a concise

introduction to the philosophy

oFnicholASoFcusa
This page intentionally left blank
a concise
introduction
to the
philosophy of
nicholas of cusa
By jasper hopkins

univecsity of minnesou ppess, minneApolis

Copyright ©1978 by the University of Minnesota.
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
Published by the University of Minnesota Press,
2037 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455,
and published in Canada by Burns & MacEachern Limited,
Don Mills, Ontario

Library of Congress Cataloging In Publication Data

Hopkins, Jasper.
A concise introduction to the philosophy of Nicholas
of Cusa.
Includes English and Latin versions of Nicholas'
Trialogus de possest.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Nicolaus Cusanus, Cardinal, 1401-1464.1. Nico-
laus Cusanus, Cardinal, 1401-1464. Trialogus de possest.
Latin & English. II. Title.
765.N54H66 189 78-16802
ISBN 0-8166-0877-6

The Latin version of Trialogus de possest is reprinted

from Renate Steiger, ed. and trans., Trialogus de
possest. Dreiergesprdch uber das Konnen-Ist (1973);
the diagram on p. 83 is from Elisabeth Bohnenstaedt,
trans., Vom Konnen-Sein. Vom Gipfel der Betrachtung
(1947). Permission for both reprintings was granted
by Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg.

The University of Minnesota

is an equal opportunity
educator and employer.
pRe&ce

For a long time I kept wondering how best to introduce my

students to the thought of Nicholas of Cusa. Like nearly
everyone else, I supposed that I ought to begin where Nicho-
las began: viz., with De Docta Ignorantia, his first and his
most important philosophical work. Yet, I found myself
unable to get a grip on this treatise, given the number of
Latin passages in which the argument seemed to me either
implausible or unintelligible. Moreover, the students them-
selves were hampered by the necessity ofrelying upon Ger-
main Heron's English translation, which does not do justice
to Nicholas's reasoning. For example, in Book II, Chapter 4
Heron renders "contracte infinitus" as "relatively infinite."
And in I, 24 he takes the sentence "Licet 'unitas' videatur
propinquius nomen maximi, tamen adhuc a vero nomine
maximi, quod est ipsum maximum, distat per infinitum" to
mean "Though 'unity' seems the more appropriate title for
the Maximum, yet it falls infinitely short of the Maximum's
true name, which is The Maximum."
After much study, I finally came to recognize that the
dialogue De Possest provides the easiest access to Nicholas's
basic ideas. Written in 1460, four years before his death, it
presents in streamlined fashion not only his views about

v
vi Preface

docta ignorantia, via negativa, and coincidentia oppositorum

but also his teachings on (1) the universe's relationship to
the absolutely Maximum, (2) the metaphysical role of mathe-
matical symbolism, and (3) the attainability of the mystical
vision of God.
I hope that not only my own students of medieval philoso-
phy but also the general student of Renaissance history will
indeed find in De Possest a helpful guide to Nicholas's specu-
lative reasoning. The best approach for the beginning student
will be to read the dialogue itself before turning to the more
encompassing introduction, which is more suited to advanced
students and to scholars. In presenting an overview of Nicho-
las's thought, I could not bring myself to withhold analysis
—lest by oversimplifying I should mislead, as do so many of
the summaries found in even the better textbooks on the
history of philosophy.
The critical edition of the Latin dialogue was edited by
Renate Steiger on behalf of the Heidelberg Academy of
Letters, which granted permission for the present reprinting.
In the preface to her admirable German translation of the
edited text Dr. Steiger remarks: "An manchen Stellen Hess
sich jedoch . . . die Interpretation nicht gam zuruckhal-
ten."1 I confess that I cannot echo this statement. For it
seems to me to be not the exception but the rule that trans-
lation and interpretation proceed pari passu, as I illustrate
at length (though in another context) in my bookAnselm of
Canterbury: Volume IV: Hermeneutical and Textual Prob-
lems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm.2 In the spirit
of close translation, though, I deemed it advisable to use
brackets as a signal that I added words whose correlates are
only implied in the Latin text. I adopted this procedure main-
ly as an aid to those readers who will want to compare the
English translation with the text itself. Nevertheless, let no
one wrongly suppose that these bracketed words and phrases
are the only places where "interpretation" occurs.
My thoughts on Nicholas of Cusa date from 1973-74,
when I was spending a sabbatical year in Paris as a fellow of
the American Council of Learned Societies, for whose assis-
 Preface vii

tance I am grateful. A travel grant from the University of

Minnesota made possible my visit, during the summer of
1977, to the Cusanus Institute at the University of Mainz
and to the Cusanus Library at Bernkastel-Kues. I express ap-
preciation to Rudolf Haubst, Hermann Schnarr, and Rektor
Moritz —all of whom received me cordially.
I also wish to thank the staff of the Wilson Library at the
University of Minnesota—especially Joan Fagerlie, Erika
Linke, Jacqueline Smith, and Douglas White, who helped
secure many of the works needed for this study. I am
obliged to Peter Petzling for calling to my attention several
articles I might otherwise have failed to read. Finally, I am
indebted to Sandra Menssen, who typed the manuscript and
who, with Richard Hogan, Pat Kaluza, and Carol Such, as-
sisted in proofreading.
Jasper Hopkins
Philosophy Department
University of Minnesota
This page intentionally left blank
contents

CHRONOLOGY OF NICHOLAS'S MAJOR WORKS xi

INTRODUCTION 3

ABBREVIATIONS 45

BIBLIOGRAPHY 47

TRIALOGUS DE POSSEST 6 62

ON ACTUALIZED-POSSIBILITY 63

NOTES 157

INDEX 181
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chRonoloqy of
nicholass major? woRks

[Extracted from Rudolf Haubst, "Nikolaus von Kues,"

Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche, 7 (1962), 989-90]

1432-33 De Concordantia Catholica

1440 De Docta Ignorantia
1442-43 De Coniecturis
1444-45 De Deo Abscondito (1444)
De Quaerendo Deum (1445)
De Filiatione Dei (1445)
1445-46 De Data Patris Luminum
1445-59 (Eleven mathematical writings)
1446 Coniectura de Ultimis Diebus
1447 De Genesi
1449 Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae
1450 Idiota de Sapientia
Idiota de Mente
Idiota de Staticis Experiment!*
1453 De Pace Fidei
De Visione Dei

XI
xii Chronology

1458 De Beryllo
1459 De Aequalitate
De Principio
1460 De Possest
1461 Cribratio Alkorani
1461-62 DeLiNonAliud
1462-63 De Venatione Sapientiae
De Ludo Globi
1463 Compendium
1464 De Apice Theoriae
A concise
introduction to the philosophy
ofnicholasof CUSA
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intRo6uction

I
Nikolaus Krebs (1401-64) was born in the town of Cues,
situated on the Moselle River. Later called Nycolaus Cancer
de Coesse, Nicolaus de Cusa, and Nicolaus Cusanus, 1 he re-
ceived his early education from the Brothers of the Common
Life at Deventer in Holland, where he was exposed to such
pietistic and mystical themes as are expressed in The Imita-
tion of Christ, attributed to Thomas a Kempis. In 1416 he
entered the University of Heidelberg, thus coming under the
influence of Scholastic philosophy and theology. After a
year and a half, he left Heidelberg for Padua, where he studied
some mathematics and physics but mainly canon law, re-
ceiving his doctor decretorum in 1423. Following a sojourn
in Rome, he returned to Germany in 1425 for a year's study
of theology at the University of Cologne. During the next
decade he was engaged in various pursuits as a canon lawyer
and was sent to Constantinople in 143 7 by the minority party
of the Council of Basel.2 The purpose of this mission was
to invite the Greeks to attend, at Ferrara, Italy, a council
which would discuss the reunification of the Greek and the

3
4 Introduction

Roman churches. Though the council was nominally a suc-

cess, no substantive or lasting reunification resulted.
In 1438 Nicholas, fearing a new schism within the Western
Church, made his break with the Conciliar Movement com-
plete by joining in full support of the papal party. Ten years
later—and partly in appreciation of his support—he was
named, by Pope Nicholas V, cardinal of the titular Church
of St. Peter in Chains. Two years thereafter the same pope
named him bishop of Brixen (i.e., Bressanone) in South Tyrol.
His attempts at reform led to clashes with Archduke Sigis-
mund, making his last years as bishop not only unpleasant
but even fearful. In 1464, during the month of August, he
died at Todi in Umbria.
Nicholas's life spans the period of the Great Schism, the
burnings of John Huss and Joan of Arc, the continuation of
the Inquisition, and the fall of Constantinople. The final
success of the tumultuous Council of Constance (1414-18) —
success in ending the strife between three different claimants
to the papacy—made a deep impact upon him. In De Con-
cordantia Catholica (1432-33) he advocates that the pope
be regarded as responsible to such a council. The desire for
unitas ecclesiae, as evidenced in his early work, is paralleled
by the doctrine of unitas complicans, which is set forth in
the major philosophical effort De Docta Ignorantia (1440).
Though in the name of unitas ecclesiae he came to abandon
his conciliar theory, he never saw a need to modify his philo-
sophical view about the nature of God as unitas complicans,
or Enfolding Oneness. Thus his philosophical position,
though differently illustrated from one work to another,
does not substantially change.
As a Renaissance man, Nicholas reaches out to investigate
mathematics, astronomy, cosmology, and ecclesiastical
polity, as well as philosophy and theology. In each of these
areas he makes a contribution which, viewed historically, is
distinctive—irrespective of the assessment of its inherent
merits. (E.g., in mathematics he presents a "proof" that any
circle can be squared.) On the philosophical front, his origi-
nality is not to be mislabeled as novelty: he is not wholly
 Introduction 5

the source of his own ideas; yet he is original in his use of

these other sources, chief among whom is Pseudo-Dionysius
(whom he lauds in De Li Non Aliud 14 [29:22] as "the
greatest of the theologians"). For instance, in The Divine
Names Dionysius alludes to the possibility of knowing God
through ignorance. (St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, Algazel,
and Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus also employed comparable
expressions). In Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae 4 Nicholas
denies that he borrowed the idea of acquired ignorance
from "Dionysium aut quemquam theologorum verorum"
and insists that "desuper conceptum recepi." Whether or not
he was initially influenced by Dionysius's version of docta
ignorantia, the development of this theme —once struck up-
on—was certainly carried out in the light of'Dionysius's
writings. One reason for God's being called unknowable is,
Nicholas teaches, that He is considered to be beyond all op-
position; and He is beyond all opposition because (in one
sense) He is not other than anything which can be.5 This last
idea, Nicholas admits, was in fact suggested to him by Diony-
sius.6
Because of Nicholas's explicit references in his own texts
and because of his comments in the margins of other texts
found in his library, his sources are easy to determine. Van-
steenberghe, Lenz, and Hommes all came to roughly the
same conclusions about these sources: viz., that aside from
Pseudo-Dionysius, the primary influences derive from Pro-
clus, Erigena, and Augustine. 7 Thus T. Whittaker leads us
astray with his verdict that
neither Cusanus nor Bruno nor Spinoza can have read
Erigena, whose great work De Divisione Naturae was
sentenced to destruction by Pope Honorius III in 1225,
and did not come to light again through a single copy
till 1681.8
For in the Apologia9 Nicholas urges that Erigena be read.
And this exhortation certainly suggests that he himself had
studied De Divisione Naturae. He is also influenced in vary-
ing ways by Plato, Aristotle, Maximus the Confessor, Thierry
6 Introduction

of Chartres, Anselm of Canterbury, Hugh of St. Victor,

Robert Grosseteste,Thomas Callus, Albert the Great, Pseudo-
Hermes Trismegistus, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lull, and
Meister Eckhart, among others. For instance, he accepts the
Aristotelian-Thomistic distinction between four kinds of
causes,10 as well as the distinction between the vegetative,
the sensitive, and the intellectual soul.11 He also cites with
approval Anselm's statement in De Conceptu Virginali 18:
"Decebat, ut eapuritate, qua maior sub Deo intelligi nequit,
virgo niteret, cut purissimus Dei aeterni filius pro filio ita
dan merebatur ut esset communis etDeiet Virginis filius."12
And he endorses a portion of Anselm's theory of atonement:

Homo ad vitam creatus non restituitur, si non ad simi-

litudinem angelorum, in quibus nullum est peccatum,
provehitur. Quod facere non potest nisi praecedente
Integra satisfactione, quam esse opportet, ut aliquid
Deo detur, quod debitum non sit et superet omne,
quod Deus non est. Peccare est Deum exhonare, quod
facere homo non deberet, etiam si cuncta, quae Deus
non sunt, perire deberent. Utique ratio exigit et
veritas immutabilis, ut, qui peccat, reddat Deo aliquid
pro honore ablato maius quam sit hoc, pro quo ilium
exhonare non debuit. Quod humana natura sola non
habebat nee sine satisfactione ad finem et regnum per-
venire potuit.13

On the other hand, the importance of some of the in-

fluences on Nicholas has been exaggerated. For instance,
Pierre Duhem claims that in De Docta Ignorantia Nicholas
plagiarizes Thierry of Chartres's De Sex Dierum Operibus—
that parts of the former are simply bad summaries of the lat-
ter.14 But this judgment needs more focusing. For one thing,
Nicholas's writings bear a closer resemblance to Thierry's
Commentary on Boethius than to his De Sex Dierum Operi-
bus. But even so, Nicholas's appropriation of such terminolo-
gy as "forma essendi," "fieri potest," "entitas omnium
rerum," "aequalitas essendi," as well as his pivotal use of
 Introduction 7

Exodus 3:14, hardly constitutes plagiarism15 of Thierry's

system. (And only such plagiarism would render Nicholas
worthy of reproach.) Nicholas does adopt some of Thierry's
ideas: But he organizes them in a way that makes the whole
of his position different from Thierry's. For example, he
refers to God the Father as unitas, God the Son as aequalitas,
and God the Holy Spirit as conexio unitatis et aequalitatis
—just as does Thierry in Lectiones in Boethii Librum. 16 But
it would be wrong to maintain that he simply takes over
Thierry's doctrine of the Trinity.
In De Possest the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius, Proclus,
Erigena, and Augustine is both abundant and patent. Nicho-
las stands in the history of philosophy as a continuer of some
aspects of the rich and variegated Neoplatonic tradition. Yet
he is no mere synthesizer of his predecessors, even though
he appropriates their terminology and utilizes their motifs.
Perhaps there is no better illustration of this fact than in De
Possest 73-74. Following the Christian Neoplatonic tradition,
Nicholas teaches that God is beyond being and not-being.
But at the same time, in the spirit of Meister Eckhart, he
qualifies this doctrine by adding that God is Being itself and
that in God "not-being is every thing which is possible to be."
So if there is a sense in which not-being is subsequent to God,
there is also a sense in which in God not-being is God. This
latter sense becomes an essential aspect of the broader view
that God is the union of posse and esse — a view spelled out
in some detail throughout De Possest.

II
The speculative and highly metaphysical character of Nicho-
las's writings render them especially difficult to compre-
hend. Much of the trouble arises from the fact that they
veer from the method and the style of medieval Scholasticism.
Whereas Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of
Ockham, and the others pay careful attention to articulating
philosophical and theological arguments, Nicholas advances
considerations so sweeping that they can scarcely be called ar-
guments. And even the few argument-approximations which
8 Introduction

he manages to formulate depend upon considerations—often-

times considerations of analogy—which do not successfully
support his metaphysical conclusions. In particular, he no-
where shows himself seriously interested in the question of
whether God's existence is demonstrable. He neither dis-
cusses the issue in detail nor takes an explicit stance toward
the "proofs" given by his predecessors. In the quasi-dialogue
De Pace Fidei, where he aims to show that wisdom is God,
he must first establish its independent and singular existence.
But his attempt to do so is not philosophically serious.
"If, then," [said the Greek] "you all love wisdom, do
you not presuppose that this wisdom exists?" They all
proclaimed at once that no one doubted the existence
of wisdom. The Word added: "There can be only one
wisdom. For if it were possible for there to be more
than one wisdom, then these several would have to
exist from one wisdom; for prior to all plurality there
is unity." 17

Similarly, in De Docta Ignorantia I, 6, which proposes some

considerations about the existence of the absolutely Maxi-
mum, or God, Nicholas does not reason rigorously. In fact,
it is difficult even to state his reasoning accurately. Accord-
ing to Armand Maurer,
Cusa offered several a priori proofs for the existence
of the absolute maximum, or God. The first argued
that the finite is inconceivable without the infinite.
What is finite and limited has a beginning and an end,
so that there must be a being to which it owes its exis-
tence and in which it will have its end. This being is
either finite or infinite. If it is finite, then it has its
beginning and end in another being. This leads either
to an infinite series of actually existing finite beings,
which is impossible, or to an infinite being which is the
beginning and end of all finite beings. Consequently,
it is absolutely necessary that there be an infinite be-
ing, or absolute maximum.
 Introduction 9

The second proof argued that the absolute truth

about the absolute maximum can be stated in three
propositions: It either is or is not. It is and it is not. It
neither is nor is not. These exhaust all the possibilities,
so that one of them must be the absolute truth. Hence
there is an absolute truth, and this is what is meant
by the absolute maximum.18

But Maurer's articulation of these "proofs" does not corre-

spond to Nicholas's text.19 As Maurer represents the first
argument, it proceeds more coherently than it does in the
text; by contrast, his representation of the second argument
introduces a textually unwarranted imprecision. Specifically,
Maurer wrongly incorporates into Nicholas's "first"argument
the proposition that the finite is inconceivable without the in-
finite. For the argument contends that the finite cannot exist
without the infinite — not that it cannot be conceived without
the infinite. 220 Moreover, the argument does not utilize the
premise that an infinite series of actually existing finite
beings is impossible. Rather, Nicholas says simply: "It is not
possible to proceed to infinity in beginnings and causes."21
By comparison, the "second" argument nowhere claims
that what is meant by the absolute truth is the absolute
Maximum. Maurer is not clear about the sense of "meant"
in his statement that "there is an absolute truth, and this
is what is meant by the absolute maximum." Presumably,
he is not suggesting that for Nicholas the expression "abso-
lute truth" is identical in meaning with the expression "ab-
solute maximum." (For this would make nonsense of the
argument.) But is he suggesting that, on Nicholas's view,
when we refer to the absolute truth we are referring to the
absolutely Maximum? If so, he is on unsafe ground. For al-
though Nicholas is claiming that the greatest truth is identi-
cal with the absolutely Maximum, he nowhere exhibits the
belief that in referring to the one we necessarily mean to be
referring to the other. (The morning star is identical with the
evening star; but in referring to the former we do not neces-
sarily mean to be referring to the latter.) But perhaps all
Maurer intends by "this is what is meant by the absolute
10 Introduction

maximum" is "this is identical with the absolute maximum."

If so, he is expressing himself misleadingly. Whatever his in-
tention, he introduces into Nicholas's reasoning an impreci-
sion which in one way or another detracts from its structure
and movement.
In last analysis, each of Nicholas's two lines of argument is
incomplete. In the one case, he takes no pains to argue for his
identification of the greatest truth with the absolutely Maxi-
mum; nor does he articulate any criteria for determining
what is to count as the greatest truth ; nor does he make any
attempt to supply a premise to the effect that a proposition
can be most greatly true only if the greatest truth exists in-
dependently of it. In the other case, he assumes without dis-
cussion that it is not possible to proceed to infinity in be-
ginnings and causes. Unlike Thomas, he makes no effort to
distinguish, within his line of consideration, between a series
in essential subordination and a series in accidental subordina-
tion, between an ontological regress and a temporal regress.
In short, Nicholas does not take seriously the project of
demonstrating the existence of God. Yet he could not fail
to realize—given his familiarity with the Thomist-Scotist-
Ockhamist controversy —what would be involved in formu-
lating such a demonstration. Accordingly, it is misleading to
call his a priori considerations proofs of the existence of God.
For this label implies that he does take the eristic enterprise
seriously— that he intends to provide conclusive arguments.
In fact, however, he aims only at giving Hinweise, or indi-
cators.
For the most part, Nicholas's other argument-approxima-
tions are, likewise, either inconclusive or specious. For ex-
ample, his considerations in De Docta Ignorantia I, 4 do not
suffice to establish that the absolutely Maximum is identical
with the absolutely Minimum:
Since the absolutely Maximum is all that which can
be, it is altogether actual. And just as there cannot be
anything greater, so for the same reason there cannot
be anything lesser, since it is all that which can be. But
the Minimum is that than which there cannot be a
 Introduction 11

lesser. And since the Maximum is of this kind, it is evi-

dent that the Minimum coincides with the Maximum.
If viewed as eristic, the reasoning here is question-begging.
For if the absolutely Maximum exists and is everything which
can be, then we might well infer that the Minimum is not
among the things which can be —or that if the Minimum is
among the things which can be, then the Maximum is not
to be identified, unqualifiedly, with everything which can
be. Yet here and elsewhere we must be cautious about speci-
fying Nicholas's objectives. Otherwise, we may take him to
be attempting to establish that the absolutely Maximum is
identical with the Minimum. But, in reality, he is endeavor-
ing only to render plausible his notion that the absolutely
Maximum is beyond all opposition and all otherness. That
is, he does not use the preceding passage to prove that God
is beyond all opposition; rather, he uses it as a step toward
claiming that God is beyond all opposition. For he knows
that the "argument" can be "controverted" by anyone who
insists upon an unrelenting application of the principle of
noncontradiction. 22 Nicholas is best understood as proceed-
ing much as Spinoza later did when he offered his "proof"
that substance is singular and exists per se. Strictly speaking,
Spinoza's proof is not a proof, since what is shown is only
what is implicit in the disputed assumption. But, then,
Spinoza realized this fact about his reasoning—as Nicholas
realized the corresponding fact about his. Neither of the two
would be troubled by the accusation of begging the question.
For each would regard whoever leveled the charge as having
misunderstood the intent of the enterprise.
On the other hand, there are passages in which Nicholas
does make outright mistakes of inference, as judged by the
ordinary canons of reasoning.223 (Nicholas himself does not
reject the application of these canons except where they con-
flict with his doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum in Deo.)
One such faulty inference occurs in De Possest 27:
Cardinal: Only the Beginning—because it is Actualized-
possibility itself—is not able to be what it is not.
12 Introduction

Bernard: This is clear. For example if the Beginning

were able not-to-be, it would not-be, since it is what
it is able to be.
John: Therefore, it is Absolute Necessity, since it is
not able not to be.
Cardinal: Your statement is correct. For how would
the Beginning be able not to be, seeing that in it not-
being is [identical with] it?
But, of course, from "B is not able to be what it is not" and
"B is not nonexistent" it does not follow, soundly, that "B
is not able to be nonexistent." For existent is not what B is
but that B is; and nonexistent is not what B is not but that
B is not.
To make matters worse, Nicholas does not always take
the time to clarify fully his cryptic or startling utterances-,
and his not doing so conduces to his being misunderstood.
Thus the casual reader may have difficulty with the asser-
tion, in De Coniecturis II, 14 (143:7-8), that "homo enim
deus est, sed non absolute, quoniam homo; humanus est igi-
tur deus": "Man is God, but not in an unrestricted sense, for
he is man; he is therefore a human God." Similarly, unless
one reads closely, it may be difficult to grasp the significance
of De Visione Dei 12, where God is said to be created as
well as creating. Likewise, even Nicholas's expression of his
grand theme, the coincidence of opposites, fosters confu-
sion. For sometimes he asserts that in God all opposites
24
coincide (in quo coincidunt opposita)24 and sometimes he
states that God is beyond the coincidence of contradictories
(ultra coincidentiam contradictoriorum). 25 Moreover, in
teaching that all things —opposites or not—are present in
God,26 that God is all things,27 that God is present in all
things,28 he lays himself open to the charge of pantheism.
Indeed, during his lifetime this charge was brought against
him by John Wenck, professor of theology at the University
of Heidelberg.29 Although Wenck was undiscerning in taking
Nicholas to be teaching that omnia cum Deo coincidunt,
Nicholas had done little in DeDocta Ignorantia to anticipate
 Introduction 13

and forestall this pantheistic construal of his assertion that

Dem est omnia, i.e., that Deus est omnia complicative. His
clarification came nine years later in Apologia Doctae Ig-
norantiae, his response to Wenck.
The very phrase "docta ignorantia" suffers from a prima
facie ambiguity: does it mean an ignorance that is erudite
or an ignorance that must be acquired—or both? Certainly,
Nicholas believes that an individual who possesses this ig-
norance is in this respect wiser than an individual who does
not. ° Nonetheless, the expressions "scientia ignorantiae"
and "doctrina ignorantiae" suggest that "docta ignorantia"—
which is sometimes also called "sacra ignorantia" —is an
ignorance which one must acquire, or learn.31 Accordingly,
the phrase makes best sense when viewed in the light of
Nicholas's teaching about the via negativa.
In another vein, a number of Nicholas's statements ap-
pear, prima facie, to be unintelligible. The most noteworthy
—and, ironically, the best known—is his assertion that God
is a sphere whose center is everywhere and whose circum-
ference is nowhere. This statement, elicited from De Ludo
Globi II and De Docta Ignorantia II, 1232 is not original with
Nicholas but derives from Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus's
"Book of the Twenty-four Philosophers," a compilation of
the late twelfth or the early thirteenth century. Nicholas,
however, seems to have borrowed this formula from Meister
Eckhart, who uses it in no less than six places.34 Yet Eck-
hart's statement—already bizarre in its attempt to express
the doctrine of divine omnipresence —becomes all the more
bizarre in the mouth of Nicholas, who comes to declare that
even the machina mundi has its center everywhere and its
circumference nowhere. Not only is it unclear what sense it
would make to apply this rubric to the mechanism of the
world, but the reason offered in support of so applying the
rubric is itself unintelligible: viz., that God is the world's
center and circumference —God, who is present everywhere
and nowhere.355 But the sense in which God, an immaterial
being, could be the world's center and circumference is never
successfully elucidated.36
14 Introduction

What makes Nicholas's ideas still more difficult to grasp,

and what sets him still further apart from his Scholastic pre-
decessors, is his loose terminology. Vansteenberghe speaks
of "les repetitions, le manque d'ordre logique, les variations
dans le vocabulaire." 377 And Jaspers judges: "Er schreibt
durchweg kein einfaches, klares und strenges Latein."3K
Sometimes Nicholas refers to God as "actus omnis posse"
and sometimes as "actualitas omnis potentiae," without
really distinguishing between "actus" and "actualitas" or be-
tween "posse" and "potential 399 Nor does he hesitate to use
"posse" in place of "possibilitas."'*0 Similarly, he feels free
to interchange "notitia" and "scientia,"41 "nominamus"
,, I t ' , ' • ) »41 4 i •

and "vocamus," 422 "esse" and "actus." 43 "Entitas" some-

times indicates esse generally and sometimes ipsum esse, i.e.,
God. 44 Moreover, God is called, indiscriminately, (1) esse
omnis esse, (2) entitas omnis esse, and (3) ens entium.45
"Subsistere" does not regularly mean "to exist independently
rather than in another."46 Sentences such as "Quare maxi-
mum absolute cum sit omne id quod esse potest, est penitus
in actu" are inexcusably ambiguous.477 And sentences such
as "Et dico nunc nobis constare deum ante actualitatem, quae
distinguitur a potentia, et ante possibilitatem, quae distin-
guitur ab actu, esse ipsum simplex mundi principium"48 rep-
resent the abandonment of the Scholastic quest for precise
i 49
terminology.
Any number of commentators have erroneously pictured
Nicholas as teaching that the universe is without spatial limi-
tation.50 And others have misconceived his relationship to
his predecessors and his successors. Thus Kurt Flasch alleges
that Nicholas's absolutely Maximum is to be identified with
the God of Anselm.51 But this claim is altogether misguided.
For the God of Anselm is neither the coincidence of oppo-
sites nor the actuality of all possibility. Nor does Anselm's
expression "es quiddam mains quam cogitari possit" play
the same role in Proslogion 15 as it does in Nicholas's con-
text of scientia ignorantiae.52 Finally, it is completely wrong
of Flasch to write: "Was in D. ign. 1 6 . . . steht, ist eine
originelle Wiederaufnahme des Proslogionbeweises, seine
 Introduction 15

Transposition indas cusanischeKoinzidenzdenken." Nicho-

las's argument may be "'originell" but it is certainly not a
"Wiederaufnahme des Proslogionbeweises." For the struc-
ture of Anselm's logic —though not of Nicholas's —is a re-
ductio ad absurdum. Where this structure is not preserved,
there is not any restatement of the Proslogion proof.
Flasch, however, is not the only one who makes mistakes
in comparing Anselm and Nicholas. D. J. B. Hawkins com-
ments: "Nicholas has already defined God in the Anselmian
manner as that than which there can be nothing greater."54
But for two reasons this comment is flagrantly wrong. First,
Anselm repeatedly and plainly uses the formula "that than
which nothing greater can be thought"; and second, this for-
mula does not function for him as a definition of the word
"God."55
With regard to his successors, Nicholas has been hailed as
in some respects a precursor of Copernicus,56 5
Bruno, 57
58 59 60 61
Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. Yet most of
these claims have been exaggerated, as, in general, has been
the attempt to represent him as "the first modern thinker."
Cassirer, for instance, believes that this rubric is fitting be-
cause, as he says vaguely, Nicholas's "first step consists in
asking not about God, but about the possibility of knowl-
edge about God."62 However, the same observation could be
aptly made about the first step taken by Moses Maimonides
and by Thomas Aquinas, neither of whom would be mis-
taken for modern philosophers.
All in all, the writings of Nicolaus Cusanus display a per-
turbing impenetrability which has militated against their be-
ing enthusiastically received by the Anglo-Saxon philosophi-
cal community. But among Anglo-Saxon philosophers, few
have made any real effort to rethink the thoughts of this
original and partly bizarre Renaissance mind. Unfortunately,
many of the English-speaking translators and commentators
upon whom the Anglo-Saxon community has depended have
greatly added to our woes. Ironically, the commentators who
heap upon Nicholas the most lavish praise are often the very
ones who are the most undiscerning about the significance
16 Introduction

and the soundness of his main ideas. It behooves us to re-

examine, briefly, these major themes—doing so partly in the
light of the dialogue De Possest. This reexamination will not
unturn any deep points hitherto unnoticed. But it may help
with the task of identifying the genuine trouble spots in Nich-
olas 's philosophy, as well as with the goal of determining what
there is of lasting importance.

Ill
Many of Nicholas's central doctrines emerge in conjunction
with his reading of Scripture. The doctrine of acquired ig-
norance is associated with I Corinthians 3:19: "The wisdom
of this world is foolishness with God." The doctrine that God
is all things is correlated with I Corinthians 15:28: "that God
may be all in all." The doctrine of the mystical vision is de-
veloped against the backdrop of II Corinthians 12:3-4: "I
know such a man (whether in the body, or out of the body,
I know not: God knoweth): That he was caught up into para-
dise and heard secret words which it is not granted to man
to utter." And the via negativa is propounded in connection
with Ephesians 1:21, which teaches that God is "above all
principality and power and virtue and dominion and every
name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that
which is to come." Indeed, Nicholas teaches that insofar as
the existence and the nature of God can be apprehended
through symbolisms, they must be grasped by the route indi-
cated in Romans 1:20, a verse which he construes as: "The in-
visible things of Him, including His eternal power and divinity,
are clearly seen from the creation of the world, by means of
understanding created things."
Intermingled with considerations of faith, Nicholas's rea-
soning in De Possest is no more rigorous than it was in De
Docta Ignorantia, written twenty years earlier. He regards
the sensible world as finite, and therefore as existing from
another (ab alio), since it cannot fix its own limits. But this
other-from-which-the-world-exists exists from itself (a se),
since it is the Creating Power and since only what is created
 Introduction 17

exists from another. Because it exists from itself, it is eternal.

And thus it is also invisible; for were it visible, it would be
temporal.64
Here a number of questions occur to us. Cannot the sen-
sible world be finite in spatial extent without existing ab alio?
Can it not be uncreated and everlasting? Instead of dealing
with these issues along philosophical lines, Nicholas simply
begs a number of philosophical issues by invoking the creator/
creation distinction. This move manifests that he does not
aim to formulate an apologetic on behalf of a theistic meta-
physic but intends only to detail, informally, certain features
of his own version of such a metaphysic. In De Possest he
more or less takes the existence of God as nonproblematical
and seeks to explain how it is that we can mount up to God
on the basis of the visible world. The route he chooses to
follow is based upon the distinction between actuality and
possibility.
We know, he reminds us, that every existing thing is able
to be that which it actually is. From this consideration we
are led (he believes) to reflect upon actuality itself, in whose
absence (he presumes) a thing cannot actually be what it is
—any more than a white thing can be white in the absence
of whiteness. So if anything actually exists, it must be the
case that actuality exists. But if actuality exists, it is able
to exist; for what is unable to exist does not exist. Moreover,
it would not be able, or possible, to exist in the absense of
possibility; for without possibility nothing is possible. So if
actuality is able, or possible, to exist, then it must be the
case that possibility actually exists. Yet the one cannot be
prior or posterior to the other. For how could possibility
exist without actuality —or actuality, without possibility?
Nicholas seems to hold that although whiteness does not
65
exist independently of objects which happen to be white,
possibility itself does exist independently of everything which
comes to be actual. For if it did not, then (he supposes) none
of these things would be possible to exist before they actu-
ally existed. Indeed, on Nicholas's view, possibility itself
exists eternally; and since it is not prior to actuality itself,
18 Introduction

the latter also exists eternally. This eternal union of possi-

bility and actuality Nicholas calls God. So God is distinct
from every other being by virtue of the fact that He alone is
the actuality of all possibility; He alone is, actually, every-
thing of which "is able to be" can be predicated truly. This
understanding of God gives rise to three additional points.
1. Since God is actually all that is possible to be, He can-
not be other than He is. Accordingly, then, He is also actually
all that He can be, whereas no other existing thing is ever all
that it can be.66 For example, although the sun is able to be
what it is, it is not actually all that it is able to be. For it is
possible for the sun to be brighter, or hotter, or larger, than
it is. Importantly, Nicholas does not here distinguish potentia
qua potentiality from possibilities qua possibility. In accor-
dance with such a distinction, someone might contend: the
sun has no potency for a greater brightness, heat, or size;
therefore, the sun cannot actually become brighter, hotter,
or larger than it now is; still it is (logically) possible for the
sun to have these characteristics. By contrast, Nicholas in
De Possest is not operating with an Aristotelian notion of
potency. Rather, according to his view, anything (other than
God) can become anything else (other than God), since God
Himself has the power "to turn any created thing into any
other created thing." 67 In short, Nicholas's use of "posse,"
"potentia," and "possibilitas" must usually be construed as
indifferent and as invoking no systematic distinction between
potentiality (in the metaphysical Aristotelian sense) and pos-
sibility (in the logical and empirical senses).
2. Having become clear about the meaning of "poss£,"we
are now in a position to determine the appropriate transla-
tions for the neologism "Possest," which Nicholas comes to
use as a name for God. As an abbreviation for "Posse est" and
in the context of Nicholas's writings, the word is used with
the literal meaning "Possibility exists," or "Possibility is ac-
tual." So God, as Possest, is Existent-possibility, Actualized
possibility, the Actual-existence-of-possibility. These con-
struals are confirmed by De Venatione Sapientiae, Chap. 13
("Solus deus est possest, quia est actu quod esse potest":
 Introduction 19

"God alone is Possest, because He is actually what is able to

be") and De Quaerendo Deum 46:1 ("O quantum est deus
noster, qui est actus omnis potentiate": "O how great is our
God, who is the actuality of every possibility!").
3. The awareness that God is Possest provides a rule for
conceiving of Him in more detail.
For example, suppose that on the basis of the beauty
of created things I say that God is beautiful; and sup-
pose I know that God is so beautiful that He is a beauty
which is everything it is able to be. Then, I know that
God lacks nothing of the beauty of the whole world.
And I know that all creatable beauty is only a certain
disproportionate likeness to that Beauty (1) which is
actually the possibility of the existence of all beauty
and (2) which is not able to be different from what it
is, since it is what it is able to be. The case is similar
concerning the good and life and other things. . . .
It is important to emphasize the phrase "disproportionate
likeness," since Nicholas never abandons his earlier state-
ment, in De Docta Ignorantia, to the effect that between
the finite and the infinte there is no proportionality.69 This
leads him to view the traditional names for God—"Creator,"
"Justice," "Goodness," etc. —as terms whose meanings are
elicited from human experience.70 Through employing these
terms, we cannot reach beyond our ignorance to apprehend
the true nature of God. Like Pseudo-Dionysius, Nicholas
emphasizes the via negativa, which teaches that God cannot
be known either in this life or in the next.71 Hence the rule
provided by the consideration that God is Possest is not in-
tended to furnish us with statements which adequately
characterize the nature of Divine Being. Nicholas does de-
clare that the name "Possest" has a "simple signification
which through a symbolism, and in accordance with your
human concept, leads an inquirer to some kind of positive
assertion about God."72 Yet these positive assertions serve
not to remove ignorance but to inculcate it, to teach us the
extent to which it is necessary.
20 Introduction

This name leads the one-who-is-speculating beyond all

the senses, all reason, and all intellect unto a mystical
vision, where there is an end to the ascent of all cog-
nitive power and where there is the beginning of the
revelation of the unknown God. For, having left all
things behind, the seeker-after-truth ascends beyond
himself and discerns that he still does not have any
greater access to the invisible God, who remains invi-
sible to him. (For God is not seen by means of any
light from the seeker's own reason.) At this point the
seeker awaits, with the most devout longing, the omnip-
otent Sun—expecting that when darkness is banished
by its rising, he will be illuminated, so that he will see
the invisible [God] to the extent that God will mani-
fest Himself.73
So, then, God "remains completely unknown to all who seek
Him by way of reason and intellect." Yet, though He sur-
passes all understanding, He will be seen by believers—seen
74
mystically—in the next life.
In De Possest Nicholas at least appears to be more agnos-
tic than he was in De Docta Ignorantia, where he maintained
that some propositions from negative theology are less inade-
quate than others. "It is truer," he said there, "that God is
not a stone than that He is not life or intelligence —truer
that He is not drunkenness than that He is not virtue."75
Yet we cannot know that God is more unlike x than y un-
less we also know that He is more like y than x. Once the via
negativa is formulated in terms of "more unlike x and less un-
like y," it can no longer be kept distinct from the via positiva.
In De Docta Ignorantia Nicholas recognizes this point and
thus hastens to add: "The affirmation which says that God is
intelligence and life is truer than [the affirmation which says
that He is] earth or stone or body." But in teaching that the
one affirmation is truer than the others, Nicholas appears in-
consistent in also teaching that there is no proportion be-
tween God and man. 76
Over and over again Nicholas has recourse to symbolism.
As we move farther and farther in time away from his early
work De Docta Ignorantia, this symbolism becomes less and
 Introduction 21

less exclusively mathematical. In De Possest he appeals not

only to the mathematical illustration of a top turning with
infinite velocity but equally to linguistic considerations asso-
ciated with the Latin words "m" and "possest." Although
these symbolisms never enable us to mount up successfully
toward understanding the nature of Divine Being, they do
purport to bring us to the point of discerning how inescap-
ably ignorant of God our intellect must be. And, allegedly,
this realization can become a stepping stone to the visio dei.
For even if we comprehend disproportionately the goodness
of God, our striving to emulate this goodness —to the extent
that we do apprehend it —opens the door to the possibility
of mystical encounter. 77
Nicholas's use of the via negativa can be elaborated only
in the light of his doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum.This
doctrine is expressed in three alternative but equivalent for-
mulas: (1) in God all opposites coincide;78 (2) God is above
(prior to) all opposition;79 (3) God is beyond the coincidence
of opposites.80 Thus Nicholas can say that (1) in God not-
being is everything which is possible to be,81 (2) God is be-
yond (prior to) being and not-being,82 and (3) God is beyond
the coincidence of being and not-being. Similarly, in God
there is no distinction between motion and rest; for maximal
motion (which God is) is indistinguishable from rest. Nicho
las illustrates this point by means of the aforementioned
motion of a top. The faster the top spins, the more it seems
to be at rest. If it could spin with infinite velocity, it would
be at rest. But since God is both maximal and minimal mo-
tion, He may be said to be more movable than any other
movable thing, as well as being said to be immovable and
immutable. 85 For neither description informs us positively
about the unnameable and unknowable nature of God, who
transcends the distinction between motion and rest.
Likewise, God is beyond the distinction between activity
and passivity,86 oneness and plurality, 87 time and eternity.88
Though we call Him the "Eternal One,"this name is no more
adequate for signifying His nature than is the name "Being."
For He exists so far beyond the opposition between time
22 Introduction

and eternity that the whole of what we call His eternity is

at once present at every point of what we regard as time. 89
Because God is beyond all such conceptual and empirical
distinctions, Nicholas goes beyond saying that we cannot
form an adequate concept of Him, Instead, he says tout court:
we cannot form a concept of Him. "For, assuredly, God is
not able to be conceived unless all that is able to be conceived
is actually conceived."90 And this conception is impossible
for us to form. Sometimes Nicholas speaks, paradoxically,
of the "inconceivable concept of God."91 But this is simply
his way of saying that God infinitely exceeds every conceiv-
able thing. Hence "the more an intellect understands the de-
gree to which the concept of God is unformable, the greater
this intellect is," states the Abbot in De Possest. And the dia-
logue continues:
Cardinal: Your statement is correct, Abbot. And so,
whoever supposes that he has apprehended God, knows
that this [belief] results from the deficiency and meager-
ness of his intellect.
Bernard: Therefore, the one who knows that he is un-
able to know is the more learned.
Cardinal: All, even the most brilliant, will have to say
this.
Bernard: When I consider that we are unable to con-
ceive of any thing as it is able to be conceived, it is
clear to me that God is not able to be conceived.92
Because we can have no concept of God, God is ineffable.93
But how is it intelligible for Nicholas to affirm that God
exists, if the concept of God is unformable? If God is incon-
ceivable, ineffable, and unapprehendable intellectually, we
cannot even know that He is one in nature. Nicholas goes
beyond the traditional Anselmian distinction between ap-
prehending and comprehending God's nature. (This distinc-
tion underlies Anselm's statement in Proslogion 15 to the
effect that God is something greater than can be conceived,
i.e., than can be comprehended.) For Nicholas does not even
 Introduction 23

allow that God's nature can be apprehended. Hence, to say

that God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, merciful,
etc., is not to signify analogically some truth about God. In-
deed, as we have seen, there is not—on Nicholas's view—any
analogy between the finite and the infinite. So the names of
God's attributes are all names which are infinitely removed
from the possibility of signifying God's being. The human in-
tellect can, therefore, approach God only through likenesses,
symbols, riddles, enigmas, mysteries —in short, through a
glass darkly.
Yet Nicholas does believe that some of these likenesses
and symbols are more appropriate than others. And this be-
lief suggests that in spite of his extreme language, he does
not regard God as unqualifiedly inconceivable. For if he did,
he would have no basis for distinguishing between appro-
priate and inappropriate symbols. Moreover, he does claim
that God is (1) Actualized-possibility, (2) Being itself, (3)
that than which a greater cannot be thought, 94 (4) that
which is greater than can be thought, 95 and (5) that in which
opposites coincide. And these claims are intelligible only in
conjunction with the further claim that God is in some re-
spect conceivable.
Assuredly, then, for Nicholas, there is a qualified sense
in which we can form a concept of God, even though there
is also another sense in which we cannot. This latter sense
we have seen to be illustrated by his statement (in De
Possest) that since God is actually every possibility, He is
not able to be conceived "unless all that is able to be con-
ceived is actually conceived."96 If God is infinite possibility
— as Nicholas considers Him to be —we can no more think
each of these infinite possibilities than we can enumerate
the infinite series of natural numbers. In this respect we can-
not conceive of God as He is. Accordingly, when Nicholas
says that God is ineffable, he means that He is ineffable in
Himself.97 And when he says that God is not nameable, he
means that no name from human discourse can conceivably
befit God's being.998 On the other hand, even though we
cannot actually think an infinite number of possibilities, we
24 Introduction

can conceive of there being such an infinity (just as we can

conceive of there being an infinity of natural numbers). If
God is taken to be this infinite number of possibilities, then
in some respect we do conceive of Him in conceiving that
the possibilities are infinite. That is, although we cannot con-
struct a concept of God, we can state the rule for how it is
to be constructed. There is a sense in which we may be said
to conceive of God by way of understanding the rule for
conceiving of Him.
So Nicholas's point is becoming clearer. In saying that we
cannot conceive of God because He is the actuality of infi-
nite possibility, Nicholas means only that we have no positive
(i.e., constructible) conception of God —not that we have no
negative (i.e., unconstructible but rule-governed) conception
of Him. Indeed, how could we conceive of Him positively?
—if to do so required conceiving of something which exists
in a sense not opposed to not-existing, something which is
alive in a sense not opposed to not being alive, something
which is one in a sense not opposed to not being one, some-
thing which is merciful in a sense not opposed to not being
merciful, something which is sun in a sense not opposed to
not being sun, and so on. Though we can indeed conceive
that something —call it God —transcends these distinctions,
we cannot conceive, positively, of what it is like for anything
to transcend them, of what it is like for anything to be God.
Accordingly, we can conceive of God only in the sense of
conceiving that He is not finite; but we cannot in any fuller
sense conceive of what it is like for Him to be infinite. So
this point is part of what Nicholas is expressing when he
refers to God as negatively infinite. Finally, although Nicho-
las holds that (positively speaking) God is humanly incon-
ceivable, he neither says nor believes that God is inconceiv-
able to Himself. On the contrary: only Actualized-possibility
can conceive and comprehend Actualized-possibility."
Nicholas's point about Being itself is similar to his point
about Actualized-possibility: viz., in calling God Being itself
we are saying that He is neither a finite being nor like a finite
being—without, however, saying positively what He is.1100
 Introduction 25

Likewise, in saying that God is greater than can be conceived,

we mean that He is unlike any known or conceivable finite
thing. So, according to Nicholas's theory, a negative concep-
tion of an infinite being is not really deemed worthy of be-
ing called a conception. And this is why he states that the
concept of God is unformable.
Nicholas's confusing statements about the inconceivability
and unknowability of God have led some commentators to
regard his views as incoherent.101 They reason as if along
the following three lines:
First, if our conception of God is wholly negative —as
the doctrine of acquired ignorance teaches —then al-
though we do have some conception of Him, we can-
not veridically conceive of Him as this rather than that.
Indeed, God will be conceived as transcending our un-
derstanding of every distinction, even the distinction
between finitude and infinitude. 102 And thus, even to
say that He is not finite will not be tantamount to say-
ing "He is this rather than that." As a result, Nicholas
has no basis for urging us to love and to worship God.
For if we cannot conceive of what God is—but instead
can conceive only that He is not any such characteris-
tic as we can apprehend—we have no basis for either
loving Him or hating Him, for either worshiping Him
or defying Him.103 Second, if our conception of God
is wholly negative, there is no basis for regarding one
symbolism as more appropriate than another, since
each of the symbolisms will be "blind." Yet Nicholas
teaches, inconsistently, that some symbolisms are bet-
ter than others. Third, exclusive adherence to the via
negativa renders unintelligible Nicholas's doctrine that
"all . . . names which ascribe infinity to God attempt
to show by the method of supereminence His inappre-
hensibility."104 The doctrine of supereminence implies
that when we assert,for example, that God is not merci-
ful, we mean that He is more than merciful in any sense
of "merciful" which we can understand. But this state-
26 Introduction

ment will be unintelligible, as will the entire via super-

eminentiae. For the via supereminentiae makes sense
only in connection with the doctrine of analogia entis.
That is, apart from there being some proportionality
between God and man, no human being will be able
to conceive, at all accurately, of what it is like for God
to be more than humanly merciful. Thus, for some
human being—a medieval monk, say —to assert that
God is more than merciful will be for him to assert
what he cannot conceive at all accurately, i.e., for him
to assert either what is unintelligible to him or else
what is totally misconceived by him. If for either of
these reasons his concept of God as this rather than
that is totally inadequate and is known to be totally
inadequate —a knowledge which is possible, according
to the doctrine of acquired ignorance—then he will
know that he cannot at all adequately conceive of
God's attributes. This knowledge undermines the sup-
posed legitimacy of the via supereminentiae.
On closer scrutiny, however, the foregoing charge of inco-
herence does an injustice to Nicholas's reasoning—if only by
failing to take account of its self-consciously paradoxical and
dialectical character. On the one hand, as we have seen,Nicho-
las asserts that God's nature cannot be known as it is in it-
self.105 To find this assertion we need look no further than De
Possest 10, where Bernard says: "Neither the name ["great-
ness"] nor the fact [of greatness], nor any of the characteris-
tics applicable to created magnitude are fittingly predicated
of God, since these are infinitely different from God. And
presumably this [point] holds true not only for greatness
but also for whatever is predicated truly of created things."
On the other hand, Nicholas again and again refers to God
as endless, powerful, good, etc.; and he regards this practice
as more fitting than that of referring to Him as ending, power-
less, evil, and so on. For example, on the basis of the beauty
of created things he sanctions (in De Possest 10) speaking of
God as beautiful—even though, presumably, he would not
find it appropriate, on the basis of the lack cf beauty of
 Introduction 27

some created things, to speak of Him as ugly. Thus it is true

both that some words whose meanings are drawn from hu-
man experience are more fittingly predicated of God and
that no word whose meaning is drawn from human experi-
ence is fittingly predicated of God. In short, the particular
ways in which we ought to conceive of God, if we are to be
true to the Christian tradition, are not ways in which God can
be truly conceived. This fact gives rise to Nicholas's para-
doxical language. In De Possest an instance of this language
is found in the statement that God "reveals Himself in every
creature as the triune, most true, and most congruent Ex-
emplar—and as surpassing infinitely all sensible, imaginable,
and intellectual knowledge which inheres in images."10 But
106

how can God reveal Himself in every creature if He infinitely

surpasses all knowledge derived from images? How can the in-
visible things of God —for example, His eternity, power, and
divinity—be clearly seen on the basis of the created world107
108
if we see them only through a symbolism1 and if this sym-
bolism is infinitely removed from signifying the nature of
God as it is in itself? Or how can God be "understood in-
comprehensibly"?—as the title of De Docta Ignorantia I, 4
indicates regarding Him.
In last analysis, Nicholas's predilection for paradoxical
expression must not here mislead us, for his view is not, after
all, self-contradictory. Indeed, he consistently teaches that
though God is unknowable and inconceivable per se, none-
theless in relation to us it is fitting that He be conceived in
accordance with the words of Christ and the theological doc-
trines derivable from them—in short, as if His mercy, jus-
tice, eternity, power, and so on, were analogous to our con-
cepts of them. In the end, then, he must not be held to the
literalness of his statement in De Docta Ignorantia I, 26,
which teaches that some propositions from negative theology
are truer than others. For what he means is that some of
them are to be regarded as if they were truer than the others
—or better, are to be regarded as truer to what the incarnate
God taught us about Himself. Thus, ultimately, Nicholas is
left in the theologically awkward position of maintaining
28 Introduction

that Deus revelatus in no way resembles Deus absconditus.

We may now be led to wonder about the justifiability of the
word "revelatus." For would it not be more fully consistent
to speak of God as presenting Himself, rather than as revealing
Himself, to us?

IV
Insofar as God is Actualized-possibility, he is distinct from
every other being (for these other beings are such that some
of their possibilities are never actualized). Yet Nicholas also
declares that God is all things and that in God all things are
God.109 By this formula, however, he does not mean that
God is identical with the sum total of objects which consti-
tute the created world. (Indeed, as stated earlier, he manages
to avoid pantheism.)110 As enfolded in God (complicata), all
things are God; but as unfolded in the created world (expli-
cata), these very things are the world.111 For example, God
may be said to be sun. But He is not the sensible sun which
was created by (i.e., unfolded from) Him. He is rather a sun
which is all that it can be. That is, He is a sun so great that
it cannot be greater, so small that it cannot be smaller, so
everywhere that it cannot be elsewhere —in short, a sun which
is "all things, so that it is not able to be anything other than
it is."112 But if God is a sun which is all other things, what
sense does it make to call Him sun? In fact, Nicholas seems
to suggest that it does not matter what we call God as long
as what we call Him is conceived to be all that it can be, i.e.,
insofar as we remove its limitations. Thus God is not sun inso-
far as sun is distinct from moon.113 Rather, He is sun insofar
as sun is not distinct from moon, insofar as it is unqualified
Being itself.
Similarly, if in God all things are God, it is misleading to
continue to refer to them plurally as all things; for in God
there is said to be no composition.114 In God nothing is
thought to remain individuated as itself.115 So when Nicho-
las states that "in the Eternal God any given being is both
God and all things,"116 he means that in God there is only
God—undivided Oneness. And when all created things are
 Introduction 29

said to emanate117 or unfold from God, Nicholas is express-

ing the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.118 Before their crea-
tion, created things exist only in God —but in God only qua
God. Nicholas states explicitly that "God's creative power is
not exhausted in His creation."119 This statement means that
there are possibilities for created things which will never be
realized in created things. Nonetheless, in God these very pos-
sibilities are actualized, since God is the actualization of all
possibility. However, as actualized in God these possibilities
are God; for they are indistinguishable from His omnipotence,
which is indistinguishable from His essence. So Nicholas's
language—presented in the (partly Pseudo-Dionysian) formula
that "in all things He is all things, in nothing He is nothing,
and in Him all things and nothing are Himself" —is radically
misleading. For the way in which, in God, all things are God
makes it almost unintelligible to keep referring to them, in
the plural, as all things; and yet Nicholas retains the plural
reference when he claims that these things exist actually in
God. (To say that they exist actually in God has the sound
of suggesting that they exist as their finite selves in God —
something which Nicholas, in fact, denies.) Moreover, it
seems paradoxical to affirm both that in God all things are
God and, at the same time, that all predicates derived from
human experience are to be denied of God.120 Is it, indeed,
coherent to assert (1) that all possible things are actual in
God, (2) that God is, actually, all possible things, and (3)
that God is no one of these things? Well, these statements
can be made coherent provided 3 is construed as meaning
that God is no one of these things without being all the
others as well, so that no one name or predicate expresses
His nature. (And this, after all, is Nicholas's thesis.) Still, we
are left with the problem posed by the language of plurality.
A final gloss is perhaps required. When Nicholas maintains
that God is the actualization of all possibilities, he means that
God is actually everything which any thing can possibly be.
He does not mean that God is everything which is expressible
by completing the proposition "It is possible that. . . ."
For example, it would not accord with his theory to assert
30 Introduction

that since it is possible that it will rain tomorrow at 3:00 PM.,

God is the possibility that it will rain tomorrow at 3 :00 PM.
Nonetheless, he would assent to the statement that God is a
rain drop, in the sense that He is every thing which a rain drop
is able to be. (This claim corresponds to his claim that God
is sun, moon, etc., in the qualified sense indicated earlier in
this section.)
So, at times, Nicholas's theories seem more paradoxical
than they are, even though at other times they are more
paradoxical than they seem.

V
In terms of the history of science many of Nicholas's views
about the earth and the universe have been thought to be of
special importance. Some of these views, e.g., that there may
well be life on other planets, are easily graspable. Others,
e.g., the view that the universe is privatively infinite, are
more difficult to interpret. Nicholas is one of the first to
maintain that the earth is in motion, though he is not clear
about what kind of motion this is. In De Docta Ignorantia II,
12 he calls it circular—though not perfectly circular—motion.
In the judgment of Koyre "it is neither the daily rotation
[of the earth] around its axis, nor the annual revolution
around the sun, but a kind of loose orbital gyration around
a vaguely determined and constantly shifting center."121 In-
deed, the earth is said to have no center, i.e., no exact center.
For since the earth is not a perfect sphere, there cannot be
found an exact point equidistant from every point on the
circumference. Likewise, the heavens have no fixed poles;
and the sphere of fixed stars moves.122 The universe, or world
—which comprises everything except God—is itself without
a center. Not even the earth is to be regarded as its center,
though it seems to us more central than the other planets.123
It would be an exaggeration to claim, in any serious sense,
that Nicholas's theory about the earth's movement antici-
pates Copernicus's.124 (For Nicholas's view is stated vaguely
and without detail, rather than systematically and fully;
moreover, it is a part of an abstruse metaphysic rather than
 Introduction 31

of an empirical scientific theory.) But it would be an outright

mistake to claim that his view of the infinite universe antici-
pates Bruno's. (For, in last analysis, Nicholas's universe is
finite.) 125 Regarding the universe, Nicholas makes a number
of statements, which, on the surface, appear contradictory:
(1) that the universe is (privatively) infinite;126 (2) that the
universe is neither finite nor infinite; 127 (3) that the infinity
of the universe is limited by finitude.128 These statements
are reconciled in the following way: God is unlimited in the
sense that He is the actualization of all possibility, and the
number of possibilities is infinite.129 This infinity Nicholas
calls negative infinity; and he ascribes it exclusively to God.
Accordingly, God is said to be the enfolding not only of all
things which at some time come to exist in the universe but
also of all not-existing-but-possibly-existing things of the
universe.130 The universe itself cannot be infinite in this
sense, for it is never all that it can be—let alone all that can
possibly be.
When the universe is said to be privatively infinite, or a
limited infinity, or neither finite nor infinite, all these expres-
sions are intended tobe interchangeable. They all indicate that
the universe is not limited in space by anything physically out-
side its dimensions. (Sometimes Nicholas expresses this point
(1) misleadingly, by saying that the universe has no circum-
ference, or (2) "nonsensically," by suggesting that God is the
circumference of the universe.) 1 1 In this sense, something
spatial is deemed to be limited only if it is limited by some
other spatial thing. But the universe is composed of whatever
spatial objects there are. Hence there is not any thing external
to it which fixes its bounds. Accordingly, it is unlimited by
anything else. (This kind of unlimitedness is what Nicholas
has in mind when he calls the universe infinitum privative.)1 2
On the other hand, the universe is not infinite in extent;
and so, it is limited with respect to itself. (This limitedness
is what he has in mind when he calls the universe infinitas
contracta.) In short, the universe is finite but (externally) un-
bounded. In being unbounded it is unlike every other finite
thing, i.e., it is unlike every object within the universe.
32 Introduction

In one respect, then, the universe is a maximum: viz., con-

sidered in itself it cannot be greater than it is. Nicholas's ar-
gument for this conclusion is bizarre:
The universe cannot be greater than it is. This results
from a lack. For possibility or matter does not extend
beyond itself. For to say that the universe is able al-
ways to be actually greater is the same as saying that
possible being passes over into actually infinite being.
But this latter [occurrence] is impossible. For infinite
actuality—which is absolute eternity and which is the
actualized possibility-of-existing of everything—can-
not originate from possibility.133 Therefore, with re-
spect to God's infinite power, which isunlimitable, the
universe is able to be greater; nevertheless, because the
possibility-of-existing or matter, which is not actually
extendable unto infinity, opposes, the universe is not
able to be greater. And so, the universe is unlimited,
since it is not the case that something greater than
the universe—something in relation to which the uni-
verse is limited—is actually positable. And hence the
universe is privatively infinite. 1134
Here Nicholas should not, tout simplement, identify matter
with possibility. For the universe is not merely matter: it is
formed matter. And there is no a priori reason why—where
there is already motion—formed matter cannot extend itself
farther and farther, though never actually extending ad in-
finitum. Nicholas seems to regard planetary motion and the
motion of the sidereal sphere as motion of fixed orbit, even
though it be imperfectly circular motion. Yet whatever em-
pirical reason he might suppose he has for denying that the
universe expands, the a priori reason he presents is, by itself,
insufficient to warrant his inference about a greater greatness
of the universe.135

VI
Nicholas's teaching on universals has long been the sub-
ject of controversy. In De Docta Ignorantia II, 6 he writes:
 Introduction 33

Universals do not exist actually, except in a contracted

manner. Indeed, in this respect the Peripatetics speak
the truth [when they say] that universals have no ac-
tual existence apart from things. For only what is par-
ticular exists actually. In the particular, universals are
— in a contracted manner —the particular. Nevertheless,
in the order of nature universals have a certain universal
being which can be contracted through a particular.
Before their contraction they have actual existence,
in the natural order, only as a contractible universal
which exists not in itself but in that which is actual.
(By comparison, a point, a line, and a surface precede
— in this order of progression —the object in which
they exist only actually.) For because the universe
exists actually only in a contracted way, so all univer-
sals [exist actually only in a contracted way]. Univer-
sals are not merely rational entities, even though they
have no actual existence apart from particulars. By
comparison, even though both a line and a surface do
not exist apart from a material object, they are not
thereby merely rational entities; for they are present
in a material object, just as universals are present in
particulars. Nevertheless, by means of abstracting, the
intellect brings it about that universals exist apart from
things. To be sure, the abstraction is a rational entity,
since absolute being cannot befit universals. For the
altogether absolute universal is God.136
Many interpreters 137 have taken this passage as endorsing
what has been called moderate, or Aristotelian, realism. In
this light, they also tend to construe the following statement
from De Docta Ignorantia III, 1 as advancing the theory that
universals have extramental reality even though they do not
exist separately from particulars: "Non autem subsistunt
genera nisi contracte in speciebus, neque species nisi in in-
dividuis quae solum actu exsistunt": "Genera exist only in
species and only as contracted; and species exist only in in-
dividuals, which alone exist actually." However, Josef Koch
appears to believe that in De Coniecturis Nicholas criticizes
34 Introduction

these realistic tendencies and moves closer to a version of

nominalism.138 Yet Koch does not offer us any details about
this quasi-nominalism. Moreover, inD^ Coniecturis Nicholas
himself does not deal systematically with the question of the
ontological status of universals. In fact, even Koch must re-
sort to an argument from silence: Nicholas, it seems clear to
Koch, here criticizes himself "indem er die game Konzeption
stillschweigend aufgibt": "by silently giving up the whole
conception."139 But, of course, such an appeal to silence does
not really serve to show that Nicholas did indeed abandon
his earlier position.
In the absence of any explicit or implied subsequent re-
nunciation, by Nicholas, of his doctrine in De Docta Ignoran-
tia, we are justified in believing that he is something of an
"Aristotelian realist." Nonetheless, this label will be mislead-
ing if it leads us to overlook such non-Aristotelian statements
as: (1) "God is the altogether absolute universal" 1140 and (2)
"Only the particular exists actually; in it, and qua contracted,
141
universals are the particular." Now, God is the Absolute
Universal in the sense that He is present in all things. We
have already seen that (according to Nicholas) "God is not
in the sun sun and in the moon moon but is that which is
sun and moon without plurality and diversity."142 Accord-
ingly, God is both universal being and universal form. (In
fact, Nicholas calls Him the universal Form-of-being.)143 In
this respect, God's absolute universality differs from the be-
ing of universals. For Nicholas teaches that whereas in the
sun God is not the sun, the universals in any particular are
that particular; for example, in Socrates humanity is Socrates,
and in Plato it is Plato; yet, in itself, humanity is neither
Socrates nor Plato. 144 But humanity does not actually exist
in itself but exists only in Socrates, Plato, and all other hu-
man beings. In another sense, humanity —which is a form —
exists also in God. For God is the Exemplar of human be-
ings, i.e., is human being per se.145 For He is the Form-of-
all-forms, in which every form exists more truly than it does
in matter. 146
 Introduction 35

Finally, Nicholas teaches that the intellect abstracts from

the individuated universal —i.e., from the set of objective
similarities which characterize particulars of the same species
—in order to form a universal concept. These concepts are
then said to resemble the individuated universal; and on the
basis of this resemblance we are said to be able to know par-
ticular objects.1 7 In the intellect universals are the intel-
lect,148 just as in a material object they are that material ob-
ject and in God they are God. As Nicholas puts it:
In a stone all is stone, in a vegetative soul all is vege-
tative soul, in life all is life, in sensibility all is sensi-
bility, in sight all is sight, in hearing all is hearing, in
imagination all is imagination, in reason all is reason,
in understanding all is understanding, in God all is
God.149
So Nicholas does not mean that one cannot distinguish a
universal concept from the intellect in which it is present.
Rather, he means that in the intellect the concept has intel-
lectual being—just as (1) in Socrates humanity has Socratic
being and (2) in God the form of human beings has divine
being. However, in the case of God, whom we conceive to
be without composition: to say that an exemplar has divine
being is tantamount to saying that it is identical with the
divine essence and is "not really" distinguishable therefrom.
By contrast, humanity in Socrates is "really" distinguishable
from Socrates. For Socrates has humanity—without being hu-
manity itself. So when Nicholas says "In Socrates humanity
is Socrates," this is not a straightforward statement of iden-
tity. For it does not commit him to claiming either that
humanity is Socrates or that Socrates is humanity but com-
mits him to claiming only that Socrates is human —i.e., has
humanity. It is important to emphasize that Nicholas does
not say that humanity is Socrates. Rather, he says that in
Socrates humanity is Socrates. But for him to say this is not
for him to say very much. For he seems to regard it as a truism
that whatever is in Socrates is, qua in Socrates, Socrates.
36 Introduction

Nicholas's statements about universals are, on the whole,

distressingly imprecise. He makes no important contribution
to either the articulation or the solution of the philosophical
puzzle. The same sort of imprecision accompanies his discus-
sion of such other topics as the relation between whole and
part. We are told that although the hand is not actually the
eye, in the eye the hand is the eye.150 Nicholas supports this
perplexing claim by reasoning that the eye is immediately in
the man (in homine) and that the whole of the man is in each
of his members.Thus the hand-qua-part-of-the-whole is in the
eye, even though in the eye it is no longer hand-qua-hand.
Ironically, Nicholas thinks of himself as having seen more
clearly than Anaxagoras the depth of the truth that "Every-
thing is everything."151
The doctrine of quodlibet in quolibet is, in fact, closely
associated with the view about the relationship between God
and the universe. According to this view, the universe —as
unfolded from God —is a contracted, or restricted maximum.
That is, it is a "finite maximum" in the sense that it is "priva-
tively infinite." Nicholas now resorts to a comparison: as God
is in the universe, so the universe is in each given thing.15 152

(Moreover, on the basis of the fact that God is the actuality

of all things, the universe is said to be in God; and because
God is in the universe, which is in each given thing, God is
153
said to be in each given thing.)15 The universe is in each indi-
vidual thing because each individual thing is a contraction, or
particularization, of the entire universe.154 "Just as humanity
is neither Socrates nor Plato but in Socrates is Socrates and in
Plato is Plato, so is the universe in relation to all things."155
That is, "although the universe is neither the sun nor the
moon," for example, "nevertheless in the sun it is the sun,
and in the moon it is the moon."156 The doctrine that the
universe —i.e., every existing thing except for God —is in the
sun, and in the sun is the sun, is reminiscent of the doctrine
that the hand is in the eye, and in the eye is the eye. Unfor-
tunately, Nicholas is unsuccessful in rendering either of these
doctrines philosophically intelligible.
De Possest improves upon De Docta Ignorantia by omit-
 Introduction 37

ting such topics as the immediately foregoing. In a sense, De

Possest is a more pedagogical work. For in developing the
single theme that God is Possest, it thereby also unfolds the
other major philosophical themes of De Docta Ignorantia —
without, however, digressing to those philosophical issues
with which De Docta Ignorantia does not deal adequately.
A final clarification is now necessary. Nicholas is some-
times interpreted as teaching that just as each thing in the
universe is a contraction of the universe, so the universe is
the contraction of God. Frederick Copleston, for instance,
tells us that "in phrases which recall to mind the doctrine of
John Scotus Erigena Nicholas explains that the world is a
theophany;a 'contraction'of the divine being."157 Copleston
bases this interpretation upon De Docta Ignorantia II, 4
(116:17-19): "Est enim dens quiditas absoluta mundi seu
universi. Universum vero est ipsa quiditas contracta" — a pas-
sage which he understands to mean "that God is the absolute
essence of the world or universe, and that the universe is that
very essence in a state of 'contraction.' "158 But, in fact, the
expression "absolute essence in a state of contraction" would
be self-contradictory, as Nicholas uses these terms: absolute
essence is never in a state of contraction; and a contracted
essence can neither be, nor become, absolute. When we look
at the entire Latin text of II, 4 we see that "ipsa quiditas"
in the foregoing passage is not a substitute for "absoluta
quiditas"— i.e., Nicholas is not saying "absoluta quiditas
contracta."
In the context of II, 4 a more accurate translation would
be: "For God is the Absolute Quiddity of the world, or
universe. But the universe is contracted quiddity." 159 No-
where does Nicholas teach that the universe is the contrac-
tion of God. Although God is maximum absolutum and the
universe is a maximum contractum, nevertheless maximum
contractum is not maximum absolutum contractum. Simi-
larly, although God is the quidditas absoluta of the world
and although omne actu exsistens in deo est, quia ipse actus
omnium,160 the world is not deus contractus, notcontractio
38 Introduction

del. As we saw earlier, however, Nicholas does sometimes

refer to man as "a human God," just as he also refers to God
as created.161 But in last analysis, even though the universe
is unfolded from God, it is not God unfolded; it is the image
(or appearance) of God, not the contracted essence of God
(even though God is the absolute essence of the universe).
In still other words: the universe is not the contracted being
of God but is the contracted reflection (resplendentia) of
God's being. This distinction is crucial. For the reflection of
God's being is not God's being—whether contractedly or
otherwise. Thus the problem Nicholas is left with is not the
problem of pantheism; rather, it is that of rendering com-
patible the claim that the universe is imago, apparitio, resplen-
dentia dei and the claim that nulla proportio inter infinitum
et finitum cadit. His attempted solution, we have seen, relies
heavily upon the notion of videre aenigmatice et symbolice.

VII
Since every individual thing is to a greater or a lesser degree
a contraction of the universe: the question arises, Is some in-
dividual thing the most perfect contraction of the universe?
Nicholas regards human nature as elevated above all the works
of God and as slightly lower than the angels.1 2 If elevated
into a union with the Absolute Maximum, human nature
will become the fullness-of-perfection for each and every
thing.163 This union of the human and the divine constitutes
the God-man, who is both absolute and contracted, 1164 with-
out being a contraction of the Absolute. Since the God-man,
viz., Christ, is complete fullness: if we possess Him through
faith, we possess all things.165 Thus we are justified not
through ourselves but through faith in Christ. Nicholas con-
joins with his notion of justification by faith a modified
Anselmian theory of atonement, 1166 in accordance with which
the God-man is said to make satisfaction for man's sin.
Since human nature is a microcosm of creation: in any
human being's turning toward God creation itself can be said
to return to God, from whom it emanated. Yet this return is
 Introduction 39

most complete with regard to that human being who is the

perfectio universi. For in Christ the finite and the infinite
come together in the same person, so that in this person God
and the perfection of the universe are one. As Cassirer notes,
this idea has at times "been so little understood that the at-
tempt has been made to sever it from the whole of Cusanus'
philosophy, considering it an arbitrary 'theological' appendix
rooted in a purely dogmatic interest. But excisions of this sort
. . . cannot be made in Cusanus' doctrine without tearing
apart its whole inner constitution, without destroying its
characteristic intellectual structure."1 7
Similarly, the philosophical ramifications of the thesis
that God is Possest cannot be separated from the theological
doctrine of the Trinity. For, according to Nicholas, the Father
is Possibility, the Son is Actuality, and the Holy Spirit is the
Union of both. And just as there cannot be Absolute Possi-
bility without Absolute Actuality, so there is always the
Union of the two. In speaking of God as both trine and one,
however, Nicholas does not mean to imply that He is numeri-
cally one or numerically three:
The First Beginning is triune-prior-to-all-number. And
if you cannot conceive of the fact that it is prior to
number, the reason is that your intellect conceives of
nothing without a number. Nevertheless, your intellect
sees that that-which-it-cannot-conceive cannot be de-
nied beyond conception; and it believes [what it can-
not conceive].Therefore, just as [it believes] that God
is great without a combination of quantities, so [it
believes] that He is three without number or discrete
quantity. And just as it believes that God is great and
ascribes magnitude to Him, so it believes that He is
three and ascribes number to Him.168

In De Li Non Aliud 5 Nicholas speaks of the threeness of God

in still other terms: viz., Unity, Equality, and Union. He even
goes so far as to intimate that these names are "more pre-
cise" than the Scriptural names "Father," "Son," and "Holy
Spirit."169 Still, none of them disclose to us, as He is, the
Unnameable God.
40 Introduction

So in spite of all his interest in mathematics and metaphys-

ics, Nicholas can still consider philosophy to be the hand-
maiden of theology, as the conclusion of De Possest testifies:
Unless by His own light He expels the darkness and re-
veals Himself, He remains completely unknown to all
who seek Him by way of reason and intellect. But He
does not abandon those who seek Him in deepest faith,
surest hope, and the most fervent possible desire—i.e.,
[those who seek Him] by that way which we were
taught by our only master, Christ, the Son of God, the
living way, the sole revealer of His own father (who is
our omnipotent Creator). Therefore, all the statements
we have made aim only at [making] us understand
that our Creator surpasses all understanding. The vision
of His countenance (a vision which alone brings hap-
piness) is promised to us believers by the Son of God,
who is Truth itself—provided that by following Him
we hold to the way which has been disclosed to us by
word and deed.
In the Cusanian scheme, our acquaintance with God comes
not through intellectualizing and philosophizing but through
the revelation of Christ. Nicholas is persuaded that this reve-
lation will occur in the future vision-of-Christ, which is
promised to all believers. But he is equally persuaded that,
in part, it has already occurred in the event of incarnation —
an event recorded in Scripture so that, like the disciples, we
too might behold the viam nobis verbo et facto patefactam.
Now, theology rather than philosophy draws its doctrines
from what it regards as revelation. In the name of theology
Nicholas feels the need to make plausible these doctrines,
e.g., the doctrine of the Trinity, by providing mathematical
and linguistic illustrations. In turn, some of the same illustra-
tions serve to elucidate, philosophically, the relation between
actual being and possible being, motion and rest, time and
eternity, abstract form and form-in-matter. Thus the example
of the top enlightens us not only regarding the statements
of the theologians (to wit, that "God is more movable than
 Introduction 41

any other movable thing," etc.)170 but also regarding the

statements of the cosmologists (e.g., that "the heavens are
moved by a forward motion from east to west and at the
same time by a reverse motion from west to east").171 Simi-
larly, the symbolism of possest instructs us not only about
the all-powerful Beginning (viz., God)172 but also about the
nature of physical motion.173

Conclusion
We now see that Nicholas's distinctive contribution to the
history of western philosophy arises from the inimitable way
in which he blends the theological, ontological, cosmological,
and mathematical —all in the service of devotio Christi. Hav-
ing rejected the disciplined method of the Scholastics, he
gives himself over to the spirit of speculation. His via specu-
lativa is not always a via intelligibilis. But believing, as he
does, that there is no proportion between the finite and the
infinite, he is intent upon maintaining that the nature of In-
finite Being is philosophically unknowable. This position can
best be appreciated, if at all, by contrasting it with Spinoza's
opposing verdict that God is knowable only philosophically.
In breaking away from William of Ockham and the via
moderna generally, Nicholas becomes a forerunner of the
dialectical tendencies in later German philosophy. His pen-
chant for paradoxical expression parallels his insistence up-
on the religious need for mystical vision, in which the prin-
ciple of noncontradiction becomes transcended. Those por-
tions of his philosophy which border upon metaphor often
aim to excite the imagination, so that it may more readily
soar beyond the confines of mere sensory reproduction. To
divorce his philosophy from its religious context is necessarily
to distort it. For to view his emphasis upon the dialectical
independently of his emphasis upon the mystical inevitably
leads to mistaking the former for incoherence and the latter
for Schwarmerei.
If we should not overrate the philosophical importance of
the writings of the man from Cusa, neither should we under-
42 Introduction

rate their creative imaginativeness. Within the tradition of

Christian Neoplatonism these works are no less significant
than were those of Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eri-
gena. The metaphysical use made of the notion of infinity
is rich with suggestiveness. (1) As infinite number is not a
number but is an endless number of numbers, so Infinite Be-
ing is not a being but is the pure being of every being; there-
fore, since it is not differentiated or restricted (contractum)
but is the Sustainer of everything differentiated and re-
stricted, it cannot be described but can only be symbolized.
(2) Infinite Being is the being not only of actual mundane
beings but also of possible, nonactual mundane beings; there-
fore, it is the being of not-being. (3) Infinite Being is, per se,
the actualization of every possibility; therefore, in it being
and not-being coincide. (4) Infinite Being is the transcendent
resolution of all opposites; therefore, it cannot be appre-
hended discursively but can only be encountered mystically.
(5) As an infinite line is present as a whole in every finite line,
so Infinite Being is present in every finite being; therefore, all
beings have the same being, so that one being differs from an-
other only with respect to its degree of determination or con-
traction, rather than absolutely. (6) As infinite number is
collectively every number (of the unending series), so Infi-
nite Being is substantially every being; therefore, every being
is in every other being, since Infinite Being is present in every
finite thing.
Such "metaphysical gyrations," though not really Cusa's,
illustrate the spirit of speculation which is characteristic of
his thought. His overall enterprise gives witness to an endur-
ing aspiration within the Neoplatonic tradition: viz., to take
seriously the notion of infinity. After the waning of this tradi-
tion, thinkers such as Spinoza and Hegel continued to build
their own respective philosophies around reformulations of
this very notion.
In the history of philosophy there are many ironies. One of
them is surely that the epithet "the God-intoxicated philoso-
pher" has come to be applied to Baruch Spinoza rather than
to Nicolaus Cusanus. For the intellectual love of God —an
 Introduction 43

ideal generated, in part, by Spinoza's concept of God as un-

responsive to human prayer—scarcely approximates ecstatic
intoxication. By contrast, desiderium devotissimum, which
motivates Cusanus's daily prayer to deus invisibilis, leads
him to proclaim that "amor Dei cum intelligentia conditus
inebriat mentem": "the love-of-God, made firm by under-
standing, intoxicates the mind."174 On Nicholas's view, amor
Dei ought always to be strengthened by intelligentia. In his
quest of intelligentia Nicholas seldom has recourse to rationes
175
necessariae, as did Anselm of Canterbury. 17 Instead, he
seeks to awaken insight by presenting a series of illustrations
like that of the top in De Possest and that of the bowling
game in De Ludo Globi. He does not mistake these illustra-
tions for compelling arguments. And he expects of his reader
the wisdom to discern between those contexts in which such
arguments are possible and those in which only intuition will
avail.
This page intentionally left blank
ABBRevutions

Apologia Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae

DAWB Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Berlin, Vortrdge itndSchriften. Heft 97:
Nikolaus von Kues. Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
1965.
DI De Docta Ignorantia
DP De Possest
MFCG Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeitrage der
Cusanus-Gesellschaft (ed. Rudolf Haubst)
NA De Li Non Aliud
NC Nicolb da Cusa. Florence: Sansoni, 1962.
NCMM Nicolb Cusano agli inizi del mondo moderno.
Florence: Sansoni, 1970.
SHA W Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie
der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische
Klasse. Heidelberg: Winter.

45
This page intentionally left blank
BlBllOQRAphy

I. Works by Nicholas
A. Major Latin Editions
Strasburg edition of 1488. (New reprinting in two volumes, ed. Paul
Wilpert. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1966, 1967.)
Paris edition of 1514. (New Reprinting in three volumes. Frankfurt:
Minerva GmbH., 1962.)
Heidelberg Academy of Letters edition. Leipzig/Hamburg: Meine
1932-present. (Many of these texts are republished by Meiner
in the series Nikolaus von Kues, Schriften in deutscher Uber-
setzung.)

B. English Translations
The Idiot. Trans, anonymously 1650; preface by W. R. Dennes 1940.
San Francisco: California State Library (Sutro Branch), 1940.
(Occasional papers; Reprint series No. 19; mimeographed.)
Of Learned Ignorance. Trans. Germain Heron with an introduction
by D. J. B. Hawkins. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.
The Single Eye, Entituled the Vision of God. Trans. Giles Randall.
London: Streater, 1646.
The Transalpine Thinkers: Selected Readings from Cusanus to Suarez
(vol. II of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Herman Shapiro and Arturo
B. Fallico). New York: Modern Library, 1969. (Contains a trans-
lation, by the editors, of De Docta Ignorantia I, 1-12.)
Unity and Reform: Selected Writings of Nicholas de Cusa. Ed. John
P. Dolan. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,

47
48 Bibliography
1962. (Contains G. Heron's translation of Book 3 of Learned Ig-
norance, most of E. Sailer's translation of The Vision of God, and
Dolan's translation of De Sapientia, De Pace Fidei, andDeStaticis
Experimentis. Dolan's translations are based upon the Basel edi-
tion of 1565, which, though adding several mathematical treatises,
reproduces the Paris edition.)
The Vision of God. Trans. Emma G. Salter with an introduction by
Evelyn Underbill. New York: Dutton, 1928.

II. Selected Works on Nicholas

Alvarez-Gomez, Mariano. "Die Frage nach Gott bei Nikolaus von
Kues,"AfFCG 5 (1965), 63-85.
. Die verborgene Gegenwart des Unendlichen bei Nikolaus von
Kues (vol. 10 in the series: Epimeleia. Beitrage zur Philosophic,
ed. Helmut Kuhn et al.). Munich: Pustet, 1968.
Bado, Walter. "What is God? An Essay on Learned Ignorance,"Mo-
dern Schoolman, 42 (November 1964), 3-32.
Baeumker, Clemens. "Das pseudo-hermetische 'Buch der vierundzwan-
zig Meister' (Liber XXIV philosophorum). Ein Beitrag zur Ge-
schichte des Neupythagoreismus und Neuplatonismus im Mittel-
alter" in Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie
des Mittelalters, 25 (1928), 194-214. (Includes the Latin text.)
Baur, Ludwig von. Cusanus-Texte. III. Marginalien. 1. Nicolaus Cusa-
nus und Ps. Dionysius im Lichte der Zitate und Randbemerkungen
des Cusanus. SHAW, 1941.
Beierwaltes, Werner. "Cusanus and Proklos. Zum neuplatonischen
Ursprung des non aliud," NCMM, pp. 137-40.
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, ed. Nikolaus von Kues. Munich: Miiller,
1928.
Bett, Henry, Nicholas of Cusa. London: Methuen, 1932.
Biechler, James E. The Religious Language of Nicholas of Cusa. Mis-
soula, Montana: American Academy of Religion and Scholars
Press, 1975.
Billinger, Martin. Das Philosophiscbe in den Excitationen des Nicolaus
von Cues (vol. 32 of Beitrage zur Philosophie). Heidelberg: Win-
ter, 1938.
Blumenberg, Hans. Aspekte der Epochenschwelle: Cusaner und
Nolaner. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976.
Bond, H. Lawrence. "Nicholas of Cusa and the Reconstruction of
Theology: The Centrality of Christology in the Coincidence of
Opposites," pp. 81-94 in George H. Shriver, ed., Contemporary
Reflections on the Medieval Christian Tradition. Essays in Honor
of Ray C. Petry. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1974.
Bonetti, Aldo. La ricerca metafisica nel pensiero di Nicolo Cusano.
Brescia: Paideia, 1973.
Bormann, Karl, "Zur Frage nach der Seinserkenntnis in dem wahr-
scheinlich letzten philosophisch-theologischen Werk des Nikolaus
 Bibliography 49

von Kues, dem 'Compendium,' "Archiv fur GescbichtederPhilos-

ophic, 50(1968), 181-88.
"Die Koordinierung der Erkenntnisstufen (descensus und
ascensus) bei Nikolaus von Kues,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 62-85.
Bredow, Gerda von. "Der spielende Philosoph. Betrachtungen zu
Nikolaus von Kues' 'De possest,' " Vierteljahresscbrift fur wissen-
schaftliche Padagogik (Bochum), 32, (1956), 108-15.
"Gott der Nichtandere. Erwagungen zur Interpretation der
cusanischen Philosophic," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 73 (1965),
15-22,
"Die Bedeutung des Minimum in der Coincidentia Opposito-
rum," JVCMM, pp. 357-66.
Briintrup, Alfons. Kbnnen und Sein. Der Zusammenhang der Spdt-
schriften des Nikolaus von Kues. Munich: Pustet, 1973.
Bufo, Giuseppe. Nicolas de Cues: ou la metaphysique de la finitude.
Paris; Editions Seghers, 1964.
Burgevin, Frederick H. Cribratio Alchorani: Nicholas Cusanus's Criti-
cism of the Koran in the Light of His Philosophy of Religion.New
York: Vantage Press, 1969.
Caramella, Santino, "Unita ideale e coincidenza reale degli oppositi
nel pensiero ni Nicolo da Cusa," NC, pp. 17-28.
"U problema di una logica trascendente neH'ultima fase del
pensiero di Nicola Cusano," NCMM, pp. 367-73.
Cassirer, Ernst. The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philoso-
phy. Trans. Mario Domandi. Oxford: Blackwell, 1963.
Clemens, F. J. Giordano Bruno und Nicolaus von Cusa. Bonn: Witt-
mann, 1847.
Colomer, Eusebio. Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Hull (vol. 2 in
the series; Quetten und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie,
ed. Paul Wilpert). Berlin: de Gruyter, 1961.
"Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Llull. Eine vergleichende
Untersuchung," NC, pp. 125-45. (This article summarizes Colo-
mer's book on the same topic.)
"Die Erkenntnismetaphysik des Nikolaus von Kues im Hin-
blick auf die Moglichkeit der Gotteserkenntnis," MFCG, 11
(1975), 204-23.
Cranz, F. E. "St. Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa in the Tradition of
Western Christian Thought," Speculum, 28 (April 1953), 297-316.
"The Transmutation of Platonism in the Development of
Nicolaus Cusanus and of Martin Luther," NCMM, pp. 73-102.
Dangelmayr, Siegfried. Gotteserkenntnis und Gottesbegriff in den
philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues (vol. 54 in the
series: Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung). Meisen-
heim: Main, 1969.
"Anselm and Cusanus. Prolegomena zu einem Strukturver-
gleich ihres Denkens," Analecta Anselmiana, 3 (1972), 112-40,
50 Bibliography

Danzer, Robert. "Cusanus-Bibliographie,Fortsetzung(1961 bis 1964),

und Nachtrage,"MFCG, 3 (1963), 223-37.
Duclow, Donald F. "Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena, Nicho-
las of Cusa: An Approach to the Hermeneutic of the Divine
Names," International Philosophical Quarterly, 12 (June 1972),
260-78.
"Gregory of Nyssa and Nicholas of Cusa: Infinity, Anthro-
pology, and the Via Negativa,"Downside Review, 92 (April 1974),
102-8.
Duhem, Pierre. "Thierry de Chartres et Nicolas de Cues," Revue des
sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 3 (July 1909), 525-31.
Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci: ceux qu'il a lus et ceux qui
I'ont lu. Vol. 2. Paris, de Nobele, 1955. (See "Nicholas de Cues
et Leonard de Vinci," pp. 99-279.)
Le systeme dumonde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques
de Platan a Copernic. Vol. 10. Paris: Hermann, 1959. (See "Nico-
las de Cues," pp. 247-347.)
Dupre, Wilhelm. 'Von der dreifachen Bedeutung der 'Docta Ignorantia'
bei Nikolaus von Kues," Wissenschaft und Weltbild (September-
December 1962), 264-76.
"Die Ideeeiner neuen Logik bei Nikolaus von Kues,"MFCG,
4(1964), 357-74.
"Nikolaus von Kues und die Idee der christlichen Philoso-
phic," Philosophischesjahrbuch, 73 (1965), 23-32.
"Apriorismus oder Kausaldenken nach der cusanischen Auf-
fassungvon der Gotteserkenntnis,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 168-94.
Falckenberg, Richard. Grundzuge der Philosophic desNicolaus Cusa-
nus mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Lehre vom Erkennen.
Breslau: Koebner 1880 (reprinted Minerva GmbH, 1968).
Feigl, M. "Vom incomprehensibiliter inquirere Gottes im 1. Buch
von De docta ignorantia des Nikolaus von Cues," Divus Thomas,
22 (September 1944), 321-38.
Flasch, Kurt.Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues. Prob-
lemgeschichtliche Stellung und systematische Bedeutung. Leiden:
Brill, 1973.
Frantzki, Ekkehard. Nikolaus von Kues und das Problem der absolu-
ten Subjektivitat (vol. 92 in the series: Monographien zur philo-
sophischen Forschung). Meisenheim: Hain, 1972.
Fuehrer, Mark L. "The Principle ofContractio in Nicholas of Cusa's
Philosophical View of Man," Downside Review, 93 (October
1975), 289-96.
Gabriel, Leo. "II pensiero dialettico in Cusano e in Hegel," Filosofia,
39,537-47.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Nikolaus von Kues im modernen Denken,"
NCMM, pp. 39-48.
 Bibliography 51

Gandillac, Maurice de. La philosophic de Nicolas de Cues. Paris:

Editions Montaigne, 1942. (Reworked by Gandillac and trans-
lated into German by Karl Fleischmann as Nikolaus von Cues.
Studien zu seiner Philosophic und philosophischen Weltanschau-
ung. Diisseldorf: Schwann, 1953.)
Gawlick, Giinter, "Zur Nachwirkung Cusanischer Ideen im siebzehn-
ten und achtzehnten Jahrhundert,"NCMM, pp. 225-39.
Giacon, Carlo, "II 'De ignota Litteratura' di Giovanni Wenck," NC,
pp.63-74.
"II 'possest' del Cusano e le dottrine aristotelico-tomistiche
dell'atto e potenza e dell'essenza ed esistenza,"NCMAl, pp. 375-
84.
Goldammer, Kurt. "Nicolausvon Cues und die Uberwindung des geo-
zentrischenWeltbildes,"pp. 25^1 inAlte Probleme-Neue Ansdtze.
Drei Vortrage von Fritz Krafft, Kurt Goldammer, Annemarie
Wettley. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1965.
Grass, Nikolaus, ed. Cusanus Gedachtnisschrift (im Auftrag der
Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultat der Universitat
Innsbruck). Innsbruck: Universitatsverlag. 1970.
Grell, Heinrich. "Mathematischer Symbolismus und Unendlichkeits-
denken bei Nikolaus von Kues," DAWB pp. 32-41.
Hagemann, Ludwig. Der Kur'an in Verstdndnis und Kritik bei Niko-
laus von Kues. Bin Beitrag zur Erhellung islamisch-christlicher
Geschichte. Frankfurt: Knecht, 1976.
Harries, Karsten, "Cusanus and the Platonic Idea," New Scholasti-
cism, 37 (April 1963), 188-203.
"The Infinite Sphere. Comments on the History of a Meta-
phor," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13 (January 1975),
5-15.
Hasse, Karl P. Nikolaus von Kues (vol. II in the series: Die Religion
der Klassiker, ed. Gustav Pfannrmiller). Berlin: Protestantischer
Schriftenvertrieb, 1913.
Haubst, Rudolf. Das Bild des Einen undDreieinen Gottes in der Welt
nach Nikolaus von Kues (vol. 4 in the series; Trierer tbeologische
Studien. Trier: Paulinus, 1952.
Die Christologie des Nikolaus von Kues. Freiburg: Herder,
1956.
"Nikolaus von Kues als theologischer Denker," Trierer
theologische Zeitschrift, 68 (1959), 129-45.
"Nikolaus v. Kues," Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche, 7
(1962), 988-91.
"Nikolaus von Kues und die Analogia Ends," pp. 686-95
in Paul Wilpert, ed. Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung
und ihre Bedeutung (Vortrage des II. Internationalen Kongresses
fur mittelalterliche Philosophic, Koln, 31. August-6. September
1961) Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963.
52 Bibliography

"Die leitenden Gedanken und Motive der cusanischen The-

ologie," AJFCG, 4 (1964), 257-77.
Vom Sinn der Menschwerdung: "Cur Deus homo. "Munich:
Hueber, 1969.
"Theologie in der Philosophic — Philosophic in der Theologie
des Nikolaus von Kues,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 233-60.
" 'Am Nichtteilnehmbaren teilhaben'. Zu einem Leitsatz
der cusanischen 'Einheitsmetaphysik' und Geistphilosophie," pp.
12-22 in Norbert Fischer et al., eds., Alte Fragen und neue Wege
des Denkens (Festschrift fur Josef Stallmach). Bonn: Bouvier,
1977.
ed. Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeitrage der Cusanus-
Gesellschaft. Mainz: Matthias-Griinewald. Vol. 1 (1961, 1st ed.;
1968, 2nd ed.); Vol 2 (1962); Vol. 3 (1963); Vol.4 (1964); Vol.
5 (1965); Vol. 6 (1967); Vol. 7 (1969); Vol. 8 (1970); Vol. 9
(1971); Vol. 10(1973); Vol. 11 (1975).
Hay, W. H. "Nicolaus Cusanus: The Structure of His Philosophy,"
Philosophical Review, 61 (January 1952), 14-25.
Heinz-Mohr, Gerd. Das Werk des Nicolaus Cusanus. Eine bibliophile
Einfiihrung. Cologne: Wienand, 1963.
Herold, Norbert.Menschliche Perspektive und Wahrheit. ZurDeutung
der Subjektivitdt in den philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus
von Kues. Munster: Aschendorff, 1975.
Hirschberger, Johannes. "Das Platon-Bild bei Nikolaus von Kues,"
NCAfM.pp. 113-35.
"Das Prinzip der Inkommensurabilitat bei Nikolaus von
Kues,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 39-54.
Hoffman, Ernst. Cusanus-Studien. I. Das Universum des Nikolaus
von Cues. SHAW, 1930.
"Nikolaus von Cues als Philosoph," introduction to the Ger-
man translation of Idiota de Sapientia by E. Bohnenstadt. Ham-
burg: Meiner, 1936.
Nikolaus von Cues. Zwei Vortrage. Heidelberg: Kerle, 1947.
Hoffmann, Ernst, and Raymond Klibansky, eds. Cusanus-Texte. I.
Predigten. 1. "Dies Sanctificatus" vom Jahre 1439. SHAW, 1929.
Hoffmann, Fritz. "Nominalistische Vorlaufer fur die Erkenntnis-
problematik bei Nikolaus von Kues,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 125-59.
Hofmann, Joseph E. Die Quellen der Cusanischen Matkematik I:
Ramon Lulls Kreisquadratur. SHAW. 1942.
"Mutmassungen u'ber das friiheste mathematische Wissen
des Nikolaus von Kues," MFCG, 5 (1965), 98-133.
"Sinnund Bedeutung der wichtigstenmathematischen Schrif-
ten des Nikolaus von Kues," NCMM, pp. 385-98.
Hommes, Jakob.DzV philosophische Gotteslehre des Nikolaus Kusanus
 Bibliography 53

in ihren Grundlehren. Munich: Philosophische Fakultat (Univer-

sity of Munich), 1926.
Honecker, Martin. Nikolaus von Cues und die griechische Spracbe.
SHAW, 1938.
Der Name des Nikolaus von Cues in zeitgenossischer Ety-
mologie. SHAW, 1940.
Hummel, Charles. Nicolaus Cusanus. Das Individualitdtsprinzip in
seiner Philosophie. Bern: Haupt, n. d.
Jacobi, Klaus. Die Methode der cusanischen Philosophie. Munich:
Alber, 1969.
Jansen, Bernhard."ZumNicolaus-Cusanus-Problem.Einmethodischer
Versuch," pp. 267-87 in Abhandlungen uber die Geschichte der
Philosophie (vol. 1 of Philosophia Perennis. Abhandlungen zu
ihrer Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, ed. F. J. von Rintelen).
Regensburg: Habbel, 1930.
Jaspers, Karl. Nikolaus Cusanus. Munich: Piper, 1964.
Kanitz-Huber, Elsi. Die Coincidentia Oppositorum als Grenzbegriff.
Biberach: Biberacher Verlagsdruckerei Dr. Hutter, 1954.
Klaus, Georg. "Das Prinzip der coincidentia oppositorum und der
logische und dialektische Widerspruch/'D^lVVB, pp. 23-31.
Kleinen, Hans, and Robert Danzer. "Cusanus-Bibliographie (1920-
1961),"MFCG, 1 (1968, 2nd ed.), 95-126.
Klibansky, Raymond. "Copernic et Nicolas de Cues," pp. 225-35 in
Leonard de Vinci et I'experience scientifique au seizieme siecle.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953.
Koch, Josef. Die Ars coniecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues (Heft 16
of Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-
Westfalen). Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956.
"Augustinischer und dionysischer Neuplatonismus und
dasMittelalter,"/Cawf-SfM^w,48 (1956-57), 117-33.
"Zur Analogielehre Meister Eckharts," pp. 327-350 in
Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson. Toronto: Pontifical Institute
of Mediaeval Studies, 1959.
"Der Sinn des zweiten Hauptwerkes des Nikolaus von Kues
de coniecturis,"NC, pp. 101-23.
"Nicholas of Cusa," pp. 449-52 in New Catholic Encyclo-
pedia. Vol. 10. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
ed. Cusanus-Texte. Predigten. 2./5. Vier Predigten im Geiste
Eckharts. SHAW, 1937.
Koyre, Alexandre. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe.
New York: Harper and Row Torchbooks, 1958.
Lai, Tyrone. "Nicholas of Cusa and the Finite Universe, "Journal of
the History of Philosophy, 11 (April 1973), 161-67.
Lenz, Joseph. Die docta ignorantia oder die mystische Gotteserkennt-
54 Bibliography

nis des Nikolaus Cusanus in ihren philosophischen Grundlagen

(Heft 3 of Abhandlungen zur Philosophic und Psychologic der
Religion, ed. Georg Wunderle). Wiirzburg: Becker, 1923.
Lewicki, Joannes B. De Cardinalis Nicolai Cusani Pantheismo.
Miinster: Theissing, 1873.
Liaci, Maria T. "Accent! spinoziani nel 'De dato patris luminum' del
Cusano?"IVC, pp. 217-42.
Liddell, Anna F. "The Significance of the Doctrine of the Incarna-
tion in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa," pp. 126-31 in Actes
du Xleme congres international de philosophic. Vol. 11. Amster-
dam-. North Holland Publishing, 1953.
Lotz, J. B. "Das Sein bei Thomas von Aquin im Hinblick auf die
'coincidentia oppositorum' des Nikolaus von Kues," pp. 3-11 in
Alte Fragen und neue Wege des Denkens (Festschrift fur Josef
Stallmach). Bonn: Bouvier, 1977.
Lu'bke, Anton. Nikolaus von Kues. Kirchenfurst zwischen Mittelalter
und Neuzeit. Munich: Callwey, 1968.
McTighe, Thomas P. "The Meaning of the Couple, Complicatio-
Explicatio in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa," Proceedings
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 32 (1958),
206-14.
"Nicholas of Cusa as a Forerunner of Modern Science," pp.
619-22 in Actes du dixieme congres international d'histoire des
sciences. Vol. I. Paris: Hermann, 1964.
"Nicholas of Cusa and Leibniz's Principle of Indiscerni-
bility,"Modem Schoolman, 42 (November 1964), 33-46.
-—. "Nicholas of Cusa's Theory of Science and Its Metaphysical
Background," NCMM, pp. 317-38.
Mahnke, Dietrich. Unendliche Sphare und Allmittelpunkt. Beitrage
zur Genealogie der mathematischen Mystik (vol. 23 in the series:
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistes-
geschichte). Halle: Niemeyer, 1937.
Martin, Vincent, "The Dialectical Process in the Philosophy of Nicho-
las of Cusa," Laval theologique et philosophique, 5 (1949), 213-
68.
Martinez Gomez, Luis. "From the Names of God to the Name of God:
Nicholas of Cusa," International Philosophical Quarterly, 5 (Feb-
ruary 1965), 80-102.
Marx, J. compiler. Verzeichnis der Handschriften-Sammlung des
Hospitals zu Cues bei Bemkastel a./Mosel. Trier, 1905 (reprinted
Frankfurt: Minerva GmbH, 1966).
Maurer, Armand A. "Nicholas of Cusa," pp. 496-98 in Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. Vol. 5. New York: Macmillanand Free Press, 1967.
Mennicken, Peter. Nikolaus von Kues (Miteiner Abhandlungvon Else
Hocks). Trier, Cusanus-Verlag, 1950.
 Bibliography 55

Metzke, Erwin. "Nicolaus von Cues und Hegel. Ein Beitragzum Prob-
lem derphilosophischenTheologie,"Kaw£-S£wcfew, 48 (1956-57),
216-34.
Meurers, Joseph. "Nikolaus von Kues und die Entwicklung des as-
tronomischen Weltbildes,"A4FCG, 4 (1964), 395-419.
Meuthen, Erich. Nikolaus von Kues, 1401-1464: Skizze einer Bio-
graphic. 2nd ed. Munster: Aschendorff, 1967.
Oedinger, K. "Idiota de sapientia. Platonisches und anti-platonisches
Denken bei Nikolaus von Cues," Tijdschrift voor Philosophic, 17
(1955), 690-98.
Peters, Johannes, "Grenze und Uberstieg in der Philosophic des Niko-
laus von Cues," Symposion. Jahrbuch fur Philosophic, 4 (1955),
91-215.
Platzeck, Erhard-W. "Randbemerkungen zur via antiqua und via
moderna im Spatmittelalter," MFCG, 6 (1967), 35-50.
Poppel, Karl G. Die Docta Ignorantia des Nikolaus Cusanus als Bild-
ungsprinzip. Eine padagogische Untersuchung iiber den Begriff
des Wissens und Nichtwissens (Heft 6 of Grundfragen der Pada-
gogik.) Freiburg, Lambertus, 1956.
Ranft, Joseph. Schopfer und Geschopf nach Kardinal Nikolaus von
Cusa. Ein Beitrag zur Wurdigung des Kardinals alsMystiker. Wiirz-
burg: St. Rita, 1924.
Reding, Marcel. Die Aktualitat des Nikolaus Cusanus in seinen Grund-
gedanken. Berlin: Morus-Verlag, 1964.
Rice, Eugene F. "Nicholas of Cusa's Idea of Wisdom," Traditio, 13
(1957), 345-68.
Ritter, Joachim. Docta Ignorantia: die Theorie des Nichtwissens bei
Nicolaus Cusanus. Leipzig: Tuebner, 1927.
"Die Stellung des Nicolaus von Cues in der Philosophie-
geschichte. Grundsatzliche Probleme der neueren Cusanus-Forsch-
ung," Blatter fur Deutsche Philosophic, 13 (1939), 111-55.
Rogner, Hildegund. Die Bewegung des Erkennens und das Sein in der
Philosophic des Nik'olaus von Cues. Heidelberg: Winter, 1937.
Rompe, Robert, and Hans-Jiirgen Treder. "Nikolaus von Kues als
Naturforscher,"D^4WB, pp. 15-22.
Rotta, Paolo. Nicolb Cusano. Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1942.
Santinello, Giovanni. // pensiero di Nicolb Cusano nella sua prospet-
tiva estetica. Padova: Liviana, 1958.
Schanz, Paul. Der Cardinal Nicolaus von Cusa als Mathematiker.
Wiesbaden: Sandig oHG., 1967 (reprint of 1872 edition).
Schmitt, Paul. "Das Urbild in der Philosophic des Nicolaus de Cusa,"
Eranos-Jahrbuch (Zurich), 18 (1950), 291-321.
Schnarr, Hermann. Mo di essendi. Interpretationen zu den Schriften
De docta ignorantia, De coniecturis, und De venatione sapientiae
von Nikolaus von Kues. Munster: Aschendorff, 1973.
56 Bibliography

Schneider, Gerhard. Gott—das Nichtandere. Untersuchungen zum

metaphysischen Grunde bei Nikolaus von Kues. Miinster: Aschen-
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Schultz, Rudolf. Die Staatsphilosophie des Nikolaus von Kues. Meisen-
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Seidlmayer, Michael. "Nikolaus von Cues und der Humanismus,"pp.
75-106 in his Wege und Wandlungen des Humanismus. Studien
zu seinenpolitischen, ethischen, religiosen Problemen. Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1965.
" 'Una religio in rituum varietate.' Zur Religionsauffassung
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des Humanismus. Studien zu seinen politischen, ethischen, reli-
giosen Problemen. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1965.
Senger, Hans G. "Zur Frage nach einer philosophischen Ethik des
Nikolaus von Kues," Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 33 (1970), 5-
25,110-22.
Die Philosophic des Nikolaus von Kues vor dem Jahr 1440.
Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung einer Philosophic in der Friih-
zeit des Nikolaus (1430-1440). Munster: Aschendorff, 1971.
Sigmund, Paul E. Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.
Stallmach, Josef. "Das 'Nichtandere' als Begriff des Absoluten. Zur
Auswertung der mystischen Theologie des Pseudo-Dionysius
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Zusammenfall der Gegensatze. Das Prinzip der Dialektik bei
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"Sein und das Konnen-selbst bei Nicolaus von Cues," pp.
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Zellinger, Eduard. Cusanus-Kondordanz. Munich: Hueber, 1960.
Zimmermann, Robert. "Der Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus als Vorlaufer
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on actualized -possibility

tRiAloqus 6e possest
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 pRAenotan6A

1. Where, for clarification, words from the Latin text are in-
serted into the translation, the following rule is employed:
When the Latin term is noted exactly as it appears in the
Latin text, parentheses are used; when the case endings of
nouns are transformed to the nominative, brackets are
used.
2. The numbering of the Psalms accords with the Douay Ver-
sion and, in parentheses, with the King James Version.
3. Quotation marks are employed when Nicholas mentions
a word rather than uses it. On occasion, however, he both
mentions and uses a word in the same sentence. In such
cases the word is italicized in the translation. (E.g., 65:3-4:
"Therefore, being which is Being itself names for us the
Form of forms.") N.B. In some passages italics are used
solely for emphasis.
4. At De Possest 18 the diagram in the Latin text is found
in the margin of Codex Cusanus 219. The corresponding
diagram in the English text is taken from p. 109 of the
notes which accompany Elisabeth Bohnenstaedt's Ger-
man translation (Vom Kbnnen-Sein. Vom Gipfel der
Betrachtung, published by Felix Meiner Verlag, 1947)
and is reproduced with the permission of the publisher.
5. The occasional appearance of brackets in the Latin text
indicates words or syllables which Renate Steiger believes
should be deleted, though they occur in Codex Cusanus
219.
6. The paragraph and sentence beginnings of the English
translation do not always coincide with those in the
printed Latin text. But a comparison of the printed Latin
text with Codex Cusanus 219 will show that these begin-
ning points are discretionary.
7. When words such as "beginning," "being," "truth," "ab-
solute," "wisdom," "form," etc., refer to God, they are
capitalized.
8. The numbers in the left-hand margins of the Latin text of
De Possest correspond to the folio numbers of De Possest
in the Paris edition of the Opera Omnia. The numbers in
the right-hand margins of the Latin text were assigned by
Renate Steiger to indicate section and line.

61
 tmaloqus 6e possest 1

Ed.
Paris. 1
fol.
174«
BERNARDUS: Cum nobis concedatur colloquendi cardina-
lem dudum optata facultas nee sibi sit onerosum conceptum
diu pensatum propalare, velis, peto, mi abba Johannes, ali-
qua ex tuis studiis ipsum excitandi gratia proponere. Provo-
catus indubie grata nobis reserabit.

JOHANNES: Audivit iam ante me saepissime. Si quid move-

ris tu, ipse scilicet citius occurret, cum te placido vultu
respiciat et diligat. Nee deero, si sic iudicabis. Accedamus
igitur propius ad ignem. Ecce ipsum in sella tuis desideriis 10
placere paratum.

CARDINALIS: Accedite. Frigus solito intensius nos artat et

excusat, si igni consederimus.

BERN: Cum tempus sic urgeat, proni sumus tuis iussis

parere.
CARD: Aliqua inter vos versatur forte dubitatio, cum sitis
solliciti. Facite me studiorum vestrorum participem.
IOH: Dubia utique habemus, quae tu speramus dissolves.
Si placet, Bernardus movebit.
CARD: Placet. 20
BERN: Incidi in stadium epistulae Pauli apostoli ad Roma-2
nos et legi, quomodo deus manifestat hominibus ea, quae
eis de ipso nota sunt. Ait autem hoc fieri hoc modo: »Invi-
sibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt
intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque eius virtus et
divinitas.« Istius modi elucidationem a te audire exposcimus.

CARD: Quis melius sensum Pauli quam Paulus exprime-

ret? Invisibilia alibi ait aeterna esse. Temporalia imagines

62
1 on actualized-possibility

BERNARD: The long-desired opportunity to converse with

the Cardinal has been granted us; and it is not troublesome to
him to divulge a long-pondered concept. So I ask you, Abbot
John, if you would, to set forth some [points] from your
studies, in order to motivate a response from him. Once he is
stimulated, surely he will disclose to us gratifying [teachings].
JOHN: He has listened to me very often already. If you
start the discussion, he will undoubtedly respond more quick-
ly, since he looks upon you favorably and esteems you highly.
I will remain present if you consent. So let us draw nearer to
the fire. Here is the Cardinal, seated and ready to accommo-
date your wishes.
CARDINAL: Come near. The cold, which is more severe than
usual, presses us close together and excuses us if we sit to-
gether around the fire.
BERNARD: Since the season thus presses us, we are readily
disposed to comply with your request.
CARDINAL: Perhaps some uncertainty is troubling you both,
for you are agitated. Let me share in your pursuits.
JOHN: Yes, we have doubts which we hope you will clear
up. If it is all right, Bernard will commence.
CARDINAL: Fine.
2 BERNARD:2 I happened to be studying the epistle of the
Apostle Paul to the Romans, and I read that God manifests
to human beings the things which they know about Him.
But the Apostle states that this [revelation] occurs in the
following manner: "The invisible things of Him, including
His eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the
creation of the world, by means of understanding created
things." We ask to hear from you an elucidation of this
mode [of revelation] .
CARDINAL: Who can express Paul's meaning better than
Paul? Elsewhere he says that the invisible things are eternal.

63
64 Trialogus de possest

sunt aeternorum. Ideo si ea quae facta sunt intelliguntur,

invisibilia dei conspiciuntur, uti sunt sempiternitas, virtus 10
eius et divinitas. Ita a creatura mundi fit dei manifestatio.

BERN: Miramur abbas et ego quod invisibilia conspiciun-

tur.
CARD: Conspiciuntur invisibiliter, sicut intellectus invisi-
bilem veritatem, quae latet sub littera, quando intelligit
quae legit invisibiliter videt. Dico invisibiliter hoc est men-
taliter, cum aliter invisibilis veritas, quae est obiectum in-
tellectus, videri nequeat.

BERN: Quomodo autem a visibili creatura mundi elicitur 3

haec visio?
CARD: Id, quod video sensibiliter, scio ex se non esse.
Sicut enim sensus nihil a se discernit, sed habet discretio-
nem a superior! virtute, sic et sensibile a se non est, sed est
ab altiore virtute. Ideo apostolus dicebat »a creatura mun-
di«, ut a visibili mundo tamquam creatura ad creator em
elevemur. Quando igitur videndo sensibile intelligo ipsum
a quadam altiori virtute esse, cum sit finitum, quod a se
esse nequit — quomodo enim finitum sibi ipsi terminum 10
posuisset? —, tune virtutem, a qua est, non possum nisi in-
visibilem et aeternam conspicere. Virtus enim creativa non
potest intelligi nisi aeterna. Nam quomodo esset ab alia
virtute, nisi foret creata? Sempiterna igitur est virtus, per
quam mundi exstat creatura, ideo invisibilis. »Quae enim
videntur, temporalia sunt.« Et haec est ipsa omni creaturae
invisibilis divinitas.

BERN: Forte hoc sic est ut clare ostendis. Videtur tamen 4

Paulum parum per hoc aperire de dei desideratissima notitia.

CARD: Immo non pauca sed maxima. Dixit enim: »Invisi-

bilia« ipsius dei »a creatura mundi intellecta conspiciuntur«,
 On Actualized-possibility 65

Temporal things are images of eternal things. Thus, if created

things are understood, the invisible things of God are seen
clearly—for example, His eternity, power, and divinity. Hence
the manifestation of God occurs from the creation of the
world.
BERNARD: The Abbot and I find it strange that invisible
things are seen.
CARDINAL: They are seen invisibly—just as when the intel-
lect understands what it reads, it invisibly sees the invisible
truth which is hidden behind the writing. I say "invisibly"
(i.e., "mentally") because the invisible truth, which is the
object of the intellect, cannot be seen in any other way.
3 BERNARD: But how is this seeing elicited from the visible
mundane creation?
CARDINAL:! know that what I see perceptibly does not
exist from itself. For just as the sense [of sight] does not
discriminate anything by itself but owes its discriminating
to a higher power, so too what is perceptible does not exist
from itself but exists from a higher power. The Apostle said
"from the creation of the world" because from the visible
world as creature we are elevated to the Creator. Therefore,
when in seeing what is perceptible I understand that it exists
from a higher power (since it is finite, and a finite thing can-
not exist from itself; for how could what is finite have set
its own limit?), then I can only regard as invisible and eter-
nal this Power from which it exists. For the Creative Power
can be understood only as eternal. For unless it were created,
how would it exist from another power? Accordingly, the
Power through which the mundane creation exists is eternal
— and hence invisible, for "the things which are seen are tem-
poral."5 And this Power is the invisible Divinity of all crea-
tion.
4 BERNARD: Perhaps [Paul's meaning] is such as you clearly
indicate it to be. Nevertheless, through this [passage] Paul
seems to disclose very little about the most coveted knowl-
edge of God.
CARDINAL: On the contrary. [He discloses] very many
things, not just a few. For he said: "The invisible things of
God are clearly seen from understanding the mundane crea-
 66 Trialogus de possest

noil quod invisibilia dei sint quid aliud quam deus invisi-
bilis, sed quia plura in creatura mundi sunt visibilia, quorum
quodlibet sua adaequata ratione id est quod est, ideo de
qualibet visibili creatura docet ad cuiuslibet invisibile prin-
cipium ascendendum.

BERN: Intelligimus competenter ista, quomodo a creatu- 10

175r ris in citamur, ut earum rationes aeternas in principio con-
spiciamus. Hoc potuisset sic clare per apostolum dici, si
aliud non intendebat. Quod si aliquid dicere proposuit fe-
cundius deum apprehendere gliscenti rogamus aperiri.

CARD: Arbitror quod multa valde etiam altissima et mihi 5

abscondita. Sed quae nunc conicio haec sunt: Docere nos
voluit apostolus, quomodo in deo ilia invisibiliter apprehen-
dere poterimus, quae in creatura videmus. Omnis enim
creatura actu exsistens utique esse potest. Quod enim esse
non potest, non est. Unde non-esse non est creatura. Si enim
est creatura, utique est. Creare etiam cum sit ex non-esse
ad esse producere, utique clare ostendit ipsum non-esse
nequaquam creaturam. Neque hoc parvum est apprehen-
disse. 10

Dico autem consequenter: Cum omne exsistens possit 6

esse id quod est actu, hinc actualitatem conspicimus abso-
lutam, per quam quae actu sunt id sunt quod sunt. Sicut
cum alba videmus visibili oculo, albedinem intellectualiter
intuemur, sine qua album non est album. Cum igitur actua-
litas sit actu, utique et ipsa potest esse, cum impossibile
esse non sit. Nee potest ipsa absoluta possibilitas aliud esse
a posse, sicut nee absoluta actualitas aliud ab actu. Nee pot-
est ipsa iam dicta possibilitas prior esse actualitate quem-
admodum dicimus aliquam potentiam praecedere actum. 10
Nam quomodo prodisset in actum nisi per actualitatem?Posse
 On Actualized-possibility 67

tion." [He did] not [mean this in the sense] that the invisible
things of God are something other than the invisible God.
Rather, [he said it] because in the mundane creation many
things are visible; and any one of them, by virtue of the form
[ratio] to which it corresponds, is what it is. And so, Paul
teaches that we must mount up from any given visible crea-
ture to its invisible Beginning.6
BERNARD: We duly understand all this—viz., how we are
aroused by created things so that we may behold their eter-
nal forms in their Beginning. This point could have been
stated just this clearly by the Apostle if he meant nothing
else. But if he intended to say something more fully to one
ardent with the desire to apprehend God, we ask that it be
disclosed.
5 CARDINAL:! think that very many [of these] things are
also very deep and lie hidden from me. But what I now be-
lieve is the following: The Apostle wanted to teach us how
we can invisibly apprehend in God those things which we see
in the creation. Assuredly, every actually existing created
thing is able to exist; for what is not able to exist does not
exist. So then, not-being is not a created thing; for if it were
a created thing, assuredly it would exist.7 Moreover, since
to create is to bring forth from not-being to being, assuredly
[the Apostle] indicates clearly that not-being is in no respect
a created thing. And to have apprehended this point is no
small matter.
6 But I add consistently: From the fact that every existing
thing is able to be that which it actually is,8 we perceive ab-
solute actuality, through which the things that actually exist
are what they are. (By comparison, when with the visible eye
we see white things, we intellectually behold whiteness, with-
out which a white thing would not be white.) Therefore,
since actuality actually exists: assuredly it is also able to exist,
because what is impossible to exist does not exist. Now, ab-
solute possibility is not able to be anything other than possi-
bility, even as absolute actuality [is] not [able to be] any-
thing other than actuality.9 This possibility which was just
now mentioned [viz., absolute possibility] is not able to exist
prior to actuality—unlike the case where we say that some
particular possibility precedes it actualization. For how
would [absolute possibility] have become actual except
68 Trialogus de possest

enim fieri si se ipsum ad actum produceret, esset actu ante-

quam actu esset. Possibilitas ergo absoluta, de qua loquimur,
per quam ea quae actu sunt actu esse possunt, non praece-
dit actualitatem neque etiam sequitur. Quomodo enim ac-
tualitas esse posset possibilitate non exsistente? Coaeterna
ergo sunt absoluta potentia et actus et utriusque nexus. Ne-
que plura sunt aeterna, sed sic sunt aeterna quod ipsa
aeternitas. Videnturne vobis haec sic aut aliter se habere?

BERN: Utique mens dissentire nequit. 20

IOH: Quasi dum solem intueor, negare nequeo ipsum
superlucidum; sic ista tuo ductu clarissima intueor. Exspecto
autem quod more tuo magna ex his inferas.

CARD: Satis mihi est, si vestro iudicio non aberro. Per- 7

gam ergo hac via ad quae festino. Nominabo autem hanc
quam sic videmus aeternitatem deum gloriosum. Et dico
nunc nobis constare deum ante actualitatem, quae distingui-
tur a potentia, et ante possibilitatem, quae distinguitur ab
actu, esse ipsum simplex mundi principium. Omnia autem
quae post ipsum sunt cum distinctione potentiae et actus,
ita ut solus deus id sit quod esse potest, nequaquam autem
quaecumque creatura, cum potentia et actus non sint idem
nisi in principio. 10

BERN: Siste, pater, parumper et dubium declara. Quo- 8

modo dicis deum id esse quod esse potest? Videtur enim

hoc de sole et luna et terra et alio quolibet pariformiter dici
posse.

CARD: Loquor in absolutis et generalissimis terminis, quasi

dicerem: Cum potentia et actus sint idem in deo, tune deus
omne id est actu, de quo posse esse potest verificari. Nihil
enim esse potest, quod deus actu non sit. Hoc facile videt
quisque attendens absolutam potentiam coincidere cum
 On Actualized-possibility 69

through actuality? If the possibility-of-being-made10 made

itself actually exist, it would actually exist before it actually
existed. Therefore, absolute possibility, about which we are
speaking and through which those things that actually exist
are able actually to exist, does not precede actuality. Nor
does it succeed actuality; for how would actuality be able to
exist if possibility did not exist? Therefore, absolute possi-
bility, actuality, and the union of the two are coeternal. They
are not more than one eternal thing; rather, they are eternal
in such way that they are Eternity itself.11
Do these matters seem to the two of you to be thus or to
be otherwise?
BERNARD: Surely, no rational being can disagree [with
these points] .
JOHN: Just as while I am gazing at the sun I cannot deny
that it is radiant, so by your guidance I see these [points]
very clearly. But I am expecting you, in your own way, to
derive important conclusions from them.
7 CARDINAL:! will be satisfied if I do not veer from your
judgment. So I will continue along this route toward the
conclusions to which I am hastening.
Now, I will call this Eternity which we thus see the glori-
ous God. And I say that it is now evident to us that God is
the simple Beginning of the world; He exists before actuality
that is distinct from possibility and before possibility that is
distinct from actuality. But all things that exist after Him
exist with their possibility and their actuality distinct. And
hence God alone is what (He) is able to be;12 but no creature
whatsoever [is what (it) is able to be], since possibility and
actuality are identical only in the Beginning.
8 BERNARD: Stop for a moment, Father, and clarify a doubt-
ful point. In what sense do you mean that God is what (He)
is able to be? For it seems that this can be said in like manner
about the sun, the moon, the earth, and any other thing.113
CARDINAL:! am speaking in absolute and very general
terms —as if I were saying: "Since possibility and actuality
are identical in God, God is —actually —everything of which
'is able to be' can be predicated truly." For anything-which-
God-is-not-actually is not able to be. (This point is easily
recognized by anyone who takes account of the fact that
 70 Trialogus de possest

actu. Secus de sole. Nam licet sol sit actu id quod est, non 10
tamen id quod esse potest. Aliter enim esse potest quam
actu sit.

BERN: Prosequere, pater. Nam certum est nullam creatu-

ram esse actu omne id quod esse potest, cum dei potentia
creativa non sit evacuata in ipsius creatione, quin possit de
lapide suscitare hominem et adicere seu diminuere cuius-
que quantitatem et generaliter omnem creaturam in aliam
et aliam vertere.

CARD: Recte dicis. Cum igitur haec sic se habeant, quod

deus sit absoluta potentia et actus atque utriusque nexus 20
et ideo sit actu omne possibile esse, patet ipsum complicite
esse omnia. Omnia enim, quae quocumque modo sunt aut
esse possunt, in ipso principio complicantur, et quaecumque
creata sunt aut creabuntur, explicantur ab ipso, in quo
complicite sunt.
IOH: Quamvis haec a te pluries audiverim, numquam 9
tamen nisi magna visa sunt et mihi difficillima. Ideo ne
pigriteris respondere: An velis dicere creaturas, quae per
decem praedicamenta significantur, puta substantia, quanti-
175V tas, | qualitas et alia, in deo esse?

CARD: Volo dicere omnia ilia complicite in deo esse deus

sicut explicite in creatura mundi sunt mundus.

IOH: Igitur deus est magnus.

CARD: Utique est magnus; sed sic magnus quod magni-
tude quae est omne id quod esse potest. Nam non est ma- 10
gnus magnitudine quae maior esse potest aut magnitudine
quae dividi et minui potest quemadmodum creata quanti-
tas, quae non est id quod esse potest.

BERN: Si ergo deus est magnus magnitudine quae id est

quod esse potest et — ut dicis — quae maior esse non potest
et quae minor esse non potest, tune deus est magnitude
maxima pariter et minima.
 On Actualized-possibility 71

absolute possibility coincides with actuality.) However, the

case of the sun is different. For although the sun is actually
what it is, it is not what it is able to be. For the sun is able
to be different from what it actually is.
BERNARD: Proceed, Father. For, assuredly, no created
thing is actually all that it is able to be. For God's creative
power is not exhausted in His creation. And thus it is not the
case that He is unable to produce a human being from a stone
and to increase or decrease each thing's size and, in general,
to turn any created thing into any other created thing.14
CARDINAL: You speak correctly. Therefore, since the facts
of the matter are such that God is Absolute Possibility, is
Actuality, and is the Union of the two (and so He is actu-
ally every possible being): clearly, He is all things, in the
sense of enfolding all things. For everything that in any way
either exists or can exist is enfolded in this Beginning. And
whatever either has been created or will be created is unfolded
from Him, in whom it is enfolded.
9 JOHN: Although I have frequently heard you make these
statements, they have never seemed to be anything except
momentous and very difficult for me.15 So do not be reluc-
tant to give an answer: Do you wish to say that created things,
which are signified by means of the ten categories (viz., sub-
stance, quantity, quality, and the others), exist in God?
CARDINAL: I want to say that as-enfolded-in-God all these
things are God; similarly, as-unfolded-in-the-created-world
they are the world.16
JOHN: God, then, is great.
CARDINAL: Yes, He is great. But He is great in such way
that He is greatness which is everything it is able to be. For
He is not great by virtue of a greatness which is able to be
greater, or by virtue of a greatness which is able to be divided
and diminished. [In this respect, He is not] like created
quantity, which is not what it is able to be.
BERNARD: If, then, God is great by virtue of a greatness
which is what it is able to be and which (as you say) is unable
to be greater and unable to be lesser, then God is maximal
and minimal greatness, alike.
72 Trialogus de possest

CARD: Utique non errat dicens deum magnitudinem ab-

solute maximam pariter et minimam; quod non est aliud
dicere quam infinitam et impartibilem, quae est omnis 20
magnitudinis finitae veritas et mensura. Quomodo enim
foret maior alicui quae sic est maxima quod et minima?
Seu quomodo minor alicui quae sic est minima quod maxi-
ma? Aut quomodo non est omnis magnitudinis essendi
aequalitas quae omne id est actu quod esse potest? Utique
essendi aequalitas esse potest.

BERN: Grata sunt haec. Sed sicut video, nee nomen nee 10
res nee quicquam omnium, quae creatae magnitudini con-
veniunt, convenienter de deo dicuntur, cum differant per
infinitum. Et fortassis non solum in magnitudine hoc verum,
sed in omnibus quae de creaturis verificantur.

CARD: Recte concipis, Bernarde. Et hoc ipsum apostolus

insinuat, cum faceret inter ilia quae in creaturis attinguntur
et in deo differentiam uti est inter visibilia et invisibilia,
quae utique in infinitum distare affirmamus.

IOH: Quantum capio, in his paucis multa valde continen- 10

tur. Nam si dico ex pulchritudine creaturarum deum puleh-
rum et scio quod deus est ita pulcher quod pulchritude
quae est omne id quod esse potest, scio nihil pulchri totius
mundi deficere deo ac quod omnis quae potest creari pulch-
ritudo non est nisi quaedam similitude improportionalis
ad illam quae actu est omnis essendi possibilitas pulchritu-
dinis, quae non potest esse aliter quam est, cum sit id
quod esse potest. Ita de bono, de vita et aliis, sic et de
motu. Nullus enim motus est in fine seu id quod esse potest
nisi qui deo convenit, qui est motus maximus pariter et 20
minimus seu quietissimus. Et ita mihi videris dicere. Sed
haesito, an in simili convenienter dici possit deum esse solem
aut caelum sive hominem aut aliud tale.
 On Actualized-possibility 73

CARDINAL: Assuredly there is no error in one's saying that

God is absolutely maximal and absolutely minimal greatness,
alike. [To say] this is to say nothing other than that He is
infinite and indivisible greatness —a greatness which is the
measure and the truth of every finite magnitude. For how
could a [greatness] that is the maximal [greatness] in such
way that it is also the minimal [greatness] be any greater?17
Or how could a [greatness] that is the minimal [greatness]
in such a way that it is the maximal [greatness] be any lesser?
Or how can [a greatness] that is actually everything it is able
to be fail to be the equality of being of every magnitude?
Surely, it is able to be the equality of being of [every mag-
nitude]. 18
10 BERNARD: These [teachings] are gratifying. Yet it seems
to me that neither the name ["greatness"] nor the fact [of
greatness] nor any of the characteristics applicable to created
magnitude are fittingly predicated of God, since these are in-
finitely different from God. And presumably this [point]
holds true not only for greatness but also for whatever is
predicated truly of created things.
CARDINAL: You are thinking correctly, Bernard. In fact,
the Apostle implied this very point. For analogous to the
difference between visible things and invisible things, [two
sets of things] which we assert to be infinitely different from
each other, he differentiated between what is apprehended
in the case of created things and what is apprehended in the
case of God.
JOHN: As far as I can tell, very many [truths] are con-
tained in these few [statements]. For example, suppose that
on the basis of the beauty of created things I say that God is
beautiful; and suppose I know that God is so beautiful that
He is a beauty which is everything it is able to be. Then, I
know that God lacks nothing of the beauty of the whole
world. And I know that all creatable beauty is only a certain
disproportionate likeness to that Beauty (1) which is actually
the possibility of the existence of all beauty and (2) which
is not able to be different from what it is, since it is what
it is able to be. The case is similar concerning the good and
life and other things—just as it is also similar concerning mo-
tion. For no motion is at rest or is what it is able to be—ex-
cept for the motion which befits God, who is not only maxi-
mal motion but also minimal motion (i.e., motion which is
most at rest). Indeed, you seem to me to be making this claim.
 74 Trialogus de possest

CARD: Non est vocabulis insistendum. Nam si dicitur 11

deum esse solem, utique si intelligitur hoc sane de sole qui
est omne id actu quod esse potest, tune clare videtur istum
solem non esse aliquid simile ad ilium. Hie enim sol sen-
sibilis dum est in oriente, non est in qualibet parte caeli, ubi
esse posset, neque est maximus pariter et minimus, ut non
possit esse nee maior nee minor, neque est undique et ubi-
libet, ut non possit esse alibi quam est, neque est omnia,
ut non possit esse aliud quam est, et ita de reliquis. Sic
quidem de omnibus creaturis pariformiter. Non refert igitur 10
quomodo deum nomines, dummodo terminos sic ad posse
esse intellectualiter transferas.

BERN: Intelligo te dicere velle deum esse omnia, ut non 12

possit esse aliud quam est. Quomodo hoc capit intellectus?

CARD: Utique hoc firmissime asserendum. Deo enim nil

omnium abest quod universaliter et absolute esse potest,
quia est ipsum esse, quod entitas potentiae et actus. Sed
dum est omnia in omnibus, sic est omnia quod non plus
unum quam aliud, quoniam non est sic unum quod non
aliud.

BERN: Cave, ne tibi ipsi contradicas. Aiebas enim parum

ante deum non esse solem, modo asseris ipsum omnia. 10

CARD: Immo dicebam ipsum solem; sed non modo es-

sendi quo hie sol est, qui non est quod esse potest. Qui
enim est id quod esse potest, utique solare esse sibi non
deficit; sed habet ipsum meliori essendi modo quia perfec-
tissimo et divino. Sicut essentia manus verius esse habet in
anima quam in manu, cum in anima sit vita et manus mor-
176'' tua non sit manus, ita de toto corpore et singulis memlbris:
ita se habet universum ad deum, excepto quod deus non
 On Actualized-possibility 75

Yet I am uncertain whether in similar fashion we can fittingly

say that God is sun or sky or man or any other such thing.
11 CARDINAL: We must not insist upon the words. For ex-
ample, suppose we say that God is sun. If, as is correct, we
construe this [statement] as [a statement] about a sun which
is actually all it is able to be, then we see clearly that this
sun is not at all like the sensible sun. For while the sensible
sun is in the East, it is not in any other part of the sky where
it is able to be. [Moreover, none of the following statements
are true of the sensible sun:] "It is maximal and minimal,
alike, so that it is not able to be either greater or lesser"; "It
is everywhere and anywhere, so that it is not able to be else-
where than it is"; "It is all things, so that it is not able to be
anything other than it is" —and so on. With all the other
created things the case is similar. Hence it does not matter
what name you give to God, provided that in the foregoing
manner you mentally remove the limits with respect to its
possible being.
12 BERNARD: I take you to mean that God is all things, so
that He is not able to be anything other than He is.19 How
can the intellect grasp this [doctrine] ?
CARDINAL: Indeed, this [doctrine] must be affirmed most
steadfastly. For God does not fail to be anything at all which
is at all possible to be. For He is the very being—that is, the
entitas — of possibility and of actuality.20 But although He
is all things in all things,21 He is all things in such way that
He is not one thing more than another; for He is not one
thing in such way that He is no other thing.
BERNARD: Beware lest you contradict yourself. For a
moment ago you denied that God is sun; and now you are
asserting that He is all things.
CARDINAL: On the contrary! I affirmed that God is sun-
though [He is] not [sun] in the same way as is the visible
sun, which is not what it is able to be. For, assuredly, He
who is what (He) is able to be does not fail to have solar
being; rather, He has it in a better way, because [He has it]
in a divine and most perfect way.
The essence of a hand exists more truly in the soul than
in the hand, since the life is in the soul and since a lifeless
hand is not a hand. (The same point can be made about the
whole body and its individual members.) Now, the universe
is related to God in away comparable to this —except for its
not being the case that God is the soul of the world in the
76 Trialogus de possest

est anima mundi sicut anima hominis anima est, nee forma
alicuius, sed omnibus forma, quia causa efficiens, formalis 20
seu exemplaris et finalis.
BERN: Vultne Johannes evangelista dicere omnia sic in 13
deo esse vitam sicut de manu dixisti et anima?

CARD: Arbitror vitam ibi veritatem et vivacitatem dicere.

Nam cum non sint res nisi per formam formentur, tune
formae in forma formarum verius et vivacius esse habent
quam in materia. Res enim non est, nisi sit vera et suo
modo viva. Quo cessante esse desinit. Ideo verius est in
forma formarum quam in se. Ibi enim est vera et viva.

IOH: Optime nos instruis, pater. Videtur mihi ex uno te

omnia elicere. Deus ergo est omnia, ut non possit esse 10
aliud. Ita est undique, ut non possit esse alibi. Ita est om-
nium adaequatissima mensura, ut non possit esse aequalior.
Sic de forma et specie et cunctis. Nee est hac via difficile
videre deum esse absolutum ab omni oppositione et quo-
modo ea, quae nobis videntur opposita, in ipso sunt idem
et quomodo affirmationi in ipso non opponitur negatio et
quaeque talia.

CARD: Cepisti, abba, propositi radicem et vides hanc 14

contemplationem per multos sermones inexplicabilem brevis-
simo verbo complicari. Esto enim quod aliqua dictio signi-
ficet simplicissimo significato quantum hoc complexum
'posse est', scilicet quod ipsum posse sit. Et quia quod est
actu est, ideo posse esse est tantum quantum posse esse
actu. Puta vocetur possest. Omnia in illo utique complican-
tur, et est dei satis propinquum nomen secundum huma-
num de eo conceptum. Est enim nomen omnium et singu-
lorum nominum atque nullius pariter. Ideo dum deus sui 10
vellet notitiam primo revelare, dicebat: »Ego« sum »deus
 On Actualized-possibility 77

way that the soul of a man is a soul. Nor is God the Form
merely of some thing; rather, He is the Form for all things,
since He is the efficient, the formal (or the exemplary), and
the final cause.
13 BERNARD: Doesn't John the Evangelist22 want to say —in
a way comparable to your statement about the hand and the
soul—that in God all things are life?
CARDINAL: I think that "life" there means "truth" and
"vitality." For since things do not exist unless they are formed
through a form, forms exist more truly and more vitally in
the Form of forms than in matter. For a thing does not exist
unless it is true and, in its own way, alive. When it ceases to
be true and alive, it ceases to exist. And so, it exists more
truly in the Form of forms than in itself; for in the Form of
forms it is true and alive.
JOHN: You teach us excellently, Father. You seem to me
to elicit all things from one thing. God, then, is all things,
so that He is not able to be anything else. He is so present
everywhere that He is not able to be present anywhere else.
He is to such an extent the most congruent measure of all
things that He is not able to be a more equal measure. The
same points can be made about form and species and all
other things. In this way it is not difficult to see that God is
free of all opposition, and to see how those things which seem
to us to be opposites are identical in Him, how in Him nega-
tion is not opposed to affirmation, and [so on for] every
such thing.
14 CARDINAL: Abbot, you have grasped the root of the matter;
and you see that this thought, which cannot be explicated
by means of many words, is enfolded in a very short word.
For let us agree that [there is a single] word [which] signi-
fies by a very simple signification as much as [is signified
by] the compound expression "Possibility exists" ("posse
est")— meaning that possibility itself exists. Now, because
what exists exists actually: the possibility-to-be exists insofar
as the possibility-to-be is actual. Suppose we call this possest
[Actualized-possibility] .23 All things are enfolded in it
[i.e., in Actualized-possibility]; and "Actualized-possibility"
is a sufficiently approximate name for God, according to
our human concept of Him. For it is equally the name (1)
of all names, (2) of each distinct name, and (3) of no name.
And so, when God willed to first reveal knowledge of Himself,
78 Trialogus de possest

omnipotens«, id est sum actus omnis potentiae. Et alibi:

»Ego sum qui sum.« Nam ipse est qui est. Quae enim non-
dum sunt id quod esse aut intelligi possunt, de illis ab-
solutum esse non verificatur. Habet autem Graecus: Ego
sum entitas, ubi nos: »Ego sum qui sum.« Est enim forma
essendi seu forma omnis formabilis formae. Creatura autem,
quae non est quod esse potest, non est simpliciter. Solus
deus perfecte et complete est.

Ducit ergo hoc nomen speculantem super omnem sen- 15

sum, rationem et intellectum in mysticam visionem, ubi est
finis ascensus omnis cognitivae virtutis et revelationis in-
cogniti dei initium. Quando enim supra se ipsum omnibus
relictis ascenderit veritatis inquisitor et reperit se amplius
non habere accessum ad invisibilem deum, qui sibi manet
invisibilis, cum nulla luce rationis suae videatur, tune ex-
spectat devotissimo desiderio solem ilium omnipotentem et
per sui ipsius ortum pulsa caligine illuminari, ut invisibilem
tantum videat quantum se ipsum manifestaverit. Sic intelli- 10
go apostolum deum a creatura mundi intellecta, puta quan-
do ipsum mundum creaturam intelligimus et mundum trans-
cendentes creatorem ipsius inquirimus, se manifestare ipsum
ut creatorem suum summa formata fide quaerentibus.

IOH: Quorsum nos vehis, pater, mundanos supra mun-

dum!
Indulgebis, ut te praesente cum Bernardo colloquar. Di- 16
cito, vir zelose, an quae dicta sunt cepisti?

BERN: Spero aliquid saltern, licet parum.

IOH: Quomodo intelligis in possest omnia complicari?

BERN: Quia posse simpliciter dictum est omne posse.

Unde si viderem omne posse esse actu, utique nihil restaret
 On Actualized-possibility 79

He said:24 "I am God almighty" —i.e., "I am the actuality

of every possibility." And elsewhere25 [He said] : "I am I-
who-am," since He is He-who-is. ("Being"26 in an unqualified
sense is not predicated truly of those things which are not
yet (1) what they are able to be or (2) what they are able to
be conceived [to be] .)27 However, the Greek has "I am Be-
ing itself,"28 where we [have] "I am I-who-am." For He is
the Form of being, or the Form of every formable form. But
the creation, which is not what it is able to be, does not exist
in an unqualified sense of "exist." God alone exists perfectly
and completely.
15 Accordingly, this name ["possest"] leads the one-who-is-
speculating beyond all the senses, all reason, and all intellect
unto a mystical vision, where there is the end of the ascent
of all cognitive power and where there is the beginning of
the revelation of the unknown God. For, having left all things
behind, the seeker-after-truth ascends beyond himself and
discerns that he still does not have any greater access to the
invisible God, who remains invisible to him. (For God is not
seen by means of any light from the seeker's own reason.)
At this point the seeker awaits, with the most devout long-
ing, the omnipotent Sun —expecting that when darkness is
banished by its rising, he will be illuminated, so that he will
see the invisible [God] to the extent that God will manifest
Himself. This is how I construe the Apostle's claim that from
the mundane creation's having been understood —i.e., when
we apprehend the world as created being and, transcending
the world, seek its Creator —God manifests Himself to those
who with most deeply formed faith seek Him as their own
Creator.
JOHN: How far beyond the world you convey us mundane
16 [creatures], Father! You will indulge my conversing with
Bernard while you are present. Tell me, zealous man, whether
you have understood what has been said.
BERNARD: Although little, at least something, I hope.
JOHN: As you understand the matter, how can it be the
case that all things are enfolded in Actualized-possibility?
BERNARD: Because by "possibility" in an unqualified
sense, every possibility is meant. Hence, if I were to under-
stand that every possibility is actual, [I would understand
that] nothing more would be left over. For if anything were
 80 Trialogus de possest

amplius. Si enim aliud aliquid restaret, utique hoc esse

posset; ita non restaret, sed prius non fuisset eomprehen-
sum.

IOH: Recte dicis. Nam si non est posse esse, nihil est, et 10
si est, omnia id sunt quod sunt in ipso et extra ipsum nihil.
Omnia igitur quae facta sunt in ipso ab aeterno necesse est
fuisse. Quod enim faetum est, in posse esse semper fuit,
sine quo faetum est nihil. Patet possest omnia esse et am-
bire, cum nihil aut sit aut possit fieri, quod non includatur.
In ipso ergo omnia sunt et moventur et id sunt quod sunt
quicquid sunt.

Sed quomodo intelligis ascendentem supra se ipsum con- 17

stitui oportere?
176V BERN: Quia nullo graldu cognitionis attingitur. Sensus
enim nihil non-quantum attingit. Sic nee imaginatio. Sim-
plex enim et quod non possit esse maius aut minus vel me-
diari aut duplicari nullo sensu nee etiam per quamcum-
que subtilissimam attingitur phantasiam. Nee altissimus
intellectus concipere potest infinitum interminum et unum
quod omnia atque ipsum, ubi non est oppositionis diversi-
tas. Nisi enim intellectus se intelligibili assimilet, non intel- 10
ligit, cum intelligere sit assimilare et intelligibilia se ipso
seu intellectualiter mensurare. Quod in eo, quod est id quod
esse potest, non est possibile; nam immensurabile utique
est, cum non possit esse maius. Quomodo ergo per intellec-
tum, qui numquam est adeo magnus quin possit esse maior,
intelligi posset.

IOH: Profundius quam credideram dicta patris nostri sub-

intrasti. Et hoc ultimum certum me facit oportere ascen-
dentem omnia linquere, etiam suum intellectum transcen-
dere, cum virtus inflnita per terminatam capi non possit. 20

CARD: Gaudeo de vestro profectu ac quod iis locutus sum,

 On Actualized-possibility 81

left over, surely this thing would be possible to exist. And

so it would not be left over but would simply have been un-
recognized at first.
JOHN: You speak correctly. For if the possibility-to-be
does not exist, then nothing exists; on the other hand, if the
possibility-to-be does exist, then all things are-what-they-are
in it, and nothing [remains] outside it. Therefore, necessarily,
all created things have existed in it from eternity. For what-
was-created always existed in the possibility-to-be, in whose
absence nothing was created. Clearly, Actualized-possibility
is all things and includes all things; for nothing which is not
included [in it] either exists or is able to be made.29 There-
fore, in it all things exist and have their movement and are
what they are (regardless of what they are).
17 But, as you understand the matter, how can it be the case
that the one who ascends must be situated beyond himself?
BERNARD: Because no grade of knowing attains [this
height]. For example, the senses do not make contact with
anything which does not have quantity. Neither does the
imagination. For what is simple and what cannot be greater
or lesser, or cannot be halved or doubled, is not reached by
any of the senses — nor even through any very acute power-of-
imagination. Nor can the most penetrating intellect conceive
the infinite, boundless, and one thing which is both all things
and the thing in which there is no diversity of opposition.
For unless the intellect becomes like the [putatively] intel-
ligible object, it does not understand [it]; for to understand
is to become-like and is to measure by means of the intellect
(i.e., conceptually) the intelligible objects. But this [measure-
ment] is not possible in the case of that which is what (it) is
able to be. For, assuredly, it is immeasurable, since [it is so
great that] it cannot be greater. Therefore, how could it be
understood through the intellect, which is never so great that
it cannot be greater?
JOHN: You have penetrated more deeply than I had sup-
posed into the statements of our father. Indeed, this last
point makes me certain that the one who ascends must leave
behind all things and must transcend even his own intellect,
since Infinite Power cannot be grasped by a finite power.
CARDINAL: I am happy with your progress and happy that
82 Trialogus de possest

qui pro suo captu dicta magnificant.

BERN: Quamvis constet mihi omnibus diebus meis con- 18

templationis cibum posse ex praemissis elicere et sermones
multiplicare et semper proficere, optamus tamen aliquo sen-
sibili phantasmate manuduci, maxime quomodo aeternum
est omnia simul et in nunc aeternitatis tota, ut ipso phan-
tasmate relicto salientes supra omnia sensibilia elevemur.

CARD: Conabor. Et recipio omnibus nobis etiam in praxi

notum trochi ludum puerorum: Proicit puer trochum et
proiciendo simul ipsum retrahit cum chorda circumligata.
Et quanto potentior est fortitude brachii, tanto citius cir- 10
cumvolvitur trochus, adeo quod videatur, dum est in maiori
motu, stare et quiescere, et dicunt pueri ipsum tune quies-
cere. Describamus ergo circulum b c, qui super a circum-
volvatur quasi superior circulus trochi, et sit alius circulus
d e fixus:
 On Actualized-possibility 83

I have spoken to those who, by virtue of their comprehen-

sion, enlarge upon what has been said.
18 BERNARD: It is evident to me that from the aforesaid
[teachings I] can, all my life long, draw food for thought and
can discourse at length [about them] and can continually
make progress [with respect to understanding them]. Never-
theless, we desire to be led by a sensible image —especially
[regarding the questions] how Eternal [Being] is all things
at once and how the whole of eternity is within the present
moment —so that when we leap forth, having left this image
behind, we may be elevated above all sensible things.
CARDINAL: I shall try [to show you such an image]. I will
take [the example] of boys [playing with] a top —a game
known to us all, even in practical terms. A boy pitches out a
top; and as he does so, he pulls it back with the string which
is wound around it. The greater the strength of his arm, the
faster the top is made to rotate —until it seems (while it is
moving at the faster speed) to be motionless and at rest. In-
deed, boys speak of it as then at rest.
So let us describe a circle, b c, which is being rotated about
a point a as would the upper circle of a top; and let there be
another fixed circle, d e\
84 Trialogus de possest

Nonne quanto velocius mobilis circumrotatur, tanto vide-

tur minus moveri?
BERN: Videtur certe, et hoc vidimus pueri.
CARD: Esto ergo quod posse moveri in ipso sit actu, 19
scilicet ut moveatur actu quantum est possibile: Nonne tune
penitus quiesceret?
BERN: Nulla successio posset notari ex repentina veloci-
tate. Ita utique motus deprehendi nequiret successione
cessante.

IOH: Quando motus foret infinitae velocitatis, b et c pun-

eta in eodem puncto temporis forent cum d puncto circuli
fixi sine eo quod alter punctus scilicet b prius tempore
fuisset quam c, aliter non esset maximus et infinitus mo- 10
tus, et tamen non esset motus sed quies, quia nullo tem-
pore ilia puncta de d fixo recederent.

CARD: Recte ais, abba. Maximus ergo motus esset simul

et minimus et nullus.
BERN: Ita necessario videtur.
CARD: Nonne quemadmodum b c puncta opposita eo
casu forent semper cum d, ita semper etiam cum opposite
eius scilicet e?
IOH: Necessario.
CARD: Nonne etiam omnia intermedia puncta circuli b c 20
similiter?
IOH: Similiter.
CARD: Totus ergo circulus etiamsi maximus foret, in omni
nunc simul foret cum puncto d, etiamsi d punctus minimus
foret, et non solum in d et e, sed in omni puncto circuli
de.
IOH: Ita foret.
CARD: Satis sit ergo hoc phantasmate posse aenigmatice
aliqualiter videri, quomodo si b c circulus sit ut aeternitas
et alius d e tempus, non repugnare aeternitatem simul totam 30
esse in quolibet puncto temporis et deum principium et
finem simul esse totum in omnibus et quaelibet talia.
 On Actualized-possibility 85

Is it not true that the faster the movable circle is rotated, the
less it seems to be moved?
BERNARD: It certainly seems true. And, as boys, [this is
how] we saw it.
19 CARDINAL: Suppose, then, that the possibility-to-be-moved
is actual in it; i.e., suppose that the top is actually being
moved as fast as possible. In that case, would it not be com-
pletely motionless?
BERNARD: Because of the rapid velocity, no change-of-
state could be observed. And so, indeed, the motion could
not be detected, since the change-of-state would have ceased.
JOHN: Since the motion would be of infinite velocity,
points b and c would be temporally present together at *
point d of the fixed circle—without its being the case that
point b was temporally prior to point c. (For if b were tem-
porally prior to c, the motion would not be maximal and
infinite.) And yet, there would not be motion but would be
rest, since at no time would points b and c move away from
the fixed point d.
CARDINAL: You speak correctly, Abbot. Hence the maxi-
mal motion would at the same time also be minimal motion
and no motion.
BERNARD: This seems to be necessarily so.
CARDINAL: In that case, just as the opposite points b and
c would be always at point d, would they not always also
be at the opposite point from d, viz., at e?
JOHN: Necessarily.
CARDINAL: Would this not likewise hold true for all the
intermediate points of the circle be"?
JOHN: Yes, likewise.
CARDINAL: Therefore, the whole of the circle (even if the
circle were maximal in size) would at every instant be simul-
taneously present at point d (even if point d were minimal
in size). And [the whole of the circle would be] not only at
d and e but also at every other point of the circle d e.
JOHN: So it would.
CARDINAL: Let it suffice, then, thatby means of this image
and symbolically we are somehow able to see that (if the
circle b c were illustrative of eternity and the circle d e were
illustrative of time)32 [the following propositions] are not
self-contradictory: "that eternity as a whole is at once present
at every point of time"; "that God as the Beginning and the
End 33 is at once and as a whole present in all things"; [and
so on for] whatever other such propositions.
 86 Trialogus de possest

BERN: Video adhuc unum utique magnum. 20

IOH: Quid hoc?
BERN: In deo hie distantia nequaquam distare. Nam d e
177r distant per diametrum circuli, cuius sunt opposita punjcta;
sed non in deo. Veniente enim b ad d est simul et cum e.
Ita omnia, quae in tempore distant in hoc mundo, sunt in
praesentia coram deo, et quae distant opposite sunt ibi
coniuncte, et quae hie diversa ibi idem.

IOH : Haec certe notanda, ut intelligamus deum supra om-

nem differentiam, varietatem, alteritatem, tempus, locum et 10
oppositionem esse.

CARD: lam intelligetis facilius, quomodo concordabitis 21

theologos, quorum alter dicit sapientiam quae deus omni
mobili mobiliorem et verbum velociter currere et omnia
penetrare atque a fine ad finem pertingere atque ad omnia
progredi. Alius vero dicit primum principium fixum immo-
bile stare in quiete, licet det omnia moveri, quidam quod
simul stat et progreditur, et adhuc alii quod neque stat
neque movetur. Ita quidam dicunt ipsum generaliter in
omni loco, alii particulariter in quolibet, alii utrumque, alii
nullum. Haec et his similia facilius per hoc speculare me- 10
dium capiuntur, licet infinite melius haec omnia sint in deo
ipse deus simplex, quam per dictum paradigma etiam per
cuiuscumque altissimum saltum.

BERN: Immo etiam de aeternis rerum rationibus, quae in 22

rebus aliae et aliae atque differentes sunt, etiam pariformiter
videtur eas in deo non esse varias. Nam etsi circuli b c
puncta concipiantur rationes rerum seu ideae, non tamen
sunt plura, cum totus circulus et punctus sint idem. Quan-
do enim b est cum d, totus circulus est cum d et omnes
 On Actualized-possibility 87

20 BERNARD: I see one further very important [lesson].

JOHN: What is it?
BERNARD: Things which are separated for us are not at all
separated in God. For example, d and e are separated by that
diameter of the circle of which they are opposite points. But
[there is] no [such separation] in God; for when b comes to
d, it is at the same time also at e. Similarly, all the things
which are separated in time in our world are in the present
before God. And all the things which [in our world] are
separated as opposites exist conjointly in God. And all the
things which here are different are there identical.
JOHN: These [facts] must certainly be noted, so that we
may understand that God is beyond all difference, variation,
otherness, time, space, and opposition.
21 CARDINAL: Now both of you will more readily understand
how you will [be able] to harmonize the [statements of] the
theologians. One of them says that Wisdom (which is God)
34
is more movable than any other movable thing and that
35
5
[Wisdom's] Word runs swiftly and pervades all things and
stretches from end to end36 and moves toward all things. But
another of them says that the First Beginning is fixed and
immovable and that it remains at rest, even though it causes
all other things to be moved. Others say that it is at once at
rest and in motion; and still others say that it is neither at
rest nor moved. Accordingly, some state that God is generally
in every place; others state that He is particularly in some
given place; others state that He is both; and [still] others
[state] that He is neither. These [teachings], and [teachings]
similar to them, are more easily understood through the mir-
rorlike medium [of our example]. Nevertheless, in God all
these things are the simple God Himself in an infinitely better
way than [is discernible] —even by means of anyone's high-
est leap—through the aforementioned example.
22 BERNARD: Indeed, even regarding the eternal forms of
things, which in things are different from one another: we
also see, in like manner, that in God these are not different
[from one another]; For even if the points of circle b c are
viewed as [illustrative of] the forms (or ideas) of things, still
they are not more than one point, since a point and the whole
circle are identical. For when b is at d\ the whole circle is at d,
88 Trialogus de possest

eius puncti stint unus punctus, licet videantur esse plura,

quando ad d e temporis circulum et eius puncta respicimus.

CARD: Multum acceditis ad theologiam illam latissimam 23

pariter et concisam. Possemus adhuc plura in hoc trochi
motu pulcherrima venari, scilicet quomodo puer volens tro-
chum mortuum seu sine motu facere vivum sui conceptus
similitudinem sibi imprimit per inventum sui intellectus
ingenium et motu manuum recto pariter et obliquo seu
pulsionis pariter et attractionis imprimit sibi motum supra
naturam trochi, cum non haberet nisi motum versus centrum
uti grave: facit ipsum circulariter moveri ut caelum. Et hie
spiritus movens adest trocho invisibiliter diu aut parum 10
secundum impressionem communicatae virtutis. Quo desi-
nente volvere trochum revertitur uti erat prius ad motum
versus centrum. Nonne hie est similitude creatoris spiritum
vitae dare non-vivo volentis? Uti enim praeordinavit dare,
ita medio motus caeli, qui sunt instrumenta exsecutionis
voluntatis eius, moventur motu recto ab oriente ad occasum
et cum hoc reversionis de occasu ad orientem simul, ut
sciunt astrologi, et spiritus vitae ex zodiaco animali impres-
sus movet vitaliter id, quod de sua natura vita caruit, et
vivificat quamdiu spiritus durat, deinde revertitur in terram 20
suam. Talia, quae tamen non sunt praesentis speculationis,
et plura valde significantur in hoc ludo puerorum. Haec sic
cursim rememorata sint, ut consideretis quomodo etiam in
arte puerorum relucet natura et in ipsa deus, quodque sa-
pientes mundi qui hoc ponderarunt veriores assecuti sunt
de scibilibus coniecturas.
 On Actualized-possibility 89

and all its points are one point —even though they appear to
be many when we look at circle d e ([which is illustrative] of
time) and at its points.
23 CARDINAL: Both of you are coming quite close to the the-
ology which is concise and most extensive, alike. We could
pursue still many other very appealing [illustrations] regard-
ing this motion of the top—e.g., (1) how a boy who wants
to enliven a dead top (i.e., a top without motion) impresses
upon it a likeness of his thought by means of a device con-
jured up from his intellect; and (2) how by both the forward
and the backward motion of his hands (i.e., by the motion of
both thrusting and pulling) he impresses upon the top a move-
ment over and above the top's nature. For the top, as a heavy
thing, had only a motion toward the center [of the earth.
But the boy] causes the top to be moved in a circular fashion,
as is the sky. Moreover, this moving power (spiritus movens)
is invisibly present to the top for a long or a short time, de-
pending upon the impression of the imparted force. When
this [power] stops turning the top, the top reverts (just as
was its original state) to motion toward the center [of the
earth]. Is this not a likeness of the Creator, who wills to
give the spirit-of-life [spiritus vitae] to what is not alive?
For just as He foreordained it to be done, so by means of
motion the heavens (which are instruments of His executing
will) are moved by a forward motion from east to west and
at the same time by a reverse motion from west to east (as
the astrologers are aware).37 And the spirit-of-life, impressed
from the living zodiac, enlivens that which of its own nature
lacks life; and it enlivens as long as the spirit lasts; and then
this thing returns to its earth. Such points (which do not,
however, pertain to the present investigation), along with
many others, are especially signified in [the example of] this
boys'-game. They have been recalled in this cursory way so
that you may observe (1) that even in a boys' device nature
shines forth (and in nature God) and (2) that the wise men
of the world who pondered this [matter] have attained unto
the truer conjectures about what is knowable.
 90 Trialogus de possest

BERN: Ago tibi immensas gratias, pater optime, quoniam 24

177V multa dubia et quae videbantur impossibi|lia hoc aptissimo
trochi aenigmate facta sunt mihi non solum credibilia sed
necessaria.
CARD: Qui sibi de deo conceptual simplicem facit quasi
significati huius compositi vocabuli possest, multa sibi prius
difficilia citius capit. Nam si quis se ad lineam convertit et
applicat ipsum possest, ut videat possest lineale, hoc est ut
videat lineam illud esse actu quod esse potest et omne id
esse quod lineam fieri posse intelligit, utique ex sola ilia 10
ratione quia est possest ipsam videt lineam maximam pariter
et minimam. Nam cum sit id quod esse potest, non potest
esse maior: sic videtur maxima, nee minor: sic videtur
minima. Et quia est id quod linea fieri potest, ipsa est ter-
minus omnium superficierum. Sic et terminus figurae tri-
angularis, quadrangularis et omnium polygoniarum et om-
nium circulorum et figurarum omnium, quae fieri possunt
ex linea sive recta sive curva, et omnium figurarum exem-
plar simplex, verissimum et adaequatissimum et aequalitas
in se omnes habens et per se omnia figurans. Et ita unica 20
figura omnium figurabilium linealiter et ratio una atque
causa omnium quantumcumque variarum figurarum.

In hoc aenigmate vides quomodo si possest applicatur 25

ad aliquod nominatum, [quomodo] fit aenigma ad ascenden-
dum ad innominabile, sicut de linea per possest pervenisti
ad indivisibilem lineam supra opposita exsistentem, quae
est omnia et nihil omnium lineabilium. Et non est tune
linea, quae per nos linea nominatur, sed est supra omne
nomen lineabilium. Quia possest absolute consideratum sine
applicatione ad aliquod nominatum te aliqualiter ducit
aenigmatice ad omnipotentem, ut ibi videas omne quod
 On Actualized-possibility 91

24 BERNARD: I thank you immensely, excellent Father, be-

cause by this very fitting symbolism38 of the top many things
which were uncertain and which seemed to be impossible
have not merely been made plausible to me but [have] even
[been shown to be] necessary.
CARDINAL: Whoever forms for himself the simple concep-
tion of God as He is signified by the composite word "possest"
grasps more readily many things which previously were dif-
ficult for him. For example, suppose that someone turns his
attention to a line and applies [to it the concept] actualized-
possibility, so that he views the line's possibility as actualized
(i.e., so that he sees the line to be actually that which it is
able to be—sees it to be everything he understands that a
line can become). Surely, from the sole consideration that
the line is actualized-possibility, he recognizes that the line
is maximal and minimal alike. For since the line is what it is
able to be: it cannot be greater, and thus it is seen to be maxi-
mal; nor can it be lesser, and thus it is seen to be minimal.
And because it is what a line is able to become, it is the
boundary line of all surfaces. Thus it is the boundary line of
triangular shape, of rectangular shape, of all polygons, of all
circles, of all figures which can be made from a line (whether
a straight line or a curved line). It is the simple, the truest,
and the most congruent exemplar of all figures. It is equality
which contains all [figures] in itself and which configures all
things through itself. And so, there is one Figure for all linear-
ly configurable things; and there is one Form and Cause of
all different figures, regardless of how many different figures
there are.
25 In this symbolism you see how if [the concept of] actu-
alized-possibility is applied to something named, [this con-
cept] becomes a symbolism for ascending to what is unname-
able (just as by means of [the concept of] acutalized-possi-
bility you came from a line to an indivisible line existing
above opposites, a line which is both everything and nothing
of all things capable of linearity; it is no longer a line which
is given the name "line" by us-, rather, it is beyond every
name for things capable of linearity). For [the notion of]
actualized-possibility, considered in itself and without ap-
plication to anything named, somehow by way of a symbol-
ism leads you to the Almighty. As a result, you there behold
all the things which you understand to be able to be, and to be
92 Trialogus de possest

esse ac fieri posse intelligis supra omne nomen, quo id quod 10

potest esse est nominabile, immo supra ipsum esse et non-
esse omni modo, quo ilia intelligi possunt. Nam non-esse
cum possit esse per omnipotentem, utique est actu, quia
absolutum posse est actu in omnipotente. Si enim ex non-
esse potest aliquid fieri quacumque potentia, utique in in-
finita potentia complicatur. Non esse ergo ibi est omnia
esse. Ideo omnis creatura, quae potest de non-esse in esse
perduci, ibi est ubi posse est esse et est ipsum possest.

Ex quo te elevare poteris, ut supra esse et non-esse omnia 26

ineffabiliter, aenigmatice tamen, videas, quae de non-esse
per actu esse omnia in esse veniunt. Et ubi hoc vides,
verissime et discretissime nullum nomen nominabile per
nos invenis. Illi enim principio non convenit nee nomen
unitatis seu singularitatis nee pluralitatis aut multitudinis
nee aliud quodcumque nomen per nos nominabile seu in-
telligibile, cum esse et non-esse ibi sibi non contradicant
nee alia quaecumque opposita aut discretionem affirmantia
vel negantia. Eius enim nomen est nomen nominum et non 10
plus singulare singulorum quam universale simul omnium
et nullius.

BERN: Intelligo te dicere quomodo hoc nomen composi- 27

turn possest de posse et esse unitum habet simplex signifi-
catum iuxta tuum humanum conceptum ducentem aenig-
matice inquisitorem ad aliqualem de deo positivam asser-
tionem. Et capis posse absolutum prout complicat omne
posse supra actionem et passionem, supra posse facere et
posse fieri. Et concipis ipsum posse actu esse. Hoc autem
esse quod actu est omne posse esse dicis, id est absolutum.
Et ita vis dicere quod ubi omne posse actu est, ibi perveni-
tur ad primum omnipotens principium. Non haesito quin 10
 On Actualized-possibility 93

able to be made —behold them above every name by which

what-is-able-to-be is nameable. Indeed, [you behold them]
above being and not-being (in whatsoever manner being and
not-being can be conceived). For since not-being is able to
exist through the Almighty, assuredly it is actual,39 since abso-
lute possibility is actual in the Almighty. For if some thing is
able to be made from not-being by some power, assuredly this
thing is enfolded within Infinite Power. Hence, there, not-
being is being everything. And so, every creature which is able
to be brought from not-being intobeing (1) exists there, where
to-be-able-[to-be] is to-be, and (2) is Actualized-possibility
itself.
26 From this point you will be able to elevate yourself so
that, though ineffably and through a symbolism, you will
behold above being and not-being all the things which —from
not-being and through Being-which-is-actually-all-things ° —
come into being. And where you behold this [sight] you find
no name which can be named by us with complete truth and
complete distinctness. For neither the name "oneness" nor
"singularity" nor "plurality" nor "multitude" nor any other
name which is nameable or understandable by us befits that
Beginning. For there being and not-being do not contradict
each other; nor do any other opposites which either affirm
or deny a distinct state of affairs. For the name of this Be-
ginning is the name of names; it is no more a singular name
for individual things than it is a universal name for both
everything and nothing.
27 BERNARD: I understand you to be speaking of how the
composite name "possest" ("actualized-possibility"), com-
pounded from "posse" and "esse," has a simple signification
which through a symbolism, and in accordance with your
human concept, leads an inquirer to some kind of positive
assertion about God. Moreover, you understand Absolute
Possibility (insofar as it enfolds all possibility) to be above
activity and passivity, above the possibility-to-make and the
possibility-to-be-made. And you conceive of this [Absolute]
Possibility as actually existing. But you say that this Being-
which-is-actual is every possibility (i.e., Absolute [Possibil-
ity] ). And so you want to say that where every possibility
is actual, there we arrive at the first all-powerful Beginning.
I do not doubt that all things are enfolded in this Beginning
which encompasses all the things which in any way are able
 94 Trialogus de possest

omnia in illo complicentur principio, quod omnia quae quo-

cumque modo possunt esse in se habet. Nescio si bene dico.

CARD: Optime. Principium igitur suam vim omnipoten-

tem in nullo quod esse potest evacuat. Ideo nulla creatura
est possest. Quare omnis creatura potest esse quod non est.
Solum principium quia est ipsum possest, non potest esse
quod non est.
BERN: Clarum est hoc. Si enim principium posset non
esse, non esset, cum sit quod esse potest.
IOH: Est igitur absoluta necessitas, cum non possit non 20
esse.
178r CARD: Recte dicis. | Nam quomodo posset non esse, quan-
do non-esse in ipso sit ipsum.
IOH: Mirabilis deus, in quo non-esse est essendi necessitas.

BERN: Quia mundus potuit creari, semper ergo fuit ipsius 28

essendi possibilitas. Sed essendi possibilitas in sensibilibus
materia dicitur. Fuit igitur semper materia. Et quia num-
quam creata, igitur increata. Quare principium aeternum.

IOH: Non videtur procedere hoc tuum argumentum. Nam

increata possibilitas est ipsum possest. Unde quod mundus
ab aeterno potuit creari, est quia possest est aeternitas.
Non est igitur verum aliud requiri ad hoc quod possibilitas
essendi mundum sit aeterna nisi quia possest est possest,
quae est unica ratio omnium modorum essendi. 10

CARD: Abbas bene dicit. Nam si posse fieri non habet 29

initium, hoc ideo est, quia possest est sine initio. Praesup-
ponit enim posse fieri absolutum posse, quod cum actu
convertitur, sine quo impossibile est quicquam fieri posse.
Quod si absolutum posse indigeret alio, scilicet materia sine
qua nihil posset, non esset ipsum possest. Quod enim ho-
minis posse facere requirat materiam quae possit fieri,
 On Actualized-possibility 95

to be. [Yet] I am not certain whether my statements are

correct.
CARDINAL: Perfectly correct.Therefore, the Beginning does
not exhaust its omnipotent power in anything which (it) is
able to be. And so no created thing is Actualized-possibility.
Therefore, every created thing is able to be what it is not.
Only the Beginning —because it is Actualized-possibility it-
self—is not able to be what it is not.
BERNARD: This is clear. For example, if the Beginning
were able not-to-be, it would not-be, since it is what it is able
to be.
JOHN: Therefore, it is Absolute Necessity, since it is not
able not to be.
CARDINAL: Your statement is correct. For how would the
Beginning be able not to be, seeing that in it not-being is
[identical with] it?
JOHN: Wonderful is God, in whom not-being is necessity-
of-being.
28 BERNARD: Because the world was able to be created, there
was always the possibility of its being. But with perceptible
things, matter is said to be the possibility-of-being. Therefore,
there was always matter. And because matter was never
created, it is uncreated. Hence, it is the eternal Beginning.
JOHN: This argument of yours does not seem to proceed
[correctly]. For uncreated possibility is Actualized-possibility
itself. Therefore, the fact that the world was, from eternity,
able to be created is due to the fact that Actualized-possibility
is eternity. Hence the following is true: in order for the pos-
sibility-of-there-being-a-world to be eternal, nothing else is
required except that Actualized-possibility be Actualized-
possibility. This principle is a unitary principle for all modes
of being.
29 CARDINAL: The Abbot speaks rightly. For if the possibility-
of-being-made does not have a beginning, it is because Actu-
alized-possibility is without a beginning. For the possibility-
of-being-made presupposes Absolute Possibility, which is
coincident with actuality (quod cum actu convertitur) and
without which it is impossible that anything be able to be
made. But if Absolute Possibility were to need something
else—viz., matter, without which it would be powerless-
then Absolute Possibility would not be Actualized-possibility
itself. For example, a man's ability-to-make requires material
which is able to be made. (The reason is that [a man's ability]
96 Trialogus de possest

(est)quia non est ipsum possest, in quo facere et fieri sunt

ipsum posse. Hoc enim posse quod de facere verificatur est
idem posse quod de fieri verificatur. 10
BERN: Difficile est mihi hoc capere.
CARD: Quando attendis in deo non-esse esse ipsum possest,
capies. Nam si in posse facere non-esse coincidit, utique
et posse fieri coincidit. Ac si tu fores auctor libri quern
scribis, in posse tuo active, scilicet in ipso scribere librum,
complicaretur ipsum posse passivum, scilicet ipsum scribi
ipsius libri, quia non-esse libri in tuo posse esse haberet.

IOH: Maxima sunt quae aperis, pater. Nam omnia in poss- 30

est sunt et videntur ut in sua causa et ratione, licet nullus
intellectus capere possit ipsum nisi qui est ipsum.

CARD: Intellectus noster quia non est ipsum possest —

non enim est actu quod esse potest; maior igitur et perfec-
tior semper esse potest —, ideo ipsum possest licet a remotis
videat, non capit. Solum ipsum possest se intelligit et in se
omnia, quoniam in possest omnia complicantur.

IOH: Bene considero quomodo omnia de possest negan-

tur, quando nullum omnium quae nominari possunt sit 10
ipsum, cum possit esse id quod non est. Ideo quantitas non
est. Quantitas enim cum possit esse id quod non est, non
est possest. Puta potest esse maior quam est aut aliud quam
est; sed non sic possest, cui nee maioritas quae esse potest
aut quicquam quod esse potest deest. Ipsum enim posse est
actu perfectissimum.

Sed nunc subiunge quaeso, postquam ille superadmira- 31

bilis deus noster nullo quamvis etiam altissimo ascensu na-
turaliter videri possit aliter quam in aenigmate, ubi potius
posse videri quam visio attingitur et in caliginem umbrosam
 On Actualized-possibility 97

is not Actualized-possibility itself, in which making and being-

made are possibility itself.) For the possibility which is pre-
dicated truly of making is the same possibility which is pre-
dicated truly of being-made.
BERNARD: It is difficult for me to grasp this point.
CARDINAL: You will understand when you consider the
fact that in God not-being is Actualized-possibility itself.
For if not-being coincides with the possibility-to-make, as-
suredly the possibility-to-be-made coincides with the pos-
sibility-to-make. For example, if you were the author of a
book which you were writing: in your active ability, viz., in
the ability to write the book, would be enfolded a passive
ability, viz., the ability of the book's being written; for the
book's not-being would exist in your ability.
30 JOHN: The things you disclose are very important, Father.
For all things are, and are seen to be, in Actualized-possibility
as in their own Cause and Form [ratio]. Yet no intellect ex-
cept that intellect which is Actualized-possibility can grasp
Actualized-possibility.
CARDINAL: Our intellect is not Actualized-possibility itself.
(For our intellect is not actually what it is able to be; and
so, it is always able to be greater and more perfect.) There-
fore, it does not grasp Actualized-possibility itself, even
though it glimpses it from afar. Only Actualized-possibility
itself understands itself and, in itself, all things—since all
things are enfolded in Actualized-possibility.
JOHN: I see clearly how all things are denied of Actualized-
possibility —since of all the things which can be named, none
of them are Actualized-possibility; for [each of them] is able
to be what it is not. Thus Actualized-possibility is not quan-
tity ; for since quantity is able to be what it is not, it is not
Actualized-possibility. For example, quantity is able to be
greater than it is or something other than it is. But this is not
the case with Actualized-possibility, which lacks neither a
greater magnitude which it is able to be nor anything at all
which it is able to be; for possibility itself is actually the
completest possibility.
31 But now answer my further question. Since that superwon-
derful God of ours cannot by any ascent—even the highest
ascent—naturally be viewed except through a symbolism:
when the possibility of being seen (rather than the actual
seeing) is attained and the seeker arrives at the shadowy
 98 Trialogus de possest

pervenit inquisitor: quomodo ergo demum ille qui manet

semper invisibilis videatur?
CARD: Nisi posse videri deducatur in actum per ipsum
qui est actualitas omnis potentiae per sui ipsius ostensio-
nem, non videbitur. Est enim deus occultus et absconditus
ab oculis omnium sapientum, sed revelat se parvulis seu 10
humilibus, quibus dat gratiam. Est unus ostensor, magister
scilicet lesus Christus. Ille in se ostendit patrem, ut qui
eum meruerit videre qui est films, videat et patrem.

IOH: Forte vis dicere, quod pater illis ostenditur, in quibus 32

Christus per fidem habitat.
CARD: Non potest Christus per fidem habitare in aliquo,
nisi habeat spiritum veritatis, qui docet omnia. Diffunditur
enim spiritus Christi per Christiformem et est spiritus cari-
tatis, qui non est de hoc mundo, nee mundus ipsum capere
potest, sed Christiformis qui mundum transiliit. Hie spiritus,
qui stultam facit mundi sapientiam, est illius regni, ubi
»videtur deus deorum in Sion«. Est enim virtus illuminativa
nati caeci, qui per fidem visum acquirit. Neque dici potest 10
quomodo hoc fiat. Quis enim dicere posset hoc? Nee qui ex
non-vidente factus est videns. Multis enim quaestionibus
interrogabatur illuminatus, sed artem qua Christus eum
178V fecit videntem nee scilvit nee dicere potuit. Sed bene dixit
ipsum facere potuisse sibi, quia credidit fieri posse videns
ab ipso, et hanc fidem respiciens noluit ipsam irritam esse.
Nemo enim umquam in ipso confidens derelictus est. Post-
quam enim homo est desperatus de se ipso, ita quod se
tamquam infirmum et penitus impotentem ad desiderati
apprehensionem certus est, convertit se ad arnatum suum, 20
 Oon Actualized -possibility 99

dimness, how is it that, at last, He-who-remains-ever-invisible

is seen?
CARDINAL: He will not be seen unless the possibility-to-be-
seen is actualized by Him who is the actuality of every pos-
sibility—actualized by means of His self-revelation. For God
is concealed and hidden from the eyes of all the wise; but
He reveals Himself to, and gives grace to, those who are small,
or humble. 41 There is one Revealer, viz., the Teacher Jesus
Christ. In His own self He reveals the Father, so that anyone
who attains the sight of He-who-is-Son sees the Father also.42
32 JOHN : Perhaps you mean that the Father is shown to those
in whom Christ dwells through faith.43
CARDINAL: Christ cannot dwell in anyone through faith
unless [this person] has the spirit-of-truth, which teaches all
things.44 For the spirit of Christ is imparted through one
who is Christlike. It is the spirit-of-love, which is not of this
world. This spirit can be understood not by the world but
by someone Christlike who has transcended45 the world. This
46
spirit, which renders foolish the wisdom of the world,
is of that kingdom where the God of gods is seen in Zion.47
For this spirit is the enlightening power of one who is born
blind and who acquires sight through faith. But we cannot
say how this happens. For who could explain it? Not even
the one who was transformed from not-seeing into seeing!
For he who received sight was questioned with many ques-
tions; but he neither knew nor could state the art by which
Christ restored his sight.48 Rather, he rightly said that Christ
had been able to do [this] for him because he believed that
he was able to be given sight by Christ. And Christ, seeing
his faith, was unwilling for it to be ineffectual; for no one
who trusts in Christ is ever abandoned [by Him]. For after
a man has despaired of himself—so that he is certain that
he is as someone infirm and completely helpless with respect
to obtaining what he desires —he turns to his Beloved and,
100 Trialogus de possest

indubia fide promissioni Christ! inhaerens, et pulsat oratione

devotissima, credens non posse derelinqui, si non cessaverit
pulsare Christum, qui suis nihil negat. Indubie assequetur
quaesitum. Apparebit enim Christus dei verbum et mani-
festabit se illi et cum patre suo ad ipsum veniet et mansio-
nem faciet, ut videri possit.

BERN: Capio te dicere velle quod viva fides, caritate scili- 33

cet formata quae facit quern Christiformem, ilia implet
defectum naturae et stringit quodammodo deum, ut quic-
quid in nomine Christi petierit assiduus orator, impetret.
Confortatur ex spiritu fidei concepto in spiritu nostro ipse
spiritus noster secundum mensuram fidei, sicut spiritus visi-
vus oculi caeci nati tenebrosus et impotens spiritu fidei
Christi sanatus et confortatus sibi prius invisibile vidit.

CARD: Ilia est suprema unici salvatoris nostri Christi doc-

trina, ipsum, qui est verbum dei per quod deus fecit et 10
saecula, omnia adimplere quae natura negat in eo, qui
ipsum ut verbum dei indubitata fide recipit, ut credens in
ea fide, in qua est Christus, potens sit ad omnia medio verbi
in eo per fidem habitantis.
Sicuti aliqua in hoc mundo medio humanae artis fieri 34
videmus per eos, qui artem habent in anima sua studio ac-
quisitam, ita quod ars est in ipsis recepta et manens et ver-
bum docens et imperans ea quae artis sunt, sic et ars divina,
quae firmissima fide acquisita est in spiritu nostro, est ver-
bum dei docens et imperans ea quae artis creativae et omni-
potentis exsistunt. Et sicut non potest indispositus artista
operari ea quae artis sunt, ita nee indispositus fidelis. Dis-
positio autem fidelis volentis deum videre, quae necessario
 On Actualized-possibility 101

clinging to the promise of Christ by sure faith, he importunes

in most devout prayer, believing that he cannot be cast away
if he does not cease to implore Christ, who denies nothing
to His own. Without doubt, he will obtain what is sought.
For Christ, the Word of God, will appear, and will manifest
Himself to him, and will come to him with His Father, and
will make His dwelling,49 so that He can be seen.
33 BERNARD: I take you to mean that living faith (i.e., faith
formed by love), which makes someone Christlike, fills the
defect of nature and somehow "constrains" God, so that the
fervent petitioner obtains whatever he asks for in the name
of Christ. According to the measure of its faith, our spirit is
strengthened as a result of the spirit-of-faith which is con-
ceived in it—just as, when healed and strengthened by the
spirit of faith in Christ, the dark and powerless visual spirit
of the eye of the one-born-blind sees what previously was
invisible to it.
CARDINAL: This is the supreme teaching of Christ, our only
savior: viz., that He Himself, who is the Word of God, through
which God created the world, provides all the things which
nature lacks —provides them in him who with unwavering
faith receives Christ as the Word of God, so that he, believing
by the faith in which Christ is present, can do all things by
means of the Word dwelling in him through faith.
34 In this world we see that some things are made by means
of a human art and by the agency of those who have in their
soul the art they have learned. Thus, the art is received in
them and remains; and it is a word which teaches and governs
those things which belong to the art. Similarly, the divine
art, which is acquired in our mind [spiritus] by very firm
faith, is the word of God which teaches and governs those
things which belong to the creative and omnipotent art. And
just as the artist who is untrained cannot do those things
which belong to the art, so neither can the believer who is
unprepared. Now, purity of heart is the preparation which
is necessarily required of the believer who wills to see God.
102 Trialogus de possest

requiritur, est munditia cordis. Illi enim beati sunt et deum 10

videbunt, ut verbum fidei Christi nostri nos docet.
BERN: Vellem de praemissis adhuc clarius si fieri posset 35
informari.
CARD: Arbitror necessarium quod qui videre deum cupit,
ipsum quantum potest desideret. Oportet enim quod posse
desiderare ipsius perficiatur, ut sic actu tantum ferveat
desiderium quantum desiderare potest. Hoc quidem desi-
derium est vivus amor, quo deum quaerens ipsum ex toto
corde, ex tota anima, hoc est ex omnibus viribus suis, quan-
tum scilicet potest, diligat. Quod quidem desiderium nemo
habet nisi qui Christum ut dei filium ita diligit sicut Chri- 10
stus ipsum, in quo utique per fidem Christus habitat, ita ut
dicere possit se spiritum Christi habere.
IOH: Intelligo fidem superare naturam et non esse deum 36
alia fide visibilem quam fide Christi. Qui cum sit verbum
dei omnipotentis et ars creativa, dum spiritui nostro ipsum
per fidem recipienti illabitur, super naturam elevat in sui
consortium spiritum nostrum, qui non haesitat propter inha-
bitantem in eo spiritum Christi et eius virtute supra omnia
ut verbum imperiale ferri.

BERN: Utique in verbo imperative cunctipotentis, qui dicit

et facta sunt, ipsa omnipotentia, quae deus creator et pater
omnium est, revelatur, neque in alio aliquo quam in suo 10
verbo potest revelari. Cui igitur hoc verbum se manifestat,
in ipso utique ut in filio pater ostenditur. Sed stupor est
ingens hominem posse per fidem ad verbum omnipotentis
ascendere.
CARD: Legimus aliquos subito artem verbi linguarum 37
dono sancti spiritus recepisse, ita ut de ignorantibus subito
facti sint scientes genera linguarum. Et haec vis non erat
nisi participatio verbi divinae artis. Illi tamen non habuerunt
 On Actualized-possibility 103

For[men-such-as]-these are blessed and shall see God, as the

word-of-faith of our Christ teaches us.50
35 BERNARD: I would like to be taught still more clearly
about these points if possible.
CARDINAL:! deem it necessary that anyone who desires
to see God desire Him as much as he can. For his ability-to-
desire must be perfected, so that his desire actually glows as
intensely as it can. Indeed, this desire is the vital love by
which the one who seeks God loves Him with his whole
heart, his whole soul —i.e., with all his might, i.e., as much
as he can.51 Indeed, no one has this desire except one who
loves Christ as the Son of God (even as Christ loves him).
Assuredly, Christ dwells in this [person] through faith, 552 so
that he can say that he has the spirit of Christ.
36 JOHN: I understand that faith surpasses nature and that
God is not visible by means of any other faith than faith in
Christ. Since Christ is the Word of the omnipotent God and
is the Creative Art: when He enters into our mind [spiritus],
which receives Him by faith, He elevates our mind above
nature into fellowship with Him. On account of, and by the
power of, the spirit-of-Christ which dwells in it, our mind
does not hesitate to be raised above all things, as is the Im-
perial Word.
BERNARD: Assuredly, Omnipotence itself—which God, the
creator and the father of all things, is —is revealed in the com-
manding Word of the Almighty, who speaks and it is done.53
Nor can Omnipotence itself be revealed in anything other
than in its Word. Therefore, to whomever this Word mani-
fests itself, [to him] the Father is shown in the Word, just
as in the Son. Yet how greatly amazing it is that man is able
to ascend by faith to the Word of the Almighty.
37 CARDINAL: We see it written 54 that by the gift of the Holy
Spirit some [persons] suddenly received the art of speaking
in tongues, so that they were suddenly transformed from
unknowing to knowing [different] kinds of tongues. This
power was nothing other than participation in the divine art
of speaking. Nonetheless, these [persons] had only human
 104 Trialogus de possest

scientiam nisi humanam, sed super hominem subito per in-

fusionem acquisitam. Alii non solum linguarum sed docto-
rum peritiam receperunt, alii virtutem miraculorum. Et
haec certa sunt. Fideles enim a principio cum fide viva
179f talem spiritum receperunt, ut certi | essent fidem tantae vir-
tutis esse. Et sic si plantari debuit expediebat, non modo 10
post eius receptionem, ut non quaerat signa sed sit pura et
simplex.

Hie spiritus per fideles receptus quamvis cum mensura, 38

tamen est spiritus Christi participator nos certos faciens
quod quando in nobis habitaret integer spiritus Christi, ulti-
mum felicitatis assecuti essemus, scilicet potestatem verbi
dei per quod omnia, scilicet nostrae creationis scientiam.
Felicitas enim ultima, quae est visio intellectualis ipsius
cunctipotentis, estadimpletio illius desiderii nostri quo oni-
nes scire desideramus. Nisi igiturad scientiam dei quamun-
dum creavit pervenerimus, non quietatur spiritus. Semper
enim restabit scientia scientiarum, quamdiu illam non attin- 10
git. Et haec scientia est verbi dei notitia, quia verbum dei
est conceptus sui et universi. Qui enim non pervenerit ad
hunc conceptum, neque ad scientiam dei attinget neque se
ipsum cognoscet. Non enim potest se causatum cognoscere
causa ignorata. Ideo hie intellectus cum sit omnia ignorans,
intellectualiter in »umbra mortis« perpetua egestate trista-
bitur.

IOH: Incidit mihi videre fidem esse videre deum. 39

BERN: Quomodo?
IOH: Nam fides est invisibilium et aeternorum. Videre
ergo fidem est videre invisibile, aeternum seu deum nostrum.
 On Actualized-possibility 105

knowledge; but it was acquired suddenly by a transcendent

infusion. Some of them received not only a knowledge of
tongues but also a knowledge of the doctors [of the Church];
others received the power of miracles. Now, these things
[which we read] are certain. Indeed, from the beginning
[these] believers received, together with living faith, such a
spirit—so that they would be certain that faith is of such great
power. And such was expedient if faith was to be planted.
But it does not occur now, after faith has been received, so
that faith does not seek signs but is pure and simple.
38 Although this spirit is received by believers in measured
degree,55 it is a participant in the spirit of Christ. And it makes
us certain that if the whole spirit of Christ had dwelt in us,
we would have obtained the highest degree of happiness, viz.,
the power of the Word of God (through which Word all things
exist), i.e., a knowledge of our creation. For the highest de-
gree of happiness—viz., the intellectual vision of the Al-
mighty—is the fulfillment of that desire of ours whereby
we all desire to know. Therefore, unless we arrive at the
knowledge of God—viz., the knowledge by which he created
the world —our mind (spiritus) will not be at rest.56 For as
long as the mind does not attain to this knowledge, it will
not attain to complete knowledge (scientia scientiarum).This
knowledge is the knowledge of God's Word; for the Word of
God is the Concept both of itself and of the universe. Indeed,
anyone who does not arrive at this Concept will not attain
to a knowledge of God and will not know himself. For what
is caused cannot know itself if the cause remains unknown.
And so, since this intellect does not know all things, it will
grieve intellectually in the shadow of death with eternal de-
privation.
39 JOHN: It occurs to me that to see faith is to see God.
BERNARD: How SO?
JOHN: Well, faith is directed toward invisible and eternal
things.57 Hence, to see faith is to see the Invisible and Eter-
nal One, viz., our God.
106 Trialogus de possest

CARD: Non es parvum verbum locutus, mi abba. In Chri-

stiano vero non est nisi Christus: in hoc mundo per fidem,
in alio per veritatem. Quando igitur Christianus Christum
videre quaerens facialiter linquet omnia quae huius mundi
sunt, ut iis subtractis quae non sinebant Christum, qui de
hoc mundo non est, sicuti est videri, in eo raptu fidelis in 10
se sine aenigmate Christum videt, quia se a mundo absolu-
tum qui est Christiformis videt. Non ergo nisi fidem videt,
quae sibi facta est visibilis per denudationem mundialium
et sui ipsius facialem ostensionem.

BERN: Haec certe meo iudicio magna sunt valde et quam 40

breviter atque clare a te dicta. Vellem tamen adhuc aliquid
a te, pater, audire de sacratissima trinitate, ut de omnibus
maximis aliquo a te sic audito mihi ipsi aliqualem praestare
possem devotam consolationem.

CARD: Semper varie multa dici posse, licet insufficientis-

sime, haec quae praemisi et quae in variis libellis meis
legisti ostendunt. Multis enim valde et saepissime profun-
dissimis meditationibus mecum habitis diligentissimeque
quaesitis antiquorum scriptis repperi ultimam atque altissi- 10
mam de deo considerationem esse interminam seu infinitam
seu excedentem omnem conceptum. Omne enim cuius con-
ceptus est aliquis, utique in conceptu clauditur. Deus autem
id omne excedit. Nam conceptus de deo est conceptus seu
verbum absolutum in se omne conceptibile complicans, et
hie non est conceptibilis in alio. Omne enim in alio aliter
est. Nihil enim per intellectum actu concipitur ut concipi
posset. Per altiorem enim intellectum melius conciperetur.
Solus per se seu absolutus conceptus est actu omnis con-
 On Actualized-possibility 107

CARDINAL: You have made an important statement, Abbot.

In the Christian there is only Christ. In this world [Christ is
in the Christian] through faith; in the other world [He will be
in the Christian] through truth. Therefore, when the Christian
who is seeking to see Christ face to face leaves behind all the
things which are out of this world (for example, after the
removal of those things which were not permitting Christ —
who is not of this world —to be seen as He is): in this rapture
the believer sees Christ in his own self apart from a symbolism.
For he who is Christlike sees himself, free from the world.
Therefore, he sees only faith, which has been made visible
to him by the stripping away of worldly things and by the
face-to-face revealing of his own self.
40 BERNARD: In my judgment these points are surely very
significant. How concisely and clearly you have put them!
Nevertheless, Father, I would still like to hear from you
something about the most sacred Trinity, so that after hav-
ing thus heard from you something about all the most im-
portant points, I may be able to provide myself with some
sort of devout consolation.
CARDINAL: The points which I have set forth above and
which you have read in various of my short treatises show
that in various ways many things can always be said, although
most inadequately. For after having very often held very
many exceedingly deep meditations with myself, and after
having very carefully sought out the writings of the ancients,
I have ascertained that the ultimate and deepest contempla-
tion of God is boundless, infinite, and in excess of every con-
cept. For, assuredly, every thing of which there is a concept
is encompased by [that] concept. But God exceeds all this.
For the concept of God is [an absolute] Concept, or an ab-
solute Word, which enfolds within itself everything which
can be conceived; but it is not conceivable in anything else.
For everything [which exists] in something other than itself
exists differently. 58 For it is not the case that anything is
actually conceived by the intellect as it could be conceived.
For it could be better conceived by a higher intellect. Only
the per se, or absolute, Concept is actually every conceivable
 108 Trialogus de possest

ceptibilis conceptus. Sed noster conceptus, qui non est per 20

se seu absolutus conceptus sed alicuius conceptus, ideo per
se conceptum non concipit, cum ille non sit plus unius
quam alterius, cum sit absolutus.
Ideo istum infinibilem et interminabilem seu inconcepti- 41
bilem dei conceptum ob suam infinitatem etiam dicimus
necessario ineffabilem. Verbum enim illud nullo nomine
seu termino finiri seu diffiniri per nos potest, cum concipi
nequeat. Sic neque ipsum nominamus unum nee trinum
nee alio quocumque nomine, cum omnem conceptum unius
et trini et cuiuscumque nominabilis excedat, sed ab eo re-
movemus omne omnium conceptibilium nomen, cum ex-
cellat.
IOH: Quanto igitur intellectus intelligit conceptum dei 10
minus formabilem, tanto maior est, ut mihi videtur.

CARD: Recte dicis, abba. Ideo quicumque putat appre-

hendisse ipsum, sciat hoc ex defectu et parvitate sui intel-
lectus evenire.

BERN: Doctior igitur est sciens se scire non posse.

CARD: Hoc necessario omnes illuminatissimi etiam dicent.

BERN: Dum considero nihil concipi per nos posse uti est
179V conceptibile, clare mi|hi constat deum concipi non posse,
qui concipi utique non potest nisi omnis conceptibilitas
actu concipiatur. 20
CARD: Scimus quod omnis numerabilis proportio diametri 42
ad costam est inattingibilis, cum nulli duo numeri dari pos-
sent, qui praecise sic se habeant. Sed quibuscumque datis
habitude eorum est aut maior aut minor quam diametri ad
costam, et quibuscumque datis possunt dari numeri propin-
 On Actualized-possibility 109

concept. But our concept—which is not the per se, or abso-

lute, Concept but is the concept of some thing—does not
conceive of the per se Concept. For the latter is the Concept
no more of one thing than of another, since it is absolute.
41 And so this unlimitable and unboundable, or inconceiv-
able, concept of God we must also call ineffable, because of
its infinity. For by no name or term can we limit or define
that Word, since it cannot be conceived. Thus we do not give
God the name "one" or "three" or call Him by any other
name whatsoever; for He exceeds every concept of one or of
three or of whatsoever nameable thing. Rather, we remove
from God every name for any conceivable thing, since He
excels [every conceivable thing].
JOHN: So then, the more an intellect understands the de-
gree to which the concept of God is unformable, the greater
this intellect is, it seems to me.
CARDINAL: Your statement is correct, Abbot. And so,
whoever supposes that he has apprehended God, knows that
this [belief] results from the deficiency and meagerness of
his intellect.
BERNARD: Therefore, the one who knows that he is un-
able to know is the more learned.
CARDINAL: All, even the most brilliant, will have to say this.
BERNARD: When I consider that we are unable to conceive
of any thing as it is able to be conceived, it is clear to me that
God is not able to be conceived. For, assuredly, God is not
able to be conceived unless all that is able to be conceived
is actually conceived.
42 CARDINAL: We know that we cannot obtain any numerical
proportion between the diagonal and the side [of a square],
since no two numbers can be exhibited which are related to
each other in precisely this way.59 Given any [two numbers],
the relationship between them is either greater or lesser than
the relationship between the diameter and the side. And given
any [two numbers, two other] numbers can be found which
110 Trialogus de possest

quiores illi habitudini. Et ita videtur possibilis, sed actu

numquam datur ilia possibilitas. Actus autem esset prae-
cisio, ita quod numeri praecise se sic haberent. Ratio est:
Quia nisi numerus detur qui nee par nee impar, non erit
quaesitus. Omnis autem numerus quem nos concipimus 10
necessario est par vel impar et non simul; ideo deficimus.
Videmus tamen quod apud ilium conceptum qui concipit
nobis impossibile praecisio exsistit. Sic dicere nos oportet
quod noster conceptus non potest proportionem ipsius posse
et ipsius esse attingere, cum nullum medium commune
habeamus per quod attingamus habitudinem, cum posse sit
infinitum et indeterminatum et actus finitus et terminatus,
inter quae non cadit medium. Sed videmus ilia in deo esse
indistincta, et ideo est supra nostrum conceptum.

BERN: Cum omne quod per nos scitur non sciatur sicut 20
sciri potest — potest enim melius sciri —, sola scientia dei,
ubi omne posse est actu, est perfecta et praecisa.

IOH: Nonne, Bernarde, verissimum est bis duo esse quat- 43

tuor et omnem triangulum habere tres angulos aequales
duobus rectis?
BERN: Immo.
IOH: Non est igitur verum quod nostra scientia non attin-
gat praecisam veritatem.
CARD: Oportet ut consideretur id quod dicitur. Nam in
mathematicis quae ex nostra ratione procedunt et nobis ex-
perimur inesse sicut in suo principio per nos ut nostra seu
rationis entia sciuntur praecise, scilicet praecisione tali ratio- 10
nali a qua prodeunt, sicut realia sciuntur praecise praeci-
sione divina a qua in esse procedunt. Et non sunt ilia mathe-
maticalia neque quid neque quale sed notionalia a ratione
nostra elicita, sine quibus non posset in suum opus proce-
dere, scilicet aedificare, mensurare et cetera. Sed opera
 On Actualized-possibility 111

are closer to the relation in question. Hence, although it

seems possible [that there are two precise numbers], this
possibility is never actually exhibited. (But the actualization
would be the precise proportion, so that the numbers would
be related in this precise way.) The reason is that unless there
is exhibited a number which is neither even nor odd, it will
not be the number in question. But every number which we
conceive is, necessarily, even or odd (but not both). And so
we fail [to find the desired number]. However, we see that
precision is present in that concept which expresses what is
impossible for us [to conceive]. Thus we have to say that
our concept cannot attain to the proportion between this
possibility and this actuality. 60 For we have no common
medium by which to attain to the relationship, since the
possibility is infinite and indeterminate, whereas the actuality
is finite and determined; and between these there is no middle
ground. But we see that these [viz., possibility and actuality]
are not distinct in God. And so, He is above our concept.
BERNARD: Since it is not the case that anything known by
us is known as it can be known (for it can be better known):
only a knowledge of God, in whom every possibility actually
exists, is perfect and precise.
43 JOHN: Isn't it altogether true, Bernard, that twice two is
four and that every triangle has three angles, which are equal
to two right angles?
BERNARD: Indeed.
JOHN: Therefore, it is not true that our knowledge does
not attain to the precise truth.
CARDINAL: We must examine what is being said. For with
mathematical [entities], which proceed from our reason and
which we experience to be in us as in their source [princi-
pium}: they are known by us as our entities and as rational
entities; [and they are known] precisely, by our reason's
precision, from which they proceed. (In a similar way, real
things (realia)61 are known precisely, by the divine [intel-
lect's] precision, from which they proceed into being.) These
mathematical [entities] are neither an essence (quid) nor a
quality (quale}; rather they are notional entities elicited from
our reason. Without these notional entities reason could not
proceed with its work, e.g., with building, measuring, and
so on. But the divine works, which proceed from the divine
112 Trialogus de possest

divina, quae ex divino intellectu procedunt, manent nobis

uti sunt praecise incognita, et si quid cognoscimus de illis,
per assimilationem figurae ad formam coniecturamur. Unde
omnium operum dei nulla est praecisa cognitio nisi apud
eum qui ipsa operatur. Et si quam de ipsis habemus noti- 20
tiam, illam ex aenigmate et speculo cognitae mathematicae
elicimus: sicut formam quae dat esse a figura quae dat esse
in mathematicis. Sicut figura trianguli dat esse triangulo,
ita forma seu species humana dat esse homini. Figuram
trianguli cognoscimus, cum sit imaginabilis, formam huma-
nam non, cum non sit imaginabilis nee sit quanta quanti-
tate discreta seu continua. Omne autem, quod non cadit
sub multitudine nee magnitudine, non potest nee concipi
nee imaginari nee de eo phantasma fieri; sic nee praecise
intelligi. Oportet enim omnem intelligentem phantasmata 30
speculari. Ideo de his potius 'quia est' quam 'quid est'
attingitur.

BERN: Si igitur recte consideraverimus, nihil certi habe- 44

mus in nostra scientia nisi nostram mathematicam, et ilia
est aenigma ad venationem operum dei. Ideo magni viri si
aliquid magni locuti sunt, illud in similitudine mathemati-
cae fundarunt: ut illud quod species se habent ut numeri
et sensitivum in rationali sicut trigonum in tetragono et
talia multa.

CARD: Bene dicis. Ideo hie sic dixerim, ut sciatis quod si

illam theologiam Christianorum deum esse unum et trinum
in aenigmate videre volumus, recurrere nos possumus ad 10
principium mathematicae: illud utique est unum pariter et
trinum. Videmus enim quantitatem, sine qua non est mathe-
matica, esse discretam, cuius principium est unum, et con-
 On Actualized-possibility 113

intellect, remain unknown to us precisely as they are. If we

know something about them, we surmise it by likening a
figure to a form. Hence there is no precise knowledge of any
of God's works, except on the part of God, who does all
these works. If we have any knowledge of them, we derive
it from the symbolism and the mirror of [our] mathematical
knowledge —even as with mathematical [entities] we [derive]
a form-which-gives-being from a figure which gives being.
[For example,] just as the figure of a triangle gives being to
the triangle, so the human form, or species, gives being to a
man. We are acquainted with the figure of a triangle since it is
imaginable; but we are not acquainted with the human form,
since it is not imaginable and does not have quantity (whether
the quantity be discrete quantity or a combination of quan-
tities). Now, anything which does not admit of multitude
or magnitude cannot be either conceived or imagined, and
no image of it can be fashioned. Hence it cannot be under-
stood precisely. (For every one who understands must behold
images.) And so, we apprehend that it is, rather than appre-
hending what it is.
44 BERNARD: So if we rightly consider [the matter, we recog-
nize that] we have no certain knowledge except mathemati-
cal knowledge. And this latter is a symbolism for searching
into the works of God. Thus, if great men have said any-
thing important, they base it upon a mathematical likeness
—for example, that species are related to one another as are
numbers, that the sensitive is in the rational as a triangle is
in a quadrangle, and many other such comparisons.
CARDINAL: Your statement is correct. And so, let me speak
here in such way that both of you will know [the following]:
if we want to see by means of a symbolism that Christian
theological doctrine that God is one and three, we can have
recourse to the beginning (principium)6262 of mathematics.
Assuredly, this beginning is both one and three alike. For we
see that quantity—without which there is no mathematics
—is both a discrete quantity, whose beginning is one, and a
 114 Trialogus de possest

tinuam, cuius principium est trinum. Nee sunt duo princi-

pia mathematicae, sed unum quod et trinum.

BERN: Capio bene quoad discretam quantitatem unum

principium, sed non quoad continuam trinum.

CARD: Prima figura quantitatis continuae est trigonus, in

quam aliae figurae resolvuntur, quod ostendit ipsam esse
180r primam. Tetragonus in trigonos resolvitur. Sed trigonus 20
non potest resolvi in duorum angulorum aut unius anguli
figuram. Quare patet primum principium mathematicae esse
unitrinum.
BERN: Si igitur viderem principium mathematicae in sua 45
puritate, utique sine pluralitate ipsum viderem unitrinum.
Principium enim est ante alteritatem et pluralitatem et tale,
quod omnia principiata quando in simplex resolvuntur, ad
ipsum terminantur.

CARD: Optime. Sed attende: Ut principium videatur,

necesse est abstrahi simplex, sine quo nihil principiatorum
esse potest. Si igitur simplex, sine quo nee numerus nee
figura esse potest, est id quod non est plus unum quam
trinum et ita unum quod trinum et non est trinum ex 10
numero, cum numerus sit principiatum, sed trinum ut sit
perfectum principium omnium, ita in aenigmate videtur
deus unitrinus ut sit perfectissimum principium omnium.

IOH: Sine numero dicis eum trinum. Nonne tres personae 46

sunt ex ternario numero tres personae?
CARD: Nequaquam. Quia numerus quern tu conspicis
dum hoc dicis est mathematicus et ex mente nostra elicitus,
cuius principium est unitas. Sed trinitas in deo non est ab
alio principio, sed est principium.

BERN: Utique trinitas in principio est principium et non

est a numero, qui non potest esse ante principium. »Omnis«
 On Actualized-possibility 115

combination of quantities, whose beginning is three. But

there are not two beginnings of mathematics; rather there is
one beginning which is also three.
BERNARD: As concerns discrete quantity, I understand
well the one beginning; but as concerns a combination of
quantities, I do not understand the trine beginning.
CARDINAL: The first figure [composed] of a combination
of quantities is a triangle, to which the other figures are re-
ducible—a fact which shows that it is the first. A quadrangle
is reducible to a triangle. But a triangle cannot be reduced
to a figure of two angles or of one angle. Therefore, it is
evident that the first beginning of mathematics is triune.
45 BERNARD: So if I were to see the beginning of mathematics
in its purity, assuredly I would see it to be triune without
plurality. For the beginning is prior to otherness and plurality,
and is such that when all the things which are originated are
reduced to the simple (simplex), they end at this beginning.
CARDINAL: Perfectly correct. But consider [the foil owing]:
to see the beginning, it is necessary that the simple (simplex)
be abstracted. For none of the things which are originated
can exist without the simple. Therefore, if the simple, with-
out which neither number nor figure is able to exist, is that
which is no more one than three and is one in such way that
it is three and is not three in number—since number is some-
thing originated —but is three in such way that it is the per-
fect beginning of all things: then, in a symbolism, God is
seen to be triune in such way that He is the most perfect Be-
ginning of all things.
46 JOHN: You say that God is three but not numerically three.
Are not the three persons numerically three persons?
CARDINAL: Not at all. For the number which you view
when you say this, is a mathematical number and is derived
from our mind; and the beginning of this number [three] is
oneness. But with God, trinity does not exist from any other
beginning; rather, it is the Beginning.
BERNARD: Assuredly, in [this] Beginning the trinity /'sthe
Beginning and does not exist from number, which cannot
116 Trialogus de possest

enim »multitudinis unitas est principium«. Si igitur trinitas

in divinis esset numerus, et principiata a se ipsa esset. 10

CARD: Vides igitur primum principium unitrinum ante

omnem numerum. Et si non potes hoc concipere quod sit
ante numerum, hoc est ideo quia tuus intellectus sine nume-
ro nihil concipit. Id tamen, quod concipere nequit, videt
supra conceptum negari non posse et credit. Sicut igitur
deum magnum sine quantitate continua, ita trinum sine
quantitate discreta seu numero. Et sicut credit deum ma-
gnum sibi attribuendo magnitudinem, ita credit trinum sibi
attribuendo numerationem.

IOH: Intelligo nos consideratione creaturarum habita crea- 47

torem unitrinum affirmare, qui — ut praedictum est — in se
manet omni modo dicendi ineffabilis.

CARD: Recte ais. Nam sine potentia et actu atque utrius-

que nexu non est nee esse potest quicquam. Si enim aliquid
horum deficeret, non esset. Quomodo enim esset si esse non
posset? Et quomodo esset si actu non esset, cum esse sit
actus? Et si posset esse et non esset, quomodo esset? Opor-
tet igitur utriusque nexum esse. Et posse esse et actu esse
et nexus non sunt alia et alia. Sunt enim eiusdem essentiae, 10
cum non faciant nisi unum et idem. Rosa in potentia et
rosa in actu et rosa in potentia et actu est eadem et non
alia et diversa, licet posse et actus et nexus non verificentur
de se invicem sicut de rosa.

BERN: Bene capio non posse negari dum mente rosam

video me unitrinam videre. Nam ipsam video in posse. Si
enim posse de ea negaretur, utique non posset esse. Video
ipsam in esse. Si enim esse de ea negaretur, quomodo esset?
 On Actualized-possibility 117

exist before the Beginning. (For oneness is the beginning of

all multitude.) Therefore, if in God trinity were number, it
would be originated from itself.
CARDINAL: You see, then, that the First Beginning is triune-
prior-to-all-number. And if you cannot conceive of the fact
that it is prior to number, the reason is that your intellect
conceives of nothing without a number. Nevertheless, your
intellect sees that that-which-it-cannot-conceive cannot be
denied beyond conception; and it believes [what it cannot
conceive]. Therefore, just as [it believes] that God is great
without a combination of quantities, so [it believes] that He
is three without number or discrete quantity. And just as it
believes that God is great and ascribes magnitude to Him, so
it believes that He is three and ascribes number to Him.
47 JOHN: I see that on the basis of the examination which we
have made of creatures we affirm that the Creator is triune,
even though (as was said) in Himself He remains ineffable
with respect to every mode of discourse.
CARDINAL: What you say is correct. For without possibility
and actuality and the union of the two there is not, and can-
not be, anything. For if something lacked these, it would
not exist. For how would it exist if it were not possible to
exist? And how would it exist if it did not actually exist
(since existence is actuality)? And if it were possible to exist
but it did not exist, in what sense would it exist? (Therefore,
it is necessary that there be the union of possibility and ac-
tuality.) The possibility-to-exist, actually existing, and the
union of the two are not other than one another. Indeed,
they are of the same essence, since they constitute only one
and the same thing.63 [For example, consider a rose.] The
possible rose, the actual rose, and the possible rose which is
actual are not different roses from one another but are the
same rose—even though possibility, actuality, and their union
are not predicated truly of one another as they are of a rose.
BERNARD: I understand well that [the following] cannot
be denied: when with my mind I see a rose, I see a triune
rose. (1) For I see the possible rose. (For if possibility were
denied of the rose, assuredly the rose would not be possible
to exist.) (2) I [also] see the existing rose. (For if existence
were denied of it, how is it that it would exist?) (3) And I
 118 Trialogus de possest

Et video ipsam in nexu utriusque. Negate enim utriusque

nexu non esset actu, cum nihil sit actu nisi possit esse et 20
sit; ab his enim procedit actualis exsistentia.

Sic video unitrinam rosam ab unitrino principio. Hoc 48

autem principium in omnibus relucere video, cum nullum
sit principiatum non unitrinum. Sed omnia principiata video
nihil esse principii, licet omnia sint in ipso ut in causa et
ratione. Deus igitur non est ut rosa unitrina. Nihil enim
habet aeternum principium a principiato, sed est unitrinitas
absoluta, a qua omnia unitrina id sunt quod sunt.

IOH: Mini similiter ut tibi, Bernarde, videtur. Nee alius

est deus a quo est rosa in potentia, alius a quo in esse et
alius a quo in nexu utriusque, cum non sit alia rosa quae 10
est in posse et alia quae in esse et alia quae in nexu, sed
unitrina. Sed cum Christiani dicant aliam esse personam
ipsius absoluti posse, quam nominamus patrem omnipoten-
tem, et aliam ipsius esse, quam quia est ipsius posse nomi-
namus filium patris, et aliam utriusque nexum, quam spiri-
tum vocamus, cum naturalis amor sit nexus spiritalis patris
et filii: has personales differentias quomodo in aenigmate
videre debeam, non capio.

CARD: Bene dicis, abba, aliam esse personam patris, aliam 49

180V filii, aliam spiritus sancti in divinis propter infinitae per-
fectionis trinitatem. Non tamen est alia persona patris per
aliquam alteritatem, cum omnem alteritatem supergredia-
tur benedicta trinitas, quae non est ab alio, sed per se est
id quod est. Ideo pater non est aliud a filio propter identi-
tatem essentiae et naturae, sed non est filius. Non per non-
esse pater non est filius, cum ante omne non-esse sit deus
unitrinus, sed quia esse praesupponit posse, cum nihil sit
 On Actualized-possibility 119

see the possible and the existing rose in union. (For if the
union of the two were denied [of the rose], the rose would
not actually exist, since nothing actually exists unless it is
possible to exist and does exist. For actual existence pro-
48 ceeds from these two.) Thus I see a triune rose from a triune
Beginning.
However, I see that this Beginning is manifest in all things,
since nothing which is originated fails to be triune. But I
see that none of the things which have been originated are
a part of this Beginning, even though all things exist in it as
in their Cause and Form. Therefore, God is not [triune] as
a rose is triune. For an eternal Beginning has nothing from
what is originated; rather, it is absolute Triunity, from which
all triune things are what they are.
JOHN: [This point] seems to me the same as it seems to
you, Bernard. God from whom there is the possible rose,
God from whom there is the existing rose, and God from
whom there is the rose which is the union of the two are
not different gods. For the possible rose, the existing rose,
and the rose which is the union of the two are not different
roses but are a triune rose. Now, Christians distinguish the
following persons: (1) the person of Absolute Possibility
itself, whom we call the omnipotent Father; (2) the person
of Existence itself, whom —because He is of possibility it-
self—we call the Son of the Father-, (3) the person who is
the Union of both and whom we call the Spirit, since natural
love is the spiritual union of the Father and the Son. Al-
though [Christians make these distinctions], I do not discern
how I am supposed to see these differences of person by
means of a symbolism.
49 CARDINAL: On account of the infinitely perfect Trinity in
God, you are right, Abbot, in saying that the person of the
Father, the person of the Son, and the person of the Holy
Spirit are distinct. Nevertheless, the person of the Father is
not distinct by virtue of any otherness; for the blessed Trinity,
which is not from anyone else but which through itself is
what it is, transcends all otherness. And so, on account of
the identity of essence (or of nature) the Father is not some-
thing other than the Son; yet the Father is not the Son. That
the Father is not the Son is not on account of not-being; for
God is triune prior to all not-being. Rather, the reason is
that existence presupposes possibility (since it is not the case
120 Trialogus de possest

nisi possit a quo est, posse vero nihil praesupponit, cum 10

posse sit aeternitas. Ideo cum videam deum qui non prae-
supponat sui principium et videam deum praesupponentem
sui principium et videam deum procedentem ab utroque et
non videam tres deos sed unitatem deitatis in trinitate, id
quod sic video distincte in indistincta deitate verius et per-
fectius esse non dubito quam ego videam. Ideo sicut video
ipsum absolutum posse in aeternitate esse aeternitatem et
non video ipsum esse in aeternitate ipsius posse nisi ab ipso
posse, sic credo ipsum posse aeternum habere hypostasim
et esse per se et de ipso deo patre, qui est per se, generari 20
deum, qui sit omne id quod est ab ipsa omnipotentia patris,
ut sit filius omnipotentiae, id scilicet sit quod pater possit:
omnipotens sit de absoluto posse seu omnipotente. A quibus
procedat omnipotentiae et omnipotentis nexus. Video deum
aeternaliter et eundem deum de deo aeternaliter ac eundem
deum ab utroque aeternaliter procedentem. Sed quia
subtilius sancti hoc viderunt quam nos, satis sit nos ad hoc
devenisse quod sicut perfectio principii deposcit quod sit
unum, ita deposcit veraciter quod sit trinum.

Non esset enim unitas naturalis et perfectissima, nisi in 50

se haberet omnia quae ad perfectissimum principium sunt
necessaria, quae per trinitatem exprimuntur. Neque trinitas
esset perfecta, nisi esset una quae unitas. Non enim unitas
quae de deo dicitur est mathematica, sed est vera et viva
omnia complicans. Nee trinitas est mathematica, sed viva-
citer correlativa. Unitrina enim vita est, sine qua non est
laetitia sempiterna et perfectio suprema. Unde de essentia
perfectissimae vitae est, quod sit perfectissime unitrina, ut
 On Aetualized-possibility 121

that anything exists unless there is possibility, from which it

exists) but possibility presupposes nothing (since possibility
is eternity). And so, since I see (1) God who does not presup-
pose a beginning for Himself, (2) God who does presuppose
a beginning for Himself, and (3) God who proceeds from
both of these—and yet I do not see three gods but see one-
ness-of-deity in trinity— I do not doubt that that which I see
thus distinctly in the deity-without-distinctions exists more
truly and more perfectly than I see.
And so, just as I see that eternal Absolute Possibility is
eternity and that the eternal Existence of Absolute Possibility
is only from Absolute Possibility, so I believe that eternal
Possibility has distinct being [bypostasis] and exists per se.
And [I believe that] from God the Father, who exists per se,
is begotten God who from the omnipotence of the Father is
all that He is. Thus He is the Son of Omnipotence, i.e., He
is that which the Father can. He is the Almighty from Abso-
lute Possibility (i.e., from the Almighty). From these [two]
proceeds the Union of Omnipotence and the Almighty. I
see (1) God [existing] eternally, (2) the same God [existing]
eternally from God, and (3) the same God proceeding eter-
nally from them both. But because the saints have seen this
more clearly than we, 64 it is enough that we have come to
the point [of seeing] that just as the perfection of the Be-
50 ginning requires that it be one, so it truly requires that it be
three. For the oneness would not be natural and most per-
fect if it did not have within itself all the things necessary
for the most perfect Beginning—which necessary things are
represented in terms of trinity. Nor would the trinity be per-
fect if it were not one trinity which is oneness. For the one-
ness which is predicated of God is not a mathematical one-
ness but is a true and living oneness which enfolds all things.
And the trinity [which is predicated of God] is not a mathe-
matical trinity but a trinity of vitally reciprocal relations. For
life, without which there is no eternal joy and no supreme
perfection, is triune. Hence it is of the essence of the most
perfect Life that it be most perfectly triune, so that the
122 Trialogus de possest

posse vivere sit adeo omnipotens, quod de se sui ipsius 10

generet vitam. A quibus procedit spiritus amoris et laetitia
sempiterna.
IOH: Quaeso parum audiri, si forte aliquid de his altis 51
percepi. Et ad possest me converto. Cum omne quod est
non sit nisi id quod potest esse, possest video omnium for-
mabilium formam verissimam et adaequatissimam. Sed in
omni re video posse, esse et utriusque nexum, sine quibus
impossible est ipsam esse, et ilia video in qualibet re sic
esse quod perfectius esse possunt. Ideo ubi haec sunt adeo
perfecta quod perfectius esse nequeunt, ut in possest, ibi
video omnium exsistentium unitrinum principium. In per-
fectione igitur primi principii necesse est omnium principia- 10
bilium esse perfectionem. Quae si maior concipi posset, uti-
que non esset perfectio principii sed principiati.

CARD: Ita oportet quod humanus intellectus, qui primum

principium sibi absconditum uti est capere nequit, ex prin-
cipiatis intellects — ut Paulus nos instruit — videat. Oportet
ergo, si posse debet esse perfectissimum, quod in ipso sit
esse et utriusque nexus. Sic si esse debet esse perfectissi-
mum, oportet quod in ipso sit posse et utriusque nexus. Et
si nexus debet esse perfectissimus, oportet in ipso esse
posse et actum sen esse. Haec ergo videmus necessario in20
perfectissimo unitrino principio, licet quomodo haec se
habeant, omnem intellectum exsuperet.

BERN: Audi quaeso me, si huius tui dicti habeo intellec- 52

turn. Et converto me ad motum. In essentia enim illius
video primo posse et ab illo generari actum atque ab utroque
procedere movere, qui est nexus ipsius posse et actus. Om-
nis autem motus qui concipi potest non est sicut esse potest
 On Actualized-possibility 123

Possibility-to-live is so omnipotent that from itself it begets

a Life of its own. From these [two] proceeds eternal Joy and
the Spirit of love.
51 JOHN: I ask to be heard a little, as to whether I have dis-
cerned something about these deep matters. I turn to [the
concept of] actualized-possibility. Since everything which
exists is only that which is able to be, 5 I see that Actualized-
65

possibility is the truest and most congruent Form of all

things formable. Now, in every thing, I see possibility, exis-
tence, and the union of the two; without these it is impos-
sible for any thing to exist. Moreover, I see that they are
present in any given thing in such way that they are able to
exist more perfectly. And so, where they are so perfect that
they cannot exist more perfectly— as in Actualized-possibility
—there I see the triune Beginning of all existing things. There-
fore, in the perfection of the First Beginning it is necessary
that there be present the perfection of all things which can
have a beginning. If this perfection could be conceived to
be greater, then assuredly it would be the perfection not of
the Beginning66 but of what is originated.
CARDINAL: So the human intellect, which is unable to grasp
the First Beginning as it is, must see this Beginning—which is
hidden from it —on the basis of having understood originated
things, as Paul teaches us.67 Hence, if possibility is to be the
most perfect possibility, it is necessary that there be in it
existence and the union of possibility and existence. Like-
wise, if existence is to be the most perfect existence, it is
necessary that there be in it possibility and the union of pos-
sibility and existence. And if [this] union is to be the most
perfect union, it is necessary that there be in it possibility and
actuality, or existence. Therefore, necessarily, we see these68
in the most perfect triune Beginning, although in what man-
ner they are there present surpasses all understanding.
52 BERNARD: Listen to me, I ask, as to whether I understand
your speech. I turn to [the topic of] motion. For in the essence
of motion I see, first of all, possibility; and [I see that] from
possibility actuality is begotten, and from these two there pro-
ceeds motion, which is the union of possibility and actuality.
Yet no motion which can be conceived is as motion can be.
 124 Trialogus de possest

motus, quia potest esse tardior et velocior motus, et ideo in

posse ipsius non est actus et nexus utriusque, quando non
movetur actus sicut potest moveri. Sed si motus esset id
quod esse potest, tune in posse foret actus et nexus aequa-
liter. Quantum posset tantum in posse esset actu. Et talis 10
181r esset utriusque nexus. Ita de esse et nexu. Sed hie motus
non intelligeretur. Narn cum esset id quod esse potest
motus, utique neque maior neque minor esse posset et ita
foret maximus pariter et minimus, velocissimus pariter et
tardissimus seu quietissimus. Et quia foret motus cui quies
non opponitur, ideo sublata oppositione nomen motus sibi
non competeret, immo non plus foret motus quam non-
motus, licet foret exemplar, forma, mensura et veritas omnis
motus.

Motus autem qui intelligitur, cui quies opponitur, ille 53

intelligitur, quia terminatur quiete ei opposita, et concipitur
per finitum conceptum. Quando igitur intelligitur hunc con-
ceptum de motu non esse conceptum motus qui id est quod
esse potest, licet qualis ille sit intelligi nequeat, dimisso
motu qui sciri potest convertit se mens ad videndum
motum qui sciri nequit et non quaerit ipsum nee per nomen
nee conceptum nee scientiam, immo per omnium quae de
motu sciuntur ignorantiam. Scit enim se nequaquam ilium
motum videre, quamdiu aliquid horum manet. Tune ad 10
non-esse motus pertingens propius ad quaesitum ascendit,
id enim quod se tune supra esse et non-esse ipsius motus
offert taliter quod quid sit penitus ignorat, quia est supra
omne nomen. Ibi ignorantia est perfecta scientia, ubi non-
 On Actualized-possibility 125

For a motion is able to be both slower and faster; and so, in

the possibility of the motion, actuality and the union of pos-
sibility and actuality are not present, since the actual motion
is not moved as it is able to be moved.69 But if the motion
[actually] were what it is able to be, then in [its] possibility
there would be (in equal measure) actuality and the union
[of possibility and actuality]. The motion would actually be
as much as it could possibly be. And such [motion] would
be the union of possibility and actuality. (The same would
hold true for actuality and this union.) 70 But this "motion"
would not be understood. For since it would be [all] that
which motion is able to be, assuredly it would be able to be
neither greater nor lesser; and so, it would be maximal mo-
tion and minimal motion, alike, and the fastest motion and
the slowest motion (i.e., motion which is most at rest), alike.
And because it would be motion to which rest is not opposed:
in the absence of this opposition, the name "motion" would
not befit it. Indeed, it would no more be motion than not-
motion, although it would be the exemplar, form, measure,
and truth of all motion.
53 However, motion which is understood and which is the
opposite of rest is understood because it is limited by rest,
which is opposed to it, and because it is conceived by means
of a finite concept. Therefore, when we understand that this
concept of motion is not the concept of that motion which
is what it is able to be (though we cannot understand what
kind of motion the latter is): after the mind has dismissed
the motion which can be known, it turns toward seeing the
motion which cannot be known. The mind does not seek it
through either a name, a concept, or knowledge. Rather, [it
seeks it] through an ignorance of all the things known about
motion. (For the mind knows that it will not at all see that
motion as long as any of these things remain.) Upon attaining
to the not-being of motion, the mind then mounts up nearer
to what is sought. For then that which [is] above the being
and the not-being of motion offers itself in such way that the
mind does not at all know what it is, since it is above every
126 Trialogus de possest

esse est essendi necessitas, ubi ineffabile est nomen omnium

nominabilium. Haec sic ex tuis dictis — nescio si bene —
collegi.

CARD: Abunde animum applicasti.

IOH: Quantum tradi potest doctrina ignorantiae illius quae 54
ad ineffabile pergit, videtur dictum. Sed adiciam aliquod
mei conceptus speculum. Nam licet aenigmata multa nos
ducant, sine quibus ad incognitum deum non habemus
accedendi modum — oportet enim ad aliquod cognitum
respicere incognitum quaerentem —, tamen in minimis prin-
cipia maxime relucent. Capio igitur abbreviatum verbum
concisum valde puta IN. Dico: Si volo intrare divinas con-
templationes, per ipsum IN, cum nihil possit intrari nisi
per ipsum IN, intrare conabor. Primo ad figuram eius ad- 10
verto quomodo est ex tribus aequalibus lineis quasi uni-
trinum et quomodo I et N per spiritum conexionis nectun-
tur. In ipso enim IN est primo I, deinde N et utriusque
nexus, ut sit una simplex dictio IN I et N et utriusque nexu
consistens. Nihil simplicius I. Nulla littera figurari potest
sine ilia simplici linea, ut sit principium omnium. N primo
omnium ex simplicissimo I in se ducto generatur. Nee N
littera est bis I littera, sed ex I semel in se ducta, ut sit una
littera. In N enim est I explicatum. Unde si I additur ad
N, non plus vocis habetur. lam enim erat in N eius virtus. 20
N enim non consonat ipsi E quasi N sit EN, sed ipsi I ut
sit IN, ut sciunt illi, qui Graecarum litterarum peritiam
habent. Nexus igitur utriusque naturalissimus est. Figura
igitur unitrini principii conveniens ipsius IN videtur. Deinde
 On Actualized-possibility 127

name. Where not-being is the necessity-to-be, and where the

name of all things nameable is ineffable, there ignorance is
perfect knowledge.
From your statements I have gathered these [points] in
this way —whether correctly or not, I do not know.
CARDINAL: You have paid careful attention.
54 JOHN: [Bernard] is seen to have illustrated the extent to
which instruction in the ignorance that leads to the Inef-
fable can be given. But let me add an image from my own
thinking. Many symbolisms guide us. (Without them we can
have no means of approaching the unknown God; for the
one who seeks what is unknown must look at something
known.) Nevertheless, the beginnings in the least significant
things are the most illuminating. Therefore, I take a very
short71 and very concise word: viz., "in." And I say: If I
want to enter into (intrare) contemplating the Divine, I shall
try to enter by means of in, since nothing can be entered
except by means of in.
First, with respect to the formation of "in," I notice (a)
that "in" is composed of three equal lines,72 as if it were
triune, and (b) that "i" and "n" are conjoined through a
uniting power (per spiritum conexionis). For in "in" there
is first "i," then "n" and the union of the two, so that there
is one simple expression "in," consisting of "i" and "n" and
their union. Nothing is simpler than "i." No letter can be
shaped without this simple line; thus "i" is the beginning of
all [letters]. Of all [letters]"n" is generated first—[being
generated] from the very simple "i," which has been redupli-
cated. Yet the letter "n" is not twice the letter "i" but is
from the letter "i," reduplicated once, so that there is one
letter. For in "in" "i" is unfolded. Hence, if "i" is added to
"n," no additional sound occurs. For the efficacy of "i" was
already in "n." For "n" is not consonant with "e" (as if "n"
were "en" but with "i" (so that it is "in"). This fact is known
by those who are familiar with Greek letters. Therefore, the
union of "i" and "n" is very natural. Hence the figure "in"
seems to be appropriate for the triune Beginning.
 128 Trialogus de possest

adverto quomodo est primo I, scilicet principium. Ex quo

N, ubi se I primo manifestat. N enim est notitia, nomen seu
relatio potentiae ipsius I principii.

Deinde considero quomodo per IN intratur in deum et 55

omnia. Nam omnia quae nominari possunt nihil nisi IN in
se continent. Si enim IN non esset, nihil in se omnia con-
tinerent et vacua penitus forent. Dum enim intueor in sub-
stantiam, video ipsum IN substantiatum, si in caelum
caelestiatum, si in locum locatum, si in quantum quantinca-
tum, si in quale qualificatum, et ita de omnibus quae dici
possunt. Quare in termino est terminatum, in fine finitum,
in altero alteratum. Si vero video ipsum IN ante omne
nomen, utique nee terminatum nee finitum nee aliquod 10
esse video omnium quae nominari possunt. Quaecumque
vero video in IN, video ineffabilitatem intrasse. Nam si
video finem aut terminum in IN, non possum amplius ipsum
nominare aut finem aut terminum. Transivit enim in IN,
quod nee est finis nee terminus. Unde secundum hoc vide-
181V retur mu|tasse nomen in oppositum, ut nominetur terminus
in IN interminus seu non-terminus. Et quia IN, quod omnia
implet et sine quo omnia sunt vacua, inest et immanet, inte-
grat et informat, ideo est perfectio omnis rei, omnis termini
et omnis finis et omnium. Patet IN plus esse quam finis aut 20
terminus, ut finis in IN non desinat esse finis, sed sit valde
finis et finis in fine seu finis finium, ut non vocetur finis,
quia non finitur omni fine, sed excedit. Sic enim omnia
quando in absolute videntur fiunt ineffabilia. IN igitur in
suo simplicissimo significato complicat simul affirmationem
et negationem, quasi I sit ita et N sit non, quae in IN conec-
tantur. IN enim dum adicitur aliis dictionibus, aut est affir-
matio aut negatio, in se vero utriusque complicatio.
 On Actualized-possibility 129

Next, I notice that first there is "i," i.e., the beginning.

From this beginning [comes] "n," in which "i" first mani-
fests itself. For "n" is the knowledge and the name73 of the
potentiality of the "i," [its] beginning.
55 Next, I consider that through in one enters into God and
all things. For all things which can be named contain in them-
selves nothing except in. For if there were not in, all things
would contain nothing in themselves and would be entirely
empty. For when I look at (intueor in) a substance, I see in
substantiated; if [I look] at the sky, [I see in] made celestial;
if [I look] at a place, [I see in] situated; if [Hook] at a quan-
tity, [I see in] quantified; if [I look] at a quality, [I see in]
qualified; and so on for all the things which can be spoken
of. Therefore, in a boundary in is bounded; in a limit it is
limited; in an other it is made other. But if I see in prior to
every name, then assuredly I see it not to be bounded or
limited or any of the things which can be named. Whatever
things I see in in, I see them to have entered into ineffability.
For example, if I see a limit or a boundary in in, I can no
longer call it by the name "limit" or "boundary." For it has
passed over into in, which is neither a limit nor a boundary.
Hence, in accordance with this fact, the name is seen to have
changed into its opposite. Thus, in in a boundary is given
the name "boundlessness" (interminus) or "nonboundary."
Now, in (which fills all things and without which all things
are empty) is present in all things, is immanent in all things,
completes all things, and informs all things.74 Therefore, it
is the perfection of every thing (omnis rei), of every boundary,
of every limit, and of everything (omnium). Clearly, in is
more than a limit or a boundary. Thus, in in a limit does not
cease to be a limit; rather, it is all the more a limit. It is a
limit within a limit (or a limit of limits), so that it is not
called a limit, since it is not limited by any limit but rather
surpasses [every limit]. In this way all things become inef-
fable when viewed absolutely. Therefore, in its very simple
signification "in" enfolds affirmation and negation together
—as if "i" were "yes" and "n" were "no" and these were
conjoined in "in." For when "in" is added to other expres-
sions, it is either an affirmation or a negation;75 but in itself
it enfolds both.
130 Trialogus de possest

IN igitur videtur conveniens speculum relucentiae divi- 56

nae theologiae, quoniam »in omnibus est omnia, in nihilo
nihil« et omnia in ipso ipsum. De hoc IN in se ineffabili
quis quae dici possent explicaret nisi ille cuius loqui est
perfectum cum sit possest? Solum enim verbum quod est
elocutio omnium dicibilium hoc potest.

CARD: Subtiliter considerasti, pater abba, et satis est

fecundum aenigma tuum, quoniam in spiritum ducit. Nam
quae in deo sunt nemo scit nisi spiritus dei sicut quae in
homine spiritus hominis. Ipsum igitur IN est aenigma spiri- 10
tus omnia scrutantis. Sed qui per ipsum IN maiestatem dei
intrare nititur, ut perscrutator opprimitur a gloria. Non enim
IN ipsum quod notatur et intelligitur est lumen illuminans
incomprehensibilitatis ipsius deitatis in se ipsa absolutae
ostensionem, sed IN et omnia nomina, quae infinitatem deo
attribuunt, eius incomprehensibilitatem nituntur ostendere
per supereminentiam.

BERN: Quoniam abbas per verbum breve et concisum se 57

intrasse in profunda ostendit, ne ego nil dicendo videar in
vacuum tot alta audisse, dicam quoddam aenigma non
reiciendum in ipso possest: Video E simplicem vocalem
unitrinam. Nam est vocalis ipsius possE, ipsius Esse et nExus
utriusque. Vocalitas eius utique simplicissima est trina. Et
ut refertur ad possE non refertur ad esse et ut refertur ad
Esse non refertur ad posse et ita ut refertur ad nExum
utriusque non refertur nee ad posse nee ad esse sed nExum.
Has igitur relationes in ipso E inconfusas et quamlibet per 10
se veram et perfectam video non esse tres vocales seu voca-
litates sed unam simplicissimam et indivisibilem vocalita-
 On Actualized-possibility 131

56 Therefore, "in" is seen to be a suitable image for illuminat-

ing divine theology. For in all things, in is all things; in nothing,
it is nothing; and in in, everything is in.1 Who could set
76

forth what could be said about this in, which is ineffable in

itself? Who but Him whose Speaking is perfect since it is
Actualized-possibility! For only the Word which is the Ex-
pression of all things expressible can [express] this.
CARDINAL: Your reflection has been subtle, Father Abbot;
and your symbolism is sufficiently suggestive, since it leads
unto the spirit (in spiritum). For no one except the spirit of
God knows the things which are in God77 —even as [no one
except] the spirit of man [knows] the things which are in
man. Therefore, "in" is a symbolism of the spirit which
searches all things.78 But anyone who, as an investigator,
attempts to enter into the majesty of God by means of in is
overwhelmed by glory.79 For the in which is seen and under-
stood is not the light which illumines the manifestation of
the inapprehensibility of the absolute deity in itself; rather,
both "in" and all the other names which ascribe infinity to
God attempt to show by the method of supereminence His
inapprehensibility.80
57 BERNARD: Since by a short and concise word the Abbot
shows that he has entered into profound matters: lest by
saying nothing I seem to have heard in vain so many deep
points, let me mention a symbolism in [the word] "possest"
— a symbolism which ought not to be rejected. I see that the
"e" is a simple triune vowel. For it is a vowel of "posse," of
"esse," and of the union of both. Assuredly, the very simple
vocalization of "e" is trine: insofar as "e" relates to "posse,"
it does not relate to "esse"; insofar as it relates to "esse,"
it does not relate to "posse"; and insofar as it relates to the
union of both, it does not relate solely to "posse" or solely
to "esse" but to their union. Therefore, with "e," I see that
these unconfused relations —each of which is true and perfect
by itself— are not three vowels, or vocalizations, but are one
most simple and indivisible vocalization. So when I mentally
132 Trialogus de possest

tern. Cum igitur haec sic mente contemplor, magnum mihi

praebet haec aenigmatica visio fidei orthodoxae argumen-
tum, ut deum unitrinum simplicissimum credam principium
esse in mundo aliquali similitudine licet remotissima ut
vocalitas ipsius E in possest, a quo mundus habet quod
potest esse et quod est et conexionem utriusque. Sicut
enim probatur vocalitatem E dare omnia ipsi possest, quon-
iam E sublato penitus desinit esse dictio significativa, sic 20
deo sublato mundus penitus desineret. Nee opus video ut
de hac aenigmatis assimilativa proprietate plura dicam, cum
vos ipsi melius me applicare possitis.

CARD: Laudo aenigma tuum, Bernarde, utique aptum 58

proposito. Sed aenigmatum nullus est finis, cum nullum sit
adeo propinquum quin semper possit esse propinquius.
Solus dei films est »figura substantiae« patris, quia est quic-
quid esse potest. Forma dei patris non potest esse aut verier
aut perfectior, cum sit possest.

BERN: Si adhuc de aenigmatibus dicenda tibi aliqua post

multa et varia in opusculis et sermonibus tuis tacta occur-
runt, adicias. Nam intellectum abunde ad theologiam manu-
ducunt. 10

CARD: Placet. Quoniam plurimum difficile est videre quo-

modo unum omnia quod essentialiter in omnibus, ad hoc
quaerantur clariora aenigmata. Cuius tamen in libello
Iconae satis conveniens ponitur aenigma. Sicut enim deus
omnia et singula simul videt, cuius videre est esse, ita ipse
omnia et singula simul est. Homo enim simul et semel in
aures omnium et singulorum ipsum audientium verburn
immittit. Sic deus, cuius loqui est creare, simul omnia et
singula creat. Et cum verbum dei sit deus, ideo deus in
omnibus et singulis est creaturis. De quo in dicto Iconae 20
libello latius.
 On Actualized-possibility 133

contemplate these matters in this way, this symbolic viewing

of orthodox faith furnishes me with a strong consideration
(magnum argumentum) for believing that God, who is the
triune and most simple Beginning, is in the world in some-
thing like the way (although the dissimilarity is very great)
that the vocalization of "e" is in [the utterance] "possest."
From possest [i.e., from Actualized-possibility] the world
has (1) what it is able to be, (2) what it is, and (3) the union
of these two. Just as it has been established that the vocali-
zation of "e" gives all things to "possest" (since if "e" is
removed, "possest" altogether ceases to be a significative
expression), so if God were removed, the world would al-
together cease to be. I see no need to say more about the
analogical character of the symbolism; for the two of you
can apply [the symbolism] better than [can] I.
58 CARDINAL:! praise your symbolism, Bernard. Surely it
suits our topic. But there is no end of symbolisms, since no
symbolism is so close that there cannot always be a closer
one. Only the Son of God is the image (figura) of the sub-
stance of the Father,81 because the Son is whatever is able
to be. The Form of God the Father82 is not able to be either
truer or more perfect, since it is Actualized-possibility (pos-
sest).
BERNARD: If after the many and the diverse points touched
upon in your treatises and sermons, there still remain some
points you ought to make about symbolisms, then add [them
here]. For they [will] amply lead the intellect to theology.
CARDINAL: Agreed. Because it is very difficult to see how
one thing which is essentially in all things is all things, let
more lucid symbolisms be sought for this purpose. However,
a suitable-enough symbolism for this is set forth in the trea-
tise On Image.83 Just as God (whose seeing is being) sees at
once all things and each distinct thing, so He is at once all
things and each distinct thing. Now, a man once and at once
infuses the same word into the ears of all, and of each, of his
listeners. Similarly, God, whose speaking is creating, creates
at once all things and each distinct thing; and since the Word
of God is God, God is in all creatures and in each distinct
creature. In the aforementioned treatise, On Image, [I have
spoken] in more detail about this point.
 134 Trialogus de possest

Sed quomodo deus in se absolute consideratus sit actus 59

182* omnis posse seu forma simlplicissima simul et infinitissima,
non video aenigma intellectuale propinquius quam si pono
lineam infinitam. Declaravi enim in libello Doctae ignoran-
tiae illam si dabilis esset actum esse omnis posse lineae,
scilicet terminum omnium per lineam terminabilium et
adaequatissimum omnium figurarum lineabilium exemplar.
Sic necesse est se habere absolutam entitatem seu formam.
Absoluta enim est interminata et infinita. Quare est cuius-
libet terminatae et finitae adaequatissimum exemplar, cum 10
nulli sit aut maior aut minor. Deum autem esse absolutum
necesse est, cum praecedat omne non-esse et per conse-
quens omnem alteritatem et contractionem. Ideo nulli alter
vel diversus, licet nihil ad eius aequalitatem accedere pos-
sit, cum omnia alia sint altera et finita. Unde cum deo nihil
sit impossibile, oportet per ea quae in hoc mundo sunt im-
possibilia nos ad ipsum respicere, apud quern impossibilitas
est necessitas. Sicut infinitas in hoc mundo actu est impossi-
bilis, sic magnitudo cuius non est finis est necessitas ilia,
quae non-ens seu nihil ut sit necessitat. 20

Adhuc mathematice aenigmatizando considera, quomodo 60

summa aequalitas quantitatum ipsas ab omni pluralitate ab-
solvit. Puta si concipis circuli a centro ad circumferentiam
lineas ut describitur in pavimento, videntur esse aequales,
sed non sunt propter pavimenti fluxibilitatem et materiam,
ita quod nulla est alteri praecise similis, ut in Docta igno-
rantia ostenditur. Sed dum intellectualiter circulus in se
consideratur, lineae multae in pavimento non possunt ibi
esse aliae et aliae, quia causa alteritatis cessat scilicet ma-
teria. Sic nee sunt plures. Sicut igitur de lineis dictum est, 10
ita de omni quanto scilicet superficie et corpore. Quando
 On Actualized-possibility 135

59 But I see no closer intellectual symbolism for how, con-

sidered absolutely in Himself, God is the actuality of every
possibility (or at once the most simple and the most infinite
Form) than if I posit an infinite line. For in the treatise
Learned Ignorance I stated that an infinite line (if it could
be posited) is the actuality of a line's every possibility —i.e.,
is the boundary of all things which can be bounded by a line
and is the most congruent exemplar of all figures capable of
linearity. Thus it is necessary that an infinite line have abso-
lute being and absolute form. (For absolute [being or form]
is boundless and infinite.) Therefore, an infinite line is the
most congruent exemplar of any given bounded and limited
line, since it is equal to every line.
But it is necessary that God be absolute, since He precedes
all not-being and, consequently, all otherness and contracted-
ness. And so, He is not an other or an opposite for anything
else— even though nothing else can approach to equality with
Him, since all other things are an other [for something else]
and are limited.84 Hence, since nothing is impossible for
God,85 we should look for Him (in whom impossibility is
necessity) in those things which are impossible in this world.
Just as in this world infinity is actually impossible, so endless
magnitude is the necessity which necessitates the existence
of not-being, or nothing.
60 Still symbolizing mathematically, consider how the su-
preme equality of quantities frees them from all plurality.
For example, if you take the case of the lines from the center
to the circumference of a circle, as the circle is described in
a floor: they seem to be equal but are not, because of both
the changing character and the material of the floor. Thus
no line is equal to the other —as is shown in Learned Ignor-
ance.86 But when the mind considers the circle-in-itself, the
many lines in the floor cannot (in the circle considered in
itself) be other than one another, since the cause-of-otherness
—viz., matter —is not operative. And so, the lines are not
many. Therefore, what has been said about the lines can be
said about everything which has quantity —e.g., about a sur-
face and about a material object. So (1) when I see that one
136 Trialogus de possest

igitur video in pavimento unam superficiem terminari figuru

circulari, et aequalem superficiem figura triangulari termi-
nari et aequalem figura hexagonali et ita de omnibus signa-
bilibus figuris et post haec considero plures videri super-
ficies illas aequales ob subiectum aliud et aliud, in quo
aliter et aliter describuntur, abstraho igitur mentaliter a
subiecto et video quomodo prius una et eadem superficies
fuit mihi alia et alia visa, quia vidi in alio et alio loco et
subiecto. Et deinde adverto quod una et eadem superficies 20
est circulus, est trigonus, est hexagonus et omnis figura, qua
superficies figurari et terminari potest.

Per hoc aenigma entitatem ab hoc et illo absolutam video 61

actu esse omnium et singulorum entium essendi formam
quomodocumque formabilem, non quidem similitudinarie et
mathematice, sed verissime et forma [bi] liter, quod et vita-
liter dici potest. Et hoc aenigma mihi placet. Nam eandem
superficiem posse esse circularem et rectilinealem et poly-
goniam et eius praxim nuper ostendi. Esto igitur quod
possibile esse ponatur actu esse, uti in theologicis faten-
dum est, utique tune aenigma clarius dirigit. Quare secun-
dum mathematicae perfectam comprehensionem ad theolo- 10
giam aenigma propinquius fieri posse arbitror. Et haec de
hoc nunc sic dicta sint.

IOH: Timeo ne importunus videar et taediosus, alioquin 62

adhuc informari peterem.
CARD: Petite ambo. Nam hae collocutiones nequaquam
me fatigant, sed apprime delectant. Ideo si quid restat,
cum alio forte tempore minus otii detur mihi, nequaquam
nunc indulgete.

IOH: Inter innumera quae audire vellem est unum prae-

cipue quomodo hanc omnipotentem formam negative melius
attingimus, quae dicitur super omne esse et non-esse videri.
 On Actualized-possibility 137

surface in a floor is bounded by a circular figure and that

an equal surface is bounded by a triangular figure and [an-
other] equal [surface] by a hexagonal figure (and so on for
all nameable figures) and (2) when thereafter I consider that
these equal surfaces appear plural on account of the dis-
tinct subjects [i.e., the distinct parts of the floor] in which
they are distinctly described: I mentally abstract from the
subjects, and I see how one and the same surface could have
seemed to me to be distinct surfaces since I saw it in dis-
tinct places and in distinct subjects [i.e., distinct parts of the
floor].87 Thereupon, I observe that one and the same surface
is a circle, a triangle, a hexagon, and every figure by which a
surface can be shaped and bounded.
61 By the foregoing symbolism I see that being itself, which is
freed from particular determinations, is actually a form (how-
soever formable) of the being of all beings and of each dis-
tinct being. [This form is the form-of-being] not mathemati-
cally and figuratively but most truly and in a way capable
of being formed (or, as we can also say, in a vital way). This
symbolism pleases me. For I have just shown that the same
surface is able to be circular, rectilinear, polygonal; and I
have given an example of this. Assume, then, that we posit
the actual existence of possible being—as should be done in
matters theological. Assuredly, the symbolism just [given]
guides [us] quite clearly. Therefore, I think that in accordance
with an accurate understanding of mathematics a quite close
symbolism can be made for theology.
Let it suffice that we have said these things about this
[matter].
62 JOHN: I am afraid of appearing troublesome and wearisome.
Otherwise I would ask to be taught still further.
CARDINAL: Both of you, keep asking. For these discussions
do not at all tire me but delight me immensely. And so, if
anything remains [to be asked], do not at all be indulgent
[with me] now; for on another occasion I will perhaps have
less leisure.
JOHN: Among the innumerable things which I would like
to learn is one thing in particular: viz., how is it that nega-
tively we better attain to this omnipotent Form, which is
said to appear above all being and not-being.
 138 Trialogus de possest

CARD: Oportet, abba, praesupponere quae alias a me 10

audisti: tres esse speculativas inquisitiones. Infima est phy-
sica, quae circa naturam versatur et considerat formas in-
abstractas, quae subsunt motui. Nam forma in materia est
natura et ideo inabstracta est atque in alio, ideo aliter.
Secundum igitur instabilitatem materiae continue movetur
seu alteratur. Et hanc inquirit anima sensibus et ratione.

Alia est speculatio circa formam penitus absolutam et 63

stabilem, quae est divina et est ab omni alteritate abstracta,
ideo aeterna sine omni motu et variatione. Et hanc formam
quaerit anima per se sine phantasmate supra omnem intelli-
182v gentiam et discilplinam per supremam sui ipsius acutiem
et simplicitatem, quae intellectualitas a quibusdam dicitur.
Estque media speculatio circa inabstractas formas tamen
stabiles, quae mathematica dicitur. Considerat enim circu-
lum, qui non est a subiecto seu omni materia intelligibili
abstractus sed bene a materia corporali et instabili. Non 10
enim considerat circulum ut in pavimento corruptibili sed
ut in sua ratione seu diffinitione. Et vocatur speculatio ilia
mathesis seu disciplina. Traditur enim via disciplmae. Et
utitur anima in huius inquisitione intellectu cum imagina-
tione. De his alias.

Nunc autem de absoluta forma theologizantes dicimus, 64

quoniam ipsa primarie dat esse. Omnis enim forma ad-
veniens materiae dat ei esse et nomen. Ut cum figura Pla-
tonis advenit aeri, dat aeri esse et nomen statuae. Sed quia
omnes formae inabstractae, quae sine materia non subsistunt
nisi notionaliter, proprie non dant esse, sed ex ipsarum cum
materia conexione surgit esse, ideo necesse est quod sit
 On Actualized-possibility 139

CARDINAL: We need to presuppose, Abbot, what you have

heard from me on another occasion: viz., that there are three
theoretical investigations.
1. The lowest [of these three] is physics, which centers
on nature and examines inabstract forms which are subject
to change. For nature is form-in-matter; and so form-in-
matter is not abstract and is in something other than itself;
and hence it [exists] in different ways. Therefore, it is con-
tinually being changed, or altered, in accordance with the
instability of the material. The soul, by the senses and by
reason, investigates this [type of] form.
63 2. Another theoretical investigation is the investigation of
the Form which is completely abstract [absoluta] and com-
pletely stable —which is divine and is free of all otherness and
so is eternal and without any change or variation. The soul,
by itself and without images, investigates this Form. [The
soul seeks it] beyond all understanding and learning —by its
own highest acumen and simplicity, which some [persons]
call intellectuality.
3. There is also a theoretical investigation which is in be-
tween [these two]. It deals with inabstract forms which are,
however, stable. (This investigation is called mathematics.)
For example, it deals with a circle which, although it is free
from corporeal and unstable material, is not free from every
subject and from all intelligible material. For it does not
deal with a circle as it is in a corruptible floor but [deals with
it] as it is in the concept or the definition which belongs to
the investigation. And this theoretical investigation is called
mathesis or disciplma [i.e., learning]. For it is passed on by
way of learning. And in investigating it, the soul uses the
intellect together with the imagination. [I have written] else-
where about these points.88
64 At the moment, however, we are theologizing and dis-
coursing about abstract (absoluta} Form, since it primarily
imparts existence. Indeed, every form which comes to mat-
ter gives to matter both existence and a name. For example,
when the figure of Plato comes to bronze, it gives to the
bronze the existence of a statue and the name "statue." But,
properly speaking, no inabstract forms —which can only be
conceived to exist without matter—impart existence; rather,
existence arises out of the union of these forms with matter.
Therefore, it is necessary that there be a completely abstract
140 Trialogus de possest

forma penitus abstracta per se subsistens sine cuiuscumque

indigentia, quae det materiae possibilitatem essendi et for-
mae ei advenienti actualitatem et utriusque conexioni rei 10
exsistentiam. Formae igitur quanto magis indigent subiecto
seu materia ut subsistant actu, utique debiliores et materia-
liores sunt et magis naturam subiecti imitantur et ideo minus
perfectae. Quanto vero minus indigent subiecto, formalio-
res, stabiliores et perfectiores exsistunt. Oportet igitur quod
forma quae penitus nullo alio indiget quoniam infinitae
perfectionis in se omnium formarum formabilium complicet
perfectiones, quoniam est actu ipse essendi thesaurus a
quo emanant omnia quae sunt, quemadmodum ipsa ab
aeterno in thesauro sapientiae concepta vel reposita sunt. 20

Refert Moyses deum dixisse: Ego sum entitas, quod re- 65

peritur in libris nostris translatum — ut praedictum est —:
»Ego sum qui sum.« Esse igitur quod entitas nominat nobis
formarum formam. Nulli dabili formae convenit esse quod
entitas nisi illi penitus abstractae et adeo perfectae quod ab
omni indigentia sit libera. Potest igitur omnis forma esse
perfectior quae non est absoluta entitas. Esse autem quod
entitas est perfectio omnis esse et ideo omnium formarum
complicatio. Unde nisi ipsa entitas daret omnibus formis
esse formativum, nequaquam haberent. In omnibus igitur 10
est divina essentia quae entitas absoluta dans omnibus esse
tale quale habent. Cum autem omnia bonum appetant et
nihil appetibilius ipso esse, quod de suo thesauro utique
Optimo emanare facit entitas absoluta, ideo deum quern
entitatem nominamus solum bonum dicimus, quia ab ipso
optimum donum nobis gratissimum, nostrum scilicet pro-
prium esse, recipimus.

Quaerimus autem fontem nostri esse videre per omnes 66

 On Actualized-possibility 141

Form which exists through itself, which is in need of nothing

else, and which imparts (a) to matter the possibility of exist-
ing, (b) to the form present in the matter actuality, and (c)
to the union of these two existence as a thing. Assuredly,
then, the more the forms need a subject or a material in order
actually to exist: the weaker and the more material they are
and the more they imitate the nature of [this] subject, and
so the less perfect they are. But the less they need a subject:
the more formal, stable, and perfect they are. Therefore, it
is necessary for the Form which does not at all need any
other thing (since this Form is of infinite perfection) to en-
fold within itself the perfection of all the forms of formable
things. For it is actually the Repository-of-being from which
all existing things emanate —even as from eternity they have
been conceived, or placed, in the Repository-of-wisdom.89
65 Moses reports that God said: "I am Being itself."90 As
was previously mentioned, 91 this statement is found trans-
lated in our books as "I am I-who-am." Therefore, being
which is Being itself names for us the Form of forms. Being
which is Being itself befits no positable form except that
Form which is completely abstract and is so perfect that it
is free from all need. Therefore, every form which is not Ab-
solute Being itself can be more perfect. But being which is
Being itself is the perfection of all being and, hence, the
enfolding of all forms. Wherefore, unless Being itself were
to impart forming being to all forms, forms would not at all
have forming being. Therefore, Divine Being, which is Abso-
lute Being itself, is present in all things, giving to all of them
such being as they have. But since all things desire the good
and since nothing is more desirable than being (which Abso-
lute Being itself causes to emanate from its own perfect repos-
itory): we say that God —to whom we give the name "Being
itself"—is the only good. For from Him we receive a perfect
66 gift, most pleasing to us: viz., our own being. But by all the
means possible for us we seek to see the fount of our being.
142 Trialogus de possest

nobis possibiles modos et reperimus per negativam nos

verius iter carpere, cum sit incomprehensibilis quern quae-
rimus et infinitus. Ut igitur tibi nune dicam quae a me exi-
gis, de negativa recipiamus negativam scilicet non-esse,
quae omnium negationum prima videtur. Nonne negativa
ilia praesupponit et negat?

IOH: Utique praesupponit esse et negat esse.

CARD: Id igitur esse quod praesupponit ante negationem
est. 10
IOH: Utique sic est necesse secundum nostrum intelli-
gendi modum.
CARD: Esse igitur quod negatio praesupponit utique aeter-
num est. Est enim ante non-esse, et esse id quod negat
post non-esse est initiatum,
IOH: Necesse videtur.
CARD: Negatio igitur quae cadit super esse negat esse 67
illud sic nominatum esse praesuppositum, quod non est
aliud dicere nisi quod esse post non-esse nequaquam est
esse aeternum et ineffabile.

IOH: Negare ista nequeo.

CARD: Sic verius video deum quam mundum. Nam non
video mundum nisi cum non-esse et negative, ac si dice-
rem: Mundum video non esse deum. Deum autem video
ante non-esse; ideo nullum esse de ipso negatur. Esse igitur
ipsius est omne esse omnium quae sunt aut esse quoquo- 10
modo possunt. Hoc nulla alia via absque phantasmate
simplicius et verius videri potest. Per negativam enim
praesuppositum ipsum, quod non-esse antecedit, entitatem
omnis esse in aeternitate simplici intuitu vides, a quo omne
quod non-esse sequitur negas.

IOH: Intelligo ipsum praesuppositum esse in negatione

necessario antecedere non-esse, alias utique nihil esset.
Quis enim non-esse in esse produxisset? Non ipsum non-
 On Actualized-possibility 143

And we discover that by negation we pursue the truer way,

since He whom we seek is inapprehensible and infinite. So,
in order that I may now tell you the things you asked me
concerning negation, let us take the negation which seems
to be the first of all negations: viz., "not-being." Doesn't
this negation both presuppose and deny?
JOHN-. Assuredly, it presupposes being and denies being.
CARDINAL: Then, that being which it presupposes is prior
to the negation.
JOHN: In accordance with our mode of understanding,
this [inference] is undoubtedly necessary.
CARDINAL: Therefore, [that] being which the negation pre-
supposes is undoubtedly eternal; for it is prior to not-being.
And that being which the negation denies is originated pos-
terior to not-being.
JOHN: It seems necessary.
67 CARDINAL: Therefore, the negation which besets being92
denies that there is this "presupposed being" (as it is called).
[To make] this [statement] is to say only: "being which is
posterior to not-being is not at all eternal, ineffable being."
JOHN: I cannot deny these points.
CARDINAL: Hence I see God more truly than [I see] the
world. For I see the world only with reference to not-being
and by way of negation—as if I were to say: "I see that the
world is not God." However, I see God prior to [any refer-
ence to] not-being; and so, no being is denied of Him. There-
fore, His being is the complete being of all the things which
either are or in any way can be. We cannot (without images)
see this fact more simply and more truly by any other way
[than negation]. For through the negation ["not-being"] you
see—by a simple intuition from which you exclude every-
thing subsequent to not-being—that the presupposed [being],
which precedes not-being, is the eternal being itself of all
being.9
JOHN: I understand that the being presupposed in the nega-
tion necessarily precedes not-being; for otherwise it is not
the case that anything would exist. For who would have
brought not-being into being? Not-being itself [could] not
 144 Trialogus de possest

esse, quando non praesupponeret esse a quo produceretur.

183' Si | igitur aliquid esse affirmamus, necesse est id quod dicis 20
esse verissimum.

CARD: Bene infers, abba. Tu autem vides aliqua esse, 68

caelum scilicet et terrain et mare et cetera. Vides autem
unum non esse aliud, et ita ilia vides post non-esse. Vides
igitur ilia de aeterno esse post non-esse hoc esse quod sunt.
Cum enim praecedat ipsa aeternitas non-esse, quod se in
esse producere nequit, necesse est omnia per aeternum esse
de non-esse seu non exstantibus produci. Aeternum igitur
esse est necessitas essendi omnibus.

IOH: Pater, dicito clarius si potes quomodo omnia in

aeterno esse videre queam. 10
CARD: Si sol in eo quod est foret etiam eo ipso omnia
quae non est, tune utique foret ante non-esse et ita sol et
omnia, quia nihil de ipso negari posset.

IOH: Admitto. Sed me conturbat conceptus solis, qui est

terminatus.
CARD: luves te igitur et respice in ipsum esse solis et
deinde tolle li 'solis' et omnem inabstractionem, removendo
sic negativam: tune de eo vides nihil negari. Quando enim
vides quod esse solis non est esse lunae, hoc evenit quia
vides esse inabstractum et sic contractum et limitatum 20
quod ideo solare dicitur. Si igitur aufers terminum et videas
esse interminum seu eterminum sive aeternum, utique tune
vides ipsum ante non-esse.

IOH: Quodlibet igitur esse sic video in deo aeterno deum 69

et omnia esse.
CARD: Ita est. Nam cum deus aeternus omnia de non-
esse producat, nisi ipse actu esset omnium et singulorum
esse, quomodo de non-esse produceret?
 On Actualized-possibility 145

[have done so], since it would not presuppose being, from

which it would be brought forth. Therefore, if we affirm
that something exists, then it is necessary that your claim
be completely true.
68 CARDINAL: Your inference is correct, Abbot. Now, you
see that some things do exist: e.g., the sky, the earth, the sea,
and so on. But you see that the one is not the other; and so,
you see these in their posteriority to not-being. Therefore,
you see that [the following is true]: (1) from Eternal Being
and (2) posterior to not-being, these things are what they
are. For since Eternity itself precedes not-being, which can-
not bring itself into being: it is necessary that all things be
brought forth from not-being (i.e., from what does not exist)
by Eternal Being. Therefore, for all things, Eternal Being is
Necessity-of-being.
JOHN-. If you can, Father, state more clearly how I can see
all things in Eternal Being.
CARDINAL-. If in its essence the sun were also thereby all
the things it is not, then assuredly it would be prior to not-
being and so [would be] both sun and all things, since noth-
ing could be denied of it.
JOHN: I grant it. But the concept of the sun—a sun which
is finite —confuses me.
CARDINAL: Assist yourself, then, and look at the very be-
ing of the sun. Next, remove (1) [the determination] of the
sun and (2) everything which is not abstract—thereby re-
moving [all] negation.94 You now see that nothing is denied
of the sun's being. For when you see that the being of the
sun is not the being of the moon, this [recognition] occurs
because you see being which is inabstract and is contracted
and limited in such way that it is called solar. Therefore, if
you remove the boundary and see Boundless (interminum
seu eterminum) or Eternal Being, then you undoubtedly see
it in its priority to not-being.
69 JOHN: In this way, then I see that in the Eternal God any
given being is both God and all things.
CARDINAL: So it is. For since the Eternal God brings forth
all things from not-being: unless He were actually the being of
all things and of each distinct thing, how is it that He would
bring [them] forth from not-being?
146 Trialogus de possest

IOH: Haec igitur vera sunt quae sancti asserunt. Aiunt

enim deum esse quantum sine quantitate, qualem sine qua-
litate et ita de omnibus.
CARD: Sic dicunt. Sed dicito tu quomodo illud intelligas.
IOH: Intelligo ipsum omnium quae videmus veritatem ab- 10
solutam. Ideo oportet de contracto contractionem negare,
ut absolutum pertingamus. In visibili namque quantitate
attendo quomodo est vera quantitas. Veritatem igitur eius,
per quam vera est, in absoluto inspicere attempto et video
ipsam esse quantitatem sine tali quantitate quam vidi post
non-esse sic et sic terminatam et limitatam, quae per hoc
nomen 'quantitas' designatur.

Oportet igitur me citra non-esse relinquere omnia ea, per 70

quae quantitas est potius quantitas quam omnia. Et ita
nomen, diffinitionem, figuram et omnia, quae omni sensu,
imaginatione et intellectu de quantitate apprehenduntur,
abicio, ut sic perveniam ad non-esse huius quantitatis.
Deinde respicio in aeternam eius quod prius videram cau-
sam et rationem. Quae etsi sit ineffabilis ante omne nomen,
tamen ipsam aeternitatem quantitatem sine quantitate no-
mino, quia ratio et veritas nominabilis quantitatis. Ratio
autem quanti non est quanta, sic nee veritas seu aeternitas, 10
sicut nee ratio temporis est temporalis sed aeterna.

CARD: Gaudeo haec a te audisse. Nee haec quae dixisti 71

cuiquam mira videbuntur, qui experitur in se quomodo
calor in regione sensibilium est sine calore in regione virtu-
turn cognoscitivarum magis abstractarum. Calor cum calore
est in sensu ubi calor sentitur, sed in imaginatione sive
intellectu sine calore attingitur. Ita de omnibus quae sensu
attinguntur pariformiter dicendum. Odor enim sine odore
et dulce sine dulcedine et sonus sine sono et ita de singulis.
 On Actualized-possibility 147

JOHN: Hence the things said95 by the saints are true. For
they say that God is quantitative [e.g., great] without quan-
tity, qualitative [e.g., good] without quality, and so on for
all [the other categories].
CARDINAL:So they say. But tell [me] how you construe
this [statement of theirs].
JOHN: I understand that God is the absolute truth of all
the things we see. Hence it is necessary [for us] to negate
the contractedness of what is contracted, in order that we
may attain to the Absolute. For, indeed, I observe how there
is true quantity in visible quantity. Therefore, I attempt to
behold in the Absolute the truth of this [true quantity] —
the truth through which this true quantity is true. And I see
that this truth is a quantity distinct from the kind of quan-
tity which, being bounded and limited in such and such ways,
I saw after not-being and which is designated by the name
70 "quantity." Therefore, I have to leave behind, on this side
of not-being, all those things through which quantity is quan-
tity rather than being all things. And so, I cast aside the name,
the definition, the shape, and all the things apprehended of
quantity by means of all sense, imagination, and intellect—
so that in this way I may arrive at the not-being of this
quantity. Thereupon, I behold the eternal Cause and Form
of that which I saw at first. Although this eternal Cause or
Form is ineffable and prior to every name, nevertheless I call
this Eternity by the name "Quantity without quantity"; for
it is the Form and the Truth of nameable quantity. But the
form of a quantity is not itself quantitative. Likewise, the
truth and the eternity [of a quantity] are not [quantitative]
—even as the from of time is not temporal but is eternal.
71 CARDINAL:! arn happy to have heard these things from
you. The points you have made will not seem surprising to
anyone who experiences for himself how heat-in-the-domain-
of-sensible-things is devoid of heat in the domain of the more
abstract cognitive powers. In the senses, where heat is sensed,
heat-which-is-not-devoid-of-heat is present; but in the imagi-
nation or in the intellect heat-without-heat is touched upon.
A similar point must be made about all the things with which
the senses make contact. For example, [in the imagination
or in the intellect there is contact with] a fragrance without
fragrance, a sweet without sweetness, a sound without sound,
and likewise for each distinct thing. Therefore, just as things
 148 Trialogus de possest

Sicut igitur quae sensibiliter sunt in sensu insensibiliter sunt

in intellectu, quia in eo non sunt sensibiliter sed intellec- 10
tualiter et intellectus, sic omnia quae sunt mundialiter in
mundo sunt immundialiter in deo, quia ibi sunt divine et
deus. Ita temporalia intemporaliter quia aeterne et corrupti-
bilia incorruptibiliter, materialia immaterialitcr ct plura
impluraliter et numerata innumerabiliter, composita incom-
posite, et ita de omnibus. Quod totum non est aliud nisi
quod omnia sunt in suo proprio et adaequatissimo aeterno
esse sine omni substantial! aut accidental! differentia dis-
cretissime ipsa simplicissima aeternitas.

BERN: Audivi utique alta lucide resolvi. Ex quibus elicio 72

munduni post non-esse initiatum ideo Graece dici pulchrum
cosmon, quia est ab ineffabili aeterna pulchritudine, quae
est ante non-esse. Et nomen id negat ipsum esse ipsam
pulehritudinem ineffabilem. Affirmat tamen esse illius ima-
ginem, cuius ineffabilis est veritas. Quid igitur est mundus
nisi invisibilis dei apparitio? Quid deus nisi visibilium in-
183V visibilitas, uti apostolus in | verbo in principio nostrae collo-
cutionis praemisso innuit? Mundus igitur revelat suum
creatorem, ut cognoscatur, immo incognoscibilis deus se 10
mundo in speculo et aenigmate cognoscibiliter ostendit, ut
bene dicebat apostolus apud deum non esse est et non sed
est tantum. Vivorum regio, quae est in aeternitate ante non-
esse, aliquantulum mihi incipit ex dictis quia est apparere
atque quale sit istud magnum chaos, de quo Christus loqui-
tur quod est inter incolas immortalitatis aeternae et eos qui
inhabitant infernum, ac quod Christus magister noster igno-
rantiam tollens et viam ad immortalitatis aeternitatem nos
docens omnia supplebit, quae nos aeternae illius immortali-
tatis incapaces reddunt. 20
 On Actualized-possibility 149

which are present sensibly in the senses are present insensibly

in the intellect (for in the intellect they are present not sen-
sibily but intellectually and are the intellect), so all things
which are present mundanely in the world are present non-
mundanely in God (for in God they are present divinely and
are God). Similarly, temporal things [are present in God]
nontemporally, for [they are present] eternally; and corrup-
tible things incorruptibly; material things immaterially; and
plural things nonplurally; numbered things nonnumerically;
composite things noncompositely; and similarly for all things.
[To say] all this is [to say] nothing other than that all things
—in their own most congruent eternal being, without any
substantial or accidental differences —are most clearly most
simple Eternity itself.
72 BERNARD: Assuredly, I have heard deep matters being
clearly resolved. From these points I infer that for the fol-
lowing reason the world, which was originated posterior to
not-being, is said in Greek to be a beautiful cosmos-, it is
[derived] from the ineffable, eternal Beauty, which is prior
to not-being. Now, the name "cosmos" denies that the world
is ineffable Beauty itself. But it affirms that [the world] is
the image of that [Beauty] whose truth is ineffable. What,
then, is the world except the appearance of the invisible God?
What is God except the invisibility of visible things —as the
Apostle says in the verse96 set forth at the beginning of our
discussion. Hence the world reveals its Creator, so that He is
known. Or better: the unknowable God reveals Himself know-
ably to the world in imagery and symbolism (for example,
when the Apostle rightly said that with God there is not both
Yes and No but is only Yes).97 From what has been stated,
the domain-of-living-things which is eternal and prior to not-
being begins to appear to me a bit. [I begin to see] that it is
and [to see] what kind of thing is that great chaos about
which Christ says that it exists between the inhabitants of
eternal immortality and the inhabitants of Hell.98 And [I
begin to see] that Christ our teacher—who removes [our] ig-
norance and teaches us the way to an eternity of immortality
—will repair all [the infirmities] which render us incapable
of this eternal immortality.
150 Trialogus de possest

Nunc satis erit tanta dixisse, quae si placet epilogando 73

concludas.
CARD: Forte sic tempus fieri postulat. Movistis ex Pauli
summi theologi sententia quomodo ex creatura mundi intel-
lecta conspiciuntur invisibilia dei. Diximus mente ilia crea-
toris sempiternam virtutem et invisibilem divinitatem con-
spici, quae mundum creaturam intelligit. Non est enim
possibile creaturam intelligi emanasse a creatore, nisi videa-
tur in invisibili virtute seu potestate eius ipsam aeterna-
liter fuisse. Oportet omnia creabilia actu in eius potestate 10
esse, lit ipse sit formarum omnium perfectissima forma.
Oportet ipsum omnia esse quae esse possunt, ut sit verissima
formalis seu exemplaris causa. Oportet ipsum in se habere
omnium formabilium conceptum et ration em. Oportet ipsum
esse supra omnem oppositionem. Nam in ipso non potest
esse alteritas, cum sit ante non-esse. Si enim post non-esse
esset, non esset creator sed creatura de non-esse producta.
In ipso igitur non-esse est omne quod esse potest. Ideo de
nullo alio creat, sed ex se, cum sit omne quod esse potest.

Et quando ipsum conati sumus super esse et non-esse 74

videre, non potuimus intelligere quomodo foret visibilis qui
est super omne simplex et compositum, super omne singu-
lare et plurale, super omnem terminum et infinitatem, tota-
liter undique et nullibi, omniformis pariter et nulliformis et
penitus ineffabilis, in omnibus omnia, in nullo nihil et omnia
et nihil in ipso ipse, integre, indivise in quolibet quantum-
cumque parvo et simul in nullo omnium. Qui se in omni
creatura ostendit unitrinum exemplar verissimum et adae-
quatissimum, omnem sensibilem, imaginabilem et intellec- 10
tualem phantasmatibus inhaerentem in infinitum exceden-
tem cognitionem, cum his cognitionibus nihil incorporeum
et spirituale attingatur, sed altissimo et ab omnibus phan-
tasmatibus absolute intellectu omnibus transcensis ut nihil
 On Actualized-possibility 151

73 It will now suffice that [we] have spoken of so many

things. If you will, bring them to a conclusion by adding an
epilogue,
CARDINAL: Perhaps time requires that we conclude in this
way. The two of you set out from the supreme theologian
Paul's statement about how the invisible things of God are
clearly seen from the mundane creation's having been under-
stood. We said that the eternal power and the invisible divinity
of the Creator are seen by that mind which understands the
world to be a created thing. For only if the created thing is
seen to have been eternally present in the Creator's invisible
power [virtus seu potestas] can it be understood to have ema-
nated from the Creator. It is necessary that every creatable
thing exist actually in the Creator's power—so that, conse-
quently, He is the most perfect Form (forma) of all forms.
It is necessary that the Creator be all the things which are
possible to be—so that, consequently, He is the truest formal
(or truest exemplary) Cause. It is necessary that the Creator
have within Himself the Concept and the Form [ratio] of
all formable things. It is necessary that the Creator be above
all opposition. For in Him there cannot be otherness, since
He is prior to not-being For if He were posterior to not-
being, He would not be the Creator but would be a creature,
brought forth from not-being. Therefore, in Him not-being
is everything which is possible to be. And so, He creates not
from any other, but from Himself; for He is everything which
is possible to be.
74 And when we attempted to see Him beyond being and
not-being, we were unable to understand how He could be
visible. For He is beyond everything simple and everything
composite, beyond everything singular and everything plural,
beyond every limit and all unlimitedness; He is completely
everywhere and not at all anywhere; He is of every form and
of no form, alike; He is completely ineffable; in all things He
is all things, in nothing He is nothing, and in Him all things
and nothing are Himself;99 He is wholly and indivisibly pres-
ent in any given thing (no matter how small) and, at the same
time, is present in no thing at all. He reveals Himself in every
creature as the triune, most true, and most congruent Exem-
plar—and as surpassing infinitely all sensible, imaginable, and
intellectual knowledge which inheres in images. For by these
ways of knowing, nothing incorporeal and spiritual is attained
to. Rather, this unintelligible [Reality] is encountered by the
loftiest intellect—freed from all images—when all things have
152 Trialogus de possest

omnium quae sunt reperitur inintelligibilis ignoranter seu

inintelligibiliter in umbra seu tenebra sive incognite. Ubi
videtur in caligine et nescitur, quae substantia aut quae res
aut quid entium sit, uti res, in quo coincidunt opposita, sci-
licet motus et quies simul, non ut duo, sed supra dualita-
tem et alteritatem. Haec visio in tenebra est, ubi occulta- 20
tur ipse deus absconditus ab oculis omnium sapientum.

Et nisi sua luce pellat tenebram et se manifestet, manet 75

omnibus ipsum via rationis et intelligentiae quaerentibus
penitus incognitus. Sed non deserit quaerentes ipsum summa
fide et spe certissima atque fervidissimo quantum fieri
potest desiderio, scilicet via ilia quam nos docuit magister
unicus Christus dei films, viva via, solus ostensor patris sui,
creatoris nostri omnipotentis. Quaecumque igitur per nos
dicta sunt non ad aliud tendunt quam ut intelligamus ip-
sum omnem intellectum excedere. Cuius facialis visio quae
sola felicitat nobis fidelibus per veritatem ipsam dei filium 10
promittitur, si viam nobis verbo et facto patefactam ipsum
sequendo tenuerimus. Quod nobis ipse dominus noster lesus
Christus concedat semper benedictus. Amen.
 On Actualized-possibility 153

been transcended. He is encountered—unlike any other exist-

ing thing — ignorantly, or unintelligibly, in a shadow or in
darkness or unknowingly. [He is encountered] where He is
seen in darkness and where it is not known what substance,
what thing, or what being He is. [He is encountered] as a
thing in which opposites coincide (e.g., motion and rest, to-
gether) —not as two but as above duality and otherness. This
vision occurs in darkness, where the hidden God is concealed
from the eyes of all the wise.
75 Moreover, unless by His own light He expels the darkness
and reveals Himself, He remains completely unknown to all
who seek Him by way of reason and intellect. But He does
not abandon those who seek Him in deepest faith, surest
hope, and the most fervent possible desire —i.e., [those who
seek Him] by that way which we were taught by our only
master, Christ, the Son of God, the living way, the sole re-
vealer of His own father (who is our omnipotent Creator).
Therefore, all the statements we have made aim only at [mak-
ing] us understand that our Creator surpasses all understand-
ing. The vision of His countenance (a vision which alone
brings happiness) is promised to us believers by the Son of
God, who is Truth itself—provided that by following Him
we hold to the way which has been disclosed to us by word
and deed.
May our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, blessed forever, grant
this [steadfastness] to us. Amen.100
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notes
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notes

All references to Nicholas's works are to the Latin texts—specifically

to the following texts in the following editions:
A. Heidelberg Academy Edition: De Coniecturis, De Deo Abscondito,
De Data Patris Luminum, Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, Idiota de
Mente, De Pace Fidei, De Li Non A Hud.
B. Heidelberg Academy Edition as found in the Latin-German edi-
tion of Felix MeinerVerlag'sPhilosophischeBibliothek: De Docta
Ignorantia, De Possest, De Venatione Sapientiae.
C. Strasburg Edition as reprinted by W. de Gruyter: De Visione Dei,
De Ludo Globi.
For some treatises the reference indicates book and chapter; for
others, section and line; for still others, page and line. Readers
should have no difficulty determining which is which when they
consult the particular Latin text. (All references to De Possest are
either by section or by section and line.)

Preface
1. "In many places, however, interpretation could not be com-
pletely withheld." See p. vii of NicolausdeCusa, Trialogusdepossest.
Dreiergesprach uberdas Konnen-Ist, trans. Renate Steiger (Hamburg:
Meiner, 1973).
N. B. The lines of the Latin text as printed in this Latin-German
edition differ in length from the lines of the Heidelberg Academy
edition. Accordingly, the line numbers in the two Latin texts do not
correspond exactly. The Latin text reproduced for the present English
edition was reprinted—with a few minor corrections—from the Latin-
German edition.

157
158 Notes

2. Jasper Hopkins, Anselm of Canterbury: Volume IV: Hermeneu-

tical and Textual Problems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm
(New York: Mellen Press, 1976). N. B. In punctuating the English
translation of De Possest I made a small number of changes in rela-
tion to the printed Latin text. For example, at 66:13-15 I construed
"Esse igitur quod negatio praesupponitutique aeternum est. Estenim
ante non-esse, et esse id quod negat post non-esse est initiatum" as
if it were "Esse igitur quod negatio praesupponitutique aeternum est;
est enim ante non-esse. Et esse id quod negat post non-esse est initia-
tum." Even such minute changes—allowed by the unprinted Latin
manuscript—represent an interpretive recasting of emphasis.

Introduction
1. On the other variants of Nicholas's name, see the second edi-
tion of Erich Meuthen's Nikolausvon Kues, 1401 -1464: Skizze einer
Biographic, 2nd ed. (Miinster: Aschendorff, 1967), p. 5.
2. His mission was approved by Pope Eugenius IV. Edmond Van-
steenberghe writes: Ce n'est pas le pape, en effet, qui envoya Nicolas
a Constantinople en recompense de sa defection, mais bien la minorite
du concile: les documents le prouvent; et a plusieurs reprises Nicolas
lui-meme a affirme, sans etre jamais contredit, qu'il fit le voyage
d'Orient sur 1'ordre du cardinal de Saint-Pierre. La verite est que son
depart pour 1'Italie ne signifiait pas encore une rupture complete avec
Bale: il laissait, en proie aux passions et a la violence, une assemblee
oil 1'on n'avail plus que faire de sa science et de sa calme raison; mais
il ne lui paraissait pas encore impossible que la minorite, lasaniorpars,
a laquelle il adherait, s'accrut assez pour devenir preponderate, et il
pouvait esperer que Cesarini, comme celui-ci 1'esperait lui-meme, reus-
sirait a ramener les peres vers la seul voie qu'il croyait compatible avec
la vie de 1'Eglise: celle de 1'union au pape."Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues
(Paris, 1920; reprinted Frankfurt: Minerva GmbH, 1963), pp. 63-64.
See also Meuthen, Nikolaus von Kues, p. 49.
3. See (1) Paul E. Sigmund's discussion on pp. 246-49 of his fine
work Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); (2) Vansteenberghe, Le Car-
dinal Nicolas de Cues, p. 414; (3) Clemens Baeumker, "Das Pseudo-
hermetische 'Buch der vierundzwanzig Meister' (Liber XXIV philoso-
phorum). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neupythagoreismus und
Neuplatonismus im Mittelalter," in Beitrdge zur Geschichte der
Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 25 (1928), p. 214.
4.Pp.12-13.
5.NA 6(13:28-30).
6.NA 1 (5:13-14).
7. Vansteenberghe, Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues, pp. 409-40.
Joseph Lenz, Die docta ignorantia oder die mystiche Gotteserkennt-
 Notes 159

nis des Nicolaus disarms in ihren philosophischen Grundlagen (Wiirz-

burg: Becker, 1923), pp. 101-29. Jakob Hommes,Diephilosophische
Gotteslehre des Nikolaus Kusanus in ihren Grundlehren (Munich:
Philosophische Fakultat, 1926), pp. 10-11.
8.T. Whittaker, "Nicholas of Cusa," Mind, 34 (October 1925),
436.
9. P. 21. Cf. pp. 29-30.
10. DeLudo Globi 48.
11. Cf. De Ludo Globi 3 7 and 40.
12. "It was fitting that the Virgin shine forth with that purity
than which a greater cannot be conceived except for God's. To her
was fittingly given the most pure Son of the eternal God—given in
such way that He was the son of God and of the Virgin." Sermo 6:
"Respexit Humilitatem,"p. 105 (13:6-9) of vol. 16, fascicle 2 of the
Heidelberg Academy's Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia. Nicholas does
not attempt to quote Anselm's text exactly.
13. "Man, who was created unto life, is not restored unless he is
elevated to the likeness of the angels in whom there is no sin. This
cannot occur unless there is complete antecedent satisfaction. For
this satisfaction to occur, it is necessary that something be given to
God which is not owed and which surpasses all that is not God. To
sin is to dishonor God—something which man ought not to do even
if all that is not God were bound to perish [as a result of man's not
sinning]. Assuredly, reason and immutable truth require that the one
who sins pay to God, in place of the stolen honor, something greater
than that for which he ought not to have dishonored God. Human
nature, by itself, did not have this [payment]; and without satisfac-
tion human nature was unable to attain the goal and the kingdom."
Sermo 3 = "Hoc Facite," pp. 44-45 (6:7-21) of vol. 16, fascicle 1,
Opera Omnia. But note Nicholas's adaptation of another portion of
Anselm's theory: Sermo 1: "In Principio Erat Verbum,"p. 18(23:
22-31) of vol. 16, fascicle 1, Opera Omnia.
14. Pierre Duhem, "Thierry de Chartres et Nicolas de Cues,"
Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 3 (July 1909),
525-31. See also vol. 10, pp. 269-72 of Duhem's Le systeme du
monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platan a Copernic
(Paris-. Hermann, 1959).
15. Vansteenberghe (Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues, p. 411, n. 7) is
certainly correct in saying: "En tout cas, Cusa ne presente pas sa
theorie comme originale, mats plutot comme quasi classique, et ily
a quelque exageration a parler id de 'plagiat'."
16. N. Haring, ed., Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of
Chartres and His School (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1971), p. 218. Duhem is not aware of this passage. But p.
529 of his article implies that had he known about it, he would have
regarded it as strengthening his case.
160 Notes

17. De Pace Fidei, Chap. 4.

18. Armand Maurer, "Nicholas of Cusa,," Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, vol. 5 (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1967), p. 497.
Nicholas uses interchangeably the phrases "maximum absolutum,"
"maximum absolute," and "maximum simpliciter."
19. In DI I, 6 Nicholas writes: "Moreover, nothing could exist if
the unqualifiedly Maximum did not exist. For since everything non-
maximal is finite, it is also originated. But, necessarily, it will exist
from another. Otherwise—i.e., if it existed from itself— it would have
existed when it did not exist. Now, as is obviously the rule, it is not
possible to proceed to infinity in beginnings and causes. So it will be
the case that the unqualifiedly Maximum exists, without which noth-
ing can exist. . . .
"Moreover, the greatest truth is the absolutely Maximum. There-
fore, either (1) it is most greatly true that the unqualifiedly Maximum
either exists or does not exist, or (2) [it is most greatly true that it]
both exists and does not exist, or (3) [it is most greatly true that it]
neither exists nor does not exist. Now, no more [alternatives] can be
either asserted or thought. No matter which one of them you say to
be most greatly true, my point is made. For I have the greatest truth,
which is the unqualifiedly Maximum."
N. B. Alternative 3 might be construed as differing from alterna-
tive 2 in spite of the fact that "neither p nor not-p'' is logically equiva-
lent to "both p and not-p." For if one claims, as Nicholas does, that
God transcends the distinction between existence and nonexistence,
one might regard 3 as true but 2 as self-contradictory. (Nicholas, how-
ever, seems to regard both 2 and 3 as true.)
20. According to Nicholas, the sense in which the finite cannot be
conceived without conceiving of the infinite is the following: an ar-
gument can be given which shows that the finite cannot exist without
the infinite; and so, on the basis of the argument, the finite cannot
be understood to exist without the infinite. In another vein, it is of
course true that the finite cannot be conceived as finite without con-
ceiving of the nonfinite. But this is not Nicholas's point in I, 6.
21. In the opening paragraph of DI I, 6 Nicholas does say that an
actually infinite progression of greater and greater beings is not pos-
sible. And elsewhere (II, 1; cf. DP 59) he does claim that matter is
not actually extendable ad infmitum. But these propositions do not
enter into the proof which Maurer is attempting to recapitulate.
22. Note his criticism of the Aristotelians for rejecting —in the
name of the principle of noncontradition —the doctrine of coinci-
dentia oppositorum. Apologia 6:7-12.
23. In places, Nicholas contradicts himself. FrederickH. Burgevin
(Cibratio Alchorani: Nicholas Cusanus 's Criticism of the Koran in the
Light of His Philosophy of Religion [New York: Vantage Press, 1969],
 Notes 161

pp. 30-31) cites the ways in which his statements about the purpose
of the Koran are inconsistent.
24. DP 74:18. See also De Coniecturis II, 1 (78:13-14) and De
Venatione Sapientiae 22 (67:3-4).
25. De Visione Dei, chap. 9 (at the end).
26. Apologia 27:1-5. DIII, 5, (118:3-4).
27. Apologia 28:18; 29:4-5. DP 12:1-15. Cf. DP 72:7-9.
28. DI II, 5 (117:5-7). DP 74.
29. Wenck's text was edited by E. Vansteenberghe under the tide
Le "De Ignota Litteratura" de Jean Wenck de Herrenberg contre
Nicolas de Cuse, vol. 8, Heft 6 (1910) of Beitrdge zur Geschichte der
Philosophic des Mittelalters (Munster: Aschendorff, 1912).
30. De Deo Abscondito 2:4-5. DP 41:15. DI I, 1 (4:16).
31. These phrases occur respectively in Apologia 3:5; DI I, 2
(5:3); I, 2 (8 = 9); I, 17 (51:3). Note the use of "docti" in DI I, 3
(10:21). Duhem's translation of the phrase "De Docta Ignorantia"
as "L 'ignorance savante" represents, in last analysis, a wrong empha-
sis. See vol. 10 of his Le systeme du monde (Paris: Hermann, 1959),
pp. 251-52,272, 279, et passim.
32. De Ludo Globi II (84). DI II, 12 (162:15-17).
33. See p. 208 of Baeumker's "Das pseudo-hermetische 'Buch der
vierundzwanzig Meister.'" Also note pp. 147, n. 2, and pp. 172-73
of Dietrich Mahnke's Unendliche Sphdre und Allmittelpunkt (Halle:
Niemeyer, 1937), and pp. 141-44 (especially p. 141, n.49) of Her-
bert Wackerzapp's Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts auf die ersten phi-
losophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues (1440-1450), in Bei-
trage zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters,
vol. 39 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1962).
34. Wackerzapp, Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts, p. 141, n. 49.
35. DI II, 12. See Karsten Harries's attempt to make sense out of
these formulas. "The Infinite Sphere: Comments on the History of a
Metaphor," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13 (January 1975),
5-15.
36. Other examples of prima facie unintelligible statements are
found throughout Nicholas's writings: e.g., DP 59: "Sicut infinitas
in hoc mundo actu est impossibilis, sic magnitude cuius non est finis
est necessitas ilia, quae non-ens seu nihil ut sit necessitat"•. "Just as
in this world infinity is actually impossible, so endless magnitude is
the necessity which necessitates the existence of not-being, or noth-
ing." Or, again, DI II, 3 (110:11-12): "Non restat nisi dicere, quod
pluralitas rerum exoriatur eo, quod deus est in nihilo": "There re-
mains only to say that the plurality of things arises from the fact
that God is in nothing."
Of course, a la rigueur, some sense can be assigned to these state-
ments. For instance, if "endless magnitude" is taken to refer to God
162 Notes

and if "not-being" is taken to refer to the world, considered apart

from God, we can construe the first statement as: "Just as in the
world infinity is actually impossible, so Infinity is the Necessity
which produces the world."
37. ". . . the repetitions, the lack of logical order, the variations
in the vocabulary." Vansteenberghe, Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues, p.
277.
38. "He does not at all write simple, clear, and exact Latin." Karl
Jaspers, Nikolaus Cusanus (Munich: Piper, 1964), p. 20.
39. Cf. DP 1 4 : 1 2 ; 3 1 : 8 ; 59:1 -2.
40.DP6:7-8.
41. Cf. DP 38:11 with 38:13.
42. Cf. DP 48 = 14-15 with 48:16.
43. See DP 52:8-11 and 47:7-8.
44. See n. 20 of the English translation of DP.
45. Cf. Sermo "Ubi est qui natus est rex Judaeontm," printed in
Cusanus-Texte. VierPredigten im Geiste Eckharts, ed. J. Koch (Heidel-
berg: Winter, 1937); DP 67:13-14;D7 II, 7 (130:14-15). Cf. the last
part of n. 20 of the English translation of DP.
46. N. B. DP 64:11-14.
4 7 . D / I . 4 (11:13-15).
48. DP 7:3-6.
49. Nicholas's commentators and translators have not always been
the best guides for helping us make our way amid the foregoing dif-
ficulties. For example, Henry Bett, in his study Nicholas of Cusa,
misleadingly entitles one chapter "The Coincidence of Contraries,"
in spite of his awareness that opposita include contradictoria as well
as contraria. ([London: Methuen, 1932], p. 122. Note also Vansteen-
berghe's phrases "la coincidence des contraires," "I'union des con-
traires" in Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues, pp. 299, 414. Likewise, D. J.
B. Hawkins repeatedly uses the expression "the reconcilation of
contraries" in his introduction to Germain Heron's English transla-
tion of Dl [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954].)
Similarly, Belt's translation of "complicatio" as "aggregate" and
of "explicatio" as "evolution" leads him to maintain, unhelpfully,
that for Nicholas "God is ... the aggregate (complicatio) of all
things, as the essential and eternal ground of their being. Things are
the evolution (explicatio) of God, as the finite, multiple, differen-
tiated development of what is grounded in Him. . . . " (Nicholas
of Cusa, p. 132. In Idiota de Mente 9 [119:2] Nicholas does say
"evolutionem, id est explicationem." But in Dl II, 4 [116:3] he
chooses "emanatio " as a substitute for "explicatio.'' Still "explicatio"
should not generally be translated either as "evolution" or as "emana-
tion.")
By comparison, Emma G. Salter's sanctioning of the words "iden-
tity" and "otherness" as occasional translations of "complicatio"
 Notes 163

and "explicatio" is equally unrevealing. (See the note on p. xxv of

her English translation of De Visione Dei [New York: Dutton, 1928].)
Moreover, H. Lawrence Bond wrongly claims that the literal transla-
tion of "possest" is "he-who-is-all-that-is-able-to-be." (See p. 92 of
"Nicholas of Cusa and the Reconstruction of Theology: The Cen-
trality of Christology in the Coincidence of Opposites," in G. H.
Shriver, ed., Contemporary Reflections on the Medieval Christian
Tradition. Essays in Honor of Ray C. Petry [Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1974].) And Germain Heron's translation of the
treatise De Docta Ignorantia is inadequate at almost every crucial
point, as a close examination of, say I, 4 and 6 will readily reveal.
Waiving such a close scrutiny, we may catch the spirit of Heron's
translation by noticing that he renders the title of I, 4 — "Maximum
absolutum incomprehensibiliter intelligitur, cum quo minimum coin-
cidit" — as "The Absolute Maximum is Known but Not Understood.
Maximum and Minimum are Synonymous." Yet the Latin title makes
no distinction between being known and being understood; nor does
it mention synonymy. Heron has no grasp of Nicholas's reasoning.
50. E.g., Sigmund, Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political
Thought, p. 257. E.g., Ludwig von Bertalanffy, ed., Nikolaus von
Kues (Munich: Miiller, 1928), In Metaphysik der Neuzeit (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 1929), p. 13, Heinz Heimsoeth gives the same mistaken
interpretation of Nicholas's teaching regarding the infinity of the
universe —as does Raymond Klibansky, "Copernic et Nicolas de
Cues," in Leonard de Vinci et I'experience scientifique au seizieme
siecle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953), p. 228, For a
corrective see Tyrone Lai's "Nicholas of Cusa and the Finite Uni-
verse," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 11 (April 1973), 161-
67.
51. Kurt Flasch, Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues.
Problemgescbichtliche Stellungundsystematische Bedeutung(Leiden-.
Brill, 1973), p. 161.
52. In De Venatione Sapientiae 26 (77:6-7), Nicholas alludes
favorably to Anselm's statement, cited as "deum esse mains, quam
concipi possit."
53. "What is present in De Docta Ignorantia 1,6 . . . is an ori-
ginal restatement of the Proslogion proof, its transference into the
Cusanian theory of coincidence." Flasch, Die Metaphysik des Einen
bei Nikolaus von Kues, p. 165.
54. See p. xviii of D. J. B. Hawkins's introduction to Germain
Heron's English translation of DI.
55. A different kind of error is perpetrated by John P. Dolan,
who remarks: "As with Anselm and Eckhart . . . the question that
Cusa proposes to answer is not whether God exists. In his writings
he rather attempts to enrich the concept of God. . . ." (Unity and
Reform: Selected Writings of Nicholas de Cusa [South Bend, Ind.:
164 Notes

University of Notre Dame Press, 1962], p. 44.) Although there has

been much debate in recent years about Anselm's intent in the Pros-
logion, the prevailing view —against Karl Barth, Anselm Stolz, et al.
—appears to be that Anselm did intend to demonstrate the existence
of God. See J. Hopkins, (1) A Companion to the Study of St. An-
selm (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), chap. 3;
(2) Anselm of Canterbury: Volume IV: Hermeneutical and Textual
Problems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm (New York: Mel-
len Press, 1976), chap. 4; (3) "On Understanding and Preunderstand-
ing St. Anselm," The New Scholasticism, 52 (Spring 1978), 243-60.
56. Dolan, Unity and Reform, p. 3. J. Koch, Nikolaus von Cues:
Zwei Vortrage (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1947), 48-49. Klibansky, "Coper-
nic et Nicolas de Cues," pp. 229ff.
57. F. J. Clemens, Giordano Bruno undNicolaus von Cusa (Bonn:
Wittmann, 1847). See pp. 134ff. Also see Helene Vedrine, "L'influ-
ence de Nicolas de Cues sur Giordano Bruno," NCMM, pp. 211-23.
58. Maurice de Gandillac, La Philosophie de Nicolas de Cues (Paris:
Editions Montaigne, 1942), p. 448.
59. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance
Philosophy, trans. Mario Domani (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), p. 42.
Bett, Nicholas of Cusa, p. 139.
Robert Zimmermann ("Der Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus als Vor-
laufer Leibnitzens," in Sitzungsberichte derKaiserlichenAkademie der
Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Classe, 8 [Vienna, 1852],
306-28) notes parallels between the thought of Cusa and of Leibniz;
but he does not claim that the former influenced the latter. For a
truer perspective see Thomas P. McTighe, "Nicholas of Cusa and Leib-
niz's Principle of IndiscernibiVity," Modern Schoolman, 42 (November
1964), 33-46.
60. Dolan, Unity and Reform, p. 4. (Dolan's citation of Gilson
in n. 4 is inaccurate. Nonetheless, Dolan appears to endorse the point
that Nicholas is a precursor of Kant.) Josef Koch, Die Ars coniec-
turalis des Nikolaus von Kues (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956),
pp.47-48.
61. F. Copleston,/! History of Philosophy, vol. 3 (London: Burns
and Gates, 1960), p. 245. Erwin Metzke, "Nikolaus von Cues und
Hegel. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der philosophischen Theologie,"
Kant-Studien, 48 (1956-57), 216-34.
62. Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philos-
ophy, p. 10.
63. Even those who are usually discerning sometimes make over-
statements in Nicholas's favor—as does A. Maurer, who speaks of
Nicholas as "mastering all the scientific, philosophical, and theologi-
cal knowledge of his time."Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random
House, 1964, second printing), p. 310.
64. II Cor. 4:18. See DP 3.
 Notes 165

65. Regarding Nicholas's doctrine of universals, see the discussion

in Section VI of the Introduction.
66. See DP 11 and n. 12 of the English translation of DP. Paul
Wilpert discerns this point clearly in his article "Das Problem der
coincidentia oppositorum in der Philosophic desNikolaus von Cues,"
pp. 39-55 in J. Koch, ed., Humanismus, Mystik, und Kunst in der
Welt des Mittelalters (Leiden: Brill, 1953). Both Kurt Flasch's rejec-
tion of this point and his attendant criticism of Wilpert are misguided.
(Note Flasch, Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues, pp.
168-74.)
67. DP 8.
68. DP 10.
69. "Proportionem vero inter infinitum et finitum cadere non
posse nemo dubitat." II, 2 (102:4-5). Note also I, 3 (9:4-5). Rudolf
Haubst defends the view that Nicholas does not altogether repudiate
the Thomist doctrine of analogy. See his "Nikolaus von Kues und die
Analogia Entis," pp. 686-95 in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Ihr
Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung, ed. Paul Wilpert (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1963).
7 0 . D / I , 24.
71. See DI I, 26 (88:16-17). Note De Li Non Aliud 8 (18:3-5).
Paul Wilpert, in his translation of NA, 2nd ed. (Hamburg: Meiner,
1976), p. 171, n. 12, claims that Cusanus values negative theology as
little as positive theology— preferring mystical theology, which sur-
mounts both. However, all things considered, Wilpert's claim is greatly
exaggerated. For like Dionysius, Nicholas does prefer negative the-
ology to positive theology; and even with respect to the via mystica
he regards God as remaining inconceivable. Moreover, as he seems
aware, to assert that in God affirmation and negation coincide—as
the via mystica does —is to deny that in God there is affirmation and
to deny that there is negation. Now, this denial is part of the via nega-
tiva. The via mystica advocates the possibility of a nonconceptual
approach to God. But as soon as this approach attempts to articulate
the Reality encountered, it must do so either negatively or positively
— the former being the better route.
Thus the following excerpt from Nicholas's letter to the abbot
and the monks of Tegernsee in 1453 should not be overemphasized:
"Since negative [theology] removes without positing anything, God
will not be seen in an unveiled way by means of it; for God will not
be found to be but rather [will be found] not to be. And if He is
sought by way of affirmation, He will be found only through images
and in a veiled way but not at all in an unveiled way. However, in
most places Dionysius taught theology by means of this disjunction:
viz., that we approach God either affirmatively or negatively. But
in the book where he wants to display mystical and secret theology
in a way possible, he leaps beyond this disjunction unto a uniting
166 Notes

and a coincidence, or a most simple union. This [union] is not a side-

by-side conjunction but is vertically beyond all removing and positing
— where removing coincides with positing, and negation with affirma-
tion." See p. 114 of Edmond Vansteenberghe's Autour de la Docte
Ignorance. Une controverse sur la Theologie mystique au XVs siecle
(Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, vol. 14
[Munster: Aschendorff, 1915]).
72. DP 27.
73.DP 15.
74. DP 75. Nicholas's notion of visio mystica stands in contrast
to others' emphasis upon unio mystica.
75.011,26 (89:4-6).
76. Cf. the last paragraph of Section III of present Introduction.
77. De Visione Dei 4 (10:15-18).
78. DP 20 and 74.
79. DP 20 and 73.
80. De Visione Dei 9 (37:10-11). Apologia 15:14-15.
81. DP 73.
82. DP 25, 62, and 74.
83. Nicholas would say this, but nowhere does, as far as I know.
Only by referring to the doctrine of coincidence can we resolve a
prima facie discrepancy in Nicholas's statements about creation. On
the one hand, he teaches that created things are produced de non esse:
from not-being. And, on the other hand, he maintains that God
creates ex se: from Himself (DP 73 ; re creation ex nihilo, see DP 26
and 68). But how are these two statements reconcilable? That Nicho-
las mentions them both in the same passage suggests that he finds no
incompatibility. In creating ex nihilo God creates ex se simply be-
cause "in Him not-being is everything which is possible to be." That
is, in God "not-being is being everything" (DP 25); for in God there
is no distinction between being and not-being. Accordingly, there is
no difference, thinks Nicholas, in saying that God creates ex nihilo
and in saying that He creates de nullo alio sed ex se. In short, God
creates from nothing in the sense that He creates from nothing other
than from Himself. N. B. Apologia 28:18-19: "Neque est verum, si
Deus est omne, quod est, quod propterea non creaverit omnia de
nihilo."
84. By "minimal motion" Nicholas means rest.
85. DP 21.
86. DP 27.
87. DP 26 and 74. N. B. NA 10 (23:1-2) and DP 41-.5, where
even the predicate "one" is said to be inapplicable to God.
88. DP 19.
89.Ibid.
90. DP 41.
91.Ibid.
 Notes 167

92.Ibid.
93. Ibid. DIl, 26 (87:1). Apologia 9:3-10.
94. Apologia 8:15-16.
95. De Venatione Sapientiae 26 (77:6-7).
96. DP 41.
97. DP 47. In DP 74 Nicholas goes so far as to call God unintel-
ligible.
98. DP 26.
99. DP 30.
100. Cf. the discussion —toward the beginning of Section IV of
the Introduction—about the sense in which God is said to be sun.
101. For example, K. Oedinger ("Idiota de sapientia. Platonisches
und anti-platonisches Denken bei Nikolaus von Cues," Tijdschrift
voor Philosophic, 17 [1955], 690-98) considers Nicholas's affirma-
tion that God is entitas, unitas, actualitas, exemplaritas, etc., as bla-
tantly inconsistent ith his denial of the knowability of God.
102. DP 74.
103. W. P Alston makes a similar point against Tillich: "If being-
itself does not admit of any characterization as this rather than that,
there is no ground for considering one sort of attitude or feeling more
appropriate to it than another." See "Tillich's Conception of a Reli-
gious Symbol," pp. 18-19 in S. Hook, ed., Religious Experience and
Truth: A Symposium (New York: New York University Press, 1961).
104. DP 56. Cf. DP 12:12-15. Also note De Visione Dei 12 (50:
8-9): "Non es igitur creator: sedplusquam creator in infinitum. . . ."
105. Note the importance of the words "perse" in D I l , I I (30:8).
Also note NA 13 (28:28-30).
106. DP 74. For another example see R. Haubst, " 'Am Nichtteil-
nehmbaren teilhaben'. Zu einem Leitsatz der cusanischen 'Einheits-
metaphysik' und Geistphilosophie," pp. 12-22 in Norbert Fischer et
al., eds., Alte I''ragen und neue Wege des Denkens (Bonn: Bouvier,
1977).
107. DP 2.
108. DI I, 11 (30:4-7).
109.DP 1 2 : l - 1 5 ; 9 : 6 - 7 . C f . D / I , 16 (43:15);II, 3 (111:13-14).
Although Nicholas maintains that God is all things, he nowhere states
that all things are God. Instead, he repeatedly says that in God all
things are God. Mark L. Fuehrer's mistaken claim that for Nicholas
"everything is, in fact, God himself" stems from his mistranslation
of 1)1 I, 22 (69:3-4). See "The Principle of Contractio in Nicholas of
Cusa's Philosophical View of Man," Downside Review, 93 (October
1975), 290. Fuehrer also wrongly ascribes to Plato the view that "Soc-
rates exists as Socrates by participating in the universal 'Socrates' "
(p. 294).
110. Note DI II, 3 (11():4-5): "If you consider things apart from
Him [i.e., God], they are nothing-just as number apart from oneness
168 Notes

[is nothing]. If you consider Him apart from things, He exists and
the things are nothing." (Contrast Hegel's statement that ohne Welt
ist Gott nicht Gott.)
Passages such as the following, however, do convey the impres-
sion of pantheism: "What, then, is the world except the appearance
of the invisible God? What is God except the invisibility of visible
things . . . ?" (DP 72:7-9). Nicholas has often been referred to as a
pantheistic thinker. See, for example, Bertalanffy, ed., Nikolaus von
Kues, p. 21.
111. DP9-.6-7. Seen. 153.
112. DP 11.
113. DP 68.
114. Apologia 27:3-4.
115. "Temporal things [are present in God] nontemporally, for
[they are present] eternally; and corruptible things incorruptibly;
material things immaterially; and plural things nonplurally; numbered
things nonnumerically; composite things noncompositely; and similar-
ly for all things "(DP 71). In DP 74 Nicholas says that God is beyond
both everything simple and everything composite.
116. DP 69.
117. DP 65 and 73.
118. See DP 26, 68, and 73.
119.DPS.
120. Cf. DP 9 with DP 30.
121. Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite
Universe (New York: Harper and Row Torchbooks, 1958), p. 15.
122. D7 II, 11.
1 2 3 . D / I I , 12.
124. Kurt Goldammer is certainly correct in maintaining that
"geocentrism is not at all clearly rejected, since the question of the
physical middle point remains completely open in Cusa" and that
"not the slightest trace of a heliocentric system is to be found." See
p. 30 of "Nicolaus von Cues und die Uberwindungdesgeozentrischen
Weltbildes," pp. 25-41 inAlte Probleme-Neue Ansatze. Drei Vortrage
von Fritz Krafft, Kurt Goldammer, Annemarie Wettley (Wiesbaden:
Steiner, 1965). Also note A. Koyre, The Astronomical Revolution:
Copernicus-Kepler-Rorelli, trans. R. E. W. Maddison (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1973), p. 72.
125. See especially the last part of D/ II, 8.
126. DI II, 1 (97:18-19).
127. Dl II, 1 (97:5-6).
128. DI II, 4 (114:10-15).
129. DI II, 8.
130. DI I, 21 (65:1-8).
131. DI I, 21 (64:11-16).
 Notes 169

132. DI II, 1 (97:18-19). For the subsequent phrase "infinitas

contracta" see II, 4 (113:13).
133. In DI II, 8 Nicholas maintains that only God is infinite ac-
tuality.
134.D/II, l.Cf. II, 5.
135. As for time, Nicholas's view is Augustinian: the world has
no temporal beginning, for time began with the world. De Ludo
Globi 18.
136. By "contracted" Nicholas means "restricted" or "limited"
or "determinate" in some respect or to some degree. At the end of
DI II, 4, he says: "Contractio means contraction to [i.e., restriction
by] something, so as to be this or that."
137. See p. 238 of E. W. Platzeck's review of J. Koch and W.
Happ's German translation of De Coniecturis: inMFCG, 10 (1973).
Note Mariano Alvarez-Gomez, Die verborgene Gegenwart des Unend-
lichen bei Nikolaus von Kues (Munich: Pustet, 1968), p. 157. Also
note p. 225 of Rudolf Haubst.Oze Christologie des Nikolaus von Kues
(Freiburg: Herder, 1956).
138. See Koch's discussion at the end of Platzeck's article "Rand-
bemerkungen zur via antiqua und via moderna im Spatmittelalter,"
MFCG,6 (1967), 35-50. See also p. 31, n. 55 of Koch's Die Ars coni-
ecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues.
139. Koch, Die Ars coniecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues, p. 31,
n. 55.
140. DI 11,6 (125:19-20).
141.0/11,6 (125:4-5). Cf. II, 3 (111:14-15).
142.0/11,4(115:14-16).
143. De Data Patris Luminum 2 (98:9). Cf. DP 14:16-17.
144.0/11,4 (115:1-19).
145. De Visione Dei 9 (33-34).
146. DP 13.
147. DI II, 6 (126:8-10, 14-16). Cf. Idiota deMente 2 (65).
148.0/11,6 (126:1-4).
149. DI II, 5 (119:15-19).
150. DI II, 5 (121:4-13).
151. See the opening sentences of DI II, 5. A detailed discussion
and critique of Nicholas's doctrine of quodlibet in quolibet is found
at the end of Vincent Martin's "The Dialectical Process in the Philoso-
phy of Nicholas of Cusa," Laval tbeologique et philosophique, 5
(1949), 213-68.
152. Cf. Dill, 5 (118).
153. Ibid. There are two different senses in which the universe is
said to be in God. In one sense it is enfolded in God ontologically
prior to creation; in another sense, it is in God even though it has
been unfolded from Him in creation. The latter sense is expressed
170 Notes

most clearly in DI II, 5, (118:3-8): "Omne autem actu exsistens in

deo est, quid ipse est actus omnium. Actus autem est perfectio et
finis potentiae. Unde cum universum in quolibet actu exsistenti sit
contractum, patet deum, qui est in universo, esse in quolibet et quod-
libet actu exsistens immediate in deo, sicut universum." ("Every ac-
tually existing thing is in God because God is the actuality of all
things. Now, actuality is the perfection and the goal of possibility.
Hence, since the universe is contracted in each actually existing thing:
it is evident that God, who is in the universe, is in each thing and that
each actually existing thing is immediately in God—just as is the uni-
verse.")
Similarly, the latter sense is the one which corresponds to DI III,
4 (204:15-19): "Hinc deus, ut est in omnibus, non est secundum
gradus in ipsis quasi se gradatim et particulariter communicando.
Omnia autem sine diversitate graduali esse non possunt; quapropter
in deo sunt secundum se cum graduum diversitate."("Hence God, in-
sofar as He is in all things, is not in them according to degrees—as if
communicating Himself by degrees and by parts. However, none of
these things can be without a difference of degrees; therefore, they
are in God according to themselves with a difference of degrees.")
As enfolded in God, all things are God rather than themselves
(DP 9); that is, in God (sense 1) they exist as God (ut deus) rather
than as themselves (secundum se). But even as unfolded from God,
they exist in God (sense 2), while also existing according to them-
selves. (Cf. DP 13 :7-8: "Idea [res] verius est in forma formarum quam
in se.")
We must be careful not to claim, as do some interpreters, that
for Nicholas things exist in God as themselves and exist outside God
as other than themselves. For as enfolded in God, things do not exist
as themselves; and outside God (i.e., as created), some things do exist
in themselves and as themselves (in contrast to existing in another
finite thing and as other than themselves). See the references given
in n. 58 of the translation of DP.
In a strict sense, however, no thing can be said to exist outside
God. Accordingly, God is said to exist in (and of) Himself; but every-
thing in the world exists by participation in God, rather than existing
in (and of) itself. See DI I, 17(50:9-51:11);!, 17 (48:3); II, 7 (130:
15). DI II, 2 (103:9) shows that Nicholas sometimes uses the expres-
sion "per se et in se" instead of merely saying "in se" or "per se."
154. Dill, 5 (118:1-2).
155.0711,4 (115:17-19).
156. DI II, 4 (115:13-14. See also 115:15-19).
157. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. Ill (West-
minster, Md.: Newman Press, 1953), p. 239. Also note p. 242. Per-
haps Copleston is also misled by the following passage in DI II, 2
(101:6-ll): "Inquantum enim ipsa creatura est esse del, nemo dubi-
 Notes 171

tat esse aeternitatem. Inquantum igitur cadit sub tempore, non est a
deo, qui est aeternus. Quis igitur intelligit creaturam ab aeterno et
cum hoc temporaliter esse? Non potuit enim creatura in esse ipso in
aeternitate non esse. . . . " (Copleston does not cite this passage.)
Nicholas teaches that as enfolded in God creatures are God. This
statement (misleadingly) suggests that all things exist in God as their
finite selves. (But this is not what he means. See Dl I, 24 [77:1-7].)
Copleston might mistakenly want to interpret the passage in II, 2 as
teaching that as unfolded from God the creation is God's being. (But
cf. the passage in II, 2 with the statement in II, 8 [140:1-3] : "Unde
cum possibilitas absoluta sit deus, si mundum consideramus ut in
ipsa est, tune est ut in deo et est ipsa aeternitas.")
Seen. 153.
Copleston's mistake is shared by many others, including Vincent
Martin ("The Dialectical Process in the Philosophy of Nicholas of
Cusa," pp. 249, 252, 263, 266), Mark L. Fuehrer ("The Principle of
Contractio in Nicholas of Cusa's Philosophical View of Man,"p. 294),
and Mariano Alvarez-Gomez (Die verborgene Gegenwart des Unend-
lichen bei Nikolaus von Kues, p. 143). Martin also wrongly teaches
that, for Nicholas, "God is the material cause from which all the crea-
tures proceed" (p. 248). N. B. Apologia 26:10-25; 33:23-25.
158. Copleston, History of Philosophy, vol. Ill, p. 239.
159. In general, Nicholas's use of "ipse" is extremely casual; of-
ten "ipse" need not even be translated. Cf. Paul Wilpert's translation
of the passage in question: "Gott ist ndmlich das absolute Wesen der
Welt, d. h. des Alls. Das Allaberist eingeschranktes Wesen." Nikolaus
von Kues, Die belehrte Unwissenheit. Buch H. Trans. Paul Wilpert
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1967), p. 37. Note DI II, 4 (115:10) where in-
stead of stating that the universe is "ipsa quiditas contracta," Nicho-
las says merely that it is "quiditas contracta."
160. "Everything which actually exists is in God because God is
the actuality of all things." DI II, 5 (118:3-4).
161. See p. 12. Similarly, Nicholas calls man a created God (deus
creatus) and a God manque (deus occasionatus). See DI II, 2 (104:3,
6).
162. Cf. Heb.2:7.
163.07111,3(198).
164. DI III, 2 (192:4-9).
165. DI III, 7 (220:2-3).
166. See n. 13.
167. Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Phi-
losophy, p. 38.
168. DP 46.
169. NA 5 (13:4-10). Cf. DI I 9 (26:12-14).
170. DP 21.
171. DP 23.
172 Notes

172. DP 27.
173. DP 52.
\74.Sermo 8 (See vol. 16, fascicle 2 of Nicolai de Cusa Opera
Omnia [Hamburg: Meiner, 1973], p. 158, lines 14-15). The expres-
sion "desiderium devotissimum" occurs in DP 15.
175. Yet, notice Nicholas's request—reminiscent of Anselm — to
his interlocutors at the beginning of NA: "I shall speak and converse
with you, Ferdinand, [but only] on the following condition: viz., that
unless you are compelled by reason, you will reject as unimportant
everything you will hear from me."
Regarding the distinction between ratio (reason) and intellectus
(intellect, understanding), as operations of the soul: Nicholas's view
changes. In De Coniecturis a number of distinctions are made —one
of which is that whereas ratio adheres to the principle of noncontra-
diction, intellectus (which is said to be the unity of ratio) attains un-
to the coincidence of opposites. (This view is also later hinted at in
Apologia 15:8-16; 28:15-17.) There are different orders of intellects
— the human intellect being the lowest, and being joined to the body
through the intermediary of reason. However, no order of finite in-
tellect—but rather only ipse divinus absolutissimus intellectus—can
attain the ineffable and most precise truth.
In DI no uniform distinction is made between ratio and intellectus.
A distinction seems not at all to be present in Book I, to be only
hinted at in Book II, and to appear explicitly for the first time in
Book III. (See Hermann Schnarr, Modi essendi. Interpretationen zu
den Schriften De docta ignorantia, De coniecturis, und De venatione
sapientiae von Nikolaus von Kues [Miinster: Aschendorff, 1973], pp.
45-48.) In DI II, 2 (100:9-10) we are told that noster intellectus
nequit transilire contradictoria-. that our intellect cannot leap beyond
contradictions. But in De Coniecturis I, 6 (25:13-15) the intellect is
said to enfold opposites.
In DP Nicholas sometimes tacitly distinguishes between reason
and intellect (as at 15:2) and sometimes uses "intellectus" in the
accustomed way (viz., as signifying the soul's power to understand
a concept). There is no better example of Nicholas's fluctuating ter-
minology.

On Actualized-possibility
1. The incipit reads: "Here begins the dialogue (dialogus) on Ac-
tualized-possibility—a dialogue of the most reverend father-in-Christ,
Lord Nicholas of Cusa, cardinal of St. Peter in Chains. There are three
discussants."
2. Codex Cusanus 219 here has "Johannes" instead of "Bernar-
dus." But Codex Monacensis Latinus 7338 contains the obviously
correct reading.
 Notes 173

3. Rom. 1:20 One difficulty with the Latin version of this text is
that the antecedent of "intellecta" is uncertain. Another is that "a
creatura mundi" may be construed temporally. Nicholas here takes
"intellecta" with "ea," though later he takes it with "creatura." He
always construes "a creatura mundi" nontemporally. See 3:6; 4:3-4;
15:10-ll;51:14-15-,73 : 4-5.
4. II Cor. 4:18.
5. Ibid.
6. "Beginning" is one of the names for God. See Rev. 22:1 3.
7. In this passage Nicholas implies that not-being does not exist.
Later, however, he maintains that not-being does exist. (See 25:12-
16. Cf. 27:22-23; 29:12-13; 59:18-20 ; 67:18; 73:18.) These passages
are not contradictory. For although not-being exists in God, it does
not exist as an object in the world: it is not a created thing. At times,
however, Nicholas does tend to reify not-being. Note NA 7 (15:26-
30): "If Not-other ceased, all the things it precedes would immediately
cease. And so, not only the actuality and the possibility of the beings
which Not-other precedes would cease but so also would the not-
being and the nothing of these beings."
8. Although a created thing is able to be that which it actually is,
it is not actually that which it is able to be —as Nicholas explains in
DPS.
9. I.e., absolute possibility is pure possibility; and absolute ac-
tuality is pure actuality. Nicholas does not make any systematic dis-
tinction between possibilitas, potentia, potestas, posse —nor between
actualitas, actus, and esse.
10. Nicholas contrasts the expression "posse fieri" with the ex-
pression "posse facere" (e.g., 27:6-7; 29:7) and with the expression
"posse esse" (e.g., 24:12-14). It may be translated in a variety of
ways: e.g., "to be able to be made," "to be able to be done," "to be
able to become," "to be possible to be made," "the possibility to be
made," and so on. See also 24:10; 28:1 -29:10. At 29:1 "posse fieri"
is associated with "posse creari" (28:1, 7). At 35:1 Nicholas uses "si
fieri posset" in the sense of "if possible"; and at 75:4-5 he uses "quan-
tum fieri potest" in the sense of "as much as possible." As a rule,
however, he does not in this dialogue use "posse fieri" to mean simply
"to be possible."
11. Eternity itself is God. Possibility, Actuality, and their Union
are the members of the Trinity.
12. (1) Sometimes Nicholas says that God is everything which is
able to be; (2) sometimes he suggests that God is everything which
He is able to be;and (3) sometimes—as in the present passage—what
he says may be construed either way, since neither the text nor the
context eliminates the ambiguity. As examples of /, note 73:12 and
8:6-7 ("It is necessary that the Creator be all the things which are
possible to be. . . ." "Since possibility and actuality are identical
174 Notes

in God, God is—actually—everything of which 'is able to be' can be

predicated truly.") As examples of 2, note 27:18-19 and 30:14-15
("For example, if the Beginning were able not-to-be, it would not-be,
since it is what it is able to be." "This is not the case with Actualized-
possibility, which lacks neither a greater magnitude which it is able
to be nor anything at all which it is able to be. . . .") As examples
of 3, note the above passage and 12:12-13 ("For, assuredly, He who
is what (He) is able to be does not fail to have solar being. . . .")
Parentheses around "He" are meant to signal the ambiguity of the
reading. The ambiguity of the Latin confuses Bernard, who asks for
clarification.
That God is actually everything that can possibly be entails that
He is actually everything that He (or anything else) can possibly be.
His possibilities are possibility itself. To say that God is everything
that He can be is to say that He cannot be anything other than He is.
This latter point is made by Nicholas at 12:1-2, as well as through-
out his work NA.
N. B. Matt. 19:26. Mark 10:27; 14:36. Luke 18:27. With God,
states Scripture, all things are possible —even what is impossible with
men.
13. I.e., we can say that the sun, etc., is what it is able to be.
14. See Luke 3:8 and 12:25.
15. "Mihi" here goes with "difficillima." Cf. 24:6-7.
16. Alternative translation: "J want to say that implicitly-in-God
all these things are God, even as explicitly-in-the-created-world they
are the world."
17. Literally: "For to a greatness (alicui) which is maximal in such
way that it is also minimal, how would there be greater [greatness]?"
N. B. Nicholas's three questions parallel his immediately preceding
three assertions: viz., that God is absolutely maximal greatness, abso-
lutely minimal greatness, and a greatness which is the measure and
the truth of every finite magnitude.
18. Alternative translation: "Or how can a greatness that is actu-
ally everything it is able to be fail to be congruent with every magni-
tude?" Here and elsewhere in the translation "greatness" and "mag-
nitude" are used as equivalent English renderings for "magnitude."
19. Cf. notes 8 and 12.
20. "Entitas" may be rendered either as "being" or as "being it-
self," depending upon the context. Throughout this treatise I use
the latter rendering, since "entitas" is being used to refer to God.Ew-
titas (qua God) is ipsum esse, forma formarum, essendi forma, per-
fectio omnis esse et idea omnium formarum complicatio.N. B. 14:15-
16;61:l-2;65.-l-16. Also see De Venatione Sapientiae,chap. 24 and
D / I , 8.
Cf. Thierry of Chartres, Commentum Super Boethii Librum de
Trinitate II, 21, (in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres
 Notes 175

and His School, ed. Nikolaus M. Haring (Toronto: Pontifical Institute

of Mediaeval Studies, 1971), p. 75.
Like Pseudo-Dionysius and Meister Eckhart, Nicholas refers to
God as the being of all being ("entitas omnis esse," "esse omnis esse").
See DP 67:13-14 and Sermo "Ubi est qui natus est rex ludaeorum,"
printed in Cusanus-Texte. Vier Predigten im Geiste Eckharts, ed. J
Koch (Heidelberg: Winter, 1937), p. 102, line 9.
21. This expression is repeated at 56:2-3 and 74:6-7. NA 14 in-
dicates explicitly that the formula is borrowed from Pseudo-Dionysius
(not to mention I Cor. 15:28). God is "all in all," teaches Nicholas,
in the sense that He is being itself, which is present in every finite
being. God is "nothing in nothing" (Or, as Dionysius says, "not any-
thing in anything") in the sense that He is none of the finite beings.
In Apologia 17:17-18 Nicholas, again following Dionysius, states his
point as follows: "God is the being of all things in such way that He
is, nevertheless, none of all things." Finally, Proposition 5 in the ap-
pendix to NA affirms that God is both the Being of being and the
Not-being of not-being. Therefore, "God is nothing in nothing" also
means, for Nicholas, that God is the very not-being of nothing. Cf.
Proposition 7.
22. Cf. John 1:3-4.
23. Alternative reading for "possest": the-actual-existence-of-
possibility.
24. Gen. 17:1.
25. Exod. 3:14.
26. "Esse" may here be translated either as "being" or as "exis-
tence.'^^ n. 20.
27. Cf. St. Anselm, Proslogion 22.
28. The Septuagint has '£70!; etjiu o &v.
29.See n. 10.
30. Acts 17:28.
31. "Cum d puncto" is used interchangeably with "in d puncto."
Note the meanings of "cum" and "in" at 19 = 24-25 and 22:6. Cf.
Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 22: "Unde si usus loquendi ad-
mitteret, convenientius did videretur esse cum loco vel tempore quam
in loco vel tempore."
32. Interestingly, Nicholas uses the moving circle to illustrate
eternity and the fixed circle to illustrate time. This procedure reverses
the usual pattern of analogy, which likens the eternal to the fixed and
unmoving.
33. Cf. Rev. 22:13.
34. Wisd.7:24.
35.Cf.Ps. 147:15.
36. Cf. Wisd.8:l.
37. The sun appears to revolve around the earth from east to west
(i.e., "with the firmament") once every day. At the same time, the
176 Notes

sun actually moves among the stars from west to east (i.e., "counter
to the firmament"), making one complete circuit of the heavens in a
year. Because the sun changes its position in the heavens constantly
at a uniform rate, it requires a few more minutes than do the stars
to complete its daily apparent revolution about the earth. A similar
effect is generally true for the planets as well.
38. Nicholas uses "aenigma" in the sense of a "symbolism." Cf. I
Cor. 13:12.
39. See n. 7.
40. I.e., through God.
41. Matt. 11:25.
42. John 14:9.
43.Eph. 3:17.
44. John 14:17,26.
45. John 16:33.1 John 5:4-5.
46. I Cor. 1:20.
47. Ps. 83:8 (84:7)
48. Note the story about the blind man in John 9.
49. John 14:23.
50. Matt. 5:8.
51. Cf. Luke 10:27.
52. Eph. 3:17.
53. Ps. 32:9 ( 3 3 = 9 ) .
54. Acts 2:4.
55. Cf. Eph. 4:7.
56. In this sentence Nicholas uses "knowledge" in two different
senses: (1) our knowledge of God; (2) the knowledge by which God
created the world. In the present passage he implies that in the next
life believers will attain to the intellectual vision of God insofar as
they will attain to the vision of Christ. However, they will never at-
tain to the knowledge of God as He is in Himself. Cf. DP 40-41 and
D / I , 26 (18:16-17).
57.Heb. 11:1. II Cor. 4:18.
58. Cf. 62:14. See also De Coniecturis I, 11 (54:6-23). God can-
not exist differently than He does exist, since all possibilities are ac-
tual in Him. Nor can He (acceptably) be conceived to be otherwise
than He is.
59. See De Coniecturis 11, 1 (76:11 -18). Cf.Nicholas's Die mathe-
matischen Schriften, Germ, trans. Josepha Hofmann (Hamburg:
Meiner, 1952), p. 30. This example is also found in Aristotle's Meta-
physics I, 2 (983a!5 ff.).
60. Here Nicholas uses "ipsius posse" and "ipsius esse" in place
of "illius possibilitatis" and "illius actus." (Cf. 42:7;42:14-15; 42:
16-17.) I therefore rendered "esse" as "actuality."
61. Realia are contrasted with rationis entia.
62. Nicholas uses the notion of mathematical beginning as a basis
 Notes 177

for inferring truths about God, who is "the most perfect Beginning
of all things" (45 = 13).
63. In Section 48 Nicholas (through John) identifies the Father
as absolute possibility, the Son as existence (or actuality), and the
Holy Spirit as the union of possibility and actuality. Thus, in the
passage about the rose, he formulates a symbolism which he will sub-
sequently use to elucidate the doctrine of the Trinity. For the Father,
the Son, and the Holy Spirit are of the same essence.
64.1 Cor. 13:12.
65. Earlier, Nicholas denied that the sun is that which it is able
to be (8:10-11). In the present passage he asserts that every existing
thing, including the sun, is only that which is able to be. That is, it
is one of the many things which are possible to be, even though it is
not everything which it is able to be.
66. The Beginning has no beginning. That is, God is unoriginated.
67. Rom. 1:20. Seen. 3.
68. Viz., possibility, actuality, and their union.
69. Because the possibility and the actuality do not coincide,
Nicholas says that actuality is not present in the possibility. However,
both possibility and actuality are present in the motion.
70. I.e., in the existence would be possibility and the union; and
in the union would be possibility and existence. Note the previous
speech of the Cardinal.
71. Re translation of "abbrevtatum": cf. 54:7-8 with 57:1.
72. In the handwritten ms. (Codex Cusanus 219) the word "in"
appears as three strokes, with a light connecting line which forms the
letter "n". It is not set off—e.g., by enlargment or by spacing—from
the other words of the manuscript. Moreover, Nicholas adopts no
convention for distinguishing using the word from mentioning it.
(Similarly, the ms. does not capitalize or in any way set off the "e"
in "posse," "esse" or "nexus" — as occurs in section 57 of the printed
text.)
73. "Name" here translates "nomen sen relatio." For "relatio"
here also means name.
74. Nicholas here uses words beginning with "in": "inest," "im-
manet," "integral," "informat,"
75. For example, "in" operates as a negative when prefixed to
words such as "comprehensible" and "competent." But it has a posi-
tive force when prefixed to words such as "form" and "fuse."
76. Seen. 21.
77.ICor. 2:11.
78.1 Cor. 2:10.
79. Prov. 25:27.
80. The way of supereminence is illustrated by Nicholas's ex-
ample of in -. "Clearly, in is more than a limit or a boundary. Thus,
in in a limit does not cease to be a limit; rather, it is all the more a
178 Notes

limit. It is a limit within a limit (or a limit of limits), so that it is not

called a limit, since it is not limited by any limit but rather surpasses
[every limit]" (55:20-23).
81.Cf.Heb. 1:3.
82. God the Son is the Form of God the Father. In his next speech
the Cardinal calls the Godhead "the most simple and the most infinite
Form."
83. This is another name for Nicholas's work De Visione Dei. The
subsequent example about seeing and being corresponds to the dis-
cussion in De Visione Dei, chap. 10.
84. In NA Nicholas expands upon this point.
85. Matt. 19:26.
86. Cf. Dill, 1 (92:1-4).
87. See Nikolaus von Cues, Die mathematischen Schriften, es-
pecially pp. 41,123,140-50. Nicholas "shows" how different plane-
geometrical figures can be equal to one another.
88. Idiota de Mente 7 (77:9-20) and 8 (82:1-7).
89. Cf. Col. 2:3.
90.Exod. 3:14. Seen. 20.
91. 14:13.
92. In his discussion of negation Nicholas does not clearly distin-
guish between using a word to mention itself and using a word to
mention something other than itself.
93. God is the presupposed Being, the eternal Being of all being.
94. Nicholas here shows that he regards determination as negation.
The principle "omnis determinatio est negatio" is a pillar of negative
theology.
95. E.g., Augustine in De Trinitate 5.1.2.
96. Rom. 1:20.
97. II Cor. 1:19. Nicholas uses this enigmatic verse as an example
of a symbolism.
98. Luke 16:26.
99. Seen. 21.
100. The explicit reads: "Praise be to God. The end of the tria-
logue—or, more truly, of the guiding star —held by the most wise and
most reverend father, Lord Nicholas of Cusa (presbyter of the Holy
Roman Church, cardinal of the titular Church of St. Peter in Chains)
with his two friends, Lord Bernard, chancellor of the archbishop of
Salzburg, and John Andrea Vigevius, abbot of the monastery of St.
Justine of Sezadium."
index
This page intentionally left blank
index

Absolutely Maximum, 8-11, 14, Earth, Karl, !63-64n55

160nl9 Being and not-being, 7, 21, 67,
Acquired ignorance, doctrine of, 93-97 passim, 135, 143-49,
see "Docta ignorantia" passim, 151,160nl 9,161 n 36,
Aenigma, 176n38 I66n83, 173n7, I75n21
Albert the Great, 6 Bertalanffy, Ludwigvon, 163n50
Algazel, 5 Bett, Henry, \62r\49
Alston, W. P., 167nl03 Bonaventure, Saint, 5
Analogia entis, 26 Bond, H. Lawrence, 162-63n49
Anaxagoras, 36 "Book of the Twenty-four Phi-
Anselm of Canterbury: Nicholas losophers," 13
compared with,6,14-15, 22, Brothers of the Common Life, 3
38,43,159n73,163n52, Bruno, Giordano, 15,30
172n/75 Burgevin, Frederick H., I60n23
works: De Conceptu Vir-
ginali, 6 -, Proslogion, 14, 15, Cassirer, Ernst, 15, 39
22,163-64n55 Christ: as revelation of God, 27,
Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, 5, 40,99-107, 149, 153,
13,172nl75, 175n21 176n56; and theory of atone-
Aquinas, Thomas: Nicholas com- ment, 38; as part of Trinity,
pared with, 6, 7, 10, 15, 39-40,119-23, 177n6J;as
165n69 image of substance of God,
Aristotle, 5, 33, 34, 176n5P 133
Atonement, doctrine of, 6, 38 Church of St. Peter in Chains, 4
Augustine, 5, 7, 169nl35 Coincidentia oppositorum, doc-

181
182 Index

trine of, 11-12, 21-22, sion of theme of God as

160n22 possest, 7, 17-19, 23-24, 28-
Conciliar Movement, 4 30 passim, 39, 41; method
Contraction, 33, 37-38, \69nl36 and style of, 11-12, 16;
Copernicus, 15, 30 doctrine of via negativa in,
Copleston, Frederick, 37, 170- 16, 20-28; compared with
71nl57 De Docta Ignorantia, 16,
I Corinthians, 16, 175n2/ 19-21, 36-37; and "proof"
II Corinthians, 16 of God, 17; use of symbol-
Council of Basel, 3 ism in, 21, 40-41, 43; teach-
Council of Constance, 4 ings on universals in, 36-37;
Cusanus, Nicolaus, see Nicholas and philosophy as hand-
maiden of theology, 40; and
De Conceptu Virginali, 6 distinction between ratio
De Concordantia Catholica, 5 and intellectus, \72nl 75.
De Coniecturis, 12, 33-34, See also "Possest"; Symbol-
172n775,176n5# ism
De Divisione Naturae, 5 De Quaerendo Deum, 19
De Docta Ignorantia, 14, 30, De Venatione Sapientiae, 18,
162-63n49: doctrine of 163n52
unitas complicans in, 4; and De Visione Dei, 12, I78n83
influence of Thierry of Divine Names, The, 5
Chartres, 6 -7; "proof" of "Docta ignorantia," 5, 13, 27
God in, 8-10; method and Dolan, John P., 163-64n55,
style of, 8-11; discussion of 164n60
absolutely Maximum in, 10- Duhem, Pierre, 6, 159nl6,
11; and charge of pantheism, I61n3/
12-13; use of symbolism
in, 13, 135; meaning of title, Eckhart, Meister, 6, 13, 163n55,
13, 27; compared with De 174-75n20
Possest, 16, 19-21, 36-37; Enfolding Oneness, 4
and proportionality between Ephesians 1:21, 16
finite and infinite, 19; dis- Erigena, John Scotus: Nicholas
cussion of negative theology compared with, 5, 7, 37, 42
in, 20, 27; teachings on uni- works: De Divisione
versals in, 32-37 passim; and Naturae, 5
distinction between ratio and "Esse," 14, 173n9, 175n26,
intellectus, 172n/ 75 176n60, 177n72
De Icona, 133 Eugenius IV, Pope, 158n2
De LiNon Aliud, 5, 39,172n7 75, Exodus 3:14, 1
173-74n/2,175n21,178n84
De Ludo Globi, 13,43 Faith, doctrine of, 16, 38, 99-
De Pace Fidei, 8 107
De Possest: sources for, 7; dis- Flasch, Kurt, 14-15, 165n66
cussion of teachings on God Fuehrer, Mark L., 167nl09,170-
in, 7, 16-30, 39, 41; discus- 71nl57
 Index 183

Callus, Thomas, 6 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,

God: as inconceivable and un- 15,42, 167-68nl/0
knowable, 5, 19-28 passim, Heimsoeth, Heinz, 163n50
41, 81, 97,107-9,151-53, Heron, Germain, 162-63n49
165-66n71, I67nl01, Holy Spirit, 39, 103, 119-23,
176n56; discussion of teach- 177n6J
ings on, in De Possest, 7, Hommes, Jakob, 5
16-30, 39, 41; as Actualized- Hugh of St. Victor, 6
possibility (Possest), 7, 17-19,
23-24,28-30,31,39,41,67- Idiota de Mente, I62r\49
79,93, 123; Nicholas's Imitation of Christ, The, 3
"proof" of, 8-10, 17, 163- Incarnation, 40
64n55; as absolutely Maxi- Infinity, notion of, 42
mum, 8-11, 14,160nl9;co- Intellectus,43, I72nl75
incidence of opposites in, 11,
12,21-22,23,42,77,87,151, Jaspers, Karl, 14
153, I66n83; as all things, John the Evangelist, 77
12,16, 28-30, 69-81 passim,
151,167n/09 ; as beyond Kant, Immanuel, 15, 164n60
the coincidence of contradic- Klibansky, Raymond, 163n50
tories, 12, 21; as created as Koch, Josef, 33, 34
well as creating, 12, 38; as Koran, 160n23
sphere and circumference of Koyre, A., 30
world, 13,31; names for, 14, Krebs, Nikolaus, see Nicholas
19,21,23-24,28,93,173n6,
174-75n20;and the created Lai, Tyrone, 163n50
world, 16-17, 28-30, 34-38, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von,
63, 71-77 passim, 151-53, 15,164n59
I66n83,I67nl09, 168n/15, Lenz,Joseph,5
169-70n/5J,170-71nl57, Lull, Raymond, 6
174nl6; man's seeking of,
16,19-21,23, 27,38,40- Maimonides, Moses, 15
41,79-81,97-107,127, Man: nature of, 12, 34, 36, 38-
151-53, 176n56; as Being 39, 171nl6l; as seeker of
itself, 2 1 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 7 9 , 141, God, 16, 19-21,23,27, 38,
143,174-75n20,175n2J, 40-41, 79-81,97-107, 127,
178nP3 ; revelation of, 27- 151-53,176n56
28,40,63-69,79,99- Martin, Vincent, 170-71ni57
107,149,151-53,176n56 ; Mathematics, 139, 178nS7:
as Absolute Universal, 34. Nicholas's contribution to,
See also Via negativa 4; Nicholas's symbolic use
Goldammer, Kurt, 168nl24 of, 21, 39-40,42, 109-23,
Grosseteste, Robert, 6 135-37,176-77n62
Maurer, Armand, 8-10, 160n2l,
Haubst, Rudolf, 165n69 164n6J
Hawkins, D. ]. B., 15, \62n49 Maximus the Confessor, 5
184 Index

Motion, 73 : Nicholas's symbolic Aliud, 5, 39, 172n/75, 173-

use of, 21,40-41,83-89,123- 74n/2,175n21,178nS4;
27; of the earth and universe, De Ludo Globi, 13,43-,De
30,32,40-41 Pace Fidei, 8;De Quaerendo
Mystical vision, doctrine of, 16, Deum, 19; De Venatione
20,21,41,79, 107,165- Sapientiae, 18, !63n52;D<?
66n7/, 166n74 Visione Dei, 12, 178nS3;
Idiota de Mente, \62n49.
Negative theology, see Via nega- See also De Docta Ignoran-
tiva tia; De Possest
Neoplatonism, 7, 42 Nicholas, V, Pope, 4
Nicholas, variants of name, 3 ; Nicolaus de Cusa, see Nicholas
life of, 3 -4; compared with Not-being, see Being and not-
Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus, being
5,6, 13 ; sources for, 5-7; Nycolaus Cancer de Coesse, see
compared with Pseudo- Nicholas
Dionysius, 5,7,19, 42,165-
66n71,174-75n20, 175n27; Oedinger, K., 167nl01
compared with Erigena, 5 , 7 ,
37, 42; compared with Pantheism: charge of, against
Augustine, 5, 7, 169nI35; Nicholas, 12,28, 38, 167-
compared with Aristotle, 5, 68nllO
33, 34, 176n59; compared Paul, Saint, 63,67
with Aquinas,6, 7, 10, 15, Plato, I67nl09: as influence on
165n69; compared with Eck- Nicholas, 5
hart,6, 13, !63-64n55, 174- "Posse," 14, 18, 173n9, 177n72
75n20; compared with An- "Possest": meaning of, 18-19,
selm,6, 14-15, 22, 38,43, 77-79,93,!62-63n49,
159n73,163n52, 172n/75; 175n2J; symbolism of, 19,
method and style of writings 21,39,41,91-93, 131-33.
of, 7-16, 41, 172nl75; com- See also God, as Actualized-
pared with William of Ock- possibility (Possest)
ham, 7, 41; and "proof" of Proclus, 5, 7
God, 8-10, 17, 163-64n55; Proslogion, 14, 15, 22, 163-
compared with Spinoza, 11, 64n55
15,41,42; doctrines of and Pseudo-Dionysius: Nicholas com-
reading of scripture, 16-28; pared with, 5, 7, 19,42,
major themes in writings of, 165-66n7I, 174-75n20,
16-41; teachings on universals, 175n2^
32-38 works: The Divine Names,
works: Apologia Doctae 5
Ignorantiae, 5, 13, 172nl75, Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus, 5,
175n21 ;De Concordantia 6,13
Catholica, 5;De Coniecturis,
12,33-34,172nJ 75,176n5S; Quodlibet in quolibet, 36,
De Icona, 133 ; De Li Non \69nl51
 Index 185

Ratio, 43, 172n/55 Operibus, 6; Lectiones in

Revelation, of God, 27-28, 40, Boethii Librum, 7
63-69,79,99-107,149, Thomas a Kempis, 3
151-53,176n56 Tillich.Paul, 167n/03
Romans 1:20, 16,63,67 Time: Nicholas's discussion of,
21-22,40,85, 169nl35,
"Sacra ignorantia," 13 175o?2
Salter, Emma G., 162n49 Trialogus de Possest, see De Pos-
Scholasticism: Nicholas's writ- ses t
ings distinguished from 7,14, Trinity, doctrine of, 7, 39, 40,
41 107,113-23, 173nll,
Science: Nicholas's views on, 4, 177n63
14,30-32,40-41,168n/24,
169nl35,175-76n37 Unitas complicans, 4
"Scientia ignorantiae," 13, 14 Unitas ecclesiae, 4
Scotus, John Duns, 7 Universe: as infinite, 14, 30-32;
Sigmund, P., 158nJ, 163n50 God's relation to, 16-17, 28-
Spinoza, Baruch, 11, 15,41,42 30,34-38,63,71-77passzm,
Steiger, Renate, 61 151-53,166nSJ, 167nl09,
Symbolism: God as sphere 168nll5,169-7Qnl53, 170-
example, 13 ; as means of 71nl57, 174nl6
approaching God, 16, 19-21, University of Cologne, 3
23,27,40-41,91-93,97, University of Heidelberg, 3
107, 127, 149; of "posses*," University of Padua, 3
19,21,39,41,91-93, 131-
33; mathematical examples, Vansteenberghe, Edmond, 5,14,
21,39-40,42,109-23, 135- 159nJ5,I61n29, 162n49
137,176-7 7n62; top example, Via moderna, 41
21,40-41,43, 83-89;mo- Via negativa, 13, 16, 19-28
tion examples, 21, 40-41, passim, 41, 137-49, 165-
83-89, 123-27 ; of "in,"21, 66n71. See also God, as in-
127-31, 177n72, 177n74, conceivable and unknowable
177-78n80; bowling-game Via positiva, 20, 165-66n71
example, 43 ; line example, Via supereminentiae, 26
91-93, 135; rose example,
117-19, 177n6J;seeing-and- Wenck, John, 12, 13
being example, 133 Whittaker, T., 5
William of Ockham, 7, 41
Thierry of Chartres: Nicholas Wilpert, Paul, 165n66, 165n77,
influenced by, 5, 6-7 171nl59
works: Commentary on
Boethius, 6; De Sex Dierum Zimmermann, Robert, 164n55?