaced by attacks
against religious minorities between 2007 and 2013 and who have been unable
to reach a durable solution, people forcibly evicted as a result of land disputes
and people displaced by a long-running separatist conflict in Papua, which trig-
gered most of the new displacements in 2018. The estimated number of new
displacements is also based on a review of reports of transgender people fleeing
targeted violence. 

IDMC considers the 1,500 returns reported by the Indonesian military in

2018 to be unverified solutions because there is insufficient evidence either
that people returned or of the conditions they returned to.
Iraq 150,000 1,962,000 1,085,000   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Iraq is based primarily on
(Year figure (1 January - 31 an analysis of data from IOM DTM assessments. This figure includes nearly two
was last December 2018) million people displaced by the country’s armed conflict since 2014 and 9,000
updated: 2018)   IDPs who returned in 2018 and are living with host families, in informal settle-
ments or collective shelters.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 includes

28,000 people displaced for the first time and 122,000 who were already
displaced and were displaced again during the year. Based on its analysis of
IOM DTM data, IDMC categorised more than a million reported returns as
partial solutions because the returnees were living in hotels, rented accom-
modation or their former homes and still faced vulnerabilities related to their
displacement.
Kenya 10,000 162,000   780 IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Kenya concerns several
(Year figure (1 January - 31 caseloads and is based on data from various sources including the govern-
was last December 2018)   ment’s National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), IOM, local media,
updated: 2018)   NGOs and civil society organisations. The figure includes people displaced by
election-related violence in 2007, 2008 and 2017 and people displaced by
inter-communal violence, resource conflicts and al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and
2018.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

data published by local media, the NDMA, and Amnesty International. IDMC
considers its new displacement figure to be an underestimate because data
collection is limited in its geographic scope and regularity.

IDMC considers the 780 people displaced by a land dispute and then
ordered to return to the Eastern Mau forest to have achieved an unveri-
fied solution because no information was available to confirm that they had
returned or the conditions they faced. 
Kosovo   16,000 200 IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Kosovo is based on a
(Year figure (1 January - 31 national database maintained by the Ministry for Community and Return and
was last December 2018) refers to people displaced during the conflict in 1998-1999. The database is
updated: 2018)   updated with the support of UNHCR and other partners and is used to provide
assistance to displaced families.

The slight decrease in the figure since 2017 represents the number of people
the government reported as returnees. Because no information was available
about these returnees, IDMC categorised these returns as a partial solu-
tion.
Lebanon   11,000 280   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Lebanon is based on data
(Year figure (1 January - 31 from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
was last December 2018)    Near East (UNRWA). It primarily corresponds to Palestinians displaced in 2007
updated: 2018)   from the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, considered to be their place of habitual
residence, who have not been able to return.

Based on information published by local media, IDMC estimates that

about 280 people displaced in 2007 reached a partial solution by
returning to the camp in 2018.
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Libya 70,000 221,000 107,000   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Libya is based primarily
(Year figure (1 January - 31 on IOM DTM reports and refers to people displaced by the country’s armed
was last December 2018)    conflict. IDMC includes in its total figure the number of people who tried but
updated: 2018)   failed to return, which was estimated based on an analysis of IOM DTM data on
returnees.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based

on an analysis of events reported on by IOM DTM through its event tracker,
the protection cluster and ACLED. Most of these movements were triggered
by conflict between the Libyan military forces and militias as well as clashes
between different militias.

IDMC’s estimates of partial solutions are based on an analysis of IOM DTM

reports on returnees and corresponds to the number of returnees who are living
in their former or new homes, temporary accommodation and other types of
shelter.
Macedonia   140   10 (As of 31 December IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Macedonia is based on data
(Year figure 2018) obtained from the government’s Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and refers
was last to Albanian minorities displaced by violence in 2001.
updated: 2018)  
The lower number IDMC reports compared with 2017 reflects 10 people who
deregistered as IDPs. Given the lack of information on their specific loca-
tion and situation, IDMC reports on this as an unverified solution.
Madagascar 1,700 2,000     IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs and the number of new
(Year figure displacements in 2018 in Madagascar are based on an analysis of data from
was last IOM and media articles, both of which refer to displacement caused by banditry.
updated: 2018)    This is the first time IDMC has reported on displacement associated with conflict
and violence in Madagascar.
Mali 126,000 120,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Mali is based on data made
(Year figure available by the Commission on Population Movement (CMP), which in turn
was last is based on IOM DTM data compiled through the registration of IDPs. The
updated: 2018)   figure accounts for people displaced by intercommunal and ethnic conflicts and
violence linked to al-Qaeda.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based

on data obtained from Mali’s rapid response mechanism, led by NRC, which
reports on verified incidents of displacement associated with the same causes.
Mexico 11,000 338,000 72 (1 January - 31 1,800 (1 January - 31 IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Mexico and the number
(Year figure December 2018) December 2018  of new displacements in 2018 are based on an analysis of data provided
was last by the Mexican Commission for the Defence and Protection of Human Rights
updated: 2018)   (CMDPDH). The total number of IDPs refers to people displaced by political
violence and land disputes, and violence associated with organised criminal
groups.

IDMC’s estimates of the number of new displacements and partial or

unverified solutions in 2018 are based on data collected by CMDPDH through
its event-based media monitoring. IDMC’s estimate of the number of people
who achieved partial solutions concerns 72 who reportedly returned to their
houses under improved security conditions, which could not be certified. IDMC
categorised the 1,800 people who reportedly returned but for whom no infor-
mation was available as unverified solutions.
Mozambique 3,800 14,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Mozambique is primarily
(Year figure based on a report published by UNICEF in 2016 on the number of people
was last living in resettlement sites in Manica, Sofala and Tete provinces. These IDPs
updated: 2018)   were displaced by violence between the government and an opposition group.
IDMC’s figure also includes people who were newly displaced in 2018 as a result
of violence associated with extremist groups in Cabo Delgado province, but
who had not returned as of the end of the year.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is derived

from local media reports about housing destruction linked to attacks in the
province.
135
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Myanmar 42,000  401,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Myanmar was produced
(Year figure using various data sources covering different regions of the country: 131,000
was last in Rakhine, 97,000 in Kachin, 50,000 in Karen, 40,000 in Tanintharyi, 27,000
updated: 2018)   in Karenni, 22,000 in Bago, 18,000 in Mon, 15,000 in Shan and 1,300 in
Chin. The majority of the estimate is based on data collected by the camp
coordination and camp management and shelter clusters and by the Border
Consortium. IDMC’s figure also accounts for smaller groups of displaced people
based on information and data obtained from the Chin state government,
township authorities in Rakhine and UN agencies. The figures include people
living in protracted displacement as a result of various internal armed conflicts
and intercommunal violence.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based

on reports by OCHA, the Border Consortium and civil society organisations
including the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) and Free Burma Rangers,
and media sources. Given the limited access to displaced populations, IDMC
considers all of its estimates to be rough approximations.
Niger 52,000 156,000     IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Niger and the number
(Year figure of new displacements in 2018 are primarily based on data reported by the
was last government, obtained through surveys conducted by local authorities. The data
updated: 2018)   covers the south-eastern region of Diffa, which borders Lake Chad and has
been severely affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. IDMC’s estimates also
reflect information obtained from the protection cluster about displacement
caused by attacks in Tillabéri and Tahoua as a result of spill-over violence from
Mali. IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs also accounts for Nigerien
refugees whom the government reported as having returned to displacement
camps in the country. 
Nigeria 541,000 2,216,000 311,000   IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Nigeria and the number
(Year figure (1 January - 31 of new displacements in 2018 are based on IOM DTM and emergency
was last December 2018)   tracking tool (ETT) reports covering the north-east of the country. From these
updated: 2018)   sources, IDMC identified people displaced by conflicts or violence. The number
of new displacements in 2018 also combines data from both IOM ETT and
media reports for the period not covered by the last DTM report of 2018. IDMC
also included information provided by the International Crisis Group and media
reports about displacement in the Middle Belt, where the spread of violence
into previously more peaceful areas of the country accounted for much of the
increase in both the number of IDPs and new displacements compared with
2017, along with greater geographical coverage in the north-east where data
collectors were able to access more areas.

From its analysis of IOM DTM reports, IDMC categorised 225,000 reported
returns to non-damaged houses in areas of high insecurity and 86,000
returns to damaged or destroyed housing or shelters as partial solutions.
Pakistan 1,800 119,000 83,000 (1   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Pakistan is based mainly on
(Year figure January-31 verified data produced by the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
was last December 2018 )   disaster management authority (FDMA). It covers the former FATA, now part of
updated: 2018)   Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where people live in protracted displacement as
a result of military operations. The National Disaster Management Authority’s
(NDMA) data on other regions is less comprehensive and is likely to underes-
timate the total number of IDPs, so IDMC supplemented its coverage of those
areas with media monitoring.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 includes

estimates of movements associated with small-scale events, based on media
and civil society reports.

IDMC’s estimate of partial solutions is based on data on reported returns

obtained from the FATA DMA.
137
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Palestine 490 238,000 15,000    IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Palestine is based on
(Year figure (1 January - 31 an analysis of data obtained from OCHA, the Shelter Cluster and the BADIL
was last December 2018)  Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. The figure
updated: 2018)   includes people newly displaced in 2018 and people displaced for several
decades about whom only limited up-to-date information is available.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 consists of

people displaced in the West Bank as a result housing damage and destruction,
evictions, sealing off of properties and confiscations. IDMC’s estimate of the
number of partial solutions is based on an analysis of shelter cluster data on the
number of houses reconstructed in Gaza in 2018.
Papua New 360 12,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Papua New Guinea is
Guinea (Year figure mainly based on data collected and published by IOM DTM. IDMC considers
was last this estimate to be approximate and conservative given the lack of access to all
updated: 2018)   displaced communities and the absence of additional sources usable for valida-
tion.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

media reports of violence against people accused of sorcery and leading to evic-
tions, which was independently validated by partners in the country.
Peru   59,000     IDMC´s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Peru is based on information
(Year figure provided by the government’s Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations,
was last which maintains a register of IDPs. It refers to people displaced during conflict
updated: 2017)   between the government and armed groups between 1980 and 2000, and 90
people relocated by the government due to acts of terrorism. The figure is the
same as last year because no update has been provided and IDMC was not able
to identify additional information.
Philippines 188,000 301,000 65,000   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in the Philippines and the
(Year figure (1 January - 31 number of new displacements in 2018 are based on reports issued by the
was last December 2018) government’s Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Centre
updated: 2018)    (DROMIC) and the Protection Cluster, which provide current and cumulative
figures on specific incidents of displacement. As in previous years, most in
2018 was triggered by conflict in Mindanao, including armed attacks, political
violence and communal tensions.

Based on its analysis of data published by DROMIC and the protection cluster,
IDMC characterises the return of 65,000 IDPs as a partial solution because they
may still face vulnerabilities related to their displacement.
Russia   2,300     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Russia is based on data by
(Year figure the government. IDMC’s estimate includes only Russian citizens recorded as
was last “forcibly displaced” within the country as a result of violence, harassment or
updated: 2018)    persecution.
Senegal   18,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Senegal is primarily based
(Year figure on an OCHA report from 2015, updated with more recent data from ICRC. The
was last displacements were triggered by a separatist conflict between the Movement
updated: 2017)   of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) and the Senegalese army in the
1990s and early 2000s.
Sierra Leone 3,000 3,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Sierra Leone and the
(Year figure number of new displacements in 2018 are both based on media articles that
was last cite Caritas as their source. Both figures concern displacements triggered by
updated: 2018)   post-electoral violence in April 2018. IDMC was not able to obtain evidence that
displaced people had managed to return or achieve any other type of durable
solutions, so they were accounted for as still being displaced as of the end of
the year.
139
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Somalia 578,000 2,648,000   200 IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in in Somalia is based on
(Year figure (1 January - 31 the Information Management Working Group’s estimate as of February 2018,
was last December 2018) which was compiled from several sources, including key informant interviews,
updated: 2018)   site assessments, IOM DTM assessments, local NGO assessments and registra-
tion data collected by the camp coordination and camp management cluster.
Because the data was not clearly disaggregated by cause of displacement, the
figure represents a mix of triggers, including people displaced by disasters and
conflict.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based

on data obtained from the UNHCR/NRC-led Protection & Return Monitoring
Network (PRMN), to which IDMC added figures from NRC/UN Habitat reports
on forced evictions. The PRMN data does not distinguish between forced and
voluntary movements, however, which means not all movements were neces-
sarily internal displacement.

The estimated number of unverified solutions is based on PRMN data

which indicates only that 200 people had returned but with no corroborating
evidence.
South Sudan 321,000 1,869,000   12,000 IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in South Sudan is based on
(Year figure (1 January - 31 data published by OCHA, which compiles figures from partners in the country.
was last December 2018) The partners’ methodologies vary, and data some caseloads is out of date.
updated: 2018)  
IDMC’s estimates of the number of new displacements and unverified
solutions in 2018 are derived from event-based monitoring which relied on
information and data obtained from OCHA, IOM DTM, REACH, UNHCR, the
protection cluster, Relief and Rehabilitation Commissions, UNMISS and the local
media. Both figures are likely to be significant underestimates given the limited
geographical coverage and lack of systematic data collection in the field on this
issue.
Sri Lanka 1,100 37,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Sri Lanka includes IDPs
(Year figure still awaiting resettlement after the end of the country’s civil war in 2009, as
was last reported by the Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Northern Develop-
updated: 2018)   ment and Hindu Religious Affairs. It also includes a very small number of people
identified as being displaced through event-based media monitoring. This latter
caseload provides the basis for IDMC’s estimate of the number of new
displacements in 2018.
Sudan 41,000 2,072,000   5,600 IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Sudan is based on an anal-
(Year figure (1 January - 31 ysis of data from IOM DTM’s August 2018 report, which covers the five Darfuri
was last December 2018) states and South and West Kordofan, data published by the Humanitarian Aid
updated: 2018)   Commission (HAC) and OCHA’s figures for Blue Nile state. Sennar state, where
IDPs are reportedly also living, is not covered, meaning that IDMC’s figure is an
underestimate.

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 is based on

data from OCHA and local media reports and covers Jebel Marrah at the inter-
section of South, North and Central Darfur.

IDMC categorised all IDPs reported as having returned as unverified

solutions because of the lack of tangible information on their conditions. The
estimate is based on data collected by IOM and published in June 2018. Given
that it only accounts for registered returnees for part of the year in the above-
mentioned states, the actual number of returnees is likely to have been much
higher than reported. 
Syria 1,649,000 6,119,000 715,000 (1   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Syria is based on an analysis
(Year figure January - 31 of data published by the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP).
was last December 2018)    IDMC combined the number of IDPs with the number of people affected by
updated: 2018)   shelter damage, who are displaced within their community.

The estimated number of new displacements in 2018 is based on IDMC’s

analysis of data obtained from HNAP, the camp coordination and camp
management cluster and Syria’s IDP Task Force. The number of new displace-
ments is an underestimate given that the data has limited coverage between
January and April 2018 and excludes IDPs displaced for fewer than 30 days.

Given high levels of insecurity and lack of services and infrastructure, IDMC
considers all reported returns to peoples’ original homes or temporary
accommodation reported by HNAP as partial solutions. 
141
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2019
GRID
Partial or unverified solutions
Country or New Total number Number of IDPs who Number of IDPs whose
have made partial progress towards Comments on the figures
territory displacements of IDPs 
progress towards a durable solutions
durable solution cannot be verified
Thailand   41,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Thailand is based on data
(Year figure from a 2010 Harvard University study that drew upon the results of a survey
was last conducted by Prince Songkhla University to evaluate the impacts on Buddhists
updated: of the ethnic separatist insurgency in the south of the country. Given that
2007)   there is no systematic mechanism to identify victims and provide assistance to
displaced people and affected communities and that the available data is several
years old, IDMC considers its estimate to be approximate.
Turkey   1,097,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Turkey includes two groups,
(Year figure people living in protracted displacement since the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in
was last the 1990s, and those displaced when their housing was destroyed during
updated: 2018)   a new flare up of the conflict and related security operations in the south-
eastern Anatolia region in 2015 and 2016. IDMC’s estimate for the first group is
based on data published by Hacettepe University in 2006. IDMC identified the
latter caseload through the transcript of a Grand National Assembly session in
November 2018, in which officials mentioned the number of houses destroyed
during security operations in Cizre, Diyarbakir Sur, Hakkâri, Idil, Mardin
Nusaybin, Silopi, Sirnak centre and Yüksekova.
Uganda 9,000 32,000     IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Uganda and the number of
(Year figure new displacements in 2018 are based on data published by Amnesty Interna-
was last tional, Human Rights Watch and the media. The estimated number of IDPs
updated: 2018)   accounts for people displaced between 2016 and 2018 and for whom there is
no tangible evidence of return or achievement of any other durable solution.

The estimated number of new displacements relates to three events in 2018

triggered by intercommunal clashes and land disputes between local population
and the government.
Ukraine 12,000 800,000 12,000 (1   IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs in Ukraine and the number
(Year figure January - 31 of new displacements in 2018 are based on data and information provided
was last December 2018)  by the UN, the media and the Protection Cluster. IDMC’s estimate of 800,000
updated: 2018)   IDPs is based on a population projection produced by the UN and its partners.
It consists of people living more permanently in government-controlled areas
and those newly displaced during the year. The 1.5 million people registered
as displaced in the database maintained by Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy is
widely acknowledged by humanitarian actors to be an overestimate because it
includes at least 477,000 people who are no longer displaced but remain on the
registry to access their pensions.

IDMC accounted for the number of people who reportedly returned to

their residences after being evacuated in October 2018 when a series of
explosions occurred at an ammunition depot, as having reached partial
solutions.
Yemen 252,000 2,324,000 1,009,000   IDMC’s estimate of the total number of IDPs in Yemen corresponds to
(Year figure (As of June 2018) people reported as displaced by conflict by the Task Force on Population
was last Movement (TFPM) in its 17th report, published in August 2018. TPFM includes
updated: 2018)   data from IOM DTM and ETT, UNHCR population movement tracking and the
National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs and Disaster Recovery (NAMCHA).

IDMC’s estimate of the number of new displacements in 2018 was

calculated from data reported by the Protection Cluster and IOM DTM and ETT.
IDMC’s estimates of the total number of IDPs and the number of new displace-
ments are approximate and conservative given limited access to displaced
people and the fact that data collection did not continue until December 2018.
For example, the TFPM’s data covering Al Jawf governorate was not updated
after January 2018.

IDMC accounts for more a million returnees reported by TFPM but

whose conditions were unknown as having achieved partial solutions.
143
144

BACKGROUND PAPERS
GRID 2019 benefitted from the input of many partners, research institutions and independent experts who submitted back-
ground papers to the main report. Full versions of the papers are available online at http://www.internal-displacement.org/
global-report/grid2019/

Are IDPs satisfied with the quality of public health and education services they receive?
A long-term perspective from urban areas in the post-socialist countries

Artjoms Ivlevs, University of the West of England

The livelihoods and wellbeing of IDPs depend on the provision of public services, the access and quality of which tend to be
better in urban areas.  This study analyses IDPs’ direct experiences of using key public services – health and education – in
urban areas of post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe that experienced conflict in 1990s and 2000s. The findings
suggest IDPs are more dissatisfied with the quality of health services than people not affected by conflict, pointing to the long
lasting vulnerability and disadvantage of IDPs in the health domain. At the same time, no disadvantage is observed for educa-
tion, reflecting the willingness of the forcibly displaced to invest in education to compensate for the loss of material possessions.

Cities as a refuge, cities as a home

The relationship between place and perceptions of integration among urban displaced populations in Iraq

Roger Guiu, Nadia Siddiqui, Social Inquiry

How does the socio-ecological context and urban morphology of the cities where IDPs reside influence their feelings of integra-
tion? Incorporating a two-fold definition of integration - belonging and influence in displacement - we use existing large-scale
datasets covering locations across four governorates in Iraq to test whether place factors - development, governance and security,
social capital and demography - in addition to household characteristics, determine the likelihood of IDPs feeling integrated. We
find that place factors matter, and that it is harder for IDPs to fit into more stable and better functioning host environments. We
argue for the importance not only of improving conditions for all in fragile urban areas where IDPs reside, but of making more
stable environments more inclusive as well.

Comparing population displacement estimates from mobile network data and other
sources
Working paper: Evidence from the Highlands earthquake in Papua New Guinea

Pamungkas Prahara, Annissa Zahara, Muhammad Rheza, Muhammad Rizal Khaefi, Dikara Alkarisya, Yulistina
Riyadi, Rajius Idzalika, George Hodge, Pulse Lab Jakarta

Accurate and timely measurement of population displacement due to natural hazards and other drivers of displacement has
proven to be complicated. This research paper explores anonymous mobile network data as a source of insights on displace-
ment and compares the findings to the current good practice for displacement tracking, namely IOM’s displacement tracking
matrix. We also compare the insights against information on the targeting of humanitarian resources, finding that the targeting
of surveys and the allocation of humanitarian assistance are respectably efficient. The findings offer new perspectives on the
quantification of displacement and underline the potential of mobile network data to offer highly valuable information during
what are often chaotic days and weeks following a disaster.

Comparing the experiences of IDPs in urban vs rural areas: Findings from a longitu-
dinal study in Iraq, 2015-2017
Rochelle Davis, Salma Al-Shami, Grace Benton, Jake Moran, Caila McHugh, Nicole Ruggiero, Moez Hayat, IOM
Iraq and Georgetown University

Millions of Iraqis were displaced by ISIS between 2014 and 2017. This longitudinal study tracks the needs, challenges, and self-
engineered solutions of IDPs not living in camps. The vast majority of IDPs report feelings of safety where they now live. But in
terms of livelihoods and standard of living, they have only found temporary, rather than permanent solutions. Urban IDPs who
worked in the agriculture sector cannot rebuild their farming and animal husbandry businesses without considerable assistance
to make the land safe again. Supporting public and private agricultural initiatives, housing projects and micro loans programmes
will allow refugees to return and rebuild their homes or successfully integrate in their new communities.

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 145

Demolition, forced evictions and wellbeing in the city

Jaideep Gupte, Dolf te Lintelo, Sheela Patel, Vinod Kumar Rao, Allister McGregor, Rajith Lakshman, Institute of
Development Studies, University of Sussex, Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres, University of Sheffield

Forced evictions and home demolitions have been described as creating another sort of refugee crisis in the developing world.
In India, we find that people who have experienced demolition have a lower sense of achievement on the lifegoals they value;
that this pattern is evident for both women and men; that a person’s outlook on life is lower than other members of the same
household who have not experienced demolition, even when they are of a similar age, have similar levels of education, have
similar occupation profiles and live under the same roof. However, we also find that this impact dissipates over time, and impor-
tantly, is mitigated when the process of relocation is facilitated through local participatory action.

Displacement profiling in urban areas

Methodological approaches for collecting and analysing data on internal displacement in cities

Melissa Weihmayer, Margharita Lundkvist-Houndoumadi, Laura Kivelä, Joint IDP Profiling Service

While there is general agreement of displacement’s impact on urban environments, evidence on the experience of internally
displaced populations in cities remains sparse. However, certain evidence-gathering techniques and processes are gradually
filling this gap. This article presents three case studies of displacement profiling in urban areas that tailored data collection
and analysis to these contexts in different ways. The approaches taken enabled a robust evidence base to inform responses
to internal displacement in those cities. The case studies from Mogadishu, Somalia (2015 - 2016); Erbil, Iraq (2015 - 2016); and
various cities in Syria (2018 - 2019), and implemented by humanitarian, development and government partners with support and
technical advice from the interagency Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), demonstrate continued learning for improved evidence.

How urban are IDPs and what does that mean for their economic integration?
Cindy Huang, Jimmy Graham, Center for Global Development

IDPs face severe economic challenges. Because economic opportunities cluster around urban areas, understanding where IDPs
are located is crucial to understanding their potential for achieving self-reliance. By analysing the existing known locations of
IDPs in developing countries and visualising them in an interactive map, we show that millions of IDPs are located in urban
areas. Thus, stakeholders can and should pursue solutions to help IDPs achieve self-reliance, as greater self-reliance should create
benefits for IDPs and hosts alike. Our analysis also underscores the lack of data on IDPs’ locations, implying that the urban
rates we present are a minimum rather than an estimate. Better data would allow policymakers to better target self-reliance
programming and policies.

Learning from survivors of development-induced displacement

Operationalising Vanuatu’s new displacement policy toward an inclusive capital city

Jennifer Day, Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh, The University of Melbourne and the University of the South Pacific

This paper documents some impacts of development-induced displacement in the capital city of Vanuatu, South Pacific against
the backdrop of a brand-new policy: Vanuatu’s National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement. Vanu-
atu’s is the first such policy in the Pacific and could be a model for peer countries. However, further work is necessary to make
Vanuatu’s policy inclusive for survivors of urban displacement, particularly for people living on the fringes of urban areas. Using
recent fieldwork, we illustrate the challenges for operationalizing the policy in Port Vila. We also analyse the policy language,
pointing out human rights that are left unaddressed by the policy. We provide recommendations that Vanuatu’s government
may consider as it operationalises the policy.
146
Stuck in the mud
Urban displacement and tenure security in Kabul’s informal settlements

Mohammad Abdoh, Anna Hirsch-Holland, Norwegian Refugee Council

This paper examines three of Kabul’s 55 informal settlements in order to explore the effects of local power dynamics and
individual interests on displacement and its disadvantaging effects. In one out of the three settlements featured in the study,
residents managed to purchase land with a written document proving ownership. In the other two sites, purported landowners
and bureaucrats seem to exploit weaknesses in policy and legal frameworks to perpetuate tenure insecurity for their own gain
– such as earning substantial income from rent, speculatively protecting land for potential real estate development or grabbing
land from others who may hold a claim to it. The research finds a stark difference between these sites: in the former, residents
have been able to build permanent structures, set up a school and plan for the future; in the latter, they are prevented from
upgrading their shelters, not enrolling children in school and live day-by-day in fear of eviction and homelessness.

The urban displaced

Fleeing criminal violence in Latin American cities

Jerome Marston, Brown University

Criminal organisations and the violence they produce force individuals and families to flee within and from cities across Latin
America. To increase understanding of this little-studied topic, this paper asks: Who flees within and from Latin American cities?
What triggers their flight? And, upon fleeing, where do they go and what are their experiences? This paper describes broad
trends in criminal violence-induced urban displacement around Latin America while also presenting fine-grained insights from
Medellin, Colombia. Finally, concrete policy recommendations are offered for mitigating urban displacement due to criminal
violence. Half of the recommendations are from the author’s analyses of survey data; half are qualitative accounts from displaced
people detailing what might have helped them to stay in their homes.

Urbanisation as a result of displacement

A case study of Bentiu, South Sudan

Dr Tarnjeet K Kang, Displacement Tracking Matrix Unit, IOM, South Sudan

This report explores urbanisation in Bentiu and Rubkona towns in Unity state, South Sudan. Using a host community percep-
tion survey and qualitative interviews conducted in August of 2018, this case study examines the impact that the introduction
of a Protection of Civilians site has had on urbanisation, establishes the perception of the host community, and clarifies what
constitutes urbanisation in a South Sudanese context. The findings revealed that insecurity in the area had interrupted develop-
ment in both towns, which had consequently hindered urbanisation in the area. The state’s access to oil revenues was seen as
a viable funding source for future development and economic stability, however respondents noted that this was contingent
on security in both the locality and the country at large.

Forced Migration and the City: the urban experience of IDPs in Abuja, Nigeria
Living at the brink of the city: the urban experience of IDPs in Abuja

Chiahemba J. Nor, Sherif Y. Abdulrazak, Bashir Abdullahi, Zainab T. Gajiga

(Federal Capital Development Authourity, Abuja, Nigeria, Konad Group, Taraba State University)

People displaced by violence or conflict are increasingly fleeing to cities, where they hope to find security and opportunity. This
study draws on 17 months of qualitative research into the experience of internally displaced people who have fled violence and
conflict their home regions for Nigeria’s capital city, Abuja. It focuses particularly on the challenges they face as they try to find
places to live and ways to generate income. The IDPs spoke about planning laws and regulations which, more than any other
single factor, they feel are working to prevent them accessing the secure and stable lives they hope for. That is, their experience
is that Abuja’s organizational and planning structure, far from helping them, is in fact making their lives harder. The study also
examines the importance of adapting urban planning concepts to city contexts and the reality of displacement.

GRID
2019
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Leonardo Milano, Maria Teresa Miranda Espinosa, Raphaëlla

IDMC team: Montandon, Álvaro Sardiza Miranda, Georgios Stathopoulos
Direction: Alexandra Bilak and Bina Desai. and Sylvain Ponserre.

Coordination: Vicente Anzellini. Policy analysis and research: Vicente Anzellini, Christelle
Cazabat, Bina Desai, Clémence Leduc, Raphaëlla Montandon,
Lead authors: Vicente Anzellini, Adrián Calvo Valderrama, Bina Romain Pawlak, Elizabeth Rushing, Schâdi Sémnani, Avigail Shai,
Desai, Justin Ginnetti, Sylvain Ponserre, Schâdi Sémnani and Chloe Sydney and Marco Tucci.
Avigail Shai.
Communications and external relations: Thami Essabih
Contributing authors: Christelle Cazabat, Vincent Fung, Eddafali, Caressa Kok, Hacen Mohammedi, Rachel Natali, Frankie
Ivana Hajžmanová, Clémence Leduc, Marta Lindström, Luisa Parrish, Francesca da Ros and Dawn Vout.
Meneghetti, Leonardo Milano, Maria Teresa Miranda Espinosa,
Raphaëlla Montandon, Elizabeth Rushing and Chloe Sydney. Layout, design, maps and graphics: Gregory van der Donk,
Maria Teresa Miranda Espinosa and Rachel Natali.
Data and analysis: Clémentine André, Ali Anwar, Adrián Calvo
Valderrama, Vincent Fung, Justin Ginnetti, Ivana Hajžmanová, Editors: Jeremy Lennard and Rory O’Keeffe.
Marta Lindström, Andrés Lizcano Rodriguez, Luisa Meneghetti,

OpenStreetMap Team Tanzania); Roger Guiu, Nadia Siddiqui

External contributions and support: (Social Inquiry); Jaideep Gupte, Dolf te Lintelo, Sheela Patel,
IDMC would like to thank especially the expert advice provided Vinod Kumar Rao, Allister McGregor, Rajith Lakshman (Institute
by the following persons: of Development Studies, University of Sussex, SPARC, University
of Sheffield); Jonathan Hall (Uppsala University); Anna Hirsch-
GRID 2019 Expert Group: Alison Brown (Cardiff Univer- Holland, Mohammad Abdoh (NRC Afghanistan); Cindy Huang,
sity), Lucy Earle (IIED), Elizabeth Eyster (UNHCR), Elizabeth Jimmy Graham (Centre for Global Development); Paul Huth
Ferris (Brookings Institution/Georgetown University), François (University of Maryland); Tarnjeet K. Kang, the Displacement
Gemenne (University of Liège), Soraya Goga (World Bank), Tracking Matrix Unit (IOM South Sudan); Artjoms Ivlevs (Univer-
Catherine-Lune Grayson (ICRC), Miloon Kothari (Independent sity of the West of England); Jerome Marston (Brown Univer-
consultant and former Special Rapporteur on Adequate sity); Barbara McCallin (Consultant on forced displacement,
Housing), Allan Lavell (FLACSO), Robert Ndugwa (UN Habitat) housing, land and property issues); Chiahemba J. Nor, Sherif Y.
Sorcha O’Callaghan (Independent), Duncan Sullivan (IOM) and Abdulrazak, Bashir Abdullahi, Zainab T. Gajiga (Federal Capital
Greta Zeender (OCHA). Development Authority, Department of Parks and Recreation of
Abuja, Konad Group and Taraba State University); Pamungkas
Peer review: Gabriela Aznar Siguan (ETHZ), Astra Bonini Prahara, Annissa Zahara, Muhammad Rheza, Muhammad Rizal
(UNDESA), David Bresch (ETHZ), Martina Caterina (Advisor to Khaefi, Dikara Alkarisya, Yulistina Riyadi, Rajius Idzalika, George
the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs), Ksenia Hodge (Pulse Lab Jakarta) and Melissa Weihmayer, Margharita
Chmutina (Loughborough University), Jimena Cuevas Portilla Lundkvist-Houndoumadi, Laura Kivelä (JIPS).
(UNAM), James Daniell (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie –
CATDAT), Rochelle Davis (Georgetown University), Christian Special thank you to the Governments of the following countries
Donaldson (Oxfam), Eugenia Giraudy (Facebook), Claus Hansen for their engagement and support in internal displacement data
(UNICEF), Priyadarshani Joshi (UNESCO), Laura Kivelä (Save the collection and analysis: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Azer-
Children), Sarah Koeltzow (Platform on Disaster Displacement), baijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Andrew Kruczkiewicz (Columbia University), Shankar Lyer (Face- Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Republic of Korea,
book), Daniel Macguire (UNHCR), Barbara McCallin (Consultant the Republic of North Macedonia, Mali, Peru, Pakistan, Philip-
on forced displacement, housing, land and property issues), Erin pines, Qatar, Serbia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland,
Mooney (PROCAP), Champa Patel (Chatham House), Laura Rubio Togo, Uganda and Ukraine.
Diaz-Leal (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México), Mario A.
Salgado-Galvez (DRM consultant), Samer Saliba (International We thank the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) offices in
Rescue Committee), David Sanderson (University of New South Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia,
Wales) and Atle Solberg (Platform on Disaster Displacement). Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Honduras,
Regional Office for the Horn of Africa, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon,
Background papers and external contributions: Jacob Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, South Sudan, Sri
Aronson (University of Maryland); Rochelle Davis, Salma Lanka, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine and Yemen.
Al-Shami, Grace Benton, Jake Moran, Caila McHugh, Nicole
Ruggiero, Moez Hayat (IOM Iraq and Georgetown Univer- We thank the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
sity); Jennifer Day, Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh (University of offices in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso,
Melbourne, Leiden University and University of the South Pacific); Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Demo-
William Evans, Sara Amand, Amedeus Kimaro (Humanitarian cratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, India,
148
Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Madagascar, Myanmar, Nepal, Nuno Nunes, Raúl Soto, and DTM Regional Coordinators (Juli-
Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Somalia, ette Hallaire, Chiara Lucchini, Muhammad Rizki, Lorenza Rossi-
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine and Ivona Zakoska); Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS); Office of the
Yemen. High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR); PRIO Cyprus
Centre; Protection Cluster Ukraine; R2P-Right to Protection;
We thank the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Rafael Landivar University; REACH Initiative (Afghanistan,
(OCHA) offices in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Central African South Sudan, Ukraine); State Committee for Affairs of Refu-
Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Democratic Republic of the gees and IDPs Republic of Azerbaijan; Shelter Cluster Palestine;
Congo, Ethiopia, Latin America and the Caribbean regional The Border Consortium for Myanmar; The Executive Unit
office, Myanmar, Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), Philip- for Displaced Persons (Yemen); Unit for Integral Attention
pines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand Regional and Reparation of Victims (Colombia); United Nations High
Office, Ukraine and Yemen. Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations Institute
for Training and Reearch - Operational Satellite Applications
We thank the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) Programme (UNITAR-UNOSAT); United Nations Office for the
offices in Afghanistan, Armenia, Burundi, Colombia, Jordan, Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); United States
Kosovo, Mozambique, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Serbia, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration and the World
Somalia, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen. Food Programme (WFP)

We thank the United Nations Online Volunteering Programme, Printed by Gonnet Imprimeur (Belley, France)
including Shaikha Al Suwaidi, Ayush Banerjee, Camila Braga,
Lukas Carvalho, Anna Chtorkh, Yunjia Olivia Ding, Olivia Engle,
Maria Fraile Moreno, Sonja Heikkinen, Natallia Hurko, Elliot
Jones, Olaya Lombardero Martinez, Meg McLellan, Andrew
Nelson, Anna Pott, Daniel Price, Fazle Rabbi Chowdhury,
Julianne Romy, Sudeshna Sinha, Ruchi Sravasti, Jevgenia
Tarassova, Virginia Vargolska, Priyanka Vakil and Li Leng
Wong.

We thank the following institutions for their continuous collab-

oration: Al-Haq, BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Resi-
dency and Refugee Rights; CCCM Cluster Syria - Turkey Cross-
border operations; CCCM Cluster for Myanmar; Civic United
Nations Holding Group of Influence; Comisión Mexicana de
Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CMDPDH);
Consultoría para los derechos humanos y el desplazamiento
(CODHES); CrimeaSOS; Cristosal; Department of Environmental
Systems Science of ETH Zurich (ETH); Directorate of Disaster
Preparedness and Refugees; European Commission’s Joint
Research Centre (JRC); Human Rights Watch (HRW); Humani-
tarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP); Humanitarian
Aid Commission (HAC); Instituto Universitario de Opinión
Pública (IUDOP) - Universidad Centroamericana (UCA);
Inter-institutional Commission for the Protection of Persons
Displaced by Violence (Honduras); International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC); International Crisis Group; International
Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC); International Organization
for Migration (IOM), with special thanks to Stéphanie Daviot,

GRID
2019
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is the leading source of information and
analysis on internal displacement worldwide. Since 1998, our role has been recognised and endorsed
by United Nations General Assembly resolutions. IDMC is part of the Norwegian Refugee Council
(NRC), an independent, non-governmental humanitarian organisation.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre www.internal-displacement.org

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