U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond PCN 10600000200 - 7 PDF

A Marriage of Convenience 125
discovered what a useful and flexible tool Marine air the large volume of Coalition traffic" when the British
control was.413 division relieved the American division in the oil
For the British the war began in much the same fields, not surprising considering the volume of
way as it had for I MEF headquarters. On 20 March, friendly forces passing through the area.416 But over-
one of the incoming Iraqi theater ballistic missiles all, the first days of the war went very well, and the
flew directly over the division headquarters, certainly British were pleased with the situation.
capturing the attention of the staff. With British un- The 15th MEU (SOC), which was to chop back to
derstatement, and humor, General Brims commented U.S. control on 25 March after being relieved in Urnm
at the evening update brief that the "Iraqis were Qasr on 24 March, had meshed almost seamlessly
showing that they too had a vote" in how the war with the British brigade. The Marine unit commander,
would run.414 By the afternoon of 21 March, 3 Com- Colonel Thomas D. Waldhauser, found it to be a
mando Brigade, the Royal Marine formation, had suc- great experience "by design and by default." He Com-
cessfully deployed into the Al Faw Peninsula, despite mented that even though the expeditionary unit's
"blackened skies from burning oil infrastructure" and ground combat element had more organic combat
a deadly crash of a U.S. Marine helicopter carrying power, there was a lot of congruence in the way both
Royal Marines.' sides were organized. The Royal Marines were true to
In the meantime, 15th MEU (SOC) took the port of their doctrine, giving the U.S. Marines mission orders
Umm Qasr, encountering some stiff resistance, par- and then giving them the leeway to execute those
ticularly from Saddam Fedayeen, but not enough to orders, which were fourfold: to annihilate the enemy
prevent it from making "excellent progress."4'5 The who fought; to accommodate the enemy who capit-
next day, 3 Commando Brigade reported Umm Qasr ulated; not to destroy the infrastructure of the city;
"clear though 15 MEU continued to have sporadic and not to get bogged down within city limits. Given
contacts," while 7 Armored Brigade and 16 Air As- the opportunity to make a contribution under un-
sault Brigade each carried out a relief in place with usual circumstances—this was not your normal
the 5th and 7th Regimental Combat Teams, respec- cruise, the Marines of the 15th MEU (which, Wald-
tively, in the Rumaylah oil fields. There was some hauser noted, had never carried out an exercise but
friction, a blue-on-blue "friendly fire" incident with only real-world operations) accomplished the mis-
no casualties between 15th MEU and 7 Armored sion with gusto."
Brigade on 21 March, and some confusion "due to Overall, the British were on plan and the Iraqis
were not; in particular, the British had been able to
' The value of the Marine contribution is suggested by the House seize petroleum and shipping infrastructure before
of Commons report on the war, which stated that the British forces the Iraqis could do much harm to it. While it would
needed more practice and training when it came to close air sup- prove impossible to get the oil flowing again quickly,
port. To the same effect, Capt Arnold M. Kiefer of 1st ANGLIC0, it was soon possible to get ocean-going ships into
found that the British did not have as much experience with com-
Umm Qasr, especially to unload large quantities of
bined arms as did the Marine Corps and tended to view the em-
ployment of supporting arms in a sequential way. They did not use supplies for the expected humanitarian crisis. The
and deconflict all of their supporting arms options. Capt Kiefer Royal Fleet Auxillery Sir Galahad (L3005), the first
added the comment that their light infantry skills were otherwise ship with a humanitarian load, began to unload on 28
world-class. (House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, Vol. 1, p. 63; March. Considering the overall situation, the Ministry
Capt Arnold M. Kiefer intvw, 17Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA)
of Defense postwar study concluded that:
**42 Commando's insertion started badly in appalling visibility,
made worse by blowing sand and smoke from fires started the
previous day. Tragically, the Marine Ch-46 "Sea Knight" helicop- Four days into the campaign the Iraqi 51st Di-
ter carrying the headquarters of the Brigade Reconnaissance Force vision had been removed from its defence of
crashed. . . With the cloud base dropping still further, the inser-
.
the oil fields. The 3 Commando Brigade held
tion was aborted, forcing the Brigade HQ rapidly to identify other critical oil infrastructure at Al Faw and the port
aviation assets and plan a new insertion for 42 Commando at
dawn, using RAF Chinook and Puma helicopters. Although the of Umm Qasr. The 16 Air Assault Brigade held
landing took place six hours late, Onto insecure landing sites, and
in some case miles away from those originally intended, all ob- "Col Thomas Waldhauser also noted the 15thMEU's air combat el-
jectives were secured." There was apparently some bad blood over ement was detached while the unit was in Iraq. He would have
the U.S. Marine Corps' decision to abort, which may explain why preferred to keep his own aviation combat element, but apart from
the British decided to use their own assets. (Cmdr 1 (UK) Armored that had no complaints about air support. This tracks with Task
Division's Diary, entry for 21Mar03 [Copy in Reynolds Working Pa- Force Tarawa's experience; its aviation combat element had also
pers, MCHC, Quantico, VA]; Ministry of Defence, Operations in been stripped away when it landed in Kuwait. (Col Thomas D.
Iraq: Lessons for the Future [London, UK: 11Dec03], p. 12) Waldhauser intvw, 14Apr03 tMCHC, Quantico, VAI)
126 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond
ahead of the rest of the force; General McKiernan

had directed them not to occupy Basrah proper until
he gave the word. He told General Brims that he
wanted the fight for Basrah to wait until the Coali-
tion had isolated Baghdad, because he did not want
to risk a dramatic urban fight in the south that could
drive Iraqis into the arms of the regime and make the
overall mission that much more difficult.42° General
Conway's guidance was similar hut keyed to I MEF's
scheme of maneuver; he directed Brims simply to
make sure that whatever he chose to do in Basrah,
he should remember the paramount goal of protect-
ing I MEF's flank.421
What Generals McKiernan and Conway wanted
was the reverse of what the Ba'athist strongman in
Basrah wanted. He was Saddam Hussein's cousin, Ali
Hassan Al-Majid, commonly known as "Chemical Mi"
DVIC DM-SD-04-01657 for his murderous suppression of the Kurds in 1988
Fire and smoke from a damaged oil and gas separa- with chemical weapons. He had been equally brutal
tion plant is visible in the background as elements of in his dealings with the Shia in the south in the 1990s
the 1 (UK) Armored Division move into southern Iraq. after the Gulf War, and was one of the prime movers
in the draining of the swampland north of Basrah,
the vital oilfield at Rumaylah and threatened the ancestral home of the "Marsh Arabs" and their
Iraq's 6th Armoured Division to the north of distinctive culture, in order to eliminate it as a haven
Basrah to such an extent that it could not in- for potential or actual rebels. The result was an eco-
terfere with Coalition operations. The 7 Ar- logical and economic disaster. Since Basrah's ap-
moured Brigade held the bridges over the proximately 1.25 million citizens were predominantly
Shatt-al-Basrah waterway to the west of Basrah Shia, he was feared far more than respected. At the
[a canal that ran from Basrah to Umm Qasr to beginning of the war, he presided over a mix of un-
the sea, paralleling the much larger Shatt-al- reliable regular army units and more reliable hut not
Arab to the east]. . [T]his was the most cm-
. . particularly skilled irregulars like the Saddam Fe-
cia! ground to hold in order to achieve the dayeen. To the extent that he had a strategy, it ap-
overall plan of protecting the right flank of the pears to have been one of trying to draw the British
U.S. advance to isolate Baghdad.417 into a drawn-out fight within the city limits of Basrah,
with the attendant collateral damage to cultural and
Like their American allies to the west, the British religious sites, and of course civilian casualties, the
were finding that the regular Iraqi Army was not as kind of thing that hurts the Coalition when it appears
much of a threat as had been feared but that there on the front page of an Arab daily, not to mention
might be more of an irregular threat than had been The Washington Post or Le Monde. British intelligence
predicted. On the evening of 23 March, General reports suggested just how basic the Iraqi plan for
Brims spoke with 7 Armored Brigade about "the Basrah was: "Whenever the British intercepted
changing nature of our understanding of the conflict. enemy communications, Saddam's henchmen were
• There was not to be a solely conventional battle, merely urging loyalists to fight, fight, fight, without
rather resistance especially focused on urban areas, specifying how."422
and troops either bypassed or deliberately inserted This was exactly what the British were determined
behind the forward line of our own troops."418 not to do, whatever the timing of the attack. British
The issue confronting the British was what to do officers commented repeatedly that they were always
next. Ultimately they would have to occupy Basrah, determined to avoid the kind of hitter, costly, house-
Iraq's second city and that was not up for discussion. to-house, street-to-street fighting that had recently oc-
As Genera! Brims commented: "to remove a regime curred in Chechnya, where the Russian army had
you cannot leave [it] . . . in control of an urban become bogged down in its fight with rebels, or like
area."419 So it became a matter of timing and method. the Eastern Front in World War II. "We were deter-
As for timing, CFLCC did not want the British to get mined," Brims commented after the war, "not to have
JCCC 030328-N-3783H-479
Royal Fleet Auxiliary Landing Ship Logistic, Sir Galahad (L 3005), arrives at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr to de-
liver the first shipment of humanitarian aid from Coalition forces.
any sort of Grozny or Stalingrad scenes."423 a Londoner might "casually" solve the wickedly con-
Over the period between 25 March and 6 April, voluted Times of London crossword puzzle, when in
through a process of thinking and experimentation, fact it was their lifelong devotion to the art of war
almost like a Warfighting Laboratory evolution, the that was manifesting itself:
British came up with the alternative approach that fit
the situation. The preliminary experiment took place I talked to the Brigade Commander. . about .
in the much smaller city of Az Zubayr, population four or five days into the thing. . and he said,
.
about 100,000, to the southwest of Basrah in 7 Ar- "I am going to work out how we are going to
mored Brigade's zone of action. The soldiers of 7 Ar- take Az Zubayr," and I said, "Good, I will go
mored, who wore the "Desert Rats" patch their away and consider Basrah." And he said, "I
predecessors had worn at the battle of El Alamein in have got the most powerful armoured brigade
World War II, found themselves taking heavy ma- the British Army's ever put in the field, and I
chine gun and rocket fire from irregulars every time will back-brief you on my bit, of Az Zubayr, to-
they came near the city. The 7 Armored had the com- morrow morning." I arranged to see him first
bat power to enter and reduce the city, but exercised thing . and he asked me to come aside of
. .
restraint, starting out small with a raid into the city by him for a short time, and he said to me, "I have
1 Black Watch battalion on 25 March. On 26 March, worked out, we cannot go into Az Zubayr
7 Armored proceeded to isolate the city, which was because that is what the regime want; we will
not the same as besieging it but rather a matter of inflict undue casualties, we will take undue ca-
controlling ingress and egress or, just as important, sualties, we will hurt the civilians . that is
. .
demonstrating its ability to do so.424 what he is after. We have got to do it in a more

General Brims tells the Basrah story in a very Eng- cunning way." I said to him, "Well, that's funny,
lish way as if he and his subordinate, Brigadier Binns, because I have worked out precisely the same
had "casually" solved the problem in the same way thing for Basrah."425
As Gen James Mattis had demonstrated outside Al Kut, I MEF was

On 26 March, General Brims convened a com-
very much aware of the legal implications of besieging a city, mander's conference at Brigadier Binns' headquar-
which both the Marine and the British divisions wanted to avoid. ters, where they discussed the issue among
themselves. Brims took the opportunity to announce

the decision to make Basrah a divisional responsibil-
ity rather than delegating it to one of the brigades, as
British commanders were more likely to do. The UK
division would hope to foment popular unrest by
conducting "deep operations" through the destruc-
tion of key targets while at the same time providing
an opportunity for the people to receive humanitar-
ian aid.426
What came next, in both Az Zubayr and Basrah,
was a series of carefully orchestrated events, aimed
as much at the enemy's mind as at his body. One of
the prerequisites was the collection of the kind of cit-
izen-by-citizen, neighborhood-by-neighborhood in- UvIc DM-SD-04-01770
telligence that can seem more like police work than In Pinzguaer reconnaissance vehicles, British Army
part of a military operation. This was apparently soldiers assigned to 2/1 Battery, 16th Air Assault
something that the British government in southern Brigade, move out on patrol in southern Iraq.
Iraq had been pursuing for years. It was also a skill selves, they needed our support, and therefore actu-
that the British Army had learned in Northern Ireland ally we had them helping us, and they were feeding
and the Balkans. By working with recruited agents, us . . accurate intelligence, worthy targets
. .and. .
some of whom were reporting by cell phone, and by we were able to conduct these raids, and they had a
simply networking, the British were able to create a very significant effect."429
detailed picture of the life of the city, from the bot- General Brims made it clear he wanted some op-
tom up.427 Next came a round of carefully calculated
erations to occur simultaneously even though the
raids, sometimes synchronized with raids by joint di- focus of main effort would shift. Initially it would be
rect attack munitions, or smart bombs, or other pre- on 7 Armored Brigade and Az Zubayr. After Az
cision munitions, which could lead to sniping or to Zubayr was determined to have fallen on 4 April
"lodgements," something like the establishment of (there was of course no formal surrender ceremony)
patrol bases that ranged in size up to the battalion the lighter 3 Commando Brigade took over in Az
level. For example, a British unit might stage a night- Zubayr and 7 Armored moved on to augment the ef-
time raid and then, when withdrawing, leave a sniper fort against Basrah, which remained a division-level
team behind to observe the neighborhood for a few operation. Resistance was becoming progressively
days, or to snipe at Ba'ath and Fedayeen leaders.428
lighter, while the population seemed to become more
At the same time, information operations worked on
welcoming of the British.430 As time went on and the
the minds of the citizenry, by means of leaflets, British became more successful, they received more
broadcasts, or even targeted mobile telephone calls
information from the citizens of Basrah. On 5 April
by General Brims himself. Then there might be a they received a tip about the whereabouts of Chem-
carefully planned air or artillery raid against a pin- ical Ali, and the Coalition launched a smart bomb at-
point target, whose effects the division could observe
tack on the building where he was believed to be
on the live feed from the "Phoenix," the British un- hiding. Although unsuccessful, it was believed to
manned aerial vehicle. "The way we did it," General
have been successful at the time and, at the least, a
Brims reported to the House of Commons, "was to
potent demonstration of Coalition power for all on
build up an intelligence picture, focused raids, the Iraqi side to see. Chemical Ali was not in fact cap-
ground raids, air raids, mind raids [the peoplel
. . .
tured until the summer. 431
wanted to be freed but they could not do it them- By now the U.S. Army and Marines were launch-
'Murray and Scales make a comment to the effect that the British ing probes into Baghdad, and there was little chance
Intelligence Service had established a network in Basrah in the that anything that happened in Basrah could disrupt
decade after the Gulf War, which if accurate suggests amazing fore- operations in the north. The most recent raids having
sight on the part of the British. (Williamson Murray MajGen
,
been deemed "very successful," General Brims or-
Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War [cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2003], p. 145)
dered his division to execute "Operation Sinbad," the
According to Murray and Scales, the regime loyalists were the final push against Basrah, which was to come from a
ones with the cell phones; if you had a cell phone, you could be number of directions. It met with "a minimum of re-
a target for a British sniper. (Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 149) sistance from individuals with small arms" who were
apparently either Ba'athist Party members or Feday-

een.432 One objective after another, the sewage plant,
the party headquarters, the governor's palace, fell
without heavy fighting, something of which Brims
was justifiably proud. Each success created the next
opportunity, which Brims exploited; he commented
later that his intent was to seek the right opportunity
to execute each phase of the plan. By twilight on 6
April, most of Basrah was in Coalition hands, if not
secure.433
Murray and Scales recount a story about the next
day that speaks volumes about the British Army's
work in Iraq. On 7 April, the division committed
paratroopers to the "old town" quarter of Basrah to
finish off any lingering resistance. But the paratroop-
ers found there was little for them to do and began
to withdraw: "As the paras withdraw, Shia crowds
began throwing rocks at British tanks and armored
personnel carriers. One of the battle group com-
manders immediately sensed what was happening.
He ordered his . . crews, as well as the infantry, to
.
get Out of their vehicles, take off their helmets, stow

most of their weapons, and walk out into the agitated
crowd. Immediately the rock throwing ended and
members of the crowd again smiled and clapped
hands for the British troops."434
This remarkable story, which begins by reflecting
Photo courtesy of Field History Branch
Shia fears of abandonment by the Coalition, conveys
something of the British sense for how to handle the As British troops, supported by tanks and armored
transition to Phase IV, post combat operations. With personnel carriers, moved into Basrah, they encoun-
his experience in Northern Ireland and the Balkans, tered minimum resistance and the city fell without
the average British soldier may be one of the world's heavy fighting or loss of 4fe.
foremost experts on the three-block war. He could Maysan province to the north, the same kind of bot-
fight a conventional battle, defend himself against a tom-up intelligence gathering that served the British
guerrilla or paramilitary threat, and conduct human- well in combat was very useful in the transition pe-
itarian operations. He excelled at most of these tasks riod. Nevertheless, there was only so much this small
in southeastern Iraq. As early as 1 April, in Az Zubayr, force could do among a population of millions.
British soldiers started to shed their helmets and pa- Like their American counterparts, the British did
trol in berets. In Az Zubayr, Basrah, and, later, in not have a definitive plan for Phase IV other than to
be ready to handle a humanitarian crisis which did
According to Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, "the initial plan of
attack was to punch deep into the city and pull back out at night.
not develop anywhere in Iraq, and to hand off to the
[But] the operation on this 'terribly long day' was going so suc- Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assis-
cessfully that Major General Brims decided to finish off the Iraqis tance, which had focused much of its planning to-
with a final stroke." To similar effect, the British liaison officer to ward the same end. The British government as a
I MEF, Maj Simon Plummer, stated that what started out as a probe whole and the British military in particular were in
became a four-pronged, final assault when it became clear there
was only minimal Iraqi resistance. While both sources are certainly
step with the rest of the Coalition in assuming that
consistent with the British practice of exploiting opportunities, as "post conflict.., there might be humanitarian or en-
opposed to "fighting the plan," the firsthand sources suggest a vironmental disasters of various sorts, refugee flows,
slightly more deliberate, planned approach. As Gen Brims com- shortage of food . and those kinds of issues.
. . . .
mented on 10 May, the division had developed a plan and waited ORHA was really designed, as far as we [British]
for the right opportunity to execute it, as opposed to simply re-
acting to events. (Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p.151; Sudarsan
could see, to prepare mainly for humanitarian is-
Raghavan, "British Take Most of Basra," MiamiHerald.com, 6Apr03; sues."435 Another similarity was their response to the
MajGen Robin V. Brims intvw, 10May03 [MCHC, Quantico, VA]) looting that occurred in their zone. Like the Amen-
cans, the British expected there would be some resid- best suited to achieving the Coalition's desired ef-
ual Iraqi police or army structure with which they fects in the combat phase, but not to carrying those
could cooperate, and they had considered the possi- effects through into the post conflict phase.440'
bility that there might be some looting, but they were In the spring of 2003, the situation in southeast
taken aback by its scope and breadth.436 Iraq did not seem as bad as the House of Commons
As in most other areas in Iraq, once the fighting and others would later say it had been. The forces
stopped virtually all levels of Iraqi government in on the ground were generally upbeat and believed
and around Basrah simply ceased to exist. The loot- they were making good progress. Examples from the
ers stepped into the resulting power vacuum and division commander's diary include, on 9 April, the
went to work with a vengeance in southeast Iraq, observation that "the mood in the city is still jubilant
"they ransacked schools, hospitals and took away and . the buses continue to run"; on 12 April the
. .
things . beds, chairs, and so on, or they just

. report that 16 Air Assault Brigade was able to pro-
wrecked things."437 The House of Commons Defence ceed north to Al An1arah in Maysan province for the
Committee judged that "the impact of this looting on relief in place with Task Force Tarawa without inci-
the task of post-conflict reconstruction has been dent; on 13 April the fact that "joint patrolling with
enormous," in terms of testing the goodwill of the the local police force commenced. . in Basrah"; and
.
people, making it difficult for them to return to work the conclusion on 21 April that "the local population
or school, get health care, or even accomplish the are becoming increasingly committed to policing
mundane tasks that local government performs for themselves and preserving their own resources."
its citizens.438 They were not prepared to cope with Shortly thereafter, on 22 April the United Nations de-
it; even if they had had the will to do so, they clearly clared the British zone permissive, a few days before
lacked the numbers and, except in a few dramatic President Bush made his declaration that major com-
cases, did not intervene. The I MEF situation report bat operations had ended. For the British this was the
for 7 April contained the laconic comment about end of the combat phase; parts of the division, to in-
Basrah: "looting ongoing, looters are only engaged if clude General Brims, made preparations to rotate
looting arms depots."439 The committee concluded home, with a sense of having accomplished their
that the scale and shape of the force provided were mission.
One of this British general's last official acts be-
A soldier from the Royal Logistics Service Battalion, fore leaving Iraq was to host a farewell reception for
10th General Service Regiment, aids local Iraqis in I MEF commanders and staff at his headquarters in
the distribution of water. Elements of the battalion Basrah International Airport on 10 May to celebrate
made daily water and food runs to Basrah and sur- not just success on the battlefield, but also the bond
rounding villages from the port of Umm Qasr. between the Marine and his division. Feelings that
jccc 030415-D-1517P-002
went beyond the usual routine expressions of offi-
cial goodwill were on display. Senior Marines took
the trouble to fly in from other parts of Iraq on KC-
130s and went into the reception area in the airport's
"VIP" quarters, which were opulent beyond belief or
good taste, with gilded trimmings, high ceilings, mar-
ble floors, and thick carpets, but no working plumb-
ing. Apart from the ultramodern Marine pattern
desert digital utility uniforms, and the unusual British
desert camouflage uniforms, it could have been a
scene from the movie Patton, as white-coated stew-
ards served gin and tonics to tired but happy officers
who felt they had something to celebrate. The divi-
sion band, very British and old-school, beat retreat
as the sun went down, as if trying to close a chapter
in history.
This led into a somewhat philosophical discussion of whether the

division's actions and effects desired by the division were really in
sync. The point was that the division had won the war, but was
anyone on the British side set up to win the peace?
Chapter 11
Postlude to Combat: Marines and Occupation of Iraq, 2003
Occupation was not a mission that Lieutenant There followed the decision for I MEF's future Op-
General James T. Conway relished. He wanted his erations and plans officers to think about Phase IV
Marines to fight the war and then to "recock," to get and to draft an operations plan, even before the
ready for the next war. This was the pattern that shooting war started. One of their starting points was
came naturally to him and to many other Marines; liaison with Coalition Forces Land Component Com-
the idea was to assault the beaches, seize the objec- mand (CFLCC) planners and their counterparts at 1
tive, and then move on to prepare for the next as- (UK) Armored Division. By design or default, Cent-
sault, leaving the occupation duties to others. When Corn had left much of the responsibility for Phase IV
he discussed the issue with a journalist before the planning to CFLCC, a dramatic change from its ap-
war, General Conway enumerated some of the issues proach to Phases I-Ill. The I Marine Expeditionary
that an occupier would face in Iraq, including some Force turned to the British because they had some re-
no-win choices, such as whether to intervene when cent experience, as well as a useful staff study on the
Iraqis turned on one another after Saddam's fall. He restoration of law and order after combat. The State
concluded: "If I had a vote, I'would say let us get [I Department's comprehensive 'Future of Iraq" study,
MEFI Out of here." But he was quick to add that the which laid out many of the challenges the United
Marines would probably have no choice but to in- States would face in Phase IV, was considered taboo
volve themselves in the postwar occupation of Iraq in for military planners, because it was not compatible
some form.44' with Pentagon policy-makers' vision of postwar Iraq.
Retired US. Army LtGen Jay M. Garner head 0/the Office 0/Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
greets arriving delegates to the Iraqi Interim Authority Conference in Baghdad. The authority was to govern
Iraq until formal elections could be held.
JCCC 030428-F-5918G-016
DvIc I)F-S1)-05-04667
US. Navy UT1 Chyne Greek, left, from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7, US. Army LtCol Matthew Gap-
inski, of the 358th Civil Affairs Battalion, and Maj Robert V. Cart-, Civil Affairs team leader with the 15th Ma-
rine Ez-peditionary Unit, assess damage to the water treatment facility located at An Nasiriyah, Iraq.
Coalition Forces Land Component Command also had stopped, able to maintain the infrastructure and that
a loosely defined relationship with a group known as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian As-
Combined Joint Task Force IV (CJTF-IV), so poorly sistance would be able to step in to take on many
funded that its members had had to attend trade tasks, especially those dealing with humanitarian as-
shows to obtain office supplies, and with what was, sistance. As General McKierrian's special assistant,
in effect, CJTF-IV's successor organization, the Office Terry Moran, commented, CFLCC planned to "lever-
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Both age the Iraqi Army and. . the [Iraqi] bureaucracy."'3
.
organizations were more or less under the tactical The Pentagon's original assumption was that even re-
control of Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, construction and humanitarian assistance office
but it was no secret that office's chief, retired Lieu- would not have to conduct operations for more than
tenant General Jay M. Garner, had direct lines of his a few months in Iraq, and that after a relatively brief
own to the Pentagon.442* occupation the Coalition could turn the country over
Coalition Forces Land Component Command to an Iraqi government.
came to assign nine governates (roughly equivalent Within the framework of Eclipse II, I MEF had a
to provinces) in southern Iraq to I MEF, covering a considerable amount of leeway, and its planners de-
territory three times the size of Virginia with a popu- veloped their own approach to the matter. First they
lation of 9 to 10 million people, and eventually is- did an "intelligence preparation of the battlefield,"
sued a formal plan known as "Eclipse II" to guide its looking at the tribes in the various regions, their in-
subordinates in Phase IV. ("Eclipse I" had been the frastructure, and the various threats Marines were
plan for the occupation of Germany after World War likely to face. They came up with two assumptions:
II.) Land Component Command focused on security that the first 6 to 12 weeks would be critical, this was
and emergency repairs to the infrastructure. The as- when precedents would be set, and that it was im-
sumption was that parts of the Iraqi government portant not to try to do too much. The Marines had
would still be in working order when the shooting to keep from involving themselves too deeply in
local affairs and to let the Iraqis solve as many of
Gen Tommy Franks wrote that he left it to the Pentagon to plan their own problems as they could. One of the future
and run post combat operations and noted that Office of Recon-
struction and Humanitarian Assistance lacked the resources it operations officers, Lieutenant Colonel Brian K. Mc-
needed to do its job. Franks' decision was later criticized. (Franks, Crary, remembered the many and varied unknowns
American Soldier, pp. 441, 524, 526) that he and his counterparts discussed: how to vet
Postlude to Combat 133
tenant Colonel George W. Smith, remembered think-

ing, it was a good beginning; I MEF had defined the
problem. But, he felt, the planners had only been
able to point in the general direction of a solution
hut not to lay one out in detail.445
General Conway announced on 15 April that it
would soon take up its postwar stance in southern
Iraq. The announcement contained the Marines'
trademark tinge of remorse about even having to
conduct Phase IV operations. Lieutenant Colonel
Smith, who doubled as the I MEF spokesman, ex-
plained to the press: "It is a tremendous responsibil-
ity and it's very complex. We focus the majority of
our efforts on war-fighting. That is what we do. And
so post-hostilities introduce a whole new spectrum
of challenges. . . We see that [fighting remnants of
.
the Fedayeen] . as the number one threat.

. . . We . .
are going to aggressively hunt these guys down and

destroy them."446
The next day, General Franks convened a meeting
of his senior commanders at Saddam Hussein's Abu
Ghraib Palace in Baghdad, "an extravagant amalgam
of marble, tile, gold fittings and massive chandeliers,
all surrounded by an azure moat," to seal the Coali-
tion's victory over the dictator and to ratify the plans
for securing the country.447 The Marine expeditionary
force apparently held its commander's conference on
Phase IV on the same day, and division followed suit
Photo courtesy of CFLCC
shortly thereafter.448
BGen Richard F. Natonski, commanding general of
With input from the Army's 358th Civil Affairs
Task Force Tarawa, examines an Al Samut missile Brigade, which remained a welcome adjunct to the
that was found at the Amara Soccer Stadium.
Marines during the occupation phase, I MEF pub-
and pay local police; how to provide routine munic- lished its order for Phase IV four days later. The plan-
ipal services (power and water); how to find, secure, ners' assumptions and the Marines' preference for
and exploit suspected weapons of mass destruction keeping the occupation short and looking to the fu-
sites; how to secure the many weapons caches from ture after leaving Iraq, are clear from the text:
looting; how to secure and process mass grave sites
of victims of the regime; even how to run prisons.444 On order, I MEF transitions to security/stability
This list did not include searching for Saddam Hus- operations—establishes military authority, de-
sein and his sons, along with other prominent mem- feats remaining Iraqi combatants, maintains
bers of the regime; such high-priority tasks were Iraqi territorial integrity, secures WMD
taken for granted. [weapons of mass destruction] in sectors, and
The interim result of the planners' work was a supports humanitarian assistance [and] the
scheme for dividing the various responsibilities restoration of Iraqi civilian administration/in-
among the 1st Marine Division, Task Force Tarawa, frastructure JOT [in order to] . enable a rapid
. .
and the British division, which declared it did not transition to follow-on Coalition forces. . .
need much U.S. assistance with Phase IV. During a

briefing to General Conway in early March, the plan- A guiding constant, to "enable," will be the basis
ners provided him with options for "transitioning the for all that we do. We must enable IOs/NGOs
force" and "enabling" the subordinate commands, es- [international organizations/nongovernmental
pecially by way of groups that would be known as organizations] and follow-on Coalition partners
"governate support teams," small teams of experts to support the Iraqi people. . We must en-
. .
that could deploy to a locality. As plans officer, Lieu- able the Iraqi people to support and govern
jccc 030511-M-9792P-018
LtCol Daniel O'Donohue, commanding 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, speaks with local officials of An Samawah
about what can be provided to rebuild the town.
themselves. . . . Our overarching focus will be between. This was partly by design, and partly the re-
establishment of a secure environment as we sult of chance. The rolling transition from Phase III to
disarm remaining Iraqi forces, [re-create] . . Phase IV was expected, but the speed and sudden-
local police forces . . . and develop . . [a small ness of the regime's collapse had been breathtaking.
new] Iraqi military. The shift was perhaps clearest for the wing. From
one day to the next, without a great deal of warning,
We must clearly communicate to the Iraqi peo- the kill boxes (the targeting control measure in the air
ple the temporary nature of our mission and war) were simply "closed." This apparently hap-
our desire to quickly transition to Iraqi self-de- pened on 11 April. There would still be calls for air
termination. . While accomplishing. Phase
. . support of various sorts, but it would no longer he a
IV, I MEF must also look "deep" toward the re- routine occurrence, and the wing could start thinking
quirement of reconstitution, regeneration and about drawing down in theater. On the ground, the
redeployment [of the forcel.449* violence also tapered off throughout the country, es-
pecially in the Marine area of operations in southern
As planned, there had been a blurred transition to Iraq, although the change for an infantryman or the
Phase IV. Task Force Tarawa and the British and driver of a light armored vehicle was a little less dra-
American divisions were conducting Phase IV oper- matic. He still went out Ofl patrol, with his weapons
ations before the force published its order, in loaded, and had to be prepared for a fight at any
Nasiriyah, Basrah, Baghdad, and many localities in time.45°
While the British division ran its own occupation,
"I MEF Fires helped to prepare the order; once the need for plan-
ning deep fires had passed, both I MEF and CFLCC used their skills
with some success, by all accounts, General James
as planners of "effects-based operations" for planning and assess- Mattis' division set the pace for the occupation in the
ing Phase IV operations. Marine governates. He already had a distinct vision
I MEF and the Law ofWar: How Marines Treated Iraqis

efore I MEF crossed the line of departure into guidance before and after combat. At this stage, the
B Iraq on 20 March, every Marine received clear
guidance: the enemy was the Iraqi regime, not the
evidence, recorded in situation reports and through
contact with Marine lawyers, is lar-gely anecdotal and
Iraqi people. Starting with General Conway, com- may never progress much beyond that. It appears
manders went to considerable lengths to disseminate, that by and large most Marines did as they were told,
down to the frontline Marine, the rules of engagement sometimes even going the extra mile for Iraqis, but
and the CentCom mandate to limit collateral damage, some Marines occasionally departed from the spirit
along with their own views on avoiding "ttiumphal- or the letter of the law.
ism" or disrespect for the people and customs of Iraq. Perhaps the best-known example of "triumphal-
Marines were to be liberators, not conquerors, and ism," which was nipped in the bud, was the incident
they were to obey the Law of War. This was not an at Firdos Square in which Corporal Edward Chin
afterthought, an addendum to other kinds of tt-aining, placed an American flag over Saddam's statue, but
but a theme that ran throughout the expeditionary quickly replaced it with an Iraqi flag and left it to the
force's preparations for war. It was especially true for citizens of Baghdad to complete the work of de-
1st Maline Division, the major subordinate command stroying that symbol of the regime. Other, less well-
most likely to encounter the enemy face-to-face.* known examples have to do with the care many
The force's legal office spent the months before Marines took not to kill civilians, even when there
the war working up the rules of engagement and then were legitimate targets nearby. In one case on 2
preparing and disseminating presentations for the Aptil, which illustrates the dilerruuas that conscien-
major subordinate commands. FollOWing I MEF's tious Marines faced in Iraq, Major Peter S. Blake, an
lead, General Mattis issued wlitten, detailed guidance AV-8B Harrier pilot, waited for a gap in the civilian
on the Law of War on at least two occasions, in addi- traffic, which had, maddeningly, continued to flow in
tion to continuously repeating and explaining the di- and around the battlefield all over the country, be-
vision's motto, "No better fliend, no worse enemy." In fore launching his attack against an Iraqi multiple
one prewar memorandum, he predicted that Marine rocket launcher with a "guided" bomb. Within the
"discipline will be severely tested by an unscrupu- next few seconds, a civilian truck came into view,
lously led enemy who is likely to commit Law of War and Blake decided to "slew" (or misguide) the bomb
violations," and went on to outline 11 corrunonsense into the Tigris River to save innocent lives. He waited
Law of War "ptinciples."** To the same effect, in late again for a break in the traffic before launching a
2002 as he sensed the approach of war, he urged his second, and final, attack. Even though at the last mo-
commanders to prepare their Marines for the proba- ment another civilian truck appeared, he felt this
bility of asymmettic attacks and, at the same time, re- time he had no choice, since 5th Marines was almost
minded them that "both decisive force and chivalry literally around the comer.***** There are numerous
will be clitical to freeing Iraq."*** other such examples, like the one in early April
To drive the message home, General Mattis had his when Marines held their fire until they knew
staff judge advocate, Lieutenant Colonel]ohn R. Ewers, whether an approaching school bus was filled with
and his deputy, MajorJoseph A. Lore, deliver classes on enemy fighters or innocent civilians, which turned
the Law of War and Rules of Engagement to division out to be the case.****** In another, more personal
units both before and duting the deployment; the gen- example, on 29 March members of the 1st Force
eral wanted the message to come from an independ- Service Support Group took the trouble to bury a
ent expert on the subject, not the unit commander. two-year-old Iraqi boy who had stepped on a land-
Mattis went so far as to have Ewers create a team to mine and been evacuated to Charlie Surgical Sup-
travel around the battlefield and investigate allegations port Company, Health Services Battalion, then in the
of wrongdoing before the smoke had cleared. The in- vicinity ofJalibah, where doctors ttied in vain to save
vestigation involved a report that a media vehicle had his life. The boy had come to the field hospital with-
been hit by fire from the 1st Tank Battalion. Riding in out identification or relatives, and the Matines and
a soft-skinned humvee, Ewers was doing just that sailors who were present decided to give him a
when he was wounded on 23 March 2003 near- the proper Muslim butial. They researched the subject
town of A:z. Zubayr in southeastern Iraq. **** carefully, and then found three Muslims to perform
It is fair to ask whether the Marines followed this the ceremony in the prescribed tradition, which in-
cluded wrapping the body in a shroud and placing events. As of this writing, even basic statistics are dif-
it in a grave with the child's face toward Mecca. The ficult to come by. The I MEF staff judge advocate's
chief of staff of the force service support group, command chronology for the first half of 2003 states
Colonel Dan-ell L. Moore, took time out of his busy that during Phase III of Operation Iraqi Freedom its
day to assist in the ceremony. This small act was one primary focus wasrepOlting and investigating viola-
of decency, pure and simple; no journalists or anglY tions of the laws of armed conflict. The same docu-
townspeople were present to demand that the ment shows that the I MEF staff judge advocate was
Marines "do the right thing."******* involved in some way in one general court-martial,
On the other side of the ledger, a few sources eight special courts-mmtial, and one summary coult-
record cases where Marines overstepped the bounds martial, but without delving into the individual cases
of fire discipline or military law. In December 2003, it is difficult to interpret the significance of these sta-
the Marine Corps Times repOlted on the case of eight tistics.
Marines charged in the death of a 52-year-old Iraqi The bottom line? The I MEF commander and his
detainee who was found dead in his cell in An subordinates did the right thing. They told vutually
Nasiriyah in the spring of 2003. The charges included evelY Marine what they expected, and they did so in
"willfully failing to properly safeguard the health" of some detail. During the war, the Marine leadership
those in custody, as well as assault and making false took measures to enforce the standards it had set.
official statements.******** According to the deputy Most Marines appear to have met those standards,
staff judge advocate of 1st Marine Division, Major while a handful fell short and were disciplined when
Lore, this was one of a handful of similar incidents a case could be made against them.
that was investigated and resulted either in nonjudi-
cial punishment or cOUlt-maltial. In their book The 'For basic data on I MEF-level staff judge advocates, see I MEF
March Up, Major General Ray L. Smith and Bing West SJA ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA). See also Gen Con-
tell a st01Y about the time when Brigadier General way's talks on the rules of engagement in Chapter 3 and Col
William D. Durrett inrvws, llFeb03, 9Jun03 (MCHC, Quantico,
John F. Kelly, the assistant commander of 1st Marine VA).
Division, admonished an unnamed battalion com- "MajGen James . Mattis, "Commanding General's Guidance
mander on 26 March for letting his troops needlessly on Law of War," u.d. (2002?) (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers,
shoot at approaching civilians. The Marines had a le- MCHC, Quantico, VA). It is interesting to note that one of the six
gitimate concern about suicide bombers in civilian books on Gen Mattis' reading list for his subordinate com-
manders was Son Tbang: An Ame-rican War Crime, by Galy
vehicles, but that did not mean every heedless civil- Solis, which was about how the 1st Marine Division handled a
ian who came within half a mile of a Marine position war crime in Vietnam.
had to be stopped with deadly force. Although West '''MajGen James N. Mattis, "Memorandum for All Command-
and Smith go on to discuss their impression that ers," 20Dec02 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
tico, VA). The division staff judge advocate, LtColJohn R. Ewers,
most Marines agonized over the decision to fire or
remembers having "a number of conversations with both Gen
not to fire, two journalists who spent time with dif- Mattis and Gen Kelly [the assistant division commander] ..
ferent units during the combat phase of the war, about law of war ... and the challenges posed in ... asym-
Evan Wright and Peter Maas, convey the impression metric warfare with a foe who was expected to . . . break the
that some young Marines were all too ready to fire rules." LtColJohn R. Ewers, e-mails to author, 6, 7Apr04 (Copies
at civilians, and that their officers and noncommis- in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
....Ibid.; Maj Joseph Lore, e-mails to author, 5Apr04 (Copies in
sioned officers did not always do a good job of re- Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
straining them. This was especially true after Marines •....Maj Peter S. Blake inrvw, 15Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
learned about the fighting at An Nasiriyah, where the ......Col Randall W. Holm inrvw, 31May03 (MCHC, Quantico,
enemy had worn civilian clothes and Marine casual- VA).
·······Maj Melissa D. Kuo, "Field History Journal," entry for
ties were heavy. At that point, the enemy for many,
29Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
if not most, Marines became any Iraqi with a ..······Gidget Fuentes, "Hearing SCnItinizes Reservists' Handling
gun. ********* of Prisoners in Iraq," Marine Corps Times, Dec03, p. 10.
It is important to note that at least five such cases ·········Evan Wright, "The Killer Elite," Rolling Stone, 13Jun03,
resulted in some form of disciplinary proceedings 24Jul03; Peter Maas, "Good Kills," The New York Times Maga-
zine, 20Apr03. Wright's articles pull few punches and tell the
against the perpetrators. According to Major Lore,
StOlY of a slice of the war from the corporals and sergeants per-
these proceedings ran the gamut from nonjudicial spective. They were subsequently expanded into the book
punishment to general court-martial. With the pas- Generation Kill (New York, NY: Putnam, 2004), which, while it
sage of time, there will be more clarity on these is well written, has had mixed reviews from Marines.
for the way he wanted to implement the force order. amphibious vehicles, his armored personnel carriers,
Like I MEF, 1st Marine Division would issue general but not his light armored vehicles, which remained
guidelines. Each of its governates would be run by a very useful. This was one way to reinforce his mes-
reinforced infantry battalion. The reinforcements sage about how to occupy a country, both to his
might consist of a governate support team, a psy- Marines and to the Iraqis. He still intended for the
chological operations team, a human intelligence ex- Marines to patrol on foot and for the two groups to
ploitation team, civil affairs elements, and sometimes become intimately familiar with each other, even to
engineer or naval construction elements. The battal- trust each other. But he did not want "a heavy boot
ion commander would have a great deal of auton- print" or the "sense of oppression" that could come
omy, but given the small size of his force, he would if "everywhere you looked you saw a Marine. If we
have no choice but to rely heavily on the interna- needed more people I wanted to enlist the Iraqis
. . .
tional and nongovernmental organizations as well as [forl . . . our common cause."45'

whatever Iraqis he could mobilize. Interestingly, he The 1st Marine Division had three basic policies.
would work not for his regiment but for division it- The first was "Do no harm," expressed in the kind of
self; General Mattis' plan was for the regimental staffs Mattis aphorism that all Marines could understand:
to focus on the retrograde and on preparations for "If someone needs shooting, shoot him. If someone
the next contingency, the "recocking" that figured in does not need shooting, protect him." The second
so many plans and talks, This would enable him to was to win heart and minds through good works.
satisfy the twin mandates in the I MEF order, not to The third and final was to be ready at all times to win
mention the spirit of the order. the 10-second gunfight.452 The general's statements
It was a dramatic move. General Mattis began the of policy branched into specific guidance. Because
occupation by sending about 15,000 of his 23,000 he wanted the Marines and the Iraqis to trust each
Marines home, along with all of his tanks and assault other, he literally wanted them to look each other in
Cpl Michael C. Brown of the 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion patrols the streets of Al Kut with a
member of the localpolice force. The purpose of the joint foot patrols was to let the residents see the Marines and
police working together in order to put a stop to the looting after the previous government was abolished.
Photo courtesy of CFLCC
the eye; in fact, one of his directives was for Marines stripped even of doorframes and floor tiles. The
to remove their sunglasses when speaking to Iraqis. Marines had to begin by cleaning it up and restoring
Another piece of guidance followed from his corn- it. The idea was to turn it into a police station, com-
monsense observation that the Iraqis would cooper- plete with armory and holding cells. Next the com-
ate more readily if the Marines helped their children, pany put out the word that it would be paying local
and he sent units into the local schools to clean them policemen, which quickly attracted them to the small
up and get them running again. base and allowed the Marines to begin the process of
Again like the force, division began its work in vetting, organizing, training, and equipping them. In
each province with a survey, with a view to devel- the words of one observer:
oping a campaign plan tailored to the needs of each
province. Generally speaking, the routine was simi- This afternoon the Marines were going to pay
lar to the one that division had followed in Baghdad the Iraqi [policemeni—and issue weapons.
before I MEF had published its order for Phase IV. The Marines frisked the Iraqis as they came in
Reestablishing security was paramount. Marines [to the compound], confiscated (temporarily)
themselves did some of that work, but wanted to vet their AK-47s (the small version with the folding
and train Iraqi police to take over from them as stock .) but let them keep their pistols if they
.
.
quickly as possible. The Iraqis joined Marine-led pa- were unloaded. Marines in HMMWVs over-
trols with a view to gradually switching roles. watched the process and armed Marines stood
The division's various locations included Al near the Iraqis as they formed themselves up.
Muthanna (2d Battalion, 5th Marines); Karbala (3d There were traffic police—dressed in white, with
Battalion, 7th Marines); Al Qadisiyah (3d Battalion, [peaked] hats like those worn by police all over
5th Marines); An Najaf (1st Battalion, 7th Marines); the world—and security police—dressed in green
and Babil (1st Battalion, 4th Marines). The provinces outfits with the [black] Iraqi berets—all worn in
of Wasit and Dhi Qar were added when 2d Battal- different styles from the pillbox (which looks
ion, 25th Marines; 3d Battalion, 23d Marines; and the ridiculous) to the usual Iraqi mushroom shape
4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion came (which is not that snappy either). No one
over to division from Task Force Tarawa, which was looked hungry—unlike some of the people on
rotating home at the end of May. the streets. A couple of the. . [policemen] bor-
.
The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was blessed with dered on obesity. There were a few officers
an unusual Iraqi partner who became the local police among them—[men with more braid who
chief, Brigadier General Fuad Hani Fans. A wounded looked like] they were used to being in charge
veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, he was said to be criti- and leading (manipulating?) others. I watched
cal of Saddam and appears to have been one of the one of them work his wiles on one of the trans-
many Iraqi soldiers who simply wrote their own lators used by the Marines. By and large, it
travel orders when the war began. Fans moved him- seemed like a good-natured crowd. A few of
self from Hillah, where he had been assigned, to Ad them . [were] a little nervous as I took pho-
. .
Diwaniyah, where his wife's family lived. When the tographs—but most smiled and waved at me.44
postwar looting began, he organized Iraqi soldiers
into guard forces and protected some of the facto- In the meantime Marines continued to patrol the
ries, ammunition supply points, and government streets, apprehend looters, and hold them for a day
buildings in the city until the U.S. Army appeared. or two in a makeshift outdoor prison, performing var-
He happily agreed to help rebuild the area and trans- ious kinds of less than pleasant tasks around the
ferred his loyalties to the Marines when they replaced compound, such as filling sandbags or burning waste
the Army in Ad Diwaniyah.453 in the latrines. Whether the looters learned their les-
The experiences of the Weapons Company, 3d son was doubtful. One of the looters claimed he was
Battalion, 5th Marines, in Ad Diwaniyah in early May innocent because he had been hired to loot, saying
illustrate what it was like for junior Marines charged the man the Marines should arrest was his employer.
with policing a city. The company was quartered in One thing the Marines learned was that no OflC
town in a villa that had belonged to a recently de- wanted to be a policeman in Ad Diwaniyah without
parted strongman. Set in a large, pleasant, walled a weapon, no one seemed to like policemen, who
compound next to a stream and including a veg- bore the double stigma of having worked for the for-
etable garden and a more formal garden, the airy, mer regime and now of collaborating with the occu-
two-story villa had been looted in early April, piers, and so they quickly decided to allow the Iraqis
Base 802668A1 (R0067) 12-99
to carry sidearms and AK-47 rifles. of operation, which included such entries as
While some Marines addressed security, others "Water/Sewage, Electrical, Medical, Education and
worked on the infrastructure. At the battalion com- Law, Fire, Public Transportation, Food and Distribu-
mand post, located on the grounds of a modern but tion." An officer's name was written in next to each
unfinished medical school campus, there was a thriv- entry. For example, Second Lieutenant Glen J. Bayliff,
ing Civil Affairs section and a chart showing the lines whose main qualification for the ob was that he was
the logistics officer, was responsible for transporta- Coalition forces, especially in the area west of Bagh-
tion, which meant conducting surveys, remaining dad around Ar Ramadi and Fallujah, two names that
abreast of developments, and helping to coordinate would become all too familiar to Marines in 2004.
indigenous efforts with those of international or nOn- This was not part of I MEF's area of operations,
governmental organizations. Sometimes Marine Re- but it was contiguous to it. Army convoys traveling
servists, described as the Corps' "hidden asset" by from Kuwait to Ar Ramadi and Fallujah had to pass
one grateful battalion commander, came to the res- through northern Babil Province, which did fall
cue with their civilian skill sets as policemen, lawyers, under I MEF. The Marines' future operations staff
or city managers. Many Marines found that neither "began studying and planning to defeat this threat."
the Office of Reconstmction and Humanitarian As- The result was a plan to set up an armored task force
sistance nor the organization that replaced it, the to patrol the area. 457
Coalition Provisional Authority, had enough re- Built around the Armored Reconnaissance Battal-
sources to weigh in at the day-to-day, working level. ion, under the spirited command of Lieutenant
For the most part, they were left to their own de- Colonel Andrew Pappas, the task force took the
vices. 455 name "Scorpion" and was clearly undeterred either
Some national events took place that did have by the challenge or the marginal liVing conditions it
repercussions on the local level. Before the war, Pres- faced. A visiting journalist, Pamela Hess of United
ident Bush is said to have approved a plan that Press International, captured the spirit of Camp Scor-
would have put "several hundred thousand Iraqi sol- pion:
diers On the U.S. payroll and kept them available" for
various tasks from providing security to repairing Mad Max would turn up his nose.... There is
roads. But in a surprise move on 23 May, Ambassa- nothing but garbage and dirt and sand as far as
dor L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional the eye can see. Marines live and sleep in the
Authority, issued a decree disbanding the army and open air of a gravel parking lot, except for the
canceling pensions. 456 Some three weeks later, on 15 few one-story concrete buildings that are air-
June, CFLCC turned over responsibility for the occu- conditioned on the rare occasions the genera-
pation of Iraq to V Corps, while keeping its respon- tors can be coaxed to work. They have no
sibilities for supporting the force. This was the last chow hall ... and until ... recently ... [sani-
day of the amnesty period under the Coalition de- tary] facilities were a plywood bench with four
cree, which limited the number and types of holes.... Powerful winds sweep the ground'l,
weapons Iraqis could possess. The predictable result kicking up massive dust clouds that coat every-
of both policies was an upswing in violence against thing in dull brown powder several times a day.
The Marine
n April and May 2003, there was almost universal get there" of the driver of a seven-ton truck making
I praise for the young eoli ted Marines who served
in Kuwait and Iraq. The hi torians who deployed
his way through the sand at night, or caring for chil-
dren under fire. Whatever his assigned task, each of
from Washington, D.C., to the field to conduct in- these Marines wa al 0 prepared to fight as a rifle-
terviews during and after the war heard story after man, revalidating one of the basic tenets of the Ma-
story praising the spirit, ingenuity, and "stick-to- rine credo. What truck many officers after the war
itiveness" of the individual Marine, and they often was how well combat infantrymen adapted to the
experienced it themselves. It was the small acts that demands of occupation duty, SWitching from a
stood out, whether it was the Marines who sensed, "weapons free" to a "weapons tight" frame of mind.
rightly, that spare parts would be in short supply They marveled at the restraint that these young men
up the road in Iraq and topped to strip them from and women were now howing. The praise for the
wrecked vehicles as they moved north, or the am- enlisted Marine sometimes contrasted with what
phibious assault vehicle mechanics who repaired Marine officer aid about one another, with the
vehicles while they were moving under tow, or the friction that often come from having too many sen-
Marines performing the lonely work of unwinding ior officers with trong personalities gathered in one
the hose reel in the desert, or the determination "to command or staff.
General Conway Sums Up
D uring the turnover to the multinational divi-

ion at Camp Babylon on 3 eptember, Gen-
eral Conway summed up the past five months in a
a negative can become a positive. A lack of doc-
trine allowed us to pass some very simple rules to
our Marines and soldiers. They were-treat others a
few words: "[A]s we headed south out of Baghdad you would like to be treated. Deal with the people
for the e provinces, we did so with a certain with fairness and firmness and dignity. And among
amount of trepidation. Marines do not traditionally other things, we emphasized the children. They are
do nation-building or ecurity operations. We have the future of this country. It is hard to be angry
no doctrine for it. We were not sure where the re- with someone when he is doing good things for
sources would come from. And we were not sure your children. "*
how we would be received by the people of south- *Sgt Colin Wyers, "I MEF Transfers Authority for Southern Iraq
ern Iraq, who had seen An1erican troop attack up to Polish-led Division," dtd 3Sep03 (Story No. 200395144422
through their governate .... [But] in some regards, po ted on MarineLink).
"This is the best we have had it!" laughs Master later on and tell them where to find him. 459 Colonel
Gunnery Sergeant Paul D. Clark from Austin, Pappas' intelligence officer, Major Steven B. Manber,
the battalion's operations chief,458 added that even though the task force was rich in
technical collection assets, 90 percent of its success-
The Marines used their imagination to defeat the ful operations stemmed from local contacts. 460
enemy. They adopted a Trojan-horse approach, dis- Similar approaches were applied to more exotic
guising their vehicles as Army supply trucks and then locales: guarding the border with Iran in desert forts
counter-ambushing the locals who had apparently that looked like the set for a modern-day movie
been paid by Ba'athists to take potshots at the con- about the French Foreign Legion; defusing tensions in
voys. They experimented with various other ways to the holy Shia cities of Najaf and Karbala; uncovering
escOrt the convoys, training the Army truck drivers and processing mass graves that were filled with the
in convoy operations and molding Marines and sol- victims of the Saddam regime; patrolling the border
diers into one team. Forced to seek cover some dis- with Saudi Arabia. Looking for weapons of mass de-
tance from the highway, the insurgents took to using struction remained high on the Marines' agenda, and
increasingly sophisticated "improvised explosive de- on that of other Coalition forces. The results were as
vices," the small but often deadly bombs that could frustrating as they were unexpected. General Con-
be rigged to detonate when vehicles passed by. The way commented that "in terms of ... the weapons,
1st Marine Division resisted advice to reply to attacks we . . . certainly had our best guess . . . [based on
with heavy firepower, which its leaders felt might be what] the intelligence folks were giving us. We were
counterproductive. Instead they decided to go to the simply wrong.... It remains a surprise to me now
source, that is trying to neutralize the perpetrators be- that we have not uncovered weapons.... It is not for
fore they struck. This they did by collecting intelli- lack of trying. We have been to virtually every am-
gence about them and conducting raids, often on the munition supply point between the Kuwaiti border
compounds of the relatively wealthy. It was possible and Baghdad, and they are simply not there."·61
to leverage the various civil affairs initiatives to get in- By early summer, Babylon was the scene of
formation; locals grateful for a month or two of elec- turnover preparations. The location encompassed
tricity or clean water might give the Marines tips both the ancient city and the site of another sumptu-
about potential insurgents, and the result might be a ous modern palace built by Saddam, on an artificial
productive raid at dawn, a time chosen by the divi- hill, where Marines could camp out. There being lit-
sion to minimize the risk of harm to bystanders. Suc- tle electricity and no running water, but lots of big
cess reinforced success. When locals saw the Marines rooms with high ceilings and marble floors, it was a
arrest and remove one perpetrator, other Iraqis were relatively cool and clean place to pitch a tent. There
emboldened to pass on a tip that would lead to the was a certain satisfaction to it; Marines were now in
next raid. Lieutenant Colonel Pappas commented that Saddam's bedroom and ballroom. Both force and di-
even if one of the attackers got away after an am- vision had their headquarters in Babylon, which was
bush, often the locals would approach his Marines not far from CFLCC's forward headquarters in Bagh-
DVIC DM-SD-05-11033
Marines of Company K, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, carrying their M16A2 rifles and gear, board a KC-130 11cr-
cules aircraft at Blair Field in Al Kut, Iraq, for the trip home. By November 2003, all Marines and every piece
of their equipment had been withdrawn.
dad. It was here that in late June they received the With the exception of the city of An Najaf, General
various parts of the Polish-led multinational division, Conway was able to turn over responsibility for the
which pitched their tents among the Marine units. zone to the commander of the multinational division
There now began a process of turnovers, the first be- in a ceremony at Babylon on 3 September and send
ginning in early July. Six more reliefs occurred in his troops south. After the turnovers, there was a
fairly rapid succession, not always smoothly. General general sense of satisfaction among senior Marines
Kelly reported that it was "an understatement to say with the force and division's accomplishments. Al-
that the multinational soldiers were shocked at the though some civilian experts noted persistent prob-
unexpected level of danger . .in [their] zones," to
. lems, particularly unemployment and inability to
say nothing of the Spartan living conditions and the communicate with Iraqis, there were some undeni-
130-degree heat in midsummer, all of which the able statistics. For example, the number of attacks on
Marines sometimes seemed to revel in, even though convoys in northern Babil Province was dramatically
there can be little doubt that many, if not most, were
also ready to go home after months, and in a few "Najaf was the site of a powerful car bomb attack on 29 August.
cases two or three years, in theater.462 There has al- This postponed the turnover, as did a number of issues that the
ways been a strange dynamic in Marine deployments. Spanish Brigade raised. The turnover finally occurred in early Oc-
tober. Reflecting his general frustration with the process, one I MEF
On the one hand, most Marines want very badly to
officer cracked that the turnover with the multinational division
march to the sound of the guns. No one wants to be was like "stuffing cats into a seabag," while another found that
left behind when the unit goes to war. But as soon as many of the foreign soldiers seemed professional and ready to (It)
the fight is over, everyone wants to go home. their job.
DVIC DM-SD-05-1 1370

A multi-national delegation, including LtGen James T Conway, second from right, and LtGen Ricardo S.
Sanchez USA, third from left, Commandei Combined and Joint Task Force 7, participate in the relief-in-place
ceremony at Camp Babylon, Iraq, as Marines assigned to IMarine Expeditionary Force relinquished author-
ity to Polish-led Coalition forces.
lower, and there were no Marines killed in action ing home, other units left heavy equipment with the
during the occupation phase, although some were 1st Force Service Support Group's "Regeneration
wounded and, tragically, others killed in various ac- Control Element," which in turn consolidated its
cidents. General Mattis made the claim that since holdings for turn-in to the special purpose Marine air-
early summer the Iraqis had been "running the things ground task force. By 31 October, I MEF was com-
that are most important to people. Are the street pletely gone from theater.464
lights on? Is the neighborhood safe? These kinds of The Marine Logistics Command morphed into the
things are already in their hands with the Marines Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force under
very much in the background."463 the new commanding general of 2d Force Service
What was left for the dwindling number of Support Group, Brigadier General Ronald S. Cole-
Marines in Iraq and Kuwait was to complete the ret- man, who came to Kuwait in June to replace
rograde process. Through most of the summer, 1st Brigadier General Michael R. Lehnert, who was
Force Service Support Group Forward conducted re- bound for a new job at Southern Command. General
deployment operations from Kuwait while exercising Coleman took up residence in the bleak expanses of
command and control over Combat Service Support Tactical Assembly Area Fox. His original charter was
Group 11, which continued to support division. Until to repatriate and repair the Maritime Prepositioning
mid-October, I MEF Rear was still at Camp Com- Force equipment that had been used in Iraq, and the
mando, and CFLCC continued to lend its resources plan was for him to get it done by the spring of 2004.
to support the Marines. With the assistance of the (Maritime Prepositioning Force equipment was the
377th Theater Support Command, Marines went Marine equipment that had been prepositioned on
through washdown and the loading onto various chartered ships that made up the maritime preposi-
kinds of shipping and aircraft. The two amphibious tioning force.) But Coleman found a way to get the
task forces had preceded them, both setting sail in job done much faster. One of the threshold issues
late May with heavy loads of troops and equipment, was whether it made more sense to do the mainte-
each going in a different direction. (Amphibious Task nance and repairs in Kuwait and then reload the
Force West had taken the more exotic route, stop- shipping, or to ship the gear first to the United States
ping for liberty in Australia on the way.) Before fly- and then have it repaired at home. Various factors, in-
cluding cost and temperatures so high that much of through Kuwait on their way to Iraq. But there were
the time his Marines were literally unable to touch already inklings that they would return to theater.
anything that was made of metal, made it advisable After his work was done, General Coleman remem-
to choose the second option, and General Coleman bered a meeting with General Mattis in the summer
was able to get every piece of Marine equipment out of 2003. The division commander was concerned
of Kuwait, and his Marines home, in time for the Ma- about the gear that was now in the Special Purpose
rine Corps Birthday in November.465 Marine Air-Ground Task Force's charge, because he
General Coleman left Tactical Assembly Area Fox thought he would need it again shortly.466 lie
more or less as it had been a year earlier. Now it seemed to know there would not be much rest for
was almost as if the Marines had never passed his Marines.
Notes
Chapter 1 11. TF 58 ComdC, p. 14.

12. Ibid., p. 9.
1. Col John A. Tempone, e-mail to author, 16Jan04 13. Ibid., p. 10.
(Reynolds Working Papers, Marine Corps Historical 14. Ibid., pp. 9-16.
Center [MCHCI, Quantico, VA). 15. Ibid.
2. See, for example, Jay E. Hines, "Operation En- 16. LtCoI Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR, "The U.S. Ma-
during Freedom," 21st Century Defense: US. Joint rine Corps in Review," U.S. Naval Institute Proceed-
Command (Clearwater, FL: Belmont International, ings, May02, p. 84. Other articles about this
2002), pp. 38-46. This is an excellent overview of the operation include BGen Michael E. Ennis, "A New
operation from the CentCom point of view by that Operating Environment," Marine Corps Gazette,
command's historian. Aug02, p. 46f, and Capt Jay M. Holtermann, "The
3. For a discussion of the historical context, see 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit's Seizure of Camp
Williamson Murray and MajGen Robert H. Scales, Jr., Rhino," Marine Corps Gazette, Jun02, pp. 41-43.
The Iraq War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 17. BGen James N. Mattis intvw, 20Jan02 (Naval His-
Press, 2003), pp. 48-59. torical Center, Washington, DC); hereafter Mattis
4. BGen Christian B. Cowdrey intvw, 26Apr03 intvw no. 1. For background, see U.S. Marine Corps,
(MCHC, Quantico, VA). For a snapshot of Marine op- "Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare," Marine Corps
erations on and after 11 September, see U.S. Marine Gazette, Feb02, pp. A-i through A-b. "Seabasing
Corps, Operation Enduring Freedom Combat Assess- enables forces to move directly from ship to objec-
ment Team Summary Report (Quantico, VA: Marine tives deep inland and represents a significant ad-
Corps Combat Development Command, 2003), pp. vance from traditional, phased amphibious
47-50, hereafter MCCDC, OEF Summary Report. This operations."
report, by Marines assigned to MCCDC's Studies and 18. Col Timothy C. Wells intvw, 27Feb03 (MCHC,
Analysis Division, is a very useful all-around source, Quantico, VA). See also MarForPac ComdC, Jul-
as are the thousands of documents and interviews Dec01 (GRC, Quantico, VA).
that they collected. 19. MarForPac ComdC, Jul-DecOl (GRC, Quantico,
5. Gen James L. Jones, Jr. intvw, 14Jun04 (MCHC, VA).
Quantico, VA). 20. LtGen Earl B. Hailston intvw, 19May03 (MCHC,
6. There are numerous sources on the history of Quantico, VA); Wells intvw.
C/JTF-CM. The Cowdrey interview is a good first- 21. Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, "OIF Field History
hand description of the first few months of its exis- Journal," 2003 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for
tence. C/JTF-CM also filed an excellent set of 10Apr03; hereafter Reynolds, Journal.
command chronologies. 22. TF 58 ComdC, p. 32.
7. Task Force 58 ComdCs, 27Oct01, 26Feb02 (GRC, 23. For a discussion of this topic, see Charles J. Quil-
Quantico, VA), p. 4; hereafter TF 58 ComdC. Al- ter II, With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in
though it contains some idiosyncrasies, this is an un- Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.:
usually well-written command chronology and gives History and Museums Division, 1993), pp. 8-11. See,
the reader an excellent picture of Marine Corps op- also Jones intvw.
erations against the Taliban. 24. Zinni intvw.
8. MajGen James M. Mattis, "The Professional Edge," 25. Col Stephen W. Baird intvw, 31May03 (MCHC,
Marine Corps Gazette, Feb04, p. 19; Bruce Catton, Quantico, VA).
Grant Takes Command (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 26. See LtCol Jeffrey Acosta, "OIF Field History Jour-
1969). nal," 2003 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for 31Mar03,
9. See, for example, Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. hereafter Acosta, Journal. See also Wells and Hail-
1 16f. ston intvws.
10. MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, p. 62. 27. LtGen James 1. Conway intvw, 7Dec03 (MCHC,
Quantico, VA). Chapter 2

28. See, for example, MCCDC, OEF Summary Report,
p. 63. Such comments were made to the author by 47. For a history of the war based largely on report-
various Marines during a visit to Tampa in December ing by the New York Times and including coverage of
2001. political events, see, for example, Todd S. Purdum,
29. MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, p. 57. A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq
30. See, for example, MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2003), p. 20. Two other,
pp. 9-15, which argues that the operation did not somewhat more controversial books that cover the
fully validate expeditionary maneuver warfare but political background to the war are Bob Woodward,
showed the utility of some of its tenets. Plan of Attack (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster,
31. LtGen David D. McKiernan intvw, 30Jun03 (U.S. 2004) and Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies
Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.), (New York, NY: Free Press, 2004). Franks, Ameri-
hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 4. To cite other ex- can Soldier, esp. p. 315 and pp. 328-33, describes
amples: Gen Hailston also commented on his good the initial taskings and briefings in late 2001.
relations with Gen Franks; Gen Mattis repeatedly 48. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn,
stressed the value of establishing good relations with On Point: The US. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom
neighboring commanders of all Services, both joint (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute
and combined. (Hailston intvw; Mattis intvw no. 1; Press, 2004), p. 31. This is a very useful and detailed
TF 58 ComdC) See also Reynolds, Journal, entry for early work on the conflict. On directives in 2001 to
10Nov03, describing a talk by Williamson Murray prepare for a possible war with Iraq, see, for exam-
and MajGen Robert H. Scales, Jr., during which they ple, Purdum, Time of Our Choosing, p. 20. For the
contrasted the personalities, and their relationships, point of view of a Marine planner at Headquarters
in the two wars. Marine Corps in 2001, see, for example, LtCol James
32. See, for example, Zinni intvw. L. Western intvw, 30Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA),
33. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 47f. hereafter Western intvw.
34. See, for example, Bing West and MajGen Ray L. 49. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO2 (GRC, Quantico, VA),
Smith, USMC (Ret.), The March U (New York, NY: Sec 2, p. 16.
Putnam, 2003), p. 221, hereafter West and Smith, 50. Ibid., pp. 28-29, 59.
March U. The current edition of FMFM 1 is known 51. LtCol George W. Smith, Jr. intvw, 8Jun04 (MCHC,
as MCDP 1. The original edition appeared in 1989. Quantico, VA), hereafter G.W. Smith intvw no. 2. For
35. McKiernan intvw no. 4. general background on the planning process, see
36. Ibid. Franks described himself as a maverick. also Col Christopher J. Gunther intvw, 24-25May03
Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York, NY: (MCHC, Quantico, VA), and LtCol Gregory M. Dou-
Regan Books, 2004), p. 367. For a critical appraisal quet, 29Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). Although he
of Gen Franks, see Andrew Bacevich, "A Modern did not become the I MEF planner until the middle
Major General," New Left Review, Sept-OctO4, pp. of 2002, Col Gunther describes how the planning for
123-134. Iraq evolved from February 2002 onward. LtCol
37. Zinni intvw. Douquet was the senior 3d MAW planner, serving
38. Acosta, Journal. with I MEF future operations from February 2002 to
39. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 60. April 2003.
40. Kevin Peraino, "Low-Key Leader/LtGen David 52. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 92.
McKiernan Is the Soft-spoken Soldier with the Hard 53. Zinni intvw.
Job of Commanding U.S. Ground Forces in Iraq," 54. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 54.
Newsweek web exclusive, 19Mar03. 55. Ibid.
41. Conway intvw. 56. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. Franks, American Sol-
42. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 65. dier, pp. 382-43 1, describes the evolution of the var-
43. See, for example, Col Christopher G. Wright ious plans in 2002 from his point of view, especially
intvw, 4Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). his broad-brush briefings to the president and the
44. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 10May03. secretary of defense, which led to general guidance
45. Conway intvw. for the planners.
46. Maj Theodore R. McKeldin, III, "OIF Field History 57. LtCol G.W. Smith intvw, 18Mar03 (MCHC, Quan-
Journal," 2003, entry for 2 April 2003; hereafter McK- tico, VA.), hereafter G. W. Smith intvw no. 1.
eldin, Journal. 58. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
Notes 147
59. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1Jul04, based on a ple, Clancy, Battle Ready, p. 345.
conversation with former PP&O current operations 78. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
officer Col Ronald J. Johnson. 79. The issue of synchronicity is addressed in,
60. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. among other sources, LtCol Richard T. Johnson
61. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; I MEF ComdC, Jan-JulO2 intvw, 26Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); McKeldin
(GRC, Quantico, VA). Journal, entry for 28Feb03; and LtCol Paul J.
62. MCCDC, OFF Summary Report, p. 54; Fontenot, Kennedy intvw, 6Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). See,
et al., On Point, p. 42. for example, G. W. Smith intvw no. 2, and Douquet
63. McKiernan intvw no. 4. intvw.
64. Conway intvw; Hailston intvw. 80. There are numerous sources on this topic. G. W.
65. See, for example, MajGen Robert R. Blackman Smith intvw no. 2 contains details of meetings on the
intvw, 31May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); G. W. Smith subject, including a meeting between Gens McKier-
intvw no. 2. On Gen McKiernan's approach to joint nan and Conway on 29 January 2003 when they dis-
operations from a Marine point of view, see Col cussed, and agreed on, this subject.
Marc A. Workman intvw, 30Nov02 (MCHC, Quan- 81. Quoted in House of Commons Defence Com-
tico, VA). mittee, Lessons of Iraq (London, UK: Stationery Of-
66. McKiernan intvw no. 4. fice, 2004), vol. 1, pp. 34-35. This is a useful source
67. See, for example, the comment on this subject with many lengthy, and candid, quotations by British
in Zinni intvw. officers. It appears to be more candid than the Min-
68. Fontenot, et a!., On Point, p. 45. This conclusion istry of Defence's "lessons learned" publications on
assumes that the subordinate commands had the the war.
requisite clearances to access highly classified files. 82. Fontenot, et al. On Point, pp. 93-94; Terry Moran
69. Tom Clancy with Gen Anthony Zinni (Ret) and intvw, 23Aug03 (U.S. Army Center of Military His-
Tony Koltz, Battle Ready (New York, NY: G. P. Put- tory, Washington, D.C.); Col Reed R. Bonadonna,
nam's Sons, 2004), p. 315. "Notes from Address by LtGen Conway, CG I MEF to
70. Zinni intvw. Officers of Task Force Tarawa," 1Mar03 (Copy in
71.MCCDC, Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat As- Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); I
sessment Team Summary Report, spring 2004 (Stud- MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), "Fu-
ies and Analysis Division, Working Draft), p. 40, tOps" (Documents), "I MEF ROC Drill, 10Mar03."
hereafter MCCDC, OIF Summary Report. 83. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; see also Gunther intvw.
72. There was a complicated set of agreements about 84. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 74.
this, which are examined in detail in LtCol LeRoy D. 85. G. W. Smith intvw no. 1.
Stearns, The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in Desert 86. Maj Evan A. Huelfer intvw, 16Mar03 (U.S. Army
Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Marine Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.); G. W.
Corps History and Museums Division, 1999), pp. 45- Smith intvw no 2; Fontenot, et a!., On Point, p. 45.
49, hereafter Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. See 87. On the neoconservative movement, see James
also Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War
The Generals' War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1995), Cabinet (New York, NY: Viking, 2004). On some of
p. 311. This is a basic source on Desert Shield/Desert the neoconservative plans that were presented to
Storm. Franks, see Franks, American Soldier, p. 373. For a
73. MajGen James F. Amos intvw, 16May03 (MCHC, general source on the planning process, see Wood-
Quantico, VA); Hailston intvw. ward, Plan of Attack. Although Woodward and
74. Stearns, 3dMarineAircraft Wing, p. 47. Franks cover much of the same ground, Woodward
75. See G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; Reynolds, Journal, describes a slightly different dynamic from Franks,
entry for 29Jul03, describing a postwar briefing by suggesting that the Pentagon, and not CentCom,
the general officers who commanded I MEF's major generally took the lead in proposing various plans.
subordinate commands. Capt Ryan M. Walker intvw, For a more critical view of the development of the
22Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). By and large, once administration's policy on Iraq, see W. Patrick Lang,
the war started, the system worked. See MCCDC, "Drinking the Kool-Aid," Middle East Policy, summer
OIF Summary Report, p. 40. 2004, pp. 39-60.
76. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p 13. 88. Although Franks said he had a productive rela-
77. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 154-183. For a tionship with Donald Rumsfeld and liked working
comment on Iraqi exiles in general, see, for exam- with the Secretary of Defense, he also expressed
reservations about his "centralized management 99. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

style." See Franks, American Soldier, pp. 313, 333, 100. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; intvw with LtCol Yanni
362, 373, and 545. Col Kevin Benson, the senior Marok, Royal Marines, 14Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico,
CFLCC planner, reported similar frustrations with the VA). Marok joined I MEF future operations staff in
Pentagon during the planning stage. Colonel Kevin September and developed an excellent relationship
Benson, "Brief at Naval War College," 25Aug04 with other planners, including Smith. His interview
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan- is particularly useful for the data it contains Ofl Al
tico, VA). See also Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq Faw.
War. Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Wash- 101. Marok intvw. This occurred in the 12-13 I)e-
ington, D.C.: CSIS, 2003), p. 150, and questions cember time frame at a conference in Bahrain. Cc)!
about "alleged meddling ...
by the Office of the Gunther was acting with the knowledge and ap-
Secretary of Defense—especially in the planning proval of his superiors.
process" down to the CFLCC/MEF level, in U.S. 102. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2: Franks, American Sol-
Naval Institute, "Interview: LtGen James T. Conway, dier, p. 396, contains his schematic of the various
USMC," US. Naval Institute Proceedings (November lines of operation.
2003). Some have suggested that war planning for 103. I MEF ComdC, Jul-DecO2 (GRC, Quantico, VA);
Iraq needs to be understood in the context of rela- Col George F. Mi!burn intvw, 1Mar03 (MCHC, Quan-
tions between the secretary and the military starting tico, VA); P. J. Kennedy intvw.
in 2000. See, for example, Elaine M. Grossman, "To 104. Reynolds Journal, entry for 19Jul04, quoting
Understand Insurgency in Iraq: Read Something Old, from journal kept by one of the officers present.
Something New," Insider, 2Dec04, containing a com- 105. Reynolds Journal, entry for 18Jul04.
ment by LtGen Gregory Newbold, who retired in 106. LtGen David D. McKiernan intvw, 20Jun03 (U.S.
2002 from a senior position in the J-3 at the Penta- Army Center of Military History, Washington, I).C.),
gon, that a cautionary tale about the Pentagon dur- hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 3. See also Blackman
ing the Vietnam years "contains remarkable parallels intvw, Workman intvw, and the television docu-
with today's environment." The book is H. R. Mc- mentary about CFLCC by CNN Presents, "Inside the
Master, Dereliction of Duty (New York, NY: Harper War Room" (Atlanta, GA: CNN, 2003), hereafter CNN,
Collins, 1997). It will be a number of years before "The War Room."
the sources are available for anyone to analyze the 107. There are numerous sources about this ap-
Iraq War in the same way. proach, defined as "a methodology for planning, ex-
89. Zinni intvw; Jones intvw. ecuting, and assessing operations . to attain the
. .
90. See, for example, LtCol Ronald J. Brown, With effects required to achieve desired ... outcomes."
Marines in Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitar- Edward C. Mann Ill, Gary Endersby, Thomas R.
ian Operations in Northern Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Searle, Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology
History and Museums Division, 1995); Gordon and forJoint Operations (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air
Trainor, The Generals' War, p. 459. University Press, 2002), p. 2.
91. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; Huelfer intvw; Moran 108. Col Gregory J. Plush intvw, 15Apr03 (MCIIC,
intvw. Moran, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, was Quantico, VA); Workman intvw.
General McKiernan's special assistant, privy to a 109. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 43; Blackman
great deal of information about the plan for the war. intvw; CNN, "The War Room."
92. Huelfer intvw; Benson, "Brief at Naval War Col- 110. Col Patrick J. Burger intvw, 16Apr03 (MCHC,
lege." Benson and Huelfer cover much the same Quantico, VA). There were approximately 12 Marine
ground. liaison officers at CFLCC.
93. Huelfer intvw. 111. See MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, p. 11, re-
94. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. porting its finding that providing adequate numbers
95. There is an excellent discussion of this topic in of staff officers for such components was a challenge
Fontenot, et a!., On Point, pp. 44-47. Once again, for the Marine Corps.
Huelfer and Smith also offer excellent descriptions of 112. Blackman intvw. See also Workman and Cow-
the process from the planner's perspective. Huelfer drey intvws. BGen Cowdrey was one of the "Janu-
intvw; G. W. Smith intvws nos. 1 and 2. ary" augmentees. In February 2003 there were some
96. Huelfer intvw; G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. 1,300 members of the CFFLC staff. LtCol Terrance J.
97. Huelfer intvw. Johns and Maj Robert F. McTague II intvw, 22Feb03
98. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. (CFLCC Military History Group intvw, 322-332).
Notes 149
113. Huelfer intvw. 134. Col George F. Milburn intvw, 3Aug03 (MCHC,
114. See, for example, Fontenot, et a!., On Point, p. Quantico, VA); hereafter Milburn intvw no. 2. This
41. is another great topic for a paper, if not a disserta-
115. Jones intvw. tion. The researcher could compare Marine, Army,
116. Blackman intvw. This tracks with the comments and British plans and orders in this conflict and con-
by Gen McKiernan and Moran with respect to the sider questions like: Had the British adapted to the
plans that were under discussion in the fall of 2003, information age, or were they simply applying les-
but diverges somewhat from two of the lead plan- Sons long since learned? How has American plan-
ners' comments. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; R. T. John- ning adapted to the information age? In a war of
son intvw; I MEF ComdC, Jul-Aug02 (GRC, Quantico, "shock and awe," when do planners reach the point
VA), sec 2 narrative summaries for G-3 Future Oper- of diminishing returns?
ations and G-5 Plans. For a more general discussion 135. Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers (New
of planning issues at this time, see Cordesman, Iraq York, NY: Henry Holt, 2004), p. 26. This is, in my
War, pp. 149-159. view, one of the best books about the war by an em-
117. LtGen David D. McKiernan intvw, 19Dec02 bedded journalist, or by anyone else. Atkinson does
(U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, an excellent job of portraying the frame of mind of
DC), hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 1. See also R. T. the staff of the 101st Airborne Division and of put-
Johnson intvw. ting its accomplishments in context.
118. Intvw with LtGen David D. McKiernan, 1May03 136. Bonadonna, "Notes from Address by LtGen
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers (MCHC, Quan- Conway."
tico, VA), hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 2. This was 137. McKiernan intvw no. 4.
a group interview with officers representing both the 138. Huelfer intvw.
Military History Group at Camp Doha and various 139. See, for example, Atkinson, In the Company of
Army lessons-learned initiatives. Much of the same Soldiers, p. 107.
ground is also covered in McKiernan intvw no. 1. 140. McKiernan intvw no. 2, 1May03 (group inter-
119. Huelfer intvw. view at Camp Doha, KU, copy at MCHC, Washing-
120. Moran intvw. ton, DC). Fontenot, et al., On Point, pp. 99,102,
121. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), offers a summary of the enemy order of battle as it
"command element," p. 41; Blackman intvw. appeared before the campaign. See also I MEF
122. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1Jul04. ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), especially
123. Zinni intvw. Future Operations folder containing "Chg 1 to MEF
124. I MEF ComdC, lJanO3-30Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, OPLAN 1003V," dated 16Mar03, and containing an
VA), Future Operations Folder, "Chg I to I MEF assessment of enemy capabilities.
OPLAN 1003V," 16Mar03. 141. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1Jul04.
125. McKiernan intvw no. 4; G. W. Smith intvw no. 142. MajGen James N. Mattis intvw, 23Jan04 (MCHC,
2. Quantico, VA); Wright intvw.
126. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. 143. Bonadonna, "Notes from Address by LtGen
127. Ibid. Conway."
128. BGen Richard F. Natonski intvw, 26Mar04 144. Steve Col, "Hussein Was Sure of Own Survival:
(MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Natonski intvw no. Aide Says Confusion Reigned on Eve of War," The
2. Washington Post, 3 Nov03, p. A-i. This would cer-
129. See, for example, Huelfer intvw. tainly not have been out of character for Saddam
130. McKiernan intvw no. 1. Hussein, many of whose past decisions were not
131. Ibid. The phases are nicely laid out in Fontenot, thought through, to put it mildly. See also Franks,
et a!., On Point, p. xxiii. American Soldier, p. 558, for a comment on the
132. G. W. Smith intvw no. 1; P. J. Kennedy intvw. work of a Joint Forces Command lessons-learned
The Conway quote is from a 7 August 2003 inter- team that debriefed Iraqi officers after the war. The
view published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- team found that while some Iraqi units were well
ings (November 2003), which also appeared on the prepared, Iraqi command and control, especially at
internet at www.usni.org/proceedings/articles03. See senior levels, was next to nonexistent. Finally, see
also Reynolds Journal, entry for 1 July 2004. various sources on a CIA report made public in 2004,
133. LtCol Jim Hutton intvw, Royal Marines, 4May03 including Douglas Jehl, "Inspector's Report Says
(MCHC, Quantico, VA). Hussein Expected Guerrilla War," The New York
Times, 8Oct04, p. A-6. maneuver force, able to exert influence over enemy
145. These issues surfaced repeatedly in oral history units and terrain on its own.
interviews. See for example, Blackman intvw; 155. These topics are addressed in two excellent in-
Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1Jul04; G. W. Smith terviews with the 3d MAW G-3, Col Jonathan G. Mi-
intvw no. 2; Zinni intvw; and Clancy, Battle Ready, clot, on 2OMarO3-l9AprO3 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
pp. 19-20. 156. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-JulO3 (GRC, Quantico,
VA), sec 2, p. 6.
Chapter 3 157. See ibid., and, for a discussion of FARPs, LtCol
David P. Lobik intvw, 24Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico,
146. Conway intvw. VA).
147. Capt tara A. Bennett, et al., No Better Friend, 158. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-Ju103 (GRC, Quantico,
No Worse Enemy (Camp Pendleton, CA: 1st Marine VA), sec 2, "G-5 Plans and Exercises."
Division, 2004), pp. 6-8. This book has pictures and 159. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 29Jul03.
text about the division in Operation Iraqi Freedom 160. MCCDC, OIF Summaiy Report, p. 18. This is a
and was distributed by the Marine Corps Associa- quote from a video teleconference; members of the
tion. Combat Assessment Team routinely attended these
148. Wright intvw; Col John A. Toolan intvw, VTCs and made shorthand notes.
10Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). 161. R. T. Johnson intvw; I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3
149. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Ju103 (GRC, Quantico, (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, p. 6.
VA), sec 2, chap 3, p. 21. There are numerous other 162. See, for example, MCCDC, OIF Summary Re-
sources on the division's preparations for war, in- port, pp. 20-21.
cluding Toolan intvw; Wright intvw; and Col Joseph 163. LtCol James W. Western intvw, 20Dec03 (MCI IC,
F. Dunford intvw, 2May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). Quantico, VA).
150. Jones intvw. 164. Peraino, "Low-Key Leader." There are other rep-
151. BGen Edward G. Usher III intvw, 19Mar03 resentative discussions of this issue in Mattis intvw
(MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Usher intvw no. 1; no. 1; Lehnert intvw; and Moran intvw.
the Commanders and Staff of 1st FSSG, "Brute Force 165. 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
Logistics," Marine Corps Gazette, Aug03, pp. 34-39. VA), sec 3, "Significant Events."
A field historian was attached to 1st Force Service 166. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC Quantico,
Support Group during Operation Iraqi Freedom. She VA), sec 2, chap 2, p. 28.
was Maj Melissa D. Kuo, who is preparing a mono- 167. The offload took about 16 days, a few days less
graph on combat service support in OIF I. I am in- than the allotted time. MCCDC, OIF Summary Re-
debted to her for reviewing my remarks on logistics port, p. 55.
and making suggestions. 168. Ibid., p. 20. See also Milburn intvw no. 2 for
152. Hailston intvw; Usher intvw no. 1; LtCol comments by the I MEF G-5 on the process.
Michael. D. Visconage, "OIF Field History Journal," 169. For a discussion of this topic, see Plush intvw.
2003 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for 15Mar03, 170. Maj Grant A. Williams, "A Marine's Eye View of
hereafter Visconage, Journal; BGen Michael R. Lehn- Kuwait," Milinet (an internet service provider that
ert intvw, 8May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). One of the posted news about the military on the web),
Marine field historians assigned to cover OIF I, 27Feb03. This excerpt is from a report originally
CWO-2 William E. Hutson, conducted numerous in- dated 19Feb03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers,
terviews at the Marine Logistics Command that are MCHC, Quantico, VA).
available at the MCHC. 171. Peter Baker, "In War, Plans Yield to Improvisa-
153. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 29Jul03. This entry tion," The Washington Post, 24Mar03, p. A-16.
contains detailed notes on a set of briefings given 172. Ibid.
by the OIF commanders, including Generals Con- 173. Col Steven A. Hummer intvw, 13Feb04 (MCI IC,
way, Mattis, and Amos, at Quantico. The author Quantico, VA). See also McKeldin Journal, entry for
worked for General Amos at The Basic School. 7Feb03.
154. This is a topic that the U.S. Air Force has ex- 174. BGen Cornell A. Wilson intvws, 6Mar03,
plored over the years. See, for example, Robert P. 3Apr03, 17May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). MCIIC
Givens, Turning the Vertical Flank (Maxwell Air holds a number of other interviews on Consequence
Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002). Col Management, along with the task force's command
Givens outlines the criteria for thinking of air as a chronology.
Notes 151
175. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 8Apr03. Tells Brits," The Press Association (web-based wire
176. Gen James N. Mattis, "Memorandum for All service), 14Mar03.
Commanders," 20Dec02 (Copy in Reynolds Working 186. Hutson, Journal, entry for 27Feb03.
Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). 187, Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 27Feb03.
177. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 7Feb03. 188. Bennett, et al. No Better Friend, p. 5.
178. For additional details see, I MEF ComdC, Jan- 189. Mattis intvw no. 1.
Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, "FutOps Narrative 190. Visconage, Journal, entry for 4Mar03.
Summary"; McKeldin, Journal; CWO-2 William E. 191. MajGen James F. Amos, e-mail to multiple ad-
Hutson, "OIF Field History Journal," (MCHC, Quan- dressees, "Message from the Wing CG," 20Mar03
tico, VA), entry for 4 Feb. 2003, hereafter 1-lutson, (Col Charles J. Quilter II CD-ROM, Reynolds Work-
Journal. There is a discussion of this phase in the ing Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). See, for example,
intvw of the I MEF's current operations officer, who Bonadonna Journal, and Maj Melissa D. Kuo, "Field
pointed out all of the work involved in bringing the History Journal" (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for
I MEF staff together and producing the plan. Col 18Mar03; hereafter Kuo, Journal.
Dennis Judge intvws, 11Aug03 and 4Nov03 (MCHC, 192. Sarah Oliver, "Not the Beginning, It's the End—
Quantico, VA), hereafter Judge intvws no. 1 and no. The Words of LtCol Tim Collins," Mail on Sunday,
2. 16Mar03, pp. 6-7.
179. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), 193. Representative of other articles in the British
Future Operations Folder, "I MEF ROC Drill, 10 Mar press about the affair are Jack Grimston and John El-
03"; McKeldin, Journal, entries for 27Feb03 and liott, "First Picture of Man Who Denounced Tim
10Mar03. For Task Force Tarawa, see Col Reed R. Collins," Sunday Times (London), 25Ma03, p. 1; and
Bonadonna, "Field Historian Journal" (MCHC, Quan- "Col Tim: The Making of a Modern Hero," Inde-
tico, VA), entries for 2 and 10Mar03, hereafter pendent on Sunday (London), 25May03, Features
Bonadonna, Journal. This journal is very well written Section. Even though somewhat condescending to
and gives the reader a good sense of what it was Americans and reservists, the last article is a thought-
like to participate in OIF as a member of Task Force ful analysis of Collins' participation in the war, from
Tarawa. I recommend it highly both to the general his prewar speech through the investigation.
reader and the reader who wants to learn more 194. "The Smearing of Col Tim; The Eve of Battle
about Task Force Tarawa. In the run-up to combat Speech," Daily Mail (London), 22May03, p. 9.
operations, subordinate commanders down to the 195. See, for example, McKeldin, Journal, entries for
division level would use the terrain model at Doha 5-6MarO3, and Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1 July
again to brief General McKiernan and his staff on 2004, reporting on a talk with the G-3 of Task Force
their plans. MajGen James D. Thurman intvw, Tarawa.
27May03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, 196. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 18Mar03.
Quantico, VA).
180. Mattis intvw no. 1; Hutson Journal, entry for Chapter 4
27Feb03. See also lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3
(GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, "Narrative Summary," 197. McKiernan intvw no. 1.
chap 3. The division has written an unusually com- 198. Bonadonna, "Notes from Address by LtGen
prehensive narrative summary from its point of view. Conway."
181. Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 1Mar03; Conway 199. Ibid.
intvw. 200. I MEF Sitrep 181800Z to 191759ZMar03 (Copy in
182. Bonadonna, "Notes from Address by LtGen Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
Conway." 201. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 93; I MEF Sitrep
183. Mark Mazetti, "Fighting Words: A Marine Com- 171800Z to 181759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Work-
mander Readies His Troops for Combat," U.S. News ing Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); McKeldin Journal,
and World Report web exclusive, 17Mar03; McKeldin entry for 18 March 2003; I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3
Journal, entry for 16Mar03. (GRC, Quantico, VA), command element, sec 2, Cur-
184. Conway intvw; Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. rent Operations Narrative.
65. 202. See, for examples, Maj Phillip N. Frietze intvw,
185. Conway intvw; Nick Parker, "Countdown to 14May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), and Maj Daniel E.
Conflict," The Mirror, 15Mar03, pp. 6-7; Vanessa Longwell intvw, 1May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); I
Allen, "Great to Have You Aboard' U.S. General MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), Future
Operations, sec 2. Quantico, VA); Bonadonna, Journal, entries for 2 and

203. I MEF Sitrep 181800Z to 1981759ZMar03 (Copy 10Mar03; 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quan-
in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). tico, VA), sec 2.
204. I MEF Sitrep 191800Z to 201759ZMar03 (Copy in 220. Maj Daniel T. Canfield intvw, 12Dec03; LtCol
Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). Rickey L. Grabowski intvw, 6Apr03; LtCol Royal P.
205. See, for example, Kuo, Journal, entry for Mortenson intvw, 7Nov03; Col Ronald L. Bailey
20Mar03. intvw, 8May03, hereafter Bailey intvw (MCHC,
206. Col John C. Coleman intvw, 11Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
Quantico, VA). 221. I MEF Sitrep 2ll800ZMarO3 to 221759ZMar03
207. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 20Mar03; Kuo, (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
Journal, entry for 20Mar03. Another description of tico, VA), p. 125.
the day can be found in Peter Baker, "Overtaken by 222. I MEF Sitrep 221800ZMar03 to 231759ZMar03
Events, the Battle Plans Are Tossed Aside," The (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
Washington Post, 21Mar03, p. A-20. tico, VA).
208. I MEF Sitrep 191800Z to 201759ZMar03 (Copy in 223. See West and Smith, March Lp, pp. 41, 59; Com-
Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); pany Commanders, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, "The
McKeldin, Journal, entry for 20Mar03. Battle of An Nasiriyah," Marine Corps Gazette,
209. Dunford intvw. Sep03, pp. 40, 46, hereafter Company Commanders,
210. I MEF Sitrep 191800Z to 201759ZMar03 (Copy in "Battle of An Nasiriyah." This is a good general
Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); source on the battle.
General Mattis' comment is in the 20-2 1Mar03 Sitrep. 224. Bailey intvw.
211. I MEF Sitrep l8l800ZMarO3 to 191759Mar03 225. See 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers at MCHC, Quan- VA), sec 2.
tico, VA). On the issue of synchronicity, see lstMar- 226. Natonski intvw no. 2; BGen Richard F. Natonski
Div ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, intvw, 25Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Na-
chap 2, p. 12, and chap 3, p. 6. tonski intvw no. 1; Bailey intvw.
212. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-JunO3, sec 3, "Sequential 227. See Maj Walker M. Field, "Marine Artillery in the
Listing of Significant Events." See also Acosta, Jour- Battle of An Nasiriyah," Marine Corps Gazette, Jun04,
nal, entry for 20May03, containing an excellent pp. 26, 30; Natonski intvw no. 2. The Bonadonna
overview of the war from the standpoint of the I journal entries for 31 March 2003 and 30 April 2003
MEF G-3, Col Larry Brown. discuss his conclusion that the "big problems" were
213. See, for example, 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-JunO3 scant intelligence and fire support. See also Gary Liv-
(GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, p. 6; Lobik intvw. ingston, An Nasiriyah: The Fight for the Bridges (Ver-
214. GySgt Melba L. Garza intvw, 26May03 (MCHC, non, NY: Caisson Press, 2004), pp. 172-173, hereafter
Quantico, VA). Livingston, An Nasiriyah. This is a useful book with
215. LtCol Gary Smythe, USA, "1st Marine Division a number of oral histories.
Fire Support Coordination during Operation Iraqi 228. Bailey intvw. Col Bailey elaborated on this in-
Freedom," Marine Corps Gazette, Jun04, p. 31. terview in a conversation with Col Bonadonna,
216. I MEF Sitrep 201800Z to 211759ZMar03 (Copy in which was subsequently relayed to the author.
Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). 229. Livingston, An Nasiriyah, p. 70.
217. I MEF sitreps 201800Z20Mar03 to 230. Company Commanders, "Battle of An
21 1759ZMar03, 21 l800ZMarO3 to 22 1759ZMar03, Nasiriyah"; Bonadonna Journal, entry for 30Apr03.
and 221800ZMar03 to 231759ZMar03 (Copies in 231. SSgt Lonnie 0. Parker intvw, 29Mar03 (MCHC,
Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). Quantico, VA).
See also lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quan- 232. Livingston, An Nasiriyah, p. 91; Wittnam intvw;
tico, VA), sec 2, chap 4. Natonski intvw no. 2; Parker intvw.
233. lstLt Michael S. Seely intvw, 3May03 (MCHC,
Chapter 5 Quantico, VA).
234. Wittnam intvw.
218. Christopher Cooper, "How a Marine Lost His 235. Ibid.
Command in the Race to Baghdad," Wall St reet Jour- 236. Livingston, An Nasiriyah, p. 101.
nal Online. 237. Parker intvw.
219. Capt Daniel J. Wittnam intvw, 1May03 (MCHC, 238. Col Reed R. Bonadonna, "A Short History of
Notes 153
Task Force Tarawa," unpublished manuscript in- War, Plans Lead to Improvisation," The Washington
cluded with Task Force Tarawa ComdC, Jan-JunO3 Post, 24Mar03, p. A-16.
(GRC, Quantico, VA). 250. McKiernan intvw no. 4.
239. Natonski intvw no. 2. See, for example, 'Inter- 251. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 23Mar03.
view: Lieutenant General James T. Conway, USMC," 252. McKiernan intvw no. 4.
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Nov 2003). 253. Quoted in Bennett, et al., No Better Friend, p.
240. I MEF Sitrep 241800ZMar03 to 25175ZMar03 51. What appears to be the original quote appears in
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan- Peter Baker, "Arab Volunteers Draw U.S. Scrutiny;
tico, VA). Marine Commander Outraged by Willingness to
241. See, for example, Reynolds, Journal, entries for Hide Behind Women'," The Washington Post,
1Apr03, 3Apr03; Cordesman, Iraq War, p. 390, quot- 9Apr03, p. A-31.
ing a report: "Nasiriyah saw the culmination of this 254. Amos intvw.
confusion over MOUT [military operations in urban 255. Mattis intvw no. 1; I MEF Sitrep 241800ZMar03
terrain]. Commanders were not prepared to go in to 251759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Pa-
and clear a town no bigger than Victorville"; Helene pers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
Cooper, "U.S. Troops Bypass Cities to Avoid Urban 256. BGen Edward G. Usher III intvw, 11May03
Warfare," Wall Street Journal, 28Mar03; Bonadonna, (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Usher intvw no. 2.
Journal, entries for 28Mar03, 31Mar03. 257. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3, sec 2, chap 5.
242. Natonski intvw no. 2; Maj [first name unknown] 258. Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 25Mar03.
Bierman, "Summary of Comments Made by Col 259. Hummer intvw.
Johnson, G-3 Task Force Tarawa," as posted on 260. Judge intvw no. 1.
CFLCC J-2 website 3Apr03 (Copy in Reynolds Work- 261. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 26Mar03; I MEF
ing Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). Sitrep 261800ZMar03 to 271759ZMar03 (Copy in
243. McKiernan intvw no. 4. See also West and Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA),
Smith, March U, pp. 35, 41, 48, and C. Cooper, which contains a reference to the suspension of air
"How a Marine Lost His Command." Cooper dis- operations at the Jalibah airfield until 0300Z on that
cusses Dowdy's thought process. day. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, reports
244. Natonski intvw no. 2; Reynolds Journal, entry that the skies finally cleared on the morning of 27
for 1Apr03; Wittnam intvw; CentCom, "News Release March.
04-03-51—A-b Friendly Fire Investigation Com- 262. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 171-
pleted," 29Mar03, hereafter CentCom News Release. 172.
See also Hector Becerra, Robert J. Lopez, and Rich 263. McKiernan intvw no. 3.
Connell, "Report Details 'Friendly Fire' Casualties in
Deadly Battle," Los Angeles Times, 28Mar03. The re- Chapter 6
port itself was placed online by Globalsecurity.org.
Its title is M.S. Central Command, "Investigation of 264. Text of Navy Cross citation, approximate date
Suspected Friendly Fire Incident Near An Nasiriyah, March 2004. See Cpl Jeremy Vought, "Rochester,
Iraq, 23 March 03," dtd 6Mar03. For a thoughtful N.Y., Marine Receives Navy Cross," 6May04. Avail-
overview of friendly fire incidents during OIF-I, see able at
Peter Pae, "Friendly Fire' Still a Problem," Los Ange- http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/look
les Times, 16May03. upstoryref/200456162723. See also lstLt Brian R.
245. Bonadonna, "Short History"; Bonadonna, Jour- Chontosh intvw, 4May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
nal, entry for 23-24Mar03; West and Smith, March 265. Mattis intvw no. 1.
up, pp. 47, 52. 266. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
246. CentCom News Release. VA), sec 2, executive summary, p. 2.
247. West and Smith, March Up, p. 47; LtCol Willard 267. Kuo, Journal, entry for 24Mar03.
A. Buhl intvw, 4Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). 268. Usher intvw no. 2; I MEF Sitrep 241800ZMar03
248. Conway intvw; BuhI intvw; Natonski intvw no. to 251759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Pa-
2; West and Smith, March U, p. 45. pers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
249. Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 23Mar03. For ad- 269. BGen Michael R. Lehnert and Col John E.
ditional impressions of an officer in theater, see Kuo, Wissler, "Marine Logistics Command, Sustaining
Journal, entries for 23-24Mar03. For a relatively mild Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield," Marine
example of press commentary, see Peter Baker, "In Corps Gazette, Aug03, pp. 30, 33.
270. BGen Michael R. Lehnert, 7May03 (MCHC, 282. 1 MEF Sitrep 271800ZMar03 to 281759ZMar03
Quantico, VA). The division G-3 commented on (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
shortages from his perspective in interview with tico, VA).
LtCol Clarke R. Lethin, 6Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, 283. I MEF Sitrep 281800ZMar03 to 291759ZMar03
VA). For a frank discussion of the MLC and praise (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
for General Lehnert's innovative leadership, see Hut- tico, VA).
son, Journal, entry for 25Apr03. 284. "Lt Gen J Conway Holds Defense News Brief-
271. Usher intvw no. 2. ing."
272. Commanders and Staff of 1st FSSG, "Brute Force 285. I MEF Sitrep 271800ZMar03 to 281759ZMar03
Combat Service Support: 1st Force Service Support (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
Group in Operation Iraqi Freedom," Marine Coi7's tico, VA). See also lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3
Gazette, Aug03, p. 37. (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6.
273. Mattis intvw no. 1. The stop order is reported in 286. 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
I MEF Sitrep 261800ZMar03 to 271759ZMar03 (Copy VA).
in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). 287. Mattis intvw no. 1.
274. See, for example, comments by the I MEF G-3, 288. Col Charles J. Quilter II, e-mail to author,
Larry K. Brown, in Acosta, Journal, entry for 19Feb04 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC,
20May03 (describing a postwar symposium in Quantico, VA). See also I MEF Sitrep 3Ol800ZMarO3
Bahrain and Brown's comment to the effect that the to 311759Z Mar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Pa-
Army had wanted a 30-day pause), and G. W. Smith pers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), containing a brief ac-
intvw no. 2. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, count of the Amos-Mattis meeting: "True to form, 3rd
pp. 168, 171, 177, offers a good reflection of think- MAW pledged its utmost support to the I)iv's
ing by some senior army officers. They had a com- planned scheme of maneuver against the Baghdad
bination of concerns over supply shortages and the Div, to include addressing critical resupply needs."
Fedayeen, leading to a natural inclination to wait on 289. Col Charles J. Quilter II, e-mail to author,
reinforcements. 21Feb04 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC,
275. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), Quantico, VA); Stu Saffer, "Col Charlie Quilter, USMC,
future operations folder, "CG Guidance/discussion The Oldest Marine in Iraq," Laguna Life and People
with OPT 25 March 03." See also Elaine Grossman, (Laguna Beach, CA: Mar04), p. 18.
"Marine General: Iraq War Pause 'Could Not Have 290. The concept of operations is clearly outlined in
Come at Worse Time'," Inside the Pentagon, 2Oct03; I MEF Sitrep Ol800ZMarO3 to 311759ZMar03 (Copy
Conway intvw. in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
276. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 245, relies on two See also lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (MCIIC,
basic kinds of sources, Army note takers who were Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 5.
present at the meeting, and his interview with Gen- 291. Mattis intvw no. 1.
eral McKiernan on 8Dec03. The note takers' records 292. Ibid.; Toolan intvw; Conway intvw. It was re-
are the only firsthand, contemporary, and currently ported in the press at the time. See, for example,
available, source on the meeting. Tony Perry, "Marine Commander Relieved of I)u-
277. Quoted in Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 245; see ties," Los Angeles Times, 5Apr03, p. A-15. A later ar-
also Conway intvw. ticle offered a comprehensive picture of the affair:
278. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 28Mar03. The C. Cooper, "How a Marine Lost His Command." The
source for the "several days" quote is "CFLCC Up- History and Museums Division conducted an inter-
date, 26 Mar 03" (OIF CD No. 65, GRC, Quantico, view with Col Dowdy in December 2003.
VA).
279. I MEF Sitrep 271800ZMar03 to 281759ZMar03 chapter 7
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
tico, VA). 293. Fontenot, et al., On Point, pp. 49-50, provides
280. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 29Mar03. an excellent discussion of this topic, which is the
281. "Lt GenJ Conway Holds Defense News Briefing basis for this paragraph.
via Teleconference from Iraq," Federal Document 294. See Blackman intvw; lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-
Clearing House Political Transcript of Interview, Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 3.
30May03, hereafter "Lt Gen J Conway Holds Defense 295. McKiernan intvw no. 1. For further discussion,
News Briefing." see for example, lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC,
Notes 155
Quantico, VA), chap 3, p. 13; and Atkinson, In the 311. Milburn intvw no. 2.
Company of Soldiers, p. 26, quoting Army Brig. Gen- 312. For an excellent discussion of the BUA, see Maj
eral Benjamin C. Freakley, the assistant division com- Robert K. Casey intvw, 27Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico,
mander for operations of the 101st Airborne VA). There is an equally good description of how
Division; West and Smith, March Up, p. 186, also dis- the CFLCC staff worked in R. T. Johnson intvw. The
cuss urban tactics. author attended numerous BUAs in March and April
296. See Reynolds, Journal, entries for 3-4AprO3; Col 2003 and heard Generals McKiernan and Blackman
Thomas C. Latsko intvw, 22Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, talk about how they wanted them to work. See also
VA). Blackman intvw.
297. Paul Martin, "British Tactics in Basra Praised," 313. Judge intvws no. 1 and 2.
Washington Times, 3Apr03, p. 1; Peter Baker, "Tac- 314. There are already numerous books and articles
tics Turn Unconventional; Commanders Draw Les- that address the subject of embedding. An excellent
sons of Belfast in Countering Attacks," The example is Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers. On
Washington Post, 20Mar03, p. A-23. the Marine Corps side, there is Capt Dan Mc-
298. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, Sweeney, "Clowns to the Left of Me," U.S. Naval In-
VA), sec 2, chap 3, pp. 19-20. For information on stitute Proceedings, Nov03, pp. 46-48
Urban Warrior, see Randolph Gangle intvw, 18Oct02 315. I MEF Sitrep O5l800ZAprO3 to 061759ZApr03
(MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Gangle intvw. (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
299. Gangle intvw. tico, VA).
300. Mattis intvw no. 1. 316. West and Smith, March U, p. 207. This was cer-
301. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, tainly consistent with General McKiernan's com-
VA), sec 2, chap 6; West and Smith, March U, p. mand style, which was to tell commanders what he
207. wanted them to do and then leave the rest up to
302. McKiernan intvws no. 1 and no. 4; Capt them.
Matthew H. Bazarian intvw, 12Apr03 (MCHC, Quan- 317. McKiernan intvw no. 4; Fontenot, et al., On
tico, VA), containing the comment that during Inter- Point, chapter 6 offers a detailed discussion of the
nal Look, General McKiernan made it clear he did Army's movements.
not want to have two commands splitting Baghdad. 318. P. J. Kennedy intvw.
303. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), 319. I MEF Sitrep O5l800ZAprO3 to 061759ZApr03
sec 2, future operations command chronology and (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
future operations folder, "CG Guidance/discussion tico, VA).
with OPT 25 Mar 03"; Buhl intvw. 320. I MEF Sitrep O6l800ZAprO3 to 071759ZApr03
304. McKiernan intvw no. 4. (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
305. McKiernan intvw no. 1. For a slightly different tico, VA).
view, see Acosta, Journal, entry for 20May03, re- 321. I MEF Sitrep O7l800ZAprO3 to 081759ZApr03
porting a briefing by the I MEF G-3 and his state- (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
ment that "about a week before the war began, tico, VA).
COMCFLCC gave I MEF the mission to secure east- 322. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
ern Baghdad." This is probably a slightly garbled ref- VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 41.
erence to the branch plan. 323. Ibid.
306. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA) 324. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 6Apr03; Judge
sec 2, future operations; Fontenot, et al., On Point, intvw no. 1; Hummer intvw.
p. 331. Fontenot makes the point that flexibility was 325. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
intentionally built into the plan. VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 49; I MEF Sitrep O6l800ZAprO3
307. "CFLCC Update for 3 Apr 03" (Disk 65, OIF-I to 071759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Pa-
Document Collection, GRC, Quantico, VA); CFLCC pers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
Briefings (Disks 55 and 56, OIF-I Document Collec- 326. I MEF Sitrep O7l800ZAprO3 to 081759ZApr03
tion, GRC, Quantico, VA), entries for 3-4AprO3. (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
308. Amos intvw. tico, VA).
309. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, 327. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
VA), sec 2, chap 6. VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 51.
310. The "digital divide" is explored in some detail in 328. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 9Apr03.
MCCDC, OIF Summary Report. 329. Peter Baker, "Marines' Orders: Ready, Set,
Switch," The Washington Post, 10Apr03, p. A-35, chapter 8

hereafter Baker, "Marines' Orders." Baker's report
tracks closely with the I MEF sitrep for the same time 349. Mazetti, "Lt General James Conway." See also
period. Conway intvw for a report of his discussions with
330. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 9Apr03. CFLCC on the north. For an excellent discussion of
331. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, the strategic dimension, see McKiernan intvw no. 1.
VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 50. 350. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 14Apr03.
332. Capt Brian B. Smalley intvw, 3May03 (MCHC, 351. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 10Apr03; I MEF
Quantico, VA). Sitreps O8l800ZAprO3 to 091759ZApr03 and
333. Quoted in Mark Mazzetti, "Lt General James O9l800ZAprO3 to 101759ZApr03 (Copies in Reynolds
Conway, Commander of the 1st Marine Expedi- Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
tionary Force," US. News and World Report web ex- 352. I MEF Sitrep 071800ZApr03 to 081759ZApr03
clusive, 9Apr03, p. 1. (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
334. Baker, "Marines' Orders." tico, VA).
335. Ibid.; Conway intvw; West and Smith, March 353. West and Smith, March U, p. 247, report that in
Up, pp. 226-227, 233-234. September 2002, General Mattis ordered a contin-
336. I MEF Sitrep O8l800ZAprO3 to 091759ZApr03 gency plan for a quick-moving task force to assist
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan- the Kurds if Turkey did not agree to open a north-
tico, VA); Hummer intvw. ern front.
337. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, 354. I MEF Sitrep O9l800ZAprO3 to 101759ZApr03
VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 53; McKeldin, Journal, entry (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCIIC, Quan-
for 9Apr03; Fontenot, et a!., On Point, pp. 337-338, tico, VA); lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quan-
quotes a good firsthand account. tico, VA), sec 2, chap 7. Except where indicated, the
338. Reynolds journal, entry for 9Apr03. rest of this chapter is based on these two sources.
339. Dunford intvw; lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 The oral histories at MCHC offer additional detail,
(GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6. such as that of Capt Brian B. Smalley on 3 May 2003,
340. McKiernan intvw no. 4. See also G. W. Smith who provides a vivid description of this operation
intvw no. 1, especially the comment that the Coali- from a company commander's point of view.
tion spent a lot of time and effort working Out how 355. Amos intvw.
it would break things but not a lot on how it would 356. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 12Apr03; Conway
put things back together. intvw.
341. Mazetti, "Lt General James Conway." See also 357. I MEF Sitrep l2l800ZAprO3 to 131759ZApr03
Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, p. 287. (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
342. William Branigin and Anthony Shadid, "Author- tico, VA).
ity Melts in Baghdad," The Washington Post, 9Apr03, 358. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
p. A-i. VA), sec 2, chap 7, p. 21.
343. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 10Apr03; I MEF 359. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 12Apr03.
Sitrep O9l800ZAprO3 to iOl759ZAprO3 (Copy in 360. I MEF Sitreps l2l800ZAprO3 to 131759ZApr03,
Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). l4l800ZAprO3 to 151759ZApr03 (Copies in Reynolds
344. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 65. 361. I MEF Sitrep l8l800ZAprO3 to 191759ZApr03
345. I MEF Sitrep O9l800ZAprO3 to 101759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCFIC, Quan-
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan- tico, VA).
tico, VA). 362. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
346. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 8, pp. 4, 6, discuss this phase of the
VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 65. operation.
347. See, for example, Jehl, "Inspector's Report Says 363. Ibid.; and Reynolds, Journal, entry for 4May03.
Hussein Expected Guerrilla War." This does not Col Christopher C. Conlin came to much the same
mean a guerrilla war was carefully planned. conclusion in his article, "What do you do for an en-
348. 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, core?" Marine Corps Gazette, Sep04, pp. 74, 80.
VA), sec 2; Text of Cmdr, MarForPac, "I MEF (Rein) 364. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico,
Unit Award Recommendation for Presidential Unit VA), sec 2, chap 8, p. 6.
Citation," covering the period 2lMar-24Apr03. 365. Taken from the I MEF Casualty Report as of
Notes 157
14May03, reported in Acosta, Journal, entry for Quantico, VA).

20May03. These statistics include the casualties from 384. Capt Arnaldo L. Colon, ed., "U.S. Marines in
the British division (20 KIA, 36 WIA). For the other North Iraq, A Certain Force," n.d. (filed with 26th
MSCs, the breakdown was lstMarDiv (22 KIA, 188 MEU ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA).
WIA); 1st FSSG (2 KIA, 2 WIA); 3d MAW (11 KIA, 8 385. Frick intvw. Colon, "A Certain Force," describes
WIA); Task Force Tarawa (19 KIA, 58 WIA). the command arrangement in some detail and is
generally a very good source like a command
Chapter 9 chronology narrative. It tracks closely with my other
basic source on 26th MEU, the narrative summary in
366. Karl Vick and Daniel Williams, "U.S. Troops Ar- the command chronology, lJanO3-30Jun03, but in-
rive in Kurd Area to Open Front," The Washington cludes more detail.
Post, 24Mar03, p. A-15. 386. lstLt Sunny-James M. Risler intvw, 15Oct03
367. MajGen Henry P. Osman intvw, 19Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
(MCHC, Quantico, VA). 387. Sgt Bryan L. Gilstrap intvw, 16Oct03 (MCHC,
368. Ibid. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 186, 195, Quantico, VA).
is an excellent potted history of this campaign within 388. For a general reference with mentions of the in-
a campaign. For information on Provide Comfort, as cident, the allegations, and the general mood of the
well as general background, see LtCol Ronald J. city, see David Rohde, "Deadly Unrest Leaves a
Brown, Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, Town Bitter at U.S.," The New York Times, 20Apr03,
1991: With Marines in Operation Provide Comfort p. A-i.
(Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 389. Colon, "A Certain Force."
1995). 390. Frick intvw.
369. Jones intvw. 391. Osman sitrep for 22Apr03.
370. Col Robert L. Hayes III intvw, 19Nov03 (MCHC, 392. Jones intvw.
Quantico, VA); Osman intvw; Zinni intvw.
371. Hayes intvw; LtCol James E. Bacchus intvw, Chapter 10
20Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Bacchus
intvw. 393. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, p. 45.
372. David Josar, "Marines, Army to Coordinate Hu- As noted, this is a great source, full of direct quota-
manitarian Aid," European Stars and Stripes, tions, without the "happy" feel of many British and
30Mar03. American lessons-learned reports.
373. Bacchus intvw; Notes on meeting with Col Keith 394. McKiernan intvw no. 1. See Huelfer intvw for
A. Lawless, 25Nov03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Pa- evidence of early consideration of this option by
pers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Lawless notes. CFLCC planners.
For the MCLC, reach back worked well, validating a 395. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v, 1, p.
21st century model for staffing. 45.
374. Lawless notes. 396. R. T. Johnson intvw; Col Jeremy M. F. Robbins
375. Gen H. P. Osman sitrep to Gen J. P. Abizaid, RM, intvw, 16Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Murray
7Apr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 135-136. Murray and Scales
Quantico, VA). place the relationship between the British and the
376. Bacchus intvw. Americans in the Gulf in a larger context, discussing
377. Osman sitrep for 24Mar03. developments over the preceding decade. A recent
378. Dan Williams and Philip P. Pan, "U.S. Plans to arrival on the bookshelves, John Keegan's The Iraq
Create Military Command in Northern Iraq," The War (New York, NY: Knopf, 2004) is said to contain
Washington Post, 25Mar03, p. 20. useful data on the British division. Excerpts from the
379. Lawless notes. book on I MEF, however, contain inaccuracies and
380. Osman intvw. add little to the literature.
381. Osman sitreps for 12, 13Apr03. 397. "Major General R. V. Brims CBE,"
382. See Col John P. Holden intvw, 9Jun03 (Naval www.nato.int/sfor/comssfor/commndsw/t000121a.htm
Historical Center, Washington, DC). At the time, Col (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico,
Holden was serving as the deputy chief of staff for VA).
plans for the Sixth Fleet. 398. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 22Apr03.
383. Col Andrew P. Frick intvw, 12Sep03 (MCHC, 399. GOC Directive 1, 3Feb03 (Copy in Reynolds
Working Papers, (MCHC, Quantico, VA). House of 418. Commander's Diary, entry for 23Mar03.
Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, p. 195, describes the 419. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 97.
British "manoeuverist" approach in much the same 420. Ibid.
terms as FMFM 1: "long at the heart of British de- 421. Latsko intvw.
fense doctrine it is 'one in which shattering the 422. Max Hastings, "The real story is how we won,"
enemy's cohesion and will to fight, rather than his Sunday Telegraph (London), 7Sep03, p. 4; Murray
materiel, is paramount." and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 144, 153, gives a good
400. See, for examples, G. W. Smith intvw no. 2 and overview of the situation in Basrah.
Hummer intvw. 423. Hastings, "The real story."
401. Cmdr 1(UK) Armd Div's Diary, entry for 7Mar03 424. Ibid.; Commander's Diary, entry for 26Mar03
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan- 425. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 99.
tico, VA), hereafter Commander's Diary. 426. Commander's Diary, entry for 26Mar03.
402. Conway intvw; Ministry of Defence, Operations 427. LtCol I)onald C. Wilson intvw, 22Apr03 (MCHC,
in Iraq: First Reflections (London, UK: 7Jul03), p. 8. Quantico, VA), described the working of British in-
403. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, p. 92. telligence.
404. Ibid., p. 93. 428. See also Latsko intvw.
405. Ibid., p. 94. 429. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 98.
406. MajGen Robin V. Brims intvw, 10May03 (MCHC, 430. Commander's Diary, entry for 4Apr03.
Quantico, VA). To be sure, there were one or two 431. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 150-151; Com-
instances of friction between British and American mander's Diary, entry for 5Apr03. See K. L. Vantran,
officers. "CentCom Officials Announce Capture of 'Chemical
407. For an excellent discussion of this topic from Ali'," Armed Forces Information Service, 21Aug03.
the British point of view, see House of Commons, 432. Commander's Diary, entry for 6Apr03. See also
Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, pp. 193, 195. This report points I MEF sitrep O6l800ZAprO3 to 071759ZApr03 (Copy
out that the distance from being a maneuverist to es- in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
pousing effects-based planning is not far, they are 433. Brims intvw; Latsko intvw.
certainly consistent. 434. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 152.
408. See, for example, Capt Tracey A. Morris intvw, 435. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, pp. 149-
30Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). 150.
409. Latsko intvw; LtCol Edward C. Quinonez intvw, 436. Ibid., p. 62.
12May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also Ministry of 437. Ibid., p. 153.
Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future 438. Ibid.
(London, UK: 11Dec03), p. 34: "the implications of 439. I MEF sitrep 061800ZApr03 to 071759ZApr03
maintaining contact and congruence with US tech- (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan-
nological and doctrinal advances should continue to tico, VA).
be assessed." 440. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 156. This
410. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 22Apr03. led into a somewhat philosophical discussion of
411. Jones intvw. whether the division's actions and effects desired by
412. Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, "Brief by Maj Chris the division were really in sync. The point was that
Parker," 11May03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Pa- the division had won the war, but was anyone on
pers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). the British side set up to win the peace?
413. Ibid.; Walker intvw; Maj. CaiyJ. Schorsch, "UK
ASE Chronology," n.d. (lOMay 03?) (Copy in Chapter 11
Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
414. Commander's Diary, entry for 20Mar03. The im- 441. Peter Baker, "Top Officers Fear Wide Civil Un-
plication was that the Iraqi missiles were fired in re- rest; Bloodshed among Iraqis Could Create Chal-
taliation for the U.S. missile strikes against Baghdad lenge for Invading Troops," The Washington Post,
the night before. 19Mar03, p. A-18.
415. Ministry of Defense, Lessons for the Future, p. 442. Benson, "Brief at Naval War College." Benson
12. was the senior planner at CFCCC. See, for example,
416. Commander's Diary, entry for 22Mar03. Bacevich, "Modern Major General," p. 129.
417. Ministry of Defence, Lessons for the Future, p. 443. Moran intvw. See also G. W. Smith intvw no. 2;
25. BGen Stephen Hawkins, USA (CG of CJTF-IV) intvw,
Notes 159
14Mar03 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Wash- LtCol Conlin and Maj Cabell commented on how
ington, DC); Benson, "Brief at Naval War College." useful the reservists' skills, and temperament, were.
444. LtCol Brian K. McCrary intvw, 6Nov03 (MCHC, 456. For a balanced discussion of this policy, see
Quantico, VA). Peter Slevin, "Wrong Turn at a Postwar Crossroads?"
445. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. The Washington Post, 20Nov03, p. A-i. This was a
446. Peter Baker, "U.S. Forces Will Redeploy into 3 Pentagon decision, opposed by many in the field,
Zones," The Washington Post, 16Apr03, p. A-31. including General Franks. Franks, American Soldier,
447. Michael R. Gordon and John Kifner, "U.S. Gen- p. 441.
erals Meet in Palace, Sealing Victory," The New York 457. I MEF ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA),
Times, 17Apr03. sec 2, "FutOps Command Chronology."
448. I MEF sitrep l4l800ZAprO3 to 151759ZApr03 458. Pamela Hess, "Raid in Iraq's 'Indian Country',"
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan- 5Aug03, United Press International. Journalist Max
tico, VA), announcing the upcoming meeting. Boot visited the same unit shortly after Ms. Hess. See
449. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA) Boot, "Reconstructing Iraq." LtCol Pappas has de-
"I MEF Sequel ("Post Hostility Operations" to I MEF scribed his experiences in a comprehensive inter-
OpOrd 1003V "Basic Order" and "FutOps Command view. Pappas intvw.
Chronology," Jan-JunO3. 459. Pappas intvw.
450. I MEF sitrep lll800ZAprO3 to i21759ZApr03 460. Maj Steven B. Manber intvw, 21Aug03 (MCHC,
(Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quan- Quantico, VA).
tico, VA). 461. Pamela Hess, "General: Iraq Chem-Bio Arms
451. Margaret Warner, "A Marine's View," Public Intel Wrong," United Press International, 30May03.
Broadcasting System Online News Hour, 26Sep03. 462. BGen John F. Kelly, "Part III: Tikrit, South to
Good sources on the division during this period are Babylon," Marine Coips Gazette, Apr04, p. 46.
lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-JunO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), 463. M. Warner, "Marine's View." See also Kelly, "Part
sec 2, chap 8; BGen John F. Kelly, "Tikrit, South to III: Tikrit," p. 43, who notes: "[O]ur efforts with the
Babylon," Marine Corps Gazette, Feb-AprO4. local population assisted us in all but eliminating vi-
452. Max Boot, "Reconstructing Iraq," Weekly Stan- olence by midsummer." Max Boot shared this view.
dard, 15Sep03. Boot, "Reconstructing Iraq." For the dissenting civil-
453. LtCol Patrick J. Malay intvw, 23Aug03 (MCHC, ian view, see Neil MacFarquhar, "In Najaf, A Sudden
Quantico, VA). Anti-U.S. Storm," The New York Times, 21Jul03, who
454. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 4May03. notes: "The lack of Iraqis involved in the recon-
455. See, for example, 2dLt Glen J. Bayliff intvw, struction at all levels, widespread unemployment,
4May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); LtCol Christopher C. and woefully inadequate means of communicating
Conlin intvw, 24Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); LtCol [with U.S. forcesi. have combined to fuel an ever-
. .
Andrew Pappas intvw, 20Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico, higher level of frustration and anger about the Amer-
VA); Maj Joseph A. Cabell intvw, 28Aug03 (MCHC, ican presence."
Quantico, VA). LtCol Conlin, "mayor" of An Najaf, 464. 1st FSSG ComdC, Jul-DecO3 (GRC, Quantico,
described his experiences in that city, while LtCol VA), sec. 2, "Current Ops Narrative Summary"; I MEF
Pappas, head of a counter-insurgency task force, ex- ComdC, Jul-DecO3 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec. 2, "S-3
pressed considerable frustration at the lack of sup- Operations and Training Narrative Summary"; Sgt
port from CPA in restoring the infrastructure. Matthew Miller, "1st FSSG Goes Home," 1Oct03
Criticism of ORHA and CPA was almost universal (Story No. 20031015350, posted on MarineLink).
among Marines interviewed by field historians. See, 465. BGen Ronald S. Coleman intvw, 20Apr04
for additional examples, Maj David P. Holahan intvw, (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
6Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); LtCol Robert 0. Sin- 466. Ibid.
clair intvw, 7Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). Both
Appendix A
Data Collection and Lessons Learned Process
Although history is not about lessons learned, did not necessarily turn into front-burner action
even an overview of the first phase of the Iraq War items. Today, more than 250 four-inch binders of
would be incomplete without a few words about data Desert Storm material sit quietly on the shelves of the
collection. Not only did various teams collect a great Gray Research Center at Quantico, and Marine Corps
deal of material that may be of use to future histori- Lessons Learned System is largely unknown to many
ans, but the process itself has an interesting devel- parts of the Marine Corps public. After 11 Septem-
opment, not to mention some of the lessons learned ber, Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, Jr., com-
themselves. manding Marine Corps Combat Development
There was a time, especially after the combat Command, ordered the creation of a combat assess-
phase, when it seemed that not enough tent space ment team that deployed to theater for Afghanistan to
and computer terminals existed for all of the lessons- conduct data during, not after, combat operations
learned teams in theater. The senior lessons-learned and to turn it around quickly, in useful form, to the
team was from Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, advocates, that is, representatives of the various com-
tasked by the Pentagon to produce the official joint munities of operators in the Marine Corps.
report. The Army had at least two lessons-learned Afghanistan was a useful opportunity to discover
groups in theater, including one whose officers pro- good and bad ways to learn lessons, and the result,
duced the admirable preliminary Army history of op- less than a year later, was a sophisticated operation
eration Iraqi Freedom, titled On Point (published by for the Iraq War led by Colonel Philip J. Exner, a dy-
the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth in namic thinker and operator out of the Combat De-
2004). The Marine Corps had the combat assessment velopment Command's Studies and Analysis Division.
team from the Marine Corps Combat Development He began by surveying the process:
Command at Quantico, Virginia. Then there were the
various groups of field historians, embedded with We . . . looked at past "lessons learned" efforts.
"supported" commands. Once deployed, Marine his- Both authors and audiences were somewhat
torians worked closely with historians from other skeptical of the value of traditional approaches,
branches, especially their counterparts from the Army which usually involved publication of a large
and the joint history staffs, as well as the Marine as- tome or collection of documents. . One of
. .
sessors and, to a lesser extent, other Services. Though the other services published an after action for
there was a distinct pecking order among these var- a more recent operations that consisted of a
ious groups, with historians generally coming from 5,000-page main report with an 800-page exec-
organizations with relatively little bureaucratic clout, utive summary and nearly 100,000 pages of ap-
most got along well. Data was usually shared freely pendices. Such monumental efforts often miss
across the board. There has probably never been so the very change agents who are essential to
much available, retrievable, and useful historical converting lessons into lessons learned because
data.1 the action officers and decision-makers are
The recent history of the Marine assessors goes often overwhelmed with information and
back to Desert Storm, when battle assessment teams chronically short of time.2
deployed from the Marine Corps Combat Develop-
ment Command to theater to conduct interviews and With the support of the Commandant of the Ma-
generally gather data to drive postwar analyses and rine Corps, Exner worked to embed his assessors in
complement the young Marine Corps Lessons the operating forces for the duration, in much the
Learned System, described as "a passive system," same way that journalists and historians were em-
which relied on units to report their observations. bedded, so that they could develop better access and
Most of their interviews were anonymous, which lim- understanding and collect better data. The data, in
ited their usefulness to historians. Their reports the form of interviews and surveys, went into a mas-
tended to go into established "channels," that is, they sive database in Quantico that was searchable and, to
some extent, linked with data collected by historians to record." He attacked the reasons for going to war,
working alongside the assessors. The assessment arguing that the United States had successfully con-
teams gave briefings to general officers, posted their tained Saddam and that it needed first to resolve the
findings on Web sites, and produced timely, reader- conflict between Israel and Palestine. "I could not be-
friendly reports for the advocates. For the more gen- lieve what I was hearing about the benefits of this
eral Marine Corps public, Combat Development strategic move. That the road to Jerusalem led
Command published the teams' findings in mercifully through Baghdad, when just the opposite is true." lie
brief summary reports that initially were limited to of- went on to make a number of points about Phase IV,
ficial use but will no doubt find their ways into li- citing the inadequate planning at both the Pentagon
braries and research centers before long. and CentCom levels, the inadequate number of
This is not to say that the operators themselves troops for occupation duties, and the, to him amaz-
neglected the after-action process. What was proba- ing, decision to disband the Iraqi Army.6
bly the first comprehensive "hot wash" took place in Marines are likely to remember the observations
Bahrain at MarCent headquarters on 20 May 2003. about Phase III that emerged from these sessions.
The highlight was a blow-by-blow, chronological re- The first had to do with maneuver warfare and the
view of the operation by the I MEF operations officer, Marine air-ground task force concept. There was gen-
Colonel Larry K. Brown.3 The next major evolution eral agreement that the Iraq War had revalidated Ma-
was sponsored by the Marine Corps Association at rine doctrine in at least two respects, speed and
Quantico on 29 July 2003 and featured briefings by organization. The I Marine Expeditionary Force was
Generals James Conway, James Mattis, James Amos, organized and equipped for speed. It had moved
and Richard Natonski.4 General Conway's brief was much faster than the enemy; the enemy never had
a very good "executive summary" of the operation. time to visualize the outlines of our "observation/ori-
Some of the specific objectives learned, covered on entation/decision/action" loop, let alone get inside it.
that day, were: The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing had remarkable new
precision technologies (and new doctrines to go with
The utility of the medical surgical units at the them) to enable it to fight with unprecedented effec-
front; the use of SAPI, or small arms protective tiveness. The wing and the 1st Force Service Support
inserts, for the flak jackets; the positive impact Group had not just supported division, which was it-
of the embedded media; the concept of combat self organized into mobile, independent combat
maintenance being performed with units on the teams; they also had been maneuver elements in
fly; and the merit in organizing large, flexible their own right, integrated into the overall scheme of
combat battalions. . . . Challenges [that is, prob- maneuver. With the Marine Logistics Command's and
lem areas] included . . [having two] Marine
. the 1st Force Service Support Group's contributions,
Corps supply systems (ATLASS I and ATLASS and the wing's willingness to switch from the deep
II), integration with special operations forces, battle to close air support to cargo missions on short
casualty reporting, combat identification to pre- notice, the division had been able to go the distance,
vent fratricide, and the need to sharpen Coali- to project Marine power on the ground far from salt-
tion intelligence sharing.5 water. This was another way of saying that Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom had revalidated the concept of the
A few weeks later, on 4 September 2003 there was "MEF single battle." The I Marine Expeditionary Force
another conference along the same lines, the Marine had demonstrated, yet again, that the whole was
Corps Association and U.S. Naval Institute Forum greater than the sum of its parts, whether the issue
2003, which featured talks by General Mattis and re- was deep fires, rear area security, or keeping the sup-
tired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who was not plies flowing to the front.7
afraid to strike out on his own and offer some pithy Conclusions about Phase IV were more cautious.
comments about how he saw the situation in Iraq. No one contradicted General Zinni and claimed there
On 4 September, and then again in May 2004, Zinni had been elaborate preparations for Phase IV.
criticized the Bush Administration's policy in lan- Nowhere in CentCom or Coalition Forces Land Con3-
guage a drill instructor might have used; he said he ponent Command had there been a plan for Phase IV
remembered the official "garbage and lies" during the that was like the plan for Phase III, let alone all of the
Vietnam era and asked if it was happening again. preparations that accompanied it, including the cross
Zinni also offered a thoughtful analysis of what had talk during its development, the many rehearsal of
gone wrong, the "10 mistakes" that "history is going concept drills, and the exchange of liaison officers.
Appendix A 163
There were the arguments, like General Zinni's, for MCCDC, "Memorandum for the Commandant of the Marine
bringing many more American troops to theater for corps/Battle Assessment Proposal," 19Jan91, and Officer-in-
charge, MarCent Assessment Team, "Letter of Instruction (Draft),"
occupation service. He wanted them to be on hand 3Dec01 (Copies in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico,
before anyone crossed the line of departure, avail- VA).
able to stabilize the country as soon as the fighting 3. Acosta, Journal, entry for 20May03.
ended. A corollary advanced by some was that the 4. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 29Jul03; Col John P. Glasgow, Jr.,
Coalition could have moved more slowly from (Ret), "Editorial," Marine Corps Gazette, Sep03, p. 2.
5. Glasgow, "Editorial."
Kuwait to Baghdad in order to secure the objectives
6. Thomas E. Ricks, "Ex-Envoy Criticizes Bush's Postwar Policy,"
that had just been seized. Still, General Mattis re- The Washin.gton Post, 5Sep03, p. A-13; Reynolds, Journal, entry for
peated his assertion that he had had the right force 5Sep03. For a more comprehensive look at lessons learned by Gen
mix on the ground in the summer of 2003: a battal- Zinni, see Anthony Zinni, "Ten Mistakes History Will Record about
ion for each province, some aviation, and not much War in Iraq," Def en.se Monitor, v. XXXIII, No. 3 (May/JunO4), p. 1.
7. The focus here is on Marine lessons learned. The report of the
by way of mechanized assets. It was not necessarily Joint Forces Command's Joint Center for Lessons Learned high-
how many troops there were on the ground, but lighted achievements in the joint arena and, except for the issue
what their skills were and what they were being told of fratricide, was generally complimentary about the "jointness" of
to do. That was why he had sent his mechanized OIF. See, for example, Vernon Loeb, "Pentagon Credits Success in
Marines home in May. The mostly infantry Marines Iraq War to Joint Operations," The Washington Post, 3Oct03, p. A-
15.
who stayed through the summer quickly proved their 8. This is not necessarily an argument against medium- or long-
ability to shift and learn on the fly, and they did a term occupations. See, for example, Gunther intvw. With respect
more than creditable job as interim occupiers in the to troop strengths, some lessons-learned analysts disagreed with
southern half of Iraq during the relatively brief pe- Gen Mattis' point of view and argued that especially for Phase IV
riod between the end of combat operations and their the force had to be much heavier than it had been; the Army Chief
of Staff, Gen Eric Shinseki, made the famous comment that it
return home. Like General Mattis, at least one other
would take some 400,000 troops to occupy Iraq, and that it would
senior I MEF officer stressed that one of the keys to have been better to sacrifice some speed in order to have de-
success was getting the timing right, the longer the ployed more force. A slower, heavier force might have gotten the
occupiers stayed, the greater the challenges would job done better than the fast, light force that conquered Iraq in 21
become. The implication was that the Marines suc- days; the argument, which is generally inconsistent with current
Marine thinking about how to fight the Marine air-ground task
ceeded in the short term but that any occupier would force, is that since the Iraqis were unable to put up much of a
face problems in the medium and long term.8 fight, it would have been better to proceed more methodically, se-
Generals Earl Hailston, James Conway, James Mat- curing and occupying terrain as the Coalition moved forward. This
tis, and Anthony Zinni made one overarching point is one of the general implications of Fontenot, et al., On Point,
that will find favor with historians. It was that since and of the 3d Infantry Division's after-action report. See, for ex-
ample, John L. Lumpkin and Dafna Linzer, "Army: Plan for Iraq
the Iraqi military was comparatively weak, and since
Flawed," Hartford Journal, 28Nov03, p. A-i. Two thoughtful arti-
every contingency is unique in its own way, it is dan- cles that explore the background to Phase IV in more depth are
gerous to over generalize from the Iraq War, to imag- George Packer, "Letter from Baghdad: War after the War; What
ine that the next war will necessarily be like the last. Washington Doesn't See in Iraq," New Yorker, 24Nov03, pp. 59,
85; Tom Donnelly and Gary Schmitt, "The Right Fight Now," The
1. Two excellent sources about the overall lessons-learned process Washington Post, 26Oct03, p. B-i. Packer's article addresses the
are James Jay Carafano, "After Iraq: Learning the War's Lessons," general topic of postwar reconstructions in the 21st century, and
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1664, 3Jul03, and Col concludes that (a) it is lengthy process, (b) it is better when inter-
Mark Cancian, "Learning the Lessons of War," 2004, unpublished nationalized, and (c) the foundation of success is security. He then
article (copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). goes on to discuss the Pentagon's initial decision not to plan for a
On the Marines in particular, see LtGen Edward Hanlon, Jr., "Lean- long-term occupation. Donnelly and Schmitt highlight the Marines'
ing Into the 21st Century," Marine Corps Gazette, Oct03, pp. 15, 17. Small Wars Manual, which they say is as good a guide as any to
2. MccDc, OJF Summary Report, p. 5. For further information, see postwar reconstruction.
Appendix B
Command List
U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command

March—November 2003*
Commanding General: LtGen Earl B. Hailston
Chief of Staff: Col Peter T. Miller
G-1: Col Richard B. Harris
G-2: Col William E. Rizzio
G-3: Col Timothy C. Wells
G-4: Col Philip N. Yff
G-5: Col Timothy L. Hunter
G-6: Col Kevin B. Jordan
SJA: LtCol Robert E. Pinder
Comptroller: Col Robert J. Herkenham
Combined/Joint Task Force-Consequence Management

Commanding General: BGen Cornell A. Wilson
Marine Logistics Command

Commanding General: BGen Michael R. Lehnert
Special Purpose MAGTF

Commanding General: BGen Ronald S. Coleman
I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced)
Commanding General: LtGen James T. Conway
Deputy: MajGen Keith J. Stalder
Chief of Staff: Cal John C. Coleman
G-1: Cal William J. Hartig
G-2: Col Alan R. Baldwin
Col James R. Howcroft
G-3: Col Larry K. Brown
G-4: Col Matthew W. Blackledge
G-5: Col Christopher J. Gunther
Col Anthony L. Jackson
G-6: Col George J. Allen (to 15 June)
Col Marshall I. Considine (after 30 June)
SJA: Col William D. Durrett
Surgeon: Captain Joel A. Lees, USN
Chaplain: Captain John S. Gwudz, USN
I MEF Headquarters Group: Col John T. Cunnings
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)
Commanding Officer: Col Thomas D. Waidhauser
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)
Commanding Officer: Col Richard P. Mills (to 6 June)
Col Ronald J. Johnson (after 6 June)
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Element (-)
Commanding Officer: Col Anthony M. Haslam

Marine Ground Combat Element
1st Marine Division (Reinforced)
Commanding General: MajGen James N. Mattis
Assistant Division Commander: BGen John F. Kelly
Chief of Staff: Col Bennett W. Saylor
Cot Joseph F. Dunford
1st Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 1)

Commanding Officer: Col Joseph D. Dowdy (to 4 April)
Col John A. Toolan (after 4 April)
5th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 5)

Commanding Officer: Col Joseph F. Dunford (to 23 May)
Col R. Stewart Navarre (after 23 May)
7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)

Commanding Officer: Col Steven A. Hummer
11th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Michael P. Marletto
2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa)

Commanding General: BGen Richard F. Natonski
Chief of Staff: Col James W. Smoot
2d Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 2)

Commanding Officer: Col Ronald L. Bailey
Marine Aviation Combat Element
3d Marine Aircraft Wing
Commanding General: MajGen James F. Amos
Assistant Wing Commander: BGen Terry G. Robling
Chief of Staff: Cot Gerald A. Yingling, Jr.
Marine Aircraft Group 11 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Randolph D. Alles

Commanding Officer: Cal Mark R. Saverese

Commanding Officer: Cal Stuart L. Knoll

Commanding Officer: Cal Robert E. Milstead, Jr.
Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Cal Michael C. Anderson
Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Ronnell R. McFarland
Appendix B 167
Marine Aircraft Group 39 (-)(Reinforced

Commanding Officer: Col Richard W. Spender
Col Kenneth P. Gardiner
Marine Combat Service Support Element
1st Force Service Support Group
Commanding General: BGen Edward G. Usher III
BGen Richard S. Kramlich
Deputy Commander: Col John L. Sweeney, Jr.

Chief of Staff: Col Darrell L. Moore
Combat Service Support Group 16 (Headquarters Elements)

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael J. Taylor
Combat Service Support Group 11 (Brigade Service Support Group G 1)

Commanding Officer: Col John J. Pomfret
Col Charles L. Hudson
Combat Service Support Battalion 13 (4th Landing Support Battalion)

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael D. Malone
Combat Service Support Group 14 (4th Supply Battalion)

Commanding Officer: Col John T. Larson
Combat Service Support Group 15 (1st Supply Battalion)

Commanding Officer: Col Bruce E. Bissett
Transportation Support Group

Commanding Officer: Col David G. Reist
I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group

Commanding Officer: RAdm (UH) Charles R. Kubic, USN
United Kingdom Forces
1 Armoured Division (UK) (-)(Reinforced)
Commanding General: MajGen Robin V. Brims
Chief of Staff: Col Patrick Marriott
7 Armored Brigade (British Army)

Commanding Officer: Brig Graham Binns
16 Air Assault Brigade (British Army)

Commanding Officer: Brig Jacko Page
3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines (-)

Commanding Officer: Brig Jim Dutton
Inc1udes billets in units which served in theater for part but not all of the period covered. Basic sources are MarAdmin 507/03, various
versions, Oct-DecO3, with 'Modifications to the J MEF Presidential Unit Citation Unit Listing," and unit command chronologies.
Appendix C:
Unit List
U.S. Marines In Operation Iraqi Freedom

March-November 2003*
U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command [USMarCent]
Command Element
Combined Joint Task Force-Consequence Management [CJTF-CMI
Marine Corps Logistics Command [MarLogComl
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force [SPMAGTFI
I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced) [I MEF]
Command Element
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [15th MEU (SOC)]
Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [BLT 2/11

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (Reinforced) [HMM-1611
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 15 [MSSG-151
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [24th MEU (SOC)]
Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 2d Marines [BLT 2/2]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (Reinforced) [HMIvI-2631
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 24 [MSSG-241
Task Force Yankee [TF Yankee]
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Element (-) Filth MEU, CmdElel
2d Battalion, 6th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 6th Marl
Sensitive Site Team Number 3, U.S. Army [SenSiteTm #3, USA]
75th Exploitation Task Force, U.S. Army [75th ExpTF, USA]
Company C, 478th Engineer Battalion, U.S. Army [Co C, 478th EngrBn, USAI
I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [I MEF HqGru]
6th Communications Battalion (-) [6th CommBnl

9th Communications Battalion (-) [9th CommBnl
1st Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st RadBn]
1st Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st IntelBnl
1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ForReconCol
I Marine Expeditionary Force Liaison Element [I MEF LsnEle]
3d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [3d ANGLICO]
4th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [4th ANGLICO]
3d Civil Affairs Group [3d CAGI
4th Civil Affairs Group [4th CAGI
Marine Ground Combat Element
1st Marine Division (Reinforced) [1st MarDiv]

Headquarters Battalion [HqBn]
1st Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 1 [1st Mar/RCT-1l
Headquarters Company [HqCo]

3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Marl
1st Battalion, 4th Marines [1st Bn, 1st Marl
2d Battalion, 23d Marines [2d Bn, 23d Mar]
2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [2d LARBn]
5th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 5 [5th Mar/RCT-51

1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Marl
2d Battalion, 5th Marines [2d Bn, 5th Marl
2d Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d TkBn]
1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [1st LAIRBn]
Company C, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion [Co C, 4th CbtEngrBnl
7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 7 [7th Mar/RCT-7]

1st Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st TkBn]
3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, (-) (Reinforced) [3d LARBn]
11th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [11th Marl
Headquarters Battery (-) [HqBtiy]

Detachment, Headquarters Battery, 10th Marines [Det, HqBtry, 10th Mar]
1st Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [1st Bn, 11th Marl
2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [2d Bn, 11th Marl
3d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [3d Bn, 11th Mar]
5th Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [5th Bn, 11th Marl
1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CbtEngrBn]
2d Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d CbtEngrBnl
1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st ReconBn]
2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d AABnI
3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [3d AABn]
4th Assault Amphibian Battalion [4th AABn]
2d Radio Battalion [2d RadBn]
Military Police Company, 4th Marine Division [MPCo, 4th MarDivl
Communications Company, 4th Marine Division [CommCo, 4th MarDivl
Battery I, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry I, 3d Bn, 10th Mar]
Battery R, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines FBtry R, 5th Bn, 10th Mar]
Appendix C 171
2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa) [2d MEB TF Tarawa]
Command Element
Detachment, II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [Det, II MEF HqGrul
II Marine Expeditionary Force Liaison Element [II MEF LsnElel
2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Originally with Task Force Yankee) [2d Bn, 6th Mar]
Company C, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion [Co C, 4th ReconBnl
2d Force Reconnaissance Company [2d ForReconCol
2d Intelligence Battalion (-) [2d IntelBnl
2d Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 2 [2d Mar/RCT-2]
Headquarters Company [HqCol

1st Battalion, 2d Marines List Bn, 2d Marl
3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Marl
Battery F, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry F, 2d Bn, 10th Marl
Company A, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion [Co A, 2d CbtEngrBnl
Company A, 8th Tank Battalion [Co A, 8th TkBnl
Company C, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [Co C, 2d LARBn]
Company A, 2d Assault Amphibious Battalion [Co A, 2d AABnI
Company A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (Reinforced) [Co A, 2d ReconBn]
Marine Aviation Combat Element
3d Marine Aircraft Wing [3d MAW]
Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 [MWHS-3]

Detachment, Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 2 [Det, MWI-IS-2]
Marine Aircraft Group 11 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-i 11
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 11 (-) (Reinforced) LMALS-1 11

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14 (-) [MALS-14l
Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 31 IDet, MALS-31]
Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) (Reinforced) [VMGR-352l
Detachment, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 234 [Det, VMGR-2341
Detachment, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 452 [Det, VMGR-452l
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 [VMFA-2321
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 [VMFA-25 11
Marine AU Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121 [VMFA(AW)-121l
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 225 [VMFA(AW)-2251
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 [VMFA(AW)-5331
Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1l
Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 [VMAQ-21
Marine Aircraft Group 13 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-131
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 (-) [MALS-131

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (-) [VMA-2111
Marine Attack Squadron 214 [VMA-2 141
Marine Attack Squadron 223 (-) [VMA-2231
Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311l

Marine Attack Squadron 542 [VMA-5421
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (-) [MALS-161

Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 [Det, MALS-26]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 [HMM-1631
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [I-IMH-4621
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 [HMH-4651
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 29 (-) [MALS-29]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 [HIvIM-1621
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (-) [HMM-3651
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 [1-1MH-4641
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 [I-IMLA-269]
Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-371
Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 [MWSS-2711

Company C, 1st Battalion, 24th Marines [Co C, 1st Bn, 24th Marl
Detachment, Military Police, 4th Marine Air Wing [Det, MP, 4th MAW]
Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced) [MACG-381
Air Traffic Control Detachment B, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 [ATCDet B,
MTACS-2]
Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (Reinforced) [MACS-il
Detachment, Marine Air Control Squadron 2 [Det, MACS-2]
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28 (-) [MWCS-28}
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 (Reinforced) [MWCS-381
Detachment, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 28 [Det, MTACS-28]
Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 38 (Reinforced) [MTACS-381
Detachment, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 48 [Det, MTACS-481
Marine Air Support Squadron 1 [MASS-lI
Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (Reinforced) [MASS-31
Battery B, 2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [Btry B, 2d LAADBnI
3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [3d LAADBn]
Detachments, Marine Air Support Squadron 6 [CA, MA Dets, MASS-61
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1I
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 EVMU-21
Marine Aircraft Group 39 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-39I
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39 (-) [MALS-39]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-1691
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267 [HMLA-267]
Appendix C 173

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [I-IMLA-3691
Atlantic Ordnance, Command Expeditionary Force [LantOrd, CmdExpedForl
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Corps Air Station,
Miramar [Det, HHS, MCAS Miramarl
Marine Combat Service Support Element
1st Force Service Support Group [1st FSSGJ**
Detachment, Headquarters and Service Battalion [Det, H&SBnl
Combat Service Support Group 11 (Brigade Service Support Group 1) [CSSG 111
Headquarters [Hql
Combat Service Support Battalion 10 (Combat Service Support Group 1) [CSSB 101
Combat Service Support Company ill [CSSC 1111
Combat Service Support Company 115 [CSSC 1151
Combat Service Support Group 13 (4th Landing Support Battalion) [CSSG 131
Headquarters, 4th Landing Support Battalion [Hq, 4th LdgSptBnl

Combat Service Support Group 14 (4th Supply Battalion) [CSSG 141

4th Supply Battalion (-) [4th SupBn}
Combat Service Support Group 15 (1st Supply Battalion) [CSSG 151

1st Supply Battalion (-) [1st SupBn]
Combat Service Support Battalion 12 (1st Maintenance Battalion) [CSSB 121
Combat Service Support Battalion 18 (Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force
Service Support Group) [CSSB 181
Combat Service Support Battalion 22 [CSSB 221
Transportation Support Group [TransSuptGrul

1st Transportation Support Battalion (-) [1st TSptBnI
6th Motor Transport Battalion [6th MTBn}
7th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [7th EngrSptBn]

6th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [6th EngrSptBn]
8th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [8th EngrSptBnl
Communications Company, 4th Force Service Support Group [CommCo, 4th FSSG]
Mortuary Affairs Company, 4th Force Service Support Group [MortAffairsCo, 4th FSSGI
Company A, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co A, MP, 4th FSSGI
Company B, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co B, MP, 4th FSSGI
Company C, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co C, MP, 4th FSSGI
Combat Service Support Battalion 16 (Combat Service Support Detachment 16) [CSSB 161
Combat Service Support Battalion 19 (Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group-il)
[CSSB 191
1st Dental Battalion (-) list DentBnl

Fleet Hospital Three, U.S. Navy [FH 3, USNI
Fleet Hospital Fifteen, U.S. Navy [FH 15, USN]
Preventive Medicine Unit, Navy Environmental Health Center [PM-MMART-5]
Preventive Medicine Unit, Navy Environmental Health Center [PM-MMART-21
Health Services Battalion (1st Medical Battalion) [Health ServBnllst MedBn]
Company A [Co A]
Company B [Co B]
Company C [Co C]
Company E [Co E]
Company F [Co F]
I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group [I MEFEngrGru]

Command Element:
30th Naval Construction Regiment [30th NCR]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 ENMCB 51
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 [NMCB 7]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 [NMCB 741
Naval Construction Force Support Unit 2 (-) [NCFSU 2]
Air Detachment, Underwater Construction Team 2 [AirDet, UCT 2]
22d Naval Construction Regiment [22d NCR]
Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 15 [AirDet, NMCB 15]

Detachment, Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 303 [Det, CBMU 303]
United Kingdom (UK) Forces
1 Armoured Division (UK) (-) (Reinforced) [1 ArmdDiv (UK)1

7 Armoured Brigade (UK) [7 ArmdBde (UK)]
1st Battalion, The Black Watch [1st Bn, BlackWatch]
1st Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers [1st Bn, RoyalFusiliers]
The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards [RoyalScotsDragoons]
2d Royal Tank Regiment [2d Royal TkRegt]
3d Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery [3d Regt, RoyalHorseArtyl
32 Engineer Regiment [32 EngrRegtl
16 Air Assault Brigade (UK) [16 AirAsltBde (UK)]
1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment [1st Bn, ParaRegt]
3d Battalion, The Parachute Regiment [3d Bn, ParaRegtl
1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Regiment [1st Bn, RoyallrishRgt]
7th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (Parachute) [7th Regt, RoyalHorseArty (Para)]
3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines (-) [3 CdoBde, RM]
40 Commando Group [40 Cdo, RMI
42 Commando Group [42 Cdo, RM]
29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery [29 Cdo, RoyalArty]
U.S. Army Reinforcing Units
Detachment, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion [Det, 9th PsyOpsBn]

Appendix C 175
354th Public Affairs Detachment [354th PADet]

Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 468th Chemical Battalion
[Det, HHCo, 468th ChemBnl
U.S. Army Space Support Team [USASpaceSptTml
86th Signal Battalion [86th SigBnl
208th Signal Company [208th SigCo]
Company C, 40th Signal Battalion [Co C, 40th SigBnl
3d Battalion, 27th Field Artillery [3d Bn, 27th FIdArtyl
1st Field Artillery Detachment [1st FldArtyDetl
498th Medical Company [498th MedCoI
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade [HHBtry,
108th AirDefArtyBdel
2d Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery [2d Bn, 43d AirDefArtyl
3d Battalion, 124th Infantry [3d Bn, 124th InfI
555th Maintenance Company [555th MaintCo]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 378th Support Battalion
[Det, HHCo, 378th SptBnl
777th Maintenance Company [777th MaintCol
727th Transportation Company [727th TransCol
3 19th Transportation Company [3 19th TransCol
319th Transportation Detachment [319th TransDetl
299th Engineer Company [299th EngrCol
459th Engineer Company [459th EngrCol
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Co., 716th Military Police Battalion
[Det, HHCo, 716th MPBnI
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 265th Engineer Group [HHCo, 265th EngrGrul
130th Engineer Battalion [130th EngrBnl
478th Engineer Battalion [478th EngrBn]
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade
[HHCo, 358th CABdeI
304th Civil Affairs Brigade [304th CABdeI
402d Civil Affairs Brigade [402d CABde)
432d Civil Affairs Battalion [432d CABn]
367th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment [367th MOPADetI
305th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [305th TacPsyOpsCol
1092d Engineer Battalion [1092d EngrBn]
Marine Follow-on Forces
3d Battalion, 23d Marines [3d Bn, 23d Marl

4th Combat Engineer Battalion (-) [4th CbtEngrBnl
4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [4th LARBn]
2d Battalion 25th Marines [2d Bn, 25th Marl
Truck Company, 4th Marine Division [TkCo, 4th MarDivl
Marine Forces with Fifth and Sixth Fleets
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [26th MEU (SOC)l
Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 8th Marines [BLT 1/81
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 26 [MSSG 261
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (USS Harry S. Truman CVN 75) [VMFA-1 151
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312 (USS Enterprise CVN 65) [VMFA-3121
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (USS Constellation CV 64) [VMFA-323]
*Unit list based on I Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Award Recommendation, 7Aug03; MarAdmin 507/03, various
versions, Oct-DecO3; "Modifications to the I MEF Presidential Unit citation Unit Listing," with additions and/or corrections provided by
Ms. Annette Amerman, Historian, Reference Branch; and Col Nicholas E. Reynolds' troop list of Oct04. Unit abbreviations are provided
in brackets.
"1st Force Service Support Group reorganized shortly before deployment; previous unit designations are shown in parentheses after the
unit's designation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 1st Force Service Support Group's headquarters elements were reorganized into
Combat Service Support Group 16 [CSSG 16] in April 2003.
Appendix D
Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
AA—Assault Amphibian
AAA—Antiaircraft Artillery
AAOE—Arrival and Assembly Operations Echelon
AAV—Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ACE—Aviation Combat Element
ADC—Assistant Division Commander
ADOCS—Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
APOD-Air Port of Debarkation
APOE—Air Port of Embarkation
ASLT—Air Support Liaison Team
ASOC—Air Support Operations Center
ASP—Ammunition Supply Point
ATARS—Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System
ATO—Air Tasking Order
BCL—Battlefield Coordination Line
BCT—Brigade Combat Team
BDA—Battle Damage Assessment
BFT—Blue Force Tracker
BSSG—Brigade Service Support Group
C2PC—Command and Control Personal Computer
CBR—Counter Battery Radar
CE—Command Element
CEB—Combat Engineering Battalion
CENTCOM—U.S. Central Command
CFACC—Coalition Forces Air Component Commander
CFLCC—Coalition Forces Land Component Commander
CG—Commanding General
CGS—Common Ground Station
CIP—Combat Identification Panel
Class Il—Batteries
Class Vill—Medical Supplies
Class TX—Repair Parts
CMOC—Civil-Military Operations Center
CPAO—Consolidated Public Affairs Office
CP-Command Post
CPX—Command Post Exercise
CRAF—Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSS—Combat Service Support
CSSB—Combat Service Support Battalion
CSSC-Combat Service Support Company

CONPLAN-Contingency Plan
CONUS-Continental United States
COP-Common Operational Picture
DA-Dispersal Area
DAC-Division Administration Center
DASC-Direct Air Support Center
DIA-Defense Intelligence Agency
DOC-Deployment Operations Center
DS-Direct Support
DSA-Division Support Area
EMCON-Emissions Control
EOD-Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPW-Enemy Prisoner of War
FAC-Forward Air Controller
FAD-Field Artillery Detachment
FARP-Forward Arming and Refueling Point
FOB-Forward Operating Base
FOE-Follow on Echelon
FPOL-Forward Passage of Lines
FRAGO-Fragmented Order
FRSS-Forward Resuscitative Surgery System
FSCC-Fire Support Coordination Center
FSS-Fast Sealift Ships
FSSG-Force Service Support Group
GBS-Global Broadcasting System
GCE-Ground Combat Element
GOSP-Gas-Oil Separation Plant
HDR-Humanitarian Daily Ration
HET-Human Exploitation Team
HF-High Frequency
HHA-Hand Held Assay
HUMINT-Human Intelligence
IC-Intelligence Community
IMINT-Image Intelligence
IMO-Information Management Officer
IO-Information Officer
IPSA-Intermediate Pumping Stations
]DAM-]oint Direct Attack Munition
]MEM-]oint Munitions Effectiveness Manual
]STARS-]oint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
KAF-Kuwaiti Armed Forces
KI-Killbox Interdiction
KLF-Kuwaiti Land Forces
KMOD-Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense
Appendix D 179
LAR-Light Armored Reconnaissance

LASER-Light Amplification through Stimulated Emission of Radiation
LAV-Light Armored Vehicle
LD-Line of Departure
LOC-Line of Communication
LSA-Life Support Area; Logistical Support Area
LTO-Logistics Tasking Order
LZ-Landing Zone
MACCS-Marine Air Command and Control Squadron
MAG-Marine Air Group
MAGTF-Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MANPAD-Man-Portable Air Defense
MARCORSYSCOM-Marine Corps Systems Command
MAW-Marine Aircraft Wing
MCIA-Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MCRE-Marine Corps Readiness Evaluation
MCWL-Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
MDACT-Mobile Data Automated Communication Terminal
MEB-Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF-Marine Expeditionary Force
MEFEX-Marine Expeditionary Force Exercise
MEG-MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) Engineer Group
MEWSS-Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System
MLC-Marine Logistics Command
MOD-Ministry of Defense (Kuwait)
MOl-Ministry of the Interior (Kuwait)
MOPP-Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MOS-Military Occupational Specialty
MOUT-Military Operations on Urban Terrain
MP-Military Policy
MPF-Maritime Prepositional Force
MPSRON-Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron
MRLS-Multiply Rocket Launcher System
MSC-Major Subordinate Command
MSTP-MAGTF Staff Training Program
MWSG-Marine Wing Support Squadron
MWSS-Marine Wing Support Squadron
NBC-Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NBCRS-Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System
OCD-Obstacle Clearing Detachment
OMC-K Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait
OPCON-Operation Control
OPLAN-Operations Plan
Opp-offload Preparation Party
OPT-Operational Planning Team
ORCON—Originator Controlled
OSW—Operation Southern Watch
PA—Public Affairs
PALT—Public Affairs Liaison Team
PIR—Priority Intelligence Requirement
PU—Position Location Information
POL—Passage of Lines
POW—Prisoner of War
PRR—Personal Role Radio
QRF—Quick Reaction Force
RA—Regular Army
RCT—Regimental Combat Team
RFF—Requested for Forces
RG—Republican Guard
RGFC—Republican Guard Forces Command
RIP—Relief in Place
ROC—Rehearsal of Concept
ROZ—Restrical Operation Zone
RRP—Refueling and Replenishment Point
RSO&I—Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
RUC—Reporting Unit Code
SAPOE—Sea and Aerial Ports of Embarkation
SAM—Surface-to-Air-Missile
SASO—Security and Stabilization Operations
SIGINT—Signal Intelligence
SIPRNET—Secret Internet Protocol Routed Network
SLTLP—Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party
SMART-T—Secure Mobile Antijam Reliable Tactcal Terminal
SOP—Standing Operating Procedure
SRG—Special Republican Guard
SPINS—Special Instructions
SPOD—Sea Port of Debarkation
SPOE—Sea Port of Embarkation
SSE—Sensitive Site Exploitation
SSM—Surface-to-Surface Missile
TAA—Tactical Assembly Areas
TACON—Tactical Control
T/E—Table of Equipment
TEWr—Tactical Exercise Without Troops
110—Target Information Officer
TIP—Thermal Identification Officer
T/O—Table of Organization
TPC—Target Procesing Center
TPFDD—Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
Appendix E
Chronology of Events
2001
11 September Al Qaeda terrorists attack the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon.
25 November Marines of Task Force 58 land in Afghanistan as part of

operations to deprive Al Qaeda of its base in that country.
2002
January Marine Forces, Pacific, orders I Marine Expeditionary Force

(I MEF) to focus on preparing for contingencies in the U.S. CentCom
theater; I MEF planners begin more than a year of work on plans to
invade Iraq.
2 August MajGen James N. Mattis becomes Commanding General,

1st Marine Division, and puts the division on a virtual war footing.
11 October The Pentagon orders I MEF to deploy its headquarters staff to

Kuwait for service with Coalition Forces Land Component
Command (CFLCC) under U.S. Army LtGen David D. McKiernan.
15 November I MEF headquarters deploys to Kuwait; newly appointed I MEF

commander LtGen James T. Conway deploys with his
headquarters.
16 November 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW) forward command post, under
MajGen James F. Amos, arrives in Kuwait.
18 November 1st Marine Division forward command post arrives in Kuwait.
24 November CFLCC exercise to test command and control links with I MEF
and other commands, "Lucky Warrior 03-1 ," begins.
9 December CentCom exercise "Internal Look," based on the current version

of the plan for the invasion of Iraq, begins.
2003
January Intense preparations to integrate 1st Armoured Division (UK)

into I MEF occur; this division assumes responsibility for
securing southeast Iraq.
2 January Pentagon issues Deployment Order 177A, soon to be followed

by 177B, which orders the wholesale deployment of I MEF forces
to theater.
6 January Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill occurs at 3d MAW in Miramar,

California; many ROC drills at various levels follow in the
coming weeks.
13 January Gen Michael W. Hagee becomes the 33d Commandant of the

Marine Corps.
15 January Amphibious Task Force (ATF) East departs Morehead City,

North Carolina, for Kuwait with 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB).
17 January Amphibious Task Force (ATE) West departs San Diego,

California, for Kuwait carrying elements of I MEF.
8 February With I MEF, participation, CFLCC exercise "Lucky Warrior

03-2," labeled "a dress rehearsal" for war, begins.
16 February 2d MEB begins to go ashore in Kuwait to reinforce

I MEF; its aviation elements transfer to 3d MAW control and
the ground elements are redesignated Task Force Tarawa.
24 February Amphibious Task Force West begins offloading its West Coast Marine units in
Kuwait; most other Marines follow by air.
9 March First leaflets dropped on Baghdad urging noninterference with

Coalition operations and soliciting support from Iraqi people.
17 March President Bush issues an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave

Iraq within 48 hours.
18 March Operation Southern Watch aircraft conduct air strikes against

Iraqi early warning radars and command-and-control capabili-
ties; Marine forces are ordered to staging areas.
Night of 19-20 March U.S. Air Force aircraft and Navy vessels conduct unplanned
attack against Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leadership targets
in what becomes popularly known as the "decapitation strike,"
which does not succeed but does initiate hostilities
20 March Iraq retaliates by firing surface-to-surface missiles against

Coalition troops in Kuwait; ground combat operations begin at
night; I MEF is supporting attack to Army's V Corps;
Regimental Combat Team (RCT 5) is leading Marine unit.
21 March Marines capture the Rumaylah oil fields, a key CentCom

objective; Marines and British forces secure the port of Umm
Qasr before moving on the city of Basrah, the most important
British objective.
23 March Task Force Tarawa begins to secure the city of An Nasiriyah and
its key bridges over the Euphrates River and the Saddam Canal;
heavy fighting ensues; friendly fire incident occurs at bridge over
canal; II Marine Expeditionary Force commander MGen Henry P. Osman
deploys to northern Iraq to establish the Military Coordination and Liaison
AppendixE 183
Command (MCLC) under operational control of CentCom in

order to maintain political stability.
Night of 24—25 March "Mother of all sandstorms" begins, slowing operations' tempo
for approximately two days.
24—27 March 1st Marine Division continues to advance up Routes 1 and 7

towards Baghdad.
27 March Operational pause begins to consolidate supply lines and

address threats by irregular Iraqi formations on the ground;
3d MAW air offensive continues unimpeded, rendering many Iraqi
units combat ineffective.
1 April 1st Marine Division resumes progress towards Baghdad; 1st Force Service
Support Group performs herculean feats of resupply with cooperation
of wing and Marine Logistics Command.
3 April U.S. Army troops move on Saddam International Airport, key

terrain outside Baghdad.
5 April U.S. Army conducts first "Thunder Run," armored raid, into Baghdad.
6 April Most of Basrah, Iraq's "second city," is in British hands.
7 April Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT 7) crosses the Diyala River and moves
on outskirts of Baghdad from the east; U.S. Army conducts second "Thunder
Run" into capital.
9 April Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, part of RCT 7,

assist Iraqi civilians in toppling a large statue of Saddam Hussein
in Firdos Square in Marine area of operations, eastern Baghdad.
10 April RCT 5 engaged in heavy fighting at Al Azimilyah Palace and

Abu Hanifah mosque in Baghdad; looting begins as fighting
tapers off; Marines begin post-combat operations.
11—12 April After the collapse of Iraqi authority in northern cities of Mosul
and Kirkuk, Kurdish forces fill the resulting power vacuum,
followed by U.S. forces over succeeding days, including Marines
from 26th MEU (SOC).
13-14 April Task Force Tripoli, out of 1st Marine Division, takes control of
Tiksit, Saddam Hussein's hometown.
20 April The relief in place with U.S. Army in eastern Baghdad is

complete; I MEF redeploys its forces to the southern third of Iraq;
mission is now security, humanitarian assistance, and
reconstruction; focus of effort is seven infantry battalions from
1st Marine Division in seven governates or districts.
22 April 24th MEU (SOC), which had supported Task Force Tarawa, begins
redeploying to its ships; other Marine units soon follow suit

as part of drawn-down to reduced manning levels that are
maintained throughout the summer.
1 May Under a banner reading "Mission Accomplished," President George

W. Bush announces that major combat operations are over; 26th
MEU (SOC) departs Mosul and returns to its ships in the
Mediterranean.
12 May Ambassador L. Paul Bremer takes over as civil administrator in

Iraq, replacing Jay M. Garner; Bremer's Coalition Provisional
Authority soon replaces Garner's Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance.
22 July Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay are killed in firefight
with U.S. Army in Mosul.
19 August A truck bomb explodes at the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad,

killing 20 people, including the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights.
3 September In Babylon, I MEF conducts a transfer of authority to a Polish-led

international Coalition force; most remaining Marines return to
Continental United States.
10 November Marines of Special Purpose MAGTF celebrate the Marine Corps

birthday in Continental United States after completing the work of repatriating all
Marine Corps equipment from theater.
Appendix F
Presidential Unit Citation
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
for service as set forth in the following
CITATION:
For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance in

action against enemy forces in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
from 21 March to 24 April 2003. During this period, I Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) (REIN) conducted the 1onest sequence
of coordinated combined arms overland attacks in the history of
the Marine Corps. From the border between Kuwait and Iraq, to the
culmination of hostilities north of Baghdad, I NEF advanced
nearly 800 kilometers under sustained and heavy combat. Utilizing
the devastating combat power of organic aviation assets, coupled
with the awesome power resident in the ground combat elements,
and maintaining momentum through the herculean efforts of combat
service support elements, I MEF destroyed nine Iraqi Divisions.
This awesome display of combat power was accomplished while
simultaneously freeing the Iraqi people from more than 30 years
of oppression and reestablishing basic infrastructure in the
country. During the 33 days of combat, to the transition to
civil-military operations, I NEF sustained a tempo of operations
never before seen on the modern battlefield, conducting four
major river crossings, maintaining the initiative, and sustaining
forces. The ferocity and duration of the campaign was made
possible through the skills and determination of the Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coalition Partners comprising I MEF
at all levels, all echelons, and in all occupational fields. By
their outstanding courage, aggressive fighting spirit, and
untiring devotion to duty, the officers and enlisted personnel of
I Marine Expeditionary Force (REIN) reflected great credit upon
themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps
and the United States Naval Service.
For
Secretary Navy
Index
Abizaid, General John P., 115 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 32, 92, 107, 111-
Abu Ghraib Palace, 133 113, 120-121
Acosta, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey, 12 82d Airborne Division, 112
Ad Diwaniyah, 79-81, 86, 106, 112, 138 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 94, 120
Afghanistan, 1, 3-4, 7-8, 10-11, 15, 25, 43 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 49
Aircraft, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, 112, 133
Bell AR-lW Super Cobra, 43 377th Theater Support Command, 42-43, 81, 143
Bell UH-1H Huey, 43 507th Maintenance Company, 67, 72-73
Boeing CH-46E Sea Knight, 43, 86 Army Special Forces, 119, 120
Fairchild-Republic A-b Warthog, 72 Operational Detachment-Alpha, 106
Lockheed KC-130 Hercules, 43, 87, 107, 118, 120 As Samawah, 38, 94
Lockheed P-3 Orions, 71, 86, 125 Ash Shatrah, 106
McDonnell Douglas AV-8 Harrier, 43 Ashmore, Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas D., 124
McDonnell Douglas FA-18 Hornet, 43 Atlantic Command, 17
Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion, 44 Atkinson, Rick, 38
Air Forces, Central Command, 9 Az Zubayr, 127-129, 135
Al Amarah, 38, 80, 85-86, 106, 123, 130 Ba'ath Party, 39, 106, 119
Al Aziziyah, 94 Babil Province, 138, 140, 142
A] Faw, 63, 121-122 Babylon, 141-142
Al Faw Peninsula, 57, 123, 125 Bacchus, Lieutenant Colonel James E., 116
Al Hamsha, 106 Baghdad, 26, 28, 32-36, 38-39, 41, 44, 50, 54, 57-58, 61,
Al Hayy, 106 64, 78-80, 83-84, 86-87, 89-94, 96-100, 103, 105-107, 109-
Al Jaber, 47-48, 58 114, 126, 134
Al Kut, 26, 38, 57-58, 65, 77, 86-89, 94, 100, 106, 123 Baghdad International Airport, 94
Al Muthanna, 138 Bahrain, 3-4, 7-8, 47
Al Nida, 39, 77 Bailey, Colonel Ronald L., 67-68
Al Qadisiyah, 138 Baird, Colonel Stephen W., 10
Al Qaeda, 1, 3, 5, 15, 43 Baker, Peter, 84, 100, 150, 152-153, 155, 158-159
Al-Majid, Au Hassan, 126 Barzani, Massoud, 117
Al-Zibari, General Babekir, 115-116 Basrah, 28, 33-37, 47, 57, 84, 90, 117, 121-122, 126-130,
Ali Al Salem Air Base, 47, 58 134
Almilyah Palace, 102 Basrah International Airport, 28, 130
Ambush Alley, 70, 75-76 Bataan (LHD 5), 5, 55
Amos, Major General James F., 20-22, 30, 43, 52, 55, 58, Bayliff, Second Lieutenant Glen J., 139
63, 77, 86-87, 93, 107, 150 Bedard, Lieutenant General Emil R., 18-19
Amphibious Task Force West, 46, 143 Bell, Major Bruce, 71
Amphibious Task Force East, 46 Benson, Colonel Kevin, 23, 89
An Najaf, 138, 142 Berndt, Lieutenant General Martin R., 114
An Nasiriyah, 27, 36-38, 64-69, 73-74, 76-77, 80, 84, 86-87, Bin Laden, Osama, 1
90, 106, 109, 134, 136 Binns, Brigadier Graham J., 123, 127
An Numaniyah, 96, 106, 112 Blackman, Major General Robert L., Jr., 31-32, 94, 97
An Numaniyah, Airfield 82 Blair, British Prime Minister Tony, 121
Ar Ramadi, 140 Blake, Major Peter 5., 135
Army Forces, Central Command, 9, 12 Blume, Captain Charles J., 71
Army Units, Boaz, First Lieutenant Nathan M., 109
V Corps, 18-20, 26-27, 34-35, 78, 81, 83-84, 89, 92-93, Bonadonna, Colonel Reed R., 55
99, 114, 140 Boomer, Lieutenant General Walter E., 10
3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 28, 33, 65, 67, 90, Bremer, Ambassador L. Paul, 140
92, 94, 98, 111-112 Brims, Major General Robin V., 52, 122-123, 125-130
British Units, Conway, General James T., 10, 12-14, 19-21, 23, 27, 29,
1 Armored Division (United Kingdom), 35, 47, 122, 33-34, 37-39, 41, 43-45, 48, 52-55, 57-59, 61, 68, 76-77, 81,
131 83-88, 92, 95-96, 100-101, 104, 107, 109, 121-123, 126,
3 Commando Brigade, 122, 125, 128 131, 133, 135, 141-142, 150, 153, 156, 162
7 Armored Brigade, 54, 122-128 Crawford, Danny J., 34
16 Air Assault Brigade, 54, 122, 125, 130 Czech Republic, 3
1st Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, 56 Davis, Richard Harding, 7
Black Watch, 54, 127 Diyala River, 98-99, 100, 107
Royal Marines, 28, 37, 50, 121, 123 Dora Farms, 61
Brown, Colonel Larry K., Jr., 46 Dowdy, Colonel Joseph D., 19, 74-76, 84
Burger, Colonel Patrick J., 31 Dunford, Colonel Joseph F., 61, 95, 103
Bush, President George H.W., 114 Edney, Admiral Leon A., 17
Bush, President George W., 1, 28, 53, 56, 58, 130, 140, El Alamein, 127
182 Euphrates River, 34, 37, 47, 65
Camps, European Command, 32, 114-115
Babylon, 141 Ewers, Lieutenant Colonel John R., 135
Commando, 28-30, 46-49, 59, 61, 95, 143 Exercises,
Doha, 2, 8, 19, 29, 48, 51-52, 82, 94, 114 Bright Star, 3
Camp H.M. Smith, I Internal Look 03, 32
Lejeune, 27, 33, 45, 113-114 Lucky Sentinel, 16-17
Matilda, 49-50 Lucky Warrior 03-1, 32
Pendleton, 3, 20, 26, 30, 41 Lucky Warrior 03-2, 52
Ryan, 53 Fallujah, 140
Scorpion, 140 Fans, Brigadier General Fuad Hani, 138
CARE, 112 Fedayeen, Saddam, 39, 71, 76-78, 80, 83, 94, 101, 110,
Castellaw, Brigadier General John G., 3 125-126, 128-129
Central Command, 1, 3, 7, 12, 15, 17, 21-22, 24-29, 32-33, Firdos Square, 101, 135
35, 57-58, 61, 74-75, 89, 113-114, 117, 121-122, 135 Fleet Marine Force Manual 1: Warfighting, 12
Center for Naval Analyses, 43 Fort Campbell, 28
Central Washington State College, 4 Fort Leavenworth, 20, 23-24
Charlie Surgical Support Company, Health Services Battal- Forward Operating Base Rhino, 7
ion, 135 Franks, Frederick M., Jr., 17
Chalabi, Ahmed, 22, 24 Franks, General Tommy R., 1, 8-9, 12, 15, 18, 23, 25, 28,
Chechnya, 126 32-33, 38, 45, 102, 116, 133, 159
Chemical Mi, 128 Frick, Colonel Andrew P., 117-120
Childers, Second Lieutenant Therrel S., 64 Gardner, Brigadier General Emerson N., Jr., 8
Chin, Corporal Edward, 101, 135 Garner, Lieutenant General Jay M., 120, 132
Chontosh, First Lieutenant Brian R., 79-80 Garza, Gunnery Sergeant Melba L., 63
Clardy, Lieutenant Colonel Herman S. III, 71, 109 Germany, 3
Clark, Master Gunnery Sergeant Paul D., 141 Gilstrap, Sergeant Bryan L., 119
Cleveland, Colonel Charles T., 113, 116, 118 Grabowski, Lieutenant Colonel Ricky L., 67-70
Coalition Forces Air Component Command, 9, 15, 20-23, Gray, General Alfred M., 12-13
44, 47, 63, 95, 108, 113 Guantanamo Bay, 43
Coalition Forces Land Component Command, 8-12, 15, Gunther, Colonel Christopher J., 28-29
19-20, 22, 25-29, 31-35, 38-39, 49, 52, 57-59, 61, 64, 74, Hagee, Lieutenant General Michael W., 2, 4, 17, 19-21
82-83, 85, 89-90, 92-96, 98, 107, 109, 112-114, 121-122, Hailston, Lieutenant General Earl B., 7, 9-10, 12, 14-15,
126, 131, 140-141, 143 17-18, 20-21, 33, 42
Coalition Forces Maritime Component Command, 9, 15 Hantush, 80, 83, 87
Coalition Forces Special Operations Command, 8, 15, 113 Hayes, Colonel Robert L. III, 115
Coalition Provisional Authority, 140 Headquarters Marine Corps, 27, 31
Coleman, Brigadier General Ronald S., 143-144 Hess, Pamela, 140, 159
Coleman, Colonel John C., 48 Highways,
Collins, Lieutenant Colonel Tim, 56 Highway 1, 65, 67, 86, 106
Colon, Captain Arnaldo L., 118-119 Highway 2, 99
Combined/Joint Task Force-Consequence Management, 2, Highway 7, 65, 67, 77, 80, 84, 86, 106
4, 10, 49-51, 82 Highway 17, 80
Combined Joint Task Force W, 132 Highway 27, 80, 87
Conlin, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C., 103 Hillah, 36, 138
Index 189
Homer, General Charles A., 17 Lore, Major Joseph A., 135-136

Hough, Colonel David K., 118 Lynch, Private First Class Jessica, 67, 73, 109
House of Commons, 121, 128, 130 Maas, Peter, 136
Huelfer, Major Evan A., 32, 38 MacDill Air Force Base, 1
Hummer, Colonel Steven A., 49, 77, 97 Manber, Major Steven B., 141
Hussein, Saddam, 15, 17-18, 22, 25, 32, 38-40, 48-50, 55, Marine Corps University, 12, 89
57-58, 61, 76, 86, 89, 100-103, 109, 110-112, 114, 117, 121, Marine Forces, Central Command, 1, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17, 19,
126, 133, 149, 182-184 25, 46, 47
Hussein, Uday, 101 Marine Forces, Europe, 114
Hutton, Lieutenant Colonel James, 37 Marine Forces, Pacific, 1, 3, 15
Imam Abu Hanifah Mosque, 103 Marine Logistics Command, 10, 19, 42, 47, 51, 81, 143
International Red Cross, 105 Marine Units,
Iraq, 1, 15, 25, 40, 46 I Marine Expeditionary Force, 2, 4, 10, 12-15, 17-22,
Ministry of Intelligence, 101 25-29, 31-39, 41-42, 44-50, 52-54, 56-59, 61-64, 68, 73-74,
Ministry of Oil, 101 76-77, 81, 83-87, 89, 91-94, 96-98, 100, 105-107, 110, 112-
Iraqi Units, 113, 121, 123, 125, 130-131- 138, 140
ICorps, 114 I Marine Expeditionary Force Augmentation Com-
Baghdad Division, 77, 87, 94 mand Element, 2
6th Armored Division, 38, 126 I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group, 34, 47
10th Armored Division, 38, 80, 85, 86, 106 I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group,
11th Infantry Division, 38 30
51st Mechanized Division, 38, 41, 64 I Marine Expeditionary Force Rear, 143
Republican Guard, 38-39, 44, 85, 89, 94, 109 II Marine Expeditionary Force, 26, 113-114
Special Republican Guard, 38-39 Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, 143-
Irbil, 118 144
Iwo Jima (LHD 7), 118 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 4
Jalibah, 68, 76, 81, 84, 86, 96 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 33-34, 46-47, 113-
Jalibah Air Base, 64 114
Johnson, Colonel Ronald J., 39, 96 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Johnson, Lieutenant Colonel Richard T., 35 Capable), 5, 7, 35, 47, 57, 86, 122-123, 125
Joint Special Operations Command, 37 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Joint Special Operations Task Force North, 28, 113, 115- Capable), 85, 114
116, 118, 120 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Joint Special Operations Task Force South, 28 Capable), 5, 7, 11, 117-118, 120
Joint Task Force Kuwait, 19, 21 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 3, 17-18, 20, 26, 34, 42-44,
Jones, General James L.,Jr., 2,4, 13, 32, 114-115, 117, 124 46-47, 62-63, 71, 85-86, 91
Jubouri, Abed Mutlaq, 39 Marine Aircraft Group, 39, 41
Judge, Colonel Dennis, 97 Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron, 91
Kabul, Afghanistan, 6 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264, 118
Kandahar Airfield, 7 Marine Wing Support Squadron 271, 63
Karbala, 36, 89, 94, 138, 141 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365, 118
Kelly, Brigadier General John F., 76, 88, 107-108, 111, 1st Marine Division, 3, 20, 26, 34, 39, 41-42, 47, 54,
136, 142 65, 76-77, 80, 86, 90, 94-95, 107, 111, 123, 133, 135-137,
Kennedy, Lieutenant Colonel Paul J., 22, 95 141
King, Captain Troy K., 67 2d Marine Division, 31
Kirkuk, 32, 107-109, 113, 115, 117 Regimental Combat Team 1, 46, 65, 74-75, 77, 80, 84,
Kiser, Colonel John B., 3, 8 87, 99
Korea, 1 Regimental Combat Team 2, 53, 67-68, 75, 86
Kosovo, 22 Regimental Combat Team 5, 63, 65, 79-80, 87, 95, 99,
Kurdish Democratic Party, 113, 116-117 103, 125
Kurds, 17, 25 Regimental Combat Team 7, 41, 49, 63-64, 79, 87,
Kuwait, 3, 16, 18, 21, 25, 28-29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 45-46, 49- 101, 125
50, 57-58, 65, 76, 82-84, 89, 112 1st Marines, 46, 76, 80, 88, 96
Kuwait City, 28, 46-48, 51, 121 2d Marines, 34
Latsko, Colonel Thomas C., 123-124 5th Marines, 41, 83, 87, 99, 104
Lawless, Colonel Keith A., 115 7th Marines, 77, 96, 98-99, 101, 105
Lehnert, Brigadier General Michael R., 42, 81, 143 11th Marines, 92, 105, 107, 112
Lethin, Lieutenant Colonel Clarke R., 95 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 67, 73, 85
3d Battalion, 2d Marines, 73 Moseley, Lieutenant General T. Michael, 12, 20-21

1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 138 Mosul, 113, 115, 117, 119-120
3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 101 Munch, Edvard, 46
1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 64, 102 Murray, Williamson, 12, 18, 39, 128-129, 145-146
2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 138 Mutla Ridge, 30
3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 77, 79, 112, 138 Najaf, 36, 90, 94, 141
Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, National Defense University, 17
138 Natonski, Brigadier General Richard F., 34-36, 45, 52, 66-
1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 101, 103, 138 68, 73, 76-77, 85, 96, 113
3d Battalion, 7th Marines, 138 Naval Air Station, Souda Bay, 118
1st Battalion, 8th Marines, 118 Naval Forces, Central Command, 3, 5, 9, 10
1st Battalion, 10th Marines, 68, 72 Naval Support Activity, 3, 9
5th Battalion, 11th Marines, 107 Naval War College, 7
3d Battalion, 23d Marines, 138 Nave, Major Kevin G., 77
Company G, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, 107 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1, 22, 114
2d Battalion, 25th Marines, 86, 138 O'Bannon, Lieutenant Presley N., 107
1st Tank Battalion, 135 Odierno, Major General Raymond, 120
Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, 101 Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,
1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 107, 111 120, 129, 132, 140
2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 107, 111 Operations,
Company C, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Desert Scimitar, 17
Battalion, 67 Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1, 4, 9, 10-12, 18, 21-22,
3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 101, 24-26, 34, 38, 51, 114, 121
107, 109-111 Enduring Freedom, 1, 7, 15, 41, 50, 118
4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 138 Iraqi Freedom, 14-15, 17, 20, 24, 44
1st Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 124 Just Cause, 18
3d Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 124 Northern Watch, 1,12,22,25,114
1st Force Service Support Group, 26, 34, 42, 47, 77, Provide Comfort, 25, 114-115, 120
80-81, 87, 135, 143 Sinbad, 128
2d Force Service Support Group, 19, 42, 143 Southern Watch, 1, 12, 20, 22, 25, 44
Combat Service Support Group 11, 42, 143 Operations Plan Cobra II, 37
Combat Service Support Group 15, 42 Operations Plan 1003V, 25-26, 28, 32, 45, 103
Combat Service Support Group 13, 42 Osman, Major General Henry P., 113-118, 120
Combat Service Support Battalion 22, 42 Pakistan, 1
8th Engineer Support Battalion, 99 Palestine Hotel (Baghdad), 101, 105
Maritime Prepositioning Force, 46, 143 Panama, 18
Mattis, Major General James N., 3-5, 7, 20, 22, 29-30, 39, Pappas, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew, 140-141
41, 43-45, 49-50, 53, 55, 58, 61, 64, 71, 76-77, 80, 83, 86- Parker, Staff Sergeant Lonnie 0., 71-73
88, 92, 96, 98, 100-102, 104-105, 107 109, 111-112, 122, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 113, 116
134-135, 137,143-144, 152, 156, 162-163 Pelelieu (LHA 5), 5
McCrary, Lieutenant Colonel Brian K., 132 Pentagon, 15, 24, 27, 33, 45
McKeldin, Major Theodore R. McKeldin III, 100 Petraeus, Major General David H., 120
McKiernan, Lieutenant General David D., 8, 12, 32, 89, Philippines, 1
95, 114, 121, 132 Plush, Gregory J., 29, 31
McPherson, Master Gunnery Sergeant Richard C., 115 Polanco, Corporal Jason J., 70
Meyer, Staff Sergeant Randy, 109 Pokorney, First Lieutenant Frederick E., Jr., 72
Miclot, Colonel Jonathan G., 17-19 Powell Doctrine, 17
Mikolashek, Lieutenant General Paul T., 8, 20, 25, 29, 32, Qalat Sikar, 26, 100, 106
34 Qattar, 115
Milburn, Colonel George F., 37 Quilter, Colonel Charles J. II, 87
Military Coordination and Liaison Command, 113, 115, Quinonez, Lieutenant Colonel Edward J., 124
116, 118, 120 Rashid MilitaryComplex, Iraq, 99
Montgomery, Bernard Law, 4 Red Crescent, 112
Moore, Colonel Darrell L., 136 Red Cross, 112
Moore, Vice Admiral Charles W., 4-5, 9 Red Zone, 89
Moran, Terry, 32-33, 132, 147 Risler, First Lieutenant Sunny-James M., 118
Morehead City, North Carolina, 27 Rommel, General Erwin, 4
Morris, Major Jason L., 112 Royal Air Force, 123
Index 191
Rumaylah Oil Fields, 57, 125 Tactical Assembly Area Fox, 51, 81, 144
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Donald H., 1, 24-25, 27, Taliban, 1, 5-6, 15
104 Talibani, Jalal, 117
Saddam Canal, 65, 70, 87 Task Forces,
Saddam City, 101 Chaos, 5
Saddam International Airport, 94 58, 4-6, 10-11, 15, 41
Sadr City, 101 South, 26-27, 33-34
Safwan Hill, 63 Tarawa, 27, 34, 36, 39, 42, 45, 47, 52-53, 64-65, 67,
Salaheddin, 116 73, 75-76, 85-86, 94, 96, 106, 109, 123, 130, 133, 138
Salman Pak Airfield, 100 Tripoli, 110-113
Saudi Arabia, 25, 141 Tempone, Colonel John A., 1
Scales, Major General Robert, 12, 18, 129 The Basic School, 12, 43
School of Advanced Military Studies, 89 Tigris River, 34, 37, 50, 93
Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman, 8, 10, 25, 33 Tikrit, 32, 109, 110-112
Sea-Air-Land (SEALs), 37 Toolan, Colonel John A., 88
Seabees, 34 Torpy, Air Vice Marshall Glenn L., 22
Seely, First Lieutenant Michael S., 72 Transportation Command, 19, 23
Serbia, 22 Turkey, 32, 35, 107, 111, 114, 116, 121
Shatt al Arab, 121 Twentynine Palms, California, 29
Shatt al Arab Waterway, 36 Ullman, Harlan K., 17
Sheikh Issa Air Base, 8 Urnrn Qasr, 33, 57, 121-123, 125
Sir Galahad (L3005), Royal Fleet Auxillery, 125 Usher, Brigadier General Edward G. III, 42, 52, 77, 80-81
Sixth Fleet, 117 Wade, James P., 17
Slovakia, 3 Waldhauser, Colonel Thomas D., 125
Smalley, Captain Brian B., 101 Wallace, Lieutenant General William S., 78, 84, 98
Smith, Lieutenant Colonel George W., 17-19, 22-23, 30, Warfighting Laboratory, 89, 91, 127
36, 133 West, Bing, 136
Smith, Major General Ray L., 76, 136 Whitley, Brigadier General Albert E., 121
Southern Command, 143 Williams, Major Grant A., 46-47
Special Forces, 108, 113, 115-116 Wilson, Brigadier General Cornell A., 50
Stalder, Major General Keith J., 17, 50 Wittnam, Captain Daniel J., 70, 73
Stratman, Major General Henry W., 15 Workman, Colonel Marc A., 29, 31
Support Areas, World Food Program, 112
Chesty, 82 World Trade Center, 15
Coyote, 82 Wright, Evan, 136
Sweeney, Colonel John L., 81 Zinni, General Anthony C., 4, 8, 10, 12, 18, 21, 34, 114,
Syria, 118 162-163

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A Marriage of Convenience 125

ahead of the rest of the force; General McKiernan

demonstrating its ability to do so.424 what he is after. We have got to do it in a more

As Gen James Mattis had demonstrated outside Al Kut, I MEF was

themselves. Brims took the opportunity to announce

apparently either Ba'athist Party members or Feday-

get Out of their vehicles, take off their helmets, stow

things . beds, chairs, and so on, or they just

This led into a somewhat philosophical discussion of whether the

Postlude to Combat: Marines and Occupation of Iraq, 2003

tenant Colonel George W. Smith, remembered think-

the Fedayeen] . as the number one threat.

are going to aggressively hunt these guys down and

need much U.S. assistance with Phase IV. During a

I MEF and the Law ofWar: How Marines Treated Iraqis

tional and nongovernmental organizations as well as [forl . . . our common cause."45'

Base 802668A1 (R0067) 12-99

General Conway Sums Up

D uring the turnover to the multinational divi-

DVIC DM-SD-05-1 1370

Chapter 1 11. TF 58 ComdC, p. 14.

Quantico, VA). Chapter 2

reservations about his "centralized management 99. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.

Operations, sec 2. Quantico, VA); Bonadonna, Journal, entries for 2 and

Switch," The Washington Post, 10Apr03, p. A-35, chapter 8

14May03, reported in Acosta, Journal, entry for Quantico, VA).

Data Collection and Lessons Learned Process

U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command

Combined/Joint Task Force-Consequence Management

Marine Logistics Command

Special Purpose MAGTF

Commanding Officer: Col Anthony M. Haslam

1st Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 1)

5th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 5)

7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)

11th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced)

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa)

2d Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 2)

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (-) (Reinforced)

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (-) (Reinforced)

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced)

Marine Aircraft Group 29 (-) (Reinforced)

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced)

Marine Aircraft Group 39 (-)(Reinforced

Deputy Commander: Col John L. Sweeney, Jr.

Combat Service Support Group 16 (Headquarters Elements)

Combat Service Support Group 11 (Brigade Service Support Group G 1)

Combat Service Support Battalion 13 (4th Landing Support Battalion)

Combat Service Support Group 14 (4th Supply Battalion)

Combat Service Support Group 15 (1st Supply Battalion)

Transportation Support Group

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group

7 Armored Brigade (British Army)

16 Air Assault Brigade (British Army)

3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines (-)

U.S. Marines In Operation Iraqi Freedom

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced) [I MEF]

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [BLT 2/11

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 2d Marines [BLT 2/2]