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From ANZUS to SEATO:

United States Strategic Policy
towards Australia and New
Zealand, 1952–1954
a
Henry W. Brands Jr.
a
Vanderbilt University
Published online: 01 Dec 2010.

To cite this article: Henry W. Brands Jr. (1987) From ANZUS to SEATO: United
States Strategic Policy towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952–1954, The
International History Review, 9:2, 250-270, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1987.9640442

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 HENRY W. BRANDS, J R .

From ANZUS to SEATO: United States

Strategic Policy towards Australia and
New Zealand, 1952-1954
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' W E HAVE GOT to keep the Pacific as an American lake,' Dwight Eisen-
hower said in the spring of 1954.1 The question was how. After the
Communist victory in China, after the Korean War, and with defeat
impending for the French in Indochina, holding the Pacific by a defence
of its western shore appeared problematic. Off the coast, however, the
US position was much stronger, especially in the island chain that ran
from the Aleutians south through Japan, the Ryukyus, Formosa, the
Philippines, and on to Australia and New Zealand. This chain appeared
firm and defensible, as long as the links in the chain remained closely
allied with the United States.
It was this reasoning, suggested by the island-hopping strategies of
General Douglas MacArthur during the Second World War, but devel-
oped fully by MacArthur and others only during die series of crises
following the collapse of the Nationalists in mainland China, that brought
Australia and New Zealand to prominence in US foreign policy in the
early 1950s. Drawing on the same cultural and political background and
sharing the same liberal democratic values as the United States, the two
countries, Americans hoped, would form a strong southern anchor to the
island chain. The ANZUS treaty, which took effect in April 1952, was
the first formal measure of the importance of Australia and New Zealand
to the United States. The SEATO pact, signed two-and-a-half years later,
in the formation of which Australia and New Zealand played key parts,
underlined this importance.
The role of Australia and New Zealand in US strategy during the
period from the ANZUS agreement to the formation of SEATO has an
intrinsic interest, of course, and is worth examining on that account alone.
But the development of US policy towards its two Pacific allies also eluci-
1
Memo by Cutler, 9 June 1954, US Department of State, F[oreign] Relations of
the] U[nited\ S[tates], 1952-4, xii [Washington, D.C., 1984], 531.

The International History Review, nc, 3, May 1987, pp. 173-344

CN ISSN 0707-5333 © The International History Review
 From ANZUS to SEATO 251

dates larger themes. The first involves the nature of the US commitment
to Asia and the Pacific in the wake of China's 'fall' and the Korean
War. The US Congress and public had only recently been persuaded
that collective security in Europe was a good idea: would they support
a similar commitment to the Far East? In the context of relations between
the United States and Australia and New Zealand, this issue took the
form of a question whether ANZUS would languish as merely a paper
pact, or develop into a Pacific version of NATO.
Second, the ANZUS relationship illustrates a particular aspect of the
grand theme of the decline of the British Empire. An intimate ally of
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each of the three ANZUS powers, Great Britain in the early 1950s was
trying to find her place in the post-war world. Stung by Australia and
New Zealand's apparent preference for the company, or at least the pro-
tection, of the United States to that of the Commonwealth, British leaders
attempted repeatedly to gain entrance to ANZUS — with as much luck
as they would have holding on to their empire.
Finally, US policy towards Australia and New Zealand was signifi-
candy affected by the rise of the newly-independent and assertive nations
of what would come to be known as the Third World. Imperialism died
hard in Asia, not least in the perceptions of those who had felt the weight
of its oppression. To many Asians, a distinguishing feature of ANZUS
was that it was an alliance of predominantly white nations. To some,
ANZUS seemed to show a desire on the part of the white race to continue
its control of international affairs. US leaders were sensitive to charges
of using the spectre of a 'Red Asia' as a device to prevent the coloured
races of the Pacific from gaining full independence. The desire to refute
these charges was an important element in the evolution of US policy
from ANZUS to SEATO.

Regarding the first question — whether ANZUS would exist primarily

on paper or would take on more substantial form — a marked difference
of opinion existed in the US national security establishment. The State
Department, recognizing that ANZUS was, in large measure, the diplo-
matic price the United States had to pay for Australia's and New Zea-
land's acquiescence in a mild peace treaty with Japan,1 and responsible

» On this point, see J.G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, 1965),
p. 68; R.N. Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-1951 (Melbourne,
1962), pp. 188-212; and Robert Gordon Menzies, The Measure of the Years
(London, 1970), p. 51. The most thorough account of the ANZUS negotiations
comes from the Australian side: see Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy
(Sydney, 1969), pp. 11-190; and Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War,
1950-1953 (Canberra, 1981), i. 185-300. Further detail and background
information can be found in Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the
 252 Henry W. Brands, Jr.
for assuring continued good relations with the two countries, leaned in
the direction of supporting those countries in their desire to put some
teeth into the ANZUS pact. The Defense Department, on the other hand,
especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed that US resources were
already stretched dangerously thin and preferred to consider ANZUS
as a statement of US intentions in the event of an attack on Australia or
New Zealand, but no more. In particular, the Pentagon resisted the idea
of ANZUS developing into anything resembling NATO, with the per-
manent military apparatus that characterized that organization.
The debate between the State Department and the Pentagon developed
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as soon as the ANZUS agreement took effect. In April 1952, the Secre-
tary of State, Dean Acheson, wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense,
Robert Lovett, acknowledging the difference of opinion between their
two departments and pressing the State Department's point of view. 'As
you know,' Acheson wrote, 'Australia and New Zealand expressed serious
misgivings about the Japanese Peace Treaty and were persuaded to
accept it only because of the assurances extended to them in the [ANZUS]
Security Treaty.' Explaining that Australia in particular had stated its
understanding that the ANZUS treaty represented not only a commit-
ment to Australia's security but a means for participating with the United
States in planning for the Pacific region, Acheson went on to say that a
'treaty which did not meet both objectives would not have been accept-
able to Australia and would not have ensured Australian support for the
Japanese Peace Treaty'.
That much was history. Turning to the present, Acheson asserted that
the ANZUS pact was 'the focal point' in US relations with Australia
and New Zealand, and that any hint that the United States did not intend
to establish the consultative machinery that Australia and New Zealand
had come to expect would be regarded in Canberra and Wellington as
'a breach of faith'. Acheson reminded Lovett of the full co-operation
Australia and New Zealand were displaying in Korea, of the economic
contribution the two countries were making to the Colombo Plan in its
efforts to ameliorate the conditions that contributed to the spread of
Communism, and of the commitments Australia and New Zealand had

United States, 1941-10B8 (London, 1969); The American Alliance: Australia,

New Zealand and the United States, 10.40-IQ70, ed. John Hammond Moore
(Melbourne, 1970); Alan Watt, Australian Diplomat (Sydney, 197a); T.B.
Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations, IJ8B-IQ.JJ (New York,
1978) 5 Joseph M. Siracusa and Glen St John Barclay, 'Australia, the United
States, and the Cold War, 1945-51', Diplomatic History, v (1981), 39-53; and
Glen St John Barclay, Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplomatic
Relations since 1945 (Melbourne, 1985).
 From ANZUS to SEATO 253
made to the defence of the Middle East. In light of all this, Acheson
declared that the continued co-operation of Australia and New Zealand,
in an atmosphere of 'confidence and mutually cooperative relations', was
something that the United States could not afford to jeopardize.*
In his reply to Acheson, Lovett agreed to a meeting between the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and officials from the State Department to discuss their
differences. At this meeting, which was rendered more urgent by an
approaching visit to Washington by the Australian Prime Minister,
Robert Menzies, the divergence in outlook between the military men and
the diplomats was clearly evident. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
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Omar Bradley, came directly to the point: 'How much are we stuck on
this one?5 he demanded of the State Department officials. Bradley ad-
mitted the need for a certain degree of co-ordination, but he objected to
the idea of any permanent consulting organization with the Australians
and New Zealanders. 'If we do get one', he said, 'we will have to get one
with everybody else.' Another problem with a formal planning organiza-
tion, in Bradley's view, was that it would diminish US freedom of action
in time of crisis. He feared that Australia and New Zealand would
demand a commitment of a certain number of ships and troops to the
vicinity of Australia and New Zealand, although the genuine threat to
that area seemed rather small. 'What we want and need', Bradley said,
'is flexibility to use the Seventh Fleet as may prove necessary. We don't
want to hamstring ourselves by an excess of formal planning.'
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Fechteler, was more
explicit in describing what he believed the United States ought to avoid.
Two aspects of joint planning in particular he rejected: a combined staff
and a continuing liaison group. 'I can't imagine what they would do,' he
said. Fechteler feared that the Australians especially were hoping for a
relationship resembling that between Australia and Great Britain, in
which British troops sent to the Australian theatre would be placed under
Australian command. 'If they are thinking of anything like that so far
as we are concerned,' Fechteler insisted, 'all I can say is the hell with it.'
The Army Chief of Staff, J. Lawton Collins, objected to the idea of
any sort of combined military planning, which he described as 'the
danger area' in relations with the Australians and New Zealanders. Col-
lins's argument reflected one of the primary purposes behind the US com-
mitment to the security of Australia and New Zealand, beyond the obvious
one of safeguarding the southern end of the Pacific island chain. At a
time when the Western position in the Middle East was being increas-
ingly challenged, but also at a time when US politics and global priorities
8
Acheson to Lovett, 4 April 195a, FRUS, 1959-4, xii. 75-7.
 254 Henry W. Brands, Jr.
did not allow a major US commitment to the Middle East, strategic
planners in the United States sought to trade a guarantee to Australia
and New Zealand for commitments by them to send troops to the Middle
East in the event of a crisis there. As Collins put the issue:
After all, we are not much interested in joint planning for the Pacific. Our
interest is to get some Australian and New Zealand troops into the Middle
East If they engage in joint planning for the Pacific their prestige will
become involved and they will feel they have to do something in the Pacific.
The whole point of this has been to protect them in the Pacific in order that
they could do something in the Middle East
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As US military officials seemed determined to stand firmly against any

formal planning organization, the State Department representatives at
this meeting were faced with the immediate problem of what to tell
Menzies, and the longer-term difficulty of keeping Australia and New
Zealand happy, or at least co-operative. The Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs, John Allison, conceded the Joint Chiefs' point
that Australia in particular was asking too much. Referring to the
Australian Ambassador at Washington, Percy Spender, Allison said: 'He
has grandiose ideas, and we certainly don't need to go as far as he wants
to go. He wants a small N A T O set-up. H e also wants to be in on the
planning for N A T O and the Western Hemisphere.' Still, Allison asserted
that some of what the Australians were asking was not entirely unrea-
sonable. 'Above all', he said, Svhat they want is the feeling that they are
treated equally and that they do not have to go through London on all
these matters.' Allison's opinion on this issue was seconded, in a rather
condescending fashion, by Myron Cowen, a consultant to the Secretary
of State. Of the Australians Cowen said: 'They have a great sensitivity
regarding their role. They made a real contribution in the last war and
they want to have some forum of their own which is distinct from London
so that they can feel grown up.'
After further discussion along similar lines, the State Department repre-
sentatives managed to persuade the Joint Chiefs to agree to a compromise.
Following a suggestion that if the United States went along with Aus-
tralia and New Zealand on matters of form, matters of substance could
be more easily managed, the Joint Chiefs acquiesced in a proposal that
military representatives from the three countries meet periodically in
Hawaii, or rotate among Hawaii, Australia, and New Zealand. The
point of designating Hawaii as the preferred US site was that there was
less going on there than in Washington. Bradley expressed a hope shared
by his fellow officers when he said: 'I think they will get tired of hanging
around with nothing to do. They may stay around for a few months and
 From ANZUS to SEATO 255
then I think their absences would grow longer and longer and the whole
thing might be solved.*
When the State Department relayed this offer to the governments of
Australia and New Zealand, they found it objectionable for precisely the
reason the Pentagon liked it. The New Zealand embassy declared that
'the obvious location' for the military committee was Washington, because
that was where US defence planning took place. Australian officials con-
curred.8 The Australians, in fact, went a good deal further: when Menzies
arrived in Washington in May 1952, he suggested an Australian tie to
NATO, arguing that as NATO decisions often had an impact on
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Australia's defence plans, Australia ought to learn about them at first-

hand*
US officials immediately, albeit politely, dismissed the idea of a NATO
connection. Acheson told Menzies that while the Truman administration
was 'open-minded' on the subject of arranging some method for non-
NATO countries to be apprised of NATO decisions, the Prime Minister
was labouring under a false conception of what NATO was all about.
The Atlantic pact, Acheson said, dealt solely with European defence, and
the United States and Great Britain both had consistently resisted any
notion of transforming it into a forum for global planning/
As to the narrower matter of whether the ANZUS military committee
should meet in Washington or in the Pacific, the Pentagon continued to
oppose meeting in Washington. The diplomats might have to worry
about the political ramifications of relations between the United States
and Australia and New Zealand, but to the Defense Department, ANZUS
was above all a military pact, and a fairly circumscribed one at that. The
remoteness of Australia and New Zealand meant that they were unlikely
to be the objects of direct attack in the near future. If a threat did exist,
it arose indirectly, from the possibility that Southeast Asia would be
captured by the Communists. Since this was a matter of special concern
to the American Pacific command in Hawaii, Pentagon officials believed
4
Memo of State-Joint Chiefs meeting, 33 April 1952, ibid., pp. 80-5.
5
Memo from New Zealand Embassy to State, undated (May 195a), ibid., p. 100.
Background paper of ANZUS council meeting, 30 July 1953, ibid., p. 161. See
also memo of conversation, Acheson and New Zealand Ambassador Leslie Munro,
19 June 195a, Acheson MSS [Truman Library, Independence, Missouri].
8
Memo of conversation, ao May 195a, Acheson MSS. See also memo of conversation,
Truman, Menzies, and Acheson, 19 May 195a, ibid. Menzies's campaign for an
ANZUS-NATO connection included an article in the prestigious US journal,
Foreign Affairs (The Pacific Settlement Seen from Australia', xxx (195a),
188-96), in which the Prime Minister repeatedly drew analogies between the
'Pacific pact" and the 'Atlantic pact', leaving the reader little choice but to agree
that a liaison between the two was the least that logic and Western security
would allow.
T
Memo of conversation, ao May 195a, Acheson MSS.
 256 Henry W. Brands, Jr.
that Hawaii was the appropriate place for the ANZUS committee to
meet.8 In this argument, not surprisingly, the role of ANZUS in freeing
Australian and New Zealand troops for deployment to the Middle East
was not mentioned.
As with many such issues, the question of whether the ANZUS mili-
tary council would meet in Washington became something of a symbol
for a more basic matter — in this case, whether the United States would
allow military consultation with Australia and New Zealand to assume a
position of importance in US planning. A tentative step in this direction
had been made in the first part of 1951, when the US Pacific commander,
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Admiral Arthur Radford, met with the Chief of the Australian Naval
Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins, and Collins's counterpart from
New Zealand, Commodore F.A. Ballance, to discuss co-ordination of
naval operations among the three countries. But the US command refused
to commit the United States to much of substance,9 and through the first
part of the summer of 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that other
matters of more pressing concern made close consultation with Australia
and New Zealand impossible.10 While Acheson and the State Department
were willing enough to approve the sort of close contacts that the Aus-
tralians and New Zealanders desired, the Pentagon remained adamantly
opposed.
Consequently, Acheson had to make the best of the position he was
stuck with. As he told the Australian Foreign Minister, Richard Casey,
on the eve of the first meeting of the ANZUS political council in August
1952 — in Hawaii — it was 'simply not possible' for Australia and New
Zealand to expect any greater access to the Pentagon. Acheson went on
to say, though, that the Australians and New Zealanders placed perhaps
too much importance on the idea of having a permanent military liaison
in Washington. Military planning for the Pacific, he said, really took
place in Hawaii, at Admiral Radford's headquarters. If Australia and
New Zealand wanted to know what was going on in the Pacific, Radford
was the man to talk to. Moreover, a military liaison in Washington would
be, for the most part, a waste of time, as the US officers with whom the
Australians and New Zealanders would be in contact were lower-level
types, and not the ones who made decisions. Regarding political matters
of common concern, Acheson said that politics was the responsibility of
the State Department, not the Pentagon, and he declared that he would
8
See negotiating paper for ANZUS council meeting, by State-Defense working
gro"P. 3° J^y '958. FRUS, 1953-4, xii. 168.
» On the Radford-Collins discussions, see O'Neill, i. 191-2.
10
See memo of conversation, Acheson and Lovett, 38 July 1953, Acheson MSS.
 From ANZUS to SEATO 257
make sure that political co-ordination took place through normal diplo-
matic channels.11
At the first official ANZUS council meeting on 4 August 1952, Ache-
son repeated essentially this argument when the question of military
planning arose." In addition, the Secretary of State called on Radford
to. second these views. Although Radford was somewhat more sympa-
thetic to the position of the Australians and New Zealanders than other
members of the United States' top military leadership, he believed with
most of his colleagues that such difficulties as ANZUS was experiencing
were being blown out of proportion. Much of the trouble he blamed on
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the press; he wrote to Allison at about this time that US and foreign
journalists were 'just determined to stir up trouble' about ANZUS.18
Radford's comments at the ANZUS meeting, while diplomatic enough,
clearly conveyed this attitude.
Facing what seemed a US stone wall, the representatives of Australia
and New Zealand settled for a compromise. The regular meetings of the
military representatives would rotate among Pearl Harbor, Melbourne,
and Wellington. Occasionally, when requested by the ANZUS political
council, meetings would be held in Washington and Canberra as well.1*
Acheson was pleased. He wrote home to Truman that the conference
had been 'a most successful one', with the Australians and New Zea-
landers leaving 'happy and contented'. 'It seemed to me', Acheson
declared, 'that both the countries suffered from the knowledge that they
had little knowledge of what was going on and of our attitude toward
and appraisal of current situations. They felt remote, uninformed and
worried by the unknown.' Therefore, Acheson continued, T decided that
instead of starving the Australians and New Zealanders we would give
them indigestion. For two days we went over every situation in the world,
political and military, with the utmost frankness and fullness. At the end
they were happy as clams with political liaison through the Council and
military liaison through Admiral Radford.'15
This victory, such as it was, was short-lived, for within the space of
several months, the deepening crisis in Indochina forced the United
States to undertake closer collaboration with Australia and New Zealand,
and with Great Britain and France. The five-power talks that grew out
11
Memo of conversation, 4 Aug. 195 a, ibid.
ls
Minutes of first meeting of ANZUS council, first session, 4 Aug. 195a, FRUS,
1952-4, xii. 174-8.
18
Radford to Allison, 18 Sept 195a, Allison MSS [Truman Library].
14
Minutes of first meeting of ANZUS council, sixth session, 6 Aug. 1953, FRUS,
1953-4, xii. 196-9.
18
Acheson to Truman in Acheson to State, 7 Aug. 1953, ibid., p. 303. See also
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), pp. 686-9.
 258 Henry W. Brands, Jr.
of the desire to find a means of holding Southeast Asia for the West led
eventually to the more intimate liaison that Australia and New Zealand
desired. At the same time, the talks also led to a solution of the problem
of how to deal with British displeasure at being excluded from ANZUS.
The ANZUS treaty had been in effect only a short time when the
British indicated to the Truman administration that they wanted a role
for Great Britain in the organization, if not as a full member, at least as
an observer. In early June 1952, the British Ambassador at Washington,
Sir Oliver Franks, called on Acheson to explain why British participation
would be a good idea. In the first place, Franks said, as Great Britain
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was already engaged in planning with Australia and New Zealand, for
their defence and that of nearby territories, it only made sense to co-
ordinate this planning with other defence arrangements. Second, the
Commonwealth connection linking Great Britain with the two countries
would be strengthened by a role in ANZUS for Great Britain. Finally,
Franks asserted, British public opinion would be 'much comforted and
reassured' by British participation.18
A few weeks later, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden,
reiterated the argument. At a meeting in London, Eden assured Acheson
that Great Britain was in no sense trying to 'gate crash' ANZUS, but
he said that, as a Pacific power, she hoped to have a representative on
the ANZUS council. Acheson responded noncommittally, saying that
while the idea of a British observer seemed reasonable in principle, in
practice it would create difficulties for all concerned. If the British were
allowed to send an observer, Acheson said, then other nations would want
to do the same. Drawing a line would be difficult, and certain to cause
offence among other allies of the United States.17
Just the previous week, Acheson had spoken with Menzies on the sub-
ject of British participation. Menzies said that Eden had raised the
matter in an earlier discussion, and that his own response had been that
while Australia would welcome the idea of a British observer, he thought
that the United States might not. Acheson confirmed Menzies's prediction,
and suggested that the matter be set aside for the time being. The
Australian Prime Minister, who was more interested in seeing ANZUS
off to a smooth start than in pleasing the British, thought this a good
solution.18
The nature of the difficulties that British participation in ANZUS
would bring, as they were seen from the US side, was best described in a
memorandum to Acheson written by the US Deputy Director for Com-
16
Memo of conversation, 6 June 195a, Acheson MSS.
17
Memo of conversation, 28 June 195a, ibid.
18
Memo of conversation, ao June 195a, FRUS, 1953-4, xii. 117-18.
 From ANZUS to SEATO 259
monwealth Affairs, Andrew Foster. Drafted at the end of July 1952,
Foster's memorandum began by explaining die background of the issue.
In die early part of 1951, the United States had been considering vari-
ous possibilities for guaranteeing the security of the western Pacific,
among them a broad Pacific pact comprising Australia, New Zealand,
die Philippines, and perhaps other Asian nations, in addition to the
United States. At that time, Foster explained, US officials had indicated
that they would have no objection to a British observer or consultant.
However, the British had opposed this comprehensive approach, and
partly because of this opposition, the United States had dropped broad
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planning in favour of ANZUS. Since the ratification of the ANZUS

treaty, representatives of the Philippines had expressed an interest in
joining the organization, as had the South Koreans. This being the case,
Foster argued that accommodating the British in the matter of an
ANZUS observer would require doing the same for otiier allies. Foster
also noted an additional argument against admitting the British that
came from the Defense Department: officials there feared that a British
role would lead in the direction of a NATO for the Pacific, with a com-
bined chiefs of staff and other structures similar to those of the Atlantic
alliance. The Pentagon, of course, strongly opposed all such notions."
This was the US position in the summer of 1952, and it remained thus
until US officials began seriously exploring the possibility of a broader
pact for Southeast Asia. In the meantime, it was not always easy to know
just how seriously the British took the matter of participation in ANZUS.
On the one hand, British leaders did seem sufficiently upset to allow
their exclusion from ANZUS to throw a pall over their relations with
Australia and New Zealand. In October 1952, Australia's Casey told
Acheson that he had recently received a note from the British Prime
Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, declaring in general terms that Casey
was an apostate from the British Empire. Acheson responded that he
thought the British were just frustrated: Great Britain faced almost
insurmountable problems with inadequate resources, and the British
were looking for someone or something to blame.™ A few days later, the
US Ambassador at Canberra reported a conversation with Menzies in
which the latter characterized Churchill's note as a 'stinker'. Menzies
added that his reply had been 'a bit of a stinker too'. Menzies went on
to criticize Englishmen who had 'outdated ideas of empire', and who

19
Foster to Acheson, 28 July 195a, ibid., pp. 159-60. Early British opposition to a
Pacific pact is also described in Spender, pp. 87-93.
M
Memo of conversation, 13 Oct. 195a, FRUS, 1952-4, xii. 329. See also Australian
Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G. Casey, ig5i-6o, ed. T.B. Millar (London,
•97a) [henceforth Casey Diaries], pp. 90-1.
 260 Henry W. Brands, Jr.
believed that in the foreign relations of Commonwealth members, the
members must choose between Great Britain and the United States.
Eden, said Menzies, was the 'agent provocateur' of this view, which
Menzies declared 'absurd'.21
On the other hand, there were indications that a British link with
ANZUS was something that the recently-elected Conservatives were
pursuing primarily as a matter of form. In a discussion with Acheson
and New Zealand's Foreign Minister, T. Clifton Webb, Casey said that
an official in the British Colonial Office had recently described to him
the background to Great Britain's campaign for inclusion. This official
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pointed out that when the Conservatives had been in opposition, they
had made political capital out of the alleged 'snub' to Great Britain that
exclusion from ANZUS implied. Now that they were in power, they
foresaw the issue's being turned upon themselves. Casey and Webb,
describing similar predicaments that they had been in at various times,
thought the whole matter rather amusing. Acheson agreed that much of
British interest in ANZUS was politically motivated. He added that his
own recent discussion with Selwyn Lloyd, then Minister of State in the
British Foreign Office, had indicated that Lloyd for one did not feel
strongly about ANZUS.21
At the head of the Conservative government, though, Churchill was
becoming increasingly impatient at what he took to be an affront to
British pride. When Churchill had met Truman at the beginning of
1952, he had not stressed the British wish for a connection with ANZUS.23
In the early part of the following year, however, when Churchill met with
the President-elect, Dwight Eisenhower, and the Secretary of State-
designate, John Foster Dulles, Churchill made it plain that he was much
put out by Great Britain's exclusion. Indicating that he hoped Anglo-
American relations would again be as close as tiiey had been during his
wartime collaboration with Franklin Roosevelt, Churchill declared in no
uncertain terms that he desired at least an observer's seat at the ANZUS
council, and preferably full membership in the organization. When
Dulles commented that the British government had not asked to be
included at the time of the formation of ANZUS, Churchill replied that
regardless of what had gone before, he now wanted a role for Great
Britain in the organization. Dulles asserted that British membership
would place upon the United States additional burdens — the defence
of Hong Kong and Malaya, for example — and that he did not know
21
Jarman to State, 30 Oct. 195a, FRUS, 1953-4, xii. 333.
22
Memo of conversation, 11 Nov. 195a, ibid., pp. 237-9.
28
Memo of conversation, Truman, Churchill, and Acheson, 5 Jan. 1959, Acheson
MSS.
 From ANZUS to SEATO 261

how US military leaders would like that. (Here, presumably, Dulles was
being polite, since he well knew that the Pentagon strongly opposed any
such commitments.) Dulles added that if Great Britain were allowed to
join ANZUS, other countries would surely come knocking — France, for
example, and Japan, Nationalist China, and the Philippines."
Dulles was discreet enough not to tell Churchill to his face, but one of
the most important reasons for opposing the admission of Great Britain
to ANZUS was that such an action would make the pact look even
more like a conspiracy of white imperialists than it already did. Churchill
probably would have found this argument unconvincing, but it carried
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great weight with Americans. US officials in both the Truman and

Eisenhower administrations recognized that the exigencies of the Cold
War at times forced the United States into collaboration with colonialists
— aid to France in Indochina being the most notable example — but
such assistance was only given reluctandy. Americans liked to consider
themselves anti-imperialists; more to the point, to be tarred with the brush
of racist imperialism would only make US relations with Asian allies and
neutrals more difficult.
US sensitivity on the racial-imperialist question was evident from the
beginning of the ANZUS alliance. In July 1952, as Acheson prepared
for the first council meeting of the new organization, he wrote to Truman
that he expected the Australians and New Zealanders to 'magnify the
importance' of die treaty, but that he and his assistants were 'making
every effort to guard against giving our other friends in the Pacific area
any reason to suspect that this is ... a "white man's treaty" or that we are
making any private deal with Australia and New Zealand on matters of
concern to other countries in that area.'25
Despite US precautions, ANZUS did in fact appear to some Asian
allies of the United States as evidence that the United States preferred
the company of whites to that of Asians. A few days after the first ANZUS
council meeting, the ambassador from the Philippines visited the State
Department to register his country's interest in joining the pact. In
making his point, he mentioned a 'considerable misunderstanding among
Oriental nations' regarding the purposes of ANZUS, and declared that
the inclusion of the Philippines and other Asian states would go far
towards reassuring them that they were not being excluded from the
consideration of affairs that rightly concerned them.*6 A short while later,
the South Korean ambassador came to the State Department with a
similar request and a similar argument. In declaring his government's
M
Report of conversations, 8 Jan. 1953, FRUS, 1953-4, srii. 358-60.
2B
Acheson to Truman, 30 July 195a, ibid., p. 160.
M
Allison to Acheson, 11 Aug. 1952, ibid., pp. 904-5.
 262 Henry W. Brands, Jr.
interest in joining an expanded Pacific alliance, he said that South Korea
regretted the United States' apparent willingness to ally itself in the Far
East only with Australia and New Zealand. Without saying that he him-
self held this view, he remarked that he had heard it said that the ANZUS
pact was a 'white alliance' and that it would never include Asians."
In response, the State Department began to consider ways to meet
these objections. At the beginning of 1953, the US planning adviser for
the Far East, Charlton Ogburn, produced a memorandum that force-
fully made the case for a greater role for Asians in US plans, even perhaps
at the expense of Great Britain and France. Responding to a British news-
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leak that more serious five-way discussions of the military situation in

Southeast Asia were imminent, Ogburn declared: 'It is difficult to
believe that any practical gains we shall make through teaming up with
the other Western powers in Asia, whether for the defense of Asia or for
any other purpose, will offset the resentment we shall arouse among the
Asians themselves.' Ogburn described this resentment as being nearly
universal throughout non-Communist Asia, felt equally by South Koreans
and Indonesians, by Nationalist Chinese and Indians. "There is no
explanation, so far as I can see,' he continued, 'that we can offer the
Asians of our reasons for developing special and exclusive relationships
with the other Western powers in their part of the world that will allay
or even mitigate the sense of affront and of injury with which they must
regard such a development.'
The United States could not claim, Ogburn said, that the Asian states
were too weak militarily: most of them were more powerful than New
Zealand; the Nationalist Chinese would soon eclipse the Australians in
armed strength, if they had not already done so; and South Korea was
on the verge of surpassing all the Western powers in the area. Ogburn
likewise dismissed other arguments for excluding Asians: there was no
lack of anti-Communist sentiment, he said, among countries like South
Korea and Nationalist China; indeed, with the exception of mainland
China, nearly all of Asia had proved itself less vulnerable to Communist
ideology than countries like France and Italy. In numerous instances,
Asians had demonstrated their willingness to fight the Communists, so
no complaint could be made on that score. 'It is to be doubted, to say
the least,' Ogburn asserted, 'that in the event of general war we should
witness any firmer stand on the part of France.'
'The plain facf, Ogburn concluded, 'is that any exclusively Western
joint action in Asia must carry with it the clear implication that we do
not take the Asians seriously and in fact regard them as our inferiors.'
The only way to remedy the situation — to 'relieve us of the odium we
,T
Memo of conversation, ai Aug. 1953, ibid., p. 3is.
 From ANZUS to SEATO 263

may expect to bring upon ourselves by excluding them' — was to invite

the leaders of the willing Asian powers into the councils of ANZUS or
some extension thereof.28
Ogburn was not a top policy official in the State Department, and his
memorandum originated at a fairly low level in the bureaucracy, but
Assistant Secretary Allison thought it important enough to pass along to
the Secretary of State with an approving note.29 Allison agreed with most
of Ogburn's argument, as did die State Department generally. But the
Pentagon, and especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, still adamandy resisted
expanding either the scope or membership of ANZUS. Beyond the
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reluctance of defence officials to accept larger responsibilities, some of

them considered certain Asian states, notably India, to be bad security
risks. Nor was this belief confined to the Pentagon; many US officials
believed that the fastest way to send information to Peking was to whisper
it confidentially in New Delhi.
The problem of the imperialist image of ANZUS became more acute
as the French position in Indochina continued to worsen and as Churchill
continued to apply pressure for British admission to the alliance. The
five-power military talks, begun under Truman, gained momentum and
urgency under Eisenhower, and seemed to many observers to portend
an extension of ANZUS to include Great Britain and France. US leaders
in die new administration judged some sort of collective arrangement
including the two European countries to be necessary for die defence of
Southeast Asia. At die same time, they realized that an overly close
attachment to Great Britain and France would bring down on die United
States precisely die charge of white imperialism they had been trying
to avoid.
In mid-1953, Dulles discussed die problem with Eisenhower, in prepa-
ration for an approaching session of the ANZUS council. The British,
Dulles noted, continued to press for an ANZUS connection. Because of
the political significance ANZUS had acquired in Great Britain, a private
or informal liaison with the alliance would not satisfy Churchill, who
now insisted on full membership. Dulles, like Eisenhower, was not averse
to the idea of a British connection on its own merits, but he did not see
how, in light of the continuing five-power talks, ANZUS could extend
an invitation to die British witiiout also inviting the French. This, he
said, would raise 'serious problems ... with the aspect of ANZUS as a
colonial organization'. Eisenhower, agreeing that the problem appeared
to have no easy solution, chose to postpone action on the issue.80
28
Ogbum to Allison, 21 Jan. 1953, ibid., pp. 260-3.
39
Allison to Dulles, 39 Jan. 1953, ibid., pp. 263-5.
80
Memo by Dulles, 8 Sept. 1953, ibid., pp. 339-40.
 264 Henry W. Brands, Jr.
At the meeting of ANZUS in September 1953, it soon became evident
that the Australians and New Zealanders essentially shared the American
attitude. When the matter of British membership came up, neither Casey
nor Webb objected to a statement by Radford, now Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the alliance, by retaining its trilateral character,
had done Very well in avoiding the accusation of setting up a white
NATO in the Pacific'. Radford added that it would be best to keep
things that way. Dulles asserted that while he was anxious not to take
any steps that would indicate discord between the United States and
Great Britain, British inclusion in die alliance Svould be deeply resented
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by our Asiatic friends'. Putting the matter to the Australians and New
Zealanders, Dulles said that if they thought it necessary, the United
States would consider trying to work out something that would satisfy
the British, but that such an attempt would be against the better judge-
ment of the Eisenhower administration. 'Any attempt to enlarge ANZUS',
Dulles warned, Svould end in is dissolution.'
Dulles's offer, as he must have known, entailed litde risk, for neither
Casey nor Webb felt any pressing desire to include die British in ANZUS.
While the membership of their countries in die Commonwealth required
at least a pro forma gesture on behalf of Great Britain's request for admis-
sion, the Australians and New Zealanders were, on die whole, quite
happy to keep ANZUS a three-way alliance. As it was, the alliance was
lopsided enough; with the inclusion of Great Britain — and perhaps
France, if die United States deemed that to be necessary — die smaller
powers would be outweighed even more. As Spender put it, ANZUS was
most effective in its present form. 'To die extent that it is enlarged,' Spen-
der said, 'its effectiveness would be diminished.' Casey agreed, even going
so far as to say that die question was closed and diat 'die present mem-
bership of ANZUS is final'. Webb thought this a good decision, and as
die tiiree member states were in agreement, suggested tiiat from die
perspective of public relations it would be wise to announce the decision
as one taken by the ANZUS council as a whole.81
This decision seemed to setde die issue of whedier die proposed security
pact for Soutfieast Asia would be an extension of ANZUS or sometiiing
entirely new, in favour of die latter alternative. Occasionally, as die
SEATO talks progressed, US leaders would again ask tiieir counterparts
from Australia and New Zealand whedier die new organization might
not supersede ANZUS; tiiese suggestions were consistendy rebuffed.81
81
Minutes of ANZUS council meeting, 10 Sept 1953, ibid., pp. 344-51.
33
In his diary, Casey described his response to a question by Dulles whether ANZUS
should go out of existence upon the creation of SEATO: 'I said immediately and
in a loud voice and without hesitation "No" — which was rapidly followed by
 From ANZUS to SEATO 265

From the perspective of Australia and New Zealand, ANZUS was an

established, operating concern, with narrow but clearly defined purposes;
SEATO, on the other hand, was an unknown quantity.
Indeed, through the spring of 1954, to say that SEATO was an
unknown quantity was to put the case mildly. Initially, the Eisenhower
administration sought an alliance for Southeast Asia as a means of making
military intervention in Indochina politically palatable in the United
States. The administration claimed that France's fight in Indochina was
also the 'free world's' fight; US voters and the Congress wanted some
evidence that the 'free world' was willing to co-operate in Indochina's
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defence. Commonwealth members, especially Great Britain and Aus-

tralia, were expected to contribute. But neither London nor Canberra
expressed any interest in a military response, preferring to negotiate at
Geneva. British and Australian leaders doubted that intervention would
save the French position at Dien Bien Phu, and they feared a widening
of the war, more dangerous now than ever with the recent development
of hydrogen weapons. 'Heaven knows', Casey wrote in his diary, Svhere
this would lead us or what would be the end of it.' Besides, as the
Australian Foreign Minister pointed out to Dulles, his government faced
elections shortly, and therefore could not commit itself to intervention.88
Gradually, as Commonwealth demurers and France's refusal to per-
mit intervention on any but French terms killed the possibility of mili-
tary action, the US objective in pursuing the new alliance shifted to
guaranteeing the non-Communist parts of Southeast Asia against further
Communist encroachment. This shift took place slowly, though, and
until the announcement of the final Geneva accords in July, it was often
unclear even to the participants in the SEATO discussion just what the
Americans had in mind.
The confusion regarding SEATO extended as well to the member-
ship of the prospective organization. Of the leading candidates for inclu-
sion, US leaders were reasonably certain of the co-operation of only
Australia and New Zealand. While Great Britain and France continued
to hesitate and waver, causing some in Washington to question whether
the British and the French understood what Americans regarded as the
true nature of Communism, the Eisenhower administration thought
highly of what it considered the realistic approach of its two ANZUS
partners to the threat to Southeast Asia. In the latter half of 1953, the
Vice President, Richard Nixon, made a tour of Asia and the Pacific, with

Munro [New Zealand's Ambassador at Washington] saying the same thing' Casey
Diaries, p. 168.
84
Quoted by Barclay, pp. 67-8.
 266 Henry W. Brands, Jr.
stops in Australia and New Zealand. As he told Eisenhower on his return
to Washington, Nixon was 'greatly impressed' by the character of the
'remarkable people' in the governments of the two countries — all the
more so, given the small populations of those countries. Menzies, whom
Nixon described as 'the ablest man of the group', was especially impres-
sive. Nixon believed that US purposes would be served by striving for
closer co-operation between the United States and Australia and New
Zealand. 'If, in our world relations, we could make better use of Aus-
tralia and New Zealand in high councils, we would be better off for it,'
he said. Nixon added that he thought Canberra and Wellington would
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appreciate the attention. They feel that they are a bit out of things and
not quite as important as other nations in the Commonwealth.'8* The
President concurred in Nixon's favourable opinion of Australian and
New Zealand leaders, especially by comparison with the leadership of
Great Britain and France. Eisenhower told Dulles that the Australians
and New Zealanders were "more realistic and perhaps more courageous
man those who are apparently willing to accept any arrangement that
allows them ... to save a bit of face and possibly a couple of miserable
trading posts in the Far East.'"
When Eisenhower referred to Australian and New Zealand leaders as
'realistic', he meant that they agreed with him regarding die need for
firm action to counter the apparently aggressive designs of China in
Southeast Asia. As early as the spring of 1952, Menzies had oudined
what Eisenhower later made famous as the 'domino theory'. In a discus-
sion witfi Acheson, Menzies had asserted that if Indochina were 'lost',
Burma, Thailand, and Malaya would 'almost certainly go' as well;
Indonesia and New Guinea might follow, with the result that Asian
Communism would be brought 'to the very doorstep of Australia'.88
The New Zealanders, at a greater distance from the fray, were not quite
so worried; Casey noted in his diary: 'Obviously they do not feel the
hot breath of Asia on their necks to the extent that we do.'8T Still,
Wellington could hardly ignore a major Communist victory in South-
east Asia.
The Eisenhower administration appreciated die co-operation of Aus-
tralia and New Zealand in its planning for Southeast Asia; such allies
ensured that die United States would not be caught in the position of
standing, as Eisenhower told his National Security Council, 'alone before
8
* Minutes of 177th NSC meeting, 23 Dec. 1953, NSC series, Eisenhower
Presidential Papers [Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas].
88
Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II (New York, 1984), pp. 904-5.
se Memo of conversation, ao May 195a, Acheson MSS.
87
Casey Diaries, p. 8a.
 From ANZUS to SEATO 267

the world as an arbitrary power supporting colonialism in Asia'.*8

Furthermore, there seemed a reasonable chance that Australia and New
Zealand, through their connections with Great Britain, might have better
luck persuading the British to make a decision in favour of SEATO
than the United States was having. At a meeting between representatives
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department, Allison pointed
out that the position of Australia and New Zealand on the SEATO
question was a good deal closer to the US view than was that of Great
Britain. 'Could we not', Allison asked, 'use them to put some pressure
on the U.K.?'89
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As matters turned out, such pressure as Australia and New Zealand

brought to bear on the British was insufficient to force a decision before
British leaders were ready to make it.40 US officials were disappointed,
but not especially surprised, because they believed, as Dulles told Eisen-
hower, that Australia and New Zealand were 'torn between their senti-
mental ties with the United Kingdom' and their 'practical security ties
with the United States'. Above all, Dulles said, Australian and New
Zealand leaders wished to avoid being forced into a choice between
the two/ 1
In conversations with representatives from Australia and New Zealand,
Dulles repeatedly offered assurances that the United States did not wish
to place them in the position of having to choose between Great Britain
and the United States over SEATO.** This solicitude resulted partly
from a desire to maintain good relations with Canberra and Wellington,
but more from the unwillingness of the Eisenhower administration itself
88
Minutes of 900th NSC meeting, 3 June 1954, NSC series, Eisenhower
Presidential Papers.
88
Memo of discussion, 3 April 1953, FRUS, 1952-4, xii. 284-5. Not surprisingly, the
idea of Australia's acting as a broker between Washington and London had also
occurred to Australian leaders. Casey commented in his diary: 'I believe that
there is appreciable advantage in Australia being poised rather delicately
between the U.S. and the U.K. in respect of international affairs. By keeping
ourselves so placed, we are in a position to exercise some influence on each'
(Casey Diaries, p. 169).
*° Even if Australian leaders had attempted to hasten substantially Great Britain's
progress towards SEATO, there was little likelihood that their attempts would be
successful. According to two leading students of this period, Joseph Siracusa and
Glen St John Barclay, nothing that Canberra said or did had 'the slightest
influence' on the British: 'The Historical Influence of the United States on
Australian Strategic Thinking', Australian Outlook, xxxviii (1984), 153-8. This
entire issue of Australian Outlook is devoted to the US connection in Australian
defence planning.
41
Minutes of 198th NSC meeting, 20 May 1954, NSC series, Eisenhower Presidential
Papers.
*2 For example, memo of conversation, 21 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-4, xii. 502-4.
 268 Henry W. Brands, Jr.
to move faster on SEATO than the British were willing to do. At times,
Eisenhower dropped hints that continued British reluctance might force
the United States to decide that Australia and New Zealand sufficiently
represented the Comonwealth in a Southeast Asian pact, but such com-
ments were mostly tactical rhetoric.*8
If British participation was a prerequisite of the creation of SEATO,
so also was Asian participation. A pact to defend a strategic region of
Asia, without Asian members, would have been a public-relations ab-
surdity, not to mention the strategic handicaps. Substantial difficulties
surrounded the choice of Asian candidates for membership, however.
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From the US perspective, the inclusion of Japan, South Korea, and

Nationalist China made a great deal of sense: these countries were firm
allies of the United States; they possessed substantial strategic resources;
and South Korea and Nationalist China especially were known for their
unrelenting anti-Communism. Unfortunately, Australia and New Zealand
considered the three countries unsuitable for membership, as did Great
Britain. In early August 1954, the New Zealand embassy at Washington
forwarded a note to the State Department describing Wellington's objec-
tions. New Zealand's basic argument was that the threat to Southeast
Asia, now that the Geneva conference had ended the fighting in Indo-
china, was primarily political. While Japan, South Korea, and Nationalist
China might contribute militarily to the defence of Southeast Asia, their
inclusion in SEATO would detract politically from the alliance's strength.
Many observers in Asia viewed Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek and South
Korea's Syngman Rhee with great suspicion, as US puppets or suicidal
warmongers, or both. As for the Japanese, their inclusion would be
downright 'provocative' in regions where the scars of the Second World
War remained unhealed. Additionally, though not incidentally, the New
Zealand embassy alluded to political problems at home that an alliance
with the three countries, especially Japan, would generate.'"
The Australian position was similar to that of New Zealand, and,
combined with British opposition, was sufficient to keep the Eisenhower
administration from pressing the point.45 Other Asian candidates whose
inclusion would have added weight to the organization — India, Indo-

43
See Eisenhower press conference, 19 May 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington, 1960), pp. 489-97.
■" New Zealand Embassy to State Department, undated (5 Aug. 1954), FRUS,
1952-4, xii. 709-11.
45
On Australian objections, see memo of conversation, 31 July 1954, ibid., pp.
648-9. For its part, Japan expressed little interest in the idea of SEATO
membership. See memo of conversation, 23 July 1954, ibid., p. 649, n. 1.
 From ANZUS to SEATO 269
nesia, and Burma, for example — were not interested. As a consequence,
when the Manila Pact, as the SEATO charter was commonly called,
was drafted in September 1954, the only Asian signatories were the
Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan.

The road to Manila was, of course, a good deal rockier than suggested
here, even after the French collapse at Dien Bien Phu made SEATO
seem more necessary than before, and after the completion of the Geneva
negotiations removed the grounds for procrastination. Between the
United States and Australia and New Zealand, however, the last leg of
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the journey was relatively uncomplicated. Some tension arose at Manila,

when the Eisenhower administration insisted on a reservation to the
treaty, obliging the United States to act only in response to specifically
Communist aggression. Casey sought a similar exception for Australia,
but Dulles resisted vigorously. Casey swallowed his objections — and
disregarded Menzies's instructions — and signed.48
In important respects, SEATO represented the culmination of Wash-
ington's attempts to remedy what the United States considered to be the
most obvious deficiencies of ANZUS. In the first place, by bringing
Australia and New Zealand into an organization that included the
United States, Great Britain, and France, the Eisenhower administration
went far towards satisfying Canberra's and Wellington's desire to play a
greater role in Pacific and global planning. SEATO never became a
Pacific NATO, but merely by its inclusion of the three most important
members of the Atlantic alliance, it afforded Australia and New Zealand
greater access to the councils of the major Western powers. Second, the
inclusion of Great Britain in a new pact with the United States, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand took most of the sting out of her continued
exclusion from ANZUS, soothing the wounds of imperial pride, and
avoiding the difficulties British pique might entail. Finally, the inclusion
of Asian countries in SEATO, even if they were not the most powerful
or prestigious, enabled die United States to shed some of the burden of
having drawn a 'colour line' in its policy for the western Pacific. ANZUS
might remain a Svhite man's treaty', but US leaders could present
SEATO as an example of their willingness to work with Asians on prob-
lems of mutual concern.
SEATO, of course, was not without its own deficiencies. Immediately,
its Asian representation came under attack as mere tokenism, and Aus-
tralia and New Zealand began to make the same demands they had
46
See Barclay, p. 71.
 270 Henry W. Brands, Jr.

earlier made with respect to ANZUS, that 'teeth' be put into it.*T But
SEATO's problems were of a different order than those of ANZUS,
leading as they ultimately did to the involvement of the three ANZUS/
SEATO powers in the Vietnam War. In 1954, the worst was yet to
come.

Vanderbilt University
*7 On putting 'teeth' in SEATO, see, for example, Australian Embassy to State
Department, 31 Aug. 1954, FRUS 1959-4, xii. pp. 834-5.
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